5

TECHNOLOGY AND THE SUCCESS OF THE

FIRST CRUSADE

JOHN FRANCE

The success of the First Crusade was a cataclysmic event in the history
of the Middle East which finds echoes even to this day in the politics
of a troubled region. To many historians of the medieval west it has
seemed the almost inevitable result of a period of profound change
when a new "feudal" Europe emerged bringing with it many of the
characteristic institutions which have formed our civilization. Mod-
em western society is marked by technological development, and we
tend to assume that this was embedded in our civilization from ear-
liest times, that it was part of the inheritance of this age of change,
and, therefore, a cause of the success of the First Crusade. Undoubt-
edly the importance of technology in modem warfare has reinforced
this tendency. I say tendency because in considering the success of
the crusading movement western technological superiority tends to
have been assumed rather than stated: significantly the most overt
statement comes from an American. 1 The ultimate defeat of the
crusaders, despite this technological advantage, has been ascribed to
the "massed hordes of the east". As part of this explanation much
has always been made, for example, of the manpower shortage of
the Latin Kingdom ofJerusalem: my own feeling is that the far more
interesting problem is how such a small political unit could produce
an army equal in size, indeed larger in 1187, than those fielded by
the greatest of contemporary European powers-but that is a matter
I intend to address in a forthcoming book. Here we face a narrower
question-how far did technological superiority contribute to the
success of the First Crusade?
Warfare at sea is entirely dependent on technology: the ship is a
fighting machine, truly a weapons-system whose capacities governed

I L. White, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962), pp. 170-71, "The
Crusades and the Technological thrust of the West", War, Technology andSociery in the
Middle East ed. V J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London, 1975), 97-112.

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164 JOHN FRANCE

the ability of its crew in a way which in medieval times had no par-
allel on land where even sticks and stones could make effective weap-
ons. The view has been expressed that "At the time of the First
Crusade there is evidence that the Italians had taken at least a tem-
porary lead both in the size and the technological capabilities of their
ships"." This is, however, a tentative view and even if true has rela-
tively little bearing on the success of the First Crusade, however im-
portant it may have been to the establishment of the kingdom in the
early twelfth century. Some of the ships which aided the First Cru-
sade were not Italian, but English and designed for totally different
conditions while it is more than likely that most of the Christian
ships were Byzantine." The technological capacity of the ships which
supported the First Crusade was never tested because they were never
seriously challenged. These ships had warlike capacity and they re-
inforced the strong Byzantine fleet at Cyprus which probably seized
Laodicea before the arrival of the crusaders at Antioch. They es-
corted merchantmen from Cyprus to the army on the Syrian coast
and the Genoese sent war-galleys. They presumably protected against
corsairs based on the Anatolian and Syrian coasts.' However their
maritime supremacy in the north-east Mediterranean was never chal-
lenged by the only significant Islamic fleet, that of Egypt, whose rulers
indeed made a treaty with the crusade. Only when the crusaders
attacked Fatimid territory breaking the treaty did an Egyptian fleet
destroy a group of western vessels, and then in conditions which
owed nothing to technical factors-the Latins were caught by surprise
in the undefended harbour ofJaffa. 5 Therefore, although naval supe-
riority was vital to the success of the First Crusade it was not techno-
logical superiority which achieved this. The main naval force working
for the crusade was probably Byzantine and the only considerable

2 J .H. Pryor, Geography, Technology and War. Studies in the maritime history ofthe Medi-
terranean 649-1571 (Cambridge, 1992) p. 30. See also his "Transportation of horses
by sea during the era of the Crusades: eighth century to 1285 A.D.", The Mariner's
Mirror 68 (1982), 9-27, 103-25; B.M. Kreutz, "Ships, shipping and the implications
of change in the early medieval Mediterranean", Vzator 7 (1976), 79-109.
3 Baldry of Dol, Histone Jerosolimitana RHC Oc.4. 18 mentions Genoese, Pisan,
Venetian, Greek and English ships.
4 Raymond of Aguilers, Liber ed. J.H. and L.L. Hill (Paris, 1969) pp. 134-35;

Caffaro, De Liberauone cioitatum orientis, RHC Oc.S. 49-50; J. France, VICtory in the
East. A military history ofthe First Crusade (Cambridge, 1994) p. 219.
5 France, Victory in the East, pp. 165-66, 252-54; J.P. Lilie, Byzantium and the Cru-
sader States (Oxford, 1994); M.A. Kohler, Allianzen und Vertroge zwischen frankischen und
islamischen Herrschem im Vorderren Orient (Berlin, 1991) pp. 1-71; RA p. 142.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 165

potential enemy chose not to attack. The determination of the west-

ern sailors and their courage in coming to the east is remarkable.
The fact that highly expensive ships were available in both northern
and southern Europe speaks volumes for the development of the west-
ern economies-but none of this necessarily means technological
superiority. Western ships may have been better supplied than those
of the Egyptians with water, but it was the fact that the Egyptians
chose not to challenge which was decisive-water would not have
been a problem had they done so for they could have used many
ports along the Palestinian littoral to resupply."
If superior naval technology was not a real factor in the success of
the First Crusade, what technological differences were there in the
weapons of land warfare where there was a very definite clash of
forces? One of the most enduring assumptions is that the westerners
enjoyed the protection of heavier armour and rode much bigger horses
which enabled them to crush their enemies: the comparison between
the armoured knight and the modern tank is commonplace. In a
fact modern research suggests that in the late eleventh century west-
ern warhorses were comparatively small-a horse of twelve hands
was quite big and one of 14 exceptional. To put this into perspective
a Shetland is 10 hands, a 12 hand horse would now be classified as
a pony and fourteen a small hunter. The development of strains of
large horse had not yet progressed far in the west and was depend-
ent on a complex and vulnerable infrastructure of stud farms, a
virtual technology of breeding. 7 It would be a mistake to draw a
sharp contrast with the horses of Islam. The Turks seem to have
used very small ponies like those still used by steppe-people such as
the Mongols. These ponies reared on the open ranges must have
been smaller than the best of the stall-fed animals of the crusaders.
Turks, however, were a small element in most of the armies faced by
the crusaders. Only at Nicaea and Dorylaeum did they face entirely
Turkish armies, and it was tactical errors in their handling and the
enormous numerical superiority of the westerners at this stage which
gave the crusaders victory. In the forces of the Caliphates of Baghdad
and Cairo which they encountered from Antioch onwards heavily

6 Pryor, Geograpl9J Tethnology and War pp. 75-86 argues that westerners used wooden
casks whose lightness enabled them to carry more water than Islamic ships. This
may be true but simply had no bearing on the outcome of the First Crusade.
7 R.H.C. Davies, "Warhorses of the Normans", Battle 10 (1987) 67-82 and The
Medieval Warhorse (London, 1989).

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166 JOHN FRANCE

armed cavalry were an important element, and indeed the Anonymous

was much impressed by the animals of what he calls Agulani, Persian
heavy horse, which carried their own armour, something unknown
in the West. The Fatimid army employed a core of similar heavy
cavalry." These animals must have been at least the equal of the best
western horses. Moreover we must remember that the crusaders were
deeply worried by their losses of horses. By the time of the battle
against Kerbogah they had lost virtually all their western horses and
were reduced to 200 or so: it was an infantry force which destroyed
Kerbogah, not the charge of an invincible western heavy cavalry
whose horses' bones lay rotting along the roads of Asia Minor. All
the sources make it clear that the crusaders rebuilt their cavalry from
local stock-there was no technological advantage here and the cru-
saders may well have been more poorly mounted-this was certainly
the case against Kerbogah-than their enemies.
Much has been made of the advantage enjoyed by the western
knights who, using the couched lance, in effect created a new weap-
ons system capable of destroying all before it by the "shock effect" of
the whole energy of man and horse concentrated in the lance-point.
The assumption that this became the standard battle-winning tactic
of the west from Carolingian times has been very widely challenged,
but controversy still rages over when the couched lance was intro-
duced and with it the "shock" charge. The Bayeux Tapestry shows
lances used in various ways-some even being thrown, and on this
basis a celebrated article argued that this represented a transitional
moment, while recent writers have argued that the massed charge
developed at dates as far apart as 1100 and the mid-twelfth century."
All this argument focuses on the issue of how the lance was held,
but this seems to me largely to miss the point. Couching a lance is

8 Anonymous, Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum ed. R. Hill (London, 1962),

p. 49; D. Nicolle, Anns andArmour of the Crusading Era 1050-1350 (New York, 1988)
1.127; on the Fatimids, France, Vzctory in the East, pp. 359-66, drawing on W J.
Hamblin, The Fatimid army during the ear~ crusades, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Michigan (1985), Nicolle, 1.203.
9 White, "The Crusades and the Technological thrust of the West" assumes the
traditional view of Carolingian origins. DJ.A. Ross, "L'originalite de 'Turoldus': Ie
maniement de lance", Cahiers de Civilisation Midiioale 6 (1963), 127-38 discusses the
Bayeux Tapestry; J. Flori, "Encore l'usage de la lance: la technique du combat vers
l'an 1100", Cahiers de Civilisation Midieoale 31 (1988), 213-40 argues for about 1100;
V. Cirlot, "Techniques guerrieres en Catalogne feodale: le maniement de la lance",
Cahiers de Civilisation Midiaale 28 (1985), 36-43 argues for a date towards the mid-
twelfth century.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 167

a quite natural way of holding such a long object, and even of using
it. The trick was to mass the men and horses in order to deliver a
coordinated charge, and this is a matter of discipline and organisation.
Medieval armies had no continuous existence-this is a theme to
which I will return-and in these circumstances delivering a coordi-
nated attack must have been very difficult. Cavalry take up a lot of
space, and move constantly and men brought together for a specific
occasion with strangers would have found it difficult to work as one.
Even at a time of much greater development the Order of the Temple
found it necessary to regulate the gathering of a force for such a
charge in minute detail-it was clearly a laborious process.'? By the
later twelfth century we have evidence that cavalry units were bro-
ken up into conroi, sub-units of 5 or 10 knights which acted together
under a banner; these may well have been substitutes for family or
tenurial groups fighting together in the armies of the late eleventh
century. II But even in the well-disciplined force which William of
Normandy brought to England knights made their own decision about
how they fought, as William of Poitiers indicates when he tells us
that some chose to fight with the sword rather than the lance." The
chronicles of the crusade are less than clear on this point. At the
Lake Battle on 9 February 1098 we are told that the small force of
700 Frankish knights divided into 6 squadrons which ambushed their
enemies, riding full-tilt into them with lances held erect and this may
imply that they were lowered against the enemy." Certainly this
was a carefully coordinated charge which drove the enemy army
into confusion. In the great battle at Antioch against Kerbogah the
crusaders were almost all infantry, but at Ascalon their 1200 knights
manoeuvered well against enemy light cavalry and charged home
to great effect, though we are not told how.l" There is little doubt
that as the crusader army approached Jerusalem it got smaller, but
it also became more cohesive and more effective, adopting a very

to M. Bennett, "La Regle du Temple as a military manual, or How to deliver a

cavalry charge",]. Harper-Bill et al., Studies in Medieval History presented to R. Allen-
Brown (Woodbridge, 1989), 7-20.
11 J.F. Verbruggen, "La tactique militaire des armees de chevaliers", Revue du Nord
29 (1947), 161-80 who for Hastings is followed by R.A. Brown, "The Battle of
Hastings", Battle 3 (1980), 1-21.
12 Guillaume de Poitiers, Gesta Guillelmi ducis Normannorum et regis Anglorum ed.
R. Foreville (Paris, 1952) p. 188.
13 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi RHC Oc.3. 647-48.
14 France, Vutory in the East pp. 245-51, 361-65.

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168 JOHN FRANCE

complex formation in the approach to Ascalon to counter ambush.

In his account of Tinchebrai in 1106 Henry of Huntingdon accounted
for the remarkable performance of Robert of Normandy's hopelessly
outnumbered army in their final charge by remarking that they were
"well trained in the wars ofJerusalem" .15 This makes the point that
armies became more effective by staying and working togetheI-the
conditions of the crusade effectively replicated the effect of the ex-
haustive training provided by a modern army.
But what was the balance of advantage in the general equipment
of war? The natural division in any discussion is between general
weaponry and armour and the implements and defences of the siege.
Here the major problem is that contemporary writers simply did not
much discuss such matters. Also, for our general knowledge we are
heavily dependent on pictures, but have little or no method of as-
sessing how typical what we see was or of understanding the accu-
racy of the artists. There is also the maddening fact that we cannot
always date them specifically. However, we have a clearer picture of
western weapons and armour than of eastern. Or at least we think
we have. Westerners seem to have used chain mail whereas in the
east a bewildering variety of mail, leather, felt, lamellar and scale
a
armour was in use. There is priori evidence that chain-mail was
actually superior for it became the dominant form of protection in
east and west; by the mid-twelfth century warriors in battle some-
times found it difficult to distinguish Franks and Muslims." However
the supposed uniformity of western protective equipment needs ques-
tioning. Even in the Bayeux tapestry some of the armoured figures
appear to be wearing something quite different from chain-mail, while
we should not forget the many infantry who lacked metal protection
and relied on padded jackets or who, like the Daylami infantry of
the east, had nothing at all." Moreover representations appear to
show enormous variation in the scale of mail protection. The full
shirt and leggings was worn by many, but shorter skirted shirts oc-
cur, and simple shirts ending at the waist. Some shirts had long sleeves,
and leggings were sometimes full-length, sometimes cut at the knee.
Most problematically there is the question of the quality of mail. By
the thirteenth century a suit such as that depicted as worn by a

15 Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum ed. T. Arnold (London, 1879) p. 235.

16 D. Nicolle, EarlY Medieval Islamic Anns and Armour (Madrid, 1976) p. 62.
17 D.M. Wilson (ed.), the Bayeux Tapestry (London, 1985); contrast the armoured
knights in PI. 45, with quilted jackets of archers PI. 60 and unprotected infantry PI. 70.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 169

crusader in the Westminster Psalter seems to have been made of

layers of very tightly woven small rings, creating a dense protection
which would have been much more effective than large open rings
in a single layer.!" Could the better-off on the crusade have pro-
tected themselves as well as this? How effective was poor chain-mail
as opposed to good lamellar? The eastern hazagand, a jerkin of leather
and mail, was later adopted by the crusaders as the "hauberc jaseran"
and spread to the west under variants of its original Arabic name."
This suggests that the hazagand, combined lightness, which was im-
portant in the climatic conditions of Syria with considerable effec-
tiveness. But presumably it was not as good as the best mail. The
fact is that the Turks and other enemies of the crusaders were per-
fectly prepared to fight at close quarters-indeed it was the anxiety
of the Turks to close with their enemy that undid them at Dorylaeum.
This suggests that they had every confidence in their defensive equip-
ment and they seem to have been the least armoured of all the
crusade's enemies. Once the westerners entered the lands of the Seljuk
Sultanate references in the sources to well-armoured horsemen mul-
tiply. Heavily armed and armoured infantry were also a major ele-
ment in the armies of the Seljuks and the Fatimids.'?" In the twelfth
century Islamic armies used long kite-shaped shields, but this was
not simply a reaction to Frankish practice, for such shields had a
long history in Islam. However at the time of the First Crusade their
use seems to have been confined to infantry, so the crusader cavalry
may have enjoyed a defensive advantage."
As to the offensive weapons of the crusaders and their enemies,
there really was little difference. Both crusaders and their enemies
used essentially similar swords about 80 ems long, although Oriental
examples in the Topkapi Palace seem to be more pointed and nar-
rower: some have a slightly bent tang giving them the character of
a sabre. It is hardly worth discussing the generality of weapons like
spears, but of course there was one weapon which the Franks did
not have, and which posed major problems for them, the composite

18 British Library Ms Royal 2.A.XII, London.

19 Nicolle, EarlY Medieval Islamic Arms and Armour pp. 66-70, 71-80 on lamellar
armour.
19a Nicolle, Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era 1.127, 205-206.
20 D. Nicolle, EarlY Medieval Islamic Arms and Armour (Madrid, 1976) p, 99, Arms
andArmour ofthe Crusading Era 1.127, 205-206; France, Vutory in the East pp. 182-83,
204-205, 295.

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170 JOHN FRANCE

bow. The composite bow had a pull of between 27 and 36 Kgms,

giving it an effective range of over sixty metres, and the crusaders
testified to its "astonishing range", rapid fire and deadly effectiveness
in penetrating mail and even shields." The Franks had no technical
response to this deadly weapon, and in essence relied on solidarity of
formation, a tactical expedient, to combat its effects. Of course all
sides knew the stave-bow, but it has often been thought that the
crossbow was a peculiarly western weapon, partly because Anna Com-
nena claims it was unknown to the Greeks. However there is room
to believe that the Persians and other eastern peoples were familiar
with it from the tenth century onwards. A special form appeared
amongst the Turks in Asia Minor and elsewhere. This weapon was
lighter than the western version and consisted of a tube which could
be filled with barbs fired by the bow-string, sometimes from horse-
back. 22 Western accounts of the crusade make no mention of cross-
bows in Muslim hands but mention their own use in sieges."
The outcome of the First Crusade as a military campaign turned
on three important sieges-Nicaea, Antioch andJerusalem.The army
also engaged in less important sieges, at Albarra, Ma'arrat-an-Numan
and Arga, and there were a number of incidental attacks on cities
and fortresses like Jabala and Tortosa. The special feature of sieges
is that they often generated the need for rather elaborate machinery-
though not necessarily. The investment of Antioch which lasted for
nine months was a large-scale blockade rather than a set-piece siege.
There was never a direct attack upon its defences and siege-machinery
is only mentioned twice. Early in the siege the count of Toulouse
attempted to block the Dog Gate by destroying a small bridge outside
it, ultimately with a talpa or penthouse, and when this failed mangonels
were brought up but proved unable to destroy the outer wall of the
city. In the end the little bridge was simply blocked with stones and
tree-trunks. In March 1098 another talpa was constructed, pushed
onto the Bridge outside the vital Bridge Gate and began to destroy

21 Gesta Francorum p. 19; Albert of Aix, Historia Hierosolimitana RHC Oc. 4.331-2.361.
22 White, "The Crusades and the Technological thrust of the West", 101; Anna
Comnena, Alexiad pp. 316-17; C. Cahen, "Un traite d'armurerie compose pour
Saladin", Bulletin d'Etudes orientales de l'Institut Francais de Damas 12 (1947/48), 132-33,
153, "Les changements techniques militaires dans la Proche Orient medievale et
leur importance historique", Parry and Yapp, War, Technology and Society, 116-18;
J.D. Latham and W. Paterson, Saracen Archery (London, 1970) pp. 145-51; Nicolle,
Early Medieval Islamic Anns and Armour pp. 136-39.
23 France, Victory in the East pp. 227, 351.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 171

it. Again the purpose was defensive-to prevent enemy raids, but it
failed when the enemy burned it. 24 So formidable were the defences
of Antioch that the crusaders never attempted a direct assault-rather
they tried to strangle it and to subvert its garrison. But this was
certainly not because the crusaders were ignorant of siege-warfare.
Anna Comnena is always assiduous in praising her father at the
expense of the hated western barbarians and she would have us believe
that the Latins were quite unable to face a city of the strength of
Nicaea and only captured it because he sent them siege engines of
his own devising." While is likely that Alexius provided advice and
materials as well as a force of troops and ships to control the Ascanian
Lake, it is unlikely that the leaders were simply ignorant of siege
warfare. They were impressed by the fortifications of Nicaea-a cir-
cuit of nearly 5 kms studded with four main gates and 114 towers
rising to 17 metres." There was simply nothing on this scale in the
west. However it was the scale of eastern fortifications which amazed
the westerners-there could not have been much which was strange
to them in a technical sense for the three great cities they attacked
all had Roman defences of a generally familiar type. After all the
Roman fortifications of Trier with its Porta Negra, Le Mans and the
cities of Provence were of much the same kind. The size of Nicaea
imposed logistical and organisational problems on an army which
was as yet unused to working as a unit-by the time they reached
Jerusalem they were much sharper. At Antioch the enormous length
of the curtain wall necessitated a definite hierarchy of towers with
very large angular towers serving as the anchors of the defence, dis-
persed amongst smaller usually rounded towers which presumably
acted a watchtowers. The fact that Firouz, the betrayer of the city,
commanded a group of three towers suggests that the garrison was
organised to take account of this. But the sheer length of the curtain
wall and the topography of the site were the major problems."
The westerners were, however, in a general way familiar with the
means of assault. In the famous siege of Paris in 886-886 both sides

24 France, Vutory in the East p. 228.

25 Alexiad pp. 335-36.
26 France, Victory in the East pp. 143-44; RA pp. 42-43; AA. 314; Fulcher of
Chartres, Histona Hieroso!ymitana ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913) pp. 81-82.
27 I would not wish to deny that there was architectural innovation in the Mus-
lim east. However the defences of Nicaea and Antioch were Roman and show no
signs of innovation. The walls of Jerusalem have largely vanished under the Otto-
man enceinte, but appear to have been much the same.

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172 JOHN FRANCE

seem to have used a wide range of siege-machinery-balistas, catapults

and mangonels to throw missiles, and a siege-tower to overawe the
defences. Siege-towers, or perhaps penthouses were used against Laon
in 938 and 988, while an especially complex tower attacked Verdun
in 985. In 1081 Robert Guiscard employed a huge tower against
Dyrrachium, but it was burned. In 1087 a Pisan and Genoese fleet
en route to Mahdia seized the Islamic fortress of Pantelleria with
high wooden towers which dominated the walls." But knowledge of
such machines is different from technical competence to make and
use them. When Robert of Normandy and his allies attacked the
castle of Brevol they needed to enlist the help of Robert of Belleme
who had a rare skill in the building and use of siege-machinery which
he later employed atJerusalem in 1099.29 The discontinuity of westem
medieval armies produced discontinuities in knowledge and technique
and these seem to have been in evidence at Nicaea. Henry of Esch
and Count Herman built a penthouse called "the Fox", but it col-
lapsed in use killing 20 knights." By contrast Raymond of Toulouse
almost forced entry with a properly built penthouse, and the other
leaders commissioned a Lombard engineer to build one." The assaults
on Nicaea were ferocious and involved the whole gamut of poliorcetic
armoury-mangonels, balistas and mining, except for siege towers.
It is difficult to know why these last were not used-but it is worth
noting that efficient penthouses seem to have come late in the siege.
At Antioch no direct assault necessitating machinery was made on
the defences, although projectile machinery was used as well as the
penthouses noted. By November 1098 when the army attacked
Ma'arra it had become practised in the arts of attack, and had enjoyed
reinforcement from seamen-so the speed with which a siege-tower
was built and deployed is hardly surprising. At Jerusalem two siege-
towers were built, attacking the city from north and south, and the
former, built by the North French, was used in conjunction with a
great ram which demolished the outer wall.V These siege-towers did
not have drawbridges. Their tactical purpose was to dominate defences,

28 J. France, "La guerre dans la France feodale a la fin du ix et au x siecle",

Revue Beige d'Histoire Militaire 23-3 (1979), 184-85; AC pp. 142-43; H.EJ. Cowdrey,
"The Mahdia Campaign of 1087", English Historical Review 92 (1977), 1-29.
29 Ordericus Vitalis, Historia Aecclesiastica ed. M. Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1969-
79) 4.288-89.
30 AA. 321-22.

31 RA p. 44; AA. 322-25.

32 France, Victory in the East pp. 313-15, 346-55.

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 TECHNOLOGY AND SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 173

allowing mining of the walls and attack by escalade. The North French
improvised a bridge when they were forced to bring their tower right
up to the wall of Jerusalem and found that the defenders had de-
serted their posts." The crusaders did not lack knowledge of siege-
equipment, but in the early stages they lacked technical grasp and
may have owed something to Byzantine engineers. Gradually prac-
tice made them, if not perfect at least fairly efficient. In general they
became adept at exploiting their limited resources, and it is quite
possible that at Nicaea the talents of Gaston of Beam had not been
realised, while we know that Robert of Belleme did not arrive until
very late in the day.
None of the siege machines of the crusaders seem to have come
as a surprise to the Muslims who were well-practised in the art of
siege-warfare. The crusaders employed siege-towers to great effect at
Ma'arra and Jerusalem. Although these weapons seem not to have
been used in the east in the eleventh century, perhaps because of the
difficulties of finding timber, they were evidently not unknown for
the defenders of Jerusalem seem not have been surprised by them,
and developed higWy effective counter-measures. The siege-tower of
the count of Toulouse attacking near the Zion Gate was set on fire
by a novel fire-throwing machine. That of the North French was
very badly battered by mangonels and threatened with toppling over
with drags. At the last the defenders hung a huge blazing tree-trunk
on chains between the siege-tower and the wall." The use of fire-
throwing machines was a novelty to the crusaders, but these apart,
both sides seem to have had the same range of catapults. The only
Muslim venture in siege warfare was Kerbogah's attack on Antioch.
Like the crusaders he did not attempt a set-piece siege and deployed
no machinery. In the first phase of his attack he tried to penetrate
the city via the citadel-an enterprise frustrated by crusader deter-
mination and topography. He then moved to slow strangulation by
a blockade, but in the process dispersed his army and so allowed the
westerners to defeat it in detail.

33 J. Prawer, "The Jerusalem the crusaders captured: contribution to the medi-

eval topography of the city", in Crusade and Settlement ed. P. Edbury (Cardiff 1985)
p. 10, n. 52 pointed this out and I have followed him in this respect in Vutory in the
East pp. 352-53 n. 60.
34- J. France, "The text of the account of the capture of Jerusalem in the Ripoll
manuscript, Bibliotheque nationale (latin) 5132", English Historical review 103 (1988),
640-57; Vzctory in the East pp. 346-55; AA. 472-77.

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174 JOHN FRANCE

In general modern writers on the crusades have overdrawn the

contrast between the armies of east and west. The great and obvious
contrast between the mounted bowmen of the Turks and the west-
ern knight is a powerful theme in almost all writing. But it was only
in the Seljuk Sultanate of Asia Minor that the Franks encountered a
force entirely made up of mounted bowmen-elsewhere they were
an element, and only an element, in Islamic forces. The small com-
posite bow constituted a powerful technical advantage-but the Turks
of Asia Minor were too few to crush the crusaders, and once into
the lands of the Caliphate the growing experience of the crusader
army produced tactical expedients to minimise its effects. Of course
the Turkish horseman had an enormous advantage in the war of
supply-the Franks, indeed any army, could only exists by ravaging-
the Turks could not counter-ravage but they could confine and their
preponderance of light cavalry enabled them to do this successfully
in the winter of 1098, almost to the point of destroying the crusaders
by attrition. Only the victory over Ridwan of Aleppo on 9 February
1098 delivered the crusaders from a profound crisis of supply. Is-
lamic armies did contain large numbers of light cavalry. In part this
was a use of the resources of the many nomadic peoples of the area
on the desert fringes and along the North African coast. It also re-
flected the climatic imperatives and the open nature of the country-
side. The existence of grass ranges reduced the incentive to stall-feed
horses which was more prevalent in the West. But in medieval con-
ditions warfare was ultimately close-quarter. A reasonably resolute
enemy might be softened up and unnerved by a bombardment of
arrows and by encirclement, the classic tactic of the Turks, but he
could only normally be defeated by closing to arm's length. Lightly
armed horsemen could manoeuvre, and even charge home, but the
armies of the Abbassid and Fatimid Caliphates had clearly seen the
value of heavy cavalry and a core of well-protected infantry for such
fighting. On the other side we should beware of too sweeping gen-
eralisation about heavy western horses and "men of iron" for the
quality and scale of western horses and protection varied enormously.
At their best the Frankish knights were probably better protected, if
only because of, their big shields, than their enemies and they en-
joyed the support of a mass of infantry who seem to have become
better and better protected as the crusade went on. This infantry
had crossbows-but these had little effect in the open field and only
came into their own in sieges. Far more importantly the crusaders

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 TECHNOLOGY AND SUCCESS OF THE FIRST CRUSADE 175

developed from a militia into a regular army as time went on. They
became an exceptionally cohesive and effective fighting force weld-
ing cavalry and infantry together. They were almost always outnum-
bered by their enemies after they left Asia Minor-even Ridwan
managed to raise 10-12,000 against Bohemond's 700 knights on
9 February 1098. But although the core of an army like Ridwan's
was "regular", the diversity of the rest of the forces and the compos-
ite nature meant that it lacked cohesiveness. The same was true of
Kerbogah's army and he made considerable tactical errors in its han-
dling. The Fatimids had a formidable army with a large regular core
which in 1102 would defeat the Franks at Ramla, but at Ascalon in
1099 they were caught by surprise. When it came to sieges the Franks
made a slow start, but this was a kind of warfare to which they were
very accustomed. At Antioch it was organising and controlling the
army which mattered, and waging the war of supply by raiding. This
was the small-change of feudal warfare and it was something the
crusaders were very good at. In formal sieges the mobile tower proved
its worth, and although it was not a novelty, it obviously conferred
a great advantage in the crusader attack on Jerusalem.
In general terms the forces which confronted one another during
the First Crusade were not as markedly contrasting as has been sup-
posed and their level of technical development was very similar. Indeed
the armies of Islam and Christendom were undergoing technological
convergence; both were moving towards a generally heavier style of
war. It is possible that the West had travelled further down this path
than the powers of Islam, but frankly there is little evidence of any
major technical advantage or total of advantages great enough to
effect the outcome of the campaign. When battle was sought both
western and eastern forces recognised that direct confrontation ne-
cessitated heavy forces, but in the east there was greater emphasis
on preparation for this decisive stage. In any case in seeking to ex-
plain the success of the First Crusade too much importance should
not be attached to battle. The crusaders showed enormous persis-
tence and skill in ravaging, in the war of supply which every medi-
eval army had to win if it was to be victorious. Eastern fortifications
were formidable, but the Franks adapted quickly and their armoury
of poliorcetic equipment was enhanced by the use of siege-towers
which exercised a real influence at Jerusalem. On the other hand
the "Greek fire" used there came as a nasty surprise to the Chris-
tians and did great damage. It should be noted, however, that the

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176 JOHN FRANCE

crusaders were prepared to risk an assault on Jerusalem without

adequate machinery-they had actually only a single siege ladder for
the abortive attack of 13 June 1099. After this failure they went to
enormous lengths to build and use appropriate equipment despite
great difficulties. At Antioch appalling problems arose and were sur-
mounted in the war of attrition. These were the actions of a force
which was highly motivated-the evidence is that the Islamic armies
as a whole were not and this was far more significant than technical
differences in accounting for the success of the First Crusade.

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