Aff doc

1AC – Russia
Contention two: Russia
Space dominance causes Russian counterspace preemption.
Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor and chair of space science and technology @ Naval War
College, 17, Space Warfare in the 21st Century, Routledge, ISBN 978131552917.

Like China, Russia became determined not be left vulnerable by some unbreachable
space technology gap after observing the advantages the US military has gained from space
since Kosovo. Three space-enabled capabilities are highlighted in Russia’s 2014 military
doctrine as main external threats to the Russian Federation: “global strike,” the
“intention to station weapons in space,” and “strategic non-nuclear precision
weapons.”86 Clearly Russia feels compelled to be able to respond to each.
The Russians see the future of warfare as driven by information and have focused on
development of information-strike operations. “An information-strike operation consists of
coordinated ‘information-strike battles, information-weapon engagements and information
strikes, which are being conducted with the goal of disrupting the enemy troop
command and control and weapon control systems and the destruction of his information
resource.’”87 Those goals require Russia to maintain access to space, which is why it,
like China, refuses to be denied such. Like China, Russia sees its nuclear deterrence as the
main guarantee of its national security; hence, Moscow’s continued and bellicose objections to
US missile defense on its perimeters— objections that can be more politically based than
technically cogent.88 Whereas the United States has consistently argued that deployment of
missile defense capabilities into Europe is not aimed at Russia (but, rather, Iran), Russia believes
otherwise, or at least claims to. In 2013, to reassure Russia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Frank Rose restated a declaration of missile defense intents previously made at the Chicago
NATO summit in 2012.

“The NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile
defense is not directed at Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence
capabilities.” Through transparency and cooperation with the United States and NATO, Russia
would see firsthand that this system is designed for ballistic missile threats from outside the
Euro– Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems can neither negate nor undermine
Russia’s strategic deterrent capabilities.89

Nevertheless, in Russia’s 2014 military doctrine, missile defense was ranked fourth in its
prioritization of threats, and Russia has threatened a range of countermeasures in response
to missile defense deployment.90 As with many other issues, Putin’s defiant, aggressive, even
provocative anti-Western (particularly anti-US) attitude serves him well with domestic
audiences and distracts them from Russia’s economic woes. Congested, contested, and
competitive 45

Russian needling doesn’t seem to have terrestrial limits. In 2015, after some curious maneuvers,
Russia parked one of its military satellites between two Intelsat satellites. The US military uses
some Intelsat satellites for operations, including drone missions and communications, so the
Russian satellite drew angst from the Pentagon. The Russians, however, shrugged off US
concern, saying that “in no way can it [the Russian satellite] be an ‘aggressor’”91 and that the
chances of a collision were small. This was not the only Russian activity in space that drew US
attention though. Russian launches in 2013 and 2014 carried declared communications satellites
and also small undeclared objects that conducted maneuvers around the declared payload,
maneuvers watched and questioned by analysts regarding whether Russia was testing ASAT
capabilities.92

Russia currently has advantages and disadvantages if it wants to reach, and potentially surpass,
the United States in military space capabilities. Because many Russian military space systems
were allowed to become moribund after the Soviet collapse, Russia is not as reliant on space
systems as is the United States. Therefore, Russian satellites are not the attractive
targets that US satellites might be; this is especially important to a country like Russia
where favoring offense, even preemption , has been traditional military doctrine.93
Whether by choice or necessity, Russia has historically opted for numerous less complex
satellites which do not last long but which they are able to rapidly replace. They have a
resilience capability that the US military must envy. But Russia also has a steep upward curve to
climb in terms of matching space aspirations to capabilities, including both development of
across-the-board capabilities and integration of those capabilities into operations. It is also,
politically, offering use of what capabilities it has, such as its navigation and positioning system
GLONASS, to other countries toward drawing users away from GPS and US influence. Russia is
not alone in its use of deliberately provocative tactics to draw US and international ire.
On February 7, 2016, when North Korea successfully launched the country’s second
satellite—an Earth observation satellite called Kwangmyongsong-4— Pyongyang celebrated
with fireworks and a government spokesman referenced international efforts to block the
launch as nothing more than a “puppy barking at the moon.”94 Grandiosity, provocation,
and defiance clearly remain the key elements of North Korean foreign policy . While
claiming the satellite launch a peaceful use of outer space in accordance with international
norms, the international community has viewed North Korean actions differently.

