Postgraduate Course

Themes in Indian Political Thought

CONTENTS:
CHAPTERS
I Introduction
II. Epistemology : Indian Theories of Knowledge
III. State, Subject, Citizen
• State in India : Ancient, Medieval and Modern
(With special reference to Kautilya's Theory of the State,
Asoka's Dhamma and Akbar's Ain-e-A kbari)
IV. Conceptions of the Political
• Power and Authority
• Legitimacy and Obligation
V. Conceptions of the Community
• Rashtra/Janapada
• Qaum Millat
• Varna
• Jati
• Sangha
VI . Perspectives on Indian Society
• Brahmanical
• Buddhist
• Bhakti/Sufi
• Dalit-Bahujan
VII. The Nation in Indian Thought
VIII. Religion and Politics
• Tolerance
'
• Accommodation
• Secularism/Communalism
IX. Morality a d Politics
• Ethics

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 INDIAN POLITICAL THOUG HT- AN INT ROD UCT ION
-Dr. R. K. Anand
'
The science of state and governm ent or · ' Politics' or Political Science. as is popularly called,
has been var iously named in ancient literature. As early as in the Vedic literature (Chhandogya
Upanisad) the term used for it is · Kshatra vidya'. The Mahabharata has also referred to this
term. Sankar in his commentary equates · Kshatra vidya' with ' Dhanurveda' . Another term used to
signify politics is Rajadharma has been mentioned an Apastambha Smriti. Manusmriti and a lso the
Mahabharata. Agnipurana. Jataka Mala and Kritya Kalpataru. There are some variations of this as
· Rajashastra in the Mahabharata and the Sucldhacharit: · Rajaniti ' in Agnipurana and Chandeshivara, and
· Raja vidya ' in Kamandakiya. The term Niti is also used for the science of government or
Kamandaka Nitisara, Vaishampayana Nitiprakashika and Sukra Nitisara. The term ' Dandaniti ' is widely
used for the science of state . The other expre ssion · Arthashastra · is directly equated with the science or
state and government. Kautilya entitled his work on the subject as Arthashastra. But the term was
familiar even earlier. the Ramayana. the Mahabharata and later Panchatantra, Devipurana and Vayupuran
also refer to ' Artha shastra'.
S6LH-ces of Political Thought
The Vedic Literture: The Vedas are the oldest literature of the world. The Vedic literature is
classfied into Shruti and Smriti. The Shruti includes the Sambita, Brabinan. Aranyaka and Upanishids.
The four Sambitas are namely, the Rig. Yajus. Sama and Atharva.
An other constituent of the Vedic literature the Upanishads. The principal of them are thirteen
in bumb er.
The Smriti literature is very wide and include the dharma shastra works. The dharma shastra
literature deals with the organisation of the society. state. duties of the king and the people, taxation.
property and inheritance. It also gives a conside rab le attention to civil and criminal jurisprudenc e -
procedure. evidence. witn esses. crimes and punishment. law amendments and such other subjects.
Epics, Novels and Dramas : The non-Vedic literatrue is also in abundance and include the epics- The
Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the Rughuvansha. (by Kalidasa), and novels- the Harsha . Charit (by
Dandin ). stories and didactics - Panchatanlra, Hitupadesha, Vetul Panchtivinshati. Dasa Kumar Charit,
Katha Sarit Sagar.
Purana : The Purana literature is full of discussions on polity, king, law and society. The Purana
composition extends from 4 B.C. to 5 A.D. Agni has detailed discussion on polity. The subject
matter or the Puranas ranges from : creation of the universe its nature natural property: dissolution
of the creation: a race. dynasty: period, age, time b: and history of a dynasty.
Arthasastra : Arthashastra another non-vedic literature which treats the sub ject matter directly. The foremost
or them is the Arthashastara of Kautilya. Kautilya is identified as the mentor -preceptor of Chandragupta
Maurya of 4th Century B.C.. though some western scholars assign him a later date. Kautilya qotes at
least five schools of thought on polity and thirteen scholars. a noth er work of importance on polity is the
Nitisara by Shukra. Nitisara of Kamandaka has a close influence of Kautilya.
Jain Litcrntur e : There are some works in fain literature which have references to polity and administration.
They have several references which are parallel to Jataka and ' Santi parva of the Mahabharata. They among
other things, discuss the origin of state, society, castes etc.
Buddhist Literature The other non-Vedic literature is the Buddhist, which is available in Pali and Prakrit.
The vinaya Pitaka is a book of discipline and organization of the Buddh ist Church. Its chapters on
‘Mahavagga and Chullavagga' are particularly interesting. The organ izat ion is democratic: the decisions
are taken by majority after deliberations.
Foreigners Travel Acco unts and Reports : Like indigenous literature. Indian references a reavailable in foreign
languages also. Accounts or the historian or Alexander (327 -325 8.C.) give a description of the
contemporary administration and society. Magasthanese was an Ambassador in the court of
Chandragupta Maurya. The Chines sources are useful for the Gupta and post -Gupta period. The travel
accounts of Fah Hsien. reflect on the administration in Madhyadesh and Bihar.
Archaeological and Archival Sources: Literary evidence is supplemented by archaeological and archival
material. They evidence the polity in practice.
Problems in understanding the sources
The sources of Indian political tradition are rich enough to synthesize a consistent thought and
theory. It should however be kept in mind that the scholars believed in unity and homogeneity of knowledge,
they were conscious of the purpose , its application, and that knowledge is divine. T he social conduct of
man and society is governed by ' dhrama ' , a term which is more misunderstood than explained. The thougln,
and li terature is conditioned by the philosophical value system of the time, advancement of knowledgement
and information and means of communication. Since the span period of thought in India is is very long and
which is broken by political upheavals, foreign subjugation, destruction of records, stag nat ion. chan
ges in language, names and frontiers-all these and many other factors hinder a clear understanding and
evaluation of the material available.
The first problem is presented by the identification of authorship and fixation of the date of
composition. This is so because many works have lost their details, or have no such details. In
particular the Vedic literature may be cited as an example. The epics like Mahabharata and Ramayana are
traditionally associated with Yyasa and Valmiki respectively but the period of their present day fo rm is
disputed as critics suspect later additions and interpolations. For example, the Mahabharata must have passed
several stages before the original ' Jaya' became ' Bha rata ' and finally developed into ' Mahabharata ' .
Confusion is also caused by the existence of traditions and schools of thought after the great
Rishis. Centuries elapse between the first and the last.
The Style of most of the works is didactic and morali stic, which does not suit a scientific
inquiry. It prescribes what the kings should do. but does not analyze why. However, does not mean that the
prescriptions are imagination, and do not have rationalization. It is true the treatment is brief and condensed.
“The whole Indian literature is not wo1th one shelf" - this remark shows the imperialistic bias of the
British rulers. And the British scholars helped Macaulay in downgrading the Indian litarature, and deride the
cultural heritage.
The bias also palys its role when the whole thought and society is examined on the criterion
of particular political philosophy, or present day conditions and norms.
A serious handicap is felt in identifying old places, geographical sites or historical personalities
which make the history mythical. creation of imagination. Links are also missing in the concepts and thought.
Meanings ass igned to words and expressions have also changed.
Sanskrit studies are losing interest. The result is that those who know the language, know little
of the disciplines and the sub ject experts do not have a gfip over the language.
Like Sanskrit texts. Pali and Prakrit are also becoming difficult to comprehend. For example critically
ed ited Jain texts are not available.
A similar difficulty exist with the G reek, Latin or chinese sources. A student has to depend
on translations in English. and is led by them. An independent review is not possible. How authentic or faithful
the translation is remains a question, besides how faitl1ful and authentic the account is.
We have seen that political power has been always concerved to be a means. Wealth and
power are important but not the final goal : spiritual development and self -contemp lation and realization stand
higher. Hindu writers always stress that force should not be the basis of political power but that the latter
shouldd have its foundation in discipline, self-restraint and the performance of the function for which
power has been instituted. The view that the ancient Hindus ga ve primacy to spiritual values over
political goals is demonstrated in the philosophy of Hindu social structure where the Brahmins. 'the
people of knowledge and renunciation are placed higher in rank than the Kshatriyas- the political people and
the fighter.

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 Absence of Political Thought
One major charge levelled against political philosophy was that there was nothing like political
thought in ancient India. With the discovery of Kautilya's Arthasastra and the intensive study of the works on
Manu. Sukra. Kamandaka, Somadeva and the epics, it is now accepted that the ancient Indian thinkers did
concern themselves with political enquiries. During the twentieth century attempts are being made to collect
politically relevant passages from the poetic compositions of Kalidasa. Bharavi, Magha and Sri H arsha. the
Bhattikavyam as well as the Buddhists and the Puranic literatures. Some defenders of Indian political thought
like Sri Aurobindo have pointed out that the ancient Indians were not concerned with political abstract
speculation; their special concern was to produce administrative manuals with the help of which the social
and political organisations could be perfected. It remains nevertheless true that we do not find many major
treatises of political theory in ancient India. Kautilya is the one which can be considered a major mature and
detailed treatise on political. administrative and diplomatic matters.
There is no doubt that political philosophy was not pursued at an intensive level in ancient India.
There are pragmatic didactic and aphoristic sermons and statements. It is true that in the Santiparva there
are long passages emphatically enunciating moral norms and postulates, but there are not to be found
integrated discussions of political ethics, legal obligation or theories of punishment.
It is a major problem for historians to determine as to why there is a dearth of political literature,
political concepts and notions in ancient Indian thought. Hegel has pointed out that the existence of the fourfold
social structure was a dominant inhibiting force to any kind of creative social and political theorisation in
ancient India because this institutional pattern was based on the notion of rigid separation.
Indian political theory was conceived in the context of a social order based on Varna srama. The
notions of Svadharma and Svakarman were emphasized and the Gita even tried to give to these notions an
ethical and philosophical content. But it cannot be helped saying that these notio ns and ideas were popularized
in the social context of a privileged elite and a dependent, underprivileged and social base. They were found on
the notions of differentiation and hierarchy depended upon the leadership of the king, his v irtues, and his
ability to promote welfare of all.
Absence of Rationality
Another charge against Indian political thought is that it has no conception of a rational scheme of
individual duty. It is true that it emphasizes duties and obligation and debts but these d uties are not determined
by the preferences and deliberate choices of the individual. There is no question of individual selection or
choice amongst a scheme of duties. In other words, the freedom of volition does not operate in the social
sphere. One's duties are laid down in the sastras and one has only to follow them. Thus. the accident of
birth in a particular caste determines one's scheme of duties. It is 0bvious that such a scheme of ethics. the
question of rational freedom or spontaneous determination of one's scheme of duties does not arise. The
whole scheme of Hindu social philosophy and its entire theory of sixteen Arya Samskaras are based on the
fact that an individual has, necessarily, to perform his obligations but there is no scheme of choice of goals
and the subsequent consideration of one's duties and means for the realization of these chosen goals.
The Indian political thought has developed in a distinct environment, which. no doubt, is
dominated by the metaphysical inquiry into the origin of the world or cosmos. and also philosophical analysis
of society and social relations. The metaphysical inquiry has deeply influenced the social organization and
values. Secondly. the Indian civilization has an ancient· origin. much of its records have been either lost or
destroyed. There are gaps in intellectual pursuits. and links are missing. This has made the available
literature obscure. imaginative or unreal. It has subjected them to interpretation. which is not free from bias.
Finaifyit is true the ancient thinkers had a holistic view of life and so in their thought look it in
totality not in fragments, as organic whole and not isolated ent itie s. The development of sciences is also
integrated. and one science has incursions into other sciences. It is for this reason that in the whole of political
thought man. his behaviour and conduct is the central point of inquiry, and since human thought and action are
not, or cannot be confined to clear-cut limits. the discussion touches upon many subjects and spheres and

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draws from them: so it may appear confused. Such factors and many others have often led scholarsto
question the existence of political thought.
In modern India, important volumes and treatises are being produced on the Dharmasastras. The
Dharmasastras occupy a great place in the history of Sanskrit literature. The concepts of legal equality, equal
protections of laws. inalienable natural right of man. and social equality. and economic justice are beyond the
comprehension of these apologists of Brahmanical supremacy.
From the standpoint of the social and behavioural sciences, several objection can be raised a gainst
ancient Indian political thought. According to the modern qualitativists even the writings of Krabe. Barker.
Maciver and Laski be long to the real political philosophy and cannot be called scientific political theory.
Unless stat istical and mathematical techniques and models are employed. it is said. we cannot have
political science. If this criterion were to be followed and if even the works of Laski and Maciver were to be
banished from the field of scientific political theory. it goes without saying that ancient Indian political thought
cannot claim the appellation of science.

Indian Contribution to Political Thought

Indian philosophy has made some significant contribution to political thought. Of them some
have not received due attention, some have been misinterpreted, while some others have been subjected to
criticism. But there are some concepts which have made their impact on thought. The following are the
significant contr i but ions.
A fundamental contribution of the Vedic literature to political philosophy is the notion of
Abhayam or Fearlessness. The Atlwn'aveda exalts the concept of Abbayam. It prays for fearlessness from
friends and foes. fearlessness in day and night and fearlessness from the known and the unkn own. This
concept of universal fearlessness is on the prime motivational foundations of political individualism.
inalienable and fundamental rights as well as disobedience of unjust laws and ordinanc es.
Another major contribution of ancient Indian political thought to political philosophy and human
civilization is the concept of the 'good of all' or Sarvabhutahita. Indian philosophical idealists. both of
theVedantic and the Buddhistic schools. have exalted the notion of the good of all living beings. The Vedant
supp orted this notion on the metaphysical ground of one spiritual entity be4ng the dominant rea li ty.
Hence, all living being including animals were considered as only aspects or manifestations of the same
dominant reality. Buddhism supported the notion of universal, good of all living beings because it is an
advocate of compassion or Karuna . The Jatakas contain numerous stories wherein it is taught that Gauta ma
Buddha in his previous existences, as Bodhisattva sacrificed himself for saving the lives of an ima ls.
It is also true that for the solution of social economic and political tensions in the present Indian
society. the valuational significance of Indian ethical notions which have. through centuries, become a
part of the intellectual-moral structure of the Indians, cannot be neglected. Tensions and struggles are certainly
there. but according to Indian thinkers, concord and harmony have their vital role to play in society. The
moral sentiment may. partly. reinforce the purely political justifications in defence of a democratic po li ty.
Hence. there is relevance of Indian social and political thought even to modern social sciences in I nd ia.
We can. today. hope for some kind of a synthesis in which those elements in ancient Indian political
thought which could be legitimately supported on the basis of rea son, should be integrated with some of the
important concept of modern civilization like reason. individuality, critical orientation, etc. Hence. we can
make efforts for building up a rational and modern society in the light of ancient Indian philosophic idealism
and the political notion of Abbayam.

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 Chapter II
PISTEMOLOGY: INDIAN THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
Dr. Brahma Bharadvaja
Indian Epistemology deals with four questions, viz., what is the nature of pramana, what is the
nature of prama, what is the nature of pramata, and what is the nature of prameya. It deals with the last two
questions in order to throw light upon the nature of prama and pramana . They are rather strictly ontological
questions which are necessarily connected with epistemology. But the most important question in Indian
Epistemology is the question of pramanya. How does the validity (pramanya) of knowledge arise? Or
what is the cause of valid knowledge? And how can we determine the validity of knowledge? Or how can
the validity of knowledge be known? All the questions of Western Epistemology are involved in the
above questions, though they do not present themselves to the Indian thinkers in the same way. Here we
shall briefly consider the questions of pramana, prama, and p ramanya.
The Nature of Pramana
Pramana literally means the principal instrument (karana) of valid knowledge (prama). Vatsyayana
distinguishes pramana from pramata, prameya. and pramiti. Pramata is the cognizer of valid knowledge, who
is induced to exertion by the desire to acquire or discard the objects of kn owledge. Prameya is the object
of valid knowledge. Pramiti or prama is the valid knowledge of the object. And pramana is the principal
instrumental cause of valid knowledge. But what is the real nature of pramana ? Opinions differ as to this
question. Some hold that it is of the nature of apprehension and non -apprehension. Others hold that it is of the
nature of apprehension alone. We briefly consider below the different views of pramana.
The Naiyayika View: For the production of valid knowledge the cognizing agent (pramata) and the
cognized object (prameya) both are necessary . Should they be Included, then, in pramana or instrument of
right cognition? They cannot be included in pramana, because , in that case, there would not be the fourfold
distinction of Pramata, or cognizer, prameya or cognized object, pramiti or valid cognition, and pramana or
instrument of valid cognition. So, the later Naiyayikas have defined Pramana as the entire aggregate of
conditions (karanasamagri), apart from the cognizing agent (pramata) and the cognized object (prameya),
which partaking of the nature of both apprehension and non-apprehensi on, bring about the cognition of an
object, which is free from uncertainties and mistakes , and which apprehends the real nature of the object. The
earlier Naiyayikas erroneously defined pramana as the entire collocation of circumstances, which, being of
the nature of apprehension and non-apprehension both, bring about the uncontradicted and undoubted
cognition of an object.
The Samkhya View : According to the Samkhya, the function of the intellect (buddhi) which takes
in the form of an object, when it has come into contact with a sense -organ, discriminated by the manas, and as
perceived by the ahankara or empirical ego. is called pramana. This unintelligent psychic mode casts its
reflection upon the transcendental self (purusa) which. being thus coloured by the psychic mode, becomes the
spectator or seer of all objects. Thus the pure transcendental self is the cognizer (pramata), the unconscious
psychic mode is the instrument of valid cognition (pramana), the reflection of the psychic mode transformed
into the form of its object, upon the pure self is valid knowledge (prama); the object that transforms the
function of the intellect into its own form and is ultimately reflected on the conscious self (purusa) is called
the object of valid knowledge (prameya).

I
 The Naiyayika criticizes this doctrine of pramana from his own standpoint. According to the
Samkhya that in which the cognition appears or that which is transformed into the form of an object is
unintelligent and material buddhi, while that to which the object of knowle dge is presented is the intelligent
self (purusa) ; the former is the pramana. while the consciousness of the purusa, which is due to the reflection
of the unintelligent psychic mode on it, is valid knowledge (prama); so that the pramana and the prama do
not inhere in the same substratum.
The Mimamsaka View: The Bhatta Mimamsaka regards a cognition as a means (pramana) and
apprehendedness (jnatata) in the object of cognition produced by the cognition as the result (phala) of
pramana. According to him cognition is of the nature of activity, and as activity is always in ferred' from its
result (phala), the activity of cognition or cognitive activity is inferred from its result in the form of
apprehendedness or manifestness (prakatya) in the nature of its object and this inferable cognitive activity is
the instrument of valid knowledge (pramana). This is the view of the Bhatta Mimamsaka.
Parthasarathimisra, a Bhatta Mimamsaka. defines pramana as the cognition of an object which has
not already been cognized, which:is free from contradiction and the causes of wl)':ich are free from defects.
According to Prabhakara direct and immediate apprehension (anubhuti) is pramana; and it is not
inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness ; it is self -lu minous . A cognition directly reveals
itself and the cognizing self as the subject of cognition or cognizer. It sometimes directly reveals its object as
in perception, and sometjmes indirectly, as in inference and other kinds of knowledge .
The labia View: The Jaina also holds that cognition itself is a pramana, which apprehends both
itself and its object. But the cognition must be of a definite character. According to the Bhatta, a cognition
can be inferred from the apprehendedness (inatata) in its object. According to the Jaina, a cognition is self -lu
minous ; it apprehends itself directly. and apprehends its object (s\;aparaprakasa). According to the
Naiyayika, a cognition apprehends its object (paraprakasa), but can never apprehend itself; it is apprehe nded
by some other cognition (anuvyavasaya) ; it is not self-luminous or self- manifesting (svaprakasa) but other-
manifesting (paraprakasa). According to Prabhakara, a cognition reveals itself, its object and the self; there is
the triple consciousness of the object, the subject, and the cognition in a single cognition (triputisamvit).
The Buddhist View: According to some Buddhists there is a parallelism between a cognition and its
object which arise simultaneously from the same complement of conditions. Ac cording to them both objects
and ideas, which are momentary, are produced by the same stuff, viz., the matter- stuff and the mind -stuff
together.
In the production of a cognition the mind-stuff is the material cause (upadanakarana) and the mind-
stuff is the auxiliary cause (sahakarikarana), while in the production of an object, the matter -stuff is the
material cause, and the mind-stuff is the auxiliary cause. Thus a cognition is produced both hy consciousness
and by an object; and an object also is produced both by an object and by consciousness. But the difference
between an object and a cognition is due to the different roles played by the matter -stuff and the mind-stuff in
producing them. Thus a cognition simultaneously arising with its object from the sa me matter-stuff and mind-
stuff becomes the apprehender (grahaka) of the latter (grahya), and, being in agreement with the object, is
called pramana. According to this doctrine neither a cognition is produc d by its object, nor is the object
produced by a cognition; they are generated simultaneously out of the same stu ff; and the cognitio n, being
in harmony with its object, is called pramana. Jayanta Bhatta criticizes this doctrine of pramana from the
Naiyayika standpoint.

6
If the object and the cognition are produced at the same moment out of the common stuff, why should the
former manifest the latter, and why should they correspond with each other? They cannot give any answer to
it.
According to the Buddhist subjective idealist, the formless consciousness is the common stuff of all
the determinate cognitions of blue, yellow, and so on; and when this formless consciousness is modalized hy
various contents of blue, yellow. and so on, this modalized consciousness or the determinate cognition with a
particular form is called pramana. According to this view there are no external objects ; nor is there any
permanent self; there are only ideas or momentary cognitions. How. then, can there be the fourfold distinction
of pramata, pramana, pramiti, and prameya which are said to exhaust the whole of reality? The Buddhist
subjective idealist says that this distinction is possible even within the stream of cognitions or ideas. A
cognition that superimposes upon itself the form of an unreal external object (e.g., blue , yellow , etc.) is
called prameya; the manifestation of this apparent ly external object is called pramiti ; the power or capacity
of manifesting it is called pramana; and the substrate of this power of manifestation is called pramata; and all
these are in one and the same cognition. Hence the distinction among these four factors involved in knowledge
is an ideal distinction within one and the same cognition. Thus, according to the Buddhist subjective idea lis
t, though the object of perception (anubhava), the agent of perception (anubhavita) and the act of perception
(anubhavana) are not different from perception itse lf, still the division of pramana, pramcya. pramata. and
pramiti is a creation of the imagination. This is the view of a Yogachara school of Buddhis m. But the
Yaibhasikas and Sautrantikas are realists; they believe in the real ex is tence of extra -mental objects; the
fonner regard the extramental reality as the object of perception, while the latter regar d it as the object of
inference. According to the Vaibhasika an external object, whjch is perceptible, is the object of valid
knowledge (prameya); the negation of non-manifestation of the object is valid knowledge (pramiti); and the
negation of incapacity of manifesting the object is the means of valid knowledge (pramana). According to the
Sautrantika an external object, which is infe1Ted from its cognition, is the prameya; the correspondence of
the cognition with its object is the pramana, and the consciousness of that correspondence between the
cognition and the cognized object is the pramiti. Dharmottara defines right knowledge as the knowledge that
is in harmony with its object. A cognition can be known to be in harmony with its object, if it can le ad the
cognizer to the actual attainment of the object. This harmony of a knowledge with its object is called pramana,
which consists in the capacity of leading to the actual attainment of the object.
The Samkara-Vedantist View: The Advaita Vedantist also regards a cognition as the pramana. In
fact, according to the Samka.rite , the fourfold distinction of pramata, pramana, pramiti, and prameya is within
the eternal consciousness modalized by different determinants . One and the same eternal consciousnes s or
Brahman is differentiated into four kinds of consciousness by four different determinants or limiting
conditions (upadhi). The cognizing self (pramata) is the consciousness determined by the internal organ
(antahkarana) which is a modification of nescience. The instrument of valid knowledge (pramana) is the
consciousness determined by the mental mode or function of the internal organ. The object of valid
knowledge (prameya) is the consciousness determined by an empirical object. And the result of the act of
valid knowledge (pramiti) is the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental mode or function of
the internal organ (antahkarana).

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 According to the Advaita Vedanta the translucent mobile internal organ (antahkarana) moves out
through the channel of the external sense-organs to an object and is transformed into the form of the object.
This moving out of the antahkarana from the psycho-physical organism to the object is called the vritti or
mode of the antahkarana; it is an apprehending mental mode; it siands between the organism and the extra -
organic object. The so-called object too veils the eternal consciousness. And this veil of nescience is broken
by the apprehending mental mode, which manifests the consciousness in the object. Now, the consciousness,
which is determined by the internal organ (antahkarana), is called the pramata; it is confined within the
organism. The consciousness detennined by the apprehending mental mode standing between the organ ism
and the extra-organic object is called the pramana. The consciousness determined or veiled by the extra -
organic empirical object is the prameya. And the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental
mode.- which was so long veiled by the empirical object- is called the pramiti.
The Nature of Valid Knowledge (Prama or Pramiti)
Prama means valid knowledge. What is the real nature of prama? As to this question also there are
different views in Indian Phil osophy. There are different types of rea lism. idealism. and pragmatism in Indian
Epistemology. These different types of thought define the nature of prama in different ways. It is beyond the
scope of our short treatise on Indian Epistemology to attempt an elaborate treatment of this vast subject . Here
we shall simply refer to the different views in Indian Philosophy as regards the nature of valid knowledge
(prama).
The Nyaya Vaisesika View: The Nyaya-Vaisesika, the Mimansaka, the .Taina, the Vaibhasika, the
Sautrant i ka, and the Samkhya-Patanjala are realists. though they differ from one another in many respects .
Some Yogacaras are subjective idealists. The Madhyamika is an absolutist. The Samkara -Vedantist is an
absolute idealist. Ramanuja is an objective idealist. The Nyaya realism and the Ja ina realism are affiliated to
pragmatism, so that they may he called realistic pragmatism. The Buddhist realism and idealism both are of a
pragmatic type, so that one may be; called realistic pragmatism , and the other, subjectivistic or idealistic
pragmatism. The Samkarite absolute, idealism also is affiliated to empirical realism and empirical
pragmatism. Ramanuja's objective idealism also is pragmatistic , and it may be termed absolute pragmatism.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika advocates uncritical and naive realism and believes in the correspondence
theory of knowledge. We know the external objects with their qualities. actions, generalities, etc., by sense -
perception. That knowledge is valid, which represents the real nature of its object. There is a corre spondence
between knowledge and its object. When there is a disagreement between the two. the knowledge is invalid.
But how can this agreement or disagreement between knowledge and its object be kn own? Here the Nyaya
realism offers a pragmatic test. According to the Nyaya. the validity or invalidity. in other words, the
agreement or disagreement of knowledge with its object, can be known only by its practical efficiency or ine
fficien cy. When a knowledge leads to fruitful activity it is valid. When it le ads to fruitless activity it is
invalid. Thus the Nyaya realism affiliates itself to pragmatism; it is realistic pragmatism. The problem of the
test of truth or the criterion of the validity of knowledge is reserved for the next section. Here we give a few
definitions of prama or valid knowledge offered by the Nyaya-Vaisesaki realis ts . Vatsyayana defines valid
knowledge as the cognition of an object in something in which it is, that is. the cognition of an object as it
really is. Uddyotakara accepts the same definition. The later Nyaya-Vaisesika defines prama as the knowledge
of the generic nature as abiding in its own subject. Sivaditya defines prama as the apprehension of the real
nature of an object. Udayana defines prama as the true ascertainment of an object. Others define it as the true
apprehension of an object.

8
 These Nyaya-Vaisesika realistic definitions of prama are based upon dualistic metaphysics. They
presuppose the existence of the knowing self and the known object. And they recognize the correspondence
between the prama and the object of prama or prameya. But the Nyaya -Vaisesika does not define the exact
nature of the correspondence between the two. It is a fact of experience and so cannot be challanged. It is
proved by its practical usefulness. The Nyaya-Vaisiesika realism is practical in its attitude towards the
problem of epistemology. The extra-mental reality is a fact of experience. It is real , and so cannot be
idealised. lt is exactly represented by valid knowledge. And this correspondence too between prama and
prameya is a fact of experience. It cannot be explained away. It is proved only by its pragmatic utility.
The Jaina View : The Jaina agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisesika in his theory of valid knowledge
(prama). He also advocates realistic pragmatism. For him, valid knowledge (prama) is the determinate
cognition of itself and its object, and invalid knowledge (aprama) is the determinate cognition of an object in
something in which it is not, that is,-the determinate cognition of an object as different from what it really is.
And valid knowledge (prama) is capable of practical efficiency in the form of the selection of good and the
avoidance of evil.
The validity of a cognition consists in its agreement with the object cognized, and the invalidity of
a cognition consists in its disagreement with the object cognized. And both the validity and the invalidity of
knowledge arise from extraneous circumstances, viz., the special virtues (guna) and the defects and
imperfections (dosa) respectively in their originating causes. But they are self -evident or determined by
themselves in the case of habituated cognitions , and they are known from extraneous circumstances , viz.,
the knowledge of harmony or disharmony, and the presence or absence of contradicting experience, in the
case of unhabituated or initial cognitions.
The Mimamsaka View : Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as direct and immediate
apprehension, which is different from recollection (smriti). Recollection is invalid as it depends upon the
subconscious impression left by past experience. All cognitions per se are valid. Prab hakara says, "It is
strange indeed how a cognition can be said to apprehend an object, and yet be invalid". The inherent validity
of a cognition is disproved only when it is found to be not in agreement with the real nature of its object.
Here Prabhakara means by pramana valid cognition , not the means of valid cognition. He identifies the
pramana with prama. According to him all cognitions as cognitions are valid; their invalidity is due to their
disagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions
themselves but to the things cognized. Siddhasena, though a Jaina logician, accepts the same view. He says
that perception is never wrong, since it is always recognized as valid; to speak of it as valid, and at t he same
time, as wrong would be a contradiction in terms.
Kumarila also,accepts the view of Prabhakara as to the nature of valid know le dge. According to
him, the validity of· a cognition consists in its being an apprehension; this validity can be set asid e only by
such discrepancies as the disagreement of the cognition with the real nature of its object and so forth.
Parthasarathimisra, though a follower of Kumarila, puts forward the following definition of valid knowledge.
A valid cognition is the cognition of an object , which has not already been apprehended , which is free from
contradiction and which arises from causes free from imperfections. A valid cognition is the cognition of an
object, which has not already been apprehended, truly representing the real nature of the object. Thus,
according to the Bhatta Mimamsaka, knowledge, in order to be valid, must truly represent the real nature of
its object, and must be characterised by novelty, and must be generated by causes which are untainted by
impe rfections . The Bhatta Mimamsaka theory of valid knowledge (prama), too, is realistic.

9
 ·
The Bhatta Mimamsaka differes from the Naiyayika in two respects. In the first place,
according to the former, the validity of knowledge is self-evident, and the invalidity of knowledge is
inferred from the knowledge of imperfections in its causes, and the knowledge of its disagreement with its
object, while, according to the latter, both validity and invalidity of knowledge are inferred fr om fruitful
and fruitless activity respectively. In the second place, the former does not appeal to the pragmatic test,
while the latter applies the pragmatic criterion to knowledge. The former advocates realism, pure and
simple, while the latter advocates realistic pragmatism. According to the Bhatta Mimamsaka, truth is its
own criterion; it is self-evident or self-validating; it does not require any extraneous evidence for its
validity; it is.its own light; it cannot be shown by any other light of evidence; but invalidity or falsity or
knowledge cannot be known by itself; it can be known through the knowledge of the discrepancy of the
knowledge with its object, and the knowledge of imperfections in its originating causes, e. g., sense -
organs, etc. According to the Naiyayika , on the other hand, both truth and error can be proved only by
fulfilled and unfulfilled activity respectively; both validity and invalidity of knowledge are not inherent
characteristics of knowledge: they are the adventitious marks of knowledge borrowed from extraneous
circumstances.
TheAdvaita Vedantist View: According to Samkara Brahman alone is the ontological reality,
and the other objects are superimposed on the eternal consciousness by nescience, and have only an
empirical existence (vyavaharika satta) as distinguished from ontological existence (paramarthika satta).
So the Advaita Vedantist distinguishes between empirical validity and ontological va li dity. The
knowledge of one undifferentiated consciousness or Brahman has ontological validity, and the knowledge
of empirical objects or the world of appearance (prapancha) has empirical validity. A knowledge is
empirically valid if it represents the nature of its object and is not contradicted by any other valid
cognition. The Advaita Vedantist does not necessarily exclude recollectipn (smriti) from valid knowledge.
The above definition of valid knowledge iscommon to both apprehension (anubhuti) and recollection
(smriti). A valid apprehension (anubhuti) is the knowledge of an object, which has not already been
apprehended by a previous cognition, - -and which is , not contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge.
The Advaita Vedantist agrees with the Mimamsaka, that the validity of knowledge is its
inherent character, and that the invalidity of knowledge is an adventitious mark of knowledge due to
extraneous circumstances. The validity of knowledge arises from itself, and is known by itself. But
invalidity of knowledge arises from extraneous circumstances, and is known through the m . The Advaita
Vedantist, however, differs from the Mimamsaka in the fact that he also appeals to the pragmatic criterion
. He defines validity of knowledge as the character of a cognition of an object as it really is ; which is
conducive to fruitful activity.
Thus, the Advaita Vedantist advocates the doctrine of empirical realism as
opposed to the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of ontological realism of a pragmatic type; it may be termed
pragmatic empirical realism or empirical realistic pragmatism . And this doctrine is affiliated to the main
Vedantist doctrine of absolute idealism, according to which, Brahma n, the absolute , or .the one eternal
consciousness alone, is ultimately real. This absolute idealism of Samkara is opposed to the objective
idealism of Ramanuja.

10
 The Samkhya View : According to the Samkhya valid knowledge is the consciousness of the self,
which is due to the reflection on the self, of the mental mode, which has, for its object, something which has
not already been apprehended, and which is free from doubts and discrepancies.
According to this view both validity and invalidity of knowledge are the inherent characteristics I
of know le dge; and they can be known by themselves . A cognition is either intrinsically v alid or intrinsically
inva li d. Its validity or invalidity is not due to extraneous circumstances. The Samkhya theory of knowledge
too is realis tic . It is based on metaphysical dua lis m. The validity of knowledge consists in the
correspondence of knowledge-forms with the object-forms. But how can knowledge copy or represent the
reality? The Samkhya holds that the transparent unintelligent intellect (buddhi), in which the sattva is the
predominant factor and the tamas is in the minimum is transformed into the form of an object which is
conveyed to it through the medium of external sense-organs, the central sensory or the mind (manas), and the
empiric al ego (ahamkara). and is intelligized by the transcendental self (purusa) which comes to have a
knowledge of the object owing to the reflection' of the intelligized function of the intellect on itself.
The Buddhist View: The Buddhist identifies pramana with prama. According to the Buddhist
realist , a valid knowledge is a cognition, which is in harmony with its object. and this harmony between a
cognition and its object is known by fruitful activity or the actual attainment of the object. Thus the Buddhist
realist advocates realistic pragmatism. But the Buddhist differs from the Naiyayika in that only the validity of
knowledge, according to him. is due to. and known by. fruitful activity. but that the invalidity of knowledge is
inherent in itself, not being due to extraneous circumstances.
According to the Buddhist subjective idealist also the validity of knowledge consists in the
harmony of experience. Dr. B. N. Seal puts it thus: "The ultimate criterion of Truth is found , not in mere
cognitive presentation, but in the correspondence between the cognitive and the practical 'activity of the
self, which together are supposed to form the circuit of consciousness. That knowledge is valid which prompts
an activity ending in fruition...Truth is not self-evidence. not the agreement between ideas, nor the agreement
of the idea with the reality beyond. if any, for th is cannot be attained direct, but the harmony of experience
(samvada). which is implied when the volitional reaction. that is prompted by a cognition. and that completes
the circuit of consciousness. meets with fruition. i .e ., realizes its immediate end'' . This doctrine of prama
may be termed suhjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism as distinguished from realistic pragmatism. This
distinction also applies to the realistic pragmatism of the Buddhist realist. the Jaina, and the Naiyayika, and the
subjectivistic or idealistic pragmatism of the Buddhist subjective idealist.

A Review of the Theories

The different theories of the test or truth or pramanya may be grouped under four heads : (1)
The Samkhya holds that both the validity and invalidity of cognitions are inherent in themselves. (2) The
Naiyayika holds that both of them are adventitious , owing their origin to other extraneous circumstances. (3)
The Buddhist holds that cognitions are intrinsically invalid, and that they owe their validity to other extraneous
circumstances. (4) The Mimamsaka and the Advaita Vedantist hold that cognitions are intrinsically valid, but
that their invalidity is due to other extrinsic circumstances.
The Samkltya Doctrine : Does the Samkhya mean that one and the same cognition is both:
valid and invalid? Or does it mean that some cognitions are valid and others are invalid? The first view is self-
contradictory.
I

11
The second view also is impossible. What determines the validity of some cognitions, and the invalidity of
other cognitions? Both of them are of the nature of consciousness; and no other circumstance is admitted by the
Samkhya to determine the validity of some cognitions and the invalidity of ot hers. Take, for instance , the
cognition of silver in a nacre. Is it valid or invalid? If it is cognized as valid, why does it not lead to the actual
attainment of silver? If it is cognized as invalid. why does it induce the cognizing agent to exert himsel f to get
the silver? Hence the Samkhya doctrine of validity or invalidity of knowledge cannot be maintained.
Criticism of the Buddhist Doctrine: Jayanta Bhatta, a Naiyayika, refutes the Buddhist view in
the following manner. It cannot be held that cognitions are inherently invalid, but that they derive their validity
from extraneous circumstances. If cognitions were inherently invalid , they could not lead to exertion for the
attainment of their objects. Moreover, the invalidity of a cognition depen ds, for its production, upon the defects
of its causes, and it is recognised as such only when it is contradicted by another valid cognition. Thus the
invalidity of a cognition depends, for its production, upon certain defects in its causes, and it depends , for its
ascertainment, on the sublating cognition which contradicts it. So a cognition cannot be regarded as
intrinsically invalid. It has been argued by some that the invalidity of a cognition is not due to the fact that it is
produced by certain defects in its causes, but that it has no real object for its objective basis . But this argument
is invalid. Many invalid cognitions. such as doubtful and illusory perceptions. have a reality for their objective
basis. Hence. cognitions cannot, in themse lves. be. invalid.
Criticism of the Naiyayika Doctrine: The Mimamsaka criticises the Nyaya view in the
following manner . According to the Naiyayika validity and invalidity do not belong to cognitions by their very
nature, but they are due to extraneous circumstances. By the validity of a cognition he means the agreement of
a cognition with its object, or the manifestation by a cognition of the real nature of its object. The Miman1saka
asks: ' Does the validity of a cognition depend upon extraneous circumstances . (I) for its own origination. (2) or
for the production of its effect, (3) or for the determination of its validity? (I) On the first alternative, does the
validity of a cogpition depend. for its origination, merely upon the essential nature of its causes , or upon some
special virtues (guna) inherent in its causes? If the validity of a cognition is said to originate merely in the
essential nature of its causes, then the Mimamsaka has no objection to this view. He himself admits that a valid
cognition arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, whereas an invalid cognition arises
from its causes impaired by certain defects; otherwise there would be nothing to regulate the effectuation of
valid and invalid cognitions. But this dependence of the validity of a cognition , upon the causes of the
cognition does not , in any way, stand in the way of its sel[-validity (svatah praman ya). But. if it be arg ued ,
as the Naiyayika does. that the validity of a cognition not only depends upon the nature of its causes, but upon
certain special virtues (guna) of its causes, then the Mimarhsaka objects to it. The so -called special virtues of
the sense-organs and the like can never be known through any source of valid knowledge. The validity of
perception depends merely upon the essential nature of the sense-organs, free from all taint of imperfection, but
not upon any special virtues of the sense-organs. If there were three kinds of cognitions, viz., valid cognitions,
invalid cognitions, and cognitions , which are neither valid nor invalid, then they would be accounted for by
three kinds of causes. The valid cognitions would have for their origin certain special virtues (guna) in their
causes; the invalid cognitioi1s would have for their origin certain defects (dosa) in their causes : and the
epistemologically neutral cognitions would have for their origin merely the essential nature of their causes ,
which are neither endowed with special virtues nor tainted with any defects.

