Rule 111 together with Article 100-104 of the RPC; Articles 29, 32, 33, 34, offense.
offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the
1157, 2176, 2177, 2180, 2206, 2219, 2220, 2230 of the New Civil Code
Jarantilla vs Ca - GR 80194 (quasi-delictual liability)
Fact:
EDGAR JARANTILLA the Petitioner allegedly with his Volkswagen Beetle, side-
swiped Private Respondent Jose Kuan Sing. Petitioner was criminal charged for
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Serious Physical Injury. During trial, Private
Respondent did not reserve the separate prosecution of his civil action and
participated in the prosecution of the criminal action. The criminal court eventually
dismissed the criminal complaint for failure to prove the guilt of the Petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. Subsequently, Private Respondent filed in the CFI a
civil action against the Petitioner to which the latter filed a motion to dismissed.
The CFI denied the motion of the Petitioner and suggest bringing the action to the
Supreme Court to which the SC denied for lack of Merit. Continuing the
prosecution of the civil action, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the Petitioner
to pay the Private Respondent for the actual and moral damages, including
Attorney’s Fees.
Petitioner appealed to the CA who affirmed the decision with modification on the
moral damages. Petitioner filed a motion for Reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the CA. hence this appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether the failure of the complainant to reserve the prosecution of his civil action
and actively participated in the criminal action is barred to subsequently pursue the
former action when accused was acquitted in the latter action for failure to prove
his guilt beyond reason doubt.
Held:
No, the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private
respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can
give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages under both types of liability.
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through
the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal
acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or
requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such
acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence
only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which
action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. Complementary to such
considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action
for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same
criminal act or omission.
Pp vs Bayotas - (extinction of civil liability ex delicto)
SUMMARY:
Rogelio Bayotas was convicted of rape by the lower court. While pending appeal
with the Supreme Court, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Supreme Court in its Resolution of May
20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged. Now, the issue then is whether the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
DOCTRINE:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon (civil liability ex delicto). As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore. In this case, the civil liability of Bayotas was also extinguished
because it is based solely on the criminal act he committed (civil liability ex
delicto).
FACTS:
1. Rogelio Bayotas was convicted of rape by the lower court. While pending
appeal with the Supreme Court, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National
Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Supreme Court in its Resolution of
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged.
2. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission
of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v.
Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
3. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the
Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In
support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
4. The Court here discussed the conflicting decisions made by the Court regarding
the extinguishment of civil liability when the accused dies pending appeal of his
conviction.
5. The old rule, which evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule, states that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability
is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
6. However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. departed from this
long-established principle of law. This court in an unprecedented move resolved to
dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil
liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if
he is civilly liable.
ISSUE:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability?
RULING:
We hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and
the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently,
the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
RULES RE: EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY UPON DEATH OF THE
ACCUSED:
1.Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a)
Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) . . . e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Phil Rabbit vs Heirs of Mangawang - GR No. 160355 (Employer's subsidiary
liability)
Facts:
Ernesto Ancheta, an employee of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI), was
involved in a vehicular accident on November 23, 1992, resulting in the death of
Eduardo Mangawang. Accordingly, an Information was filed charging Ancheta with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The case, filed at the RTC of Capas,
Tarlac, resulted in a conviction on November 12, 1999, sentencing Ancheta to
imprisonment and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Mangawang. Ancheta
failed to file his appeal brief, leading to the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of
Appeals (CA) on November 10, 2000. The decision became final, prompting the
issuance of an arrest order for Ancheta. Subsequently, PRBLI filed a Notice of
Appeal, which was initially denied due to the finality of the judgment but was later
given due course after a Manifestation with Motion cited a relevant ruling. The CA,
upon review, affirmed the RTC’s decision with modifications on the awarded
damages.
Issues:
1. Whether the legal representation of Ancheta by a counsel from PRBLI suffices
as participation by PRBLI in the proceedings to protect its interests, thereby
binding PRBLI to the decision on Ancheta’s civil liability.
2. Whether the finality of the conviction against Ancheta also bars PRBLI from
contesting the decision, especially its subsidiary liability for damages awarded to
Mangawang’s heirs.
