The

PUBLIC SAFETY
PROGRAM
VIETNAM

OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY

U S AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SAIGON, VIETNAM
1966
 T H E PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

UNITED STATES AGENCY

For
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Saigon, V i e t n a m

C H A R L E S A MANN
DIRECTOR, USAID/VIETNAM

R O B E R T C LOWE
ASSISTANT D I R E C T O R F O R P U B L I C S A F E T Y

Saigon
1 April 1966
 FOREWORD

T h e purpose of t h i s pamphlet is t o provide a brief n a r r a t i v e

description of the objectives, a c t i n t i e s and accomplishments of the
Office of Public Safety of the United States Agency f o r International
Development (USAID) Mission in Vietnam, a s they w e r e at the beginning
of calendar y e a r 1 9 6 6

The pamphlet is intended p r i m a r i l y f o r the u s e of United States

civilian o r m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s in Vietnam whose effectiveness may be
enhanced by a general knowledge of the work of the National Police and
other law enforcement agencies and of the r o l e of the Office of Public
Safety in supporting and developing those agencies It is a l s o available
as a ready r e f e r e n c e f o r m e m b e r s of the working p r e s s and o t h e r s with
a s e r i o u s i n t e r e s t in Vietnam It is not intended as a p r o g r a m justifi-
cation n o r is it a manual f o r Public Safety Advisors

It is hoped that the information provided h e r e will be useful and

that it will promote a s p i r i t of cooperation and mutual helpfulness

The t a s k of civil policing and law enforcement, particularly

under the p r e s e n t difficult circumstances, is s o overwhelming that the
National P o l i c e and the Office of Public Safety need, and ask, the s y m -
pathetic understanding and wholehearted support of everyone in Vietnam

Robert C Lowe, Assistant Director

1 April 1 9 6 6 USAID Mission in Vietnam
 Robert C Lowe
Assistant Director f o r Public Safety

- 3 -
 Philip D Batson
Deputy Assistant Director f o r Public Safety

Maynard N Shirven - Chief, Finance and Logistics Division

-4-
Charles E O'Brien - Chief, Operatlons Division

E l m e r E Adkins, J r
Chief, Admlnlstratlon and Support Division
( T r a n s f e r r e d f r o m Vietnam, April 1966 )
NATIONAL

COMMISSIONER PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER CAREER COMMISSIONER DAILY STATUS

REDACTOR DAILY STATUS

REDACTOR PRINCIPAL
 INTRODUCTION

The civll police of the Republic of Vietnam a r e organized o n a

national basis, i e , there a r e no local police forces such as a r e found
in the United States, except f o r some village constables who a r e largely
untrained and operate at a very low level

The police organization is known as the Directorate General of

National Police, or, for the sake of simplicity, a s the National Police
It is headed by a Director General under whom a r e a Deputy Director
seven A s s i s t ant Directors for, respectively, Admini st ration, Personnel
and Training, Intelligence, Operations, Resources Control, Field Force,
and Scientific Police -1/
There a r e six National Police Regional Directorates, designated
and located as follows

North Central Lowlands Hue

South Central Lowlands Nha Trang
Central Highlands Ban M e Thuot
Eastern Bien Hoa
Upper Mekong My Tho
Lower Mekong Can Tho

-I / The Directorate General of National Police w a s established on

June 27, 1962, with the signing of a decree by the President of the
Republic of Vietnam P r i o r to that date there were many separate
police agencies operating throughout the country, without essential
coordination and without the unity of effort that is particularly necessary
to meet the widespread threat to national security posed by the Viet
Cong and their foreign allies and supporters

- 7-
 The boundaries of the Regions are shown i n the map on page 9
In addition, t h e r e is the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate (SMPD),
which r e p o r t s directly to National Police Headquarters in Saigon The
SMPD includes i n i t s jurisdiction the neighboring province of Gia Dinh
A l l the other provinces and autonomous cities a r e grouped into one o r
another of the six Regions Each of the Regions and the Saigon Municipal
Police Directorate h a s an appointed Regional o r Municipal Chief of Police

In each Province and Autonomous City t h e r e is a Provincial

Chief of Police or, a s the case may be, a MunicipalChief of Police
P r o v i n c e s are divided into districts, each of which h a s a Chief of Police

The administrative chain of command of the National Police is

f r o m Headquarters to Region to Province to District T h i s encompasses
such m a t t e r s as police policy and doctrine, personnel administration,
including recruitment, pay, promotion and t r a n s f e r , training, technical
standards, budgets and finance, equipment and supply, and like functions
Administration is highly centralized, t h e r e being comparatively little
delegation of authority t o the field In t h i s respect t h e r e is g r e a t similarity
to the F r e n c h s y s t e m of administration and therefore considerable
divergence f r o m the American s y s t e m

In practice the operational chainof command is the s a m e a s the

administrative chain, although as a m a t t e r of Government regulation
each Province and District ChiefJ<is responsible f o r l a w enforcement
in h i s own a r e a These regulations date f r o m the Diem regime and have
never been revised Of necessity t h e r e is g r e a t e r delegation of authority
i n operational than i n administrative m a t t e r s

'k Note The Province Chief and the District Chief are not t o b e confused
with the Province Chief of Police and the District Chief of Police
When the l a t t e r are meant in this pamphlet, t h e i r full t i t l e s
are used

- 8 -
 USOM/PSD
REGIONAL POLICE AREAS
IAP PROVIMCE I
REGION MAP PROVINCE
I NAME MAME REGlOl

I QUANGTPI
L THUATHIEI
LOWLANDS 1 35 AN GIANG
40 AN XUYEN
PI
3 QUAWGNAM
XI
39 8A XUYEN PI 17th PAR ALLEL
4 QUANGTIW
5 QUANGNGA
26 S E N HOA m
6 6lNH 81NH
II
LOWLANDJ
Ip
7 P ~ Y E N SOUTH
Ip
8 YHANHHOI
9 NINHTH~II
II
0 BINHTHUAI
IY
I KONTUM
ICHUOWGTHIEU PI
HIGHLANDS CON SON
2 PLEIKU
5 PHUBON
DARLAC m
DlNH TUONG P
1 DARLAC
GIA DlNH Ip
i QUANGDM
KHANH HOA II
; TUYENDlIi
KfEN GlANG
' L A M DONG
KlEN HOA
YI
P
I PHUOC LOW, EASTERN 1
KlEN PHONG P
1 BINH LONG REGION 2 KlEN TLlONG P
' TAY N l N H I KONTUM
81NH DUONi
III
I LAM DONG m
PHUOCTHANH 2 LONG AN P
LONG KHANH 2 LONG KHANH Ip
8lNH TUY
NlNH THUAN II
PHUOC TUY 3 PHONG DlNH PI
BIEN HOA I:
GIA DlNH
PHU 6 O N rn
II P H W C LONG Ip
LONG AN 'PER MEKoY 2: HUOC THANH Ip
KlEN TUONG REGION 2: PHUOC TUY
KlEN PHONG
r?
PHU YEN II
I DINHTUONG I' PLEIKU III
? KlEN HOA
1 VlNH BlNH
I5 PUAWG DUC m
WEL MEW1 1 lUANG NAM
I VlNHLON6
I
REGION 5 ?UANGNGAI
i ANGIANG
I
4 ?UANG TIN I
i KlENGlANG I WANG T R I I
PHONGDINH !O .AY NlNH 1p
I CHUOlVGTHltW 2 'HUA THlEN I
' EA XUYEN 6 W E N DLlC m
AN XUYEN 13 VlNH 8lNH
CON SON
PI
4 V l N H LONG XI

- 9 -
 The Province Chief is also the military (Sector) commander i n
the Province and as such r e p o r t s to the Corps Commander Police
operations a r e routinely coordinated with military operations through
this channel

The Province Chiefs report through civil channels to the Ministry

of Interior, in which the Directorate General of National Police is located
organizationally (An organization chart of the Ministry of Interior is
on page 11 The organization of the National Police is shown on page
12

F r o m a f o r c e level of 22, 000 in mid-1964 the National Police

had reached 52,000 by the end of 1965 and a further increase of 2 0 , 0 0 0
is planned f o r 1 9 6 6 , with a target strength of 72, 000 by the end of 1 9 6 6
A s would be expected, this l a r g e and rapid expansion h a s brought in its
wake a host of problems, with which the police and the Office of Public
Safety a r e struggling jointly This pamphlet outlines our joint efforts

The Assistant Director of USAIDfor Public Safety is the principal

advisor of the Director General, National Police, o r , in bureaucratic
parlance, they a r e counterparts Similarly, each of the USAID Regional
Police Advisors h a s as his counterpart the appropriate Regional Director
of the National Police and each USAID Provincial Police Advisor h a s
a s his counterpart the Provincial Chief of Police Nearly all other
public safety advisors also have counterparts within the National Police
hierarchy o r in one of the other organizations supported under the public
safety program, namely, the Combined Telecommunications Directorate
of the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General, P r i s o n Rehabili-
tation (Ministry of Interior) and the Customs Directorate General
(Ministry of Finance)

A s of January 1 9 6 6 the Office of Public Safety was authorized t o

have 160 professional advisors, of whom approximately 100 w e r e on
board Additionally six British and one Australian police advisors are
on loan to the Office of Public Safety to a s s i s t i n project implementation

- 10 -
 ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
COMMISSIONER FOR INTERIOR
I I

CHIEF OF C A B W I T

CHARGE OF YlSsloN PRIVATE SECRETA

1
CABINET ATTACHE

I
I
DlRECTORArE
I
DIRECTORATE
I
DIRECTORATE DIRECTORATE
GEN OF NAT OF OF TELECOM OF CIVIL
POLICE REHABILITATION MUNlCATlONS DEFENSE
CORK

I
OFFICE OF rnf COYYISSIOMER
I SPONDENCE
SECTION
6 INSPECTORS

CHIEF OF CABINET
CABINET

DIRECTOR DIRECTOR

POLITICAL AFFAIRS A M I N AFFAIRS

I
I I II 1
SERVICE D BUDGET 8
SECRETARY ATTACHES CONTROL LEGISLATI DMfflISTRAT PERSONNEL
I
I
I
BUREAU OF BUREAU OF
RESEARCH a ENTRANCE
LOCAL GENERAL
ADNIN ADMlN PERSONNEL

BUREAU AMMUNITION RESEARCH REWISTION

PRESS PERSONNEL

BUREAU SECURITY
SECTION ALIENS
MEASURES

USAlD/PAD Dec 16 1965

1-4 MINORITIES
COOAOINATION
 I PRIMEMINISTER 1
WAR & REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT GROUP

Autonomous Cities
- Hue
- Da Nang
- CamRanh
- Da Lat
- Vung Tau (+) (Also Police representation in
some Villages & Hamlets)
I
F
N
i

NHA TRANG BIEN HOA

I I

PROVINCI&L
8 Precincts + I I I I
Gia Dinh Police I Prov Pol 6 Prov Pol 5 Prov Pol 9 Prov Pol 8 Prov Pol 8 Prov Pol
( 8 Districts) 8 Precincts
HQ s HQs HQs
I I I I
I I I i
I
District Distnct District District District District
Police Police Police Police Police Police
Results of V C terrorist bombings in Saigon

- 13 -
V C t e r r o r i s t bombings such as these are
investigated by National Police

- 14 -
 OBJECTIVES O F THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

Gene r a1

In ordinary circumstance the principal functions of the civil police

f o r c e s of a state are t o maintain l a w and order, toprotect the lives and
property of p e r s o n s within i t s borders, t o detect and s u p p r e s s such
illegal activities a s subversion and incipient insurgency, and to perform
various regulatory functions, ranging f r o m traffic control to the control
of the movement of persons and goods a c r o s s o r within i t s b o r d e r s and
the protection of the currency TheNational Police of Vietnam have all
these functions, and in addition they must currently support and a s s i s t
the military and paramilitary f o r c e s i n suppressing the Viet Cong in-
surgency, which derives much of i t s military strength and support f o r m
outside the b o r d e r s of South Vietnam

