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The role of nuclear weapons in Russia's strategic

deterrence: implications for European security and
nuclear arms control
Wachs, Lydia

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Wachs, L. (2022). The role of nuclear weapons in Russia's strategic deterrence: implications for European security and
nuclear arms control. (SWP Comment, 68/2022). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2022C68

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NO. 68 NOVEMBER 2022 Introduction

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s

Strategic Deterrence
Implications for European security and nuclear arms control
Lydia Wachs

In the West, Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is often described as one of “escalate
to deescalate”. The thinking goes that Moscow is prepared to use nuclear weapons
at an early stage in a conflict in order to “deescalate” and terminate the confrontation
quickly in its favour. However, Russia’s official military doctrine, nuclear exercises
of the Russian military, and debates among political and military elites have so far
pointed in a different direction. With the concept of “strategic deterrence”, Russia
has developed a holistic deterrence strategy in which nuclear weapons remain an
important element. Yet, to gain more flexibility below the nuclear threshold in order
to manage escalation, the strategy also conceptualises a broad range of non-military
and conventional means. Given Russia’s dwindling arsenal of conventional precision
weapons due to its war against Ukraine as well as the strategic adaptation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia’s strategy is likely to change: In the
coming years, Russia’s reliance on its non-strategic nuclear weapons will probably
increase. These developments could both undermine crisis stability in Europe and
further impede the prospects for nuclear arms control in the future.

Over the past decades, Russia has carried
out a comprehensive modernisation of its
nuclear forces. As part of this, it has not
only replaced legacy delivery systems, but
also developed entirely new capabilities.
The size of the strategic arsenal of the Soviet
Union and Russia has historically not been
determined by specific targeting require-
ments. One of the main objectives has in-
stead been to achieve numerical parity with
the United States. Today, Russia has an
active nuclear arsenal of about 4,500 nuclear
warheads. About 1,600 of these warheads
are deployed on land-based intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and at
heavy bomber bases. At present, the New
START Treaty with the United States still
limits Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
However, the treaty expires in 2026. Since
Russia currently has around 1,000 additional
warheads in storage, it would then have the
possibility to substantially increase the num-
ber of its deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
Russia’s modernisation campaign is also
driven by concerns about the credibility of
 its own second-strike capability, especially
in view of the US missile defence pro-
gramme. Although the latter poses no real
threat to Moscow’s second-strike capability,
the Russian leadership has repeatedly
underlined its concerns and has framed the
development of several new strategic and
partly asymmetric capabilities as responses
to advances in US missile defence. These
Russian capabilities include the already
deployed Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle,
the new Sarmat ICBM, which is supposed to
be deployed in the next months, the Poseidon
nuclear-powered, long-range underwater
drone, and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered
cruise missile with global range. The latter
two systems are still being developed and
tested.
Russia’s non-strategic
nuclear weapons
In addition to its strategic arsenal, Russia
possesses about 2,000 non-strategic nuclear
weapons, meaning weapons with generally
lower yields and shorter ranges. These are
not subject to any arms control or transpar-
ency measures.
The fact that Russia still possesses and
modernises such a sizeable number of non-
strategic nuclear weapons has triggered
debates in the West about Moscow’s nu-
clear threshold. These have intensified with
Russia’s attack on Ukraine and its nuclear
threats. In particular, Western officials and
analysts have voiced the concern that Rus-
sia could employ nuclear weapons early
in a conflict in a limited way because its
leaders believe that this will allow Russia
to end the conflict quickly on its terms –
an approach that has been described in
the West as “escalate to de-escalate”. The
Kremlin has always rejected this portrayal
of its deterrence strategy. Instead, it offi-
cially states that Russia would use nuclear
weapons only in the event of an attack with
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction, or if the existence of the Rus-
sian state were threatened by a large-scale
conventional aggression. However, it
SWP Comment 68
November 2022
2
remains unclear what Moscow would con-
sider a threat to the state’s existence. This
uncertainty about Russia’s exact nuclear
threshold cannot be resolved. Perhaps not
even the Kremlin has precisely defined the
point at which it would employ nuclear
weapons. An analysis of Russian strategic
documents and debates among the political
and military elites can nonetheless shed
light on how Moscow conceptualises deter-
rence.
Moscow’s nuclear threshold
In its military doctrine, Moscow has for
decades not ruled out using nuclear weap-
ons first. This notwithstanding, Russia’s
deterrence strategy has changed over time
with implications for its nuclear threshold.
