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REV: AUGUST 11, 2020
REBECCA HENDERSON
NIEN-HÊ HSIEH
Putting the Guiding Principles into Action: Human

Rights at Barrick Gold (A)
It was an identity-changing moment. We thought we were a responsible company, but our guards were gang-
raping women.
— Jonathan Drimmer, Vice President & Deputy General Counsel, Barrick Gold, 2011
It’s not the event; it’s how you respond that defines you.
— Aaron Regent, CEO Barrick Gold, 2009–2012
As Jonathan Drimmer walked down the steps of London’s Lancaster House on March 28, 2015, he
was struck by the contrast between his surroundings—Lancaster House, featured in Downton Abbey,
was two minutes away from St. James Palace—and the lush valleys of Papua New Guinea. Lancaster
House had just hosted the annual plenary of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
and Drimmer, Deputy General Counsel at Barrick Gold Corporation, was thinking both how much
Barrick had accomplished with respect to its human rights program over the previous four years and
how much remained to be done. Drimmer, a lawyer with long exposure to human rights issues, had
been hired by Barrick in 2011 following his work with the company running an independent
investigation into allegations made by Human Rights Watch (HRW), a well-regarded international
NGO. In 2010, HRW had approached Barrick asserting that members of the company’s security force
at the Porgera Gold Mine in Papua New Guinea had on multiple occasions raped women who were
trespassing onto the mine’s waste dumps in search of gold.
The subsequent investigations had identified significant evidence to support HRW’s allegations,
and the revelation had led to broad-ranging change both at Porgera and at Barrick more generally.
Drawing heavily on the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs),
Barrick had not only moved to make efforts to provide restitution to the women involved, but also
rolled out a comprehensive set of policies designed to embed the protection of human rights into the
entire company. In the process, one of Drimmer’s colleagues had played a central role in leading the
development of a verification framework that allowed for auditing a company’s implementation of the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs), a set of commitments embraced by most of
the world’s largest extractive companies. 1 Five years previously, both civil societies and governments
Professors Rebecca Henderson and Nien-hê Hsieh prepared this case. It was reviewed and approved before publication by a company designate.
Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. HBS cases are developed solely as
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315-108 Putting the Guiding Principles into Action: Human Rights at Barrick Gold (A)
had been putting significant pressure on the signatories to the VPs to provide more transparency, and
Barrick’s work—and particularly the leadership provided by Mark Wall, then the head of Barrick’s
global security and of nonfinancial auditing, in combination with Barrick’s Community, Health,
Environment, Safety, Security and Human Rights (CHESS) auditing program—had transformed the
conversation about the issue by demonstrating that it was possible to reach consensus around concrete
measures that could provide verifiable assurance of progress.
Human rights policies and programs for businesses were still at an early stage. In a 2015 Economist
Intelligence Unit survey of 853 senior executives from a range of industries, 83% of respondents agreed
(74% strongly) “that human rights are a matter for business as well as governments.” 2 However, only
22% of the surveyed companies had a publicly available policy, while an additional 19% had a purely
internal one. 3 Among the barriers to such policies were a lack of understanding of businesses’
responsibilities (32%), a lack of resources (27%), and increased costs/lower profit margins (15%). 4
Drimmer was confident that Barrick was at the leading edge of human rights compliance programs.
At the same time, however, he and others at Barrick were very much aware that the firm continued to
face real and significant challenges. In particular, the firm needed to think deeply about how to
implement its policies beyond its immediate boundaries. For example, Barrick was beginning to think
hard about how to ensure human rights compliance in its supply chain—not an easy task since the firm
had over 20,000 suppliers. Another significant question was how to be most effective in making sure
that entities in which Barrick owned a substantial interest but did not have operational control had
appropriate human rights policies in place. Barrick also had to think strategically about its relationship
with the state in many of the countries where it operated. The police in Papua New Guinea, for instance,
had a reputation for human rights abuse. 5 Yet in the case of Porgera their presence was critical to
ensuring that law and order in the community and around the mine did not completely break down.
Barrick was contributing significantly to the capacity of the local force—including building barracks
and facilitating training. But the police were, of course, a state entity. What were Barrick’s
responsibilities with regard to human rights? And how could it meet them?
Mining in Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea, one of the world’s largest islands, has fortunes in gold under its lush green mountains.
Called the “Last Great Place,” it is home to hundreds of unique species of animals and plants from tree kangaroos
to orchids of unearthly beauty, as well as to upward of 820 languages. It is the closest thing you may ever see to
paradise: forested mountains surrounded by shining South Pacific seas, where clean water springs from rich
volcanic soil. And that makes the poverty of its inhabitants and the destruction of its ecology all the more
heartbreaking.
— Corporate Watch, February 2007, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14381
Papua New Guinea (PNG) was one of the most diverse societies in the world, and one of the most
recently colonized by the West. According to the U.S. State Department, the indigenous population
was extraordinarily heterogeneous. There were several thousand separate communities, speaking
more than 800 different languages, most of them totally unrelated to each other. 6 Some of the
communities in the high, mountainous valleys that characterized the island had not seen Europeans
until the 1930s, and the country did not obtain independence until 1975.
PNG shared the second-largest island in the world with Indonesia, and had a land area of around
462 kilometers, making it about the size of California. But in 2010 its population was only about 6.7
million, compared with California’s close to 39 million, and in 2009 GDP per capita was $1,180. The
Putting the Guiding Principles into Action: Human Rights at Barrick Gold (A) 315-108
economy was very dependent on natural resources. Agriculture was 32% of GDP, with the majority of
the population reliant on subsistence agriculture, while mining and mineral extraction—particularly
gold and copper—provided 52% of PNG’s exports in 2012. 7
The Economist Intelligence Unit ranked PNG in joint 75th place out of 167 countries on its
Democracy Index, placing it among “flawed democracies.” According to the study on which those
rankings were based, although elections in PNG were considered technically free, election-related
violence and electoral fraud remained problems. 8 In 2014, Transparency International had ranked PNG
number 145 in corruption in the world, just above the Central African Republic and the Republic of
Congo. 9 (See Exhibit 1 for rankings and indicators of governance and development for PNG and other
selected countries.)
Crime was widespread on the island, despite a long history of attempts to improve the capacity of
the local police force. 10 One aspect of PNG society that complicated law enforcement was a cultural
tradition that stressed community engagement and compensation in response to offenses, rather than
punishment. There were only about 5,000 police officers across the entire island, and crime rates were
high. One report claimed, for example, that Port Moresby, the capital, averaged 54 murders per 100,000
inhabitants annually, making it one of the most dangerous places in the world. 11 The status of women
was particularly problematic. Many PNG societies were polygamous, and women had historically
often been viewed as chattels. The same report claimed that 70% of PNG women would be raped or
sexually abused in their lifetimes. There was also evidence that rape (and gang rape specifically) was
used a method of punishment. 12 A RAND study suggested that “extreme forms of gender based
violence are frequent and unpunished” in PNG, while another study found that two-thirds of PNG
women had been subject to gender-based violence and that “despite extensive public awareness and
education programs . . . women’s acceptance of a submissive role and a man’s right to hit a woman or
demand sex are equally alarming.” 13,14 All of this was despite the long-standing criminalization of rape
and assault and more recent legislation to criminalize domestic violence. 15
The Porgera Gold Mine

