FRIENDSHIP
Men and women of all ranks of society and every
state of life, ‘‘filled with a living love of God,’’ moved
with ‘‘compassion for their fellow-men in affliction,’’
and ‘‘concerned about the corruption of the world and the
faults of men which awakened the wrath of God’’
(Tauler), embraced the ideals of the Friends and sought
direction from their leaders. There were the friar and
priest leaders; nuns, such as the Dominicans Margaret
Ebner of Maria-Mödingen and Christine Ebner of Engel-
thal; layfolk, such as Margaret of the Golden Ring, Her-
man of Fritzlar, and Rulman Merswin (founder of the
Grüner Wörth center); knights and ladies, such as Queen
Agnes, widow of King Andrew III of Hungary, who had
retired to a German monastery (see SPIRITUALITY, RHE-
NISH).
The Friends of God were entirely orthodox in their
beliefs and were devoted to the Church. Even when they
venerated outstanding lay members of their company,
they manifested no distrust of the hierarchy or the priest-
hood, nor did they exhibit any trace of ecclesiastical sepa-
ratism. They set themselves apart from other clergy and
layfolk in the Church only in their spiritual ideals, in their
desire to live a truly spiritual life under the guidance of
a spiritual master, and in their hope to rescue the Church
and society from contemporary evils. They must also be
clearly distinguished from the Brethren of the Free Spirit,
WALDENSES, and heretical BEGUINES, who, glorying in a
false liberty and preaching emancipation from the
Church, concealed their heretical and separatist tenden-
cies by assuming the name Friends of God.
The term ‘‘Friends of God’’ began to fall into disuse
toward the end of the 14th century, probably because of
the general decline of mysticism and its terminology.
Bibliography: A. CHIQUOT, Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascé-
tique et mystique. Doctrine et histoire, ed. M. VILLER et al. (Paris
1932) 1:493–500. J. M. CLARK, The Great German Mystics (Oxford
1949) 75–97. A. G. SEESHOLTZ, Friends of God: Practical Mystics
of the 14th Century (New York 1934). R. M. JONES, The Flowering
of Mysticism: The Friends of God in the 14th Century (New York
1939).
[W. A. HINNEBUSCH]
FRIENDSHIP
A reciprocal relationship of affection or sympathy
between persons of the same sex or at least independent
of sexual attraction, and based on a community of nature
and of interests, the latter of a spiritual kind. This article
traces the historical development of the concept, presents
a systematic analysis in traditional Catholic terms, and
concludes with an evaluation of the role of friendship in
Christianity.
6 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
History. The basic formulation of the definition of
friendship took place in the context of Greco-Roman cul-
ture—the beginnings of the classical development in
Greek antiquity and the remainder in Roman society.
Later centuries added little to the essentials that were
there discerned.
Greek Antiquity. The Greek naturalists were the first
to speak of friendship, and this in connection with efforts
to offer a rational explanation for changes going on in na-
ture. They conceived of friendship as the basic principle
of attraction and repulsion that governed the combining
actions whereby material bodies were formed from their
elemental constituents. Most of their discussions were
concerned with the question of whether friendship was
basically a union of contraries or a union of things with
similar characteristics.
With SOCRATES, Greek thought began to restrict
friendship to a relationship between persons and to give
it a precise psychological meaning. In fact, friendship fig-
ured so importantly in Socrates’s thought that he set him-
self to teach and to practice the art of acquiring friends.
Following his example, both PLATO and ARISTOTLE at-
tracted their disciples more as friends than as students, so
much so that L. Dugas could remark that the philosophi-
cal schools of ancient Greece were ‘‘not so much schools
as they were associations of friends’’ (23).
Aristotle presents perhaps the most complete analy-
sis of friendship in classical antiquity in bk. 8 of his Ni-
comachean Ethics. Rejecting the equivocal usage of his
naturalist predecessors, he restricts friendship (filàa) to
a type of accord among human persons and distinguishes
it from the love (fàlhsij) that is also properly human.
