Why the alarm over Russia’s use of

hypersonic missiles in Ukraine is

misplaced
By Andrew W. Reddie | March 31, 2023

A Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile carried by a MiG-31K. Photo credit: Russian

Presidential Press and Information Office

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Early in March, news outlets reported that almost a year after Russia first used
Kinzhal (Kh-47M2) hypersonic missiles in Ukraine, Moscow had used six more of
its hypersonic weapons as part of a particularly severe attack that also included Kh-
22 anti-ship missiles, S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, and Iranian Shahed drones. Of
note, Ukraine’s theater missile defense could not prevent the six Kinzhal missiles
—among many of the other missile variants—from getting to their targets. The
missile fusillade ultimately caused at least nine civilian deaths.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this attack led to a substantial increase in reporting about

hypersonics, with coverage from the BBC, New York Times, Washington
Post, CNN, and NPR among other outlets. The alarmism captured in this reporting
indicates the broader misunderstanding concerning the characteristics of
hypersonic weapons that matter in both the Ukraine context and (as I wrote
earlier in the Bulletin) the broader strategic context involving Washington,
Moscow, and Beijing.

This alarmism has two strands.

The first concerns the ability of the Kinzhal missile to evade Ukraine’s air
defenses. This is driven by its speed—according to CSIS, the Kinzhal rapidly
accelerates to Mach 4 (4,900 kilometers per hour) and can travel as fast as Mach 10
(12,350 km/hr)—and its maneuverability. Regardless of the speed and
maneuverability of Russian missiles, the ability of hypersonic and non-hypersonic
missiles to make it through air defenses should be unsurprising. In the best case, of
course, Ukrainian air defenses would prevent all missile attacks to make it to their
target, but missile defense—even at the theater level—remains a difficult technical
challenge to conquer. The general ineffectiveness of missile defense technology is
not intrinsic to the hypersonic-ness of some of Russia’s missile systems.

Moreover, Russia’s decision to throw one of its most advanced weapon systems at
targets in Ukraine when other, cheaper, more “vanilla” capabilities would appear to
be sufficient seems a strategic misstep—making some observers wonder why
Moscow took this particular decision.

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The second strand of alarmism pertains to the perceived imbalance in hypersonic

capabilities between the United States on the one hand and Russia and China on
the other—exacerbated perhaps by the apparently close ties between Moscow and
Beijing.
Robyn Dixon and David Stern’s reporting in the Washington Post is indicative of
this concern, noting, “Globally, Russia’s use of the hypersonic missiles—’Kinzhal’
means dagger in Russian—renewed alarm over the Kremlin’s sophisticated
arsenal, and it highlighted that Putin possesses difficult-to-intercept, nuclear-
capable weapons that the United States and its allies do not yet have.”

The alarm is misplaced.

The notion that the United States is “behind” in the hypersonic weapon arms race
is off-base because it fails to consider the varying strategic challenges posed by the
current distribution of military capabilities among the United States and its near-
peer adversaries.

Indeed, the proposed application of hypersonic weapons by the United States

focuses on its conventional rather than nuclear use. As a consequence, the
requirements for the weapon system—in terms of its accuracy, for example—are
entirely different from those that Russia and China are developing, and, thus, you
can expect that their relative technology readiness levels might be different. This is
reflected both in the diverging test schedules of hypersonic capabilities and
deployment timelines across all three countries.

But perhaps most important is the very different strategic pictures that Washington,
Moscow, and Beijing face. Bearing in mind that the primary characteristic of a
hypersonic weapon system germane to strategic competition is its maneuverability,
which enables it to evade missile defenses, Russia and China’s deployment is
perhaps unsurprising given Washington’s focus on developing strategic missile
defense (ostensibly focused on North Korea and Iran). If nothing else, the
capability represents a hedge against US strategic missile defense systems reaching
maturity.

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Russia and China do not have a reciprocal focus on missile defense, so there is
little that hypersonic weapons would add to the US military’s toolkit that is not
already supplied by existing capability. The existing nuclear triad of the United
States holds its adversaries at risk, with or without hypersonic delivery vehicles;
Russia’s capabilities, with or without its hypersonic capabilities, do the same.
Indeed, if speed is the characteristic of interest, then ballistic missiles can reach
speeds significantly greater than those of hypersonic weapons. At the margins,
research and development spending focused on the latest materials science
challenges is appropriate, but hypersonics rhetoric reminiscent of the 1950s
“missile gap” is unhelpful.
Clearly, there is something about the “hypersonic” moniker that draws the
journalist, the policy-maker, and probably the laboratory scientist, but it serves us
to be clear about what the characteristics of these weapon systems are and how
they either alter the status quo or do not. In terms of the broader dynamics of
strategic competition, these capabilities still do not appear to move the needle—
and particularly not if the recent use in Ukraine is representative of the broader use
case.

Rather than focusing on “matching” capabilities and engaging in arms-racing

behavior, both analysts and policy-makers ought to focus on the consequences for
strategic stability of Moscow and Beijing developing these technologies. For
example, there are good reasons to think that future variants of hypersonic
weapons might evade existing early warning systems—reducing still further the
already limited amount of time that civilian leaders have to order a second strike.
What are the hypersonic missiles Russia is
using in Ukraine?
Russia bombarded Ukraine with Kinzhal missiles, which fly many times faster than
the speed of sound, and are impossible to shoot down with ground defences.

This handout video grab shows an MiG-31K fighter of the Russian air force carrying a Kinzhal
hypersonic cruise missile [File: Russian Defence Ministry/AFP]

Published On 10 Mar 202310 Mar 2023

Russia unleashed a barrage of high-precision missile attacks on

Ukraine that triggered a wave of power cuts and temporarily caused
Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant to lose power.

According to Ukraine’s military, Russia is believed to have used six

Kinzhals – hypersonic missiles which fly many times faster than the
speed of sound.

President Vladimir Putin regularly touts the Kinzhal, which means

“dagger” in Russian, as a weapon for which the NATO alliance
backing Kyiv has no answer.

Here is what you need to know about the weapon:

What are hypersonic missiles?

 Hypersonic weapons travel in the upper atmosphere at more

than five times the speed of sound – or about 6,200kmph
(3,852mph) – and they can evade advanced radar systems.
 There are two major types of hypersonic missiles. One is the
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which leaves the Earth’s
atmosphere and then plunges back into it.

 The second is the hypersonic cruise missile (HCM) which,

while not as fast, flies low and at extremely high speeds, giving
opponents little time to react. They can also carry a nuclear
warhead.

