Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1982, Vol. 43, No. 3, 503-513 0022-3514/82/4303-0503$00.75

Effects of Public and Private Self-Awareness on

Deindividuation and Aggression
Steven Prentice-Dunn and Ronald W. Rogers
University of Alabama

This study tested the proposition, derived from differential self-awareness theory
(Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, in press), that only one type of antecedent variable
traditionally associated with deindividuation (attentional cues) and a single as-
pect of self-awareness (private) are involved in the deindividuation process.
Groups of four participants were exposed to factorial combinations of attentional
cues (internal vs. external focus of attention) and accountability cues (potential
accountability to authority figures and victims) and then allowed to aggress
against a victim. As predicted, attentional cues affected private self-awareness
but not public self-awareness, whereas accountability cues altered public but not
private self-attention. External attentional cues and low accountability cues dis-
inhibited aggression relative to internal attentional cues and high accountability
cues, respectively. Exposure to external attentional cues created an internal state
of deindividuation, composed of reduced Private Self-Awareness and Altered
Experience, that mediated aggression. Results identified two major types of col-
lective aggression: One category resulted from group members' assessments of
the possibility of an authority figure's and the victim's surveillance of their at-
tacks; the other category resulted from the decreased cognitive mediation of
behavior evoked by the deindividuation process.

Antisocial aspects of crowd behavior have
repeatedly illustrated the tenuousness with
which humans adhere to norms of social pro-
priety. Investigators as early as LeBon (1896)
noted that certain group contexts insulate
individuals from feelings of social responsi-
bility and fear of reprisals for proscribed
acts. Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb
(1952) labeled these disinhibiting effects
deindividuation. Zimbardo (1970) concep-
tualized deindividuation as a process whereby
external input variables lessen self-aware-
ness and concern with others' evaluation of
oneself, leading to a release of restraints
against disinhibited behavior. Diener (1977,
1980) shifted the focus of attention from the
input variables to the mediational role of in-
ferred internal changes in producing disin-
hibited actions, stating that an internal state
of deindividuation had to be demonstrated
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Cash Spivey and John Traweek in the collection of the
data.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Steven Pren-
tice-Dunn, Department of Psychology, University of
Alabama, University, Alabama 35486.
503
for the concept to be valid. Subsequent stud-
ies in the area of aggression (Prentice-Dunn
& Rogers, 1980; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn,
1981) and socially inappropriate but non-
aggressive behavior (Diener, 1979) have pro-
vided the necessary evidence for a subjective
state that mediates deindividuated behavior.
The overriding issue in recent studies in
deindividuation has been the question of its
construct validity (Diener, 1977,1979; Pren-
tice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980). Recent research
identifying an internal state of deindividua-
tion that is causally related to aggression has
confirmed the utility of the deindividuation
construct but has failed to provide a unifying
interpretation of past research, which has
yielded puzzling, often inconclusive, results.
Not infrequently, investigators have dem-
onstrated that deindividuation manipula-
tions produced disinhibited acts without pro-
ducing a subjective deindividuated state.
These results are subject to the more par-
simonious interpretation that the experimen-
tal manipulations simply serve as discrimi-
native cues that release aggression (Diener,
1977).
Recently, we (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers,
504 STEVEN PRENTICE-DUNN AND RONALD W. ROGERS
in press) have proposed a theory of deindi-
viduation that attempts to rectify these past
ambiguities by refining the deindividuation
construct. This differential self-awareness
theory of deindividuation specifies the con-
ditions under which deindividuation is a
likely cause of collective aggression, as well
as the precursors of disinhibited but non-
deindividuated collective aggression. The
theory is based on the assumptions that (a)
an individual's self-awareness has dual com-
ponents—public and private and (b) the
variables historically posited to initiate dein-
dividuation may be reduced to two catego-
ries. The major purpose of this study was to
test the proposition, derived from differen-
tial self-awareness theory, that only one type
of antecedent variable and a single aspect
of self-attention are actually involved in the
deindividuation process.
Much deindividuation research has been
based on the concept of self-awareness re-
duction "as a crucial element in the deindi-
viduation process. These studies (e.g., Di-
ener, 1979; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980)
incorporated Wicklund's (1975) undimen-
sional view of attention as either focused in-
ward on oneself or outward toward the en-
vironment. However, Fenigstein, Scheier,
and Buss (1975) and Buss (1980) suggested
that inward focus could be further divided
into public and private aspects. Public self-
awareness involves attention to oneself as a
social object. Concerns about one's appear-
ance and the impression made in social sit-
uations fall within this domain. On the other
hand, private self-awareness refers to a focus
on personal, more covert aspects of oneself
such as perceptions, thoughts, and feelings.
We propose that it is only when antecedent
variables decrease private self-awareness
that the deindividuation process is evoked.