Russia’s changed threat perception is likely
one factor that has influenced this as well
as the interplay of conventional and nu-
clear capabilities.
In the first years after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russia’s perceived conven-
tional inferiority compared to the modern
precision strike capabilities of the United
States led Moscow to rely more on its non-
strategic nuclear weapons. Increased nu-
clear signalling but also Russia’s declaratory
policy underlined this. According to the
Russian military doctrine from 2000, Rus-
sia would also consider the use of nuclear
weapons in response to a conventional
aggression “critical to the national security
of Russia” (emphasis added). Russia thereby
appeared to signal a willingness to employ
nuclear weapons even as a response to an
aggression that did not threaten the exist-
ence of the state. This lowered nuclear
threshold was however also controversial
in Moscow, as discussions among political-
military elites indicate. After all, threaten-
ing a nuclear response in the face of non-
nuclear threats seemed non-credible also in
the eyes of these elites.
The role of nuclear weapons in Moscow’s
deterrence strategy appeared to gradually
change with the modernisation of its con-
ventional forces and the development of
Figure
modern conventional or dual-capable land-,
sea-, and air-based capabilities in the 2010s.
These include the dual-capable short-range
Iskander missile system as well as several
intermediate-range missiles, such as the
dual-capable sea-based cruise missile Kalibr
and the air-based conventional or nuclear
cruise missile Kh-101/Kh-102.
These new conventional and dual-capable
systems did not replace the role of nuclear
weapons in Russia’s strategy of escalation
management and nuclear weapons remain
an important component in Russia’s deter-
rence system. Yet, Moscow’s over-reliance
on nuclear weapons appears to have been
significantly reduced in the past decade.
Writings in Russian military journals sug-
gest that the availability of non-nuclear
capabilities is primarily intended to create
more flexibility below the nuclear thresh-
old and in the early phases of a conflict. Its
most recent military doctrines also indicate
that Moscow is raising the bar for nuclear
weapons use: Today it officially declares
that it would consider using nuclear weap-
ons as a response to a conventional aggres-
sion that threatens the state’s existence.
Strategic deterrence
With the concept of “strategic deterrence”
(“strategicheskoe sderzhivanie”), Russia is today
pursuing a holistic deterrence strategy that
integrates both non-military and military
means. Above all, however, the concept is
based on the credible threat to use military
force, which includes a broad range of
weapons – from conventional to strategic
nuclear weapons. This is supposed to con-
tribute towards deterring and containing
adversaries in peacetime as well as manag-
ing escalation in wartime.
It follows that the Russian understanding
of deterrence is much broader than the tra-
ditional Western one: From Moscow’s point
of view, it is based not only on the threat of
force or intimidation, but also on the will-
ingness to use limited force (“silovoe sderzhi-
vanie”). Furthermore, according to the offi-
cial definition, its deterrence tools may be
used to influence not only political deci-
sion-makers but also the general public of
an adversarial state.
Nuclear weapons are included within
this conceptualisation. The Russian stra-
tegic debate on the utility of nuclear weap-
ons starts from a conceptualisation of dif-
ferent conflict archetypes. At one end of
the spectrum are local wars, such as the one
in Ukraine; at the other end are large-scale
wars between major powers or coalitions.
In between are regional wars, understood
as more limited military confrontations
with an alliance of states, such as NATO.
An analysis of publications in Russian
military journals from the past few years
suggests that the role of nuclear weapons
in local wars is limited to mere threats of
nuclear employment. Such threats are sup-
SWP Comment 68
November 2022
3
 posed to deter other states from interven-
ing, thereby keeping a limited war from
becoming a regional one. In confrontations
of this nature, the focus lies on the use of
(strategic) conventional capabilities. In turn,
it is within regional wars that Russian strat-
egists conceptualise a transition from the
use of strategic conventional weapons to
non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is only
for the largest conflict type that Russian
debates theorise the possibility of a massive
use of non-strategic and strategic nuclear
weapons (see figure).
Accordingly, the nuclear element has
three main functions: deterrence through
the threat of escalation, actual limited use
in order to manage escalation, and massive
retaliation or warfare in the event of esca-
lation.
