Naveen Patnaik Authors a New Chapter for Orissa

Author(s): SURYA NARAYAN MISRA

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 39 (SEPTEMBER 26-OCTOBER 2, 2009),
pp. 148-150
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Naveen Patnaik Authors a
New Chapter for Orissa
SURYA NARAYAN MISRA_
Breaking off its long partnership Before the Lok Sabha and assembly
with the Bharatiya Janata Party,
the Biju Janata Dal and its new
allies won both the Lok Sabha
and assembly elections held
in Orissa in April 2009. The
Congress proved too inept to
take advantage of the changed
political scenario, while the
bjp found itself pushed out of
the picture. A major factor that
contributed to the b jd victory was
Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik's
personal popularity. Added to the
party's reasonable performance in
power, this prompted the state's
electorate to once again buck
the anti-incumbency trend and
re-elect the ruling party with an
expanded majority.
This survey is a part of "General Elections
2009 - A Behavioural Study of Political
Attitudes and Opinion in Orissa", a project
funded by the University Grants Commission.
Surya Narayan Misra (suryamisra50@ya.hoo.
com) is with the Department of Political
Science, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar.
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election and a two-thirds majority in the
assembly.
The sjd-bjp coalition had put up an im
pressive show in the 1999 and 2004 Lok
Sabha polls as well as the 2000 and 2004
assembly elections. The parting of ways
was an opportunity for the Congress, the
leader of the United Progressive Alliance
(upa) at the centre, to capitalise on. But it
elections in April 2009, Orissa made could do little because of leadership quar
news for more than one reason. rels, the nomination of unworthy candi
First, there was a steady stream of reports dates and a negative poll campaign. Both
about anti-Christian riots and tensions due elections resulted in an even stronger bjd,
to them. Second, on the eve of the elec with more seats and an enhanced support
tions, the long-standing alliance of the base. Had it only protected its own vote
Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp) with the Biju share, the Congress could have gained sub
Janata Dal (bjd) came to an abrupt end. stantially in terms of seats. But while the
Shocking the bjp, the bjd unilaterally an bjp lost only 2 percentage points in its Lok
nounced it was severing links with the Sabha vote share, the Congress lost almost
national party. This opened up the possibil 7 percentage points in comparison to 2004.
ity of a triangular contest because the bjd
Surprising but Not Unexpected
chose not to ally itself with the Congress.
That the new scenario would hurt the bjp The April 2009 Lok Sabha and assembly
was a foregone conclusion but specula election results were surprising but not
tion whether the triangular contest would unexpected. There was surprise because
benefit the Congress remained. given the background to the break-up of
the bjd and the bjp, many observers ex
Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik played
his cards smartly to rid the bjd of the stig pected the bjd to suffer some losses. In ad
ma of having been a partner of the bjp in dition, Patnaik was facing voters yet again
the wake of the communal violence in as an incumbent. But the electorate was
Kandhamal district in 2007-08. Though neither swayed by the goodwill created by
the bjd and the bjp were coalition part the upa government in New Delhi nor
ners in two assembly and Lok Sabha elec biased against the bjd because it had been
tions, they contested independently in ru in power. Thus Orissa once again bucked
ral and urban elections in 2007 and 2008. the anti-incumbency trend and chose to
The bjd's noteworthy performance in re-elect the ruling party with an added
these elections, particularly its victories in majority. Though the Congress improved
Bhubaneswar and Cuttack, and the bjp's its tally of two in 2004 to six in the Lok
role in the Kandhamal riots, led to Pat Sabha, its performance in the assembly
naik's decision to go it alone. The Left
Table 2: Change (Gain/Loss) after BJP-BJD Split_
Front promptly announced its support for LokSabha VidhanSabha
the bjd and the Nationalist Congress Par _Seats Votes (%) Seats Votes (%)
ty (ncp) also decided to back it at the state Congress +4_-767__-11_-5.7_2_
level. This friendship ended in seat shar
BJP_-7___j-2.41_-26_-2.08
BJD_+3 +7.23_+42 +1 1_.50__
ing among the bjd, the ncp, the Commu
Others_0 +2.85_-5_-3.70
nist Party of India (Marxist) (cpi(m)) and Source: Election Commission of India.