T o oppose, seek out and destroy the military f o r c e s of the Viet

Cong is the function of the military f o r c e s of Vietnam and i t s allies
In t h e i r supporting role, the police must gather intelligence on Viet
Cong clandestine operations and movements, must maintain public o r d e r
in urban a r e a s and i n r u r a l areas that have been pacified by the military,
including the control of s m a l l i r r e g u l a r f o r c e s which may remain behind
o r may reinfiltrate, and must control the movement of men and m a t e r i a l
into and out of Viet Cong hands

The National Police as presently constituted a r e not capable of

fulfilling their responsibilities in toto They a r e understrength and,
owing to the rapid expansion since 1964, they a r e f o r the m o s t p a r t
inadequately trained Frequent changes in command associated with
the s e r i e s of coups have had an adverse effect on management and ad-
ministration Inadequacies in police jurisdiction a t t i m e s render the
police ineffective Specifically, it is believed that the Viet Cong receive
a l a r g e part of their equipment and supplies, including a r m s and ammu-
nition, through illegal traffic within Government - controlled areas,
especially the Saigon A r e a It is known that Viet Cong personnel some-
t i m e s infiltrate Government areas d r e s s e d i n ARVN uniform and thus

- 15 -
acquire a t l e a s t partial immunity f o r t h e i r illicit operations T h e s e a r e
deficiencies that must be remedied in o r d e r to make police m o r e effective

A m a j o r objective of t h e o f f i c e of Public Safety is to develop the

National Police into a modern professional l a w enforcement organization
capable of maintaining l a w and o r d e r and of constituting an effective
first line of defense against subversion, insurgency and g u e r r i l l a activi-
ties The National Police will be trained and equipped to a level where
they can cope with g u e r r i l l a operations short of those by organized
units employing military discipline and tactics and essentially military-
type weapons and where they can hold a r e a s c l e a r e d by the rl ilitary, thus
enabling the l a t e r to concentrate on offensive action against the military
main f o r c e units of the Viet Cong Concurrently, the capability of the
National Police will be strengthened so that they can control civil dis-
turbances with a minimum of violence and cope with common c r i m e in
a manner befitting a modern state These t a r g e t s a r e closely inter-
related, i e , the efficient performance of normal police functions tends
to prevent c r i m e s associated with insurgency

The c u r r e n t priority objective of the police, as of the entire

Government of Vietnam, is t o c r u s h the Viet Cong insurgency To this
end, intensive efforts are being devoted t o improvement of police in-
telligence and t o such special functions as r e s o u r c e s control and counter-
t e r r o r i s t operations and to the development of the Police Field F o r c e s - -
essentially a constabulary type of police organization- -while at the s a m e
t i m e stepping up training and high-level managerial advice to the police

Specific Objective s

--- Support the expansion of the National Police to 72, 000 men by the
end of 1966 by providing essential equipment and supplies not other -
wise available and a l s o by providing budgetary support to tne extent that
the accelerated expansion is beyond the c u r r e n t financial capability of
the Government of Vietnam

- 16 -
 -
Lows J Poudre Senlor Advlsor, Loglstrcs and
Tran Van Son, Loglstlcs Technlclan

,Mf L I H P ~

J a m e s F Gorman, Jack M Forcey - Research and

Reportmg Offlcers and Nguyen Ngoc Cam,
Adminlstratlve Asslstant to A s s l s t a n t &rector
--- Strengthen the operational capability of the Provincial and District
police organization , particularly with r e s p e c t t o counter- insurgency
operations

- - - Assist the National Police t o establish and t r a i n a tactical police

f i e l d f o r c e consisting of small, highly mobile, lightly a r m e d units
capable of

a Controlling a low level of a r m e d insurgency and banditry,

wherever i t occurs,

b Protecting r e s o u r c e s control operations against g u e r r i l l a

action,

c Supporting other Government agencies in the "holding" phase

of the pacification p r o g r a m and rooting out VC i n f r a s t r u c t u r e in Govern-
ment -controlled t e r r i t o r y ,

d Interdicting VC lines of communication into and out of

pacified areas,

e Collecting intelligence by watching t r a i l s and waterways

and by reconnaissance patrols,

f Reinforcing police posts which come under attack

--- Assist the National Police t o regulate the movement of selected

r e s o u r c e s , both human and material, in o r d e r to r e s t r i c t support of
the Viet Cong o r deprive them of it altogether and to interrupt and d e s t r o y
VC non- military communications More specifically, the objective is
to intercept and detain known o r suspected m e m b e r s of the VC and other
p e r s o n s who may be engaged in transporting intelligence o r supplies t o
the VC, to interdict materiel going out of Government controlled t e r r i t o r y
which would be of value t o t h e VC, including food, medical supplies and
petroleum products, and t o s e i z e contraband m a t e r i a l s , e g , explosives,
entering o r being transported within Government-controlled t e r r i t o r y

- - - Improve the police r e c o r d s and identification system, which is

basic t o all police w o r k

- 18 -
 - - - Enhance the capability of the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate
to p e r f o r m effectively, normal metropolitan police functions, including
traffic control, and improve the effectiveness of counter -insurgency
measures

--- A s s i s t the National Police t o provide adequate r e c r u i t and r e f r e s h e r

training to all m e m b e r s of the National Police and to provide advanced
training for selected personnel

- -- A s s i s t the National Police to select, equip and fully t r a i n police

personnel in civil disturbance control, s o that the police w i l l have the
capability of coping with r i o t s and other civil disturbances i n accordance
with modern humane methods and with a minimum level of force

--- Enable the Combined Telecommunications Directorate to establish,

operate and maintain nation- wide integrated telecommunication facilities,
s y s t e m s and s e r v i c e s for t h e National Police and other civil security
agencies i n direct support of the counterinsurgency effort, civil security,
r u r a l construction and the preservation of law and o r d e r

- - - Support the Customs Service by providing equipment and supplies

e s s e n t i a l f o r its modernization (Administrative and procedural r e f o r m s
a r e the responsibility of the Assistant D i r e c t o r f o r Special P r o j e c t s )

- - - A s s i s t the Directorate General of P r i s o n Rehabilitation to establish

an adequate s y s t e m of p r i s o n e r confinement and re-education

PUBLIC SAFETY ACTIVITIES

Support of Expansion of the National Police

T o support a police f o r c e of the s i z e needed i n present c i r c u m -

stances is beyond the present limited economic and financial capabilities
of the Government of Vietnam Accordingly, in view of our mutuality
of i n t e r e s t , the USAID h a s undertaken to supplement Vietnamese re-
s o u r c e s with American, as p a r t of the economic aid p r o g r a m The
a s s i s t a n c e provlded is financial, material and technical

- 19 -
 OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY
I
I
1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
I 1 I

H DEPUTY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
COUNTER INSURGENCY

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

I
N
0 I I

CHIEF
ADMINISTRATION a n d FINANCE and LOGISTICS POLlCE FIELD FORCE
SUPPORT DIVISION OPERATIONS DIVISION DlVl Sl ON

r l 1
t

t
SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FIELD LOGISTICS I PROGRAM and CIVIL POLICE
OPERATIONS OPERATIONS EVALUATION DISTU R B A N C E S
- 1 1
I I I
I

SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR SENIOR ADVISOR
EDUCATION and RECORDS a n d RESOURCES INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH and CONSTRUCTION
TRAINING IDENTIFICATION CONTROL REPORTING
Weapons Maintenance Admsors Samuel P Beverlin and Joseph
A Sobotta at t h e i r office in N P Headquarters, Saigon

Advisor Sobotta teaching N P weapons maintenance men

the operating of the gun bluing machines at N P Headquarters
- 21 -
Logistics Advisor Lowell E Diamond checking U S A I D
commodities t o be deLvered to N P

Logistics Advisor Walter E Swarthout supervising loading

of concertina w i r e for delivery to National Police
- 22 -
 T h e provision of direct budgetary a s s i s t a n c e on a significant
scale is a n innovation i n 1966, made n e c e s s a r y by the l a r g e i n c r e a s e
i n the police strength at a t i m e of s e v e r e budgetary stringency, the l a t t e r
brought about by a government policy of budgetary austerity as a counter-
inflationary m e a s u r e Direct financial g r a n t s and r e l e a s e of counterpart
funds ranging f r o m t e n t o thirty o r thirty- five p e r cent of the overall
police budget may b e made i n 1966 To the extent they are made, they
will b e u s e d to pay the c o s t s of the 20,000- man expansion and to provide
funds f o r r e p a i r and rehabilitation of essential facilities and a minimum
of n e c e s s a r y new construction

It is a l s o n e c e s s a r y t o equip the police in o r d e r that they may

operate effectively The principal i t e m s of equipment furnished on a
force- wide b a s i s are s m a l l a r m s and vehicles The basic police weapon
is the 38 c a l i b r e revolver, one of which is furnished f o r every man i n
the f o r c e (except f o r Field F o r c e personnel) In addition, forty p e r
cent of the men are furnished carbines, twenty p e r cent submachine
guns, ten p e r cent 1 2 gauge shotguns and two p e r cent B A R ' S Except
f o r the revolvers, these weapons are normally kept i n the police ar-
m o r i e s and are issued daily a s required Some other weapons a r e pro-
vided f o r special purposes, and the Field F o r c e s have t h e i r own table
of weapons

Ammunition is furnished on the b a s i s of a table of standard al-

lowances, which w i l l b e modified as experience is gained USAID h a s
provided a reloading plant f o r 38 calibre wadcutter (training) c a r t r i d g e s
T h i s will r e s u l t i n considerable savings i n ammunition costs, i n fact,
no m o r e wadcutter ammunition is being procured

Vehicles are furnished on a b a s i s of t h r e e p e r 100 police, with

s o m e exceptions made f o r the Field F o r c e s and c e r t a i n other special
units The vehicles furnished a r e 1 / 4 - t o n t r u c k s (jeeps) and 1 1 / 2 - t o n
trucks, in the r a t i o of t h r e e to one One t h i r d of the j e e p s and all the
1 1 / 2 - t o n t r u c k s havefour-wheel drive In addition, 148 five-ton t r u c k s
have be en f u r n i s h e d

- 23 -
 T h e vehicle f l e e t 1s rapidly being standardized, in o r d e r to f a c i l -
i t a t e maintenance and r e p a i r and t o minimize s p a r e p a r t s inventories
A r r a n g e m e n t s have been made to obtain s p a r e p a r t s f r o m a U S depot in
J a p a n on instantaneous requisitions (Milstrip), thus effecting maximum
economy both in inventories and in t i m e lost by deadlining

Recently ( F Y - 6 6 ) USAID h a s a g r e e d t o a s s i s t by furnishing i t e m s

of individual clothing and equipment Substantial quantities of uniforms
have been and will be supplied, a s w e l l a s boots and c e r t a i n o t h e r in-
dividual i t e m s It is planned t o equip a police clothing f a c t o r y ( p r i m a r i l y
with cutting and power sewing machines), thus effecting economies in
supply of clothing A shoe f a c t o r y is a l s o under consideration

In o r d e r to improve the s e c u r i t y of police installations, l a r g e

amounts of sandbags, barbed w i r e and concertina w i r e have been f u r n i s h -
ed In addition, cement and roofing m a t e r i a l s a r e being supplied to
meet urgent r e q u i r e m e n t s P r o v i s i o n of t h e s e l a t t e r is a f o r m of budge-
t a r y support which m a k e s possible v a r i o u s high p r i o r i t y p r o j e c t s that
otherwise could not be undertaken by the police because of f i s c a l l i m i -
tations

B e c a u s e of s e c u r i t y conditions i n the countryside, it h a s been

impossible t o effect the n o r m a l distribution of equipment and supplies
by r a i l and road Accordingly USAID h a s provided air t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
on a r e g u l a r b a s i s f o r police m a t e r i a l and occasionally f o r personnel
A i r s e r v i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e under study with a view to a long- range
solut i on