Barrick Gold, a Canadian company and the largest gold miner in the world, acquired the Porgera
Joint Venture (PJV) in 2006 as part of its $10.4 billion acquisition of Placer Dome. (Exhibits 2a, 2b, and
2c give selected Barrick financials and the history of the company’s stock price.) The mine opened in
1990—an operation that required building a 400-mile-long gravel road, since the mine was located in
one of the most remote parts of the island. Although Porgera was originally worked as an underground
mine, open pit operations had become increasingly important. In 2009, the mine was moving about
160,000 tons of rock and ore per day (see Exhibit 3). 16 Since it could take 30–100 tons of ore to generate
a single ounce of gold, the mine generated enormous amounts of waste. 17 This was left in piles around
the site, and environmentalists had long been concerned about waste disposal methods at Porgera. In
2010, for example, HRW claimed that the mine discharged as much as 6 million tons of liquid waste
directly into the river every year. 18
Porgera was one of the largest mines in PNG, contributing around 12% of the country’s export
earnings. Under the terms of the acquisition, Barrick owned 95% of the mine and the PNG government
owned 5%. In 2015, gold production was expected to be 500,000–550,000 ounces, at all-in sustaining
costs of $1,025–$1,125 per ounce. 19 (Exhibit 4 gives the price of gold over time, while Exhibit 5 lists
Barrick’s proven and probable reserves and possible mineral resources. a)
The local community had originally welcomed the mine as a source of roads, hospitals, schools, and
hard cash, but by the time of the acquisition, relations with the surrounding community were becoming
increasingly strained. As people from across PNG had migrated to Porgera in search of opportunity,
the original community of around 6,000 people had grown to around 50,000 people. The valley was
not a large one, local government had limited capacity, and the community had always been grindingly
poor, all of which made the influx of so many people a source of significant stress.
When the mine was first being developed, the PNG government had made a commitment to police
the site, but it had not made good on this commitment. In response, the mine employed a private
security force of about 500 people. In addition to a small group of 10–12 expatriates who acted as
trainers, the security force was composed of two groups: asset protection officers (APOs) and guards.
Both were largely PNG natives, but the APOs were not recruited from the local community and
typically had experience in either the military or the police. They lived in camps at the mine (rather
than in the local community), carried weapons, and were typically asked to do things like guard gold
and fuel. The guards were unarmed locals and were used in less critical and less exposed roles.
It was a “difficult site.” Every day, hundreds of people attempted to access the site for gold or gold-
bearing rock. Mark Fisher, who became site manager in 2007, recalled: “People would grab the rocks
and run. It was incredibly unsafe. Rocks would fall from the pit wall, and occasionally invaders would
die in accidents.” The invasions contributed to what was experienced by some Barrick employees as
an “intensely hostile environment” or as being “like a war zone.” Several commented on the way in
which violent and often fatal tribal struggles could break out seemingly anytime within the
community, and on the way in which the security forces had to deal with the threat of intense violence
and the constant possibility of theft. Fisher summarized:
The mine was in the midst of a tribal conflict situation. Tribal conflict is typically local
and of short duration but can result in significant casualties. Beating, shooting, or raping
people is experienced as a terrible event anywhere in the world, but in the Porgera Valley
tribal conflicts and other social factors give rise to an increased incidence that may be seen
as normal by some residents.
The Allegations
The first allegations that Barrick’s security forces were committing rape surfaced shortly after the
acquisition of Porgera in 2006. The allegations were made by Catherine Coumans of Mining Watch
Canada, a Canadian NGO, who approached both the general manager and the head of community
relations at Porgera. In response, senior management at the mine asked a prominent female member
of the local community to make inquiries as to whether there was any truth to the allegations. She came
back with assurances that the accusations were false—that there might be some trading of sex for gold
going on but that no one was being raped. Barrick management took her at her word.
In May 2010, HRW contacted Barrick with detailed allegations that women who had ventured onto
the mine’s waste tailings in the search for gold had been raped by Barrick’s security guards. The
security force was under orders to detain people on the rock waste piles, since Barrick was concerned
a “Mineral resources” are reserves that do not have economic viability at current costs and prices.
that venturing onto the piles was extremely hazardous, and HRW claimed that at least some of the
guards had offered the women they detained a choice between sex and jail. b,20
Anthony Smare, who was Barrick’s in-country head of legal, reached out to the trusted community
member. Her response again was that what was going on was sex for gold. Smare asked her to make
further inquiries, and she then confirmed there was indeed evidence that there was cause for alarm. It
looked as though HRW might have uncovered horrific misconduct, and there was evidence of multiple
instances of sexual abuse by the mine’s guards stretching back several years.
In explaining why the truth was not uncovered earlier, some employees suggested that the woman
who had been asked to contact the community might have been of a different social class from the
women who were raped, making it difficult for her to learn about what was going on. According to
one investigator hired to explore HRW’s allegations:
There were failures of communication up and down the hierarchy. Some nationals
knew these kinds of things were going on but were not reporting it to the expats on the
security staff. They were not aware that it was an issue that the company cared about. c
Moreover, they were afraid that if they reported negative issues, their relationships with
their colleagues would be significantly affected. The expats were aware of the rumors but
discounted them. There was a grievance management system, but there was a general
impression it was only to be used to address issues that spoke directly to the mine. There
was no hotline through which locals could report an incident to other locals. There were
no escalation policies in place. There was a community relations department—Barrick had
CR policies—but it was all very reactive.
In addition, the victims were not reporting the crimes. In the local society there was no open
discussion of sex. Women were supposed to be under the protection of men, and if they were raped
they were often frightened to tell their families—for fear that their movement would be restricted and
that their bride price would collapse. Managers at Barrick were deeply shaken. Many recalled it was
not a question of the cost to fix the situation, the operating impact, or what it would look like on the
front page of the Globe and Mail. Sybil Veenman, who had just been promoted to the position of General
Counsel, recalled:
These were sexual assaults. It was appalling. It’s one thing if there’s an incident and
the police overreact in the face of perceived threats. It’s another to have your own people
raping. There is no justification, no basis for it. The fundamental driver of our response
was just a human and moral one. My job was to manage legal liabilities, but the best way
to deal with legal risk is to deal with problems, not bury them. We needed to put a stop
to it.
Aaron Regent, who had been appointed as Barrick’s CEO just the year before, said:
I didn’t want to be involved in an organization where things like this happen. We have
to be able to go home to our wives and kids. We were in a position to do something about
b HRW’s report, including a long section detailing Barrick’s response to the allegations, was finally published in February 2011.
c At this time Barrick’s human rights training focused on issues such as torture, corruption, and the treatment of detainees—it
didn’t specifically call out sexual conduct, as the company believed that it was so obvious that sexual violence was beyond the
pale that it did not need to be specifically called out.
it. Why wouldn’t you do everything you can? I said, “Find out what happened, and do
the right thing.”
Cathy Delaney, a senior HR employee at Barrick, said:
We had to respond—it was a matter of the type of company we wanted to be. My