The Kinzhal is capable of striking targets 2,000km (1,250 miles) away at a speed 10 times the speed
of sound [File: Sergey Pivovarov/Reuters]
What are the key features of Kinzhal missiles?

 Kinzhal is an air-launched ballistic missile that is capable of

carrying nuclear or conventional warheads.

 It has a reported range of 1,500-2,000km (930-1,240 miles)

with a payload of 480kg. The missiles may reach speeds of up
to Mach 10 (12,350kmph or 7,674mph).
  President Vladimir Putin says Russia is the global leader in
hypersonic missiles whose speed, manoeuvrability, and
altitude make them difficult to track and intercept.

 In Ukraine, the missiles were first used in March 2022 to

destroy a fuel depot, according to Moscow.

 On Thursday, Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for Ukraine’s air

force, said his country did not have the capability to “counter”
the Kinzhals.

Who else is developing hypersonic missiles?

 The United States has actively pursued the development of

hypersonic weapons – manoeuvring weapons that fly at
speeds of at least Mach 5 – as a part of its Conventional
Prompt Global Strike programme since the early 2000s,
according to a congressional report.

 In April 2022, Australia, the United Kingdom and the US – a

grouping known as AUKUS – agreed to cooperate on
hypersonic weapons and electronic warfare capabilities.

 China is also aggressively developing the technology,

according to the US Congressional Research Service (CRS).

 Iran, Israel and South Korea have conducted basic research on

the technology, the CRS has said previously.
 HYPERSONIC HYPE? RUSSIA’S KINZHAL
MISSILES AND THE LESSONS FOR AIR
DEFENSE
Peter Mitchell | 05.23.23

The May 4 interception of a Russian Kinzhal hypersonic missile by one of Ukraine’s Patriot
air defense systems in Kyiv has caused a significant stir in the international missile defense
community. The ensuing saturation attack against Kyiv on May 16, which according to
Russian sources was specifically aimed at knocking out a Patriot system, has only further
underscored the significance of advanced missile defense systems in today’s evolving
security landscape. This dramatic first-ever engagement between modern Western air
defense systems and the hypersonic weapons specifically designed to defeat them was
marked by contrails streaking the skies over Ukraine, literally and figurately underlining the
significance of this latest technological revolution.

The Kinzhal: Overhyped and Underperforming

The Kh-47 Kinzhal (Russian for “Dagger”) air-launched missile, first unveiled in 2018, has
been described by Russian state media as a “uniquely capable” next-generation hypersonic
weapon capable of penetrating any and all enemy air defense systems and hit London in
nine minutes. Hypersonic weapons are generally defined as long-range, maneuvering, air-
breathing systems that travel in excess of Mach 5. The Kinzhal is reported to have a range of
around 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), which is relatively short for a hypersonic missile,
especially one benefiting from the increased range that comes from being launched from an
aircraft. For context, the US Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon currently in
development has a planned unclassified range of 1,725 miles. Hypersonic missiles typically
employ a scramjet engine or other advanced propulsion to allow for maneuverability while
maintaining hypersonic speed. The Kinzhal instead uses a solid-fuel rocket engine, likely
derived from the SS-26 Iskander, which—like most solid rockets—likely can’t be shut down
or throttled in flight. Once the rocket motor has burnt out, the missile then coasts to its
target. This raises significant doubts about whether the Kinzhal can actually maintain
a sustained speed of Mach 10 throughout its flight as Russians has claimed. Air resistance
would slow the Kinzhal down just as it reaches the most critical, terminal stage of its attack,
leaving it vulnerable to interception. This propulsion method and meager reaction control
systems along with the sheer mass of the missile (approximately one thousand kilograms)
raises questions about its actual agility and maneuvering capabilities. The missile is not
capable of making sharp turns or rapid changes in direction, which is a critical aspect that
makes hypersonic weapons so potentially difficult to intercept. In terms of maneuverability,
the Kinzhal is more akin to a giant lawn dart loaded with explosives.
With this technical analysis in mind, it appears the Kinzhal is likely to join the Su-57, T-14
Armata, and BMPT Terminator in the dustbin of vaunted Russian weapons that have
severely underperformed on the battlefield.

Saturation Attack: The Patriot’s Worst-Case Scenario

The truly impressive takeaway from the Patriot systems in Ukrainian service is not the
singular takedown of the first Kinzhal but the Patriot’s performance under saturation
bombardment. The May 16 air raid on Kyiv featured every category of long-range precision
munition in the Russian arsenal: unmanned aerial vehicles as well as cruise, ballistic, and
hypersonic missiles were all used in a coordinated saturation attack intended to overwhelm
Ukrainian air defenses and destroy their systems. The saturation attack works through filling
the three-dimensional airspace with more incoming targets than the defense can handle
using a combination of land-, sea-, or air-launched missile platforms, a coordinated impact
time, varied altitudes and azimuths of approach, decoys and countermeasures, and sheer
numbers.
The ability of the Patriots donated by the United States and Germany to detect, track, and
defeat this saturation attack coming from all different directions showcases the impressive
advancements and upgrades that the venerable system has experienced since the Patriot
was first updated for use against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles in the 1990s after
its less-than-impressive showing against those threats during the Gulf War. Modern air
defense systems have never faced a threat on the level of the current Russians air raids
against Ukraine. Even during the height of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, around twenty-three
ballistic missiles were fired against coalition forces, of which only nine were deemed targets
for interception. The Ukrainian success in utilizing Patriot systems to counter a saturation
attack from modern weapons from a near-peer enemy demonstrates the remarkable
evolution of defense technology and its ability to adapt to emerging challenges.

Strategic Implications
The interception serves as a reminder of the growing importance of robust defense
capabilities in an era of evolving threats. As nations around the world invest in the
development of unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic
weapons, the need for effective missile defense systems becomes even more crucial. These
recent successful interceptions underscore the necessity for partner nations to continually
enhance their air defense capabilities to counter advanced threats. Additionally, it is vital to
not allow the recent successes over Kyiv to create complacency in the missile defense
community. Policymakers cannot afford the luxury of assuming future hypersonic
missiles will be plagued by as corrupt and inept a development as the Kinzhal.
As noted previously, the donation of Patriot systems to Ukraine was only the beginning
of increasing strategic integration of Ukrainian and NATO forces. As the war rages on,
increasingly capable offensive weapons such as long-range cruise missiles with stealth
capabilities are being delivered as well as training Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighters. This
month’s attacks have firmly reestablished Western military technology, doctrine, and missile
defense as a formidable force capable of countering sophisticated threats. It has also shown
that NATO must continue to reassess their defense strategies, placing a renewed emphasis
on developing and acquiring advanced missile defense systems. The performance of the
Patriot and IRIS-T in Ukraine will lead to a strategic reevaluation by other nations of their
offensive arms programs designed to defeat these systems, potentially reshaping dynamics
not only in Eastern Europe, but around the world. This advantage, like all technological
advantages, is only kept as long as innovative processes are encouraged by the West. As the
proliferation of effective small unmanned aircraft systems has shown, the United States and
its allies could just as quickly lose their edge in the missile defense sphere.

