THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS:

ON PHOTIOS’ USE OF SYLLOGISMS

AGAINST THE FILIOQUE IN THE MYSTAGOGIA

Christophe Erismann

The long ninth century was indisputably a time of religious and theological
controversies, both within Christianity and among and against neighbouring
cultures. The dispute about the veneration of images bitterly divided Byzan-
tium; Latins were also involved in the polemical exchange. Controversies
against Islam, already begun in the eighth century by John of Damascus, who
considered Islam a Christian heresy, intensified, especially due to further trea-
tises by Theodore Abu-Qurra and Niketas Byzantios.1 Arabic Christian theolo-
gians, like the Jacobite Abū Rā’iṭah and the Dyophysite ῾Ammār al-Baṣrī, also
wrote polemical essays.2 Numerous treatises against non-Chalcedonian Chris-
tian groups considered to be heretics flourished. Even if it is written with dip-
lomatic courtesy, Photios’ letter to the Armenian Prince Ashot is a firm exhor-
tation to adopt Chalcedonian Christology. Finally, the Filioque controversy
began, spawning a host of polemical treatises of its own.3
A striking feature of this abundant polemical literature is the frequent use of
Aristotelian logic. The application of logic in religious controversies is indeed
not an invention of the ninth century. The debates between the followers of the
Christology of Chalcedon and their Miaphysite opponents were often enhanced
by logical considerations.
The ninth-century production of logically informed theological texts is dis-
tinguished not only by the sheer number of works that were composed, but also
by the impressive quality of the majority of the treatises. Moreover, the applica-
tion of logic took many forms, including the use of conceptual logical terms
(like “essence”, “accident”, “genus”, “species”, “difference”, “relation”), or

1
The title of Niketas Byzantios’ apology of Christian dogma reads as follows: “An affirma-
tory argumentative exposition of the Christian doctrine, developed from general concepts (ἐκ
κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν) through dialectic method (διαλεκτικῆς μεθόδου), rational arguments and mul-
tiple logical deductions (συλλογιστικῆς πολυτεχνίας)”. He frequently has recourse to logic in
his polemical writings against the Muslims.
2
See S. L. Husseini, Early Christian-Muslim Debate on the Unity of God: Three Christian
Scholars and Their Engagement with Islamic Thought (9th Century C.E.), Leiden, 2014.
S. T. Keating, Defending the ‘People of Truth’ in the Early Islamic Period: The Christian Apolo-
gies of Abū Rā’itah (The History of Christian-Muslim Relations, 4), Leiden, 2006.
3
For an overview of the debate, see A. Siecienski, The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal
Controversy, New York, 2010.

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 90 C. ERISMANN

the adoption of patterns of reasoning or of argumentation, like syllogisms

(i.e. the combination of a general statement, the major premise, and a specific
statement, the minor premise, from which a conclusion is deduced).
For the ninth century, the most striking example of the former is offered
by the iconophile thinkers active during the second period of Iconoclasm,
­Theodore of Stoudios and Nikephoros of Constantinople.4 They used two Aris-
totelian logical concepts in particular to elaborate their understanding of images.
First, they described the relation between prototype and image by invoking the
concept of Aristotelian relatives (πρός τι), and they followed the Categories
point for point in their understanding of the definition and properties assigned
to relatives.5 Second, they explained the relation between prototype and image
as one of homonymy, that is, they both share the same name, but not the same
definition of essence.6
A particularly remarkable example of the second kind of logical argumenta-
tion – that of syllogisms – arises from a controversy between Greeks and Lat-
ins. This is Photios’ On the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit (Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου
Πνεύματος μυσταγωγίας) a polemical treatise against the Latin innovation of
the Filioque.7 The theological debate about the procession of the Holy Spirit
is, after the dispute about the veneration of icons, the second greatest theologi-
cal controversy of the ninth century. The main point of disagreement is the
Latin addition to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed of a clause claiming that
the Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son (the so-called Filioque
speaking of the Holy Spirit as proceeding “from the Father and the Son”).
Photios tackled this issue in three texts: his Encyclical to the Eastern

4
P. J. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople: Ecclesiastical Policy and
Image Worship in the Byzantine Empire, Oxford, 1958, pp. 189-213. T. Anagnostopoulos,
­Aristotle and Byzantine Iconoclasm, in GRBS, 53 (2013), pp. 763-90; K. Parry, Depicting the
Word: Byzantine Iconophile Thought in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries, Leiden, 1996, pp. 52-63;
Idem, Aristotle and the Icon: The Use of the Categories by Byzantine Iconophile Writers, in
S. Ebbesen – J. Marenbon – P. Thom (eds), Aristotle’s Categories in the Byzantine, Arabic and
Latin Traditions, København, 2013, pp. 35-57.
5
See C. Erismann, Venerating Likeness: Byzantine Iconophile Thinkers on Aristotelian Rela-
tives and their Simultaneity, in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24/3 (2016),
pp. 405-425.
6
See C. Erismann, The depicted man. On a fortunate ninth century Byzantine afterlife of the
Aristotelian logical doctrine of homonyms, forthcoming.
7
The date of the work is uncertain. J. Hergenröther, Photius, Patriarch von Constantinopel:
Sein Leben, seine Schriften und das griechische Schisma, Regensburg, 1869, vol. 3, p. 156 places
the Mystagogy in 885, whereas V. Peri, Il Filioque divergenza dogmatica? Origine e peripezie
conciliari di una formula teologica, in Annuario de Historia de la Iglesia, 8 (1999), p. 170, dates
it after 886. According to V. Polidori, Towards a critical edition of Photius’ Mystagogy of the
Holy Spirit, in Studi sull’Oriente Cristiano, 19.1 (2015), p. 8, “it would be reasonable to posit the
end of 884 as a certain terminus post quem. Furthermore, the date of composition cannot be much
later, since in §87 it is stated that a generation (about thirty years, according to the definition given
by Photios himself in the Amphilochia) has not yet passed since the time when Leo III affixed the
famous silver shields bearing the Creed”.

