Introduction

Turkey is one of the examples that belong to a group of democratic states where the state
predominates but it allows, too, the military to play an important role in domestic politics.
1
Additionally, in public side, the military ranks first in any public opinion poll of most
2
respected institution in the country. The career officers are viewed quite positively and
treated with much respect.3 The reason behind these, of course, may lay on very different
realities, nevertheless, Jenkins’ argument toward this issue points out a powerful reality which
could be explained historically too. According to him, the military is the institution in which
the Turkish society can take a “justified pride”, particularly, when one considers the fact that
there are high suspicious feelings towards west. 4
The Turkish military, along with that reality, recognizes itself not only guarantee of
domestic stability and the guardian of the official ideology; Kemalism, but also a soul of
Turkish nation as well.5 The institution is not self appointed at all. It has a popular mandate,
which is expected; also, restore order from the chaos created by inexpert and corrupt civilian
government. 6 There is, therefore, mutually constructed military perception in whole society,
including civics and the military.
In this paper we discuss civil military relations by considering the political autonomy
of the military by taking the definition of political autonomy which of Cizre. Political
autonomy, according to Cizre, is the “ability to go above and beyond the constitutional
authority of democratically elected governments, can have not only direct but also indirect
influences on the government”.7 Accordingly, Military autonomy is considered by Cizre into
two levels; one is institutional autonomy, corresponding to structural properties, and second is
political autonomy, pertaining to political goals and influences. The former holds a defensive
goal against unwanted interference by outsiders. The latter involves both an ideological and a
1
Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East”, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 1 (Spring, 2000): 68
2
Gareth Jenkins, Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, International Affairs
, Vol. 83, No.2 (2007): 239
3
Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East”, 71
4
Gareth Jenkins , “Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics”, (New York : Oxford
University press, 2001), 13
5
Jenkins, Continuity and Change, p.339-340
6
Gareth Jenkins , “Context and Circumstance”, 18
7
Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military” , Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2
(January, 1997),153

1
behavioral dimension, which is representing the military's hatred toward, or even
disobedience of civilian control.8 By taking the latter, we discuss the relations by considering
historical, societal and political dimensions of the issue and then we explain the mechanisms,
respectively; formal and informal that led to the political autonomy of the military in Turkey .9
Then, we focus on the developments in civil military relations in a European Union’s
perspective.
Before to start, it should be noted that the autonomous position of the army could be
seen in various armies, however, after end of the cold war (with decreasing threat of war)
particularly, democratic control of the armies turned into a rule that many countries obey but
10
not Turkey. The most significant features of the military’s political autonomy to describe
situation in Turkey is the acceptance of the legitimacy of both democracy and civilian rule
and it asserted its power through medium of the army rather than by penetrating civilian
institutions.11 The political autonomy of Turkish military is achieved in two methods,
respectively, applications of the constitutional powers accorded to the military after each past
intervention, and the ultimate justification of the military’s actions since the fact that accept
the military as a guardian of the national interest as a consequence of the all societal,
historical and political dimensions of the issue. 12

Role of military in the historical context:

8
Ibid.,154
9
Umit Cizre, Egemen ideoloji ve Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, Kavramsal ve İlişkisel Bir Analiz, in Bir zümre, Bir
Parti Türkiye’de Ordu, ed. Ahmet İnsel- Ali Bayramoğlu (İstanbul: Birikim Yayıncılık, 2009), 139
10
Ibid.,138
11
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 153
12
Ibid.,154

2
 13
Historically, the army is oldest social institution in Turkey. Notion of soldier has taken its
own significance from the very beginning of the existence of context of being Turk. The first
appearance in the historical records of "Turks" was raiding nomads and mercenaries from
Central Asia; this was, actually, army rather than a nation. 14 The army in Ottoman period was
before anything else, it was formed and empowered itself through conquest. It occupied
highest place in the traditional social institution. Consequently, one of the first pillars among
the four estates was respectively; the military, the learned, the merchants and the peasants. 15
Janissaries who were selected by the Christian population were, too, in significant position in
the whole sultanate and the bureaucracy stood. Soldiers, Janissaries has links with society by
having important social and political roles, however, the specific conditions of time
16
terminated this conditions and soldiers has associate directly with state and status quo. It
should be noted that it was not an institution but rather had martial values and virtues.
Actually, in this period, conscription was deeply unpopular and poses a constant problem.
Jenkins
During the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire was in final stage, the military was
willing to form western modern state. These enthusiasm were not only consist of forming
western military theories and technology, but also the establishing the first secular schools for
Muslim, publishing the first-ever Turkish grammar even encouraging the simplification of the
Turkish script which led eventually to the adoption of the alphabet. 17

 The Army, Ataturk, Republican Period & Kemalism

The army, without doubt, has a huge role in foundation of republic and the reconfiguration of
the official nationalism in Turkey.18 In fact, the army presents itself as a carrier of the Turkish
national identity from to Seljuk Empire to today. Indeed this interpretation of the army is one
of the clearest examples of nation-military understanding. Through military interventions the
reconfiguration of the nationalism incrementally centralized19.

