AIOM 3
CLAT POINT
CLAT PG 2024
ANSWER KEY & EXPLANATIONS
1. (c) The 28th of April, 1976, is regarded as one of the
Supreme Court of India’s saddest days. On this date,
the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench ruled in the
case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla that a
person’s right to life cannot be upheld by a High
Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution
during a National Emergency.
The judgment in the ADM Jabalpur case is one of the
most criticized judgments in the history of the Indian
Judiciary. The ADM Jabalpur case has become a
landmark case and is widely known as the ‘Habeas
Corpus Case’. It is said that this case was like a test
for the Supreme Court Judges and only one Judge
(Justice Khanna) passed the test.
The name of the ADM of Jabalpur who brought the
case to the Supreme Court is Karan Vijay Singh and
Shivkant Shukla was representing the political
persons who were detained by the State. This case
is such a milestone case in the Indian Legal System
that even today the case holds immense
significance. Although the majority judgment did not
provide justice to the prisoners but in a subsequent
judgment it was rectified.
After passing this judgment, since Justice Khanna
passed the extremely strong dissenting view, there
was a huge uproar throughout the State and he lost
his chance of becoming the Chief Justice of India.
Justice P.N. Bhagwati later expressed his regret in
sliding with the majority view of the Court.
2. (c) Justice Hans Raj Khanna had the sole dissenting
opinion in the ADM Jabalpur vs Shivkant Shukla
case. However, his opinion was overruled by the
opinion of the majority bench of judges.
Justice H.R. Khanna famously dissented from the
majority, a dissent that costed him the position of
Chief Justice of India. He disagreed with the position
of the majority that Art. 21 can be suspended by the
declaration of Emergency.
He held that if the right to enforce Art. 21 is
suspended then there would be no remedy against
deprivation of a person’s life or liberty by the State
even though such deprivation might be without the
authority of law or even in flagrant violation of the
provisions of law. Observing that such a position
would be against rule of law, J. Khanna noted that,
“without such sanctity of life and liberty, the
distinction between a lawless society and one
governed by laws would cease to have any
meaning.”
Further, he also held that the right to not be deprived
of one’s life or liberty, without the authority of law,
was not the creation of the Constitution. Such rights
existed before the Constitution came into force. And
even in the absence of Article 21 in the Constitution,
the State has got no power to deprive a person of his
life or liberty without the authority of law. Art. 21 is
not the sole repository of the right to personal liberty.
Such a right not only follows from common law, but
it also flows from statutory laws like the penal law in
force in India.
3. (b) As portrayed in the ADM Jabalpur Case, the majority
view has now been nullified by the 44th Amendment
Act and the consequent judicial interpretations and
following judgements. It holds no weight in the
current scenario. Now Articles 20 and 21 cannot be
suspended in any condition.
Articles 352 and 359 have not been invoked after
1975. 44th Constitutional Amendment Act has
amended the term ‘internal disturbance’ to ‘armed
rebellion’ and also provided that an internal
disturbance not amounting to armed rebellion shall
not constitute a ground for a Proclamation of
Emergency. 44th Constitutional Amendment Act
provided for several other provisions relating to the
Proclamation of Emergency so that no future
government can misuse this provision of the
Constitution of India.
4. (d) Justice P.N. Bhagwati admits that the decision of the
Supreme Court in ADM Jabalpur was incorrect and
pleads guilty to the same thing. In 2011, Justice
Bhagwati expressed regret by saying: “I was wrong.
The majority judgment was not the correct judgment.
If it was open to me to come to a fresh decision in
that case, I would agree with what Justice Khanna
did. I am sorry. I don’t know why I yielded to my
colleagues. Initially, I was not in favour of the majority
view. But ultimately, I don’t know why, I was
persuaded to agree with them. I was a novice at that
time, a young judge…I was handling this type of
litigation for the first time. But it was an act of
weakness on my part.” Such acceptance from the
judge mean how grave the situation was that time
and what impact it left on India.
5. (a) In 2017, the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v.
UOI (AIR 2017 SC 4161) overruled the decision of
ADM Jabalpur. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (writing
with 3 other judges- Justice J.S. Khehar, Justice R.K.
Agarwal, and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer) held that the
ADM Jabalpur case was flawed. Justice Nariman
and Justice Kaul also categorically overruled the
decision in ADM Jabalpur. The majority, in almost
echoing J. Khanna, they observed:
“No civilized state can contemplate an
encroachment upon life and personal liberty without
the authority of law. Neither life nor liberty are
bounties conferred by the state nor does the
Constitution create these rights. The right to life has
existed even before the advent of the Constitution. In
recognising the right, the Constitution does not
become the sole repository of the right.”
6. (d) Article 359 of the Indian Constitution is a provision
that deals with the suspension of the enforcement of
the rights conferred by Part III (except Article 20 and
21) of the Constitution during emergencies. Part III
of the Constitution is titled “Fundamental Rights”,
and contains a list of fundamental rights that are
guaranteed to all citizens of India. The said Article is
enshrined in Part XVIII of the Indian Constitution
which is titled “Emergency Provisions.”
7. (c) The Rule of Law doctrine was later developed by
A.V. Dicey in his book, “Introduction to the Law of
 Constitution (1885).” The Rule of Law according to
Dicey means that no man is punishable or can be
lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for
distinct breach of law and no man is above the law.
8. (b) Dicey’s rule of law consists of following three
meanings:
1. Equality before the law: Dicey says it emphasises
the impartiality of law. It means that there shall be no
distinction between the rich and the poor, officials
and non-officials, majority and minority, no one can
be degraded and no one can be upgraded. Law
gives equal justice to all. The principle has been
incorporated in India under Article 14.
2. Rule of Law alone: The Rule of Law rejects all
kinds of arbitrary and discretionary powers of the
government or public officials. It implies that a man
may be punished for a breach of law but he can’t be
punished for anything else. An alleged offence is
required to be proved before the ordinary courts in
accordance with the legal procedure. This principle
is applicable in India as law is regarded as the
supreme and no one is above law.
3. Constitutional Law stems from ordinary law: It is
generally presumed that the written constitution is
the source of legal liberties of citizens. However, it is
not true as Britain has an “unwritten Constitution.”
Legal spirit is the real source of law in England. The
legal spirit is seen in its customs, conventions and
judicial decisions. Dicey opines that the individual
rights and liberties are more safely protected in
Britain than France. This concept is not applicable in
India as the Constitution is a written document and
the ordinary law stems from Constitutional Law.
9. (b) In Sambamurthy v. The State of A.P. a question of
great legal importance arose, having a far-reaching
effect. In this case the Supreme Court held that
Article 371-D (5) (Proviso) of the Constitution
violates the Rule of Law which is a basic structure
and essential feature of the Constitution.
In this case the Supreme Court upheld the principles
of rule of law as the basic structure of the Indian
Constitution. Clause 5 of Article 371-D was
challenged before this court which provided the
government with the power to modify or annul the
administrative tribunal’s order. Chief Justice
Bhagwati in this case held clause 5 of Article 371-D
as unconstitutional on the basis of doctrine of basic
structure. He held that clause 5 is contrary to the
principle of rule of law which is the basic structure of
the Constitution and is thus unconstitutional. Judicial
review which is one of the tenets of rule of law is
provided to the courts under the constitution to
ensure that the law is observed and is complied with
by the executive and other authorities and such
power of judicial review cannot be taken away from
the court. Any such attempt would be against the
Rule of law and thus ultra vires.
10. (d) ‘Habeas Corpus’ literally means “to have a body of”.
This writ is used to release a person who has been
unlawfully detained or imprisoned. By virtue of this
writ, the Court directs the person so detained to be
brought before it to examine the legality of his
detention. If the Court concludes that the detention
was unlawful, then it directs the person to be
released immediately.
