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Apperception in chess players' long-

range planning
a b
Pertti Saariluoma & Michael Hohlfeld
a
Department of Psychology , University of Helsinki , Helsinki,
Finland
b
Department of Psychology , University of Tubingen , Tübingen,
Germany
Published online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Pertti Saariluoma & Michael Hohlfeld (1994) Apperception in chess
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 EUROPEAN JOURNAL O F COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, 1994, 6 (1) 1-22

Apperception in Chess Players’ Long-range Planning

Pertti Saariluoma
Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

Michael Hohlfeld
Department of Psychology, University of Tubingen, Tubingen, Germany
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Chess players’ long-range planning or chess-strategic thinking is based on

more or less poorly definable and intuitive notions such as weak-square,
initiative, space advantage, etc. Since these concepts are fuzzy and thus
close to everyday concepts, chess players’ long-range planning provides a
good environment to study apperception with poorly definable notions. The
three experiments provided data indicating that problem subspace abstrac-
tion has both benefits and costs. Active representation blockades alternative
representations unless subjects restructure. As a result, chess players often
make serious cognitive errors by abstracting the wrong problem subspaces.
Even in strategical positions, the problem subspaces generated are self-
consistent and bound by unconscious content-specific principles.

INTRODUCTION
All fundamental scientific notions rely on intuitive images or ideas and the
efficiency of theoretical thinking depends on the efficiency of these images
and ideas (Nagel, 1961). In general, the tacit implications of theoretical
concepts do not bear greatly on the practical research, but sometimes it is
proper to call attention to the intuitive assumptions in common theoretical
concepts in order to improve the efficiency of the conceptual systems used.
In modern cognitive psychology, the problem of mental representation
formation has stimulated a number of theoretical concepts with strong
intuitive assumptions. Examples of such concepts are stimulus equiva-
lence, fixation, set, affordances, top-down vs bottom-up processing, pat-
tern recognition, planning and schema theory (Anderson, 1983; Duncker,
1945; Gibson, 1941; Maltzman, 1955; Neisser, 1976). All these notions are
widely used, but their sheer number and vaguely defined borders show that

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Pertti Saariluoma. Department of Psychol-

ogy, University of Helsinki, Fabianinkatu 28, 00100 Helsinki 10. Finland.

0 1994 Lawrence Erlbaurn Associates Limited

 2 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

sufficient generality has not been achieved. This means that research into
representation formation is to some extent in a state of conceptual confu-
sion.
In the context of the research on chess players’ thinking, three of the
above notions are relevant. They are planning, pattern recognition and
schema activation (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965; Simon & Chase,
1973; Wilkins, 1979). The intuitive problems with these concepts are
typical and they can be used to demonstrate the conceptual problems
characteristic of the current psychology of thinking.
Planning, which was borrowed by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960)
from computer science, has had practically no applicability outside the
problem-solving literature. Pattern recognition as the process of accessing
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familiar plans in long-term memory does not effectively apply to the study
of genuine problem solving and the construction of new ideas (Chase &
Simon, 1973; Duncker, 1945; Holding, 1985; Luchins, 1942; Polya, 1957;
Saariluoma, 1984; 1990). Finally, schema activation is unclear because the
notion of schema does not express how our memory could produce
concrete representations such as images (see Alba & Hasher, 1983; Neis-
ser, 1987). A schematic memory could not, for example, play blindfold
chess (Saariluoma, 1991a).
Our conceptual standpoint arises from that part of European philosophy
which has always considered it very important to make a strict distinction
between simple perception and the perception of something as something
(e.g. Husserl, 1913; Kant, 1781/1966). Consequently, we have adopted
apperception as our basic notion. It is defined as that cognitive or mental
process which constructs content-specific representations (Kant, 1781/
1966; Leibniz, 1704/1979; Stout, 1896; Wundt, 1880).
The notion of apperception is designed to emphasise the fact that the
notion of object perception or any stimulus-bound notion (e.g. recogni-
tion), cannot express the process of internal representation construction in
thinking. People represent or “see” the same objects differently depending
on their background knowledge. Gary Kasparov’s semantic figure of
thought is different from those of the authors, though we all perceive the
same chess board and the same pieces. Chess protocols also show that the
same stimulus may be represented in an individual’s thinking in very
different ways from time to time. Indeed, the contents of mental represen-
tations may refer to non-perceivable objects and issues such as atoms,
infinity, tomorrow or yesterday, which cannot possibly be present in any
percept.
The use of the term “apperception” is not an absolute necessity. N o
theoretical term is absolutely necessary, but cognitive psychologists should
not underestimate the importance of the intuitive and imaginary contents
of theoretical concepts (Nagel, 1961). Behaviourism should be a sufficient
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 3
warning concerning the discouraging consequences of minimally expressive
theoretical concepts. By saying that chess players’ abstraction of problem
subspaces is “seeing”, which is common in the skills literature, we imply
that the problem is not clear enough for sensible empirical research. As the
recent research into chess players’ problem solving has now made it
possible to discuss the notion of apperception directly, this opportunity
should be used (Saariluoma, 1990; 1991b; 1992).
The research into chess players’ apperception of problem subspaces has
revealed that three cognitive mechanisms are involved. First, the apper-
ception of problem subspaces leads to fixation-type effects and, conse-
quently, apperception explains a part of chess players’ cognitive errors
(Saariluoma, 1990; 1992). Second, apperception is strongly mediated by
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conceptually controlled mental imagery, which partly explains human

