I. Day 1, Part 3 (1:00-41:05) [41 minutes] The Supreme Court said no. In the case of Ynot v.
IAC,
So in the statement of the Supreme Court, do you see any
correlation in comparison between lawyers and plumbers?
The SC said that: “If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove
better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced.”
(DECS v. San Diego).
Is that only a random comparison or is there a hidden message
to that statement?
Yes. As part of the profession, lawyers file cases; all
imaginable. So in the process, the filing of multiple cases
result in the clogging of the court dockets, while plumbers on
the other hand, their job is to remove obstruction in order to
ensure the free flow of water. So in essence the SC is saying in
DECS v. San Diego, that if the state sees a potential in a
student, the state must advise that student so that we will not
become a society of misfits. So instead of becoming a
problem, these students may become problem solvers. So
again, the choice of a profession is a lawful subject of police
power.
So again there are two tests to a valid exercise of police
power: Lawful Subject and Lawful means
Can we say that once a governmental act passes one of these
tests it can already be a valid exercise of police power?
Answer is no. both test must be complied with.
In Ynot v. IAC, the governmental act challenged in this case is
EO 106-A. The objective of the EO is to prevent the
indiscriminate moving of carabaos and other large cattles. The
means in order to achieve the objective is to prohibit the inter-
provincial transportation of carabaos and carabeef. So in this
case, the EO was challenged on the basis of invalid exercise of
police power. So in the case of Ynot v. IAC, the SC cited a
similar case; the case of U.S. v. Toribio. But in the case of
U.S. v. Toribio, the SC was called upon to rule on the
constitutionality of the supplemental law of the act challenged
in Ynot v. IAC. The supplemental law also intends to prevent
the diminishing number of carabaos. In U.S. v. Toribio, the
law involved in the case requires registration of carabaos and
large cattles, branding and permit for slaughtering. So under
the law, only 11 year old female carabaos can be slaughtered
with a permit. 7 year old carabaos and above can be
slaughtered with a permit. So in the case of U.S. v. Toribio,
the act is valid according to the Supreme Court because the
objective of the law is to prevent the decreasing number of
carabao and the means employed is branding, registration and
permit for slaughtering. Supreme Court said, there is a rational
connection between the object of the law and the means
employed.
So can we say that since U.S. v. Toribio involves a similar law
in the case of Ynot v. IAC, we should also have the same
conclusion with regard to the challenged act?
among others the SC declared unconstitutional the executive
order because of violation of the tests for valid exercise of
police power, particularly lawful means. Because according to
the Supreme Court while the executive order has a lawful
subject which is carabao, which is considered a poor man’s
tractor, the Supreme Court said that the means employed has
no rational connection with the objective of the law because
the carabao can be slaughtered with less difficulty in any
province, as in any other provinces. So the prohibition of
inter-provincial transportation will not save the carabao. In the
same manner, that if a carabao stays in one province,
protection will be increased. According to the Supreme Court,
on that score, the law or executive order is unconstitutional.
There was a time when the inherent powers of the government
namely, police power, eminent domain, and power of taxation
are considered as living in different planets. So the Supreme
Court in those times, apply one to the exclusion of others. So
for example in the case of Baguio v. NAWASA, the Supreme
Court said that the state already exercised eminent domain,
therefore police power cannot be exercised. Which means that
the three powers are treated as exclusive. If the state exercises
police power, it can no longer exercise eminent domain or
taxation.
Is that still the rule?
So with the modern trends of developments in political law
now allow the comingling and simultaneous exercise of these
three inherent powers. The Supreme Court allows the exercise
of police power to retrofit the power of eminent domain, and
police power using taxation as an implement. In the case of
Lutz v. Araneta, congress enacted CA 567; a tax measure
which assesses the tax on the production of centrifugal sugar.
The objective of the law is to retain the preferential status of
cane sugar in the US market so that is why congress imposes a
tax on the producers of the sugar. So in Lutz v. Araneta, the
law was being challenged on the basis that it is an invalid
exercise of the power of taxation; particularly, it violates the
uniformity in taxation because it only imposes taxes in sugar
and not on other commodities. According to the Supreme
Court, the power exercised in the enactment of the law is
police power, using only the power of taxation as an
implement. So the power of taxation is only used as a tool to
further a valid police power objective. So the police power
objective is to regulate sugar industry and the means employed
uses taxation by imposing in the production of sugar. The
power of implementation is only used as an implement or tool
in furthering or espousing the police power objective.
How can we determine whether the enactment of a tax masure
is in the exercise of the powr of taxation or police power using
only the power of taxation as an implement?
It depends on the objective. If the objective of a tax measure is
to generate income or raise revenue, the power involved is
power of taxation. So in that regard to determine the validity
of that law we have use uniformity and equity in taxation. But
when the objective of the tax measure is to regulate a
particular activity, the power involved is police power and the
power of taxation is only used as an implement.
So the police power can also be used together with the power
of eminent domain. While the power of taxation can be used
as an implement of police power, the power of eminent
domain cannot be used as an implement. In the case of
Association of Small Landowner v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, the Supreme Court in one sentence says that the
power of eminent domain can be used as an implement of
police power but they clarified by citing Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co, “power of eminent domain can only be used as a
complement not as an implement.” Because as an implement,
it means as a tool. It cannot be used as a tool in the discharge
of police power because the objective in police power and
eminent domain is different. In police power, the objective is
to regulate property. Properties can also be taken in police
power but the objective of taking is destruction. While in
eminent domain the objective is taking of private property,
and in police power, the property taken is noxious, in the
power of eminent domain, the property is wholesome. So in
that regard, power of eminent domain cannot be used as an
implement otherwise, it can be used as a complement.
Complement means the two will be used together but not one
as a tool of the other.
One good example of the exercise of eminent domain as a
complement of police power is the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. So in the case of
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of the CARP. Under the CARP, there are two
stages. The first stage is the imposition of retention limit. So
landowners can only retain five hectare each and every child
of age tilling the land, three hectares. So that’s the first stage
of CARP. The second stage is the taking of property in excess
of the retention limits. So any property in excess of the
retention limit shall be taken by the government for
distribution for qualified beneficiaries. The government will
pay the property owner. So this is a good example of the
comingling of the exercise of police power and the power of
eminent domain. As to the imposition of retention limit, the
power involved is police power because it imposes a restraint
or regulation on the exercise or the use of property. On the
second stage, the taking of property in excess of the retention
limit, the power involved is eminent domain because it
requires the taking of property and the government will pay
just compensation.
Primarily, police power is exercised by the state to regulate
liberty or property. But as we said earlier, in police power,
properties can also be taken. But not all properties can be
taken in the exercise of police power. Only properties that are
noxious or intended for noxious purpose can be taken in the
exercise of police power. If the property sought to be
confiscated I wholesome, it cannot be taken in police power
but rather in eminent domain and therefore there is a
requirement of payment of just compensation.