Numerous variables have been posited to
initiate the internal changes that lead to
deindividuated acts (see reviews by Diener,
1977, and Dipboye, 1977). These antecedent
variables may be reduced to two broad cat-
egories: accountability cues and attentional
cues.
Early investigators (Festinger et al., 1952;
Singer, Brush, & Lublin, 1965; Zirnbardo,
1970) proposed that the precursors of dein-
dividuated aggression were conditions that
lessened identifiability. These manipulations
provide the potential aggressor with infor-
mation concerning scrutiny by authority
figures, the possibility of retaliation by po-
tential victims, and responsibility for harm-
doing. In short, they offer information in-
dicating the extent to which people will be
held accountable for their actions; hence, the
label accountability cues.
As Figure 1 indicates, differential self-
awareness theory posits that accountability
cues operate primarily on public self-atten-
tion. Increased public self-awareness has
been found to increase adherence to social
standards; that is, in the presence of others,
people tend to conform to group norms, act
honestly, and fulfill role expectations (e.g.,
Buss, 1980; Klecketal., 1976), If increments
in public self-attention produce socially ap-
propriate behavior, the reverse should also
hold true: Lowering awareness of public as-
pects of oneself should decrease concern with
social standards and reduce conformity. Sev-
eral studies investigating deindividuation
have found that exposure to antecedent vari-
ables such as anonymity and diffused re-
sponsibility decreases concern with evalua-
tion of oneself by others (e.g., Diener, 1976;
Diener, Lusk, DeFour, & Flax, 1980; Rogers
& Ketchen, 1979; Zirnbardo, 1970). Thus,
it is possible that many prior deindividuation
manipulations have functioned to produce
aggressive behavior, not through deindividu-
ation, but by expectancy value theory con-
siderations (Atkinson, 1957; Lewin, Dembo,
Festinger, & Sears, 1944). Individuals ex-
perience the safety of being in a group that
is not observed by a potential evaluative au-
dience; thus, they are less, concerned with
social evaluation. Not expecting censure or
reprisals from authority figures or potential
victims, they behave aggressively. In short,
the individuals under these circumstances
are quite aware of their actions—they sim-
ply do not expect to suffer negative conse-
quences. The accountability variables thus
serve as discriminative cues that signal that
disinhibited behavior will go unpunished.
Hence, as Johnson and Downing (1979) sug-
gested, anonymity-induced aggression "may
not require a reduction in the subjective
sense of individuation but, in many in-
stances, could reflect a simple reduction in
 SELF-AWARENESS AND DEINDIVIDUATION
ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS
Figure 1, Two categories of collective aggression: model of independent effects of alternate types of self-
awareness on aggression.
perceived negative sanctions" (p. 1537). We
propose that antecedent conditions that lower
public self-awareness produce disinhibited
actions, but not through deindividuation.
The second category of antecedent con-
ditions historically advanced to induce dein-
dividuation is modifications in the person's
attentional and perceptual processes. Inves-
tigators focusing on this class of antecedent
have concentrated on fostering (a) group
cohesiveness and arousal (e.g., Diener, 1979)
and (b) focus of attention away from oneself
(e.g., Diener, 1979; Diener & Kasprzyk,
Note 1). Johnson and Downing (1979) sug-
gested that such variables may have "influ-
ences beyond those related to identifiability"
(p. 1536). Thus, when exposed to these at-
tentional cues, people immerse themselves
in group activity rather than focusing on
self-regulation of behavior.
Differential self-awareness theory asserts
that attentional cues alter private self-
awareness (see Figure 1). As with studies in
public self-awareness, research on private
self-awareness has neglected to consider the
effects of its reduction on subsequent be-
havior. However, increased attention to pri-
vate aspects of the self has been shown to
enhance resistance to attempted coercion
(Carver, 1977) and false suggestions about
bodily symptoms (Gibbons, Scheier, Carver,
& Hormuth, 1979) and to enhance mood
(e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1977). , pected to inhibit aggression relative to ex-
Our theory proposes that a decrement in
private self-awareness is the crucial media-
tor in the deindividuation process. As the
antecedent situation is manipulated to direct
attention away from oneself, private sblf-fo-
cus is reduced. The individual is not as aware
505
SUBJECTIVE STATE BEHAVIOR
as usual of thoughts, moods, bodily states,
and other internal processes. The person can-
not retrieve standards with which to compare
and adjust his or her behavior (cf. Carver,
1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Diener,
1980) and is therefore less likely to regulate
behavior on the basis of these personal and
social norms. Ordinary perceptual and emo-
tional processes become altered. Thus, dein-
dividuated aggression results from reduced
cognitive mediation of behavior, whereas
aggression due to lessened accountability is
the product of the person's conscious weigh-
ing of the benefits of disinhibited actions
versus possible negative sanctions. Only the
lower portion of Figure 1, then, depicts dein-
dividuated aggression.