Technical advice h a s been and is being furnished on a continuing

b a s i s on a wide range of administrative and m a n a g e r i a l p r o b l e m s These
include such fundamental m a t t e r s a s the organization of the National
Police, the r u l e s and p r o c e d u r e s of the police, f o r c e levels, l o g i s t i c s
s y s t e m s , and, f o r the future, personnel administration

In 1 9 6 5 a joint study of the organization of the h e a d q u a r t e r s of

the National P o l i c e w a s conducted o v e r a period of s e v e r a l months and

- 24 -
recommendations f o r reorganization w e r e submitted t o the Director
General Similarly, a joint study of t h e regulations and p r o c e d u r e s of
the police was initiated and the draft of the f i r s t of t h r e e projected
volumes of a manual of p r o c e d u r e s and standing o r d e r s , including control
of expenditures, was submitted t o the Director General T h i s study is
scheduled f o r completion by J a n u a r y 1967 and should lead t o the p r o -
mulgation of a complete code of p r o c e d u r e s and standing o r d e r s f o r t h e
police No such code e x i s t s at the present t i m e and the lack is grievously
felt A new police decree, establishlng the National P o l i c e and providing
f o r its discipline, h a s been drafted and is awaiting promulgation A
codification of the l a w s is a l s o urgently required, but this arduous
t a s k h a s not yet been undertaken
A consolidated Logistics Service w a s c r e a t e d in National P o l i c e
Headquarters in 1 9 6 5 and USAID undertook to give it technical support
T h i s involves technical advice in logistics planning, supply and d i s t r i -
bution techniques, stock r e c o r d s s y s t e m s , warehousing, maintenance
s y s t e m s f o r vehicles, boats and weapons, and the establishment and
operation of maintenance shops A v e r y c l o s e working relationship,
based on mutual dependence, h a s developed between t h e police Logistics
Service and the Logistics Unit of the Office of Public Safety, with t h e i r
combined e f f o r t s resulting in increasingly effective supply and main-
t enance operations

Support of P o l i c e F i e l d Operations
In a sense, of course, all non-headquarters operations a r e field
operations, and in that s e n s e ninety p e r cent of t h e National Police
operations a r e i n the field H e r e , however, we are talking about the
operations of Regional, Provlncial and m s t r i c t police h e a d q u a r t e r s
T h e s e are supported by USAID with technical advice and equipment and
supplies, and indirectly, through the budget, with funds

It is planned to station a Public Safety Advisor in each R e s o n a l ,

Provincial and autonomous city police headquarters A s of A p r i l 1966,
t h e r e was an advisor i n each of the s i x r e s o n a l headquarters and t h e r e

- 25 -
 T h i r d P r e c i n c t N P p e r s o n n e l being b r i e f e d on p l a n s f o r
a night F a m i l y C e n s u s operation at P r e c i n c t H e a d q u a r t e r s

I
I!
d

Vincent E Young, Advisor to Saigon Municipal P o l i c e

T h i r d P r e c i n c t , offering advice to T h i r d P r e c i n c t Chief and
c l e r k on p r o p e r index p r o c e d u r e s f o r police r e c o r d s
r

Saigon Municipal Police on a night-time

Family Census checking operation

A gambling den raided by Saigon Municipal Police

were 31 Advisors distributed among the 43 provinces and autonomous
cities, exclusive of Saigon Obviously most of these Advisors w e r e
s e r v i n g m o r e than one headquarters, another 1 7 were required f o r
complete staffing, and these were a r r l v i n g a t a good r a t e a s recruited
and trained
The various field headquarters are lacking i n transportation
and are seriously deficient in up - to - date office equipment, such
a s typewriters and duplicating machines Some of these deficiencies
w i l l be made up i n 1 9 6 6 and it is planned to continue this kind of support
in future y e a r s A s a m a t t e r of principle we consider that field offices
should b e a t l e a s t as well equipped, in relation to need, a s the National
H e adqu a r t e r s
The physical facilities - office buildings, police stations and
official q u a r t e r s - have not expanded significantly with the i n c r e a s e i n
the numbers of policemen, with the result that they are now, by and
large, g r o s s l y inadequate, with a resulting deleterious effect on ef -
ficiency and morale While t h e r e is a shortage of r e s o u r c e s , both
f i s c a l and physical, we propose to do what we can to ameliorate the
situation A n urgent need is a long-range plan of construction,
with p r i o r i t i e s clearly identified We shall work jointly with the police
to develop this
S u m o r t of Police Field F o r c e s

C oncer>t

The w a r h a s produced s e v e r a l attempts at a r e a pacification In

each of these a consistent pattern h a s emerged of inability t o provide
permanent local security within which civil development may take place
The reason for this weakness l i e s in a gap between the roles and
missions of the Armed F o r c e s , including the R e s o n a l and Popular
F o r c e s , and the ordinary National Police The gap is not apparent, of
course, while the A r m y (ARVN) is present and is conducting clearing
operations, However, when the ARVN h a s completed its clearing

- 28 -
operation and is redeployed elsewhere, m i l i t a r y responsibilities devolve
upon the R e s o n a l F o r c e s and the Popular F o r c e s It then becomes
necessary, in the view of most Province Chiefs and District Chiefs
under whose control these f o r c e s lie, to employ them l a r g e l y f o r the
protection of the provincial and d i s t r i c t capitals

The result is that the villages and hamlets scheduled f o r the

final stages of "hold" operations and the social developments associated
with pacification are left without continuous protection against the re-
emerging village g u e r r i l l a s These s m a l l groups of VC thugs then
t e r r o r i s e the hamlet dwellers, undisturbed

Eradication of the village g u e r r i l l a s , elimination of the VC infra-

structure, and r e s o u r c e s control a r e the essential and interlocking
components of "hold" operations which can only be finally effective when
conducted at vlllage /hamlet level

The existence of this gap in r o l e s and m i s s i o n s was appreciated,

and the Mission Council supported a GVN decision to f i l l it with an ap-
propriate component of the National Police T h i s w a s confirmedby de-
c r e e i n J a n u a r y 1965

The decision to u s e police had a two-fold origin F i r s t , in ex-

amining solutions to s i m i l a r problems elsewhere, the pattern set by the
Police Field F o r c e i n Malaya, working as the a r m of Special Branch
Intelligence, w a s found to be closely related t o that of the older US-
sponsored Philippine Constabulary Both handled this type of problem
with conspicuous s u c c e s s and thereby established relevant precedents
Second, a need was clearly evident f o r a post- hostilities organization
capable of smoothly taking over a diminishing tactical situation f r o m
the military, f u r t h e r reducing it, and handling it on to the uniformed
police Such an organization would need both a tactical capability (minor)
and a police capability, including powers of a r r e s t and s e a r c h

- 29 -
 The identification of this need resulted in the creation of the
Police Field F o r c e (PFF), a grouping of minor tactical components,
strong enough to dominate a village/hamlet complex against the village
guerrilla groups, within range to support the local representatives of
the uniformed police, and in the direct police line of command to ensure
the rapidity of response that only personal responsibility can inspire

The PFF is a lightly-armed, ground-mobile force administrative-

l y organized by companies, performing i t s function of maintaining a
presence of government strength by platoons, each platoon responsible
f o r the hamlets of one village a r e a selected by the District Chief i n
coordination with the District Police Chief, filling the village/hamlet
gap and complementary to the District Chief's R F / P F f o r c e s and h i s
r u r a l construction team

Deployment

The diagram on page 31 r e p r e s e n t s a "slice" of a pacifi-

cation program which, f o r convenience, may be assumed to be one
province

Illustrated is a typical situation in which the peripheral a r e a is

VC controlled and a c c e s s by GVN can be effected only by a military
operation, which would be conducted by ARVN Such an operation might
b e short, with an aim of disturbing the VC t o prevent their buildup -
tactical, logistic o r political This type of operation would be described
a s interdiction

The next inner ring is the designated a r e a f o r ARVN pacification

operations, aimed at eliminating VC main force and regional f o r c e units,
and s o depriving the VC infra- structure of the support they need to
develop their activities This type of operation would be described as
destruction

Finally, t h e r e is the pacified area, where control is exercised

by the National Police inthe normal ciml sense This is a development
situation

- 30 -
w
I

rn
z
e:
w
E
E

P4

- 31 -
 The limits of these a r e a s cannot be clearly defined The r e a r
of the ARVN a r e a will be sufficiently c l e a r of major VC concentrations
f o r PFF to begin their operations, and the forward edge of the pacified
a r e a w i l l still contain sections which a r e l e s s than completely secure
It is this zone, broadly astride the boundary between military tactical
action and civil police action, that is the PFF a r e a of operation, and
the r a t e at which PFF can move forward governs the r a t e of the whole
pacification program There can be no short cut

A s PFF move forward they a r e followed up by regular National

Police and by the civil program of regional development

The diagram on page 33 shows a typical PFF province

alloc at ion

It will be observed that this province consists of five districts,

of which
One is thoroughly pacified and under normal N P security
One is V C controlled
T h r e e have recently been cleared, o r partly cleared, and a r e
designated PFF "task districts ' I , with one company each

Looking more closely at one district, which has seven villages,

we see
One is secure, with normal N P arrangements

Two a r e V C controlled

Four have recently been cleared and a r e designated as "task

villages", with one platoon each

It will be noted that no provision is made f o r PFF deployment

in the vicinity of the provincial capital Their work is in the field

It w i l l be further noted that a PFF r e s e r v e platoon is located at

district headquarters and that it is NOT a tactical r e s e r v e but an admi-
nistrative r e s e r v e to ensure that the field platoons a r e at full operational
strength

- 32 -
 DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS - I1

PROVINCE

w
I
NP PFF PFF PFF vc
COMPANY COMPANY

@
Villages

NP PFF PFF PFF PFF vc vc

PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON PLATOON

P R O V I N C E PFF C O M P O N E N T 3 companies each of 3 - 5 platoons

 Finally, although operational directives come f r o m the District
Chief, through the District Chief of Police, to the Company Commander,
the line of administrative control is through the PFF representatives
on the staff of the Provincial Chief of Police and Regional Chief of P o l i c e
Pacific at ion Role

The PFF is a p a r t of the provincial pacification t e a m and functions

under the overall direction of the Province Chief, through the Province
Chief of Police and the unit commander, to give expression to the P r o -
vince Chief's pacification plan

The f i r s t stage in the pacification p r o g r a m is intelligence pro-

curement, planning, and preparatory psychological w a r f a r e The PFF
must be actively associated with the plan f r o m this first stage

The next stage is the tactical action of ARVN, with V N A F support,

to c l e a r the selected area of VC main f o r c e and provincial force units

T h i s is followed by the securing of the cleared area by R F / P F

elements During this phase, the PFF is deployed to the villages se-
lected f o r i t s operations
With security augmented by the R F / P F presence, the PFF

- - - Conducts day and night tactical patrols, normally in platoon

strength,

- - - Initiates and maintains civic action procedures, either alone

o r in conjunction with the appropriate civilian organization,

- - - Supports the National Police i n their r e s o u r c e s control

measures

When the situation is secured to a degree that the PFF can operate
alone, the R F / P F move off to support further A R V N operations - but not
before It is fatal to redeploy the R F / P F on a rigid time table Their
onward movement can only be decided in the context of the local develop-
ment of the security operation That this may delay f u r t h e r planned
deployments of ARVN is appreciated, but must be accepted

- 34 -
 Command S t r u c t u r e

Command of the PFF is e x e r c i s e d by the Commander, PFF, who

h a s the s t a t u s of a Director at the H e a d q u a r t e r s of the National P o l i c e
F o r t h i s purpose, the Commander, P F F , h a s the H e a d q u a r t e r s , P F F ,
at which a r e r e p r e s e n t e d all b r a n c h e s of staff and s e r v i c e s