He approaches its definition indirectly by considering it
as a form of attraction and finds its basis in being liked,
whether this be for interest, or pleasure, or virtue. He thus
distinguishes three kinds of friendship: that based on util-
ity, which unites opposites, and those based on pleasure
and virtue, which unite similars. Friendships based on
utility or on pleasure care less for the friend than for the
good he affords, and for this reason are less stable, ceas-
ing as they do when their motivation disappears. Friend-
ship based on virtue, on the other hand, is more perfect;
in fact it is friendship par excellence, for in its case the
friends seek each other for what they are, rather than for
what they give. Again, it is more stable than other friend-
ships because it is based on virtue, which itself is endur-
ing, and at the same time has all of their prerogatives, for
those whom it unites are pleasurable and useful for each
other. Yet it is rarely found, partly because there are few
who are capable of it, and partly because of the time in-
volved in discovering and cultivating those persons who
may be worthy of it.

Finally, for Aristotle, friendship thrives only when
there is some community in living (sunz≈n). Those who
reciprocally and consciously seek the good in each other,
but are unable to associate and communicate for one rea-
son or other, cannot strictly become friends. The element
of community involved in friendship was understood dif-
ferently, however, by various Greeks: the Pythagoreans
saw it as a community of resources; Aristotle, as a com-
munity of likes and interests; and the Epicureans and Sto-
ics, as a community of philosophical beliefs.
Roman Society. Among the Romans, CICERO held a
position analogous to that of Aristotle among the Greeks
as their principal theorist of friendship. Less profound
than Aristotle, perhaps, he made up for this by the charm
and warmth of his treatment. He based his notion of
friendship on the instinct for sociability that is found in
man, defining it as a perfect agreement of wills, tastes,
and thoughts accompanied by benevolence and affection.
Nothing, in his estimation, is more adapted to human na-
ture than this type of accord. Other goods such as riches,
health, power, and honor are uncertain and defectible;
only friendship is really enduring, because it is based
upon virtue. It can be found only among good men, for
they alone have the loyalty and integrity to sustain it and
lack the cupidity and passion that destroy it. True friend-
ship is not easily found, he admits; but once found, it is
forever.
The reason why true friendships are rare, for Cicero,
is that few are worthy of being loved in and for them-
selves and many seek to make friends purely for pleasure
or for profit. A true friend must be another self; thus if
one desires to find friends, he must become good himself
and then seek out someone similar. Cicero saw friendship
as an aid to virtue, since good people who are benevolent
to each other become masters of their passions and pre-
serve virtue in one another. This explains why Cicero in-
sisted that one should choose his friends well, for a
failure of judgment could cause one to become attached
to a person who would later do him harm, and then would
not be a true friend.
Later Centuries. The thoughts of Aristotle and Cic-
ero on the subject of friendship have remained classic.
They passed on to the Fathers of the Church, such as St.
AUGUSTINE and St. AMBROSE; to scholastic doctors and
theologians, such as St. AELRED, St. THOMAS AQUINAS,
and St. FRANCIS DE SALES; and to secular writers, such as
M. E. de MONTAIGNE. They thus constitute a heritage that
has become traditional in the Western world. Modern
psychologists have complemented their doctrines on
points of detail, and philosophers have subjected them to
searching analyses, but neither have contradicted them in
their essential elements.
NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
FRIENDSHIP
Systematic Analysis. With this historical back-
ground, it becomes possible to present an analysis of the
concept of friendship that describes its psychological
characteristics, its metaphysical nature, and its moral as-
pect.
Psychological Characteristics. Friendship is first of
all an attraction; seen externally, its principal effect is one
of dynamism, for friends seek one another out and are not
happy unless they are together. When proximity is spa-
tially impossible, the attraction manifests itself by the
one’s turning his thoughts and desires to the other.