There is furthermore a much closer link
between non-nuclear and nuclear capabili-
ties than in the West. This is also evident in
organisational terms: For example, Russian
forces are not structured into strategic or
non-strategic nuclear forces. Rather, Russia
differentiates functionally between general
purpose forces (“sily obshchego naznacheniya”),
which are supposed to achieve effects directly
in the theatre of military operations, and
strategic deterrence forces (“strategicheskiye
sily sderzhivaniya”), which range from stra-
tegic conventional weapons to strategic nu-
clear weapons. Owing to this much greater
integration of conventional and nuclear
capabilities, some Western experts argue
that when compared to the approach of
NATO states, Russia’s nuclear threshold is
much more blurred.
Russia’s conventional operation in
Ukraine to some extent demonstrates this
strategy. Moscow seems to be trying to keep
the war limited to Ukraine and to deter
NATO from intervening through veiled
nuclear threats. Nuclear signalling serves
escalation management purposes. This
approach is not entirely new. Russia used
nuclear rhetoric during its annexation of
Crimea in 2014 and in Georgia in 2008 –
but not to the same extent as in 2022.
In the West, however, the predominant
interpretation of Moscow’s strategy of esca-
SWP Comment 68
November 2022
4
lation management has so far been that
Russia would use the signalling effect of its
non-strategic nuclear weapons only to pro-
tect its own national security and territory –
not to pursue revisionist goals in its own
neighbourhood. Russia’s actions in Ukraine
now call this interpretation into question.
Russia’s problems with
conventional precision weapons
In the future, the role of nuclear weapons
in Russia’s strategic deterrence is likely to
change. Two factors in particular could lead
to a greater reliance on the nuclear com-
ponent: Russia’s dwindling arsenal of non-
nuclear strategic weapons and NATO’s
political and military adaptation.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine,
Russia has used a vast number of ballistic
and cruise missiles. According to Western
intelligence, however, Russian missiles
appear to have a high fail rate as well as
problems with precision. In addition, Rus-
sia’s arsenal of modern non-nuclear preci-
sion weapons is slowly running low, which
is why the military leadership is increasingly
having to resort to older, less precise systems
and reaching out to partners such as Iran for
assistance. To reconstitute Russia’s depleted
stocks, missile manufacturers have tried to
accelerate production but are struggling to
significantly increase volumes.
Russia’s dependence on semiconductors
and electronic components from the West
exacerbates this situation. Systems such as
Russia’s Iskander-M, Kalibr, and Kh-101 mis-
siles require specialised microelectronic
components that are produced primarily in
North America, Europe, and East Asia. Yet,
due to Western sanctions and export con-
trols, the Russian military appears to be
struggling to replenish its arsenal. Moscow’s
efforts to build its own semiconductor in-
dustry have so far met with little success.
In the short and medium term, imports
from China are also not an option due to
the extraterritorial effect of US sanctions.
Therefore, Russia either has to produce less-
efficient systems or it has to try to circum-
vent sanctions, for example by using front
companies.
Against this background, the question
arises as to whether the vacuum left by
Russia’s strategic conventional capabilities
in its deterrence strategy could to a certain
extent be filled by non-strategic nuclear
weapons. As a consequence, Moscow would
– at least temporarily – rely more on non-
strategic nuclear weapons in its strategy
of escalation management, resembling its
approach in the early 2000s.
Could Moscow adapt its
nuclear posture?
In addition to the described conventional
weaknesses, the current changes in the
European security order could further
contribute to the growing role of nuclear
weapons in Moscow’s deterrence strategy.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has triggered a
substantial transformation in the security
architecture in Europe. The accession of
Finland and Sweden to NATO will make it
easier for the Alliance to defend and stra-
tegically utilise the Baltic region, while
hampering Russia’s ability to conduct mili-
tary operations in the Baltic Sea. Thus,
future Russian military planning will have
to take into account a much longer coast-
line and land border with the Alliance.
NATO’s steps to adapt its deterrence and
defence posture are likely to further worsen
the strategic situation from Moscow’s point
of view. Russia already has considerable
military resources in Kaliningrad, in the
St Petersburg region, and on the Kola Pen-
insula. This notwithstanding, the Kremlin’s
threat perception will most likely increase
in light of NATO’s strategic adaptation,
potentially triggering Russian force adjust-
ments. Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has
already stated that the above-mentioned
developments will affect Russia’s defence
strategy. What form this might take
remains unclear, however. At the moment,
Russia does not seem to have sufficient
conventional forces to increase its regional
presence in the Baltics. This could be an-
other factor spurring an elevated role of
especially non-strategic nuclear weapons
in Russia’s deterrence strategy and driving
nuclear posture adjustments in the regions
bordering NATO.
