Contentions of defendant
1. Limitation:
According to the defendant,
since the acquisition was in
1981 and possession had
been taken then itself, this
suit in 2001, after 20 years
is barred by limitation. Suit
has to be field within three
years of the date of
acquisition.
Rulings cited in support :
1981 KLT 386
1985 KLT 375
Reply by plaintiff
Suits for declaration time
limit is three years. No
quarrel. But Three years
from which date ?
Limitation Act says 3 years
from the commencement of
cause of action. So the
starting point depends on
the cause of action.
Here what is the cause of
action ? The cause of
action for this suit is not
the acquisition or taking
possession of the land by
the Government. So 1981 is
irrelevant.
This suit is regarding
division of Rs. 56 and odd
Lakhs, available as the
enhanced
compensation.This
enhanced compensation
arises only when the HC
confirmed the enhancement
by the Sub Court. If the HC
had held that no
enhancement is liable to be
paid, this suit could not and
would not have been filed.
The HC order Ex. A4
confirming the
enhancement was passed
only in 1999 and the suit is
filed within three years of
that date. It may be noted
that the claim by the
plaintiff in this suit is not
for 3/6 share in the original
Rs. 6 Lakhs, awarded by
the Collector, but in the
enhanced amount only.
Dispute regarding sharing
this amount arose only
when the plaintiff filed IA
985 in 1999 claiming 3/6
which was opposed by the
defendant, and not before

2. Res Judicata :
Jumbled plea of Res
Judicata and constructive
Res Judicata argued.
The Tahsildar in his award
Ex. A2 has decided that the
amount is to be given
equally. The plaintiff did not
object to this.
In the Sub Court, he did not
raise the plea that he is
entitled to 3/6 amount
In the High Court also the
plaintiff did not make any
such claim. The orders of
the Tahsildar, Sub Court
and the High Court operate
as Res Judicata barring the
present suit
Ruling cited in support:
1959 Mys 265
1978 KLT 315 - RJ applies
to Land Acquisition
proceedings
The plaintiff having
received 1/3rd of the sum of
Rs.6 Lakhs and having filed
affidavits alleging he is
that. So cause of action for
this suit arises only in 1999.
Hence there is no limitation
for this suit.
Primary rule of Res
Judicata applies only when
a question has been raised
and decided. See
explanation III to S.11. The
present dispute regarding
the proportion of sharing
was not raised before the
Tahsildar, Sub Court or HC
and hence the basic
principle of RJ does not
apply. The award of the
Tahsildar, the order of the
Sub Court and the order of
the HC did not advert to the
proportion at all and hence
will not create the bar of RJ
as such.
RJ and constructive RJ are
two different principles
applicable in different
circumstances. Both cannot
be intermingled but have to
be considered separately
1959 Mys 265 has been
expressly overruled by the
SC in 1966 SC 237.
1978 KLT was a case where
LA Court had decided
dispute which was RJ in
subsequent suit. Here Sub
Court has not decided
apportionment
There is no RJ on account
of the award of the
Tahsildar
There are two answers to
this objection:
The dispute in this suit is
entitled to 1/3 only, is
estopped from claiming
larger share
1979 KLT 425 Election of
remedy
4. Suppression :
Plaintiff has not referred to
Award No. 9 by which he
has received more amounts.
B20 produced to show this
5. Nonjoinder :
Two counts :
Avarankutty one of the
not regarding the Rs 6
Lakhs already received, but
of the amount now lying in
deposit as enhanced
compensation.
For estoppel to apply the
plaintiff must have made a
wrong representation on
the basis of which the
defendant must have acted
believing the representation
to be true. When the truth is
known to both parties there
is no estoppel. Here the
plaintiff and defendant
knew the respective title to
the property. Hence any
representation by the
plaintiff will not mislead the
defendant.
The correct principle to be
applied is that admission
will not confer title. Even if
the plaintiff says so, the
defendant will not get right
over any land in excess of 1
acre set apart to him under
the partition deed.
1969 KLT 412
1997 KHC 482
Award 9 does not relate to
the disputed property but to
a different item in RS 75/6.
The disputed property for
which 56 Lakhs has been
ordered is in RS 75/5.
Further the amount covered
by Award 9 was received
not by all three but by the
plaintiff alone.
When Award 9 does not
relate to the suit property
which is covered by Award
10, there can be no
allegation of suppression
In the proportion of 3:1:2
claimed by the plaintiff, or
equal as contended by the
three to whom the property
is allotted is not joined.
Plaintiff says 2.89 belongs
to 6 persons; other four not
made parties
6. Maintainability :
defendant, there will be no
change as far as
Avarankutty is concerned,
since he has been allotted 2
acres in the partition deed.
2/6 is 1/3. Since he will not
be affected by the decision
in this suit he is not a
necessary party to this suit
The plaintiff does not say
that the property belongs to
6 persons. Only by an
alternate argument, it was
contended that if the court
holds that 6 acres out of
8.89 alone has been
divided, then the legal
effect will be that the
excluded 2.89 will belong to
the original acquirers, who
are six in number. Each of
them will be entitled to 1/6 .
The plaintiff will then get
only 1/6 in the 2.89 in
addition to 3/6 in the 6
acres. Defendant will get
only 1/6th in the additional
2.89 along with 1/6th in the
6 acres. The balance 4/6 of
the additional area of 2.89
will belong to the other four
executants of the partition
deed.
The plaintiff asking for 3/6
in the suit has to be given
3/6 in the 6 acres, and can
be given a lesser 1/6th in the
additional 2.89 if the court
decides the case on the
alternate basis. In such a
case the defendant will be
entitled to 1/6th in the 6
acres and 1/6th in the extra
2.89 acres. The balance will
belong to the other four
executants of the partition
deed. For giving benefit to
the others, they need not be
parties. Only if something is
being taken away from
them, need they be made
parties.
LA Act being a special The principle of a special
statute providing special statute and special remedy
remedy, suit is barred is not applicable to the
Rulings relied on : present case.

1958 KLT 941 1966 SC 237specifically

1974 KLT 724 lays down that in the matter
of apportionment, a suit will
be a proper remedy. See
Para

Order in CRP also expressly

reserves the right of suit
 IN THE COURT OF THE SUBORDINATE JUDGE OF MANJERI

OS 72 of 2001

K V Kunhimohammad, aged 57 .. Plaintiff

K V Shaikkutty, aged 53 .. Defendant

Plaint presented under section 26 read with

Order 7 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure

1. The plaintiff is the son of Mohammad and is residing in

Pulickal amsom of Ernad Taluk. The defendant
is also the son of Mohammad and is living in
Anthiyurkkunnu amsom of Ernad Taluk. Address for
service on the parties is the same.

2. A sheet of granite rock called Karimbanchola, extending

to 3.6003 Hectares in RS 75/1 Anthiyoorkkunnu amsom
of Pulickal village was acquired by the State of Kerala
and the acquired area has been subsequently
demarcated as RS 75/3. This acquisition was under the
emergency provisions and advance possession of the
land was taken on 09.07.1981 without any 4[1]
notification, S.6 declaration and S.9 notice. The award of
the LA Authority numbered as Award 10 of 1986 was
passed on 01.06.1986

3. The LA Tahsildar fixed the compensation at Rs.

5,40,488.39 with a solatium of Rs.91,971.81 making a
total of Rs. 6,32,460.20. Dissatisfied with the quantum of
the compensation, the parties to this suit and their
brother Avarankutty requested for a reference regarding
the quantum and the matter was referred to the Sub
Court, Manjeri. The amount offered by the LA Officer was
received under protest by the claimants.

4. The plaintiff was the A claimant and the defendant was

the B claimant and their brother was the C claimant in
the proceedings before the Sub Court. The A claimant
was examined as the witness for all the three claimants.
The Court by its order dated 22.12.1994 enhanced the
compensation fixing the land value at Rs.15,18,750 and
the Court also allowed solatium at 30% of the land
value. Before the claimants moved for execution of the
Court award, the State deposited Rs.56,18,233 on
09.02.1996.

5. The State preferred LAA 41 of 1996 against the award

of the Sub Judge. By order dated 18.06.1999 the High
Court confirmed the enhancement of land value, with the
sole modification of disallowing interest on solatium.
6. A claimant, the plaintiff herein, filed IA 985 of 1999 for
half share of the total amount in deposit; B claimant, the
defendant in this suit, filed I A 920 of 1999 claiming one
third of the amount in deposit. C claimant also filed I A
921 of 1999 for his one-third share. Since B claimant had
made a claim for one-third instead of the lawful one-
sixth, this was opposed by the A claimant. The Sub
Judge passed orders dated 24.01.2001 allowing one half
of the deposit amount to the A claimant, and one-sixth
to the B Claimant.

7. The B claimant filed CRP 391 of 2001 in the High Court

against the order of the Sub Judge. By orders dated
29.03.2001 [followed by order dated 11.04.2001] the
High Court set aside the order of the Sub Court,
observing that the amount in deposit is payable equally
to the three claimants, and that the A claimant can
recover the lawful amount due to him from B claimant by
appropriate proceedings.

8. The acquired property which originally belonged to the

plaintiff, defendant and Avarankutty was included in the
general partition of the common properties. The division
of the acquired property was made as detailed below:
there was a vertical division of the whole property, into
eastern and western plots, and the eastern half was
allotted to the plaintiff. The western half was divided
horizontally into two plots, and the northern plot was
allotted to Avarankutty. The southern half of the western
half, was allotted to the defendant.