chess players’ ability to deliberate thinking from strict stimulus control
(Saariluoma, 1990; 1991b). Finally, apperception entails information integ-
ration processes, which explain the highly economic, logical and self-
consistent structure of human chess players’ problem solving (Saariluoma,
1990; 1992). Moves generated in abstracted problem subspaces form small,
logically connected networks. This self-consistency is possible because the
defender’s moves must accompany both spatially and temporally the
attacker’s moves, that is, the defender’s pieces must eventually end up on
squares through which the attacker’s pieces must move (Saariluoma,
1990). Here it is possible to explain using only a few content-specific
reasons why human search spaces are so small compared with current
computers (Saariluoma, 1990).
In protocols, the abstraction of subspaces can best be seen in the
contents of the episodes (for the concept of episode, see Newell & Simon,
1972). However, an abstracted problem subspace and an episode are not
one and the same thing. Several episodes may refer to the same problem
subspace. I n this way, episodes are surface structures, while the problem
subspaces are the deep structures behind them.
So far, the research into apperception has been restricted to problems
which are termed “tactical”. This means that the consequences of the
suggested moves are in principle fully analysable. Much in chess players’
thinking is based on less well-defined chess-strategic notions, but in this
paper we wish to analyse positions with a clearly more strategic character.
By chess-strategic thinking we mean the type of thinking required in
business or military actions rather than the way the term is used in
cognitive psychology. To us, chess-strategic thinking is long-range plan-
ning. Clausewitz (1832/1978) expressed the notion of military strategy as
follows: “Strategy has been the employment of the battle as the means
towards the attainment of the object of war”. Here strategy means long-
range planning, which allows a military leader or a chess player to knit all
 4 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

the various small tactical incidents into a whole and direct them into a more
or less common course (Euwe & Kramer. 1956).
Instead of considering concrete moves, chess strategy concentrates on
the permanent strong points and weaknesses of positions. A state of affairs
is permanent on the chess board if it cannot be changed in a few moves. A
pair of bishops, for example, have in many positions a permanent advan-
tage over two knights, because the exchange of a bishop with one of the
knights is often difficult.
Central notions of chess strategy may be general such as a “line”, rather
specific such as a “doubled pawn”, or very abstract such as “initiative” and
“development” (Euwe & Kramer, 1956). Thus, chess-strategic thinking is
in many respects close to everyday thinking with its rather fuzzily defined
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and intuitive notions.

Chess-strategic thinking has been a rather neglected area of chess
players’ problem-solving research. De Groot (1965) argued that strategic
considerations may suggest moves. Newell and Simon (1972) pointed out
that tree pruning may also be a consequence of strategic thinking. Char-
ness (1977) suggested that concrete position types may be a factor in
strategic decision making and, finally, Holding (1985; 1992) has argued for
the importance of evaluation in the development of chess skill. Though
these ideas provide a very good basis for subsequent research, much more
empirical work is required before the secrets of Stout’s (1896) “notional
synthesis” (i.e. information integration) are uncovered.

EXPERIMENT 1
The first experiment was designed to gain an empirical overview of the
nature of chess-strategic thinking. Four positions were presented to the
subjects and they were asked to search for a move while thinking aloud
(see Fig. 1). The positions had a strongly chess-strategic character and we
assumed that they would evoke strategic chains of thought and provide
new data on the nature of strategic thinking.
I n chess. strategy and ractics are always very strongly interconnectcd
(Euwe Kr Kramer. 1956: Lasker. 1947). There are no purely strategic
positions nor purely tactical ones. Still. it is possible to select positions so
that either tactical or strategic aspects of the game are emphasised in chess
players’ thinking. In some positions. the tactical problems are so simple
that they cio not cause problems to subjects. while at the same time the
chess-strategic problems are very evident. We call these type o f positions
strategic positions (cf. Euwe & Kramer. 1956: Lasker, 1947).
It may he of interest to readers who are chess players to gain a more
accurate formulation. although this is not essential from the psychological
point of view. The critical issue is that we classify all the positions that are
not perfectly calculable as strategic. For example. so-called positional and
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 5
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a b c d e l g h

FIG. 1 Positions in Experiment 1: Black to move in (a) and (b). (a) Ne8 with the idea a6, b5;
(b) Rb6; (c) 0-0; (d) h4 with the idea hS-Ne3-Nf5.

intuitive sacrifices are, in our opinion, predominantly strategic operations,

because initiative is such an important notion in them and they also fit in so
well with de Groot’s (1965) idea of dynamic evaluation. The rest of the
positions in our classifications should be considered as very standard.
In the protocol analysis, we concentrate on the extraction of typically
strategic characteristics of protocols. We also try to classify these features
and to ask more detailed questions in the subsequent experiments.

