9/8/22, 8:42 PM The Role of Artillery in a War Between Russia and Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

COMMENTARY

The Role of Artillery in a War Between Russia and

Ukraine
Sam Cranny-Evans
14 February 2022
8 Minute Read

Artillery is likely to play a prominent role in any conflict

between Ukraine and Russia. Russia’s predominance in self-
propelled howitzers and ISTAR will prove decisive and may
have strategic outcomes.

A conflict between Russia and Ukraine would inevitably involve extensive use
of tactical artillery on both sides. This was the case in 2015 when fighting was
at its most intense and, despite the improvement in ground attack capabilities
of the Russian air force, it is evident that much of Russia’s lethality is retained
by its artillery within the Ground Forces.

The Russian army has been characterised as an artillery army with a lot of
tanks. This is because much of the Russian way of war relies on the ability of
ground troops to bring their tactical and operational indirect fire systems to
bear against an opponent’s forces. This means that Russia’s ability to find and
target Ukraine’s forces, and Ukraine’s ability to conduct counter-battery fire
missions, will likely have a decisive impact on the outcome of any conflict
between the two states.

Intelligence is Everything
A counter-battery campaign, like most military endeavours, cannot be
conducted without intelligence. At a top level, the Ukrainian forces might
seek to first understand the opponent: what line of advance is the most

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serious threat, whether any forces are a diversion or a feint, and if is there a
centre of gravity that can be targeted. Thereafter, in a counter-battery
context, the most pressing information to gather is the location of enemy
guns, as well as the enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets. The former presents multiple challenges, as
it may be in the defender’s benefit to absorb some attrition, driving the
enemy to unmask more guns, before conducting their own counter-battery
fires. This is one of the critical components of counter-battery missions: the
need to destroy enemy systems is balanced by the need to find and
understand them, and every action will likely lead to an additional counter-
battery reaction. Because of this, Ukraine will have to carefully martial its
own artillery, with a near-equal focus on survivability and lethality, if it is to
draw Russian forces into the kind of protracted conflict that would run
counter to the Kremlin’s interests.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) will also provide vital aerial intelligence in
support of targeting functions, likely with assistance from counter-battery
radars. Ukraine has developed and deployed its own radars in this role,
including the Zoopark 3, which provides a range of ‘several dozens of
kilometres’ and a 180-degree coverage. In addition, the US has supplied a total
of 13 counter-battery radars, including the AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder and AN/TPQ-
49 lightweight counter-mortar radars. All three radars are used to identify
artillery munitions in the air and trace the path of the projectile back to the
likely position of the guns or launcher. These systems may be supplemented by
the Polozhennya-2, an acoustic detection system designed to provide data on
the noise generated when an artillery system fires. The Ukrainian Armed
Forces (UAF) will have an advantage in their terrain appreciation; they
should know the likely approaches and what ground Russian forces will be
able to traverse. This may enable them to assign counter-battery assets to
specific sectors based on the potential risk, however, the Russian forces are
also likely to conduct their own terrain appreciation and adjust their
approaches based on the likely areas selected by the UAF.

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The UAF must carefully manage and preserve their

limited resources, choosing opportune moments to
fight counter-battery battles that will impact the
outcome of the war

Despite efforts to improve capabilities in this area, however, the UAF will
likely struggle to cover the entire area of operations in the event of a conflict,
as they lack the radars to do so. Furthermore, Russian forces have shown the
ability to jam or spoof radars with limited electronic warfare (EW)
capabilities in past engagements. If the current situation escalates into more
general Russian involvement, they are unlikely to limit the use of EW, and
may be able to exert greater effects against Ukrainian radars. This leads to a
further challenge facing the UAF: data sharing. Time is critical to counter-
battery fires as both sides will be aware of the dangers incurred by remaining
in place for too long after unmasking their guns. To ensure targeting data is
transmitted in a timeframe that matters, the UAF will need to take steps to
protect their communications and simplify the transfer of data.