9. The partition deed dated 2251 of 1971 set apart items 4,

measuring 3 acres to the plaintiff, item 11 measuring
one acre to the defendant, and item 14 measuring 2
acres to Avarankutty. No other sharer was allotted any
portion of this property. Though the partition deed takes
in only six acres, the actual extent of the property as
seen from the acquisition proceedings is 8.29 acres. The
difference of 2.29 acres was not included in the partition
deed, since a dispute was raised by the northern
neighbour over the area. The understanding was that the
said disputed area, lying to the immediate north of the
eastern half of the total property, adjoining the property
set apart to the plaintiff, will go to the share of the
plaintiff, as the same is within the boundaries shown in
the partition deed, for the property allotted to the
plaintiff. The dispute was settled with the northern
neighbour and hence the plaintiff became the full owner
of the 2.29 acres also.

10. When the entire 8.29 acres was acquired, the northern
neighbour had submitted a statement to the Land
Acquisition authorities disclaiming all rights over the
 acquired land. At that time there was no dispute
between the plaintiff and his brothers regarding rights to
the land. According to the partition deed the area
allotted to the plaintiff was 3 acres, the area for the
defendant was 1 acre and the area allotted to
Avarankutty was 2 acres. Since there was no dispute
inter se regarding the title to the acquired property,
between the brothers, the acquisition official did not
have to decide the apportionment of the amount of
compensation at that stage. Since the reference was
also on the question of the quantum of compensation,
the Sub Court also did not have occasion to decide the
proportion in which the amount was to be divided.

11. The plaintiff submits that as the owner of 5.29 acres

under the partition deed, he is entitled to the
compensation for the said area, while the defendant as
the owner of 1 acre is eligible to get only the
compensation for that area. However the plaintiff, being
the eldest brother, did not want to enforce his pound of
flesh and was willing to share the excess land with his
brothers in the proportion of 3:1:2 so that the entire
enhanced compensation can be divided in that ratio. It
was on this basis, that the plaintiff filed cheque
application IA 985 of 1999 for 3/6 share of the total
compensation amount agreeing to give 1 out of 6 share
in the entire amount to the defendant. The share of
Avarankutty will be 2 out of 6 in either case.

12. The defendant has in law no right to claim

compensation for any land except the one acre set apart
to him in the partition deed. By virtue of the concession
by the plaintiff, he can take one out of six share of the
total amount, but nothing more.

13. The total compensation amount in deposit is

th
Rs.56,18,233/. The plaintiff is entitled to 3/6 of the said
amount and the defendant to 1/6 th of the same. The
defendant is claiming more than his legitimate share of
the compensation amount, and objecting to the plaintiff
getting more than 1/3rd of the total amount. Thus the
dispute between the plaintiff and defendant is in respect
of 1/6th of the total amount in Court deposit. The plaintiff
is filing this suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is
entitled to the disputed 1/6th of the total compensation
amount [in addition to the admitted one-third share] and
for a consequential injunction restraining the defendant
from objecting to the plaintiff receiving the said share of
the amount from Court deposit in LAR 32 of 1988 of the
Sub Court, Manjeri.

14. The cause of action for the suit arose in March 2001,
when the High Court ordered the deposit amount to be
given equally to the three claimants, with liberty to the
 plaintiff to seek appropriate relief to get his real lawful
share of the compensation amount and thereafter within
the jurisdiction of this Court where the defendant is
residing and where the compensation amount is
deposited.

15. Valuation for court fee an jurisdiction is as shown

below:

Valuation for the relief of declaration

regarding disputed amount and the
Consequential injunction Rs. 9,36,372 - 17
Court fee payable u/S 25 [d] [ii] Rs 68,530 - 00
Court fee paid u/S 4A Rs. 6,853 - 00
Balance Court fee payable Rs. 61,677 - 00

16. The plaintiff therefore prays for a declaration that the

plaintiff is entitled to the disputed 1/6th of the total
compensation amount [in addition to the admitted one-
third share] in deposit in LAR 32 of 1988 on the file of
the Sub Court, Manjeri and for a

consequential injunction restraining the defendant from

objecting to the receipt of the said disputed amount
from the Sub Court, Manjeri in LAR 32 of 1988.

Dated June 2001

Plaintiff

I, K V Kunhimohammad, the plaintiff do hereby declare

that the facts stated above are true to the best of my
knowledge, information and belief.

Dated June 2001

List of Documents

1. 22-10-1971 Regn. Copy of partition deed No. 2251 of 1971

2. 01.06.1986 Award of the Land Acquisition officer
3 22.12.1994 CC of Award of Sub Court, Manjeri in LAR 32 of 1988
4. 18.06.1999 CC of Order of Kerala High Court in LAA 41 of 1996
5. 24.01.2001 CC of Order of Sub Court, Manjeri in cheque
applications
6. 29.03.2001 CC of Order of the Kerala High Court in CRP 391 of
2001
7. 11.04.2001 CC of order of the High Court in R P 186 of 2001

Dated June 2001

Advocate for Plaintiff

 BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
APPEAL SUIT NO. 97 OF 2005

K.V. Kunhimohammad : Appellant / Plaintiff

K V Shaikkutty : Respondent / Defendant

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 17TH JANUARY

2005 OF
THE SUBORDINATE JUDGE OF MANJERI IN

O. S. 7 2 of 2001

K.V. Kunhimohammad : Plaintiff

K V Shaikkutty : Defendant

The appellant, aged 61, son of Mohammad, is residing in

Pulickal Amsom of Ernad Taluk. The respondent, aged 57,
son of Mohammad, is living in Anthiyurkkunnu Amsom of
Ernad Taluk. Address for service on the parties is the
same.

Statement of Facts.

1. The appellant and the respondent are brothers. This

appeal concerns the division of the enhanced
compensation amount awarded for the acquisition of
three items of property. While the appellant plaintiff
claimed that the total compensation is to be divided
based on the title to the property, the defendant wanted
the compensation to be divided equally, which plea has
been accepted by the trial Court. Hence this appeal.

2. The plaintiff and defendant along with their two

brothers and two sisters [total six persons] obtained an
item of property. In a general partition between the co-
owners, in 1971, evidenced by the registered partition
deed Ex A1, this property was divided into three plots,
measuring 3 acres, 1 acre and 2 acres. The three acre
plot was allotted to the plaintiff and the 1 acre plot was
allotted to the defendant. The 2 acre plot was allotted
to another brother Avarankutty.

3. In 1988 all the three items were acquired by the

Government. It was then discovered that the actual
extent of property is more than the documentary extent.
Compensation was determined for the entire property
including the excess area. On a reference u/S 18 for
fixation of value alone, the Sub Court allowed
enhancement, for the total which was confirmed by the
High Court [with the only modification regarding
 interest]. The enhanced compensation was deposited by
the State. Since there was dispute regarding the
division of this amount, the plaintiff filed the suit for
declaration that the defendant is entitled only to the
compensation proportionate to his share of the
property. The trial court, overlooking the fundamental
concept that compensation is determined on the basis
of title, dismissed the suit, on legally untenable
grounds.
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court, dismissing the
suit, the appellant begs to prefer this appeal under Section
96 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the following among
other grounds:

Grounds of Appeal

1. The judgment of the Lower Court is against law and

weight of evidence.

2. The Lower Court erred in holding that the suit is not

maintainable, ignoring the direct ruling on the point, AIR
1966 SC 237. The application of the principle of “special
statute, special remedy” by the trial court to cases of
Land acquisition is perverse.

3. The Lower Court manifestly erred in accusing the

plaintiff of suppression of facts, ignoring the simple fact
that advance possession was taken of the acquired
property and the enquiry followed.

4. The Lower Court erred in holding that the suit is barred

by limitation, mis-applying the law, when the total
amount of compensation was in court deposit at the
time of the filing of the suit, and the cause of action
arose only when the dispute arose between the parties
regarding the division, in 1999.

5. The Lower Court erred in not understanding the correct

principles of constructive res judicata and in applying
the rule to the facts of this case. The Lower Court ought
to have held that AIR 1978 AP 463 is not applicable to
the case on hand and that it is not good law

6. The Lower Court has failed to appreciate the basic

principles of estoppel in holding that the plaintiff is
estopped from claiming rights based on the partition
deed. The Lower Court grievously erred in not adverting
to the axiom that admission cannot confer title.

7. The Lower Court erred in holding that the suit is bad for
non-joinder when no opportunity was given to the
plaintiff to cure the alleged Nonjoinder. The Lower Court
erred in holding that the suit is bad for Nonjoinder when
the primary dispute is only between the plaintiff and
 defendant that can be resolved without the junction of
the other executants of the partition deed

8. The Lower Court ought to have realised the importance

of Ex B1 statement wherein the parties referred to the
partition deed as the only basis of title.

9. The Lower Court ought to have held that the award of

the Tahsildar directing payment of the total
compensation equally to the claimants has no legal
effect in determining the rights of parties

10. The Lower Court erred in not considering the alternate

contention put forward on behalf of the plaintiff
regarding 2.89 acres in excess of the partition deed
measurements.

11. The Lower Court ought to have decreed the suit as

prayed for

Certified copy of the judgment appealed against is

produced herewith.