This writ ensures swift judicial review of the alleged
unlawful detention of the prisoner and immediate
determination of his right to freedom. However,
Habeas corpus cannot be granted where a person
has been arrested under an order from a competent
court and when prima facie the order does not
appear to be wholly illegal or without jurisdiction.
This writ can be filed by the detained person himself
or his relatives or friends on his behalf. It can be
issued against both public authorities and
individuals.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus is a remedy available to
the person who has lost his personal liberty and as
such, it cannot be invoked to challenge past illegal
detentions.
11. (b) In the case of Aishat Shifa, the Supreme Court
delivered a split verdict on the issue of hijab ban. The
split verdict was delivered by Justice Hemant Gupta
and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia on 13th October,
2022. It is from that judgment that the above
paragraph has been extracted from.
Resham vs. State of Karnataka is the Karnataka
High court decision where the three judge
unanimously decided that the government order of
banning hijab in schools is not illegal and it does not
violate any fundamental rights. Shayara Bano is a
case where court held the practice of Triple talaq in
Muslim law illegal.
12. (a) Justice Hemant Gupta upheld the restriction on the
ground that Secularism is applicable to all citizens,
therefore, permitting one religious community to
wear their religious symbols would be antithesis to
secularism. Justice Gupta held that the religious
belief cannot be carried to a secular school
maintained out of State funds. It is open to the
students to carry their faith in a school which permits
them to wear Hijab or any other mark, may be tilak,
which can be identified to a person holding a
particular religious belief but the State is within its
jurisdiction to direct that the apparent symbols of
religious beliefs cannot be carried to school
maintained by the State from the State funds. Thus,
the practice of wearing hijab could be restricted by
the State in terms of the Government Order.
13. (c) In the Avadhuta case, the Supreme Court held that
essential part of a religion means the core beliefs
upon which a religion is founded. It is upon the
cornerstone of essential parts or practices that the
superstructure of a religion is built, without which a
religion will be no religion. The test to determine
whether a part or practice is essential to a religion is
to find out whether the nature of the religion would
be changed without that part or practice. If taking
away of that part or practice results in a fundamental
change in the character of that religion or in its belief,
then such part could be treated as an essential or
integral part of the religion.
In Hanif case, the Court found the sacrifice of a cow
to be not obligatory and essential to the religion of
Islam. The Court negated the argument of the
appellants when it was held that there is “no material
on the record before us which will enable us to say,
in the face of the foregoing facts, that the sacrifice of
a cow on that day in an obligatory overt act for a
Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea.”
In Ismail Faruqi case, the SC held that offering of
prayer or worship is a religious practice, but its
offering at every location where such prayers can be
offered would not be an essential or integral part of
such religious practice.
14. (d) In this case none of the options are correct
statement. Number one is incorrect for the simple
reason that the state has the right to interfere, in non
 religious activities that has been clarified by multiple
cases. Statement number two is also incorrect as the
right of managers religious activities is not an
individual right but a community right. Statement
number three is also incorrect as it is in violation of
article 27 of the constitution that their shall be no
religious instructions in state institutions and hen
sports option number d that is none of the above is
the correct option.
15. (d) none of the above listed practices are essential
religious practices as declared by Supreme Court in
various cases. In the case of Ismail Faruqi, the SC
held that A mosque is not an essential part of the
practice of the religion of Islam and namaz (prayer)
by Muslims can be offered anywhere, even in open.
In Shayara bano. Triple talaq was not recognised as
an essential religious practice. In the Avadhuta case,
the Supreme Court held that essential part of a
religion means the core beliefs upon which a religion
is founded. Therefore, tandav in anand marga- not
essential religious practice.
16. (b) Article 25 provides for Freedom of conscience and
free profession, practice and propagation of religion.
The clause (1) provides that Subject to public order,
morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of
conscience and the right freely to profess, practise
and propagate religion. Therefore, option (b) is
correct.
17. (d) In the case of Ras Behari Lal and Others vs. The
King-Emperor in AIR 1933 PC, Lord Atkin quoted
that ‘Finality is a good thing, but justice is better’.
18. (b) It is mentioned in the case of Aishat Shifa vs. state
of Karnataka, that the challenge in the present
appeals is to an order passed by the Full Bench of
the Karnataka High Court on 15.3.2022, dismissing
the challenge to the Government Order dated
5.2.2022. Such Government Order directed the
Government Schools in Karnataka to abide by the
prescribed uniform, and the private schools were
directed to mandate a uniform as decided by their
Board of Management.
19. (d) The correct option in this case is option number d
that is only first statement for the simple reason that
essential religious practice provides that when can a
state interfere in the religious interest of a community
and it is very clear that only article 25 is the place
where state has a right to if interfere in limited sense
and hence the doctrine of essential religious
practices was developed . article 26 does not talk
about essential practice for the simple reason that it
talks about the community rights and not the rights
of an individual and statement number three is also
incorrect as preamble only provides the liberty to
worship and not any restriction towards it and hence
only article 25 correct option that is option d
20. (a) In the Bijoe Emmanuel case, Supreme Court held
that the three students were not guilty of
disrespecting the National Anthem just because they
refused to sing it. Moreover, they did stand in respect
whenever the National Anthem was being sung.
forcing every student to sing the National Anthem
despite real concerns that it would offend their
religious beliefs obviously violates the right provided
by Articles 19(1)(a) and 25(1) of the Indian
Constitution. Justice Dhulia in his verdict in the Hijab
ban case cited Bijoe Emmanuel as support for the
claims that, first, the requirement for invoking Article
25(1) protection is merely a matter of conscience
and, second, that once that requirement has been
met, there is a right to a fair accommodation of
difference.
In Naveen Jindal, the Court noted that the rights
protected by Article 19 of the Constitution were not
absolute. With this in mind, the Court reasoned that
“[s]o long as the expression is confined to
nationalism, patriotism and love for motherland, the
use of the National Flag by way of expression of
those sentiments would be a fundamental right.
In shyam narayan case, there should be no
commercial usage of the National Anthem, no
dramatization of the Anthem as would amount to
disrespect, it should not be printed or displayed on
any object on any such place as it is associated with
national identity roots, it should be played before the
start of the film and all would be under obligation to
show respect, in the cinema while the song is played.
21. (d) The judgment was Manoj Kumar Soni v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh which was passed by Justice S.
Ravindra Bhat and Justice Dipankar Datta on 11
August 2023. Justice Dipankar Datta is the author of
the judgment. The Supreme Court observed that
disclosure statements cannot be the sole basis for
conviction in a criminal case.
22. (c) Privy Council, in Pullukuri Kotaya vs. Emperor, held
that only that part of confessional statement would
be taken into account which may lead to a discovery
of a fact and that discovery should be of physical
object and not only of a mental fact. The decision of
the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor8 is
the most quoted authority for supporting the
interpretation that the “fact discovered” envisaged in
the section embraces the place from which the object
was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to
it, but the information given must relate distinctly to
that effect.
23. (c) It was observed by the court in the case:
A doubt looms: can disclosure statements per se,
unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be
deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it
implausible. Although disclosure statements hold
significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a
case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece
of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything
more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable
doubt.
It implies that disclosure statements are not sufficient
evidence on its own and should be supported by
other evidences. Therefore, option c is correct.
24. (b) When something is discovered as a result of
information or statement given by accused in police
custody, that statement is known as "Disclosure
Statement". It can be a confessional or not, which
depends upon the facts and circumstances of a
case. In Indian law, there is no use of word
`Disclosure Statement', but there is a provision
introduced in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, i.e.
Section 27, which corresponds with such concept.
25. (b) The court in this case quoted these words. It
observed:
What could have more aptly summarise the entire
prosecution case, especially the flawed investigation
in the matter at hand, than the words of Daniel J.
Boorstin, the American historian: “The greatest
obstacle to true discovery is not ignorance, but rather
the illusion of knowledge”.
26. (a) The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure
statements of co- accused too is settled; the courts
 have hesitated to place reliance solely on disclosure
statements of co-accused and used them merely to
support the conviction or, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins
observed in Emperor vs. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty,
to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co-
accused”.