In summary, the present study sought to
assess the influences of attentional cues and
accountability cues on subjective deindividu-
ation and aggression. Small groups were ex-
posed to factorial combinations of the two
types of antecedent cues. Based on the dif-
ferential self-awareness theory of deindivid-
uation (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, in press),
we predicted that the antecedent cues would
have independent effects on private and pub-
lic self-awareness and aggression: Atten-
tional cues would alter private self-focus,
whereas accountability cues would affect
public self-attention. Internal attentional
cues and high accountability cues were ex-
ternal attentional cues and low accountabil-
ity cues, respectively. Exposure to external
attentional cues was predicted to form an
internal state of deindividuation, whereas
exposure to accountability cues was not. Fi-
nally, the use of repeated measures of sub-
506 STEVEN PRENTICE-DUNN AND RONALD W. ROGERS
jective deindividuation allowed us to assess
the existence of a possible feedback loop
between the internal state and aggression.
Such a loop, not previously tested, has been
suggested by some (Diener, 1977; Prentice-
Dunn & Rogers, 1980) as the mechanism
whereby subjective deindividuation might
increase aggression that would further en-
hance subjective deindividuation.
Method
Design and Subjects
A 2 X 2 factorial design was employed with two be-
tween-subjects manipulations: (a) internal attentional
cues versus external attentional cues and (b) high ac-
countability cues versus low accountability cues. Forty-
eight male students enrolled in introductory psychology
courses participated in the experiment to earn extra
credit. Twelve subjects were randomly assigned to each
cell.
Apparatus
The shock apparatuses were modified Buss aggression
machines. The four aggression machines each contained
10 push-button switches that could be depressed to de-
liver "shocks" of progressively increasing intensity. Of
course, shocks were not actually delivered.
Procedure
Subjects arrived and were tested in groups of four;
three were naive participants and one was our assistant.
This assistant's primary responsibility was to note any
communication between other group members that
might endanger independence of shock responses or self-
report ratings. Fortunately, this type of communication
did not occur.
The study was explained as a combination of two
experiments. The naive subjects signed up for a study
entitled "Problem Solving Processes" and were tested
together. The second experiment was a "Memory
Study" for which another introductory psychology stu-
dent (actually a second experimental assistant) had vol-
unteered. (After half of the experiment had been com-
pleted, the assistants switched roles.) The purpose of the
problem-solving study was given as the rating of thought
processes as people performed cognitive tasks, such as
solving anagrams and watching and evaluating video
games. The memory experiment was explained as an
investigation of the role of stressful distractions in the
memory of details. Problem-solving participants were
told that as the memory subject played video games, he
would attempt to remember game settings, locations of
played mistakes, and so on, for later recall on a memory
questionnaire. Subjects were informed that since both
studies involved the same video games and since the
memory subject had to be distracted anyway, they could
save the experimenter from recruiting additional sub-
jects by providing the stress distractions (electric shocks
delivered via a finger electrode) themselves.
We explained to all subjects that they received their
extra credit points for simply showing up and that they
could discontinue at any time. Each subject was asked
if he had any questions about or any objections to the
use of electric shock. All questions were answered and
no one declined to participate. In addition, written in-
formed consent was obtained. Two mild sample shocks
were administered to each of the problem solvers (i.e.,
the naive subjects). The shocks were from Switches 4
(.25 mA) and 6 (.35 mA) on the aggression machine
and each lasted for 1 second. These samples were ad-
ministered to convince the subjects that the apparatus
really worked and to give them some idea of the shocks
they would be delivering. These two shocks were de-
scribed by the subjects as feeling like a "pinprick" and
"a burning sensation," respectively.
Next, the problem solvers' distraction duties were
detailed. Subjects were shown a room in which four
seats were arranged in a semicircle around a television
monitor and a cabinet speaker. Shock panels were
mounted on tables in front of each seat. Partial parti-
tions allowed subjects to see each others' faces but
blocked any view of the shock panels other than
their own.
Subjects were informed that, as part of the problem-
solving process study, they would later watch and eval-
uate video games and that subsequently their self-rat-
ings of thoughts while viewing the games would be elic-
ited. The televised program was explained as a view of
the game as the memory subject played it in an adjacent
room. The experimenter explained that during the video
task, a green signal light on their shock panels would
be presented occasionally, indicating that a shock dis-
traction was to be administered to the memory subject.
Each subject was then to select and press 1 of the 10
push-button switches: The higher the level chosen, the
stronger the shock that was administered. In addition,
"shock" was delivered as long as the switches were de-
pressed. The shock received by the memory subject was
alleged to be the average of the four intensities and
durations selected on each trial by the four problem
solvers.