12
But, in fact. we have not three kinds of knowledge, valid. invalid, and neutral. We find in our experience only
two kinds of knowledge, valid and invalid. Invalid know ledge, no doubt. arises from causes impaired by certain
defects. Valid knowle dge, therefore, must be held to be produced by its cause free from all defects. It is
needless to assume certain special virtues (guna) in the causes of a cognition to account for its validity. Hence
cognitions owe their validity not to any special virtues (guna) in their causes but to their essential nature; but
they owe their invalidity to certain defects in their causes. Nor does the validity of a cognition depend upon any
extraneous condition to produce its own effect. The effect of valid c ognition is the manifestation of its object;
practical activity or exertion for the attainment or avoidance of the object depends upon the desire of the
cognizing self.
The Bhatta Mimamsaka holds that a cognition, in order to manifest its object, need not be
cognized by itself as the .Taina and Prabhakara hold, nor by another cognition (anuvyavasaya) as the Naiyayika
holds. A valid cognition does not depend upon any condition to produce its effect in the shape of manifesting its
o ject. Nor does the validity of a cognition depend upon any extraneous condition for its own ascertainment
(pramanya niscaya), for no such condition is possible. If the ascertainment of the validity of a cognition depends
upon an extraneous condition. does it depend upon the cognition of the special virtues of its causes (karana guna
jnana); or does it depend upon the cognition of the absence of a contradictory cognition (badhaka bhava jnana),
or does it depend upon the correspondence of the cognition with its object (samvada)?
There can be no knowledge of the special virtues of the causes of a cognition. because there are
no special virtues in the causes of a cognition except their essential nature. Nor can the ascertainment of the
validity of a knowledge depend upon the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting cognition. For, if it is so.
is the absence of a contradicting cognition known just at the time of determining the validity of a knowledge or
at a subsequent time? Very often a contradictory cognition does not arise at the time of the cognition which it
contradicts. but afterwardst And, then, again. the absence of a contradictory cognition cannot be known
exhaustively hy us because we are not omniscient. Hence the validity of a knowledge cannot be ascertained by
the cognition of the absence of a contradicting cognition. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by
harmony of experience (samvada).
What is haim ony? The Naiyayika says that it is the agreement of a cognition with the cognition of fruitful
activity initiated by it. It cannot be held that the validity of the first cognition of on object. which prompts
activity, is determined by its agreement with the subsequent cognition of fruitful activi ty. For, unless the
validity of the latter cognition is determined , how can it determine the validity of the first cognition? But how
can the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity be determined? Is it determined by another cognition of
fruitful activity? If it were so, then the validity of that cognition too would be determined by another cognition
of fruitful activity and so on to infinity. And, if the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity were said to be
determined by the first cognition, then there would be a circular reasoning: the validity of th e first cognition
would be determined by the cognition of fruitful activity. and the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity
would be determined by the first cognition that prompts activity. And if the validity of the cognition of fruitful
activity is held to be determined hy itself, then what is the harm of regarding the validity of the first cognition
as self-valid? Hence, the Mimamsaka concludes that the validity or invalidity of a cognition is not determined
by its agreement or disagreement with the subsequent cognition of fruitful activity prompted by the initial
cognition. but that the invalidity of a cognition is determined by the cognition of a contradictory cognition or of
any defects in the causes of cognition, though the validity of a cognition is determined by itself, not by any
other condition different from itself.

l3
 The Naiyayika Defence of his own Position: The Naiyayika argues that the validity of a cognition
is ascertained by fruitful activity (pravrtti sam'arthya). What is pravrtti samarthya, which determines the
validity of knowledge? Some hold that it means a subsequent cogni tion following upon the first cognition of an
object. Others hold that it means a detailed cognition of an object (visesa darsana). But both these
interpretations are wrong. Vatsyayana explains it as the fulfilment of the activity prompted by a cognition.
According to him, pravrtti means effort or activity, and samarthya means fulfilment of, or attainment of fruition
by, activity; so pravrttisamarthya means the cognition of activity ending in fruition, of fruitful activity.'
The Mimamsaka has brought the charge of infinite regress against the Naiyayika. What determines
the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity? If it were determined by another cognition of fruitful activity ,
then the validity of that cognition too would be determined by another cognition of fruitful activity and so on to
infinity. To this the Naiyayika replies that the above argument is quite irrelevant. There is no need of
examining the validity of the cognition of fruitful activity. All cognitions do not require an examination of their
validity. In the cognition of fruitful activity the end has been -realized; and so there is no need of examining its
validity. Thus there is no infinite regress. Moreover, there is no doubt as to the cognition of fruitful activity,
and, consequently, there is no need of determining its validity. When we perceive water in the rays of the sun,
we have a doubt in our minds whether really there is water or not. Hence its validity or invalidity is determined
by fruitful or unfruitful activity. But when we are in the midst of water and make use of it, we have no doubt at
all as to the cognition of fruitful activity (e.g., drinking, bathing, etc.). And as the cognition of fruitful activity
is undoubted, it does not depend upon any other condition for the determination 'Of its validity. The
Mimamsaka has asked: wherein does the cognition of fruitful activity differ f om the first cognition, which
prompts activity so that the former determines the validity of the latter? The Naiyayika replies that the first
cognition is doubtful; and that there is no certainty in the first cognition whether it agrees with reality or not.
But the cognition of fruitful activity is undoubted in character; it unmistakably proves the correspondence of
the cognition with its object. When we are in the midst of water, and drink it and bathe in it, there cannot be the
least doubt in our minds as to the validity of the cognition of water; for these actions are never possible if the
cognition is invalid.
The Advaita Vedantist View: The Advaita Vedantist agrees with the Mimamsaka that, the
validity of knowledge is self-evident, but that the invalidity of knowledge is due to extraneous circumstances.
Dharma-rajadhvarindra defines valid knowledge as the cognition of an object as it really is , which is
conducive to fruitful activity. Avalid cognition is produced by the general conditions of consciousne · ss free
from all defects; it does not depend upon any special virtues in excess of the general conditions of
consciousness, because there is no special virtue common to different kinds of valid know le dge. The validity
of a cognition is self-evident; its apprehension does not depend upon adventitious circumstances . By the self -
evidence of the validity of knowledge the Advaita Vedantist means that in the absence of any defect in the
conditions of knowledge the self apprehends the cognizing mental mode which is the substrate of its validity as
well. But the invalidity of knowledge is not produced by the general conditions of consciousness, for, in that
case, there would be no distinction between valid and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge is produced by
ce1tain defects in the causal conditions of knowledge , while valid knowledge is produced by the general
conditions of knowledge, free from all defects. And though the validity of knowledge is self-evident, the
invalidity of knowledge is inferred from unfruitful activity.

14
Hence the invalidity of knowledge is both produced by adventitious conditions, viz., defects in the causes of
cognitions and apprehended through the extraneous circumstances of unfruitful activity prompted by it. Thus
the Advaita Vedantist differs from the Mimamsaka only in his appeal to the pragmatic test.

Characteristic of Valid Knowledge

1. Correspondence (Yatharthya) : The Nyaya defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object as it
really is. When ajar is apprehended as ajar in which the genus "jarness'" subsists, the apprehension is
valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is apprehension of an object as endued with qualities, which really
exist in it. The apprehension of an object in its real nature is valid knowledge . Invalid knowledge is the
apprehension of an object as it is not in its real nature. It is the apprehension of an object as endued with
qualities, which do not really exist in it. When a white conchshell is apprehended as yellow by jaundiced
eyes, the knowledge is invalid. Thus correspondence is the test of truth. Correspondence is agreement or
harmony of ideas or judgments with facts. When a shell is apprehended as a shell, the knowledge is true
or valid. When it is apprehended as silver, the apprehension "this is silver" is false or inval id. Thus
factual consistency or correspondence is the test of truth. The Niayayika is a realist ; he regards
correspondence as the test of truth.
2. Workability (Pravritti Samarthya) : The Nyaya regards workability or practical utility also as a test of
truth. The knowledge "this is water" is valid, if it leads to fruitful activity, if it pro mpts activity which
quenches thirst. A judgment is true, if it has capacity for prompting fruitful activity. If it does not prompt
fruitful activity, it is invalid. The judgement "this is silver" is invalid, if it cannot lead to fruitful activity.
A shell mistaken for silver cannot come to practical use. It cannot be made into an ornament.
Thus practical inutility is a test of falsity. The Nyaya recognises the realistic test of factual
consistency or correspondence and the pragmatist test of practical efficiency as the criteria of truth. The
Nyaya advocates realistic pragmatis m. Workability is a test of truth. But it does not constitute truth. Truth is
correspondence of ideas with facts. It is conformity with reality. A judgment is true, if it conforms to facts.
But its truth or correspondence with facts is known by its practical utility.
Coherence or Non-contradiction (Abadhatatva): The Advaita Vedantist regards logical
consistency of a judgment with other judgments known to be true as the test of tru th. Uncontradictedness or
coherence is the test of truth. When a judgment is contradicted by other judgments, it is false. When it is not
contradicted by other judgments. it is true. Non-cortt diction, coherence, ideal consistency. or harmony of
judgments is the test of truth. The Vedantist regards coherence as the test of truth.
The ''Vedantuparibhasa'" gives three tests of truth, viz. (I) novelty (2) non -contradiction, and
(3) practical utility or efficiency. Valid knowledge is characterized by novelty. It must apprehend something
new, which was not known before. Recollection is memory of an object. which was perceived before. It does
not add to our knowledge. It is simply reproduction of previous perception . So it should not be regarded as
strictly valid knowledge. Valid knowledge acquaints us with something new. Novelty is a character istic of
truth. It implies factual consistency or agreement with given facts, which hav empirical reality. The
Advaita Vedanta recognizes the empirical reality of the world. hut not its ont:ological reality. The empirical
knowledge of plurality is contradicted by the intuition of Identity of the Absolute. The tests of truth given
above apply to facts of empirical knowledge.

15
 Sources of Valid Knowledge
Indian philosophers are divided on the number of the -so urces of right knowledge, which range
from one to as many as ten. Vasist ha, the author of the Yoga Vasistha, recognizes intuition (anubhava,
whereas the Carvakas regard perception (pratyaksa) as the only source ofright knowledge. Visvanatha, author
of the Bhasa Pariccheda , in the later school ofVaisesika recognizes two, namely, perception and inference
(anumana) and includes analogy and testimony in inference. So do all other Vaisesikas, the Jains and the
Buddhists. Sankhya and Yoga give only three namely,pratyaksa, anumana, and sabda (testimony). Isvara
Krishna, author of the Sankhya Karika and Patanjali, author of the Yoga Sutra, and also the Vedant Schools of
Ramanuja, Madhva and Nimbarka concede the above three. Gotama. founder of the Nyaya School. admits
four - perception, inference, testimony, and analogy (upamana). The Prabhakara School of Mimansa adds
presumption (arthapatti) as the fifth means of knowledge. The Bhatta School of Mimansa and the Vedantists
of Sankara School recognize non-perception (anupalabdhi) as the sixth instrument of knowledge. The Puranas
admit eight, adding tradition and possibility (sambhava). The Tantrikas give nine, the ninth being chesta,
whereas some other thinkers add the 'remainder' (parishesha) and thus extend the number to ten.
Perception : The Carvaka regards perception alone as the means of valid knowledge. The
Bauddha regards perception and inference as the means of valid knowledge. The Sankhya and the Yoga
regard perception , inference, and testimony as the means of valid knowledge. The Mimamsaka (Kumarila)
and the Advaita Vedanta regard perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption , and non -
apprehension as the means of valid knowledge. Prabhakara, the founder of a 1 school of Mimamsa. rejects
non-apprehension as a distinct source of valid knowledge.
The Nyaya defines perception as knowledge produced by the intercourse of a sense -organ with an
object. which cannot be defined by a name, which does not contradict the real nature of its object, and which
is of the nature of determinate knowledge. Perception is knowledge produced by the sense-object-
intercourse. Valid perception does not contradict the real characte¼ of its object as it really exists. If it does
not conform to its object, it is illusory. There are two kinds of perception, indeterminate and determinate.
Indeterminate perception is nameless. It is perception of an object devoid of its name. Determina perception
is definite knowledge of an object with its name.
The later Naiyayika de'fines perception as immediate knowledge or knowledge which is not
produced through the medium of some other knowledge. Inference is mediate know le dge. It is produced
through the medium of some other knowledge. Knowledge of the middle term produces infe rence. But
perception is not mediate knowledge. It is directly produced by the intercourse of a sense -organ with an
object. This definition includes divine perception and yogic perception. which are not produced by the
sense-object-intercourse.
Indeterminate perception is perception of an object as some th i ng . It is immediate apprehension. It
is knowledge of acquaintance. It is perception of an object as not endowed with qualities, actions, generality,
and other features. Indeterminate perception is free from reco llect ion. It is devoid of assimilation and disc
rimination . Perception of a pen as something, not as a pen like other pens. and different from pencils. books,
inkpots and the like is indeterminate. But when an object is perceived as belongin g to a particular class or
genus, endued with certain qualities, and bearing a particular name, the perception is determinate. When an
object is perceived as a pen like other pens, unlike books, pencils, inkpots and the like, the perception is
determinate. Indeterminate perception is presentative knQw!edge. Determinate perception is presentative
representative

16
knowledge. Indeterminate perception does not involve knowledge of relations, assimilat io n, and
discrimination.Determinate perception involves knowledge of relations, assimilation, and discrimination.
Indetrminate perception is free from memory. Determinate perception contains memory. It is perception mixed
with memory.
Perception is not wholly trustworthy. The faculties of sense are so many portals. The doors wide-open
if the blast penetrates the chamber of the soul. It forthwith extinguishes the lamp of knowledge. When its light
is put out. there is no untying the knot, for intellige11ce is undone by this blast of sensuality. The senses do not
approve of wisdom; they are even inclined to sensual enjoyment. That is to say, the senses are so overpowering
that even the best of sages get killed by the looks of a beautiful maiden. The senses, however, become inactive
on attaining knowledge (jnana), as travellers do when they get tired. But there are the illusions of perception. A
rope, for example, appears as a snake in the dark, the sun looks covered by clouds, the moon appears double
on pressing the eye with a finger: similarly a shell looks silvery and a mirage full of water. Such illusions tend
only to deprive perception of its efficacy. Hence the Reality is transcendental (gotita)
Inference: Inference is knowledge (a num) after (anu) knowledge. It is knowledge derived through
the medium of some other knowledge. Inference is knowledge of a probandum in something, derived from the
knowledge of the probans which is known to be invariably accompanied by the probandum. Inference is
based upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term. Smoke, the
middle te rm, is known to be invariably accompanied by a fire. Wherever there is smoke, there is a fire.
This is called vyapt i. It is pervasion of the middle term by the major term . I perceive smoke in a hill, but I
dot not receive a fire in it. Then I remember the vyapti that wherever there is smoke, there is a fire. Then I
infer the existence of a fire in the hill from the smoke perceived. The inference or syllogism consists of the
following five propositions:-
(I) The hill is fiery (thesis);
(2) Because the hill is smoky (reason) ;
(3) Whatever is smoky, is fiery for example. a kitchen
(4) The hill is smoky (application);
(5) Therefore, the hill is fiery (conclusion). A syllogism consists of five propositions:
( 1) thesis; (2) reason : (3) example ; (4) application : and (5) conclusion.
The thesis states the proposition to be proved. The reason states the reason or the middle term for
proving the existence of the major term. The example states the general rule of invariable concomitance of the
middle term with the m jor term, illustrated by an example. The mention of the example shows that the
universal major premise is an induction derived from generalization from particular instances observed. The
universal major premise is applied to ·a particular instance, and a new conclusion is reached. The Nyaya
syllogism is in ductive -deductive. It is material-formal. It does not give only formal truth. It gives also
material truth.
The Greek syllogism propunded by Aristotle consists of three propositions, the major premise, the
minor premise, and the conclusion. The third, fourth, and fifth propositions of the Nyaya syllogism correspond
to the major premise. the minor premise. and the conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism, Or, the first, second,
and third propositions of the Nyaya syllogism correspond to the couclusion, the minor premise, and the major
premise of the Aristotelian syllogism. The Nyaya universal major premise is illustr ated by an example, while
the universal major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism is not illustrated by an example. The Nyaya
syllogisrn is induct ve-deductive, while the Aristotelian syllogism is purely deductive.

17
 - There are three kinds of inference. Purvavat in Ference is inference of an effect from a cause.
Future rainfall is inferred from the rise of clouds. Sesavat inference is inference of a cause from an effect.
Previous rainfall is inferred from the flood in the river and swiftness of the current. Samanyatodrsta inference
is inference of an unperceived event from a perceived event. which are uniformly co-existent. The motion of
the sun is inferred from its different positions in the sky in different parts of the day. Or it is inference by
eliminat io n. The existence of the substance, self, is inferred from cogn ition , pleasure, pain , desire, aversion,
and volition. They do not exist in earth, water, fire, air, either, time, space, and manas. Therefore they must
exist in the self. The ancient Nyaya recognizes these three kinds of inference.
The modern Nyaya recognizes three kindsyf inference: Kevalanvayi, Kevalavyat ireki, and
Anvayavyatireki. Whereever there is smoke, there is a fire, for example, in a kitchen. Wherever there is no
fire, here is no smoke, for example, in a lake. There is smoke in the hill. Therefore there is a fire in the hill.
This is Anvayavyatireki inference. It is based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Whatever is
knowable is m;meable , for example, a cloth. The jar is knowable. Therefore the jar is nameable. This is
Kevalanvayi inference. It is based upon agreement in presence only. A negative instance is not available here.
Earth differs from the other substances because it has smell. What does not differ from the other substances,
has no smell, for example, water. This is not like that. So it is not water. Here what has smell is different from
the other substances. There is no positive instance of this . Earth is the only subject of inference. This is
Kevalavyatireki inference. Inference, too , has a limited value. Reasoning is of little avail becaus it has no
approach, to Rama,, and those who, wish to attain to Him should give up all reasoning (tarka). Persons of gre at
intellect, power and learning cannot reason Him out. It is also because reasoning leads to, delusion· (moha).
Further, it is useless to advance argum en,ts since whatever God has ordained shall come about. The word
anumana may he used in the sense of reason, guess, or conjecture. Rama, the Ultimate is beyond all reasoning
through the intellect (buddhi), the understanding, (mana) and the speech (vani); and that His actions, too,
cannot be so discussed or argued. Hence, those who seek Him should give up all reasoning (tarka). A sound
reasoning, however. must be based on intelligence (buddhi), discretion (viveka), power (bala) and suitable
occasion (samaya). But the Reality cannot be apprehended by the understanding (mana-gotita). It is beyond
reasoning (anumana) or understanding (mati); for the latter is liable to be polluted by the mire of delusion
(moha-kalila).
Comparison (Upamana) : The Nyaya holds that comparison is the knowledge of an unknown object
from its similarity with a known object. For example, the knowledge ' the wild cow is like a cow' is
comparison. The wild cow is the object denoted by the name ' wil d cow.' Comparison is the knowledge of the
relation of a name and an object named. Knowledge of similarity is the instrument of the knowledge by
compar ison. A person hears from a forester that 'a wild cow ' is like a cow, goes to a forest. remembers the
statement of the forester. and perceives an animal similar to a cow. Then he knows that the unfamiliar animal
is a wild cow. Here comparison is knowledge of similarity with a cow existing in a wild cow. Comparison,
according to the Nyaya, is knowledge of similarity with a remembered object existing in an unfamiliar
perceived object.
The Madhyamika Sunyavada: Nagarjuna was an exponent of the Madhymika doctrine of Sunyavad.a
. He maintains that the Reality is essenceless, predicateless, and indefinable. It is beyond all intellectual
categories. It is beyond time, space, rest, motion, substance, quality, relation , causality, self, not-self, whole,
part, and the like.

18
It is unthinkable and ind escribabl e. All categories are fraught with self-contradiction. The Rea lity is not
void. It is absolute. It is neither exist ent, nor non-existent , nor both, nor neither. It may be indicated by the
word ' sunya' . It is the Absolute. It cannot be thought by intellect. It can be grasped by intuition. Thus
Nagarjuna was not a Nihilist. But he was an Absolutist. According to him the Absolute is the ontological
reality. External objects and internal cognitions have only empirical reality. They are phenomena only, which
become extinct in the Absolute. Illusions, dreams , reveries and the like have only illusory reality.
Samkara's Absolute Idealism : Samkara, the great protagonist of the Advaita Vedanta. maintains that
the Ab.solute (Brahman) alone is the ontological reality. It is not essenceless, as Nagarjuna holds. It is one
eternal, pure Being , Consciousness, and Bliss . Subject-object-less consciousness constitutes its essence.
Transcendental bliss also forms its essence. It is devoid of difference. It is beyond time, space, and causality .
It is non-tempora l, non-spatial , and non-causal. It is non-dual. It is one. It is the ground of the individual
selves. It is the ground of world-appearance . The individual selves have empirical reality only. Their
individuality is destroyed when they realize their absoluteness or identity with the Brahman. The world-
appearance is fals e. It appears to be real to the intellect infected with nescience (avidya.). When avidya is
destroyed by intuition of Brahman. the multiform world-appearance vanishes. This is the doctrine of Absolute
Idealism or Absolutism advocated by Samkara and his followers. ·
Ramanuja Objective Idealism : Ramanuja , an exponent of qualified non-dualistn, maintains that the
Brahman or Abso l ute , and individual selves are real and inseparable from one another. They form an
organic unity. The Brahman has internal difference. It is a Unity- in-difference. It is the Substance (visesaya).
The finite souls and the world are its adjectives (vis esana) or modes (prakara). There is an inseparable
relation (aprthak siddhi) between Brahman and the souls and the world. They constitute the body of Brahman,
which is their Soul. Brahman is God. Thus the finite souls and the world are real in and through God. There is
no consciousness without a subject and without an object. This is Ramanuj·s doctrine of Objective ldealisn .

19
 CHAPTER Ill-A
STATE IN INDIA : ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KAUTILYA'S THEORY OF STATE, ASOKA'S
DHAMMA AND AKBAR'S AIN-1-AKBARI)
-Dr. N.D.Arora
The fact of the existence of the state is older dian its name. The state as a word. Stu/e appeared in
Italy in the early part of the nineteenth century, probably in the writings of Machiavelli. The meaning of
the state in the sense of body politic became common in England and France in the later part of the nineteenth
century. The word Stuatskunst became the German equivalent of ragione di stole during the seve ntee nth
century and a little later, the word Matscrecht got the meaning of jus publicum so came the use of the
word State in the west.
In ancient India. the use of the word ·rajya' in the Sanskrit texts, has been instead, common. having in
it the seven elements. i .e .. saptanga. The controvcr y exists away the scholars as to the use and me _an i ng of the
term ·rajya· . Ghothal (A History of Indian Political Ideas) cautions against identifying the elements of rajya
with the state; Anjaria (Nature and Grounds of Political Obligation in the Hindu S,ate). t hough uses the term ·state'
for ·Rajya' hesitatingly for the 'rajya' does not imply anything about the relationship between state and subjects. V
P. Veriha (Studies in Hindu Po l itic al Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations) while rejecting the word ' State '
, refers to 'rajya' as an extremely complicated political structure and organised populations associated with i t. R.P.
Kangle ('.'Manu and Kautilya" in Indian Antiquarv 3rd session. 1964), prefers the term 'rule' to state.

In most parts of the ancient and medieval India. as also during the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries in the
West. the word ·state' came to be commonly understood somewhat identical with the terms ‘soveregin’ or
‘king’ or ‘Raja’ ---- the Nitivakyamitra says’ “Raja is the activity of ruler’. Louis XIV says. “I am the State'· Barker
(Principles of Social and Political Theory) referring to Louis XIV rightly says· "Was he not in h is own view. as
in that of his subjects, the person who enjoyed the ''State and position of being the supreme political
authority, and was he not. therefore, the state.''

With the rise of the nation-state and subsequently, the democratisation of the structure of the governmental
bodies the state came to be known as what it is known now. If sovereignty was to reside in the sovereign.
sovereign was, now (in the years si nce later eighteenth century in the west and the post- independent era in India).
not the k ing , but the whole citizen-body expressing its will in the le gis lat ure. Barker. thus. concludes. ·'The state
is now the whole community: the whole legal association: the whole of the juridical organisation. This is
democracy, or a result of democracy; we must hencefo1th think of the state as ourselves: and we must henceforth
give the name of "Government" to the authority before called state-which is now seen as exercising on our
behalf the power which it had hitherto claimed as its own."
The State in Ancient India : Kautilya in particular
The State in ancient (as is true about the medieval) India was not. as it was with the I 7th -18th
centuries. English individualists. a necessary evil, though maintainance of law and order was one o( the important
functions of the state then. More than. or at least as important as the security of the people, dhor111a_was an
essential aspect of the general conception of the polity. Accordingly, the state was considered a political i
ns tru me nt to promote the cause of the Dhurma. It was a necessary be ne facto r, rather a necessary evil: it was
an agglomeration of power with absolute authority over the lives of the people. but was one where the
absolute authority was rarely or never used; it was though not a state chosen by the people, but it was
certainly a state which existed or cared the welfare of all dharma, in ancient India was the basis of the state. The
King, referred to as dhritavaria, was regarded as the upholder of the sacred law whose duty was to promote
religion. encourage morality, and patronise education. That was why he is called dharmapati in Satapatha
Brahmana. This makes dharma being described as the end of the state. a view generally accepted by most

20
of the Indo logists. This is not to state that the king, in ancient India was concerned mainly with the moral
well-being of the people; he was also responsible for the promotion of the material well-being of the people as
well. The state, we may th1::refore say, in India. provided for both material and moral development of the
individual. leading ultimately to the fullest development of the society as a whole. all sanskrit literature of the
ancient India, emphasising on Moksha through Dharma. Artha and Kama. The ancient Indian society, wedded to
Dharma, was one where the state. through the office of the king assisted by his counsil and ministers, was to
realise the over-all welfare of the individual.
The State in ancient (in med ieval.times) India personified itself with the king; the king was, thus, the
personification of the state. The origin of the state is closely related in all ancient writings to the origin of the
kingship--be it Manu's theory of the divine origin or Kautilya's theory of social contract. With regard to the
origin of kingship Varma believes that it a:rose in the vedic period as a part of the process of integration of
families. tribes, clans, and villages into rashtra or a state. Law (Aspects of' Ancient Indian Polity). on the
other hand, regards kingship as the handiwork of the magicians who gradually turned themselves into kings,
Hopkins (The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India) observes that the kings were
related from aristocrats, heroes and commanders of the army. But once kings c ame, k i ngsh ip, and state
became one; the office of the king was the institution of the state.
There is the reference of the institution of state in Vedic literature.The Ramayana refers to the origin as well
as the institution of the state: " A kingdom without a sovereign is like a river without water . a forest without
vegetation, a cow without a cowherd . The king leads his people on the path of righteousness and guides them in
integrity; he is the parent of his subjects and their bene factors .The king, discerning good and evil , protects his
kingdom; bereft of him. the country is enveloped in darkness." The importance of the state has also been noted in
the Mahabharata , for the Arajaka states are regarded not worth dwe lli ng. The end of t he state, in the
Mahabharata , is referred to as the attainment of the four objects of li fe- Dharma. Artha, Kama and Moksha, in a
way, both material as well as moral. The Puranic state makes Dharma as its basis; by Dharma is meant truth; it exists
to promote/protect Dharma, thus it is more or less a law upholding state. Also are referred to the three bases of the
Puranic state : Varta. Dharma, Dando . Varta . implying agriculture, cattle-rearing and trade ; Dharma signifying the
eternal which holds, the world: Dando, consisting of government, sovereignty and obedience-all rolled into one,
the state, in Manu Smriti is one that postulates a perfect social and economic organisation. Adeveating the divine
origin theory of the state. the Manu Smriti makes the state a Saptanga having limbs such as the Lord, Ministe,'.
Capital. Rashtra, Treasure. Army. Ally, mentioning swarashtra (friendly and enemy states) and Manda/ rashtra. The
functions of the state. in the Manu Smriti are : make all Varna observe their duties (Dharma) observance of general
laws, maintenance of peace within the state and keep the state free from externa l cont rol. make laws to control the
prices. settle disputes, impart education, le,vy taxes, punish the criminals. Manu's state exists to help the people
accomplish moral righteousness, wealth and pleasur e. The state. in the Sukraniti. consists of seven limbs, i.e., the
state being a kingdom, the organisation of seven limbs: (I) The sovereign is the head (2) The minister is the eye (3)
friend is the year (4) the treasure is the mouth (5) the army is the mind (6) the fort is the arms and (7) the state is the
legs. The Sukra state seeks to attain functions such as (a) protection of person and prope1ty (b) the administration of
justice (c) spread of religion and culture, philanthropy and charity (d) realisation of revenues.
Kautilya's views, as stated in Arthasastra, are, indeed, vivid.Though he has not defined what the state exactly
is, but he does refer to the seven elements of the state be free from wilderness, tigers and Swami (the king with
qualities such as bravery, quickness o-f dec ision, strength of m in d, easily approachable sharp i nt ell ect),
Amatya (the ministers-in-charge of the entire administration), Janapada (population and land: land devoid o rocky,
saline, uneven and thorny tracts and wild animals, and abound in fertile lands, timber and elephant forests); Durga
(fortress, the military establishment to protect the people from natural calamities, also a kind of arsenal, a storage of
military artilleries and communication); Kosa (treasury, filled with gold, silver. precious jewels, and gems, should
be able to withstand any calamity); Dando (consisting of hereditary and hired soldiers, i.e. force, soldiers b e skilled);
Mitra (friendly state s). Every element is regarded at par with another in the Arthasastra.

21
 With regard to the origin of the state. Kautilya seems to have adveated social contract theory. He says that
the state originated when people got weary of the law of the fish (Matsyanyaya). The people selected Manu to be
their king. It was. he explains. settled that the king should receive one-sixth of the grain and one-tenth of the
merchandise and of gold as his due share. The revenue so collected would enable the king to ensure the security and
well being of the subjects.
The state. in Kautilya 's Arthasastra. is presided over by the Swami. the king; there are officials who advise
him on matters relating to the administration; he rules over his territory from a fortified capital; the treasury and the
army ensure stability and security while the allies help him keep the kingdom safe. This is what is the crux of the
Saptanga theory. and yet, while discussing the troubles of the king, Kautilya seems to regard the two elements as
primary ones in the state: the King and the kingdom. the king symbolising sovereignty and the kingdom. the state.
The Kautilyan state is monarchical. for he desired to establish a strong and powerful monarch with a
view to protect the life and property of the state. And yet, he demands of the king to protect customs. religion and
morality, embracing, thus. the whole range of human life-social, economic. cultural. religious, political. The
protection of Dharma remains, however. the most important function of the Kautilyan state.
In Kautilya's views. the promotion of the welfare of the people is an essential task of the king
personified in the institution of the state. Kautilya says in the Arthasastra. power is necessary and it means
strength. but it is not the end: the end, according to Aristotle, is happiness of the peop le . While the sta te.
he argues. has to possess power its role object is to promote the happiness of the people.
The Kautilyan state looks after the material well-being of the state, but it does not stop there; do also
protects the social. religious and the moral lives of the subjects. It supports. the poor. the orphan, the aged. the
helpless. the infirm the pregnant women and the newly born babies.
Sanitation and hygiene did not escape Kautilya's eyes. The villages and the cities were to be built according
to plan: every house had to have a dunghill and an outlet: throwing of garbage on the roads was an offence:
dumping of carcass or dead bodies on the road, was a grave offence; adulteration of grains. oils. alkalies. salt.
medicine was a punishable offence.
The Kautilyan state ram a few important industries, though it could not be labelled as a socialist state;
there did run private enterprises. It would be safe to all the Kautilyan economy as more or less, a mixed one. The
state regulated trade and commerce with a view to promote the welfare of the people : the market towns
were established and the market hours fixed.
To conclude, one may say that the ends of the state, according to Kautilya, were confined not merely to
the maintenance of law and order or the protection ofthe people. but extended to enable the individual attain the
highest development. It appeared, more or less, as a welfare state of our times. There was no other greater object
than the happiness of the people. Aristotle adveates emphatically. this function is a Sutra which reads: ·'In the
happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king and what is beneficial for the subjects is his own benefit".
The order of the state, we may argue, is not merely for the sake of order; it also is. as Kautilya puts it, for
protection, conversation, development and distribution : the state must create what is there, and distribute
what has been increased.
The State in Asoka's Dhamma
Dhamma is the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit word Dharma. meaning the universal law or righteousness or,
if one likes to extend, one may say. the social and religious order found in a society. The word. in a way, has a
much more general connotation judging by the way in which the word. Dhamma was used in his edicts, though
Asoka gave it a wider meaning. Asoka's inscriptions consist of two types : the small group. the edicts, describe his
adherence to Buddhism, two larger group, as inscribed on rock surfaces, include Major an d Minor Rock ed icts,
and the Pillar edicts, propagating his ideas, in the manner of exhortations to his subjects. All these define what he
understands by Dhamma, a concept of utniost self introspection, utmost obedience, and utmost enthusiasm,
including in it deeds such as compassion, liberality, truthfulness. purity. gentleness and goodness· and notions
such as noble and pure intentions. proper maintenance of social relationship and absentation from animal
slaughter.

22
 A brief summary of the Major Rock Edicts and the Pillar Edicts gives Asoka's theory of state, the Minor
Rock Edicts dealing purely with his Buadhist activities.
The first Major Rock Edicts contains the prohibitions of animal sacrifice, and festive gatherings : ' He
re no living thing is to be killed and sacrificed, and no assembly is to be held." The emphasis, it may be noted, is
more in the sacrificing of animals rather than their killing, i.e. prohibition of the ritual of sacrificing animals.
The second Major Rock Edict relates to certain measures of social welfare including such as medical
centres for men and animals, the construction of roads supplied with wells and lived with shady trees, and
the planting of medicinal herbs .
The third Rock Edict contains that liberality to Brahmans is a virtue: tolerance and broad-mindedness
towards other sects.
The fourth Rock Edict assumes that the policy of Dhamma has improved the g5neral conditions of
the people and there has been a tremendous moral advancement, suggesting almost an ideal state : a period of
prosperity and righteousness when men Iived as Gods and when Gods were not afraid to m ing!e with men.
The fifth Rock Edict is devoted to matters of social and administrative welfare, making prisons as
reformatories. not a place of torture or a house of doom . It also refers to the appointment of the dhama-
mahamaltas whose work was concerned with the general welfare of the populace with emphasis on the teaching
and practice of Dhamma .
The sixth Rock Edict makes the relationship between the king and his subjects via the mahamattas even
more cle ar. The mahamattas are told to make their repo11s to the king at any time. The edict gives an impres s
io n that Asoka exercised control over the state through a well-organised system of officers and couriers. His
experience of k i ngsh i p, his knowledge of it from the theoretical works of the period and his own personality
have made him aware of the responsibilities of being king of such a vast territory.
The seventh Rock Edict pleads for toleration among all sects, the king realising the harm these
sectarian conflicts would produce.
The eighth Rock Edict stresses the importance of tours, i.e., the Dhammayatas. Ashoka hoimself states,
the purpose of these tours was manifold. visiting the brahmanas and making gifts, visiting the aged and supporting
them with gold, visiting the people of the country and instructing them in high morals.
The ninth Rock Edict maintains that the practice of morality is infinitely more valuable than the
observance of the ceremonies. i.e., ceremonies performed during illness, at the bir1h of the child, or when setti
ng out on a journey etc.
The tenth Rock Edict denounces fame and glory and reasserts that the only glory the king desires is
that h i s subjects follow the principles of Dhamma, the reason being (a) obtaining merit in next world and the
elimination of danger to man in this.
The eleventh Rock Edict contains the explanation of the Dhamma. The Dhamma, for Asoka. is a way
of life and the essence of what he had culped from his moral teachings. This edict also stresses the importance
of the family. caste system accelerating the development of the family as an institution of primary impo rtance.
The twelveth Rock Edict is a direct and emphatic plea for toleration amongst the various sects, adding.
thus the overall progress of the essential doctrines of all the sects.
The thirteenth Rock edict is important in so far as it considers deplorable the deaths and deportations
that accompany war, upsetting in the process all normal rules of social behaviour. Ac,oka insists that the idea
of Dlw111111a j opposed to the idea of war.
The last Rock edict is a short one, explaining the intentions of the king to spread the teachings of the
Dhamma to all the subjects in every form.
The Minor Rock edicts. associated with Asoka's Buddhism, do not reveal his ideas on the theory of
the state. though the Pillar edicts do. The first Pillar edict states the progress achieved through Dhamma,

23
“for this is my principle : to protect through Dhamma, to administer affairs according to Dhamma, to please
the people with Dhamma to guard the empire with Dhamma." The second Pi:!ar edict, continuing along with
the first. describes Dhamma as a minimum of sins, many virtues, compassion. liberality, truthfulnes s. and
purity. The idea, in this edict, attempts to convey the idea of social and personal relationships, leading. thus ,
to a better understanding of social life. The third Pillar edict makes a distinction betwe;n virtuous deeds
and evil doings, latter leading to ruins and destruction.
The fourth Pillar edict insists on the uniformity of judicial proceedings and of punishments, the principle
being equality of all subjects in the eyes of law, and also equality of law throughout the empire. The fifth Pillar
edict orders that certain nimals are not to be killed on certain days (considered, for example, sacred in Buddhism),
and others are not to be killed at all. The sixth Pillar edict explain the purpose of the edicts, that being a concern
for the welfare and happiness of the king's subjects. The seventh Pillar edict mentions the implementation of the
reforms carried out in the well-being of the people.
What appears, following the study of the major Rock and the Pillar Edicts, to be Asoka ' theory of state,
as incorporated in his Dhamma, may be summed up in his view of kingship as (i) a theory of kingly exertion and
efforts , (ii) a theory of the well-being of all, and (iii) the paternalist theory conceiving of people as children of
the king, the father: "All men are my children, and just as I desire for my children that they sho uld obtain
welfare and happiness, both in this world and the next, so do i desire for all men. " He expects king posses sed
with qualities such as truthfulness, uprightness, freedom from malice. compassionateness and forbearance. He also
institutes a set of officers. called Dhamma-mahamatta. as officers of righteousness to ensure the norms and
rules of Dhamma are implemented by all.
To conclude, one may say that the Dhamma of Asoka assumes a state of non-violence.
incorporating a number of ideals and practices. Abstinence from killing was an important one. so was also
the insistence of considerate family relationships and social ones, whether these were between parents and
children, elders and youn ger people, friends or various ideological sects. Also was impo rtant in Asoka's
Dhamma 's social and political theory, a programme of social welfare such as providing medical facilities , good
communications and prohibiting useless expenditure on superstitions. Moderation was. in his theory of
State, the keynote of thoughts and action; there was no attempt of coercion of any kind, principles for suggested
and it was left to the conscience of each individual to make a choice. Dhamma. the righteousness. rem ai ns the
very basis of Asoka's theory of State.
The State in Akbar's Times : Ain-i-Akbari
The Ain-i-Akbari describes the state as it existed in the medieval Ind ia, in Akbar 's times. the concept as
it came to be understood and the institutions which arose out of it.
The state, as the Ain-i-Akbari (in its own words) states, is a divine institution, the roya lty being a light
emanating from God, and a ray from the sun, the illuminator of the un iverse : Akbar used to worship the sun as
the visible representative of God, and the immediate source of life. Through God. the king obtains q ua li tie s
such as (i) a paternal love towards the subjects; (ii) a large heart : nothing disagreeable un se tt les h im, noth
ing ·d is crim i natory elements obstruct him, nothing indecisiveness rebutes ; (iii) a daily increas ing trust in God
: God makes do him the act, whatever he does , he does on the dictates of God,
Prayer and devotion : adversities would not cause him to forget God, reason reigning the desires, his
tyranny never oversteps its limits, it works in favour of the weaker . Royalty, is the Ain-i-Akhari , is a
divinely i nst itutio n, and the king, a representative of God , the apostle of divinity. The king is more than a
ruler in the Ain-i-Akbari. he is a public servant, he is a patron father, he is generous and acts always as
an example for others. When he sits in judgement, Abul Fazal writes, " the petitioner seems to be the judge.
and he liimself,.....the st1itor j us tice . He does not permit petitioner to be delayed on the path of hope...... He
is forever searching after those who speak the truth , and is not displeased with words that seem bitter but
are in reality sweet. He considers the nature of the words and the rank of the speaker. He is not content
with not committing violence, but he must see that no injustice is clone within his realm."

