ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023

Peace & Security

Council Report

Special edition
Focusing on unconstitutional changes of government
 Coup culture returns to Africa
The 30 August 2023 coup in Gabon was the 100th successful military coup
in post-colonial Africa. In the 71 years between the first coup, in Egypt in July
1952, and this latest one, the continent has experienced only 25 coup-free
years. Of the 55 member states of the African Union (AU), only 20 have not
been affected by military coups.
The Gabon putsch was also the ninth unconstitutional change of government
(UCG) in Africa since 2020. The continent has not seen so many coups in
such a short time since the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. This recent
upsurge has come against the backdrop of dwindling coup numbers since
the 1990s.
From a high of 15 successful coups in the 1990s, the number dropped
to eight from 2001 to 2010 and further to six between 2011 and 2020.
What explains this upsurge in the occurrence of military coups despite the
existence of several normative continental and regional instruments?

Reasons for resurgence

To justify their actions, military actors behind recent coups have cited three
‘unpardonable’ mistakes of overthrown leaders. These are bad governance
and authoritarianism, widespread corruption and nepotism combined with
a bad economic situation, and deteriorating security. Indeed, at least one of
these is often present in coup situations.
However, experience shows that seldom are these the true or only concerns
of soldiers who stage coups. It may be their genuine concern initially but
often they quickly change course, their untold motivations being personal or
related to the interests of a segment of military establishment.
Foreign interventions against the backdrop of geopolitical interests and/or
rivalries also accounted for a good number of coups, particularly during the
Cold War era. While it might be difficult to establish this in the current wave

Acronyms and abbreviations

ACDEG African Charter on Democracy, Elections ECOWAS Economic Community of West African
and Governance States
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture PSC Peace and Security Council
AU African Union RECs Regional economic communities
CAR Central African Republic UCGs Unconstitutional changes of government
CMR Civil-military relations US United States
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African
States

2 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

Chart 1: Successful military coups in Africa per decade and region,
1952–2023

30
Coup-virgin Coup-free
25 25 countries years
20/55 25/71
Number of coups

20 21
15 15
15

10
8 8
6
5
2
0
1951– 1961– 1971– 1981– 1991– 2001– 2011– 2021–
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2023
Central East North Southern West Total
Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa

Source: © Issaka K Souaré, 2023

of coups, the possibility of international geopolitics as part of the calculus of

coup-makers in some countries cannot be discounted.
Regardless of the sincerity or lack thereof of coup-makers, the presence of
‘favourable conditions’ of coup-making should be considered red flags for
activating proper preventive measures. While condemning military coups,
the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Governance
and Elections (the two main continental anti-coup frameworks) acknowledge
several factors that may reduce the threat.
In particular are strict adherence to ‘the principles of good governance,
transparency and human rights and ‘strengthening of democratic institutions’.
These, the two maintain, would considerably reduce the risk of UCGs –
including military coups – on the continent.

Why the change? Current PSC Chairperson

If these factors can explain the occurrence of coups, what explains the HE Churchill Monono,
changing trends? The downward trend observed in the three decades Cameroon’s Ambassador
from 1990 can be explained by several inter-related factors. One was the to Ethiopia and Permanent
(re)establishment of multiparty democratic systems after decades of military Representative to the
and single-party dominance. African Union.
This meant that military rule was largely discredited. Another connected factor
PSC members
is the departure of many longstanding leaders following ‘founding’ elections
at the beginning of the 1990s and in the new millennium, which gave hope for Burundi, Cameroon,
true democratic renewal in many African countries. Republic of Congo, Djibouti,
The Gambia, Ghana, Morocco,
Although some still question its rationale, a third factor is said to be the Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal,
presidential term-limit provision included in most new constitutions on the South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia,
continent. This began bearing fruit in the 2000s. So far, some 33 African Uganda, Zimbabwe
heads of state have so far left office after serving their constitutional terms.

ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 3

 The latest two to do so are Muhammadu Buhari of
Nigeria (2015 to 2023) and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya
(2013 to 2022).
Regular electoral defeats of sitting leaders and prospects
of power alternation after a maximum of consecutive
four- to seven-year terms arguably created hope for
power change. They may have removed a key pretext
of coup-makers. Most importantly, anti-coup norms
and frameworks were adopted in the same period.
They were also applied with consistency and loopholes
corrected over the years.
A reverse trend began to take hold in the same period.
This coincided with several African leaders scrapping the
term-limit stipulation in their constitutions. This practice
has taken two forms over two generations. The first
form and generation began in Burkina Faso in January
1997. Then, about a year to the end of his first seven-
year term, then-president Blaise Compaoré modified the
term-limit provision in the 1991 constitution.
Guinea followed in 2001, Tunisia and Togo in 2002,
Gabon in 2003, Chad in 2004, Uganda in 2005,
Cameroon and Algeria in 2008, Niger in 2009 and
Djibouti in 2010. All but Cameroon, Gabon and Djibouti
have reversed the changes.
The second form and generation of term-limit provision
reforms has been general constitutional modification or
adopting a totally new constitution accompanied by the
claim of the birth of a new political dispensation. In this
case, the term limit is often not touched.
But because a nouvel ordre politique (new political order)
has been born, the term-limit clock is set to zero on the
basis of the classical legal principle of non-automatic
retroactivity of laws. This was used in constitutional
reforms in countries such as Rwanda and the Republic
of Congo in 2015, Côte d’Ivoire in 2016, Egypt in 2019
and Guinea in 2020.
Reversing the trend
How can the current trend of military coups be stemmed
and constitutional rule restored and consolidated?
Without being naïve about the declared motivations
of coup-makers, there is surely a need for concrete
preventive actions to deter constitutional manipulations
by sitting leaders and to ensure credible elections. These
actions are likely to restore the trust of disillusioned
African citizens in the political systems of their countries.
4 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
Regular alternations of power can not only benefit
countries through new ideas and more energised and
fresh governing teams, but can reveal to citizens the
dynamism of their democratic governance systems.
Abolishing term-limit provision or bypassing it through
controversial constitutional reforms have proven
important arguments by many African citizens who
charge African institutions with ‘double standards’, as
they consider these ‘constitutional coups’.
True, countries cannot be prevented from ‘reforming’
their legal texts, including the constitution. However,
while respecting this legitimate prerogative of sovereign
states, experience shows that targeting term limits in
such reforms is mainly a desire to prolong a stay in
power. Rarely is there a genuine concern for imperative
adaptation to new social realities. Therefore, preventing
the abuse of this crucial aspect of constitutions and
mechanisms for peaceful alternation of leadership will be
key in the immediate- and medium terms.
The AU and regional economic communities should
redouble efforts to help member states tackle security
challenges facing their countries, holistically and not
by focusing only on kinetic military approaches. These
efforts should include social-economic development
and promotion of social cohesion and peaceful
intercommunal co-existence, without discarding
dialogue with dissident groups to understand their
legitimate grievances.
Member states should tackle security
challenges holistically, not focus only on
military approaches
Communication channels should also be kept open
with de facto authorities of military transitions despite
their suspension from regional and continental
institutions. International contact groups between 2008
and 2015 served this purpose. The newly launched
AU and United Nations Development Programme
African Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions could
be a credible communication platform, assisting
cooperating authorities to restore constitutional order.
This should be based on a clear and credible transition
roadmap agreed with the AU and/or the regional
economic community.
The evolution of coups
The toppling of King Farouk in 1952 by the Egyptian army marked the
beginning of military intervention to gain political power in Africa. Since then,
military interferences in politics have become a recurring feature to access
political power, with 100 successful coups in 35 countries. Thus, despite
growing concern about the increasing frequency of coups recently, the
phenomenon is not new.
Coups in Africa have been characterised by three major dynamics. First is the
uneven distribution of their frequency, with intermittent surges connected to
the state of governance in individual states. Secondly, the causes of individual
coups, their triggers, actors and eventual consequences vary significantly
from one to the next. This has resulted in diverse domestic transitional
dynamics and management approaches to addressing the impact of coups
in countries.