Next, the experimenter emphasized that the response
of interest in the memory study was the memory sub-
ject's performance on a postgame recall questionnaire
(i.e., we were not concerned with how well he played
the game). In addition, subjects were told that any of
the 10 shock switches would be sufficient for the purpose
of the experiment. It was explained that the equipment
had been designed with different shock intensities be-
cause we had not known how strong the shocks would
have to be to distract someone. We explained that we
had discovered that the different shocks all had equal
effects on the memory subject's recall, so the naive sub-
jects could choose any intensity they wished on each
trial. These instructions were designed to eliminate any
potential altruistic motivation, and they made clear that
use of the lowest possible intensity on every trial would
fulfill the requirements of the experiment. Use of any
intensity greater than Switch 1 would only result in
additional pain to the memory subject.
 SELF-AWARENESS AND DEINDIVIDUATION
After the distraction duties were detailed, the problem
solvers were taken to another room where they were
given 15 minutes (in the absence of the experimenter)
to solve 25 anagrams that formed names of popular rock
bands. Upon completion of the anagrams, the problem
solvers returned to the video-task room, where their
previously explained video activities were then con-
ducted. Twenty shock distraction trials were completed.
The interval between the appearance of any two signal
lights was initially chosen randomly, ranging from 25-
60 seconds, and then'held constant across subsequent
replications. In addition, three self-report questionnaires
assessing a subjective state of deindividuation were ad-
ministered: (a) ah 11-item list given both before the
anagram task and after Shock Trial 10 and (b) a 21-
item list completed after Shock Trial 20. The latter list
included all of the items in the former list.
All items were rated on 10-point Likert scales adapted
from Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1980) and Rogers and
Prentice-Dunn (1981). Also included in each question-
naire were items assessing public and private self-aware-
ness. To form a private self-awareness score, two items,
based on Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) Private Self-Con-
sciousness Scale, were summed for each subject. These
items were (a) "Generally, I've been very aware of
myself and (b) "Rather than thinking about myself,
my mind has been concentrated on what is going on
around me" (reversal). Two additional items, based on
Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) Public Self-Consciousness
Scale, were tallied for each subject to form a public self-
awareness score: (a) "I have been somewhat concerned
about the way I've presented myself to the experi-
menter" and (b) "I have been concerned about what
the memory subject might think of me."
Experimental Manipulations
The first independent variable, attentional cues, was
designed to maximally affect private self-awareness by
focusing attention on or away from oneself. This was
accomplished through verbal instructions, the presence
or absence of a task fostering group cohesiveness and
arousal, and by the inclusion or omission of stimuli that
maintained subject interest. In the external attentional-
cues condition, subjects were given repeated instructions
to focus attention outward and not on themselves. Fur-
ther, the study was described repeatedly as concerning
group problem-solving processes. Anagrams were solved
collectively with subjects' interaction encouraged in or-
der to develop group cohesiveness (cf. Marshall & Hes-
lin, 1975). Participants organized single stimulus letters
on a table in a dimly lit room. While working, subjects
listened to loud rock music devoid of aggressive lyrics
(e.g., songs by Jackson Browne and Bruce Springsteen),
which has been found to increase arousal (e.g., Rogers
& Ketchen, 1979). Verbal interaction among group
members was also promoted during the video task. Sub-
ject interest was enhanced by the use of two color video
games (Superman and Video Golf from Atari, Inc.) that
were manipulated .to contain exciting play and colorful
instructions describing the games. After the initial in-
structions, loud rock music was played during the video
activities.
507
In the internal attentional-cues condition, subjects
were told throughout the experiment that the unit of
interest was the individual and his unique reactions. In-
structions were repeatedly given to concentrate only on
one's own thoughts and feelings while performing the
experimental tasks. The anagram task was performed
in a brightly lit room at individual desks, with separate
word lists and no communication or music. During the
video task, subjects were also tested in a brightly lit
room with no communication or music. To decrease sub-
ject interest relative to the external attentional cues con-
dition, the video task involved only the Superman game,
taped in black-and-white. This single game was equal
in duration to the two video games viewed in the external
condition. It contained instructions delivered in an in-
different voice and had comparatively less action and
character movement than the games of the external con-
dition.