24
 The king, as the personification of the state/kingdom, is always attentive to the health of the body politic.
and is. therefore. ready to apply remedies to the several diseases thereof. The political constitution. like the animal
constitution, becomes well tempered by a proper division of ranks: and by means of the warmth of the ray of
uncertainty and concord. The king has to put each class (warriors, artificers/ merchants. the learned. the husband
men) in its proper place. These four classes mai<.e up the state. each working in its place with all honesty and
hardwork to make the body-politic stand on firm grounds and maintain its equilibrium.
But the body-politic too needs officers to maintain peace and prosperity. The Ain-i-Akbari. therefore,
refers to fourfold division of officers.These are the nobles. the assistants. the companions and the servants. The
nobles resemble fire. being ardent in devotion and conquering in dealing with foes. These include. for
example. the Vakil as the emperor's lieutenant in all matters connected with the realm and the household.
and is also responsible for promotion and degradation, appointments and dismisals. having in him the
qualities of wisdom, nobility of mind, affability, firmness and magnamanity; the Mir -mail; i .e. the keeper of
the real. the Mir-yakhshi. the Bar-begi, the Qurbegi, the Mir-tozak the Mir-yahri , the Mir- manzil. the Khawan
ratar. the Munshi. the Qush-begi, the Akhtabegi-all these, the ministerial staff assigned to perform their
respective duties. The (b) assistants of victory include Vizier also called Diwan together with the Mustawfi. the
Sahib-i-tawzi, the Awarja Nawiz. the Mir-saman . the Nazir-i-Buyutat. the Diwan-i-Buyullat . the Mushrif the
Waqi/'a Nawis. the Amil-all these collectors of revenue. who in the administration. resemble wind, and at times a
hea11-rejoicing breeze, and at other times, a hot pestilential blast the Vizier. at the head. is the member of the
Divine Faith. is one, a Meilful arithmetician, free from avarice. warm-hearted. active in business, pleasing in
his style, clear in his writing. truthful and a man of integrity.
The (c) companions of the king. known as the ornaments of the court by the light of their wisdom, resemble
water in the affairs of the body-politic. Wisely fettering ambition on the battle-field of the world. they
extinguish the sparks of wrath by the rain of their wisdom. At the head of this class stan ds the philosopher
and include in it the Sadr. the Mir-Adi. the Qazi, the physician, the astronomer, the poet. the soothsayer. The
philosopher purifies the morals of the nation, and grinds himself with the noble aim· of putting the welfar e of
mankind upon a sound basis.
The (d) servants perform the duties about the king. They occupy in the system of ' the state the position
of the earth. As much, they lie, A bu ' I- Faz l says, on the high road of submission, and in the dust. before the
majesty of the king. The table servant, the armour bearer, the servants incharge of the sharbat and the water. the
servant incharge of the mattresses and the wardrobe belong to this class.
The Ain-i-Akbari mentions.four persons as the chief supports of the state. These are :-
i. An upright collector : he protects the husbandman, watches over the subjects, develops the country and
improves the revenues:
ii. A conscientious commander of the army: he is active and strict;
iii. A Chie.f juslice: he is free from avarice and selfishness, who sits on the eminence of circumspection
and insight, and obtains his ends by putting various questions, without exclusively relying on witnesses and
oaths;
iv. An intelligencer: he transmits the events of the time without addition or diminution: he always
keeps to the thread of truth and penetration.
The Ain-i-Akbari states that a just king is one who makes himself acquainted with the characters of me n:
should be the ragacious people who lay at one extreme. and should be able to keep himself away from the vicious
men, at the other extreme; he should listen to the former, and improve, if. not kill. the latter. A just king ?hould
know the people-their rank and character, and then should regulate business accordingly.
For Abu'I Fazl a great king is one who knows well how the household, the army and the empire are reg
u lated. He concludes: "The exalted monarch of our times is no endowed with the laudable-dispositions

25
that it is no exaggeration to call him their exordiwn. From the light of his wisdom, he discerns the worth of
men, and kindles the lamp of their energy...adorns his wisdom with the beauty of practice".
The theory of state in the ancient and medieval India, by way of conclusion, may thus be described as
the theory of benevolent monarchy. In terms of ethics, it is oriented towards the ideals of norms and morali ty; in
terms of administrations it is oriented towards the welfare and the happiness of the people. As against the
western state type the Indian state of ancient and medieval times has been non-exploitative, promotive,
accommodative, its all-comprehensiveness notwithstanding.
Suggested Readings
Abu'I, Fazl S., The Ain-i-Akbari . New De l h i: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, third edition, 1977.
Altekar, AS., The State and Government in Ancient India, third edition, Patna Motilal Ba nars idass, 1971.
Basham, AL., Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture, Bombay: Asia Pub lish i ng, 1966.
Ben i Prasad ; Theory of Government in Ancient India, Allahabad, Central Book Depot, 1968.
Ghoshal, U.N., History of the Indian Political Ideas. Bombay : Oxford University Press, 1959.
Law, NN ., Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity. London : Oxford University Press, 1921 .
Sen, AK ., Studies in Kautilya , De l h i : Munshiram Manohar Lal, 1958.
Sharan, P., Ancient Indian Political Thought and Institutions Meerut : Meenakshi Prakashan , 1978.
Thapar, R., Asoka, Delhi Oxford University Press, 12th edition, 1992.
------------ ., Early India : From the Origins lo AD 1300, London: Penguin Book , 2002.
Questions
1 . Discuss Kautilya 's theory of stat e.
2. What kind of state emerges from Asoka's Dhamma .
3. Briefly describe the institutions of monarchy , and the administration as described in Ain-i-Akbari .

26
 CHAPTER IV

CONCEPTIONS OF THE POLITICAL

POWER AND AUTHORITY
Concept of the State
Ransacking of the modest library of antiquity belonging to India reveals a lot of political literature
that throws a flood-light on the genesis and evolution of some of the fundamental problems that credibly existed
prior to Greek history and persist even today. Vedas, Upanishads, Smritis, Nitis, Shastras, Ramayana and
Mahabharata form the main body of texts and scriptures as classes that speak in the language of mythology
generally and, thus, present formidable difficulties in the extrication of rational thought from supers tition.
Another insurmountable obstacle is the paucity of historigraphical evidence : the first established date of Indian
tradition is 326 B.C. All other dates are conjectura l, although authenticated by archaeological, anthropological,
and philological researches about the Indus Valley c iv ili zatio n. It is safe to believe that some 3500 years ago
there arose in a rudimentary form a science of politics whose exact chronological development is hard to
determine but whose philosophical postulates are easy to comprehend . Being a curious mixture of dogma,
theology and reasoning, and having little chronological and topographical material, Hindu though t defies scientific
analysis for purposes of discerning a well-knit theory of state out of the scattered ideas in the diverse schools.
Although political ideas, beliefs and institutions did exist, the existence of the technical science of polity is
evidenced as late as 326 B.C. Upto 320 A.O. political principles and organisation enunciated by Manu and
Kautilya had been fully identified.
Manu's concept of the political institution underlines a state where disinterested politicians
worked for public good, where the king's life was dedicated to the service of the people, where enlightened and
illuminative wisdom prevailed, where an efficient and a loyal cabinet, an honest b<>nd of officials. and
an impartial judiciary prevailed, where taxes were low and judiciously levied, where education was free, where
teachers were wise and intelligent, where the poor, the sick, the homeless, and the helpless were taken care of,
where power was decentralized, where sovereignty was maintained and where social and political Federalism, and
panchayats operated, there 'the gods live'. In such a state alone could a man reach perfection.
In the previous chapter you have been told about the state, subject and the citizen. You have learnt
that state is a political organisation which lays emphasis on the welfare and development of the citizens. In this
lesson you will be able to know about the "Conceptions of the Political". You ill be explained the important
concepts and this significance such as power, authority; legitimacy and obligations. You will not only have the
historical perspective of the concepts but also will learn about this role and importance in the present day scenario.
In other words you will be able to have a group of these concepts not only have their traditional perceptions but
also this modern view points.
It is clear that the ancient Indian thinkers regarded the state as an organic whole comprising the
seven elements-Swami. Amatya. .Janapad. Kosh. Bal, Durg and Mitra.1 ''They, no doubt regarded the king as
the most important element of the organism, but other, if less important, also indispensable for the proper
functioning of the body-politic. One should not forget to note that the organic concF.:ption of the state is only
partially true. The leadership of the king is clearly recognized : he is the epoch maker. It is his respons i bili ty -
and inalienability-to establish peace, security and order, to bring prosperity, development and happiness and to
provide justice to all. Credit for the achievement and condemnation for failure are only his. This public
accountability is not shared by others.
The Vedic literature does not specifically discuss the aims or ideals of the state. Incidental
observations made there i n. however, enable us to gather than peace, order, security and justice are regarded as
the fundamental a ims. of the state. The k ing; or the head of the state, is to be like God Varuna the upholder of
law and order; he is to punish the wicked and help the virtuous. ' Dharma' is to be promoted. morality to be
encouraged and education to be patron ise d. The state, however, is to secure not only the moral but also the
material well-being of its citizens.

27
 Classical Indian political theory draws a clear distinction between Society and State on the
assumption that in an ideal society, the state is relevant. The state is a concession to human fa lli bili ties .
The society on the other hand, should be sovereign, allowing maximum voluntary activity through customary
social institutions. The state being an instrument of coercion can at best be a secondary association for social
welfare. Most functions, according to the Indian tradition, can best be performed independent of the state
i nterfere nce. Dependence on the state for welfare needs is to be avoided except when it is a must. The
state exists to help the helpless, but for a better health of society, self-employment and autonomous
functioning of social agencies is desirable.
The state is considered as a divinely ordained instrument for creating the conditions of peace
and happiness . Its task is to repress by the use of force and violation of the rights of personal fre edom and
property, to enforce the practice of people's own traditional customs and usages and to take serious care
of virtues and dharma.
The state in India is designed in a special way. It is all powerful, a divine creation but not tyrant
or tota li tarian. Political power is not supreme, and in no way absolute. The state should seek to sustain li fe ,
promote higher quality of life and develop human beings. 'Protection'-protection of life, property, peace and
order, is the primary function of the state. Next comes its welfare.
Concept of Authority
The Yajus Samhita and the Brahmanas conceived the twin principle of 'authority' and
'obligation' of the temporal ruler; this principle has been developed in the Dharmasutras. The Samhita and the
Brahmans seek to base the authority of the king upon the doctrine of omnipotent sacrifice : Rajasuya,
Ashvamedha and Yajapeya. The Satapatha Brahmana provides a two fold basis of the kings authority he
derives his authority, including immunity from punishment from the sacrifice through the intermediary of the
gods. He also acquires divinity. Another explanation in Mahabharata is that he gets his authority in the Divine
creation. Rajanya is the visible representation of Prajapati (Satapatha Brahman 3.5.27, 4.3.4,4.3.7). There is
another view that he derives his authority from the royal coronation.
Kautilya (4th century B.C.) did not delude himself by believing in the divinity of the king.
Probably he himself had made an ordinary person a king and master of large dominions. But he (foes advice
the king to use all tile tricks of the trade to make people believe that the king was a god. TheJnost interesting
part is when he asks the king to use his agents to propagate the story about the election of mythical Manu
Vaivasvata as the first king'. He tells us that there was chaos in the beginning of the aeon (cosmic cycle) and
that Manu Vaivasvaffi was elected to this high office in order to end chaos and establish order. They allotted
one-sixth of the grains grown and one-tenth of merchandise as sovereign dues. Fed by this payment the king
took upon himself the responsibility of maintaining the safety and security of the subjects.
In the same passage Kautilya advises the king to tell his people that as the king fulfils the
functions of god Indra (Lord of the gods) and of the Yama (the lord of death) on this earth, those who show
him disrespect will be punished on this earth and in the he aven. Further, he advises the king to inspire his
troops before joining in the battle and tell them that he is as good or as had a paid public servant as they are;
thus emphasises the earthly character of the king. But on the other hand he asks the king to send out his secret
agents disguised as gods and allow himself to be, seen in their company, so that his subjects (at least some of
them) may come to believe that the king is favoured by gods and keeps their company.
Narad and Brahaspati postulate the original existence of a ' golden age' and point out that it
soon came to an end and was succeeded by a social chaos. Government came into Existence to put an
end to it. Sukra recognizes a quasi divinity in the case of a virtuous king.
II
POWER, AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY
Authority consists of two important components: Power and Legitimacy . Legitimacy of a rule or
decision implies that the members of society treat that rule or decision as beneficial to society as well

28
as to the mse lves . So they willingly tend to abide by it. Power alone involves capacity to get a decision obeyed
by others against their will. Robert M. Maciver has aptly defined power as ' the capacity in any relationship to
command the service or compliance of others' . Power may involve use of 'force' but service or compliance
of others will best be obtained when they regard the command as 'right', ·good ' or ' be ne fic ial' . Power ,
to be effective and stable, must be accompanied by the capacity to secure willing obedience. Use of force or
coercion or sanctions may be resorted to only when legitimacy fails to work. If we think of power as a naked
sword, authority may be envisaged as a sword in its scabbard. lf power is based on fear or force, legitimacy
is based on respect and willing compliance. Authority is, therefore, the most effect ive instrument of
exercising power in the sphere of politics.
Max Wber (1864-1920) identified three types of authority prevalent in the modern state.
F;rstly, traditional authority in volves the right to rule as established by trad itio n, such as, hereditary or
dynastic ru le . Seco ndly , charismatic authority results from exceptional personal characteristics of the
political leader, or hi s magne tic personality, as exemplified by Hitler. Finally, legal -rational authority
emanates from the po li tic al office held by an individual , where he is appointed through the prescribed
procedure , suc h as, merit-based select io n, promot io n, election, rotation onomination, and not from the
personal characteristics of the individual holding an office. In other words, legal -rational authority is
attached to an office which automatically extends to the individual holding that office. Weber
recognized that none of these categories existed in pure form. In any case, legal-rational authority,
which, is characteristic of bureaucracy, is the outstanding attribute of the modern state.
Weber's Analysis of Authority

Authority
(Right to obtain compliance)

Traditional Charis matic Legal-Rational

( Based on the
lo ng- establi s he d t rad ition.
e.g. the here ditary ruk)
(Based on ext raord i nary
personality or the leader,
e.g. the rule of a popular dictator)
(Based on the olliee of the
individual. obtai ned
through the prescr ibed
procedure. e.g. th e rule of
bure auc racy)

III
Different Forms of Power
Social Analysis of power cannot be confined to the realm of 'political power'. Economic and
ideological forms of power should also be taken into account as they play an important role as the support-bases
of political power. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between these three major forms of power.
Political Power
According to Alan Ball (Modern Politics and Government; 1988), " the concept of political
power.... is a key concept in the stud y of politics is the resolution of conflict, the distribution of power within a
political commun ity determines how the conflict is to be resolved, and whether the resolution is to be effectively
observed by all parties." In order to identify the nature of political power it is esse nti al, at the outset, to
distinguish between the formal and informal organs of such power. Legisl ature, executive and judiciary are the
tradionally recog ni zed organs of power in a state; they represent the formal organs. The obedience secured by
these organs, backed by sa nct io ns, is an important form of political power. Executive and Legislature, taken
together, make laws, policies and decisions regulating the allocation of values in a society. They impose taxes
and use a vast machinery for the collection of taxes. They issue licences, permits, and regulate a large variety of
citizens ' actions , such as, keeping vehicles and arms, running certain businesses, maintaining the quality of
products, working conditions of the labour, building of houses, etc. There is police to catch hold of offenders,

29
courts to try the offenders and settle disputes; and prisons to punish the conv icts. Then military is meant to
deal with foreign aggressors. In short, formal organs of political power play on effective role in a
given terr itory.
Informal organs of political power not only take the form of political parties in power and in
opposition, but also a large number of pressure groups, public opinion, popular movements, etc. Thus political
power is not the sole prerogative of the formal organs of the state but these organs themselves are
responsive to the ' inputs ' received from the 'environment'. This may be illustrated with reference to three
cases: (i) in independent states, public opinion, popular movements and organized interests directly influence
the decision making; in demo cracies , the ruling party is bound to seek a fresh mandate from the people at
regular intervals ; (ii) in the colones, dependencies and dictatorships. the struggle for independence and strong
popular movements are sooner or later able to secure not only substantial concessions but even to win their
independence; and (iii) in the international sphere. organized groups of nations do exercise their influence
on the 'authoritative allocation of values'. The constant pressure exercised by the ' third world' countries on the
super powers to change their economic and foreign policies is a case in point.
Economic Power
Economic power is the power emanating from the possession of material things, especially the major
means of production and distribution. It is a potent factor behind politics. For instance. big landlords. industrial
tycoons and business magnates are able to influence public decisions regarding the fixation of priorities in
economic development in a liberal democracy. In India itself the organized economic interests have been able
to secure priority of colour TV for the urban rich, over drinking water for the rural poor.
The possessors of economic power in a liberal democracy exercise their influence on politics in
several ways. Their pressure groups are stronger, more organized and more vocal. For instance in India. the
chambers of commerce and industry are very stro ng, the workers ' unions are not as strong. peasants ' unions
are less strong and consumers' organizations are the weakest log. The major news-papers are owned by a
handful of big business houses who take full advantage of this medium to promote opinion which suits their
interests. Besides, the big business houses extend a large amount of financial help to political parties, often
clandestinely, and to the candidates seeking elections. The recipients of such help play a dual game- they pay
lip-service to the interests of the masses but are secretly committed to safeguarding the interests of their
financiers.
Ideological Power
Ideological power pro v ide s a more subtle base of political power . The ideas unheld and
promoted by the ru li ng class in a given society regarding the 'best system of government' constitute
political ideology. Ideolo gy may be defined as ' a systematic set of arguments and beliefs used to justify
an existing or desired social order ' (Joseph Dunner, ed., Dictionary of Political Science; 1965). An
outstanding feature of political ideology is that it provides legitimacy to the ruling classes and helps them
maintain their stronghold on political power. When people are made to believe that a particular
system of government is the best system, they will not be inclined to challenge the authority of the ruling
classes . When people have learnt to respect their laws, the need for coercion to secure their obedience
would be eliminated or at any late minimized.
Political ideology involves not only 2 set of beliefs. it is always action-oriented. It puts forward a '
cause ' for which people are prepaied not only to fight but to make a lot of sacrifices. As Alan Ball
(Modern Politics and Government) has elaborated : "Individuals are prepared to fight for causes. often
realistically hopeless causes, or to undergo ill-treatment and torture in the belief that some political values are
superior to others.'' Ideology is of n devoid of reason. It picks up certain convenient formulae and elevates
them to the level of 'absolute truth' by exploiting people's sent iments. Thus , so me id eas are held sacrosanct
by a particular group while others remain indifforent or even disdainful toward very ideas.
Ideological power represents the manipulative power of the dominant class which holds sway on the
thinking and emotions of the people. Ideology even creates an illusion of ' consent'. Under an ideological spell,
the people express their approval to the rule of particular persons and policies. They are led to believe

30
that they are being governed with their ' conse nt' while they actually continue to be governed according to the
des ig ns of the dominant classes. Marx and Engels (The German Ideology: 1846) had noted that 'the ideas of
the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas'. According to them the class which owns the means of
material production in any society also controls the means of mental produrtion. Antonio Gramsci (1891-
1937), an Italian Merxist, gave the concept of ' hegemony ' to explain the phenomenon of ideological
domination, particularly of the capitalist class , in the contemporary society. Hegemony , in this sense, denotes
a form of rule where power is apparently exercised with the consent of the ruled. According to Gramsci,
the spiritual and cultural supremacy of the ruling class in the capitalist state was accomplished through
the manipulation of 'civil society', particularly through the mechanism of socialization, such as the
church, the school and the mass med ia. Gramsci's concept of ' hegemony' also explains why the working-
class parties have only achieved a relatively moderate degree cf success in the open competition for political
power in the capitalist countries. Gramsci, therefore, insisted that revolution in the economic sphere was
not enough to end the capitalist domination. It was necessary to reinforce revolution in the cultural sphere
in order to achieve this end.
Ideological Power, Political Power, Economic Power : The Interrelation
Ideological power is intrinsically related to political and economic power. Ideas have been crucial
to politics and have been responsible for political changes. They brought democracy in various parts of
the world and subsequently affected socialism in Soviet Union and in other countries. The political
power for its own safety also propagates and protects the ideology. The Marxists, after seizing power in
Soviet Union vowed to expand the communist ideology beyond their frontiers . Stalin declared that
Soviet Union was an island in midst of a vast capitalist sea and therefore, communist ideology must
be exported to other countries as well, so that Soviet Union ceases to r emain an island. Thus he
saw the preservation of his political power in the expansion of communist ideology internationally.
A large part of ideology contains economics. This shows the relationship between the
ideological power and economic power. The ideologies of democracy or capitalism and communism
came as a result of economic changes in the society. As Ashim Gill says that "capitalism and
communism had to wait till the industrial revolution, before they could be fully developed into the
powerful ideologies of their times."
In fact both the ideologies were associated and affected by the industrial revolution. On the
other hand the Industrial Revolution also, as Watkins says owed "much to the power of ideo lo gy." Ashim
Gill comments that , "The fall of communism today is a sign of the times that the factors that were ripe
for the rise of communism and existed at the beginning of the century are no lon ger relevant ." Ideology
is a vision which needs a plan or programme of action in different fields of politics and economics. If the
action fails, the whole ideology would fall as the house of cards. This is evident from the collapse of
communism in different parts of the world. Hence, economic, political and ideological powers are inseparable
parts of one whole with the objective of maintaining or changing a particular system.
A Critical Appraisal
The chief merit of the power approach lies in its ability to identify the motive force operating behind
politics. Moreove r, it can be applied to an analysis of domestic as well as international politics. However , this
approach suffers from several drawbacks. In the first place, it lacks precision. As Vernon Yan Dyke has
elucidated: "Power is aid to derive from sources ranging from tacitly accepted rules of politeness to the
possession of spaceships; and it is said to manifest itself in situations ranging from a request that the salt be
passed at the dining table to a situation in· which states are exchanging all-out thermonuclear blows."
(Political Science-A Philosophical Analysis ; 1960). This sort of imprecision in the concept of power itself
defie any classification or quantification of data for the purpose of political analysis.
Secondly, this approach seeks to reduce all politics to a struggle for power, and ignores other
important purposes for which men have recourse to politics. As Dyke has further elaborated: "Political actors
rarely, if ever, struggle for power alone. They pursue other purposes, too. The theory that politics is a
struggle for power does not say how much power is desired or what price political actors are willing
J

31
to pay for it in terms of other values. The thoughtless a sumption that all political actors constantly
seek a maximization of power at any price is obviously false."
Finally, all struggle for power in different social situations cannot be treated as a subject -matter
of po li t ics . For instance. competition among film-actors to win popular applause or that between extile-
manu facturers to control consumer choices do involve struggle for power, but that is hardly a manifestation
of politics. Politics is concerned only with a struggle for power to control public affairs, that is, to have
access to positions of taking decisions for the allocation of public goods, services, opportunities and hono
ur s. Any deviation from this focus will make the power approach a futile exercise.
IV
The Structure of Power
The stud ent of politics is chiefly concerned with identifying the centres of power in a given
society or in an international setting and relating them to the mode of authoriative allocation of values
prevailing in that setting. This approach to the study of politics is a typically modern approach. It should not
be confused with the traditional approach which recognized a threefold division of the 'powers' of a
government legislative, executive and judicial-and tried to describe them according to the formal constitution
of a given country. The modern approach marks a departure from the traditional one as it implies a sh ift in
focus from the formal organization to the informal one. In other words, we are no longer satisfied by
learning as to ' who rules a country according to its constitution ' ; we want to know and identify the groups
and classes which actually wield power although the constitution guarantees ' equality of status and
opportunity' ! Political power in a country is always rooted in its socio -economic and ideological
structures. It is, therefore, essential to discover the real sources and centres of power in order to understand
politics.
Can we identify such groups in society out of which one group has constantly exercised power over
another group? Different schools of thought have offered different answers to this question. Marxist
school of thought views the situation in ' class perspective'. Elitist school of thought holds that an elite group
always doming 'gender perspective'. Finally, pluralist theory uphold 'group perspective' on power to show
that sev eral groups in society have their own share in the exercise of power.
It was probably because of the deification of the king and his also being the favorite of gods,
that king like Asoka and his successors started calling themselves as the 'Beloved of gods' (devanampiya)·.
As time passed, su bseq uent dynasties started using high sounding titles for themselves . The culmination of
this tradition was when the Chola kings got their images put up in the temples and they were wor-
shipped. It was in this very tradition that all important , even unimportant dynasties, from the very ancient
times. down to the Rajputs traced their lineage to Sun , Moon and the Fire, all three of them beings gods.
But by far the most interesting aspect of this deification was that they were supposed to have
become the special repository of Gods' favour. They were supposed to have been imbued with
marks of a sup erman (Mahapurusa takkhana). Originally the king may have been a very handsome
fellow but soon several marks of a superman were invented and this number swelled to 32. The Digha
Nikaya declared that one so endo wed was destined to be either a ' Chakravarti King' or a great Path -Finder
like Gautama Buddha . Without referring to the credibility of the marks , the important aspect is ' that
religious literature was used to support the king's position and power. It was further asserted that a
Chakravarti King who lived by Dharma. and kept a sabbath, would be endowed with special gifts by
God. On a full Moon day, seven special jewels (ratnas) would appear to him· : viz, the jewels of the
Wheel (chakra ratna, one similar to the Wheel carried by Visnu) , the Elephant, the Horse , the Gen (mani
ratna) the Woman , the Treasure and the Adviser. Apparently all these possessions would be there with every
king, but what was special about them was that their powers make the king invincible against all foes.
Such a king, was supposed to rule the four quarters of the earth (See Mahasudassana Sutta).
The Manusmriti excels in importance all other literature trying to glorify the king. This book ,
as we all know, has played a very important role in the life of the Hindu throughout the history.

32
Often this book was referred to by the judges of present day High Courts and the Supreme Court for clarifying
law points, Book VII of the Laws of Manu dec lares .
"The Kashatriya who has had various sacraments (sanskarm,) performed according to the Vedas,
should be established as a king. In the absence of a king there was fear writ large everywhere in the world,
and , therefore, the God created a king. He took the best elements of the various gods Indra, Vayu, Yama, Sun,
Fire, Water. Moon and Kubera (the lord of Wealth) and out of them created the king (i . e . , he has to play
the role of all gods in varying degree). He is the best of men, and even if he is an infant, he is not to be
despised and though a mortal he is the· God in human form."
Thus, according to the theories found in the early Indian literature, both the state and the kingship
evolved out of "necessity caused by, the evils of anarchy and of wickedness inherent in human character."
Therefore, very great stress is laid on the importance of danda which can be identified with authority to punish
and chastise those who do not obey the law of the land or the norms of the society, Kautilya thinks that danda is
so impo11ant that the very science of government or political science is termed Dandaniti .. But this power to
chastise must be exercised judiciously and not indiscriminately.
But personal duties apart. the king was often blamed for the natural calamities also. Over and
over again in the entire gal-nut of ancient Indian literature, it is asserted that the king is the
representative of his times (raja kalarya karanam) . The king has a great role to play in providing a lead. If
the king, is good, the times are happy: and if bad, he brings misery and calam ities . If the rain god
rains in time, if the crops are good, the king gets the credit for go od administration; and if there are
floods or drought, the king is to be blamed . Even today an average Indian justifies, his correction or
deceitful methods by asserting that corruption percolates from the top. This has continued to be a part
of the human psyche. The leader is limitated by the followers. The Queen in England is also the norm-setter
in the British social life.
But inspite of all these pretensions on the part of the kings and the assertions of the religious and
law books , the king is not vested with that 'divine right of kings' which the Stuart kings of England claimed
over their subjects . They asserted that they were accountable to none else but God and that the Parliament did
not have any right to question them. Nor is this Indian king supposed to be the personal owner of the entire
land, which was the basis of Norman feudalism in England from the 11th century onwards. The land is owned
by the community. Yet he can make grants of revenues or the uncultivated land , but all the arable land
was held by the farmers.
As early as the 7th century A.D. Bana Bhatta openly asserts that the entire story of the royal
divinity is bunk and is the work of "sycophants who befuddled the minds of the weak and stupid king
but did not fool the strong and the wise ."
It may also be noted that the monarchy is not the state, but only a part of it. The state is conceived
as an organism and the constituent parts or the angas mentioned are : 'the kin g, the minister, the country, the
fort, the treasury, the army and the friend (the friendly state.)' At times, Manu considers the king superior to
the others, but finally he asserts that none of the organs is superior to the others.2
Thus , the over-all picture appears to be a sort of dichotomy in which the king has some superior
characteristics (may be called divine) but he remains a human being enjoying divine power which a common
man does not. That is why the Indian kings were never given the 'abject servility' which was the hall mark of
the Roman and Chinesa or even the TLirkish emperors.
Dr. Manoj Sinha
Reader
Dcptt. of Pol. Science

33
 LEGITIMACY AND OBLIGATION
LEGITIMACY
The king occupies a central position in the administration, a great emphasis is placed on the
intellectual and moral discipline of the ruler. It is repeatedly pointed out that he should be dutiful,
industrious and impartial. The Arthshastra rightly observes that when the king is alert, his servants likewise
become alert." Similarly in the happiness of his subjects lies the king's happiness, in their welfare
his welfare. His well being consists not in what pleases himself , but in what pleases his subjects,"
Likewise the Mahabharata observes that the eternal duty of the king is to make his subjects happy.
The king is enjoined to show favour. to his people like a father. Similarly, it has been opined by
writers that the ruler to treat his subject as his own children.
The concept of Dhanna is fundamental in understanding the legitimacy of the adthority of the ruler
the king. The term has variously been defined by the scholars. For example, it is said to be eternal
and necessary moral law, the code of righteousness. It is also taken to mean custom, obligation,
sacred law, justice and the no rm of conduct. There is a view that sacred tradition as revealed in the
Vedic canon should be the foundation of dharma. However, it inclt1des custom and popular us age,
morality and most what we ordinarily mean by religion - all fall under this head. Hence , dharma
encompasses social order, tradition and is divinely obta ined but subject to change, interpretation and
elaboration. Therefore, it sta nd s above the king. It is, therefore, the ruler's duty to rule in accordance with
the law and tradition, and to respect and encourage the different customs and norms of the family, caste and
country consistent with the dhanna. It i s to ensure security, happiness and property of the people. In order to
achieve this objective the king is required to promote and encourage education, religion and the arts,
charitable services and agriculture and commerce. He is therefore, advised to subordinate his
interest to the i nterests of his subje cts. To emphasize this point of view, the k i ng is occasionally called
the servant of the people and so is warned not to antagonize his subjects. His political power is su bject to ' d
harma ' Dharma perhaps is designed to severely limit his absolute authority. Should the king depart from his
duty and take it upon himself to go against the precepts of the dharma. he would be struck down by the
danda.
The political authority is created on the stronger basis, and monarchy is the ideal of the Hindu
political philosophers. But at the same time the king is subjected to the laws of -the disciplinary canons-both
political and soc ial. The scope of activity of the king in the matter of le gis lat io n is narrowed down.
Laws are allowed to evolve gradually and their interpretation and exposition is vested in the wis e expo nen
ts of real social opinion. Within their lords communities, have the fullest scope for democratic social life and
their customs are regarded as valid. In social and economic matter too, the representatives of the different
sectio ns have their recognized place.
The mo narchhas six other associates : ministers and the officials, the country (Janapad), fort, the
revenue, the army. and finally anally. All the seven are considered essential for the efficient worki ng
of the polity. However. according to Kautilya of all the seven the king is the most impo rtant. The
ruler, as the Arthasastra puts it. acts as pivot of the state structure because it is he who directs the
administrative machine. appoints the officials. makes and shapes the policies and finally takes
measures to strengthen the other elements. Th is may be interpreted as the exaltation of the royal powe r.
It can be discerned again from the statement of the same author that the royal order supersedes all the
others.
The monarchy is generally thought to be hereditary. Kautilya emphatically says that the king
should never select an undisciplined prince as the crown prince. He further recommends that the p rince
on reaching the proper age should be trained by teachers. He therefore, prescribes a co mprehensive
scheme of education and training of the princes. According to his scheme, the prince shall apply himself
to learn, writing and arithmetic early. Later. he shall learn the sacred canon and philosophy from the
learned people. economics from the hands of the administrative departments and politics from those
versed in its theory and practice. After his formal education he takes to the practicals. To this end, he
is required to devote the first part of the day to learning. Besides. emphasis is also laid on military science
and the second part to hearing lessons on a large numb er of sciences. Further, it is prescribed that he
34
should learn discipline from his teachers and by associations with people of mature learning. The above
course of education has been described as the formulation for the first time an integral scheme of education
for the training of the prince and for the development of his intellect and character.
OBLIGATION
The Vedic and later thinkers are more concerned how this authority should be exercised. K
i ng's obli gations emerge from his divinity or divine associations. from ethico-legal principles of
dharma, and th irdly. from the quasi-contractual nature of origin. Manu points out that the king becomes
immediately pure because he occupies the seat of authority. and he is seated there for the protection of his
subjects. Further, Manu (IX 304-313) tells eight-fold obligations (functions) of the king like those of
eight' deities- Ind ra. Sun, Wind. Yama. Varuna, Moon. Fire and Earth. He should shower benefit
upon his . k i ngdom like Indra showers rains: collect taxes as the Sun extracts water with his rays: penetrate
everywhere through h is spies as wind moves about everywhere: control his subjects as Yama brings all
under subjection at the proper time: punish the wicked as Varuna binds sinners with his rope: gladden his
subjects as full Moon gladdens men: visit criminals with his anger and destroy wicked vassals as Fire
burns all: and support his subjects as the Earth supports all created beings. The Mahabharata (XII 68.1 -
47) reduces these eight to five with some variation: like Fire, he burns down sinful men with his fierce
energy: like Sun he keeps a watch on all persons through his spies: like Destroyer, he destroys hundreds
of evil doers with their families: like Yama he restrains all wicked persons with severe punishment and
favours the good: and like Kuber he rewards his benefactors with showers of wealth and snatches away
the valuables of his malefactors, and he bestows prosperity upon some and takes it away from others.
The Mahabharata declares the king's office to be the foundation of individual security (of person and
property) as well as the stability of the social order, the basis of the great institutions of family and
property, the support of the fundamental law of the social order, and the guarantee of the normal
functioning of the social, the economic and the religious activities of the People. By applying the science
of polity he is the maker of his epoch, and not merely through the degree of fulfilment of his obligation
or functions.
The Ramayana also holds the king's functions in high significance. The king's office is the
safeguard of the institutions of family and property, the security for the fulfilment of individual obligation
and the guarantee of enjoyment or the. material advantages and amenities of life. The king is the symbol of
virtue and beneficence as well as super human excell ence. The Ramayana conceives the king's office in
such high terms as to make him at his best the means of fulfillment of the complex human en ds as
well as of law (or dharma) and at his worst the means of their corruption. The author of the Ramayana
also describes the functions of the king like Manu and the Mahabharata : the Indra -functions, the
Sun- funct ions, the Wind-functions, the Yama-functions, the Varuna-functions, the Moon-functions and the
Earth-funct ions. Their elaboration, however, has some· var iations. Like Indra, the king should shower
remissions upon his kingdom, followed by collection of revenue according to law as the Sun extracts
water with his rays for eight month s; like the Wind-god, he should penetrate everywhere with hi,, spies;
like Yama the king after mature deliberation behave equally towards friends and foes; like Yaruna the
king should bind down robbers: like full Moon, the king should gladden all his subjects and like Earth,
he should sustain them.
Late Smritis also have elaborated the functions of the king. According to Narada (Narada Smriti/
Naradiya Manusamhita XVIII 5 & 17) the king shall protect with attention all orders in accordance with the
rules prescribed by the canon and the four political expedients. Constantly cherishing the good and punishing
the wicked constitut e for kings their end of virtue (dharma), while refraining from oppression of his subjects
constitute s their end of wealth (artha). The king's five-fold forms or functions are those of Fire, Indra, Mo'
on, Yama and Kuber. But here Fire signifies burning subjects when being sustained by anger with or
without cause. The king is Indra when acquiring might he marches forth with uplifted weapons against his
enemies with a will to conquer. He is called Moon, when shedding his anger and cheerful in aspect he is seen
by his subjects. He becomes Yama when seated on throne of Justice and weilds the rod of punishment with

35
impartiality towards all creatures. He is called Kuber, when he favours guests, preceptors and learned men
as well as servants and so forth with gifts.
Brihaspati (I 1.6.8) holds the view that the king was created by appropriating portions of
lustre of the deities , namely the Moon, Fire. the Sun, Wind, Indra, Kubera, and Yama.
Some other smritis have emphasized one aspect or the other. Thus, according to Katyayan (8)
the king is Indra having fallen from heaven: to Angiras he is the preceptor who purifies sinners with heavy
punishment. and afterwards protects the m. Brihatparushar says that Brahma created the king out of the
part ic le s of eight deities. of the eight q uarte rs . The king's authority over his subjects is, therefore, based
upon a number of early Smritis' principles relating to the kings orig in, office and functions.
Katyayan (8 & 15) summarizes the position and functions of the king saying that he is created for a
threefold purpose : namely. constant protection of the people, eradication of thorns and honouring
Brahmans.
The analogy and affinity with gods has been carried to Purans also. In the Markandeya
Purana (27 .21- 5), for example, Queen Madalasa says that the king should in the process of
administration assume the form of ' five deities : In dra, Sun, Yama, Moon and Wind. Indra gratifies
people by bestowing rain for four months in the year: so the king should gratify people by grant of
remissions. Just as the Sun absorbs water with his rays for eight months in the year, he should
collect customs duties and so forth by subtle mea ns. The king should behave impartially towards
friends and foes, just as Varna punishes friend and foe equally at proper time. The people enjoy
happiness under the king's rule as one is happy at the sight of the full Moon. The king should set his
spies upon his subjects in the towns, upon his ministers and friends, just as wind moves secretly among
men. These functions are based on the double doctrine of his divine similarity or orig in.
The various above views may be summarized now. The king's functions may be narrated under
the following groups:
(a) Security against external threats
(b) Security against internal chaos, disorder, theft, robbery, crimes etc.
(c) Maintenance of social order and law.
(d) Collection of information through spies
(e) Collection of revenues
(f) Administration of justice : and exercise of authority, and
(g) Welfare of the people-by public works, promotion of economic prosperity, sustain and support
the people .
A notable feature of the obligations is that they are all essential or primary; there is no
distinction of primary or secondary, or police (obligatory) functions and welfare (optional) functions.
Second, the association of the deities like Indra, Sun , Yama, Fire and others is significant two-fold : they
prescribe what should be done, and also illustrate how the authority should be exercised. Like Indra, it
showers benefits but like sun it should collect taxes which does not put a burden at one time or that the
'pinch' is imperceptible.
The Buddhist ideas of the authority of the tempora\ ruler are not fully de ve lo ped. They are
wanting in logical consistency. In Pali works we have popular conception that kings are gods by human
convention, that obedience of tlie subjects is a matter of necessity, and that protection is the natural and
necessary function of the, ruler. Aryasura (in Jatakamala) refers to the king's moral obligation of protection
in return for the willing obedience of the subjects. Aryadeva (in Chatuhsatak) asserts the doctrine of
sovereignty of the people with the ruler serving them for wages. The Suvarnaprabhas-sutra justifies the
king's authority by an evident adaptation of Manu's theory and his social and political institutions have no
direct bearing on the author 's conception of the mutual relations of the temporal ruler and his
subjects.
Accordingly the Jain conceptions on this subject partake the miscellaneous character of the
Buddhist notion. While Somadeva and Hemachandra follow the Smriti principle of the ruler's