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS91

Patriarchs (Epistle 2)8, his Letter to the Patriarch of Aquileia (Epistle 291)9
and his Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit10 (assuming one accepts its authenticity).
This last text constitutes a particularly significant example of the use of logical
tools in a theological debate. It is also historically fundamental; first, because
it is the first Greek treatise written against the Latin addition of the clause
Filioque to the Creed, and second because it will soon become a model for the
subsequent tradition on this question, inspiring Niketas Byzantios’ Capita Syl-
logistica XXIV de processione Sancti Spiritus (Κεφάλαια συλλογιστικά),
Nicholas of Methone’s De processione Spiritus Sancti adversus Latinos and
Nikephoros Blemmydes’ Hypothetical Syllogisms on the procession of the Holy
Spirit (Ὑποθετικοὶ συλλογισμοί, ὅτι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ μόνου τοῦ
Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ).
This article consists of two parts: in the first, I will analyse some representa-
tive examples of Photios’ extensive use of logic in his arguments against the
inclusion of the term Filioque in the Creed; in the second, I will discuss
the intellectual background and possible reasons why Photios supplemented the
more traditional strategy of relying on Patristic authorities with logical argu-
mentation. I would like to present an example of the type of logically informed
discourse employed by the Latins we may hypothesize that Photios was
responding to.
I will start by discussing Photios’ use of logical tools in some of the argu-
ments he proposed against the Filioque in the Mystagogy (particularly interest-
ing syllogisms are to be found at paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 32, 36, 37, 41 and 62),
then I will explain their underlying logical principles, and finally for the sake
of clarity I will present them in a reconstructed form.

I. Logical argumentation in the Mystagogia

Logic plays an important role in Photios’ argumentation, as his strategy is

often to attack the logical consequences of the double procession and to try to

8
Photius, Ep. 2, Encyclical letter to the Eastern Patriarchs, ed. B. Laourdas – L.G. ­Westerink,
Photii patriarchae Constantinopolitani Epistulae et Amphilochia, Leipzig, 1983, vol. 1, pp. 39-53.
9
Photius, Ep. 291, To the Archbishop of Aquileia, ed. B. Laourdas – L.G. Westerink, Photii
patriarchae Constantinopolitani Epistulae et Amphilochia, Leipzig, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 138-152.
10
The Greek text of the Mystagogy was edited by J. Hergenröther: Photius, De Spiritus
Sancti Mystagogia, PG 102, coll. 279-401; recently edited Photius, La Mistagogia del Santo
Spirito, ed. V. Polidori, Roma 2018. The manuscript tradition is described by Polidori, Towards
a critical edition, pp. 10-16. There are several translations of the text. In the following, we will
use On the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, translation by the Holy Transfiguration Monastery,
Astoria, NY, 1983. I have nevertheless often modified it. The French translation by the Fraternité
Orthodoxe Saint Gregoire Palamas (La mystagogie du Saint Esprit, Écrits trinitaires, tome 2,
Paris, 1991) deserves reading.

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 92 C. ERISMANN

reduce them to absurdity or to heresy. He uses both sides of apagogy (ἀπα-

γωγή), showing either that the contrary of the proposition which he upholds is
absurd or that one can deduce absurd consequences from the position of his
adversaries. His main point is to show that the Filioque would either imply
a rupture of the consubstantiality among the persons of the Trinity or a superior
dignity of the Son over that of the Spirit, which are both unacceptable conclu-
sions. The monarchy of the Father, and his status as unique principle, is
acknowledged; so the main point of Photios is to preserve the equality between
the Son and the Spirit and to avoid both the presence of two principles in the
Trinity and a revival of the Macedonian or Pneumatomachian heresy.
A first set of logical arguments uses the notion of proprium or characteristic
property, one of the five predicables or terms defined by Porphyry in his intro-
duction (Isagoge) to the Categories, together with genus, species, difference
and accident. According to Porphyry a proprium is something possessed by all
the members of a given species, and only by those members, such as laughing
(γελαστικόν) in the case of human beings and neighing for horses. “For even
if man does not always laugh, he is said to be laughing not in that he always
laughs but in that he is of such a nature as to laugh – and this holds of him
always, being connatural” says Porphyry.11 The property converts, which
means that if you have an individual able to laugh then it is necessarily a man
– as no member of a different species can have this property – and that if you
have a man, he is necessarily able to laugh, even if he is not laughing now.12
Photios uses this understanding of the proprium as a property necessarily
belonging to all the members of a given species, i.e. to all the individuals who
share the same essence, or to say it in more theological language, those
who are consubstantial. Describing co-specific individuals as consubstantial is
not an invention of Photios but a common patristic practice validated by the
formula of the Council of Chalcedon, according to which Jesus Christ is “con-
substantial with the Father as to the divinity and consubstantial with us as to
humanity” (ὁμοούσιον ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα). Photios’
argument relies on the Porphyrian definition of the proprium as belonging to
the members of just one species, to all of them and at all times. Property is then
a criterion for testing whether something belongs to a given species, and more-
over whether it is consubstantial with something else. That is to say, an indi-
vidual X cannot be consubstantial with an individual Y if X does not have the
same proprium or characteristic property as Y.

11
Porphyrius, Isagoge, ed. A. Busse, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV.1, Berlin 1887,
p. 12, ll. 18-20, transl. J. Barnes, Oxford 2003, p. 12.
12
Porphyrius, Isagoge, p. 12, ll. 20-22: “And they say that these are properties in the strict
sense, because they convert: if horse, neighing; and if neighing, horse” (transl. Barnes); ταῦτα
δὲ καὶ κυρίως ἴδιά φασιν, ὅτι καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ ἵππος, χρεμετιστικόν, καὶ εἰ χρεμετι-
στικόν, ἵππος.