colleagues were saying “If we don’t take this seriously, I don’t want to be here.” It really
hit people. Part of it was surprise. We thought we were a responsible company.
Veenman invited HRW to Toronto to participate in a full and frank discussion and to give Barrick
enough information to allow for a full investigation. Barrick found HRW a very effective partner. Peter
Sinclair, Barrick’s Chief Sustainability Officer, remembered:
HRW were firm in their findings and transparent and ethical in their engagement.
Moreover, they gave us space to come up with a response. Had they said, “The report
comes out next week,” we would have just gone back to a defensive mode. It took us
weeks, months to understand what was really going on. It took a long time to unpack root
causes. There were lots of long calls late at night.
Veenman then launched two major streams of work. The first was an independent investigation run
by Drimmer in his role as external counsel, during which every single individual in both the security
and the community affairs departments was interviewed. Some local managers were initially skeptical
of the effort, fearing that the results could not be trusted, but the site manager agreed that everyone
should be included. In the end, 650–700 people were interviewed.
The second was a completely independent effort headed by Ila Geno, the former Chief Ombudsman
for PNG and also former commissioner of the PNG police. Barrick supported and funded the effort,
which was designed to facilitate the work of the local police, who had only limited resources to pursue
the inquiry. The effort focused on identifying and reaching out to the women who claimed to have
been abused.
In the end, Barrick terminated 14 people, of whom the police arrested 4. (A number of the employees
who were implicated in the investigation had recently been terminated for other misconduct.) While
neither Barrick nor Geno’s inquiry could definitively identify any specific instance of abusive behavior,
it became clear that the patterns revealed in the allegations, coupled with community problems of the
same flavor, made it likely that at least some of what HRW identified had in fact taken place. It had
been “submit to sex or get arrested.” Barrick believed that between 1990 and 2010 there had probably
been around 30–40 instances of sexual assault.
Uncovering the problem was one thing. Deciding what to do about it was another. HRW had made
a number of recommendations as to what could be done at Porgera, and while a focused dialogue
continued with HRW, Barrick adopted these recommendations wholesale as a first step. (Exhibit 6 lists
the actions that Barrick took in the immediate aftermath of the event.) But a number of deeper questions
remained: How should Barrick think about the relationship between its own responsibilities and those
of the state authorities? Barrick, after all, had no authority to arrest or to punish individuals who had
committed crimes, whether or not they worked for the firm. What duty did Barrick have toward the
women who had been abused? What kinds of training or other forms of intervention would ensure
that the chances of something like this ever happening again were minimized? One place to look for
answers was global guidelines or industry best practices. Barrick had been a signatory to the United
Nations (UN) Global Compact since 2005 (see Exhibit 7) and was also a party to the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs), an extractive industry initiative developed in 2000 by
the Clinton and Blair administrations. But the UN Global Compact was too general to be helpful, and
the VPs—which included basic rules of engagement with public and private security providers—did
not cover many important issues. As the entire management team wrestled with how to move forward,
one option to emerge was looking to the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs)
under consideration at the UN.
The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