In the case of City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, the
petitioner sought to implement an ordinance in Quezon City.
Under this ordinance, all memorial parks within Quezon City
are required to give the local government unit 6% of the area
of their memorial parks for the burial of pauper residents of
Quezon City without payment of just compensation. So that
ordinance was challenged on the basis of an invalid exercise
of police power. So according to the local government, they
are not confiscating the property, they are only regulation. So
in this case the Supreme Court distinguished, the concept of
regulation and taking. The Supreme Court said that while as a
general rule, properties may be taken, if regulation goes too
far, it will be recognized as taking. So according to the
Supreme Court in the case of City Government of Quezon
City v. Ericta, the regulation went too far and it already
amounted to taking. So according to the Supreme Court, since
it is a taking, it is not valid in the exercise of police power,
because the memorial park is not a noxious or a harmful
property. So since it is not a harmful property, it can only be
confiscated or taken in the exercise of eminent domain.
Secondly, the purpose of compulsory donation is not for
condemnation. The purpose is for public use; to be used as a
burial place for pauper residents. According to the Supreme
Court, this is not a valid objective of taking in police power,
because in police power, noxious properties are taken for
destruction. One good example of exercise of police power
which involves confiscation is the government can confiscate
shabu and other prohibited drugs without paying just
compensation. The purpose of that confiscation is not for
public it is for condemnation, it is for destruction. So in that
regard, this is an example of taking in police power.
In another case, Mosqueda v. The Pilipino Banana Growers
and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA), this involves an
ordinance which was passed at the time President Duterte was
still mayor of Davao. So in 2007, the ordinance was enacted to
prohibit the aerial spraying for all agricultural plantation in
Davao. So in Mosqueda, the ordinance in question also
requires a buffer zone, so all agricultural plantations in Davao
City are required to maintain a buffer zone consisting of 30
meters surrounding the property. And the buffer zone cannot
be used for planting banana but it can be used for the planting
of tall diversified trees in order to prevent aerial drift. So the
ordinance in question was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court not on the basis that is it constitutes taking
insofar as the buffer zone, because the respondents contend
that the maintenance of the 30 meter buffer zone constitutes
taking without just compensation. The Supreme Court
declared the ordinance unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection of the law but not for the violation of the tests
for a valid exercise of police power.
So let’s first discuss police power. Insofar as police power, the
Supreme Court said that the establishment of a buffer zone
does not constitute taking but mere regulation. Because in
order to constitute taking, the property owner but be deprived
of all the beneficial use of the property. In the case of the
buffer zone, the property owner can still derive benefit by
planting trees, which means that, that does not constitute
confiscation. That is only regulation. The owner can only
devote it to a specific purpose.
Another case is Manila Memorial Park v. DSWD. This
involves the senior citizen discount law. Prior to the
amendment of the Senior Citizen Discount Law, all discounts
extended by establishments are treated as tax credit which are
deductible to the tax due of the establishments. This means
that if the establishment extended 10 peso discount to a senior
citizen, that 10 pesos discount shall be deducted from the tax
due from the establishment. So there is an equivalent peso per
peso compensation. But when the law was amended, the
discounts extended by establishments are only treated as
deductible expense not as a tax credit anymore but only
deductible from the gross sales prior to tax. This means that
the establishment cannot recover everything. So if the
establishment extended 10 pesos, the establishment can only
recover 3.25 because it will only be treated as deductible
expense before tax. So in this case, the amended law was
challenged on the basis that it constitutes taking without just
compensation. The Supreme Court ruled on the negative,
stating that the discount extended by the establishment is not
yet part of the profit. There is only an expectation that it may
become a profit. Since it is not yet part of the profit, it is not
yet a property of the establishment. The Supreme Court
compared the amended law to other laws like price control act.
Under the price control act, the prices of basic necessities are
regulated. Rice and Sugar for example can only be sold in
specific amounts. So according to the Supreme Court, there
can be no doubt that the price control act is a valid exercise of
police power and the imposition of suggested retail price does
not constitute taking but mere regulation. Supreme Court said
that insofar as the price control act, it only regulates the
amount of profit that the establishment can make, so that they
cannot overly profit or they cannot engage in profiteering in
the basic necessities. Similarly, insofar as the senior citizen
discount law as amended, the Supreme Court said that, in
effect, the law only regulates the amount of profit that
establishments can make. There is no taking involved. So
since there is no taking involved, there is no requirement for a
peso per peso compensation.
While police power is inherent in the state, in that it does not
require an express constitutional conferment, it is nonetheless
based on two legal principles. The two legal principles that
constitute the basis of the exercise of this power are the
principle of salus populi est suprema lex or the will of the
people is the supreme law and the principle of sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non laedas. Literally it means use your property so as
not to injure other property rights. SO both these principles
call for the subordination of private interest to the common
good. So there can be no absolute liberty. There can be no
absolute dominion over property. Properties can be regulated
but regulation cannot go beyond regulation because it will
amount to taking.
So we go to eminent domain. Eminent domain is the power of
the state to take property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. The power of eminent domain is regarded as
the highest and the most exact idea of property remaining in
the state. This only means that under this power, all private
properties are reserved for use by the government upon
payment of just compensation. Which means that if the
government seized for the use of a public property, it can be
expropriated in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
upon payment of just compensation. Eminent domain is used
interchangeably with expropriation.
Is eminent domain synonymous with expropriation?
No. Eminent domain is different from expropriation. Eminent
domain again is the inherent power of the state to take private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
On the other hand, expropriation is the means by which the
state exercises the power of eminent domain. The difference
between these two terms is apparent under section 1 of Rule
67. It is provided therein that the power eminent domain shall
be exercised through the filing of a verified petition. That
verified petition is a petition for expropriation. Which means
that eminent domain is the power used, and expropriation is
the means by which the power is exercised. So by analogy,
when the congress enacts a law, the power involved is
legislative power. And that legislative power is exercised by
passing bills. So that’s the comparison insofar as eminent
domain and expropriation is concerned.
Section 9 of Article III provides that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. So can we
say that this provides, the constitutional basis of the exercise
of the power of eminent domain?
No. The power eminent domain is an inherent power of the
state and as such it does not require any express constitutional
grant. Section 9, of Article III is not a grant of power to the
state, it is a limitation of the power of the government. That is
the reason why it is provided for under article III not under
article VI because it provides a limitation in the power of the
government. So under section 9 of article III, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain can only involve private
property. And the exercise of the power of eminent domain
shall only be for public use and it requires payment of just
compensation.