13
Kemal H. Karpat, “The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio- Cultural Analysis of a Revolution”
in the American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 6 (October, 1970), 1656
14
Gareth Jenkins, “Context and Circumstance”, 10
15
Karpat, “The Military and Politics in Turkey”, 1656
16
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 155
17
Gareth Jenkins, “Context and Circumstance”, 10
18
Umit Cizre, “Egemen Ideoloji ve Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri”, 164
19
Ibid., 169-72

3
 During the very early years of the republic, Ataturk not only sought to create a secular, to
homogenize nation state, but also he enthusiastically encouraged the identification between
the nation and it’s military. In fact, this was introduction of military legacy through various
means. For instance, after the republic was founded, concept of military-nation inculcated
through educational system. School children learned in schools that they were born as soldier
and they are part of army as well. The inculcation of compulsory military service, as well, in
1927 showed another representation of this idea. 20 The reflection of this is still seen today.
For instance, 1995 high school National Security Knowledge textbook dictates students
“military service, the most sacred service to the nation and the homeland, prepares young
people for the real life situations. A person who does not participate in military service is not
good to himself, to his family, or to his family. 21 It is noteworthy to add that military service
also assumes an educational and civilizing role. 22 Besides, it has a function to give a national
conscience during the republican period. 23
Jenkins’ argument that Ataturk had been influenced by the ideas of General Colmar
Freihher von der Goltz who is the German general appointed to restructure and revitalize the
ottoman officer corps in the 19th century is very meaningful to mention here to understand the
mentality which brought up to today in name of army’s perception itself. Since, his writing
was recommended reading for all Ottoman Military and it was calling for soldiers to play an
active role in reshaping society and regarded the military as a soul of nation. 24
When Ataturk found the Republican People’s party (RRP), he emphasized the people
from the military should resign and the military obeyed the rule. However, this does not
necessarily mean that they also left their military understanding into governmental level. 25
Besides, existence of both Fevzi and Ismet Pasha in the government and of the Erkan-I
Umumiye Reisi showed that this rule is vague.26 By posing example of the military nation
state Ataturk launched a huge military authority to inaugurate a huge number of reforms to
modernize the nation towards western style and homogenous, to do so, this reformers did not
hesitate to use the military as one of the main instruments. 27This was very example of the

20
Jenkins, “Continuity and Change”, 340
21
Ayse Gul Altınay, “Becoming a Citizen” in the Myth of the Military-Nation militarism, Gender, and Education
in Turkey, (Newyork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 70
22
Jenkins, “Continuity and Change”, p. 340
23
Cizre, “Egemen İdeoloji ve Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri”, 166
24
Jenkins, “Continuity and Change”, 340
25
Jenkins, “context and circumstances”,
26
Cizre, “Egemen İdeoloji ve Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri”, 141
27
Jenkins, “Context and Circumstances” ; Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations
in the Middle East”, 72

4
 28
reflection of the seeing the war of liberation and Ataturk’s reforms were a whole. Even
during the presidency of Ismet Inonu, the military was still considered to be the vital prop for
the Republican regime29
It is important to note that the institutional separation of the military from politics in
the early republic was not intended to establish civilian supremacy as in Western Europe and
America. Its only aim was to preclude the military's growth potential as a rival source of
power to the ruling group. Therefore, in the course of Turkish political development it was
necessary for the military to constitute a political front which claimed to be anti-political. This
character of the military give its motivation to confront reactionary Islam, ethnic
secessionism, and, with the emergence of left-wing ideologies, namely Communism. Political
power throughout the republic has always resided in the barrel of a gun, although to differing
degrees at different junctures. (kim?)
As regard to Kemalism, which is an ideology came to scene after Ataturk, is a project
of politically constructing and manipulating a modern Turkish nation state on secular and
western rather than Islamic principles. This ideology became very important task for the
military to protect it and penetrate into society. 30 Kemalism, in other words the official
ideology in Turkey has give a huge role to the army specifically Turkish armed forces (TAF),
in name of official ideology they could dictate who will rule the country and how they will do
it. The interventions, coup d’états are obvious examples of this perception of the military.
However it does not mean that all interventions are in the same directions. They all, indeed,
gave different meaning to official ideology.31
All in all, Turkish army found the republic and subsequently modernized it in lines
with west. This reality turned into a mission for the military to preserve nation, a political
32
symbol of the nationhood. This, in turn, both affected perceptions of the military to itself
and its anxiety about some phenomenon and events as we will describe below.
Beginning in the early 1950s, by time Ataturk and most of his original associates had
left the scene, the Turkish military assumed the mission of protecting the republic from
unruly, irrational civilian politicians. During the intervening years, this self-ascribed mission
is seen and as Amos Perlmutter states, the army showed itself as an "arbitrator army” in which
it is willing to return to the barracks once disputes are settled. Hence, the army does not seek

28
Jenkins, “Continuity and Change”, 16
29
Jenkins, Context and Circumstances; Kamrava “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in
the Middle East”, 72
30
Sakalllioglu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy”, 153-154
31
Cizre, “Egemen İdeoloji ve Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri”, 136
32
Sakalllioglu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 153

5
to maximize army rule and is instead interested in improving it power in a way that it will
operate as a pressure group from behind the scenes. All three examples of direct military rule
were preceded by intense periods of political instability and partisan power struggle. With
each intervention, as we will discuss in detail below, the military has sought to further
institutionalize by enchasing its role in succeeding democratic regime and has continued to be
act as a guardian, and an arbitrator. 33