Capt. Peter Mitchell is an air defense officer and strategic studies instructor at West Point.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States
Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. 1st Class Christopher Smith, US Army
GGE’s work as reflected in annual reportsGGE MeetingsAdditional resources

GGE on lethal autonomous weapons

systems
This page gives an overview of the work of the Group of Governmental
Experts related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous
weapon systems.
In 2013, the Meeting of State Parties to the Convention on prohibitions or
restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be
deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects
(Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – CCW) agreed on a
mandate on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). It mandated its
Chairperson to convene an informal Meeting of Experts ‘to discuss the
questions related to emerging technologies in the areas of lethal
autonomous weapons systems in the context of the objectives and
purposes of the Convention’. Such meetings of experts were convened
three times, in 2014, 2015, and 2016, and produced reports which fed into
meetings of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.
In 2016, at the Fifth CCW Review Conference, High Contracting Parties
decided to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts on
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS (GGE on LAWS), to build on
the work of the previous meetings of experts. Since then, the group has
been re-convened yearly.
GGE in 2023

The 2022 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the

CCW decided that the work of the GGE on LAWS is to continue in 2023:
‘ In the context of the objectives and purpose of the Convention, the Group
is to intensify the consideration of proposals and elaborate, by consensus,
possible measures, including taking into account the example of existing
protocols within the Convention, and other options related to the
normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the
area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, building upon the
recommendations and conclusions of the Group of Governmental Experts
related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon
systems, and bringing in expertise on legal, military, and technological
aspects. ‘
The 2023 GGE, chaired by Ambassador Flavio Damico Soares of Brazil,
hosted its first session on 6–10 March 2023, and the second session on 15–
19 May 2023, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

As the advance version of the final report (CCW/GGE.1/2023/2) indicates,

the GGE concluded that when characterising weapon systems built from
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, it is crucial to consider the
potential future developments of these technologies. The group also
affirmed that states must observe particular compliance with international
humanitarian law throughout the life cycle of such weapon systems. States
should limit the types of targets and the duration and scope of operations
with which the weapon systems can engage; adequate training must be
given to human operators. In cases where the weapon system based on
technologies in the area of LAWS cannot comply with international law,
the system must not be deployed.

GGE at a glance

Mandate

 The GGE was mandated to examine issues related to emerging

technologies in the area of LAWS in the context of the objectives
and purposes of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
Composition

 The group is open to all High Contracting Parties and non-State

Parties to the CCW, international organisations, and non-
governmental organisations.
Issues discussed

 Characterisation of LAWS in order to promote a common

understanding on concepts and characteristics relevant to the
objectives and purposes of CCW
 Potential challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of
LAWS to international humanitarian law (IHL)
 The human element in the use of lethal force; aspects of human-
machine interaction in the development, deployment and use of
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS
 Potential military implications of related technologies
  Options for addressing the humanitarian and international security
challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of LAWS
Guiding principles

The guiding principles developed by the GGE were endorsed by the CCW
Meeting of the High Contracting Parties in 2019. Below is an extract from
the principles; the full version can be found in the report of the 2019
GGE and the report of the 2019 meeting of the CCW Meeting of High
Contracting Parties
GGE’s work as reflected in annual reports

Report of the 2023 GGE

The 2023 GGE held two sessions in March and May 2023. According to
the advance version of the final report (CCW/GGE.1/2023/2), the GGE
concluded that when characterising weapon systems built from emerging
technologies in the area of LAWS, it is crucial to consider the potential
future developments of these technologies. The group also affirmed that
states must observe particular compliance with international humanitarian
law throughout the life cycle of such weapon systems. States should limit
the types of targets and the duration and scope of operations with which
the weapon systems can engage; adequate training must be given to human
operators. In cases where the weapon system based on technologies in the
area of LAWS cannot comply with international law, the system must not
be deployed.
Report of the 2022 GGE

At the Sixth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the

CCW, states agreed that the work of the GGE on LAWS was to continue
in 2022. The group held two sessions throughout the year; these
concluded with the adoption of a relatively brief report highlighting that
‘every internationally wrongful act of a State, including those potentially
involving weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of
LAWS entails international responsibility of that State, in accordance with
international law. In addition, States must comply with international
humanitarian law. Humans responsible for the planning and conducting of
attacks must comply with international humanitarian law.’
As with previous groups, the GGE discussions possible measures and
other options related to the normative and operational framework on
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. In this regard, delegations
presented and discussed several proposals including: legally binding
instruments under the framework of the CCW; a non-legally binding
instrument; clarity on the implementation of existing obligations under
international law, in particular international humanitarian law; an option
that prohibits and regulates on the basis of international humanitarian law;
and the option that no further legal measures are needed
The report also included a recommendation for the group to continue its
work.
Report of the 2021 GGE

The GGE held three sessions in 2021, during which it explored and sought
agreement on possible recommendations on options related to emerging
technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. The report
of the meeting notes that delegations presented different options related to
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, including a legally-binding
instrument, a political declaration, clarity on the implementation of
existing obligations of international law in particular international law, and
the option that no further legal measures are needed. The group also
considered the 2019 guiding principles, which 'may be further developed
and elaborated'. However, it could not reach consensus on how to reflect
its deliberations, including possible conclusions and recommendations.
The Chair summary, annexed to the report, offers an overview of the
group's discussions on a wide range of issues, including international
humanitarian law and other applicable bodies of international law, state
responsibility, human accountability, human-machine interaction, and risk
mitigation.
Chairman's Summary | 2020 GGE

