The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

https://www.emerald.com/insight/2514-9407.htm

Governance of
The commons institution of mankind
Antarctica: a roadmap to resources

governance of mankind resources

Paschalis Arvanitidis and Aikaterini Almyriotou 165
Department of Economics, Laboratory of Economic Policy and Strategic Planning,
University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece Received 23 February 2021
Revised 16 April 2021
Accepted 23 April 2021

Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to draw on Ostrom’s commons theory to analyse the governance regime of
Antarctic as a commons institution. Antarctic is a peculiar territorial space on Earth, which due to its unique
characteristics constitutes a global common resource that very much resembles outer space resources. On
these grounds, the paper highlights successful, and less successful, arrangements developed in the Antarctic
commons to be considered as a blueprint or roadmap towards the governance of outer space resources as a
commons.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses first, the social-ecological system (SES)
framework to outline the characteristics of Antarctic as a commons institution, and second, Ostrom’s
design principles to assess the commons institution of Antarctic. The Antarctic commons institution is
used next, as an analogy to reflect on the challenges outer space global resource face and the way it
could be managed.
Findings – The paper concludes that Antarctic enjoys a functional, credible and successful commons
institution that should reinforce the twofold governance structure it exhibits. Similar cases of global
common resources, such as these of outer space, that seek to establish a similar commons institution
should take into account issues related the benefits spectrum and the credible commitment of actors to
engage in different levels of the governance regime. What matters is not necessarily the form of the
regime but rather how the commons as an institution functions, whether it fulfils the needs and interests
of the driving actors and, on these grounds, how credible these arrangements are in the eyes of the
committed members.
Research limitations/implications – Both Antarctica and outer space are rather unique cases and
domains of multiple resources.
Practical implications – The paper provides an analogy to consider sustainable appropriation of global
resources (“global commons”) for peace and prosperity to all.
Originality/value – The paper is original, in the sense that according to the best of the authors’
knowledge, no published work has identified Antarctic as a commons institution or has used the
aforementioned methodologies to analyse Antarctica as a commons and to employ their findings in providing
directions for the design of appropriate governance frameworks for other resources that exhibit the
characteristics of global commons, such as these of the outer space.
Keywords Institution, Design principles, Outer space, Antarctic, Global commons, SES framework,
Mankind resources
Paper type Research paper

The paper has benefited from the discussions took place during the RMIT Conference on “Property Journal of Property, Planning and
rights and real estate interests in outer space” conducted in May 2020. Authors are gratefully Environmental Law
Vol. 13 No. 2, 2021
acknowledge the organisers and all the participants to the conference. Authors would like also to pp. 165-184
thank the editors and the reviewers for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions to improve © Emerald Publishing Limited
2514-9407
the manuscript. The usual disclaimers apply. DOI 10.1108/JPPEL-02-2021-0013
JPPEL 1. Introduction
13,2 The “governance of the commons” has gained interest in recent years aiming to articulate
successful approaches for the sustainable appropriation of internationally or globally shared
resources (inter alia: McGinnis and Ostrom, 1996; Buck, 1998; Ostrom, 2002/2003; Stern,
2011; Smith, 2017). This development has been associated with the increasing concern
regarding the (over-)exploitation of natural resources and the consequences this has for the
166 environment and for human life (Harrison and Sundstrom, 2010; Pillai and Dore, 2020). The
proliferating interest in the decoding of “the commons” signals an extremely rich literature,
where the commons, seen through different approaches, refers to a governance regime set by
a community of stakeholders to self-manage their common resources. It should be noted that
this idea of a commons from an economics perspective should not be confused and mixed
with the international law concept of “global commons”, which is simply a typology for
resources that are not subject to the sovereign control of any state (Ranganathan, 2016).
The current paper draws on Ostrom’s work to discuss the governance such regime of a
unique territorial space on Earth, Antarctica, which due to its peculiar characteristics
constitutes a globally shared (or, simply, common) resource [1] and a commons (Buck, 1998;
Collis, 2017). In particular, the paper assesses the commons institution of Antarctic, aiming
to highlight successful, and less successful, arrangements developed in the collective
governance of the Antarctic resource(s) to be considered as a roadmap towards the
governance of similar kinds of globally shared resources, such as those of the outer space
(Peterson, 1997; Buck, 1998; Dodds et al., 2017; Vollmer, 2020). This seems important
especially due to the fact that the legal framework for outer space has set the basic principles
and values regulating such activities, but it lacks the required clarity (Blount, 2017;
Shackelford, 2014) and the effective cooperation provisions (Kerrest, 2011; Porras, 2006),
whereas recent developments (including a 2020 US executive order on space resources) have
challenged the long-held view of outer space as a globally shared resource [2] (Wall, 2020;
Williams, 2020). We believe that Antarctica constitutes a similar frontier and useful
conclusions can be drawn to guide sustainable and peaceful use and exploration of outer
space resources.
The argument starts with the acknowledgement that Antarctica is a unique territory,
since, there is no universally recognized territorial sovereignty over it (Herber, 1991) and
from a legal point of view, it does not belong, or is ruled, exclusively by anyone. The
governance regime, developed over the years, reflects the principles of a commons, which
have enabled to guarantee its stability and the successful management of Antarctic
resources, along with the various demands of the participating states and other international
players. The legal imprint of the above is the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), a base legal-
political framework which specifies property rights and regulates relations between
interested parties. Through its analysis the paper builds the argument that Antarctica is a
unique kind of a global commons that resources are governed quite successfully by a well-
defined community of key stakeholders. The experience it brings can help the consider
plausible governance options for other resource domains that exhibit similar characteristics,
i.e. domains to which all nations have legal access, such as outer space (Buck, 1998; Kerrest,
2011; Triggs, 2011; Shackelford, 2020).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses why common pool resources are
led to destruction and the governance solutions that have been offered, to focus on Ostrom’s
approach and the methodology she provided to analyse and assess commons as an
institution. Section 3 outlines briefly the characteristics of Antarctica and the arrangements
that have been made over the years for its management as a global resource. Section 4 uses
the two methodological tools developed by Ostrom, the Social-Ecological System (SES)
framework and the Design Principles, to analyse and assess, respectively, Antarctica’s Governance of
governance regime as a commons institution. With this under our belt, Section 5 outlines the mankind
developments and challenges that the outer space governance faces. Section 6 concludes.
Before starting our discussion, it is important to note what this paper does not do. First, it
resources
adopts the economics’ notion of global commons as an institution, which concerns shared
resources that can be overexploited regardless of national jurisdiction, and not the concept
as is used in geopolitics and international law (i.e. global commons) referring to areas that lie
beyond national jurisdiction (Ikeshima, 2018). Second, the paper employs squarely Ostrom’s 167
approach to analyse a global commons institution through the lenses of the Ostromian
strand of institutional economics, and not from the Marxism (Harvey, 2011) or autonomous
Marxism perspectives (Caffentzis and Federici, 2014; De Angelis, 2017; Holloway, 2010),
which keep a critical stance to state and capitalist institutions and structures. Third, the paper
focuses on the global commons of Antarctica, which is a well-established and functional
institution, and not on the outer space domain as a commons institution, which concerns not
only a diverse and complicate set of resources (Shackelford, 2014) but also a debatable issue
(Buck, 1998; Fountain, 2003; Pop, 2009). The aforementioned lines of research (i.e. analysis of
global commons from a legal perspective, or with the lenses of the anti-capitalist commons
strand, or of outer space resources as commons institutions) though important, constitute
different directions and terrains that go beyond the scope and capacity of the current paper.