The idea that all humans have rights solely by virtue of their status as human beings was brought
to international prominence by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1948. The declaration encompassed six families of rights: security rights (e.g.,
freedom from torture and a right to bodily integrity); due process rights (e.g., a right to a fair and public
hearing); liberty rights (e.g., freedom of movement and freedom of thought, conscience and religion);
political rights (e.g., a right to vote); equality rights (e.g., protection against discrimination); and social
rights (e.g., rights to education, to work, and to an adequate standard of living). 21 (See Exhibit 8 for
examples.) It was adopted in the hope that every nation would eventually enact its provisions into their
own laws, and for many years human rights were largely framed as a question of the relationship
between the individual and the state. 22
Beginning in the 1990s and accelerating into the 2000s, many NGOs and other observers suggested
that the private sector should also have responsibility for maintaining and protecting human rights.
One particularly important moment was the 1995 execution by the Nigerian government of activist
Ken Saro-Wiwa, who protested damage to the lands of the Ogoni people by Royal Dutch Shell. 23
Another was the publication in 1996 of an article in Life magazine claiming that Nike soccer balls were
hand-stitched by 12-year-old boys for 6 cents an hour. The piece unleashed a storm of protest around
Nike’s sourcing practices, and the firm moved aggressively to try to address the issue. 24 NGOs across
the world increasingly argued that multinational firms were abusing human rights and had a
responsibility to do something about it. Their efforts were soon successful. In the late 1990s, Talisman
Energy—a Canadian oil and gas company—came under pressure to sell its stake in a venture in Sudan
with Sinopec, a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), and Petronas, a Malaysian SOE. Activists
charged that royalties from the operation funded the Sudanese government, which was alleged to have
committed human rights violations and sponsored genocide. In 2003, Talisman sold its stake to a
subsidiary of India’s national oil company, ONGC. 25
However, the question of exactly what legal or ethical responsibilities a firm had with respect to
human rights remained a highly charged one. A lively debate in the philosophical literature explored
the question of whether firms did in fact have any ethical responsibility in the space and, if so, on what
basis that responsibility rested. 26 Some argued that human rights were universal moral rights that
everyone had a duty to fulfill. Others argued that universal duties attached to negative rights (i.e.,
rights not to be interfered with) but not to positive rights (i.e., rights to specific goods or actions on the
parts of others). For some, human rights were distinct from moral rights and represented claims against
the state of which one was a citizen. Simultaneously, some actors argued that firms had—or should
have—legal responsibilities in the area. Some NGOs argued, for example, that the U.S. Alien Tort
Statute gave victims of human rights abuses the right to sue the firm responsible in U.S. courts. 27 (This
right was largely limited by a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 2013.) 28 Others argued that the world
needed a body of international law to hold firms responsible for human rights violations. Many large
multinational firms objected, arguing that the primary responsibility for human rights enforcement
rested with states, and that industry self-regulation was the tool best suited for addressing issues that
local law did not or could not address. 29
In 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights drafted the
“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights,” which assigned obligations to protect human rights to multinational
enterprises. Subject to much debate and opposition, the norms were ultimately rejected by the
Commission on Human Rights. The commission, however, did provide for a special representative to
investigate the matter further. In 2005, Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, reached out to
Professor John Ruggie to take on this role. Ruggie, a highly respected political scientist, had worked
with Annan from 1997 to 2001 as UN Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning. In that role,
Ruggie was one of the principal architects of the UN Global Compact. At the time, fewer than 100
multinationals were known to have any policies or practices in place that addressed the risk of their
involvement in human rights harm, and only a third of the Fortune Global 500 companies stated that
they routinely included human rights criteria in their social and environmental impact assessments. 30
In his new role, Ruggie became increasingly convinced that the only way to move forward was to
find a middle ground between the international legal regime advocated by many of the NGOs and the
purely voluntary approach advocated by many of the multinationals. Attempting to impose broad
responsibilities on companies under international law seemed to him fraught with difficulties—
including the risk that this would greatly diminish the essential role of the state in protecting human
rights. But relying solely on companies’ voluntary efforts would, he believed, leave unanswered the
question of whether firms actually had the systems in place necessary to support the claim they were
indeed respecting human rights. In reflecting on his goals at the time, he later wrote:
Achieving significant progress . . . would require moving beyond the Mandatory-vs.-