In November 2019, the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties decided

that the GGE work would continue in 2020 and 2021, to explore and agree
on possible recommendations on options related to emerging technologies
in the area of LAWS, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the
Convention.
The 2020 GGE concluded its work in April 2021 without agreeing on a
substantive report. The group – mandated with clarifying, considering and
developing the normative and operational framework on emerging
technologies in the area of LAWS , building on the work of previous
groups – was expected to present a report for consideration to the Sixth
Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(to be held in December 2021). However, as the advanced version of the
Chairperson’s Summary notes, ‘it was not possible for the group to
develop and agree’ on such a report. Instead, the summary provides an
overview of the group’s discussions, while also outlining (a) possible
elements for consensus recommendations and (b) areas for possible future
work with a view to arriving at additional elements for consensus
recommendations. For instance, the group considered the following
elements as a possible basis for consensus:
  (a) international humanitarian law (IHL) imposes obligations on
states, parties to armed conflict and individuals, not machines;
 (b) states, parties to armed conflict and individuals remain at all
times responsible for adhering to their obligations under applicable
international laws;
 (c) IHL requirements and principles must be applied through a chain
of responsible command and control by human operators and
commander;
 (d) it is unlawful to use weapon systems, including LAWS, with
effects that cannot be limited in accordance with IHL or that cannot
otherwise be used in accordance with IHL;
 (e) states shall ensure a human operator or commander exercises
judgement over the operational context, including through
constraints applied to the weapon system, the parameters of the
weapon system’s use, and the required interaction between human
and weapon system;
 (f) in implementing agreed measures, states shall not hamper
progress in or access to civilian and military research and
development and use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS;
 (g) human responsibility for the use of weapons systems based on
emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons
systems can be exercised in various ways across the life-cycle of
these weapon systems and through human-machine interaction.

With regard to possible policy options for addressing the challenges raised
by LAWS, the group has considered:

 (a) the negotiation of a legally binding instrument containing

prohibitions, regulations, positive obligations or a combination of
these (a call for a moratorium on the development and use of
autonomous weapons in the interim was also made);
 (b) the negotiation of a political declaration containing important
principles such as human control, possibly based on the Guiding
principles agreed in 2019;
 (c) the negotiation of a non-legally binding technical outcome
comprising a compilation of existing applicable international law
and identifying associated good practices and information sharing
for states;
  (d) a recognition that no further legal measures are needed, if the
view is that IHL is fully applicable and sufficiently clear to deal with
any possible challenges raised by LAWS.

As the summary notes, these policy options are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.
Report of the 2019 GGE

At its 2019 session, the group adopted the guiding principles affirmed in
2018 as a basis for its work. It also identified an additional principle,
which states that human-machine interaction should ensure that the
potential use of LAWS is in compliance with applicable international law,
in particular IHL.
Other conclusions outlined in the group’s report included, among others:

 The potential use of weapons systems based on emerging

technologies in the area of LAWS must be conducted in accordance
with applicable international law, in particular IHL and its
requirements and principles.
 States, parties to armed conflict, and individuals remain at all
times responsible for adhering to their obligations under applicable
international law, including IHL.
 Human judgement is essential to ensure that the potential use of
weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of
LAWS is in compliance with international law, and in particular
IHL.
 A weapons system based on emerging technologies in the area of
LAWS must not be used if it is of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering, or if it is inherently
indiscriminate, or is otherwise incapable of being used in
accordance with the requirements and principles of IHL.
 Identifying and reaching a common understanding among High
Contracting Parties on the concepts and characteristics of
LAWS could aid further consideration of the aspects related to
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.
 Human responsibility for the use of weapons systems based on
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS can be exercised in
various ways across the life-cycle of these weapon systems and
through human-machine interaction.
  During the design, development, testing and deployment of weapons
systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, the
risks inter alia of civilian casualties, as well as precautions to
help minimise the risk of incidental loss of life, injuries to
civilians, and damage to civilian objects must be considered.
 Research and development of autonomous technologies should not
be restricted based on the sole rationale that such technologies could
be used for weapons systems. But it is important to promote
responsible innovation and use of such technologies.

The group continued discussions, without reaching an agreement,

on possible policy options for addressing the humanitarian and
international security challenges posed by emerging technologies in the
area of LAWS. The four possible categories put forward in 2018 were
reiterated.
The GGE also took note of multiple issues that would require further
consideration and review, such as:

 Possible bias in the data sets used in algorithm-based programming

relevant to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.
 Different potential characteristics of emerging technologies in the
area of LAWS.
 Developing a shared understanding on the concept of the human
element in the use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.
 Further clarifications on the type and degree on human-machine
interaction required in the development, deployment and use of
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.
Report of the 2018 GGE

In its report of the 2018 session, the GGE outlined a series of emerging
commonalities, conclusions and recommendations.

 A set of possible principles to guide the work of the GGE was

developed. Among them: IHL continues to apply to the development
and use of LAWs; human responsibility must be retained when it
comes to decisions on the use of weapons systems; risks assessments
and mitigation measures should be part of the design, development,
testing and deployment cycle of emerging technologies in any
weapons systems.
  The report also summarised the group discussions on the human
element in lethal force, aspects of human-machine interaction in the
development, deployment and use of emerging technologies in the
area of LAWS, and on the potential military implications of related
technologies.
 When it comes to the possible policy options for addressing the
humanitarian and international security challenges posed by
emerging technologies in the context of LAWSs, the report
outlines the four proposals discussed within the Group:
 A legally-binding instrument stipulating prohibitions and
regulations on LAWS
 A political declaration that would outline principles such as the
necessity of human control in the use of force and the
importance of human accountability, and with elements of
transparency and technology review
 Further discuss the human-machine interface and the
application of existing international legal obligations
 A view was also expressed that no further legal measures were
needed, as IHL is fully applicable to potential LAWS.
Report of the 2017 GGE

At the end of its November 2017 meeting, the GGE adopted

a report outlining several conclusions and recommendations. Among
these:

 IHL applies fully to all weapons systems, including the potential

development and use of LAWS.
 Responsibility for the deployment of any new weapon systems in
armed conflicts remains with states, which must ensure
accountability for lethal action by any weapon system used by their
forces in armed conflict in accordance with applicable international
law, including IHL. The human element in the use of lethal force
needs to be further considered.
 Given the dual nature of technologies in the area of intelligent
autonomous systems, the Group's work should not hamper
progress in or access to civilian research and development and use
of these technologies.
 There is a need to keep potential military applications of related
technologies under review in the context of the Group’s work.
  There is a need to further assess the aspects of human-machine
interaction in the development, deployment, and use of emerging
technologies in the area of LAWS.
 There should also be further discussions on possible options for
addressing the humanitarian and international security
challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

GGE Meetings

2023 GGE sessions

 6–10 March 2023 | First session

 15–19 May 2023 | Second session

Previous GGE sessions

 2022 GGE | 7–11 March and 25–29 July 2022

 2021 GGE | 3–13 August, 24 September – 1 October, and 2–8
December 2021
 2020 GGE | 21–25 September and 2–6 November 2020
 2019 GGE | 25–29 March and 20–21 August 2019
 2018 GGE | 9–13 April and 27–31 August 2018
 2017 GGE | 13–17 November 2017

Additional resources

 Searching for meaningful human control: The April 2018 meeting on

lethal autonomous weapons systems, by Barbara Rosen Jacobson,
DiploFoundation (April 2018)
 Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Mapping the GGE debate, by
Barbara Rosen Jacobson, DiploFoundation (November 2017)
 Defending the boundary: Constraints and requirements on the use of
autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian and
human rights law, by the Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (May 2017)
 Artificial intelligence: Lethal autonomous weapons systems and
peace time threats, by Regina Surber, ICT4Peace Foundation
13 Sep 2023

Key takeaways from the sixth UN session on cybercrime

treaty negotiations
The 6th Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime finished its work,
and one final round of inter-state negotiations is left. Is there a treaty text
yet, and are states close to a final agreement?