3. Whether PRBLI was deprived of its right to due process when it was not
furnished copies of the CA Resolution and the RTC’s arrest order for Ancheta.
4. Whether PRBLI has the right to appeal the RTC’s decision convicting Ancheta,
particularly concerning its civil liability.
Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court denied PRBLI’s petition for review for lack of merit, affirming
the CA’s decision to dismiss PRBLI’s appeal due to the finality of the RTC’s
decision. The High Court ruled PRBLI, as the employer of the accused, had an
interest in the case and should have ensured its participation in the defense.
PRBLI’s failure to be notified of developments was attributed to the negligence of
its provided counsel, not to a deprivation of due process. The Court held that an
employer’s right to due process arises during the execution phase, especially
during proceedings for the issuance of an alias writ of execution due to the
employee’s insolvency.
Doctrine:
The finality of a decision convicting an employee of a crime is conclusive on the
employer regarding both the existence and amount of civil liability, provided no
collusion exists between the accused-employee and the complainant. An
employer’s right to due process in relation to its subsidiary civil liability is exercised
during proceedings for the issuance of an alias writ of execution due to the
employee’s insolvency.
Class Notes:
– **Subsidiary Liability**: Enshrined in Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, it holds an employer liable for the civil damages resulting from crimes
committed by employees in the discharge of their duties, contingent on the
employee’s insolvency.
– **Finality of Judgment**: A judgment that has become final and executory, even if
erroneous, cannot be modified or appealed.
– **Employer’s Participation in Criminal Cases**: Employers must take an active
role in the defense of their employees to protect their interest, especially regarding
civil liability.
– **Due Process for Employers**: The right to due process for employers
regarding their subsidiary liability arises during the execution phase, not at the
conviction stage of the employee.
Historical Background:
This case underscores the implications of the doctrine of subsidiary liability under
Philippine law, especially highlighting the responsibilities of employers in criminal
cases involving their employees. It emphasizes the necessity for employers to
actively participate in the defense of their employees to protect their interests and
avoid being adversely bound by a final judgment.
San Miguel vs Perez - GR No. 166836 (Prejudicial Question)
FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc.,
represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver, 130
residential lots in its subdivision in BF Homes Parañaque. However, 20 TCTs (out
of 40) were withheld delivery by BF Homes since Atty. Orendain had ceased to be
its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions;; BF Homes refused to
deliver the TCTs despite demands. Because of this, SMP filed a complaint-affidavit
in the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pinas charging respondent directors
and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25 in
relation to Sec. 29 both of PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree). Simultaneously, SMP sued BF Homes for specific performance
in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 on the
ground, among others, that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the
suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB.
SMP appealed the resolution of the OCP to the DOJ, which denied the same.
Upon elevation of the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
SMP submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case presented a prejudicial
question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of PD No.
957. CA dismissed SMP’s petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the HLURB administrative case for specific performance could be a
reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of
PD No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
HELD:
YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an
administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be resolved.
Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the
crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case.
Yet, contrary to SMP’s submission that there could be no prejudicial question to
speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending,
the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that
sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal
violation of PD No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere
except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and
original. The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended
because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in
the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues
raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of PD No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of
guilt in the criminal case.
Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether
or not SMP was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs,
while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and
officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the
former (admin case) must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold SMP to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty.
Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability
for the violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the
need to proceed with the criminal case.
Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the dismissal of SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 for
lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question
Another contention of SMP:
SMP further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial
question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents
had not themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the
criminal action. It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question arising from
the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated
said related case. The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question
makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
ought not to distinguish.
Pajarito vs Seneris -GR NO. L-44627 - (employer's subsidiary liability)
FACTS:
On May 9, 1975, Joselito Aizon, the driver-employee of an Isuzu Passenger Bus
operated by Felipe Aizon, caused the bus to turn turtle as a result of which two of
his passengers on board sustained injuries which caused their death. Thereafter,
an information was filed in the CFI of Zamboanga City charging the accused with
double homicide through reckless imprudence. Upon arraignment, respondent
pleaded guilty and the court rendered a judgment convicting him and to pay the
amount of P12, 000.00. Due to the insolvency of the accused, petitioner Lucia S.