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS93
Paragraph 17 of the Mystagogy offers a fascinating theoretical construction
of the basis of the Porphyrian understanding of proprium.
Here is the text:
Καὶ γὰρ ἅπαν κυρίως ἴδιόν τινος ἐπὶ
δύο τινῶν ἀπ’ἐκείνου πραγματικῶς
λαμβανόμενον, καὶ κατὰ θατέρου μὲν
ἀληθῶς λεγόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου
οὐκέτι, ἑτεροφυῆ τὰ προτεθέντα δεί-
κνυσιν·
αὐτίκα τὸ γελαστικὸν ἀνθρώπου κυρίως
ἴδιον ὂν καὶ Ἰησοῦ μὲν εἰ τύχοι τῷ
δημαγωγῷ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ ἁρμοζόμενον,
τῷ δὲ ἐπιστάντι αὐτῷ ἀρχιστρατήγῳ
τῆς τοῦ Κυρίου δυνάμεως κατὰ πάντα
διϊστάμενον, ὁρᾷν ἐναργῶς δίδωσιν
οὐχ ὁμοφυῆ τὸν δημαγωγὸν οὔμενουν
τῷ ἀρχαγγέλῳ νομίζειν οὐδ’ ὁμοού-
σιον.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὁ διὰ τῆς
αὐτῆς μεθόδου προϊὼν σαφῶς τε καὶ
ἀταλαιπώρως εὑρήσει τὴν αὐτὴν θεω-
ρίαν προβαίνουσαν.
Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο πανταχοῦ κρατεῖ καὶ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀποσώζει διάνοιαν, ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦ
Πνεύματος ἡ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπόρευ-
σις τὸ πατρικὸν ἀνακηρύττουσα ἴδιον,
τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὸ φρύαγμα τῆς αἱρέσεως
ἐφαρμόζεται μὲν τῷ Υἱῷ, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ
Πνεύματος οὐδαμῶς (οὕπω γάρ τις
τοῦτο τὸ δύσφημον ἐννοήσειε)· τὸ ἑξῆς
αὐτοὶ κατὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν κεφαλῆς οἱ τῶν
τηλικούτων κακῶν εἰσηγηταὶ συναγέ-
τωσαν·
εἰ δὲ μὴ πατρικὸν ἴδιον τὴν τοῦ Πνεύ-
ματος ἐκπόρευσιν φήσουσι, δηλονότι
οὐδὲ τοῦ Υἱοῦ· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦ Πνεύ-
ματος, λεγέτωσαν οἱ πάντα λέγειν θρα-
σεῖς, πῶς ὃ μηδενός ἐστιν ἴδιον τῶν
τριῶν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ κοινόν, χώραν ὅλως
ἔχει θεωρεῖσθαι ἐφ’ ἑνός τινος τῶν
ὑποστάσεων τῶν θεαρχικῶν;
100957_Bucossi_OLA_04_Erismann.indd 93
For indeed, when anything which is actu-
ally apprehended as a proprium in the
strict sense of something is predicated of
another thing and is truly asserted con-
cerning only the first of the two, but defi-
nitely not concerning the other, then the
two things are shown to be of different
nature.
For example, laughing is the proprium in
the strict sense of man; as such if it hap-
pens to belong also to Joshua, the leader
of the people of Israel, it nevertheless in
no way belongs to the archangel of the
Lord’s host who appeared to him (Ios. 5.
12 sqq), it plainly follows that the leader
of the people is not at all of the same
nature as the archangel, nor indeed is
consubstantial with him.
Whoever treats all other matters through
the same method shall find that the same
understanding develops clearly and with-
out difficulty.
So if this is applicable everywhere and
preserves the same sense, then if the pro-
cession of the Spirit from the Father is
proclaimed to be the proprium of the
Father, and this proprium, according to
heretical wantonness, is also asserted of
the Son, but not at all of the Spirit – let
what follows fall upon the heads of them
who introduced such great evils, for up to
now, such slander was unthinkable.
If they say [on the contrary] that the pro-
cession of the Spirit is not the proprium
of the Father, then clearly, it also does
not belong to the Son; and it does not
belong to the Spirit either. Let those who
impudently say anything tell us how that
which is not the proprium of any of the
Three, yet is also not common to all, can
have a place in any one of the hypostases
of the divine sovereignty.
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We can reconstruct this argument as follows. Photios starts by presenting

a logical principle:
If two things share the same proprium, they are consubstantial, of the same nature.
The ability to laugh is the proprium of man, in the strict sense.
Joshua, as a man, possesses this property.
The archangel does not possess it.
Therefore, Joshua and the angel are not consubstantial, i.e. they are not of the
same nature.

This principle of the proprium is, according to Photios, of universal validity.

So it is valid in theology as well.
Photios applies this reasoning to Trinitarian theology in order to demonstrate
that the introduction of the Filioque breaks the consubstantiality between the
Son and the Spirit. This is true whether or not the procession of the Father is
taken as the proprium of the Father. If it is:
The procession of the Spirit is the proprium of the Father.
According to the heretics [i.e. those who support the Filioque], the procession of
the Spirit is also the proprium of the Son.
Yet, it is not the proprium of the Spirit [as he does not proceed from himself],
therefore the Spirit and the Son are not consubstantial [because consubstantial
entities have to have the same proprium, which is not the case of the Son and the
Spirit].

The last part of the argument:

If the procession of the Spirit is not the proprium of the Father,
then it could not be the property of the Son [because if the Father and the Son are
consubstantial, they must have the same proprium]
and it is not the proprium of the Spirit.
So it is the proprium of none of the three persons of the Trinity [which is absurd].