27. (b) In State of Maharashtra vs. Damu, S/o Gopinath
Shinde and Ors., JT 2000 (5) SC 575 has held that
the Section 27, the Evidence Act was based on the
doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events and
giving the section actual and expanding meanings,
held:
“The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by
subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the
principle that if any fact is discovered in a search
made on the strength of any information obtained
from a prisoner, such a discovery is guarantee that
the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The
information might be confessional or non-inculpatory
in nature, but it results in discovery of a fact it
becomes a reliable information. Hence the
legislature permitted such information to be used as
evidence by restricting the admissible portion to the
minimum. It is now well settled that recovery of an
object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in
section. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri
Kottaya vs. Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67] is the most
quoted authority for supporting the interpretation that
the ‘fact discovered’ envisaged in the section
embraces the place from which the object was
produced; the knowledge of the accused as to it, but
the information given must relate distinctly to that
effect.”
28. (b) In fact, a three Judge Bench in Chinnaswamy's case
(AIR 1962 SC 1788) stated that section 27 is an
exception to section 25 also. In Aghnoo Nagesia
case (AIR 1966 SC 119), this view has been
reiterated. It stated:
Let us then turn to the question whether the
statement of the appellant to the effect that ,he had
hidden them (the ornaments)" and "would point out
the place" where they were, is wholly admissible in
evidence under s. 27 or only that part of it is
admissible where he stated that he would point out
the place but not that part where he stated that he
had hidden the ornaments. The Sessions Judge in
this connection relied on Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-
Emperor (2) where a part of the statement leading to
the recovery of a knife in a murder case was held
inadmissible by the Judicial Committee. In that case
the Judicial Committee considered s. 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which is in these terms :-
"Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody
of a police officer, so much of such information,
whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved."
This section is an exception to ss. 25 and 26, which
prohibit the proof of a confession made to a police
officer or a confession made while a person is in (1)
[1951] S.C.R. 676.
29. (d) Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act states:
A confession made by an accused person is
irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of
the confession appears to the Court to have been
caused by any inducement, threat or 2promise
having reference to the charge against the accused
person, proceeding from a person in authority and
sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the
accused person grounds which would appear to him
reasonable for supposing that by making it he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal
nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
30. (d) Section 313 states:
(1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of
enabling the accused personally to explain any
circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him, the Court-
(a) may at any stage, without previously warning the
accused, put such questions to him as the Court
considers necessary;
(b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have
been examined and before he is called on for his
defence, question him generally on the case:
Provided that in a summons- case, where the Court
has dispensed with the personal attendance of the
accused, it may also dispense with his examination
under clause (b).
(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused
when he is examined under sub- section (1).
(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to
punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or
by giving false answers to them.
(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken
into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in
evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into,
or trial for, any other offence which such answers
may tend to show he has committed.
31. (b) rebus sic stantibus which is a Latin phrase that refers
to a situation where a contract cannot be withdrawn
from or terminated as long as the conditions and
circumstances surrounding the contract have not
fundamentally changed. This is specifically used in
treaty law, and has been a subject of debate and
disputes. This doctrine is a part of customary
international law but a provision for this doctrine has
been provided in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 1969 as well.
Pacta sunt servanda means that agreements should
be kept. Pacta iertis nec nocent nec prosunt means
that a treaty binds the parties and only the parties.
Thus, it states that the binding power of a treaty is
limited only to the consenting party. Forum
prorogatum is a fundamental principle of
international law that no state can be compelled to
submit its disputes to an international court or
tribunal without its consent
32. (a) Primary Sources of International Law are considered
formal in nature. They come from official bodies
which include Treaties, Customs and principle of
Law. Article 38(1)(a-c) of the ICJ statute is widely
recognized as the backbone of the formal source of
International Law. It is generally regarded as an
authoritative statement of the sources of
international law. Treaties are part of primary
sources of international law. They are also provided
under Article 38 of the ICJ.
33. (d) 1969- Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, 1969
1961- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
1961
1985- Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, 1985
1963- Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, 1963
34. (b) Mr. Salve was the lead counsel for India in the
Jadhav case at the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). He served as the Solicitor General of India
from 1 November 1999 to 3 November 2002.
35. (b) it was held in the case of Mexico vs. USA, famously
known as Avena case. The court held the above-
mentioned statement.
36. (d) In the year 2008, India and Pakistan signed an
agreement on consular access. Section 4 of the
agreement states that the governments of both
nations would provide consular access. This has to
be provided within three months to citizens of
another country, under arrest, detention, or
imprisonment in the other country. Section 5 of the
agreement provides that within one month of
confirmation of the national status and completion of
sentences both governments should release and
return people.
37. (b) Article 26 provides for ‘pacta sunt servanda’. It
provides that Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.
Article 25 provides for provisional application of
treaties. 27 provides for internal law and observance
of treaties and article 28 provides for non-
retroactivity of treaties.
38. (a) Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on law of treaties
provides that, a treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose. The context for the
purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes. Recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion, if the meaning is ambiguous or
obscure. Hence, option (a) is correct.
39. (b) jus cogens refers to fundamental overriding
principles of international law. So, if a treaty
becomes jus cogens, that means it is void.
40. (a) The LaGrand was a case between Germany and
USA. It was a legal action heard before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) which concerned
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In the
case, the ICJ ruled that its own temporary court
orders were legally binding and that the rights
contained in the convention could not be denied by
the application of domestic legal procedures.
In the Avena case, i.e., Mexico vs. USA, On 9
January 2003, Mexico brought a case against the
United States of America in a dispute concerning
alleged violations of Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963
with respect to 54 Mexican nationals who had been
sentenced to death in certain states of the United
States. The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United
States of America (1986)was a case where the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the U.S.
had violated international law by supporting the
Contras in their rebellion against the Sandinistas and
by mining Nicaragua's harbors. The case was
decided in favor of Nicaragua and against the United
States with the awarding of reparations to Nicaragua.
41. (c) Kelsen proposes that the law be described as a De
psychologised command. Kelsen considers
‘sanction’ to be an important part of the law, but
prefers to refer to it as ‘norm.’ Kelsen’s philosophy of
law is devoid of any ethical or political ideals or
judgments.
42. (d) The similarity between the theory of Austin and
Kelsen are:
1. Both emphasize on the element of sanction
2. Both are positivist, both purports to describe a
posited law independent of moral evaluation.
3. Both believe judges do make law.
Austin creates a dualism between the sovereign (or
state) and the legal order (of law). To Austin law is
subordinate to the sovereign. The law emanates
from the sovereign and so cannot control the
sovereign. To Kelsen the state is merely the
‘personification’ of the legal order. As a political
organization the state is a legal order, and every
state is governed by law. The State is nothing but
the sum total of norms ordering compulsion, and it is
thus coextensive with the law. Kelsen identified
State with law, as the State is nothing but a system
of human behaviour and social order, and every
norm of social behaviour is law. He regarded law as
imperative, and therefore the duties under law as
absolute. Rights are concessions of law, and
therefore no right is above law. In other words, he
could not recognize fundamental rights or
‘inalienable human rights.’
According to Kelsen, there can be no distinction
between law and state. Therefore, the difficulty of
treating Constitutional law, which purports to bind the
State, as law strictu sensu which confronted Austin
does not arise for Kelsen. While Austin says that the
State creates the law, Kelsen would say that law
regulates its own creation.
43. (a) The contrast between public and private law is
another important characteristic of the hierarchical
organisation of law. According to Kelsen, because
every law gets its force from the same Grundnorm,
there is no distinction between public and private
law. They cannot be distinguished on the basis that
they safeguard various types of interests. In the
public interest, private interests are preserved. He
identifies this divergence as the result of a political
philosophy that aims to “elevate public law and
justice authoritarianism.”
