CHAPTER 8: VISUAL IMAGERY & SPATIAL COGNITION

• Visual images (vs. auditory, cutaneous/feeling) receive most attention in cognitive psychology
• Cannot be seen, counted, or controlled by other people --- problematic as objects of scientific
inquiry
• behaviourism rejected the concept of an image because they can be distorted or biased
• Athletes who mentally imagine a smooth performance perform better when doing the sport
• E.g. visualizing cool aspects of a negative experience (e.g. where I was standing) reduces
hostile feelings (vs. imagining visceral reactions during incident, or not forming any images)

I. MNEMONICS & MEMORY CODES

• Mnemonics: techniques used to increase chances of remembering/recalling

• Several though not all involve imagery: Method of Loci, Interacting Images, Pegword Method

1. Dual-Coding Hypothesis

• ALLAN PAIVIO
• Dual-coding hypothesis: LT memory involves 2 coding systems (codes) for representing info
to be stored; verbal (contains info about item’s abstract, linguistic meaning) & imagery
(mental pictures that represent what the item looks like) à use one or both
• Pictures and concrete words use both, while abstract words use verbal
• In experiment with CC, CA, AC, or AA word pairs (concrete = C, abstract = A), people averaged
11.41, 10.01, 7.36, and 6.05 correct responses respectively à whenever possible, they formed
visual images of the pairs à visual imagery increases with concreteness (unlike verbal labels)
• Coding using images & verbal = higher change of retrieval
• Pictures remembered better than words; verbal label may be forgotten/misplaced
• Paivio also said the 1st noun in a pair = stimulus noun = conceptual peg on which the 2nd
(response noun) us hooked à mental anchor à better if imaginable (so CA > AC)
• But how well does this explain imagery mnemonics & nonimagery mnemonics?

2. Relational-Organizational Hypothesis

• BOWER
• Relational-organizational hypothesis: imagery improves memory not because images are
richer than verbals, but because imagery produces more associations/hooks between items to
be recalled
• Group 1 used overt rote repetition (rehearse), group 2 made 2 images that did not
interact, and group 3 made an interactive scene --- for paired words --- all people
recognized 85% of words, but the recall differed --- 30%, 27%, and 53% respectively
• If imagery actually led to more elaborate coding of paired associates (dual-coding hypothesis),
then group 2 and 3 should have performed similarly --- so it’s not imagery that helps memory,
but the way imagery is used --- interacting images = more links between target info & other info
--- easier retrieval

II. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF IMAGERY

• LEE BROOKS: participants were asked to imagine a letter (e.g. F), then move clockwise
mentally from a particular corner of the letter & indicate whether the corner was at the very
top/bottom of the letter --- pointing to irregular pattern of Y & N = 2.5x slower than verbal
yes/no answers
• Participant were also asked to indicate whether each word in a given sentence was a noun ---
but these were faster to respond by pointing than verbally
• A visual image is more disruptive of & disrupted by another spatial or visual task (pointing)
than verbal --- also, holding a sentence in memory (verbal) is easier to do with a visual/spatial
task (pointing) than with another verbal task
• Pointing/ talking differ in difficulty as a function of the task with which they’re performed
• Supports dual coding hypothesis --- images & words use different internal codes
• MOYER: faster reply when 2 objects differed greatly --- symbolic distance effect --- reply
faster to “which is bigger? Whale or bug?” vs. “hog or cat?” --- images seem to function like
pictures --- faster response If we saw actual photos vs. consulting visual images