It is interesting to note that Photios uses the expression “proprium in the

strict sense”, κυρίως ἴδιον. This is a technical term often used in the logical
tradition. It was first coined by Porphyry in his Isagoge (ταῦτα δὲ καὶ κυρίως
ἴδιά φασιν, ὅτι καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ ἵππος, χρεμετιστικόν, καὶ εἰ χρεμε-
τιστικόν, ἵππος. ‘And they say that these are propria in the strict sense, because
they convert: if horse, neighing; and if neighing, horse’13). It is also used by
Porphyry again,14 by Philoponos15 or by Simplikios in their commentaries to
the Categories. Here is, for example, Simplikios’ description of the three kinds
of propria:

13
Porphyrius, Isagoge, p. 12, ll. 20-22.
14
Porphyrius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, Commentaria in
­Aristotelem Graeca IV.1, Berlin, 1887, p. 94, l. 27.
15
Iohannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, Commen-
taria in Aristotelem Graeca XIII.1, Berlin, 1898, p. 69, l. 23

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS95

Τριχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι τὸ ἴδιον, τὸ μὲν παντὶ μὲν οὐ μόνῳ δὲ ὑπάρχον ὡς τὸ

δίπουν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ δὲ μόνῳ μὲν οὐ παντὶ δὲ ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ γραμματικόν,
τὸ δὲ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ παντί, ὅπερ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ
γελαστικόν. Τὰ οὖν μὴ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα, ταῦτα καὶ κοινά ἐστιν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα
γένη, ὅταν παντὶ μὲν μὴ μόνῳ δὲ ὑπάρχῃ.16
For the proprium is said in three ways: (1) what belongs to all [the members of
a given species] but not to it [i.e. this species] alone, as two-footed belongs to
human being; (2) what belongs to it alone but not to all [individuals], as gram-
matical belongs to the same [i.e. human being]; (3) what belongs to it alone and
to all, which is indeed a proprium in the strict sense, as being capable of laughter
belongs to human being. Those which do not belong to it alone are indeed in com-
mon with the other genera, when it belongs to all but not to it alone.17

In the case of the Trinity, it is necessary to understand ἴδιον slightly differ-

ently. The meaning of ἴδιον here is not that of the characteristic proprium of
a species, but rather the distinctive property of a person.

Photios likes to use logical argumentation to show the absurdity of the logi-
cal consequences of the Filioque, for example in paragraph 18:
Εἰ τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ Πατρὸς εἰς τὴν ἰδιότητα If the property of the Father is transposed
μεταβάλλεται τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τὸ ἴδιον to become the property of the Son, then
δηλονότι τοῦ Υἱοῦ εἴη ἂν εἰς τὴν ἰδιό- clearly the property of the Son could also
τητα μεταβαλλόμενον τοῦ Πατρός. be transposed to become that of the
Ἅπαξ γὰρ ὁδὸν ἀνατεμούσης τῆς δυσ- Father. For once godless prating takes
σεβοῦς γλωσσαλγίας, δι’ ἧς τὰ τῶν the path of wanting change and transposi-
ὑποστάσεων χαρακτηριστικὰ ἰδιώματα tion in the characteristic properties of
μεταπίπτειν καὶ ἀντιπεριΐστασθαι βού- the hypostases, then it will even have the
λεται, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῖς (ὦ βάθος Father – o depth of impiety! – undergo-
ἀσεβείας!) ὑπελεύσεται τὴν γέννησιν, ing birth seeing that the Son is begotten.
ὅτε γεγέννηται ὁ Υἱός.

The argument can be reformulated as follows:

If the property of the Father is attributed to the Son [i.e. by attributing also to the
Son a role in the procession of the Spirit],
then the property of the Son is also attributed to the Father.
The property of the Son is to be begotten.
Then it is the property of the Father too.
Then the Father is begotten [which is false]

Paragraph 41 is another good example of how Photios leads his opponent’s

argument to two false conclusions:

16
Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, Commentaria in
Aristotelem Graeca VIII, Berlin, 1907, 93.12-17.
17
Simplicius, On Aristotle Categories 5-6, transl. F. de Haas, London, 2001, p. 36,
modified.

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 96 C. ERISMANN

Ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτην δοίην ἂν σιγῇ τὴν
ἀτοπίαν μείζονα λέγειν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῇ
φύσει (ἄπαγε· ὁμοούσιος γὰρ ἡ Τριάς),
ἀλλά γε τῷ αἰτίῳ τὸν γεγεννηκότα τοῦ
γεννήματος μυσταγωγεῖ μὲν ἡ Δεσπο-
τικὴ φωνή· διδάσκει δὲ μυηθεὶς ἐκεῖθεν
καὶ ὁ τῶν ἱερῶν Πατέρων ἡμῶν χορός·
μείζονα δὲ τῷ αἰτίῳ τοῦ Πνεύματος τὸν
Υἱὸν οὔτε θείων ἔστι ἀκούειν λογίων,
ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ νοῦς εὐσεβὴς μέχρι νῦν ἑάλω
διανοηθείς· ἡ δέ γε θεομάχος γλῶσσα
οὐ τῷ αἰτίῳ τὸν Υἱὸν μείζονα τοῦ Πνεύ-
ματος μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς πατρικῆς
ἐγγύτητος πορρωτέρω ποιεῖ.
I should also not let this absurdity remain
silent. The Master’s words mystically
instruct us to consider the Begetter greater
than the Begotten, although not by nature
– away with this thought! The Trinity is
consubstantial! – but inasmuch as He
is cause; and the choir of our sacred
fathers, having been initiated by these
words, teaches the same. Nor do the
divine Scriptures state that the Son is
greater than the Spirit by reason of being
cause, nor has any pious mind up to the
present ever been detected to have
thought so. But the tongue of the enemies
of God not only makes the Son greater
than the Spirit by reason of being His
cause, but it also renders the Spirit more
distant from the Father.