Pajarito, mother of the deceased passenger, filed with the court a motion for the
issuance of subsidiary writ of execution against the operator Felipe Aizon. The
court denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in denying the motion for subsidiary writ of execution.
HELD:
Yes, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil
action arising therefrom. Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was
the registered operator of the bus, the proceeding for the enforcement of the
subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the
execution of judgment.
Jugueta vs Ca - GR No. 202124 (computation of loss of earning capacity;
damages in specific cases)
FACTS:
Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side
by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening,
when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by appellant and his
companions.
They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea
for mercy, they fired at them successively and indiscriminately, having hit and
killed his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were 13 years old
and 3 ½ years old respectively.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger
San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder.
However, based on the sworn statement of one Danilo Fajarillo, the Provincial
Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel.
Appellant was then convicted by the trial court of Double Murder and Multiple
Attempted Murder.
Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the CA, which
rendered a Decision affirming appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant is guilty of the crimes charged.
RULING:
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful
killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances
such as treachery or evident premeditation.
The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery
attended the killing of Norberto’s two children.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up
a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of
appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the
manner of, the commission of the crime.
The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for
attempted murder.
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into
account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that
the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient
allegations to that effect.
In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that “[i]t has been held in a long line of
cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law
accords to human abode. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him
wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.” Dwelling aggravates a
felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided
that the latter has not given provocation therefor.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify
the penalties imposed on appellant.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify
the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable
penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder.
However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of
the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion
perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole.
With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.
Pilipinas Shell vs Duque - G.R. No. 216467 (bp 22 civil liability of a corporate
officer)
The power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances specified in
the afore-quoted provision. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a
notice of appeal on an entirely different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a
proper remedy."
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a lessee of a building
known as Shell House at 156 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On
August 23, 2000, PSPC subleased a 500meter portion of the 2nct Floor of the
Shell Building to the The Fitness Center (TFC). Thereafter, TFC encountered
problems in its business operations. Thus, with the conformity of PSPC, TFC
assigned to Fitness Consultants, Inc, (FCI) all its rights and obligations under the
contract of sublease executed by PSPC in its favor. Respondent Carlos Duque is
the proprietor, while respondent Teresa Duque is the corporate secretary of FCI.
Subsequently, FCI failed to pay its rentals to PSPC. FCI subsequently issued a
check, with respondents as signatories, which would supposedly cover FCI's
obligations to PSPC. However, the check was dishonored, thus, leading to the
filing of a criminal complaint against respondents for their alleged violation of BP
22. The parties then went to trial, which subsequently resulted in a verdict finding
herein respondents guilty as charged. Respondents appealed the above MeTC
Decision with the RTC of Makati. On March 16, 2011, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 143, rendered judgment acquitting respondents but holding them civilly
liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents, as corporate officers, may still be held civilly liable
despite their acquittal from the criminal charge of violation of BP 22.
RULING:
NO. The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate
check can be held civilly liable when he is convicted. The criminal liability of the
person who issued the bouncing checks in behalf of a corporation stands
independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising
from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this criminal liability with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to
recover such civil liability, not from the corporation, but from the person who
signed the check in its behalf. As held above, it is clear that the civil liability of the
corporate officer for the issuance of a bouncing corporate check attaches only if he
is convicted. Conversely, therefore, it will follow that once acquitted of the offense
of violating BP 22, a corporate officer is discharged from any civil liability arising
from the issuance of the worthless check in the name of the corporation he
represents. This is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt or that there was a pronouncement by the trial court that the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Moreover, in the
present case, nothing in the records at hand would show that respondents made
themselves personally nor solidarily liable for the corporate obligations either as
accommodation parties or sureties. On the contrary, there is no dispute that
respondents signed the subject check in their capacity as corporate officers and
that the check was drawn in the name of FCI as payment for the obligation of the
corporation and not for the personal indebtedness of respondents. Neither is there
allegation nor proof that the veil of corporate fiction is being used by respondents
for fraudulent purposes. The rule is that juridical entities have personalities
separate and distinct from its officers and the persons composing it. Generally, the
stockholders and officers are not personally liable for the obligations of the
corporation except only when the veil of corporate fiction is being used as a cloak
or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, which is not the case here.