the cpi. The electoral are
Table 1: Results in Orissa for the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha 2009_
na mainly had three con
Contested_Won_Vote(%)
testants - the bjd and its LokSabha Vidhan Sabha LokSabha VidhanSabha LokSabha VidhanSabha
new friends, the Congress Congress__21_147 6_27 32.76_29.10
and the bjp. The gamble BJD_18 129 14 103 37.25 38.86_
BJD allies
paid off big time for the
bjd and Patnaik authored (CPI, CPI(M), NCP)_3_18_1_6__4^3___ _3-?0 _
BJP_21 145 0_6_ 16.89 15.05
a new chapter with his
Others_94_915_0_5 8.57 13.99_
party's impressive perfor Total_157 1,354 21_147 100 100_
mance in the Lok Sabha Source: Election Commission of India.
148 September 26, 2009 vol xliv no 39 uuui Economic & Political weekl
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Table 3: Orissa: Region-wise Analysis for Lok Sabha 2009_ various social sections. Tables 5 and 6 give
Congress BJP BJD BSP Others an idea of the social bases of different par
Regions Total Seat Turnout Won _ Vote Won_Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote
ties in this election. This data is based on a
Coastal 11_63.8_1_32.3_0_13.7 9 40.8_0_IX)_1 12.2
South 4 65.8_2__33.7 0 197_2_35.6_0__4.4 0 6.6 statewide survey carried out by the writer
West" 6 67.9 3 33.1_ 0_20.8_3_31.9 0 2.0 _0__12.3 in collaboration with the Centre for the
Total _ _21_A5?_6 32.8 _0_ 16.9 14 37.2 0 1.9 _1_11.2
Source: CSDS Data Unit.
Study of Developing Societies (csds),
Delhi. In terms of caste groups, the bjd
Table 4: Orissa Region-wise Analysis of Assembly Result_ was somewhat weak among dalits and
Congress _BJP_ BJD_ BSP Others adivasis; but here too, our earlier study
Regions_Totaljeat_Turnout Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote Won Vote
(National Election Study 2004) shows that
Coastal_77_63.8_5_29.6_0_11.7 64 44.2 0 07 8 13.8
South_28_65.8___9_27.4 3 19.7 16 357 0 3.6 0 13.6_ the Congress failed to gain even among
West_42_67.8 13 29.4 3_18.1 23 31.2 0 1.8 3 19.6 the sections whose support it enjoyed -
Total_147_ _65.3_27 29.1 6 15.1_103 38.9 0 1.5_11 15.4
Source: Election Commission of India.
compared to the last time, fewer dalits and
adivasis supported it this time. The bjd's
Table 5: Category-wise Vote and Seats Won_ support base was a combination of upper
Category Congress BJP BJD+_Others castes and Other Backward Classes (obcs)
_._Seats_Turnout (%) Won Vote(%) Won Vote(%) Won Vote(%) Won Vote(%)
while the Congress was dependent on dal
SC_3_67__0_38_0_10_3 51 0_1_
its and adivasis. Education showed almost
ST_5_66_2_30__0_21_3 46 0 3
Gen_13_65_4_ 32_0_17_9_48 0_3 a textbook pattern of support. Support for
Total 21_65 6_33 0_17_15_48_2_
Source: CSDS Data Unit
the Congress declined as the level of edu
cation rose; for the bjd, it was exactly the
Table6: Rural-Urban 2009 LokSabha Poll Result_ opposite. The bjd's voter profile in terms
Locality Congress BJP_BJD+ Others of class was more tilted towards the well
_Seats__Turnout (%)_Won" Vote(%) Won_Vote(%) Won Vbte(%) Won Vote(%)
Rural_18 67 5_33 0_17_13_48_0_2_ to-do while the Congress got more votes
from among the poor (Tables 7 and 8).
Urban_3_57_1 29 0_19_2_51_0_1__
Total___21_65 6 _33_0_17_15_48_0 2
Source: CSDS Data Unit.