So we said earlier that while police power is an inherent
power, it is nonetheless based on two legal principles. How
about the power of eminent domain. What is the basis of the
exercise of this inherent power?
In the case of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila, the Supreme Court said that the only basis of the
exercise of eminent domain is necessity. Which means that
necessity is the basis of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. In the City of Manila case, the local government unit
sought to expropriate part of the Chinese Cemetery. So there
are property owners who offer property in exchange of that
part of the Chinese cemetery, but the government said no, they
wanted to pass through the Chinese Cemetery. They will not
use other properties. So in this case, the exercise of the power
of eminent domain was challenged as unreasonable and
arbitrary, particularly as to necessity. One of the issues of this
case is whether necessity or the question of necessity is a
justiciable controversy or a political question because
according to the petitioner, necessity is a political question
because in expropriation proceedings, there are only two
issues namely, 1) authority of the expropriator and 2) the
amount of just compensation. So once the authority of the
expropriator is already established, the only remaining issue is
the amount of just compensation. The Supreme Court said no.
Necessity is a justiciable controversy but of course that needs
qualification. So according to the Supreme Court, necessity is
a political question if the power of eminent domain is
exercised directly by congress or when the exercise of the
power of eminent domain is through a delegate under a
specific delegation. The question of necessity is a justiciable
controversy on the other hand if the power of eminent domain
is exercised by a delegate under a general delegation.
What properties can be taken in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain?
Only private properties.
How about public properties or properties registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Can they be
expropriated?
Note that under section 1 of rule 67, the rules of court provide
that when the property subject of expropriation is registered in
the name of the republic, it must be alleged in the petition. So
impliedly, the rules of court allow the filing of a petition for
expropriation even if the property is registered under the name
of the republic, as long as that fact has been alleged in the
petition.
So can we now say that public properties owned by the
republic can be expropriated?
No. Only private properties can be expropriated. To reconcile
the principle with the rules of court provision by saying that, a
property can be the subject of several interests. A property
may be owned by the government and yet there is a private
interest attached to this public property. So say for example,
the land belongs to the government. The title of the property is
under the name of the Republic of the Philippines. But this
land has improvements introduced by private individuals.
Supposing the government needs those improvements over its
property for public use. The government cannot just take the
property without just compensation. The government needs to
expropriate those property; not the land but the improvements.
So in that regard, what can be expropriated is the private
interest attached to the government property not the
government property itself because expropriation is a forcible
taking of property. So the government cannot force itself to
yield with its property because it is already owned by the
government.
What about properties devoted for public use? This was raised
in the case of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila. According to the respondent, in the general sense, the
Chinese cemetery is already a property devoted to public use
because any person of Chinese descent can buy a lot in that
cemetery for the burial of their dead family. So according to
the Supreme Court, to that extent, it can be considered a
property devoted to public use. So since it is a property
devoted to public use, but still private property, then it can still
be the subject of expropriation as long as it is the congress that
exercises the power or it is a necessity for the exercise of the
power exercised by a delegate.
So again, there is a difference between a public property and a
property devoted to public use. A public property means the
property belongs to the government. Property devoted to
public use means that the property is of private ownership but
it can be used by the public. So one good example is a private
park which admits the public for a fee. This is private property
although devoted to public use. This can be further
expropriated but not a public property. So all private property
can be expropriated.
What kind of private property can be expropriated?
According to the Supreme Court, any private property that
may come under the dominion of man can be expropriated. It
can be real, personal, tangible, intangible, corporeal, and
incorporeal. So as long as it may come under the dominion of
man, it can be expropriated. According to Justice Cruz, all
private properties can be expropriated, except money or
choses in action. So choses in action, it is understandable
because choses in action are just expectancy. They have not
yet ripened into a right. But how about money. Why can’t we
expropriate money? Justice Cruz explained that expropriation
of money will result in an absurd situation where the
government will take money and pay money as just
compensation. But this is not absolutely correct because U.S.
dollars are considered as money but U.S. dollars can be
expropriated because possession of a U.S. dollar by the
government is different from possession of local currency.
Because in international market or in the international field,
the financial standing of a state is measured according to its
dollar reserves or gold reserves. So which means that, the
financial standing of a state is measured based on the
possession of this currency so even if the state has a high local
currency reserve, if it has low dollar reserve, it will not enjoy
preferential treatment in the international community. So in
that regard, the statement of Justice Cruz that money cannot be
expropriated can only be applied to the legal tender in the
Philippines. It can only be applied to Philippine Peso that are
in circulation, which means that Philippine Peso which are out
of circulation or demonetized can be expropriated not for their
face value but for its intrinsic value. So again only private
property can be expropriated.
How about services. May services be expropriated?
In the case of Republic v. PLDT, PLDT and the Bureau of
Telecommunications entered into a contract for
interconnection. So when the contract expired, PLDT didn’t
want to renew the contract. So the main question in this case is
first, can it compel PLDT to enter into a contract, can it
compel PLDT to renew the service agreement and second, can
the government compel PLDT to render the services. As to the
first question, the Supreme Court said, that the Republic
cannot compel PLDT to renew the agreement because one of
the essential elements of a contract is consent voluntarily
given, so if a party to a contract is compelled, meaning it is not
voluntary to enter into a contract then there is a vitiation of
consent and as such the contract is not valid. But on the other
hand, while the government cannot compel PLDT to renew
the service agreement, PLDT can be compelled to render
services under the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
So according to the Supreme Court, the services of PLDT, are
private properties therefore they can be expropriated for public
use upon payment of just compensation.
So can we say then that with the pronouncement of the
Supreme Court that services can be expropriated that any
service can be compelled by the government to be rendered
for the government upon payment of just compensation as
long as it is intended for public use?
Not necessarily. That statement of the Supreme Court that
services could be expropriated should be interpreted within the
factual circumstances of the case. So remember that in the
case of Republic v. PLDT, the service involved is
telecommunication service. A telecommunication service is a
public utility service. This means that the statement of the
Supreme Court in Republic v. PLDT that services can
expropriated can only be applied to public utility services not
to personal services. This is supplemented by section 18,
article XII which provides that for the interest of national
welfare and defense, the state may transfer ownership of
public utilities for the operation of the government. This does
create additional power to the government but it imposes
limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent domain
when it comes to public utility services. Which means that
under the exercise of the power of eminent domain the state
can take any private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation, even public utility services. But in the
advent of section 18 of article XII, the constitution limits the
exercise of this power when it comes to public utility services
to the extent that they can only be expropriated by the
government in the interest of public welfare or national
defense. So it imposes limitations rather than additional power
on the part of the government.