2. From “the tragedy” to commons as an institution: Ostrom’s perspective

The common pool resources (CPR) is a special kind of goods (either natural or man-made)
which exhibit two main characteristics: non-excludability, meaning that it is difficult (i.e.
costly) to block potential appropriators, and subtractability, meaning that appropriation by
some reduces availability to others. These features compel rational economic agents to
exploit the resource without taking full responsibility for their actions, that is disregarding
the social, long-term costs from overexploitation (Bromley, 1991). As a result, the resource is
gradually depleted and eventually led to degradation and destruction, a situation Hardin
(1968) termed as “the tragedy of the commons”.
Possible ways out of the tragedy situation include to infuse stewardship ethic among
appropriators and to stimulate moral behaviour toward sustainability (Worrell and
Appleby, 2000; Barclay, 2004), or/and, as Hardin (1968) and others (Demsetz, 1967;
Arvanitidis and Nasioka, 2017) have highlighted, to allocate credible (that is, clearly defined
and enforceable) property rights, either to individuals or to a higher-level authority, giving
the owner incentives and power to guarantee the sustainability of the resource.
However, Hardin’s solutions have been criticized on the basis that they restrict the rights and
interests of the actual users, undermining their social relations and networks, to the detriment of
both their community and the sustainability of the resource. Main exponent of this view is the
2009 Nobel laureate in economics, Elinor Ostrom. Drawing on multiple cases across the world,
Ostrom (1990, 1992, 2000, 2010), as well as others (Wade, 1987; Stern et al., 2002; Dietz et al.,
2003), demonstrated that communities of actual users can successfully manage CPR by
themselves, even in the absence of private ownership and a strong regulatory authority.
As a result, a third, more socially acceptable, governance option emerges, where the users
themselves overcome collective action problems and form strong and stable institutions for the
sustainable management of their CPR. These institutions are particular arrangements (rules,
norms, practices, etc.), which define and allocate rights and obligations among involved parties
and provide mechanisms for monitoring, enforcement and conflict resolution.
In addition, based on extensive empirical work globally, Ostrom (1990) identified eight
design principles on how CPR can be governed sustainably among interested parties. They
JPPEL could be considered as a kind of a basic checklist, used to assess the success and longevity of
13,2 a commons regime, whereas each principle can provide insights into areas for improvement
in the existing governance structure or next steps (a roadmap) for those ongoing policy
initiatives (Cox et al., 2010). These eight principles are:
(1) There are clearly defined boundaries of both the resource and the community.
(2) There is congruence between the rules (regulating appropriation and provision)
168 and the local (socio-politico-economic) conditions.
(3) Rules and decisions are made through collective-choice arrangements that allow
most stakeholders to participate.
(4) Monitoring is conducted by monitors who are part of, or accountable to, the
appropriators.
(5) Violations are punished by using graduated sanctions.
(6) Conflicts are addressed with low-cost and easy-to-access conflict resolution mechanisms.
(7) The right of the stakeholders to self-govern is recognized by higher-level authorities.
(8) In the case of larger resource systems: governance is organized through multiple
layers of nested enterprises.

To study commons as a complex institutional system and to explore its dynamics, Ostrom
(2007, 2009) developed the Social-Ecological System (SES) framework. This framework
provides a common analytical language aiming to elucidate the variables, relations,
interactions and outcomes occurring in complex such systems. It has been applied in various
contexts, ranging from wildlife (Dressel et al., 2018), stormwater (Flynn and Davidson, 2016)
and urban parks (Arvanitidis and Papagiannitsis, 2020), to a series of conservation efforts
worldwide (Berkes, 2007). The basic assumption of the framework is that actors, though
they make conscious decisions as individuals, are part of a community, and this community
defines the range of available choices and the variation of outcomes.
Aiming to facilitate diagnostic and descriptive inquiry in CPR management, the SES
framework identifies Actors that extract Resource Units from a Resource System developing
appropriate arrangements within an overarching Governance System and in the context of
Related Ecosystems and the wider Social, Economic and Political Settings. These together
determine the matrix of Action Situations leading to Interactions and Outcomes (Figure 1).
Within each of these structures are lower-tier qualities, that help scholars to identify
potentially applicable elements of interest, that can be fully explored (expanded, discarded,
etc.) in subsequent studies.

3. Antarctic
Antarctic is a region located at the southernmost part of the planet. It comprises a mass of
land which is almost entirely covered by glaciers, and a number of islands scattered in the
Southern Ocean, covering altogether the 10% of Earth’s surface. Antarctic has the driest,
coldest, wildest and most inhospitable environment on the planet. Due to these conditions,
biodiversity is limited, including a small but important (due to rarity and economic
significance) variety of plant and animal life (Liggett et al., 2015). In addition, the region
contains (possibly sizable) deposits of minerals as well as other natural resources, including
freshwater (accounting for 90% of the world’s total), which, however, are unlikely to be
profitably exploited in the near future (Curtin et al., 2004). What is more at stake is the issue
of securing access to strategic resources for the future than of looking for short-term
appropriation (Zorn, 1984).
 Governance of
mankind
resources

169

Figure 1.
The SES framework

Although Antarctica’s discovery goes back to the 17th century, it was not until the early
20th that states decreed sovereignty over its sectors (Stoller, 1995). By the 1950s, seven
countries (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK) claimed
territorial sovereignty, whereas there has been an overlap between claims raised by
Argentina, Chile, and the UK. Eight other countries (the USA, the Soviet Union, Belgium,
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Japan, and South Africa) although had engaged in exploration
had not made sovereignty claims [3] (however, the USA and the Soviet Union reserve the
right to assert such claims in the future). Formal territorial claims were made, either on
traditional legal grounds, such as discovery and occupation (Stoller, 1995), or based on the
principle of contiguity or geographic proximity (applying a controversial legal notion, the
so-called sector theory) (Beck, 1994). As a result, while some of the aforementioned countries
have mutually recognized each other’s claims, the validity of all these claims has not been
recognized universally.
Fortunately, international scientific associations have made arrangements enabling
effective cooperation. These activities gave rise to the International Geophysical Year of
1957–1958 (IGY), a joint effort embraced by 12 nations (Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the
USA) to conduct scientific research on the continent. After WWII, the growing concern of
keeping the area from becoming militarized, gave rise to diplomatic discussions leading the
12 IGY nations to sign in 1959 an agreement, known as the Antarctic Treaty (entered into
force two years later) which specified that: for the next 30 years that the Treaty will be in
force (Article XII), the territory, comprised by all areas south of latitude 60°S (Article VI),
will stay clear of nuclear explosions and radioactive waste disposal (Article V), and will be
used only for peaceful purposes (Article I), including primarily scientific investigation
JPPEL (Article II) and international cooperation (Article III). The legal status quo will freeze (i.e.
13,2 existing territorial claims will not be abrogated) (Article IV), whereas the territory will be
open for inspection by any nation (Article VII) and subject to periodic meetings and
reporting with respect to science, legal matters, resource conservation and international
relations (Article IX). The contracting parties will undertake efforts to prevent
activities that run contrary to the treaty (Article X), whereas disputes that cannot be
170 settled by peaceful negotiation or arbitration will be referred to the International Court
of Justice (Article XI).
As stated, a provision of the Treaty set periodic meetings of the 12 states to take place
(known as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, ATCM) to confront emerging problems,
including environmental and management ones. This gave rise to numerous related
agreements that collectively comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). In addition, the
regime allowed additional countries (engaged in long-run scientific activities in the area) and
other interested parties (such as international organizations and NGOs) to participate. As of
2021, the treaty concerns 29 consultative parties (including the original 12 states) and 25
non-consultative parties.
Environmental and political concerns over potential commercial exploitation of non-
renewable (mineral and petroleum) resources led 33 nations to sign, in 1988, a new Convention
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). Yet, the convention
was short-lived, since strong objections raised by a coalition of international organizations
(including Greenpeace International) and other nations called for a complete and permanent
ban on all mineral resource activities in Antarctica. This was materialized in a new legally
binding agreement, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (also
known as the Madrid Protocol), entered into force in 1998 for 50 years to designate Antarctica
as a global “natural reserve” capable of promoting peace, science and environmental protection
(Cioppa, 1995). Because of the increasing complexity of ATS and the growing number of
agreements and parties, an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat was established in 2004.