36
authority or obligation or both, Jinasena mentions a sectarian theory of the ruler's obligation based on a
equally sectarian view of his origin.
Kautilya has enumerated in detail the eight-fold functions in his Arthasastra (Book II and V). He ,
however, emphasizes the maintenance of law and order as one of its major functions. The state must
maintain order, based on justice and social helpfulness. For Kautilya, the progress of the world depends
on order. If the operation of the law was suspe nded , society would relapse into anarchy. Active social
service came to occupy an important place in his political system.
The activity of the state, as envisaged by the Mahabharata and Arthasastra, cover all the aspects of
human life-social, economic and religious. The state is not regarded as a necessary evil whose coercive
activities are to be reduced to the minimum. According to them the activity of the state is to embrace
the whole human life. both here and hereafter. The state is to offer facilities to religious sects to develop
on their own lives and foster and inculcate pie ty, morality and righteousness. It is to imp rove the social
order and to encourage learning, education and exten'ding patronage to scholars and artists. It is to
establish and maintain rest houses. charity halls and hospitals and relieve the distress due to floods,
locusts, famine. pestilence and earthquakes.
Sukra on the obligations of the State
Sukra enumerates eight obligations of the state : (i) punishment of the wicked, (ii) charity, (iii)
protection of the subjects, (iv) performance of Rajasuya and other sacrifices , (v) equitable realisation of
revenues, (vi) conversion of princes into tributory chiefs, (vii) quelling of enemies, and (viii) extraction
of wealth from land.
These functions of the state can be classified as protection of person and prosperity,
administration of justice, spread of dhanna and culture, philanthropy and charity, and realisation of
revenues.
Further the function of the state is to see that the population is evenly distributed and to encourage
colonisation of fresh lands . It is to enrich the resources of the country by developing forests. working
mines and constructing dams and canals in order to make agriculture independent of rain as far as
possible. It is to offer active help to trade and industry, and also to protect the population against
exploitation. It is to regulate the vices of the community by appointing officers to supervrse over wine
booths and gambling houses.
Ancient Indian thinkers permit the state a wide sphere of activity, not because they do not value
individual liberty, but they feel that the state organize them best by reconciling conflicting interests.
Following the tradition of the Mahabharata , and the Arthasastra, Sukra also emphasises that the goal of
the state is to create such conditions and environments as would enable all men to live in peace and
happiness, to pursue their advocat ions , to follow their own customs and usages and their ' svadharma' to
enjoy without interference the fruits of their labour and the property acquired by them. The state according
to him, is not autocratic and despotic with absolute powers but on the contrary is one which is quite close
to the modern concept of the state.
Public opinion : Majority Decision : Sukra does not stress the principle of heredity as the basis of
political power . On the other hand , he asserts that the qualities and virtues make a state liberal, enlightened
and democratic. Sukra is emphatic that the head of the state must abide by the we ll thought out decisions
of the councillors and office beareis, subjects and members attending a meeting and never come at
decision by his own opinions. When listening to the council of Ministers, he suffers from worst
consequences and becomes the cause of miseries and soon gets not only estraged from his kingdom but
also is alienated from his people.
Manu ' s concept of the political institution underlines a state where disinterested politicians work
for public good, where the king's wife is dedicated to the service of the people, where enlightened and
illuminative wisdom prevails, where an efficient and a loyal Cabinet , and honest band of officials. and an
impartial judiciary prevail , where power is decentralised, where sovereignty is maintained an d where social
and political federalism-panchayat operates. there the ' gods live' . In such a state alone can a man reach
perfection.
37
 Sukra's state is democratic because according to the ideology, it is the majority which
works and not a single individual. Even a powerful individual cannot match the unity of opinion
possessed by the many. The majority opinion is like a combination of many threads which is
strong enough to drag a lion. Thus . in the system of Sukra, majority is so vereign and not the
individual.
Sukra does not believe in casteism and. thus. his state is free from the distinction of caste
and creed. He openly discards the gene ra ll y accepted view that caste goes by birth and believes that
work, character and merit are to be res pected . He, therefore, has a firm conviction that a person
having quali ties required for their respective post should be appointed irrespective of their caste.
According to Sukra, the function of the state is to promis e happiness and the strength of the nation
which stems from the performance of one's own duty and adds to social integration. As far as the
performance of the duty is concerned from the highest head of the state to the lowest at the social
ladder, all are to be treated equally. Suk ra's notion of the state implies that the performance of
duty is the best safeguard for rights.
Law and Procedure : The is to is s ue among the people the edicts by the beat of drum and
exhibit it in writing at the junction of four roads, so that there is wide publicity to the state orders and
the people are not ignorant of them. Sukra's state presents a remarkable picture of a popular
democratic welfare state. In his treatise, he underlines the need fro equitable rates of wages for
labourers. According to him, moderate remuneration is to be that which supplies the indispensable need
for food and clothing and good wages are those by which food and clothing are adequately supp lie d.
He insists that the wages should be so fixed that the worker is able to maintain those who are
dependent on him. Sukra observes that workers getting low wages become enemies by nature a·nd
always look for opportunities for trouble and are plunderers of pleasure and people. Even in the pre
se nt times , servants getting low wages are prone to bribery and corruption and destroy the harmony
of the state and morality. Thus, equitable wages are prescribed by Sukra. Sukra's picture of the state
resembles the welfare state of the present times.
Suk ra's concept of the state is not rigid but reflects a progressive outlook. Contrary to the
old ideals that laws have lasting validity, Sukra speaks of the law undergoing changes and new
enactments which override old injunctions. Sukra believes that due to the difference of opinion
and the changing pattern of society, the laws undergo changes.
Culture and Development : Sukra constantly states that protecting people's property,' administering
justice and coilecting revenue, are the important functions of the state. The promotion of religion and
culture of the country is also an important function of the state for the harmonious growth and the
mental upliftment of his people. He, there fore, advises that the state should honour persons
holding distinctions in the sphere of academics and art. The state should organise festivals where
people from all walks of life assemble and meet without any distinctions. There should be dances,
dramas and folk songs where high dignitaries of the state alongwith the common should participate
and enjoy. The state should take such steps which advance the arts and sciences of the country. The
state should be liberal and should gift land and give interest free loans to the poor people.· Lands
for temples, parks, public grourids and dwelling houses for poor are to be given free to the people.
The state, according to Suk ra, should build rest ho uses for travellers, highways to connect villages
with towns and used for conv eya nce of marketable commodities. For the betterment of environment, the
state should take care of its forest wealth. Domestic plants are to be planted in villages, and wild
trees in forests .
Taxations : The state should realise its share of procedure from land according to ' Prajapati
System' , but in times of danger and difficulty according to Manu's system and not otherwise. Realisation
of Manus system would, therefore, inflict great hardships on the subj ects, hence the injunction that
in ordinary times, Prajapati system is to be followed.

38
 But under exceptional circumstances, when there may be a great demand for mon ey, the state may
use Manu 's calculations and practically enhance the rates of payment. Thus, Sukra conceives of a state
where tax is realised without putting burden on the subjects; but in times of emergency or under abnormal
conditions, he authorises the state to demand higher tax according to Manu 's system, but its
realisation is to be taken as a safety valve and should not be used for individual motives.

Sukra, therefore. is against arbitrary and exhorbitant taxation which is a great hinderance to the
development of national resources and hence the cause of political and military inefficiency. He, therefore,
strongly asserts that the state which extracts its share through Cupidity-that is , beyond its dues
ruined with its subjects.
Obligation for welfare activities : The state of Sukra is a welfare state where among other functions,
the Land is given free for the construction of temples, parks, public grounds and dwelling houses to the
weaker section of the society.
In each village there should be roads of 10 cubits and should be provided with drain on both the sides
for the passage of water. According to Sukra, it is the responsibility of the state to repair the roads every
year with gravels. Between every two villages a sarai is to be built. It is to be daily cleared and well
governed by the headmen of the villages. Encourag eme nt education, spread of learning and the
development of arts and sciences are regarded as some of the benevolent functions of the state. Sukra
while enumerating the so many social, moral and economic functions in addition to the ordinary political
and administrative functions of the state does not forget the, educational activities when he observes that
the state should always adopt such steps as may advance the arts and sciences of the country.
Conclusion
The Indian culture aims at evolving the highest type of humanity and to enable the individual to
attain his own ends: Dharma. Artha, Kama and Moksha. The thinkers, however, do not circumscribe
the scope of state action. They do not limit the exercise of the sovereign power simply to police func tions
; on the other hand, they also do not invest the state with powers simply to police functions, on the
other hand they also do not invest the state with powers too extensive to deal with the individual as it
likes. They clearly see the sphere to which its action might safely be delegated without interfering with the
development of man's superior nature , and in this the state is allowed a free exercise of its authority. A
clear distinction is made between the two. Man is regarded both as a means and also an end. In the
first instance, man must look to well being of society, should help others and be helped. Herein he
comes under the full scope of the state activity. His maintenance, his opportunity for self-realization,
protection of his life and property-everything is put to the care of the state but beyond this, the
jurisdiction of the state comes to an end. In matters of h ighe r development, the state had nothing to
prescribe, but will only facilitate the individual in this sphere ; the individual is free.
The rights of the state are again conceived as being far from absolute. They are limited, and thought to
be merely arising out of contract. Political idealism does not carry its concept to that logical fineness
which we find in the concept of state in the West, bot ancient and modern. To the weste rne r, the state
is the highest institution which a man can devise-a thing which can bestow the highest benefit on man. But
in the ancient Indian thought it is not assigned this position. It is a means to a great end. It has never
become the highest God on earth.

39
 CHAPTER V

CONCEPTI ONS OF THE COMMUNITY

RASTRA (JANAPADA)
The term ' Rastra' or 'Janapada' denotes a territorial society in the modern sense. As the third necessary
element of the state, a definite territory or Janapada (as defined in the Arthashastra) indicates that both territory
and population as a part of the state are intended to be covered by this expression. The prosperity of the state to
a great extent, depends upon the natural resources of its territory and the case with which it can be defended. It
must be, populated by an energetic and industrious population, for the character of its people determines the
destiny of a state more than any other fact or consideration.
Further, it is stated that the king depends for its prosperity on the qualities of the soil. The prosperity of
the territory tends to be the prosperity of the king. Therefore, a king should choose for the sake of his
prosperity, land which possesses rich qualities.
A country is prosperous and is to be preferred if it yields livelihood to people easily. Natural
resources like fertile land, bountiful sources of water, cattle and forests go a long way to make a state affluent.
It should have artisans and merchants, traders and farmers who all work together to achieve economic
opulence. People whether native or foreigners should not be vicious or foolish but dedicated to the
national uplift and progress. These requirements show that the country must be prosperous, well- stocked with
the necessaries of life, and well suiled to defence. Manu requires that the kingdom should consist mostly of
Aryas, while Visnu holds that a country should be, peopled mostly by Vaisyas and Shudras.
These prescriptions demonstrate that a country can claim to be prosperous if social welfare is provided
for and the necessities of life are guaranteed. From what has been stated in the classics in terms of Rastra
or Janpada is a coherent concept of the welfare state.
Durg (Fort)
Durg (or fort) represents the defence establishment in the state. It is the fourth necessary element of the
state. Fort is necessary to defend the very existence of the state, and thus is regarded as an essential
constituent. According to a Kautilya, it is on the fort that the safety of the treasury and the a'rmy depends, it
is from the fort that operations like secret war, control over one's partisans, maintenance of the army, reception
of the allies, and driving out of the enemies are successfully carried out.
The ruler should, according to Kautilya, construct forts in all the four directions suited to fighting
purposes. Manu considers Durg prior to Rastra. It is regarded as the pivot of the whole machinery of
government. Significantly, the capital mirrored the prosperity of the country and if properly walled also
provides security. The reason for the construction of the forts from where a single archer under the shelter
of the fort-wall could fight a hundred of the enemy and a hund red could fight ten tho us and. Kautilya says, in
the four quarters of the boundaries of the kingdom, forts should be built for offering resistance on ground
naturally fitted for the purpose. He speaks of four kinds of forts audaka (water-protected), parvata (mountain
one), dhanvana (desert fort), and a forest fort full of wagtails and water and thicket of reed.
Kosha (Treasury)
Kosha really speaking stands for the institution of financial resources of the state including revenue,
budget, taxation and the implementation mach inery . The fifth element of the state is ' Kosa ' or ' treasury' .
According to Kautilya, the treasure accumulated by righteous and legitimate means should be retained by
the king or should be amassed by him in the same manner . Filled with gold and silver, the treasury should be
able to stand the strain of expenditure during the time of adversity, such as, famines or distress. He further
says, that a king whose treasury is depleted preys Upon the citizens and the rural population; all
undertakings depend upon Kosa, there fore, the king must pay the first attention to it.
The ' Santiparva ' calls upon the king to guard his finances with great effort, since kings depend upon
Kosa, which tends to the prosperity of the kingdom. Manu says that Kosa and government of the realm
depend on the king, i.e., they should he the personal concern of the king. Sukra says, the king s hou
ld
40
personally look into the income and, expenditure every day and keep in his treasury-buildings whatever is
brought by those who are appointed to bring gold and wealth. The principal means of filling the treasury is taxat
ion. It is, there fore, necessary to consider first the Principles of taxation as evolved by the writers. The king
cannot levy taxes at his pleasure or sweet will and the rate of taxes should be light and not heavy. The principal
and perenial sources of income of the state are three; viz., the king's share in the produce of the land, customs and
duties, and fines levied on wrong doers, Further, the source of revenue is divided into two - bhaga and shulka. In
order to maintain public power, financial contribution from the citizens becomes necessary, giving rise to taxes.
This may be compared to the 'Kosa' without which the army cannot be maintained.
Bala (The Army)
Danda is a comprehensive idea which reflects the code of punishment, the norms for the use of
force and coercion. In ancient literature, dandaniti, implying the use of Bala, is a well developed science. The
sixth constituent element of the staste is Danda or coercive power in the form of army and police. Kautilya
distinguishes six kinds of army-hereditary forces, hired troops, soldiers from fighting corporation, troops of an
ally, troops of an enemy and soldiers of wild tribes. An idea army is a hereditary one manned by the members of
the Kshatriya Varna. Sukra says the king derives his strength from the army. Without the army there is no
kingdom, nor wealth, nor prowess. All-round prosperity is ensured by the observance of niti (policy) and use of
danda. He enumerates six kinds of strengths: of the body, of the valour and prowess, of the army, of arms, of
intelligence and of life. Of these, the army is the most superior, for without it, the king cannot overpower even a
weak enemy. The gods, monsters and human beings, all have to depend on the strength of the army. As the
army is the only instrument of defeating the enemy, the king should scrupulously maintain a powerful
army.
Sukra divides army into two parts own army and the army belonging to the allies. Each , again,
is of two types: long standing and the newly recruited. Fu1ther, he subdivides it as useful or useless. Kautilya
emphasizes the size of the army, and so holds that an army of Kshatriyas, well-trained in wielding of arms or
an army of Vaisyas and Sudras having greater numerical strength, is better than an army composed of Brahmana
soldiers. The Arthasastra contains an elaborate discussion about the orgnization of the king's army.
QAUM/MILLAT
The Concept of Millat (Community)
In the writings of Muslim thinkers the concept of Millat (Community) has an important place.
According to them Muslims of world belong to a supra-territorial community of Believers called Millat
(Community). In Millat (Community a loose collection of unique individuals or is it a compact entity existing in
its own right? Muslim thinkers like Iqbal believe in the universality of the Millat (Muslim Community). The
basis of such community' is the common belief in Tauhid (unity of God) and Rijalat (Prophethood of
Muhammad) which constitute the vital factors in uniting the Muslims of the world as a separate entity in
the comity of nations. The Millat (Community) is not circumscribed by territorial limits. Nations have a
defined territory. Pan-lslamist of late 19th century and early twentieth century believed that Millat (Muslim
Community) is universal Community of Believe1's, transcending all barriers of caste, colour. race, nationality
and territory. The universal fraternity of Islam has been emphasized by the Quran by laying down the
principle :-
The Believers are but one Brotherhood. (The Quran X. LIX : IO)
It is a historical fact for centuries the Muslims of the world used to move freely from one Muslim
country to another. G.E.U. Grunebaum writes in his book Modern Islam.
" In accordance with this attitude, the law considered any Muslim a full -fledged '' citizen of
the Muslim- ruled rate in which he happened to find himself. Hence the possibility of taKing employment in
distant countries under different princes in one sense no Muslim could be an alien in any Muslim land ."
The conquest of Muslim lands by European powers was the first blow to this principle.
Various European powers imposed territorial restrictions on their territorial acquisition. It was in these

41
circumstances that during the last decades of the Nineteenth Century, in an atmosphere of protest and
bitterness the Pan- lslamist movement arose in the Muslim world. The most outstanding herarld of this
movement was Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. His Pan-lslamism was a doctrine of unity of Muslim Millat
(Community).
Dr. Mohd. Iqbal in India believed in the universality of Millat (Muslim Community). In this book
Rumuz-i-Bekhudi be says that the basis of such community is belief in unity of God and prophethood
of M uh ammad. The other nations link their destiny with territory. Why should the Muslims seek the origin
of Millat (community) in territory.... The foundation of our Millat is different. It is based on feelings
which reside in our he art. According to Mohd. Iqbal "Qaum (nation) means a party of men, and this party
can come into being in a thousand places and in a thousai1d forms upon the basis of tribes, race colour,
language, land and ethical code. Millat (community), on the contrary, will curve out of the different pa1ties
a new and common party. In other words mil/at embraces nations but cannot be merged in them.
The ideal of Millat (Muslim Community) as a universal fraternity of believers is still an
article of faith , but in practice the Muslim Nations are territorial entities, attached more to their self
contained cultural system than to the religious ideal.
VARNA
Every civilized nation of the world has its own distinct type of polity. The factors determining
the social and socio-political organization are, ho we ve r, not the same in all lands. We find one set of
principles, behind the division of the Babylonians into the Awilum ( no ble) , the Mushkenum (humbler
folk) and the slave; another accounts for the classification of Iranians into Athravas (priests), Rathaestha
(warriors) etc. A third set of ideas is at the bottom of the distinction in Athens between Eupatrids (noble),
the Geomori (husbandmen) and the Demiurgi (artisans). We may also refer to the division of the early
Romans into Particians and Plebs.
Varna and Jati
The classification of Indians who follow the Hindu discipline is said to rest on varna and
jati, colour and birth. Varna or colour, in the sense of a pigment of the skin or ethnic origin, was
undoubtedly a factor of primary importance in the early Vedic polity. Mention may be made in this
connection of the distinction between the fair complexioned (Svitanya) Aryans and the darkskinned
aboriginals called Dasa or Dasya.
It i s clear that we have here a division of the people into two groups on the basis of
ethnic and, at the same time, of cultural differences. As a result, however, of assimilation through inter -
marriage with peoples outside the Vedic pale, and other processes, a number of blue-blooded Aryans
must have in course of time lost their original complexion. The word varna soon came to be applied
to four, instead of two, social groups. This was the direction towards which ancient Indian society was
moving in the period represented by the later Vedic text. Treatises like the Satapatha Brahmana distinctly
refer to chatvaro varnuh or the four ' colours ' , i . e., social classes or grades. These varnas are usually
mentioned as : (a) Brahman, Brahman a, or Deva; (b) Rajan, Rajanya, or Kshatriya: (c) Vaisya or A rya; (d)
Sudra, roughly anwering, perhaps, to the Chandala Raja ny a, or Kshatr iya; (c) Vaisya or Arya; (d) Sudra,
roughly anwering. perhaps. to the Chanda la of the Chhandogya Upanisad (Vol. 10.7.) and the Dasa-
Dasyu of earlier texts .
Diversity of ‘colour’ did not moreover blind the eyes of the Vedic sages to a proper
appreciation of the underlying unity of the social organism, way of the whole universe. In the
domain of religion and philosophy, the many gods were being synthesized into one supreme reality (cf.
to what is One, the poets give many a name', That One alone breathed'. ' Brahman is all', sarvam khalvidam
Brahma).2 In a similar way the conception of an ultimate unity that absorbed the manifoldness of the
social structure, makes its appearance as early as the tenth mandala of the Rigveda. In the Purusasukta . all
the four social classes are represented as having their origin and being in the same Purusa . ' The
Brahmana was his mouth: the Rajonya was made his arms, the Vaisya constituted his th ig h; the Sudra
sprang from his feet.' The account, as already pointed out by several scholars, bears on its face the
stamp of allegory.

42
 The most significant fact in the Purusaukla is the absence of any reference to tegumental or ethnic
difference as the basis of the classification of society. Members of the four social grades are represented as
integral parts of the same organism. albeit with different functions. Thus, we have in the famous hymn. which is the
Magna Carta of the Hindu social polity, recognition of the organic unity of the society with implied functional
differences. It has been rightly pointed out by scholars in connection with a few other hymns that the word
Brahmana at times suggests something peculiar to the individual and denotes a person distinguished for genius or
virtues or elevated by special characteristics to receive the gift of inspiration.
But the relative precedence of the four grades was rather interminate in the early period. The
Atharvaveda (XIX 32.8) and the Vajasneyi Samhila of the Yajurveda , while speaking of the four classes, give s the
Sudra the third place in order of enume ration, and the Arya or Vaisya the fourth . The Mailrayani Samhila 3 places the
Vaisya before the Rajanya. The Satapatha Brahmana 4 distinctly speaks of the superiority of the Kshatriya over all
other classes: tastnat ksa/rat param nasti. That the chalurvarna system, as distinguished from the other two -fold
division into Arya and Dasa-Dasyus. did not entirely rest on birth seems to be proved by such Vedic stories as
that of the sage Kavasha who apparently ranked as a Brahmana . but was alleged to have been born of a Dasi
or Dasa woman5.
Varna Basis
In post-Vedic literature especially in the epics, two currents of thought--one basing social distinction on
birth. the other on vrilla ( conduct- are found running in parallel streams . The theory of the first group of writers
which holds the field in large measure even in our own times, and is represented in such epic passages as yena jalah su
evasah is too well known to need any elaboration. But even to this school, birth implied by the expressionsjati and
janman does not in all cases refer only to a physical fact, but has sometimes a cultural and spiritual significance, as
is clearly suggested by the use of the word dvija, which points to a second (non-material) birth, and the term santati,
spiritual offspring. It may further be noted that social status claimed on the basis of birth alone was not held in any
great esteem is the disparaging expressions Brahma bandhu. Rajanyu-bandhu and kshatra-bandhu very clearly
suggest.
The exponents of a higher thought never forgot the essential evenness and unity of society. They
based social status not on the accident of birth but on the spiritual quality and activities of man and boldly proclaimed
the truth that ' there is nothing nobler than man' (guhyam Brahma tadidam vo bravimi na manusachchhreslhataram hi
kinchit ).
The sense in which the epics uperstood the term varna, presents interesting features. The colours
of the Brahmana , Kshatriya. Vashya and Sudra is said to have been white, red , yellow, and black respectively.
But it is emphasized that there is no essential difference (visesa) amongst the varnas, as originally all men were
Brahmanas or emanations from Brahman. They were, however, grouped into grades according to complexion based
on character and conduct. The idea as said to be that the complexion of a man is conditioned by his spiritual nature
and deeds. Nilkantha states that; 'white,' is pure, enlightened. self restrained controlled by nature; ' red ' represen ts
rajoguna, wordly, by nature valour; 'yellow' is mix of rajas and tamas. and engaged in agriculture and other
lower works; and black represents tamas, ignorant, lacks tendencies for self-expression and driven by others like
a cart. It is to be noted that the above theory not only discards the question of birth as the basis of the division
into varnas, but, actually points to the identity of origin of all the four varnas. In the Srimadbhagavadgita -
parvadhyaya of the Mahabharala. Vasudeva Krishna clearly says in very clear terms that the classification of
the people into four vamas is based on gunakarma. i . e . , spiritual quality and conduct.
There is evidence which definitely proves that, according to a very important school of thought. the
chaturavarna system was not based on birth, performance of rites and ceremonies , sacred knowledge or spiritual
succession, but exclusively on vritta or conduct. A Brahmana might be degraded to the status of a Sudra and a
Slidra might be elevated to that of a Brahmana by following particular modes of social behaviour. The words
attributed to Vasudeva (Vishnu), Siva and Brahma , the three manifestations of the supreme Spirit according to Hindu
belief, cannot be regarded as less binding than the opinion and obiter dicta of law-givers and jurists of less exalted
rank.

43
Such passages regarding conduct as the basis of the varna division are found in different parts of the
Mahabharata.
While commenting on Mahabharata 189.8., Nilakantha says that dharma, not race, is the cause of
the Varna division. The views attributed to the Trinity in the Gita and the 'Santiparavan 'receive a striking
confirmation from the 'Vanaparvan. 'According to this book, the gods accept as Brahmans only those persons
who possess the requisite spiritual quality.
Change of Varna
The possibility of change of varna is also recognized by the supplement to the Mahabharata known as
the Harivamsa: Even the Manusamhita which, in several passages, mentions a more or less rigid system
of caste based on birth, could not altogether ignore the importance of vritta or guna -karma. It is clearly
stated in this, work that a Brahman becomes a Sudra by following a particular course of action. It is
added that the son of a Brahman is not a Brahman simply by virtue of his birth. If he is negligent of
his duties, he is no more than a vratya, one fallen in social status. The - Manusamhita further describes
how various tribes and clans (jatayah) belonging to the Kshatriya varna were gradually degraded to the status
of Yris alas, deviators from approved social conduct, as a result of their neglect of prescribed duties.
The liberal thought of the Mahabharata finds support in certain passages of the sister epic.
There was no bar to the attainment of the status of a maharsi for a man even of mixed VaisyaSudra
extraction. To this category belonged the blind sage who figures in one of the most tragic episodes of the
Ramayana. He is represented as versed in the sastras though born of a Sudra mother and Vaisya father.
Guha, who was a nisada, is described as a Rajan and is treated as a confrere by prince Rama sprung
from one of the proudest of the, Kshatriya lines. Sabari doubtless belonging to a tribe branded as Dasyu
in the Aitareya Brahmana, is not only called siddha, topodhaha and tapsi, but is all owed to touch the feet of
Rama and offer him achamaniya and food. The above section of the Ramayana breathe an atmosphere
that offers a striking contrast to that of the story of Sambuka as given in the supplementary book,
doubtless of a later age, styled the Uttarakanda. Here we find a Sudra forfeiting his life for the offence
of performing penances. It is further stated that in the Treta age only Brahmanas and Kshatriyas could
become tapasavins, not Vl\isyas and Sudras.
Varma-sankara in reality suggests social anarchy, as matsyanyaya connotes political chaos. The concept
should not be confounded with that underlying inter-caste or intertribal marriage sanctioned by law or usage.
Gautamiputra Satakarni, emperor of the Deccan, who claims to have been a Brahmana and a ruler who put an
end to varna-sankara. is known to have had matrimonial relationship with Sakas of Western India.
Importance of the Varna System
The ' Purusha Sukta' of the Rigveda is significant. According to it, the Brahman formed the
mouth of the ' Purusha ' , Kshatriya the arms, the Yaishya the thighs and the shudras were born from the feet.
It may be interpreted the following way. The Purusha is the ' Yirat Purusha' of the body social-politic. The, Sukta
portraits the creation of the whole universe from the mouth of the purusha from which the Brahmans are
created is the seat of speech; the Brahmanas are, therefore, created to be teachers and instructors of mankind
wherever there is application of intellect and reason, it is the field of Brahmanas. Arms are the symbol of valour
and strength and Kshatriya's mission on to protect people, establish order and dharma . Thig hs carry the
main weight of the body, and the Yaishya also provide the main support to the society-the artha, the
economy. They carry on agriculture, trade and commerce. Artha is the main stay of life , the Brahmana and
the Kshatriya do not carry on the economic activities, it, is only the Yaishya and his activities. The
creation of Shudra from the foot symbolizes the service, at the instance of the other.
The whole social organization, it may be said is concerned symbolically as one human being
the Body Soc ial- with its links representing the social classes based on the principle of division of
labour.

44
 Duties of the Varna
Duties are classified as (a) -common to all varnas, and (b) duties of the varnas specific. Among the,
common duties to all are the following: control of anger, speaking the truth, justice, f0rgiveness, begetting
children of one ' s own married wife, pure cond uct , avoiding quarrel, uprightness, and maintenance of ones
dependents. In the second category, the Brahaman ' s duties consist of: teaching, self-control, practice of
tapas. The Kshatriya 's duties are, study, protecting people, performing sacrifices and making gifts. Study
making gifts. celebration of sacrifices and acquiring wealth by fair means are the specific duties of a
Vaishya; and those of a Shudra are the services to the three vnrnas . Manu summarizes t he varna duties
thus among the several duties the most commendable are teaching the Veda for the Brahman protecting
the people for the Kshatriya and trading for a Vaishya.
Besides, there is concept of duties in adversity or distress ('apad dharma). In such case, the varnas can
follow the occupations of the one immediate one step lower, not beyond nor othe rw ise . In all such relaxations of
the dharma the relation of observable duti s to the conditions existing in the particular time and place is viewed as
of fundamental importance. Bhishma in the Mahabharata says emphatically (Shantiparva, 78, 32). " Dharma may
become adhanna, and adharma may become dharma according to time and place (desa-kala), such is the
significance and power of time and place." In this context. it is interesting that Manu lays down that one should
under no circumstances adopt mode of life prescribed for the varna or varnas higher than his own.
Characteristic Traits of the Varnas
The Bhagwat mentions the characteristic traits of the persons of the different varnas:
Brahmana: Peaceful nature. self restraint, austerity, purity, contentment, forgiveness, uprightness, knowledge.
kindness , abstention from media or injury to others, firm devotion to god and truthfuhess.
Kshatriya : Bravery, valour. courzige, heroic, lustre, captures wea lth, charity, self-control. forgiveness,
friendliness towards Brahman, Graciousness and inclination to give protection.
Vaishya : Devotion to God , to guru and to the firm, sustenance to the three classes, tends cattle, engages in
agriculture and other means of acquiring riches, believes in god, industry and dexterity.
Shudra: Humility, purity, unaffected service to others, sacrificing without mantra absence at tendency to steal,
truthfulness and preservation of the cattle and the Brahmanas , accepts food indiscriminately and is prepared
to do any work.
This characterization of the varnas also keeps in mind the 'purpose' or object of ones actions , Positive
approach to life. service to humanity, its welfare and promotion are respectable and praise worthy. The guna
and karma when inspired by them make Brahman, Kshatriya etc. But the guna and karma are directed by
destructive approach, annihilation of life, personal greed, arrogance etc. the Brahman etc. degenerate and do not
command reverence . This thought is present throughout the social thought. Ravana, the son of a Brahman rishi
does not get respect for his birth, power or learning. Devaguru and daityaguru both come under ilic Brahman
class but do not have the same respectability. Another example will further illustrate this Capturing wealth is
one of the duties of a Kshatriya, but a thief, a robber or a dacoit is not ragarded brave , a hero but is called
·dasyu ' or ' saha sik'. Even now a days such distinction is ma i ntai ned . Whereas a ' spy ' gets reward for
his espionage work. the thief gets punishment.
The ' karma ' of the varnas has another elements of gun a: the division of varnas is based of ' guna' and
' karma'. These gunas are three : Sattva (goodness), Rajas (Passion) and Tamas (dullness. d arkness or ignorance).
Of these, sattva is characterized by purity, enlightenment, and healthy nature: it binds one to peacefulness and
knowledge. Rajas in essence is passion, source of yearnings and clingings, and it fetters the embodied one by
attachment to activity. Tamas is born of ignorance, it is the source of delusion of all embodied beings binding
them qualities of carelessness, sloth and sleep. Thps. the three gunas bid for a life of peace . restless activity
and veilling right perception leading to carelessness or negligences respectively. Again. from Sattva arises
knowledge. from rajas arises greed and from tamas springs only carelessness. delusion and ignorance.

45
The Doctrine of Varnasrama and Polity
In the matsya-nyaya condition there is the praja or the people, but no state, because there is no danda to
enforce dharma. If the praja is not to remain infinitum an amorphous mass of selbststanding atoms, it must
follow svadharma, i . e., the members of the society must perform their respective 'duties' whic h, as we have
seen, really ' laws ' turned inside out. The observance of these duties would necessarily imply the organization of
the people into a unified state , a samuha or a polis.
Now , organizationally speaking, prakriti or the members of a society naturally fall into economic and
professional groups or, classes, the groupments professionals, the so-called castes of Ind ia. These groups of the
people or classes of members of the state are known as varnas, classes (literally, colours) probably designated after
some typical (or hypothetical?) ethnic complexion. Further, from the standpoint of the individual. we have to notice
that people pass "through well-marked metabolistic or rather physiological stages, e.g., infancy, adolescence, etc.
Similarly, the stages of life in every person are called the ashr amas. The total population with all the interests and
problems of all its different groups and periods of life is then comprehended by the two categories, varnas
(classes) and asramas (stages). If, !herefore, the people are to constitute a state, every member of each of the
varnas (no matter what their number and their occupations) must have to observe the Ordnung, system or discipline,
i.e. , perform the duties (svadharma) of his ·station ' at each of the four asramas or periods of life. Thus, the
soldier at the front must ' do or die ' , the young man while at schocl must practise continence, the king must
keep to the coronation oath, and so forth . This is the doctrine of varnasrama, the counterpart of the Platonic
correlation of ' Virtue' and status.
As soon as the people are organized into a state, .be it in any part of the world or in any epoch of
history, varnasrama spontaneously emerges into being. It is inconceivable, in this theory , that there should be a
state and yet no varnasrama. To say that the state has been born, and yet the various orders or classes of the
people do not follow dharma would indeed oe a contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity. Svadhanna (Rechi)
leads inevitably to varnasrama (ordnung). The two are relative terms. In Koellreletter 's terminology der
Rechtsstaat is at the same time der Ordnungsstaa.t They indicate coexistent phenomena the social world. In other
words, the doctrine of varnasrama is a corollary to that of dharma as duty: varnasrama is but svadharma writ
large.
The non-existence of varnasrama is possible only under conditions of the non-performance of duty.
Suppose the, varnas do not follow dharma, e.g:, the soldier files from the enemy in a cowardly manner,
the husband does not maintain the wife, the judge encourages the fabrication of false evidence , the king violates
the samaya or compact with his subjects, and so forth, then according to Sukra, the offenders are to be
rectified by the danda of the state. This is the supreme moment for the exercise of aisvarya (sovereignty and
Staatsra son (interests of reason of the state). Why, even the king is not immune from penalty. Rather, as
Manu declares the settled rule, where ' a common man would be the king shall be fined one thousa nd ' .
Really, a state is not state unless it can enforce as duty the dharma that it has enacted as law. This should
be postulated in the irreducible minimum of the states functions. One can, therefore, easily understand
with Kamandaka why, if dharma is violated by the members of the state, there is bound to be a ' pralaya' or
dissolution of the world. Verify. with the extinction of varnasrama there is a reversion to matsy anyaya '. The
violation of svadharma and of varnasrama brings back the ·state of nature' and the state aut omatically ceases
to exist.
Varnasrama , though obviously in ethnic-economic and a socio-pedagogic term, is thus fundamentally a
political concept. It is an indispensable category in an organic theory of the state. It is identical with rast ra from
the demographic (praja or population) aspect. The doctrine of varnasrama is, therefore, the doctrine of rastra minus
the doctrine of ownership' and further, the doctrine of dharma (as law, and duty) applied to the total Prakriti (or
members of state) coincides with the doctrine of classes and stages . The doctrine of varna srama. then, is clearly
an integral part in a consistent philosophy of politics.
Conclusion
The varnashanna system is the basis of social organization: the state being a part of the society also accepts it
as its basis. The varnas are based on the guna of man and are assigned functions or duties accordingly.

46
The functions which require a bias free judicious approach cannot be performed by a person having passions.
greed or igno rance . The Varna system prescribes qualifications not only in terms of education and information,
money , or physical power, but also in terms, of aptitude. and temperament and nature, training and discipline. In
modern times, we do recognize in terms of principles (e.g. rule against bias) but these principles have not been
institutionalized in the society. The varnas can be compared with ' models' or social groups with qualifications
and functions. Another implication of the varna is the division of labour and work in the society; if all, engage in
one type of work for money or power or other consideration. chaos will be the result. Some areas will be
neglected, whereas in some others there will be over-crowding, and the social interest will suffer.
The ashrama system also divides the individual ' s life into four different sets of act invities. In the first, he
learns, acquires knowledge and discipline, and gets training for the future life. The society gives him the
accumulated sociocultural wealth to be carried forward. In the second, he enters life- engages himself in
occupation and trade , has progeny to continue the lineage, earns wealth to support the other three ashramas
and also those who are engaged in the service oriented professions like teaching, medicine, etc. The man lives in
family. But in the third again he renounces the family, lives outside the village commun ities and begins the
life of a researcher. thinker, trains the younger generation and impa1ts advance knowledge. In the final
station he fu1ther enlarges his self and identifies with the social self- the 'Purusha' of the Purusha Sukta;
and also attempts at the spiritual realization of the atman. The ashr ama system in political context applies
the principle of retirement. This has helped smooth transfer of power: the old king renounces voluntarily in
favour of the heir. This further avoids wars of succession. The varnashrama system keeps the social relevance,
and it is not in terms of status and privile ges. Status and privileges follow the social service, nature of
duties and the needs there of.
FOOTNOTES
I. Hemchandra Ray Chaudhary, Studies in Indian Antiquities. (University of Calcutta, 1958) pp. I 68-
1 8 0.
2. I X. 11 2.3 .
3. IV 4.9; cf. Ved. I nd ., II 252 n. 49.
4. XIV 4.2.23.
5. Cf. the case of the dark-complexioned sage (Krishna) Dvaipayana Vyasa born of a fishermaid
according to the Mahabhara /a.
SUGGESTED READINGS
I . Hemchandra Ray Chaudhary, Studies in Indian Antiquities , (University of Calcutta, 1958) pp. 168-
18 0. It d iscus ses the distinction between varna and jati, its origin, etc.
2. Benoy Kumar Sircar, "Some Basic Ideas of Political Thinking in Ancient India" in Dr. C.P. Ramaswamy
Aiyer, The Cultural Heritag e of India. Vol. II (Calcutta 3962) pp. 519-521. It discusses how the
varnashram is relevant in the political system.
3. Pandharinath H. Prabhu , Hindu Social Organization, (1979) pp. 73-1 00, and 284-335. It discusses
the social aspect of the ' va rna ' and 'ashrama' system.
SANGHA IN LITERATURE
The case for the republican governments in ancient India rests mainly on two terms ' gana' and ' sangh ' and
their interpretation. In Vedic Iiterature there are references to gana, vrata, sardha, vish, sreni or puga.
Similarly, the early grammar ian, Panini, of circa 500 B.C. has also explained these terms as association or
aggregate of many. Thus, vrata retains its vedic significance of a fighting clan, whereas a puga refers to a
group of people engaged in economic and commercial activities. Gana and Sangh refer to unions and associations
of various descriptions. However, Panini equates sangh with gana : These terms, in brief refer to multitude,
heap, collective action, group, corporation and union. An example of this corporate union is " ayudhajivi
sangh".
The Arth asaslru a lso refers to the Sangh or gana, and also to ayudhajivi, astropajivi and also some other
classes of sanghs. Kautilya, however, makes a distinction in the two types of sastropajivi sanghs.