Valuation as in the lower court Rs. 9,36,372-17

Court fee payable as in lower court Rs. 68,530-00
Court fee paid Rs. 22,844-00
Balance court fee payable Rs. 45,686-00

Dated February 2005

Advocate for Appellant/s

Date Event Remarks Ex

09-07-1981 Adopted as the 4[1] notfn date In the Sub Court order

01-06-1986 Award of the LA officer Total Rs. 6,32, 460.20

01-06-1986 Deposit of Rs. 5,40,488.39 to comp. And Rs.91971.81 to solatium

22-12-1994 Sub Court enhanced Compensation to 56,18,233

09-02-1996 Deposit of Rs. 56,18,233.00

20-09-1996 Cheque applns IA 1143, 863 & 864 By On objections by State that they
A,B,C claimants dismissed are preferring an appeal

29-11-1995 Claimants move Supreme Court for addl Disallowed based on Premnath
comp & int on solatium

18-06-1999 HC modified award – Addl comp and Interest on solatium disallowed

31-05-2000 I A 493 of 2000 by State for refund Rs.20,46,334-30 claimed

23-01-2001 IA 493 dismissed as defective appln Parties names not shown - notice
not given to claimants

24-01-2001 IA 920, 921 & 985 of 1999 for cheque 2:1:3 But order set aside in CRP
By claimants B, C and A by B Claimant
IA 985 allowed

25-01-2001 IA 187 of 2001 to restore IA 493/2001 Filed by State

02-02-2001 A Claimant filed counter in IA

187/2001

19-09-2001 Premnath case overruled in Sunder 2001 [7] SCC 211.

12-10-2001 I A 187 of 2001 to restore IA 493 Dismissed

25-01-2002 State filed IA 251 of 2002 for refund Of Rs. 12,62,256-90

00-05-2002 A claimant filed counter in IA

251/2002

12-07-2002 I A 251 of 2002 by State allowed Rs.12,62,256-90 to be refunded

IA 1015 of 2002 cheque appln by State For amount allowed in IA 251

CRP 1699 of 2002 filed by A claimant Ag. IA 251/02 order stay granted

19-11-2003 IA 1996, 1997, 2067 by claimants for Cheque Allowed by Sub Court

27-11-2003 IA 2454, 2456, & 2457 of 2003 by To release FD Allowed

claimants for direction to the Bank

28-11-2003 Direction by SC to Bank to release FD to the three claimants

00-03-2004 CRP 389/ 2004 by Govt ag. Orders In IA 1997

00-03-2004 CRP 411 of 2004 by Govt against Orders in IA 1996

00-03-2004 CRP 594 of 2004 by Govt against Order in IA 2067 of 2003

16-02-2005 CRP 1699 allowed - Order in I A 251 set CRP 389 of 2004 by State
aside and court directed to consider if dismissed
refund is allowable

23-07-2007 CRP 411 and 594 of 2004 dismissed Ag. I A 1996 and 2067 of 2003

08-01-2008 Sub Court allowed IA 1015/2002 But amount is Rs. 22,48,595

25-02-2008 Calculation on 8-01-2008 confirmed Pay amount by 04-03-2008

04-03-2008 Amount not paid by claimants Take RR action by 17-6-08.

WP 18463 of 2008 ag. Order of Sub Court dt 25/2 and 4/3

WP 18463 allowed - SC directed To consider IA 251/2002

06-09-2008 Hg in Manjeri Sub Court OR to 18-09-2008

 Govt filed I A 637 of 2008
I A 1547 of 2008 To reopen & hear I A 251
I A 1748 of 2008 To amend I A 251

14-10-2008 IAs came up for hearing IA 1547 /08 and IA 1748/08

IA 637 of 2008 not pressed posted for counter

24-10-2008 R1 filed Cr in IAs 1547 & 1748 Argued – Orders 04-11-2008

04-11-2008 Judge on leave reposted 07-11-2008

07-11-2008 Adjourned on GP's request to 17-11-2008

17-11-2008 Adjourned on GP's request to 19-11-2008

19-11-2008 IA1748/08 not pressed- dismissed GP Enquiry 05-12-2008

filed new calculation statement

05-12-2008 Enq. Adjourned to 12-12-2008

12-12-2008 IA 251 of 2002 heard and posted For orders to 05-01-2009

05-01-2009 Orders not pronounced

17-05-2010 Courts reopened Judge Transferred

03-07-2010 Hg in IA 251 of 2002

11-10-2010 Hg in I A 251 of 2002 Before new judge

06-12-2010 IA 1984/2010 by Claimant to decide Maintainability of IA 251

09-12-2010 Cr & Hg in IA 1984 Adjourned

15-01-2011 Declared Holiday reposted

Mr Ananthakrishnan transferred

10-01-2013 Hg before Mr Seshadri

IA 251 dismissed No Kerala Civil Rules of Practice

HC, Kerala RFA 97 of 2005
Appellant
SC, Manjeri OS 72 of 2002 ` Plaintiff

Kunhumohammad [dead] and others APPELLANTS

SHAIKKUTTY [DEAD] AND OTHERS RESPONDENTS

Argument note on behalf of the Appellants

Fact profile

1. The original appellant was the plaintiff in OS 72 of 2001

of the Manjeri Sub Court. His name as seen in A1 deed
is Kunhumohammad. But in the award and all previous
court proceedings, it is misspelt as Kunhimohammad
and so that name is shown in the plaint also. The
appellant died and his legal heirs are added as
Appellants 2 to 7 and Respondents 7 and 8.

2. The original respondent in this appeal was the

defendant in the suit. On his death, his legal heirs were
added as R2 to R 6. For convenience all further
references are to the party array in the trial court.

3. The prayer in the suit was for declaration that that the
plaintiff is entitled to the amount in court deposit in
LAR 32 of 1988 of the Manjeri Sub Court, and for a
consequential injunction restraining the defendant
from objecting to the plaintiff receiving the said
amount from the Sub Court, Manjeri. The dispute
regarding the amount in court deposit arose as
narrated below:

FACT PROFILE

4. Plaintiff, his 3 brothers and two sisters, as co-owners

had rights over several items of properties which were
divided by the partition deed 2251 of 1971 marked as
Exhibi A1, in which one item of property called
Chenneeri Mala and Karimbanchola, then included in
RS 75/1 of Anthiyoorkkunnu amsom of Pulickal village
was allotted to the Plaintiff, Defendant and another
brother Avarankutty alone. The other three executants
of the partition deed, consisting of one brother and two
sisters were not allotted any portion of this property,
called Chenneeri Mala or Karimbanchola.

5. The land called Chenneeri Mala and Karimbanchola

was divided into 3 plots of different areas by A1

Item 4 3 acres to the plaintiff, Kunhumohammad

item 11 1 acre to defendant, Shaikkutty
item 14 2 acres to Avarankutty.
 No part of Karimbanchola/Chenneeri mala was allotted
to any of the other three executants of the partition
deed. This allotment is the sheet anchor of the case of
the plaintiff and its significance was totally missed by
the Lower Court

6. The entire property called Chenneeri mala and

Karimbanchola was acquired by the Government under
emergency provisions. The Government took advance
possession of the property before passing the award
u/S 5. The whole property was a sheet of granite rock,
which was later renumbered as RS 75/5.

7. By A2=B18, Award No 10/86 of the Tahsildar, dated

01.06.1986, the State offered to pay to the landowners
the total amount of Rs. 6,32,460.00 as compensation as
seen in page 12.

8. Page 2 [wrongly typed as 1] of A1 showed the names of

four persons as the occupants [not owners] of the land
in RS 75/5: They were the Plaintiff, the defendant, and
Avarankutty [three brothers] plus a stranger K K
Kunhammed. The plaintiff’s name is Kunhumohammad

9. Page 3 of A1 shows that the area of the land acquired

was initially adopted as 6 acres. Advance possession
was taken before the Award. Page 5 shows that the
acquired area was separately sub divided as 75/5. And
when this land was measured by the Government
officials, the area was actually found to be 3.6003 H =
8.89 acres and not 6 acres. The legal title to this
excess area is one of the questions to be decided here.

10. The plaintiff defendant and Avarankutty filed a joint

statement Exhibit B20 before the Tahsildar claiming
rights under A1 partition deed. Page 12 of A1 refers to
this statement. The award proceeds on the basis that
all the three claimed rights over the acquired property,
only on the strength of A1 partition deed.

11. At the award enquiry, Kunhammed, the stranger,

initially shown as an occupant by the acquiring official,
disclaimed right over the acquired land, admitting that
the land belonged only to the three brothers.

10. The amount awarded was paid and received by the

three parties equally. No dispute was raised by any of
the parties to the sharing of the compensation then
awarded. There is no dispute even now regarding the
sharing of that amount in this suit. This suit pertains
only to the sharing of the enhanced amount and not to
the initial amount paid by the State.
11. The plaintiff for and on behalf of his two brothers filed
an application under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
requesting for a reference to the Court. That
application sought for a reference only regarding the
amount of compensation soliciting enhancement. The
reference did not seek the adjudication by the
reference court regarding the division of the enhanced
amount. P11 of the Exhibit A2 award refers to this. The
effect of a joint application has been spelt out in 2003
KHC 905

14. A reference was made by the Tahsildar to the Manjeri

Sub Court under S. 18 regarding enhancement of
compensation alone by B22 dated 10.06.1988. Plaintiff
filed B1 statement while the other two claimants filed
B2 as a joint statement. In both statements it has been
stated that the three persons “were” [not are] having
joint title and possession of 3.6003 H = 8.89 acres.
Perhaps because the reference was only the quantum
of compensation nothing was stated by them regarding
the partition deed or the area allotted to each on
division, or about the shortage of the area in the deed.
[By the Sub Court award Exhibit A3,=B5 the market
value was doubled and with the addition of solatium
and other benefits under the 1984 amendment, the
total compensation swelled to Rs 56,18,233. 00. That
amount was deposited by the State in the Sub Court in
LAR 32/1988 on 09.02.1996, without anyone filing any
execution application.