4. Antarctic as a commons institution

4.1 Outlining Antarctic as a commons institution: the social-ecological system (SES)
framework
The current section uses the SES framework to outline Antarctic as a global CPR and a
commons institution. For reasons of space economy, analysis focuses explicitly on the first
level elements of the framework, though second level qualities are also discussed.
The governing regime of Antarctic, being part of the global geopolitical arena, is
influenced and interacts with the wider socio-economic-political environment (S). The
Antarctic Treaty was developed at a time of significant international tension, due to the Cold
War between the USA and the Soviet Union, and a key concern of the involved states was to
ensure stability for peace and science in the region (Grob, 2007; Gilbert, 2015). Subsequent
developments in the political, technological, economic and environmental fronts have altered
these conditions posing significant challenges to Antarctica’s community and order (Liggett
et al., 2017; Lord, 2020). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of other world
players (such as China) have altered the initial political balances, whereas tremendous
changes in the technological sphere have made the region more accessible and opened up
possibilities for commercial exploitation of its resources, both tangible and intangible.
Increased environmental concerns gave rise to a global environmental movement that has
managed to consolidate its political influence over the years. Today, Antarctic is well
established within global tourist markets hosting a considerable fishing and whaling
activity (Liggett et al., 2015; Lord, 2020). Environmentally, the region is firmly established
within global climate change debates, and politically, the ATS has an increased membership Governance of
where member states coexist with a range of international bodies and NGOs concerned with mankind
the environmental protection and the sustainable governance of the region.
The resource system (RS) of Antarctic is rich and large (Chown and Brooks, 2019),
resources
comprising an area of over 14 million sq. km. and corresponding to 10% of the planet’s surface.
The area’s boundaries are clearly defined by the ATS, covering all land and ice shelves south of
60°S latitude. Antarctic presents a significant variety of resource units (RU), including fisheries,
biodiversity (bioprospecting), minerals, freshwater, scientific research and tourism, which are of 171
high value and significance to humanity (Curtin et al., 2004; Liggett et al., 2015). Antarctic’s
multiple values (scientific, environmental, economic, aesthetic, intrinsic, etc.) have been
recognized, at least implicitly, by the ATS, designating the region as a global reserve in the
interest of all of humankind (Neufeld et al., 2014).
The governance system (GS) of Antarctic as a commons is founded on the Antarctic Treaty,
which set the legal-political bases for the provision of a series of collectively accepted principles,
rules, practices and mechanisms (comprising in its totality a governance regime reflected in the
ATS) that enable effective appropriation of Antarctic resources along with stability, protection
and conservation (Triggs, 2011). In effect, the regime brings to view a unique transnational
attempt to co-manage and co-govern a global CPR as a commons, where a well-defined (but not
closed) community of participants and stakeholders take the leading role.
The governance rules of Antarctic as a commons institution are structured at three
levels:
(1) The constitutional, which concerns the fundamental principles and values that
imbue the community and the commons institution. These are summarized in the
strategic vision of Antarctic as a world’s natural reserve, devoted to peace and
science in a context of global cooperation. Aiming to attend the interests of all
humankind, the ATS has effectively ‘freezeed’ all sovereignty claims to the region
to promote scientific knowledge and a balance between aspirations for economic
exploitation and demands for environmental protection (Race, 2011; Liggett et al.,
2017).
(2) The collective-choice, which defines who participates and how participants are
involved in the commons, that is, what property rights are attributed to the
stakeholders. From 12 original country members, the commons today comprises 54
members, of which 29 are Consultative Parties (CPs) with voting status, and 25 are
non-consultative parties (NCPs) with observer status. Governance, thus, rests with
the CPs and decisions are taken by consensus on meetings (ATCMs) organized at
least annually to discuss all policy matters, including the admission of new
members, which are judged on the basis of scientific visibility and credible
commitment to the region (though less tangible political factors are taken into account)
(Dodds, 2010; Dudeney and Walton, 2012). Matters for discussion are raised through
official Working Papers (tabled by any of the CPs and the three Observers [4]) and are
subject to formal deliberation and action, or through Information Papers, which are
informative and are discussed on a discretionary basis.
(3) The operational, which concerns the regulation of appropriation activities and the
at situ management of Antarctic resources. These rules are incorporated into the
ATS complex, a series of interlinked conventions, agreements, measures and
recommendations made for the purpose of regulating activities, such as scientific
cooperation, protection of the environment, conservation of plants and animals,
preservation of historic sites, designation and management of protected areas,
JPPEL management of tourism, information exchange, collection of meteorological data,
13,2 hydrographic charting, logistic cooperation and communications and safety. In
addition to the original Antarctic Treaty, cornerstones of the ATS are four
international (legally binding) agreements, each of which was acknowledged, in its
time, as a trail blazer in international environmental law (Race, 2011): the 1964
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of the Antarctic Fauna and Flora, the 1972
172 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 1980 Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the 1991
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol).