Kelsen does not distinguish between natural and
legal beings. There is no distinction between
physical and legal beings. In law, he defines
‘personality’ as an individual who is able to bear
rights and obligations. All legal personalities are
fictitious and derive their validity from superior
norms.
Individual rights, according to Kelsen, do not exist in
law. The ‘essence of law’ is legal obligations. Law is
always a necessary system in a state. He believes
that the notion of right is not fundamental to a legal
system. A legal right is just a responsibility as
regarded by the person who has the authority to
demand that it should be fulfilled.
International law, according to Kelsen, is a
component of the legal system as a whole. As a
single ultimate legal system, international law has
been recognised. As a result, all national norms
should be viewed as subservient to international
legal order, the validity of which is defined by an
international law basic norm. It is sufficient for
international law to be presupposed by the basic rule
of power. Grundnorm, it doesn’t need to exist. Kelsen
was able to understand that the state is not an
isolated entity and that it might have greater political
 allegiance by rejecting sovereignty. Kelsen’s
principal goal in developing this theory was to build
a generally accepted theory that could be applied to
all legal systems. According to Kelsen, a legal
standard should be recognised universally. It should
serve as a benchmark for all legal systems. In terms
of making his norm applicable to all legal systems,
Kelsen dismisses the pluralistic approach and
embraces a monist viewpoint.
44. (c) Sir Lauterpacht, a former member of the United
Nations’ International Law Commission and a judge
of the International Court of Justice, believes that
Kelsen’s theory of natural law allows for the
precedence of international law above state law. He
opines that ‘lawness’ of international law cannot be
derived from the grundnorm itself.
45. (b) Rudolf Stammler, (born February 19, 1856, Alsfeld,
Hesse [Germany]—died April 25, 1938,
Wernigerode, Germany), German jurist and teacher
who is considered to be one of the most influential
legal philosophers of the early 20th century.
Stammler was a professor of law at Marburg (1882–
84), Giessen (1884), Halle (1885–1916), and Berlin
(1916–23) universities. By distinguishing the concept
of law, which is purely formal, from the ideal of law,
which is the realization of justice, he emphasized,
unlike most 19th-century legal philosophers, the
search for a theoretically valid ideal of justice with
which law ought to conform. That ideal, in
Stammler’s view, was not immutable but reflected
the degree of social harmony possible in a particular
place and time. One of his major works, Die Lehre
von dem richtigen Rechte (1902), was translated by
Isaac Husik as The Theory of Justice (1925).
46. (d) As Maitland remarks, “Equity had come not to
destroy the law, but to fulfil it.” Meant to assist the
law. As Maitland observes, “Equity is not a self
sufficient system”. Equity presupposed the extension
of common law at every point. It accepted the
common law rules on any question that might arise,
but added that something more was necessary,
either because the common law rule was
inadequate, or because it caused hardship. There
was no inherent conflict between the doctrines of
Equity and Law, their practical working has also been
harmonious.
47. (b) The term Justice in the Preamble embraces three
distinct forms - Social, economic and political
secured through various provisions of the
Fundamental and Directive Principles.
48. (a) Article 10 of UDHR states:
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in
the determination of his rights and obligations and of
any criminal charge against him.
49. (c) Few sentences have been quoted more often than
the aphorism: “Justice must not only be done, but
must also be seen to be done”. This dictum was laid
down by Lord Hewart, the then Lord Chief Justice of
England in the case of Rex v. Sussex Justices,
[1924] 1 KB 256.
50. (a) In M.P. State Legal Services Authority v. Prateek
Jain, (2014) 10 SCC 690, the Supreme Court
observed that the concept of Lok Adalat is an
innovative Indian contribution to the world
jurisprudence. It is a new form of the justice
dispensation system and has largely succeeded in
providing a supplementary forum to the victims for
settlement of their disputes. This system is based on
Gandhian principles. It is one of the components of
alternative dispute resolution systems specifically
provided in Section 89 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 as well. It has proved to be a very
effective alternative to litigation. Lok Adalats have
been created to restore access to remedies and
protections and alleviate the institutional burden of
the millions of petty cases clogging the regular
courts. It offers the aggrieved claimant whose case
would otherwise sit in the regular courts for decades,
at least some compensation now.
51. (d) for the purpose of computing the period of limitation,
the relevant date must be considered as the date of
filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings
and not the date of taking cognizance by a
Magistrate or issuance of process by a court.
52. (c) The Supreme Court has held that the limitation
period prescribed under Section 468 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable for the filing of
an application by an aggrieved woman under Section
12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005. the Supreme Court held that a
Section 12 application cannot be treated as an
application in respect of an "offence". The offence
under the Domestic Violence Act arises only under
Section 31 when there is a violation of an order
passed under Section 12. The Court added that the
starting point for limitation for an offence committed
under Domestic Violence Act would arise only after
there is a breach of an order passed under Section
12 of the Act. “There would never be a starting point
for limitation from the date of application under
Section 12 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005”, the bench comprising
Justices UU Lalit and PS Narasimha stated.
53. (b) In Batra case, it held that the wife is only entitled to
claim a right to residence in a shared household, and
a `shared household' would only mean the house
belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the
house which belongs to the joint family of which the
husband is a member. It has been overruled by
Ahuja case, that the definition of 'shared household'
given in Section 2(s) of the Act cannot be read to
mean that it can only be that household which is
household of the joint family of which husband is a
member or in which husband of the aggrieved
person has a share. n the event, shared household
belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in
a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the
conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied
and the said house will become a shared household
54. (d) Section 468(2)(c) of CrPC provides that the period of
limitation shall be three years, if the offence is
punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding
one year but not exceeding three years.
55. (b) The two judges Bench of the Apex Court consisting
of Justice R. Nariman and Justice Kurian Joesph
held that the words “Adult male person” shall be
struck down in Section 2(q) of the Act. The judges
placed reliance on the Statement of Objects of the
Act and the Preamble of the Act and thereby did not
restrict themselves by applying the literal
interpretation principle as argued by Advocate
Raval.
Further, the Court made very important observations
regarding the safety of women which includes the
fact that a non- adult can participate or abet an act of
domestic violence against the aggrieved and hence
the word “adult” is struck down.
56. (a) the above judgment was delivered by a two judge
bench comprising of Justices U.U. Lalit and P.S.
Narsimha with Justice U.U. Lalit authoring the
judgment.
57. (c) The Domestic Violence Act was not passed in
consonance with the constitutional provision of Art.
14- equality, Art 15- no discrimination and Article 21-
right to life and dignity. Article 42 is not the correct
answer.
58. (c) The recommendation no. 12 provides for laws
protecting from violence against women. Tenth:
Tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, so various general issues were
added. General Recommendation No. 11 provides
for technical advisory services for reporting
obligations. Recommendation 13 provides for Equal
remuneration for work of equal value
59. (d) The Supreme Court in the significant judgment of
Kamlesh Devi vs. Prabha Tyagi held the above
following points.
60. (c) The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 was intended to be a “civil legislation”
which focuses on providing effective and immediate
remedies for women experiencing domestic violence
from intimate relationships, and making people
accountable for the same. While the reliefs such as
protection, residence, and monetary orders are civil
in nature, the proceedings are governed by the
Criminal Procedure Code or procedure as decided
by the Court as per Section 28 of the DV Act. The
law is still unsettled but it can be said that it is a
quasi-criminal legislation.
61. (b) The term belligerent was used until the end of World
War II to refer to the States taking part in a war or the
individuals authorized to use armed force.
62. (a) Article 352 was amended to replace Internal
disturbance as one of the grounds for imposing
National Emergency by Armed Rebellion
63. (b) The 44th Amendment to the Constitution of India
replaced the term ‘internal disturbance’ by ‘armed
rebellion’ in respect of national emergency in India.
National Emergency is imposed under Article 352.