Hence, respondents cannot be held liable for the value of the checks issued in
payment for FCI's obligation.
Pulido CASE (Bigamy, prejudicial question)
Summary
In the leading case of Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, Hernando,
J., the SC en banc exonerated the accused from criminal liability for bigamy when
during the pendency of the bigamy case, a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was entered. Previous decisions had held that a person who contracts a
second marriage without a prior court declaration of nullity of his first marriage was
liable for bigamy even if the first marriage was subsequently declared void by a
court. The SC held in Pulido that the requirement of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity under Article 40 of the Family Code, which is for purposes only of
remarriage, should not have been extended to criminal cases.
Case law prior to Pulido
The crime of bigamy is committed by any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage while validly married to another. (See Article 349, Revised
Penal Code).
Consider this hypothetical: Horace contracted marriage with Annika. Horace then
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Annika on the ground of
absence of a marriage license. While this petition was pending, Horace contracted
a second marriage with Blondie. When Annika learned of this, she filed a criminal
complaint with the prosecutor for bigamy against Horace. The information for
bigamy against Horace was subsequently filed in court.
(a) Horace filed a motion for suspension of the criminal case on the ground that
the marriage nullification case presented a prejudicial question. Should the motion
be granted?
(b) Assume that the motion was not granted. During the pendency of the criminal
case, judgment was entered declaring the marriage between Horace and Annika
as void because of the absence of a marriage license. Will the judgment
exonerate Horace from criminal liability?
Prior to Pulido, the answer to (a) was in the negative. The petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage will not pose a prejudicial question since, as will be discussed
in the answer to (b), Horace can still be convicted of bigamy even if his prior
marriage to Annika was later nullified.
The answer to (b) was also in the negative. In a line of cases, the Supreme Court
has held that a spouse cannot take the law into his own hands and contract
marriage without a previous judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.
“Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second
marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of
evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.” (See Vitangcol v. People, 780 SCRA
598 [2016]). This holding was based on Article 40 of the Family Code which
provides that “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.”
The Pulido case
In Pulido, the petitioner contracted marriage with a woman whom we shall refer to
as W1. Subsequently, petitioner contracted marriage with another woman, W2.
Stung by this betrayal, W1 filed a complaint for bigamy against the petitioner. The
petitioner’s defense was that his marriage with W1 was void because of the
absence of a marriage license. In accordance with the then case law, the petitioner
was however convicted by the RTC of Las Piñas City since there was no prior
judicial declaration of his marriage with W1 at the time he married W2. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, a judgment
was entered by the RTC of Imus, Cavite, declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and W1 as void due to the absence of a marriage license.
With this development, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner should be
exonerated from criminal liability. The High Court stated that for bigamy to arise,
there must have been a prior valid marriage. The fact that the judicial declaration
of nullity was obtained after the accused had contracted the second marriage will
still not give rise to bigamy because a void marriage is inexistent from the very
beginning.
With respect to Article 40 of the Family Code, the Court held that its application to
a bigamy charge was not warranted. The Court held that by the express terms of
Article 40, the prior judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage is a requirement
only for purposes of remarriage and that Article 40 should not have been
construed as imposing a requirement for the accused to raise the defense of nullity
of the first marriage.
Thus, in the light of Pulido, the answer now to (b) of the hypothetical is that the
judgment of nullification will exonerate Horace from criminal liability for bigamy.
Effect of Pulido on prior rulings re prejudicial question

The doctrine laid down in Pulido will necessarily call for a revisit of previous
doctrines which held that a pending marriage nullification case will not pose a
prejudicial question in a bigamy case.
In light of Pulido, the answer to (a) of the hypothetical is that the motion for
suspension on the ground of prejudicial question should be granted. The
resolution of the issue of whether the prior marriage between Horace and W1 is
valid is determinative of whether the criminal case for bigamy will proceed.