Establishing mechanisms for activities’ monitoring and rule compliance constitute key
elements of an efficient commons institution. All areas of Antarctica, including stations,
facilities and equipment, as well as all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking
cargos or personnel in Antarctica, are open at all times to inspection by observers appointed by
the CPs. Although inspections have no legal authority to enforce compliance when violations
are detected, their findings can be reported in Working Papers providing the basis for
discussion and policy. Moreover, they work as a deterrent to non-compliance, due to the
potential bad publicity and political costs of such behaviour (Tamm, 2018). While these
inspections have long concerned scientific research stations, they are now increasingly targeted
at tourist vessels or shipments dependent on private operators. Over 50 inspections have taken
place between 1961 and 2015, the majority of which has been conducted in the last couple of
decades (www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/antarctic-treaty/).
Despite that the ATS has a technical secretariat, there is no administrative body to
oversee rule implementation and enforce compliance to all players (Jabour, 2014). Yet,
member states are both liable for environmental emergencies occurring in their Antarctic
Treaty Area, and responsible to incorporate into domestic law the ATS environmental
regulations and to punish violators (Tamm, 2018). The methods of dispute resolution
promoted by the ATS are negotiation, arbitration, and if all involved parties agree,
adjudication by the International Court of Justice, something which, however, has never
occurred (Lord, 2020).
The CPs are the key Actors (A) of the commons. According to the Treaty (Article IX, 2),
any state member of the UN with “substantial scientific research activity” in the region can
obtain CP status. Yet, such undertakings require considerable budgetary expenditures and
political will that are not available on the part of many states. Consequently, the “core
community” of the commons is comprised by certain countries (CPs) with an established
degree of credible commitment to the region, led by the USA and Russia, who have provided
most of the science (Dudeney and Walton, 2012). This is supported by an “extended
community” of the commons, which includes all the NCPs, the three Observers (SCAR,
CCAMLR, COMNAP) and various Invited Experts, that is inter-governmental and non-
governmental organizations representing scientific (e.g. International Hydrographic
Organization – IHO, World Meteorological Organization – WMO), environmental (e.g.
International Union for Conservation of Nature – IUCN, Antarctic and Southern Ocean
Coalition – ASOC) and economic interests (International Association of Antarctic Tour
Operators – IAATO, Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators – COLTO). These parties
participate in the ATCMs but have no formal voting rights. They, however, contribute to the
discussions and may exert influence on decision-making through lobbying and informal
channels (based on personal networks, links, relationships). Moreover, Antarctica has
increasingly attracted the attention of other world organizations and NGOs, especially
environmental ones (Herr, 1996; Spectar, 1999), such as the Greenpeace International, which Governance of
mobilize grassroots support and join forces with experts to advance their agendas. mankind
The components of SES examined so far constitute the relevant contextual factors that
inform the action situations (I-O), which can be seen here as the matrix of choices actors
resources
have in shaping the commons institution in the course of time. With a lifespan of over
60 years, the ATS is the base of the most successful global commons institution, promoting,
through international cooperation, peace, science and environmental protection in the
interest of all humankind (Triggs, 2011; Liggett et al., 2017; Lord, 2020). Over the course of 173
time, the institution has managed to adequately evolve in response to various political,
social, economic and environmental changes. First, membership has been expanded
incorporating a number of less developed countries (e.g. Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Ukraine,
Uruguay as CPs and Belarus, Colombia, Guatemala, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia,
Venezuela, as NCPs) and international organizations and NGOs, representing environmental
and economic interests. This has diluted the (relative) homogeneity of the original
community and also brought a subtle shift in the prevailing values that place more
emphasis on environmental and economic aspects instead of geopolitical ones (Liggett et al.,
2017). Community enlargement proceeded in tandem with thickening at the operational
level. From a comparatively simple treaty, the ATS has become an amalgam of conventions,
measures, decisions and regulations aiming to enlarge capacity for peaceful, consensus-
based governance [5] and resource protection (Lord, 2020). This thickening, on the one hand,
tied the existing members closer together in terms of collective responsibility and helped to
build trust and reinforce interstate and interpersonal relationships, and on the other,
increased transparency, political legitimacy and international acceptance (Dodds, 2010).
Antarctic ecosystems are integral, influential and extraordinary components of the
planetary ecosystem (Chown and Brooks, 2019). The processes (geological, biological,
chemical and physical) that take place in the Antarctic atmosphere, soil, subsoil and
surrounding ocean have a disproportionate effect on related ecosystems (ECO), with
profound planetary-wide consequences on the climate, biogeochemical cycles and sea levels
(Rintoul, 2018; Golledge et al., 2019). In addition, Antarctic ecosystems are exceptionally
vulnerable to human influence. Given that human presence in the region has increased over
the years, and is going to increase further in the future, it is important to consider the
Antarctic ecosystem under the context of global resources.

4.2 Assessing Antarctic as a commons institution: the Ostromian design principles

The previous section outlined the Antarctic regime as a commons institution and identified
its specific characteristics and dynamics. Building upon this, the current section draws on
Ostrom’s eight design principles to assess the commons’ quality, highlighting its strengths
and pinpointing its shortcomings. These should provide a basis for reflection on policy
matters, applicable to both the Antarctic and to other similar, globally or internationally,
shared resources, such as those of the outer space.
4.2.1 Principle 1: Well-defined boundaries of both the resource system and the
community. As discussed, the geographical boundaries of Antarctic as a commons are
clearly defined, whereas the isolated location, (unin-)habitable conditions and insular nature
of the region provide a natural fence (an ‘enclosure’ in the jargon of commons) that helps to
both deter unauthorized intruders and to internalize the externalities produced, giving
incentives to appropriators to bear the costs and to invest in the commons. The boundaries
around the community are also clearly defined and regulated. The appropriators (PCs) are
those with a physical presence in the region and an established degree of credible
commitment to the commons. It is a small community of stakeholders that keeps
JPPEL membership controlled but open to other players on the condition that they share the same
13,2 principles and values and are willing to undertake a similar degree of credible commitment.
In turn, the extended community concerns parties with an established interest towards
sustainable management of the Antarctic’s resource system, but with lack of means or will,
to make required investments and to bear the associated costs of full engagement. They
participate in the commons; their role is mainly advisory, acting as a counterweight (a
174 mechanism for checks and balances) to appropriators, though they may steer policy towards
their own priorities (once necessary investment and commitment are undertaken in
organizing “collective action” through lobbying and other informal channels).
4.2.2 Principle 2: Congruence between (appropriation and provision) rules and (socio-
politico-economic) conditions. The first condition of the principle highlights that all rules
need to conform in some way to the contextual environment, whereas the second condition
necessitates congruence between appropriation and provision, something that is frequently
described in the literature as congruence between costs incurred and benefits acquired on
the part of the participants (Cox et al., 2010). We found evidence of both elements. With
regard to the former, we saw that during the initial stages of the commons, arrangements