The 6th session of the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to elaborate a UN

cybercrime convention is over: From 21 August until 1 September 2023,
in New York, delegates from all states finished another round of text-
based negotiations. This was a pre-final session before the final
negotiation round in February 2024.

CONTENTS
 Stalled negotiations over a scope and terminology
 Hurdles to deal with human rights and data protection-related
provisions
 Articles on international cooperation or international competition?
 SDGs in the scope of the convention?
 What’s next?
Stalled negotiations over a scope and terminology
Well, reaching a final agreement does not seem to be easy. A number of
Western advocacy groups and Microsoft publicly expressed their
discontent with the current draft (updated on 1 September 2023), which,
they stated, could be ‘disastrous for human rights’. At the same time some
countries (e.g. Russia and China) shared concerns that the current draft
does not meet the scope that was established by the mandate of the
committee. In particular, these delegations and their like-minded
colleagues believe that the current approach in the chair’s draft does not
adequately address the evolving landscape of information and
communication technologies (ICTs). For instance, Russia shared its
complaint about the secretariat’s alleged disregard for a proposed article
addressing the criminalisation of the use of ICTs for extremist and terrorist
purposes. Russia, together with a group of states (e.g. China, Namibia,
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and some others), also supported the inclusion of
digital assets under Article 16 regarding the laundering of proceeds of
crimes. The UK, Tanzania, and Australia opposed the inclusion of digital
assets because it does not fall within the scope of the convention.
Concerning other articles, Canada, the USA, the EU and its member states,
and some other countries also wished to keep the scope more narrow, and
opposed proposals, in particular, for articles on international cooperation
(i.e. 37, 38, and 39) that would significantly expand the scope of the treaty.
The use of specific words in each provision, considering the power behind
them, is yet another issue that remains uncertain. Even though the chair
emphasised that the dedicated terminology group continues working to
resolve the issues over terms and propose some ideas, many delegations
have split into at least two opposing camps: whether to use ‘cybercrime’ or
‘the use of ICTs for malicious purposes’, to keep the verb ‘combat’ or
replace it with more precise verbs such as ‘suppress’, or whether to use
‘child pornography’ or ‘online child sexual abuse’, ‘digital’ or ‘electronic’
information, and so on.
For instance, in the review of Articles 6–10 on criminalisation, which
cover essential cybercrime offences such as illegal access, illegal
interception, data interference, systems interference, and the misuse of
devices, several debates revolved around the terms ‘without right’ vs
‘unlawful’, and ‘dishonest intent’ vs ‘criminal intent’.
Another disagreement arose over the terms: ‘restitution’ or ‘compensation’
in Article 52. This provision requires states to retain the proceeds of
crimes, to be disbursed to requesting states to compensate victims. India,
however, supported by China, Russia, Syria, Egypt, and Iran proposed that
the term ‘compensation’ be replaced with ‘restitution’ to avoid further
financial burden for states. Additionally, India suggested that
‘compensation’ shall be at the discretion of national laws and not under the
convention. Australia and Canada suggested retaining the word
‘compensation’ because it would ensure that the proceeds of the crime
delivered to requesting states are only used for the compensation of
victims.
The bottom line is that terminology and scope, two of the most critical
elements of the convention, remain unresolved, needing attention at the
session in February 2024. However, if states have not been able to agree
for the past 6 sessions, the international community needs a true
diplomatic miracle to occur in the current geopolitical climate. At the same
time, the chair confirmed that she has no intention of extending her role
beyond February.
Hurdles to deal with human rights and data protection-related provisions
We wrote before that states are divided when discussing human rights
perspectives and safeguards: While one group is pushing for a stronger
text to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms within the
convention, another group disagrees, arguing that the AHC is not
mandated to negotiate another human rights convention, but an
international treaty to facilitate law enforcement cooperation in combating
cybercrime.
In the context of text-based negotiations, this has meant that some states
suggested deleting Article 5 on human rights and merging it with Article
24 to remove the gender perspective-related paragraphs because of the
concerns over the definition of the ‘gender perspective’ and challenges to
translate the phrase into other languages. Another clash happened during
discussions about whether the provisions should allow the real-time
collection of traffic data and interception of content data (Articles 29 and
30, respectively). While Singapore, Switzerland, Malaysia, and Vietnam
proposed removing such powers from the text, other delegations (e.g.
Brazil, South Africa, the USA, Russia, Argentina and others) favoured
keeping them. The EU stressed that such measures represent a high level
of intrusion and significantly interfere with the human rights and freedoms
of individuals. However, the EU expressed its openness to consider
keeping such provisions, provided that the conditions and safeguards
outlined in Articles 24, 36 and 40(21) remain in the text.
With regard to data protection in Article 36, CARICOM proposed an
amendment allowing states to impose appropriate conditions in
compliance with their applicable laws to facilitate personal data transfers.
The EU and its member states, New Zealand, Albania, the USA, the UK,
China, Norway, Colombia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Switzerland, and some
other delegations supported this proposal. India did not, while some other
delegations (e.g. Russia, Malaysia, Argentina, Türkiye, Iran, Namibia and
others) preferred retaining the original text.
Articles on international cooperation or international competition?
Negotiations on the international cooperation chapter have not been
smooth either. During the discussions on mutual assistance, Russia, in
particular, pointed out a lack of grounds for requests and suggested adding
a request for “data identifying the person who is the subject of a crime
report” with, where possible “their location and nationality or account as
well as items concerned”. Australia, the USA, and Canada did not support
this amendment.
Regarding the expedited preservation of stored computer data/digital
information in Article 42, Russia also emphasised the need to distinguish
between the location of a service provider or any other data custodian, as
defined in the text, and the necessity to specifically highlight the locations
where data flows and processing activities, such as storage and
transmission, occur due to technologies like cloud computing. To address
this ‘loss of location’ issue, Russia suggested referring to the second
protocol of the Budapest Convention. The reasoning for this inclusion was
to incorporate the concept of data as being in the possession or under the
control of a service provider or established through data processing
activities operating from within the borders of another state party. The EU
and its member states, the USA, Australia, Malaysia, South Africa,
Nigeria, Canada, and others were among delegations who preferred to
retain the original draft text.
A number of delegations (e.g. Pakistan, Iran, China, Mauritania) also
proposed an additional article on ‘cooperation between national authorities
and service providers’ to oblige the reporting of criminal incidents to
relevant law enforcement authorities, providing support to such authorities
by sharing expertise, training, and knowledge, ensuring the
implementation of protective measures and due diligence protocols,
ensuring adequate training for their workforce, promptly preserving
electronic evidence, ensuring the confidentiality of requests received from
such authorities, and taking measures to render offensive and harmful
content inaccessible. The USA, Georgia, Canada, Australia, the EU, and
its member states, and some other delegations rejected this proposal.
SDGs in the scope of the convention?
An interesting development was the inclusion of the word ‘sustainability’
under Article 56 on the implementation of the convention. While
sustainability was not mentioned in the previous sessions, Australia,
China, New Zealand and Yemen, among other countries, proposed that
Article 56 should read: ‘Implementation of the convention through
sustainable development and technical assistance’. Costa Rica claimed
that such inclusion would link the capacity building under this convention
to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)”.
Additionally, Paraguay proposed that Article 52(1) should ensure that the
implementation of the convention through international cooperation should
take into account ‘negative effects of the offences covered by this
Convention on society in general and, in particular, on sustainable
development, including the limited access that landlocked countries are
facing’. While the USA and Tanzania acknowledged the importance of
Paraguay’s proposal, they stated that they could not support this edit.
What’s next?
The committee will continue the negotiations in February 2024 for the
seventh session, and if the text is adopted, states will still have to ratify it
afterwards. If, however, ‘should a consensus prove not to be possible, the
Bureau of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) will confirm that
the decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the present voting
representatives’ (from the resolution establishing the AHC). The chair
must report their final decisions before the 78th session of the UN General
Assembly.
About authors