Russian counter-space preemption causes global nuclear war. Changing

perceptions of US-Russia space conflict is key.
Alexey Arbatov et al, head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National
Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Major General Vladimir
Dvorkin, a principal researcher at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National
Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations and Peter Topychkanov, fellow
at the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, ‘17 “Russian And Chinese
Perspectives On Non-Nuclear Weapons And Nuclear Risks” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Publications,
https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Entanglement_interior_FNL.pdf
Against this background, Russian military and technical experts are currently engaged in
efforts to elaborate strategies for fighting an air-space war. The following is an attempt to
frame such an integrated doctrine by one of its main theoreticians, Colonel Yuri Krinitsky
from the Military Air-Space Defense Academy: “The integration of aerial and space-based
means of attack has transformed airspace and space into a specific field of armed conflict: an
air-space theater of military operations. United, systematically organized actions of [U.S.] air-
space power in this theater should be countered with united and systematically
organized actions by the Russian Air-Space Defense Forces. This is required under the
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and Air-Space Defense Plan approved by
the Russian president in 2006.”6

This document goes on to list the tasks of the Air-Space Defense Forces as “monitoring and
reconnaissance of the airspace situation; identifying the beginning of an aerial, missile, or space
attack; informing state organs and the military leadership of the Russian Federation about it;
repelling air-space attacks; and defending command sites of the top levels of state and military
command authorities, strategic nuclear forces’ groupings, and the elements of missile warning
systems.”7

While picking apart in detail the organizational, operational, and technical aspects of the Air-
Space Defense Forces (now part of the Air-Space Forces),8 military analysts step around the
basic question of what constitutes “the means of air-space attack” (SVKN in Russian, MASA in
English). This term and “air-space attack” are broadly used in official documents (including the
Military Doctrine) and statements, as well as in the new names of military organizations (such as
the Air-Space Forces), and in a seemingly infinite number of professional articles, books, and
pamphlets.

If MASA refers to aircraft and cruise missiles, then what does space have to do with it? To be
sure, various military communication and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance
satellites are based in space, but these assets also serve the Navy and Ground Forces without
the word “space” tacked onto their names.

If MASA refers to long-range ballistic missiles, which have trajectories that pass mostly through
space, then this threat is not new but has existed for more than sixty years. There was—and still
is—no defense against a massive ballistic missile strike, and none is likely in the future in spite of
U.S. and Russian efforts at missile defense. In the past (and possibly now), one of the possible
tasks of ballistic missiles was to break “corridors” in the enemy’s air-defense system to enable
bombers to penetrate it. But with ballistic missiles being armed with more warheads with
improved accuracy, and with the advent of longrange air-launched cruise missiles, it is
increasingly unnecessary for bombers to be able to penetrate enemy air defenses. Coordination
between air and notional “space” systems has apparently moved to the background of strategic
planning. Anyway, this tactic was never considered as air-space warfare before now.

MASA may be used in reference to potential hypersonic boost-glide weapons, which are
discussed below. But their role and capabilities are not yet known, so it would clearly be
premature to build the theory of air-space war on them, and even more so to start creating
defenses against them. In any case, referring to those weapons as MASA is farfetched: besides a
short boost phase, their entire trajectory is in the upper atmosphere at speeds greater than
airplanes but lower than ballistic missiles. It is, therefore, even less apt to describe such systems
as space arms than it is to refer to traditional long-range ballistic missiles as such. Finally, as for
theoretically possible space-based weapons that would conduct strikes against targets on the
ground, at sea, and in the air, they do not yet exist, and their future viability is far from clear.