were mainly focusing on safeguarding peace and science in the region, reflecting the low
economic interest and environmental concerns, and the increased necessity for peace,
security and stability across the world. Over the course of time such political concerns were
lessen, whereas environmental and economic priorities came to the fore triggering respective
changes in both the operational and the collective-choice fronts of the rule structure (both
economic and environmental voices are increasingly heard in the ATCMs and regulations
reflect global concerns towards sustainability). Overall, the commons has been quite flexible
and adaptive to the evolving socio-political conditions it has encountered without losing in
terms of stability and international acceptance. Respective evidences are also found in
favour of the second condition of the principle: the (rather medium) degree of investments
participants have made at the individual basis to provide an effective system of monitoring
and enforcement, corresponds to the (rather medium) degree of scientific and environmental
benefits acquired at a state level (and the difficulties in excluding other nations from free-
riding), in addition to the uncertainty and the distant perspective of economic exploitation of
certain Antarctic resources on the part of the participants. This explains, to a degree, why
core members are not particularly forthcoming in tackling difficult governance challenges
(Hemmings, 2017; Lord, 2020), something which raises concerns with regard to the
reliability, stability and longevity of the Antarctic commons institution.
4.2.3 Principle 3: collective-choice arrangements with wide stakeholder participation. As
discussed, the institution has developed effective mechanisms where both appropriators
(CPs) and the extended community of the commons participate in decision-making and
policy formation. Measures, Decisions and Resolutions, agreed through consensus between
CPs (the core actors) at the ATCMs, give effect to the ATS complex and provide regulations
and guidelines for the management of the Antarctic CPR and its governance as a commons.
In turn, the extended community of NCPs, Observers, Advisors and their networks provide
a pilar of checks and balances and policy steering, helped to build trust and to afford
transparency, legitimacy and credibility to the institution. Yet, some scholars have
expressed concerns with regard to situations wherein the principle exists in form but in
function it has been: co-opted by powerful actors, notably the USA and Russia (Dudeney and
Walton, 2012), undermined by formalistic or cumbersome procedures that enable to perform
only low-level status-quo management (Hemmings, 2009, 2018) or segmented, due to key
stakeholders’ retreat to more individualistic agendas and approaches (Lord, 2020).
 4.2.4 Principle 4: monitoring by accountable monitors. Like Principles 1 and 2, this Governance of
principle contains two subcomponents. The first stipulates the presence of monitors and the mankind
second argues for the monitors to be members of the community or otherwise accountable to
those members. Monitoring has a pivotal role in the efficient function of a commons, as it
resources
makes those who do not comply with rules visible to the community and to the world,
facilitating enforcement through other (social and political) channels, and also informs strategic
and contingent behaviour of those who do comply with rules. Of course, monitoring is a costly
175
procedure requiring credible commitment and increased investments on the part of the
participants. Such investments are usually undertaken once members are convinced that the
effort is justified and worthwhile (Cox et al., 2010). Focusing on our case, it has been
documented that the Antarctic commons institution provides mechanisms for monitoring
activities in the region conducted both by the CPs and by independent monitors accountable to
the CPs (Dodds, 2010). However, inspections have no legal authority to enforce changes of
behaviour when violations are discovered and, given that there is no independent inspectorate,
it is incumbent upon the relevant parties to bring operations and activities into compliance
implementing mainly domestic (as well as international) legislation. As such, when country
interests have been at stake monitoring and enforcement have worked quite effectively (Dodds,
2010), whereas in interstate or transnational matters, such as those related to the protection of
the environment, where decisions require consensus between parties, monitoring and
enforcement have been more problematic (Tamm, 2018).
4.2.5 Principle 5: graduated sanctions. A system of graduated sanctioning deters
interested parties from excessive or recurrent violations of the rules. It also indicates the
commitment of the community towards protection of the CPRs, and the reliability of the
commons institution. As discussed, in the Antarctic case formal rule enforcement and
sanctioning mechanisms have been provided at the country level, where each CP is
responsible for punishing the actions of its own nationals that fall within the jurisdictional
scope of their domestic law. Yet, the Antarctic as a collectivity falls short on the front of
sanctioning. It not only lacks such a collective system of formal sanctioning but also has
refrained from providing even guidance on what procedures should be followed when a
violation is inspected (Tamm, 2018). Such a stance can be well attributed to the commons’
founding value of global cooperation, which gave rise to a governance regime operating
exclusively on the basis of consensus among participants. The benefits of consensus-based
governance include lower risk, wider participation and higher deliberation and acceptance
of decisions reached, all of which make a robust commons. Yet, the downside to this is low
compliance behaviour and delays in policy formulation.
4.2.6 Principle 6: Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Theory states that conflict over
exhaustible CPRs is an inevitable situation, necessitating mechanisms for conflict resolution to
maintain collective action (Ostrom, 1990; Cox et al., 2010). Imbued by the spirit of global
cooperation, and given that major issues of potential conflict (namely, sovereignty, military
activity and mining) have been removed, the approach of dispute resolution promoted is
through consultation and negotiation, which are “low-cost” and “easy-to-access” conflict
management mechanisms. On addition, when such cooperative means come to a deadlock,
adjudication by the International Court of Justice provides the ultimate way to dispute
settlement. Yet, no dispute has ever found its way to judicial settlement, with most
disagreements usually resolved in ATCMs. While there is no reason to believe that consultation
and negotiation will not continue to provide a solid basis for conflict resolution, environmental
degradation and increased activity in the region could give rise to conflicts in the future,
requiring a more (pro-)active stance on the part of the commons on this front (Wilder, 1995).
JPPEL 4.2.7 Principle 7: minimum recognition of rights. Principle 7 stipulates that external or
13,2 higher-level agencies recognize and support the right of the community for self-management
and self-governance. This is certainly the case here, since the commons of the Antarctic is
itself a higher-level, global institution, recognized and supported by numerous international
organizations and international conventions.
4.2.8 Principle 8: nested enterprises. Principle 8 states that successful governance of
176 larger CPRs is organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises, whereas nesting may occur
either around different community groups (horizontally) or around external organizational
structures (vertically). We have seen instances of both organizational forms in the Antarctic.
First, the community is organized in subgroups: CPs (core community), NCPs (peripheral
community states), Observers and Experts, each of which is bestowed with difference sets of
(de jure or de facto) rights and roles. The ways in which these rights are structured, are
allocated and are used have a great impact on the benefits generated and the inequalities
produced and, ultimately, on the commitment of the actors and the sustainability of the
commons (Arvanitidis and Papagiannitsis, 2020). Power asymmetries within and between
groups play a key role in these processes, usually reproducing existing asymmetries in the
political and economic arenas at a global scale, and on these grounds are expected to be
relatively stable (at least in the shot run). In addition, players are nested in other global
networks, joining forces with other entities, such as state coalitions, international
organizations, NGOs, and grassroots movements. All these networks add power to
participants, as well as obligations to promote the network objectives and priorities.