The accountability cues manipulation was intended
to affect public self-awareness by influencing the iden-
tifiability of subjects' actions to the experimenter and
the potential victim. This was accomplished through in-
structions pertaining to the monitoring of subjects' shock
levels and the presence or absence of numerous meetings
of subjects with the victim. In the high accountability-
cues condition, the memory subject reported to the same
meeting room as the problem solvers before being dis-
missed for instructions elsewhere. The problem solvers
were told that after the experiment they would again
meet the memory subject to discuss the experiment, in-
cluding the shock levels they each used. Subjects were
shown how the equipment could monitor their individual
shocks. Further, they were told that the experimenter
was interested in the shocks that each person used and
that he would record them. Finally, the memory subject
was taken into the video-task room before the video
game was begun and shown the arrangement of the
shock panels. As the experimenter named the shock
panel number for each seat, the memory subject made
eye contact with the person at that particular shock
panel,
In the low accountability cues condition, the problem
solvers did not see the memory subject before or during
the study and were told that they would not be meeting
him after the experiment. Further, the shock monitoring
equipment was not explained. Finally, participants were
told that their shocks were not of primary interest to
the experimenter and therefore would not be recorded.
Postexperimental Session
Following the video task, subjects completed a ques-
tionnaire that assessed suspicions about the experiment.
Five subjects suspected that shocks were not actually
delivered; these subjects were deleted from data anal-
yses. After each experimental session, each subject was
thanked and given a full debriefing that was based on
Mills's (1976) recommendations. Finally, a question-
naire was given to each student in a stamped envelope
addressed to the Psychology Department's Committee
on Ethics, These anonymous responses were returned
by 65% of the subjects. Respondents unanimously be-
lieved that (a) the deception was warranted, (b) they
508 STEVEN PRENTICE-DUNN AND RONALD W. ROGERS

Table 1 ment cell to equate cell n.) Significant mul-

Mean Aggression and Self-Awareness Scores as tivariate effects were found for accountabil-
a Function of the Two Independent Variables ity cues, F(2, 38) = 3.41, p < .05, and
Multi-
attentional cues, F(2, 38) = 21.52, p < .0001.
variate Private Public All other multivariate effects failed to reach
Cue aggres- self- self- significance.
condition sion awareness awareness Subsequent univariate analyses of vari-
ance revealed the predicted main effect of
Accountability
High 2.66, 10.46. 10.32, accountability cues on the two items assess-
Low 3.36b 10.00, 8.00 b ing public self-awareness, F(l, 39) = 6.98,
Attentional
p < .02. As shown in Table 1, subjects in the
Internal 2.86, 12.46 a 9.14, high accountability-cues condition rated
External 3.54b 8.00b 9.18, themselves as more publicly self-aware than
did subjects in the low accountability-cues
Note. Pairs of column means that do not share a com- condition. Private self-awareness was not
mon subscript differ significantly (p < .05). significantly affected by the accountability
cues variable (p > .5).
had received a fair explanation of risks, and (c) the As expected, the attentional cues manip-
study was structured to prevent harm. All but one re- ulation significantly affected the two items
spondent agreed that they had volunteered for the study. measuring private self-awareness, F(l, 39) =
This subject failed to explain his response in the space 39.89, p < .0001. Compared to participants
provided on the questionnaire. Fortunately, this student,
along with every other subject (100% of the sample), receiving internal attentional cues, subjects
indicated that (a) the experiment should be allowed to whose attention was externally focused re-
continue and (b) they would be willing to participate ported less private self-awareness. However,
in another similar experiment. the attentional cue variable failed to influ-
ence public self-awareness (p > .9). No other
Results univariate main or interaction effects were
significant.
Aggression
Subjects' shock intensity totals and shock Internal State of Deindividuation
duration totals for Trials 1-10 and Trials Subjects' responses on the retrospective
11-20 were submitted to multivariate anal- questionnaire administered after Trial 20
ysis.1 A multivariate analysis of variance were factor analyzed for indications of a sub-
disclosed main effects for both accountabil- jective state of deindividuation. These 21
ity cues, F(2, 38) = 5.29, p < .01, and at- items included items from previous research
tentional cues, F(2, 38) = 5.00, p < .02. The isolating a subjective deindividuated state
multivariate blocks effect and all interac- (Diener, 1979; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers,
tions were nonsignificant. The multivariate 1980; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981) plus
aggression centroids are shown in Table 1. the items from Fenigstein et al.'s (1975)
Compared to subjects in the high account- Self-Consciousness Scale assessing public
ability-cues conditions, subjects receiving and private self-awareness.
low accountability cues displayed more A scree plot of eigenvalues (Cattell,
aggression. In addition, the external atten- 1966) provided by a principal-axis factor
tional-cues condition produced more aggres- analysis indicated a two-factor solution. Two
sion than did internal attentional-cues con-
dition. 1
A cell mean was added to one of the treatment cells
to equate the four cell ns; subsequently, one degree of
Public and Private Self-Awareness freedom was deleted from the total. Data analysis in the
present study not involving repeated measures did not
Subjects' public and private self-aware- include the additional cell mean. These unequal n de-
ness scores were collected after Trials 10 and signs were analyzed with the complete least squares
20 and submitted to a multivariate analysis model recommended by Overall, Spiegel, and Cohen
(1975) because this model meets the criterion of esti-
of variance (MANOVA). (As with the aggres- mating the same parameters as those in an orthogonal
sion data, a cell mean was added to one treat- design.