Method
Subjects. Eight subjects participated in the experiment. Four of them
were experts, one with slightly over 2000 E L 0 points and the rest with at
least 2200, but no more than 2400. The other group of four had an
estimated rating significantly below 1600 points.
 6 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

Details of the ELO-rating system can be found in Elo (1978). However,

the basic idea of the system is simple and is explained here. In this system,
each player has an interval level numerical rating; the higher the rating, the
better the player. The numeric value is determined based on results in
competitions. By beating somebody, a player gains more points. The
stronger the player one has beaten, the more points one is awarded.
Correspondingly, the weaker the player one loses to, the greater the
number of points deducted. After a number of games in this kind of
system, each player will find his or her correct rating. A beginner’s rating is
somewhere around 1200 points, while the world champion has around 2800
points. The strongest amateurs usually have between 2200 and 2400 points.
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Srirnuli and Procedure. Four positions were selected randomly from

various chess publications. The only criterion was that both authors
assessed them to be predominantly chess-strategic positions. However, we
tried to use positions that, in a chess sense, represented different types of
strategic problems. The standard thinking aloud procedure was used. The
subjects were asked to find a move and relate all that occurred to them
during the problem-solving process. The verbal protocols were recorded
and later transcribed.
Each position was produced with chess print transfers and presented on
a 9 x 9 cm board glued to a white AS-size card. In half of the positions it
was white’s move and in the other half it was black’s. The presentation
order of the positions was random and counterbalanced over subjects. No
time limits were imposed.

Results and Discussion

The basic background statistics are given in Table 1. It presents the mean
number of correct solutions, the average length of solution times, the
number of episodes, and the number of moves generated per subject in the
two groups. The episodes are defined in a very similar manner to Newell
and Simon (1972). Each time subjects generate a new base move, a new
episode is counted. An episode is different from a problem subspace,
because the same problem subspace can be referred to by several different
episodes.
The between-group differences were statistically significant with
respect to time “(6) = 3.40, P < 0.051, the number of correct solutions
( t ( 6 )= 9.998, P < 0.0011, the number of moves generated [ f ( 6 ) = 6.71, P <
0.0011 and the number of episodes generated “(6) = 6.88, P < 0.001]. The
search spaces generated by the experts were thus much larger than those of
the less skilled players, which shows again what an elusive and position-
dependent measure the size of a search tree is. On the one hand, de Groot
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 7

TABLE 1
Percentage of Solutions, Average Number of Moves per Position (Null Moves
Included), Episodes and Average Solution Times for the Two Skill Groups in
Experiment 1

Correct Moves Episodes Solution

(%) (4 (4 Times (min:s)

Experts 69 111 18 9:40

Non-experts 6 36 8 5:25
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(1965) and Saariluoma (1990) did not find essential differences between
“super-experts’’ and experts, but here on the other hand, the difference
appears again as in Charness (1981a) with combinations and in Saariluoma
(1992) with endgame positions (see also Holding, 1985, 1992, for a discus-
sion). Perhaps the super-experts in the experiments by de Groot (1965)
and Saariluoma (1990) were simply stronger than those in the experiments
with contrasting results, and the positions were too easy for the skills of the
super-experts.
Table 2 gives the absolute number of evaluative sentences at the begin-
ning, within (intermediate) and at the end of the episodes. The small
number of intermediate evaluative sentences was not very encouraging as
far as computer search models are concerned. The number of intermediate
nodes was far larger than the initial or terminal nodes and, therefore, the
low frequency of intermediate evaluation sentences strongly suggests that
computers which search heuristically are not particularly good models for
human search. This does not mean that no evaluation is made, but its role
is probably very different from that which has been assumed in designing
chess-playing computer programs.
The number of strategic attributes in protocols was small, which suggests
that people use strong attribute selection (Charness, 1977; Newell &
Simon, 1972; Saariluoma, 1984). Indeed, around 70% of the evaluations

TABLE 2
Absolute Number and Location of Evaluative Sentences in the
Two Skill Groups

Beginning Intermediate End

Experts 36 191 270

Non-experts 35 51 107
Toral 71 242 377
 8 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

were based on just one strategic attribute. This attribute (e.g. open line,
strong point or weak point, etc.) was normally a consequence of some
move or move series and it was used to assess the value of the whole
episode. Multi-attribute evaluations, that is evaluations based on the
unification of several different strategic attributes before making a deci-
sion, were common only in the very first orienting episode of a protocol.
The move sequences that were generated had a strongly chess-strategic
character. These are not tactical combinations but manoeuvres, and are
normally classified as chess-strategic entities (e.g. Euwe 8i Kramer, 1956).
The strategic character of a generated move series can be supported by the
frequent gaps which occur. Such gaps have been termed “null moves” (de
Groot, 1965; Hohlfeld, 1988; Newell & Simon, 1972; Saariluoma, 1992).
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Technically, we registered any gap in a move sequence appearing in a