So in order to validly exercise the power of eminent domain, it
requires taking of private property. Taking of private property
in eminent domain is different from taking of property in
police power. In eminent domain, properties are taken for
public use, and in eminent domain the property taken should
be justly compensated.
Does taking of the property in eminent domain require the
transfer of ownership of the property expropriated, does taking
in eminent domain require transfer of possession of the
property expropriated?
These questions were answered by the Supreme Court in the
case of Republic v. PLDT. So according to the Supreme Court
in that case taking does not require transfer of ownership.
Taking in eminent domain does not require transfer of
possession. So the imposition of burden on the property may
constitute taking in eminent domain. And this ruling of the
Supreme Court should likewise be read with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Republic v. Castellvi. In Republic v.
Castellivi, the property involved was subject to a contract of
lease between the Philippine Airforce and the owner of the
property. So there was contract of lease that started on July 1,
1947. So the lease contract was for one year, renewable in a
year to year basis. So the government started to occupy the
property on the concept of a lessee on July 1, 1947. On June
30, 1956, the owners already manifested to the Philippine
Airforce, their intention not to renew the lease contract. So the
owners were already terminating the contract because they
will subdivide the property for residential purposes. The
government stayed on the property despite non-renewal of the
lease contract. On July 26, 1959, the government initiated
expropriation proceedings over the property and then upon
filing of the petition for expropriation, the government filed a
motion for a writ of possession so that it may be placed in
possession of the property sought to be expropriated. The writ
of possession was granted by the trial court and issued on
August 10, 1959. So the main issue in the case of Republic v
Castellvi is when was there taking in eminent domain. Was
there taking in eminent domain on July 1, 1947 where the
government started occupy the property under a lease contract.
Is there taking in July 1, 1956 when the government’s contract
of lease expired and yet stayed in the property or was there
taking in the concept of eminent domain in June 26, 11959
where the government file the petition for expropriation or
was it from August 10, 1959 when the trial court granted the
writ of possession.?
[Covered time ends from here]
II. Day 2, Part 1 (1:50:32- 2:12:09) [21 minutes]
How about level or degree of civilization? In the case of
People v. Cayat, this involves a law that prohibits non-
Christian tribes, (the use of the term non-Christian tribes under
the law refers to the cultural minorities) of the use and
possession of non-traditional alcoholics to the cultural
minorities. So they are only allowed to use the traditional
spirits, traditional drinks. The basis of the law is because of
the study that shows that cultural minorities who consume
non-traditional drinks, become more violent. So in the case of
People v. Cayat, the Supreme Court sustained the
classification. According to the Supreme Court, the
classification between those who have higher degree of
civilization and those cultural minorities rests on substantial
distinction.
So again, so far we have identified four distinctions that could
be the basis of reasonable classification. So again, gender, age,
citizenship, and degree of civilization.
Can we say, that applying the doctrine of stare decisis, or
adherence to judicial precedence, that whenever these
classifications are the basis of differences in future laws, we
can apply the decisions in these cases in order to justify the
validity of the classification? So can we say that if a future law
gender as a distinction, we can apply PASEI v. Drilon? If the
law classifies individuals based on age, we can say Dumlao v.
COMELEC, can we use stare decisis in cases of valid
classification?
The Supreme Court in PASEI v. Drilon said no. We cannot
apply stare decisis insofar as the reasonableness of the
classification in one case. So which means the reasonableness
of a classification shall only apply as to the factual
circumstances of each case. But the Supreme Court did not
stop there. The Supreme Court said that there is a general rule.
The Supreme Court in the case of PASEI v. Drilon cited
Justice Fernando. According to Justice Fernando, when the
classification is based on distinctions that make a real
difference such as infancy, sex, or degree of civilization of
cultural minorities, or citizenship, the better rule it would seem
according to Justice Fernando, is to allow their validity only if
the young and the old, the women, the cultural minorities, and
the Filipinos are singled out for favorable treatment. So if
these classifications are used to favor the group, the
classification is valid. But if these classifications are used to
discriminate the group, the classification is invalid. So to
better understand it, we have learned in Ichong v. Hernandez,
the Supreme Court said that classification between Filipino
nationals and aliens is valid because it is based on substantial
distinction. In the case of International School Alliance of
Educators v. Quisumbing, this is a case involving professors
of the international school. In I.S. the rate of salary of the
professor depend on the manner of hiring. Local hires peso
rate, so lower. Foreign hires on the other hand, dollar rate is
used, therefore higher. They’re performing the same job but
paid differently. While the Supreme Court did not apply
section 1, of Article III because I.S. is a private institution, and
we only apply equal protection when it comes to governmental
acts, the Supreme Court applied a similar concept under labor
law; equal pay for equal work, which is the same concept as
the equal protection. So the Supreme Court declared that the
policy of I.S. is invalid for violating the principle of equal pay
for equal work. So had it been different, meaning, Filipino
professors are paid higher than foreign professors, that policy
would have been considered valid because Filipino citizens
are treated favorably but they cannot be treated with prejudice.
So again, the concept of stare decisis cannot be applied in
equal protection cases but there is a general rule. If the four
classifications we have identified earlier are the bases of
classification for favorable treatment that is a valid
classification.
So we have learned in our political law that before courts can
assume jurisdiction over constitutional issues, courts must
satisfy the four requisites of judicial inquiry namely, 1) Actual
case or controversy, 2) Proper Party, 3) Raised at the earliest
possible opportunity and, 4) the constitutional question is the
Lis Mota of the controversy. Actual case or controversy means
that there is an actual injury or at the very least, threatened,
injury because of the questioned act. Actual case or
controversy does not allow speculation so it must be based on
facts.
Do we apply this principle insofar as equal protection cases?
Can we say that when there is no inequality yet, courts must
refrain from entertaining constitutional questions about the
law?
In the case of Ormoc Sugar v. Treasurer of Ormoc, the local
government unit issued an ordinance imposing a tax on
centrifugal sugar produced by Ormoc Sugar Company. The
ordinance specifically names Ormoc Sugar. At the time the
ordinance was passed, it is only Ormoc Sugar which is the
sugar mill in Ormoc. That is the reason why it was named in
the ordinance. The ordinance says “we hereby impose a tax of
X% to the centrifugal sugar produced by Ormoc sugar. At the
time the ordinance was passed, the naming of Ormoc Sugar in
the ordinance did not result in discrimination because Ormoc
Sugar is the only central in Ormoc. So the naming of Ormoc
Sugar does not result in discrimination. So the ordinance was
challenged on the basis that it was unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection of the law. The Supreme
Court assumed jurisdiction over the issue because according to
them, the reasonableness of the classification is only based on
the factual circumstances at the time. If the circumstances
change, if another industry is involved in the production of
centrifugal sugar, then it will result to hostile discrimination.