Even if the concept of air-space war is ill-defined, the military and technical experts who
propound it reach a predictable conclusion with regard to the capabilities needed to
fight one. They typically argue that Russia needs “to counter the air-space attack system
with an air-space defense system. . . . A prospective system for destroying and
suppressing MASA should be a synergy of anti-missile, anti-satellite, and air-defense
missiles, and air units, and radio-electronic warfare forces. And its composition should be
multilayered.”9 Such calls are being translated into policy. Most notably, the air-space
defense program, for which the military’s top brass and industrial corporations
lobbied, is the single largest component of the State Armaments Program through
2020, accounting for about 20 percent of all costs when the program was first announced in
2011—about 3.4 trillion rubles ($106 billion at the time).10 Along with the modernization of
the missile early-warning system by the development and deployment of new Voronezh-type
land-based radars and missile-launch detection satellites, the program envisages the
deployment of twenty-eight missile regiments of S-400 Triumph air-defense systems
(about 450 to 670 launchers), and thirty-eight battalions equipped with the next-
generation S-500 Vityaz (recently renamed Prometey) systems (300 to 460 launchers).11 In
total, the plan is to manufacture up to 3,000 missile interceptors of the two types, for
which three new production plants were built. A new integrated and fully automatic command-
and-control system is being created to facilitate operations by the Air-Space Defense Forces.
The Moscow A-135 missile defense system (now renamed A-235) is being modernized
with non-nuclear kinetic interceptors to engage incoming ballistic missiles (previously the
interceptors were armed with nuclear warheads).12 The current Russian economic crisis, which
has resulted in defense budget cuts in fiscal year 2017, may slow down the air-space armament
programs and the scale of arms procurement, but the underlying momentum will be unaffected
unless stopped or redirected by a major change in Russia’s defense posture.

In a sense, Russian policy may be explained by the visceral desire of the military to break
out from the deadlock—the “strangulating effect”—of mutual assured nuclear
destruction, which has made further arms development, high-technology competition,
and supposedly fascinating global war scenarios senseless (indeed, it prompted U.S. and Soviet
leaders of the 1970s and 1980s to agree that, as then U.S. president Ronald Reagan put it, “a
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”13) During the four decades of the Cold
War, several generations of the Soviet military and defense industrial elite had learned and
become accustomed to competing with the most powerful possible opponent, the United
States, and such competition became their raison d’être.

The end of the Cold War and of the nuclear arms race in the early 1990s deprived them of this
supposedly glorious quest, and opposing rogue states and terrorists was not a noble substitute.
U.S. and NATO operations in Yugoslavia and Iraq, however, provided a new
hightechnology challenge, defined in Russia as air-space warfare, which was eagerly
embraced as a new and fascinating domain of seemingly endless competition with a
worthy counterpart. Besides, this new dimension of warfare doubtless gave the military
and associated defense industries an opportunity to impress political leadership with
newly discovered esoteric and frightening threats, justifying the prioritization of national
defense, and hence arms procurement programs and large defense budgets.
In any case, the Russian strategy for air-space war is directly connected to the problem of
entanglement. Astonishingly—and this makes the concept look quite scholastic—its framers
shed no light on the single most important question: Is the context for air-space war a global (or
regional) nuclear war, or a non-nuclear war that pits Russia against the United States and NATO?

If it is the former, then in the event of the large-scale use of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear
warheads (and in the absence of effective missile defense systems), the Russian Air-Space
Forces would be unlikely to function effectively. Except for issuing warnings about incoming
missile attacks, they would not be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them by Russia’s Military
Doctrine, including “repelling air-space attacks and defending command sites of the top levels of
state and military administration, strategic nuclear forces’ units, and elements of missile
warning systems.”14

Alternatively, if air-space war assumes a non-nuclear conflict, then the concept raises serious
doubts of a different nature. Russian state and military leaders have regularly depicted
terrifying scenarios of large-scale conflicts being won through non-nuclear means.
Former deputy defense minister General Arkady Bakhin, for example, has described how
“leading world powers are staking everything on winning supremacy in the air and in
space, on carrying out massive air-space operations at the outbreak of hostilities, to conduct
strikes against sites of strategic and vital importance all across the country.”15 It is difficult to
imagine, however, that such a conflict, in reality, would not quickly escalate to a
nuclear exchange, especially as strategic forces and their C3I systems were continually
attacked by conventional munitions.