Russia permanently deployed Iskander-M
systems to Kaliningrad in 2018, although
it remains unclear whether it also stores
nuclear warheads there. Over the past years,
Moscow has carried out renovations of
some storage sites in the exclave. If it has
not already done so, Russia could now
move nuclear weapons to the region. Mos-
cow also deployed Mig-31I fighter jets with
Kinzhal dual-capable missiles to Kaliningrad
in August 2022 to strengthen its strategic
deterrence. The Kinzhal medium-range air-
launched ballistic missile is one of Russia’s
advanced weapons systems. Although it
is often labelled as a hypersonic missile,
its design is likely derived from Russia’s
Iskander-M systems. Its distinguishing fea-
ture is not so much its high speed, which
resembles the speed of other ballistic mis-
siles, but its manoeuvrability, limiting the
ability of the defending party to target
the incoming missile.
Another way in which Russia could
respond to the changing European security
order is by transferring nuclear weapons or
nuclear-capable systems to Belarus. Alexan-
der Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin ad-
dressed this issue in late June, announcing
that in the coming months Belarusian Su-25
aircraft would be modified in Russia so
that they could carry nuclear weapons and
personnel would be trained accordingly.
In addition, Putin announced the transfer
of Iskander-M systems to Belarus. However,
what the two men did not touch upon was
the transfer of nuclear warheads to Belarus.
Even though the ban on hosting nuclear
weapons on Belarusian territory was re-
moved through changes in the Belarusian
constitution in February 2022, such a trans-
fer would be relatively difficult. Former
Soviet storage sites in Belarus would first
need to be reactivated. Moreover, the Bela-
rusian Su-25 aircraft could most likely carry
only gravity bombs, and its survivability
against defensive measures would be rela-
SWP Comment 68
November 2022
5
 tively poor. Recently, the Su-24 aircraft was
also raised as another option in Belarusian
media reports. This aircraft would be nuclear-
capable, but it was removed from service by
Belarus 10 years ago and would therefore
first need to be reactivated.
For the time being, several political but
also technical questions therefore still
appear unresolved. What is also possible is
that the public deliberations between Putin
and Lukashenko were first and foremost
aimed at sending a political signal rather
than providing the basis for an actual trans-
fer of robust systems to Belarus.
Crisis stability could decline...
An elevated role for nuclear weapons in
Russia’s deterrence strategy and a strength-
ened nuclear posture in areas bordering
NATO could weaken European security and
stability in different ways.
First, strengthened deployments of
nuclear weapons in western Russia could
trigger new arms dynamics in Europe. The
immediate military impact of deploying
non-strategic nuclear weapons in Kalinin-
grad and Belarus would likely be limited.
Russia can already hold any target in
Europe at risk with its various missiles.
Nevertheless, a strengthening of Russian
nuclear forces in the Baltic region and pos-
sibly in Belarus could generate political
pressure within NATO to respond to these
moves. So far, the military Alliance has
rejected the deployment of new land-based
nuclear missiles in Europe. Yet, the United
States is currently developing various
conventional stand-off missiles. Decisions
about their deployment are still pending.
Should Russia expand its nuclear deploy-
ments close to NATO, Central and Eastern
European states in particular could demand
not only a strengthening of defensive capa-
bilities such as missile and air defence.
They could also pressure NATO to increase
offensive capabilities by deploying Ameri-
can conventional cruise missiles and hyper-
sonic weapons, which are currently in the
final stages of development.
SWP Comment 68
November 2022
6
In the long term, this could push Mos-
cow towards developing a serious interest
in non-strategic arms control, much like
in the 1970s and 1980s. In the short to
medium term, however, it could exacerbate
Moscow’s threat perception and thus influ-
ence escalation dynamics.
This leads to the second point: A greater
role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s esca-
lation management could have an impact
on the stability and dynamic of potential
crises between NATO and Russia. Research
on nuclear crises highlights two factors in
particular that can influence crisis stability.
These are, firstly, the incentive to use nuclear
weapons first and, secondly, the degree to
which crises can be controlled, for example
through communication channels. What
matters is less the actual situation than the
perceptions of the actors involved.
Thus, in a worsening crisis situation, for
example in the Baltic Sea region, the United
States might be concerned about a low Rus-
sian nuclear threshold and therefore con-
sider the use of conventional precision weap-
ons. Russia, in turn, is likely to fear such
a step, which could make a Russian use of
nuclear weapons more likely. Overall, the
escalation potential of crises would thus
increase.