The same is true in People v. Vera. In this case the probation
act was challenged on the basis that it allows provinces to
appropriate funds and it allows other provinces not to
appropriate funds and thereby, there is a difference in the
application of probation law. At the time that the probation act
was challenged, there is no province, even the city of Manila
that has ever appropriated funds for the salary of the probation
officer. This means that at the time that it was being
questioned, there is no discrimination because the law does
not apply nationwide. So to say that one province will
appropriate and another province will not appropriate is just
speculative. It may or may not happen but the Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction over the issue because of the third
requisite of reasonable classification. For the classification to
be considered reasonable, the reasonableness of the
classification must go beyond the factual circumstances at the
time the classification is made. Even if the factual
circumstances change, that classification must still be
reasonable. So in the case of Ormoc Sugar, if the factual
circumstances change, as when another business engages in
the production of centrifugal sugar, that becomes
discriminatory. So in that regard, the Supreme Court said it
was invalid, even if there was no actual case or controversy at
that time. So which means that there are some instances
where courts do away with strict procedure. Such as in the
case of equal protection, the courts waives the requirement of
actual case of controversy. In the case of overbreadth doctrine,
facial challenge, the course do away with the actual party
requirement because even the rights of another person may be
invoked by a person challenging the constitutionality of the
law.
The last requisite of reasonable classification is that it must be
applied equally to all members of the class. So which means
that there should be no sub-classification within the class. So
let’s take the case of Meralco v. PTC, so again this case
involves Executive Order No. 1, Series of 2010 of President
Benigno Aquino. Under EO No. 1, it calls for the creation of
the PTC which was tasked to investigate the violations of law
of the immediately preceding Arroyo administration. There
are two issues involved in this case. First is the power of the
president to create that ad hoc body and second is the
constitutionality of the task of the PTC. As to the power or
authority of the president to create PTC, the Supreme Court
said it was valid. The basis of said authority is section 17 of
article VII, better known as the “take care clause”. Under that
constitutional authority of the president to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed, he can create investigative or ad hoc
committees to determine whether laws are faithfully executed.
So in that regard the creation of PTC by the president through
EO No. 1 is constitutionally allowed. How about the power of
the PTC? Note that the power of the PTC is only to investigate
violations of the immediately preceding administration
(Arroyo administration). According to the Supreme Court, on
this score, the creation of the PTC is unconstitutional because
it treats Arroyo administration apart from other members of
the class. According to the Supreme Court, all previous
administrations should be treated similarly. The flaw of EO
No. 1 according to the Supreme Court is that it does not apply
to previous administration but singles out the Arroyo
administration. But to argue on the constitutionality of the law,
the Solicitor General contends that, indeed EO No. 1 only
applies to Arroyo administration and that they recognize that
there are violations of law of previous administrations but
according to the Solicitor General, the insufficiency of the law
to address all violations of law of all previous administrations
does not make it constitutional it makes it insufficient. The
Solicitor General invokes the underinclusiveness Doctrine.
Under the underinclusiveness doctrine, the failure or
insufficiency of the law to cover all the evils sought to be
avoided is not a ground to declare it unconstitutional. The
remedy is supplemental legislation. So if the law covers only
one aspect of the evils sought to avoided, it is not in violation
of the constitution. There should be an implementing or
supplemental legislation that will cover other acts. But the
Supreme Court said, yes that’s the underinclusiveness rule, but
in order to apply this rule, the insufficiency of the law must
not be deliberate. So meaning the failure of the law to cover
everything must be on the basis of inadvertence. So if the
insufficiency of the law is deliberate, and intentional, the
underinclusiveness doctrine cannot apply. So the Supreme
Court in the case of EO No. 1, the singling of Arroyo was not
through inadvertence. It was intentional because according to
the Supreme Court, no less than three provisions of EO No. 1
mentions the previous administration. So that means it is
specifically and deliberately intended only for the Arroyo
administration. So in that regard, underinclusiveness doctrine
cannot be applied.
So again, to validly treat persons under classification, all the
members of the group must be treated similarly. In the case of
Almonte v. Vasquez, this is the case involving the anonymous
complaint. So insofar as cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman, the ombudsman allows anonymous
complaints. But we know that in cases cognizable by regular
courts, the accused can only be brought to court by persons
who can meet them face to face. But insofar as cases
cognizable by the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan
anonymous complaints are allowed. So in this case, that rule
was challenged on the basis of violation of equal protection of
the law. According to the petitioner, in other cases, the
respondent and the accused can only be charged by a person
who has the courage to make know his identity; not
anonymous. But for public officers, it is allowed so they
contend it violates the equal protection clause. In that case, the
Supreme Court classified the employees into two groups.
According to the SC, employees in the private sector, and
employees in the civil service are different. Employees in the
civil service are accountable to the people. So in that regard,
the Supreme Court said that any person can file a case against
them even anonymously because of the recognized reluctance
of Filipino citizens of filing cases against their public officers
because of fear of reprisals. So according to the Supreme
Court, classification based on employment; employment in the
civil service, employment in the private sector rests on
substantial distinction.
So having that in mind, in another case, in the case of
Himagan v. People, the law challenged here is the law that
deals with members of the PNP. Members of the PNP who are
charged with grave offenses, can be indefinitely suspended
(Indefinite Preventive Suspension) under the law. So that law
is being challenged in Himagan v. People because under the
Civil Service Law, public officers can only be preventively
suspended for 90 days maximum. So why is there a sub-
classification among members of the PNP? The Supreme
Court said that the classification in Almonte v. Vasquez is not
carried over in this particular case. Indeed the SC has treated
employees in the civil service similarly but that classification
cannot be applied to other cases. So in the case of Himagan v.
People, SC said that there is a difference between police
officers and other civil service personnel. Police officers carry
firearms and the purpose of preventive suspension is so that
the person charged of the offense cannot interfere with the
investigation. So since police officers carry firearms, if they
will be on active duty while the investigation is moving, they
may threaten witnesses. So in that regard, the Supreme Court
said the classification rests on substantial distinction.
So Similarly in Quinto v. COMELEC, the SC sustained the
classification of officers based on their assumption of office;
appointive and elective. So under the omnibus election code,
prior to its amendment, the filing of COC will be deemed ipso
facto considered as resignation of public officers regardless
whether appointive or elective. But when the Omnibus
Election Code was amended, it was only the appointive that
are considered ipso facto resigned. The elective public officers
can continue in office even after the filing of the COC. So in
Quinto v. COMELEC, the petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of the amended Omnibus Election Code
because it discriminates public officers. According to the
Supreme Court, NO. There is a substantial distinction between
appointive and elective public officers. According to the SC,
appointive public officers are disallowed by the constitution,
particularly under article IX of the constitution to engage in
partisan political activity. So which means that when an
appointive public officer files a COC, that appointive officer is
already engaged in partisan political activity. So that is
prohibited under article IX of the constitution. But the nature
of elective public officer is partisan according to the Supreme
Court. So from day one until the end of their term they are
engaged in partisan political campaign. So to disqualify them
by the mere fact that they are engaged partisan political
campaign would deny the nature of their office which is
partisan. So according to the Supreme Court, this the basis
why they are not deemed ipso facto resigned even after the
filing of their COC. In that regard, the Supreme Court
sustained the classification in that case.