Ms Anastasiya Kazakova
Anastasiya Kazakova is a cyber diplomacy knowledge fellow at DiploFoundation,
focusing on cyber conflict, cybercrime, and cybersecurity topics. Anastasiya also
implements the Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace.

Mr Kevon Swift
Mr Kevon Swift is the Head of Public Safety Affairs at the Latin American and
Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry (LACNIC). He has been involved in internet
governance processes across the Latin American and Caribbean region, and
previously ran LACNIC's internet governance research and mentorship programme.
Ms Bojana Kovač
Ms Bojana Kovač holds an LLM in Public International Law from Utrecht University
and an LLB in International and European Law from the Hague University of Applied
Sciences. Bojana joined Diplo in 2022, and from April 2023, she has been a basket
coordinator and researcher for the Digital Watch Observatory, focusing on human
rights, legal and regulatory topics, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime process.
How AI Will
Revolutionize Warfare
The new arms race in technology has no rules and few guardrails.

By Michael Hirsh, a columnist for Foreign Policy.

An illustration showing a tank firing rows of binary code to represent digital warfare

FOREIGN POLICY ILLUSTRATION

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APRIL 11, 2023, 10:09 AM

When it comes to advanced artificial intelligence, much of the debate has

focused on whether white-collar workers are now facing the sort of
extinction-level threat that the working class once did with robotics. And
while it’s suddenly likely that AI will be capable of duplicating a good part
of what lawyers, accountants, teachers, programmers, and—yes—
journalists do, that’s not even where the most significant revolution is likely
to occur.
The latest AI—known as generative pre-trained transformers (GPT)—
promises to utterly transform the geopolitics of war and deterrence. It will
do so in ways that are not necessarily comforting, and which may even turn
existential.

On one hand, this technology could make war less lethal and possibly
strengthen deterrence. By dramatically expanding the role of AI-directed
drones in air forces, navies and armies, human lives could be spared.
Already, the U.S. Defense Department is experimenting with AI bots that
can fly a modified F-16 fighter jet, and Russia has been testing autonomous
tank-like vehicles. China is rushing to roll out its own AI-run systems, and
the effectiveness of armed drones will also take off in coming years. One of
the largest, although still nascent, efforts to advance AI is a secretive U.S.
Air Force program, Next Generation Air Dominance, under which some
1,000 drone “wingmen,” called collaborative combat aircraft, operate
alongside 200 piloted planes.

“I can easily imagine a future in which drones outnumber people in the

armed forces pretty considerably,” said Douglas Shaw, senior advisor at the
Nuclear Threat Initiative. According to retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Charles
Wald, “That’ll be a force multiplier. One of the biggest problems right now
is recruiting.”

On the other hand, AI-driven software could lead the major powers to cut
down their decision-making window to minutes instead of hours or days.
They could come to depend far too much on AI strategic and tactical
assessments, even when it comes to nuclear war. The danger, said Herbert
Lin of Stanford University, is that decision-makers could gradually rely on
the new AI as part of command and control of weaponry, since it operates
at vastly greater speeds than people can.

In a book published this year, AI and the Bomb, James Johnson of the
University of Aberdeen imagines an accidental nuclear war in the East
China Sea in 2025 precipitated by AI-driven intelligence on both the U.S.
and Chinese sides, and “turbo-charged by AI-enabled bots, deepfakes, and
false-flag operations.”

“The real problem is how little it takes to convince people that something is
sentient, when all GPT amounts to is a sophisticated auto-complete,” said
Lin, a cybersecurity expert who serves on the Science and Security Board of
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Given AI’s propensity to hyperbole,
Lin said, “when people start to believe that machines are thinking, they’re
more likely to do crazy things.”
In a report published in early February, the Arms Control Association said
AI and other new technologies, such as hypersonic missiles, could result in
“blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack.” The
report said that the scramble to “exploit emerging technologies for military
use has accelerated at a much faster pace than efforts to assess the dangers
they pose and to establish limits on their use. It is essential, then, to slow
the pace of weaponizing these technologies, to carefully weigh the risks in
doing so, and to adopt meaningful restraints on their military use.”

U.S. officials have said they are doing so, but they may be navigating a
slippery slope. This January, the Defense Department updated its directive
on weapons systems involving the use of artificial intelligence, saying that
at least some human judgment must be used in developing and deploying
autonomous weapon systems. At the same time, however, the Pentagon is
experimenting with AI to integrate decision-making from all service
branches and multiple combatant commands. And with the Biden
administration cracking down on high-tech exports to China, especially
advanced semiconductors, in order to maintain the current U.S. lead in AI,
the Pentagon is likely to accelerate those efforts.