Voluntary dichotomy to devise a smart mix of reinforcing policy measures that are
capable over time of generating cumulative change and achieving large-scale success—
including in the law. . . .
. . . I envisioned a model of widely distributed efforts and cumulative change. But for
such efforts to cohere and become mutually reinforcing, they require[d] an authoritative
focal point that the relevant actors [could] rally around. 31
In 2008, Ruggie presented the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework to the UN Human Rights
Council. The framework sought to provide a more precise definition of corporate responsibility in
relation to human rights, to begin to outline what specific measures such a responsibility entailed, and
to explore how it could be linked more effectively to the public law construction of internationally
recognized rights. It proposed a clear division of responsibility between actors. States had “the primary
role in preventing and addressing corporate-related human rights abuses”—a duty to protect—while
the corporate responsibility was to respect human rights, which meant “acting with due diligence to
avoid infringing on the rights of others, and addressing harms that do occur.” 32 The responsibility
encompassed all human rights, and the scope was “actual or potential adverse human rights impacts
by an enterprise’s own activities or through the business relationships connected to those activities.” 33
The third pillar of the framework called for victims to have better access to both judicial and nonjudicial
remedies. 34
The framework was clear to avoid framing the responsibilities of businesses as “duties” or
“obligations.” It stated, “While corporations may be considered ‘organs of society’, they are specialized
economic organs, not democratic public interest institutions. As such their responsibilities cannot and
should not simply mirror the duties of States.” 35 Instead, the responsibility to respect human rights
was a social norm with “near-universal recognition,” meaning it was widely acknowledged by
business itself and for which deviations were “most likely to be socially sanctioned.” 36 Ruggie pointed
out that while not a legal duty, endorsement by the UN meant the responsibility had been given
“official recognition in the system of public governance, thus beginning to pull it beyond the realm of
‘social expectations’ from which it had emerged.” 37
The council unanimously welcomed the framework, and it was widely praised by both NGOs and
business organizations. NGOs were encouraged that the framework clearly embraced the idea that
corporations had real responsibilities with respect to human rights—while businesses appreciated the
clear statement that this duty was inherently limited and that it was states that had the primary
responsibility for protecting human rights. At the same time, companies increasingly recognized that
they faced reputational, operational, and in some cases legal risks that required a systematic response.
Ruggie then moved to a discussion of the ways in which the framework could be put into practice.
The resulting set of 31 “General Principles” was unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights
Council in June 2011, having been extensively discussed in a wide variety of forums beforehand. Of
the 31 principles, 14 were addressed to businesses. They gave guidance in three key areas: 38
• The policy commitments required of business enterprises to meet the responsibility to respect
human rights;
• The due diligence processes that could identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for the way in
which companies addressed human rights impacts; and
• Processes that could enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts that business
enterprises might have caused or to which they might have contributed.
The framework and the GPs were not without their critics. One criticism was that they lacked any
binding force, leaving regulatory authority to state governments. 39 Other commentators criticized
Ruggie’s reliance on social norms on the grounds that, in many parts of the world, corporations were
expected to do more than respect human rights—they were also expected to actively promote and
protect them like states. 40 Another criticism concerned Ruggie’s conception of corporations. For many,
to assume that corporations were merely specialized economic organs was an assumption that
foreclosed debate about the purpose of the corporation. 41 Still others criticized the potential lack of
clarity around the idea of “respecting” human rights. (See Exhibit 9 for key principles and
commentary.)
As Drimmer and Veenman grappled with the question of how to move forward, they found
Ruggie’s work increasingly valuable. Veenman recalled:
Around this time [the summer of 2010], I started following John’s work. He was doing
a great job articulating the role of international companies as a force for good in the world,
and the fundamental importance of both company values and well-designed policies in
ensuring companies lived up to their responsibilities.
The GPs allowed us to be clear about what the government’s role was, and what was
ours. The role of the state was to protect—to set clear rules and to enforce them. Our job
was to respect those roles. And we weren’t the one suggesting that this was the case—we
could say, “This universally respected framework says . . .” We could act, and say that
something was “in line with” the Ruggie principles. It created a common framework for
external engagement, allowing us to say to the state, for example, “We’re operating under
this framework, and it says you should do this.”
Moreover, the GPs were the first thing companies had to tell them how to respond to
these issues. For example, we weren’t sure of the best way to do reparations. We asked
NGOs, but they had no immediate answers. Another tough question we grappled with
was the question of how one does human rights due diligence. What’s an adequate
process? What’s appropriate given the circumstances?
The principles brought a framework. The issues you face are unpredictable, and it’s
hard to know how to tackle them. We will never get it perfect. The GPs were a starting
point, and gave our efforts some legitimacy. The issues are hugely tough and it’s easy for
others to be judgmental.
Drimmer elaborated:
Ruggie’s GPs were incredibly important. They did two ground-breaking things. First,
they took the discussion from theory to practice by giving us a framework within which
to assess a corporate human rights approach. Second, they took the dialog around these
issues from something fuzzy and intangible to something immediately concrete because
John was able to develop so much consensus around the principles. The conversation