Right up until the mid-1980s, the military leadership of the USSR believed that a major war
would likely begin in Europe with the early use by Warsaw Pact forces of hundreds of tactical
nuclear weapons “as soon as [they] received information” that NATO was preparing to launch a
nuclear strike.16 After that, Soviet armies would reach the English Channel and the Pyrenees in
a few weeks, or massive nuclear strikes would be inflicted by the USSR and the United States on
one another, and the war would be over in a few hours, or at most in a few days, with
catastrophic consequences.17

After the end of the Cold War, the task of elaborating probable major war scenarios was
practically shelved because such a war had become unthinkable in the new political
environment. However, strategic thinking on the next high-technology global war apparently
continued in secret (and probably not only in Russia). Now, at a time of renewed
confrontation between Russia and the West, the fruits of that work are finally seeing
the light of day. In all likelihood, the authors of the strategy imagine that over a
relatively long period of time—days or weeks—the West would wage a campaign of air
and missile strikes against Russia without using nuclear weapons. Russia, in turn,
would defend against such attacks and carry out retaliatory strikes with long-range
conventional weapons. Notably, in 2016, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that
“by 2021, it is planned to increase by four times the combat capabilities of the nation’s strategic
non-nuclear forces, which will provide the possibility of fully implementing the tasks of non-
nuclear deterrence.”18

In other words, the basic premise is that the U.S.-led campaigns against Yugoslavia in
1999 or Iraq in 1990 and 2003 (which are often cited by experts in this context) may be
implemented against Russia—but with different results, thanks to the operations of
the Russian Air-Space Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy against the United
States and its allies.

The emphasis on defensive and offensive strategic non-nuclear arms does not exclude,
but—on the contrary—implies the limited use of nuclear weapons at some point of the
armed conflict. Sergei Sukhanov, one of the most authoritative representatives of the
defense industries as the constructor general of the Vympel Corporation, which is responsible
for designing strategic defense systems, has exposed the whole panorama of Russia’s
contemporary strategic logic on the interactions between offensive and defensive systems
and between nuclear and non-nuclear systems:

If we cannot exclude the possibility of the large-scale use of air-space attacks by the U.S.
and other NATO countries (i.e., if we accept that the Yugoslavian strategy might be
applied against Russia), then it is clearly impossible to solve the problem by
fighting off air-space attacks with weapons that would neutralize them in the
air-space theater, since this would require the creation of highly effective air- and
missile defense systems across the country. Therefore, the strategy for solving the air-
space defense tasks faced in this eventuality should be based on deterring the enemy
from large-scale air-space attacks by implementing the tasks facing air-space defense in
this eventuality at a scale that would avoid escalation but force the enemy to refrain
from further airspace attack.19 (Emphasis added.) In other words, because of the
inevitable limitations in Russia’s ability to defend against air-space attacks,
Sukhanov argues that Russia may have to resort to the limited use of nuclear
weapons in order to compel the United States and its allies into backing down.
This basic logic is widely accepted in Russia.
Judging by the available information, the United States does not have—and is not expected to
have for the foreseeable future—the technological means or the operational plans to wage non-
nuclear air-space warfare against Russia. However, the fact that a major war with the
United States and NATO is seen in contemporary Russian strategic thinking as a
prolonged endeavor involving an integrated technological and operational continuum
of nuclear and non-nuclear operations, defensive and offensive capabilities, and ballistic
and aerodynamic weapons creates a breeding ground for entanglement. The result could
be the rapid escalation of a local non-nuclear conflict to a global nuclear war. The
remainder of this chapter discusses how new and emerging military technologies might
contribute to such an escalation.

Entanglement and confidence building aligns US-Russian space interests.

Colonel Craig Roseberry, United States Army, Master of Strategic Studies, ’15, “Current
Challenges in Deterring the Use of Space Weapons”
https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/588.pdf

Cooperate in Space

To reduce the problem of U.S. capability dominance in producing strategic dilemmas,

the nation must alter the perceptions of threatened countries by initiating cooperation
in space through a whole of government approach. The first step is for Congress to formalize
agreements on rules of behavior, or a code of conduct, which support our national security in
space and share information on space activities. The Department of Defense acknowledges the
benefits of such a code and supports the formal adoption of one as consistent with the nation’s
strategies.81 However, the Department of Defense cannot establish the code on its own accord.
The nation must now move forward with the work of the United Nations for the adaptation of
the draft 22 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities that is suitable to U.S.
interests. Understandably, there will be hurdles to garner both the domestic and international
consensus required, but the need for more detailed frameworks is now urgent, as more
participants are entering space.