The Social and Cultural Context:

The military has all cultural characteristics of the society that it manifests these
characteristics, and that it too serves these characteristics through the education. 34 Turkish
society demonstrates characteristics which are rather hierarchical, patriarchal and
authoritarian while emphasizing on collective rather than individual rights and values. The
communal integrity, like in the family, local community or the nation takes precedence over
individual rights and freedoms. The personal relations within the system are based on loyalty
and patronage and to abeyance to the authority. Hierarchy, in this sense, has huge meaning in
Turkey. In the Turkish education, too, these characteristics combined with the context of
“nation and military”, particularly the teaching of history full of military achievements, heroes
of war in a way that deploys into national values and the essence of Turkishness. The army is
seen as a protector of independence and integrity of the country, national unity and guarantee
of the people’s future as well.35 The very early example of the Military Duty (Askerlik
Vazifesi) which is part of Civilized knowledge for the Citizen published in 1930 by the
ministry of education, with Afet Inan, for use in the military course in secondary and high
schools. The book basically calls every citizen to participate in the country’s defense.
As regard to bond between the military and the public is developed by military service
which is seen as a holy duty and the post you could get title of ‘martyrs’. Indeed for the many
people in Turkey the military service remains one of the rites to route into manhood. 36
As Karpat (1970) states, Turkish military named itself as a planner and justifier of the
political action through norms and stereotypes borrowed from family and society, books,
mass media, education, personal knowledge and experience, social or professional group and
its ethics. The identification of the military in these directions has been shaped by the history
33
Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East”, 73; Ergun Ozbudun,
“ The Military in Politics”, Contemporary Turkish Politics, 105
34
Altinay,”Introduction”, in the Myth of the Military Nation, 1
35
Jenkins.”Continuity and Change”,11- 12
36
Ibid.,13

6
and social and political mores of the army as well as duty toward the nation and the state,
reform and modernity.37
We discuss in the following section (informal mechanism) the effects of the socio-
cultural context once again to explain how this context functions into informal mechanism.

Political Context

The Turkish political culture, too, reflects social characteristics of the Turkish society even if
the theoretically Turkey experienced the democracy for 60 years. The loyalty, patronage and
authoritarian tendency of the society show itself in politics. Political parties in this regard are
rather similar to clans which needs to a single charismatic individual leader rather than
institutionalized organizations. 38
The system of political parties, which has witnessed unstable periods in the history of
republic, brings to Turkish nation a trust on army. The lack of confidence in politicians and
the political process helped to armed forces to raise its own prestige and “right” to engage in
politics. Approval of coups by the majority of Turkish public and even the very advocators of
democracy, like TUSIAD, are the significant demonstrators of the relations of military and the
public. 39

The Perceptions of the Security Environment

As we mentioned in the historical context military see itself as a guardian of the nation and
Kemalism as well. Nonetheless, the fact that this is not the only military’s perception of its
own role; this is also part of the public perception towards security.
Popular support for the military is also strengthened by the security perceptions of the
security environment of the country; which is perceived as internal and external threats. The
fear of that other countries planning to divide or acquire Turkish territory and believe in that
the some are seeking to change the constitutional status quo are main perception of the
military’s role. Externally, Sèvres Syndrome which was designed to allocate large territories
of Turkey to Greece, Armenia, Italy and France and the ultimate creation of an independent
Kurdish state; internally, Kurdish nationalism and a resurgent Islamic movement are is worth

37
Karpat, “The Military and Politics in Turkey”, 1655
38
Jenkins, “Continuity and Change” 14-17
39
Ibid., 16-17

7
to bring up here. Additionally, Kemalism, which is also integrated with the state itself, is to be
and ought to be a something protected by army. 40
Additionally, the civilian world, according to the military, is full of its praetorians,
instability, inefficacy, and careerism, and populism, lack of prudence, corruption, and
irresponsibility. The military standards produce an impasse for the regime by conceiving the
articulation and mediation of interests and resolution of conflicts by political parties and
interest groups as disruptive. It is contrary indeed that existence of a politically powerful
military that conceives democracy as "a means of preserving and promoting the state" to
promote a democratic impulse since democracy can take root by the independent growth of
the civil mechanisms of conflict management. 41
These all threat perceptions of the military and public have assumed give a role to
military to involve in politics. Bole bir arguman bulunmalı, referans… !!! Besides the
incorporation into the constitution such perceptions by referencing some values such as the
territorial integrity, national sovereignty, secularism which is highly cherished by the military
has given the tutelary power to the military. As a result, many provisions of the 1982 Turkish
constitution prepared by a military dominated Constituent Assembly referred to territorial and
national integrity of the state and to the modernizing reforms of Ataturk.42
In the following section we will investigate the coup d’états that Turkey experienced
by focusing on how military gain or increased its power in the institutional by this aim we
named our sections as institutional (formal) mechanisms of the military to seize its power into
politics, and into the administration of Turkey.