It should be noted that by virtue of the 1 December 2000 amendments to the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the civil case in order to pose a prejudicial question must
have been filed prior to the institution of the criminal case. Hence, if the civil case
for marriage nullification was filed after the criminal case had been instituted, there
will be no suspension of the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question.
In such a case, the remedy of the accused is to prove the nullity of his prior
marriage in the criminal case. Pulido held that a prior judicial declaration is not the
sole means of proving the nullity of the prior marriage. The accused may
collaterally attack the validity of the first marriage by introducing evidence, for
example, that no marriage license was obtained therein. The Court held that a
certification from the LCR that no record of a marriage license was found in its
record would cast reasonable doubt on the accused’s guilt.
Retroactive effect of Pulido
What about an accused who had been convicted of bigamy notwithstanding a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage? May he invoke the Pulido doctrine?
It is submitted that the accused may do so. It is axiomatic that a law should be
given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused. (Article 22, Revised Penal
Code). Judicial decisions favorable to an accused should be given retroactive
effect since such decisions form part of the law in accordance with Article 8 of the
Civil Code and so as not to infringe upon the constitutional right of the accused to
equal protection of the law. (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). In such a case, the accused may file a petition for habeas corpus to obtain
his release from prison.
GR 205275, Austria vs AAA (Guidelines on appeal by private complainant in
criminal cases)
In a significant legal development, the Supreme Court established guidelines for
private complainants seeking to appeal judgments and orders in criminal
proceedings. The decision, written by Justice Mario V. Lopez, denied a petition filed
by Mamerto Austria challenging a Court of Appeals (“CA”) ruling that overturned his
acquittal on criminal charges of acts of lasciviousness. The Supreme Court reviewed
existing laws and rulings regarding the legal personality of private complainants in
criminal proceedings.
In the said case, the Supreme Court first discussed that in any criminal case or
proceeding, only the Office of the Solicitor General (“OSG”) has the authority to bring
or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines or represent the People
or the State before the Supreme Court and the CA. This is stated in Section 35 (1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code of the Philippines.
The reason for this rule is that in a criminal case, the State is the party affected by the
dismissal of the criminal action, not the private complainant. The private
complainant’s interest is limited to the civil liability of the accused. The private
complainant’s role is mainly that of a witness for the prosecution, so if a criminal case
is dismissed or results in an acquittal, only the State, through the OSG, can appeal
the criminal aspect of the case.
However, the Supreme Court also acknowledged that there have been divergent
rulings in the past that paved the way for private complainants to question judgments
and orders in criminal proceedings even without the involvement of the OSG.
The Supreme Court has recognized that private complainants have legal standing to
challenge the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of a criminal case equivalent
to an acquittal. They can do this by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court based on grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process. Thus, in
People v. Judge Santiago, 255 Phil. 851 (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that the
victim can avail of the remedy of certiorari to question the validity of acquittal, since
there was no doubt that the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of due
process.
The Supreme Court also recognized that private complainants have the right to
appeal or file a Petition for Certiorari to question decisions and orders that dismiss a
criminal action which is not necessarily an acquittal. This includes cases where the
criminal charges are dismissed due to lack of probable cause, improper venue, or
insufficiency of information. This was applied in Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,