Wald said, “I do think that AI will help with target prioritization. This could
prove useful in the strategy against China, which owns a home field
advantage over the U.S. in bridging the vast distances in the Pacific that
could interfere with a coordinated response to an attack” on Taiwan.

In a 2019 speech, Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, the former director of the
Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, said that while the Defense
Department was eagerly pursuing “integration of AI capabilities,” this
would definitely not include nuclear command and control. Shanahan
added that he could imagine a role for AI in determining how to use lethal
force—once a human decision is made. “I’m not going to go straight to
‘lethal autonomous weapons systems,’” he said, “but I do want to say we
will use artificial intelligence in our weapons systems … to give us a
competitive advantage. It’s to save lives and help deter war from happening
in the first place.”

The question is whether the Chinese and Russians, along with other third
parties, will follow the same rules as Washington.

“I don’t believe the U.S. is going to go down the path of allowing things …
where you don’t have human control,” Wald said. “But I’m not sure
somebody else might not do that. In the wrong hands with the wrong I
think the biggest concern would be allowing this machine or entity too
much latitude.”
 READ MORE

An image shows China, the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Canada
driving artificial intelligence technology.

Who’s Winning the AI Race? It’s Not That Simple.

Figuring out who’s ahead is a lot tougher than counting rockets or warheads.

EXPLAINER

RISHI IYENGAR
U.S. President Joe Biden delivers remarks on lowering costs and creating jobs in
the Hudson Valley at the IBM facility in Poughkeepsie, New York.

The U.S. Wants to Make Sure China Can’t Catch Up on

Quantum Computing

Washington is likely to impose new controls in the race for a key technology.

ARGUMENT

KEVIN KLYMAN
Shou Zi Chew gestures as he speaks into a microphone. A video screen showing
him speaking is seen behind him.

Better Tech Regulations Can Save Democracy

China is exploiting a U.S. leadership void.

ARGUMENT

ALINA POLYAKOVA

Another concern is that advanced AI technology could allow rogue actors

such as terrorists to gain knowledge in building dirty bombs or other lethal
devices. And AI is now shared by far more actors than during the Cold War,
meaning that it could be used to detect nuclear arms sites, reducing the
deterrent effect of keeping their locations secret. “AI will change the
dynamic of hiding and finding things,” said Shaw, who noted that much of
the data today is held by private companies that might be vulnerable to AI-
driven espionage and probing of weapons systems.
What seems clear is that a new AI arms race is underway, and there is
probably little that can be done to stop it. In an open letter in late March,
more than 2,000 technology leaders and researchers—including Elon Musk
and Steve Wozniak—called on labs worldwide to pause in training up the
newest digital intelligence models because of cascading fears that they
could lead to disaster for the human race.

Their warning of an existential threat to society may be somewhat

exaggerated; the letter was criticized by some AI experts as
“fearmongering” over the illusion that these models can ever be sentient, as
in sci-fi movies like The Terminator. “It’s not Skynet,” said Lin, referring to
the AI villain that destroyed human civilization in the famous 1984 movie.
“But it could lead to human error based on overdependence. It’s a
precision-guided munition against human intelligence and human
rationality.”

Moreover, the idea that governments are going to sanction a delay for
safety’s sake is unlikely in the extreme. This is not only because the world’s
biggest tech companies are engaged in vicious competition, especially in
Silicon Valley, but also because the new technology is being rolled out in an
international environment in which the U.S., China, and Russia are now
embroiled in a grim struggle for dominance.

“It’s important to remember that the enemy gets a vote,” said retired Air
Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula. “Even if we stopped autonomy research and
other military AI development, the Chinese and to a lesser degree Russians
will certainly continue their own AI research. Both countries have shown
little interest in pursuing future arms control agreements.”

The open letter was only the latest evidence of what can only be called a
widespread panic since ChatGPT appeared on the scene late last fall and
major tech companies scrambled to introduce their own AI systems with
so-called human-competitive intelligence. The issues at stake, the
letter said, were fundamental to human civilization: “Should we let
machines flood our information channels with propaganda and
untruth? Should we automate away all the jobs, including the fulfilling
ones? Should we develop nonhuman minds that might eventually
outnumber, outsmart, obsolete and replace us? Should we risk loss of
control of our civilization?”

But the key line was this one: If the companies that fund AI labs don’t agree
to such a pause, then “governments should step in and institute a
moratorium.”
As far back as 2017, though, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that
“the one who becomes the leader in this sphere [AI] will be the ruler of the
world,” and that future wars will be decided “when one party’s drones are
destroyed by drones of another.”

The biggest problem, said Shaw, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, is that
“we’re not really having a conversation about what’s next.”

Many others agree. DARPA—the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency—is conducting a wide-ranging research program called AI
Forward. DARPA spokesman Matt Turek said recently that generative AI
systems such as ChatGPT have raised serious new issues about “the level of
reliability that we probably need … for life or death decision-making.”

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Michael Hirsh is a columnist for Foreign Policy. He is the author of two books: Capital
Offense: How Washington’s Wise Men Turned America’s Future Over to Wall Street and At
War With Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World.
Twitter: @michaelphirsh
 Disruptive
technology will
have profound
impact on future
warfare By
Geospatial World
-
07/19/2021 6 Minutes Read

Enhancement in digital technologies like AI, Machine Learning, Big Data,

IoMT and GIS is bound to change the way information is acquired,
collated, analyzed and disseminated, says Lieutenant General Chandi
Prasad Mohanty, Vice Chief of the Army Staff.
How do you assess the impact of China’s economic and military
expansion, and its belligerence on the global security scenario; and
how can we ensure peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region?

China has taken umpteen steps in recent years to modernize its military
and has improved its capabilities to exert influence far beyond its maritime
or continental borders. Unprecedented economic growth over the last few
decades has enabled China to secure overseas investment, resources and
power. Debt diplomacy coupled with overt military belligerence in South
and East China Seas, as well as Eastern Ladakh, have led to an
environment of uncertainty and volatility in the region.

The Indo-Pacific signifies the confluence of the Indian and Pacific oceans,
and is home to over 64% of world population, 62% of global GDP and
50% of global trade. India is a pivotal force in this region and is steadfastly
working to achieve peace and stability through cooperation in maritime
security, open trade, connectivity and risk mitigation amongst the littoral
states. Capacity building of all stakeholders in the region has been a
priority for India in countering non-traditional security challenges, such as
crime, piracy, drugs, arms and human trafficking, and Climate Change.
‘Quad’ as a grouping of like-minded countries which share the global
commons is an attempt towards a ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific region.

