The debate over why parts of Europe experienced significant economic growth from the eighteenth

century onwards while much of Asia, Africa, and the Americas (excluding the United States) lagged
behind has been a long-standing and prominent topic. Historians and thinkers spanning the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including prominent figures like Karl Marx and Max Weber, have
engaged with this critical issue. Even contemporary historians such as Eric Jones, Douglass North, and
David Landes have contributed to this discourse. This historical phenomenon is commonly referred
to as the "Great Divergence," a term popularized by Kenneth Pomeranz's 2000 book.

Over the last fifteen years, this debate has evolved with several overlapping strands of contention,
with a more significant focus on China than on India. This preference partly stems from the earlier
publication of Pomeranz's work and the long history of China–Europe comparisons. Additionally, the
abundance of historians specializing in China compared to India in the United States and Europe has
kept the discussion alive. China and Japan have also garnered more interest in the divergence
question than India. While economic history is flourishing in East Asia, it has declined significantly in
South Asia since its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s.

In contrast, more recent scholars like

The text delves into the historical debate on agricultural productivity and its role in economic
divergence, primarily focusing on the Lower Yangzi region of China and its comparison to Europe,
particularly England.

Kenneth Pomeranz, along with supporting evidence from others, argues that the agricultural system
in the Lower Yangzi was remarkably robust. Research by Robert Allen suggests that as late as 1820,
productivity per labor day in Yangzi Delta farming was almost on par with that in England. Moreover,
the annual net income for a Delta tenant family was slightly higher than that of a similar English
household, especially when factoring in the contribution of wives engaged in part-time cloth-making.

Another study points out that labor productivity in Yangzi Delta farming around 1800 was equivalent
to that in Holland, reaching 94% of English levels. Notably, land productivity in the Delta exceeded
most of the world, second only to certain parts of Japan and roughly nine times that of England. This
implies exceptionally high total factor productivity, even surpassing various European countries that
industrialized in the nineteenth century. By contrast, agricultural labor productivity in Germany was
only about 50% of English levels.

These findings challenge the concept of 'agrarian fundamentalism,' which posits that industrial
readiness is contingent on efficient agriculture as it frees up labor and capital for other economic
uses, ultimately keeping food prices and wages low. Such a perspective has also faced scrutiny within
the Indian context.

In Chinese historiography, a variation of agrarian fundamentalism once dominated, suggesting that

peasant production (as opposed to large farms relying on wage labor) could not yield surpluses or
the flexibility required for sustained per capita growth. However, this view is in contrast to empirical
data on labor and total factor productivity, as well as the remarkable economic performances of
regions like Japan, Taiwan, and Eastern China, where small-scale family farming with strong
ownership or usufruct rights prevails.

The broader assertion made by the "Great Divergence" theory that living standards and per capita
incomes were comparable between Europe and China, as well as between England and the Yangzi
Delta, has undergone some revision. Initially, Pomeranz suggested this comparability still held true in
1800, and most likely around 1750. Recent research by scholars like Stephen Broadberry, Hanhui
Guan, and David Daokui Li suggests that the divergence in per capita GDP likely occurred closer to
1700 than 1750, but the exact timing remains a subject of debate. Some argue that the range of
disagreement is narrowing, as more scholars explore alternative measures, such as consumption,
particularly focusing on grain, which still indicates comparability between the Lower Yangzi and
England, at least as of 1750 and possibly beyond.

The debate on standards of living in India versus China, initiated in 1998 by Parthasarathi's work,
involves differing views from economic historians like Broadberry and Gupta. Broadberry and Gupta
argue that silver wages in India during the 17th and 18th centuries were significantly lower than in
England, with Indian grain wages declining sharply in the 18th century. However, this perspective has
been disputed by scholars like Sashi Sivramkrishna and Parthasarathi, who emphasize broader
measures of real wages and other factors. Broadberry and Gupta's figures are also critiqued for not
considering non-monetary benefits, labor market conditions, and bargaining power. The debate
remains inconclusive, highlighting the complexity of comparing historical wages and living standards.

The text discusses the timing and implications of economic divergence between advanced regions in
Europe, particularly England, and China and India. It addresses the revisions in historical perspectives
regarding when this divergence occurred.