15. The claimants applied for disbursement of the amount

by I A 864, 865 and 1143 of 1996, claiming one-third
each as seen from B7 to B9. All the applications were
opposed by the Government by B10 counter, on the
ground, that the enhancement award was being
challenged. All the three cheque applications were
dismissed by B11 order.

16. Exhibit A3 award was substantially confirmed by the

High Court in LAA 41 of 1996 by A4 order dated
18.06.1999 except regarding additional interest and
interest on solatium, which were disallowed based on
the then prevailing law of Premnath.

17. A slight detour is necessary at this stage regarding the

action of the State following the appellate order. As the
full amount under the award of the reference court had
been deposited by the State in the reference court, the
proper remedy of the State was to file an application
for restitution in the light of the appellate order.
However no restitution application was filed by the
State. Instead of that, the State belatedly filed I A 251
of 2002 in the reference court in the LAR for a direction
to the landowners to refund the alleged excess
 amount. This application was heard and finally
dismissed by the reference court. That order has
become final since it was not questioned by way of
revision or writ. The result is that there was no
reduction regarding the compensation amount
deposited in court and available for division.

18. This has not resulted in any unlawful gain for the
claimants because Premnath Kapoor -- 1996 [2] SCC 71
— rendered per incuriam had been overruled by a
Constitution Bench in Sunderlal -- 2001 [7] SCC 211 --
by the time the IA was heard resulting in its dismissal.

19. On 24-01-2001 fresh cheque applications were filed by

the three persons as shown below, which is the
starting point of the present dispute

I A 920 of 1999 by B Claimant - defendant – for 1/3 rd

amount
I A 921 of 1999 by C claimant Avarankutty – for 1/3 rd
amount
I A 985 of 1999 by A claimant - plaintiff -- for ½ of the
amount B19

12. The claim of the plaintiff in his cheque application for

3/6 share of the enhanced amount, is based on the
proportion of the area of land allotted to the three
persons in A1 partition deed. As the plaintiff was
allotted 3 acres out of the total of 6 acres, he claimed
3/6 = 1/2. Avarankutty who had been allotted 2 acres
out of six by A1, claimed 1/3rd

13. Though the defendant had been allotted 1 acre in A1

partition, so that his share cannot exceed 1/6 th [one
acre out of six acres] he claimed 1/3 rd share. The
plaintiff opposed the application of the defendant.

14. In B12 counter filed by the defendant in the cheque

application by the plaintiff, his only objection is that
the plaintiff having agreed to the equal sharing of the
initial amount cannot ask for more. No objection is
raised to the title under the partition deed.

15. In the enquiry in the three cheque applications, the

plaintiff was examined as Pw1. That deposition is
marked as B13 in the suit. Though he was cross
examined by counsel for the other two claimants
[defendant and Avarankutty] it is significant to point
out that the evidence tendered by Pw1 stands
uncontradicted. The defendant has not examined
himself, inviting the necessary adverse inference. The
evidence tendered by the plaintiff and recorded in his
deposition will be referred to in detail later.
16. Based on the partition deed the court ordered the
enhanced amount to be divided in proportion to the
allotment in the partition deed 3:1:2. I A 985 of 1999 by
the plaintiff for 3/6 share was allowed by the court by
EXHIBIT A5 = B14 order dated 24.01.2001. The
defendant’s claim for 1/3rd was disallowed and he was
given only 1/6th based on the area of land allotted to
him, which was only 1 acre. Avarankutty got 2/6 th ie
1/3rd of the total compensation. Avarankutty accepted
the order and had no complaints against the division in
accordance with the ratio of 3:1:2 adopted in the
partition deed.

20. The Defendant filed CRP 391 of 2001 in the High Court
against the order of the Sub Judge. Because the
reference under S 18 was limited to the enhancement
of the compensation amount and did not call for any
adjudication regarding apportionment, the High Court
set aside the order of the Sub Court, by order dated
29.03.2001. Vide 1979 KHC756. This order was
produced by the plaintiff as document No 6 along with
the plaint. But the judgment wrongly shows that this is
marked as A6. But the number of the C.RP given
therein as 600/2001 is wrong. It should be 391 of 2001.

21. Though this Court set aside the order of the Sub Court,
this court has added a rider that the plaintiff, [A
claimant] can recover the lawful amount due to him
from the defendant [the B claimant] by appropriate
proceedings, apparently relying on the proviso to S 31
[2] of the Land Acquisition Act.

22. The plaintiff filed a review application RP 186 of 2001

pointing out the possible confusion on account of the
observation of this court regarding the rights of parties
in the sharing of the amount. By its order A7=B17,
dated 11.04.2001 the court has clarified that it did not
determine the rights of parties by the earlier order and
that the plaintiff has been given the liberty to establish
his right for the larger share in proper proceedings
before the civil court .

23. The plaintiff then filed the present suit and sought
attachment of the excess 1/6 th which the defendant
was permitted to withdraw by IA 871 of 2001. That
application was dismissed by the trial court. Plaintiff
preferred CRP 2391 of 2001 against that order.

24. The plaintiff had also filed IA 922 of 2001 in the

reference court marked as B15 for disbursal of the
undisputed 1/3rd amount due to him, which was also
dismissed due to the counter B16 filed by the State. He
preferred C.RP 2827 of 2001 against that order. Both
 revision petitions were heard together and a common
order was passed by this court.

25. By order dated 19.02.2003 the High Court directed the

defendant to furnish security for the disputed 1/6 th
amount. That order was followed by the order in RP 470
of 2003 dated 26.08.2003 confirming the legal position.
These orders have not been produced and marked as
documents but will be available in the file.

26. Fresh Cheque applications, I A 2454, 2456, and 2457 of

2003, were filed. The plaintiff was allowed to withdrew
the undisputed 1/3rd of the total amount, and
Avarankutty was also allowed to withdraw 1/3 rd of the
total amount.

27. The defendant did not furnish security for the disputed
1/6th and so cheque was issued to him only for the
undisputed 1/6th The disputed 1/6th of the total amount
continues to remain in court deposit even today. That
1/6th is the subject matter of this suit.

28. In this suit a declaration is sought that the plaintiff is

entitled to the 1/6th amount in court deposit, [and not
the defendant] and a consequential injunction is prayed
for to enable the plaintiff to withdraw the same. This is
strictly in accordance with the directions in A6, and A7
orders and in conformity with S 31 [4] of the Act

29. The Lower Court grievously erred in overlooking these

two decisions which are inter parties and allowing the
defendant to appropriate the value of 2.96 acres when
he had title only over one acre of land according to A1
deed. The suit was dismissed on five grounds: [a] it is
barred by Limitation [b] it is barred by Res Judicata [c]
Estoppel, [d] Nonjoinder and [e] not maintainable. In
2001, when this court had expressly permitted the
plaintiff to agitate his rights based on the partition
deed, which can only be by a regular civil suit, the
judgment of the Lower Court without adverting to the
orders of this court and without any finding on the
respective title the judgment is patently wrong. This
one factor would justify a limited remand to reconsider
the case taking into consideration A6 &A7 orders of
this court

Real Questions that ought to have been decided

30. The Lower Court ought to have answered the following

three queries: [a] Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get
3/6 share in the enhanced compensation amount as
claimed in the plaint? [b] Whether the defendant’s
claim for 2/6 [1/3rd ] share is legally justified; or is his
right limited to 1/6th only [c] Will the right of the plaintiff
 to get 3/6 share be attenuated to 1/3 rd because he had
shared the amount initially awarded by the State
equally with the defendant ? The answers to these
queries involve the interpretation of Ss. 11, 12, 18, 30,
29 and 31 of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act in the light
of the precedents.

Title to the acquired property

31. The starting point in this enquiry must be the

ascertainment of the title over the acquired property.
The title deed A1 shows that the acquired land, named
Karimbanchola, was allotted only to the plaintiff, the
defendant and Avarankutty. The other three executants
of the deed, [one brother and two sisters] have not
been allotted any part of Karimbanchola. Hence it is
crystal clear that they can have no right whatever on
the acquired property. It is not a case of one divisible
item being omitted to be included in the partition deed,
in which case that item will continue to be common
divisible property thereafter. When there is no
omission, and the item is included in the partition, the
principle of boundaries prevailing over area will apply,
and the allottees of that land [whether one or more]
alone will be entitled to the total area of that property.

32. Complication concerning title to the acquired land may

arise because of the difference in the area; while A1
proceeds on the basis that the total area of Chenneeri
Mala and Karimbanchola is only 6 acres, it has been
discovered by official measurement at the time of the
acquisition that the area is 8.99 acres. Who has title
over the excess area of 2.89 acres ?

33. The plaintiff as Pw1 in the course of the enquiry in the

cheque applications, has given detailed evidence as to
how the partition was effected and why the 2.89 acres
was not shown in the deed. That deposition is Exhibit
B13. The total property was divided into two plots,
creating the eastern and western plots. The eastern
half was allotted entirely to the plaintiff. The western
half was divided horizontally into two plots; the
northern plot was given to Avarankutty; the southern
half of the western moity, to the defendant.

34. Pw1 asserted that the area allotted to him was shown
as 3 acres in the partition deed, because at that time
the land to the north of the 3 acre plot, was claimed by
a stranger called Kunhammad as belonging to him. This
dispute with the northern neighbour was resolved later
and the neighbour gave up his claim.

35. This version of Pw1 is corroborated by the award of the

Tahsildar where, that neighbour, Kunhammed who was
 initially shown as an interested person, in occupation
of part of the acquired land had disclaimed rights
giving up his claim at the enquiry.

36. The result is that the plaintiff gets title to 5.89 acres
while the defendant got rights over one acre alone.
There is no dispute about the right of Avarankutty over
2 acres. Therefore the legal title over the land will be
5.89 acres to plaintiff, 1 acre to the defendant and 2
acres to Avarankutty.