64. (d) International humanitarian law defines and regulates
only two categories of armed conflict. It uses the term
non-international armed conflict to denote very
diverse situations, both in terms of the form and the
objective of armed confrontations. This term is used
as opposed, on the one hand, to the category of
international armed conflict and, on the other, to the
category of internal disturbances and tensions,
which are excluded from the definition of armed
conflicts.
Non-international armed conflicts are provided for
and governed by Common Article 3 to the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by the Additional
Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions,
which contains twenty-eight articles that complete
the guarantees of Common Article 3 for the victims
of non-international armed conflicts.
65. (c) Insurgency is an uprising or rebellion by an
organized group against their government or
governing authority. Frequently, other terms are
used to describe situations of insurgency, including
uprising, rebellion, and insurrection. Essentially,
these are all forms of non-international armed
conflict (Armed Conflict, Non-International);
however, authorities are frequently reluctant to
accept that an insurgency has risen to the level of
armed conflict and will choose instead to downplay
the conflict by referring to it as an internal
disturbance. Insurgency, term historically restricted
to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions
of an organized revolution.
66. (b) The doctrine of qualified neutrality (also called
benevolent neutrality and non-belligerency) also
arose in the 20th century. International law
historically contemplated that states could vindicate
their rights by resorting to war in a wide array of
circumstances. After World War I, the international
system began to transform following efforts to limit or
prohibit war as a method for resolving interstate
conflict. This paradigm shift culminated in Article 2 of
the U.N. Charter, which prohibits use of force in most
cases and requires member states to settle disputes
by peaceful means. As part of this evolution in
international relations, states and scholars began to
contend that a binary system of neutrals and
belligerents is no longer viable, and that modern
international law allows for an intermediate position
in which countries can actively assist victims of
unlawful wars.
67. (d) Article 2 of UN Charter states:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the
Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance
with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the
rights and benefits resulting from membership,
shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance
with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which
are not Members of the United Nations act in
accordance with these Principles so far as may
be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.
68. (c) The sources of the international law of neutrality are
customary inter- national law and, for certain
questions, international treaties, in particular the
Paris Declaration of 1856, the 1907 Hague
Convention No. V respecting the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on
Land, the 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII
concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
 in Naval War, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol I of 1977. Additional Protocol
II completes fundamental guarantees contained in
Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions
(known as Common Article 3), relating to the
protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts.
69. (d)
70. (c) To obtain neutral status, the State does not have to
make a formal declaration, nor do other States or
parties formally have to recognize such status. A
formal declaration will only have the effect of making
neutral status better known.
The neutral State must ensure respect for its
neutrality, if necessary using force to repel any
violation of its territory. Violations include failure to
respect the prohibitions placed on belligerent parties
with regard to certain activities in neutral territory,
described above. The fact that a neutral State uses
force to repel attempts to violate its neutrality cannot
be regarded as a hostile act. If the neutral State
defends its neutrality, it must however respect the
limits which international law imposes on the use of
force.
71. (b) A bench comprising Justices R F Nariman and
Ravindra Bhat passed the order in the contempt
petitions filed by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay and
Rambabu Singh Thakur complaining that Election
Commission of India had failed to comply with the
directions laid down by the Constitution Bench in
2018 with respect to decriminalization of politics. On
September 25, 2018, a five-judge bench of the
Supreme Court had directed that the candidates
should widely publicize the details of the criminal
cases, if any, pending against them, whether at the
stage of the investigation or trial. Public Interest
foundation is the case whose contempt, the
Supreme Court was hearing.
72. (b) The Supreme Court on Thursday directed that all
political parties to publish the details of criminal
antecedents of their candidates in the Lok Sabha
and Assembly polls within 48 hours of selection of
the candidate or within two weeks of nomination,
whichever is earlier. And, all the concerned political
parties must also submit a report of compliance with
the directions passed by the Apex Court with the
Election Commission of India within 72 hours of the
selection of the candidate
73. (c) As per Section 8(3) of the Representation of the
People Act of 1951, the conviction of a lawmaker for
an offence that carries a sentence of two years or
more leads to them being disqualified from the
House. Earlier, Section 8(4) of the RPA said dis
qualification takes effect only "after three months
have elapsed" from the date of conviction. The
lawmaker would meanwhile have time to appeal it in
a higher court. However, this was struck down as
"unconstitutional" in the apex court's landmark 2013
judgment in Lily Thomas.
In the case of Union of India v. Association for
Democratic Reforms and Another, this Court was
considering whether there is a right of the voter to
know about the candidate’s contesting election.
Holding in affirmative, it was held, ‘They have right to
elect or re- elect on the basis of the antecedents and
past performance of the candidate’. In People's
Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, [the second
PUCL case], a Bench of three learned Judges
recognised the right of the person to express his
disapproval of the candidates who stood for election
by pressing a button which would indicate ‘none of
the above’ (NOTA). The Supreme Court's ruling in
Lok Prahari v. Union of India on information
disclosure lays the stage for constitutional
interventions in political party funding structure,
including the electoral bond scheme.
74. (a) In the case of Public Interest Foundation, the court
held that the right of the citizen to seek and receive
information about the candidates who should be
chosen by him as his representative to be
recognised as a fundamental right.
In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,
[the second PUCL case], a Bench of three learned
Judges recognised the right of the person to express
his disapproval of the candidates who stood for
election by pressing a button which would indicate
‘none of the above’ (NOTA). In People’s Union for
civil Liberties (PUCL) and Another vs. Union of India
and Another 2003, Justice M.B. Shah while dealing
with the nature of the right to vote, held that “the right
of the voter to know the bio data of the candidate was
the foundation of democracy”. In the case of Union
of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and
Another, this Court was considering whether there is
a right of the voter to know about the candidate’s
contesting election. Holding in affirmative, it was
held, ‘They have right to elect or re- elect on the basis
of the antecedents and past performance of the
candidate’.
75. (b) The Goswami Committee Report of 1990
recommended that the Election Commission should
be empowered to take strong action on the report of
returning officers, election observers, or civil society
in regards to booth capture or the intimidation of
voters. It further recommended that the Election
Commission should make use of electronic
surveillance equipment as a deterrent to booth
capture or intimidation of voters.
76. (a) A bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and Ujjal
Bhuyan was hearing a couple of pleas – one by the
administration of the Union Territory of
Lakshadweep, and another by the complainant who
accused the parliamentarian of attempting to murder
him – challenging a January 25 order of a single-
judge bench of the Kerala High Court suspending
Faizal’s conviction and sentence. the SC orally
observed that Conviction Can't Be Suspended Only
Because Parliamentarian Will Otherwise Be
Disqualified.
77. (d) Election Commission of India is a permanent
Constitutional body as it is established by the
authority of Article 324 of Constitution of India. It was
established on 25th January 1950. The Commission
is responsible for conducting free and fair elections.
It also acts in accordance with Representation of
Peoples Act of 1950 and 1951. ECI consists of Chief
Election Commissioner and two other members
known as Election Commissioners. They are
appointed by the President of India. The tenure of the
Election Commissioners is 6 years. However, they
can be removed from office by the same procedure
by which a judge of Supreme Court can be removed.
Hence, only option (d) is incorrect and is the answer.
78. (a) The Vohra Committee Report on Criminalisation of
Politics was constituted to identify the extent of the
politician-criminal nexus and recommend ways in
which the menace can be combated.
79. (c) The Supreme Court's ruling in Lok Prahari v. Union
of India on information disclosure lays the stage for
constitutional interventions in political party funding
structure, including the electoral bond scheme.
80. (a) Section 171C of IPC, 1860 provides for undue
influence in elections. Section 171F provides for the
punishment with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to one year or with fine,
or with both.
81. (c) Article 239AA was inserted into the Constitution by
the 69th Amendment Act in 1991. It conferred special
status on Delhi, following the recommendations of
the S Balakrishnan Committee. The provision grants
Delhi an administrator and a Legislative Assembly,
along with specific powers and limitations.