protocol as a null move, irrespective of whose move was omitted.
Null moves or plans with gaps are not, of course, specific to chess.
Eminent psychologists such as Selz (1913) and Bartlett (1958) have always
been interested in gap-filling during problem solving, which means that
plans with null moves have a wider psychological significance. The genera-
tion of plans with gaps in chess is a form of sketching the solution.
Consequently. we should pay special attention to them. Unfortunately, the
literature on chess players’ problem solving does not provide much infor-
mation about null moves. De Groot (1965) has referred to them and has
suggested that they play some role in the control of search. Newell and
Simon (1972) also mention them very briefly, but follow basically de
Groot’s (1965) suggestions. Hohlfeld (1988) and Saariluoma (1992) have
also paid some attention to null moves.
Charness (1981b) discussed null moves very briefly in his paper on ageing
and search in chess. He suggested three explanations for the phenomenon.
First, he suggested that null moves are failures in plausible move genera-
tion; second, that null moves serve the function of allowing search to
progress without the strain of remembering additional change; and, third,
that null moves are options for planning used in a similar fashion by all
players.
Null moves were common in this experiment, and we found 273 cases in
our 32 protocols. This equates to about 12% of all moves. The overall
results are very similar to those of Charness (1981b), who reported that
10% of all moves were null. All the subjects generated null moves, which
were found either at the beginning, during or at the end of move sequences
(Charness, 1981b). The null moves in the present experiment are listed in
Fig. 2.
Close reading of the protocols showed that in 42.8% of cases, null moves
were bound during the subsequent problem-solving process. By binding,
we mean that subjects relate a new version of a variation, replacing the null
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 9
Position a. Because the queen is in c4 and the rook in b3, if they were moved to h4 and h3 it
would be a threat.
Position b. Perhaps it would be possible to carry out a knight-manoeuvree7-c8-b6.
Posirion c. So, another idea to finally support the rook. Move the rook to b6 in order to take
a4.
Position d . One can also consider seriously Bf4 and castling. . .

FIG. 2 Examples of null moves in protocols (positions in Fig. 1)

move with some real move (see Fig. 3). The phenomenon of binding does
not support Charness’s (1981b) first suggestion. If null moves were not
bound, the failure in a plausible move generation hypothesis could be
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supported. However, the phenomenon of binding suggests that the omis-

sion of moves is a result of a normal cognitive operation in chess. The
binding of null moves is not dependent on the memory load hypothesis and
no conclusive arguments can be proferred. However, the association of
null moves with planning seems to us a very relevant idea.
The high percentage of non-bound null moves is very probably a
consequence of the strategic character of the positions. It is not necessary
to bind all moves from the initial position to the goal, but some of the
moves can be left undefined. Consequently, the plans evoked in players’
minds cannot consist of complete operator information. The player is not
concerned with the opponent’s counter-changes and precise operator
knowledge, but evaluates when he will keep the advantage whatever move
his opponent makes.
The phenomenon of binding also seems very important because it
provides a bridge between strategy and tactics. By binding null moves,
chess players complete operator sequences. Figure 3 contains some con-
crete examples (see also the Appendix). The high frequency of binding
shows that this mechanism must be important (de Groot, 1965; Newell &
Simon, 1972). De Groot (1965) and Newell and Simon (1972) have
suggested that null moves play a role in the control of searching. Although
they did not suggest a more specific control mechanism, it seems to us that
binding is a process in which plans with null moves control information
selection and search. The ideas of Selz (1913) are central to this interpreta-
tion.

(1) . . .Kb8 null Nb6

Bd8 Nb6
(2) Nc8 null Nb6 a:b c:b etc.
Nc8 Be2 Nb6 a:b c:b etc.
FIG. 3 Binding null moves in problem behaviour. The binding moves are underlined.
 10 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

The key question is the nature of the binding moves, that is, the moves
that are suggested to fill the gaps in the move sequences generated. What
kind of moves are they? Are there any criteria for their selection? In fact,
the moves fall mainly into the four categories suggested by Saariluoma
( 1990) for tactical counter-moves: exchange, escape, blockade and
counter-action (counter-attack) moves.
The classification in this experiment was the same as that used by
Saariluoma (1990). The classification itself is very simple, precisely defin-
able and almost mechanical. Only multimotive moves (e.g. escape and
exchange) may cause interpretational problems, but the classification is in
no way a question of taste. (To convince readers about the implausibility of
any judication procedures, we have collected together a large number of
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examples in the Appendix.) Indeed, the classification can be realised by a

computer. In the “exchange” category, all moves are included in which the
defender takes the attacker’s active piece or considers taking it. In the
“blockade” category, a piece is moved between the original and the

O w n counter-action: Ne8, - -, e6
Ne8, Re3
This is a mysterious rook move. The idea is to place a rook in a line that will be opened up by
the opponent later. The manoeuvre does not contain any direct threat, but it must still be
classified as one’s own counter-action.

Exchange: Qg4. - Q:dl -.

Og4, - Qf3 -.
Qg4. ofl
This prevents both threats (Q:f4 and Q:dl) by exchanging in an imaginary scenario the
attacking queen (e.g. Q:dl. Q:dl). This is probably the most complicated case of exchange,
because the exchanges cannot be seen in the protocols, they must be deduced. This case could
also be classified separately. under the heading “protection“ for example. However, for
4mplicity. i t is classified as an exchange.

E x a p e : Qg4. - -, Bh6
Qg4. Rfl. Bh6
Again. this is a critical case. because escape ( R f l ) contains an element of exchange as well
(i.e. Q:f-t. R.f4).