Modern technologies like Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,

Big Data, Internet of Things and GIS are playing an important role
in warfare. How can our defense forces adapt faster to the changing
technologies?

Disruptive technologies would bring about a quantum change in the way

future wars are fought. Enhancement in digital technologies like AI, ML,
Big Data, IoMT (Internet of Military Things) and GIS is bound to change
the way information is acquired, collated, analyzed and disseminated.
These are dual use technologies that would have a profound impact on
future warfare.

The Indian Army is abreast with these advancements and is adopting

measures to identify the domains where these technologies can be
assimilated. Some of these domains include lethal autonomous weapon
systems, unmanned patrolling and ISR, threat modeling, war game
simulation and training, supply chain and logistics, and predictive
maintenance. After having identified the military fields of application,
modes of induction through IDEX, Make II, TDF (Technology
Development Fund) and R&D have also been identified. There are
measures/steps under progress for Tri-Services application of these
technologies in an integrated and joint manner. There is an endeavor to
improve our teeth to tail ratio by incorporating these technologies to
reduce our logistics footprint.
Lieutenant General Chandi Prasad Mohanty took charge as the Vice Chief
of the Army Staff in February this year

Recent border clashes have highlighted the value of satellite data

and analytics more than ever. How is the Indian Army enhancing
this capability, and does it plan to utilize the commercial satellite
industry to support it in this endeavor?

Space offers immense force-multiplication capability for the Armed

Forces, hence dependence on Space for military application is rapidly
increasing. ISRO, under the Department of Space (DoS), drives India’s
civil and commercial Space requirements. The Tri-Services Defense Space
Agency (DSA) under HQ IDS has been created to enhance peaceful
exploitation of the Space domain for military purposes. DSA is mandated
to fulfil its charter in conjunction with ISRO, DoS and DRDO. The
Government of India’s recent decision to open the Space domain to
commercial enterprises and directions to ISRO to handhold them is a
positive step and should provide the much-needed additional avenues for
strategic users to build capability.

Conventional wars are increasingly being replaced by hybrid

approaches to conflict, often stopping short of war. In this hybrid
construct, both Space and cyber are opening up new frontiers in
warfare. How is the Indian Army adapting to these changes?

While methods of prosecuting military operations have forayed into non-

kinetic domains like cyber, Space and human psychology, conventional
wars still remain a possibility, even though it may not be a ‘total war’. The
Indian Army is adapting well to this transformation and there does exist
seamless coordination between various stakeholders. A robust cyber
framework is in place to cater to cybersecurity requirements of various
organizations.

As far as utilization of Space capabilities is concerned, necessary measures

are in place to harness it in the fields of surveillance, ISR, communication,
etc. The capability exists to exploit it as a primary source of information as
well as to act as redundancy in communication. The technology
demonstrations in Space have exhibited our capabilities and would also act
as a deterrent to our potential adversaries.

“The Indian Army is abreast with modern

technology advancements and is adopting
measures to identify the domains where
these technologies can be assimilated”
Drones are causing disruption in warfare. Can you elaborate on the
Army’s plans on utilizing drones and countering their use by
adversaries?

The use of drones for military purposes has been a significant game
changer in recent conflicts. Swarm drones with AI have led to disruptive
effects in warfare, as seen during recent Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian
conflicts. Their versatility emanates from the variety of payloads and
flexibility afforded due to endurance and range of operations. Drones have
not only resulted in enhanced battlefield situational awareness but also
facilitated the operational tempo. We have been employing UAVs of
foreign origin for quite some time for communication, ISR, electronic
warfare, etc. The indigenous drone ecosystem is still evolving in terms of
production of micro/mini/tac drones and in areas of manned/unmanned
teaming.

Counter drone solutions are also keeping pace with continuously evolving
drone technologies. The varieties of drones available in different shapes,
size, speeds and capabilities makes it a challenge to counter them with a
single method. The aspects of detection, identification and location
technologies are also difficult due to low radar cross-section, slow speed
and size. The various stakeholders in the Army have been assigned with
clearly defined goals in short and medium terms to defeat the adversary
drone/unmanned systems. Towards this end we have had demonstrations
of some promising prototypes which are under development.
While self-reliance in defense production is a must, the requirement
of state-of-the-art weapon systems in a timely manner cannot be
over emphasized. How can there be a balance between these
seemingly conflicting requirements?

India has been amongst the top three military spenders in the world,
importing most of its requirements from foreign countries. However, with
‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India), a concerted effort has been made
to promote self-reliance in the field of defense technology and indigenous
production. Some of the aspects include issuing a positive list of
indigenization, raising FDI (foreign direct investment) limit in the defense
sector and spending a proportion of capital budget for domestic capital
procurement. Notwithstanding the self-reliance mantra, a proportion of
state-of-the-art systems can also be inducted in order to retain
technological edge, without waiting for the domestic industry to mature.

A long-term integrated perspective plan of the defense requirements would

give the industry a clear picture of future requirements and provide a level
playing field. Steps like establishment of a nodal agency like Indigenous
Defense Equipment Export Association, switching from low value items to
high value indigenous combat platforms like tanks, armored fighting
vehicles, guns, aircraft, helicopters, destroyers and frigates would also
encourage potential foreign buyers. Ultimately, defense industry matures
over a period of time and an entire ecosystem has to be set up to support
the process.

“Space offers immense force-multiplication

capability for the Armed Forces, hence
dependence on Space for military
application is rapidly increasing. As far as
utilization of Space capabilities is concerned,
necessary measures are in place to harness it
in the fields of surveillance, ISR,
communication, etc.”
The Government of India recently promulgated new guidelines for
acquiring and producing geospatial data services including maps.
How do you see the Army benefitting from the recent relaxation in
the rules, and are there any security concerns?

The new guidelines promulgated by the Department of Science and

Technology have subsumed all the existing Ministry of Defense/other
ministerial guidelines and have liberalized mapping and acquiring
geospatial data to a much greater extent. This would definitely result in
enhanced participation by private players and make acquisition of
geospatial data by the industry a lot easier. However, there are concerns
due to relaxation in guidelines for acquisition of geospatial data which is a
prime resource for national security requirements. These concerns have
been highlighted to the ministry from time to time for incorporation of
regulatory mechanisms to ensure availability of data to legitimate entities.
Although the aspects of liberalization of data acquisition and ease of doing
business are well acknowledged, the same should be done with the
requisite regulatory mechanism in place to prevent pilferage of sensitive
geospatial data.

 TAGS

 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
 DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE
 FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES
 SPACE & EARTH OBSERVATION
Geospatial World
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