This argument could be reconstructed as follows:

The Father is greater than the Son by the fact of being his cause [because a cause
is greater than its effect18].
If one adopts the Filioque,
then the Son is greater than the Spirit by the fact of being his cause [which is
false].
Therefore also, the Son is closer to the Father than the Spirit is [because both the
Father and the Son are causes, and the Spirit is not] [which is false].

Paragraph 36 offers another excellent illustration:

Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰ πᾶν ὃ μή ἐστι
κοινὸν τῆς παντοκρατορικῆς καὶ ὁμο-
ουσίου καὶ ὑπερφυοῦς Τριάδος, ἑνός
ἐστι μόνου τῶν τριῶν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἡ
τοῦ Πνεύματος προβολὴ κοινὴ τῶν
τριῶν, ἑνὸς ἄρα καὶ μόνου ἐπὶ τῶν
τριῶν. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς
φήσουσιν ἐκπορεύεσθαι τὸ Πνεῦμα,
καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἐξομόσονται τὴν φίλην
αὐτοῖς (καὶ) καινὴν μυσταγωγίαν; Εἰ δὲ
ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τί μὴ κατ’ ἀρχὰς εὐθὺς
ἐθάρρησαν ὅλον αὐτῶν ἐξεμέσαι τὸν
ἰόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀναβλύζουσιν;
’Εχρῆν γὰρ εἴπερ ἦσαν πεποιθότες
αὐτῶν τῷ δυσσεβήματι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνο
μολογεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον τὸν Υἱὸν προβο-
With reference to what has been said, all
that is not common to the whole, omnipo-
tent, consubstantial, and supranatural
Trinity must appertain to only one of the
three; since the procession of the Spirit is
not common to the three, then it belongs
to only one of the three. If then they
affirm that the Spirit proceeds from the
Father, then why do they not renounce
the innovative mystagogy so cherished by
them? Or if they contend that He pro-
ceeds from the Son, then why did they
not have the courage to vomit forth all
their poison frankly from the beginning,
rather than emitting it in part? When they
broached their dogma of the Son being

18
On the possible philosophical – Neoplatonic – background of this principle, cf. A. C. Lloyd,
The Principle that the Cause is Greater than its Effect, in Phronesis, 21.2 (1976), pp. 146-156.

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS97

λέα τοῦ Πνεύματος δογματίζουσιν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Πατέρα τῆς προβολῆς
ἀπελαύνουσιν· οἷς ἀκόλουθον δήπου
καὶ τὴν γέννησιν τῇ προβολῇ συμμετα-
τιθέναι καὶ συμμεταφέρειν, καὶ μηδὲ
τὸν Υἱὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρός, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
Υἱοῦ τερατολογεῖν τὸν Πατέρα τὴν
γέννησιν ἔχειν […].
the originator of the Spirit, they ought to
have professed that they also exclude the
Father from the origin, if they were really
convinced of the truth of their impious
teaching. Doubtless, they might also find
it logical to alter and to transpose the
begetting and the procession, and to con-
coct the notion that the Son is not begot-
ten from the Father, but the Father from
the Son.

The reconstructed reasoning goes as follows:

In the Trinity, what is not common belongs to only one of the three persons;
the property of the procession of the Spirit is not common to the three persons;
therefore, the property of the procession of the Spirit belongs to only one of the
three persons.
To the Father? This would negate the Filioque.
To the Son? Then the Son only, and not the Father, is implied in the procession
of the Spirit [which is false].

A last example of logical argument is offered by paragraph 32.

Πάλιν δὲ εἰ ἐν ᾧ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορεύ- Furthermore, if the procession of the

εται τὸ Πνεῦμα, ἡ ἰδιότης ἐπιγνώσκε-
ται αὐτοῦ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾧ γεν-
νᾶται ὁ Υἱός, ἡ τοῦ Υἱοῦ· ἐκπορεύεται
δέ, ὡς ὁ ἐκείνων λῆρος, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα
ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, πλείοσιν ἄρ’ ἰδιώμασιν
διαστέλλεται τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Πατρός,
ἤπερ ὁ Υἱός. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρόοδος ἡ ἐκ
τοῦ Πατρός, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρόεισι γεν-
νητῶς, τὸ δὲ ἐκπορευτῶς, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐπί-
σης αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον ἀφορίζει τῆς
πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως· ἀποδιαστέλλε-
ται δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα καὶ δευτέρᾳ διαφορᾷ,
ἣν αὐτῷ τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως
προξενεῖ· εἰ δὲ πλείοσι διαφοραῖς δια-
στέλλεται τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα ἤπερ
ὁ Υἱός, ἐγγυτέρω ἂν εἴη τῆς πατρικῆς
οὐσίας ὁ Υἱός, καὶ διπλῶν ὄντων ἰδιω-
μάτων τῶν ἀφοριζόντων τὸ Πνεῦμα
θατέρῳ τούτων ὑποβεβηκέναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ
τῆς ὁμοφυοῦς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα συγγε-
νείας τὸ ἰσότιμον δυσφημηθήσεται
Πνεῦμα, καὶ οὕτως ἡ Μακεδονίου
πάλιν κατὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἀναδύσεται
λύσσα […].
Spirit from the Father is recognized as
being the specific property of the Spirit,
as the begetting of the Son from the
Father is the Son’s specific property; and
if according to their babble, the Spirit
proceeds also from the Son, then, the
Spirit is differentiated from the Father by
more idiomatic properties than the Son.
Both issue forth from the Father, and
even if the one issues forth by begetting
and the other by procession, nonetheless,
one of two modes equally separates them
from the hypostasis of the Father; but
here the Spirit is differentiated by a sec-
ond distinction arising from the dual pro-
cession. If more distinctions differentiate
the Spirit from the Father than differenti-
ate the Son from the Father, then the Son
would be nearer to the Father’s essence,
and the Spirit, equal in honour, will be
blasphemed as being inferior to the Son
in pertaining to consubstantial kinship
with the Father, by virtue of two proper-
ties which separate the Spirit. Thus the
madness of Makedonios against the Spirit
will again spring forth.