Hlockade
Sincc. in the protocols. there were no clear null move binding blockade moves, the blockade
cuarnple is from a protocol move sequence:
Og4. - -. O:dl
Og4. Rf3
The move blockades Q:dl. but it is critical because it prevents Q:f3 by exchange (R:f4).

FIG. 4 Examples of critical and problematic borderline cases in the binding categories from
the various protocols in position (a) in Fig. 1.
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 11

destination square of an attacker’s piece. Usually, the blockading piece is

protected, but this is not absolutely necessary. An “escape” move is any
move which takes a target piece out of the square which the opponent is
going to attack. “Own counter-action’’ is any move which creates activity
by the defender that must be parried by the attacker. For example, if the
attacker can checkmate in three moves, he will not realise his plan if the
defender can checkmate in two moves.
Examples of these cases are presented in Fig. 4. The examples are
critical cases, which must be classified on the basis of main threat. In fact,
double classification could also be considered. These categories are not the
only possible ones, but at the current stage of research they are sufficient.
More sophisticated systems can be presented but the details of the classi-
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fication can be best discussed in the context of more tactical protocol

materials.

TABLE 3
Distribution of Bound Null Moves among Chess-specific Move Categories

Counter-action Exchange Escape Blockade

Experts 49 23 19 1
Non-experts 9 9 7 0

Total 58 32 26 1

The distribution of the binding moves in the present experiment are

presented in Table 3, although we are aware, of course, that the percenta-
ges are highly task-dependent. The difference between the two skill groups
was not significant [2(5)= 2.17, NS, escape and blockade pooled]. The
high number of counter-action moves was probably due to the chess-
strategic character of the positions. In tactical positions, forced exchange,
escape and blockade moves are more important because of the “forced”
character of the attacking moves. In strategic positions, subjects feel that
they have more time to carry out their plans in the absence of immediate
threats.
Null move binding also shows how tactical and strategic information is
combined in subspace closing (Saariluoma, 1990). By “closing” we mean,
simply, proving that no move that one’s opponent can make will result in a
more favourable position for him than the terminal position. In protocols,
subjects may find good manoeuvres, that is plans with null moves, but this
is not in itself sufficient. They must also be able to decide that no move by
their opponent can prevent them from achieving the goal, and this verifica-
tion process leads to the closing of a problem subspace.
 12 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

Terminal node evaluation is needed in deciding whether the selected

move is good, since the value of the move is precisely the value of the
terminal position it leads to. Players must also know whether they can
really achieve the goal. This often, but not always, requires concrete
analysis and the generation of related path moves to see if the space can be
closed. A chess player must be aware of the alternatives and be able to
assess them correctly. However, in closing, the only ways of preventing the
active side from reaching their goal is to blockade the attack, exchange key
pieces, enable the target to escape or provide sufficient counter-changes.
All other moves do not make sense.
The abstraction of problem subspaces in strategic positions is not neces-
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sarily very far from the abstraction of problem subspaces in more tactical
positions. Just as tactical knowledge is structured into tactical combina-
tions. so strategic knowledge is partly organised around manoeuvres.
Chess strategy rules are mainly used in terminal node evaluation to assess
the apperceived problem subspaces as wholes.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 1 suggested that null moves are an important characteristic of

strategic thinking. In the second experiment, the role of null moves is
placed under more direct experimental testing. It is possible to provoke
strategic thoughts by manipulating chess positions. If, in a highly tactical
position. the main tactical continuations are made impossible, for example
by moving just one piece, it is highly likely that the position takes on a
more strategic character. Of course, this is not absolutely necessary but, by
choosing the positions correctly, the character of the position can be
changed by this kind of minimal transformation from a highly tactical
position into a much more strategic one (see Fig. 5 ) .
In Experiment 2 . this minimal transformation technique was used. The
main hypothesis was that the minimal transformation would increase the
number o f null moves. The more strategic a position, the more common
null mwes should be. In this way, it is possible to show experimentally the
connection between null moves and strategic thinking. Null move binding
should also be observed.
The manipulation adopted also allows very direct comparisons between
strategic and tactical thoughts. I t will be especially interesting to observe
the alternative thoughts for the main problem subspaces in the tactical
positions. I f some key piece is moved. do subjects pay any attention to
climinatcd continuations? If they do not. the unconscious selcction
mechanisms must eliminate these continuations.
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 13
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a b c d e l g h

FIG. 5 Examples of stimulus position types. (Left) White wins by playing Nf6+ B:f6, Bd3
Re8, B:h7+ Kh8, Bg6+ Kg8, Qh7+ Kf8, Qf7 mate. (Right) Bd3 is eliminated by placing a
pawn on d3.

As a rough operationalisation for the term “unconscious”, we refer to

those aspects of chess players’ information-processing control which are
not explicated by the subjects. For example, the principles of exchange,
blockade, etc., cannot be found in the protocols and not even in chess
books, and yet they explain a great deal about the problem-space size.
Thus, we assume that they are highly automatic and unconscious. Proces-
ses which are explicitly mentioned in the protocols, we take as undoubtedly
conscious processes (see also Ericsson & Simon, 1980). Naturally, part of
the processing falls between our criteria for conscious and unconscious
moves, but its practical meaning is not decisive.
It is interesting to observe whether problem subspaces in strategic
positions are such that they would also have been possible in the tactical
positions but remained unnoticed, because the tactical problem subspaces
were dominant. Saariluoma (1990) has found this kind of fixation-type
phenomenon and it would be interesting to see if it can be generalised to
strategic positions.