Furthermore, as a confidence-building measure, the military must open communications with

other developing space nations that goes beyond satellite collision warnings. The United
States currently shares space situational data with five countries and forty-one
commercial entities, and is seeking agreements with five additional countries .82 These
agreements need extensions for wider sharing of information with other space-faring
nation military operations centers to reduce uncertainties associated with military activity
in space and reduce perceptions that lead to the security dilemma. Eventually, the
nation must overcome its reluctance to cooperate with others, including potential
adversaries. Personnel exchanges, exercises, and the permanent opening of operations
centers as was done with Russia in the 1990s needs to occur with new entrants to
space. This will establish deterrence by entanglement and will align potential
adversary’s interests with U.S. interests. While this seems exceedingly challenging given the
current political environment, particularly with China, this may be the strongest method to
enhancing deterrence. Of course, others may elect not to participate, but the true risk
remains with the nation’s commitment to this course of action. Uncertainty regarding how some
countries will regard space as a domain in which they may gain an advantage over the United
States through militarization further complicates an already complicated strategic environment.
These proposed measures then become the basis for international norms as a means to prevent
the future 23 militarization of space and reduce the chances for conflicts to escalate into space
warfare. The transparency gained through the establishment of confidence-building
measures will also ultimately lead to more cooperation in space. These measures also
mature the peaceful utilization of space among the growing number of participants. These
actions will as well reduce the security dilemma faced by some nations by effectively
sharing information on intentions and capabilities .

Confidence building through SSA solves space war

Kentaro Tanaka, M.A. in International Science and Technology Policy, Space Policy Institute,
Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, ‘17 “Applicability of
remote sensing policies to space situational awareness,” Space Policy, Volume 42, November 17

In addition to helping to ensure long-term sustainability of outer space activities,

having the capability to monitor space activities precisely and share that information
internationally can serve as a good transparency and confidence-building measure
(TCBM). SSA as a TCBM is expected to reduce the risk of misperceptions, mistrust, and
miscalculations between space actors, thereby reducing the chances of an armed conflict in
space. This is increasingly important because tensions between major space faring
nations, particularly the United States, Russia, and China, have recently escalated in
space. For example, China has been rapidly developing its ASAT capabilities. An alleged ASAT
test conducted in 2013 showed that China could attack almost any satellite in any orbit. Additionally, it seems that
China has also been developing its technologies in on-orbit servicing (OOS) and active
debris removal (ADR). Such systems are supposed to be used to refuel and repair other satellites in orbit, but
could also be used to attack other space systems [28]. In response to the growing threats, the 2015 National
Security Strategy states that the United States should enhance the resiliency of critical space capabilities [29, p. 13]. Amid this
rising tension, international SSA information sharing is becoming increasingly
important. By closely monitoring space activities, including OOS and ADR, the sharing
of SSA information could help to deter provocative actions , or at least debris-producing
actions, in space. China, for example, is considered to have conducted several ASAT tests even after the one in 2007, but it
has not created significant long-lived debris since then. In the face of harsh criticisms it received from the
international community, China may have realized that conducting a debris-producing
ASAT test would damage its national interests. Although international scrutiny alone would not be sufficient
to deter irresponsible acts, international SSA information sharing as a TCBM, will play an increasingly
significant role as SSA networks extend throughout the world . It may even be able to
perform a complementary role as a technical means of verification if space arms
control agreements are made in the future.

Russia says yes and the plan is a strong TCBM.

Robert J. Rovetto, the NASA Datanauts open data initiative; AIAA standards committee; and a
research affiliate of the Center for Orbital Debris Education & Research (Univ.of Maryland), M.A.
@ Buffalo, B.A. @ Maryland, ’16, “The Orbital Space Environment and Space Situational
Awareness Domain Ontology – Toward an International Information System for Space Data”
Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies 2016 Conference

We read a similar idea expressed by [9] and [10**Start Endnote Ten**“Considerations on the
set of prime requirements and factors that should shape the policy of international information-
sharing serving safety of space operations” A/AC.105/L.303, Working paper submitted by
the Russian Federation; United Nations General Assembly, Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, 59th session Vienna, 8-17 June 2016. URL=
http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2016/aac_105l/aac_105l_303_0_html/A
C105_L303E.pdf**End Endnote Ten**], but which do not mention ontologies, for:
“establishing a centralized international database as a functional addition to the existing
national and integrated international capabilities in the area of monitoring and assessment
of the situation in outer space. The conclusion is obvious: the collection and fusion of
multi-source information should not be neglected”[10Z,p.6, emphasis added]
"An international mechanism for collecting orbital information from different sources "
[10Z,p.21]