While e v e r y m e m b e r of the PFF is a fully- trained policeman

who, at t h e direction of the Director General, m a y at any t i m e r e v e r t
t o a civil police function, he is a l s o a fully t r a i n e d s o l d i e r , operating
within a field t a c t i c a l context Because the operations of the PFF a r e
tactical, its administration, logistic support and discipline a r e designed
t o support tactical operations and, although within the o v e r a l l police
administrative f r a m e w o r k , are distinct

T h e Commander, PFF, is r e p r e s e n t e d at the h e a d q u a r t e r s of

Regions and P r o v i n c e s by PFF o f f i c e r s attached t o the offices of the
Regional Chief of P o l i c e and P r o v i n c i a l Chief of P o l i c e r e s p e c t i v e l y
T h e duty of t h e s e o f f i c e r s is t o e n s u r e continuous and adequate logistic
and administrative support f r o m Headquarters, P F F , to keep the' Com-
mander, PFF, continuously informed on all a s p e c t s of the s t a t u s of h i s
companies, and to e n s u r e a p r o p e r working relationship between PFF
company c o m m a n d e r s and the P r o v i n c e District administration In
p a r t i c u l a r , they must e n s u r e that the PFF field e l e m e n t s a r e used only
f o r the purpose f o r which they have been provided, i e , mobile f i e l d
operations at village level They will not provide p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r
P r o v i n c e o r District Chiefs, t h e i r equipment will not be diverted t o non-
PFF e l e m e n t s n o r may they b e u s e d a s s c o u t s f o r ARVN o r R F / P F
t a c t i c a l operations

A s the PFF o p e r a t e s on a s e p a r a t e disciplinary code, designed

t o meet tactical conditions, the s y s t e m of inquiry and punishment w i l l
r e s i d e within the PFF, c a s e s beyond t h e competency of the company
c o m m a n d e r being r e f e r r e d to the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Commander, P F F ,
a t P r o v i n c e o r Region a s n e c e s s a r y

- 35 -
 It is the prerogative of the P r o v i n c e Chief t o decide in which
d i s t r i c t s of h i s province the PFF companies w i l l be deployed This he
w i l l do as p a r t of h i s pacification plan F r o m t i m e t o time, a s the
situation develops, one way o r another, he may decide that
1) The local s e c u r i t y h a s so deteriorated that the PFF can no
longer o p e r a t e according t o concept, and w i l l be withdrawn,
or

2) The local s e c u r i t y h a s so improved that PFF operations are

no longer n e c e s s a r y , and s e c u r i t y w i l l p a s s t o the r e g u l a r
police

It is the task of the Provincial Chief of Police to e n s u r e that,

within the selected " task districts" , the police administrative and in-
telligence machinery and the a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r cooperation with all o t h e r
government agencies ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the a r m e d f o r c e s ) a r e such that the
PFF companies can effectively operate

It is the t a s k of the PFF r e p r e s e n t a t i v e at Provincial Headquarters

t o e n s u r e that the PFF companies allotted t o a d i s t r i c t a r e at all t i m e s
and in all r e s p e c t s operationally effective

The D i s t r i c t Chief w i l l decide in which villages of h i s d i s t r i c t

the PFF platoons w i l l be deployed T h e r e a f t e r , a s the situation develops,
h e may re-deploy them (bearing in mind that, once re- deployed, they
w i l l not regain maximum operational effectiveness f o r t h r e e months)

The District Chief of P o l i c e w i l l u s e all the District police r e -

s o u r c e s t o e x p r e s s h i s policy Of these, t h e PFF company is only one,
though probably the l a r g e s t H e w i l l give t a s k s (by designating a r e a s )
t o the PFF Company Commander, who w i l l deploy h i s platoons t o villages
to handle t h e s e t a s k s H e w i l l not t e l l the PFF Company Commander
how t o do h i s job

The PFF Platoon Commander w i l l work i n c l o s e association with

the Village Chief of the village t o which h i s platoon is assigned How-
e v e r , t h e Village Chief h a s no authority o v e r the Platoon and t h e Platoon

- 36 -
Commander h a s no authority over the Village Chief The e s s e n c e of
the PFF is collaboration with the village and hamlet authorities

Training C e n t e r s

A Police Field F o r c e Unit Training Center h a s been constructed

at Trai Mat i n the mountains n e a r Dalat, Tuyen Duc Province A s of
1 March 1966, five companies had graduated f r o m t h i s center and six
companies w e r e undergoing training, which consists of twelve weeks
of intensive field work Following a decision of the Director General,
National Police, to give basic police training f o r all r e c r u i t policemen
destined f o r the Field F o r c e at Dalat, construction of a basic training
c e n t e r adjacent to the unit training center was begun T h i s new c e n t e r
w i l l have a capacity of 1000 t r a i n e e s

Though not fully equipped, the operations of the limited number

of companies deployed by 1 March 1966 have tended t o c o n f i r m t h e
soundness of the Police Field F o r c e concept

Strength

A s of March 1, 1966 the Field F o r c e w a s authorized a strength

of 8500 men, t o b e organized into 47 companies It seemed probable
that this authorization would be i n c r e a s e d eventually

USAID Support

The USAID is providing technical assistance and extensive budge-

t a r y and commodity support to the Field F o r c e , i n the belief that it can
and will make a m a j o r contribution toward pacification of the country
A total of fifteen Public Safety Advisors is planned, although only eight
w e r e on board i n March 1 9 6 6 A special Assistant f o r Counterinsurgency,
located i n the USAID Office of Public Safety, coordinates Field F o r c e
plans and operations with related activities The USAID h a s provided
the a r m s and ammunition and most of the equipment of the Field F o r c e s ,
including s o m e rations and clothing

- 37 -
Police Field F o r c e trainees at Dalat camp on the pistol
range and hand grenade throwing range

- 38 -
Support of the Resources Control P r o g r a m

The Resources Control P r o g r a m is based on the p r e m i s e that

the Viet Cong, like any other sizable g u e r r i l l a force, is dependent on
the support of the local populace f o r i t s continued existence (Confer
Mao T s e Tung's analogy of the g u e r r i l l a a s a fish who swims in the
ocean of the population ) If popular support is not forthcoming, then
the g u e r r i l l a f o r c e cannot maintain itself i n the field, much less move
effectively on the offensive This p r e m i s e is considered valid in spite
of the fact that the Viet Cong a r e receiving reinforcements and logistic
support f r o m outside the boundaries of South Vietnam It is essential
therefore to break contact between the Viet Cong and the general popu-
lation, t o the maximum extent possible, thus depriving the Viet Cong
of supplies, intelligence and other support (The principles of r e s o u r c e s
control, a s well as an account of the Malayan experience, a r e s e t forth
i n a 200-page pamphlet The Police and Resources Control in Counter-
Insusgencyby E H Adkins, J r , publishedby the USAID/Vietnamin 1965 )

The f i r s t U S - supported efforts in this direction date back to

1 9 6 1 and 1962, when a Public Safety Advisor visited Malaya and studied
the successful Resources Control P r o g r a m employed there Subsequently
4 2 i n s t r u c t o r s w e r e trained in the techniques of r e s o u r c e s control and
these i n t u r n trained s o m e 300 policemen However, the effort w a s al-
lowed to lapse, owing to opposition within the GVN at the t i m e

T h i s opposition was finally overcome and in September 1 9 6 4 an

operation christened Hop T a c (Cooperation) was mounted in Saigon and
seven surrounding provinces (Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, Hau
Nghia, Long An, Phuoc Tuy, Phuoc Thanh) T h i s area, with 3, 6 0 0 , 0 0 0
people and eighty percent of Vietnam's industrial capacity, was the
principal source of non-agricultural supplies f o r the Viet Cong The
theory w a s that the Army (ARVN) would c l e a r the a r e a progressively
of a r m e d opposition and that the National Police would immediately
move into the pacified a r e a s , hold them, and establish r e s o u r c e s control
there, as well a s in the already s e c u r e areas

- 39 -
 T o t h i s end, police strength i n the a r e a w a s i n c r e a s e d by 3445
o v e r a two-month period ( f r o m 9447) Additional vehicles w e r e assigned
and a few assault c r a f t w e r e borrowed f r o m the A r m y The original
42 i n s t r u c t o r s w e r e given r e f r e s h e r training and 58 new i n s t r u c t o r s
were trained

T h e GVN assigned responsibility f o r r e s o u r c e s control t o the

National P o l i c e and a bureau was established f o r t h i s purpose within
National H e a d q u a r t e r s T h i s bureau a l s o a s s u m e d staff responsibility
f o r the Family Census and Identity C a r d p r o g r a m (vide i n f r a )

The HopTac p r o g r a m did not attain maximum r e s u l t s a s rapid-

l y as had been hoped, p r i m a r i l y because the ARVN w a s not able to c l e a r
a r e a s on schedule On the o t h e r hand, i t is considered that the R e s o u r c e s
Control P r o g r a m i n the pacified a r e a s h a s fully m e t expectations In-
telligence r e p o r t s indicate that the Viet Cong have been hurt

P l a n s have been completed f o r extending the p r o g r a m to the

Mekong Delta (It should be noted that the s y s t e m of checkpoints is i n
u s e throughout the country now, what is involved next is an intensification
of the effort, utilizing m o r e t r a i n e d men a n d g r e a t e r m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s )
The Delta contains most of the 6, 000, 000 a c r e s under r i c e cultivation
in South Vietnam and produces enough r i c e to feed the whole country
and provide a s u r p l u s which normally constitutes V i e t n a m ' s principal
export The t e r r a i n of the country, c r i s s c r o s s e d by r i v e r s and s t r e a m s
interlocked by i r r i g a t i o n ditches and rich in food provides an ideal s i t e
f o r g u e r r i l l a activities Success in r e s o u r c e s control h e r e p r e s e n t s
numerous and g r e a t difficulties, i f attained, i t w i l l r e n d e r the Viet Cong
position in the whole Delta p r e c a r i o u s

T h e problem of r e s t r i c t i n g , depriving and denying personnel,

logistical and communications support t o the enemy g u e r r i l l a s is attacked
by interrupting the movement of men and m a t e r i e l in t h r e e ways

a T h e establishment of static (fixed) checkpoints along p r i m a r y

and secondary a r t e r i e s of t r a v e l , both land and m a r i n e

- 40 -
 b Implementation of mobile o r s u r p r i s e checkpoints t o catch
individuals t r y i n g t o b y - p a s s a s t a t i c control point i n a vehicle, and
utilization of p a t r o l s t o c o v e r the foot p a t h s and trails b y which tons of
material m a y b e t r a n s p o r t e d on the s h o u l d e r s of volunteer o r indentured
coolies

c Establishment of sound r u r a l i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y along with

a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r o l s i n villages and stategic h a m l e t s t o obstruct the
t r e m e n d o u s seepage of supplies and information f r o m t h e s e population
c e n t e r s to the enemy

One of the f i r s t things to be done i n controlling human r e s o u r c e s

is t o identify the people T h e first Vietnamese national p r o g r a m f o r
identification of the population w a s introduced i n 1 9 3 8 T h e identification
document w a s a s i m p l e piece of p a p e r on which t h e r e q u i r e d identification
data w e r e p r i n t e d T h i s was found t o b e a n unsuitable document, but did
s e r v e t h e useful p u r p o s e of making an initial identification of the c o u n t r y ' s
people

I n 1957 legislation w a s p a s s e d r e q u i r i n g a l l p e r s o n s o v e r the age

of 1 8 t o obtain and c a r r y an identification c a r d Everyone was t o be
f i n g e r p r i n t e d when a c a r d w a s i s s u e d to him, with two fingerprint i m -
p r e s s i o n s becoming p a r t of the ID c a r d and a full s e t of p r i n t s being
sent t o t h e files of the C e n t r a l Identification Bureau of the National P o l i c e
H e a d q u a r t e r s i n Saigon Lack of durability of t h e s e c a r d s , made by a
s i m p l e laminating p r o c e s s , together with f o r g e r i e s by t h e Viet Cong,
l e d t o the development of the ID c a r d now u s e d C a r d s a r e now m a d e
with safety paper, covered with laminated plastic, which is e m b o s s e d
on one side, a distinctive kind of p l a s t i c is used and the p l a s t i c is budded
t o the p a p e r c a r d i n s i d e the p l a s t i c