The first coup wave was characterised by the overthrow

of liberation leaders whose political visions and ideological
orientations conflicted with major colonial powers

Regional and continental responses to coups have differed significantly.

For instance, the way the 2014 coup that unseated then-president Blaise
Compaóre in Burkina Faso was managed by the African Union differed
markedly from how the 2013 Egyptian event was approached. Similarly, the
recent spate of coups is being managed case by case. The third feature is
that each surge has usually resulted in a tightening of regional and continental
responses that has often contained the trend until another wave emerges.

As Africa still reels from a third surge since 2019, recourse is being made
to frameworks developed in response to previous waves. The three
characteristics, however, raise the question of whether the nature and forms
of coups have evolved from 1952 to the most recent occurrence in Gabon,
which deposed the decades-long Bongo dynasty. It is also important to
establish whether contemporary coups are different from earlier forms. SINCE 1952, AFRICA

100
HAS WITNESSED
Seven decades of disruption
The occurrence of coups in Africa over the last seven decades has been
related directly to the nature and evolution of politics and citizen responses.
This is due to the primacy of politics in the emergence and perpetuation of

35
SUCCESSFUL COUPS IN
the many variables that underlie grievances among citizens. Thus, the three
major waves of post-independence coups have differing primary motivations,
actor profiles and consequences, thereby defining the extent to which coups
have evolved over time.

The immediate post-independence political context generated the first coup COUNTRIES
wave, between the 1960s and 1970s. This era saw the overthrow of post-

ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 5

 independence liberation leaders whose political visions
and ideological orientations conflicted with the interests
of major colonial powers. This was compounded by
the leaders’ failure to meet citizens’ economic and
developmental aspirations. Given the intense superpower
rivalry during the Cold War and the emergence of
one-party states and dictatorships, a cocktail of issues
informed the actions of senior military officers.
These coups were generally bloody and saw the
death of 12 African leaders, extra-judicial killings and
widespread human rights abuses, particularly in West
Africa. Some coups were praised for truncating one-
party statism and life-long presidencies. The first wave
ultimately resulted in the first reordering of Africa’s post-
independence political landscape.
Following the failure of 1980s African leaders, mostly
military, to fulfil their promises, embrace democracy
and meet citizens’ socio-economic needs, a new wave
of coups emerged from 1990 to 2001. Although similar
in motivation to the first wave, this was led largely by
mid-level military officers who touted their escapades as
addressing economic mismanagement.
This wave, however, accounted for only 14% of leader
deaths and was characterised by a comparatively
significant reduction in the level of human rights
abuses associated with coups. Notwithstanding this,
it presented a major threat to the security of tenure of
many African leaders and threatened the democracy that
was unfolding on the continent.
Consequently, regional and continental norms were
tightened by the end of the decade, resulting in the
Algiers decision on unconstitutional changes of
government and the subsequent adoption of the 2000
Lomé Declaration. The former banned coup-makers
from attending Organisation of African Unity summits,
while the latter pronounced on UCGs, defining a zero-
tolerance policy against coups. The outcomes of these
responses, coupled with the spread of democracy,
significantly reduced coup numbers, ending the
second wave.
The third wave
Since 2021, Africa has experienced a third wave of
coups – in Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger
and Gabon – with generally different characteristics
from the coups of the previous decades. First, there
6 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
has been a shift in the motivation for coups. Some have
been over democratic backsliding concerns linked to the
manipulation of national constitutions for term extensions,
rigged electoral outcomes, deterioration of security and a
rise in anti-colonial sentiment.
The complexities of these issues and how they’ve
manifested have differed across countries. The coup-
makers in Niger, for instance, assert that they were
motivated by ‘the continuous deterioration of the security
situation and bad social and economic management’.
In Guinea, the junta slammed Alpha Conde for
‘mismanagement, corruption and bad governance’. While
some coups, particularly those in Guinea and Gabon, have
been framed as attempts to restore democracy, the actual
drivers and outcomes are more complex and varied.
Recent events in Guinea, Niger and Gabon have all been
led by elite presidential guards rather than the army. This
highlights the second feature of modern coups. This is due
mostly to coups having occurred in francophone African
countries where the army’s presidential guards protect the
presidency. They are often more armed and better trained
than the regular army.
Recent coups have been linked to
constitutional abuses, rigged elections
and rising anti-colonial sentiment
It is easier for them to use their proximity to the
presidency to take over power and then lobby for army
involvement. In Niger, for example, expectations that
the armed forces would quell the coup early faded
when army chief of staff Abdou Sidikou Issa announced
the army’s support for the ousting of then-president
Mohamed Bazoum. This reflects a dangerous, simmering
undercurrent of tensions originating from the politicisation
of the army and nepotism within army ranks blamed on
political elites.
Unlike previous waves, which were bloody and
characterised by wanton human rights abuses (figure on
page 7), recent occurrences have been ‘smart coups’.
They are largely bloodless, with fewer human rights
abuses. The reduction in the number of officeholder
deaths in the 1990s has continued.
Coups after this era have not seen officeholder executions
signalling that recent coups were carried out with
Chart 2: Coup-related leader deaths in Africa over time
6
Successful coups
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Leader survived
Source: Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne
restraint. Deposed leaders have often been held by the
junta for varied periods before release, under immense
international scrutiny and demands. In Niger, the fear of
what could happen to Bazoum limited the army’s role
in quashing the coup according to Sidikou Issa – the
Nigerien army feared endangering the president’s life.
While the international dimension of previous coups was
centred largely around the hidden hands of external
powers, recent coups have had an undertone of anti-
imperialist sentiment among citizens, mostly against
France. In Mali, this resulted in the expulsion of French
troops and similar agitations in Niger. Conversely, foreign
military elements such as Wagner Group and their use
to secure the country have increased after coups in Mali
and Burkina Faso, in particular, with similar expectations
in Niger.
Coup-makers have also resisted the implementation of
regional and continental norms against UCGs and, in
Niger, have shunned engagements with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Also
important is the ‘coup alliance’ among Gabon, Niger
and Burkina Faso based on solidarity and allegiance
towards one another. In the case of Niger, Burkina
Faso, Guinea and Mali pledged support for the junta
and threatened retaliation against proposed military
intervention by ECOWAS.
While these dynamics distinguish contemporary coups
from predecessors, the central role of political elites’
failure to meet citizen expectations and the governance
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Leader killed
deficit cannot be discounted as primary drivers. That fact
establishes the similarities between past and present
coups in that even though coups may have evolved, their
central governance imperatives remain the fulcrum around
which the evolution revolves. Thus, although the third
wave defines coups of a different kind, they are essentially
different shades of the same threat.
Implications for response
Given the evolving dynamics of coups in Africa and the
features of recent occurrences, the Peace and Security
Council (PSC) should advocate a comprehensive
review of existing frameworks to counter UCGs. This is
crucial to align responses with the changing dynamics
of contemporary coups. First would be the Lomé
Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance.
Dealing with the phenomenon, however, demands
a multifaceted approach that effectively tackles
the immediate challenges posed by coups and the
underlying governance issues that contribute to them.
The PSC’s inconsistencies and selective application
of continental norms in managing coups should be
addressed as these may undermine the moral authority
needed to respond to events.
The establishment of the PSC sanctions committee should
be prioritised as an important demonstration of political will
against coups on the continent. This will also strengthen
the African Union’s efforts to monitor suspended countries.
ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 7