1. Mental Rotation of Images

• We can create and mentally transform images

• SHEPARD & METZLER: people were shown line-drawings of 3D objects; each trial, people saw
2 drawings, either same object that’s been rotated, or mirror-image reversals (similar but not
same)
o The amount of time it takes to decide if the 2 drawings are the same object or a mirror-
image reversal --- proportional to the angle of rotation between the drawings
o Suggests that they performed the task by mental rotation of one drawing
o Took same amount of time for rotations in the picture plane & in depth --- so they were
mentally rotating 3D images (vs. just the 2D drawings)
• COOPER & SHEPARD: people also mentally rotated more recognizable stimuli --- if we’re
given a letter & an angle, we can rotate just as quickly clockwise as counter-clockwise, but takes
the longest for 180 degree rotation --- faster if the test was right after being shown the
letter/angle
• COOPER: we mentally rotate the whole stimulus, and not just certain parts --- experiment with
polygons & reflections of polygons rotated --- response time did not vary w. complexity but
again, with the angle of rotation
• COOPER: mental rotations are continuous, like physical rotations --- people were shown a
polygon at a certain orientation, then the shape was gone, and they had to mentally rotate it
clockwise. Then, a test shape (polygon or its reflection) was presented at some orientation ---
fast response if two shapes had same orientation, slower with larger disparity between the
orientations
• TARR, PINKER, GAUTHIER, TARR: we use mental rotation to recognize 2D shapes drawn to
resemble asymmetric characters --- contrasts BIEDERMAN & GERHARDSTEIN: when we see
3D objects (or drawings of them), as long as the distinctive geons (basic components) of the
object are visible, we can recognize it without mental rotation
• All this suggests that images are like pictures --- contain visual info, can be transformed

2. Scanning Images

• STEPHEN KOSSLYN
• Imaginal scanning: form a visual image, scan it, moving from one location to another in
image --- this idea reveals something about the ways images represent spatial properties
(location, distance)
• KOSSLYN: people studied drawings of objects which were elongated & had 3 describable parts
--- they had to form an image of one of the drawings & then had to look for a particular part
o Some were told to focus on one part (e.g. left) & then scan to find the specific part
 o The longer the distance between the starting point & the part they were trying to find, the
longer it took --- visual image takes spatial traits of the drawings (parts of drawings that
are separated in space are also separated in the image)
o LEA: reaction times increased not due to distance, but due to items that had to be scanned
o KOSSLYN, BELL, REISER: created a map of a fictional island, had people memorize
locations of 7 objects on it which allow 21 distinct paths of varying length without
intervening objects --- reaction time still correlated with distance --- images preserve spatial
relations
o PINKER: similar results with a 3D array of objects (random toys in open box)
• Our scanning of visual images is similar to scanning actual pictures (distance --- time) ---
support idea of images as mental pictures
• BARBARA TVERSKY: contrasts Kosslyn due to systematic errors in memory for maps
• We use different heuristics (rules of thumb) in orienting and anchoring oddly shaped units
(e.g. continents, provinces) --- propensity to make our mental image of a map more aligned ---
systematic distortions --- one way that mental images are unlike mental pictures
• CHAMBERS & REISBERG: people who form images of the same physical stimulus, but who give
different construals/meanings to it, actually form different images --- seeing a duck vs. a rabbit
in 3 similar drawings, focusing on face which is the part that makes the drawing a duck/rabbit,
seeing the difference between the 3 drawings if the facial area was also the differing area ---
Even with hints, few people reversed their image of the duck/rabbit
• KNAUFF & JOHNSON-LAIRD: not always beneficial to use mental images --- 3 term series
problems (“dog A is before B, C is after B, which is first?”)
• Problems like above-below and front-back use visual and spatial visions --- “A is in back of B, B
is in back of C” --- easy to spatially depict the relative positions of the three dogs without
forming a detailed visual image of them
o Cleaner-dirtier, fatter-thinner --- easy to form mental images but not spatial
o Control group problems were not easy to form any kind of image/spatial rep (better/worse)
o Visual relations (cleaner/dirtier) slowed down performance compared to control
problems or visuospatial problems --- mental capacity used by visual images and not by
logical conclusion

III. THE NATURE OF MENTAL IMAGERY

• What are images? What are their properties? How are they like/unlike real pictures’
properties?