changed. For example, there was no generally accepted model for training programs. Who
do you train? What kind of training is appropriate? Who oversees it? Human rights are
complex and multifaceted. They don’t “belong” anywhere in a company—they apply to
everyone, and everyone can violate them. Where should they be housed?
We started to ask, “How do we do this? How do we integrate this?” We took the key
ideas from the GPs and developed the skeleton of a compliance program. It was a catalyst
for the firm. But our goal was not “to comply with the GPs,” but to develop a human
rights program that was operationally effective for the company. We expected to cover
the GPs but to do more.
Barrick’s Response
Barrick’s long-term response to the violations uncovered at Porgera was twofold. First, Barrick
designed a process through which it could provide compensation to the victims. Second, the firm began
the hard work of designing policies, procedures, and key performance indicators (KPIs) that would
embed respect for human rights deep into the organization. The first took about 18 months, while in
the spring of 2015 the second was still being implemented.
The Remediation Process

One of CEO Aaron Regent’s first statements to his team had been “We have to do something for the
women who have been affected,” and there was complete agreement within the group that Barrick
should do what it could. Peter Sinclair recalled, “Concern for our reputation was not the driving force.
We were moved by outrage and embarrassment.”
In preparation for the effort, Barrick assigned an employee in Australia, Patrick Bindon, to
spearhead the project full-time. Bindon kicked off an 18-month consultative process with leading
experts in PNG, in the Porgera region, and around the world—including John Ruggie, HRW, and the
UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. In October 2012, the firm announced
the launch of the Olgeta Meri Igat Raits (All Women Have Rights) project. It was designed to be a
sensitive, expeditious, and culturally appropriate alternative to the formal justice sector, and to be
10
aligned with the GPs. 42 The project was implemented independently of the company and was overseen
by an independent body, led by Dame Carol Kidu, a former parliamentarian and cabinet minister in
PNG, and Ume Wainetti, the National Director of the Papua New Guinea Family and Sexual Violence
Action Committee. 43
The administration and assessment of the individual claims process were to be led by well-
respected, local, independent experts. Claims were processed by an independent assessment team, and
claimants were provided the choice of funds to hire an attorney or access to an experienced
independent attorney who had done work with Amnesty International and other civil society
organizations. John Numapo, the former Chief Magistrate of PNG, assessed the eligibility of the
claimants. It was envisioned that remedy packages, which were developed jointly by the claimants and
framework personnel, might include the facilitation of access to justice, access to medical and/or
psychosocial support, “fair and appropriate” reparations, and “to the extent practicable, rehabilitation
of rights and circumstances experienced prior the allege offense.” 44 Ultimately, Barrick spent over $10
million on the program. The remediation team processed about 125 claims and gave more than 2.4
million Papua New Guinean kina (around US$1 million) to the claimants. More than 90% of women
eligible for remediation accepted remedy packages. Local experts had encouraged lower levels of
remediation, but Barrick insisted that PNG civil damages should be a floor, not a target.
In 2013, Mining Watch Canada (MWC) approached the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), claiming the process violated GPs 29 and 31 (see Exhibit 9). One issue MWC
raised was that recipients of the remedy package were to sign a waiver not to “pursue or participate in
any legal action against PJV [Porgera Joint Venture], PRFA [Porgera Framework Association Inc.] or
Barrick in or outside PNG.” 45 MWC claimed this violated GP 29, the commentary for which stated that
operational-level grievance mechanisms “should not be used . . . to preclude access to judicial or other
non-judicial grievance mechanisms.” 46 For example, 11 women had opted out of the remediation
process and sought to sue Barrick in the U.S., ultimately settling out of court. 47 Barrick amended the
waiver to state explicitly that recipients agreed not to pursue “any claim for compensation, or any civil
legal action” and that this did not preclude criminal action. 48 In its mid-program review of the process,
BSR, a leading social consultancy, “applauded” the revision but noted that “there is still a risk that
claimants will lack the requisite capacity to understand their legal rights and the ramifications of the
waiver.” 49 While it was not clear whether Barrick would seek to enforce the waiver if challenged, in its
opinion the OHCHR did not find the remediation process inconsistent with the GPs. 50
The Olgeta Meri Igat Raits project was also charged with putting in place a community development
program tailored to the needs of the local community. Barrick promised that programs “would be
planned and implemented by an experienced team with the advice of a panel of experts” and that they
would “directly relate to gender and sexual violence issues in the Porgera Valley, but . . . with the
potential to be applied elsewhere in PNG.” 51 As of 2014, Barrick employed about 200 community
relations specialists in the Porgera Valley in a wide variety of roles—including the provision of support
to the Porgera District Women’s Association and White Ribbon, the second of which was a Canada-
based NGO focused on ending violence against women by providing training and education for men
and boys.
Reflecting on the program afterward, current and former employees at Barrick had a variety of
responses. Some stressed that it went over and beyond what anyone might have reasonably expected,
while some identified challenges and missteps. Others remembered that reactions in the community
were very mixed. Some community members wondered why Barrick was giving money to “bad girls”
who were “doing something illegal and got what they deserved.” Others suggested that Barrick might
be “overreacting” and wondered whether it was appropriate for Barrick to take the place of the judicial
11
system. Still others acknowledged disappointment by claimants that they had not received more. Most
felt that because the framework had such light standards of proof, the company had likely
compensated many women who had not been abused (something Barrick simply accepted as part of
trying to ensure that all of the victims received remedy).
Developing New Policies and Procedures