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 98 C. ERISMANN

Here is the reconstruction of the argument:

If one acknowledges that the property of the Spirit consists in processing from the
Father and that the property of the Son consists in being begotten of the Father;
if, then, one also acknowledges, as they claim, that the Spirit also proceeds from
the Son, then the Spirit possesses more idiomatic properties than the Son.
The possession of idiomatic properties distinguishes entities between themselves.
The more idiomatic properties an entity possesses, the more distinct it is from
another entity.
Due to the dual procession, the Spirit is differentiated from the Father by more
idiomatic properties than the Son is differentiated from the Father.
Then the Son is closer to the Father’s essence than the Spirit is.
Then the Spirit’s dignity is inferior to that of the Son with regard to consubstantial
kinship with the Father [which is false].

A logical point is presupposed in order to make this argument work, namely

that properties make individuals different. The more properties you have –
which are not shared properties, i.e. which are not essential properties in the
case of co-specific individuals – the more distinct you are from the other. The
logic behind the argument is that the addition of determinations or distinctions
makes two entities more different. This is the principle which is at the basis of
a particular logical structure, the famous division of essence or ousia known as
Porphyry’s tree, in which genera and species are distinguished by a special
kind of property, the difference (διαφορά). In the case of the Trinity, the dis-
tinction is not between species, but between hypostases, so the properties at
play are not differences, but idiomatic properties. The conceptual framework
remains nevertheless the same.

These five examples are sufficient to illustrate the kind of argumentation that
Photios employs. It is clear that such arguments invoke logical principles. Two
secondary conclusions could be drawn. The first is related to Photios’ author-
ship of the Mystagogy, which has recently been challenged.19 It is obvious that
the author of the Mystagogy has excellent logical culture. Metrophanes of
Smyrna has been mentioned as a possible author of the Mystagogy due to the
fact that certain manuscripts attribute this treatise or parts thereof to him. Nev-
ertheless, even with the generous attribution of several texts to Metrophanes of
Smyrna recently suggested by Peter van Deun,20 we do not have textual

19
See T. M. Kolbaba, Inventing Latin Heretics: Byzantines and the Filioque in the Ninth
Century, Kalamazoo, MI, 2008, pp. 76-103. See also the response by V. Polidori, Photius and
Metrophanes of Smyrna: the controversy of the authorship of the Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit,
in MEG, 14 (2014), pp. 199-208.
20
P. Van Deun, La chasse aux trésors: la découverte de plusieurs œuvres inconnues de
Métrophane de Smyrne (IXe-Xe siècle), in Byz, 78 (2008), pp. 346-367.

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS99

evidence for ascribing such logical culture to Metrophanes.21 Photios is by far

a more likely candidate for the attribution of the Mystagogy. Among his
Amphilochia, number 77 deals with the question of genera and species within
the conceptual framework of Porphyry’s Isagoge and numbers 137 to 147 dis-
cuss Aristotle’s Categories. We should also note that the expression “property
properly speaking”, κυρίως ἴδιον, which is the key notion for several argu-
ments, recurs often in the logical Amphilochia (138.138, 139.55, 140.114,
143.58, 146.47).
The second conclusion is that Photios in the Mystagogy is not afraid of using
logic for theological purposes, at least in a polemical context. Logic does not
appear as an extrinsic or foreign element to Christianity but as an excellent tool
for tackling heresies.

II. Why logic?

Photios’ extensive use of syllogisms in his argumentation is neither trivial

nor arbitrary. The Patriarch is forging a new style of theological writing. Some
elements that stem from the intellectual context both inside and outside Byz-
antium may be mentioned here as possible partial explanations for his
motivation.
First, after the Aristotelian turn inaugurated by Iconophile thinkers like
­Theodore of Stoudios and Nikephoros, logic was considered a useful tool by
ninth-century Byzantine theologians. There was in the Zeitgeist a trend favour-
able to rational argumentation about theological questions and a conviction that
logic was an adequate weapon against doctrinal positions considered heretical.
Photios was not unaffected by this trend. In Amphilochia 231, for example,
Photios is keen on using logic for solving a question about the humanity of
Christ.22
Furthermore, the Mystagogia is a polemical treatise. By nature, a polemical
treatise is a place for critical arguments where one attempts to refute the posi-
tion of the adversary. It is never a bad strategy to demonstrate the incoherence
of the opposing argument.
There is yet a final element. Could the fact that Photios was writing against
the Franks in some way have determined or influenced the form of his mes-
sage? Photios was a highly cultivated scholar. It was certainly a weapon in
Photios’ arsenal to adapt the form of his discourse to fit his addressee. Although

21
He does however follow Theodore of Stoudios and Nikephoros in their use of logical tools
to describe the relation between the model and the icon.
22
See C. Erismann, Photius and Theodore the Studite on the humanity of Christ. A neglected
Byzantine discussion on universals, in DOP, 71 (2017), pp. 175-191.