47
 One is sastropajivi and the other Raja sabdopajivin sanghs. Jayaswal suggests in the latter case, head of the
sangh bore the title of 'Raja'. A third class of the sangh was var ttasastropajivi ; these included Kambhoj ,
Surastra, Kshatriya, Shreni. The interprettion of these three types is only a guess-work. Jayaswal strongly feels that
in the first type the head of the sangh was not called the 'raja', whereas in the second he bore the title ; in the
third case these sanghs were not merely military nations, but were also having developed agriculture, trade and
economy side by side, and hence strong and powerful.
The Mahabharata also discusses the ' kulas' and ' ganas ' of the kings , their strength and weaknesses.
policies, corporate mind etc. (Santiparva, Chapter 107 also 81). The Narada Smriti explains gana as "assemly of
cohabitants".
In Avadan Satak there is distinction between the gana-rule and the king-rule. When asked by the king in a
south Indian state , the traders from central India replied " some states are under the gana-rule (ganadhinah) while
some others are under a king (rajad hin ah)".
The Abhidhana Rajendra attempts to define a gana as "a group with the main characteristic of possessing
a mind". Thus , a gana has a corporate personality. In this context it is sometimes rightly used (e.g. for Malla,
pura), but it is abused also (e.g. for vasu gana). It is a significant contribution.
Sangh Societies in History
Panini has pointed out a number of societies (or states) as ' ayudhajivi sanghas'. They are: 1. The
Vrika , 2. The Damani , 3. The Trigarta-sastha (league of Six Trigartas: the Kaundop aratha, the Dandaki, the
Kaushtaki, the Jalaman i, the Brahmagupta , and the Janaki or jalaki) , 4. The Yaudheya and others , and 5. The
Parsva and ot hers . A majority of the ayudhajivi sanghas were situated in vahika which is identified with Punjab
and the Sindh valley. The Trigarta is located in the foothies of the Himalaya near Jammu or Kangra and
Punjab. ·
Besides the ayudhajivi sangha, Panini mentions some other sanghas also . They are: (1) the Madra,
(2) Vriji, (3) the Rajanya, (4) Andhaka ,and Vrishni, (5) the maharaja, and (6) the Bharga.
The Buddhist literature , the Mahaparinibbana Sutlanta (Vl.21-27) also records a number of republican comm
unities or nations , such as: (a) the Sakya with capital at Kapilavastu , (b) the Koliyas of Ramagram, (c) the Licc
havis with capital at Vaishali , (d) the Videhas with capital at Mithila, (e) the Mallas with capital at
Kusinagar (Kusinara) and Pava, (t) the Moriyas of Pippalivana, (g) the Buiis of Alla kapa, and the Bhaggas
(Bhargas) . The Vrijji, i.e ., Licchavis and the Mallas were most important or dominant po litically. The
Vrijji are noted by Panini and also by Kautilya. The Kautilya's Arthasastra records the following republic es whose
rulers had the title of 'Raja' - (I) The Lichhavikas, (2) The Yrijikas, (3) the Mall akas, (4) the Madrakas ,
(5) the Kukaras, (6) the Kurns , and (7) the Panchalas. Again, the rulers of the Kambhojas, the Surastras, the
Kshatriyas and the srenis did not have the title of Raja , and Kautilya calls them as ' Vartta-Sast ropajivin'.
The Greek writers, too, have described several such states. The Kathaians (east of Ravi) were very powe rful.
The Ksudrak, Malavas, lbi, Ambashthas , Kshatriyas, Ossadioi, Musicani, Brachmanoi and Patal were notable
repubics among the numerious others.

48
 CHAPTER VI

PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN SOCIETY

In this Lesson we will be bringing about the perspectives on Indian Society. There are two types of literary
sources in ancient India from which we obtain ideas about political problems and matters. The vedas. the upanishads and
the philosophical systems provide incidentally some significant political concepts but their fu ndamental orientation is
towards theology, religion and philosophy. The Arthshastra, the Dhannashastra literature deals more intensively and
systematically with political problems and theories of administration. In the Shantipara and Mahabharta we find pol itical
realism and speculative idealism of an advanced level. We will try to know about the most important perspectives
namely : Brahmanical, Buddhist, Bhakti-sufi, Indo-Islamic, Dal it Bahujan and Feminist. You may be enlightened about
them and comprehend about these.
BRAHMANICAL PERSPECTIVE

The earliest civilized inhabitants of Indian worshipped a Mother Goddess and a horned fertility god; they had
sacred trees and animals. and ritual ablutions apparently played an impo11ant part in their religio us life. Beyond this
much has been said and written about the religion of the Harappan people, but in the absence of intelligible texts any
efforts at further defining it are very speculative. The salient features of Harappan religion appeared agai n in a new
form at a much later date, and we must assume that it ne r died, but was quietly practiced by the humbler people,
gradually developing from contact with other doctrines and cults, until it gathered enough strength to reappear , and
largely to overlay the old faith of the Aryan rulers of India.

We do have knowledge of the religion of the early Aryans from the 1028 hymns of the Rig Veda, which is the
oldest religious text in the world still looked on as sacred, and which was probably composed between 1500 and 900
B.C. The Rig Veda is a collection of hymns for use at the sacrifices of the aristocratic Aryan cult. The three later
Vedas, the Sama. Yajur and Atharva, are of somewhat different character. The Sama Veda is almost useless to the
historian, being a collection of certain verses of the Rig Veda arranged for liturgical purposes. The Yajur Veda.
compiled a century or two later than the Rig Veda, contains sacrificial formulae in prose and verse t o be pronounced
by the adhvaryu, or priest who performed the manual part of the sacrifice. It exists in various recensions
(Samhita), which are of two types. the "Black" giving the formulae with rubricated instructions, and the "White"
adding detailed instructions in a lengthy appendix called a Brahmana. The Atharva Veda consists mainly of magical
spells and incantations in verse. and was certainly compiled after the Rig and Yajur. It possesses. however. an
atmosphere of simple animism and sympathetic magic, and seems to reflect a lower cultural level than that of the
Rig Vecta, deriving from the plebeian religion of the Aryans and containing many non-Aryan ele me nts . The
massive Bra hm anas , which are looked on as appendices to the Vedas, and the mystical Aranyakas and Upanisads.
which are in turn appendices to the Brahmanas. complete the literature generally known as Ved ic . The material in the
Brahmanas looks back in the main to the period between c.800 and 600 B.C., and t he earliest Upanisads overlap with
the latest Brahmanas, though some Upanisads are certainly of much more recent date. The religion of the people who
composed this literature was not that of later India. and many scholars refer to it is Brahmanis m or Vedism, to
distinguish it from Hinduism, to which it bears a relation similar to that between the sacrificial Judaism of the temple
and the later Judaism of the synagogue.

Much of the Rig Veda is imperfectly un de rstood ; the oldest exegetical work on it, the Nirukta (Etymology) of
Yaska, perhaps dating from 500 B.C., shows that at a very early period the brahmans had forgotten the tru e meaning of
many obsolete words. But the broad outlines of the religion of the Rig Veda are clear en ough. The chief objects of
worship were the devas, a word cognate with the Latin deus. The root from which this word is derived. div, is
connected with brightness and radiance, and the devas by connotation were “the shining ones” . The early gods of the
Aryans, like those of the Greeks, were chiefly connected with the sky and were predominantly male. A few

49
goddesses occur in the Rig Veda ; for instance Prthvi, a vague and rarely mentioned personification of the earth,
Aditi, a mysterious and tenuous figure, the great mother of the gods, Usas, the goddess of the dawn, to whom a
number of lovely hymns were addressed, Ratri, the spirit of the night, who has a beautiful hymn to hersel f and
Aranyani, the Lady of the Forest, a nature goddess of little importance who is praised in one very late hymn; none
of these, however, played a significant part in the cult.

At a remote period the ancestors of the Aryans, Jranjans , Greeks , Roman s, Germans , Slavs and Celts had similar,
if not identical, religion had developed far from the old Jndo-European faith. The great father god of the Jndo-
European peoples, who appears in Greek as Zeus and in Latin as Ju-piter. was known to the Aryans as Dyaus, the
personified heavens, but his star had already set. Father Heaven was often mentioned as the parent of other divin ities,
but few hymns were composed in his honour, and he was eclipsed by his children.

From the point of view of the Aryan warrior the greatest god was Indra, who fulfilled the dual function of war -
god and weather-god. Though his name was different he had many of the characteristics of the Greek Zeus and the
Germanic Thor. As Indra tonans he rode at the head of the Aryan host and destroyed the fortresses of the Dasad; as
Indra pluvius he slew the evil dragon Vrtra who held back the waters, and thus he brought rain to the parched land.
Indra was associated with storm and thunder , and , like Zeus and Thor. his hand bore the thunderbold (vajra), with
which he destroyed his enem ies. He was a rowdy amoral deity, fond of feasting and drinking. One hymn, according
to the usual interpretation, shows us the drunken Indra bragging in his cups, though it may well represent the feelings
of a worshipper who has drunk liberally of the sacred drink soma:

With Indra in his course across the sky rode the bright host of Maruts, singing martial songs as they aided the war -
god in his battles. They were the lesser spirits of the storm, conceived on the analogy of the host of Aryan warriors
charging into battle beside their leader. The Aryans evidently had many legends in which Indra was the protagonist,
but none of them can be reconstructed in detail from the cryptic allusions of the hymns. Two of Indra's traits connect
him with lndo-European mythology, for they were applied to various gods and heroes throughout ancient Europe -he
was a drago n- slayer, and a wild rider of the storm . The former feature of his character may have been a very early
borrowing from Mesopotam ia.

Several gods were associated with the sun. Surya (the common word for sun) drove across the sky in a flaming
chariot, like the GreekHe li os, Savitr, the Stimulator, was another solar god, a beautiful verse in whose honour is the
most holy of all the verses of the Veda, Pusan too was in some measure a solar god, driving daily across the sky. but his
main function was that of guardian of roads, herdsmen and straying cattle. Visnu, a god connected in part with the
sacrifice, also had solar characteristics, covering the eaith in three paces. a trait which he retained in later
Hinduism, when his importance greatly increased. On the fringes of the solar pantheon was Surya, the sun-god's
daughter, who seems never to have been worshipped, but merely served to connect her two husbands, the Asvinc;
("Horsemen" also called Nasatyas), with the sun; these are described as driving across the sky in their three-wheeled
chariot, but in the hymns they are not closely associated with natural phen omena. They are twins -a fact which
connects them with the Greek Dioscuri and twin gods of pre-Christian Baltic mythology. The Asvins appear
chiefly as helpers of men; among their many good deeds they are said to have rescued shipwrecked mar i ners, provided
artificial legs for the maimed , and found husbands for old maids.

The fire-god, Agni (which means simply ·'fire", and is related to the Latin ignis), was the object of much primitive
mysticism and specu lat ion. He was the god of the priest, who dealt with him at the fire- sacrifice; he was the
intermediary between gods and men, for he consumed the sacrifice and carried it to the gods. He dwelt in t he
waters of heaven in the form of lightning, and on earth in many forms. He was hidden in the fire-sticks, with which
the sacrificial fire was kindled and which were personified as his parents. Agni, in fact was here, there and
everywhere. Was there only one Agni, or were there many Agnis? How could Agni be one and many at the same
time? Questions like these are asked in the Rig Veda. and show the ear li est signs of the tendency towards monism.
which was to bear fruit in the Upanisads.

· 50
 Soma was a divinity of special character. Soma was originally a plant, not certainly identified, from which a
potent drink was produced. which was drunk only at sacrifices, and which caused the most invigorating effects. as
we have seen from the hymn quoted above. The Zoroastrians of Persia had a sim ilar drink. which they called
haoma . the same word as soma in its Iranian form; the plant identified with haoma by the modern Parsis is a
bitter herb, which has no specially inebriating qualities, and which is therefore not thesoma of the Veda. The drink
prepared from the plant can scarcely been alcoholic. for it was made with great ceremony in the cours e of the
sacrifice, when the herb was pres se d between stones. m ixed with milk. strained and drunk on the same day. Sugar
and honey, which produce fermentation, were not usually mixed with it, and the brief period between its brewing
and consumption cannot have been long enough for the generation of alcohol in appreciable quality. The
effects of soma, with vivid hallucinations and the se nse of expanding to enormous dimensions , are rather like those
attributed to such drugs as hashish. Soma may well have been hemp, which grows wild in many parts of India, Central
Asia and South Russia. and from which mode rn Ind ia ns produce a narcotic drink called bhang.

Like many ancient peoples the Indians connected the growth of plants with the moon , with which Somla.
the king of plants. was later identified. So important was the god Soma considered by the ancient editors of the Rig
Veda that they extracted all the hymns in his honour and placed them in a separate book' ' (mandala). the ninth
of the ten which constitute the whole. He was the special god of the brahmans. who referred to him as their “king”
or patron deity. He is sometimes even called the king of the gods. but by the ordinary Aryan it is doubtful if he
was so highly esteemed.

Vanma second only to Indra in importance. was a god of a type rather different from the others. He i s
known as an Asura, a term, also applied to certain lesser gods, which in later Hinduism came to mean a class of
demons. but which was in Persia adopted by the reformer Zarathustra in its local form as part of the ti tle of the
great god of light , Ahura Mazda. Just as the shadowy Dyaus represents the high god of the lndo-European
peoples before their separation, so Varuna may have been the high god of the Indo- lranians before the two peoples
divided, one to settle in N.-W. India and the other in the Persian high lands. The name is connected by some
authorities with the shadowy Greek heaven-god Uranus. At the time of the composition of the Veda. Varuna 's
prestige was waning before that of Indra. but he retained some impo rta nce for many centuries.

Varuna was first and fore most a king-not a boisterous tribal warlord like Indra. but a mighty emperor sitting in
great palace in the heavens often associated with gods around him. Mo st important of these was Mitra a god
with some solar characteristics, but mainly connected with vows and compacts. Mitra was represented in the
Zoroastr ian pantheon, and under his Greeo-lranian name Mithras, was widely worshipped in the Roman Empire
in early Christian times. Around Varuna sat his scouts or spies (spas). who flew all over the world and brought back
reports on the conduct of mortals.

Varun a was the guardian of Rta. the cosmic order, a concept which was perhaps the highest flight of Rig
Vedic thought. The world takes its regular course, day follows night and season succeeds season, because of Rta:
man must live according to Rta: in later days " nonrt a" (anrta) became one of the commonest words for untruth
and sin. Rta depended on Varuna. who was sometimes looked on as its maker. and was thus a sort of
creator-god.

Of all the Aryan gods Varuna was ethically the highest. He was always a ware of the deeds of men, and
was omnipresent in the the istic as opposed to the pantheistic sense. Two men. even in the most secret of places
or at the ends of the earth. cannot make plans alone-a third person, Varuna, is always there. The worshipper
approac hed Varuna in a spirit different from that in which he prayed to the other gods, most of whom were lively.
cheerful fellows. whom men need not fear if they offered regular sacrifices. Varuna was so p ure and holy that
the mere performance of sacrifice woud not ensure his favour for he a bhorredsin or that" which was not confo
rmable to Rta.

51
 So humble was the worshipper in Varuna's presence. so conscious of weakness, guilt and shortcoming , that on
reading the hymns to Varuna one is inevitably reminded of the penitential psalms of the Old Testament. It
has been suggested that Varuna owes much of his character to Semitic influence - certainly not to the Jews for the
penitential psalms were composed after the hymns to Varuna. and as far as we know the early Hebrews never
came in contact with the Aryans. but perhaps to the Baby lonians. who often approached their gods in a
similar penitential spirit.

Yama, lord of the dead. was a sort of Adam, the first man to die. who became guardian of the World of the
Fathers. where the blessed dead. tho se who have performed the rites of the Aryans. feast joyfully forever.

Rudra (perhaps meaning "the Howler”). like Varuna, had a dangerous side to his character, but unlike Varuna.
was quite amoral. He resembled the Greek Apollo in that he was an archer-god, whose arrows brought disease, Like
Indra he was associated with the storm. but he lacked Indra's popular and genial character. He was a remote god.
dwelling in the mountains. and was generally an object of fear. invok ed to ward off his arrows of plague and
disaster. He had, however, a beneficent aspect. for he was guardian of healing herbs. and as such might give
health to tho se whom he capriciously favoured.

There were many other gods. such as Tvastr. the Vedic Vulcan, Aryaman, guardian of compacts and
marriage, and Vayu, the wind-god. who. though important, cannot be described here. There were also demigods
of various kinds. among then Vis vedevas, a vague group of indeterminate deities, the Maruts. or storm-spirits.
already mentioned, Rbhus, gnomes who worked in metal, Gandharvas. divine musicians, originally a single divinity but
later looked on as many, and the lovely Apsarases. comparable to the nymph s of Greece. who might become
the mistresses of gods and men.

No Homer or He s io d attempted to construct a definitive genealogy of all these gods: their relationships are
usually vague. and there is no tidy scheme of precedence among them. Each god must have had his own special
devotees and priests. and the Rig Veda is the result of an imperfect syncretism of many tribal beliefs and cults. Already
in the latest stratum of the Vedic hymns gods are equated or paired together, and there ar e doubts as to which god is
really the greatest. In one hymn this important question is asked as a refrain to every verse-"Whom, then, shall we
honour with our oblations?": later theologians were so puzzled by this that they decided that there was a go d called
Ka ( who?) , to whom the hymn was addressed.

The centre of the Aryan cult was sacrifice. The cult of the domestic hearth existed in, many ancient Indo-
European communities, and small domestic sacrifices, performed by the head of the house, must have
been as important in the days of the Rig Veda as they were in later Hinduism, but the earliest texts describing
them are the Grhya Sutras of a much more recent period. The Rig Veda is rath er concerned with great
sacrifices, paid for by chiefs and wealthier tribesmen. They were already complex rites involving much
preparation, the slaughter of numerous an ima ls , and the participation of several well- trained priests.

The main purpose of the sacrifice was the gratification of the gods in order to obtain boons from the m. The
gods descended to the sacred straw (Barhis) on the sacrificial field, drank and are with the worshippers. and dul y
rewarded them with success in war, progeny, increase of cattle and long life, on a quid pro quo basis. The solemn
Varuna and the grim and unpredictable Rudra are exceptional in the Vedic pantheon. Most of the gods were good
natured. Guilt-offerings and thank-offerings. of the kind offered by the ancient Hebrews. are almost unheard of in
the Veda.

Nevertheless the ceremony must have had its element of awe and wonder . The worshippers, inebriated with
soma , saw wondrous visions of the gods' they experienced strange sensations of power: they could reach up and
touch the heavens: they became immortal: they were god themselves. The pr ies ts, who alone knew the rituals and
formulae whereby the gods were brought to the sacrifice, were masters of a great mystery.

52
With these ideas, which are explicitly stated in the hymns , went others less obvious. Often in the Rig Veda we
read of a mysterious ontity called Brahman; in many contexts Brahman is the magical power in the sacred
utterance (mantra), but sometimes it has a wider connotation, and implies a sort of supernatural electricity, known to
students of primitive religion as mana. The possessor of Bra hm an, by a c ommon process of secondary word
formation in Sanskrit, became known as brahmana, the tribal priest and magician. In later Vedic times the
connection of Brahman with speech became more and more pronounced. and the brah111an ' s magic was
thought to lie in the words he uttered. The words and syllables of the Veda were analysed. and. though the texts were
still unwritten. the letters of the alphabet were recognized and personified as eternal divinities. The metres used in t he
Veda were also thought of as gods. Later certain syllables were believed to be particularly holy, notably OM (the
pranava). which contains the essence of the Vedas and is pregnant with the utmost power and mystery.

A second conception which is hinted at in many hymns of the Rig Veda. and becomes prominent in the latest
stratum. is also widely known in primitive religions-the mystical identification of god, v:ct im and sacrificer. From
these ideas the sacrifice obtained an even greater importance in the scheme of things than it had at the time of the
composition of the earlier parts of the Rig Veda. By the end of the period it was widely believed that the universe
itself arose from a primeval sacrifice.

Though Varuna sometimes may have been looked on as a sort of creator, and there are suggestions of Indra's
having fulfilled the same function, there is no !early defined creator-god in the main body of the Rig Veda. By the
encl of the Rig Vedic period. however, such a god had developed; whether wholly from the speculations on the
brahmans or from non-Aryan influences. This god was Prajapati, "the Lord of Beings". often identified with Brahma.
the masculine form of the neuter Brahman. Prajapati was thought of as a primeval man (purusa), who existed before the
foundation of the universe. The man was sacrificed, presumably to himself, by the gods. who apparently were his
children. From the body of the divine victim the universe was produced. The "hymn of the Primeval Man". in which
this first cosmic sacrifice is described. bristles with obscurities. but its purport is quite clear.

By this time a new attitude to the sacrifice had developed, and the rite had become a supernal mystery. By
means of it the priests mystically repeated the primeval sacrifice, and the world was born ane w. Without regular
sacrifices all cosmic processes would cease, and chaos would come again. Thus the order of nature was on
ultimate analysis not dependent on the gods, at all, but on the brahmans, who by the magic of the sacrifice
maintained and compelled hem. The Brahman was more powerful than any earthly king or any god; by his accurate
performance of sacrifice he maintained all things. and was therefore the supreme social servant; by the slightest
variation of ritual he could turn the sacrifice against his patrons and destroy them, and was therefore the mos t
dangerous of enemies.

This is the basic doctri,ne of the Brahmanas, and it prevailed in many Aryan communilies in North lndia
from about 800 B.C. onwards, and left its mark on Hinduism in the exaltation of the Brahman. In this period many
of the old gods of the Rig Veda lost their greatness, and became comparatively unimportant, while others rose in
popularity, notably Visnu and Rudra; the latter was already sometimes called by the epithet Siva, "the Propitious",
originally a deprecatory euphemism.

As Aryan culture pressed further down the Ganga, it absorbed new ideas about the after-life. In the Rig
Veda the fate of the dead seems to have been finally decided when they died-they went either to the ··World of
the Fathers" or to the "House of Clay", where they remained indefinitely. But, in one l ate hymn it is suggested in
cryptic language that they might pass to the waters or remain in plants. This may be a reference to metempsychosis
in the crude form believed in by many primitive peoples, according to which the souls of the d ead pass to
animals, plants or natural objects before being reborn in a human body. The Brahmana literature, which had lost
the optimism of the Rig Veda, recognized the possibllity of death even in heaven.

53
 In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad the first form of the doctrine of transmigration is given. The souls of
those who have lived lives of sacrifice, charity and austerity, after ce1tain obscure peregrinations, pass to the World
of the Fathers, the paradise of Yama; thence, after a period of bliss, they go to the moon; from the moon they go to
empty space, whence they pass to the air, and descend to earth in the rain. There they "become food. ...and are offered
again in the altar fire which is man, to be born again in the fire of woman", while the unrighteous are
reincarnated as worms, birds or insects. This doctrine, which seems to rest on a primitive belief that conception
occurred through the eating by one of the parents of a fruit or vegetable containing the latent soul of the
offspring, is put forward as a rare and new one, and was not universally held at the time of the composition o f
the Upanisad. Even in the days of the Buddha, transmigration may not have been believed in by everyone, but it
seems to have gained ground very rapidly in the 7th and 6th centuries B.C. Thus the magnificently logical Indian
doctrines of samsara. or transmigration, and karma, the result of the deeds of one life affecting the next, had humble
beginnings in a soul theory of quite primitive type; but even at this early period they had an ethical context, and had
attained some degree of elaboration.

In whatever way the doctrine of transmigration was developed it involved belief in the repeated passage of the
soul from life to life, either for all eternity or for an inestimably long time. It linked all forms of life into a single
system. The gods themselves must pass away, and be rep!aced by other gods. As one Indra died, anot her was born. The
souls of the departed, though now in bliss, would sooner or later pass to new abodes. Animals, insects. and according to
some sects plants, all lived under the same law. With remarkable imaginative insight some sages taught that even
water, dust and air were filled with minute animalcule, and that these too had souls which were the same, in essence, as
those of men. The whole of life thus passed through innumerable changes.

It was generally, though not universally, thought that these changes were determined by conduct. As one
behaved in the present life so one's status in the scale of existence would in future be exalted or abased, and one 's
lot would be happy or wretched . This doctrine of karma (literally "deed" ) soon becam e fundamental to most Indian
thought. It provided a satisfactory explanation of the mystery of suffering, which has troubled many thoughtful souls
all over the world, and it justified the manifest social inequalities of the Aryan community.

To the ordinary man such a doctrine might not appear distasteful, and the fact that it quickly obtained almost
universal acceptance shows that it met in great measure ancient India's spiritual needs. Indeed in many respects the
idea of samsara, which offers infinite potentialities of new experience to the soul, and which holds out hope even to the
humblest of living things and the most evil of beings, might seem more attractive than the traditional static heaven
and hell of the West. But to many earnes people the thought of transmigration was not pleasant. Death was always
terrible, and the prospect of having to die innumerable times was not a happy one. Life, even when devoid of the major
sorrows, was drab and inadequate, while continual rebi1th seemed monotonously boring. The growth of the doctrine
of transmigration coincided with the development of pessimistic ideas. Rebirth in heaven was not enough -a way
had to be found to escape the cycle of birth and death a ltogether. It was found, to the satisfaction of the best
minds of the times, in mystical knowledge. achieved by much meditation and asceticism.

In a late hymn of the Rig Veda we read of a class of holy men different from the brahmans, the "silent ones"
(munis), who wear the wind as a gird le, and who, drunk with their own sil enc e, rise on the wind and fly in the
paths of the demigods and birds. The muni knows all men's thoughts, for he has drunk of the magic cup of
Rudra, which is poison to ordinary mortals. Another class of early ascetic, much mentioned in the Atharva Veda, was
the vratya. This term, in its later broad mean i ng, implied an Aryan who had fallen from the faith and no longer
respected the Vedas; but the vratya of the Atharva Veda was a priest of a non-Vedic fertility cult. which involved
ritual dancing and flage ll at ion. He traveled from place to place in a cart, with a woman whom he prostituted, and
a musician who performed for him at his rites. The status and nature of the vratyas are still not wholly clear, but it
is evident that great efforts were made to convert them to the Aryan faith and to find room for them in the orthodox
cu lt, and they were probably one of the chief sources of the new doctrines and practices.

54
 By the time of the Upanisads asceticism had become very widespread, and it was through the ascetics, rather
than the orthodox sacrificial prie sts, that the new teachings developed and spread. Some ascetics were solitary
psychopaths, dwelling in the depths of the forests, and suffering self-inflicted tortures of hun g r. thirst. heat. cold and
rain. Others welt in " penanc e-ground s" on the outskirts of towns. where , like some of the less reputable holy-men of
later times. they would indulge in fantastic self- torture, sitting near blazing fires in the hot sun, lying on beds of thorn s
or spikes, hanging for hours head downwards from the branches of trees. or holding their arms motionless above their
heads until they atrophied.

Most of the new developments in thought, however, came from ascetics of less rigorous discipline, whose
chief practices were the mental and spiritual exercises of meditation. Some of these dwelt alone on the outskirts of
towns and villages, while others lived in huts, under the leadership of an elder. Others wandered. often in large groups,
begging alms, proclai1i1ing their doctrines to all who wished to listen. and disputing with their rivals. Some
were completely naked, while others wore simple garments.

The original motive of Indian asceticism was the acquisition of magical power. The brahmans claimed this
already, by virtue of their bi1th and training, but there were other types of power, obtainable by other means. By the
time of the Upanisads faith in the cosmic mystery of the sacrifice had perhaps begun to wane, even among the
brahmans themselves. Though sacrificial mysticism did not immediately disappear the rite once more came to be
thought of as a means of obtaining prosperity, long life, and rebirth in heaven, rather than of sustaining the cosmos.
Indeed the wealthy patrons of sacrifices had probably always had the former as their main motive. In the eastern
parts of the Ganga Basin Brahmanism was not so deeply entrenched as in the west, and older non-Aryan currents
of belief flowed more strongly. The sacrificial cult did not wholly meet the needs of these lands, where firmly
founded kingdoms were growing in power and material civilization was rapidly progressing.

The ascetic. even though his penance was of the most severe type, rose far above the heights achieved by the
sacrificial priest. Once he had inured his body to pain and privation immeasur able joys awaited him. The hermit of
the lower type had much to look forward to even on the material plane, in the form of honour and respect which
as an ordinary man he could never hope for, and complete freedom from worldly cares and fears. This sense of
freedom, of a great load lifted from one's shoulders by casting aside one's family and possessions, is evident i n
many passages of calm joy' i n the religious Literature of India. But there were greater incentives to asceticism
.than these. As he advanced in his self-training the hermit acquired powers beyond those of ordinary mortals. He
saw past, present and future; he mounted the heavens, and was graciously received at the courts of the gods,
while divinities descended to earth and visited him in his hermitage. By the magical power acquired through his
asceticism he could work m i rac les- he could crumble mountains into the sea; if offended, he could burn up his
enemies with the glance of his eye, or cause the crops of a whole people to fail; if respected, his magical power could
protect a great city. increase its wealth, and defend it from famine, pestilence and invasion. In fact the magic potency
formerly ascribed to the sacrifice now began to be attributed to asceticism. In the succeeding age the idea that the
universe was founded and maintained through sacrifice slipped into the background; in its place it was widely
believed that the cosmos depended on the penances of the great god Siva, meditating forever in the fastnesses of the
Himalayas, and on the continued austerities of his human followers.

If ascertism had its charms even for the less spiritual, they were still greater for the questing souls who
took to a life of hardship from truly religious motives. As his mystical exercises developed his psychic faculties.
the ascetic obtained insight which no words could express.

The metaphysical interpretation of the ascetle's mystical knowledge varied from sect to sect, but the
fundamental experience was the same, and, as has been many times pointed out, was not appreciably different from
that of the Western saints and mystics, whether Greek, Jewish, Christian or Muslim. But Indian mysticism is unique in
its elaboration of techniques for inducing ecstasy, and in the complex metaphysical systems built upon interpretations
of mystical experience. Where in other religious mysticism is of varying importance, in those of India it is
fundamental.

55
 The great development of asceticism and mysticism soon became too strong for the more earthbound and
materialistic Brahmanism to ignore. Places were found for the hermit and the wandering ascetic in the Aryan social
structure by the formula of the four stages of life, which first appear in the Dharma Sutras.

It has been suggested that the development of ascetic and mystical doctrines, especially in the heterodox
systems of Buddhism and Jainism, represents a reaction of the warrior class to the pretensions of the brahmans and
to the sterility of the sacrificial cult. This, however, is certainly not the whole truth.

Buddha and Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. were ksatriyas; they proclaimed the futility of sacrifice,
and more than one passage in the Buddhist scriptures may be interpreted in an anti-brahmanic sense. But many of the
teachers of the new doctrines were themselves brahmans.

There was certainly some opposition to brahmanic pretensions, and dissatisfaction with the sacrificial cult;
but behind this, and the growth of pessimism, asceticism and mysticism, lay a deep psychological anxiety. The
time of which we speak was one of great social change, when old tribal units were breaking up. The feel ing of group
solidarity which the tribe gave was removed, and men stood face to face with the world, with no refuge in their
kinsmen. Chief-rains were overthrown, their courts dispersed. their lands and tribesmen absorbed in the great er
kingdoms.

55
 BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

While the doctrines of the Upanisads found a place in the brahmanic system, there were other
teachings which could not be harmonized with orthodoxy, but were fostered and developed by heterodox
sects. Chief among the teachers of such doctrines was the man who at the end of the sixth and the beginning
of the fifth century B.C. established a community of yellow-robed followers. and was known by them as
the Buddha, the Enlightened or Awakened. Even if judged only by his posthumous effects on the world at
large he was certainly the greatest man to have been born in India.

The traditional story of the Budd ha, like those of most saints and heroes of ancient days, has
suffered much at the hands of higher criticism. The story of his birth and early life appears only in the later
books of the Buddhist Scriptures, and many of the references to him in those pai1s of the canon which
purport to give his teachings verbatim are by no means reliable. Even the "Sermon of the Turning of the
Wheel of the Law", which is said to be the first sermon preached after the Budd has enlightenment , and
which is the basic teaching of all Buddhist sects, is of dubious authenticity, and in the form in which
we have it is not among the earliest parts of the canon.

Certain facts about the Buddha's life are reasonably certain. He was the son of a chief of the
Sakyas, a small tribe of the Nepalese Terai. He became an ascetic, and propounded a new doctrine which
gained the support of numerous disciples. After many years of teaching in the kingdoms of Kosala and
Magadha and in the tribal lands to the north of the Ganga, he died at the age of eighty at some time between
the years 486 and 479 B.C. probably nearer the former date than the latter.

One night Mahamaya. chief queen of suddhodhana, king of the Sakyas, dreamt that she was carried
away to the divine lake Anavatapta in the Himalayas, where she was bathed by the heavenly guardians of the
four quarters of the universe. A great white elephant holding a lotus flower in his trunk approached her , and
entered her side. Next day the dream was interpreted for her by wise men-she had conceived a wonderful
son, who would be either a Universal Emperor or a Universal Teacher.

The boy was named Siddhartha, at a great ceremony on the fifth day from his birth. His gotra
name va., Gautama (in Pali, Gotama) by which he is commonly referred to in Buddhist literature. The
soothsayers prophes,ed that he would become a Universal Emperor, with the exception of one. who declared
that four signs would convince him of the misery of the world, and he would becom e a Universal
Teacher. To prevent this prophecy coming true King Suddodhana resolved that he should never know the
sorrows of the world.

But fur all his prosperity and success he was not inwardly happy and for all the efforts of
his father he did see the four signs foretold, which were to decide his career, for the gods knew his
destiny, and it was they who placed the signs before him.

Hearing of this King Suddhodhana doubled his precautions. Siddhartha was made a virtual
prisoner, though still surrounded with pleasures and luxuries of all kinds; his heart knew no peace, and he
could never forget the four signs. One morning the news was brought to him that Yasodhara had
given birth to a son, but it gave him no pleasure. That night there were great festivities. but when all
were sleeping he roused Channa, who saddled his favourite horse Kanthaka, and he rode off into the night,
surrounded by rejoining demigods, who cushioned the fall of his horse's hcofs so that no one
should hear his departure.

56
 When far from the city he stripped off his jewellery and fine garments. and put on a hermits; robe,
provided by an attendant dem igod. With his sword he cut off his flowing hair, and sent it back to his father with his
garments by the hand of Channa. The horse Kanthaka dropped dead from grief when he found that he was to be
parted from his master, and was reborn in one of the heavens. Thus Siddhartha performed his ·'Great Going Forth"
(Mahabhiniskramana) and became a wandering ascetic, owning nothing but the robe he wore.

At first he begged his food as a wanderer, but he soon gave up this life for thctt of a forest hermit. From a
sage named Alara Kalama he learned the technique of meditation, and the lore of Brahman as taught in the
Upanisads; but he was not convinced that man could obtain liberation from sorrow by mental discipline and
knowledge, so he joined forces with five ascetics who were practicing the most rigorous self-mortification in the hope
of waring away their karma and obtaining final bliss.

His penances became so severe that the five quickly recognized him as their leader. For six years he
tortured himself until he was nothing but a waling skele ton. One day, worn out by penance and hunger, he
fainted, and his followers believed that he was dead. But after a while he recovered consciousness, and realized
that his fasts and penances had been useless. He again began to beg food, and his body regained its strength. The
five disciples left him in disgust at his backsliding.

One day Siddhartha Gautama, now thirty-five years old, was seated beneath a large pipal tree on the
outskirts of the town of Gaya, in the realm of Bimbisara king of Magadha. Sujata, the daughter of a nearby
farmer, brought him a large bowl of rice boiled in milk. After eating some of this he bathed, and that evenings,
again sitting beneath the pipal tree. he made a solemn vow that, though his bo1ies wasted away and his blood
dried up, he would not leave his seat until the riddle of suffering was solved .

So for forty-nine days he sat beneath the tree. At first he was surrounded by host-: of gods and spirits,
awaiting the great moment of enlightenment; but they soon fled. for Mara. the spirit of the world and of sensual
pleasure. the Buddhist devil, approached. For days Gautama withstood temptations of all kinds. Mara, disguised
as a messenger, brought news that the wicked cousin Devadatta had revolted, thrown Suddodhana into prison, and
seized Yasodhara, but Gautama was not moved. Marp called his demon hosts, and attacked him with whirlwind,
tempest, food and earthq uake, but he sat firm, cross- legged beneath the tree. Then the tempter called on Gautama
to produce evidence of his goodness and benevolence; he touched the ground with his hand, and the Earth itself
spoke with a voice of thunder". " I am his witness".

Mara then tried gentler means of shaking Gautama's reso lve. He called his three beautiful daughters,
Desire, Pleasure and Passion, who danced and sang before him, and tried every means of seduction. Their wiles were
quite ineffectual. They offered him Universal Empire; but he was unmoved.

For a time he doubted whether he should proclaim his wisdom to the world, as it was so recondite and
difficult to express that few would understand it but the god Brahma himself descended (from hea ven and
persuaded him to teach the wor ld. Leaving the Tree qf Wisdom , he journeyed to the Deer Park near Varanasi (the
modern Sarnath), where his five former disciples had settled to continue their penances.

To these five ascetics the Buddha preached his first sermon or in Buddhist phraseology, ''set in motion
the Wheel of the Law''. The five were so impressed with his new doctrine that they gave up their austerities and once
more became his disciples. A few days later a band of sixty young ascetics became his followers, and he sent them
out in all directions to preach the Buddhist Dharma. Soon his name was well known throughout the Ganga Plain,
and the greatest kings of the time favoured him and his followers. He gathered together a disci plined body of monks
(called bhiksus, or in Pali bh ikkhus , literally "beggars"), knit together by a common garb, the yellow robes of the
order. and a common discipline, according to tradition laid down in detail by the Buddha himself. Many stories are
told of his long years of preaching. He returned to Kapilavastu, and conve11ed his father, wife and son Rahula, as
well as many other members of the court, including his cousin Devadatta, whose heart remained full of
jealousy.
57
 Though according to legend his life was attended by many wonders, the earliest traditions record few
miracles accomplished by the Buddha himself. Once he is said to have performed feats of levitation and other
miracles at Sravasti, a result of a challenge from rival teac he rs, 1but he sternly forbade the monks to imitate
him. and there is no record of his healing the sick by supernatural means. One touching story of the Buddha
is interesting in this connexion, since it contrasts strikingly with the Gospel stories of the miracles of Jesus. A
woman, stricken with grief at the death of her only son, and hearing that the Buddha was in the vicinity.
brought the child ' s corpse to him in the hope that he would restore it to life. He asked her first to go to the
nearby town and bring a handful of mustard seed from a family in which no one had d ie d. She went from
ho us e to house, but course could find no such fam il y, until at last she understood the inevitability of death and
sorrow, and became a nun.

For eight months of the year the Buddha and his followers would travel from place to place, preaching
to all and sundry. For the four months of the rainy season, roughly corresponding to the English summer, they would
stop in one of the parks given to the Buddhist order by wealthy lay followers, living in huts of bamboo and reed -
the first form of the great Buddhist monasteries of later times. For over forty years his reputation grew and the
Sangha (literally society, the Buddhist Order) increased in numbers and influence. With the exception of the
conspiracy of Devadatta he suffered no persecution, though a few of his followers were maltreated by their
religious opponents. His ministry was a long. calm and peaceful one , in this respect very different from that of
Jesus.

The end came at the age of eight. He spent the last rainy season of his life near the ci ty of Vaisali,
and after the rains he and his followers journeyed northwards towards the country which had been the home of
his youth. On the way he prepared his d isc iple s for his death. He told them that his body was now like a
worn-out cart, creaking at every joi nt. He declared that he had made no distinction between esoteric and exoteric
teac h ing , but had preached the full doctrine to the m. When he was gone they were to look for no new
leader- the Doctrine (Dharma) which he had preached would lead the m. They must rely on themselves, be
their own lamps, and look for no refuge outside themselves.

At the town of Pava he was entertained by a lay disciple. Cunda the smith. and ate a meal of pork.
Soon after this he was attacked by dysentery. but he insisted on moving on to the nearby town of Kusinagara (Pali.
Kusinara). Here, on the outskirts of the town, he lay down under a sar tree. and that nigh t he died. His last
words were : "Final Blowing-out" ( Pari nirvana). His sorrowing disciples cremated his body, and his ashes were
divided between the representatives of various tribal peoples and King Ajatasatru o f Magad ha.

58
 PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN SOCIETY (CONT.)

The religious, milieu of India when Islam reached this subcontinent, presents a phase where Buddhism had
lost its supremacy, Brahmanism was trying to consolidate its position by compromising with Buddhist doctrines as
well as with pre-Aryan practices. Islam though altogether a new th i ng, had exercised an influence upon the Ind ians
with its principles of universal brotherhood and human equality. In the words of Tarachand " Not only did Hindu
religion, Hindu al1, Hindu literature and Hindu Science, absorb Muslim e le ments, but the very spirit of Hindu
culture and the very stuff of Hindu mind were also altered , and the Muslim reciprocated by responding to the change
in every development of li fe". An everlasting process of give and take, thus began. Among the Muslims, Al-Biruni,
Amir Khusrau, Abul Fazl, Dara Shikoh, etc., tried to understand Hinduism and made valuable attempts to enhance
Muslim understanding of Hinduism by their own works and by translating Sans_krit works into Persian. Rulers like
Feroze Shah Tughlaq, Zainu Abidin of Kashmir, Sikandar Lodi, Akbar, Jahangir etc. encouraged this trend with the
result that scholars like Mirza Jan .Janan rose in the 18th century to declare that both Rama and Krishna were
prophets. During this period one can identify two significant trends in the realm of religion, mainly Bhakti and Sufi,
a detailed discussion on which follows in the subsequent sections.