FROM 2002 – 2023,
24
THERE WERE
ATTEMPTS TO AMEND
CONSTITUTIONS TO
EXTEND POLITICAL POWER
8 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
Constitutional coups predispose states to
military coups
Before its coup on 30 August 2023, Gabon underwent the ninth revision
of its 1991 constitution. Article 9 was amended to shorten the presidential
term from seven to five years and single-round voting was reinstated. This
enabled Ali Bongo to run for a third term. Many argued that the return to a
first-past-the-post electoral system was engineered to help the president
avoid a runoff with the increasingly fragmented opposition, which could not
agree on a challenger.
Despite strong opposition from civil society groups that believed that passing
the revision through a bill rather than a referendum violated the country’s
constitution, the change was upheld. It framed a contentious pre-electoral
political climate for Gabon’s 2023 presidential, parliamentary and legislative
elections. This was compounded by last-minute rules requiring voters to
‘select their presidential and parliamentary candidate from the same political
party’, internet shutdowns and a lack of observers.
The election outcome was marred by violence and allegations of rigging
but was declared in favour of President Bongo. Amid the ensuing tension,
Gabon’s army announced a coup, claiming that ‘the organisation of the
elections [held on August 26] did not meet the conditions for a transparent,
credible and inclusive ballot’.
This is not the first recent instance where constitutional tampering before
elections, often termed constitutional coups, has resulted in a UCG. The
overthrow of Guinea’s Alpha Conde by Colonel Doumbouya was also
preceded by heavily contested constitutional revision followed by a violently
contested election that gave President Conde a third term in office.
Against ongoing efforts to stem the tide of Africa’s third wave of coups, it is
important to establish whether constitutional manipulations have any bearing
on the emergence of complex political transitions or UCGs.
Manifestations of constitutional coups
Analysis of constitutional modifications in Africa from 2002 to 2023 reveals
that there were 24 attempts to amend constitutions to extend political
power. Of these, 19 were successful. This amounts to one attempt a year
over the last two decades of AU existence, with an approximate success
rate of 78%.
Modifications generally manifest in two ways. The first alters the duration of
term limits, by either increasing or decreasing the number of years. In the
April 2023 electoral modification in Gabon, the presidential term in office was
shortened from seven to five years, but in Guinea (2020) it was extended.
This constitutional change often precedes invocation of the principle of non-
retroactivity of the new law to allow incumbents to contest for office. In so
doing, they reset the clock of their stay in office and circumvent the spirit of
their constitutions to extend their stay.
Chart 3: Outcome of third- and unlimited-term agenda, 2002 to 2023
No. Country President then Date Outcome
1 Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika 2008, 2016 Successful
2 Benin Patrice Talon 2017 Failed
3 Burkina Faso Blaise Compaoré 2014 Failed
4 Burundi Pierre Nkurunzinza 2015, 2018 Successful
5 Cameroon Paul Biya 2008 Successful
Central African Republic Faustin-Archange Touadéra 2023 Successful
6 Chad Idriss Déby 2005; 2018 Successful
7 Congo Republic Denis Sassou Nguesso 2015 Successful
8 Comoros Azali Assoumane 2018 Successful
9 Democratic Republic of Congo Joseph Kabila 2016 Successful
10 Côte d’Ivoire Alassane Ouattara 2020 Successful
11 Djibouti Ismaïl Omar Guelleh 2010 Successful
12 Egypt Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 2019 Successful
13 Gabon Omar Bongo 2003 Successful
14 Guinea Lansana Conté 2020 Successful
15 Malawi Bakili Muluzi 2003 Failed
16 Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo 2006 Failed
17 Rwanda Paul Kagame 2015 Successful
18 Senegal Abdoulaye Wade 2012 Failed
19 South Sudan Salva Kiir 2015, 2018 Successful
20 Togo Gnassingbé Eyadema Faure Gnassingbé 2002 Successful
2015, 2019 Successful
21 Tunisia Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 2002 Successful
22 Tunisia Kais Saied 2022 Successful
23 Uganda Yoweri Museveni 2005, 2017 Successful
Source: adapted and updated from Kabele Matlosa, 2023