Institutional Mechanisms

As we already implied previous paragraphs, the military's institutional raison d’être is to

preserve its integrity, unity, and modernity. 43 The one of the important way for the military to
realize this aim is to use institutional mechanism which is also directly related with the
political autonomy of the military. Before we start it should be noted that this section will be
analyzed through 7 subtitles; respectively General Staff, National Security Council,

40
Ibid., 16-17,39
41
Sakalllioglu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 156
42
Ergun Ozbudun, “ The Military in Politics”, 106-107
43
Ibid., 152

8
The Presidency, military budgets, arms production, procurement, and military, modernization,
internal security and intelligence gathering, senior promotions. All these sections would
include historical background as well.

 General Staff

The Turkish army's pervasive influence throughout the political system is also
exercised through the organization of its relations to the government. Even though Turkey has
a single ministry of defense, rather than separate branch ministries, there is no complete
civilian control over the military. 44 To investigate relations of TAF with the government in
this sense is indispensable part of our paper.
In the first place, between the years of 1923- 1927 the military was turned into a
significant mean to unify all the groups in the parliament in way that it founded a control
mechanism. During this era the civil military relations consolidated as continuity of war
administration model. This led, in the end, the approval of military in governmental issues is
become a mean to legitimate government’s policies, and to be controlled by military is seen as
45
a part of the administration. This period witnessed three main mechanisms which were
created different models than before and than western military configuration. To understand
the structure of the military it is necessary to emphasize these three mechanisms here.
Erkan-i Harbiye-i Ummumiye regulations which introduced generals and military
officer in place of regional front military, created also centralization by posing a rule that new
officers had to present its reports to chief of the Erkan-i Harbiye-i Ummumiye. This led to
increase in hierarchy among military service by showing the understanding of continuity
national independence war and extreme centralization in those years. In this time, however,
the regulation did not directed against “war”, but “struggle in domestic politics”. 46
The second regulation, in this regard, was the foundation of Erkan-i Harbiye-i
Umumiye Risayeti in place of Erkan-i Harbiye-i Ummumiye which give the post to an
independent status. By doing so, the law did not mention any responsibility or dependency
mechanism. Hence the Turkish Armed Forces were not bounded to any post. The appointment
of the chair of Erkan-i Harbiye-i Umumiye Risayeti by the president was not a demonstration
of president power since the fact that the president was not accountable to any post. It should
be noteworthy to mention that this institution had a huge authority. The defense ministry, for
44
Sakalllioglu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”,
45
Kitap Türkçe
46
Kitap Türkçe 65-66

9
instance, was as a buffer between the parliament and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), by letting
TAF to enjoy its authorities and impede any control mechanism to TAF. This mechanism,
particularly putting emphasizes on individual chair, led the military’s authority in a
strengthened position and would augment its power in future. Briefly, this centralization
process in the army led to consider and control beyond its issues and deal with politics from
education to economy. 47
Thirdly, dated 26 February 1925 Ali Askeri Şura Kanunu, in defense matters, raised
military’s power towards civilian issues by giving a power to negotiate in civil, financial and
martial. In this respect, this law prepared unchangeable principles of Askeri Şura. 48
Accordingly, under the 1961 both the de jure and de facto autonomy of the General
Staff were increased by making it directly answerable to the prime minister rather than the
defense Ministry; which were reversed before by Adnan Menderes, who was the former prime
minister before the coup. 49
As regard to General chief of Staff, his position is above the minister of defense and he
is appointed by the president from the generals who were formerly commanders of the land
forces, upon nomination by the council of ministers. The position of the Turkish general chief
of staff, briefly, has experienced three stages. In 1924 it was subjected to the prime minister;
in 1949 it was placed under the control of the minister of defense. 50 It should be noted that
years of 1944-1960, particularly since beginning of the multi period in 1946 civil authority
rather than directly challenge to military power itself in constitutional democratic standards
51
and norms, tried to subordinate military position in the system. With the 1961 Constitution
the chief of the general staff’s status was established, however, the constitution fails to define
to whom the chief of the general staff is responsible, while he conducts his duties 52. Later, two
laws passed in 1970 specified the duties of the minister of defense and general chief of staff.
The general chief of staff obtained autonomy in determining defense policy, the military
budget, future weapons systems, production and procurement of arms, intelligence gathering,
internal security, and all promotions. In time of war, under the 1982 constitution, the general
chief of staff exercises the duties of commander-in-chief on behalf of the president of the
republic. The function of the general chief of staff is to plan military policy and undertake the
functions of command. As specified by Article 117, the chief of the general staff works

47
Kitap Türkçe 67
48
Kitap Türkçe 71
49
Jenkins, “Continuity and Change”, 341-342
50
?
51
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 155
52
Cizre p.?; Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu p. 70,

10
closely with the Ministry of National Defense, however, he is accountable to the prime
minister not to the minister of national defense.53
The ability of the general chief of staff to influence the civilian bureaucracy, as Cizre
states (1997), is facilitated by the lack of career civil servants specializing in military affairs
that could provide a buffer between the military and society.54