Second, friendship involves affection, being based
on an emotion known among the Greeks as fàlhsij and
among the Latins as amatio. It is because a man loves his
friend that he is attracted to him in various ways. This
emotion is more interior than exterior, and one senses it
without always being able to see it; yet it is occasionally
discernible, sometimes by gestures, sometimes by smiles
or even by tears.
Third, friendship is a reciprocal affection. It is only
when an ¶ntifàlhsij responds to the fàlhsij, or a reda-
matio to the amatio, that one can speak of true friendship
(filàa, amicitia). This explains why inanimate things
cannot be friends or the object of friendship; a man may
love wine, but wine cannot be his friend. Again, the reci-
procity involved in friendship explains why it grows and
deepens with each return of affection, for it involves a
type of psychological resonance based on the phenome-
non of love’s provoking more love in ever-increasing
proportions.
Fourth, friendship is a union of a spiritual kind.
There are reciprocal affective responses even at the level
of brute animals, and yet one does not speak of these as
friendship. What is peculiar to friendship is its concern
with the intellectual life, not with the life of sense. Its ac-
tivity has a certain independence from matter, and it pro-
vokes a spiritual union, i.e., one based on intellect and
will and feeling, and thus properly human. This is why
Aristotle could maintain that friendship can exist only be-
tween persons.
Fifth, friendship is a disinterested type of relation-
ship. Persons may voluntarily associate for a variety of
reasons, such as for profit or for pleasure; but what these
associations have in common is that they promote the in-
terest of the one entering into them. The peculiar associa-
tion that is friendship is more noble and ideal than these,
for it sets aside personal gain and, in this sense, is disin-
terested. The true friend is such because of the qualities
he finds in the other; this explains why he will make sac-
rifices for his friend and do things with no thought of
what he himself gets out of them. This also explains why
7
FRIENDSHIP
friendship has a lasting character, for monetary and sen-
sual interests are subject to frequent change, whereas the
virtuous qualities that attract a friend are stable and en-
during.
Finally, perfect friendship is a fusion of souls. Spiri-
tual and disinterested relationships can be more or less
intimate, but at their best they encompass all the activities
of the souls engaging in them. The effect of this perfect
friendship, in the expression of Aristotle and Augustine
(Conf. 4.6.11), is to put but ‘‘one soul in two bodies.’’
Then everything is held in common; the distinction be-
tween the ‘‘I’’ and the ‘‘Thou’’ disappears; and there re-
sults the highest type of unity to be found among men.
Metaphysical Nature. Friendship manifests itself by
its acts, but such acts presuppose the reality that is friend-
ship just as volition presupposes the will and judgment
presupposes the intellect. This reality is not a power or
faculty of the soul, because it is not inborn in man; rather
it involves an acquired disposition, a HABIT, that exists
in man’s rational appetitive faculty, or WILL. This habit
is actualized, as Aquinas teaches, when one friend ‘‘in-
forms’’ the affection of the other. As HENRY OF GHENT
and RICHARD OF MIDDLETON observed, however, habits
of this type must exist in each person involved in the
friendship, and thus the habits themselves must be nu-
merically distinct. The reality that is friendship must
therefore be a RELATION that is based on two absolute
habits; one may refer to each habit as friendship in the
person participating in it, but the notion is not complete
unless it includes the relationship that unites one habit to
the other.
Thomas Aquinas and other theologians who study
friendship in the context of man’s relationship with God
generally speak of it as a kind of LOVE; they see the ‘‘love
of friendship’’ as the highest form of love, and oppose
it to the ‘‘love of concupiscence’’ (Summa theologiae
1a2ae, 26.3–4). From this viewpoint, one may define
friendship as a love of benevolence, something held in
common and based on the mutual regard of its partici-
pants. Lower forms of love are at the level of sense; they
seek pleasure and self-gratification, and this is true even
of the sexual love whereby man is prompted to conserve
his species (see SEX). The love of friendship, on the other
hand, is of a higher order; it is essentially spiritual, and
thus serves well to explain the optimum relationship that
unites man to God (see CHARITY).