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 100 C. ERISMANN

it is difficult to assess precisely what knowledge Photios had of the Latin

texts,23 it nevertheless seems reasonable to think that he was at least decently
informed about Frankish arguments, perhaps thanks to communication with
some Greek-speaking monks of Southern Italy.24 So, in order to suggest the
recipient as a possible explanation for Photios’ use of syllogisms, one has to
show that this would have been an adequate answer to the Franks. This could
be the case if the Franks themselves used such an argumentative strategy. In
the last part of this contribution, I would like to show that this was indeed the
case, and to suggest that Photios was tempted to respond to the Franks in kind
and to refute with logical rigor – and irony – their fledgling application to
theology of basic logical and grammatical tools.
For this demonstration, I will use one of the most emblematic texts written
by Frankish theologians: the official response of the Carolingians to the second
Council of Nicaea known as the Libri Carolini. This anti-Byzantine treatise
deals mainly with the question of the veneration of images, but also contains
statements about the Filioque that the Carolingian theologians will subse-
quently try to defend. It is certainly not my intent to claim that Photios read
this text, which never circulated widely; yet, I suggest that this treatise is rep-
resentative of the kind of content Photios may have been indirectly aware of
and which could have motivated him to use logic in response. The Libri Caro-
lini make abundant use of syllogisms and attempt to show through logic the
incoherence of the iconophile position, which will, by the way, later become
Photios’ own position on the question. This text is also, as noted by Richard
Haugh, “the first Carolingian effort not only to propagate the Filioque doctrine
but also to oppose it to the Eastern doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit
from the Father through the Son”.25

The Libri Carolini and logic

The so-called King Charles’s Work against the Synod (Opus Caroli Regis
contra Synodum or Libri Carolini) is the official response of the Franks to the
Second Council of Nicaea (the council which restored the veneration of icons
in 787); a poor Latin translation of the council’s acts had reached Charlemagne.
The Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum was composed between 790 and 793.

23
Did he, for example, have access, at least indirectly, to Ratramnus of Corbie’s Contra
Graecorum opposita Romanam ecclesiam infamantium?
24
In his Encyclical letter to the Eastern Patriarchs (Ep. 2, p. 43, ll. 104-105) when Photios
mentions the modification of the Creed and the addition of the Filioque, he says that this was
done with “supposititious arguments and false statements” (νόθοις λογισμοῖς καὶ παρεγγρά-
πτοις λόγοις). The exact meaning of λογισμός here is uncertain, but the term could very well
refer to logical arguments.
25
R. Haugh, Photius and the Carolingians: The Trinitarian Controversy, Belmont, MA,
1975, p. 45.

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS101

The work was collectively discussed, as is attested by the manuscript Città del
Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 7207, a draft containing numerous corrections and
comments. Although issued in the Emperor’s name, this work against the
Synod has now been shown by Ann Freeman26 to be, with rather high probabil-
ity, the work of Theodulf of Orléans. Theodulf (d. 821) was one of Charle-
magne’s court intellectuals. He was a Goth, born around 760 and appeared out
of nowhere at the Carolingian court and became immediately influential. The-
odulf is described by Thomas Noble as “a superb biblical scholar, a gifted theo-
logian and the finest poet of the Carolingian age”.27 Theodulf is also the author
of a Libellus de Processione Spiritus Sancti, an influential collections of Patris-
tics texts in favour of the Carolingian teaching on the Filioque.
The Carolingian position defended within the Opus Caroli Regis contra
Synodum is the following: images play no role in salvation and have no impor-
tance in the Christian religion except for their two practical uses, namely the
ornamentation of a church and as a reminder to the congregation of past accom-
plishments and stories. This is presented as the via media between the two
Byzantine excesses that had followed upon one another in short order, icono-
clasm on the one hand, image veneration on the other. Or to phrase it differ-
ently, for the Carolingians it was forbidden both to destroy and to worship
images.
Syllogisms and logical inferences are frequent in the text. Ann Freeman, the
editor, has counted and listed 37 syllogisms.28 They are mainly of a basic form:
every A is B; every B is C; then every A is C. Here is one example:
Omne, quod sine profectu est, inutile est; et omne, quod inutile est, vanum est.
Omne igitur, quod sine profectu est, vanum est. Et omne, quod inofficiosum est,
profectu caret; et omne, quod profectu caret, vanitate non caret. Omne igitur,
quod inofficiosum est, vanitate non caret. (Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum I,
26, p. 218, ll. 14-19)
Everything that is without effect is useless, and everything useless is vain. So,
everything that is without effect is vain. And everything that is invalid is without
effect, and everything that is without effect is not without vanity. So, everything
that is invalid is not without vanity.

In the chapter 23 of the fourth book,29 vast swathes of the logical tradition
are brought into play. The point is to show that the Greeks are wrong in con-
tending that ‘to kiss’ and ‘to venerate’ mean the same thing. Theodulf chooses

26
See the studies collected in A. Freeman, Theodulf of Orléans: Charlemagne’s spokesman
against the second Council of Nicaea, Aldershot – Burlington, 2003, as well as the introduction
to her magisterial edition of the text (Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Concilia. Tomus II. Sup-
plementum I, Hannover, 1998).
27
T. F. X. Noble, Images, Iconoclasm, and the Carolingians, Philadelphia, 2009, p. 163.
28
Freeman, Theodulf of Orléans, pp. 55-56.
29
Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum, IV.23, pp. 544-550.