82. (c) Through the Constitution (Sixty-Ninth Amendment)
Act, 1991, Parliament inserted Articles 239AA and
239AB. Article 239AA of the Constitution created
special provisions for Delhi. First, it provided that the
‘Union Territory of Delhi’ would henceforth be known
as the ‘National Capital Territory of Delhi’ (NCT). The
administrator of the NCT would be the ‘Lieutenant
Governor’ (LG). Article 239AA set up a Legislative
Assembly which would have the power to make laws
for the NCT with respect to the matters in the State
List and Concurrent List of the Constitution—so far
as these matters apply to Union Territories.
However, the Legislative Assembly was not
empowered to make laws on public order, the police,
and land. Article 239AA did not deprive Parliament
from making laws with respect to Union Territories,
Delhi included. The provision set up a Council of
Ministers, and a Chief Minister for Delhi, who would
‘aid and advise’ the LG on those matters that the
Legislative Assembly was empowered to make laws
on. In case of a disagreement between the LG and
the Legislative Assembly, the President shall decide
the dispute.
83. (c) Articles 239 to 241 in Part VIII of the Constitution
deal with the union territories and there is no
uniformity in their administrative system.
The original Constitution under Article 239 provided
for the administration of UTs directly by the President
through the administrators. Article 239A was brought
in 1962, to enable Parliament to create legislatures
for the UTs. In this direction, some UTs were
provided with a legislature and a Council of Ministers
to fulfil the democratic aspirations of the people of
these territories. Article 239AA on the Indian
Constitution was added by Constitution (69th
Amendment) act, 1991 according special provisions
for the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
Under Article 240, President has the power to make
regulations for the peace, progress and good
governance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
Lakshwadeep, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and
Diu and Puducherry. In the case of Puducherry, the
President can make a regulation to legislate only
when the assembly is suspended or dissolved.
A regulation made by the President has the same
force and effect as an act of Parliament.
Article 241 states that the Parliament may by law
constitute a High Court for a Union Territory or
declare any court in any territory to be a High Court
for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution. Only
NCT of Delhi has a separate High Court.
84. (a) A five-Judge Bench of the SC, in Government of
NCT of Delhi v Union of India, 2018, (2018) 8 SCC
501 unanimously held that it is the Chief Minister who
is the executive head of the NCT. The LG is bound
by the ‘aid and advise’ of the Council of Ministers on
all matters where the Delhi Assembly has the power
to make laws. The LG must only be consulted on all
matters where the Legislative Assembly has the
power to make laws—however, the LG’s
concurrence is not required. Further, the LG cannot
refer every matter where there is a conflict between
the LG and Council of Ministers to the President. A
matter must be referred to the President only in
exceptional circumstances.
85. (c) In a split-decision, the SC in Government of NCT of
Delhi v Union of India, 2019, deliberated on who has
power over ‘services’ in Delhi, or the appointment
and transfer of bureaucrats. Justice A.K. Sikri held
that the Delhi Government held power over the
services, while Justice Bhushan said that it was the
Union who exercised these powers. This matter was
referred to a three-Judge Bench of the SC in the
same year.
86. (d) Our Constitution is both federal and unitary. It is
federal in structure but unitary in spirit. Its very first
federal feature is that it is a union of the 28 States
and 7 Union Territories. Our Constitution selected
also possesses some other federal characteristics,
e.g., ma, Rajya a written and a rigid Constitution,
division of powers between the Centre and the
States, bicameral situation, Parliament and an
independent judiciary with power may of judicial
review. But at the same time unitary features are
more prominent, e.g., a single Constitution for the
Centre and the States, State Governor's
appointment by the to the President, Centre's vast
powers on 97 subjects in possesses the Union List,
Centre's right to interfere in the State creed,
administration, emergency powers of the President
and above all the financial dependence of the States
himself on the Centre. So India has been called
quasi-federal. We have a Quasi federal system of
government which means a federal system with a
strong Central Government. It is similar to that of in
Canada, we have adopted the idea of residual
powers from Canada.
87. (a) A 5-Judge bench comprising Chief Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud with Justices Krishna Murari, M.R.
Shah, Hima Kohli and P.S. Narasimha unanimously
upheld the Delhi government’s power over
administrative services in the National Capital
Territory of Delhi (NCTD) on 11 May 2023. The
Bench gave special emphasis to the unique identity
 of Delhi created by Article 239AA which allows the
Delhi Government to make laws related to all matters
except public order, police and land. The SC ruled
that the democratically elected Delhi government
cannot be deprived of its legislative and executive
powers by the Union.
88. (c) The conclusions made by the Court are:
 There does not exist a homogeneous class of
Union Territories with similar governance
structures;
 NCTD is not similar to other Union Territories.
By virtue of Article 239AA, NCTD is accorded a
“sui generis” status, setting it apart from other
Union Territories;
 The Legislative Assembly of NCTD has
competence over entries in List II and List III
except for the expressly excluded entries of List
II. In addition to the Entries in List I, Parliament
has legislative competence over all matters in
List II and List III in relation to NCTD, including
the entries which have been kept out of the
legislative domain of NCTD by virtue of Article
239AA(3)(a);
 The executive power of NCTD is co-extensive
with its legislative power, that is, it shall extend
to all matters with respect to which it has the
power to legislate;
 The Union of India has executive power only
over the three entries in List II over which NCTD
does not have legislative competence;
 The executive power of NCTD with respect to
entries in List II and List III shall be subject to the
executive power expressly conferred upon the
Union by the Constitution or by a law enacted by
Parliament;
 The phrase ‘insofar as any such matter is
applicable to Union Territories’ in Article
239AA(3) cannot be read to further exclude the
legislative power of NCTD over entries in the
State List or Concurrent List, over and above
those subjects which have been expressly
excluded;
 With reference to the phrase “Subject to the
provisions of this Constitution” in Article
239AA(3), the legislative power of NCTD is to be
guided, and not just limited, by the broader
principles and provisions of the Constitution;
and
 NCTD has legislative and executive power over
“Services”, that is, Entry 41 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule because:
(I) The definition of State under Section 3(58)
of the General Clauses Act 1897 applies to
the term “State” in Part XIV of the
Constitution. Thus, Part XIV is applicable to
Union territories; and
(II) The exercise of rule-making power under
the proviso to Article 309 does not oust the
legislative power of the appropriate
authority to make laws over Entry 41 of the
State List.
89. (c) In IK Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh51, a four
judge Bench of this Court held that the entries in
Schedule VII have to be read in their widest possible
amplitude. The Bench held that the area of legislative
competence defined by Entry 41 is far more
comprehensive than that covered by Article 309:
“32. It is well settled that the entries in these
legislative lists in Schedule VII are to be construed in
their widest possible amplitude, and each general
word used in such entries must be held to
comprehend ancillary or subsidiary matters. Thus
considered, it is clear that the scope of Entry 41 is
wider than the matter of regulating the recruitment
and conditions of service of public servants under
Article 309.”
90. (b) In Shiv Kirpal Singh v. VV Giri, held that definitions
under the General Clauses Act as modified by the
President under the adaptation order by virtue of the
power conferred under Article 372A do not apply to
the interpretation of the Constitution. In this case, the
issue was whether the phrase “elected members of
the Legislative Assemblies of the States” in Article 54
(which constitutes the electoral college for the
election of the President) would include the elected
members of the Legislative Assemblies of Union
territories. This Court answered in the negative. This
Court held that the modifications under Article 372A
was limited only to the interpretation of laws of
Parliament and would not apply to the interpretation
of the Constitution because Article 367 stipulates
that the General Clauses Act shall apply to the
interpretation of the Constitution, subject to such
adaptations made under Article 372. The provision
does not provide that the interpretation must also be
subject to the adaptation made under Article 372A.