I n the c i t i e s , people w e r e asked by the Government t o c o m e t o

p r o c e s s i n g s t a t i o n s t o complete the p a p e r work n e c e s s a r y to implement
the I D C a r d P r o g r a m In the r u r a l a r e a s the Government went t o the
people, i n the form of mobile p r o c e s s i n g t e a m s , which could s e r v i c e one
village o r small area at a t i m e

- 41 -
 T h e p r o g r a m was sponsored by the then Public Safety Division
USAID furnished a l l the c a m e r a s , lights and r e l a t e d equipment n e c e s -
s a r y to p r e p a r e the c a r d s E a c h p e r s o n t o whom a c a r d was i s s u e d w a s
charged 1 0 p i a s t e r s , just enough t o c o v e r the cost of photographic paper,
chemicals, blank f o r m s and s a l a r i e s of the people who did the p r o c e s s i n g

T h e Viet Cong reactedviolently to t h i s ID C a r d P r o g r a m and did

t h e i r b e s t to nullify i t They ambushed mobile r e g i s t r y t e a m s , threw
g r e n a d e s at r e g i s t r a t i o n c e n t e r s , and conducted an a n t i - r e g i s t r a t i o n
propaganda campaign A r m e d police f r u s t r a t e d t h e s e efforts, however

The I D C a r d P r o g r a m was d e c l a r e d completed on J u n e 30, 1963,

by which t i m e c a r d s had been i s s u e d t o approximately 7, 000, 000 of the
approximately 8, 000, 000 population o v e r 1 8 y e a r s of age T h e remaining
1, 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 people could not be reached since they w e r e under control of
the Viet Cong At the p r e s e n t t i m e about 25, 000 p e r s o n s reaching the
age of 18 a r e p r o c e s s e d each month

I D c a r d s , of course, become out of date People change in ap-

pearance, i n n a m e (through m a r r i a g e ) a n d o t h e r w i s e and the c a r d s t h e m -
selves deteriorate It t h e r e f o r e becomes rrecessary to r e i s s u e the c a r d s
on s o m e s y s t e m a t i c b a s i s T h i s problem is c u r r e n t l y u n d e r study and
i t is hoped t o begin a p r o g r a m of r e i s s u a n c e sometime in 1 9 6 6 One
possibility is to r e i s s u e a l l c a r d s when a c e r t a i n specified period, such
a s five y e a r s , h a s elapsed since the date of original i s s u e Another
possibility is to r e i s s u e all c a r d s in c e r t a i n geographical a r e a s , such
a s a city o r province In any c a s e the r e i s s u a n c e p r e s e n t s many ad-
m i n i s t r a t i v e problems which have not yet been solved Furthermore,
the c a r d s t h e m s e l v e s a r e of l i t t l e value f o r police purposes, and may

even h a m p e r the police, if they a r e not based in the f i r s t instance on

p r o p e r identification of the subject T h i s problem is closely r e l a t e d
to the problem of unclassified and unfiled fingerprint c a r d s ( s e e page48 )
Until these t w i n p r o b l e m s can be solved, Vietnam cannot be s a i d to have
an adequate s y s t e m of personal identification

- 42 -
 T h e F a m i l y Census c o n s i s t s of an inventory of the population by
housing unit The r e g i s t r a t i o n f o r m is a booklet in which a r e r e c o r d e d
pertinent data concerning each legal resident of a p a r t i c u l a r dwelling
unit T h e s e data include the name and c u r r i c u l u m vitae of each resident,
a l l significant r e s o u r c e s of the residents, such a s outbuildings, tools
and domestic animals, and the political affiliations o r tendencies of
each resident, if known A group photograph (highly prized by m o s t
families) is a l s o included Two copies of each booklet a r e made, of
which one is held by the family and one by the authorities Each head
of household is reponsible f o r reporting changes, such a s b i r t h s and
deaths and changes of a d d r e s s

T h e s e documents obviously contain information of value f o r many

purposes,including population census and vital s t a t i s t i c s , although it is
doubtful i f they are fully exploited F r o m the standpoint of the police,
especially in r e s o u r c e s control, they a r e invaluable Armed with the
a p p r o p r i a t e booklets, the P o l i c e can cordon off an area and check e v e r y
dwelling place within Using this technique, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the
curfew hours, they detect and apprehend illegal residents, draft dodgers,
deserters, and wanted c r i m i n a l s o r s u s p e c t s Not infrequently VC
i n f i l t r a t o r s o r s u s p e c t s are discovered i n this manner Follow-up in-
vestigations then r e v e a l f u r t h e r information and may lift a c o r n e r of
the veil over the VC i n f r a s t r u c t u r e T h e r e is no doubt that such police
checks, conducted regularly, tend t o keep the VC off balance, i n t e r r u p t
VC intelligence and psychological w a r f a r e operations and i n t e r f e r e with
supply, sabotage and t e r r o r i s t activities T h e Police, especially in
Saigon, a r e pursuing this p r o g r a m mgorously

F o r a s t a t i s t i c a l s u m m a r y of s o m e of the r e s u l t s obtained t o
date, s e e the t a b l e s on pages 44 - 47

USAID h a s cooperated fully with the National Police in the e s -

tablishment of a sound R e s o u r c e s Control P r o g r a m It h a s provided high-
level technical a s s i s t a n c e and a l s o significant amounts of equipment and

- 43 -
NATIONWIDE R E S U L T S OF T H E RESOURCES C O N T R O L P R O G R A M WEAPONS
F r o m 1 J a n u a r y to 30 December 1 9 6 5

M O N T H I

Total
- - 677 units
NATIONWIDE RESULTS OF T H E RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM
FOODSTUFFS
From 1 January to 10 December 1965
I

-
Total 2, 852, 680 units
 NATIONWIDE R E S U L T S OF T H E RESOURCES C O N T R O L P R O G R A M
MEDICINES
From 1 January t o 30 December 1 9 6 5

I
rp
Q)

Total 96, 839 units

 NATIONWIDE RESULTS OF T H E RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM
EQUIPMENT
From 1 J a n u a r y to 30 December 1965

mMonth I

400,000
I

330,589

I I I

250,000

200,000 3
150,000

100,000 ,~

50,000
I
,25.325

Total 1, 041, 438 u n i t s

supplies In 1 9 6 6 it is planned t o initiate p r o c u r e m e n t of s o m e 7 6 f o r t y -
foot r i v e r p a t r o l c r a f t f o r u s e in the Delta and a l s o to provide l i m i t e d
budgetary support

R e c o r d s and Identification

A s indicated above, good r e c o r d s a r e fundamental to a l l police

work However, the r e c o r d s of the National P o l i c e , invaluable though
they a r e , l e a v e much to be d e s i r e d T h e s y s t e m of p e r s o n a l and incident
d o s s i e r s is outmoded, a s it o v e r u s e s s c a r c e filing space, i n t e r m i n g l e s
police r e c o r d s with r e c o r d s of o t h e r agencies and is not conducive t o
the excerpting of c r i m e s t a t i s t i c s f o r administrative u s e Records a r e
not r e t i r e d and/ o r destroyed when they have outlived t h e i r u s e f u l n e s s
and duplicate r e c o r d s a r e maintained, with consequent additional s t r a i n
on l i m i t e d personnel and s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s T h e r e a r e s o m e 7,500, 000
unclassified civilian fingerprint c a r d s , s o m e of which are filed alpha-
betically, but many of which a r e simply s t o r e d i n b a g s and a r e thus
completely unusable

T h e National P o l i c e , with the a s s i s t a n c e of USAID, a r e working

h a r d to r e m e d y t h e s e deficiencies Standard p r o c e d u r e s a r e being
developedfor the checking and filing of f i n g e r p r i n t s of a r r e s t e d p e r s o n s
Training in fingerprint classification is being extended, and files a r e
being decentralized t o provincial and regional l e v e l s A standard system
of police r e c o r d s is being developed which should make the r e c o r d s l e s s
bulky and m o r e usable than in the existing n o n - s y s t e m Hopefully a l a r g e
volume of obsolete r e c o r d s will be r e t i r e d and destroyed, e i t h e r with
o r without being m i c r o f i l m e d (Only a s m a l l portion need t o b e p r e -
served f o r posterity 1

USAID is i n p r o c e s s of furnishing additional filing cabinets, which

a r e urgently r e q u i r e d , and l i m i t e d quantities of o t h e r equipment and
supplies It is a l s o furnishing technical advice and guidance, which,
a s is not infrequent, is m o r e important than equipment

- 48 -
Identity c a r d s which all Vietnamese 18 y e a r s of age,
and over, must c a r r y on t h e i r p e r s o n s at all t i m e s

- 49 -
 USAID is a l s o providing technical a s s i s t a n c e and commodity
support f o r the police laboratory, which is organizationally associated
with the Records Bureau

S u m o r t of Saigon Municipal Police

The Saigon Municipal Police a r e an integral p a r t of the National

Police, but by virtue of t h e i r numerical strength and t h e i r strategic
location in the capital city, they e x e r c i s e a g r e a t e r degree of autonomy
than the f o r c e s of the provinces o r the other autonomous c i t i e s

T h e Saigon Police suffer f r o m much the s a m e weaknesses a s

the r e s t of the National Police, t o wit, poor administration and manage-
ment, a r i s i n g out of lack of trained and experienced administrators,
inadequately trained personnel, a basically inadequate personnel system,
an inadequate budget f u r t h e r complicated by unduly rigid r u l e s f o r budget
administration, and shortages of equipment and m a t e r i a l of all kinds,
ranging f r o m patrol vehicles and office equipment to gasoline f o r c a r s
and motorcycles For example, the daily allowance of gasoline p e r
vehicle is ten l i t r e s - enough to run a jeep about thirty m i l e s in Saigon
- a s compared with a daily minimum of 100 m i l e s p e r vehicle in an
American municipal jurisdiction P r e c i n c t administration is weak and
needs g r e a t e r attention

In recent y e a r s the Saigon Police have been subjected tonumerous

changes in the upper echelons, associated with changes at the National
Police Headquarters, with consequent disruptive effects Further
political changes would no doubt be reflected In the Municipal Police a l s o

Nevertheless s o m e p r o g r e s s has been made and m o r e is in

prospect

The Saigon Police have played an important and increasingly

effective role in the Resources Control P r o g r a m Checkpoint operations
and the associated training have shown good r e s u l t s in t e r m s of Viet
Cong a r r e s t e d and contraband seized The F a m i l y Census P r o g r a m

- 50 -
within Saigon is proving effective i n the detection of illegal r e s i d e n t s
and thus h a s made it m o r e difficult f o r VC c a d r e s to infiltrate and live
within the city Continuing sweeps have netted numerous draft dodgers,
m i l i t a r y d e s e r t e r s and wanted criminals, as well as illegal r e s i d e n t s
andknown or suspectedVC While these p r o g r a m s w e r e at first r e s i s t e d
by some Saigon Police administrators, the input of men and m a t e r i e l
h a s gradually paid off and the p r o g r a m s are now generally supported

A s y s t e m of "Roll Call" training h a s been instituted consisting

of twenty-minute lectures on police procedures and practlcal police
problems which a r e Bven to personnel of each shift immediately
before they go on duty T h i s device, which was originated i n the United
States, where it is now widely used, h a s a l s o proved to b e a valuable
element ir the Saigon Police training p r o g r a m - so much so, in fact,
that it h a s been adoptedby the National Police Headquarters and is being
instituted i n the various provinces