Method
Subjects. Two groups of four subjects were used. The groups were
matched with respect to playing strengths. The subjects’ E L 0 ratings
varied between 2150 and 2300.

Materials and Procedure. Four tactical combinations were selected

randomly from chess books. They each contained a tactical combination.
For the second group, the positions were transformed into more strategic
ones by transposing one relevant piece from its original location so that the
 14 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

main combination was no longer possible. The procedure was identical to

that of Experiment 1.

Results
The increase in the number of null moves as a consequence of the
elimination of the tactical main line was very clear. The average number of
null moves was 1.6 per position in the tactical positions and 6.3 in the
strategic positions. The difference was statistically significant [t(6)= 4.84,
P < 0.011.
The null move binding mechanism was also studied. In the tactical group
47% of null moves were bound, whereas in the strategic group only 24% of
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the moves were bound. Obviously, in the tactical positions, null move
binding was more common. If the bound null moves are analysed qualita-
tively in the tactical group, the binding of null moves was suggested in 42%
of the cases by the player's own counter-action, 17% by blockade or
exchange, and in the rest by escape moves. For the strategic tasks, 63%
were by the player's own counter-action, 12% by blockade and 25% by
exchange.
The analysis of the possible but unmentioned problem subspaces also
confirmed the main hypothesis. Since the first moves described very
effectively different problem subspaces in this sample, this very mechanical
and easily realisable measure was adopted. All eight subjects suggested on
average 9.75 different first moves per position. How the moves were
distributed among the groups is shown in Table 4, which presents the
number of moves for the strategic group, the moves for the tactical group,
and the moves suggested by both groups.

TABLE 4
Number of Different First Moves

Strategy group only 21

Tactical group only 6
Both groups 5

Since some of the moves were impossible for the strategic group, most
attention must be paid to the moves that were possible for both groups, but
were generated only in the strategichactical group. Surprisingly, the strate-
gic group suggested on average 5.25 moves per position which couldn't be
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 15

found in the protocols of the tactical group, although they were fully
realisable.

Discussion
The main hypothesis was verified. The number of null moves substantially
increased when a strategic transformation was made. This suggests that
null moves are typical of chess-strategic thinking. Subjects merely outline
the possible solutions in strategic positions. Obviously, closed operator
sequences are difficult to find, because an opponent has great freedom of
choice. On fhe other hand, an opponent does not have at his disposal truly
forcing moves either, and thus a player’s thinking works on a more general
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level than in highly tactical positions.

Null move binding was relatively more common in the tactical group.
This suggests that the strategic positions were not as forcing as the tactical
positions, and thus calculations could be more sketchy. Again, the results
support the planning interpretation and not the move generation failure
interpretation of null moves (Charness, 1981b). Neither the players nor
their opponents had such forcing measures that would have made it
absolutely necessary to close all the continuations. Indeed, some kind of
open-endedness is quite characteristic of str&egic thinking and this makes
it more like everyday thinking. In strategic thinking, as in everyday life, no
absolutely forcing conclusions can be made.
The second main result can be found by observing the alternative
problem subspaces in the strategic positions. The problem subspaces that
were generated in the strategic positions were in general also possible in
the tactical positions. Nevertheless, the subjects in the tactical group did
not mention them. This implies that one activated representation may
easily blockade alternative representations (Saariluoma, 1990). Since the
main line of tactical combinations is so interesting, subjects do not find it
necessary to search for other possible alternatives. Only the elimination of
the main line brings to the fore any alternative ideas.
As Saariluoma (1984) has suggested, subjects generate more alternatives
when they do not have a directly acceptable continuation. For example,
masters clearly calculate more moves when they fail to solve a problem
than when they succeed. This observation fits quite well with the observa-
tion by Newell and Simon (1972), that players usually first try the most
obvious alternative and only later search for less familiar ones.
Putting all this together, we suggest that chess players possess an
unconscious content-specific mechanism. This mechanism places the alter-
native problem subspaces in an order of preference, possibly on the
grounds of familiarity. However, we do not know much more than this at
the moment. This is unfortunate because this preference mechanism is
essential for any general theory of apperception.
 16 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 2 suggested that the evocation of a strategic plan may prevent
subjects from finding the right plan. In tactical positions, a similar pheno-
menon has been reported (Saariluoma, 1990). The evocation may block-
ade the right plan, though subjects could, in principle, find it. The mere
possibility of apperceiving a wrong plan may divert subjects from the right
one.
In this experiment, subjects were given two types of tasks. In the first,
each given position contained one very familiar idea (e.g. intuitive sac-
rifice) and another strategic idea that was optimal but less familiar. In the
second series, the first plan was eliminated by moving just one piece (for an
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example of such a pair, see Fig. 6). If the familiar plan blockades the non-
familiar. there should be more correct solutions in the second task than in
the first.

FIG. 6 Stimulus position types. In the control position, b2 is in b3 to prevent the promising
false continuation Qa4 instead of the right move Qc2.