 SELF-AWARENESS AND DEINDIVIDUATION
factors were then rotated using a varimax
method. A final solution was based on item
loadings of .4 or above on only one factor
and on interpretability of the data. The re-
sultant factor loadings are shown in Table
2. (An analysis of only subjects in the ex-
ternal attentional-cues condition yielded the
same two factors.) One factor might be la-
beled Private Self-Awareness, since it is
composed of items pertaining to attention to
one's thoughts and moods. This factor con-
tains elements of private self-attention found
in Prentice-Dunn and Rogers's (1980) and
Rogers and Prentice-Dunn's (1981) Self-
Awareness factor, but it does not contain
aspects of public self-focus found in the Self-
Awareness factor of the two previous inves-
tigations. Thus, our series of studies indi-
cates that self-awareness should be differ-
entiated into public and private components.
To complete our theory of deindividuated
aggression shown in the bottom half of Fig-
ure 1, we should include the additional sub-
jective state of Altered Experience, which
is produced by attentional cues and mediates
deindividuated aggression. This factor, which
contained aspects of arousal, group cohe-
siveness, and positive affect, is highly similar
to the Altered Experience factor isolated by
others (e.g., Diener, 1979; Prentice-Dunn
& Rogers, 1980).
To assess the effects of accountability cues
and attentional cues on subjective deindivid-
uation, a multivariate analysis of variance
was conducted on subjects' Altered Experi-
ence and Private Self-Awareness factor
scores. This yielded a significant multivari-
ate effect only for attentional cues, F(2,
38) = 14.70, p< .0002. Subsequent univari-
ate analyses disclosed significant attentional-
cues effects on both Altered Experience, F( 1,
39) = 15.67, p < .0006, and Private Self-
Awareness, F(l, 39) = 7.60, p < .009. As
expected, external attentional-cues subjects
had higher scores on the Altered Experience
factor than the internal attentional-cues sub-
jepts (Ms = .53 and —.49, respectively), but
lower scores on the Private Self-Awareness
factor (Ms = —.39 and .39, respectively).
Deindividuation and Aggression
To assess the overall path model in which
we previously proposed (Prentice-Dunn &
509
Table 2
Factor Loadings on the Rotated Factors
Factor 1: Altered Experience
Feeling of togetherness among group .83
Felt active and energetic '.83
Time seemed to go quickly .81
Felt jubilant .77
Thoughts were concentrated on the moment .76
Felt glad .70
Felt gleeful .67
Willing to volunteer again with same group .61
Mind was focused on what was happening
around me .59
Emotions were different from normal .53
Thinking was somewhat altered .50
Factor 2: Private Self-Awareness
Aware of the way my mind was working .84
Alert to changes in my mood .73
Aware of myself .63
Thought of myself a lot .63
Note. These two factors accounted for 30% and 16% of
the variance, respectively. Reliabilities (coefficient al-
phas) were .89 and .73, respectively.
Rogers, 1980; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn,
1981) that subjective deindividuation has a
causal influence on aggression, path coeffi-
cients were determined for the paths be-
tween Altered Experience and aggression as
well as between Private Self-Awareness and
aggression. Data used in this analysis were
subjects' factor scores on the two internal
state factors and a total multivariate aggres-
sion score. The path coefficient from Altered
Experience to aggression was .30, while the
coefficient from Private Self-Awareness to
aggression was —.15. As such, these path
coefficient values were similar to those found
in the earlier studies for Altered Experience
(M = .28) and Self-Awareness (M = -.20;
Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980; Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1981). It should be noted
that due to the small number of degrees of
freedom, only the Altered Experience path
coefficient was statistically significant in the
present study.
Our theoretical model shown in Figure 1
may now be examined in light of these re-
sults. First, the two categories of collective
aggression (accountability cues and atten-
tional cues) are independent because they
were the independent variables in the ex-
perimental design. Second, the results (see
Table 1) demonstrated that (a) account-
ability cues produced public but not private
510 STEVEN PRENTICE-DUNN AND RONALD W. ROGERS
self-awareness and (b) attentional cues pro-
duced private but not public self-awareness.
Third, the path analysis demonstrated that
the two factors of the subjective state of
deindividuation (Altered Experience and
Private Self-Awareness) mediated deindi-
viduated aggression. (No coefficient was
computed for the path from Public Self-
Awareness to aggression because our re-
search has focused on the theory of deindi-
viduation. However, the accountability cues
main effect on both public self-awareness
and aggression suggest that this path would
be significant.) Thus, the figure indicates two
separate networks for collective aggression:
The top half, through public self-attention,
results in nondeindividuated collective ag-
gression; the lower half, through private self-
attention, results in group aggression by
deindividuation.