When the upa was gaining in many
states, why did Orissa remain supportive of
poll was woeful. It had to be contentand
with the
of its 21 Lok Sabha seats, only three bjd? The personal popularity of Patnaik
fall
27 seats against the 38 it had in 2004in the urban category. In the April 2009
seems to have played an important role in
(Tables 1 and 2, p 148). the
election, the urban polling percentage outcome. He remained the most popular
was
much below the state average while itchoice
Orissa can be divided into three regions: was for the position of chief minister,
coastal, southern and western. There was in rural areas. The bjd capturedwith
higher moremore than 60% of the respondents
seats
not much variation in the turnout in all the and votes in the rural areas. Its preferring
urban him over K P Singh Deo, the
three regions for the Lok Sabha election
performance was not bad either (Table Pradesh
6). Congress Committee chief, who was
(Tables 3 and 4). The support base of Given
the the overall success of the bjd,picked
it is by only 8%. Apart from this, the bjd
bjd in coastal and southern Orissa clear
was that the party was popular across government was also reasonably popular.
larger than those of the Congress and the
Table 7: Social Groups and Votes in Orissa (2009)ifln%)_____
bjp. But in western Orissa the Congress was Congress _ _BJD+ _ BJP_ Others_ N_
Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan Lok" " Vidhan
slightly stronger and well ahead of the bjp. Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha_Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha
Of 11 seats in coastal Orissa, the bjd Brahmin_32
won 26_47 49 20 20 0_5 78 84 _
Other
nine and one went to the cpi. The Congress uppercaste_27_33_49 48 _15_12_9_7 15
Yadav _ 35 22 46 58 19 11 0 9 78 78
won only one seat. In southern and western
Orissa, the Congress and the bjd had an
KhandyaT_22 16 40 47 17_
QtherOBC_28 25 50 58 16_13 6 4 _217 224
equal share of seats, but there was a huge SC _43_39 37 45 _11_14_10 2 158 _160_
difference in their share of votes. ST ~~ 44 35 26 ~51~ 21 14 9 " 1 161 164
There are three and five seats from the Others_32 30_36_48 32_17__0_4_22_23_
state reserved in the Lok Sabha for scheduled All_33 29 _42 51 17_14_8_6 _J,009 1,035
Table
castes (scs) and scheduled tribes (sts), re 8: Vote by Class and Gender _ _
~ ~ Congress ~ BJ0+ ~ BJP Others N
spectively. The turnout was a little above Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan Lok Vidhan
average in these. Given that Orissa has a Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha Sabha

huge adivasi population (22% against the Rich_26 22 45_53_28 25 0 0_53_55

Middle
national average of 8%), the st vote assumes 31_24 __44_47 16_14 9_ J 5_ 313 323
Lower_33
significance. In the constituencies reserved
30 43 55_16 _11__8 4 345 352
Poor _ 35 28 39 5.5 19 14 6 2_216 220
for sts, the bjd got a little less than its aver Very poor_40_48 " 30_38_12 13_17_1
age votes (Table 5). The state has a huge Male_30_29_38_48_19 15 12 8 _566 586
Female_36;_29_47_55_
rural population (85% in the 2001 Census) 14 12 3_4_444 449
Economic & Political weekly uuui September 26, 2009 vol xliv no 39 149

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Orissa was one of the few states where the formally remained with the Janata Party
popularity of the state government surpassedand the Janata Dal after his experiment
that of the upa government at centre. While with the Utkal Congress. The main reason
72% of the respondents were satisfied with for forming the bjd was joining hands
the state government, only 56% said they with the National Democratic Alliance
were satisfied with the upa government.
Conclusions
Orissa is a state where the Congress faced
early challenges. In that sense, state par
ties are not new to Orissa. In the 1950s,
the Ganatantra Parishad, in the 1960s, the
Jana Congress, and in the 1970s, the Utkal
Congress were prominent and they were
partners in various coalition govern
ments. The bjd came on the scene in 1997
after Biju Patnaik's death in 1996. The
most important non-Congress leader from
the state, Biju Patnaik operated auto
nomously at the state level though he
Sikkim: Politics of Inclusiveness
and One-Party Dominance
MUKUND GIRI_
The peculiar history and social
composition of Sikkim have
compelled its government,
dominated by the Sikkim
Democratic Front, to pursue a
prudent, all-inclusive policy. This
has yielded rich dividends in all
elections since 1994, putting to
rest the many theories associated
with the anti-incumbency factor.