Method
Subjects. A group of 20 subjects participated in this experiment. They
were recruited from the Tiibingen chess club. Their ability ranged between
1500 and 2300 E L 0 points. The group mean was about 1950 points. The
data for this experiment were collected alongside those of another experi-
ment that took place during the same session. This was necessary because
the first experiment normally took less than 10 min and it would have been
difficult to re-motivate the subjects after such a short experiment. A pause
of more than 10 min was allowed between the two tasks.
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 17

Materials. Two sets of six positions were created in the same way as in
the previous two experiments. Five of the positions were from grandmaster
and master games. One was a game-like composition created by slightly
transforming a master game. In the first series (A), there was always one
familiar strategic idea and one less familiar but strong idea. In the second
series (B), the familiar idea was eliminated by slightly transposing some of
the key pieces. The less familiar line was left as intact as possible and it was
the best move in each position. The correctness of the good line was
decided on the basis of the game move by the grandmaster or master in his
competitive game. The correctness of the move was also carefully analysed
by the authors, who are national master level players, before a position was
accepted.
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Procedure. The subjects were divided into two groups of 10. The two
sets of chess positions were counterbalanced across groups so that one
group got the positions a l , a2, a3, b4, b5, b6 and the other positions a4, a5,
a6, b l , b2, b3. The subjects were told that they should think as they do in
their normal competitive chess games and that they had as much time as
they wanted to find a good solution.
The size of the boards was the same as before, and the cards were of the
same size as in the first experiment. The order of presentation was random
and verbal protocols were collected and transcribed afterwards. Other-
wise, the procedure was the same as in the previous experiments.

Results and Discussion

The positions with two alternative plans were clearly more difficult than
the positions in which the promising alternative was eliminated. The
percentages of correct solutions were 58% when the promising alternative
was blockaded and 22% when no blockade existed. The difference
between the two types of positions was statistically significant [t(ll) = 5.68,
P < 0.0011. The elimination of one possible plan substantially increased
the probability of finding the correct solution. This means that activation of
one alternative problem strategic plan may block the discovery of another.
Close reading of the protocols provided new information about this
blocking mechanism. We looked at the number of episodes under control
conditions that included the promising plan and, surprisingly, found that
56% of the episodes concentrated on the promising plans. Obviously, the
existence of a promising but incorrect side-plan occupies the attention of
the subjects and demands effort. If the side-plan is eliminated, subjects'
attention is not distracted. Correspondingly, the number of correct solu-
tions also rose.
 18 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

It is always possible to argue that the motives for moves could be

different from those we have suggested. In the transformed position in Fig.
6, for example, subjects could move the queen to support the knight. The
protocols do not provide any support for this kind of speculative interpre-
tation. Besides, the queen could be moved to c2 in the basic position and
the pawn could be moved to b3 in the next move.
Subjects did not fail because they were unable to find the correct
solutions, but because they expended too much time and effort on the
wrong strategic plan and, correspondingly, on the wrong problem sub-
space. This means that one evoked plan can blockade the activation of
another plan. If the solution is not in the semantic foreground or field of
apperception. it can easily be missed. The only possibility of finding the
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right solution is to restructure the problem and code the stimulus in the
correct way.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our goals were empirical. We were interested in how tactical and strategic
information is used in controlling the size and content of abstracted
problem subspaces. This issue is important because it provides information
about "notional synthesis". i.e. integration of different types of informa-
tion in thinking.
Apperception in chess is a highly selective process. Chess players
abstract small search spaces with a very small number of move sequences,
neglecting millions of alternative paths (Saariluoma, 1990). Even evalua-
tion is highly selective. Subjects do not use all t h e possible strategic
characteristics of a position and make an overall sum to evaluate interme-
diate and terminal positions. They pick up only a few relevant strategic
features and base their decision on those attributes (see also Newell &
Simon, 1972).
One important mechanism apperception uses to select information is
null move generation and binding. I n the first experiment and in the
strategic group in the second experiment, the subjects systematically left
gaps in their calculations, which. in approximately half of the cases in the
first experiment, were later bound by suggesting some concrete moves. In
the second experiment, null move binding was less common. In binding
moves. the subjects unconsciously used very similar criteria to the ones
suggested by Saariiuoma (1990) in studying tactical combinations:
exchange. blockade, escape and counter-action. However, their own
counter-actions were much more common in strategic positions than one
would assume on the basis of earlier studies with tactical positions (Saari-
luomii. 1990).
 APPERCEPTION IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING 19