III. Day 2, Part 2 (1:00-34:37) [34 minutes]
Mere presence under look and see, does not make the search
as being conducted by public officers. So again, only searches
conducted by the government and officers of the government
whose task is to enforce the law or in short, law enforcement
officers are covered by the constitutional guarantee.
So we go now to the requisites of a valid warrant. So under the
constitution, the requisites of a valid warrant are: 1) It must be
based upon probable cause, 2) The probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation, 3) the determination of probable cause
must be through examination of the complainant and the
witnesses, and 4) The warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched or the person and things to be seized. So
these are expressly provided for under the constitution. So
note that under the constitution, the constitutional duty to
determine the existence of probable cause rests on a judge,
because the constitution says “to be determined personally by
a judge”.
What is the implication of the specific mention of this
authority to judges?
It means that it cannot be withdrawn either by congress or by
Supreme Court. But the authority under section 2 of article III
in determining the existence of probable cause and the
consequent issuance of a warrant, refers only to cases where a
complaint or information is already filed in court. So which
means that the determination of the existence of probable, the
issuance of a warrant after the criminal action is filed in court
is a duty given by the constitution to the judge and therefore it
cannot be withdrawn by the congress or the supreme court. So
which means that other authority of judges, which are not
included in the constitution can be withdrawn either by the
congress or the constitution. So to better understand it, prior to
the amendment of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
particularly under rule 112. In 2005, there was an amendment
to rule 112. But prior to the amendment, MTC judges can
conduct preliminary investigations. When the preliminary
investigation is conducted by MTC judges, they can issue
warrants of arrest, even at the preliminary investigation stage.
So this is not the warrant of arrest contemplated by section 2
of article III, because the warrant of arrest contemplated by
section 2 of article III refers to a warrant of arrest after the
filing of the criminal information in court. So in the case of
warrant of arrest that can be issued by MTC judges during
preliminary investigation, this was withdrawn through a
circular in 2005. So starting 2005, MTC judges can no longer
conduct preliminary investigations. So since they cannot
conduct preliminary investigations, they can no longer issue
warrants of arrest during preliminary investigations. So this
can be validly withdrawn because this is not the authority
covered by section 2 of article III. So authority covered by
section 2 of article III cannot be withdrawn either by the
congress or the Supreme Court.
So again, the first requisite of a valid is that it must be based
upon probable cause. What does probable cause mean?
Probable cause refers to such facts or circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that in themselves are
sufficient to induce a reasonably cautious man to rely on them
and to act in pursuance thereof. So that is the general
definition of probable cause. But as applied to search warrant,
probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the object sought in relation to the offense may be
found in the place sought to be searched. So this is probable
cause as applied to search warrant.
In the case of Mantaring v. Judge Roman, this is a case where
a search warrant was served for the search and seizure of
unlicensed firearm and the search warrant named Mantaring
Jr. So Mantaring Jr. was named in the search warrant. When
the criminal information was filed, Mantaring Sr. was
included and consequently a warrant of arrest is issued against
Mantaring Sr. So according to Mantaring Sr., the issuance of
warrant of arrest can only be done to those who are named in
the search warrant. So since he is not named in search warrant,
he cannot be named in the subsequent warrant of arrest (he
contends). The Supreme Court said no. Search warrants and
warrants of arrest are based on different probabilities. So there
are different probabilities on search warrants and there are
different probabilities in warrants of arrest. In search warrants
according to the Supreme Court, the probabilities are: the
object sought is in connection with an offense and second that
it may be found in the place sought to be searched. Those are
the only probabilities in a search warrant. While in a warrant
of arrest the probabilities are: a crime has been committed and
that the person sought to be arrested may be probably guilty
thereof. So since search warrants and warrants of arrest are
based on different probabilities, persons named in the search
warrant may be different from persons named in the
subsequent warrants of arrest.
So what is a search warrant?
Under section 1 of rule 126, a search warrant is an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines,
signed by the judge directed to a peace officer commanding
him to search for personal properties described therein and to
bring it before the court.
So may a search warrant be issued for the search and seizure
of a real property?
No. by express provision under the rules of court, the search
warrant can only be issued for the search and seizure of a
personal property. Because in a search warrant, the serving
officers has two duties. First is to look for the property
described in the warrant. After finding it, bringing it before the
court. So it would be physically impossible for serving
officers to bring real property before the court. So the search
warrant can only be issued for the search and seizure of
personal properties. Under section 3 of Rule 126, the three
properties enumerated under the rules of court which may be
seized by virtue of search warrant are all personal properties.
So search warrants may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal properties which are: 1) object of the crime, 2)
embezzled, stolen or proceeds of crime, 3) used or intended to
be used as a means to commit the crime. All of these
properties are personal properties and search warrants are only
valid for 10 days. The ten day period shall be counted from the
day of the issuance not the day when the police receive the
order. As distinguished from a warrant of arrest, a warrant of
arrest is valid until served. Only that the serving officer has a
period of 10 days from receipt to make a return meaning they
have to explain why they weren’t able to serve it but they can
serve the warrant of arrest even beyond the ten day period. But
when it comes to search warrant, they can only be served
within ten days from the date of issuance.
Supposing, a search warrant was issued for the search and
seizure of shabu June 1, 2019. So on June 1, 2019, the police
officers went to the place described in the warrant. They did
not find shabu. Can they go back the next day, given that it’s
within the 10 day period?
No. A search warrant can only be served once. So once that
search warrant is already served on the first day, even if there
are nine days remaining, police officers can no longer use that
search warrant. They have to apply for another one.
What is the nature of search warrant proceedings?
In the case of UNILAB v. Isip, the respondent contends that
search warrant proceedings are criminal proceedings. So since
they are criminal proceedings, only the Solicitor General, and
the Public Prosecutor can participate. According to the
respondent, since the appeal of UNILAB is not through the
Solicitor General or the Public Prosecutor, it cannot be
entertained by the court because UNILAB is a private property
and according to the respondent proceedings are criminal
proceedings. The Supreme Court said no. Search warrant
proceedings are not criminal cases. While they are titled like
criminal cases because search warrant proceedings are also
titled “People of the Philippines v. Juan dela Cruz”. Search
warrant according to the Supreme Court are not directed
against a specific person. So even if the title of the case say
People of the Philippines v. Juan dela Cruz, it is not directed
against Juan dela Cruz. It is directed against a personal
property. According to the Supreme Court, a search warrant is
a John Doe proceedings, it applies to all persons of the whole
world, whoever that may be. As long as that property is
specifically in the warrant. So in that regard, search warrant
proceedings are not criminal proceedings.