The state's politics, thus, remain
an anomaly when compared to
other Indian states.
Lokniti, Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies, Delhi, in its National Election Study
2009, conducted a post-poll survey among 463
respondents in Sikkim in May 2009.
Mukund Giri (mukunds4@yahoo.co.iri) is with
the Department of Political Science, Sikkim
Government College, Gangtok.
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(nda). The party became a part of the nda
in 1998 and formed coalition govern
ments in the state after the 2000 and
2004 elections.
But the bjd also represents the regional
sentiments of the people of Orissa. Patnaik
is known as a crusader against corruption;
he also symbolises the developmental
aspirations of the backward state and its
regional pride. When he severed links
with the bjp, his erstwhile ally made the
mistake of harshly criticising him and
making a hero out of him. Propaganda by
the bjp revolved around the theme of
"treachery" - a strategy the party thought
When one-party dominance seems
to be on the decline elsewhere,
Sikkim, a late entrant to the
democratic politics of the country, appears
to be presided over by one political party -
the Sikkim Democratic Front (sdf). Sikkim
is a state with 32 Vidhan Sabha constituen
cies and one Lok Sabha constituency. In the
2004 general election, the sdf won 31
Vidhan Sabha seats and the lone Lok Sabha
seat. Given this, the performance of the
party in the April 2009 general election,
when it won in all the Vidhan Sabha con
stituencies and the Lok Sabha constituency,
may not appear to be spectacular (Table 1).
But it was because the sdf, which has been
in power since 1994, not only managed to
overcome the anti-incumbency factor but
also bettered its past-poll performance.
It is clear that Sikkim, relatively new to
competitive politics, is yet to come to terms
with a multiparty situation. Many of the
peculiarities of politics in the state emanate
from its social composition and history. Be
fore its merger with India in 1974, Sikkim
was ruled by the Bhutias and Lepchas.
150 September 26, 2009 vol xliv no 39 EHC9 Economic & Political weekly
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
had worked well in Karnataka. By distanc
ing itself from the bjp, the bjd could fend
off blame for the loss of lives and safety in
Kandhamal district. The bjd skilfully
combined its clever politics with a strong
pro-poor programme. The supply of rice at
Rs 2 a kilogram for families below the
poverty line was an example of this.
The bjd's election success points to a
path that seeks to combine popular poli
cies, effective performance and non-com
munal politics. While the Congress did not
succeed in taking advantage of political
developments in the state, the bjd's
victory may have pushed the bjp's com
munal agenda to the background. Also,
the demise of the bjd-bjp coalition has
meant further isolation of the bjp. In this
sense, Orissa's election results may have
implications beyond the state.
They also owned most of the land. But the
state was populated by a large proportion
of Nepalis, who kept migrating in search of
jobs. The Nepali population of Sikkim was
in the forefront of the democratic move
ment, which led to the merger of the terri
tory with India on the basis of an assembly
resolution. So, today's Sikkim is dominated
in demographic terms by the Nepali popu
lation though, economically, the Bhutias
and Lepchas continue to be influential.
A special provision of the Constitution of
India (article 371-f) protects the property
rights of the Bhutias and Lepchas. Consid
ering the complex social composition and
political history of the state, 13 seats in the
Vidhan Sabha are reserved for these com
munities. This ensures that though the sdf
is dominated by Nepalis and its leadership
is also Nepali, it has to tread cautiously lest
it lose the support of these 13 mlas. Thus,
while the sdf, which represents the inter
ests of the Nepali community (75% of the
state's population), enjoys political power,
prudence compels it to accommodate the
interests of the Bhutias and Lepchas. This
paves the way for one-party dominance with
a balanced policy of inclusion. The Nepali
Table 1: Party Performance in Assembly Election_
Party_Contested_ _ Won_Vot?J%)_
INC_32____0____27-6_4
SDF _32_32_65.91_
SH R P_20_0_02.19__
Others_ 83^ __ _0 _?? l6__
Souice: Election Commission of India