 National Security Council

The Higher Defense Council (Yüksek Müdafaa Meclisi, YMM), founded on 24 April 1933,
was a predecessor of the current National Security Council. The YMM was organized under
the chairmanship of the prime minister, or the president if he wished, with the participation of
the chief of the general staff and the members of the council of ministers. Its activities were
regulated by decree and its mission was defined as ‘developing and coordinating the national
security policy of the state of the Turkish Republic.’ The YMM was later replaced by the
National Defense Higher Council (Milli Savunma Yüksek Kurulu, MSYK), which was
founded on 3 June 1949, consisted of the prime minister as chairman, ministers proposed by
the prime minister and elected by the cabinet, the minister of defense, the chief of the general
staff, and the president. With the council of ministers decree of 1 July 1949, the following
ministers became council members: internal affairs, foreign affairs, finance, public works,
economy, commerce, transportation, and agriculture and enterprises. The commander of the
Turkish Armed Forces according to same decree would only be a member of the council in
times of war. The MSYK was responsible to arrange the National Defense Policy for the
government, to define the national defense duties and missions that are to be execute by
governmental organizations, private institutions and enterprises, citizens, and to prepare the
Total National Mobility Plan in times of peace and to ensure its full application whenever it is
needed.’55
In the 1961 constitution also the MSYK was transformed into a National Security
Council (NSC), comprising leading members of the civilian government and the high
command of the Turkish General Staff (i.e. chief of general staff and representatives of the
forces; the army, navy, and air) which would serve by that day as an advisory body to the
53
Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, Turkish Armed Forces in Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector in
Turkey: 2005/2006 Status Report p. 70
54
Cizre p.?; Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu p. 70,
55
Gencer Ozcan, “National Security Council’ in the Democratic Oversight and Reform of the Security Sector”
retrieved May, 2, 2010, from
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=47643&nav1=5

11
Council of Ministers, under Article 111. 56 The NSC which became a constitutional
organization was seen at this period in many NATO countries, was aiming to solve
coordination problems during the war and to fulfill all the necessities of defense in peace
period. Nevertheless, the NSC’s applications rather tend to deal with state and politics and
share state authority with the politicians. Thus the NSC consisted with mixture of civil and
military authorities (e.g. the prime minister, minister of state and vice prime minister,
ministers of national defense, domestic affairs, finance, labor and of transport and Chief of
57
General Staff, representatives of navy, land , and air forces. In brief, the NSC’s mission is
to ‘declare the necessary basic concepts concerning national security to the cabinet, and to
support in the decision-making process, and to provide coordination.’ 58
Besides, The NSC, as in the years of 1962 and 1971 focused on domestic
developments. The NSC during these years, dealt with amnesty of Justice Party, controlled
Democratic Party. The NSC demanded change of the constitution. All these demands and
interventions associated with the national security and later led to 1971 intervention. 59
Following the Memorandum of 12 March, Article 111 was amended on 20 September
1971, in a way that the members should be the ‘commanding officers of the army’ instead of
‘representatives of a range of armed forces.’ 60 This was the declaration of a national security
fields are in the control of the NSC. Between years of 1971-1973 the executive power of the
institutions raised with constitutional amendments. Hence the NSC became a mean and a
center for military to run politics, to control its execution and to plan fundamental
constitutional amendments and the macro politics. 61 In addition; the council would ‘give
advice on the necessary basic concepts. The NSC’s decisions were, thus, strengthened and
took the form of ‘recommendations.’ 62
Under the 1982 constitution its position was enhanced: its recommendations would be
63
given priority consideration by the council of ministers. To explain EU perceptive towards
the Turkish military the situation post coup of 80 respects to the NSC in a more coherencies
way we will discuss it in subsequent paragraphs.

56
Ibid ; Jenkins, Continuity and Change, 341-342; Jenkins, “Context and Circumstances” ,45; Ozbudun
“Military in Politics”, 107
57
Kitap Türkçe 78
58
Gencer Ozcan “National Security Council”
59
Kitap Türkçe 79
60
Gencer Ozcan “National Security Council”
61
Hale Akay, Tesev Demokratikleşme programı Siyasa Raporları Serisi, Türkiye’de Güvenlik Sektörü: Sorular,
Sorunlar, Çözümler, p. 9-10
62
Gencer Ozcan “National Security Council”
63
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 157

12
 It should be emphasize that the 1961 constitution and the 1973 constitutional
amendments had already created a double-headed political system: the civilian council of
ministers coexisted with the national Security Council on the executive level, and the military
64
system of justice continued to operate independently alongside the civilian justice system. .
to be more clear about the double-headed political system; the NSC is more decisive decision
making role, the council of ministers is more decisive in legislative decision making body
than the NSC.65 A new system of criminal courts, called the state security courts, was founded
after 1980. Trying cases involving the security of the state, they were yet another blow to the
principle of an independent judiciary because of the political manner in which the new courts'
members were appointed. 66
To sum up National Security Council (NSC) In the last two decades the military has
not only gained more strength vis-à-vis civilian actors, but by participating in the civilian
authorities' decision-making process has also begun to extend its authority over areas that
were traditionally under civilian control. Since military authority has been extended through
constitutional (legal channels), some interpreted it as a division of responsibilities with
civilians to develop a more harmonious cooperation than existed before 1980. According to
Cizre, the military has consolidated its political hegemony more deeply. The NSC establishes
in the last two decades the most decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making,
the other is council of ministers. The concrete decisions of the council cover an unprecedented
spectrum: determining the curriculum in schools; regulating television stations' broadcasting
hours; abolishing the penal immunity of members of parliament from the (Kurdish)
Democracy Party; closing down certain prisons and television stations; making bureaucratic
appointments of the ministry of public works in the southeast; postponing the termination date
of military service for current conscripts; suggesting the formation of electoral alignments
between political parties before the March 27, 1994, local election; stating the substance of
the laws on terror and capital punishment; and offering Arabic as an elective subject in
67
secondary schools. Hence, the importance of the NSC is that the military used it to
institutionalize its oversight in politics.68