USAID proposes t o take the following actions in 1 9 6 6 in support

of the Saigon Police

- - - T o develop and maintain close counterpart relationships between

precinct commanders and t h e i r Public Safety Advlsors, thereby a s s i s t -
ing the precinct commanders to make rapid and sound decisions and
judgments in everyday precinct management and operations A USAID
Public Safety Advisor has been assigned to each precinct

- - - T o coordinate plans with American military elements f o r the elimi-

nation o r reduction of static police guard posts at American m i l i t a r y
facilities, thereby freeing a minimum estimated 2 5 percent of the total
f o r c e f o r the performance of regular police duties

--- To establish a s y s t e m of mobile radio p a t r o l s in support of the

fixed post s y s t e m now generally employed, thus providing improved police
protection and effecting substantial savings i n manpower The Mission
h a s already furnished enough radio-equipped vehicles t o p e r m i t the
assignment of approximately 40 continuous p a t r o l s

- 51 -
--- To-obtain National P o l i c e Directorate General sanction of a t r i a l
work schedule calling f o r a basic work day of eight h o u r s and providing
f o r 1 6 h o u r s offduty f o r each policeman between r e g u l a r t o u r s of duty
T h i s c o n t r a s t s with the present s y s t e m of four h o u r s on and eight hours
off throughout the seven- day work week
-- - T o develop and establish, in a pilot precinct, a coordinated s y s t e m
of operational record- keeping f o r m s and procedures f o r t h e i r u s e
--- T o obtain Saigon Municipal Police Directorate and National P o l i c e
Directorate General support of t r a f f i c law enforcement Advisory
a s s i s t a n c e t o the traffic unit is being provided, as well a s minimum
traffic control equipment, such as traffic lights

--- T o provide advisory a s s i s t a n c e t o the Harbor Police in h a r b o r

police management and operations
--- T o provide commodities (boats, s p a r e p a r t s , tools and supplies)
as n e c e s s a r y for Harbor Police operations, upon conclusion of an a g r e e -
ment between the Mission and m a r i n e security agencies (Harbor Police,
Resources Control Bureau, and Customs Service) providing f o r combined
support and maintenance facilities at Saigon and elsewhere a s appropriate
--- T o obtain a consolidated a i r p o r t s e c u r i t y organization ( p e r h a p s
under the VN A i r F o r c e o r the National Police) in place of the s e v e r a l
autonomous and, t o s o m e extent, duplicating commands which now exist,
and t o strengthen the Saigon Police role at the airport, a s it may b e
defined, through advisory s e r v i c e s , participant training and minimum
commodity support
- - - To a s s i s t the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate in the establish-
ment of improved management and administrative procedures within
the Directorate Special emphasis w i l l be given t o personnel adminls-
tration establishment of a pilot precinct, and improved budget p r e -
paration and follow-up

The National Police Training P r o g r a m

T h e typical police r e c r u i t is a young m a n with a sixth- grade
education who m a y o r may not have had m i l i t a r y training H e knows

- 52 -
 - -

virtually nothing about law or law enforcement, h a s never driven an

automobile or a truck, is ignorant of mechanics, and, unless he has
s e r v e d in the a r m y , h a s nexer f i r e d a weapon However, he is lit-
e r a t e , and this in itself is of g r e a t advantage In practice, h e h a s proven
to be reasonably intelligent and adaptable and compares w e l l with police
recruits in other developing countries His first and basic need is training

At the beginning of 1966, t h e b a s i c ( r e c r u i t ) training c o u r s e w a s

six w e e k s , of which one was devoted to r e s o u r c e s control This w a s
obviously inadequate and w a s so acknowledged by the responsible autho-
r i t i e s , but the urgent need t o get policemen on the job, combined with
a dearth of training facilites, made a longer c o u r s e impracticable
In J a n u a r y 1966, however, the b a s i c c o u r s e was lengthened to twelve
weeks, a m a j o r step i n the right direction The curriculum of the twelve
week course is shown on page 56

The National Police now plan to have t h r e e basic training schools,

at Vung Tau (Rach Dua), Da Nang and Dalat Rach Dua will be expanded
t o a capacity of 2, 000 r e c r u i t s at any one time, as compared with i t s
present 1 , 0 0 0 and Da Nang and Dalat developed t o a capacity of 1, 000
each The output of the Dalat b a s i c training center is destined f o r the
Police Field F o r c e Training school sites presently i n u s e at T a m Hiep
and L e Van Duyet (in the Saigon area)will be r e l e a s e d to the Army as
soon as alternate facilities are ready f o r occupancy
An advanced training school is under construction at Thu Duc,
n e a r Saigon, and t h e r e a r e plans f o r the eventual creation of a police
college at Dalat, e i t h e r along the l i n e s of the Royal Malaysian Police
College n e a r Kuala Lumpur o r of the Thai Police College n e a r Bangkok
T h e s e plans w i l l probably have to wait until the present budgetary
stringency is eased, but t h e i r realization is an essential p a r t of the
training p r o g r a m

R e f r e s h e r training and retraining a r e also essential to a complete

training program, and this is doubly t r u e i n Vietnam where the initial
b a s i c training was inadequate p r i o r t o 1 9 6 6 T h e r e a r e plans, not yet

- 53 -
1

Training Advisor Brooks D Anderson illustrating hand-to-

hand combat tactics to N P instructor and t r a i n e e s
Anderson died on duty in Saigon in May 1966

Training Advisor Thomas P Isbell illustrating u s e of the

"sawed off" 1 2 guage shotgun to N P f i r e a r m s instructor
- 54 -
I

Equipment furnished under the Public Safety p r o g r a m in u s e at

r e p a i r shop of Combined Telecommunications Directorate

Training Advisor Dudley J Britton demonstrating u s e of

38 caliber revolver to N P Training I n s t r u c t o r s
- 55 -
 CURRICULUM NATIONAL POLICE
BASIC TRAINING PROGRAM
5 2 8 hours 1 2 weeks

A - GENERAL POLICE SERVICE

1- General Administration 12
2- Police Administration 40
3- Judicial Police 24
4- Resources Control 40
5- I D Cards, Records, Scientific Police 10
6- Civil Disturbance Control 24
7- Traffic Police 12

B- SPECIAL BRANCH POLICE 24

C - MISCELLANEOUS

1- Note-taking 2
2 - U s e of Telephone & Mobile Radio 4
3- Fire Prevention & Protection 4
4- F i r s t Aid 10
5- Defensive Tactics & Disarming Techniques,
Police Baton 20
6- Circumstances of Using Weapons 4
7- Evacuation, A l a r m s & Curfews 4

D- PSYWAR & PUBLIC RELATIONS 16

1- Police Attitude 10

E - DIRECTOR'S TIME, SANITATION 20

F- MILITARY TRAINING

1- Military Basic 132

2 - Weapons, F i r e a r m s 116

Total 52 8
G - EXAMINATIONS ( 3 days) 24

- 56 -
worked out i n complete detail, f o r retraining f o r all police personnel
now serving Weapons r e f r e s h e r training is currently being given t o
as many police as can be accommodated at the r a t h e r limited firing
ranges available to the police in the Regions and Provinces

USAID h a s encouraged the development of an adequate training

p r o g r a m and h a s supported it with men, money and materiel, that is,
with technical advlce, budgetary support, and equipment and supplies
Among the last named, training aids, books, film, and other essential
commodities have been and w i l l continue to be furnished Thirteen USAID
Training Advisors a r e planned

Civil Disturbance Control

Good police administration r e q u i r e s that i n t i m e s of emergency

t h e r e be a capability f o r dealing with unruly demonstrations, riots,
and natural d i s a s t e r s Enlightened practice a l s o r e q u i r e s that timely
m e a s u r e s be taken to prevent the development of civil disturbances and,
when they do occur, that they b e dealt with i n accordance with the
11
principle of minimum force" For this reason it is essential that a
properly trained and equipped civll police organization be available and
that military units be employed f o r this purpose only as a l a s t r e s o r t

During the Diem regime, civlldisturbance control was the work

of the Combat Police, who were deployed throughout Viet Nam in all
the major towns, the number i n any one town varylng according to the
s i z e of the town and the security h a z a r d s of the surrounding a r e a
Shortly after the assassination of Diem, the Combat Police, whose ex-
c e s s e s had caused them to be popularly detested, were disbanded

However, the requirement f o r specially trained police continued

to exist, especially in Saigon, and in December 1964, following extensive
disorders, a special unit was created and training w a s initiated In
January 1965, it was decided t o c r e a t e two battalions, t o be known a s
O r d e r Police These t w o battalions, the 222 and the 8 1 6 how have
approximately 1000 men each Both a r e located in Saigon, the 222

- 57 -
directly under the Director General of National Police and the 816 under
the Director, Saigon Municipal Police The 222 Battalion is currently
used to bolster night security in the outlying precincts, while the 816 is
primarily a r e s e r v e force Both a r e in readiness when called upon to
perform their primary function Creation of a third battalion sometime
in the future is under consideration.

During F Y 1 9 6 6 it is planned to institute a rotational system of

training within the Saigon Municipal Police so that a s a long t e r m pro-
ject all the police within the capital city w i l l be trained in civil d i s -
turbance control This training w i l l produce an adequate number of
specially selected men, who after a course in the techniques of in-
struction, w i l l provide a cadre of instructors These instructors w i l l
be used f o r civil disturbance cclntrol training in the various Regional
Director ate s throughout Vietnam

During F Y 1 9 6 7 it is proposed to initiate training in civil d i s -

turbance control in each of the six Regional Directorates The training
course willlast for four months and will be repeated three times y e a r -
ly at each of the six Regional training centers, namely Can Tho, My
Tho, Bien Hoa, Ban Me Thuot, Nha Trang and Hue

A s along- termproject, trained menfrom the Regional Director-

a t e s will be used a s instructors for civil disturbance control training at
the provincial and district levels

Each District Police Chief within the Regional Directorate w i l l

be required to nominate a minimum number of men f r o m within his
command to attend the training course This w i l l ensure that the com-
pany will always have some men familiar with the topography of any of
the Directorate in which they may be required to operate

Men who during training prove to be of outstanding ability and

display qualities of leadership w i l l be recommended f o r consideration
for a course at the Command School A promotion incentive w i l l thus
be created

- 59 -
 Technical advice in civil distnrbance control is currently
provided by a British Police Advisor attached to the USAID Office of
Public Safety The USAID has provided substantial commodity support
including vehicles, weapons and ammunition, and plans to continue
support of this essential activity, a s w e l l a s t o promotethe doctrines of
prevention and minimum force

Support of Other National Police Activities

Harbor Police

The Harbor Police, which is a section of the Saigon Municipal

Police (q v ) patrols the waters of the Saigon River f r o m below the
mouth of the Kinh T e Canal to the GVN Navy p i e r s up r i v e r f r o m the
commercial docks A r i v e r patrol operates 24 hours a day every day
t o protect ships entering and leaving the harbor against the operations
of p i r a t e s and to discourage smugglers The land patrol is responsible
f o r the security of the harbor f r o m the landside They a r e responsible
f o r safety of ship's cargo untilit is placed in warehouses A l l vehicles
and persons entering and leaving the harbor are checked by Harbor
Police, who also notify m a s t e r s of ships of local conditions and needed
security precautions C r i m e s committed aboard ships in the h a r b o r
are investigated by Harbor Police personnel, who also check departing
ships f o r stowaways and i s s u e p a s s e s for merchant seamen and ship's
p a s seng e r s

The Public Safety Advisor working with the Harbor Police a s s i s t s

i n all problems of administration and operation related to that organi-
zation Vessels and other equipment have been provided by the USAID

A i r p o r t Police

The Airport Police is a l s o a section of the Saigon Munic ip a1

Police It has the responsibility f o r examining passports, especially
f o r proper visas, checking manifests, checking incoming and outgoing
passengers prohibited f r o m entering o r leaving the country f o r political

- 60 -
%-

I ’

>”

Reginald S Davis - Senior Advisor, Telecommunications

(left) and P S Communications Advisor Robert A Craft
receiving GVN awards of m e r i t f o r t h e i r work from the
Director General of National Police