Ontology terms annotate instance data about space objects in this potential international
database. Annotations indicate the meaning of the data that users can access. An orbital space
domain ontology would provide a higherlevel but domain-specific general terminology for
annotating, classifying, representing and describing orbital data, objects, events, causal
relationships and phenomena, as well as the interrelationship therein. This should provide us
with a generic picture of the orbital space environment, whereas instance data indicates specific
objects, states and events (what have been called ‘particulars’ in philosophical ontology and
metaphysics). Given that some databases are siloed—and therefore isolated from, or non-
connected to, others—a spotty view of individual orbital objects and events is the
result. Fusing and integrating orbital data should generate a more continuous and
complete understanding of the situation in orbit.
Ontologies therefore have the potential to expanding our scientific knowledge of the near-Earth
space environment in arguably a variety of ways. First, by formally representing current
scientific domain knowledge (and the objects they describe), we may glean insights not
previously conceived. That is, conceptual analysis of domain concepts, scientific principles, and
orbital objects may yield helpful distinctions, classifications, and conceptual constructs. Second,
translating this formal representation into a computable format affords data-annotation,
automated reasoning and knowledge discovery over various data-sets. Note that limitations in
expressivity exist partly due to the interrelations between categories specified by the formal
semantics. Despite this, by using a well-made ontology we can determine (to some degree of
accuracy) the relationships between an individual space object and other entities in the orbital
environment.

Toward resolving the orbital information deficiencies listed above, [10**Start Endnote
Ten**“Considerations on the set of prime requirements and factors that should shape the policy
of international information-sharing serving safety of space operations” A/AC.105/L.303,
Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation; United Nations General Assembly,
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 59th session Vienna, 8-17 June 2016. URL=
http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2016/aac_105l/aac_105l_303_0_html/A
C105_L303E.pdf**End Endnote Ten**] proposes an information platform for the
aforementioned international database , and lists a variety of information content to
include. We read: “the platform database should cover all information categories relating
to space launches, space objects, in-orbit operations and events in near-Earth space
that would be included in the set of guidelines for ensuring the longterm sustainability
of outer space activities.” [10, p.20, emphasis added] The proposal mentions an information
model (consisting of the information content) as one requirement, and includes metadata [10,
p.24] as part of the content. Ontology can contribute to the formation of an information model
and the use of metadata by providing a semantically rich model of the SSA domain. Moreover,
information models and metadata are related to ontology development in general. The content
for the information platform includes the following [10, p.20-28], some of which were
mentioned in [2][3] as necessary content to ontologically represent.

Information on…

• Type of launch vehicle

• Unique identifier of a launch

• Launch location (launch site, launch facility, launch complex)

• Name of each space object

• Approximate dimensions and mass

• An independent orbital flight,

• reference to the State which has jurisdiction and control over each of the objects, contact
information for communication with the entities responsible for space object
(spacecraft)operations

• The trajectory of motion of space objects, e.g., planned parameters of the orbit of each space
object

• the change of status of a space object (cessation or resumption of operation)

• predicted and actual conjunction, or de-orbiting of a space object

• Assessment of boundaries of the time interval of the breakup

• The number of spacecraft, launch vehicle stages and accompanying operational fragments

• a new space object detected by near-Earth space monitoring means

• Information providers

• Date and time of…

 o compilation of the information by the provider

o receipt of the information in the platform database

o the launch (time intervals for different dates)

Each of these is to be ontologically modeled by asserting corresponding category terms, their

definitions and interrelationships. This will provide us with a broader conceptualization to
understand the SSA picture. For example, in beginning an ontological analysis of the desired
content, we will need: temporal categories for representing times, dates, durations; terms for
physical and geometric properties; terms for names or identifiers; event categories for, say,
launches; and for particular actors, agents or organizations. Finally, we will need terms for
predictions, predictive information, and modality; as well as spatio-temporal concepts. One
challenge is to represent the orbital environment and its phenomena in an accurate manner,
while taking into account the expressive limitations of logical and computational formalisms
(and computational models themselves) and the need to search and reason over data.