How about civil? Since private parties can participate in
search warrant proceedings, can we say now that search
warrant proceedings are civil proceedings?
Supreme Court said no because search warrant proceedings
are not concerned with adjudication of civil rights and
obligations. So in that regard, even if private parties can
participate, they don’t partake in the nature of civil
proceedings.
How about administrative proceeding? Can we now say that
since search warrant proceeding are neither criminal nor civil
proceedings, can we say that these are administrative
proceedings?
Supreme Court said no. They are not administrative
proceedings as well because in administrative proceedings, the
standard of evidence mandated by the Supreme Court is
substantial evidence. In search warrant proceedings, the
standard of evidence is only probably cause. This made the
Supreme Court conclude that search warrant proceedings are
Sui Generis proceedings. Supreme Court said that search
warrant proceedings is a mode of discovery. So in that regard,
even in search warrant proceedings, private parties can
participate.
Probable cause must be determined the judge and the
constitution mandates that the just must personally determine
the existence of probable cause. Does that mean that in
determining probable cause, the judge must personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses he may produce?
This is the issue in several cases. In the case of Soliven v.
Makasiar, this is an offshoot of the libel complaint by former
President Corazon Aquino against petitioners for libel because
she was portrayed in the Philippine Star editorial as having
hidden under her bed during the 1987 coup. So she filed a
criminal complaint against Soliven et. al. (Editors and board of
Philippine Star). In Soliven v. Makasiar, the trial court issued
a warrant but when the petitioners asked “did you personally
interview the president before you issued that warrant of
arrest?” the trial court said no and said she relied on the
resolution of the public prosecutor. This is the reason why
according to the petitioner in the case, there was a violation of
their right particularly in the constitution because the judge did
not personally examine the complainant and the witnesses.
In the case of Silva v. Judge Ontal and Mata v. Bayona, in
these cases, the trial court judge issued a warrant based on the
affidavits of the complainants and the affidavits of the
witnesses. Did the Supreme Court in both cases sustain the
validilty of the warrant? In the case of Soliven v. Makasiar,
the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the warrant but in
the case of Silva v. Judge Ontal and Mata v. Bayona, the
Supreme Court said not valid. So what is the difference
between these two cases on the one hand and Soliven v.
Makasiar on the other hand?
In the case of Soliven v. Makasiar, the warrant issued by the
judge is a warrant of arrest. In the latter two cases, the warrant
issued by the court in both cases are search warrants. So which
means that, for warrants of arrest, the judge can determine the
existence of probable cause even if the judge won’t personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses. According to the
Supreme Court in Soliven v. Makasiar, the constitutional duty
of the Judge is to only personally evaluate the report of the
public prosecutor as well as the supporting affidavits as to the
existence of probable cause. If the judge is satisfied he may
issue the warrant of arrest, if not he may require the
submission of supporting affidavits but there is no need to
personally examine the complainant and the witnesses. But
when it comes to search warrant, the search warrant cannot be
issued, particularly under the Rules of Court, under section 5
of rule 126 “a search warrant shall not issue unless the trial
court judge conducts searching question and answers under
oath and in writing of the complainant and the witnesses”.
Which means that in issuing search warrant, the judge must
personally examine the complainants. So the complainants
must personally appear before the judge before the judge can
issue a search warrant. But for warrant of arrest, the judge
only needs to review the report of the public prosecutor. If he
is satisfied he may issue the warrant. So seemingly, search
warrant proceedings are stricter than warrants of arrest
because, in warrants of arrest because there is no need to
personally examine the complainants but for search warrants,
complainants must appear before the judge. It is not enough
that the judge examine their affidavits. The complainants and
their witnesses must appear before the judge so that the judge
can conduct searching question and answers.
Why do the rules impose stricter conditions insofar as search
warrants, when the object of search warrants are just personal
properties? When it comes to warrants of arrest, the object is
liberty, deprivation of liberty of an individual.
The answer is that, in search warrant proceedings, there are no
anterior proceedings prior to the issuance of a search warrant.
Meaning there is no case filed yet against any person. And the
purpose of that search warrant is obtain custody over a
personal property so that it can be used in filing a criminal
complaint. So since it is the first time that the merit of the
application is being assessed, it is but necessary for the judge
to personally examine the complainant. Warrants of arrest,
particularly for those which are subject to preliminary
investigation, prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest there is
already a proceeding before the public prosecutor. So the
public prosecutor has to examine the complainant, and the
witnesses of both sides and then he must make a resolution. So
according to the Supreme Court in Soliven v. Makasiar, it is
enough that the judge examines the report of the public
prosecutor because the public prosecutor already examined
personally the complainants and the witnesses. So no need to
repeat this in the determination of probable cause for warrants
of arrest. So under the constitution, particularly section 2 of
article III, judges can issue warrants of arrest upon
determination of probable cause.
So can we say now that only judges can issue warrants?
Under the 1973 constitution, the authority to issue warrants,
whether search warrants or warrants of arrest are not only
limited to judges. They may be also be issued by responsible
officers. Is that still valid under the 1987 constitution? Taking
the case of Salazar v. Achacoso, this is a case involving article
38 of the labor code. Article 38 authorizes the Secretary of
Labor and the administrator of POEA to issue search warrants
and warrants of arrest for charges of illegal recruitment
preparatory to criminal prosecution. In the case of Salazar v.
Achacoso, that provision under the labor code is
unconstitutional because the authority to issue warrants
whether search warrants or warrants of arrest can only be done
by judges. But now, in another case, Harvey v. Santiago, the
commissioner of the bureau of immigration issued a warrant
of arrest. So in this case, it was also contested that the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration not being a judge
cannot issue a warrant of arrest. In both cases, the conclusion
of the Supreme Court is different. In the case of Salazar v.
Achacoso, the Supreme Court said that, that provision under
the labor code is already invalid under the1987 constitution, so
meaning it ceases to be effective under the present
constitution. But insofar as in Harvey v. Santiago, the
authority of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration
under the charter of the bureau of immigration is still valid.
The bureau of immigration commissioner can still issue
warrants.
So what is the difference between warrants that can be issued
only by a judge, and warrants that can be issued even by
administrative officers?