5. The outer space as a common resource: developments and challenges

With the analysis of the Antarctic commons institution under belt, the paper now moves to
consider the case of another substantial global resource domain, outer space [6]. Scholars of
different fields and areas, including international law (inter alia: Coffey, 2009; Collis, 2017;
Freeland and Pecujlic, 2018; Vollmer, 2020), space (inter alia: Peterson, 1997; Kerrest, 2011)
and the commons (inter alia: Buck, 1998; Shackelford, 2014), have concluded that the
Antarctic model provides a good (if not the best) analogy for the way space could be
managed.
Right after Sputnik I was put into orbit by the Soviet Union, the United Nations General
Assembly formed (in 1959) a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOUS)
with the task to foster and to coordinate international cooperation in the peaceful use and
exploration of outer space and to moderate international space law and policy. Within the
following two decades COPUOUS engendered cooperation and consensus-building to put in
force five international treaties and a number of other bilateral and multilateral agreements
which currently comprise the corpus juris spatialis that specifies governance of outer space
activities [7].
The most significant treaty is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
or simply the Outer Space Treaty (OST). It was ratified in 1967, setting the base upon which
all international space law is founded (Porras, 2006; Coffey, 2009). The treaty begins by
acknowledging the common interests of all people arguing that outer space should remain
open and freely accessible for exploration and use by all. Out of its 17 Articles in total, four
are pertinent to the curret discussion. In particular, Articles I indicates that outer space is the
“province of all mankind” to benefit from, pledging freedom to access, exploration, use and
scientific investigation, along with co-operation among all nations and in accordance to
international law (Article III). In turn, Article II prohibits state appropriation of territory,
without however extending this bar to other entities. This leaves open the possibility for
private property, ownership and entrepreneurship towards commercial exploitation and use Governance of
of space resources, naturally when certain profits can be securely claimed (Coffey, 2009; mankind
Shackelford, 2014; Blount, 2017), something that has led specific states (the USA,
Luxembourg and the UAE) to unilaterally take legal action, seeking also international
resources
support, for the private and public exploitation of outer space resources, consistent with
applicable law (Blount, 2020; Shackelford, 2020). Finally, Article VI requires all non-
governmental entities to be authorized and supervised by a member state [8], granting, thus,
governments the power to regulate these activities accepting a kind of joint liability. Overall, 177
it becomes clear that OST perceives outer space as a common resource proclaiming that
space exploration should be carried out for the benefit of all mankind in the most expansive
sense of the phrase, yet, the emerging workable definition places a kind of “closure”, putting
limitations on the types of rights and benefits “to be enjoyed by all” and distinguishing
between groups of players or “classes of ‘mankind’ in space”, in favor of those who have the
capacity and the will to participate in the commons (Porras, 2006, p. 173). Notably, as
discussed, ATS adopts a similar approach.
In the next twenty years after the inception of the OST four additional treaties [9] came
into force, giving rise to a body of space law that remained practically unchanged over the
past four decades. Progress in the early days has been accelerated due to the political,
military and economic conditions of the time and the need for international stability and
peace (Freeland and Pecujlic, 2018), the legally non-binding, despite the consensus-based,
character of regulation (Vollmer, 2020) and the fact that space technology was inaccessible
or prohibitively costly, thereby limiting the number of parties able to or interested in
engaging in substantial exploitation of space (Shackelford, 2014). This lack of capacity or
interest in developing a space program meant that most states have lagged behind in
developing a comprehensive body of legislation concerning space exploration (Peterson,
1997), whereas the corpus juris spatialis that has been developed through the years is a
unique case of international law formulated on the basis of international norms and politics,
rather than on domestic policies, which is usually the case (Porras, 2006). In that sense, on
the one hand, the USA, due to its unique position as a dominant space power and an
industry leader, have had, and is likely to have, a strong influence on the legal frameworks
developed and adopted (Porras, 2006), but on the other, states are granted with a relative
flexibility and discretion (also due to lack of legally-binding specifications and enforcing
mechanisms [10]) in adopting international space agreements and providing domestic
legislation concerning space exploration (Freeland and Pecujlic, 2018).
Yet, the developments of space-related technology over the years have been astonishing,
enabling an even greater array of activities to be undertaken not only by states themselves
but also increasingly by the private sector. While the fundamental principles of OST (i.e.
states’ territorial non-appropriation and international-law conformity) remain relevant and
applicable, they do not necessarily provide the level of specificity or direction required for all
possible aspects of modern space activity (Shackelford, 2014; Blount, 2017). In addition, the
law lags quite significantly behind the technology and the changing socio-political
environment [11], leaving a number of ‘grey areas’ relating to the exploration and use of
outer space undefined (Freeland and Pecujlic, 2018). This is, of course, even more so given
the highly sensitive military and strategic interests at play when it comes to outer space, not
to mention the substantial economic and commercial opportunities that emerge due to
technological progress that drives the development of many new space activities. Overall, it
seems that advances in all fronts (political, economic, social and most importantly,
technological) have outweigh the capacity or the willingness of the international community
to respond using typical and conventional instruments to regulate multilaterally space use
JPPEL and exploration. Instead of international treaties negotiated through COPUOS, many
13,2 nations resort to bilateral and regional agreements to regulate space, giving rise to a number
of overlapping, often uncoordinated and sometimes competing regimes (Shackelford, 2014;
Vollmer, 2020). This “space regime complex” (Shackelford, 2014) of somewhat disparate and
patchy legal regulation, comprise the outcome of a growing number of space players, the
increasing role of the private sector and the relative fragmentation of governance, that, for
178 the moment, has sustained the peaceful use and exploration of outer space, but at a cost of
increasing instability and uncertainty.
Although the current formulation might, for the time being, be an adequate treatment to
space governance in line with the new and emerging space specificities, this approach has
definite flaws when compared to a commons institutional structure, a kind of which is this
developed in Antarctica. The commons institution of Antarctica is more coherent and
credible, yet adaptive and flexible. It already has a system in place that allows for different
levels of participation and commitment among interested parties. Based on their level of
actual involvement, rights are granted. And this applies to states as well as to other
stakeholders, including private sector representatives as well as civil society groups,
enabling all sorts of interest to be represented and to be fully engaged according to their will.
The ATS also provides an updated binding legal mechanism where players are able to work
together, without having to resolve divergent positions regarding existing sovereignty
claims. Antarctica’s bifocal, multilevel and multi-stakeholder approach has proven to be a
successful method in overcoming initial differences to enhance ongoing cooperation for
peace and prosperity.
We argue that such an approach of a commons institution provides a roadmap that
should be able to guide outer space governance addressing the increasing number of
challenges that it encounters and will face in the future. Inclusiveness with credible and
binding commitment and flexibility to accommodate diverse state, private and non-state, in
general, interests should be the key principles signposting the way of peaceful use and
exploration of outer space without compromising the interests of all the humankind.

6. Conclusions
This paper has used Ostrom’s two methodological tools, the Social-Ecological System (SES)
framework and the Design Principles, to analyze and assess Antarctic’s international
governance regime as a commons institution. The approach taken has not only advanced
the analysis and understanding of the ATS regime as a commons institution but also laid
down a rich framework for deliberation and study of similar cases of shared resources, such
as these of the outer space (Kerrest, 2011; Race, 2011; Triggs, 2011). On these grounds the
case of the Antarctic commons provides an analogy and a roadmap, that can guide collective
management and exploitation of outer space as a commons institution, in line with recent
developments that challenge the international law perception of space resources as an
“unrestrictedly open global commons”. As we have seen, boundaries of some kind and
closure along the lines of credible commitment are essential ingredients of a functional and
successful commons institution. In the light of the foregoing, the discussion and findings
reported herein allow some concluding remarks to be made.
The first point concerns the view on the global commons that the present study has
introduced. Drawing on the Ostromian commons theory our approach advances the
narrative arguing for more solid developments along credibility, commitment and openness
in participation when dealing with the global commons of the outer space (Kerrest, 2011;
Race, 2011; Triggs, 2011). Our perspective points the need to unpack commons institutional
structure looking into the benefits spectrum and the credible commitment of the actors to
engage in different levels of the governance regime. Institutional arrangements usually Governance of
emerge in response to critical needs of stakeholders, accomplishing important functions in mankind
the political, social, economic and environmental fronts. This, in turn, provides a base to
assess commons institutions. What matters is not so much the form of the regime but rather
resources
how the commons as an institution functions, whether it fulfils the needs and interests of the
driving actors and, on these grounds, how credible these institutions are in the eyes of the
committed members.
The second point we would like to call attention to the analogies that emerge from the 179
Antarctic case. Overall, it was made clear that the regime is a functional, credible and
successful commons institution. It is functional because it has established a much-needed for
the planetary ecosystem, institution that has managed to designate the domain as a global
natural reserve, promoting peace and science in the interests of all humankind. It is credible
because it has aligned together a number of major global players (states and organizations)
committed to govern collectively the global resource gaining the respect and support of the
international community. It is successful because for more than 60 years now has managed
to accommodate the various needs of the community projecting the institution along “[. . .]
other great symbols of man’s quest for enlightenment and order” (Triggs, 2011, p. 40). And
finally, it is a commons institution because the international community has collectively
established institutional arrangements (mechanisms, rules, practices, norms, rights, etc.)
that sustainably regulate the use, appropriation, governance and further development of the
resource.
On the basis of all these, the policy recommendations that come to the fore (in the light of
the Ostromian design principles) concerning all similar global resources seeking to develop
a commons institution are: First, keep a clear structure of core players with established
commitment to the sustainable governance of the resource and offer full membership to
other stakeholders on the condition that they adopt the same principles and values and are
willing to undertake a similar degree of credible commitment. Second, allow core actors to
sustainably appropriate and exploit the resource, along the lines of the constitutional
principles and values of the commons, affording them with powers of adjusting governance
structure according to contextual dynamics, and of excluding potential free-riders through
efficient monitoring and enforcement. Third, support the development of an extended
community of stakeholders acting as a mechanism for checks and balances to the core
community with extended powers for policy steering in urgent situations (e.g. in cases of
environmental disasters) or when procedures delay. In this endeavor we should not ignore
the value of the private sector, the interest of the civil society, the multipolar international
relations and the power balance between key actors. Advocates are correct to argue that
specifying clear property rights is a crucial determinant (Blount, 2017), but allocation this is
not necessarily a binary choice between a “global commons” or private property
(Shackelford, 2014, 2020). There is an array of rights and solutions that deserve
consideration and that could provide a solid foundation for sustainable appropriation of
global resources for peace and prosperity to all.