37. The Lower Court committed a colossal blunder when it

says in para 25 that the plaintiff has not mounted the
box. Obviously the Lower Court callously overlooked
Exhibit B13, the deposition of the plaintiff during the
enquiry into the cheque applications. This omission is a
defect in the judgment, that has affected the whole
rationale of the judgment. No court, conscious of the
unchallenged testimony of the plaintiff regarding the
mode of division, could conclude that the defendant
can claim rights over any land in excess of one acre

38. Moreover Pw1 had stated on oath that the defendant

had paid him the excess amount received by him out of
the initial awarded amount, which can only be in
recognition of the real title of the parties to the
acquired land. No conscientious court could ignore this
assertion which has neither been challenged in the
cross examination nor contradicted by the defendant
entering the box. This one circumstance strikes at the
very root of the defendant’s case

39. When the partition deed allotted only 1 acre to the

defendant, allowing him to claim 1/3 rd share or any area
in excess of 1 acre, would amount to rewriting the
partition deed, which will inevitably result in the
deprivation of the area actually allotted to the Plaintiff,
since 2 acres to Avarankutty is undisputed. The court
cannot confer title on the defendant over the 2.89
acres or over any area in excess of one acre.

40. In the last cheque application and in this suit, the

plaintiff is not claiming division of the amount in the
ration of 5.89 : 1 : 2 but only as 3:1:2, based on the
ratio in the partition deed. By limiting his claim to
50% the plaintiff is actually allowing the defendant and
Avarankutty to get amounts in excess of what they are
legally entitled to get. As the eldest brother, he did not
want to appropriate the entire value of the 2.89 acres
[5.89 minus 3 = 2.89] for himself. He was willing to
share the compensation for the additional 2.89 acres
with the two brothers who are co-sharers of the land
according to the proportion in the partition deed.
41. The advantage for the defendant and Avarankutty will
be apparent if the percentage basis is calculated. The
data according to the real right vis-à-vis the share
claimed by the plaintiff in the cheque application [on
the ratio of A1 deed] are:

Plaintiff Defendan Avarankutt

t y
As per real title 66.25% 11.25% 22.50%
5.89:1:2
As per ratio in A1 50% 16.66% 33.33%
3:1:2
Loss or excess - 16.25% +05.41% +10.83
illegal equal 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
share

FAULTY FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT

53. The reasoning of the Lower Court in the impugned

judgment can be divided into five heads : [a] Limitation
[2] Res Judicata [3] Estoppel [4] Nonjoinder and [5] Suit
not maintainable

Limitation [Para 13 to 17 ]

54. According to the lower court, since the acquisition was

in 1981 and possession had been taken then itself, this
suit in 2001, after 20 years is barred by limitation,
since suits for declaration have to be filed within three
years. Which is the starting point for counting the three
years; it is three years from of the date when the cause
of action for the suit arose. So the starting point
depends on the cause of action.

55. Here what is the cause of action ? The cause of action

for this suit is not the acquisition as such or the
dispossession of the land by the Government. So 1981
and 2001 are irrelevant. The Lower Court wrongly
assumes that the cause of action for this suit is the
acquisition itself.

56. This suit is only regarding the inter se division of the

enhanced compensation of Rs. 56 and odd Lakhs. This
enhancement came into existence only when the HC
confirmed the enhancement by the Sub Court by A4 in
1999. If the HC had held that no enhancement is liable
to be paid, there would have been no such suit. The
cause of Acton for this suit cannot arise before 1999.

57. It may be noted that the claim by the plaintiff in this

suit is not for 3/6 share in the original Rs. 6 Lakhs,
awarded by the Collector, but for 3/6 share in the
enhanced amount of 56 and odd Lakhs only.
58. Dispute regarding sharing of this amount arose only
when the plaintiff filed I A 985 in 1999 claiming 3/6
which was opposed by the defendant, and not before
that. As I A 985 by the plaintiff was allowed by the Sub
Court, he need not have filed this suit. It was only when
that order was set aside in CRP in 2001, by A6 order,
that the cause of action for this suit arose. So the
casue of action for this suit arose only in 2001. Thus
the contrary finding of the Lower Court is to say the
least perverse.

59. The lower court has relied on 1985 KLT 687 to say that
cause of action arose on the date of dispossession of
the land, which was in 1981 in this case. [Para 16] That
ruling was under the Income Tax Act based on S 45 as
it stood then before the 1988 amendment providing for
assessment of capital gains. The decision depended on
the special provisions of the Income Tax Act regarding
revenue receipt as distinguished from Capital receipt
and also on the method of accounting of the assessee
being mercantile and not cash basis. In the mercantile
system income was assessed on accrual basis and not
on receipt basis.

60. It is in that context that the Full Bench held that the
right to the enhanced compensation amount, arose on
the date of dispossession, and interest on delayed
payment of that amount accrued in each year of delay,
so that the total interest income cannot be assessed
as income in the year when it was finally paid, but has
to be proportionately added to the income for each
year. That was not a decision in civil law as to when
the cause of action for a share in the enhanced
compensation arose.

61. The 1987 amendment to the IT Act changed the law

completely. This will be clear 2009 [315] ITR 1 and
2014 [367] ITR 498. After the amendment the income
by way compensation became assessable only on
actual receipt not on the deemed accrual date. Ie the
date of transfer.

62. The tax law now conforms to the civil law. Cause of
action for a suit strictly comes within the ambit of the
Code of Civil Procedure. In this suit, declaration of right
regarding the 1/6th share of the additional
compensation awarded by the reference court, can
arise not when the acquisition was effected, not when
the enhancement due is quantified, and not when that
calculation is confirmed by the higher court but only
when the claim for 3/6 share, allowed by the Sub Court,
was disallowed in the CRP. That was only in 2001 and
the suit was filed in 2002
63. Reliance by the lower court on the rulings 1985 KLT
572 and 1989 [1] KLT 386 is misplaced. 1985 KLT 572,
was for recovery of loss caused by the misconduct of
an employee and it was held that cause of action arose
on the date of misconduct and not when the amount of
loss was quantified. 1989 [1] KLT was a case of a suit
for damages for loss in transit where knowledge of the
loss is the starting point for limitation.

64. The assumption by the lower court that the cause of

action for this suit arose when the plaintiff got
knowledge of his right to get compensation for 2.89
acres is illogical and illegal. It is also perverse because
the claim by the plaintiff is not for the compensation in
respect of 2.89 acres. His claim is that he has the right
to get half share of the total amount of enhanced
compensation awarded by the Court based on the
proportion stated in the title deed which is the partition
deed A1. At the risk of repetition it has to be stated
that in claiming the value of only 3/6 share of the total
land [50%] instead of 5.89 out of 8.89 [66.25%] he is
allowing his two brothers to get a portion of the value
of the excess land. The following table proves this:

NAME SHARE AS PERCENTAGE SHARE AS PERCENTAGE LESS/MORE

PER TITLE PER EX A1
Plaintiff 5.89/8.89 66.25 3/6 50% - 16.25

Defendant 1/8.89 11.24 1/6 16.67 + 5.43

Avaran 2/8.89 22.50 2/6 33.33 + 10.17

54. By the dismissal of the suit, the defendant gets the

value of 2.96 acres while he was allotted only one acre
by the partition deed. In that case the share of the
plaintiff is illegally reduced to the value of 2.96 acres
whereas he had been actually allotted 3 acres. This is
blatantly inequitable

55. It is also to be remembered that this suit would not

have been filed if the order in IA 985 of 1999 had not
been set aside by the High Court in CRP 391 of 2001.
The finding of the lower court that cause of action for
this suit arose on the date of taking possession [1981]
is therefore baseless. Cause of action for the suit arose
only in 2001 when the right of the plaintiff to ½ share
was in jeopardy by A6 order in the CRP, which itself
conferred the right on him to claim the same through
court.

Res Judicata [Para 18 to 21]

56. Another patent error perpetrated by the Lower Court is

in holding that this suit is barred by constructive Res
Judicata. The Lower Court agrees with the plaintiff
that primary Res Judicata does not arise in this case,
 because the issue involved has not actually been heard
and decided by anyone. Vide Para last line of Para 18

Constructive Res Judicata

57. The case of constructive Res Judicata is predicated by

the Lower Court based on the failure of the plaintiff to
raise his claim for half right before the Tahsildar, the
Sub Court and the High Court. In other words the
decision of the Tahsildar, followed by the court award
and the order in the S 54 appeal, operates as
constructive Res Judicata because the plaintiff did not
raise this dispute about the sharing before those
forums. According to the Lower Court since the
plaintiff did not object to the payment of the initial
award amount in equal shares before the Tahsildar, or
in the subsequent proceedings, he is barred from
making the claim in this suit.

58. There is no legal justification for this result. The finding

of the Lower Court is founded on a faulty understanding
of the legal concepts related to Ss 11, 12, 18, 29 and
30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

59. The plaintiff countered the plea of Res Judicata on the

ground that there was no “decision” by the Tahsildar
on which the plea of Res Judicata can be mounted. The
award by the Tahsildar, does not have the force of a
decree. The award of the reference court u/S 18 in this
case is also not a “decision” that can operate as a
decree.

60. That the order of the reference court acting under S 18,
is only an award, and is not a “decree” which is
appealable by virtue of S 54 as if it was a decree, but
that the court deciding a reference under S 30
functions as an ordinary civil court and it passes a
decree, which is appealable under S 96 of the CPC, [not
under S 54] has been explained in AIR 1970 Gujarat 37;
2010 KHC 4130 sc

61. As the order of Tahsildar was not a decision, and the

order in the appeal u/S 54 also does not qualify as a
decree, the question of Res Judicata does not arise at
all.