The second form is the complete removal of term or
age limits to allow incumbents to perpetually contest
elections. In most cases, this allows them to stay in office
continuously with the support of compromised electoral
institutions, heavy-handed security apparatus and an
unbalanced political landscape.
Many have argued that, even if contested, such
referendum-facilitated modifications raise questions
rather than condemnations. However, these modifications
are often orchestrated to serve the interests of the
incumbent, thus hardly undergo fair, free and transparent
referenda. Neither do they uphold national interests as
the prime objective – they go against the spirit of
constitutionalism and amount to manipulations or
coups frowned upon by the AU.
Article 23 (5) of the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance, refers to ‘any amendment
or revision of the constitution or legal instruments’
being an infringement on democratic change of
government principles. This, according to Article
23, constitutes an ‘illegal means of accessing or
maintaining power’ and, therefore, ‘an unconstitutional
change of government and shall draw appropriate
sanctions by the Union’.

ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 9


Article
23 (5)
OF ACDEG PROHIBITS ANY
ILLEGAL AMENDMENT
OR REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS AND
CONSIDERS IT A UCG
10 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
From constitutional meddling to military moves
A fundamental link between constitutional tampering and coups is the erosion
of citizen confidence in democratic norms. When leaders exploit constitutions
through third terms, multiple terms or the complete removal of term limits,
they break the political consensus governing power alternation. In captured
states, with electoral processes skewed in favour of incumbents, there is
no guarantee of changing such leaders through established constitutional
processes. This essentially undermines trust in the democratic process and
fuels discontent, often culminating in widespread protests.
The ongoing process to develop AU constitutional
amendment guidelines must be expedited
The search for alternative means of expressing discontent, usually through
protests, pits the incumbent against citizens, often resulting in a violent
crackdown on protesters and political activity. The resulting volatility or
discontent, whether it leads to a state of emergency or renders the country
ungovernable, opens the door for equally disgruntled elements of the military
to interfere in politics. Accordingly, they blame the dethroned leader for
mismanaging the country or the electoral processes over which they presided.
In Gabon, the perfect storm of issues reached a crescendo after the
discredited electoral process was declared in favour of Bongo. In Guinea,
the killing of 21 people during the unrest that followed the nation’s disputed
elections defined the cocktail of issues that triggered the military takeover.
Establishing a direct cause-and-effect relationship between constitutional
modifications and military coups is challenging. Therefore, the complexity
of issues triggered by constitutional coups creates pathways by which any
vulnerable political context is predisposed to interference by military actors.
Policy considerations for the PSC
To address coups in Africa, the PSC needs urgently to elevate constitutional
manipulations to the severity level of military coups. In most instances, these
actions provide the contextual backdrop, in conjunction with other factors, that
encourages coup-makers to forcibly intervene in the political landscape.
Considering the prevalence of constitutional amendments and the ease with
which they are manipulated, the PSC must call for the expedited completion of
the ongoing process to develop AU constitutional amendment guidelines. This
will serve as a blueprint for advancing and shaping progressive amendments.
Recognising the dangers of constitutional manipulations, any attempts flagged
by regional and continental early warning structures should immediately
prompt the PSC to act. It must trigger the use of the good offices of the
chairperson or commissioner of peace and security, special envoys and
members of the Panel of the Wise to address the issues with involved leaders.
Are civil-military relations spurring recent coups in West Africa?
In response to the first (1960s and 1970s) and
second waves (1980s and 1990s) of military coups in
Africa, the AU and the continent’s regional economic
communities and mechanisms established normative
frameworks to counter UCG. Efforts culminated in
the 2000 Lomé Declaration on UCGs, which ‘rejected
any unconstitutional change as an unacceptable
and anachronistic act’ that contradicts the AU’s
democratic norms.
ECOWAS established the Supplementary Protocol
on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), which
defined constitutional convergence principles. These
stipulated free, fair and transparent elections as the only
route to power.
After being in power, the military struggles
to become subordinate to civilian rule
and oversight
The continent also adopted a zero-tolerance
policy against power obtained or maintained by
unconstitutional means and demanded that armed
forces be apolitical and under legally constituted
political authorities. For instance, the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region promulgated
a similar protocol in 2006 to reinforce the norms
governing civil-military relations.
Despite these and other normative instruments, civilian
and military unconstitutionality has resurged, with dire
implications for implementing the African Governance
Architecture and the Peace and Security Architecture
(APSA). This has rekindled the debate about the
state of civil-military relations in Africa and their role
in instigating instability, including civil wars, violent
protests and coup d’états.
Is it all about military coups?
Civil-military relations (CMR) refers to the nature and
form of interactions among the armed forces, political
entities and citizens. In practice, however, it entails
balancing the need to create and maintain a military
establishment strong enough to protect the state but not
overthrow the government. In Africa’s fragile states and
democracies with weak institutions, CMR is crucial to
national security.
Two significant trends define Africa’s current challenges
with UCGs and CMR, reflecting a ‘third wave’ of coup
d’états that threaten to reverse democratic gains. The
first is UCGs perpetrated by the military. Since 2000,
Africa has witnessed 25 successful coups amid many
failed attempts.
Aside from the 14 successful coups, West African