Moral Aspect. Friendship as such is good, and there-
fore is legitimate for man. It is, in fact, beneficial for his
soul: the companion of VIRTUE, it may itself be consid-
ered as a virtue in the one possessing it. Yet it places de-
mands on those who embrace it, and in certain
circumstances, particularly when too restrictive, can be
8 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
harmful and even vicious. (For a fuller discussion, partic-
ularly as related to the spiritual life, see FRIENDSHIP, PAR-
TICULAR.)
Role in Christianity. The fact of being a Christian
in no way changes man’s nature or his needs. It is thus
possible for Christians, while living a supernatural life,
to have purely human friendships among themselves.
There is nothing distinctively Christian about such
friendships, however, unless Christianity in some way
enters into the relationships and transposes them to a
higher level.
Some have seen an opposition between the teaching
of the pagans on friendship and the New Law given to
men by Jesus Christ. For example, Jesus prescribes chari-
ty toward man’s neighbor, and this independently of
one’s particular feelings and personal likes or dislikes.
Such a prescription seems to deprive friendship of its
proper character; for, rather than seek something selec-
tive and personal, the Christian is urged to a universal at-
titude of love toward all men, and this by obligation
rather than by free choice. Thus the pagan ideal of friend-
ship seems to be absorbed in charity, and itself destroyed
in the process. Again, the perfection of the love of God,
as conceived by such spiritual writers as St. IGNATIUS OF
LOYOLA, seems to demand of man that he transfer all of
his affection from creatures to his Creator; thus the renun-
ciation of human friendships seems to be the ideal toward
which the perfect Christian should tend.
There is some element of truth in these consider-
ations, but at the same time it is possible to oppose them
by others that argue for the basic compatibility between
friendship and charity. For one, Christianity has focused
attention on the dignity of the individual independent of
his place in society; it has liberated man more from mat-
ter by accenting the immortality of his soul. Such a liber-
ation can only favor friendship, for it provides the basis
for greater personal appreciation of one’s fellow men.
Much the same can be said for the teaching on the univer-
sality of the Redemption, for this too proclaims the equal-
ity of all souls in God’s sight. Finally, by the gift of
supernatural life, Christianity has made numberless
human souls incomparably better and therefore more
worthy of love; it has increased their resemblance to one
another and has thus provided a new basis of community
among them.
De facto, friendship does exist among Christians. It
has never flourished so much as it has since the promul-
gation of the gospel, nor has it ever been so pure and so
noble in its practice and its ideals.
Bibliography: G. VANSTEENBERGHE, Dictionnaire de spiri-
tualité ascétique et mystique. Docrine et histoire, ed. M. VILLER et
al. (Paris 1932–) 1:500–529. W. M. RANKIN and ST. GEORGE STOCK,

Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. J. HASTINGS (Edinburgh
1908–27) 6:131–138. E. CENTINEO, Enciclopedia filosofica (Ven-
ice-Rome 1957) 1:168–169. E. BISER, Lexikon für Theologie und
Kirche, ed. J. HOFER and K. RAHNER (Freiberg 1957–65) 4:363–364.
J. DE VRIES and H. VAN OYEN, Die Religion in Geschichte und Ge-
genwart (Tübingen 1957–65) 2:1128–32. L. DUGAS, L’Amitié an-
tique (2d ed. Paris 1914). P. PHILIPPE, Le Rôle de l’amitié selon la
doctrine de saint Thomas (Rome 1937). A. ODDONE, L’amicizia
(Milan 1937). M. NÉDONCELLE, La Réciprocité des consciences
(Paris 1942). P. J. WADELL, Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre
Dame, Ind. 1989). G. MEILAENDER, Friendship, a Study in Theolog-
ical Ethics (Notre Dame, Ind. 1981).