62. What is the legal effect of the award of the Tahsildar.

Though it is called the award of the Tahsildar, actually
courts have construed that the award under S 12 is
only an offer by the State and nothing more. It is not a
judgment and reference is not an appeal. 1961 KHC
721 Para 5 and 1988 KHC 674
63. The source of the right to compensation is not the
award. It only quantifies the offer of the State 1966
KHC 408 Para 16 and 19. The Lower Court grievously
erred in not understanding and applying this law. It
should have held that the enquiry under S 11 is
confined to the examination of similar sales, valuing of
improvements and amounts if any under clauses 3 and
4 of Section 23 to make the offer. No adjudication of
the rights inter se between the landowners is involved
in the S 11 enquiry especially regarding the sharing of
the proposed compensation amount. This position is
confirmed by AIR 2003 SC 942 Para 36 & 37 .

64. The Lower Court has mistakenly relied on AIR 1978 AP

463, failing to notice the ratio of that ruling. That was a
case of a writ by a landowner to direct the LAO to
make a reference regarding the apportionment of the
awarded compensation, on the ground that the LAO
has no jurisdiction to decide such a dispute. It can also
be seen that he had not filed any application for
reference. The only question arising for decision in that
case whether the LAO has the power to decide the
mode of apportionment. The plaintiff here does not
question that power; his contention is that the decision
of the LAO cannot operate as a judgment resulting in
Res Judicata, and that the decision by him cannot
confer title on any party.

65. S 18 provides for reference to the court on different

disputes enumerated therein concerning: [a] area, [b]
amount, [c] right of the recipient and [d] sharing of the
amount. It is also necessary to give due emphasis to
the words “who is not accepting the award”. The
reference can therefore be confined to that part of the
award which is not accepted by the party.

66. The powers of the reference court are confined to the

determination of the particular dispute referred to it.
That court has jurisdiction only decide what has been
referred to it in accordance with the application by the
party. The court cannot travel beyond the terms of the
reference. 1979 KHC 564 [SC] and 2009 KHC 4383 SC
[Para 13] Since in this case the reference was limited
to the amount awarded, the reference court cannot
decide how it is to be apportioned. The High Court in
the further appeal under S 54 also cannot consider the
mode of apportionment of the enhanced amount.

67. If a reference had been sought and made regarding the

apportionment either U/S 18 or under S 30, the order of
the reference court, irrespective of whether it is an
award or a decree will operate as Res Judicata. As
there was no such reference in re the division, the
question to be decided is whether is a party is bound to
 ask for a reference [ought to within the meaning of
Explanation IV to S 11.] Refer to Para 48 supra Land
Acquisition Act is not a special statute creating a
special right prescribing a special remedy. The statute
provides an easy and summary remedy so that a civil
suit is not barred.

68. This will be evident from the third proviso to S 31 [2]

which says that any person who receives any amount
from the LAO in excess of what is lawfully due to him,
is liable to refund the excess to the rightful person
which means that the rightful person can recover such
excess amounts from the person who has received it
from the LAO. That recovery can only be by a civil suit
in which the civil court will determine the right to get
the amount based on the title to the land.

69. The compensation under L A Act is the equivalent of

the land acquired, so that it is based on title to the land
acquired. Rights of parties to the compensation is
therefore directly proportionate to their title. No one
can claim compensation for any land over which he has
no title. The claim of the defendant for 1/3 rd share of
the enhanced compensation can be upheld only if he
had title to 1/3rd of the total land acquired ie only if he
had right and title over 2.963 acres of land [8.89
divided by 3] When A1 partition deed specified his
share of the land as just 1 acre, he cannot get
compensation for any larger area. In this suit the
defendant has neither attempted nor proved his right
over any land in excess of 1 acre. Because of the
concession by Plaintiff [limiting his claim to 3/6 alone,
he gets value for 1.48 acres 1/6 th of 8.89 though he has
right only to 1 acre.

70. Constructive Res Judicata is commonly referred to as

coming within the “might and ought” clause. The first
element to attract the doctrine is that the dispute
should be one which could have been raised in the
earlier proceedings. The second element which is the
critical element is that there must be the crucial duty
on the concerned party to raise that before the first
forum. This is the second defence of the plaintiff to the
plea of constructive Res Judicata.

71. There was no dispute at the Tahsildar stage regarding

the sharing of the amount offered by him on behalf of
the State. Even now in this suit, the plaintiff is not
claiming that he is entitled to half share in the amount
offered and paid by the Tahsildar. The prayer in the suit
pertains only to the enhanced amount awarded by the
court and deposited in court.
72. Even if it is postulated that the plaintiff could have
raised the dispute before the Tahsildar and applied for
inclusion of this dispute in the S 18 reference, the law
does not compel him to do so. It is optional on his part
to do so. S 18 uses the word may and Court has
interpreted it as party can. This is because there is no
express or implied bar against the determination of the
dispute regarding entitlement to the amount between
the private parties by the civil court, which is expressly
provided for in S 31.

73. The Land Acquisition Act only states that no dispute

between the State and the person interested in the
acquired land can be raised except under the
provisions of the Act. The appellant reiterates that he
is not raising any dispute regarding the sharing of the
amount initially paid by the State as compensation.
The equal payment of the initial amount is not
questioned or attacked in this suit. The dispute raised
in this suit is only about the enhanced amount.

74. That the sharing dispute can be decided if it forms part

of the reference application does not mean that such a
reference is mandatory. Reference u/S 18 and civil suit
are two remedies open to the landowner. That he did
not resort to the quicker or summary remedy does not
preclude his right to file a suit to establish his title and
rights

75. Misled by the word final in S 12 of the L A Act, the trial

court seems to have thought that the only mode of
questioning the equal apportionment order of the
Tahsildar is by a reference and not by a suit. But this
submission attractive at the first blush is not sound in
law as is clear from the ruling reported in 2003 KHC
894 = AIR SC 942 para 36

76. 1978 KLT 315 = 1978 KHC 78 relied on by the Lower

Court is not a case of constructive Res Judicata at
all. The ratio of that ruling was that a decision of a
special tribunal like the Land Tribunal will operate as
Res Judicata in a subsequent civil suit on the same
question. This qualifies as a primary Res Judicata and
is not a case of constructive Res Judicata at all. That
ruling has no bearing in the present case because here
there is no prior decision by any tribunal. The
Tahsildar, the reference court and the High Court did
not decide the dispute regarding sharing of the amount.

77. AIR 1959 Mysore 265 was not concerned with

constructive Res Judicata at all; the ratio of that ruling
was that the acquiring authority cannot make a
reference u/S 30 after having passed an award. That
ruling had been expressly overruled by AIR 1966 SC
 237. No question of constructive Res Judicata arose in
that ruling.

78. The other two rulings relied on by the Lower Court in

this regard do not relate to the Land Acquisition Act
nor about any amount to be determined by any court.

79. AIR 1945 PC 132 dealt with two suits – the first suit by
the father of the plaintiff in the second suit and the
later suit by the son. In both the claim was for a half
share in the offerings in a temple, on specified
occasions. The first suit was decreed for half share. In
the subsequent suit for a later period, claiming the
same half share for the subsequent period, defendant
raised an objection to the claim for half share. The
court held that the defendant’s objection was
prohibited by constructive Res Judicata; he cannot be
permitted to dispute the half share since he did not
raise that in the earlier suit by the father of the
plaintiff.

80. AIR 1977 SC 1680 was a case of a writ followed by a

suit challenging the dismissal of the petitioner. The
dismissal was questioned in the writ only on the
ground that no reasonable opportunity was given to
him to contest the charges of corruption. In the
subsequent suit, his contention was that the dismissal
order was not by the competent authority [ the IG and
not the DIG]. This was not allowed to be raised due to
constructive Res Judicata. The rulings have no
relevance to the facts of this case.

Estoppel [Para 22 & 23 ]

81. The confusion harboured by the Lower Court regarding

the legal principles applicable to the case is
confounded by its illegal import of the principle of
estoppel to dismiss the suit. It says that the plaintiff
having received 1/3rd of the sum of Rs.6 Lakhs alone as
his share, he is estopped from claiming larger share
now. Refer to B9 and B23. There are two answers to
this objection:

82. The dispute in this suit is not regarding the Rs 6 Lakhs

already received, but of the amount now lying in
deposit as enhanced compensation.

83. When one reads S 115 of the Evidence Act which

defines the law of estoppel, the three cornerstones of
estoppel are: [a] a misrepresentation of fact made by
one person, [2] believing which another party has acted
[3] resulting in some detriment to him. If all the three
conditions are satisfied, the first party will not be
permitted to assert the truth to the disadvantage of the
 second party. None of the three criteria or elements
exist here.

84. Where is the wrong representation here ? How can it

be said that the defendant was misled by such a
statement when there was no statement at all. There
was no representation by the plaintiff at any time
anywhere that the defendant is entitled to equal rights
over the acquired property. That he agreed to payment
of the initial amount equally to the three claimants
cannot amount to conduct confessing or professing
equal rights over the land. The Lower Court
conveniently forgets that in the claim statement filed
by the defendant before the Tahsildar, he expressly
traced his rights to A1 partition deed.
85. Assuming that there was a misstatement regarding the
rights, by the plaintiff, what is the action by the
defendant believing it to be true that has caused him
any detriment. What is there to show that the
defendant acted on the basis of the wrong statement.
The only action by him is the filing of the cheque
application. But his cheque application does not say
that he is claiming equal share because of the
representation by the plaintiff. The defendant has in
fact no case and cannot also have any contention that
believing the representation made by the plaintiff he
had done anything resulting in his detriment. 2014 [1]
KHC 131 is an illustration of the application of the rule
that there is no estoppel, if the person to whom a
wrong representation has been made, has actually
acted on it.