states alone experienced 17 coup attempts and
plots, and significant constitutional crises in Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, Gambia, Guinea
and Senegal.
The second trend relates to democratically elected
leaders who engineer the national constitution to
extend their terms in office. In West Africa alone,
11 attempts have been made since 2003 to extend
presidential terms in seven countries. These were
Burkina Faso (2005 and 2014), Togo (2005 and
2015), Benin (2006, 2010 and 2019), Guinea (2020),
Côte d’Ivoire (2020), Senegal (2023) and The Gambia
(2020 to 2021). Apart from contradicting democratic
norms and processes, civilian incumbents, who
are commanders-in-chief, have adopted strategies,
including violence and constitutional manipulation, to
remain in power.
Civil-military frictions
Further to the numerous issues underlying frictions
in member states, including competition for control
over natural resources, unemployment, corruption and
defence procurement matters, tensions also arise from
the politicisation of national militaries and other security-
sector institutions.
Another pertinent challenge observed in recent coups
is the role of presidential guards inherited from the
French Republican Guard system. In francophone
countries, presidential guards are directly answerable
to and protect the presidency. Presidential guards have
instigated some of Africa’s recent coups, notably in
Niger (2010), Mali (2012), The Gambia (2014), Burkina
Faso (2015) and Gabon (2023).
ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 11
 These underscore the dilemma of abusing the assigned
functions of presidential guards that are maintained to
the detriment of the capabilities of regular armed forces
and security forces in preserving constitutional order. It
also stokes tensions between well-equipped presidential
guard regiments that do not usually participate in national
security operations, such as counter-insurgency, but are
very well equipped compared with the regular armed
forces that often endure most combat. It also blurs
the boundaries between civilian control and military
subordination, encouraging the politicisation of security
services with adverse consequences for national security
and regional stability.
Tensions have also emerged around political actors’
approaches to dealing with national security threats.
Examples are the presence of foreign powers such as
France in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Gabon, Russia’s
Wagner Group in Togo, the Central African Republic
(CAR) and elsewhere, and the United States (US) in
Burkina Faso and Niger. These are not only efforts by
weak states to outsource national security, but also part
of a calculated regime security measure.
The use of presidential guards encourages
the politicisation of security services with
adverse consequences
Since 2012, a series of intractable insurgencies appears
to have exacerbated CMR in Mali, Burkina Faso (2016
and 2022) and Niger (2023). In the first two, CMR
frictions arose from disagreements over the role of the
Wagner Group. In Niger, then-president Mohamed
Bazoum appears to have triggered Niger’s ‘military
grievance’ coup (26 July). This was prompted by the
April ‘sacking’ of General Salifou Mody, chief of staff
of Niger’s armed forces, for negotiating a ‘hot pursuit’
agreement with Mali.
Bazoum viewed this as an embarrassing violation of
ECOWAS sanctions against Mali. His second cardinal sin
might have been his investigation of the disappearance
of 50% of Niger’s defence budget (US$125 million) during
Mahamadou Issoufou’s administration (2011 to 2021).
A third was the attempt to restructure and downsize
the presidential guard (from about 2 000 to 700) and
scrutinise its budget.
12 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
Long periods of military rule undermine a culture of
military subordination to civilian rule and oversight.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea have experienced
extended military rule in the periods following
independence. Having tasted power, the military
struggles to adapt when political dynamics change
and it must again be subservient to civilian rule. This
catalogue of CMR irritations causes civilian clashes
with the armed forces, which perceive themselves
as guarantors of constitutional sanctity or national
security strategies, including tensions over alliances
with external powers.
Improving relations
The many civilian and military coups suggest
a vicious cycle of instability arising from weak
governance, corruption and human rights abuses
that perpetuate grievances and fuel rebellions and
other political violence.
To effectively stem this cycle and improve civil-military
relations, the AU PSC, regional organisations and
member states need to encourage member states
to enhance civilian oversight. This can be achieved
by strengthening the capacity and independence
of civilian institutions, including through budget
transparency and parliamentary oversight to ensure
transparency, accountability and adherence to
democratic principles within African armed forces.
Also important are promoting professionalism within
the military and emphasising the need to respect
civilian authority, human rights and international
humanitarian law.
PSC sessions can also serve as vehicles to
strengthen regional cooperation to actively promote
and monitor CMR and for member states to share
best practices and experiences around norms and
standards. PSC sessions should foster dialogue,
cooperation and education by creating regular
engagement and collaboration platforms on the
issues raised above.
Efforts to address civil-military challenges in Africa
require comprehensive approaches to strengthen
democratic institutions, promote good governance
and address the causes of socio-economic
disparities. This is preferable to the irrational, knee-jerk
military intervention projected in Niger in 2023 or the
misinformed call for an African counter-coup force.
Are foreign actors scapegoated in
Africa’s coups?
Following the 26 July Niger coup, the 1172nd PSC communiqué –
which suspended Niger from AU activities – strongly rejected external
interferences by any actor or country outside the continent in African peace
and security matters.
Even though internal issues have been the primary drivers of recent coups,
mounting concerns about the role of external actors have steadily gained
traction among African citizens. This is due largely to the rise in anti-Western
sentiment associated with recent military takeovers. The question, however,
remains whether external actors have played roles in recent increases in the
occurrence of coups.