To supplement the major analyses of the
present experiment, the possibility of a feed-
back loop between subjective deindividua-
tion and aggression was examined. This may
be conceptually represented by bidirectional
causal paths between the internal state and
aggression. However, to test the causal loop
using a recursive path model, the relation-
ship was extended temporally to reflect the
order in which the measurements were taken.
Hence the variables were subjective dein-
dividuation (Time 1), aggression (Time 1),
subjective deindividuation (Time 2), aggres-
sion (Time 2), and subjective deindividua-
tion (Time 3).
For each subject, a multivariate aggres-
sion score, obtained from MANOVA results
on shock intensity and duration, was cal-
culated for Trials 1-10 and Trials 11-20. To
calculate deindividuation scores, seven items
were used that (a) were common to the three
self-report questionnaires and (b) loaded
clearly on either the Altered Experience or
Private Self-Awareness factor. Of the seven
items, six were contained in the Altered Ex-
perience factor; only one loaded on the Pri-
vate Self-Awareness factor. These seven
items were summed for each of the admin-
istrations of the questionnaire. Thus, each
participant had two aggression scores and
three subjective deindividuation scores.
Correlations among the variables ranged
from .13 to .22, all of which were nonsig-
nificant. Contrary to expectations, none of
the path coefficients reached significance.
Thus, confirmation of the feedback loop was
not obtained.
Discussion
This study confirmed the central propo-
sition of differential self-awareness theory:
Traditional deindividuation antecedent vari-
ables may be divided into two broad cate-
gories (accountability cues and attentional
cues) that have independent effects on self-
awareness and aggression. Exposure to
accountability antecedents altered public
self attention but failed to influence private
aspects of self-focus. On the other hand, at-
tentional variables altered private self-
awareness but not public self-awareness.
Private-public self-awareness theory (Buss,
1980; Carver & Scheier, 1981) was ad-
vanced by the present investigation of the
effects of a reduction in self-focus on be-
havior. Previous studies concentrated exclu-
sively on the examination of increased public
or private self-attention. In addition, the
finding of no interaction between the two
types of antecedent variables on private-
public self-awareness corroborated earlier
research (see review by Buss, 1980) that the
two types of attention to self operate inde-
pendently of one another. Apparently, the
decreased focus on thoughts and bodily
states entailed in a reduction of private self-
awareness does not automatically alter pub-
lic self-awareness.
As predicted, both accountability and at-
tentional antecedents influenced the display
of physical aggression. The multivariate
analysis indicated that the two types of sit-
uational variables functioned independently.
Hence, exposure to external attentional cues
as compared to internal cues magnified
aggression, whereas high accountability cues
inhibited harm-doing when compared to low
accountability cues. Low accountability cues
signaled subjects that any harm directed to-
ward the potential victim was likely to go
undetected. Conversely, cues emphasizing
high accountability made participants feel
that their actions were readily identifiable
to both the experimenter and the memory
 SELF-AWARENESS AND DEINDIVIDUATION
subject. In fact, during debriefing, some high
accountability-cue subjects expressed the
belief that their use of severe shocks might
lead to acts of retribution by the victim.
Thus, accountability manipulations served
simply as discriminative cues signaling
whether harmful acts might be punished.
This is consistent with previous research il-
lustrating the impact of potential censure on
aggression (see review by Baron, 1977).
Exposure to external attentional anteced-
ents limited cognitive mediation of behavior
by evoking the deindividuation process. This
decrement in private self-focus resulted in
less attention to the thoughts and behavioral
standards necessary for behavioral regula-
tion (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Thus, exter-
nal attentional cues may have decreased at-
tention to behavioral norms concerning the
lenient treatment of another person who had
done nothing provoking. In addition, the de-
creased ability to retrieve such standards
may have led to the enactment of socially
proscribed behaviors, such as aggression,
that are normally held in check. On the other
hand, exposure to internal attentional cues,
by increasing private self-attention, facili-
tated behavioral compliance with personal
norms of lenient treatment (cf. Carver,
1975). This resulted in less aggression di-
rected toward the victim.
The successful isolation of a subjective
state of deindividuation replicated and ex-
tended previous research (Diener, 1979;
Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980; Rogers &
Prentice-Dunn, 1981) that indicates -that
deindividuating antecedent variables pro-
duce an internal state of deindividuation.
The subjective state was composed of dual
orthogonal components, Altered Experience
and Private Self-Awareness.
The Altered Experience factor closely re-
sembled previous Altered Experience factors
(Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980; Rogers
& Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Common elements
included group cohesiveness, time distortion,
altered thinking and emotions, arousal, and
positive affect.