384 Phil. 322 (2000).

In Morillo v. People, 775 Phil. 192 (2015), the Supreme Court allowed the private
complainant to appeal the dismissal of criminal cases without the involvement of the
OSG. This decision was based on the unique circumstances of the case and in the
interest of substantial justice. In this particular case, both the Regional Trial Court and
the Metropolitan Trial Court had convicted the accused. However, the CA dismissed
the cases without prejudice due to improper venue. The private complainant then
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
OSG, in turn, agreed with the CA’s position that the venue was improperly laid. The
Supreme Court explained that, as a general rule, a judgment of acquittal can be
challenged through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, not under Rule 65, and not filed by
the OSG, should be summarily dismissed. However, the Supreme Court ruled that
the circumstances warranted its consideration. In the interest of substantial justice,
the Supreme Court concluded that it should give due course to the petition and rule
on its merits. The unique circumstances of the case left the petitioner with no other
suitable recourse but to appeal on her own. Not only was there a lack of support from
the OSG, but the government office also took a position that contradicted the rights
and interests of the petitioner.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court had also recognized that private complainants could
question interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings that do not involve the acquittal
of the accused or dismissal of the case. Examples of such orders are those that
suspend the criminal case due to a prejudicial question, give due course to a notice
of appeal, or grant bail. This was applied in the case of Rodriguez v. Gadiane, 527
Phil. 691 (2006), where the Supreme Court ruled that if the criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court, or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State. The capability
of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the
civil aspect of the case. However, if the order which the petitioner seeks to assail is
not one dismissing the case or acquitting respondents, there is no limitation to the
capacity of the private complainant to seek judicial review of the assailed order.
Finally, in the case of Austria v. AAA and BBB, G.R. No. 205275, decided on 28 June
2022 and published on 4 February 2023, the Supreme Court clarified that these
divergent rulings cannot be interpreted as a blanket grant of legal personality to
private complainants to question judgments and orders in criminal proceedings on
grounds of grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the People, through the OSG, has a legal interest over the criminal
aspect of the proceedings, whereas the private complainant has a legal interest over
the civil aspect of the case. Case law allowing private complainants to question
judgments and orders in criminal proceedings should not be stretched to the degree
of violating the mandate of the Administrative Code as to the nature and extent of the
OSG’s power and authority.
Thus, the Supreme Court formulated the following guidelines to harmonize case law
and ensure clarity on the legal standing of private complainants in questioning
judgments or orders in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA:
The private complainant has the legal personality to appeal the civil liability of the
accused or file a petition for certiorari to preserve his or her interest in the civil aspect
of the criminal case. The appeal or petition for certiorari must allege the specific
pecuniary interest of the private offended party. The failure to comply with this
requirement may result in the denial or dismissal of the remedy.
The reviewing court shall require the OSG to file a comment within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from notice if it appears that the resolution of the private
complainant’s appeal or petition for certiorari will necessarily affect the criminal
aspect of the case or the right to prosecute (i.e., existence of probable cause, venue
or territorial jurisdiction, elements of the offense, prescription, admissibility of
evidence, identity of the perpetrator of the crime, modification of penalty, and other
questions that will require a review of the substantive merits of the criminal
proceedings, or the nullification/reversal of the entire ruling, or cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action or meddle with the prosecution of the offense,
among other things).The comment of the OSG must state whether it conforms or
concurs with the remedy of the private offended party. The judgment or order of the
reviewing court granting the private complainant’s relief may be set aside if rendered
without affording the People, through the OSG, the opportunity to file a comment.
The private complainant has no legal personality to appeal or file a petition for
certiorari to question the judgments or orders involving the criminal aspect of the
case or the right to prosecute, unless made with the OSG’s conformity.
The private complainant must request the OSG’s conformity within the reglementary
period to appeal or file a petition for certiorari. The private complainant must attach
the original copy of the OSG’s conformity as proof in case the request is granted
within the reglementary period. Otherwise, the private complainant must allege in the
appeal or petition for certiorari the fact of pendency of the request. If the OSG denied
the request for conformity, the Court shall dismiss the appeal or petition for certiorari
for lack of legal personality of the private complainant.
The reviewing court shall require the OSG to file a comment within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from notice on the private complainant’s petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of the accused, the dismissal of the criminal case, and the
interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion or denial of due process.

These guidelines shall be prospective in application.

With these new guidelines, the Supreme Court has struck a delicate balance
between the powers of the OSG and the rightful participation of private complainants
in the pursuit of justice. This recent clarification serves to further reinforce the existing
clarity on the matter, emphasizing that private complainants must seek the OSG’s
conformity to appeal or file a Petition for Certiorari.

As these guidelines are set to be applied prospectively, they mark a turning point in
our legal system, providing a clearer framework for private complainants to navigate
the complex terrain of criminal proceedings.