1. Principles of Visual Imagery

• FINKE’s 5 principles describe the fundamental nature & properties of visual images

1. Implicit encoding: mental imagery is instrumental in retrieving info about the physical
properties of objects/physical relationships among objects, that was not explicitly encoded
before --- images are places we can get info from, even if unintentionally stored
2. Perceptual equivalence: imagery is functionally equivalent to perception to the extent
that similar mechanisms in the visual system are activated when things are imagined as
when they’re actually perceived --- same kinds of internal processes in mental
visualization & visual perception
o PERKY: people imagined they were looking at an object while staring at blank screen,
then faint pictures of the object showed up & they couldn’t tell
 o MARTHA FARAH: people imagined a certain letter, then saw a faint image of a letter -
-- those who imagined a letter better detected the actual letter than a different letter ---
prime
3. Spatial equivalence: the spatial arrangement of the elements of a mental image
corresponds to the way objects or their parts are arranged on actual physical
surfaces/space
o Scanning studies by KOSSLYN --- we preserve real spatial relationships in our minds
o NANCY KERR: separated visual and spatial characteristics of image/object/drawing
through a map-scanning study where blind participants learned the “map” by feeling
distinct objects on a flat surface --- experimenter then named a pair of objects & they
imagined moving a raised dot from one object to its pair --- greater distance took
longer for both blind & sighted people
o Visual imagery has spatial properties because blind people still use spatial images
4. Transformational equivalence: imagined & physical transformations exhibit
corresponding dynamic characteristics & are governed by the same laws of motion
o Mental rotation works like physical rotation --- it’s continuous, moves through
intermediate orientations on their way to final orientation, the time it takes to mental
rotation depends on how much rotation is to be done, and the whole object is rotated
5. Structural equivalence: structure of mental images correspond to that of actual
perceived objects, so the structure is coherent, well organized, and can be
reorganized/reinterpreted
o The larger/more complicated an object, the longer it takes to look at the details ---
construction of visual images works the same way; they’re not formed at once, but in
parts
o KOSSLYN, REISER, FARAH, FLIEGAL: people formed images of pictures that differed
in detail level--- took people 1.3x longer to form image of detailed pictures than outline
drawings
o Took longer to form image of 5 squares making a cross vs. two overlapping rectangles

2. Critiques of Mental Imagery Research & Theory

1. Tacit knowledge & demand characteristics: imagery experiments give explicit/implicit

hints for people to perform by relying on their beliefs & knowledge vs. strictly on visual imagery
o ZEON PYLYSHYN: results from studies reflect our underlying tacit knowledge and beliefs
about the task vs. our actual construction & manipulation of visual images
o FINKE: this expectation can distort results because if we could move a cup by teleporting
it, we might pause to adjust our time in moving the cup depending on the distance moved
o PYLYSHYN: people may be mentally pausing in image-scanning experiments because of
expectations of what the experimenters want --- tasks that are affected by beliefs &
expectations are cognitive penetrable
o A task that cues people on how to behave is said to have demand characteristics
o Experimenter expectancy effects: unconscious cues affect some imagery investigations -
-- INTONS PETERSON had undergrads conduct imagery studies where some of them
thought the results would turn out one way, and others thought the opposite --- their
participants performed as they expected them to (experiment with imaginal primes vs.
perceptual primes)
o She did not say that results from all visual imagery experiments are the result of bias
2. Picture metaphor: questions the metaphor of visual images as mental pictures --- they differ
o We can physically look at a picture without first knowing what it’s a picture of, but we
can’t for images because they’re internal constructions
o Pictures and images are disrupted in different ways --- can cut a photo, but images are
organized more meaningfully so the less-meaningful parts “fade”
 o images are more easily distorted by viewer’s interpretations, just like our memory for
stories changing over time & depending on initial/subsequent interpretations
o CARMICHAEL, HOGAN, WALTER: participants were presented with patterns with one of
2 labels --- their reproductions of the patterns were distorted in accordance with the label
given
o NICKERSON & ADAMS: we make many errors when trying to reproduce images of
familiar objects due to not having all the info of a real photo of the objects
o Visual imagery exists as a distinct mental code with visual/spatial qualities, the analogy
only works roughly
3. Propositional theory: is imagery really a distinct kind of internal code?
o There is a single code for mentally representing info, neither visual/verbal but
propositional
o Propositions: means of specifying relationships between different concepts --- can be
linked together in networks, with two closely related ideas joined by sharing many
propositions
o PYLYSHYN: propositional theory explains results of imagery experiments --- participants
might look like they’re using internal visual representations, but they’re actually using
internal propositional representations (same representations that underlie their
processing of verbal material like stories) since all info is stored in propositional code
o KOSSLYN: tested association strength between animals & physical traits (claws & cats
vs. head & cats). When we don’t use imagery, we’re faster to verify that cats have claws
(high association value, small visual part of cat) than have heads (low association, high
visual) --- propositional theory would say that higher association value means faster
verification, but when people used imagery with the task, reaction times were opposite ---
using imagery results in performance that propositional theory does not predict