Some of the new policies seemed almost to write themselves. For example, it was clear that Barrick
needed to develop new grievance procedures that were consistent with the effectiveness criteria in the
GPs. Community members needed a place to go where they could complain about the company—in
confidence—directly to an employee who was in turn a member of the community. Every allegation
received would go through an assessment, and all indications of potentially serious human rights
violations would be reported to the legal department and investigated independent of the site—for
example, by a third party or by an independent corporate investigations unit that reported to Jonathan
Drimmer and to Mark Wall. A new global internal procedure required the immediate reporting and
escalation of information related to any potential negative human rights impacts.
A foundational decision was to consider human rights norms to be legal requirements and thus to
mandate compliance with them in the same way as international and local regulatory requirements.
This decision was consistent with the GPs, which stated that companies should “treat the risk of
causing or contributing to gross human rights abuse as a legal compliance issue wherever they
operate.” The human rights program was lodged under Sybil Veenman, and she was given a direct
reporting relationship to the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of the board of directors. A
new human rights policy and a revised code of business conduct and ethics were approved by the
board, and the new global compliance program was announced globally by the CEO. The program was
treated as part of Barrick’s internal governance structure, with progress on its implementation
discussed during quarterly and subsequently monthly global operational meetings. Senior executives
repeatedly emphasized the importance of the program to help develop a “tone from the top.”
Changes were made in the hiring and recruitment process. Questions were added to the employee
screening process to ensure that the backgrounds of potential new hires did not suggest they posed a
human rights risk, and employment letters and contracts contained explicit language about Barrick’s
human rights expectations and the need to comply with them. 52 A video was created to ensure that all
employees received basic human rights training at induction, and thousands of employees also
received annual “refresher” human rights training and live sessions covering material directly relevant
to their immediate responsibilities. In 2013, more than 10,000 employees received some form of human
rights training. Barrick tried to be completely clear that violation of the firm’s human rights policies
and/or procedures would lead to disciplinary action, up to and including termination.
Drimmer and his colleagues also worked directly with the mines and with numerous functions
across the firm to ensure that they had appropriate human rights training, and that they embedded
human rights issues in their management systems. But the local operations were given responsibility
for making sure that these policies were adapted to account for local nuances and were effectively
implemented. Drimmer remarked, “This is a very decentralized culture. Things really happen on the
ground—that’s where the credit is due and the results are best measured.”
One particularly important decision was to implement company-wide programs to assess Barrick’s
human rights risks and impact. One assessment was overseen by Avanzar, a respected third-party
consulting organization whose founder had been involved in the formation of the VPs. Avanzar’s
assessment tool, a significant advance over the commercial tools available, covered dozens of
12
individual human rights and hundreds of indicators. Over a period of three years, Avanzar made
assessments at every high- and medium-risk operation at Barrick.
Two separate external independent assessments were also conducted regarding the effectiveness of
Barrick’s security and human rights program. First, working together with a group that included
representatives from 15 of the firms who had committed to the VPs, Mark Wall led the design of a set
of KPIs that codified the VPs’ broad commitments into a set of detailed, workable processes that could
be tracked, measured, and tested. These were then separately tested by Bureau Veritas, a respected
testing company, during Barrick’s annual audits for the International Council on Mining and Metals
(ICMM). Second, assessments of the company’s programs in mitigating security and human rights risks
were conducted, and an internal security governance group also assessed compliance with company
security policies. 53 Management systems for environment, health and safety, and community
relations—functional units where human rights risks could be present—received similar assessments.
The assessments resulted in numerous changes both large and small.
More recently, a decision had been made to coordinate independent human rights assessments
together with the internal audit of all of Barrick’s nonfinancial compliance risks, so that environment,
health and safety, security, community relations, anticorruption, and human rights were all audited
simultaneously by different assessors. KPIs based on all four areas were included in executive
management’s compensation, determining up to 30% of an executive’s bonus.
Periodic audits revealed that human rights awareness had substantially increased throughout the
organization. The company began to see a reduction in conflicts and situations that created human
rights risks across its operations, and growing comfort among the workforce in reporting human rights
concerns. In particular, sexual harassment programs were developed at Porgera and other mines, and
as of early 2015, no sexual assaults by mine security had been identified at Porgera since the time of the
initial allegations.
New Challenges
As he walked across St. James Park, Drimmer reflected on all that had been accomplished through
the hard work of many people throughout Barrick over the past four years—and on all that remained
to be done in light of the challenges the company faced. In addition to ensuring that the systems and
policies that had been put into place were continually reviewed and updated in response to experience,
Drimmer was thinking hard about three major issues that needed to be addressed in the not-too-distant
future: the best way to integrate human rights awareness into the supply chain, how Barrick should
think about working with entities where the firm had a financial interest but not operational control,
and how the operations at Porgera should work with government entities, including the local police
force—an issue with wide-ranging ramifications across the firm.
Implementing appropriate human rights due diligence across all 20,000 of Barrick’s vendors was a
major challenge. Combating corruption, for example, was conceptually easier (although still
challenging to implement) since a discrete set of illegal activities that were easier to describe had to be
rooted out. In contrast, there were dozens of human rights that could be implicated in myriad ways by
almost every functional unit, and the relevant risks differed significantly across both countries and
contexts. From the beginning Barrick had been careful to stress that the new human rights policies
applied “to every corner of the company,” including third-party contractors. Barrick created a human
rights due diligence package for higher-risk third parties, introduced human rights due diligence in its
Vendor Onboarding Standard, and created a Supplier Code of Ethics. Standard contract language had
13
also been developed to require human rights compliance, but Drimmer wondered about the best way
to ensure that Barrick’s suppliers were held to the same standards to which Barrick held itself.
Another significant challenge involved working with entities in which Barrick had a substantial
financial interest but lacked operational control. For example, there had been significant human rights
issues at the North Mara mine in Tanzania. The mine was owned by African Barrick Gold (now Acacia
Plc.), a company in which Barrick had a majority financial interest but over which Barrick by legal
agreement could not exercise control—it had independent management, an independent board, and
its own policies, procedures, and systems. Another example was Jabil Sayid, a project in Saudi Arabia
that was scheduled to go into production at the end of 2015. Barrick had 50% ownership in the project,
with Ma’aden, a largely state-owned mining company, holding the other half. Barrick controlled half
the board but had no operational control. Drimmer suspected that these kinds of ownership structures
were likely to become increasingly common, and he wondered how best to support them, given
potential human rights challenges.
In addition, Porgera remained a challenge. Although structuring relationships with the local
government, particularly the local police force, was an issue of concern around the world, it remained
particularly salient at Porgera. In the absence of a well-established police presence within the Porgera
Valley (and indeed in many, if not most, of the remote regions of the island), the PNG government had
long relied on mobile police squads to enforce order around the country’s major extractive projects. 54
Although these squads were widely regarded as usually effective in restoring order within local
communities, there was widespread concern about the methods they used, and they were rumored to
routinely violate human rights. In 2009, Barrick had come under significant criticism for alleged abuses
by mobile police squads deployed to the area. 55 Barrick had housed and fed the mobile squads, and
some critics had argued that the firm should withdraw this support. Barrick, however, believed that
the government would not continue to deploy the squads if it did so, and there was general agreement
that their deployment contributed to sharp reductions in violent crime and insecurity around Porgera,
something widely welcomed by local residents. 56 Indeed, without the police, there was a real risk that
law and order would deteriorate completely.
The challenge was not limited to the police. For example, during a recent audit the assessor had
gone to the local prison and was appalled. He had come back to the site’s management and said, “You
have to fix this.” But maintaining jails was a state function, and it was unclear how much Barrick should
take on. Barrick had been funding the building of local police barracks and had also been facilitating
the officers’ training. Would improving prison conditions mean the firm would also have to pay for
the prisons’ upkeep? Ensure that there was appropriate food? Whose job was it to make sure that the
facility was not overcrowded? Barrick had signed a “memorandum of understanding” with the PNG
police force, documenting what each party was hoping to receive, under what conditions, and as a
result had some grounds for dialogue with the local authorities, but the relationship was limited in
scope. Drimmer wondered what more, if anything, Barrick could realistically do in this regard. Could
the company somehow monitor the physical prison facilities maintained by the state? Could it monitor
how the police were treating people post-arrest? And what about the judicial system? Could Barrick
ensure fairness in that process, and ensure that the prisoners were there for the right reasons? What
should the company do with any information it collected?
A recent local initiative—called “Restoring Justice”—seemed to provide a promising way forward.