Allegations and arguments

An examination of arguments about external footprints in Africa’s recent
coups indicates contrasting viewpoints. Some argue that political and military
interests and access to natural resources are major motivations for Western
interference in Africa, including removing leaders who stand in their way.
This camp associates the quest for strategic interests with the inconsistency
of foreign actors’ responses to coups. It highlights French endorsement
of the April 2021 military takeover in Chad, and its citing of ‘exceptional
circumstances’ and security reasons as an example.

The PSC 1172nd meeting which suspended Niger strongly

rejected external interference by any actor or country
outside the continent

The US and France condemned military takeovers of and suspended aid to

Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. However, they permitted militarised rule
in Chad because of its role in the fight against Islamist militants in the Sahel
and Lake Chad Basin. Chad is a key ally of France in its security strategy in
Africa, particularly its military campaign against Islamist groups in the two
regions.

The US also delayed using the coup label on Niger, neither applying
sanctions nor suspending assistance until two months following the coup
for similar geopolitical reasons. Meanwhile, the Russian private military
Wagner Group is reported to have thwarted a plot in the Central African
Republic, which in return guaranteed its continued presence and interest
in the country. In Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt
reportedly supported the military’s bid to hold onto power to enhance their
regional ambitions.

Relatedly, the failure of foreign actors’ approaches to security has led to

anti-Western sentiment that has been used by coup plotters to justify their

ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 13

 actions in the Sahel. The lack of its military success in
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has weakened France’s
credibility as a security partner and frayed relations with
its former colonies.
This has caused a concomitant rise in anti-French
sentiment among sections of the military elite to justify
the overthrow of leaders close to France. As this rhetoric
intensifies, Niger’s military regime has joined forces with
Mali and Burkina Faso to blame Paris for the Sahel’s
security crises.
More controversially, various reports have raised
questions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea about the
foreign military training of junta leaders. Colonel Assimi
Goïta, who led Mali’s 2020 and 2021 coups, received
training from the US, Russia, France and Germany.
Guinea’s Colonel Mamady Doumbouya led the 2021
coup, allegedly while receiving US military training.
Fuelling perceptions
Since it is common in Africa for military officers to be
trained by multiple countries abroad, efforts to link
military training to foreign manipulation, short of direct
evidence, have lacked substance. They, however,
bring into question the extent to which perceptions
can be fuelled by the association of coup-makers
with certain countries, whether through training or
professional closeness.
Beyond military interests, some have argued that the
need to access Africa’s natural resources is a key
driver of external influence in coups. Until its coup,
Niger had played a significant role in the security
architecture of the West, particularly in the US and
France, in the fight against armed insurgencies in the
Sahel region.
Although France has finally vacated the country,
its protracted refusal to do so following the coup
– citing the illegitimacy of the putschist regime
and ‘instrumentalised anti-Westernism’ – raised
questions in some policy circles about its motives,
given that it vacated Mali and Burkina Faso under
similar circumstances.
Certain observers contend that French reluctance
to leave despite sustained pressure to withdraw
diplomatically and militarily is attributable to the needs
for access to Niger’s uranium. This France requires for
14 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
its energy needs and to preserve its political hegemony
in the country.
Some Guineans raised questions about Washington
in their 2021 coup, citing American mining interests.
Analysts have also suggested that Gabon’s recent coup,
led by General Brice Oligui Nguema, was driven partly by
Ali Bongo’s slow shift away from Paris – symbolised by
Gabon’s joining of the Commonwealth.
They portrayed Bongo’s October 2022 meeting with
King Charles as widening the wedge between the
deposed leader and the French, who feared the United
Kingdom might be encroaching on its interests in Gabon.
Opposition leader Ondo Ossa – who was likely to
continue tilting away from Paris – believes the coup was
designed to prevent him from assuming office and to
maintain the Bongo family in power.
Scapegoating or genuine concern?
Others contend that whatever role external actors may
have played in recent coups is only an extension of
politics. They believe that this demonstrates that the
events were perpetrated to serve the economic and
political ambitions of certain African civilian and military
actors, which sometimes align with the interests of
foreign parties.
Hence, it is not illogical to imagine that the US, French
and other European actors will strive to maintain their
footprint in parts of the continent for ‘counterinsurgency’
operations. This is so even if it means backing and
working with military-led governments. In this context,
the recent coups can be seen as an extension of politics
by other means.
External players will strive to maintain
a continental footprint for
‘counterinsurgency’ operations
The recent uptick in takeovers can be explained by a
confluence of factors – oscillating between deteriorating
domestic dynamics and foreign influences. At the
core, these coups are a symptom of the chronic
misgovernance and insecurity dogging affected
countries. This manifests in weaknesses in the military
that translate to failure in addressing Islamist insurgency
(such as in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger).
They are also a direct consequence of fissures between civilian and military
governments over control of transitional governments. These were factors
behind the coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (January and September 2022)
and Niger (2023), and the attempted coups in Guinea-Bissau (2022) and The
Gambia (2022).

Additionally, elections deemed credible and democratic by international and

continental observers, although tarnished by opposition allegations of fraud
and anti-government protests, contributed to the coups in Mali (2018) and
Niger (2021). Deepening economic woes and autocratic moves including
political clientelism and constitutional manipulation were also factors in the
coup in Guinea.

This makes it difficult to place the blame wholly on external factors or actors.
However, it does not take away the valid concern of how external influences
impinge on Africa’s peace, security and governance landscape. Blaming
the recent uptick on external influences alone constitutes scapegoating and
detracts from the role of domestic factors and the agency of African leaders
in finding solutions to the myriad driving causes.

Policy implications
It is in the continent’s best interests to address factors that create an
environment conducive to external interference, rather than focusing on
external influence itself. With a holistic approach that addresses internal and
external factors, policymakers can better navigate the challenges associated
with coups and promote stability and democratic governance.

While addressing the failure to contain Islamist insurgencies, a rethink is

needed of Sahel and Lake Chad Basin security strategies given increasing
withdrawal of foreign security forces. A new security response framework
should be implemented that addresses the security void created by exiting
foreign actors. It should reshape the nature of engagement with parties with
foreign military presence across the continent. Simultaneously, the capacity
of regional and continental policymakers must be strengthened to monitor
and shape security partnerships across states.

Relatedly, the weakness of Sahel militaries and in continental and regional

counterinsurgency efforts underlines the urgent need for action. The AU and
regional economic communities must rally continental resources and lead the
coordination of counterinsurgency approaches in the Sahel and Lake Chad
Basin. Improved security in these regions could minimise the incidence of
coups. The importance of full deployment of the African Standby Force and
the establishment of its counter-terrorism unit cannot be overemphasised.

Domestically, addressing misgovernance and insecurity that trigger coups

in member states is crucial. Activating the anticipatory role of the PSC could
THE DEPLOYMENT OF
help revitalise an often-neglected dimension in coup containment, namely THE AFRICAN STANDBY
prevention. Popularising the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and FORCE COULD ALLEVIATE
Governance could also help entrench accountable governance and promote INSECURITY IN THE SAHEL
constitutionalism in member states.

ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 15

 Sanctions and suspensions not necessarily the solution
In response to the resurgence of UCGs, especially
coups, since 2019, the AU continues to use sanctions
against defaulting member states. It upholds its
normative frameworks and sanctions on UCG
predominantly through the use of suspension. Between
June 2019 and August 2023, the AU effected seven
suspensions. These were Sudan (June 2019 and
October 2021), Mali (August 2020), Guinea (September
2021), Burkina Faso (January 2022), Niger (August
2023) and Gabon (August 2023).
Two of the three affected regional economic communities
(RECs) – the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS) and ECOWAS – have taken similar steps.
ECCAS suspended Gabon recently, while ECOWAS
suspended Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso. In 67% of
recent coups, ECOWAS has exceeded suspensions to
impose economic sanctions.
Despite the impressive record of AU and REC sanctions,
the persistence of UCGs, coups particularly, raises
doubts about their effectiveness. There is a mounting
sense in policy circles that sanctions have failed to curb
coups and deter UCGs. However, determining whether
or not sanctions are effective requires assessing the
motivations for using them.
Motivations
AU and REC sanctions are motivated by the desire to
change the behaviours of defaulting member states
and promote collective norms. The AU, for instance,
sanctions states when they act counter to collective
financial and governance rules and for non-compliance
with decisions and policies.
Responding to UCGs, the AU has sought members’
compliance with democratic norms of its Constitutive
Act, PSC Protocol and African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance. Since 2003, the AU has
suspended all the coup countries mentioned above,
except Chad.
From a REC perspective, Articles 1 and 4 of the
ECOWAS Supplementary Act stipulate that the aim
of sanctions must be to prevent the non-respect or
non-application of acts of the authority and council of
ministers. Those include the ECOWAS (revised) treaty,
conventions, directives, protocols, supplementary acts
16 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT
and decisions. Article 4(3) of the Act addresses UCGs
specifically. It states that sanctions against member
states must seek to create conditions to restore normal
constitutional processes when imposed, for example,
following a breakdown in democracy.
Against this backdrop, ECOWAS has suspended three
of the four current coup countries, excluding Niger, and
imposed economic and administrative sanctions on
all as supplementary means to hasten their behaviour
change. ECCAS has justified the suspension of Gabon
by the need ‘to restore constitutional order swiftly’. In so
doing, it has reemployed a recurrent language in both
the AU and ECOWAS communiqués addressing coup
countries and aiming to foster compliance of de facto
authorities with democratic norms.
(In)Effectiveness of sanctions
From the 1960s to 2019, the AU consistently
implemented sanctions against UCGs, especially
coups, with evident success. Two waves of decline
were observed owing to its ‘zero tolerance of coups’
policy. From an average of 2.2 coups a year between
1960 and 1989, the number dropped to 1.6 in the
1990s and 0.8 between 2000 and 2019.
However, since 2019, the continent has experienced
a resurgence of coups. From 0.8, the average
number of coups in Africa reached 1.8 in 2023,
getting closer to the level of 1960 to 1989. This is
likely to increase, given that several African countries
are vulnerable to takeovers.
A trend in this third wave is that sanctions implemented
against Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso have not
prevented the repetition of coups there. Nor have they
deterred military unlawful assumption of power in
Guinea, Niger, Chad and Gabon. Several continental
and regional factors could explain this.
From the above, it is clear that AU and REC
responses to the current wave of UCGs have yet to
achieve the intended objective. Sanctions have failed
to change behaviour and deter disregard for
democratic norms.
This is particularly because, despite punitive measures,
several countries are yet to restore constitutional
order or revert to the status quo meaning that
coup-makers seem to drive transitional agendas. The
latest manifestation is the postponement of the February
2024 presidential elections in Mali. Whether the AU and
ECOWAS have been consulted remains unclear.
Reasons
As with the previous coup waves, the AU has stuck
to suspending defaulting member states. However,
inconsistencies in responding to the current coups and
other UCGs have prevailed. While it promptly suspended
Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Gabon, it hesitated to
act against Niger. Even though it did so ultimately, the
application of the rule was delayed, given the suspension
should have been immediate, in line with AU Constitutive
Act Article 30.
In Chad, the military assumed power instead of the
president of the national assembly as enshrined in the
Chadian 2018 constitution (Article 81). The AU’s response
was perplexing as it failed to define and treat the situation
as a UCG, hiding behind security risks.
The PSC must work with regional bodies
to ensure targeted sanctions that are
respectful to citizens
In addition, it kept silent while constitutional
manipulations occurred in Côte d’Ivoire (2016), Guinea
(2020), Gabon (2023), Rwanda (2023) and the CAR
(2023) for term extensions beyond constitutional limits.
Even though the unconstitutionality of such amendments
may be debated, the silence of the AU ran counter to the
2009 Ezulwini Framework on UCGs.
In line with Article ix of the framework, the AU should
have deployed preventive missions based on early
warning indicators when the events occurred. These
could have been fact-checking missions to determine
whether constitutional amendments could be
considered UCGs, at least to show seriousness about all
unconstitutional changes, not only military coups.
As the AU failed to treat the events equally, it
reinforced a sense of double standards among coup-
makers and citizens of countries where constitutional
manipulations occurred. Lack of firmness and
consistency in its treatment of coup countries has
undermined the AU’s legitimacy, diluted the deterrence
effect of sanctions implemented against previous
waves and fostered defiance among coup plotters in
Mali, Guinea and Niger.
ECOWAS, the most affected REC, has, in addition
to suspensions, implemented economic and
administrative sanctions against all coup countries in its
region. However, these have not changed behaviours
for two reasons. First, neighbouring countries
undermine imposed sanctions.
This was observed in Mali, where some regional
countries expressed reservations about ECOWAS’s
sanctions and enhanced cooperation with Malian de
facto authorities. Although ECOWAS decisions do not
apply to non-members, AU member states could have
supported such sanctions given that they adhered to
a continental norm of zero tolerance of UCGs, which
ECOWAS was attempting to preserve.
The second reason is ECOWAS economic
sanctions’ comprehensiveness and dire effects
on livelihoods in coup countries. This has fostered
popular aversion to the regional body and fertile
ground for citizens’ support to coup plotters in the
name of nationalism. Popular rejection of ECOWAS
measures in Mali (2020 and 2021), Guinea (2021)
and Niger (2023) are examples.
Implications
To respond robustly to the current coup wave, the PSC
should fix its inconsistencies to address all forms of
UCGs with equal seriousness and intensity. Doing so
requires thorough implementation of guidelines such as
the Ezulwini Framework and accelerating the activation
of the PSC Subcommittee on sanctions to monitor
measures implemented against defaulting states.
Regionally, the PSC, given its primary role in peace-
making, should ensure consistency and equal
treatment in regional bodies’ responses to UCGs.
It should also collaborate with regional bodies to
ensure sanctions are targeted and respectful to
citizens of affected countries. This would minimise
the popular rejection of sanctions and heighten the
chances of success for measures adopted during
crises. The Council should also secure neighbouring
countries’ support and ensure they promote
collective principles and norms instead of individual
strategic interests.
ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 17
 Ambassadorial views on UCGs

PSC Report sought the opinions of Council chairperson for September 2023, Ambassador Churchill
Ewumbue-Monono, about coups, their causes and the PSC’s stance.