86. Another well known exception to the estoppel rule is

that there is no estoppel when the truth is known to
both parties.

1965 KHC 739 [SC] 2016 [1] KHC 303 SC

87. Here the plaintiff and defendant knew their respective

title to the property, which is the partition deed to
which they are parties. The court has to recall that in
the joint statement filed by him before the Tahsildar,
along with his two brothers, he claimed rights to the
acquired property only under the partition deed and as
per its terms. That precludes the possibility of any
misleading representation by the plaintiff. Even now
the plaintiff is claiming only the share to which he is
entitled to under A1. 2014 [4] KHC 131

88. The plaintiff in permitting the defendant to receive a

larger share of the initial payment was not making
any misleading representation; it was not a
representation or statement but only a concession that
 cannot be elevated to the level of estoppel barring him
from asserting his right later.

89. One significant sentence in Exhibit B13, has been

callously overlooked by the Lower Court, where Pw1
says that after receiving the initial amount awarded by
the Tahsildar, the defendant had paid the amount in
excess of his share to the plaintiff. There is no cross
examination on this point at all.

ADMISSION WILL NOT CONFER TITLE

90. Even assuming that the action of the plaintiff in

accepting 1/3rd of 6 Lakhs as his due share, amounts to
an admission that he has only 1/3 rd rights and not ½
right, the correct principle to be applied is that
admission will not confer title. Even if the plaintiff
admits, the defendant will not get right over any land in
excess of 1 acre set apart to him under the partition
deed. 1969 KHC 94 and 1997 KHC 482. Compensation
under the Land Acquisition Act being the just
equivalent of the land taken away, the plaintiff can
assert his title to the rightful share at any time.

Nonjoinder of parties [Para 25]

91. The judgment becomes “curiouser and curiouser” in

the language of Lewis Caroll in Alice in Wonderland,
when it finds that since the partition deed takes in only
6 acres, and the area acquired is 8.89 acres, there is
an excess of 2.89 acres that belongs to all the six
executants of A1 and hence the nonjoinder of the other
siblings vitiates the suit.

92. Avarankutty was allotted 2 acres in the 1971 partition.

So his share according to the area as shown in the
deed will be 2/6 ie 1/3. He has received a cheque for
1/3rd of the enhanced amount from the court about
which no one has any dispute. The dispute in this suit
is only between plaintiff and the defendant, and that
too with regard to the claim of 1/3 rd by the defendant,
while according to the plaintiff the defendant is
entitled only to 1/6th . The declaration sought for in the
suit is about this 1/6th in which Avarankutty has no
interest. Hence Avarankutty is not a necessary party to
this suit.

93. Since the entire Karimbanchola in 75/1 was allotted to

three persons, the other executants cannot have any
right over any part of that property. This is not a case
of an item of partible property being omitted to be
included in the partition. Assuming they have a right as
they were not parties to the acquisition proceedings, it
 is open to them to claim their share by a suit under S
31 [2] if they so desire.

94. The plaint pleading is that the 2.89 is part of the land
allotted to the plaintiff and as Pw1 he has explained
why that area was not shown in A1 deed. This evidence
stands uncontradicted. The lower court ought to have
acted on the evidence instead of hypothetically holding
that the 2.89 acres belongs to six persons.

95. The defendant also has not pleaded that the 2.89 acres
belongs to all six persons. His claim was only that he
must be given an equal share with the plaintiff and
Avarankutty. By this claim he is actually excluding the
other three siblings thereby denying the right which the
court suo motu postulates. Further it is trite law that a
suit cannot be dismissed for nonjoinder without a
specific posting and opportunity to the plaintiff to cure
the defect. Subject to correction, there was no suc
posting here

Suit not maintainable [Para 11 & 12]

96. The discussion on additional issue No 8 begins with the

unfounded finding that the appellant had suppressing
material facts [last line of para 11]. The plaintiff had
not pleaded that the suit is maintainable because there
was no notification, declaration and S 9 notice. That
there were no such notices since the State invoked
the emergency provisions is clearly stated in A2 award.

97. But the plaintiff has not projected any such case in the
plaint. There is no pleading in the plaint that the
plaintiff was unable to stake his claim based on the
partition deed at the award enquiry stage because of
the absence of notice etc as alleged in para 11 of the
judgment. There was no oral evidence in the suit also.
It is a mystery how the Lower Court harboured this
fallacious idea. The case of the plaintiff is that he is
not barred by any law from insisting on the sharing of
the enhanced amount in accordance with the title to
the property

98. The trial court holds that the Land Acquisition Act is a
special statute dealing with acquisition and so party to
the proceedings can only invoke the special remedy
under that statute. As Ss 18 and 30 provide for
apportionment disputes no civil suit will lie according
to the Lower Court. The Court relies on four rulings :
AIR 1966 SC 1089; AIR 1979 SC 1250.1958 KLT 941 and
1974 KLT 724

99. At the risk of repetition it has to be stated that the

award under the Land Acquisition Act is not the source
 of the right to compensation for the landowner. That
right is founded on title to the property, which is being
appropriated by the State under its sovereign power
called eminent domain with the common law right of
payment of just compensation. Since compensation is
neither a special right created by the Land Acquisition
Act in favour of the landowner, nor is it a special
liability imposed on the State, the special remedy
provided there in will not bar a civil suit

100. The reliance on the four rulings by the Lower Court is

misplaced. 1966 SC deals with assessment of sales tax
under the special statute. 1979 SC again deals with
assessment of profession tax. These relate to liabilities
created by those acts, and hence the statutory
remedies alone are available for redressal of all the
disputes arising therein.

101. 1958 KLT laid down that a third party cannot get
himself impleaded in the court dealing with a reference
u/S 18. The court expressly refers to S 21 for its
conclusion.

102. 1974 KLT actually is in support of the plaintiff in this

case. That was a case of a reference under S. 30 [S 32
of the Kerala Act] for apportionment of the whole
compensation amount deposited by the Tahsildar in
court. The party who claimed rights over 16 cents
alone before the Tahsildar made an additional claim
over 8 cents in the Court. This claim was disallowed by
the court on the ground that he had not raised it before
the Tahsildar. The Full Bench reversed the decision of
the court holding that once a reference is made it is in
the nature of an interpleader suit and parties can raise
all contentions regarding their rights before the court,
even if they had not raised it before the Tahsildar. Here
there was no reference u/S 30 by the Tahsildar.
However the discussion in fact refers to the right of a
party to file a civil suit also.

103. There is no express bar of civil suit under the Land

Acquisition Act. An implied bar, by the special statute,
arises only when the right or liability, not in existence
under the Common law, was newly created by the
Statute. When an additional remedy is provided for
determination of a pre-existing right under the common
law, the summary remedy under the statute is optional
and does not prohibit the remedy by a civil suit.

104. The Land Acquisition Act does not create or impose

any new liability. It only prescribes the procedure for
the State to exercise its power of Eminent domain.
2014 [4] KHC 612 . It also preserves the right of a
 regular suit as far as inter se rights of the persons
eligible to receive the compensation

105. The first prayer in the suit is for the declaration of title
of the plaintiff. Declaration which is a right in rem can
be granted only by the civil court, and not by any
special forum under the Land Acquisition Act. Here it is
not a question of simple apportionment that is involved
but a determination of the rights in respect of 2.89
acres not covered by the partition deed is also to be
ascertained. That can be done only by the regular civil
court.

106. In the present suit the Government of Kerala is not

made a party; no rights are claimed in respect of the
amount disbursed b the Tahsildar. The State is
unconcerned as to how the landowners divide the
enhanced compensation amount deposited in court.
The relief is carefully worded so that a decree in the
suit in favour of the plaintiff will not affect payment
already made by the Government of Kerala. The
declaration of title and payment of the excess
compensation are purely civil rights unconnected with
Land Acquisition Act.

107. Further the Land Acquisition Act as explained by the

Supreme Court is concerned only with the
determination of the rights between the State on the
one hand and the landowners on the other hand. It is
not intended to adjudicate the rights inter se between
the landowners

108. The defendant has produced B21 award No 9 of 1986

to show that the compensation for another land has
been shared equally between the parties. That was a
different land in RS 75/6 with an area of 0.7625 Ares
and capable of being cultivated. Plaintiff, defendant
and Avarankutty claimed rights over 0.4920 [1 acre and
22 cents] under a different partition deed 225 of 1971.
Perhaps that property had been allotted to the three
persons equally in that deed. Anyway the
compensation amount was paid to the plaintiff without
any division. That award does not have any impact on
the rights of the parties over Karimbanchola dealt with
by Award No 10 of 1986

Additional document in appeal

109. A partition deed of 1981 between the plaintiff,

defendant and their siblings is produced by the
defendant in the appeal here which has no relevance
for the determination of the appeal. It is stated in the
affidavit in support of the application that if the excess
2.89 had been left out of the 1971 partition it would
 have been included in the 1981 partition. The plaintiff
has no case at all that 2.89 had been left out by the
1971 partition. His definite case is that this 2.89 is
included in the partition and that this land had been
allotted to him, which is borne out by the boundaries
and his uncontradicted evidence.