After the rise and growth of Buddhism in the country between the 6th century B.C. and the 2nd century
A.O., the medieval bhakti movement was undoubtedly the most wide-spread, far-ranging and multi- faceted
movement that appeared in India. The bhakti movement influenced almost the whole country at different times, and
had a definite impact not only on religious doctrines, rituals, values and popular beliefs, but on arts and culture as
well. In turn , these had an impact on the value structure of the medieval state and the ruling classes. At a certain
stage of its development in some reg ions, the bhakti movement was sought to be used as a platform by forces
opposed to the centralizing Mughal state. In the cultural field, the growth of regional languages, devotional music,
dance, pa i nting, sculpture etc., became closely related to the bhakti movement.
BHAKTI MOVEMENT

The bhakti movement can scarcely be called a mass movement in a strict sense, for its objective was
individual salvation or mystical union with God rather than a change in the living conditions of the masses. except
indirectly. Like-wise, it can hardly be called a single movement, barring irl the broad, doctrinal sense of a move
ment which emphasized divine grace as a means of attaining salvat ion or nearness to God with the help of a
guide or guru. Even within this compass, there were often wise differences regarding the nature of relationship of
the devotee with God, the attitude towards the scriptures and the traditional faith. as also towards the society and the
ruling authority. Commenting on the teachings of Ramanand. Tara Chand noted that they "gave rise to two schools
of religious thought, one conservative, and the other radical.'' Such variations were, by no means, confined to the
north . While the southern movement of bhakti was fundamentally egalitarian in spirit, it hardly denounced the caste
system, or brahmanical privileges as such. However, the Virashaiva movement, which followed the path of
bhakti and came to the forefront during the 12th and 13th centuries, adopted a strongly radical and heterodox
attitude. The movement also differed from one region to another. Thus, in the Punjab , an essentially quietist
movement became a vehicle for the expression of popular sentiments on a wide range of subjects, and provided a
basis for men and women of diverse classes and backgrounds to come toget her, and act against what they
considered " tyranny" . Hence, the historical background of the rise of bhakti, the factors contributing to i ts
growth and spread, its variations in different regions, and its impact on society, politics and culture have to be studied
in detail. However, we are attempting here a delineation of some general features that characterized the bhakti
movement. or the trend towards it in northern India.

That the philosophy and framework of bhakti had been developed in the centuries before the Christian era,
and were furthered in the succeeding centuries by the rise of Mahayana Buddh ism, and later by the wor ship of
Narayana and Vishnu , are too welI-known to be repeated here. - Although the worship of Vishnu began to
spread under the Gupta rue (4th-6th centuries A. O.), it is questionable whether bhakti had acquired a genuine
popular base by that time. Till then, the works pertaining to bhakti were invariably found written in Sanskrit.

59
A genuine popular movement could hardly have expressed itself in a language which was the preserve of the elite.
especially of the brahmans who were identified with and were the chief upholders of a ritual and a set of doctrines
that largely excluded the people, or kept them at a distance. and accorded all kinds of privileges to the
brahmans. Our understanding of the subject is, however limited to some extent by the comparative neglect of
apabhramsha literature in our Universities and centres of learning. Although apabhramsha was nea rer to the
languages of the people than Sanskrit, and was used by the Jains and others for a long time for religious and secular
purposes, we do not know enough about its secular forms, orientation, value structure etc. On the basis of our present
knowledge , we may not be far wrong in drawing the conclusions that bhakti in its popular form rose and
flourished for the first time in south India from the 6th century onwards.

The rise and growth of bhakti in its popular form between the 6th and 10th centuries in south India rather
than in north India- where it had its early development-needs some explanation. Efforts have been made to trace the
process by which bhakti travelled from the south to north India. and a key role in this has been assigned to
Ramanand. who lived at Kashi and whose period of work is supposed to cover the last quarter of the 14th and the first
half of the 15th centuries. Latterly, th e rise of the Varkari saints of Maharashtra and the growth of Sahajay ana in
Orissa and eastern India have been emphasized as links in the northward movement.

Islamic religious movements gene rall y arose out of controversies about Allah's attributes and decrees
and their impact on the universe. Such movements did not emphasize the dichotomy between the secular and
religious or temporal and spiritual. M uh ammad , unlike Christ, did not urge his followers to ' render unto Caesar
the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God 's’. Islamic religious and spiritual movements
consequently have major political implications and repercussions. The founders of various religious movements
sought state support to strengthen their ideologies, but this often recoiled upon the leaders ' own heads.

It was in the wake of the battle of Siffin in June-July 657, between ' Ali and Mu' awiya, that a new
movement. the ' im al-kalam (the science of defending orthodoxy by rational arguments), crystallized. O ne of
the most important contro ve rs ies with i n this movement concerned free will. One section, Jabriyya, denied ma n 's
freedom and claimed that human actions were subordinate to divine compulsion. Conversely another section, the
Qada riyya, rejected predestination and believed that man produced his own actions; the word ' created ' was
never use d. Their position was modified by the Mu'tazila, who founded the specu lative dogmatics of Islam.
According to them men are endowed with free will and are therefore rewarded for good deeds and punished for
evil ones. God is aware of evil actions but He does not create them. He is just , neither desiring evil or
ordaining it. His will and His commands are identical. The Mu' taz ila recognize the divine attributes of
knowledge; power, and speech but assert that they are not distinct from God' s essence. They do not believe that
there is an uncreated Word within God. ' Word of God' signifies that God gave the power of language to
contingent beings so that He could communicate H i s law to man . The Qur ' an. as the 'Word of God' ,
according to the Mu ' tazila refers to what God wants man to know.

The Mu' tazila were a pro-' Abbasid group but they were rejected by the ' Abbas id Caliph al-Mutawakkil
(847-61 ). Several leading Mu ' tazila, who left the movement and founded their own schools, because pioneers of the
defence of Sunni orthodoxy. The most prominent among them was Abu'I-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873-9 36), who attracted a
large number of disciples. He opposed the Mu ' tazil a by asserting that God kno ws, sees, and speaks by His
knowledge, sig ht, a_nd speech, and that Qur ' an ic expressions such as ·God's hand and face ' do not refer to
corporeal attributes but denote His ·grace' and ' esse nce ' . According to the_As h' arite s, the Qur'an i s the word of
God, eternal and unc reated . Whereas the Mu ' taz ila rejected belief in the possibility of a human vision of God,
because this implied that He is corporeal and limited , al- Ash ' aripreached the reality of the beatific vision after
death, although its nature cannot be explained . The Ash ' sar ites believe that the same matter assumes different
forms and that the world consists of atoms which are united , disconnected, and reunited again. A l- Ash ' ari's
contemporary, Abu Mansur al- Matur idi, also fostered the development of orthodox Sunnism although he
differed from the Asha rites on many significant points.

60
To the Maturidis predestination and free will stand side by side. Both systems flourished in India and
provided the basis for orthodox Sunni intellectuals and kalam.

The Abbasid Caliphal-Ma'mun (81_3-33) set up an institution called the Baytu ' l- hikma (House of
Wisdom) where Greek scientific and philosophical literature of the late Hellenistic schoo ls was translated in
to Arabic from Greek and Syriac. Some of the translators brought their conclusions into line with Islamic
doctrines. AI-Kindi, known as Fayls ufu' l- ' Ara b (Philosopher of the Arabs) , pioneered this strategy. Ar-Razi,
known in Europe as Rhazes of Ravy (near Tehran), made original contributions to both philos ophy and
medicine. AI-Farabi (875-950), known as ' the second teacher ' (Aristotle was the first), improved on al - Kindi 's
interpretations. His philosophy combined Aristotle and Plato 's Republic and Laws with Neo platonism. In the
centre of Farabi's philosophy is the First Being or Absolute One , identified with Allah. Following Plato,
Farabi identifies God with Absolute Good, while thinking and thought coincide in Being. lbn Miskawayh 's
Tahdhib al-akhlaq added a new dimension of deep ethical sens itivity to the understanding of Being. It was,
however, Avicenna (lbn Sina, 980-1037) who suggested that the entire knowledge of the physical world is
subordinate to the knowledge of Being. He advocated an ontological distinction between essence (mahiya)
or nature. and existence (wujud) or experience on the one hand , and a division between the necessary (wajib),
the possible (mumkin) , and the impossible (mumtani') on the other. Unity and existence are only accidents
which may or may not be added to essence for contingent humanity; but in the Necessary Bein g (Wajibu'l-
Wujud) or God, essence and existence are inseparably united. The orthodox Islamic Kalam preached that the
world began at some point in time. They rejected the Greek system of the eternal heavens or any other order of
reality which violated the notion of the transcendence of God. They believed that the entire creation is
dependent upon the transcendence of the divine principle. Consequently the orthodox did not approve of the
cosmological doctrines of Farabi and Avicenna, asserting that creation is the manifestation (ta'aqqul) by God
of His own Essence. Ghazali (1058-1111) took both Farabi and Avicenna to task for advocating the eternity
of the world and denying a specific act of creation. He contended that to state that earlier philosophers had
believed that God was the maker or agent who created the world was to distort their philosophical writings.
In fact, he claimed, according to the philosophers, God has no will or attributes, and whatever proceeds from
Him is a necessary consequence of His nature. About a century later, Fakhru ' d-Din Razi ( 1149- 1209) carved
out a new defence of Sunni Ash ' arite doctrine. He neither totally rejected Greek philosophy nor , like Avicenna's
peripatetic followers, adhered strictly to it. He wrote critical_commentarieson Avice nn a's best -known 'works,
such as al-Isharat wa' l- tanbih at and the Qanun . Razi completely rejected the Muslim philosophers' theory
that only unity can follow from unity, claiming that multiplicity is also possible.

The influence of Ghazali and Razi provided a firm basis for the Sunni intellectual system, but the
generation following Razi depended mainly on the state for the defence of Sunni orthodoxy. The Sunnis expected
the state to annihilate their oppone nts , particularly the philosophers. For example , Sayyid Nuru' d -D in
Mubarak Ghazanawi, who was a highly respected scholar in Delh i, claimed that kings could not obtain salvat -
-ion unless they banished philosophers and stopped the teaching of philosophy. According to Sarani, if Avice
nna , who had revived Greek philosophy and was the philosophical leader in Muslim countries, had fallen into the
hands of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni , his contemporary, the Sultan would have ordered him to be cut into
pieces and his flesh given to vultures. However, to Barani 's utter disappointment, it proved impossible either
to stop the study of philosophy or to bring abo ut the expulsion of philosophers from India.

In the fifteenth century Gujarat became the centre for Muslim intellectuals , tlie most prominent
among whom was Abu'l-Fazl Gaziruni. Shaykh Abu' I- Fazl 's fathe r, Shaykh Mubarak, was Gaziruni 's disciple
and had studied the Kitabal- Shifa' and al- lsh arat wa'l-tanbihat under h im. From Sultan Sikandar Lodi's reign the
study of Avicenna's philosophy grew increasingly popular in Delhi. The pioneers in Delhi were haykh ' Abu '
llah Tulambi and Shaykh ' Az izu ' llah Tulambi of Multan. When Shaykh Mubarak arrived in Agra in 1543 the
study of philosophy and Kalam was further inc reased. Abu' l- Fazl 's mastery of philosophy and kalam

61
enabled him to defeat the orthodox ' ulama ' in the religious discussions at Akb ar's court. The interest in
philosophy and science was accelerated in northern India by Mir Fathu'llah Sh iraz i, who moved from ' Ad il Shah's
court in Bijapur to Akbar ' s court in 1582. Fathu ' llah Shirazi remained at court until he died in 1589 while
accompanying Akbar on his tour to Kashmir.

We learn from the Sunni Puritan revivalist, the Mujadd id, that the philosophers at Akbar 's court were inspired
by Greek philosophy and by Persian translations of Sanskrit works by ancient Hindu sages. One of these
philosophers was the famous Abu' I-Fazl, who referred to himself as ' the perflect and accomplished' : al-
fazilah wa' l-fazl. He claimed that the main aim of the institution of prophethood was to promote knowledge and
public welfare and to reform people's lives. Prophets were supposed to prevent strife, law lessness, and
licentiousness. They had nothing to do with ultimate salvation but were concerned merely with ethical regeneration
and the promotion of the virtues contained in works of philosophy. According to him physical a cts of worship dtd
not affect salvation, since they did not influence the spiritual wor ld. The Mujaddid wrote the lsbat al -Nubuwwa to
strengthen the general belief in the prophets and to prove that Muhammad was the ' sea l of the prophets' .
In their defence the ph il osophers at Akbar 's court asserted that they rejected neither the prophets nor Muh
ammad . They sought to emphasize the prophets ' ethical mission and glossed over their m i racles. Consequently the
orthodox puritanical literature failed to undermine the study of ph il osophy. Both Jahangir and Shahjahan
patronized ph il osophers. In Shahj ahan 's reign there flourished Mulla Mahmud Faruqi Jaunpuri, whose scholarship
and learning had made a very deep impact even on Iranian ph ilo sophers. Prince Shah Shu ja' and Shayista Khan
were his disciples. The Shams al- bazigha, by Mulla Mahmud , is an outstanding contribution to physics and
metaphysics. It is even now an important text in the traditional Indian semmanes.

The most interesting philosopher in the courts of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb was Danishmand Khan. He was a
native of Yazd and entered Shahj ahan 's court in 1651. He resigned because of differences with Dara Shukoh, but
Aurangzeb re-employed him in the second year of his reign, awarded him a high man sab, and reappointed
him governor of Delhi in consideration of his studious habits. Aurangzeb exempted him 'from the ancient ceremony
of repairing twice a day to the assembly, for the purpose of saluting the king', Danishmand employed Dara Shukoh
's principal Sanskrit scholar to explain Hindu philosophy to him. The French doctor Bernier taught him the
medical discoveries of William Harvey ( I 578-1657) and Jean Pecquet (1622-74) and the philosophy of Pierre
Gassendi (1592-1655) and Descartes (1596-1650). The Dabistan-1 Mazah ib, the seventeenth-century encyclopaedia
of religions, discusses the important and original philosophers of Shahjah an ' s reign in great length. They,
however, drew mainly on Hindu and Islamic sources and were not interested in the Westerp philosophy which so
fascinated Danishmand Khan.
THE SUFI MOVEMENT

The philosophers' objective was to rationalize the nature of Necessary Being, while the kalam scholars were
principally concerned to defend divine transcendence (God as above His creation and not one with it). Sufism, on
the other hand, strove to achieve the inner realization of divine unity by arousing intuitive and spiritual faculties.
Rejecting rational argument, the Sufis plunged into contemplation and meditation.

Such a system is bound to be studd ed with controversial judgements and married by personal prejudice. We
shall therefore follow the historical analysis of the eighteenth-century Indian scholar Shah Waliu ' llah. who comb in
ed in himself both the sufi and kalam traditions. He contends , when outlining the history of Sufism, that Islam is
endowed with two aspects : the exoteric and esoteric. Islam 's exoteric aspect is concerned with public good, while
its esoteric one involves tht.: purification of the heart through ethical regeneration. The Shah identifies the esoteric
aspects with ihsan, the doctrine that Allah should be worshipped with the certainty that either the worshipper is
watching. Alliah or He is watching the worshipper. The holy men who were known as awliya ' Allah (proteges of
God) or Sufis upheld ihsan.

The Shah divides Sufism into four epochs. The first began with the prophet Muhammad and his companions
and extended until the time of Junayd of Baghdad. The Sufis of the first period devoted themselves to prayer,

62
fasting, and zikr (invoking one of God's names). They were sometimes transported into spiritual ecstasy, but this was
not considered necessary for spiritual life. The second epoch started during Junayd's time. Many Sufis of the period
lived in a state of continued meditation and contemplation. This resulted in intuitive insights and intense spiritual
experiences which could be expressed only symbolically or in unusual phrases. These Sufis were so emotionally
affected by sama (religious music) that they swooned or tore their - clothes in ecstasy. Their spiritual illumination
enabled the Sufis to see into people ' s heaits. To protect themselves from material desires or thoughts and from the
devil's temptings, the Sufis practiced self-mortification. Many are only grass and leaves, wore rags, and lived an
isolated existence in the mountains and jungles.

From the advent of Shaykh Abu Sa’id bin Abu’ l Khayr and Shaykh Abu'I-Hasan Kharaqani, Sufism entered
upon its third stage. The emphasis among the sufi elite of this epoch was to live in a state of ecstasy which led
to tawajjuh (spiritual telepathy), although many perfect Sufis still followed earlier beliefs and practices. The
Sufis in tawajjuh overcame worldly constraints. The veils separating them from the divine dispersed, and they
could see existence issuing from Being. In contemplating the union of temporal and eternal their individuality
dissolved, and they even ignored their regular religious practices such as prayers and fasting.

The fourth epoch dates from just before the birth of Shaykh al-Akbar Muhiyu'd-Din lbnu ' I ' Arabi (1165-1240),
when the Sufis discovered the theory of the five stages of the descent from Wajibu'I -Wujud (Necessary Being). The
first stage is Ahadiyya (Essence of the Prima One). The second stage is Wahdaniyya (Unity of God); the third
descent is the sphere of Arwah (Sphere of Infinite Forms), the fourth is the sphere of Misal (Similitude or
Angelic Forms), and the fifth the sphere of Ajsam (Bodies of the Physical World). The problems of the
Wahdat al-Wujud lie in the perception of the steps of the descent of Being. The important question is
whether these stages are really One or merely give this impression.

The Shah does not claim that the four historical epochs were mutually exclusive. There was a considerable
overlap; some of the Sufis of the fourth epoch exhibited the characteristics found in the first. What is remarkable is
that the contributions from the Sufis of each epoch helped to make Sufism a unique movement in the history of
Islamic spiritual development.

The Shah says that Sufism began with the Prophet Muhammad. Some of his companions, who led a retired life
in the Medina mosque, given to poverty and self-mortification, are counted as sufi leaders. Among them were the
Ethiopian Bilal, the Iranian Salman, Abu ' Uba ydah, ' Ammar bin Yasir, and Abu Dharr Ghifari. Although the first
three successors to the Prophet are deeply respected by the Sufis, 'Ali is regarded by them as their Shaykh
(leader). Hasan Basri (642-728) is believed to be the link between ' A li and the sufi sects. Hasan was both a
Qadariyya and an ascetic. The word 'sufi' was not applied to the Prophet's companions, who were known as
sahaba (companions) , or tabatabi ' un (those who had seen one or more of the tabi' un ).

Among the leading Sufis of the first epoch was one of the greatest sufi women of all time. She was Rabia of
Basra . Many famous Sufis called on her in her lonely hermitage and even visited her when she had withdrawn into
the wil derness . Her disinterested love of God added a major dimension to the sufi devotional attitudes.

Before the end of the first epoch, a sufi home, known as a khanqah (hospice), was built by a Christian dignitary
in Ramla near Jerusalem. This enabled the S.ufis to shar e their ideas, but individual mystical experience is the true
hallmark of Sufism.

Towards the end of the first epoch, Bayazid or Abu Yazid Tayfur of Bistam in Iran became famous. According to
Junayd, he occupied the highest rank among the Sufis, as Gabriel did amongst the angels. He believed that
he had shed his ' I ' in mystical annihilation (fana) 'as snakes their skin ' and in that state of changed consc -
iousness he shocked the orthodox by declaring : 'Glory be to me! How great is my majesty! Thy obedience
to me is greater than my obedience to thee.
63
 Bayazid’s utterance. in what is known as mystica) intoxication (skkr), was matched by those of al-Hallaj. He was
born at Tur in Ears in eastern Iran in 857-8. lii 913 he was imprisoned after his theopatic cry, ‘Ana’l-Haqq’ ('I am the
Truth of God’). While in prison, Hallaj wrote his famous work on the case of Iblis. the Devil. Ta Sin at-Azal. Hallaj
believed Iblis’s monotheism had prevented him frotn penetrating before Adam.

It the second epoch the Sufis were better organized and were divided into sects according to the distinctive
ideologies and practices evolved by their :Founders. Sufi literature on doctrine, practice, arid history was written in
both poetry and prose. Sufi masters now began to send their disciples to distant tands to disseminate tl›eir teachings.
This tendency increased in the third epoch. M8ny eminent Sufis also moved to indie. "

OF these migrants, Shaykh Safiu’d-Din Gaziruni. the nephew o£ Shaykh Abu Ishaq Gaziruni, settled at Uch. It
was apparently Mahmud ofGhazni’s conquest of Ie Panjab that prompted m8ny notable Sufis to settle there. The sufi
who left an indelible marL both on India and on the history of Svfism was Abu’l- Hasan ’Ali bin 'Usman at-Hujwiri,
knowt as Datx ”Ganj Baksh (Distributor o:F Unlimited Treasure).

The Awariful’1-na’arif by Shaykh Shiliabu’d-Din Suhtawardi (1234-5) was the second important sufi textbook
on which the early Indian sufi doctrines and practices were based. Both works denounce those who believe that
gnosis (spiritual knowledge) absolved Sufis :From the need to obey the shari’s. To them, shari’s (law), ma’rifa
(gnosis), and I aqiqa (reality) were interdependent. The achievement o”f particular states (hal) in Sufism involved a
changing psychological condition, while maqam (position in time and space) was relatively permanent. It was
not essential fat mystics lose all consciousness in a state of fana’ (8nnil Station), since when the stBte o£ baqa’
(abiding in God) was achieved a sufi regained I is power of action. The section on sufi athics Bnd mystic ways of lifé
in Ie ’Awarif is a marked improvement upon the corresponding discussion in Hujwiri’s Kash£u’I-mah]ub.

By the thirteentlz century the division of Sufis into fourteen orders or silsilas had already crystallized. The Sufis
of each silsila guarded theit traditions strictly and urged their disciples to refrain from entering more than one order.
Some of Shaykh Sliihabu’d-Din’s disciples migrated to India, but the real founder of the Sulimwardiyya si Isi la was
Shaykh Baha’u’ d-Din Zakariyya.

Shaykh 'AriPs son, Shaykh Ruknu’d-Din, was highly respected by the Delhi sultans from ‘Ala ‘u’d- Din Klialji
to Muhammad bin Tughluq; his fame spread as far as Alexandria, and Ibn Battuta was advised to call on him.
According to shaykh Rukiiu’d-Din the leaders of the sufi community should possess tluee attributes. Property was
essential in order that the sufi leaders could satisfy the Qalandars’ demands for sherbet. Otherwise the disappointed
Qalandais would commit the sin of abusing their sufi leaders and would be punished on resurrection day.

Qiitb-I ‘Alain, a grandson of Makhdum-I Jahaniyan, settled near Ahmedabad, the new capital of Gujarat founded
by Sultan Ahmad (141 1-42). His son, Sayyid Muhammad, known as Shah Mahijhan, was also very famous. He was
given the title Shah-I 'Alam (King of the Universe). Many leading Ciujarati noblemen were among his disciples. One
of them collected from his iqta’ only those taxes sanctioned by the shar’a. Consequently all the peasants wished to
move there, and his iqta’ grew very prosperous.

In the fourteenth century a collateral line of the Suhrawardiyyas, known as the Fitdawsiyya, emerged. The
outstanding sufi of this order was Shaykh Sharafu’d-Din Ahmad Yaha Munyari, whose ancestors had settled in Bihar
in the early thirteenth century. He practiced arduous ascetic exercises in the forests. Throughout the reigns of both
Muhammad bin Tughluq and Firuz Tughluq, Shaykh Sharafu’d-Din’s khanqah in Munayr was the rendezvous rat
many seeking a spiritual life. The Shaykh’s letters to his disciples, which have been compiled in several volumes,
exhibit his rear talent as a teacher. The Shaykh was deeply disappointed in Sultan Firuz, who had memilessly executed
his friends and fellow-sufis, such as Shaykh ‘Izz Kaku’ I and Shaykh Ahmad Bihari, at the instigation of the bigoted
’llama’. Shaykh SharaIu’d-Din expressed surprise fat a town in which such killings were tolomted still mmained
standing and had escaped destruction at God’s hands. The Shaykh was saved From execution by the intervention

64
of Makhdum Jahan iyan . The sufi hagiologists ascribe the destruction of /Delhi during Timur 's invasion to the
execution of two Sufis there.

The Shaykh believed in the Wahdat al-Wujud and drew heavily on the ideas of the exponents of this ideology such
as the Persian poets Far idu ' d-D in 'Attar. 'Iraqi, and Jalalu'd-Din Rumi . Shaykh Sharafu' d-D i n .d ied in 1381.
His spiritual descendants were also· influential, and their surviving letters epitomize the Firdawsiyya devotion to the
Wahdar al-Wujud doctrine.

The fifteenth and sixteenth -cent ury Suhrawardiyya Delhi centres owed their reputation to the scholarship and
impressive personality of Shaykh Sama'u'd-Din, who died in 1496. His disciple, known by his nom de plume
Jamali. was an eminent poet who trave led throughout the Islamic wor ld. Sultan Sikandar Lodi admired Jamali greatly,
but after Babur 's conquest. Jamali wrote a panegryric to the new ruler. Later Jamali accompa n ied Humayun on his
expedition to Gujarat, dying there in 1536. Of Jamali's two sons, Shaykh · Abdu l ' ! Hayy (d.1551 -2) was a member of
Sher Shah's court, but his elder son. Shaykh Gada'I, remained loyal to the Emperor I --lumayun and his prime minister,
Bayram Khan . After Akbar's restoration, Bayram Khan repaid Gada ' l ' s services to the Mughal cause by appointing
him the Sadru ' s-Sudur . Gada'I revoked the innumerable madad-I m'ash grants recklessly given by Sher Shah and the
Lod is to the Afghan ‘ulama’ and dignitaries. so naturally the dispossessed Sunni orthodoxy turned against him. After
Bayram's fall from power in 1560 Gada'I retired into obscurity and died in 1569 or a year later. The rise of new
silsilas ,vith influential friends at court undermined the Suhrawardiyya silsila. Of the old silsilas, only the Ch isht
iyya s, who had never depended on court patronage, retained their popularity.

The Chishtiyya silsila is essentially an Indian one. The branches which were developed in Chisht or
Khwaja Chisht about sixty miles east of Hirat have not survived. In India the Chishtiyya silsila was founded by
Khwaja Mu' mu ' d-Din. Unfortunately for us the records of his early career are legendary and arose from apocryphal
literature written in the names of famous sufis. He was born in Sijistan (Sistan) in about 1142 and was educated at
leading intellectual centres in eastern Iran. After travelling through many parts of the Islamic East. the Khwaja
reached Lahore and arrived in Delhi after Sultan Mu' izzu' d- Din·s death in 1206.

Khwaja Mu' inud -Din died in 1236 at Ajmir. His tomb was at first tended by the sultan of Malwa, but from
Akbar 's reign it came under state management. The Mughal emperors' devotion to the Khwaja's tomb and their frequent
visits for both political and spiritual reasons made Ajmir the leading Muslim pilgrim centre in India.

The Khwaja’s young disciple, Shaykh Hamidu'd-Din, made Nagaur (Rajasthan), containing a predominantly
Hindu population, the chief Chishttiyya centre . His father , Ahmad. had migrated from Lahore to Delhi. where
Hamidu'd-Din was born after its conquest in 1192 by Mu'izzu'd-Din. Shaykh Ham idu ' d-Din had in Nagaur a
small plot of land which he worked himself. He and his wife lived in a hut and supported themselves on the
produce of the land . He re' fused to accept gifts of either land or money from the rulers, although he had barely
enough to keep body and soul together.

Of the Khwa ja's disciples. Shaykh Faridu'd-Din, or Baba Farid, was very celebrated. The Shaykh's father was a
scholar, but it was his mother, an exceedingly pious lady who spent her nightly vigils in lengthy prayers. who exerted
the greatest influence on the future sufi saint. Baba Farid, however, decided to leave Delhi when his fame became an
obstacle to his prayers and he finally settled at Ajodhan.

The Saba 's successor was Shaykh Nizamu'd-Din Awilya'. He came originally from Sada 'un but had settled in
Delhi. The storie s of his own apprenticeship in the jama'at-khana at Ajodhan show that the Baba trained him in a
very vigorous environment so that he could make the Chishtiyya order the dominant sufi silsila in India. The
ethical influence radiating from Ghiyaspur, where the Shaykh resided, seems to have made a considerable impact upon
the people of Delhi. The Shaykh was, however, completely estranged from Sultan Qutbu'd-Di Mubarak and
Ghiyasu'd-Din Tughluq, although Nasiru'd- Din Khusraw had befriended him.

65
 When the future Sultan Ghiyasu' d-Din Tughluq invaded Delhi, Khusraw offered huge gifts to the holy men
in Delhi to seek their blessing for his success. Three of the sufis rejected the gifts: othe rs accepted them,
intending to return them to the next ruler if Khusraw lost.
Shaykh Nizamu'd-Din accepted the gifts, but then, according to his custom, instantly distributed them
among the needy. Naturally he could not return the gifts to the new Sultan. The ' u lama' and some other sufis, who
were envious of the Shaykh, poured oil on the fire of growing enmity and reopened the old question of sama' ,
accusing the Shaykh o frivolity and sin. More than two hundred and fifty scholars gathered to oppose the Shaykh
at an assembly organized by the Sultan to settle the dispute. The Shykh was accompanied only by his disciples. A
heated discussion took place, but the Sultan refused to yield to ‘ulama' pressure to deliver judgement against the
Shaykh. The Shaykh died in April 1325, while the Sultan was away on his Tirhut expeditio n. They were still
estranged. The Sultan died three months later, in July.
According to the Shaykh, the first lesson in sufism was not related to prayers or meditational exercises
but began with the practice of the maxim : ' Do unto others what you would they do unto you; wish for yourself
what you wish for them also.' Defining renunc iatio n, the Shaykh said that it was not wearing a loincloth in a state
of asceticism, for one should wear clothes and continue to eat, but rather the distribution of all unnecessary
items to the poor. He was impressed by those people who fed all the hungry indiscriminately, ignoring caste and
class distinctions. Lik the contemporary ' ulama' and sufis, the Shaykh was hostile to the Muslim philosophers'
cosmological theories and loved to relate anecdotes from Shaykh Abu Sa' id and Shihabu'd -Din Suhrawardi,
condemning Avicenna and other philosophers.
Shaykh Nizamu ' d-D in Awliya' was succeeded in Delhi by his talented disciple Shaykh Nasiru' d-D in
Mahmud, later known as Chiragh (the Lamp) of Delhi. Both he and some leading Chishtiyya saints were reluctant
to serve the state, and this brought them into conflict with Sultan Muhammad bin 'Tughluq, who wished
the sufis to help him realize his political ambitions. During Sultan Firuz's reign many sufi khanqahs
prospered as a result of state grants, although the Shaykh himself never abandoned his ascetic life. One
of the Qalandars tried to assassinate him, but 'the Shaykh stopped his disciples taking revenge. He died in
1356. Because he considered none of his disciples worthy of receiving the relics bequeathed to him by
Shaykh N izamu' d-D i n Awliya' they were buried with him in his grave.
Shaykh Nasiru'd-Din's teachings were embodied in the Khayru'l-majalis, compiled by one of his disciples.
They represent a peak in the Chishtiyya philosophy which had evolved in India during the course of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Following the tradition of his spiritual ancestors, the Shaykh emphasized the
necessity for associating with the common people but simultaneously withdrawing from them. Shaykh Nasiru ' d-
Din was deeply distressed at the degeneration of Delhi ufism into mere formalism. Many of his disciples
wisely decided to start new centres in the provinces rather than remain in the capital. Thi s did not result in the
disintegration of the centre, for other important Chishtiyyas stayed on in Delhi.
By the end of the fourteenth century the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud had become firmly rooted in Indi
a. Its principal Chishtiyya exponent was Mas'ud-1bakk. Although he was related to Sultan Firuz, pressure from
the ' ulama' compelled the Sultan to behead him.
Another follower of this doctrine was Sayyid Muhammad Husayni bin Ja' far al-Makki. His long life
extended from the reign of Sultan Muhammad bin Tug luq to that of Sultan Bahlul Lodi. He travelled widely.
According to him the ecstatic cries of Bayazid and Hallaj did not emanate from themselves; their spiritual
absorption had converted them into the same form as the Absolute Being .
Another sufi, Mawlana Burhanu'd-Din Gharib, an age khalifa of Nizamu'd-Din Awliya, was forced by
Muhammad bin Tughluq to leave Delhi for Daulatabad in the Decan. The sufi who did most to make the
Chishtiyya silsila popular in the Decan , ho wever, was Sayyid Muhammad bin Yusuf al-Husayni, commonly
known as Khwaja Banda Nawaz or Mir Gisu Daraz. He was Shaykh Nasiru'd-Din ' s leading disciple. Apparently
the news of Timur's invasion of Delhi prompted Gisu Daraz to move to a safer place. He went first to Gujarat
and later to Gulbarga on the western border of the Decan. Mir Gisu Daraz was a prolific writer. His earlier works
are based on the Wahdat al-Shubud doctrines.

66
 He was influenced by the works of ' Ala'u'd-Dawla Simnani (d. 1336), the founder of the Wahdar al Shuhud
movement, who I was violently hostile to the Wahdar al-Wujud beliefs. The Wahdat al-Wujud followers held
that there cannot be two orders of reality (Creator and created), independent of each other,·wh il e the Wahdat al-
Shuhud considered that ideas undermining the divine transcendence were heretical. Mir Gisu Daraz was amazed
that lbnu ' I-' Arabi's followers should call themselves sufis, when they did not recognize God's true
transcendental form. Condemning the works of lbnu'I-' Arabi and the sufi poets, such as 'Attar and Rumi, who
ardently supported the Wahdat al-Wujud philosophy, Mir Gisu Daraz denounced them as enemies of Islam. He
died in November 1422, having lived for about 101 years.

In Bengal the Chishtiyya centre was established by Shaykh Nizamu'd-Din Awliya's disciple, Shaykh
Akhi Siraju-d-Din 'Usman'. At Pandua he made Shaykh 'Ala'u'l-Haqq, who held a high position in the
government his kh ali fa. Shaykh 'Ala'u'l-Haqq renounced the world. He died in 1398, and his spiritual
descendants established Chishtiyya khanqahs in many parts of Bengal. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
the Chishtiyya khanqahs in Jaunpur, Rudawli (near Lucknow), Lucknow, Kalpi, and Gangoh (east of Delhi)
exe11ed a considerable influence on the spiritual life in their respective regions. In the sixteenth century
Thaneswar became an important Chis'11tiyya centre. Shaykh Jalal Thaneswari and his disciple, Shaykh Nizam
Thaneswari, were famous Chishtiyya sufis, but in May 1606 Jahangir banished Shaykh N izam to Mecca for
blessing the rebel Prince Khusraw. The sixteenth and seventeenth-century Chishtiyya centres in Delhi were also
well known, although they could not compete with the popular Shaykh Salim Chishti. whose prayers, Akbar
believed, were responsible for the birth of his son Prince Salim-in August 1569. Akbar built Fathpur-Sikri to
show his gratitude to the Shaykh. At the same time the intellectually challenging Gujarat Chish tiyya centre
pushed the Suhrawardiyyas even further into the backg round . The Chishtiyya centres in Burhanpur, Jaunpur,
and Lucknow were also famous, but the outstanding Chishtiyya sufi scholar was Shaykh Muhibbu'llah Mubariz
llahabadi. The Shaykh tried to undermine the importance of both philosophy and kalam. He also waged a battle
royal against the opponents of the Wahdat al-Wujud doctrine and did not even spare 'Ala'u'd-Dawla Simnam
and Gisu Daraz.

Dr. Manoj Sinha

Reader Deptt. of Eol. Science

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 CHAPTER VI E
DALIT-BAHUJAN
-Dr. K.K. PANDA

The importance of Dalits in the political development of India was not only recognised by the political
leadership in the pre-Independence period but also by the ruling classes in the post-1947 administrative set-up . The
Dal it international conference at Vancouvre the conclave of Chief Ministers in Srinagar, the Bhopal Conference,
and the international conference at Durban, South Africa, have highlighted the importance of the Dalit movement in
the contemporary political systems. The Bhopal declaration of a new 'Dalit Agenda for the 21st Century' was the
product of the new Dalit consciousness that took a powerful political shape immediately after the Durban
Conference. Although the Dal its have no other option but to support the Congress and the left parties as 'natural'
allies in the contemporary electoral politics of Ind ia, they do not feel so comfortable with the Brahmanic Hindu
symbolism and class-oriented statist leftism of the Congress. In order to assuage the feelings of the Dali ts towards
the contemporar y developments in the structures of governance in India, the Bhopal Declaration rightly emphasized
on the ' affirmat ive' actions in the non-governmental areas. Not only did this Declaration include the principles of
land ownership for every Dalit family, it also emphasized on the theme of ' divers ity' - the right of every
Dalit to a fare share in the resources, power and wealth both in the governmental and non-governmental sectors.

The Dal its constitute more than one fifth of the population of India. Unless effective political and
administrative measures are taken to move the Dalits out of centuries of oppressive political and social circ
les, the Indian political developments can never be free fro1i:i societal and political upheavals. Dr. Baba Saheb
Ambed kar, one of the chief architects of the Constitution of India strongly believed that social, economic
and political justice in the lndian context were mainly meant for validating social stratification process and to
perpetuate casteism. The deprived communities in India, in particular, looked into the State system as the saviour
to liberate them from the age old structures of de privation. But this objective has not been achieved during
the decades since Independence.

The Dalits in the contemporary India are victims of deepest social degradation. It is very important to
understand that the central issue of the Dalit movement is not only their economic emancipation but to ensure
them equality and human dignity within the traditional social order. The word ' Dalit ' literary means poor and
deprived persons. It has acquired a new connotation by its reference to ' those who have b een, ground down by
those above them in deliberate and active way.' (Zel Iiot, 1978). Etymologically the term refers to
downtrodden, disadvantaged, under privileged, dispossessed, deprived, handicapped, abused, humble, prostrate etc.
It implies both economic exploitation and cultural suppressi o n. According to Das and Massey, it is essentially a
•
political category for asse1tion of identity and mobilization for collective action , and connotes an ideology for
fundamental change in soc ia l structures and re lat io nsh ips1 In the administrative parlance it refers to Scheduled
Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). It is important to remember here that
although sociologically speaking the Scheduled Castes experienced the stigma of untouchability and were
recognised as Ati-Sudras or Avarna in the Hindu caste structure, all ex-untouchables were not included in the
'schedule', and all castes belonging to the ' sched u le' d id not experience 'untouchability'.

A substantial number of political leaders in the Constituent Assembly were deeply affected by the logic
of 'Hindu Nat io nalis m' . While moving the amendment to delete Scheduled Castes from the list of minorities, K.M
. Munshi said that ' the Harijans are part and parcel of the Hindu community and the safeguards are given to them to
protect their rights only till they are completely absorbed in the Hindu Community.' This view was not objected
to by any member of the Constituent Assembly. Jose Kananaikil said, 'as far as the Scheduled Castes were conce
rned, the Constituent Assembly made them like orphans adopted to a royal family. Those Scheduled Castes who
paid allegiance to Hinduism became legally part of the great Hindu family. Those who refused to offer allegiance
to it did not exist in the law. Yet the adoption was far from being a generous outpouring of the royal bounty to
the Scheduled Castes.

68
It did not make members of the royal famil y. The acceptance of the ' Hindu' Scheduled Castes as part of the
Hindu community and granting of special rights to them seem to have been more the results of a Hindu appi -
ehension and a response to the growing disenchantment of the Scheduled C astes, and only to them, was one
way to check the leakage from Hinduism. 2

The Dalits are of the view that the ruling classes in the Congress, in the late 1940s, wanted to block the
growth of the proletarian consciousness of Dalits by inducting them into the administrative and organisational
frameworks. They even regard Gandhi's Poona Pact and making of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as the Chairman of the
Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly were parts of the strategy to alienate the Dalits from the
mainstream. Even if they constituted nearly fifteen percent of the population of India, they could not become a
powerful factor in the electoral politics for nearly three decades.