Whereas the Altered Experience compo-
nent of subjective deindividuation may refer
to the product of private self-awareness, the
Private Self-Awareness factor found in the
present study refers to the process of being
511
conscious of one's thoughts and feelings.
This Private Self-Awareness factor con-
tained items not previously assessed in ear-
lier research. These items (e.g., "Aware of
myself and "Alert to changes in my mood")
referred to attention to the more covert,
unobservable aspects of self, whereas the
Self-Awareness factor found in Prentice-
Dunn & Rogers (1980) and Rogers & Pren-
tice-Dunn (1981) predominantly contained
elements of public self-focus (e.g., "Con-
cerned with what experimenter thought of
me" and "Concerned with what victim
thought of me"). The isolation of a self-
awareness factor concerned exclusively with
private self-attention was probably due to
two differences between this experiment and
the two prior studies. First, the inclusion of
numerous items tapping private self-focus
was an obvious prerequisite for identifying
such a factor. Second, the much stronger
manipulation of attentional cues (both in-
ternal and external) in this study vis-a-vis
past experiments may have allowed the Pri-
vate Self-Awareness factor to emerge.
It should be noted that the present exper-
iment was not designed to replicate the five-
factor configuration of the internal state sug-
gested by Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981).
Factor-analytic investigations of possible ad-
ditional facets of the state of deindividuation
should employ much larger subject samples.
Thus, the results of MANOVA and factor
analysis suggest the crucial role of private
self-attention in the deindividuation process.
This is reflected in the identification of the
Private Self-Awareness component of sub-
jective deindividuation, paired with the find-
ing that attentional cues but not account-
ability cues influenced subjects' scores on the
internal deindividuated state. In addition,
these results indicate the greater appropri-
ateness of differential self-awareness theory
as an explanation of deindividuation com-
pared to explanations based on reduced con-
cern with public self-attention; for example,
impression management theory (Lindskold
& Propst, 1980) and behavioral contagion
(Wheeler, 1966).
The initial path model evaluated in the
present study posited the subjective state of
deindividuation to be a causal mediator of
aggression. This path analysis yielded path
512 STEVEN PRENTICE-DUNN AND RONALD W. ROGERS
coefficients similar to recent studies (Pren-
tice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980; Rogers & Pren-
tice-Dunn, 1981) that confirmed the model.
Thus, increments in Altered Experience
were shown to predict aggression, whereas
reductions in Private Self-Awareness pre-
dicted harm-doing. However, due to the
small number of degrees of freedom, only
the path coefficient for Altered Experience
was significant. Nevertheless, when com-
bined with the results of previous investi-
gations, the available data strongly suggest
that subjective deindividuation mediated the
expression of aggression.
None of the path coefficients assessing the
causal feedback loop between subjective
deindividuation and aggression were signif-
icant. One problem with the analysis may
account for the unexpected results. Although
the factor analysis indicated a bicomponen-
tial subjective state, the deindividuation
score on which the path analysis was based
contained too few items from one of the fac-
tors. Of the seven items chosen a priori to
calculate the deindividuation score, six were
from the Altered Experience factor and only
one was from the Private Self-Awareness
factor. Thus, because Private Self-Aware-
ness, a crucial mediator in the deindividua-
tion process, was underrepresented in the de-
individuation score, the feedback loop sug-
gested by Diener (1977) and Prentice-Dunn
and Rogers (1980) was not adequately tested
in the present experiment. Future research
using more items specifically tapping Private
Self-Awareness is needed to evaluate such
a causal network.
Conclusion
This test of differential self-awareness the-
ory suggests that the frequent linking of ac-
countability variables to the deindividuation
process in past research may have been in-
appropriate. The present results clearly dem-
onstrate that although accountability cues
certainly influence the disinhibition of
aggression, they do not produce deindividu-
ated aggression. Thus, past and future dein-
dividuation research may be better under-
stood by reference to the alternate types of
self-attention evoked by experimental ma-
nipulations.
Differential self-awareness theory sepa-
rates two major types of collective aggres-
sion. One category of group aggression re-
sults from a group member's active calcu-
lations that his or her attacks on another
person will not be subject to scrutiny or pos-
sible retaliation from potential victims and
authority figures. It is the product of the
person's conscious choice between the ben-
efits of aggression and the possible negative
consequences. On the other hand; group
aggression may result from decreased cog-
nitive mediation of behavior. Situational
cues may debilitate self-regulation of a
group member's behavior when private self-
awareness is reduced by the initiation of the
deindividuation process. Any systematic at-
tempts to prevent potentially harmful out-
bursts among groups of people must consider
both types of aggression and their indepen-
dent causes.
Reference Note
1. Diener, E., & Kasprzyk, D. Causal factors in dis-
inhibition by deindividuation. Unpublished manu-
script, University of Illinois, 1978. (Available from
Ed Diener, Department of Psychology, University of
Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820).
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