64
Ibid., ?
65
Linda Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command in the Seventh Harmonization
Package and its Ramifications for Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, (March,
2007): 31
66
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”,
67
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, ?
68
Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command”, 31

13
 Before to start other mechanisms that has given to military its power in involving civil
issues, it better to discuss now the centers, group, and the documents within General Staff and
the NSC to get a comprehensive picture about the power of military by considering their
effects on foreign policy issues in institutional respect.

o Centers and Groups within General Staff and the NSC

Centers, working groups, committees are established within the General Staff as we
see in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
For instance, Greece, Cyprus department is to investigate relations with Greece and
Cyprus, Trust (Güven) working group is to investigate problems on the national intelligence
security, Barbaros working group is to surveillance missile deployment in the neighboring
countries which was, indeed, responsible for searching missile deployments in Cyprus.
European Union working group after Turkey had declared its candidacy to the EU.
69
Additionally Caucasia working group was established to search developments in the region.
To monitor the increasing threat envisaged in Islamic Fundamentalism, a new working group
called as Western Study Group was formed alongside the Prime Ministerial Crisis
management Center within NCS. These groups theoretically should have been responsible to
the prime minister it was answerable to the NSC. For Heath Lowry, the real policy objectives
are being generated by the TGS and its various working groups and task forces demonstrates
70
such informal mechanism too. In 2003, after Western Study Group was closed, Republish
Working Group within the Gendarme Intelligence Department was established. Similar to
previous working group, the new one search people who has Islamic tendency in all
institutions, schools, civil society organizations, owners of firms and some public institutions.
This organization also investigates various issues such as Justice and Development party’s
activities, headscarf problem, Kurdish problem, elections of the President .71 Diğer dikkati
çeken bir grup ise Kürt sorununa izleyebilmek için kurulmuş olan Doğu Çalışma Grubu
olmuştur. Ancak bu grupda sadece Kürt sorununa odaklanmamış, BÇG ve CÇG gibi irticai
faaliyetler ve bu faaliyetler içinde olan kişilere yönelik raporlar hazırlamıştır.
Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi (SAEMK) 1997’de kurulmuştur. Bu
komitenin amacı yükseköğretim kurumlarında, Türkiye’nin bölgesel, ikili ve çok taraflı
uluslararası ilişkilerini kapsayan tarihi, kültürel, siyasi, iktisadi, hukuki, sosyolojik, jeopolitik
69
Gencer Özcan, “, Turkiye Dış Politikasında Algılamalar, karar alma ve oluşum süreci” in Türk Dış
Politikasının Analizi ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, 845
70
Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command”, 37
71
http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2923963 (Erişim Tarihi: 01.05.2010)

14
ve stratejik yapısına yönelik bilimsel yöntemlerle araştırmalar, incelemeler ve
değerlendirmeler yapmaktır. 72
Strategic Research and Study Center launched by Turkish General Staff on January, 8,
2002, and restructured on January 15, 2009. SAREM is functioning under the ATASE
(Military History and Strategic Studies) Directorate. The duty of the organization is to
contribute to the activities of Turkish General Staff in producing short, medium and long term
strategies by conducting future scientific research and studies at geostrategic and geopolitical
level, especially on security matters, which require long study periods and concern Turkey
closely in global, regional and national terms, and to submit their results to the use of related
military authorities. SAREM fulfills this duty by organizing scientific activities such as
symposiums, panels, forums, workshops, brainstorms, conferences and group studies and
delivering the results of these studies to related authorities. 73
Çalışma gruplarının yanı sıra Ocak 1997’de iç ve dış kriz durumlarında eşgüdüm
sağlamak amacıyla Başbakanlık Kriz Yönetim Merkezi. 74

o Documents

The National Security Policy Document (NSPD) identifies the domestic and foreign
threats faced by Turkey and determines the policies in order to avoid these threats. (chpter 5,
s.71) Even though the duty of preparation of this document belongs to the Prime Minister,
75
Turkish Armed Force is, in practice, preparing this document. This document is published
every five year by reviewing in every December and includes the military’s evaluation of
these threats.76 The national security politics which is defined in the article of 2(b) in law 2945
actualize via National Security Politics Document, in certain periods. 77 The law of the NSC
and the Secretariat General of the NSC identifies the State’s National Security Policy as “the
policy covering the principles of the course of internal, external and defense actions
determined by the Council of Ministers within the views set by the National Security Council
78
with the aim of ensuring national security and achieving national objectives.” the study for
the documentation is started in The General Staff headquarters and is transformed to its final

72
http://www.yok.gov.tr/content/view/450/255/lang,tr_TR/
73
Aynı; http://www.tsk.tr/SAREM/SAREM_ANA.htm (Erişim Tarihi: 28.02.2010)
74
http://www.khgm.gov.tr/mevzuat/y%C3%B6netmelik/basbakanlik%20kriz%20yonetimi.htm
75
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/almanak2008_02_07_09.WEB%20icin.pdf p.134
76
Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command”, 30; Ozcan 845
77
Akay, p.11
78
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Ingilizce/Kanun/kanun_en.htm