Notes
1. The terms “globally shared resource”, “global resource”, “mankind resource”, “global common
resource”, “common pool resource” or simply “common resource” refer essentially to the same
idea and are used interchangeably in the current paper.
2. The aforementioned executive order (i.e. Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13914 – ‘Encouraging
International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources’ issued on April 06, 2020)
JPPEL states that “outer space is a legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the
United States does not view it as a global commons.” (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/341746).
13,2
3. However, the USA and the Soviet Union reserve the right to assert such claims in the future.
4. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), the Commission for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Council of Managers of National
Antarctic Programs (COMNAP).
180 5. However, concerns were raised (Hemmings, 2009, 2017; Liggett et al., 2017; Tamm, 2018)
regarding the efficiency of this consensus-based regime to enforce rules and adequately address
substantive policy and governance challenges.
6. Where outer space appears in this paper it refers to the full phrase “outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies.”
7. For a comprehensive discussion see, inter alia, Porras (2006) and Kerrest (2011).
8. As at January 2020, the Treaty has 110 states-parties, with another 23 countries that have signed
it but have not yet completed ratification (available at: www.unoosa.org).
9. In support of the OST, four other treaties have been put into place between 1968 and 1979. The
Rescue Agreement (1968) specifies duties to assist in the rescue and return of persons and
spacecraft, the Liability Convention (1972) discusses liability for accidents, the Registration
Convention (1975) concerns registration obligations of all objects launched into outer space,
which is important for matters such as avoiding space debris, and the Moon Agreement (1979),
specifies property rights and usage of the moon and other celestial bodies in the solar system.
This treaty, however, has only been signed by 16 nations, all of which are minor players in space
exploration.
10. Though, there is a sort of international pressure when a nation strays from international norms
and principles.
11. The increasing number of space powers, the transition from bipolar to multipolar world, the
emergence of strong non-state actors, the privatization of states (outsourcing some of the
classical state functions to the private sector) and the overall strengthening of civil society, etc.
have resulted in a complex map of vested interests that are not easily negotiable and contribute
to stagnation in developing new international legislation.