Warrants that can only be issued by judges should be in line
with the definition of warrant under the rules of court,
particularly, rule 113 and 126. So note that under section 1 of
rule 113, the arrest is defined as the taking of a person in
custody so that he may be bound to answer for a criminal
offense. So a warrant of arrest in line with section of rule 113
is intended to take custody over the person of the accused so
that he may be prosecuted. Only a judge can issue that. A
search warrant that can only be a judge should be in line with
the search warrant definition under section 1 of rule 126 which
is taking custody over a personal property so that it may be
used for criminal prosecution. So which means that if the
purpose of a warrant of arrest or search warrant is not to
obtain custody over the person of the accused or the personal
property for prosecution purposes, it can be issued even by an
administrative officer.
So to better understand that, the factual circumstances in
Harvey v. Santiago. In this case, 22 suspected pedophiles were
arrested on February 27, 1988 as a result of three month
surveillance of the agent of the bureau of immigration. These
22 suspected pedophiles were arrested in flagrante delicto in
committing the crime of pedophilia. So they were arrested
while in the company of young boys, naked in possession of
immoral literature. So immediately after their arrest, they were
already detained in Camp Bagong Diwa. March 4, 1988, the
bureau of immigration out of the 22 there were 17 of them
opted for self-deportation, one was released for lack of
evidence and another was charged for illegal employment but
not pedophilia so that leaves three petitioners. So these three
petitioners were detained as early as February 27, 1988. March
4 of the same year, the bureau of immigration conducted the
deportation proceedings to determine whether the three
petitioners violated the conditions of their visa, whether they
may be considered as undesirable aliens. After the hearing, the
BOI, issued a decision, finding the three petitioners as
undesirable aliens and ought to be deported. March 7, 1988,
the commissioner of the BOI issued a warrant of arrest. So
note that as early as February 27, 1988, they are already in
detention. So which means the purpose of that warrant of
arrest issued on March 7 is not intended to take custody of the
person of the accused so that they may be prosecuted. The
purpose of that warrant of arrest is to execute the order of
deportation. So which means that it is not a warrant of arrest
that is contemplated under section 2 of article III because the
purpose of that warrant of arrest is to execute a final decision.
So in that regard, the commissioner of the BOI can validly
issue that warrant. So this principle is not only limited to the
BOI, this can also be done by other administrative officers as
long as they are authorized by the law and the purpose is not
to prosecute crime. The purpose is to execute a final and
executory decision.
So the determination of probable cause must be done after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant.
May the probable cause be based information coming from a
reliable source?
In the case of Alvarez v. CFI, a police officer file a search
warrant for the search and seizure of documents related to
usurious transactions and the basis of the application is
information coming from reliable persons. Is that allowed?
Supreme Court said no. probable cause must be based on the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce. Why? Because according to the Supreme Court,
even if the complainant himself is convinced that the source of
the information is reliable, it is the obligation of the
complainant to convince the judge. It is not enough that the
complainant himself is convinced. The judge must be
convinced. And under our rules of court evidence can only be
procured from the personal knowledge of witnesses. So in that
regard, reliable information cannot be the basis of determining
probable cause. And in the case of Alvarez v. CFI, the
Supreme Court defined what an oath is. Note that under the
constitution it’s either the complainant and the witness taking
an oath or an affirmation so it’s alternative; either take an oath
or affirmation.
What is the difference between an oath and an affirmation?
So to better understand it let’s take a constitutional provision
as an example. Under section 5 of article VII, it states the oath
or affirmation of office of the president, vice-president or
acting president. So under section 5 of article VII it is
expressly provided that before they enter on the execution of
their office, the president, vice-president or acting president
shall take the following oath or affirmation. The oath or
affirmation goes like this: “I do solemnly swear” if it’s an
oath. If it is an affirmation: “I do solemnly affirm” and then all
the other items are the same. Then if it is an oath it ends with
“so help me God”. So which means that the only difference
between an oath or affirmation is the starting phrase and that
in affirmation the last phrase of “so help me God” is not
included. That is the only difference between an oath and
affirmation. In the case of Alvarez v. CFI, the Supreme Court
said that in its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in
conscience to perform an act truthfully and faithfully. And it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by a person
taking it, that his promise or attestation is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. So which means
that whether it is an oath or affirmation, the obligation of the
affiant is the same; to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth. But the source of that obligation is
different. In an oath, the source of the obligation is because the
person taking an oath believes in God. So since he believes in
God, he is answerable to his God. But in an affirmation, this is
in deference to the religious freedom, which involves the right
not to believe. So persons who do not believe in God cannot
be compelled to take an oath. They may instead be required to
take an affirmation. And in an affirmation the obligation to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is an
obligation before the law. So which means that it is the court
that compels the affiant to tell the truth.
What is the test of a sufficient oath and affirmation?
According to the Supreme Court in Alvarez v. CFI, the test of
sufficient oath and affirmation when it is drawn in such a
manner that the person taking it can be held liable for perjury.
This is also the reason why the application for a search
warrant based on reliable information cannot be done. Because
if the affiant says that, he believes based on reliable
information coming from a source that a crime was
committed, the person making the declaration cannot be held
liable for perjury because if his statement proves to be false,
the affiant can just say that he believed in good faith that the
crime was committed and just be sorry he was wrong. So he
cannot be liable for perjury. That’s the reason why that is not a
sufficient oath.

So the last requisite of a valid warrant is that particularity in

the description. So whether it is a search warrant or warrant of
arrest. How particular should the description be in order that it
may be considered as a valid warrant? Should it go to the
extent of particularly describing specific details like color of
the house, size of the house, the number of cabinets to be
opened? Should it be that particular?

The answer is no. A warrant is sufficient if it will allow the

public officers who are to serve that warrant to determine the
place to be searched and the objects sought to be ceased. And
as applied to a warrant of arrest, to determine the person who
is the subject of that warrant. So which means that even if the
warrant of arrest does not provide for the name of the person
to be arrested as long as there are person descriptions that
could lead the police officers to identify the subject of the
warrant that is a sufficient warrant.

Supposing the warrant of arrest did not particularly describe

the person sought to be arrested. May the personal knowledge
of the police officer who is serving the warrant supply the
lacking information? So supposing a warrant of arrest was
issued and the warrant of arrest directs the police officer to
arrest and detain a person named as “boy tigas” so that is the
only description in the warrant. The police officer to whom
that warrant of arrest was assigned said that “your honor
you’re very lucky because your description of the person is
too general but because I know who boy tigas is” so with that I
will arrest him and detain him. This means that the police
officer who is about to serve the warrant has independent
personal knowledge that he can supply in order to identify the
person who is generally described in the warrant. Is that
allowed?

No. because according to the Supreme Court in People v. Del

Rosario….

[End of covered time]