15
state in NSC General Secretariat. After this process, it is nearly compulsorily approved by the
Prime Minister. 79 The decisions are taken, has taken into force through secret decrees. 80 After
the “controlled” approval, National Strategy Document and National Military Strategic
Concept (MASK) in which there are military evaluations of threats toward Turkey are created
and it is presented to prime minister to ratify in the High Military Council’s meeting. 81 NSPD
and MASK are not open to public opinion on the grounds that they are secret documents.
Having considered the broad definition of national security policy, it can be seen that both
Document and Concept have the opportunity to influence wide range of issues-from politics
to economics.82
The constitution and organization laws see “national security policy” as superior and
independent from the government’s general policy. (Almanac, p. 24) The NSPD particularly
is seen as the constitution of the military particularly after 28 February process. Taking into
consideration of the MGSB on 31 October 1997, the text which is consist of 2 books, 10
annexes and 14 articles not only evaluates internal and external threats but also mentions
privatization, accession to the European Union, judicial mechanism, politics towards local and
cultural issues. 83 These issues without hesitation are bound to the Turkish National Assembly.
The obligation is that the laws and politics, execution, administration functions is to be
concord with this text demonstrates one more time the power of the TAF over the will of the
assembly, directly, systematically, and legally. This should be emphasized that even if the
authority of the preparation of the document belongs to the prime minister, practically, the
initiative and the authority belongs to TAF in preparation process of the documents. 84 In this
regard, The National Security Policy Document which is also known as Secret Constitution is
stated as constitution also by the former chief of general Secretary, Dogan Güreş, in 1997,
determines the limits of governments’ maneuver areas about political, social economic and
cultural issues. In other words, NSPD resembles to directives for the governments. (Almanac,
p. 24) moreover, NSPD is not submitted to the approval of the parliament. According to
National Security Council, the reason of this issue is “principle of separation of powers” in
85
Turkey. However, it can be said that this institution ignores the supervising function of the
parliamentary in contrast to implications in other democratic states. In democratic countries,

79
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/almanak2008_02_07_09.WEB%20icin.pdf p. 134
80
Ozcan “……………” , 845
81
Akay, p.11; Hlilin kitabı p. 91
82
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/almanak2008_02_07_09.WEB%20icin.pdf p. 134
83
Ahmet insel, bir toplumsal sınıf olarak Turk Silahlı kuvvetleri, Türkiye’de Ordu, p. 89-91; Ozcan, 856-867
84
Ahmet insel, bir toplumsal sınıf olarak Turk Silahlı kuvvetleri, Türkiye’de Ordu, p. 89-91
85
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/sss.html#soru_40

16
executive power by definition can not hide its political actions from the parliamentary.
(Almanac, p.24)
As considered the decision taking?? system in the MGK…. 851
 The Presidency

The Presidency is a significant way that the NSC has claimed further areas of
executive power and the presidential office's powers were extended under the 1982
constitution. Increasing the power of the presidency is sources from two assumptions that the
military accurately held. First Turkish presidents would continue to be former generals as it
occurred until Turgut Ozal- except from Celal Bayar, second if civilians are elected, they
would not be permitted to override the military. 86 Developments after the election of the
second civilian president, Turgut Ozal, in 1989 and the third, Suleyman Demirel, in 1993
confirmed the reliability of these assumptions. Despite Ozal's image as a challenger of the
military's political power and his seeming success in imposing the civilian government's
choice for the general chief of staff in 1987, he did not act in this manner and had did not
obtain the support of President Kenan Evren, the ex-general and leader of the coup. Nor he
did not attempt to change the military's legal framework to subject the military to civilian
control. Former general chief of staff Necip Torumtay comments in his memoirs that Ozal
was not specifically committed to subjugating the military high command to civil authority,
but rather totally disregarded any source of power in policymaking other than his own,
civilians included. The current and third civilian president of the republic, Suleyman Demirel
has basically remained a conservative politician tended to a strategic compromise with the
military more than any of his predecessors did before.

 Military Budgets

Turkish armed forces are particularly well-placed to press their demands for and to pay out
budgetary defense allocations. In contrast many western democracies’ parliamentary that
prescribes in detail how the military should spend its budget, the Turkish defense budget has
never been subjected to parliamentary debate.
According to Law on the Court of Accounts (1967), “Military personnel cadres, equipment,
supplies, goods, plants and institutions are subject to auditing by the Court of Accounts.
86
http://e-devlet-linkleri.zogizo.com/2009/06/turkiye-cumhurbaskanlari-sirasiyla.html, ; sakallioğlu p. 158

17
However, the procedure for auditing shall be provided by a regulation to be prepared by the
87
Ministries of Finance and Defence upon consultation with the Court of Accounts.” With the
amendments of this law in 1985, the military purchases and contracts could not be supervised
by Court of Accounts. In the same year, the Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF) in which
weapon procurements were provided was excluded from military budget. Moreover, this fund
was excluded from the control of the Court of Accounts. 88
There has been “Bill of New Law on the Court of Accounts” which contains important
articles regarding civilian oversight over the military budget. Since 2005, this bill has not
been legalized due to the various reasons. 89 The supervision of expenditures of the military by
Turkish Parliament Budget Plan Commission and General Council is implemented as a mere
formality; the military budget can not be accurately discussed by the Parliament. 90

 Arms Production, Procurement, and Military Modernization

The autonomy is higher where defense industries remain in the hands of the armed
forces, rather than partly controlled by the state or society, and where the military are able to
obtain all the weapons systems. Production and procurement which are considered to be in the
military's own domain are in the priority lists which are prepared by the general chief of staff.
The Turkish military-industrial complex is supported by a fund set up by the armed forces and
managed by a civilian undersecretary in the ministry of defense. Another purpose of the under
secretariat is to accomplish the modernization of the armed forces. The program to upgrade
the efficiency of the forces' combat techniques was accelerated by the general chief of staff
because of the failure in the southeast against the PKK guerrillas. The senior hierarchy of the
armed forces has been willing to enhance its credibility and legitimacy and to strengthen its
political autonomy particularly after 1980s. 91
The system of Turkish Armed Forces to ensure the supply of weapons and the
equipment was created by Law No. 3238. The shape of the weapon systems and equipment
procurement is determined by the General Staff in accordance with the strategic goal set by
the Defense Industry by the High Commission. Founded in 1985, the Defense Industry Under
secretariat (SSM) is the executive body of the weapons procurement system. Prime ministers,
chiefs of staff and national defense ministers comprising the Defense Industry Executive
87
http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/english_tca/law.htm
88
Hlilin kitabı , p. 85-86
89
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/almanak2008_02_07_09.WEB%20icin.pdf p.176
90
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 160
91
Ibid.

18
Committee of the weapons and other instruments of international and domestic supply in
decision-making and research and development, prototype declaration, advance payments and
incentives in the SSM directive gives. Supervisory Board and the Defense Industry Under
secretariat for Defense Industries Support Fund, which controls all transactions and the Prime
Ministry, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance and one member appointed by the two-
year. 92
In this system TAF is the client of the arms, planner of the arms procurement and the
consumer of the arms. In Turkey, in the total turnover of the defense sector businesses,
companies’ shares within Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is 33% and public companies the
share of 31%, so that, the domestic arms production in the Turkish Armed Forces have the
weight is observed. 93
However, a non-bureaucrat's appointment to the position of the undersecretary, under the
National Defense Ministry and the abolition of the Domestic and Foreign Procurement
Departments within the Ministry of Defense are the positive developments. 94

 Internal Security and Intelligence Gathering

The Turkish military combines external defense with an internal security function.
Throughout the republic it has repressed subversive political activity, Communism in the past
and the PKK and, to a lesser extent, radical Islamists presently. 95 Article 35 of the Military's
Internal Service Code exemplifies that the internal enemies and legitimize the basis for
military interventions into politics by giving the task of “protecting and safeguarding the
Turkish motherland and the Turkish Republic” the army. 96 21st general chief of staff, Dogan
Güreş confirmed that the duty of the Turkish armed forces has not changed and is to protect
the Turkish republic against internal and external enemies. 97
Apart from the military's own intelligence operation units, the National Intelligence
Agency of Turkey (NIA) serves as the civilian-based intelligence center subject to prime
ministerial control. Despite its civilian character, the head and key cadres of NIA have always
been recruited from officers and generals, either retired or active. 98

92
Hale Akay, p 17
93
Hale Akay, p 17
94
Hale Akay, p 17
95
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 160-161
96
Ozbudun, “Military in Politics”, 110
97
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 160-161
98
Ibid., 161

19
  Senior Promotions

The appointment of the forces' commanders and the general chief of staff has additional
political importance towards the military's institutional autonomy which has directly
constitutional authority. The president officially has the final say on whether to accept or
reject the nominee for the chief of general staff (CGS). However, the current chief of staff
selects his own successor, by the consultations with senior commanders. This suggestion to
the president, generated along with an ambiguously defined and self-interpreted principle of
seniority. 99 The CGS is the most powerful person in the government. The CGS decides on
nominations and promotions within the armed forces, arms production and procurements,
100
defense expenditures, and the budget which will be detailed in the following sections.
Similarly, the general chief of staff, rather than the minister of defense, has the final say on
who fills the positions of force commanders, due to the same principle of seniority. 101
Three attempts were made in the 1970s to break the military's tradition of controlling
senior promotions. In 1973, at a time of intense politicization and disunity within the army, an
interparty alliance in parliament successfully prevented the election to the presidency of the
hastily retired general chief of staff. In 1976 and 1977 the prime minister, Suleyman Demirel,
attempted to supersede the military's monopoly in deciding on the promotions for the force
commanders' positions. The first effort was overruled by the supreme military administrative
court, while the second was rejected by the president, a former admiral. Ozal said: "Since
1960, no civilian government has appointed the general chief of staff itself. The position has
been filled by automatic succession. From now on, this is going to be normalized.
Governments should appoint the general chief of staff themselves according to merit.”
Afterwards, Tansu Çiller continued to opt for alignment with the military hierarchy in order to
consolidate her political authority, proving that civilian rule continues to be vulnerable to the
military. 102

99
Ibid.
100
Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command”, 30
101
Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military”, 161-162
102
Ibid.

20