The emergence of a significant gap in economic development between Europe and China, and
possibly India, by 1800 is acknowledged, with this gap rapidly expanding thereafter. This divergence
primarily resulted from the greater productivity of non-agricultural workers in Europe and England
compared to China and Japan, coupled with a growing non-farm workforce on both sides of Eurasia.
This suggests that explanations for the divergence should be sought beyond agriculture and should
avoid simplistic black-and-white contrasts between entire societies, emphasizing the complexity of
the issue.

Furthermore, the text highlights the earlier divergence in unskilled wages, both urban and rural,
compared to overall living standards. By the mid-eighteenth century, Delta wages in China had
already fallen significantly behind those in Europe. This apparent contradiction can be reconciled by
considering the proportion of wage laborers in each society. In the highly commercialized Lower
Yangzi, wage laborers made up a relatively small portion of the rural workforce, whereas in England
and Holland around 1700, a substantial portion relied on wage earning. This difference in the
composition of the labor force allows for significant wage disparities while maintaining comparable
average living standards between Jiangnan and Northwestern Europe.
The text discusses the significance of institutions in shaping global trade flows and East-West
divergence. Various institutional differences are examined, including property rights, contract
enforcement, fiscal systems, and more. Pomeranz argues that East Asian property rights and contract
enforcement were sufficient for market expansion. Access to land allocation in China and Japan was
effective. While capital in East Asia was more expensive than in Europe, it did not hinder economic
activities like handicraft production, trade, and agricultural improvement. Public finance systems in
Europe were better for raising immediate funds, but this mattered less in early modern times due to
lower military costs and different technological needs. However, the 19th century brought significant
changes, including the impact of overseas colonization and evolving institutions that played a crucial
role in economic growth, highlighting the importance of discontinuity in institutions under changing
conditions.

Economic historians and historians of science approach these issues differently. Historians of science
have shifted their focus beyond laboratory work to include field sciences, revealing the contributions
of non-European individuals to the development of modern science. They emphasize the global
nature of scientific endeavors. Additionally, historians of science struggle to establish a direct, micro-
level connection between scientific knowledge and technological change, recognizing that major
technological advances often preceded a full understanding of the underlying science. Furthermore,
historical evidence shows scientific interest in South Asia during the 17th and 18th centuries,
challenging arguments for the exceptional nature of European science. The differing approaches of
economic historians and historians of science will need reconciliation for the debate to progress.

, as Eric Hobsbawm argued.

"The Great Divergence" builds on classic writings about coal and British industrialization, tracing back
to the 19th century. Key figures include William Stanley Jevons, John Nef, and Tony Wrigley. Eric
Jones's concept of 'ghost acres' and Eric Williams' work on Caribbean slavery also contribute to this
discussion.

On the other hand, "Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not" focuses on different aspects of the
British Industrial Revolution, particularly cotton. This theme has roots in 19th-century works,
including Edward Baines' "History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain." In the 20th century,
scholars like Paul Mantoux, David Landes, and Eric Hobsbawm emphasized the significance of cotton
in the industrial revolution. John Clapham's periodization of British industrialization into stages aligns
with this perspective.

The debate on divergence encompasses various areas of disagreement, including the relative
economic development of Europe and Asia, the nature of industrialization, the role of institutions,
and the contribution of science and knowledge. Adjudicating these issues often relies on interpreting
qualitative data, making judgments subjective and context-dependent. Additionally, quantitative
data, while valuable, is also subject to interpretation and limitations. Scholars face challenges in
assembling accurate historical data, and even with data in hand, interpreting it can be complex.
Therefore, plausible explanations for divergence must consider a range of evidence, both
quantitative and qualitative, taking into account factors such as export surpluses, military
capabilities, and economic regression in different regions over time.

The debate on the role of science in the divergence between Europe and other regions presents
three distinct positions within the literature. First, some argue that science wasn't relevant,
especially in the early stages of industrialization, and that artisanal knowledge was more crucial.
Scholars like Allen and Pomeranz represent this perspective. Second, others assert that European
science became critical by the 18th century, bringing a unique approach to knowledge and its
application globally. Notable proponents of this view include Margaret Jacob, Joel Mokyr, and Patrick
O'Brien. A third position, articulated by Parthasarathi, combines elements of the first two
perspectives. It acknowledges that knowledge application existed outside Europe, particularly in
early modern India, and suggests that early modern science transcended national boundaries. It also
agrees with Allen that artisanal knowledge played a significant role in the initial stages of
industrialization, with scientific knowledge often following technical breakthroughs.