Since both sides will factor these poten-
tial escalation dynamics into their military
planning and established crisis communica-
tion channels do exist, nuclear escalation
should remain unlikely. Nonetheless, look-
ing into the future, the perceptions of asym-
metric force distribution are more likely
than ever before to shape both crises and
the strategic behaviour of both sides.
...and the prospects for arms
control could further dwindle
Third, a potentially growing role of nuclear
weapons for Russia’s security will pose
an additional obstacle to arms control. The
New START Treaty, which limits the num-
ber of strategic delivery systems and nuclear
warheads, expires in 2026. At present, it is
highly unlikely that the United States and
Russia will conclude a follow-on treaty. This
is not only due to bilateral tensions but also
due to China’s nuclear build-up and the
domestic political situation in the United
States. It remains to be seen whether, despite
these obstacles, a politically binding upper
limit on strategic nuclear weapons or trans-
parency measures, for example limited data
exchanges, can be negotiated.
With regard to non-strategic nuclear
weapons, the situation is even more com-
plicated. Already before the war, arms con-
trol of non-strategic systems faced serious
challenges. The 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned
land-based intermediate-range missiles, fell
apart in 2019 when the Trump administra-
tion decided to withdraw from the treaty.
Russia’s development of a cruise missile
banned under the treaty had triggered this
decision. Moscow had however always
denied violating INF provisions and, in
turn, accused the United States of breaching
the treaty. Since then, various arms control
and transparency initiatives regarding INF
systems have not come to fruition.
If Russia’s reliance on non-strategic
nuclear weapons once again increases, Mos-
cow’s appetite for limitations on short- and
medium-range missiles will likely erode
even further. The United States is also un-
likely to have any interest in restrictions
in view of both its own missile programmes
and China’s growing arsenal of medium-
range missiles. Thus, there will be no sig-
nificant increase in nuclear security and
stability in Europe in the coming years,
neither on the strategic nor on the non-
strategic level.
Recommendations
Germany’s forthcoming National Security
Strategy provides an opportunity for the
government to analyse the new threat land-
scape in Europe and to adapt its position.
Lydia Wachs is Research Associate in the International Security Research Division at SWP. This Comment appears within
the framework of the project STAND (Strategic Threat Analysis and Nuclear (Dis-)Order).
In this context, it is first of all important
that Germany remains clear-eyed and ac-
knowledges the current challenges: Russia
will have no interest in arms control, let
alone the disarmament of non-strategic
nuclear weapons in the coming years. On
the contrary, Moscow’s reliance on nuclear
weapons for deterrence and escalation man-
agement will likely grow. The “disarmament
offensive” called for in the German coali-
tion agreement, which also demands arms © Stiftung Wissenschaft
control measures covering nuclear weapons und Politik, 2022
with shorter ranges, is unlikely to have any All rights reserved
chance of success in this legislative period.
This Comment reflects
In addition, Berlin should strengthen its
the author’s views.
position with regard to the arms dynamics
taking place in Europe. In view of Washing- The online version of
ton’s development of new conventional this publication contains
medium-range missile systems and the re- functioning links to other
SWP texts and other relevant
activation of the 56th Artillery Command
sources.
in Germany, Berlin might face difficult
decisions concerning the deployment of SWP Comments are subject
conventional medium-range missiles in the to internal peer review, fact-
coming years. Negotiations with Moscow, checking and copy-editing.
however, can only succeed from a position For further information on
our quality control pro-
of strength, which is based in particular on
cedures, please visit the SWP
a united Alliance. Thus, the German gov- website: https://www.swp-
ernment should seek to prevent decisions berlin.org/en/about-swp/
on possible US missile deployments in quality-management-for-
Europe from becoming a test for NATO. swp-publications/
Finally, German government officials
SWP
should thwart Russia’s nuclear intimidation Stiftung Wissenschaft und
strategy, which is among other things Politik
aimed at weakening social cohesion within German Institute for
Western societies. Moscow’s nuclear sig- International and
nalling will likely continue in the coming Security Affairs
years and potentially disconcert the Ger-
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
man population. Effective communication 10719 Berlin
and explanations of the situation and con- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
text can help counteract the effect of intimi- Fax +49 30 880 07-100
dation. Here, media representatives can www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org
play an important role as well.
ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
DOI: 10.18449/2022C68
(English version of
SWP-Aktuell 59/2022)
SWP Comment 68
November 2022