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 102 C. ERISMANN

to make his critique of this weak position the pretext for a demonstration of his
mastery of logic. As well noted by John Marenbon, “Above all, he sees the
chapter as an opportunity to demonstrate his prowess in handling arguments,
even though none of this complicated syllogizing is necessary, or even ger-
mane, for overturning the Greeks’ position”.30
Theodore quotes various logical sources: Boethius’ first commentary On
interpretation, Pseudo-Apuleius’ Peri Hermeneias and Isidore of Sevilla’s Ety-
mologies. He quotes a long passage from the pseudo-Apuleian text about
the truth-values of different propositions. He illustrates the distinction with the
following argument: a man kisses his wife and his children but he does not
adore them, and God whom he venerates, he cannot kiss.
It is possible to offer a rough characterisation of Theodulf’s use of logic
through a few observations. First, logic is accepted as a tool in theology and as
a weapon in the fight against a position considered to be heretical. Secondly
the main logical sources used in theology by the contemporary Greeks are rela-
tively absent; Porphyry’s Isagoge for example does not appear at all. We know
nevertheless thanks to an extremely important Carolingian ninth-century manu-
script, the so-called Codex Leidradi, the manuscript of Leidrad, that the Isa-
goge was known at the time. The Leidrad manuscript is dated to the end of the
eighth or the beginning of the ninth century (795-814).31 It was copied in Lyons
for Leidrad, the bishop of Lyons and friend of Alcuin of York on the eve of
the ninth century. In the Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum, references to
Aristotle’s categories are very sparse. The content of the Categories was known
through an anonymous paraphrase, the so-called Paraphrasis Themistiana or
Categoriae decem, attributed at the time to Augustine. We find the Categoriae
decem mentioned with regard to the question of simultaneity32 and for an argu-
ment about the category of relation, namely that relatives admit of more or
less.33 More central is Aristotle’s On interpretation, which seems to have been
known through Boethius’ first commentary to this text. We can also observe
the use of typical Latin sources of the time, mainly Pseudo-Apuleius’ Peri
Hermeneias.
Sometimes the use of logic appears artificial, unnecessary and overplayed.
This can be explained by the general polemical strategy of writing deployed in

30
J. Marenbon, The Latin Tradition of Logic to 1100, in D. Gabbay – J. Woods (eds),
Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance logic, Amsterdam,
2008, p. 25.
31
This manuscript is now the Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pagès 1
(olim Casa Generalizia dei Padri Maristi A.II.1). For a detailed study of the manuscript, see
P. Radiciotti, Romania e Germania a confronto: un codice di Leidrat e le origini medievali della
minuscola carolina, in Scripta, 1 (2008), pp. 121-144.
32
Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum, I.1, p. 108, l. 8.
33
Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum I.8, p. 146, l. 10.

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 THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE, LOGICAL ARGUMENTS103

Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum, i.e. to present the Franks as more educated
and literate than the Greeks and to prove that they are not barbarians anymore.34
Theodulf accuses the Greeks of failing to understand the grammatical and rhe-
torical artifices of the Old Testament. Byzantines are relentlessly criticised for
the poor literary, rhetorical and philosophical quality of the Acts of the Second
Council of Nicaea.
According to Theodulf, they use bad rhetorical style. In the Preface, Theod-
ulf states that “We refuse to acknowledge the writing of this most inappropriate
council, which not only lacks the form of speech through which small things
are said in a modest style, mediocre things in a moderate style and great things
in a grand style, but also fails in the use of ordinary prose”.35 The Byzantines
confuse terms, like habere (to have) and adorare (to worship), or adorare and
osculari. They are unable to see that on the matter of definition, you cannot
distinguish the depicted Virgin from the depicted donkey (IV.21). They often
misinterpret Biblical quotes because they fail to see the spiritual meaning. They
take literally passages that must be understood spiritually, allegorically, or
typologically. And more important to our purpose, they are accused of breaking
the rules of dialectic and of proving points by invalid quasi-syllogisms (IV.23).
The goals of chapter 23 of the fourth book are, first, to show that the Byzan-
tines use invalid syllogisms, and secondly to demonstrate the Carolingian mas-
tery of the rules necessary to reach valid conclusions.
Theodulf takes the opportunity to give his critics a lesson. When he bitterly
criticises the Greek interpretation of the Psalms, he provides lessons on gram-
mar and figures of speech. The same goes for logic. Logic is not used to con-
vince, but to illustrate the difference in learning and mastery of the liberal arts.
The exaggerated use of logic is part of the Frankish strategy to present them-
selves as more literate and educated than the Byzantines, and thus as better
leaders for Christianity. For Theodulf, the mastery of the liberal arts is con-
nected with theological leadership.
If Photios had been aware of any attempts by the Franks at such an argu-
mentative strategy, he would probably have wanted to respond accordingly.

34
A. Ommundsen, The Liberal Arts and the Polemic Strategy of the Opus Caroli Regis Contra
Synodum (Libri Carolini), in Symbolae Osloenses, 77.1 (2002), p. 180, notes rightly that “in the
OC [=Opus Caroli Regis contra Synodum] the required rhetorical features far exceed the mini-
mum, and great effort is put into giving the OC a high stylistic level. The Carolingians make their
text as text an important part of the argument against the Byzantines”.
35
Praefatio p. 102, ll. 17-21, illius ineptissimae synodi scripturam, quae non solum illa loqu-
tione caret, qua parva summisse, mediocria temperate, magna granditer proferuntur, sed etiam
pedestris sermonis modum neglegit, abnuentes, institutoris nostri, sermonis videlicet Dominici,
nitimur fieri usquequaque sequaces, transl. Ommundsen, The Liberal Arts, p. 184.

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 104 C. ERISMANN

Conclusion

Photios’ use of logic in the Mystagogy is characterized to some degree by

the integration of purely logical concepts, like the proprium, but for the most
part by syllogistic reasoning. Whatever the motivation behind them, the func-
tion of these syllogisms is not decorative; instead they play a real role in
­Photios’ argumentation. Their task is to underline the absurdity of the double
procession and to prove that it would lead to consequences which are either
absurd or false. Photios also mobilises a powerful set of logical arguments. This
gave to the debate a new dimension and would prove, if not successful in con-
vincing the Franks, nevertheless very influential among later Byzantine
theologians.36

36
This paper was written under the auspices of the research project “Reassessing Ninth Cen-
tury Philosophy. A Synchronic Approach to the Logical Traditions” (9 SALT) generously granted
by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 648298). I would like to thank Alessandra
Bucossi and the participants of the conference “Contra Latinos et Adversus Graecos: La sepa-
razione tra Roma e Constantinopoli dal IX al XV secolo”, especially Alexander Alexakis and
Michel Stavrou, for their insightful comments and suggestions after the talk. My deep gratitude
goes to Byron MacDougall for his careful reading of this article.

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