The Dalit movement under the leadership of Dadasaheb Gaikwad became a radical one, and touched
the most sensitive nerve of the feudal structures in India. The alliance between the Republican Party of India
(RPI) and the Congress helpee the RPI members to be members of the S tate Assembly and Parliament.
This was indeed a grand strategy to contain the Dalit radicalism in Indian politics.

The lack of ideological coherence in the Dalit Movement led to the disintegration of the RPI in the 1960s,
and this process continued unabated till the birth of the Dalit Panthers in the early 1970s. With the birth of the Dalit
Panthers, there was a distinct paradigm shift in the Dalit politics. The Dalit movement acquired a proletarian -radical
class identity and got linked to the world-wide struggles of the oppressed people for their civil and political rights.
This revolutionary change in the accepted legacy of Dr. Ambedkar, being an ideological amalgam of Dr. Ambedkar
and Marx, could not sustain for long. The supporters of the orthodox Ambedkarism opposed the radical shift in the
paradigm of Dalit politics indicated by the manifestos of the Dalit Panther. They considered the Dalit Panther as an
ally of the Nexalite movement, and criticised their programmes as an offspring of the ten-point programme of the
Black Panther Party (BPP) of the USA. The Dalit Panther phase represented Dr. Ambedkar as a radical and a
committed rationalist thinker who perpetually strove for a radical outlook of the Dalit movement.

The decline of the Dalit Panther saw the emergence of the 'Bahujan' identity of the Dalit movement in India
under the leadership of Kanshiram. This movement reflected a different strategy, and was mainly obsessed with the
electoral politics of the day. Whereas the ' dalit' practically represelted only the Scheduled Castes, the Bahujan
encompassed all the SCs, STs, BCs, OBCs and religious minorities. It started as an apolitical organisation of the
government employees belonging to Bahujan identifying them to be resource of the above communities.
Subsequently this Bahujan identified itself into an agitating political group creatively coined as DS -4, the Dalit
Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti which eventually became a full-fledged political party-the Bahujan Samaj Party
(BSP).

The BSP has imparted a qualitative dimension to the Dalit politics, as a symbol of all the downtrodden
people of India, the emphasis being on only their castes and communities. The BSP has become a formidable
constituency in parliamentary parlance. The obsession with political power has taken the BSP away from the
fundamental values which Dr. Ambedkar propounded and cherished. Dr. Ambedkar's emphasis was on liberty,
equality, and fraternity whereas Kanshiram is more concerned with political and money power. Whereas Dr.
Ambedkar considered capitalism aild Brahm inism as the twin enemy of the Dalit movement, Kanshiram would
not hesitate to embrace them without any embarassment to his conscience, for furthering political equations.

Apart from broad political trends stated above there are number of regional outfits like Dal it Mahasabha in
Andhra Pradesh. Mass Movement in Maharastra, and Dalit Sena in Bihar, and many others. Some of these
organisations are interested only in political and electoral issues. Another trend in the contemporary Dalit movement
is towards spreading of Buddhism in India. A number of organisations consider Buddhism as the culmination of
Dr. Ambedkar's mission. They also highlight the policy of reservation in services of the Central and State
governments as well as public sector undertakings.

69
 It is surprising that although Dr. Ambedkar highlighted the role of the women that constitute the half of the
human race as a major factor in the Dalit movement, the contemporary Dalit politics has not made any
significant progress to transcend the bound ar ies of sanskr itis at io n. Their women folk symbolise the worn out
model of a Brahmin woman. It is also a sad commentary of history that except for a brief period under Dadasaheb
Gaikwad, the Dalit movement has not taken any important measure for the material development of Dalits at the
grass-root levels. It seems that the Dalit movements have been hijacked by petty leadership for their electoral
calcul ations. All said and done, the Dalit-Bahujan has nonetheless emerged as a significant factor in the electoral
politics of the contemporary politics. A brief overview of the Dalit movement would be incomplete without
reference to the process of Dalit assertion in the cultural and societal structures. In fact, since 1970s the term
Dalit has acquired a greate't\ momentu111 acquiring in itself connotations of active anger, assertion and pride.
According to Zll'i'ot, 'There is in the word itself an inherent denial of pollution, karma and justified caste hie -
rarchy.3

The increasing atrocities on Dalit communities in different parts of the country and somewhat casual
manner in which the reservation policy is being implemented by the State have created an ever -increasing conflict
situation in our societal structures. The somewhat the casual manner in which the reservation policy is being
implemented as a substitute for meaningful policy decisions that could ultimately lead to social jus tice, has
affected the very structural growth of the marginalised groups. It is also doubtful whether the Dalit leaders have
developed a sign of maturity and ability to work as pressure groups to further their interests. Moreover, their
participations in the proceedings of legislatures and Parliament, as also in other decision-making structures . The
Dal it movement still continues to be inadequate and marginal in its performance, and not yet moved from the
sphere of symbolic to substantial. The recent decisions of the Congress State governments to grant' reservation
for the privileged Brahmins', and the BJP's advocacy for' affirmative action for poor Muslims' have attracted
criticisms from the Dalit organisations. According to P.L. Mimroth, Convenor of the Centre for Dalit Human
Rights, 'The stand of both the parties is politically motivated. Their talk of providing reservation on the
economic basis is part of their game to outmanoeuvre each other and garner votes. " Reservation, he said, which is
an affirmative action policy designed to give Dal its their due share, should have nothing to do with economic
status of any community.' While analysing Dalit politics, one has to remember that the policy of protective
discrimination was implemented basically to remove caste inequalities and provide justice to the Dalits. It
seems that this very policy has brought about differential deveiopments among the Dalits. According to a study by
Uma Ramaswamy, ' The very success of the policy has brought about in its wake a new set of problems.

While on the one hand , protectionism attempts to mode ate the inequality between the Scheduled Castes
and the rest, on the other hand, it has engendered inequality among the Scheduled Castes themselves. The
exploitation of benefits by some section of these castes has pushed to the fore the differences rather than the
uniformities among them. 4

The conditions of vast majority of the Dalits has not improved during last five decades significantly,
despite an active poverty eradication programme. The State has to play a significant role as a saviour of the
deprived communities in the caste-ridden social structures of Ind ia. This would indeed be a major challenge to our
parliamentary democracy. To conclude in the words of Rajni Kothari, 'The Dal it expectation and strategy seems to
be designed to challenge the dominant castes by means of education, employment and special rights. in a struggle
against the system that begins with the challenging injustices within it, thinking of the struggle against
imperialism and other such things as a second order importance. 5

70
 REFERENCES
I. Das, Bhagwan and Massey, Ed., Dalit Solidarity (Delhi, 1995).
2. Kanana ikil , Jose, Scheduled Castes in the Constituent Assembly (Delhi. 1982). P.23.
3. Zell io t, E., 'Dali! : New Cultural Context for an Old Marathi Word', Asian and African Studies, 1-
2, I , 1_978.
4. Uma Ramaswamy , 'Protection and Inequality among Backward Groups·. Economic and Political
Week ly, vol. 21 , No . 9, March 1986.
5. Rajni Kothar i, ' Rise of the Dalits and the Renewed Debate on Caste ·. Economic and Political
Weekly, 25 June 1994.

71
 CHAPTER VII
THE NATION IN INDIAN THOUGHT
-S.B. George, Reader,
Department cf Political Science,
A.R.S.D. College
Like all social phenomena, nationalism is a historical category. It emerged in the social world at a certain
stage of evolution of the life of the community when certain socio-historical conditions, both objective and subjective,
matured. As E.H. Carr remarks, ' " nation", in the modern sense of the world, did not emerge until the close of the
middle ages.'1 Nation is a modern phenomenon . The term 'nation' took bi1th only after the end of tribal, slave and
feudal era. Nation is a very sophisticated and cultured term. This belongs to the very development of human beings.
At a certain stage of social, economic and cultural development, nations came into being. In E.H. Carr's words, " the
term nation has been used to denote a human group with the following characteristics:
(a) The idea of a common government whether as a reality in the present or past, or as inspiration
of the future.
(b) A ce1tain size or closeness of contact between all its individual members .
(c) A more or less defined terr itory.
(d) Certain characteristics (of which the most frequent is language) clearly distinguishing the
nation from other nations and non-national groups.
(e) Certain degree of common feeling or will , associated with a picture of the nation in the minds
of the individual members."2

The above definition carries all the important ingredients of a term 'Nation'. But the nation in Indian
Political Thought emerged in almost different way. Indian society is a product of many races and cultures. It is
necessary to recognize this fact to appreciate the complexity of the Indian society. The Indian concept of nation'
has its origin and growth with the advance of historical research. The most important fa ctor in sha ping the
growt h and development of India's political thought in ancient times must have been, such as: ''firstly, her
spirituality, the master key of the Indian mind ; Secondly, her stupendous vitality, her inexhaustible power o f li
fe and joy of life, her almost' unimaginably prolific creativeness: th ird ly, her strong intellectuality, at once
austere and rich, robust and minute, powerful and delicate, massive in principle and curious in detail." 3 Next to
influence the geniu s of the Indian people , as a factor in the development of their political ideas , may be their
historical development through centuries.

The development of nationalism in different countries followed their own respective social and cultural heri
tage. Every nation was born in its unique way. The process and growth of the concept of nation in Indian Thought
is very complex and multisided. Indian nation was developed in phases. Number of other factors, which influenced
the growth and structure of Indian 'nation' are such as the social structure of society, impact of foreign
invasions, ruin of Indus Valley civilization, settlement of Aryans in North India, religious factors, politica l
factors etc. Nation req uired civilization. "Civili zation means the formation of urban civic life as a leading feature of
the life of a whole country." 4 In the words of Earnest Geitner, ' it is the need for homo geneity which generates
nationalism.' 5 Below we shall discuss the rise and growth of ' nation ' in Indian Political Thought.

' Carr. E.H. (Chairman . Study group) Nat ional ism (1939) p.7 quoted from Desai. A.R. Social Background qf Indian Natio nalism
jl . XXIX .
' Carr. E.H. (Cha irman . Stu dy Gro up) Nationalism ( 1 9 39) quoted from Desai, A.R. Social Background of Indian Natwnalism p.xxx '
Sri Aurobind o. Ghoshal. U.N. A History of Indian Pol 1t1cal Ideas p.3.
' Kosarnb i. D.D. The Cullure a11d Civilization qf Ancient !11dia i11 Historical 0 111/i11e. p.53
; Spectacles a11d Predicaments: Essay in Social Theory. Cambrid ge Un iversity Press. 1 9 79. p.273 quoted from Poli tics and Beyond . Roy.
Ramashray p 1 5

71
 The emergence of Harappan Civilization led to the growth of community life in India. This well cultured
civilization did trade with far off civilizations. It also had political as well as social life as was evident from the coins
of that time. Nation is a product of "state + people and especially sovereign people. undoubtedly linked nation to
territory..."6. Cultural and religious practices prevailed at that time and they united and integrate the community.
Indus Valley Civilization was followed by Vedic age, in which Aryans invaded India and Dravidians were forced to
migrate towards Southern part of India. The culture of Aryans was totally different from that of Dravidians. They
were more a cattle-breeding commun ity, which at initial stage used to live in forests. While settled in forests they
wrote the Hymns of Rig Veda, the oldest known scripture. T here after, number of other Vedas such as Atharva,
Sama and Yaju came into picture. Now the question arises as to who were these Aryans? In the words of Romila
Thapar, "The Indo- Europeans emerged from the region of Caspian Sea and the southern Russian steppes, and
gradually divided into number of tribes which spread far a field in search of pasture, to Gre ece and Asia
Minor, to Iran. and to India, by which time they were called, 'Aryans' some time in the second millennium B.C.
The Aryans or lndo-Aryans descendants of the Indo-Europeans had remained for some time in Bactria and the
northern Iranian Plateau, but by 1500 B.C., they migrated into northern India through the passes in the Hindu
Kush Mountains" 7. The root of contemporary Indian culture and the emergence of 'nation' in Ancient Indian
Thought were laid in the fusion of Aryan culture with that of Dravidians. Conclusively in Vedic age, the king
emerged as the dominant power that ruled over the prajas (other people) and prajas followed the law of the king.
In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, " The diversity of India is tremendous; it is obvious; it lies on the surface and
anybody can see it . There is little in common, to outward seeming, between the Pathan of the Northwest and Tamil
in the far South".8 'The Pathans and the Tamils are two extreme examples; the others lie somewhat in between. All of
them have their distinctive features; all of them have still more the distinguishing mark of lndia.' 9 The two great
epics of ancient India-the Ramayana and the Mahabharta, deal with the early days of Indo-Aryans, their
conquests and civil wars, but they were composed and compiled later. Indian myths, stories and epics, are heroic in
conception and teach adherence to truth and the pledged word, whatever the consequences, faithfulness unto death
and even beyond, courage, good work and sacrifice for the common good. This imagined history, mixture of fiction
with fact, later on played with the passage of time in the minds of the people of India. Now the big question is of
Vikram Samvat calend ar. In April 2004 it will complete its 2060 years!Now throughout India Vikram Samvat is
celebrated with great zeal, which of course is justified. But, with whom the calendar is associated i.e.,
Vikramaditya the national hero, who pushed out foreign invaders and who is famous for his generosity. service for
others, courage, power, excellence, was bon in 4th century A.O . I-le fought against Huns . Now the question is
how he be connected with 57 B.C. from when the Vikram Samvat was began . This was done by few min d boggling
Indians who played with history in order to connect the traditional hero with the beginning of the 2059 years ago.
To make him more a national hero, they laid emphasis on his fight against foreigners and his desire to establish unity
of India under the national state. Infact Vikram's realm was confined to north and central India. But this is how
we can analyse the urge of nationalism and nationality and the birth and growth of ' nation ' grown up in Indian
Thought.

The division of labour and division of society was the product of Vedic Age . Due to this static structure
the Brahm in, Khastriya, Vaishya, and Shudra (four divisions of society on the basis of occupation) came up . Th i
social structure continued in India for another good 2000 years from the Vedic Age. Because of which the
growth of Indian culture was halted. India is not simply a unity of different states with different languages but it's a
big village consisting of innumerable cultures and traditions. India was invaded by several foreign invaders
especially Mughals, who ruled here for a considerable period. But they made a better adjustment with India
and comming led with Indian culture because of which it looked.

'' Hobsbawn, E..J. Na /ions and NrJttona lism. Programme. Myth . Reality since 1780 . Cambridgt: University Press, 1992, p.19.
' A History of Indi a, vol. I . p.29 -30
'The Discovery of India p.48
'' Ibid p 49.
72
as if, they were a part of India. The advent of British in India is the milestone for Indian concept of nation. After their
invasion the intelligentsia of Indian community stood up on its toes and from here onwards the mode rn concept of
nation took birth.

The economy and culture of pre-British India was unique. India had self-sufficient village communities,
which had survived the onslaught of foreign ki ngdoms , territorial siftings, and interstate struggles. They were
little republics having everything within and they were almost independent of foreign re lations . Barter system
was the sole trading system. which prevailed here. Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, English became masters
in turn, but the village communities remained the same. "This does not however mean that during its age long
historical existence, nothing happened to or inside the village. In fact while retaining its fundamental autarchic
characteristic and stationariness, the village was a theatre of considerable inner s ociety activity. The village people
had their own social festivals, a rudimentary stage (Ram Lila), religious gatherings (Kathas), and other forms of
collective activity. In the period of a titanic religious upheaval such as the rise of Bud dhism or of a new
tendency within the framework of Hinduism itself, it also happened that the preachers of the new religion or a
fresh interpretation of the old religion (schools and sects founded by Shankaracharya, Vallabhacharya , Ch aitanya,
Ramanuja and others) spread out to the villages with a view to convert the people to the new religion or cult. It
even happened that, as a result of such religious propagandist acivity. a village, which was overwhelmingly Hindu
before. became overwhelmingly Buddhist. or which was predominantly Vaishnavite, became predominantly
Shaivite. Such startling changes on the religious outlook of the people in the village, however, did not bring
about any fundamental change in the consciousness of the people, did not extend their co,1sciousness, did not
and could not engender and build up any national consciousness. The same narrow village perspective continued
to dominate the outlook of the villager. Instead of considering himself a Hindu, he considered himself a Buddhist, or
instead of feeling himself a Vaishnavite, he now felt himself as a shaivite. He never developed the consciousness of
being an Indian, which the growth of the national sentiment signifies. Even when he felt the unity of India, it
was only in a religious sense, i. e. India to him was the land of the Hindus who were united by the common
religion of Hinduism and not that of the Indians who inhabited the Indian territory and who were
economically and politically welded into a single'unit. It was the consciousness of a religio -ideological unity
and not that of a politico-economic unity (nationalisrn)." 10

In Pre-British India there was an absence of National Sentiment. Indian culture was glorified but not in
any national spirit. India was glorified in her art and culture (Kutub Min ar, i.e. tomb; which was the greatness of
monarchs or passion of love, i.e. the Royal Taj Mahal; Sati system, Widow-spinster ship, etc.). It was the art of
aristocracy or of the religious commun ity, Muslims or Hindu, not of the nation. The essential ingredients of
nation such as a common economic, social and state existence were absent in Pre-British India. Generally the
common economic life accelerates the growth of a common language, which is the means to consolidate the
community into a well-knit natio n. In the words of A.R. Desai, "the Nation, in different stages of its co nsolidation,
evolves the consciousness of a singk economic, and the urge for an independent state existence. It increasingly
evolves a culture which in song, sculpture, paint i ng, drama, novel , or sociological literature, expresses the needs
of development of the national society and the aspirations of the in d ividua ls , groups and classes comprising it for
a free unfettered and richer social, economic and cultural life." 11 British introduced economic reforms, which
chained India into one natio n. The impact of these economic reforms was not limited to one sphere of a country
but its impact was all-round. First time the whole nation followed common economic structure. This new capitalist
structure also created a new social structure i.e. the bourgeois, proletariat and the peasantry. The progressive sections
of the bourgeoisie, proletariat, and peasantry were however the result of new national economy. ·'These social
(national) classes emerged as a reaction to feudals as well as the imperialist rule.

'" Desai. A.R. Social Background of Indian Nationalism. p. 14-1 5

11 D,..: a, . A. R.. Ibid p. 21

73
They had their own conflicting class interests in proportion as they developed group consciousness, became
national in form through class in context, e.g. the culture of the class-conscious workers, which became socialist in
content and national in form. These growing cultures of the new classes, namely, the national bourgeoisie, the
national proletariat, the national petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry formed the totality of national culture in India,
which also included the cultures of awakening nationalities in different territorial zones of the country such as
the Bengalis, the Guj rat is , the Maharashtrians, the Karnatakis and others " 12 This type of national culture was
absent in Pre-British India because of lack of uniform economic system and the combination of such social and
economic classes. Infact, the nationalist movement of India was the direct product of excessive pressure
exerted by the British in terests on the Indian people and the various social classes co mposing it. So we can
conclusively says that the growth of nation .in Indian political thought begins right here. Indian concept of nation
was the result of exploitative economic po lic ies , resurgence of Indian social structure , destruction of tra ditional
village web and commercialization and Industrialization. of Indian economy by the British. Introduction of modern
means of transport such as railways, buses , and steams hips, united the people into a nation. They made it
possible to spread progressive social and scientific ideas among the people. Indian Nationalism wps
developed due to the introduction of modern education by the British. Every society for its economic
growth required kno wle dge. Pre-British India also had knowledge but minimal. Education in Pre-British India
was basically religious. Hindu society was caste-strat ified, where only Brahmin caste had exclusive right to preach
religious doctrines. For common people there were vernacular schools , which taught mainly reading , writing and
a bit of arithmetic. Women, the lower castes, and the peasants rarely received any education. Neither rationality
nor individuality could develop among the pupils of these schools. "The introduction of modern educa tion was
an event of great historical significance for In d ia. It was definitely a progressive act of the British rule." 13 And
this is also the turning point of Indian history. ' It is true that with the introduction of western learning in India a
new spirit of Intellectual quest was generated and it applied itself to re ligio us , soc ial, economic, and political
problems.' 14 'The intellectual renaissance of India has been a great causal factor in the rise of modern Indian natio
nalism'.15 In the words of J.N. Farquhar, modern religious movements in India, "out of clash of the new mechanical
civilization of the occident and the old pietistic and religious cultures of India, we find the emergence of a
new India." This was a period of revivalism as well, when the Indian renaissance movement deliberately moulded
and modelled the contemporary life on the basis of past scriptures such as Vedas, Upanishads etc. " As a defense
mechanism against the impact of an alien political power in the country, the old cultures of the land begun to
revive and reassert themse lves . A new humanist and cosmopolitan interpretation began to be put upon the old
writings . Sometimes attempts were made to find the germs of modern scientific conceptions in the old
scriptures" 16 Indian nationalism is the product of modern ed uc ation , which was introduced by British. The
knowledge of English had immeasurable advantages. Access to modern English literature was foremost among
them. The educated Indian who studied democratic principles of the West, was inspired by it and felt rebellious
against the reactionary social institutions (cast system, untouchability etc.) of a Pre-British era whose aim was to
enslave the individual and suppress his free initiative. "Indian literature, both Hindu & Muslim, of pre-British era
didn ' t include any work on nationalism. It was inevitable and can be historically explained by the fact that due to
economic backwardness , the Indian people were not socially or politically integrated into a nation." 17

The first expression of personal and political freedom was found in the writings of Raja Ram Mohan Roy
( 1772-1833), the founder leader of the Brahmo Samaj. His theory was co)1structed more on Indian framework of
Lokasamgraha (common social good). He stood against the caste system, and social evils such as
untouchability.

" Desai, A. R. ibid p.21

" Desa i. A.R., Ibid p. 28
" Verm a. VP. Modern In dian Poli 1rc a / Thought . p.04
" Verma, V P. Modern Indian Po/,11ca / Thought , p.04 '
1
' Venna , V P. Modern Indian Pohlica/ Thought. p.05

17 Desai. A. R.. Ibid p. 149

74
Liberty according to him is a priceless possession of the human being and he had a keen appreciation towards the
uncompromising freedom of the creative spirit. He worked hard against irrationality and superst itio n. He worked hard
against satipratha and child marr iage. But, his attitude was slightly different. He was not advocating nationalism in a
sense so as to go against the colonial power . He accepted them as ruler and as a representative of a renaissance ,
he approached them.

Swami Dayanand Sarawati (1824-1883) was a born fighter against injustice. Though, he is not a
political philosopher in a technical sense but his political expressions can be collected cumulatively from his
two works Satyarthaprakasha and Rigwedadidhasyabhmika. He held that the defects in the Indian character to be
responsible for India's downfall. In Satyarlhaprakasha he wrote that India's down fall, " is due to mutual feud ,
differences in religion, want of purity in life , lack of education, child marriage, in which the contracting parties
have no voice in the selection of their life- partners , indulgence , in carnal gratifications, untruthfulness, and other evil
habits, the neglect of the study of Veda, and other malpractices." 18 Dayanand offered a counter challenge to
western civilizations by way of Vedic revivalism. It was defensive protection against the influence of Islam and
Christianity. Dayanand is called by some authors as a pioneer of vernacular movement , which furthered the
rise of Indian Nationalism. After 1872 he used Hindi in his public speeches. He glorified the Vedic past of In
dia . He advocated Swarajya but not openly condemned the British imperialist rule. His nationalism was
restricted to particular section of society i.e. Hindu. Annie Besant ( 18 47-1933) was born an Irish, played a
significant role in the rise of nationalism in India. Her tho ughts are vital to understand the Indian concept of
nation because she has a honoured role in the annals of modern Hindu religious revivalism. The nation according
to her is a spiritual identity and a unique revelation of God. According to her , "National religion can be a fac tor
for the survival of the nation even when it has its own government and te rritory destroyed as happened in
the case of He brews . A nation becomes a state when a fixed territory and government are added to it." 19 She
further elaborated the fact that there is a distinction between Indian nationalism and western nationalism. Indian
nationalism had religious roots. For her nationhood is a spiritual phenomenon . She expanded the narrow meaning
of nationalism to the cosmo poli tanism . Rabindra Nath Tagore (1861 -19 41) follows the Mandukya Upanishad's
concept of 'Satyam, Shivam, and Advaitam '. In his words, " Ind ia stands before the c ivili zed world as an
embodiment of the ideal of unity through diversity. To see the On; in the world and within onese lf, to instal l
the One in the midst of the many, to discover It by knowledge, to establish It by actio n, to realize It in love and
to proclaim It in life-this is what India has been doing through the centuries in the face of danger and d ifficu lty,
and in times good or bad. When we shall discover in her history that central and eternal note, the gulf
separating our past from our present will disappear." 20 Tho ugh , he had intense love towards Indian nation but
he rarely acted in politics. For him nationalism fosters separatism and its aggressive nature can cause harm
to the civilizations of world at large.

Swami Vivekanand (Narendranath Nath Dutta), I 863-1902, was a young Calcutta born student, from a
Kayastha family of lawyers. He received a good western style education. This Vedantic Hindu missionary had an aim
of being a lawyer but his interaction with Ramakrishna changed the course of his life . This ' Hindu Napolean '
had chan g ed the course of Indian intell igents ia. He defined religion as the vital and moral force, which gives
strength to a person or to a nat io n. He wanted to have a fusion of the Kashatriya manhood and Brahman
intellectualism. He also like Swami Dayanand Saraswati stands against the evil practices of Hinduism. " He
condemned the doctrine of adhikarvada. This doctrine propounds the exclusion of the Shudra or the masses from the
benefit of the Vedic knowledge." 21 He denounced untouchability. According to him "there is one dominating
principle manifesting itself in the life of the each nation.

" Dr. Verma. VP. Modern Indian Political Thought p.44

, ., Besant. Annie. le ctures on Polilical Science ( 1918) p.33 quoted from Verma , VP. Modern Indian Politi cal Thought, p.63
' ' Tagore. Rabindra Nath. ' T he Me ssage of India s Iiistory". The Visvabharti Quarterly, vol. XX II, Autumn . 19 56, p.11 3. Quoted from Verma,
VP. p.85
" Verma. V.P. Modern Indian Political 71,ought. p. 11 5.

75
In each nation, as in music , there is main note, a central theme, upon which all others turn. Each nation has a theme
: everything else is secondary." 22 Bipin Chandra Pal and Aurobindo further elaborated his theory of religious
nationalism. His theory was further glorified by the fact that his principle of resistance, which consists of
fearlessness and strength, laid the foundation stone for the extremists to stand against the British. He wanted to
make Hinduism aggressive. His concept of nation was founded on aggression. According to him India should take
practical knowledge from Europe, and in exchange should teach religious wisdom to the world. In his
comprehensive theory of freedom, the only condition of growth is liberty. His concept of liberty is natura l right. He
did not advocate absolute liberty. But, he stood over the point that one should use his intelligence and body freely
i.e . natural liberty. For Rabindra Nath Tagore, nation is composed of individuals. Hence, noble virtues like
manliness, is sense of human dignity and all individuals should cultivate honour. "He harmonizes the individualistic
and the social approaches with the scales tipped in favour of the moral growth of inclividuals. True it is that the
nation is a comm unity."23 Therefore, he advocated that the political upliftment of a nation could be possible only
through raising the masses. Thus, his concept of nation has the following important characteristics- firstly, nat
ion 's important component is its members i. e. individuals. Secondly, he favours comprehensive theory of freedom
in which an individual can uplift oneself completely. Thirdly, according to him the roots of Indian nation are
religious. Fourthly, political upliftment was not possible without awakening the masses. Swami Ram Tirth ( l 873-
1906) believed in pure dynamic, spiritual nationalism. Though his writing were having a great quantum of
spiritualism than economic and political considerations yet the spirit of nationalism can be seen in it. For him, "The
land of India is my own body. the commorin is my feet; the Himalayas my head. From my hair flows the Ganges,
from my head come the Brahmaputra and the Indu s. The Vindhyachals are girt round my loins. The Coromandal is
my left and the Malabar is my right leg. I am the whole of Ind ia, and its east and west are my arms and I spread
them in straight line to embrace humanity. I am universal in my love. Ah! such is the posture of my body. It is
standing and gazing at infinite space; but my inner spirit is the soul of all. When I walk, I feel it is India walking
when I speak, I feel it is India speaking. When I breathe, I feel it is India breathing. I am India, I am Shankara, I am
Shiva. This is the highest realization of patriotism, and this is practical Vedanta." 24 Like Vivekananda his approach
towards nation is also re li gious , but with one remarkable difference i.e.' he denounced orthodoxy and flowered the
true Dharma . He hailed that Mother India is a de ity. Ramtirtha was a great Vedantist. But, he was not tied to the
old dogmas of the scriptures.

Dr. Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-191 7), the grand old man of India, was first of long series of such men,
who drew the plans and laid the foundation for India's self-government. With his famous theory of ' the drain' of
India's wealth to Britain, Dadabhai Naoroji, sounded the keynote of Indian economic nationalism. Despite
condemning the British rule in India, he never held that violence would be the only solution to get rid of British.
" Besides economic drain, Dadabhai also referred to 'the moral dra in ' of the country." 25 His concept of nation is
slightly different from that of others. He advocated the extension of education (western). Because "' Educat ion is
not only a method of personal illumination but it generates in the minds of men a consciousness of right. He hoped
that the spread of education and the accumulation of administrative experience would hasten the process of the
attainment of Swaraj. Hence he demanded, "free and compulsory primary education, and free higher education
of every kind ." 26 Mahadev Govind Ranade ( 1841-190 I), like Comte and Hegel, accepted the concept of society
as a complex organism. He was very keen to form social and national character by way of re moving baseless
superstitions. He wanted to eliminate the following "flaws of Hindu society-
I. Aloofness from contacts with the external world.

12 Verma. VP. Modem Indian Political lhought. p.11 7

' ' Verma. VP. Modern Indian Political Thought. p. 1 20
" Ram Tirtha : ..The Future of Ind ia'·. In Woods of God- Reali zation. vol. IL p.60. quoted from Verma. VP. Modern Indian l'olitical 771011gl11.
p.135
21 V rma , VP. Modern Indian Political 7710 11gh1. p.146

,,. Verma. VP. Modern Indian Polilical 711011ght. p. 1 53

76
 II. . Submission to external authority and not to the voice of conscience,
Ill. Maintenance of social subordination, social distance and caste
arrogance. IV . Passive acquiescence in the perpetuation of evil, and
V. Reluctance to excel in the secular departments of life ."27

Ranade used Maratha history for the upliftment of Maharashtra. This unique experiment helped in
nation makin g, because it was a unity of a whole population bound together by common religion, language, rae
and literature. This nation-building is a modern one based on common religion, race and literature. He, "synthesized
the idealistic and individualistic orientations to the nature of the state." 28 Surendra Nath Banerjea (1848-1925) was
inspired by Joseph Mazzini's (1805-1872) self-sacrifice, sincerity of heart and splendid character. For him if India
has to have a stand in front of the world, she required unity. Understanding between Hindus and Muslims formed
a major plank in the moderate's platform. These Moderates had strong faith in the Imperialist British to the extent
that they will provide self- government to them. It is for this reason that their approach to 'nation' was cool and
moderate in character. They had a submissive nature.

Gopal Krishna Gokhle (1866-1915), the servant of India, was one of the most respected of India's
statesme n. In 1905 he was a member of a delegation, which went to England to stop the passing of a bill,
which dealt with partition of Bengal. He supported the Swadeshi Movement. He was the champion of the
cause of untouchables. He favoured decentralization. He had a deep concern towards the concept of nation.
He wanted Hindu community to come forward and help other commun ities . Rule of majority was put
forwarded by him. He favoured spiritualization of politics. He did his best to advocate the way of unity in
diversity.

The marriage of politics and religion was pronouncedly seen after the emergence of Extremists in the
National Platform. They advocated aggressive nationalism with the help of religion. They used language, history and
religion as their weapons and means to create support and unify westernized elite with the illiterate peasantry . The
activities of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) were mainly confined to Maharashtra. He was the real founder of
vigorous, aggressive and valiant nationalism. He published his ideas about political liberty and natural rights th rough
Kesari. In 1896-97 he referred to Home Rule and talked of Swaraj. He utilized Indian Labour movement for spirit
of independence. He tried his best to awaken the people for moulding them into a nation. "Tilak's nationalism was
influenced by the western theories of national independence and self- determination." 29 Hence, Tilak' s philosophy
of nationalism was a synthesis of the Vedantic ideal of the spirit as supreme freedom and the western conception of
Mazzini, Burke, and Mill and later on of Wilson. This synthesis he expressed in terms ofSwaraj, a Vedic term
which was used in Maharashtra to indicate the Maratha policy of Shivaji." 30 According to him Swaraj (nation) was
a Dharma. His nationalism is revival of orientation. He put moral and spiritual enthusiasm to the nation through the
messages of Vedas and Gita. Nationalism for him was a psychological phenomenon whose roots wer e in the deep
old sentiments of tribal patriotism. By celebrating Ganapati Utsava at large, he reinforced the national sentiments
among the masses. According to him, the celebration of Shivaji festival is the prime duty of Hindus . He used
religious celebrations as a golden opportunity to blend the uneducated and educated on a common national platform.
"Nationalism according to Tilak, is not a visible and concrete entity but is a kind of sentiment, an idea and in
generating this idea the historical memories of the great figures of country play a significant pait." 31 He,
"emphasized the psychological conception of nationalism and said that a feeling of common belongingness was
essential for constituting an agglomeration of people into a nation." 32 Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) was not only
an extremist but also a philosophical analyst of Indian nationalism and its development.

" Verma. VP. Mod ern In dian Polilical Thought. p. I 59

" .Vcrnrn, VP. Mo dern lndw11 Political 7110ught. p.168
'" Verma. VP. Modern l11dia11 Political Thought. p.224-2 25
'" Verm a. VP. Modern Indian Palittcal Thought. p.225
" Verm a. VP. Modern In dian Pohti cal Thought. p.227
'' Kelkar. N.C. Life And Times Of Tilak p.486-87 quoted from Verma . VP. Modern Indian Political Thought . p.24 1

77
He advocated, "The organic theory" of a nation. According to which nation is not mechanical contract but "is an
organism and is informed with an all pervasive intelligence and moral bond." 33 Nation is the extension of men
(Viral purusha). Pal declared in an article, " In a nation, the individuals composing it· stand in an organic relation
to one another and to the whole of which they are limbs and organs. A crowd is a collection of indi viduals; a nation
)s an Organism, the individuals are its organs. Organs find the fulfillme!1t of their ends, not in themselves but in
the collective life of the organism to which they belong. Kill the organism-the organs cease to be and to act.
Paralyse the organs , the organism also ceases to live and work. An organism is logically prior to the organs.
Organs evolve, organs change , but the organism remains itself all the same . lndividua!s are born, individuals die ,
but the nation liveth forever."34 Pal with Aurobindo were responsible for resurrecting New India. His Divine
Democracy' consists in, 'the Swaraj of India was to be a Swaraj of the Indian people .' Lala Lajpat Rai ( 1865 -
1928) was a staunch nationalist. According to him every nation had the fundamental right to fix and work out its
ideals and any interference with its right was unnatural and unjust. His concept of nation required the character of
citizens . He wanted to cultivate in Indians the high sense of public duty and public morality. Sri Aurobindo (1872-
1950) had in 1892 become a member of ' Lotus & Dagger· - a secret society whose members pledged
themselves to the emancipation and recon s truct io n of lndia.' 35 According to him, ·'Nationalism is simply the
passionat;! aspiration for the realization of th e divine unity in the nation, a unity in which all the component
individuals, however, various and apparently unequal their functions as political, social or economic factors are yet
really and fundamentally one and equal." 36 His cosmopolitan nation's concept was universally acknowledged. His
theory of an exa lted , purified and sanctified nationalism was an important contribution to Indian political thought.

Mohan Das Karam Chand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi) ( 1869- 1948), bitterly condemned western
democratic politics and favoured spiritualization of politics. He had given totally different interpretation of
Swaraj. According to him "The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India
because of their strength, but because we keep them...... They came to our country originally for purposes of trade.
Recall the company Bahadur. Who made it Bahadur? They had not the slightest intention at the t ime of
establishing a kingdom. Who assisted the company's officers? Who was tempted at the sight of their silver ? Who
bought their goods? History testifies that we did all th is . In order to become rich all at once we welcomed the
company's officers with open arms . We assisted them. If I am in the habit of drinking bhang and a seller thereof
sells it to me, am I to blame him or myself? By blaming the seller shall I be able to avoid the habit? And , if a
particular retailer driven away will not another take his place? A true servant of India will have to go to the root of
the matter. If an exces:; of food has caused me indigestion, I shall certainly not avoid it by blaming water. He is a
true physician who probes the cause of d ise ase, and if you pose as a physician for the disease of India, you
will have to find out its true cause ." 37 His concept was totally different. For him the fallacy lies with the nature
of Indians and not with Br itish . Further he said that petition without force has no value. And Passive
Resistance, that is, force of the soul. is matchless.

Deshabandu Ch itta Ranjan Das ( 1870-1925) believed in the hearty co-operation of Hind us and
Mos le ms. He realized that aggressive nationalism is a threat to world peace. He said, "Nationalism is the process
through which alone will world peace come. A full and unfettered growth of nationalism is necessary for
world peace just as full and unfettered growth of individuals is necessary for nationality....The essential truth of
nationality lies in th is , that it is necessary for each nation to develop itself express itself, and realize itse lf, so
that Humanity itself may develop it self, express itself and realize itself." 38

" Verm a. VP. Aloder'n In dian Po litical Tho11gh1. p 283

" Verm, a V I'. Modem In dian Polilical Tho11gh1. p.283
' 1 Verma. VP. Modem /11dian /Jo lilical Thought. p.303-304 .
"· 13and c Mataram, September 22. 1 9 0 7 quo te d from Verma, V P. Modern Indian Political Tho ught. p. 305
" Ga ndh, i Mahatm, a Hind Swara_j p. 3 5
" Ve rm a, V P. Modem Indian l' olilica l 7h o 11gh1. p.47 1

78
Absolutely new twist and turn to the concept of ' nation' was provided by M.N. Roy (Manavendra Nath Roy)
(1886- 19 54). He proclaimed India to be a ' multi- national ' . In his New Humanism he said that nationalism
is not the final stage of his social ph iloso phy. According to him, it neglects social questions. Hence, for him in place
of nationalism. world brotherhood in needed. Jawarharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was a great fanatical student of his-
tory. Though he was a great nationalist but he had not promulgated any new theory of nationa lis m. He believed in
the objectivity of the fundamental unity of India foster on cultural foundations "' wh ich were not religious in the
narrow sense of the term." According to him 39 "Nationalism is essentially a group memory of past
achievements, traditions and experience, and nationalism is stronger today than it has ever been... Whenever
a crisis has arisen nationalism has emerged again and dominated the scene, and people have sought comfort
and strength in their old traditions." One of the remarkable developments of the present age has been the
rediscovery of the past and of the nation." Nehru was an in ternat io nalis t, believer in the creative possibilities of
human nature.
,

Indian nation required the Emotional Integration of the different cultures and races prevailing.
Concept of nat io n had experienced fusion of different thoughts over the centuries. In India especially becau se
of typic al and unique lineage of thought we had cultured a totally different conception of 'nation'. Religion
plays an important role in the formulation of Indian Nation. According to Ashis Nandy, "The Hindu natio na
lis ts subscribe to this assumption in their conviction that there is no genuinely nationalist position other than the
irs. This egregiously overlooks the fact that at present , with all the obsessive globalization and surr ender to
the demand s of international capital and the credit agencies of the West, it is nationalism that is and must be a
central plank in any genuinely Left (Leftist) programme that resists this tendency. Equally, on the other hand,
Nandy subscribes to the assumption for the quite different reason that he believes that nationalism is the single
and common explanatory category that underlies the wrongs of the seemingly diverse and opposed standpoints of
both secularism and Hindu nationalism." 40 Modern Indian Political Thought revo lve s around the concept of
Indian ' nation' . " In India, the debates on minority rights and multiculturalism within political theory have mostly
revolved round the relationship between the various religious commun it ies , particularly the Hindus and the
Muslims." 41 That is why the ·nation' in Indian se nse is not one religion and one culture but the unity
in diversity of different religions and different cultures.'' Aloka Parasher-Sen stated that multi-ethnic and
multi-religious nation-states like India. born after the colonial intervention, find it difficult to identify a single
criterion for explaining cultural d iffere nces. 42 The whole confusion is due to the fact that ancient concept of
nation lost its meanin g in the modern Indian literature. While answering a question, ' do Multicultural Individuals
Require a Multicultural State?' Sarah Joseph, said '' Indian communitarians have advocated building the state around
and encompassing culture rather than around sovereignty and proced ures. Respect for different cultures cou ld be
based on the tolerance. which has evolved in the society over time." 43 We are leading towards one natio n and
that is a GLOBAL VILLAGE. It is for this reason that it becomes far more necessary to understand the neutral
conception of ' Nation' .