Harbor Police Advisor Otto H Ludwig,

J r with Police P a t r o l Craft
- 61 -
Telecommunlcatlons equipment furnished by U S A I D
as part of Public Safety program

Saigon Office of Public Safety teletype operators

o r other reasons, investigating and issuing passes t o persons having
business in the airport (Tan Son Nhut) at Saigon, providing guard posts
at entrances and strategic a r e a s at the airport and surrounding a r e a s ,
and conducting undercover investigations by plain clothes police p e r -
sonnel in the airport a r e a

A Public Safety Advisor is assigned to participate in activities

designed to improve s e c u r i t y a t the Tan Son Nhut Airport and suggest
methods for improvement in efficiency and utilization of security
personnel and equipment

Special Police Branch

The Chief, Special Police Branch, on 15 April 1964, issued the

following "statement of mission" which is still valid "Special Police
Branch is in charge of intelligence, responsible f o r collection of in-
formation necessary for the eradication of any threat to internal security
which may hurt the Republic's national security 'I This branch maintains
hourly and daily liaison with all other GVN intelligence agencies, both
military and civllian, a s w e l l a s with Saigon Municipal Police Head-
quarters The Special Branch h a s units working i n all National Police
regional and provincial headquarters, in most districts, and in many
villages and hamlets throughout the country

The Public Safety Advlsor working with this branch suggests the
use of acceptable police techniques to be employed in pursing the Brancn
mission, recommends improvements needed f o r performance of modern
operations, and suggests interrogation techniques, particularly f o r Viet
Cong suspects and political prisoners who threaten internal security
He also conducts local and national level instruction and is currently
employed in devising a pattern of integrated activlty f o r the Special
Branch and the Police Field F o r c e s He is also concerned in the building,
staffing, and admimstrative establishment of a nationwide network of
provincial interrogation centers to be manned by the Special Branch

- 63 -
 Internal A f f a i r s Division

T h i s division of the National P o l i c e H e a d q u a r t e r s w a s c r e a t e d

during M a r c h 1964 t o investigate all complaints r e c e i v e d against
m e m b e r s of t h e police and t o make recommendations concerning d i s -
ciplinary action t o the Director General It is responsible directly to
the D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l alone A l l personnel of t h i s division a r e stationed
at the h e a d q u a r t e r s T h e c a s e l o a d outside of Saigon is handled by road
trips

When evidence of a c r i m e is obtained, r e p o r t s a r e furnished t o

the Judicial P o l i c e f o r t h e i r disposition

The Advisor assigned to w o r k with this Division has t h e r e s p o n s i -

bility t o confer with and advlse the Chief and Assistant Chiefs of the
Division on policies and p r o c e d u r e s in the adrninistratlon of the office
H e a l s o a s s i s t s i n the evaluation of complaints received, m a k e s r e c o m -
mendations as t o contemplated investigations, and a s s i s t s i n supervision
of important c a s e s T h e Advisor also l e c t u r e s in special training c l a s s e s
f o r personnel of t h e division

Judicial Police Service

~~

T h i s branch of the National P o l i c e conducts open (non- covert)

investigations a s assigned by the v a r i o u s c o u r t s , d e a l s with economic
and financial offenses, investigates smuggling and black m a r k e t offenses,
conducts investigations of p e r s o n s indebted t o the government and
m e m b e r s of f o r m e r r e g i m e s , m a k e s open investigations upon receipt
of complaints, investigates narcotic c a s e s and illegal p u r c h a s e s of
medicinals, controls p u r c h a s e of c h e m i c a l s and i t e m s having m i l i t a r y
value, investigates and m a k e s a r r e s t s of professional c r i m i n a l s , conducts
investigations upon r e q u e s t of other police agencies and governmental
bodies throughout t h e country on important c a s e s , m a k e s undercover
investigations on undeveloped c a s e s

- 64 -
 The advisor assigned to this Servlce examines procedures and
techniques and suggests efficient and effective operational methods

Immigration Service

The Immigration Service, a branch of the Judicial Police, is

responsible f o r control of foreigners entering into, residing in, and
leaving Vietnam Visas a r e issued by this service, after approval has
been granted by the Minister Foreigners who apply f o r Vietnamese
citizenship a r e investigated by the Immigration Service Passenger
and commodity control at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport is a l s o vested
in this service

The Advisor working with the Immigration Service examines

procedures and techniques of the Servlce with the purpose of making all
operations more efficient and effective

A dminist r ative Police

The Administrative Police Service consists of the Administrative

Investigation Bureau, the Passport Bureau, the Research and Control
Bureau and the Secretariat of the Service Their work consists of making
background checks of civil servants, contractors, business men, teachers
and cab d r i v e r s They investigate certain types of sensitive employment,
investigate and i s s u e permits to c a r r y weapons and operate radio
stations, r e B s t e r and change reglstrations of vehicles, make investi-
gations before issuance of passports to Vietnamese nationals
and investigate and process all political and criminal prisoners to be
released One USAID Public Safety Advisor maintains liaison with che
Service, but to date USAID support has been minimal

Support of Combined Telecommunications Directorate

The Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) is r e -

sponsible f o r the establishment and operation of an integrated system
of country-wide telecommunications - radio, telegraph, teletype, tele-
phone - f o r all Government Agencies directly engaged in providing civil

- 65 -
security These include, but are not limited to, the Directorate General
of National Police, the Ministry of Interior, the Customs Service, the
Rehabilitation Servlce, and the Railway Security Service This ar-
rangement w a s designed to eliminate duplication of manpower and equip-
ment, and without doubt it is eminently successful in achieving this
objective
T h e s y s t e m a s planned, and now virtually completed, is shown
pictorially on page 67, It w i l l be noted that it follows established
government channels in proceeding f r o m the National Capital in Saigon
t o the Regions and thence on to Provinces, Districts, Villages and
Hamlets Communication is by radio teletype f r o m Saigon to the Regions,
by radio telegraph f r o m Regions t o Provinces and f r o m Provinces to
Districts, and by radio-phone f r o m Districts to Villages T h e r e is a
land-line teletype system within Saigon inter-connecting the P r i m e
Minister's Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Directorate General of
National Police, the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and USAID with the C T D
c ommunic at ions center

The system extending f r o m Saigon through Regions and P r o -

vinces to Districts is known a s the Administrative Network and is owned
and operated by the CTD It w i l l handle m e s s a g e s for any government
agency, but police traffic takes precedence over other traffic

T h e CTD has a Base Communications Center at Saigon and a

Base Depot and Technical Training Center near Thu Duc, in the Saigon
area T h e r e a r e six Regional Headquarters, corresponding to the
National Police Regions, with radio relay facilities and technical and
logistic capabilities to support communications activities in each Region
The CTD staff numbers approximately 2600

Since the beginning of 1 9 6 5 the USAID h a s gradually been pro-

viding radio-phone equipment to enable the Director General of National
Police to communicate with the Regional Police Directors, the Regional
Directors with the Provincial Police Chiefs and these in turn with Dis-
t r i c t Police Chiefs To date radios have been installed in Regional,

- 66 -
 U s OM / PS 0 CO M B I N E D S ECUR I TY TE LECOM M U N ICAT I0 N 01RECTORATE

NAT10 NAL
OTHER C I V I L
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR- SECURITY AGENCIES
RADIO TELETYlE
SYSTEM

nmon
*1610N CIVIC S I C U I I I V
AOlMCleS

6 REGIONS r
SAICON
HUE BANYETHUOT CAN THO M Y THO DIEM H O A NHA T R A N G
POLICE

RADIO TELEORAPH
I 1YSTEM
Qs
4
I I I movinct I \
CIVIL *lCunlTt
MmoaaL ~ O L I C ~
AOIICICS
4 3 PROVINCES 1 I I

PROVINCE

U n e M L C.LICI

238 DISTRICTS
I
8

vuwx CONYUNICATION
1YSTEW
nAm0 WONE
I
I
m

2500 VILLAGES
,-+ I I I
I l l

*
I

7000 HAMLETS 1c tiAYLETS

Provincial and District Police offices T h i s is basically a V H F - F M
radio system In the Highlands and South Lowland R e s o n s an HF-SSB
radio-phone system h a s been installed between Regional Headquarters
and Provinces because the distances are too g r e a t f o r V H F - F M s e r v i c e
E a r l y rn 1966 the first F M - 1 and FM-5 radios w e r e received and w i l l
be issued to Provincial and District Police, including police and R e -
s o u r c e s Control checkpoints Eventually t h e r e w i l l be about 5000 of
these radios in all phases of the Police organization, including Field
Forces (See page 69 f o r illustrations of these radios )

A major effort of CTD, supported by USAID, h a s been the de-

velopment, establishment and support of the Village-Hamlet Radio
System T h i s is a system of about 1 2 , 000 two-way radio-phone units
that were designed and procured to USAID specifications for specific
requirements in Vietnam The f i r s t village radios w e r e installed early
in 1962 and final installation was made in June 1 9 6 5 It h a s been pro-
posed to procure additional radios in F Y - 6 7 t o r e p l a c e those lost t o VC
action and to provide equipment f o r newly activated o r recaptured a r e a s
and f o r pacification t e a m s

The USAID, through i t s Office of Public Safety, h a s provided

technical assistance and equipment i n support of the CTD In addition
t o five Americanpublic safety communications technicians on the USAID
staff, t h e r e a r e approximately 25 American technicians provided under
a contract (currently the Philco Corporation)and 50 Filipino technicians
employed under another contract (currently Landis Brothers) Virtually
all of the telecommunications equipment of the CTD and the other civil
security agencies, with a value of many million dollars, h a s been sup-
plied by USAID Expansion, upgrading and support of these s y s t e m s
is continuing

T h e USAID h a s a l s o provided direct communications support t o

the Saigon Municipal Police Department Since 1958 this Department's
telecommunications capability h a s been expanded to provide a central

- 68 -
F M 1 (above) and F M 5 radios furnished through USAID
Combined Telecommunications Directorate

- 69 -
communications center, a dispatching radio station, about 1 2 0 radio-
equipped mobile patrol vehicles, 50 fixed-radiophone-equipped security
posts, a call-box telephone s y s t e m of 40 call-boxes and m o r e than 150
hand-held radios f o r patrol u s e

T h e Customs Service h a s been provided with ship - t o - s h o r e

radios and equipment f o r b o r d e r posts Radios have a l s o been furnished
the Rehabilitation (prison) Service, the Railway Security Service, and
the P o r t Authority f o r pilot operations at Saigon and Danang CTDpro-
vides the engineering, technical and logistic facilities to support these
organic t elec omrnunic ations s y s t e m s

T h e CTD h a s alsoprovided s e r v i c e to USAID by handling 1 0 , 0 0 0

USAID m e s s a g e s to and between the USAID Offices i n Saigon, the four
Regions and the 43 Provinces in 1965 In addition to the m e s s a g e traffic,
CTD personnel a s s i s t the USAID field operations by providing telephone
facilities and ground- air radios and teletype s e r v i c e f r o m the CTD
Regions to USAID Regional Offices

The USAID p r o g r a m f o r the immediate future includes the fol-

lowing

1 Completion and continued support of the command and in-

telligence radiophone s y s t e m f o r the National Police and the i s s u e of
radios to Police Field F o r c e s and r u r a l posts and patrols

2 Continued support of the Saigon Police, Customs Service,

Rehabilitation Service and other civil security agencies

3 Provision of technical and commodity support to CTD to

enable that Directorate to furnish support to i t s " u s e r s "

Support of the Customs Service

Customs receipts constitute approximately forty p e r cent of the

r e g u l a r GVN budget revenues In the opinion of the Finance Minister,
with which the senior USAID Customs Advisor concurs, up-grading of

- 70 -
- - - I_.