IV. NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS

• ROLAND & FRIBERG: people show massive activation in the brain parts for visual processing
of info (occipital lobe & other posterior regions) during the imagery task (vs. arithmetic &
auditory)
• More blood flow in those areas, as well as event-related potentials (ERPs) /electrical
activity
• Creation of visual images activate parts of the brain involved in visual processing --- occipital
lobe (region of cerebral cortex for visual processing)
• KOSSLYN, THOMPSON, KIM, ALPERT: the occipital lobe showed maximal activation (blood
flow) depending on size of the image created (of previously memorized line drawings of
common items)
• ZATORRE, HALPERN, PERRY, MEYER, AND EVANS: blood flow pattern for detecting pitch
change (secondary auditory cortex in temporal lobes) is similar whether hearing the song &
not
• O’CRAVEN & KANWISHER: fMRI study shows that forming mental images of faces vs. places
activates different areas of the brain --- faces (& photos of faces) activate fusiform face area
vs. places (& complex scenes) activate parohippocampal place area (ventromedial area)
• FARAH: her study (i.e. visual imagery activates same brain parts as vision) is not susceptible
to demand characteristics unless certain assumptions are made:
o That subjects know what parts of their brains are normally active during vision
o That subjects can voluntarily alter their brain electrical activity/blood flow
• KOSSLYN: cognitive tasks are not simply produced by tacit theories of how imaginal
processing ought to function because visual process areas are active when forming visual
images

V. SPATIAL COGNITION
• Spatial cognition: how people represent/navigate in/through space --- how we acquire,
store, and use mental representations of spatial entities, and use them to get from point A and
B
• Example of spatial entity = cognitive map of some part of our environment (e.g. landmarks)
• Opinions vary on how maplike a cognitive map is
• BARBARA TVERSKY: there are different kinds of spaces

1. Space of the body: knowledge of where different parts of our body are located at any
given moment, what objects different body parts are interacting with, internal sensations
(hunger) --- used as we reach for things, duck/avoid things, walk/run to things
2. Space around the body: room we’re in, region we can see --- we localize objects in this
space along 3 axes that are extensions of the body: front-back, up-down, and left-right
axes --- we locate objects fastest along up-down and slowest along left-right
3. Space of navigation: too large to perceive from one place; must be integrated from
different pieces of info that are not immediately comparable; ones we walk through,
explore, travel to/through --- buildings, countries, planets --- places are interrelated by
paths or directions in a reference frame

o Giving directions to someone in route perspective (landmarks) or survey

perspective (bird’s eye view, N S W E) are both using space of navigation
o TVERSKY: Cognitive collage is more appropriate than cognitive map because the
representations we form within the space of navigation aren’t always
accurate/complete
o MONTELLO: navigation consists of 2 major parts: locomotion (moving the body over
terrain) and wayfinding (planning & making decisions about where to go/how to get
there)