'" Nd1 ru. fawaharlal. The Discovery of I nd ia. p.455

•• Bhargava . Ra jeev. Secularism And Its Criti cs. p. 3X5. O,ford India Paperback s. 1999
• Deh. Kushal. Mapp ing M11/t1c 11/ 111ralis111. p.14. Rawat Pub li cations. 2002 "
1

Deb. Kushal. Mapping M11/1i cult11ra /1s111. p. 4 1 , Rawat Pub li cat ions. 2002 "
Deb. Kushal. Mapp111g A /11/11 c 11/t11ra!ts111. p. 1 70. Rawa t Publi cations. 2002

79
 CHAPTER-VIII

RELIGION AND POLITICS

Dr. K.K. Panda

(a) Tolerance (b) Accommodation (c) Secularism / Communalism

"Religious fundamentalism and religious nationalism are more appropriately applicable to religiously
singular societies as in European Christian or West Asian Islamic societies. In Christian Europe, religious
nationalism is weaker in the periphery where national identity was more secure and less aggressive.
Where the origin myths of the nation which connect it to religion (e.g., Anglican Protestantism in the
UK), are old and the unions of nation and religion more relaxed, when external threat is not strong, then
religious consciousness generally, as well as its relationship to nationalism, is dormant and weak." 1 "But
even where tendencies and sentiments of religious nationalism are stronger ( e.g., Greece, Poland, Belgium,
Croatia), there also exist sign ficant countervailing forces in the shape of the earlier institutionalization
of secular-democratic discourse."2 Religion is the system of theological beliefs and dogmas. It is also a
vital basis for identity formation. Religion is a moral force. which gives strength to a person or to a
nation. Politics is the art of governance. If politics is the last refuge of scoundrels and religion, the opium
of the masses, any nexus between the two is bound to spell doom. Religion is the root of most of the
profound and permanent values of life while politics is about recognition and conciliation of opposing
interests within a given unit of rule. We cannot dismiss the idea of the relationship etween politics and
religion. This was the sole reason of introduction of secularism in Indian Constitution. "The liberal
democratic vision of secularism is generally seen as characterized by three principles :-
l. Liberty and freedom of religion;
2. Citizenship, and the right to equality and non-discrimination; and
3. Neutrality, and the separation of state and religion." 3
''The first two principles have posed little controversy in the Indian context. Rather, the right to
freedom of religion and the right to equality and non-discrimination are generally recognized as important
constitutional values in their own right as well as a foundation of Indian Secularism." 4 The third
principle i . e . relation between religion and politics, is the main cause of problem. To understand the
relation between religion and politics it's necessary to analyse the concepts of 'Toleration'
Secularism/Communalism and ' Accommodation'.
TOLERANCE
The principle of ' Tole ration' is derived from the cultural traditions of Indian society. "One of the
major issues in the understanding of Indian history is the manner of cultural development and assimilation
of various sections in the cultural stream. The second is the nature of the state in India during various
historical phases. As far as the first is concerned, two ideal prototypes have been put forward-first, the
alleged assimilation of the Dravidians into Aryan culture, and second, the assimilation of the Scythians,
Huns, etc., in the Hindu fold later on." 5 The whole situation changed significantly after the arrival of
Muslims in India. In the words of Dr. R.C. Majumdar, Muslims "did not merge themselves into this
pattern and form with the Hindus as a single type of homogeneous culture." 6 For him both the
communities were, " permanently divided into two powerful units, which did not prove amenable to a
fusion or even any close permanent co-ordination." 7 In the words of M:K. Gandhi, "India cannot cease to
be one nation because people belonging to different religions live in it.

' Mart i n. D. ( 19 78), A General Theory of Secularization (Oxford: Blackwell), Chapter 3. quoted from Deb, Kushal. Mapping Mu lticulturalism.
p.208
2 Deb. Ku sha l. Mapping Multiculturalis m. p.208

' Crossman. Brenda and Kap ur. Ra tna, Secularism 's Last Sigh? p. 56.
' Ibid. p. 56-57 .
' Ed. Majumd ar, R.C. and other s. The Ddhi Sul,ta 1ate, 1960, p. XXVlll (Vidya Bhavan Series. Vol. VI) quoted from Chandra. Salish,
Historiog raphy. Religion And State In Medieval In dia, p.33
" Ibid. p. 33
7 I bid. p.. 33-34

. 80
The introduction of foreigners does not necessarily destroy the nation: they merge in it. A country is one
nation only when such a condition obtains in it. That country must have a faculty for assimilation. India
has never been such a country. In reality there are , as many religions as there are individuals: but
those who are conscious of the spirit of nationality do not interfere with one another's religion ...lf the
Hindus believe that India should be peopled only by Hindus-, they are living in dreamland. The Hindus, the
Mahommedans, the Parsis and the Christians who have made India their country are fellow countrymen,
and they will have to live in unity, if only for their own interest. In no part of the world are one nationality
and one religion synonymuus terms; nor has it ever been so in lndia." 8 Though the statement given by
the legend that it's impossible to assimilate both the religions, is somehow true, but still the Framers of the
Constitution of India found the alternative of this problem i. e., Secu lar ism. The Indian concept of
'secularism' is different from Western one because it includes ' Tole rat ion' as another important ingredient.
"Toleration has been cast as the characteristic of the Majority Hindu Community." 9 Concept of 'Toleration'
needs democratization. This requires the delinking of ' Tole rat ion' with that of majoritarian and
religious foundations.
" Religious conception of ' Toleration ' is based on the idea that there are different forms of worship and
religious practice that ultimately all lead to the same place. It is based on the idea that underneath the
surface manifestations of these different religious beliefs, practices and forms of worship, is a common
religiosity. This religious 'Toleration' is based very much on religion itself- on recognizing the legitimacy of
different religions.This conception of ' Toleration' may appear to be extremely useful in the context of a
religious pluralistic society, particularly one characterized by an increasing erosion of respect for religious
minorities, as is the case in contemporary India...Moreover, it is concept of 'Toleration' that does not extend
beyond the ' Tolerat ion' of religious difference. This religious 'Toleration' could not address the
importance of tolerating those who think, act and live d iffere ntly, if those differences were based on
something other than reli gion." 10 Principle of 'Toleration' in strict religious sense must apply not only
for promoting the respect of differences between the religions but also to protect the other danger zones of
separation.
Political perception of ' Tolerat ion' therefore, has much important role to play, because it is capable
in accommodating the conflicts and cleavages. "In terms of legal and political discourse, 'Toleration' would
no longer need to be derived from ancient sources but rather, approached as a constitutional value in its
own right. This political norm would begin from the most basic premise of ' Tole rat ion ' - accepting
people and their practices despite our d isagreemen_t s and disapproval. It means not only accepting
differences, but accepting those differences that at some level we find un acceptable." 11 The courts should
do this work of disentangling the ' Toleration' from its religious and majoritarian basis. But, "when the
Supreme Court has attempted to base its concepti rn of 'Toleration', in religion (as in the Ayodhya 12
decision), it has failed to adequately pluralize this ' Toleration' , resting instead on the unstated norms of the
majority. But when the Court has based its conception of secularism and in turn, 'Toleration' on the
Constitution itself (as in the Bommai case' ), it has been on much stronger ground. The courts should
not feel compelled to search ancient texts to legitimatize the rightful place of 'Toleration' in the Indian
Constitution, but rath er, should confidently assert 'Toleration' as its own constitutional value."14 'Toleration'
needs a neutral approach. In other words, it requires more than the mere 'Toleration'. It demands adoration
for cultural diversity, which requires 'a more active demand than ' Toleration' , for it may call for
accommodation of subgroup practices and, therefore, changes in dominant institutions'. 15 Therefore,

' Ga ndh i. M.K., Hind Swar i, (1908) p.44-45

'' Crossman . Brenda . Kapur Rillna . Secularisms last Sigh? p. 117
'" Ibid. p. 121
11 Crossma n. Brenda . Kapur Ratn a. Sernlan sm s, / as! Si_g/,? p. 123

" Dr. M . Isma il Faruqu1 and Oih ers etc. v. Union of India and Others etc.·. 1994 (6)° SCC 360
" S. R. Bommai v. Union or India ( 1 9 94) 3 SCCI
14 Crossman . Brenda . Kapur Raina . Sec11/ an sm s l as! Sigh' p. 1 25 "

Ibid. p 126

81
the view presented by the Hindu Right Majorities that they are tolerant towards other religions
should be taken a back seat because it provided a -vision of dominant religious group. This view is
locating ' Toleration' to others only to the xtent that those communities are seen to accept and practice
a similar vision of it. "Tolerance requires us to accept people and permit their practices even when we
strongly disapprove of them. Tolerance thus involves an attitude that is intermediate between
wholehearted acceptance and unrestrained opposition.'' 16 Further we will discuss the concept of
'Accommodation' in relation to ' religion and politics'.
ACCOMMODATION
‘Accommodation is an agreement or corripromise between different people or groups, which enables
them to exist together without trouble." 17 ‘Accommodation’ is an important ingredient of 'Indian Secu
larism'. Indian Constitution considers an individual as a citizen, and not as a member of a particular
religious group. The concept of 'Accommodation' presupposes that there is one dominant majority
religion and that religion has its own characteristics. 'Dominant Majority Religion' accommodates other
religions and cultures in its own main stream. In India, Hinduism is considered as majority religion.
"Indian law permits application of different bodies of family law on religious lines, permits public laws,
like those of religious trusts, to be differentiated according to religion, and permits protective or
compensatory discrimination in favour of disadvantaged groups, which may sometimes be determined in
part by religion. The penal law in India is extraordinarily solicitous ofreligious sensibilities and undertakes
to protect them from offence. The electoral law attempts to abolish religious appeals in campaigning. In
all these areas courts must determine the nature and boundaries of a particular religion. But, beyond this,
the state is empowered generally to use its broad regulative powers to bring about reforms in religious
institutions and practices, and this power is wider with regard to Hinduism than it is in relation to other
religions ." 18
According is a dream of the minority that wishes to shape the majority in its own image, which
wishes to impose its will upon history but lacks the power to do so under a democratically
organized polity. According to majority's view 'Accommodation' is an empty-headed word, because
they do not know whether it is desirable to privatize religion, and if it is, how this may be done.
But the problem of accommodation is not a small problem. In India the political parties have
politicall/exploited this problem of 'Accommodation'. The demolition of 'Babri Masjid' clearly
proved tht; failure of adoption of modern concept of 'secularism'. The espousal of' Accommodation' and
'Toleration' to the concept of secularism is the only solution available. The cosmopolitan intellectuals
in India have been insensitive to the traditions of interreligious understanding in their societies. "It is
the awareness of this political process that has convinced a small but growing number of Indian
political analysts that it is from non- modern Ind ia, from the traditions and principles of religious
tolerance encoded in the everyday life associated with the different faiths of India, that one will have to
seek clues to the renewal of Indian political culture." 19
"In the context of defending the importance of secularism in contemporary India, it is not in any way
essential to make any claim whatsoever about how Muslim emperors of the past behaved-whether they
were sectarian or assimilative, oppressive or tolerant. There is no intrinsic reason why a defence of
India's secularism must take a position on what, say, the Mughals did or did not do. The 'guilt' of Muslim
kings, if any, need not be 'transferred' to the 110 million Muslims who live in India today." 20 Though
according to the History there is no consistency in the behaviour of the Mughals. Some of them were
oppressive to their subjects and some had a very warm feeling towards the Hindus. It had noted in history
that Aurangzeb was anti-Hindu. He imposed special taxes on Hindus and destroyed some of the temples
too. But, because of him, to consider whole Muslim community as anti-Hindu is a fa:sification of history.

"' Bhargava, Rajc:ev. Sernlan sm And Its Critics. p.54

17 Collin s Cobuild English Dicti onary (1997), p.11
" Bhargava. Ra jc:cv. Secularism And !rs Critics. p.270
,., Ibid. p. 337
'" Ibid. p. 474

82
Akbar ( 1556 - 1605) was deeply interested in Hindu philosophy and culture, and he attempted to establish a
synthetic religion (Din-1-Ilahi). He followed the policy of ' Accommodation ' to assimilate other religions.
'There are more Muslims in India than in any other country save Indonesia. Similarly, there are more
Hindus in India than in any other country . There are also more Christians in India than in many countries
recognized as Christian. But India is not a Hindu country or a Muslim country or a Christian country. It
belongs to all of them and the millions of followers of other religions as well." 21 Not only Hinduism but
Islamic thought also had a decisive impact on Indian culiure. The practice of Islam itself reflects Indian
influence, which synthesises with existing beliefs. Maulana Azad in his presidential address to the plenary
session of the Indian National Congress in 1940, said. ·'I am a Muslim and profoundly conscious of the fact
that I have inherited Islam 's glorious traditions of the last thirteen hundred years. I am not prepared to
lose even a small part of that legacy...) am equally proud of the fact that I am an Indian, an essential
part of the indivisible unity of Indian nationhood, a vital factor in its total make-up without which its noble
edifice will remain incomplete. I can never give up this sincere claim. It was India's historic destiny that its
soil shou ld become the destination of many different caravans of races, cultures and religions. Even before
the dawn of history's morn i ng, they started their trek into India and the process has continued since.'' 22
The concept of ' Accommodation ' is born out of 'Majority Hindu Religion' because, only when one
religion thinks itself to be dominant and others to be the subgroups, only then the started giving due
recognition to subgroups in the name of ' accommodation' . Accommodation requires an acceptable minimum
stand ard of human interaction between the communities. In the words of Gandhiji, "I do not want my
house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to blow
about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any. "23 " A nation is
distinguished from the national minority by the fact that its members occupy a definite terr itory, usually
speak one language, above all live a common economic life, and further have a common psychological
structure expressed through its culture...The members of a national minority, such as the Indian Muslims
and the depressed classes, are interspersed over the entire state territory. They are generally united by a
common religion or labour under some common specific social grievance, when democratic conditions
do not prevail." 24
Therefore the search here is of a new innovative and indigenous concept in place of ' Indian Type
Western Secularism', which consists of ' Tolerance' and ' Accommodation ' as important ingredients. Secu
larism, i.e., Tolerance and Accommodation provides a platform to the 'Majority Hindu Religion ' instead of
providing a neutral approach towards all the prevailing religions. India is a ' Multicultural Society'.
Hence, she has to follow ' Multiculturalism'. It was in 1990's only, when the issues concerning
multiculturalism and minority rights have come to the forefront. In India, the demoIition of Babri Masjid in
1992 shook the secular basis of Indian democracy. Multiculturalism demands 'fusions of the extreme
horizons' (Hinduism and Islam). Secularism has emerged from the dialectic of modern science and
Protestantism and not from simple repudiation of religion and rise of rationalism. " ...culture as comprising
three components (i) a society (people and their institutions ); (ii) a civilization (texts and artifacts produced
by the people); and (iii) a mentality (the codes that inforrn the former two)" 25 " Mu lticultu rali sm, as a
policy device, serves the purpose of retaining the monopoly of the state. Its impact then depends on who
does the state belong to. If it is made up of a dominant group (class, estate, caste), it will lead at best to a
growth of dominance at the cost of dominated sub-systems and worst to sociocide of indigenous ethnic
societies. On the other hand, if the state is truly democratic, its effect depends on the correspondences and d
iscrepancies between the conceptualisations of the pa1ticipating cultures in terms of their indigenous
knowledge systems."20
" Ga ndhi . So n ia. Contl 1c t and Cocx1stcnce in our age. Semina r 521- .lanu ary 2003. p. 38
" Ibid. p. 39
'' Ibid. p. 39
'' Desa i. A R. So c ,a/ Background of /11d,an Na 10111ali. rn1. p. 36 0-36 1 ''
Deb. Kush al. Mapping M11 /11rn /111ro lis111. p.277
;,. Deb. Ku s ha l. Mappmg M 11/ 11cu/111ra /1s111. p.288-289

83
 SECULARISM/COMMUNALISM
-Dr. K.K. Panda
Secularism is the most pressing issue in the contemporary Indian political system. In a multi-religious
society like ours. secularism cannot be merely explained and understood as the separation of politics or
the State from the religion. It can neither be understood as an alien, intolerable , and modernist imposition
of the Western concept of secularism on the Indian society, nor it could be ascertained simply as a
religious, moral-political reconstruction of the contemporary society. The Indian Constitution requires the
State to be equally tolerant of all religions. The Indian model of secularism, as envisaged by the founding
fathers of the Constitution, neither supports the theory of 'wall of separation' advocated by the Western-
oriented critics of secularism nor it stands for theocratic fundamentalist approach or orientation of the
statecraft. It is in deed an assimilation of the Nehruvian concept of a democratic state and the Gandhian
politics of 'satya' and 'ahirnsa'. An ethico-political approach to the statecraft is the need of the ho ur. A
creative synthesis of the basic tenets of religious values and the western democratic norms and outlook
can alone rein force a sense of human solidarity and a common commitment to the core values of human
civilization such as respect for life, liberty, justice and equality, mutual respect, caring and integrity, what
Gandhi calls a climate of creative co-existence.
The Indian Constitution emphasizes on the equal tolerance of all religions, ' sarva dharma samabhav',
simultaneously upholding the basic spirit of democracy , the separation of politics from religious spheres, and
yet after fifty-five years of democratic forms and governance, various religious groups have distorted the basic
philosophy of our Constitution, and have used it as an economic-political phenomenon to further what is
often referred to as communalism, a perverted form of secularism. What is important therefore is to analyse the
concept of secularism/ communal ism in the context of India 's contemporary socio-political-economic realities
that might enable us to understand as to why communalism often springs up and controls the systemic
interaction process despite constitution makers' conscious efforts to counter its evil influences. In the early of
In dependence, it was thought that secularism would develop as a consensus - value to neutmlize the
hegemonic orientations of state policy on secularism.
Secularism (often translated as 'dharma nirapeksata) as a concept of state policy was first used at the
end of the Thirty years War in Europe in 1648. The secularism was understood then as a process of
transfer of properties of the Church to the princes. The similar process took place after the French
Revolution. During the 1850s, George Holyoake, used the term ' secular' to refer to the rationalist
movement. In Europe, the process of ' d ifferent iat io n or separation' of the political sphere from the
religious ones gathered momentum during the period of Enlightenment. This process by which' sectors
of society and cultures are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols became known as
' secularisation ' or desacralisation of the world.1 The 'secularization' , then widely impIied apart from reference
to the separation of religion from poli tics, decreasing role of religion , emphasis on rational and worldly
factors rather than supernatural ones, the replacement of the ' sacred' or 'mysterious' conception of the
world with the view that both world and society could be rationally explained or manipulated or
socially engineered' , and a view of religion and religious beliefs and institutions as ' human constructions and
responsibilities rather than as divinely ordained mysteries 2 .'
In India, the term ' secularism' not only contains all the elements as referred to above, but has an expansive
connotation. It is indeed, sui generis, in character. The Constitution of India even did not contain the word
'secular'. It i s only in 1976 amendment, the term ' sec ular ' became a part of the Indian Constitution. Although
the original Constitution of India did not contain this term, it had enough provisions to ensure the Indian state of
its secular (non-theocratic and non-communal) character. It was on the basis of these provisions of the
Constitution, the full bench of the Supreme Court in 1973 declared that 'secularism' is a constitutive feature of
the ' bas i structure' of the Consti tut io n. In the West , the antonym of the term ' secular ' is ' religious' ,
whereas in India, the antonym of ' secular ' is 'communal'. One has to be cautious about pluralism of religions
in India. The emphasis in the Indian Constitution is on the wholistic nature of all religions, not on the 'wall
of separation' between the state and religion.
84
 •
A leading professor of law, P.K. Tripathy, pointed out that the framers of the Indian Constitution '
contemplated a secularism which is the product of India's Social experience and genius. 3 The main
provisions in the Constitution regarding a 'secular state' could be summarised as follows: no discrimination
on the basis of religion. all persons have equal freedom of conscience and religion, no communal
elec tora te, the state has powers to regulate secular activity, religious institutions being opened to all
classes and sections of Hindus, abolition of unto uchability, powers to establish institutions for religious
and charitable purpo ses, all religious minorities having right to establish and administer
educational institutions, no public revenue for the promotion of any religion, and no religious instructions in
educational institutions maintained by state. A constitutional amendment in 1976 has made a provision for all
citizens to have their fundamental duty to · preserve the rich heritage of our composite character. ' The separation
of the religion from politics is provided in Article 26 and 25 of the Constitution that grants constitutional aut ho
rity to all per sons to have ' freedom of conscience and right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.'
To Gandhi secul ar is m meant ' sarva dharma samabhav ' . Jawaharlal Nehru said, A secular state 'does not
obviously mean a state where religion is discouraged. It means freedom of religion and conscience,
including freedom for those who have no religion, subject to oniy their not interfering with each other with the
basic conception of our state.' Despite all the secular provisions of the Constitution, the Indian state, in practice.
has failed to live upto its expectations. There are different sets of laws for different communities. Although
Article 44 of the Constitution requires that the state should frame a uniform civil code, a se pa rate civil code
exists for the Muslims. Besides , occasional concessions to the religious communities has paved the way for a
rapid growth of majority communal is m. Throughout the nat io nal freedom. altho ug h it dod not approve of the
idea of Islamic identity, the leadership always preferred to go for concessional pacts and alliances with the
minorities which ultimately led to the propagation of two nat io n theory. Some critics are of the opinion that
Gandhi alienated the Muslims' for his' religious appeal was heavily spiced with Hindu symbolism4. The
tissiparous tendencies became more prominent after withdrawal of the British administration from India. The
spate of communal violence in recent years, whatever may be the factors, suggests that, over the years since In
de pendence , the Indian state has not bee n able to defuse tensions among the various communities. It has failed
to inject the spirit of secu laris m in different societal structures. Some consider communal ism as a
psychological phenomenan . But ther e are instances to prove that the communal outbursts could be as a result of
political and economic programmes of some political and social groups to have better access to the decisjon-
making structures. Professor Romila Thaper says, ' Communa lism in the Indian sense therefore is a
consciousness which draws on a supposed religious identity and uses this as the basis for an ideology. It then
demands, political all egianc e to a religious cdmmunity, and supports a programme of political action designed
to further the interests of that religious community.'
Professor Randhir Singh however, insists on exploring ' communalism's interconnections with the
ideology. culture, and other important domains of contemporary Indian society, its ' corrupt and corrupting
capitalist socio -economic development' 5. He argues that the heightening of communalism today is
simultaneously the product of social, moral, and political crisis and the reaction of the ruling classes to this
crisis. It is als o alarming to know that ' with the older basis of the power and hegemony weakening (the
ruling classes) are increasingly turning to communalism in general and to Hindu communalism in pai1icular, to
win votes, fragment and divide the people and, above all, secure their continued political and
ideological dominance over them.'
The communalism in India is largely the result of uneven socio-economic development and imba
lances. There are stud ie s to sho w that ' the rece nt intensification of regionalism communal is m and
casteism is a product of inequalities created and per petuated by the operation of capitalism in the last
four decades after independence. ' Since the mid- 1980s, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ' Sangha
Parivar ' have been emphasizing on a distinction between their ' positive secularism' and the ' pseudo-secularism
' of the Congress. According to them, the ' pseudo -secularism' of the Congress Party has been used to
denigrate the Hindu categories and symbols of the majority community and to justify the pampering of the
minority communities.

85
The BJP wants to initiate the process of ‘positive secularism’ which would mean ' justice for all and
discrimination against none ' 6 According to T.B. Hansen , the ideology of the Hindutva and ' positive ' or ' true
' secularism would mean the principle of rule by Hindu majoritarianism. He says that it is a peculiar co -
articulations of brahminical ideologies of purity, romanticist notions of fullness and authenticity, and quasi-
fascist organism and celebration of strength and masculinity which characterises the Rastriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) and its affiliated organisations. ' 7
The concept of ' positive secularism' has been strongly criticised by Ashis Nandy, TN. Madan, and
Partha Chatterjee. According to Nandy , secularism, 'a modern demonology, a tantra with a built-in code of
violence', in the name of ideology of nation-building security, development, etc, helps the state-elites. The
Nehruvian approach towards secularism has helped the state-elites' to legitimize themselves as the sole arbiters
among traditional communities, to claim for themselves a monopoly on religious and ethnic tolerance and on
political rat io nali ty. To accept the ideology of secularism is to accept the ideologies of progress and modernity
as the new justification of domination and the use of violence to achieve and sustain the ideologies as the new
opiates of the masses8. This approach, he says, has failed to eliminate religion from politics or to promote
greater religious tolerance. Nandy supports the ethico-politically appropriate alternative found in the non-
modern, prosecu lar, conception of religion as a greater accommodative, tolerant faith practiced by Ashok, Akb r
and Gandhi. Their religious tolerance was not the product of secular politics but from Buddhism, Islam, and
Hinduism respective ly. Like Nandy, T.N. Madan maintains that the secularists, by denying the very legitimacy
of religion in social life have helped in the growth of fundamenta lis m. Madan concludes that 'the only way
secularism in South As ia, understood as interreligious understanding, may succeed would be for us to take both
religion and secularism seriously and not reject the form as superstition and reduce the latter to a mask for
communal ism or mere expediency.' From their analysis, it is understood that the Gandhian method of
interreligious understanding and dialogue could be only answer to check communalism in a pluralistic
society like India.
Chatterjee, like Nandy and Madan, emphasizes on the duty of the democratic state to ensure policies
of religious tolerance. The RSS emphasis on 'indianization' of the Muslims outlook as the only solution of the
socio-religious as well as political aspects of the communal problem could never be a solution for our
pluralistic society.
The politics of hegemonic secularism is not an answer for the growth of a democratic process. A
dialogue with religion against social and class domination could alone lead towards reconstruction of a society
on rational basis. Although, the wave of communal violence in recent years reflects the structural crisis of our
polity, it could be taken care of by levelling down the social barriers. By removing social inequalities and
regional d is parities, we can help in the development of a participant and decentralized polity.
REFERENCES
I . P.L. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (London, 1973), p. I I 3
2. Upendra Bax i, 'T he Struggle for the Redefinition of Secularism in India ', Social Action · 44 (Jan.-
March , I 994)., See also, Amartya Sen, The Threats to Secular India ', Social Scientist 2 I (March-
Apri I, 1993); Rajni Kothari, ' Plu ra lis m and Secularism: Lessons of Ayodhya', Economic and Political
Weekly, 19-26 Decemb er, 1992.
3. P.K. Tripathy, ·Secularism : Constitutional Provisions and Judicial Review' , in Secularism : Its
Imp lication for Law and Life in India, ed. by G.S. Sharma (Bombay, I 966), p. 193.
4. Gunnar Myrda l, Asian Drama : An Enquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, Vol. I, (New york, 1968),
p. 236.
5. Randhir Singh, 'Theorising Communalism·. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 23 No. 3, 1988, p.
1547.
6. See, Nana Deshm ukh , Our Secularism Needs Rethinking, (Delhi, I 990).
7. T.B. Hansen. 'Globalisation and Nationalist Imaginations : Hindutva 5· Prom ise of Equality Through
Di fference·. Eco. and Pol. Week ly, 3 March 1996, .p.608.
8. Ash is Nandy, 'The Politics vf Secularism and the Recovery of Religions Tolerance·. Alternative
( 1988). p.192.

86
 CHAPTER-IX
MORALITY AND POLITICS
Man is born as an individual, a self-interested individual, who must be transformed into a citizen
attuned to the promotion of the good of the collectivity of which he is a part. Good and bad , right and
wrong human behaviour is a subject matter of morality. To teach good and right human behaviour was
the responsibility traditionally shouldered by society. " With the desig nat io n soc ie ty, the role of the state
as an integrative force has beco me ce ntral. The centrality of the state in modern time s has further meant the
un c halle nged asce nd ance of politics as a means not only of finding a solution to conflicting claims of
ent itl e me nt but also of reso lving conflicts if and when they arise because of unsettled claims of
entitlement. In view of this; politics has assumed a disproportionate importance in regulating collective life
and relations and preserving the integrity, unity and inviolability of social order." 1 Though there was a time
when in order to make politics a perfect science, some 'political scientists' tried to separate politics from moral
values. But the study of politics cannot be value free. Modern thinkers agreeing with earlier idealists like
Piato have accepted the state as a moral institution. In modern welfare state it is really very difficult to
differentiate the functions of politics with that of moral social values.
ETHICS
If political order has to survive it has to be moral. Ethics is the basis of all the laws and
commands of the state. Ethics means moral principles that govern.person's or group's behaviour. The great
Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle also based their political analysis on the basis of ethics. Politics
is helpful in sustaining the very soul of society by implementing the laws, which are based on the
study of different values available in the society at the given period of time. ' What is ethically wrong
cannot be politically right ' is an old saying. The prospects of brighter democracy can only be
maintained when in a given society the politics works in cooperation with ethical values. The abolition of
the evil practices li ke Sati ;p atha, child marriage etc. and the entrance of the laws such as The Hindu
Widows ' Remarriage Act ( 1856), The Sharda Act ( 1930) etc. were made possible only because of the
value based studies of the society under the umbrella of politics, under the modern value system.
The following words of Wasby, " Because values are crucial to politics, and are its inotivation
and l ubr icati ng force, they are crucial to the study of politics. Without them , politics might be simpler to
study but would not exist, as we know it" 2 and David Easton when he says, "The goal of value-free
research is a myth. unattainable inspite of the best of intentions... The utility of political research stems from
the fact that it helps men to decide upon the kind of political system they would prefer and to
understand how to go about changing social policy to obtain it. The inspiration behind political science
is clearly ethica,l" clearly proves th at mere collection of facts and data's , without any theory based
upon ethical values, leads to useless hyper factualism.
Ethics is different from religion. Religion is a system of theological beliefs and dog mas
whereas eth ics is a moral code of conduct. If ethics has a considerable influence on politics, so also has
politics on ethics. Though there are certain differences between both of them such as : -
• The subject matter- political behaviour is the subject matter of politics while ethics concerned more with
the ethical behaviour of the person.
• Scope- politics is practical , normative, descriptive and is concerned with 'is' and ' ought' , taking
man as a citizen moreover deals ith the external aspect of a human being whereas ethics is mainly nor
mative, theoretical and is concerned primarily with ' ought' , taking man as a moral being and deals with
the inner-development of human beings.

1 Ro y. Ramashray. f'o/,1, c s and /Jeyoml. p. vii

' Was hy, S. L.. />0/,1,cal Sc1e11c e- fhe D1sc1p/1r1e and 11s IJ1111ens1ons. p.26.
1 Easton. Dav id. A /1em a11ve S1rn1eg1es 111 Theoret,cal Research . 111 l'arieties of Polit 1c al 711eo1J'. p. 223 .

87
 Despite the above-mentioned differences both have to work together to maintain the' equilibrium of
the society, because if we study politics without taking into consideration the ethical values then what
we will get is a mere plethora of laws and regulations controlling the external actions of the human beings
and in the same way if we study ethics without taking into account the political perspective of human beings
then the result would be obvious i.e ., a stagnated society. Therefore , for the best outcome , one should take
both, politics and ethics , into account while dealing with the complex web of society.
Unity in Diversity
Politics and ethics is a unity in diversity. In the words of David Held, "Power is shared and bartered
by numerous groups representing diverse and competing interests, for example business organizations, trade
unions, parties, ethnic groups, students... etc. Hence, political outcomes are determined by democratic
processes and pressures ; governments try to mediate and adjudicate between the demands " 4 The adjudication
of demands between diverse political groups can only be possible with the help of a measurement scale
based on the ethical values prevailing in the society at the time of adjudication.
To give only one instance, monogamy owed its origin to the Christian principles governing marriage.
However, even a non-believer or a rationalist would agree that monogamy provides an ideal and sound form of
human relationship for the institution of family. Howeve r, ethics need not necessarily proceed from rational
thinking. In the words of Lord Rostow, " mo rali ty is nothing but a blend of reason and feeling, cus to m and
convict io n, experience and prejud ice ." 5 Ethics primarily concern more with duties towards oneself and
incidentally to othe rs, politics deals more with external actions in relation to others. In the words of D.V. Rao,
" the moral principles prevalent at a particular time in a country do not necessarily depend on its sophistication
of cultural advancement. It is possible to conceive of a backward country boasting of high moral standards ,
though moral decadence might set in due to various (other) factors like economic backwardness and poverty.
This might be the reason (why) that Bentham stated that law and morality are like concentric circles ." 6 St.
Thomas Aquinas also emphasized the fact that politics is survived because of its ethical purpose. There.fore,
ethics is the justification for politics. In the words of Swami Paramananda, " is there any common standard of
duty? In studying the ethical laws of various peo ples , we are led to believe that there cannot be any universal
objective starv:lard; but there is a subjective principle which under!ines the moral codes of all nat io ns . The
outward form of duty changes according to our position in life. It can never be defined therefore by any fixed
set of rules. That which might be a duty in one condition would not be under other circumstances ." 7 Whether
there is any universal standard of Ethical code available or not one thing is sure , politics in absence of ethical
rules is a mechanical body living without soul. The amalgamation of ethical rules and principles of politics is
unity in diversity. Swami Vivekananda in a lecture delivered to the Shakespeare Club of Pasadena, Califo-
rnia, on 27th .January 1900 presented in a very artistic way the commingling of the ethics with that of politics
by saying, '' In every nation you will have to work through their methods. To every man you will have to speak
in his own language. Now, in England or in Ame ric a, if you want to preach religion to them, you will have to
work through political methods-make organizations, societies, with voting, balloting, a president , and so on,
because that is the language, the method of the western race. On the other hand , if you want to speak of
politics in India, you must speak through the language of religion. You will have to tell them something like
this : 'The man who cleans his house every morning will acquire such and such an amount of merit, he will go
to heaven, or he comes to God. ' Unless you put it that way, they will not listen to you ." 8 In every society the
language of ethics may be different but the crux of the matter is that it always influences the politics of the
country.

' Held. David. Po /ili ca l Theo ry and lire Modern State. p. 119 . Poli ty Press.
' Rao. D V. Lau Justice a11J Mo ra /11y , And lira Law Times. p.94. Janu ary 2004.
" Ibid. fl. 95.
7 Para mananda. Swami. Seer!!/ of /?1glr1 ac t1v11y , p. 41 .

• Vivekanand a. Swami. My l.1/e anJ Mis sio n. p. 1 3.

88
 According- to David Held. " political theories a recomplex · networks' of concept:; and
generalizations about political life involving ideas. assum pt ions and statements about the nature, purposes
and key features of government. state and society and about the poli tical c apab ili tie s of human
beings."9 In the words of David Easton. 'Whatever effort is exerted. values cannot be shed in the way a
person removes his coat. They are an integral part of personality and as we are hum an, we can assume that
our mental sets and preferenc es will be with us." 10 Ethical values can not be subtracted from the politics.
"The work of ethics has been. and will be in the future. not the destruction of variation and the establishment
of sameness in the external world. which is impossible for it would bring death and annihilation- but to
recognize the unity in spite of all these var iat ions ... and to recognize the eternal. infinite, essential, purity of
the soul in spit e of everything to the cont rary that appears on the sur face." 11 He further elaborates the argu
ment of commingling of ethics with politics by saying, · 'That some will be stronger physically than others,
and will thus naturally be able to subdu e or defeat the weak, is a se lf-ev ident fact, but that because of this
strength they shou ld gather un to themselves all the attainable happiness of this life, is not according to
law. and the fight has been against it. That some people through natural aptitude, should be able to
accumulate more wealth than other s, is natural; but that on account of this power to acquire wealth they shou
ld tyrannise and ride roughshod over those who cannot acq1ire so much wealth, is not a part of the law.
and the fight has been against that. The enjoyment of advantage over another is privilege, and throughout
ages. the aim of morality has been its destruction. This is the work which tends towards sameness.
towards un ity. without destroying variety." 12 Superior fusion of ethics with politics provides the better
version of civilization.
Ethics and Politics: The Search for Interconnections
J
In the words of Edm und Burke. -- Political relation is a computing princ iple: adding, subtracting,
multiplying and dividing. morally and not metaphysically, or math ematically, a true moral denomination." 13
“ Every age relies up on a particular notion. such as. man. society, history, political system, etc.. to deliver
mankind firm its existe nt ial ills that it may suffer from at any given time. In the eighteenth century,
it was individualism: in the nineteenth. it has been the idea of progress, and in the large part of the twentieth
century. it was the idea of development. For the last two or three decades, however, this notion has veered
around the idea of '"civil society” .1 The essential of an ideal civil society primarily consists in
interconnection between the ethics and the politics. Ethics and politics are not only different but have
different origins. This is the ve rsion given by th ose who are against th e interaction of both the disciplines
i.e. Ethics and Politics. For them ethics provides ethical code of conduct, which ought to be followed by
every individual of the society. whereas. poliics provides the web of laws through which th is ethical code of
conduct can be Successfully implemented. Therefore. values are ne cessary for the politics.
Even our ancient text Kautilya 's Arthushastro. which is considered as a masterly treatise on ancient
Ind ian polity and a verita ble res ervoir of ru les. ta l ks of eth ics as · the lamp of all scie nces, the means of
performing all the works. and t he supp ort of all th e dut ies.' Arthashastru means the · science of polity' . The
compendium deals with matters. which are worldly, as distinguished from religious, and principally with the
state and its governance. This treatise also consists of ethical code of conduct to be followed by the
king. In writing about politics, ancient think ers dwelt on one question of great importance, that is, the idea of
good governance. They de li berate d upon how a good government could, in fact, be created and maintained
in history. And for making good governance they provide ethical rules to be followed by the society as a

'' Held. Dav id. l' o!ttica l 'f1H!OIJ' a nd the ,1/ ode m S tate. 1 993 . p. 5.
111 Easto n. David. quoted from Gou ld and Th urs by: Co 1//1.!111pora, y l' o /i t1c a l Though t. I 969. p.

361. ' ' 'li \' kananda . Swam i. li!acl11n gs u( S1r a 1111 - l '1veka11a 11da . p. 57
" !hid p 5lJ
" Roy. Rama sh ra) . /'o /111c.1· um/ Her o11d. p 24.
,,, !hid . p 24.

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whole, the ruled as well as the ruler. Manusmriti is one of the examples, which exclusively provides the
ethical rules for good governance. Morality of purpose is the source of authority, which refers to the
factor that justifies the act of a ruler. When the spiritual and moral bases of the state are eroded, rulers
turn arbitrary and, not infrequently become tyrants. "The contemporary democratic polity is marked , de
Tocqueville argues , by a peculiar feature : the ideal of freedom from despotism has been replaced by the goal
of state secured equality. As a result, the people who are supposed to swear by such key political slogans as
liberty and equality become willing or unwilling accomplices in aiding and abetting the dominance of the
state. This has allowed the government to intrude in C:ifferent areas of the people ' s life ...In the name of
freedom and equa li ty, the state becomes regulator of social life." 15
In today's welfare democratic state where unlike the older varieties of despotism, it doesn't
destroy life or tyrannise ; it only perfects and "civilizes" its techniques of control and is, therefore,
rendered less odious and degrading in the eyes of its subjects. The acceptance of Roscoe Pounds concept of '
Social Engineering' by almost all the modern welfare states endeavours to prove that the commingling
and fusion of both the disciplines i. e ., Ethics and Politics, has been accepted universally. The
compounding and combination of both ethics and politics provides the seed of a healthy civil society.

© S.B. George, Reader :

Department of Political Science, A.R.S.D. College. Dhaula Kuan,
New Delhi-110018. Phone (Res.) 25502660
And
Jasper Vikas, LL.M. Ilnd Year,
Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, Delhi.

,. l hid. p . 217.

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