Telecommunication equipment furnished under

U S A I D Public Safety program

- 71 -
the quality of the inspectional s e r v i c e s would result i n a significant in-
c r e a s e in collections The USAID Customs Advisors have devoted as
much t i m e a s feasible to assisting GVN customs personnel with the clear-
ing of ships and c a r g o e s in the port a r e a , but much r e m a i n s to be done
in management and control, documentation, appraisal and financial
procedures It is possible that a Participating Agency Service Agreement
(PASA) with the U S Customs Bureau may offer the best long-range
solution

Customs enforcement and investigations a r e the responsibility

of the Customs Fraud Repression Service Owing in l a r g e p a r t to lack
of confidence i n the personnel f o r m e r l y assigned to t h i s unit, it h a s
received v e r y little support f r o m the USAID However, it is now con-
sidered that some limited support may be worthwhile and it is proposed
t o furnish c e r t a i n equipment and supplies which w i l l extend i t s capability
in the investigation of criminal offenses against the customs l a w s

Other than f o r two participants who w e r e accepted f o r third

country training s o m e t h r e e y e a r s ago, USAID h a s not supported any
Customs training Local training i n weapons, particularly f o r the boat
fleet personnel and f o r those assigned to Cambodian B o r d e r outposts,
was initiated i n 1965 T h e r e h a s been no f o r m a l training within the
Customs Service itself since the Vietnamese took over f r o m the F r e n c h
A p r o g r a m h a s been drawn up whereby the younger officers who have

entered the servlce i n the past five y e a r s may receive basic training

Any significant p r o g r a m of up-grading customs p r o c e d u r e s

necessitates a corresponding build-up of t h e i r f i s c a l facilities The
buildings and collection offices in the m a j o r p o r t s of Saigon and Danang
have long outlived t h e i r usefulness and replacement is badly needed
T h e r e is a need for dock and p i e r facilities, storage warehouses, etc ,
f o r the port a r e a s and also f o r the customs stations along the Mekong
and B a s s a c r i v e r s Under the present procedure this necessitates p i a s t e r
expenditures which cannot be expected with any degree of optimism f r o m

- 72 -
the present m e a g e r r e s o u r c e s of the Vietnamese government Although
approximately 25 million p i a s t e r s have been requested i n the budget
f o r construction of required facilities, none have been forthcoming

The weapons with which the Customs Service was equipped w e r e

the leftovers of the French colonial regime When s e v e r a l customs
outposts w e r e overrun by the Viet Cong i n succession i n early 1964,
owing p r i m a r i l y to inadequacies in t h e i r protective facilities, it w a s
c l e a r that improvements were i n o r d e r During F Y 1965 some 500
weapons, ranging f r o m 38 calibre revolvers to 60mm m o r t a r s , w e r e
furnished by USAID and were distributed to various outposts and boat
fleet units An equivalent number of obsolete and antiquated weapons
of various types w e r e collected and turned over f o r destruction by the
Army

Adequate s t o r e s of ammunition f o r both training and operations

have been procured by USAID and delivered t o the Customs Service
This is a continuing requirement

A s t a r t h a s been made i n up-grading the vehicle fleet of the

Customs Service by supplylng 1 2 jeeps and two five-ton t r u c k s and
ordering five m o r e vehicles f o r F Y 1 9 6 6 The Customs rolling stock
is in poor condition countrywide owing to the lack of p r o p e r maintenance
facilities, particularly in the a r e a s outside of Saigon In Saigon itself
the situation is not bad and w i l l continue to improve, particularly since

the USAID has equipped a v e r y good maintenance and r e p a i r shop with

the tools and equipment n e c e s s a r y to perform satisfactory maintenance
N o up-grading of the rolling stock is contemplated f o r the country a r e a s ,
nor does it appear feasible, since the officers in those a r e a s a r e ex-
t r e m e l y hesitant about accepting jeeps because of the security situation
They f e e l they can travel safely in t h e i r respective a r e a s only when
a r e not identified a s government officers In o r d e r to achieve this
status they t r a v e l in civilian clothes without identification and in Euro-
pean made vehicles such a s Peugeot and Citroen

- 73 -
 No additional units have been acquired f o r the boat fleet s i n c e
the Customs S e r v i c e became a s e p a r a t e entity However, in o r d e r to
enable the Service t o c a r r y out its responsibilities, it was apparent that
a build-up of the boat fleet would be n e c e s s a r y Accordingly, additional
c r a f t w e r e o r d e r e d i n F Y 1 9 6 5 and F Y 1 9 6 6 ( a total of 50), mostly 30
and 40-foot U S Coast Guardutility c r a f t T h e s e w i l l be put i n s e r v i c e
in the Mekong-Bassac r i v e r complex and i n the deep s e a p o r t s of the
South China Sea

T h e facility f o r vehicle r e p a i r s , in Saigon h a s been up- graded to

a quite s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a t e T h i s maintenance unit is a l s o engaged in
maintenance and r e p a i r of the v a r i o u s boat fleet units Additional equip-
ment h a s been s e c u r e d and m o r e h a s been o r d e r e d sufficient to bring
t h i s u p to a high l e v e l of operating capability For the f u t u r e t h e r e a r e
under way s t e p s t o s e t up an additional maintenance facility at Vinh Long
i n the Delta a r e a t o take c a r e o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the C u s t o m s boat
fleet units operating on the r i v e r s and a l s o simultaneously to s e r v i c e
t h e National P o l i c e w a t e r - b o r n e units which w i l l be used i n r e s o u r c e s
control

T h e C u s t o m s Service o p e r a t e s a l a b o r a t o r y f o r a n a l y s i s of the
components of imported commodities s o that p r o p e r classification and
evaluation of t h e s e commodities may be made T h e l a b o r a t o r y is used
f o r the secondary purpose of such c r i m i n a l identification work as the

C u s t o m s a c t i v i t i e s n e c e s s i t a t e T h e laboratory, while effective, is pos-

s e s s e d of a considerable amount of obsolete equipment A s u r v e y of
its n e e d s w a s conducted b y a Public Safety L a b o r a t o r y Technician and a n
o r d e r h a s been placed f o r approximately $5, 000 worth of new equipment
which w i l l significantly up-grade its capability and make it much m o r e
useful f o r routine c u s t o m s and police b a l l i s t i c s and identification work

During the past two y e a r s , a s p a r t of the Public Safety p r o g r a m ,

a countrywide r a d i o net h a s been established tying i n all c u s t o m s p o s t s

- 74 -
Translator and typing pools of Saigon Office of Public Safety

- 75 -
and m a r i t i m e units with the headquarters station in Saigon The net is
operating satisfactorily
F o r the future, it is planned to i n c r e a s e the patrol fleet f r o m
2 9 to 70 vessels, while scrapping 2 7 obsolete vessels, to expand the
training program, and to reorganize the s e r v i c e in such manner a s to
strengthen internal management and control
Technical assistance to the Customs Service h a s been provided
b y t h r e e Public Safety Advisors In 1 9 6 6 a decision w a s reached to pro-
vide additional technical assistance of an operational nature through
the USAID Assistant Director f o r Special Projects, who now has the
operational responsibility f o r technical assistance to the Customs
Service OPS w i l l continue to manage the n e c e s s a r y supporting
commodity acquisitions

S u m o r t of P r i s o n Rehabilitation

Following the overthrow of the Diem r e s m e , the number of

p r i s o n e r s was reducedfrom about 30, 000 to about 1 6 , 0 0 0 , but is now
back to 2 5 , 0 0 0 , owing to m o r e GVN and U S military activity Several
new and m o r e modern prisons a r e under construction t o replace some
of the m o r e primitive institutions in u s e at present P r i s o n e r s are
being segregated by types of c r i m e s and severity Approximately
$20r3, 000 worth of US commodities have been received, including sewing
machines, office equipment, carpentry tools, vehicles, projectors,
public address systems, and handcuffs
A realistic in- service training school h a s been established f o r
j a i l e r and rehabilitation c a d r e Thirty-five female j a i l e r s a r e under-
going n u r s e training Vocational schools have been s t a r t e d in s e v e r a l
of the c e n t e r s in carpentry, tailoring, u eaving, typing, and other subjects
Two participants have received seven months training at Southern
Illinois University, and two have attended the UN school in Japan on
c r i m e , delinquency, and correction Four m o r e participants w i l l be
sent t o Southern Illinois University in 1 3 6 6 The policies of the Di-
r e c t o r a t e have changed f r o m the punitive type to the correctional type

- 76 -
A p r i m a r y classification s y s t e m is being introduced and the e n t i r e p r i -
s o n e r r e c o r d s y s t e m h a s been revamped

N e w C e n t e r s or Correction Institutions w i l l be m o r e modern in

design than those now i n u s e Few of the present C e n t e r s have p r o p e r
facilities f o r housing p r i s o n e r s Most kitchens a r e dirty and in d i s r e p a i r
Bathing and toilet facilities a r e inadequate and primitive Sewers a r e
almost non-existent, and those present a r e inadequate and usually not
functioning Most of t h e training buildings a r e " jerry-built" out of s c r a p
m a t e r i a l and thatch, with a few "conference rooms" available in some
c e n t e r s f o r m a s s reeducation

Two new c e n t e r s a r e under construction and two m o r e a r e on

the drawing board These new c e n t e r s and o t h e r s planned, together
with the renovation of s o m e of the older ones now in use, w i l l cost ap-
proximately VN$ZOO million over a period of y e a r s T h i s amount w i l l
a l s o include housing f o r personnel employea by the Directorate

A training p r o g r a m f o r both jailers and rehabilitation c a d r e h a s

been i n operation since April 1964 About 100 of the 1, 1 0 0 employees
have already successfully completed the 3G-day c o u r s e Additional p e r -
sonnel have been authorized and w i l l be r e c r u i t e d and trained during
F Y 1 9 6 6 P r e s e n t plans call f o r the recruitment of a l e a s t 50 additional
new employees during each of the next five y e a r s Previously, e m -
ployment requirement s, both physical and mental, w e r e extremely, low
A s wage l e v e l s have been quite low, f e w educated indimduals w e r e at-
t r a c t e d t o the s e r v i c e The standards have now been r a i s e d f o r both

jailers and cadre, and t h i s w i l l contribute toward a b e t t e r p r i s o n e r r e -

education p r o g r a m New personnel meeting the higher standards are
eligible f o r commensuraxely higher wages The p r e s e n t c a d r e and jailer
i n - s e r v l c e training school w i l l continue until all have been r e t r a i n e d
P r e - s e r v i c e schooling is planned f o r all new r e c r u i t s An advanced in-
s e r v l c e training school f o r the m o r e experienced j a i l e r s and c a d r e is
in the planning stage

- 77 -
 Instructors have beenhired f o r vocational training for a number
of the centers and equipment for their shops is either in country o r on
order These training schools f o r prisoners w i l l s t a r t with basic tools
and equipment, and a s more instructors a r e provided, they w i l l become
more sophisticated and modern power equipment w i l l be introduced
Academic subjects a r e taught in most centers to a limited degree, but
present plans call for this program to be expanded to cover m o r e grades,
up to and including the equivalent of American high school

In F Y 1 9 6 6 and F Y 1967 procurement actions w i l l be continued

on a limited scale in support of rehabilitation efforts and improvement
of the physical facilities Training w i l l continue for Rehabilitation Cen-
t e r personnel in various aspects of prisoner rehabilitation and prison
admini st rat ion

The USAID has one Prison Advisor and plans to add one more

- 78 -
P r i s o n Rehabilitation activities i n various prison c e n t e r s

- 79 -
 I

PUBLIC S A F E T Y ADVISORS

WHO DIED WHILE

SERVING IN VIETNAM

I
 a
P

Jack Ryan
Chief of Office
1964- 1965

83
 JohnF McCabe
Deputy Chief
1960- 1962

Wyman W Vernon
Deputy Chief
1959- 1960

84
Brooks Anderson Carl Alexander
1962 - 1966 1964 - 1966

E d w a r d H Forney
B r i g Gen USMC ( R e t
1960- 1965 /

Jack W e l l s Dolph B O w e n s
1965 85 1960