Parliament responded to the anomaly created by the
judgment in Shiv Kirpal Singh , and inserted an
Explanation to Article 54 by the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1992. The
Explanation clarifies that the reference to ‘State’ in
Articles 54 and 55 would include the National Capital
Territory of Delhi and the Union Territory of
Pondicherry for constituting the electoral college for
the election of the President. In Shiv Kirpal Singh,
this Court did not refer to the decision in Advance
Insurance. Thus, the decision in Shiv Kirpal Singh is
per incuriam to the extent of interpretation of Article
372A.
91. (a) CIRP stands for Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process. CIRP aims to resolve the defaulting
companies in a time-bound manner and maintain the
company as a going concern status.
92. (b) Section 14 of IBC provides for moratorium. It
provides that the Adjudicating Authority shall by
order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the
following, namely:
(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending
suits or proceedings against the corporate
debtor including execution of any judgment,
decree or order in any court of law, tribunal,
arbitration panel or other authority;
(b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or
disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its
assets or any legal right or beneficial interest
therein;
(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any
security interest created by the corporate debtor
in respect of its property including any action
under the SARFAESI, 2002;
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or
lessor where such property is occupied by or in
the possession of the corporate debtor.
Therefore, the correct answer is option (b)
93. (d) Justice Nariman along with Justices Navin Sinha and
KM Joseph had ruled in March 2021 that the
declaration of moratorium under Section 14 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 covers
 criminal proceedings for dishonour of cheque under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI
Act) against the corporate debtor. The judgment was
delivered in P Mohanraj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat
Ltd. which challenged the continuation of criminal
trial under Section 138 NI Act during the pendency
of liquidation proceedings in the National Company
Law Tribunal (NCLT).
In the case of Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirusa
Software Pvt. Ltd, which explained the scope of
"existence of debt" and distinctions between
"operational creditors" and "financial creditors". In
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel v. Satish
Kumar Gupta, SC had read down Section 4 of the
IBC, 2016 which provided for a mandatory timeline
of 330 days within which the Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process (CIRP) needed to be completed.
SC had done so by striking down the word
'mandatorily' before the stated timeline to ensure its
constitutional validity. In Manish Kumar case, SC
had upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 3, 4
and 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Amendment) Act 2020, which introduced additional
conditions for homebuyers to initiate insolvency
process.
94. (d) Section 8 of the IBC provides for insolvency
resolution by operational creditor. It furthers that an
operational creditor may, on the occurrence of a
default, deliver a demand notice of unpaid
operational debtor copy of an invoice demanding
payment of the amount involved in the default to the
corporate debtor. Section 9 elaborates this process
furthers as after the expiry of the period of ten days
from the date of delivery of the notice or invoice
demanding payment under sub-section (1) of section
8, if the operational creditor does not receive
payment from the corporate debtor or notice of the
dispute under sub-section (2) of section 8, the
operational creditor may file an application before the
Adjudicating Authority for initiating a corporate
insolvency resolution process. Therefore, the correct
answer is option (d).
95. (a) Section 5(7) of IBC defines financial creditor as any
person to whom a financial debt is owed and
includes a person to whom such debt has been
legally assigned or transferred to. No other terms
provided in the list are defined in IBC.
96. (c) The court in the given case held that the word any
under Section 14 implies that it would include all
kinds of proceedings against the corporate debtor,
whether civil or criminal.
97. (c) Section 142 of NI Act, provides that notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, no court shall take cognizance of
any offence punishable under Section 138 except
upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or,
as the case may be, the holder in due course of the
cheque; and such complaint is made within one
month of the date on which the cause of action arises
under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138.
Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be
taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the
complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not making a complaint within such period.
98. (a) Offence under Section 138 of the Act is primarily a
civil wrong. Burden of proof is on the accused in view
of presumption under Section 139 but the standard
of such proof is “preponderance of probabilities”.
99. (d) A bench comprising Justices RF Nariman, Navin
Sinha and KM Joseph delivered the judgment on a
batch of petitions in P Mohanraj and others v M/s
Shah Brothers Ispat Ltd and connected cases, which
challenged the continuation of criminal trial under
Section 138 NI Act during the pendency of liquidation
proceedings in the National Company Law
Tribunal(NCLT). The judgemnt was authored by
Justice R.F. Nariman.
100. (d) Section 2 of the Act provides for the application of
IBC. It says that the coDE shall apply to:
i. any company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 2013 or governed by any
special Act
ii. any Limited Liability Partnership incorporated
under the Limited Liability Partnership Act,
2008;
iii. such other body incorporated under any law
iv. partnership firms and individuals.
As we can see that, financial service providers are
not included. Therefore, the correct answer is option
(d).
101. (a) The Earth's biological resources are vital to
humanity's economic and social development. As a
result, there is a growing recognition that biological
diversity is a global asset of tremendous value to
present and future generations. At the same time,
the threat to species and ecosystems has never
been so great as it is today. Species extinction
caused by human activities continues at an alarming
rate.
In response, the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) convened the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Experts on Biological Diversity in
November 1988 to explore the need for an.
international convention on biological diversity. Soon
after, in May 1989, it established the Ad Hoc Working
Group of Technical and Legal Experts to prepare an
international legal instrument for the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity. The
experts were to take into account "the need to share
costs and benefits between developed and
developing countries" as well as "ways and means
to support innovation by local people".
By February 1991, the Ad Hoc Working Group had
become known as the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee. Its work culminated on 22
May 1992 with the Nairobi Conference for the
Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on
Biological Diversity.
The Convention was opened for signature on 5 June
1992 at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (the Rio "Earth
Summit"). It remained open for signature until 4 June
1993, by which time it had received 168 signatures.
The Convention entered into force on 29 December
1993, which was 90 days after the 30th ratification.
The first session of the Conference of the Parties
was scheduled for 28 November – 9 December 1994
in the Bahamas.
The Convention on Biological Diversity was inspired
by the world community's growing commitment to
sustainable development. It represents a dramatic
step forward in the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from
the use of genetic resources.
102. (b) Article 8 provides for in-situ conservation. In situ
conservation means the conservation of ecosystems
 and natural habitats and the maintenance and
recovery of viable populations of species in their
natural surroundings and, in the case of
domesticates or cultivated species, in the
surroundings where they have developed their
distinctive properties.
103. (c) Ex situ conservation is the technique of conservation
of all levels of biological diversity outside their natural
habitats through different techniques like zoo,
captive breeding, aquarium, botanical garden, and
gene bank. It is the methods of conserving all the
living species in the artful habitats that reflect their
natural living habitats. Article 9 of CBD provides for
ex-situ conservation.
104. (c) Article 8(j) states that each contracting Party of the
Convention on Biological Diversity shall, as far as
possible and as appropriate, subject to national
legislation, respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous
and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and promote
their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the
utilization of such knowledge innovations and
practices.
105. (b) The concept of sustainable development received its
first major international recognition in 1972 at the UN
Conference on the Human Environment held in
Stockholm. The term was not referred to explicitly,
but nevertheless the international community agreed
to the notion - now fundamental to sustainable
development - that both development and the
environment, hitherto addressed as separate issues,
could be managed in a mutually beneficial way.
The term was popularised 15 years later in Our
Common Future, the report of the World Commission
on Environment and Development, which included
what is deemed the 'classic' definition of sustainable
development: "development which meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs".
106. (c) Section 7 of Biological Diversity Act provides:
No person, who is a citizen of India or a body
corporate, association or organisation which is
registered in India, shall obtain any biological
resource for commercial utilisation, or bio-survey and
bio-utilisation for commercial utilisation except after
giving prior intimation to the State Biodiversity Board
concerned:
Provided that the provisions of this section shall not
apply to the local people and communities of the
area, including growers and cultivators of
biodiversity, and vaids and hakims, who have been
practicing indigenous medicine.
107. (c) The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
entered into force on 29 December 1993. It has 3
main objectives:
1. The conservation of biological diversity
2. The sustainable use of the components of
biological diversity
3. The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources
108. (d) The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity is an international
agreement which aims at sharing the benefits arising
from the utilization of genetic resources in a fair and
equitable way. It entered into force on 12 October
2014, 90 days after the date of deposit of the fiftieth
instrument of ratification.