[W. A. WALLACE]
FRIENDSHIP, PARTICULAR
Particular friendship is an exclusive association be-
tween two persons based upon emotional fascination. As
such, it is a perversion of God’s gift of good and whole-
some friendship. In the very definition of particular
friendship is found the distortion of truth that it is. It is
an exclusive association and therefore detrimental to the
universal charity due to all. It is a friendship based upon
emotional fascination and motivated more by the selfish
interests of the ‘‘friends’’ than the desire of each to pro-
mote the good of the other. Therefore, it does not deserve
to be called FRIENDSHIP except in an extended sense of
the term.
The danger of forming particular friendships is di-
rectly proportional to a person’s emotional instability.
Such an association exists most often between those who
are emotionally insecure. Particular friendships are an ex-
pression of the human tendency to love and be loved,
which in this case is applied wrongly. Such friendships
can develop between those of the opposite sex, or those
of the same sex.
The characteristics of particular friendship are: (1)
Exclusiveness—all one’s attention is focused on one per-
son to the point that there is resentment of the intrusion
of others. (2) Jealousy—because all attention is focused
on one person, there is jealousy if that person has other
friends. (3) Absorption of mind—the friends think of
each other continually in much the same way that young
lovers do. As a result, the freedom to pray, study, work,
do one’s duties, or be with others is hampered. (4) The
tendency to manifest affection—because this type of
friendship has all the marks of the relationship between
young lovers, the friends feel more and more the desire
to manifest affection. This they do by talking in a senti-
mental way and even by the physical expression of love.
Because of this, it is obvious that particular friendship
can easily lead to violations of chastity. This may not al-
ways happen, but even when it does not lead to this, the
detrimental effects of particular friendship are numerous.
NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
FRIENDSHIP HOUSE
Avoidance of particular friendship and freeing one-
self from it involve the use of means consistently recom-
mended by spiritual writers. These are: (1) Conviction—
the persons must be firmly convinced that such
friendships are harmful and therefore must be avoided or
eliminated. (2) Confidence—when emotion dominates a
person, victory can seem impossible, but one must be
convinced that victory is possible. (3) General self-
discipline—just as an alcoholic cannot break his habit
without a general practice of self-discipline, so neither
can one break a particular friendship without a similar
self-discipline. (4) Physical separation—one must care-
fully avoid all unnecessary association with this kind of
‘‘friend,’’ and when association is necessary, must be
careful to control the emotional response that accompa-
nies it. (5) Mental separation—one must avoid thinking
about the other person as much as possible, for this only
feeds the flame of emotional involvement. (6) Cultivation
of other interests—such persons cannot succeed in a vac-
uum, as it were, but must substitute for the object sacri-
ficed an interest in the right things. Only in this way is
it possible to avoid or remedy a grave defect.
To see the so-called particular friendship for the per-
version that it is, one need only compare it with the good
and healthy friendship in which the friends grow mutual-
ly in goodness and the pursuit of higher ideals.
See Also: FRIENDSHIP.
Bibliography: G. A. KELLY, Guidance for Religious (West-
minster, Md. 1956) 55–81. A. TANQUEREY, The Spiritual Life
(Westminster, Md. 1945).
[C. BROWNING]
FRIENDSHIP HOUSE
A movement of Catholic lay men and women seek-
ing to relate the Church to interracial justice, the poor and
marginalized; founded in Toronto, Canada, in 1930 and
in New York City in 1938. In 1938 Catherine DE HUECK
DOHERTY, a Russian immigrant, took up residence and
opened a store-front office and community center in Har-
lem; she attracted a group of young men and women to
live and work with her there. The center became a source
of emergency assistance for the poor, a recreational place
for children, a meeting place to discuss and disseminate
the Church’s social doctrine, and a place where the litur-
gy became a daily way of life for the laity. Located as it
was in the African-American ghetto, it was one of the pi-
oneer efforts to arouse the consciences of Americans,
particularly Catholic Americans, to the sinfulness of ra-
cial discrimination and segregation. Friendship House
identified itself with the segregated and the insecure, not
9