The proposal also describes the platform as "A single international database of events
in space"[9, p.21]. Ontological analysis can provide an event type terminology or categorization
for orbital events, such as those mentioned: “termination of existence of objects in orbit,
docking/separation of objects, break-ups”. Moreover, an ontology offers a semantics to capture
various relationships (causal, functional, etc.) between the orbital event, the surrounding
environment and other objects therein. For example, when an event is detected in orbit, or once
the actors/satellites involved are identified, it can be categorized as an instance of a given
ontology class which in turn may imply other relationships. Each particular event can be
recorded and ontologically represented accordingly.

"[T]he coverage of all the above-mentioned information categories by a single

database of the platform should contribute to the successful implementation of the
guidelines and to an increase in transparency and confidence in outer space activities"
[9, p.20] Although the need for sharing and integrating orbital and other SSA-related data has
existed for years, the preceding points from [1][9][10] focus the attention to it on an
international scale. The motivation and opportunity exists for members of the global space
community to form more partnerships in data exchange towards safer and fuller state
of SSA.
2AC
 1AR - Trial good
Trial is good for trump and witnesses are already on the table - McConnell
THE TIMES EDITORIAL BOARD today (1.4.2020, “Editorial: The Senate owes the nation a
full and fair impeachment trial”, Los Angeles Times,
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-01-04/the-senate-owes-trump-and-the-
nation-a-full-and-fair-impeachment-trial)
Good for them for once again demonstrating their willingness to think independently. If just a few more Republicans insisted on
witness testimony, that would produce the necessary majority. A trial with witnesses would be both fair to
Trump , whose lawyers should be able to cross-examine them, and in the national
interest. As Sen. Doug Jones (D-Ala.) put it in an opinion column in the Washington Post : “For
Americans to have confidence in the impeachment process, the Senate must conduct
a full, fair and complete trial with all relevant evidence regarding the president’s conduct.” Jones rightly argued that a
fair trial would require testimony from past and present administration officials who didn’t testify in the House impeachment
investigation, notably acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney (who is also director of the Office of Management and
Budget) and former national security advisor John Bolton. Mulvaney and Bolton are also among the witnesses Senate Minority
Leader Charles E. Schumer has said should be subpoenaed to testify. Bolton has been free with public comments about a variety of
issues — most recently U.S. policy toward Iran. But he has failed to share with Congress what he knows about Trump’s apparent
efforts to persuade Ukraine to investigate former Vice President
Joe Biden, and any connection between
that request and the decision to stall hundreds of millions of dollars in congressionally
approved aid. Bolton’s lawyer tantalizingly said in November that Bolton was “personally involved” in many events, meetings
and conversations relevant to the impeachment inquiry. If anything, recent developments strengthen the case for
a Senate trial that includes testimony from witnesses who could shed further light on Trump’s actions. On Dec. 29 the New
York Times reported on how Trump’s opposition to releasing the $391 million in security assistance for Ukraine “sent shock waves
through the White House and the Pentagon.” The newspaper also reported on a meeting in August in which Bolton, Secretary of
Defense Mark Esper and Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo unsuccessfully sought to persuade Trump that releasing the aid was
in the interest of the United States. Did Trump explicitly acknowledge at that meeting or at any other that he was withholding aid in
order to put pressure on Ukraine to announce the investigations? Testimony from Mulvaney, Bolton and other administration
officials could answer that question. The Senate also should hear from former New York City Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Trump’s
personal lawyer. (In his notorious July 25 telephone conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump suggested
that Zelensky talk to Giuliani, who “very much knows what’s happening.”) House Democrats decided not to delay their impeachment
vote because they were denied testimony from some witnesses. They were right not to let themselves be held hostage to the White
House’s efforts to stall the proceedings and keep witnesses from testifying. But now, with the process moving to the Senate, it’s
appropriate to try to obtain such testimony. Republicans who insist that Trump did nothing wrong should
support such an effort . If even only a few Republican senators insist on witnesses, that could make the difference. Of
course, some witnesses might decline to testify nevertheless, citing the privileged nature of conversations
with the president and the issue could be entangled in litigation. Still, the goal should be a fair and complete trial. That is not what
McConnell seems to have in mind, although he did say recently that Senate Republicans haven’t “ruled
out witnesse s.” Yes, the Republican majority in the Senate gives that party a control over
the process comparable to that exercised by the Democratic majority in the House. But that doesn’t give McConnell the
license to rush through a half-baked trial when the allegations against the president are so serious. A handful of Republican senators
could and should make the majority leader recognize that fact.