These four reasons basically explain why human problem subspaces are
so small and compact compared with the problem spaces generated by
current computer programs. The criteria divide the huge “mass” of legally
possible moves into a large set of senseless moves and a small set of
sensible moves. They explain why chess players do not generate irrelevant
or casual moves. A move which does not try to parry an opponent’s
dangerous action directly or by counter-action is senseless because it may
cause a decisive disturbance of the delicate balance between the opponents
and lead to the loss of the game. These criteria basically explain why the
subspaces generated by the players are sensible and self-consistent wholes.
Subspace abstraction has both benefits and costs. Experiments 2 and 3
show how active representations interfere with the activation of alternative
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and correct problem subspaces. The time and effort wasted in considering
one alternative may prevent subjects from finding the solution.
Positions practically always provide more possibilities and more alterna-
tive plans than can be encoded by human chess players. The active
problem subspaces blockade other subspaces very effectively and they can
only be considered one at a time. This mechanism often results in fixation
and set-type effects. In fact, many alternative moves simply go unnoticed
for years, which can be seen in the development of opening theory.
Recognition very probably plays a role in subspace abstraction (Chase &
Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965). However, more complex conceptual infor-
mation integration processes are also required, because solution moves do
not appear instantly as is the case with recognition. In particular, we need
more information about the selective information processes associated
with recognition. There is always much more to be recognised on a chess
board than actually becomes conscious, i.e. is explicitly mentioned in
protocols.
These experiments provide material for preliminary and tentative
thoughts on human apperception. Apperceptive processes are very rapid
and largely automatic, unconscious and effortless. The result of appercep-
tion is a conscious representation of the problem, i.e. a hypothesis. This
representation is, in chess, extremely undercoded on the one hand, and
strongly enriched on the other. By “undercoding” we mean that only a
very small part of the possible information in the stimulus is encoded. The
mental representation includes only a few of all the possible paths, but it
contains many elements that are not directly present in the physical
stimulus. The moves, for example, are generated only in imagery, not on
the board (Saariluoma, 1991a; 1991b; 1992).
Problem subspace abstraction is based on different types of information:
moves, patterns, weaknesses, rules of thumb, etc. Apperception is able to
integrate very effectively these various types of knowledge into a self-
consistent representation in which the elements have a ”meaningful” or
 20 SAARILUOMA AND HOHLFELD

sensible role. This logicality and self-consistency of apperceived represen-

tations contains the real essence of human chess players' thinking.
The null move binding mechanism is important for apperception
research. It shows that notional synthesis is content-specific (see Allport,
1980, for the notion of content specificity; see Stout, 1896, for notional
synthesis). This means that the contents of the representational elements
are decisive in notional synthesis. Only elements with suitable content may
be combined into one single representation.
The plans we call manoeuvres outline possible attacking routes and goals
players use to get their pieces into suitable positions. After this, and when
necessary, players bind the null moves with reasonable moves of their own.
In tactical thinking, this process is normally very swift and many fewer null
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moves are required. The unbound null moves are also much more common
in strategic than in tactical positions, because tactical thinking must have
an algorithm-like precision, whereas strategic thinking is much more
intuitive.
Null move binding allows chess players to assimilate their strategic
knowledge with the tactical demands of the current problem. Null move
binding adapts strategic manoeuvring patterns, which contain knowledge
about effective piece placements as well as possible threats and counter-
threats. In this way, a strict difference between chess strategy and tactics
proved to be non-existent (de Groot, 1965; Lasker, 1947). This is because
the tactical and strategic aspects of chess are very strongly intertwined in
problem subspace abstraction. Tactical and strategic thinking can be
handled separately like pitch and intensity, but, in practice, both concepts
are actively used in apperceiving problem subspaces.

Manuscript received February 1992

Revised manuscript received October 1993

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APPENDIX
Examples of classifications: A variarion

Bound null moves marked with "- - -" and unbound with "***" . Bounding moves in brackets
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and classifications after each move. ex, Exchange; blo, blockade; esc, escape; oc. own
counter-action. It is important that readers look very carefully at the exchange moves. We
count a move which protects a piece or a square as an exchange move, though no actual
exchange takes place, because in mental representation the exchange is assumed. A comma is
placed between each black and white pair, while black pairs are unsigned, i.e. each white ply
is preceded by a comma. Colons symbolise the taking of a piece. For details of notation, see
Holding (1985) or any comprehensive encyclopaedia.

Position a
N:b5, Q:b5 - - -, a5 (Rb8[oc], a6[ex], Rd.d7[oc])
Nb5, a:b5 e6. - - - e:d6 (d:e6[ex])
Ne8, * * * a6. - - - e6 (Nc3[ex])
a6. Nc7 Qc7. Qa6 c4, Rc3 - - -,R:c4 (Rc7[ex], B:c3 [ex])

Position b
- - -. a:b5 c:bS (Nb6[oc])
Kc7. - - -, b:a4 (B:e7[ex])
Rb6. - - - b:a4 (B:e7[ex])
Nc8. - - - Nh6. a:b5 c:b5 (KeZ[oc])

Position c
Bf4 - - -, Nc7 (Kf7[esc], Bb6[ex], Ne4[oc])
0-0 - --. B:c5 (b.e3[ex])
BdS - - -, Nd5 (Qb6[esc])
B:c5 N:c5. Qd6 - - -. Nc7 (B:e6[ex])

Positron d
h4 - - - ( I ) . h5 g5. Ne3 - - -(2). Nff ((1) Ne6[esc]. (2) Bc8[ex])
-.
h4 Ne6. - - Nf4 (Oe3[esc]. h5[ex])
-.
h3 Nf7. h5 p5, Ne3 - - Nf5 (Nd6[ex], Kh7[esc])
- - - h5. Ne3 N:e3 (f3[ex])
-.
Qe3 - - f4 (f5[oc])
-.
Q e 3 . - h3 Nf7 (Rh8[0c])