It is understood that the UAF are relatively resilient in their communications

practices, having developed them based on the experience of 2014–2015. This
has included the delivery of digital radios from L3 Harris and Aseslan that are
more resistant to jamming than the Soviet radios they used at the time.
Nonetheless, Russian EW and kinetic targeting would likely be capable of
degrading the communications networks that are essential in sharing
counter-battery targeting data and suppressing or reducing the UAF’s fleet of
UAVs, even if only for short periods of time. All of this together heightens the
task facing the UAF: they must carefully manage and preserve their limited
resources, choosing opportune moments to fight counter-battery battles that
will impact the outcome of the war.

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Artillery Wins Wars

The UAF have a considerable artillery park, including 36 2S19 Msta-S 152 mm
self-propelled howitzers (SPH), the Cold War-era 2S7 Pion – a 203 mm
howitzer originally designed to deliver tactical nuclear payloads – and the
2S5 Hyacinth SPH, as well as a range of rocket artillery, including a battalion
each of the BM-30 Smerch and BM-27 Uragan. These assets are concentrated
in Ukraine’s separate artillery brigades and regiments, and its older
mechanised infantry formations are equipped with the 2S3 Akatsiya SPH.
The newer motorised infantry formations, however, are reliant to a large
extent on towed guns such as the 152 mm D-20 or Msta-B, a towed version of
the self-propelled 2S19. The towed guns take several minutes to emplace, and
several minutes to make ready for movement. They require a truck or vehicle
to be brought into position to tow them away, and ammunition to be either
unloaded or reloaded into the supporting vehicle. This time delay creates a
critical vulnerability for Ukraine’s artillery forces: those that are equipped
only with towed howitzers will be at a distinct disadvantage in a counter-
battery context, as they will lack the speed to reposition at short notice.

The UAF’s self-propelled assets themselves are mixed in their capabilities.

Some – the 2S3 Akatsiya in particular – have a relatively short effective range of
17 km when firing standard ammunition, compared with 24 km for the Msta-S,
which is found more widely in Russian forces. Further complexity is added
by the need for ammunition, likely at an operational level, which enables a
counter-battery campaign to be sustained for the duration of a conflict.
There are also questions over the condition of Ukraine’s gun tubes, as it is not
clear that an effective source of replacement barrels exists for the UAF. The
availability of guns, ammunition, and mobility of certain systems will have to
be balanced with the need to conduct a very aggressive and violent counter-
battery campaign. To be successful, the UAF will have to inflict significant
artillery losses on the Russian forces throughout their depth and degrade
their ability to fight the kind of war that Russian forces prefer. They will also
have to position their guns carefully, ensuring that they are within easy reach
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of operational ammunition reserves, while maintaining a sensible distance

from likely Russian gun emplacements.

To be successful, the UAF will have to inflict significant

artillery losses on the Russian forces throughout their
depth and degrade their ability to fight the kind of war
that Russian forces prefer

Hide and Seek

Survivability in the initial stages of a conflict may be impacted significantly
by the ability of the UAF to hide their positions from UAV observation and
reduce emissions to prevent detection by EW assets. Foundational soldiering
skills, such as making efforts to remove vehicle tracks approaching a hide
and creating dummy positions, are critical to successful camouflage and
concealment efforts. It is likely that the UAF understand the need for digging
and preparing gun positions, as the lessons of 2014–15 have been well-
ingrained into the force. However, it is worth noting that Azeri familiarity with
Armenian positions in 2020, and a lack of care around concealment, likely
aided the Azeri forces in finding and striking targets.

The availability of camouflage netting – particularly types capable of

obscuring multi-spectral observation, such as the solutions provided by Saab –
could improve levels of survivability, and challenge the Russian ability to
detect targets from the air. While it would not represent a perfect solution,
nor would it prevent all attrition, it would complicate the ability of Russian
reconnaissance units to understand the target, and to conduct engagements.

Tactical Fires, Strategic Results

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If Russia does push its forces into Ukraine, the success of the UAF may, in the
end, hinge on their ability to destroy Russian guns. Preserving the strength
of their artillery forces will require the UAF to carefully balance and
maintain the available stocks of ammunition, work hard to conceal and
disperse their gun positions, and prosecute any counter-counter-battery
missions with extreme aggression. They will have to strive to maintain their
communications networks and the logistics assets needed to keep their
forces in the field, all of which will likely be targeted by Russian units before
and during any large movements of armoured forces.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not
represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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WRITTEN BY

Sam Cranny-Evans
Research Analyst
Military Sciences

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