110. The conclusion that I would invite this court to draw,

is that the impugned judgment is a jumble of mistaken
notions, misunderstanding of the law, and
misinterpretation of the rulings resulting in the
miscarriage of justice. It is prayed that the suit may be
decreed on a proper application of the law regarding
title to the acquired property based on A1, granting a
decree to the plaintiff for the 1/6 th share of the
enhanced compensation remaining in court deposit
with costs of the appellant.

Dated 4th January 2024

Advocate for Appellants

29. If the right or liability dealt with by the statute is one of
common law origin and only prescribes a procedure for
quick relief or a summary remedy, the right of the civil
court is not taken away. The statutory remedy is then
only optional and the party may choose to avail the
civil suit remedy. Moreover if the statutory remedy is
not exhaustive, then there is no bar

1973 SC 1059 1994 Delhi 51 2010 KHC 543

1999 [3] GauLJ 257
HC, Kerala RFA 97 of 2005
Appellants

CITATIONS FOR APPELLANTS

1 2014 [4] KHC 612 Para 9and 10 - Eminent domain and payment of compensation are part of
pre-existing common law – sovereign power - Land Acquisition Act only
prescribes procedure, not creating right or liability – Not a special act
creating a new right or liability

2 1973 SC 1059 Agrl IT sought to be recovered by suit and not under the Act – Not
maintainable acc to trial court – reversed by HC – SC holds once tax
becomes a debt, option arises for recovery
Refund is not a debt – right has to be determined and quantified which can
be done only under the statute

3 1994 DELHI 51 Shares – rectification – company court can – summary remedy - party can
file suit to secure title – here the complication is due to the 2.89 acres in
excess of 6 covered by A1 partition deed

4 2010 KHC 543 TC Societies Regn Act – S 25 does not bar an ordinary suit u/S 92 Para 39
and 40 –

Banks can file suit after RR prcoeedings – not mutually exclusive

5 1999 [3] GAU LJ 257 Coop society filed suit instead of arbitration under the Act – suit later
transfererd to DRT – question if suit is mainatinable – Para 20 to 22 –
Declaration cannot be granted by summary court

6 1966 SC 1089 Refund of sales tax – express bar - statutory remedy alone is available –
point decided was that when assessment is ultra vires the Act suit is
maintainable Para 24 and 26

7 1979 SC 1250 Profession tax by Municipality – express bar in statute – See Para 20 – asst
on individual partners and not on firm not ultra vres

8 1966 SC 237 Locus classicus – not properly read or understood by trial court. Para 1 to 6
is the minority view . Majority judgt begins at Para 7.

Compensation apportioned between owner Grant and village community.

They sought enhancement reference u/S 18 and apportionment. Reference
under both 18 and 30 made.
Govt became the landowner under Land reforms Act. Claimed share. Also
referred u/S 30. Court disallowed claim of Govt , but allowed enhancement,
and divided it between Grant and the community. In the appeal by Govt,
HC disallowed compensation to Grant who filed appeal to Supreme Court

Para 12 & 13 analyse the provisions – Para 14 overrules 1959 Mys 265, on
which the trial court here relied – Para 16 is the ratio
18 and 19 deal with apportionment – right of suit recognised

9 1959 Mys 265 was concerned with the power of the L A O to refer dispute
after the award. See para 20. Overruled by SC on this point. In re suit
reference is in para 14 – no finding suit is barred

10 1961 KHC 721 Para 5 – Decision by the Collector is only an offer on behalf of the Govt .
1961 SC 1500 PC quoted.

Validity of the Reference by the Collector cannot be examined by Court.

This part was overruled in AIR 1979 SC 404 but the award being offer was
cofirmed
11 1979 SC 404 Para 9,14,15 19, and 29 - Para 9 onwards – - 1930 PC also referred to -
1961 SC referred to – Up to the stage of the award Collector functions only
as an administrative authority not statutory or judicial authority.

12 1988 KHC 674 Para 4 scope of reference to court – original proceedings – award not
judgment - reference not appeal -

13 2003 SC 942 Para 36 and 37 – Award is not the source of the right to compensation; it is
only a preexisting right recognised
 S12 finality – not among the persons interested – para 36 & 37
Difference between Ss 18 and 30 dealt with in extenso

14 2017 SC 2671 Para 8 – reference u/S 30 is not mandatory. Suits already filed by persons
claiming return of advance from landowner are valid

15 2009 KHC 4383 SC Jurisdiction of court confined to reference – cannot be widened – valuation
referred, no apportionment

16 1930 PC 64 Reference court cannot enlarge scope of reference

17 1972 BOM 217 Para 22 and 24A – Under S 30, Collector has no power to decide dispute in
re apportionment – agreement or reference

18 2003 SC 2588 Joint award is combination of several decrees not one composite
determination – arose in connection with abatement

19 1963 SC 1618 When may can be read as shall – when power is conferred on puboic
authority – not where privat eindividual is given a remedy

20 1977 SC 1516 When power is coupled with duty, may to be read as shall

21 2008 SC 1155 The above rule does not apply where the authority is given to court – may
remains purely permissive

22 1960 KHC 148 Para 4 and 5 – only to enforce public duty

23 2018 SUP KER 858 Govt bound to name authority

24 1985 KHC 1735 May was not read as shall – demolition of Karnataka High Court building

25 1985 KLT 687 Interest u/34 to be spread over – spl provisions of income tax act for capital
gain, and revenue receipt & accounting system – before 1988 there was no
S 45 in IT Act by which compensation amount was made taxable

26 1973 87 ITR MAD 22 Madars HC explains the legal liability under the mercantile system of
accounting and also the concept of revenue receipt

27 1987 [165] ITR 231 Supreme Court approves 87 ITR of Madras High Court because accounting
was on mercantile system

28 1964 SC 1878 Interest income is revenue receipt not capital receipt

29 2009 [315] ITR 1 SC holds compensation taxable only on receipt as capital gain Ghanashyam

30 2014 [367]ITR 498 SC Confirms Ghanashyam – taxable on receipt alone no spreading over as
in the case of interest u/S 34

31 1989 [1]KLT 386 Recovery of loss of goods in transit – date of knowledge is starting point for
limitation
32 1985 KLT 572 Receovery of loss on Misconduct of employee – date of knolwedge material

33 1978 KHC 78 Res Judicata order of Land Tribunal in subsequent suit

34 1945 PC 132 Sharing of offerings – objection not raised in the earlier suit – cannot be
raised in subsequent suit

35 1977 SC 1680 First writ competency of dismissing officer not raised cannot be raised in
second writ

36 1979 KHC 227 Esioppel by election does when applies

37 1965 KHC 739 No erroneous belief no estoppel

38 2016 [1]KHC 303 No estoppel when truth is known

39 2014 [1] KHC 131 No estoppel when other party has not acted on representation

40 1969 KHC 94 Admission cannot confer title

41 1997 KHC 482 Admission does not create title

 Citations by defendant in lower Court

1 1958 KLT 941 Dispute between Jenmi and tenant referred to court, under S.18.
Brother of tenant filed impleading appn in court. Not
maintainable because he was not a party to the award enquiry.
2 1974 KLT 724 Reference u/S 32 of Kerala Act [corresponding to S 30 of
Central Act] in re 16 cents out of 1.48A. One Party raised
dispute about addl 8 cents – Court Disallowed. HC says it has to
be considered. Difft from reference u/S 18. Also refers to S. 31
agrt between parties
3 1978 KLT 315 Decision of special court is Res Judicata in subsequent suit.
Here Land Tribunal
1 1959 MYS 265 Overruled in 1966 SC in para 14 – When the Land Acquisition
Official has decided the apportionment he cannot make a
reference.
4 1985 KLT 687 Interest on enhanced compensation – income tax on it to be
spread over years – special provisions of I T Act
18-06-1999 HC modified award – Addl comp and Interest on solatium and addl
compensation disallowed
following Premnath case

31-05-2000 I A 493 of 2000 by State for refund Rs.20,46,334-30 claimed

23-01-2001 IA 493 dismissed as defective appln Parties names not shown - notice
not given to claimants
25-01-2001 IA 187 of 2001 to restore IA 493 Filed by State
19-09-2001 Premnath case overruled in Sunder 2001 [7] SCC 211.
12-10-2001 I A 187 of 2001 to restore IA 493 Dismissed
25-01-2002 State filed IA 251 of 2002 for refund Of Rs. 12,62,256-90
00-05-2002 A claimant filed counter in IA
251/2002
12-07-2002 I A 251 of 2002 by State allowed Rs.12,62,256-90 to be refunded
CRP 1699 of 2002 filed by A claimant Ag. IA 251/02 order stay granted
16-02-2005 CRP 1699 allowed - Order in I A 251 set CRP 389 of 2004 by State
aside and court directed to consider if dismissed
refund is allowable
IA 251 dismissed by Sub Court
Comparative chart of Land Acquisition Act 1894
And Kerala Land Acquisition Act, i961

SUBJECT CENTRAL KERALA

ACT ACT
Preliminary notification 4 3

Hearing of Objections 5A 5

Declaration 6 6

Notice to interested person 9 9

Enquiry and Award 11 11

Award when final 12 12

Reference to court 18 20

Collector’s statement 19 21

Matters to be considered 23 25

Matters to be neglected 24 26

Award by court 26 28

Apportionment to be specified 29 31

Dispute as to apportionment 30 32

Payment 31 33

Appeal 54 60
 BEFORE THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

RFA 9 7 of 2005

Kunhimohammad & Ors Appellants

Shaikkutty & Ors Respondents

Karimbanch

2.89
A

Mudukkuzhi
Mala
Cholakkat

Item
14
ola
Karimbanch

Item 4
3A
Plaintif

Item 11
1A
Defenda
nt

Chenneeri Paramba