109. (b) Section 37 of Biological Diversity Act states:
(1) Without prejudice to any other law for the time
being in force, the State Government may, from time
to time in consultation with the local bodies, notify in
the Official Gazette, areas of biodiversity importance
as biodiversity heritage sites under this Act.
(2) The State Government, in consultation with the
Central Government, may frame rules for the
management and conservation of all the heritage
sites.
(3) The State Government shall frame schemes for
compensating or rehabilitating any person or section
of people economically affected by such notification.
110. (d) In T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India,
(2012) 3 SCC 277, the Supreme Court held that
environmental justice could be achieved only if we
drift away from the principle of anthropocentric to
ecocentric. Many of our principles like sustainable
development, polluter-pays principle,
intergenerational equity have their roots in
anthropocentric principles. Anthropocentrism is
always human interest focused and that non-human
has only instrumental value to humans. In other
words, humans take precedence and human
responsibilities to non-human based benefits to
humans. Ecocentrism is nature-centered where
humans are part of nature and non-humans have
intrinsic value. In other words, human interest does
not take automatic precedence and humans have
obligations to non-humans independently of human
interest. Ecocentrism is therefore life-centered,
nature-centered where nature includes both humans
and non-humans.
111. (c) In Gautam Navlakha case, the Supreme Court
encountered the opportunity to consider that the
order of transit remans is the one passed under
Section 167 CrPC. Transit remand is where the
accused is arrested in such a place that is not within
the jurisdiction. It is a type of police remand.
In Serious Fraud Investigation case, the Apex Court
held that an accused cannot seek default bail merely
on the ground that cognizance has not been taken
before the expiry of 60 days or 90 days, as the case
may be, from the date of remand if chargesheet was
already filed. The indefeasible right of an accused to
seek statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure arises only if the charge-sheet
has not been filed before the expiry of the statutory
period, the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara
Rao and BR Gavai observed.
In A.G. Perarivalan case, the Supreme Court held
that the Governor is required to exercise his power
with the advice of the State Cabinet is binding on the
Governor in the exercise of power in matters related
to commutation/remission under Article 161. The
judgment states, "Governor is but a shorthand
expression for the State Government. Hence, the
correct answer is option (c).
112. (d) In the Manubhai case, the Supreme Court had held
that the act of directing remand of an accused was
fundamentally a judicial function and while
exercising this function, it was obligatory on the part
of the Magistrate to “satisfy himself whether the
materials placed before him justify such a remand”.
 In Sandeep Kumar, among the guidelines, the
committee has observed that, the magistrate before
whom the arrestee is produced, must apply his mind
to the facts of the case and should not grant transit
remand mechanically. He must satisfy himself that
there exists material in the form of entries in the case
diary that justifies the prayer for transit remand. In
Gautam Navlakha case, the Supreme Court has
reiterated the concept of Manubhai case.
113. (a) Yes, under the concept of Section 167, if the person
is ordered house arrest as per the provision, it would
be deemed a police custody as sometimes, the
practical realities are such like overcrowding of jails,
that it is not feasible for every accused to be kept
there. However, in Gautam Navlakha case, the
Supreme court denied his house arrest as custody
as the Delhi High Court set asiding the order of the
Magistrate, has ordered house arrest. This order of
house arrest, was not in furtherance of or
modification of the order of the Magistrate. Further,
the standards that are applicable to a Magistrate
ordering detention under Section 167, were not
followed by the High Court.
114. (b) A "transit anticipatory bail" therefore is when a
person is apprehending arrest by police of a State
other than the State where he/she is presently
situated. As the word "transit" suggests, it is an act
of being moved or carried from one place to another.
A is a resident of Punjab and has an apprehension
that a case might get registered against A in Delhi.
In a normal situation, A will have to travel to Delhi
from Punjab in order to get bail as the Delhi Court is
empowered to grant bail to A. However, if A is
apprehending arrest by the Delhi Police within
Punjab jurisdiction, he can move a Court in Punjab
seeking anticipatory bail. The local courts grant
transit bail as a limited protection till the time accused
approaches the jurisdictional court for bail.
115. (b) Section 167 of CrPC elaborates on the procedure
when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-
four hours. In the case of CBI vs. Anupam Kulkarni,
1992, the Supreme Court encountered the issue of
discovery of new offense while investigating the one
for which remand under Section 167 was initially
taken. The question was whether a fresh period of
remand can be claimed when a new offense is
discovered. The court said that the new offense that
is discovered can be classified into two parts i.e., one
that is committed in the same transaction in which
previous offense was done and other is a different
transaction than the one for which remand has been
previously granted.
If in the investigation of an earlier offense, a new
offense has been discovered which has been
committed in the same transaction, then in such
case, no new case has been made out and such
discovered offense will be added in the ongoing
investigation and not added in the FIR. Therefore, for
such discovered offense, no new remans can be
claimed.
However, if a new offense has been discovered in a
different transaction constituting a separate case,
then for the said discovered offense, a separate FIR
will be registered. A formal arrest would be made of
the accused and he will be liable for a fresh period of
remand for his new offense discovered.
Therefore, the correct answer is option (b)- no fresh
period can be claimed
116. (b) Article 16 starts with that there shall be equality of
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the
State. Hence, it is available to citizens. Others like
Article 21, 14 and 20 are available to persons.
117. (b) Maneka Gandhi is an immensely important judgment
which was delivered on 25th January 1978 and it
altered the landscape of the Indian Constitution. This
judgment widened Article 21’s scope immensely and
it realized the goal of making India a welfare state,
as assured in the Preamble. The unanimous
judgement was given by a 7-judge bench which
comprises of M.H. Beg (CJI), Justices Y.V.
Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna Iyer, P.N. Bhagwati, N.L.
Untwalia, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and P.S Kailasam.
Justice P.N. Bhagwati authored the judgment along
with Justices Chandrachud, Iyer and Beg who wrote
separate but concurring judgment.
118. (c) Section 309 of CrPC, 1973 provides for the power to
postpone or adjourn proceedings. Subsection (2)
elaborated that if the Court, after taking cognizance
of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it
necessary or advisable to postpone the
commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it
may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded,
postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it
thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable,
and may by a warrant remand the accused if in
custody: Provided that no Magistrate shall remand
an accused person to custody under this section for
a term exceeding fifteen days at a time.
In Section 309, there is also a concept of remand but
no specification has been made by the legislature.
The process of Section 309 starts after the
cognizance has been taken by the courts under
Section 190 of CrPC. That means, the judiciary has
now taken a front seat in the criminal process.
Therefore, the custody of Section 309, though not
prescribed will be of judicial nature only. Hence,
option (c) is the correct answer.
119. (b) As per the Supreme Court judgment on Serious
Fraud Investigation vs. Rahul Mode, the Apex Court
held that an accused cannot seek default bail merely
on the ground that cognizance has not been taken
before the expiry of 60 days or 90 days, as the case
may be, from the date of remand if chargesheet was
already filed. The indefeasible right of an accused to
seek statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure arises only if the charge-sheet
has not been filed before the expiry of the statutory
period, the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara
Rao and BR Gavai observed.
120. (d) The Supreme Court in the case of Gautam Navlakha
held that a Habeas Corpus petition is one seeking
redress in the case of illegal detention. It is intended
to be a most expeditious remedy as liberty is at
stake. Whether a Habeas Corpus petition lies when
a person is remanded to judicial custody or police
custody is not res integra. The act of directing
remand of an accused is fundamentally a judicial
function. The Magistrate does not act in executive
capacity while ordering the detention of an accused.
Unless the court is satisfied that a person has been
committed to jail custody by virtue of an order that
suffers from the vice of lack of jurisdiction or absolute
illegality, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted.