40th Western Protective Relay Conference, 2013

Can Relay Detect Ground Faults and Faulted Phase without 3I0
Current – A Case Study at 230 kV Parallel Line Application
José Castro, Pedro Jimenez - Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)
Zhiying Zhang, Ilia Voloh – GE Digital Energy, Markham, Canada

1 Introduction
Transformer neutral and winding connections play a very important role in transmission line
ground fault protection because they directly affect the zero sequence current flow paths, and as a
result, affect the ground fault currents. The ground fault protection performance of the protective
relays, especially in terms of sensitivity and selectivity, could be severely affected. In a recent
application of distance relays on a 230 kV parallel transmission line at Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA), difficulties and challenges were encountered due to lack of zero sequence currents at one line
terminal. In this application, the protected line at one end is terminated to a wye/delta winding
connected power transformer with a delta winding on the protected line side. As a result, there is no
zero sequence current flowing through this terminal for any ground faults on the transmission line. The
other end of this transmission line and the parallel transmission line have regular zero sequence
sources, therefore distance relays at these terminals don’t have the difficulties as this relay has
experienced. Additionally, strong mutual coupling between these two parallel lines and the single pole
tripping/reclosing requirement bring further complexities to this application.

In this paper, we will first have a brief review on system grounding and its impact to zero sequence
current flow paths and to ground fault protection, and then follow with detailed discussions on this
case, including power system background, application requirement, initial plans of the application of
distance relays, challenges and difficulties encountered, technical solutions with RTDS simulation
confirmations, and last we will talk about the lessons we have learned and the conclusions.

2 Brief Review of System Grounding and Zero Sequence Current

Sources
2.1 System Grounding
System grounding refers to the neutral to ground connections of specific pieces of apparatus in
the system, usually power transformers and generators. In general, system grounding can be broadly
classified as either grounded or ungrounded. The former refers to the system in which at least one
conductor or point, for example the neutral point of a transformer, is intentionally grounded, either
solidly or through impedance; the latter refers to the system without an intentional connection to
ground.

Many of the early power systems were ungrounded, mainly due to the advantage that the first
ground fault in the system did not require the tripping of the system so that service can be continued
without interruption. However, a big disadvantage with the ungrounded system is that it provided no
control of transient over-voltages, and as a result, it could lead to severe equipment damages.
Therefore in modern power systems, ungrounded systems are no longer recommended, instead,
grounded systems in some forms (solidly or through impedance) are the predominant choice.

The basic objectives in selecting a grounding scheme for any given system include [3]:

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 (a) Voltage ratings and degree of surge-voltage protection available from surge arresters
(b) Limitation of transient line-to-ground overvoltages
(c) Sensitivity and selectivity of the ground-fault relaying
(d) Limitation of the magnitude of the ground-fault current
(e) Safety

In terms of system grounding classifications, it might be quite easy and simple for a simple power
system. For example, in a low voltage distribution system or in a power-plant auxiliary system, where a
single transformer may be the only power source and also serve as the system-neutral grounding
point, the neutral grounding method of this single transformer directly determines the grounding class
of the whole system. That is to say, if the neutral point of the single transformer in this simple power
system is grounded through a resistance, the whole system would be classified as a resistance-
grounded system. However, in more complex systems, like high voltage (HV) or extra high voltage (EHV)
transmission systems, there are many pieces of apparatus (power transformers, capacitor banks,
reactors, etc.) that may have neutrals grounded. In such multiple-grounded systems, the class of
grounding of the system is determined by the cumulative effect of all the grounding points. If most of
the major transformer neutrals are grounded by similar means, then the system may loosely be
described as being of one class [3].

In general, for the system with multiple grounding points of different types of apparatus and
different means of apparatus neutral grounding, the grounding class of the system can only be
determined by the zero-sequence to positive-sequence impedance ratios, as viewed from a selected
location. Reference [3] specified such ratios that are used to characterize the classes of system
grounding, in which X0/X1<3 and R0/X1<1 are defined as the criteria for the class of solid or effective
grounding, where “X0” is the zero sequence reactance, “R0” is zero sequence resistance and “X1” is the
positive sequence reactance.

2.2 Transmission System Grounding and Zero Sequence Network

Power systems with voltage level at 115kV or higher are typically classified as transmission
systems. Solid or effective grounding is the most common grounding method used in utility
transmission systems mainly due to insulation cost and effective ground-fault protection requirement,
such as sensitivity, selectivity, and speed. Transmission systems are typically connected to generating
systems through a delta-wye connected power transformer with delta winding on the generating
system side and grounded-wye on the transmission system side. This type of connection can provide a
zero sequence current source for the transmission system as shown in Table 1.

Most utility transmission systems consist of multiple voltage levels which are usually
interconnected through autotransformers with the benefits of lower cost. This type of arrangement
generally requires effectively grounded at both of the voltage levels. If one of the voltage levels needs
to be non-effectively grounded (such as resistance grounded, inductance grounded, etc.), two-winding
conventional transformers could be used, but with a higher cost than the autotransformer
arrangement.

Transformer winding and neutral connections (e.g. delta, wye or grounded-wye), ground bank and
zigzag transformer installations in the system all affect the zero sequence sources and zero sequence
current flow paths, and as a result, affect the ground fault current level and thus the performance of
ground protection relays. Table 1 below shows zero sequence circuits versus different transformer
connections, in terms of whether passing zero sequence currents and providing zero sequence
sources [2] [4].

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 Table 1. Transformer Connections and Zero Sequence Circuits
Transformer Connection Passing Zero Sequence Providing a Source of Zero
Primary Secondary Current Sequence Current
No No
No No
No No
Yes No
No No
No Yes (to sec. only)
No Yes (to pri. only)
No No
No Yes (to sec. only)
No Yes (to pri. only)
Yes Yes (to pri. and sec.)
Yes No
Yes Yes (to pri. and sec.)

Let’s use an example to show how the zero sequence networks are affected by transformer
neutral and winding connections. As shown in Figure 1 below, EX is the generating system, which is
connected to the transmission system through a two-winding delta/grounded-wye power transformer
with delta winding on the generating system side. Transmission system consists of multi voltage levels.
EY represents another voltage level of the transmission system, and they are interconnected through a
3-winding auto-transformer.

Figure 1. System Single Line Diagram

The sequence network of the system for a single line to ground (SLG) fault on the transmission line
L between bus X and Y is shown in Figure 2, where ZX and ZY are the source impedances for source EX
and EY; ZTX and ZTY are the impedances for transformer TX and TY, in which subscript letters P, S and
T represent the primary, secondary and tertiary side impedances of the autotransformer TY.

From the sequence network, Figure 2, it can be seen that the zero sequence impedance network is
made up of one or more parallel impedances (based on the transformer winding and neutral
connections and source system grounding) that provide a path for ground current to flow from the
fault point back to the source. These parallel impedances in the zero sequence network are often
referred to as ground sources or zero sequence sources that are shunt paths for ground current to
flow. It needs to be mentioned that though they are also referred to as “sources”, the only driving
sources for the fault currents to flow are actually the positive sequence voltage sources (EX and EY in
this example) produced by synchronous ac generators and other real sources in the system. The
sources of negative and zero sequence voltages and currents are actually the flow paths of negative
and zero sequence currents because of the unbalanced nature of the faults.

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 Figure 2. Sequence Network

3 PDVSA 230kV Parallel Line Application Case

3.1 Case Study Overview

3.1.1 PDVSA Power System Introduction

The electrical system of a refinery complex is composed of different loads and different priorities
of operation for critical process equipment is necessary to ensure continuity, therefore requires a
system that supplies electric energy safely and reliably to such equipment.

The power supply to Puerto La Cruz Refinery (PLCR) is done through the substations and Power
Plant, A Substation (S1) is linked with the National Electrical System (NES) in 230 kV Guanta 2
Substation (S2), according to Figure 3.

Figure 3. Single Line Diagram of the PDVSA System under Study

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 PLCR connects to NES by two (2) 230kV transmission lines between Guanta 2 Substation of
National Electricity Corporation (Corpoelec) and A Substation of PDVSA.

In 2011 in order to meet the requirements of the new projects of PDVSA, enters service Alberto
Lovera Substation, 230 kV (S3). This installation is associated generation system consisting of two (2)
electrical generators, 16.2 kV, 150 MW, open cycle, both driven by gas turbines. Energy is transported
from the generators through the Alberto Lovera Substation. The commissioning of the substation and
generators, was conducted through a tie-off connection to the transmission line 2 Substations A and
Guanta 2.

PDVSA plans its protective relays and control schemes to provide for personnel safety and
equipment protection and to minimize disruption of services during disturbances. New
interconnections onto PDVSA electric power system usually require additions or modifications of
PDVSA protective relays and/or control schemes. Interconnections must be compatible with PDVSA
existing protective relay schemes, for this reason physical phenomenon as mutual coupling must be
simulated and can show the influence in ground fault protection for single line to ground faults. Relays
with mutual coupling compensation should handle this effect, when they are fed with the residual
current of the parallel line. Normally two relays are tested simultaneously to see the correct behavior
of the teleprotection scheme.

In order to get the most information about their behavior, it is recommended to test with one
strong and one weak source, according to the new network topology product of the commissioning of
the Alberto Lovera Substation.

3.1.2 Sequence Network and Line Parameters

As shown in Error! Reference source not found., relay 1 and 2 are employed to protect line 1, and
relay 3 and 4 are employed to protect line 2. Line 1 and 2 are strongly mutually coupled with a Z0M/Z1
ratio of 2.07, and transformer T1 and T2 are two (2) winding power transformers which are connected
in delta and grounded-wye but with delta winding on the 230kV transmission line side. As mentioned
earlier, this type of connection actually resulted in the lack of zero sequence current at the terminal
where relay 1 located, and brought a lot of application difficulties in relay 1. Though T2 is connected in
the same way as T1, T3 can provide alternative zero sequence current sources at the bus where relay
3 is located. Therefore unlike relay 1, relay 3 doesn’t have the issue of lack of zero sequence currents.
Source S2 is the equivalent source of the 230kV transmission system which is effectively grounded
with Z1=10.61∠87.70 ohms primary and Z0= 21.34∠79.20 ohms primary.

The parameters for the 230kV parallel lines (Line 1 and Line 2) are listed below.
• Length=11.06 km
• Z1=0.0584 + j0.4879 ohms/km
• Z0=0.461+j1.4969 ohms/km
• Z0M=0.4031+j0.9361 ohms/km

The sequence network of the system is shown in Figure 4 below, where subscript number 1, 2 and
0 represent positive, negative and zero sequence network respectively. It can be seen from the zero
sequence network that the left terminal of line 1 (i.e. where relay 1 located) does not have any zero
sequence current paths. As a result, no zero sequence current could flow from this terminal. Note that
shunt capacitances of the transmission line are omitted in this study.

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 Figure 4. Sequence Network

The purpose of this study is to confirm the protection performance of relays 1 and relay 2 during
various fault conditions, especially during ground faults (solid and resistive grounding faults), in terms
of sensitivity, selectivity and security.

3.1.3 Can a Regular Distance Relay Be Used to Protect the Line without Zero Sequence
Current
For this application, the initial plan as per PDVSA was to use the regular distance elements to
protect the line. Though there are no zero sequence current sources at the terminal where relay 1
located, it was expected that the ground current IG from the parallel line (line 2) could help overcome
this difficulty through mutual coupling compensation, so that the ground distance elements of relay 1
can reliably clear various ground faults on line 1 as it does usually (i.e. in protecting the line with
regular zero sequence current sources).

Based on this plan, PDVSA had conducted some fault studies beforehand. One of them is shown
below, in which an A phase to ground (AG) fault was applied at 8.4 km (76%) on line 1 from PLCR
substation as shown in Figure 5. The voltage and current signals that are seen at relay 1 are:
VA= 11.77 kV ∠-15.50
IA = 0.218 kA ∠-84.10
I0 = 0
I0’= 1.27 kA ∠-83.50
Where I0’ is the zero sequence current from the parallel line (line 2).

For this fault, based on the line impedance parameters listed in the previous section, the
theoretical AG loop apparent impedance should be ZAG=8.4*(0.0584 + j0.4879) = 4.13∠83.20 ohms
primary.

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 Figure 5. AG Fault at 76% of the Line
Now let’s calculate the AG loop impedance with the measured voltage and current vectors:
Without Mutual Coupling Compensation:
௏஺ ଵଵ.଻଻∠ିଵହ.ହబ
ܼ‫= ܩܣ‬ ೋబ = = 53.99∠68.6଴ Ohms primary
ூ஺ାቀ ିଵቁ∗ூ଴ ଴.ଶଵ଼∠ି଼ସ.ଵబ
ೋభ

With Mutual Coupling Compensation:

௏஺ ଵଵ.଻଻∠ିଵହ.ହబ
ܼ‫= ܩܣ‬ ೋబ ೋబಾ = భ.బభవ∠లల.ళబ
= 4.13∠83.3଴ Ohms primary
ூ஺ାቀ ିଵቁ∗ூ଴ା ∗ூ଴ᇲ ଴.ଶଵ଼∠ି଼ସ.ଵబା ∗ଵ.ଶ଻∠ି଼ଷ.ହబ
ೋభ ೋభ బ.రవభ∠ఴయ.మబ

It can be seen without mutual coupling compensation, the calculated AG loop apparent
impedance (53.99 ohms) is way off from the theoretical value (4.13 ohms), which would result in severe
underreach. When mutual coupling compensation is applied, the calculated AG loop apparent
impedance matches the theoretical value perfectly. Actually for relay 1, the mutual coupling
compensation must be applied; otherwise relay 1 cannot even detect the fault at 10% on the line due
to the severe underreach caused by mutual coupling.
Based on this, the regular ground distance element seems to be ok for protecting this line, as long
as the mutual coupling compensation from the parallel line zero sequence current is applied. However,
this is actually only true for relay 1. It’s not true for relay 2. Mutual coupling compensation could cause
relay 2 false operation on external faults. This can be illustrated with the following case, in which an AG
fault occurred at 10% on the parallel line (line 2) from the Guanta II Substation as shown in Figure 6.
The voltage and current measured by relay 2 for this test case are shown below:

VA= 9.07 kV ∠-5.070

IA = 0.177 KA ∠94.70
I0 = 0
I0’= 2.03 KA ∠-79.40

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 Figure 6. AG Fault on Parallel Line

The calculated AG loop apparent impedance at relay 2 is:

௏஺ ଽ.଴଻∠ିହ.଴଻బ
ܼ‫= ܩܣ‬ ೋబ ೋబಾ = భ.బభవ∠లల.ళబ
= 2.25∠91଴ Ohms primary
ூ஺ାቀ ିଵቁ∗ூ଴ା ∗ூ଴ᇲ ଴.ଵ଻଻∠ଽସ.଻బ ା ∗ଶ.଴ଷ∠ି଻ଽ.ସ బ
ೋభ ೋభ బ.రవభ∠ఴయ.మబ

ZAG = 2.25∠910 ohms will result in relay2 zone-1 false operation (the line impedance is 5.43∠83.20
ohms and measured impedance is 2.25∠910 ohms which is way inside zone 1 characteristic) for this
reverse fault due to mutual coupling compensation impact. Actually, this has been a known issue for
mutual coupling compensation that the ground distance elements of the healthy line could falsely
operate for the faults on the parallel line. A typical method for preventing such possible false operation
is to disable the mutual coupling compensation on the healthy line through checking the ratio of I0
magnitude of the protected line to the I0 magnitude of the parallel line based on the assumption that
the magnitude of the zero sequence current on the faulted line is higher than that on the healthy line.
This method works for relay 2 but does not work for relay 1, because at relay 1 the ratio of |I0|/I0’| is
always equal to zero.
On the other hand, relay 1 actually does not have this mutual coupling compensation related
overreaching problem like relay 2 because the parallel lines are not terminated to the same bus at
relay 1 location; instead they are terminated to a bus farther away through two power transformers T1
and T2 as shown in Figure 6. These power transformers have significantly lessened the mutual
coupling impact to the apparent impedance calculation when faults occur on the parallel line because
the phase voltage does not drop exceedingly even for close-in faults on the parallel line. Therefore,
mutual coupling compensation at relay 1 can be applied all the time regardless whether the fault is on
the protected line or on the parallel line.
Based on the above analysis, the mutual coupling compensation can be enabled all the time in
relay 1 while the compensation in relay 2 should be enabled only when the fault is on the protected
line.
However, in some designs of distance relays, the |I0|/I0’| ratio checking is built-in either with a hard
coded threshold or with a user settable threshold of greater than 1.0. In such designs, the mutual
coupling compensation at relay 1 could not be successfully applied because the |I0|/I0’| ratio is always
0. As a result, relay 1 would experience severe underreach.

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 Even the |I0|/I0’| ratio checking could be forcedly enabled or disabled through a user setting,
ground distance elements with classical designs would still heavily rely on zero sequence current, in
which a series of additional supervision conditions are employed to enhance security, directional
integrity and reach accuracy, including
• I0 Current Supervision
For ground distance element to pick up, a minimum I0 current is required to ensure security.
• Reactance Line
For quadrilateral characteristic, the reactance line could be negative sequence or zero
sequence current polarized; for Mho characteristic, zero sequence current polarized
reactance line is typically used along with the variable Mho characteristic to avoid
overreaching during resistive faults under heavy pre-fault load conditions.
• Directional Element
Zero sequence current and negative sequence current may both be used for directional
integrity supervision in ground distance elements.
• Phase Selection
It is well known that ground distance elements may have limited accuracy during line-to-line-
to-ground (LLG) faults. In order to prevent mal-operation in such cases the ground elements
are blocked during such LLG faults through phase selector which is utilized by comparing zero
sequence and negative sequence current phase angle.

In summary, due to the reasons that we have discussed above, it can be concluded that without
significant modifications, regular ground distance elements with classical designs cannot be used in
this application of transmission line protection without any zero sequence current. The zero-sequence
current based supervision conditions are essential to ensure selectivity, security, directional integrity
and accuracy in ground distance elements. Attempt to remove these supervision conditions is not
recommended and should be avoided.

3.2 Solutions
Since the regular ground distance elements cannot be used to detect the ground faults and
correctly identify the faulty phases in this application, other solutions must be developed. After further
study and also based on the communication availability, we have come up with a negative sequence
directional overcurrent based hybrid POTT scheme to effectively protect the line when the
communication to the remote terminal is available. A backup solution is also developed in case the
communication to the remote terminal is lost. RTDS dynamic simulation testing has been carried out to
confirm these solutions.

3.2.1 Communication to Remote Terminal is Available

When communication channels between the local and the remote terminal relay are available, a
hybrid POTT scheme has been used to detect ground faults and trip single pole when need to be. The
simplified logic diagram of the hybrid POTT scheme is shown in Figure 7 below. It can be seen that
besides distance elements (phase and ground zone 2 and zone 1 for forward fault detection; zone 4 for
reverse fault detection), there are additional entries that can be set to assist detecting forward and
reverse ground faults. As the sequence network shown in Figure 4, for a SLG fault on line 1, though no
zero sequence current can flow from the relay 1 terminal, negative sequence current has the regular
paths. Therefore, the negative sequence directional overcurrent elements can be used to detect
various forward and reverse ground faults.

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 Figure 7. Simplified Hybrid POTT Scheme
In addition, in order to realize single pole tripping/reclosing, 4-bit communication channels have
been used in this scheme so that the complete fault type information can be transmitted to relay 1
from relay 2. The 4-bit transmit codes for various fault types are defined in Table 2 below [6].
Table 2. Hybrid POTT Scheme Transmit Codes Table for 4-BIT Channels
PHASE SELECTOR BIT PATTERN TRANSMITTED
DETERMINATION OF FAULT TYPE TX1 TX2 TX3 TX4
AG 1 0 0 0
BG 0 1 0 0
CG 0 0 1 0
AB, ABG, BC, BCG, CA, CAG, 3P, Unrecognized 0 0 0 1

Based on the fault type information received (RX1 to RX4 in Figure 7), relay 1 is able to make
decisions whether to trip a single phase or trip all 3 phases. The trip table of this scheme is defined in
Table 3 below [6].
Table 3. Hybrid POTT Scheme Trip Table for 4-BIT Channels
REMOTE DATA LOCAL DATA
BIT PATTERN RECEIVED REMOTE LOCAL DETERMINATION OF TRIP OUTPUT
RX1 RX2 RX3 RX4 DETERMINATION OF FAULT TYPE
FAULT TYPE
0 0 0 1 MULTI-P AG Trip Phase A
0 1 0 0 BG AG
0 0 1 0 CG AG
1 0 0 0 AG AG, AB, ABG, CA, CAG, 3P,
Unrecognized
0 1 0 0 BG BG, AB, ABG, BC, BCG, 3P, Trip Phase B
Unrecognized
1 0 0 0 AG BG
0 0 1 0 CG BG
0 0 0 1 MULTI-P BG
0 0 1 0 CG CG, BC, BCG, CA, CAG, 3P, Trip Phase C
Unrecognized
1 0 0 0 AG CG
0 1 0 0 BG CG
0 0 0 1 MULTI-P CG
1 0 0 0 AG BC, BCG Trip Three Phases
0 1 0 0 BG CA, CAG
0 0 1 0 CG AB, ABG
0 0 0 1 MULTI-P Unrecognized

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 For example, if relay 2 detected an AG fault and sent to relay 1 with TX1=1 and TX2=TX3=TX4=0 as
per Table 2, even though the phase selector in relay 1 may fail to identify the fault type, based on the
above trip table, relay 1 is still able to trip phase A correctly with the help of fault type information
(RX1=1 and RX2=RX3=RX4=0) received from relay 2.

3.2.2 Communication to Remote Terminal is Not Available

When communications to remote terminal is not available a fall back strategy was developed.
When SLG fault occurs on the line under investigation, the fault type can be brought to the relay 1
from the parallel line distance relay (relay 3 as shown Error! Reference source not found.) located in
the same substation. This can be achieved with either hard wires or with GOOSE I/Os over the LAN. As
shown in Figure 8 below, relay 3 will be sending first of all some kind of the forward fault detection
(VO2) and also phase selector outputs indicating which type of SLG fault is detected AG, BG or CG.

Figure 8. Parallel line is signaling fault type over GOOSE

Relay 1 then needs to determine that fault is present during communications channel failure and
with the aid of the parallel line relay 3 to determine the faulted phase to trip. This is achieved with
phase undervoltage and negative–sequence directional forward elements along with parallel line
indication that fault is present and fault selector determines phase A fault. To allow operation during
resistive fault, negative-sequence overvoltage is complimenting phase undervoltage.

Figure 9. Relay 1 logic to trip phase A when communications to remote terminal is not available
However, this requires coordination delay with the parallel line protection to discriminate between
parallel line fault and internal fault. This delay needs to be greater than maximum protection operate
time plus breaker opening time. In this application, breaker opening time is 2 1/2 cycles and protection

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maximum operate time is 1 1/2 cycles which needs delay at least 4 cycles or 66ms at 60Hz. Another
complication is that if fault is internal, it can be tripped by remote terminal first and fault type
signature may disappear. To memorize it, a drop off delay of 40ms is added to the GOOSE inputs
carrying the fault signature from the parallel line relay 3.

3.2.3 RTDS Testing Results

A thorough RTDS simulation testing has been carried out to confirm the above solutions. The
RTDS model is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10. RTDS Model for Dynamic Testing

In the actual testing, many cases have been tested with the variation of fault location, fault
resistance, fault type, point on wave, etc. In this paper, however, only a few of typical cases are
discussed.

(a) Test Case 1 - Communication to Remote Terminal is Available

In this test case, phase A to ground fault was applied at 50% of line 1 with 45 ohms fault
resistance (refer to Figure 3). For this fault, it can be seen from Figure 11 that the fault current that
relay 1 measured was very small so that there is no obvious difference between the load current and
the fault current due to the lack of zero sequence sources at this terminal. However, the relay on the
parallel line (see IG in Figure 11) and the relay at the remote terminal (IA in Figure 12 ) have seen
significant fault currents. Though the fault current level at relay 1 was so low, the negative sequence
directional overcurrent element was still sensitive enough to pick up this high resistive fault (NEG SEQ
DIR OC1 FWD operand assertion in Figure 11).

Also from relay 1 oscillography shown in Figure 11, it can be seen that though the local phase
selector failed to identify fault type (PHASE SELECT VOID operand asserted due to lack of 3I0), the relay
was able to trip phase A correctly (TRIP PHASE A asserted) based on the negative sequence directional
overcurrent element and the fault type information received from the remote relay (RX1=1,
RX2=RX3=RX4=0).

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 Figure 11. Oscillography at Relay 1

At relay 2, though the fault type information received (RX1=RX2=RX3=0, RX4=1) from the remote
relay was incorrect, relay 2 could trip phase A correctly as per Table 3 based on the correct fault type
identified by the local phase selector.

Figure 12. Oscillography at Relay 2

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(b) Test Case 2 - Communication to Remote Terminal is Not Available

This case is the same phase A to ground fault at 50% of line 1 with 45 ohms fault resistance, but
without communication assistance from the remote terminal relay.

Figure 13. Oscillography at Relay 1

It can be seen from Figure 13 that Remote Inputs 8 and 9 carrying fault signature from parallel line
relay assert along with negative-sequence directional forward on the protected line and after
coordination delay of 80ms as was described above, relay trips phase A for this high-resistive fault.

4 Conclusion
In this paper, a case study of distance relay applications on a 230kV parallel line without any zero
sequence current sources at one line terminal is presented. Application difficulties and challenges due
to lack of zero sequence currents are discussed, and solutions are provided. Lessons learnt in this
study and solutions to overcome these difficulties are summarized below:

• Even with proper mutual coupling compensation, regular ground distance elements cannot be
used to protect the line without 3I0 current because additional supervision conditions in regular
distance elements with classical designs heavily depend on the zero sequence current. These
supervision conditions are essential to ensure selectivity, security, directional integrity and reach
accuracy in ground distance elements.
• Negative sequence directional overcurrent via hybrid POTT scheme with 4-bit communication
channel assistance from the remote terminal can be used to reliably detect ground faults, identify
faulty phases, and achieve single pole tripping.
• In case remote terminal communication channels are lost or not available, under voltage
elements with fault type information received from the local parallel line relay can be used as a
backup solution for the above single pole tripping scheme.

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Biography
José Castro received his electrical engineering degree from the University of Orient, Venezuela in 1996
and currently studying M.Sc. degrees from the University of Orient, Santiago de Cuba. He joined
engineering consulting in 1996 as project engineer in the electrical division for several industries. Since
2003 joining Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), he has been involved in design, testing, and
commissioning of substation and protection projects, including RTDS, synchrophasor and IEC 61850
applications. He works from 2011 in the Project Modernization Electrical Protection Systems,
Monitoring and Numerical Control (Mosipescon) like protections team leader and currently serves as
electrical protection manager in Electric Services Management.

Pedro Jiménez received his electrical engineering degree from the University of Orient (UDO),
Venezuela in 1996 and a M.Sc. degree from the University of Orient (UDO), Venezuela in 2006. He joined
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) in 1996 as project engineer in the engineering division and 2011 as
electrical protection manager in Electric Services Management. Since joining PDVSA, he has been
involved in design of substation, integration and automation projects, including and IEC 61850
applications. He works from 2011 in the Project Modernization Electrical Protection Systems,
Monitoring and Numerical Control (Mosipescon) like protections manager.

Zhiying Zhang received his B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees from the North China Institute of Electric Power
(now North China Electric Power University-NCEPU) and a Ph.D. degree from the University of
Manitoba, Canada, all in Electrical Engineering. He has over 25 years of working experience with
electric utilities and with relay manufactures in various technical positions. Since 2007 he has been
with General Electric, and currently holds the position of principal applications engineer at GE Digital
Energy in Markham, Ontario. Zhiying is a registered professional engineer in the province of Ontario
and a senior member of IEEE.

Ilia Voloh received his Electrical Engineering degree from Ivanovo State Power University, Russia. After
graduation he worked for Moldova Power Company for many years in various progressive roles in
Protection and Control field. He is currently an applications engineering manager with GE Multilin in
Markham Ontario, and he has been heavily involved in the development of UR-series of relays. His
areas of interest are current differential relaying, phase comparison, distance relaying and advanced
communications for protective relaying. Ilia authored and co-authored more than 20 papers
presented at major North America Protective Relaying conferences. He is an active member of the
PSRC, and a senior member of the IEEE.

Reference

[1] IEEE Std 142TM – 2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial
Power Systems
[2] J. Lewis Blackburn and Thomas J. Domin, Protective Relaying: Principles and Applications, Third
Edition, 2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
[3] IEEE Std C62.92, IEEE Guide for the Application of Neutral Grounding in Electrical Utility Systems
[4] Gerald Johnson, Mark Schroeder, Gerald Dalke, A Review of System Grounding Methods and Zero
Sequence Current Sources
[5] W. A. Elmore, Protective Relaying Theory and Applications, (Marcel Dekker Inc, 2004).
[6] GEK-113589, D60 Line Distance Protection System Instruction Manual, GE Multilin

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