References
Arvanitidis, P. and Nasioka, F. (2017), “Urban open greenspace as a commons, an exploratory case
study in Greece”, The Public Sector, Vol. 43 No. 1, pp. 19-32.
Arvanitidis, P. and Papagiannitsis, G. (2020), “Urban open spaces as a commons: the credibility thesis
and common property in a self-governed park of Athens, Greece”, Cities, Vol. 97 No. 97,
doi: 10.1016/j.cities.2019.102480.
Barclay, P. (2004), “Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the ‘tragedy of the
commons’”, Evolution and Human Behavior, Vol. 25 No. 4, pp. 209-220.
Beck, P. (1994), Boundary and Territory Briefing, Who Owns Antarctica? Governing and Managing the
Last Continent, University of Durham, Durham.
Berkes, F. (2007), “Community-based conservation in a globalized world”, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104 No. 39, pp. 15188-15193.
Blount, P.J. (2017), “Outer space and international geography: article II and the shape of global order”,
New England Law Review, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 95-123.
Blount, P.J. (2020), “Another pyrrhic victory: the white house’s latest executive order on space mining”,
SpaceWatch Global, available at: https://spacewatch.global/2020/04/another-pyrrhic-victory-the-
white-houses-latest-executive-order-on-space-mining/
Bromley, D. (1991), “Testing for common versus private property: comment”, Journal of Environmental Governance of
Economics and Management, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 92-96.
mankind
Buck, S.J. (1998), The Global Commons: An Introduction, Island Press, Washington, DC.
resources
Caffentzis, G. and Federici, S. (2014), “Commons against and beyond capitalism”, Community
Development Journal, Vol. 49 No. 1, pp. 92-105.
Chown, S.L. and Brooks, C.M. (2019), “The state and future of Antarctic environments in a global
context”, Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 1-30.
181
Cioppa, T. (1995), “The exploitation of Antarctica’s natural resources and the evolution of the
Antarctic treaty system: an overview”, Boundary and Security Bulletin Autumn, Vol. 1
No. 6, pp. 59-66.
Coffey, S. (2009), “Establishing a legal framework for property rights to natural resources in outer
space”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 41 No. 1, pp. 119-147.
Collis, C. (2017), “Territories beyond possession? Antarctica and outer space”, The Polar Journal, Vol. 7
No. 2, pp. 287-302.
Cox, M., Arnold, G. and Villamayor, T. (2010), “A review of design principles for community-based
natural resource management”, Ecology and Society, Vol. 15 No. 4, available at: www.jstor.org/
stable/26268233
Curtin, R., Hayes, M., Jakob, A., McClatchy, H. and Schleich, N. (Eds), (2004) “Resources in Antarctica:
with the world’s dwindling natural resources, is there a chance for exploitation in Antarctica?”,
ANTA 501 Syndicate Report 2003.
De Angelis, M. (2017), Omnia Sunt Communia. On the Commons and the Transformation to
Postcapitalism, Zed Books, London.
Demsetz, H. (1967), “Toward a theory of property rights”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 57
No. 2, pp. 347-359.
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C. (2003), “The struggle to govern the commons”, Science, Vol. 302
No. 5652, pp. 1907-1912.
Dodds, K. (2010), “Governing Antarctica: contemporary challenges and the enduring legacy of the 1959
Antarctic treaty”, Global Policy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 108-115.
Dodds, K., Hemmings, A.D. and Roberts, P. (Eds) (2017), Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica,
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Dressel, S., Ericsson, G. and Sandström, C. (2018), “Mapping social-ecological systems to understand
the challenges underlying wildlife management”, Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 84,
pp. 105-112.
Dudeney, J.R. and Walton, D.W. (2012), “Leadership in politics and science within the Antarctic treaty”,
Polar Research, Vol. 31 No. 1, pp. 1-9.
Flynn, C.D. and Davidson, C.I. (2016), “Adapting the social-ecological system framework for urban
stormwater management: the case of green infrastructure adoption”, Ecology and Society, Vol. 21
No. 4, p. 19, doi: 10.5751/ES-08756-210419.
Fountain, L.M. (2003), “Creating the momentum in space: Ending the paralysis produced by the
‘common heritage of mankind’ doctrine”, Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 1753-1787.
Freeland, S. and Pecujlic, A.N. (2018), “How do you like your regulation – hard or soft? The Antarctic
treaty and the outer space treaty compared”, National Law School of India Review, Vol. 30 No. 1,
pp. 11-36.
Gilbert, N. (2015), “A continent for peace and science”, in Liggett, D., Storey, B., Cook, Y. and Meduna, V.
(Eds), Exploring the Last Continent, Cham, Springer, pp. 327-359.
Golledge, N.R., Keller, E.D., Gomez, N., Naughten, K.A., Bernales, J., Trusel, L.D. and Edwards, T.L.
(2019), “Global environmental consequences of twenty-first-century ice-sheet melt”, Nature,
Vol. 566 No. 7742, pp. 65-72.
JPPEL Grob, J. (2007), “Antarctica’ s frozen territorial claims: a meltdown proposal”, Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 30 No. 2, pp. 461-484.
13,2
Hardin, G. (1968), “The tragedy of the commons”, Science, Vol. 162 No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248.
Harrison, K. and Sundstrom, L.M. (Eds) (2010), Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative
Politics of Climate Change, MIT press, Cambridge MA.
Harvey, D. (2011), “The future of the commons”, Radical History Review, Vol. 2011 No. 109, pp. 101-107.
182 Hemmings, A.D. (2009), “From the new geopolitics of resources to nanotechnology: emerging
challenges of globalism in Antarctica”, The Yearbook of Polar Law Online, Vol. 1 No. 1,
pp. 55-72.
Hemmings, A.D. (2017), “Antarctic politics in a transforming global geopolitics”, in Dodds, K.,
Hemmings, A.D. and Roberts, P. (Eds), Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, pp. 507-522.
Hemmings, A.D. (2018), “The hollowing of Antarctic governance”, in Goel, P.S., Ravindra, R. and
Chattopadhyay, S. (Eds), Science and Geopolitics of the White World: Arctic-Antarctic-Himalaya,
Springer, Cham, pp. 17-31.
Herber, B. (1991), “The common heritage principle: Antarctica and the developing nations”, American
Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 50 No. 4, pp. 391-406.
Herr, R. (1996), “The changing roles of non-governmental organisations in the Antarctic treaty system”,
in Stokke, O.S. and Vidas, D. (Eds), Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of
the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 91-110.
Holloway, J. (2010), Crack Capitalism, Pluto, London.
Ikeshima, T. (2018), “The notion of global commons under international law: recent uses and limitations
within a security and military context”, Transcommunication, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 37-46.
Jabour, J. (2014), “Strategic management and regulation of Antarctic tourism”, in Tin, T., Liggett, D.,
Maher, P. and Lamers, M. (Eds), Antarctic Futures – Human Engagement with the Antarctic
Environment, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 233-252.
Kerrest, A. (2011), “Outer space as international space: lessons from Antarctica”, in Berkman, P.A.,
Lang, M.A., Walton, D.W.H. and Young, O.R. (Eds), Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science and
Governance of International Spaces, Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, Washington, DC,
pp. 133-142.
Liggett, D., Frame, B., Gilbert, N. and Morgan, F. (2017), “Is it all going South? Four future scenarios for
Antarctica”, Polar Record, Vol. 53 No. 5, pp. 459-478.
Liggett, D., Storey, B., Cook, Y. and Meduna, V. (Eds) (2015), Exploring the Last Continent, Springer,
Cham.
Lord, T. (2020), “The Antarctic treaty system and the peaceful governance of Antarctica: the role
of the ATS in promoting peace at the margins of the world”, The Polar Journal, Vol. 10
No. 1, pp. 3-21.
McGinnis, M. and Ostrom, E. (1996), “Design principles for local and global commons”, The
International Political Economy and International Institutions, Vol. 2, pp. 465-493.
McGinnis, M.D. and Ostrom, E. (2014), “Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and
continuing challenges”, Ecology and Society, Vol. 19 No. 2, available at: www.jstor.org/stable/
26269580
Neufeld, E., O’Reilly, J., Summerson, R. and Tin, T. (2014), “Valuing Antarctica: emerging views
from international studies”, in Tin, T., Liggett, D., Maher, P.T. and Lamers, M. (Eds),
Antarctic Futures: Human Engagement with the Antarctic Environment, Springer,
Dordrecht, pp. 233-252.
Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Ostrom, E. (1992), “Community and the endogenous solution of commons problems”, Journal of Governance of
Theoretical Politics, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 343-351.
mankind
Ostrom, E. (2000), “Reformulating the commons”, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 29-52.
resources
Ostrom, E. (2002/2003), “Managing resources in the global commons”, Journal of Business
Administration and Policy Analysis, Vols 30/31, pp. 401-413.
Ostrom, E. (2007), “A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas”, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of Sciences, Vol. 104 No. 39, pp. 15181-15187.
183
Ostrom, E. (2009), “A general framework for analyzing sustainability of socialecological systems”,
Science, Vol. 325 No. 5939, pp. 419-422.
Ostrom, E. (2010), “Analyzing collective action”, Agricultural Economics, Vol. 41 No. 1, pp. 155-166.
Peterson, M.J. (1997), “The use of analogies in developing outer space law”, International Organization,
Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 245-274.
Pillai, M.B. and Dore, G.G. (Eds) (2020), “Global commons: issues”, Concerns and Strategies, Sage,
London.
Pop, V. (2009), “Who owns the moon?”, Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources
Ownership, Springer.
Porras, D.A. (2006), “The ‘common heritage’ of outer space: equal benefits for most of mankind”,
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 143-176.
Race, M.S. (2011), “Policies for scientific exploration and environmental protection: comparison of the
Antarctic and outer space treaties”, in Berkman, P.A., Lang, M.A., Walton, D.W.H. and
Young, O.R. (Eds), Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science, and the Governance of International
Spaces, Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, Washington, DC, pp. 143-152.
Ranganathan, S. (2016), “Global commons”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 27 No. 3,
pp. 693-717.
Rintoul, S.R. (2018), “The global influence of localized dynamics in the Southern ocean”, Nature,
Vol. 558 No. 7709, pp. 209-218.
Shackelford, S. (2020), “US seeks to change the rules for mining the moon”, The Conversation, May 19,
2020, available at: https://theconversation.com/us-seeks-to-change-the-rules-for-mining-the-
moon-136665
Shackelford, S.J. (2014), “Governing the final frontier: a polycentric approach to managing space
weaponization and debris”, American Business Law Journal, Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 429-513.
Smith, K. (2017), “Innovating for the global commons: multilateral collaboration in a polycentric world”,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 49-65.
Spectar, J.M. (1999), “Saving the ice princess: NGOs, Antarctica and international law in the new
millennium”, Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 23, pp. 57-100.
Stern, P.C. (2011), “Design principles for global commons: natural resources and emerging
technologies”, International Journal of the Commons, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 213-232.
Stern, P.C., Dietz, T. and Ostrom, E. (2002), “Perspective: research on the commons: lessons for
environmental resource managers”, Environmental Practice, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 61-64, doi: 10.1017/
S1466046602021038.
Stoller, P.L. (1995), “Protecting the white continent: is the Antarctic protocol mere words or real
action?”, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 335-366.
Tamm, S. (2018), “Peace vs compliance in Antarctica: inspections and the environment”, The Polar
Journal, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 333-350.
Triggs, G. (2011), “The Antarctic treaty system: a model of legal creativity and cooperation”, in
Berkman, P.A., Lang, M.A., Walton, D.W.H. and Young, O.R. (Eds), Science Diplomacy:
Antarctica, Science, and the Governance of International Spaces, Washington, DC. Smithsonian
Institution Scholarly Press, pp. 39-49.
JPPEL Vollmer, S.L. (2020), “The right stuff in geospace: using mutual coercion to avoid an inevitable prison
for humanity”, St. Mary’s Law Journal, Vol. 51 No. 3, pp. 777-815.
13,2
Wade, R. (1987), “The management of common property resources: collective action as an alternative to
privatization or state regulation”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 96-106.
Wall, M. (2020), “Trump signs executive order to support moon mining, tap asteroid resources”,
Space.com, April 06, 2020, available at: www.space.com/trump-moon-mining-space-resources-
executive-order.html
184
Wilder, M. (1995), “The settlement of disputes under the protocol on environmental protection to the
Antarctic treaty”, Polar Record, Vol. 31 No. 179, pp. 399-408.
Williams, M. (2020), “Trump signs an executive order allowing mining the moon and asteroids”,
Phys.org, April 13, 2020, available at: https://phys.org/news/2020-04-trump-moon-asteroids.
html
Worrell, R. and Appleby, M.C. (2000), “Stewardship of natural resources: definition, ethical and
practical aspects”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 263-277.
Zorn, S.A. (1984), “Antarctic minerals: a common heritage approach”, Resources Policy, Vol. 10 No. 1,
pp. 2-18.

Further reading
Libecap, G.D. (2009), “The tragedy of the commons: Property rights and markets as solutions to
resource and environmental problems”, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 129-144.

Corresponding author
Paschalis Arvanitidis can be contacted at: parvanit@uth.gr

For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com