Africa has experienced a notable uptick in coups
since the Chad crisis. To what extent does the PSC
acknowledge its role in this situation?
First, it is debatable whether the situation in Chad in April
2021 was a coup d’état. The PSC did not qualify it as
such after its informed field mission of May 2021. It is,
therefore, difficult to link Chad’s situation to subsequent
coups in Mali (June 2021), Guinea (September 2021),
Sudan (October 2021), Burkina Faso (January 2022),
Niger (July 2023) and Gabon (August 2023).
In fact, these countries witnessed coups several times
before April 2021, and, therefore, the causes are more
structural and deeply rooted in their national political
governance. I believe the causes of coups on the
continent must be addressed on a case by case basis.
Citizens perceive that the AU has faltered in
effectively responding to UCGs. Does the PSC
concur and how relevant are frameworks such as
the Lomé Declaration?
The AU’s response to UCGs is prescribed in a series of
normative instruments. These include the 2000 Lomé
Declaration, 2002 Constitutive Act of the African Union,
2002 PSC Protocol, 2007 African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Governance, 2009 Eswatini framework and
2022 Accra Declaration.
These instruments are usually complemented by
instruments of RECs and regional mechanisms when
responding to UCGs. The problem is that we are
dealing with independent, sovereign nations and
people. The AU is not a supranational organisation and
its instruments can be implemented only by negotiated
agreements with military regimes.
PSC responses to recent coups have included
‘carrot-and-stick’ measures. The carrot responses
include direct negotiations with the authorities of the
regions and mediations between special envoys and
representatives and military authorities to return to
constitutional order. They may also include providing
coup-affected countries with governance-related
assistance to manage transition.
The stick approach has been packaged through
condemnations, suspensions and sanctions. The
PSC has long been involved in policy development to
respond to UCGs. At its Eswatini retreat of December
2009, for instance, it adopted the Eswatini Framework
for the Enhancement of Measures of the African Union
in Situations of UCGs. On 27 January 2022, the Council
called for a brainstorming reflection forum with other
stakeholders on the problem.
The PSC respects states’ sovereignty
and independence, including the right to
amend constitutions
This took place in Accra, Ghana in March 2022 under
Lesotho chairship and led to the Accra Declaration on
UCGs in Africa. Finally, the PSC, under Cameroon’s
chairship, contributed to the 16th Extraordinary Summit
on Terrorism and UCGs in Malabo of May 2022. There it
presented its position on the issue, which was factored
into the Malabo Declaration.
However, I still think we need to review the Lomé
Declaration because of the changes in context and
new challenges. We need also to revive the PSC sub-
committee on UCG, which existed in the Organisation of
African Unity central organ between 1995 and 2002, to
provide a policy oversight mechanism on UCGs.
The principles of complementary and subsidiarity
appear to cause tensions between the AU and
RECs in the management of UCGs. Is this tension
real and, if so, how does the AU intend to navigate
and mitigate it?
The cooperation between the AU and RECs in managing
UCGs based on complementarity and subsidiarity has
been a mixed bag. Generally, the AU has relied on the

18 PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

comparative advantages of RECs in its response to individual cases. They
are distinct organisations with distinct legal personalities in international law.
Each has its statutes, instruments and principles. RECs are not subordinate
to the AU but are partner organisations. Their relations are based on
negotiation, cooperation, collaboration and coordination with the AU.

It is hoped that ongoing AU institutional reforms will create a more

conducive framework for collaboration and coordination. This
is notwithstanding AU and REC joint mediation and fact-finding
missions using joint high-level representatives and special envoys.
They have also cooperated through co-mediators and have been
involved in joint cooperation arrangements to provide assistance to
countries restoring constitutionalism.

It is suggested that PSC sanctions against UCGs may have lost

their deterrent effect. How will the PSC counter this?

A major outcome of the extraordinary summit in Malabo was the creation

of an AU ministerial committee on sanctions. The PSC Committee of
Experts and the AU Commission are currently working on the mandate,
composition and functioning of the committee, to be presented to the
policy organs.

It is hoped that this new mechanism will provide policy oversight and
develop strategies to restore and strengthen PSC capabilities. But as I
stated earlier, it is necessary to revive the sub-committee on UCGs that
existed between 1995 and 2002, to endow the Council with a policy and
oversight mechanism. It is due to this structure that we have, for instance,
the Lomé Declaration.

Many have argued that the focus on coups neglects major

constitutional precursors to their occurrence. How is the PSC
dealing with constitutional manipulations on the continent?

Constitutionalism is a recurring theme in the PSC indicative annual work

programme. Moreover the PSC engages annually with AU governance
institutions such as the Peace and Security Department, the African Peer
Review Mechanism and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights. Since August 2022, the PSC has also interacted with all members
of the African Governance Architecture platform through the Permanent
Representatives Committee Sub-committee on Human Rights, Democracy
and Governance.

The PSC respects the sovereignty and independence of AU member

states, including their right to amend their constitutions according to
their laws. It also acknowledges that AU member states have the right to
their own political systems and usually condemns foreign intervention in
African crises. REVIVING THE OAU’S
SUB-COMMITTEE ON UCG
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, no item on constitutional manipulation COULD PROVIDE A POLICY
in a member state has been tabled since 2004. The Council cannot OVERSIGHT MECHANISM
deliberate and decide on an issue not tabled on its agenda.

ISSUE 161 | SEPTEMBER 2023 19

About the PSC Report
The Peace and Security Council Report analyses developments and decisions at the African Union
Peace and Security Council (PSC). The monthly publication is the only one of its kind dedicated to
providing current analysis of the PSC’s work. It is written by a team of ISS analysts in Addis Ababa.

About the ISS

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Contributors to this issue

Maram Mahdi, Researcher, ISS Addis Ababa
Moussa Soumahoro, Researcher, ISS Addis Ababa
Hubert Kinkoh, Researcher, ISS Addis Ababa
Andrews Atta-Asamoah, African Peace, Security and Governance Programme Head, ISS Addis Ababa
Festus Aboagaye, Executive Director, Ulinzi Africa Resources
Issaka Souaré, Regional Adviser, ISS Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin

Contact
Maram Mahdi
ISS Researcher
ISS Addis Ababa
Email: mmahdi@issafrica.org

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