Promoted by the Porgera Joint Venture, the initiative took a holistic approach, bringing together
government, businesses, community leaders, and NGOs to focus on peace building, conflict resolution,
social justice, and community development. The initiative involved capacity building of relevant state
institutions, including an increase in the permanent police force in the district from 14 to 50 members,
14
the creation of a family and sexual violence police unit to serve the district, increased penalties for
illegal mining, and training for Village Court officials to address gender-based violence. Such an
approach seemed very much aligned with the local community’s approach to the problem of law and
order, but Drimmer continued to think about how Barrick could most constructively engage with the
effort. 57
He could think of few problems that were more important.
15
315-108 -16-
Exhibit 1 The Human Development Index and Its Components, Selected Countries
HDI Human Life Mean Expected Gross EIU EIU Rule of

rank Development expectancy years of years of national Democracy Democracy Law Rank
Index (HDI) at birth schooling schooling income Rank Index
(GNI) per
capita
Value (years) (years) (years) (2011 PPP
$)
2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2015
1 Norway 0.944 81.6 12.6 17.5 64,992 1 9.93 2
4 Denmark 0.923 80.2 12.7 18.7 44,025 5 9.11 1
8 United States 0.915 79.1 12.9 16.5 52,308 19 8.11 19
50 Russian Federation 0.798 70.1 12.0 14.7 22,352 132 3.39 75
74 Mexico 0.756 76.8 8.5 13.1 16,056 57 6.68 79
90 China 0.727 75.8 7.5 13.1 12,547 144 3.00 71
110 Indonesia 0.684 68.9 7.6 13.0 9,788 49 6.95 52
130 India 0.609 68.0 5.4 11.7 5,497 27 7.92 59
145 Nepal 0.548 69.6 3.3 12.4 2,311 105 4.77 48
155 Zimbabwe 0.509 57.5 7.3 10.9 1,615 150 2.78 100
158 Papua New Guinea 0.505 62.6 4.0 9.9 2,463 75 6.03 n/a
187 Central African Rep. 0.350 50.7 4.2 7.2 581 166 1.49 n/a
Sources: United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data; Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index; and World Justice
Project Rule of Law Index, http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index.
Notes: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index measures electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil
liberties. Regimes are classified as Full Democracy (10–8), Flawed Democracy (8–6), Hybrid Regimes (6–4), Authoritarian Regimes (4–0).
The Rule of Law Index measures government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal
justice.
Exhibit 2a Barrick Gold Financial Highlights, 2011–2014
(in millions of US dollars except per share 2014 2013 2012 2011
data)
(Based on IFRS)
Revenues 10,239 12,527 14,394 14,236

Net earnings (loss) (2,907) (10,366) (538) 4,484
per share (2.50) (10.14) (0.54) 4.49
Adjusted net earnings1 793 2,569 3,954 4,666
per share1 0.68 2.51 3.95 4.67
Operating cash flow 2,296 4,239 5,983 5,315
Adjusted operating cash flow1 2,296 4,359 5,700 5,680
Cash and equivalents 2,699 2,404 2,097 2,749
Dividends paid per share 0.20 0.50 0.75 0.51
Annualized dividend per share2 0.20 0.20 0.80 0.60
Gold production (000s oz.) 6,249 7,166 7,421 7,676
Average realized gold price/ounce1 1,265 1,407 1,669 1,578

Adjusted operating costs per ounce1 598 566 563 463
All-in sustaining cash costs/ounce1 864 915 1,014 821
Copper production (Mlbs) 436 539 468 451

Average realized copper price/lb1 3.03 3.39 3.57 3.82
C1 cash costs per pound1 1.92 1.92 2.05 1.71
C3 fully allocated costs per pound1 2.43 2.42 2.85 2.30
Sources: Barrick Gold Annual Report 2013, p. 2; and Barrick Gold Annual Report 2014, p. 2, p. 21.
1 These are non-GAAP financial performance measures with no standardized meaning under IFRS.
2 Calculation based on annualizing the last dividend paid in the respective year.
17
Exhibit 2b Barrick Gold Financial Highlights, 2008–2010
a) (In millions of US dollars, except per

share data) 2010 2009 2008
(US GAAP basis)
Sales 10,924 8,136 7,613

Net earnings (loss) 3,274 (4,274) 785
per share 3.32 (4.73) 0.90
Adjusted net income1 3,279 1,810 1,661
per share 3.32 2.00 1.90
Operating cash flow 4,127 (2,322) 2,254
Adjusted operating cash flow1 4,783 2,899 2,254
Cash and equivalents 3,968 2,564 1,437
Dividends paid per share 0.44 0.40 0.40
Operating Highlights
Gold production (000s oz.) 7,765 7,397 7,657

Average realized gold price per ounce1 1,228 985 872
Total cash costs per ounce1 457 464 443
Net cash costs per ounce1 341 360 337
Copper production (Mlbs) 368 393 370

Average realized copper price/lb 1 3.41 3.16 3.39
Total cash costs per pound1 1.11 1.17 1.19
Source: Barrick Gold Annual Report 2010, p. 5.
18
Exhibit 2c Barrick Stock Price, February 2005–February 2015
Source: Datastream, accessed March 2015.
19
Exhibit 3 The Porgera Gold Mine
Source: Wikimedia Commons, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9d/Porgera_Gold_Mine.JPG.
20
Exhibit 4 Average Yearly Gold Prices, 1969–2014
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
Source: London Gold Bullion Market Historical PM Gold Fix, http://www.goldprices.com/historical-gold-prices.htm.
21
Exhibit 5 Summary of Gold Mineral Reserves and Mineral Resources
For the years ended December 31 2014 2013
Tonnes Grade Ounces Tonnes Grade Ounces

Based on attributable ounces
(000s) (gm/t) (000s) (000s) (gm/t) (000s)
North America
(Proven and Probable)
(Mineral resources)
Goldstrike Open Pit 74,192 3.24 7,724 76,436 3.31 8,122
4,496 1.90 274 5,361 2.40 413
Goldstrike Underground 6,661 8.83 1,890 9,502 8.46 2,585
3,740 11.60 1,395 5,430 10.37 1,810
Goldstrike Property Total 80,853 3.70 9,614 85,938 3.88 10,707
8,236 6.30 1,669 10,791 6.41 2,223
Pueblo Viejo (60.00%) 87,522 3.31 9,318 92,844 3.25 9,694
74,748 2.62 6,301 115,606 2.42 9,011
Cortez 153,821 1.99 9,851 188,434 1.82 11,024
38,925 2.81 3,513 91,142 1.68 4,914
Goldrush - - - - - -
68,122 4.83 10,574 68,529 4.52 9,960
Bald Mountain 60,477 0.70 1,361 122,518 0.62 2,460
206,947 0.63 4,160 187,278 0.59 3,579
Turquoise Ridge (75.00%) 8,199 16.91 4,458 8,893 17.73 5,070
81,206 4.64 12,111 82,119 4.35 11,488
Round Mountain (50.00%) 27,299 0.79 690 42,146 0.68 919
23,766 0.58 440 38,115 0.74 904
South Arturo (60.00%) 1,711 4.40 242 18,620 1.68 1,007
32,420 1.46 1,525 29,598 1.51 1,440
Ruby Hill 1,566 0.48 24 4,502 0.97 140
188,345 0.65 3,923 161,869 0.69 3,612
Hemlo 12,267 2.08 820 12,802 2.48 1,019
36,930 1.41 1,671 52,847 1.12 1,903
Marigold Mine (0.00%) - - - 80,010 0.54 1,389
- - - 11,188 0.44 158
Spring Valley (70.00%) - - - - - -
62,369 0.66 1,326 - - -
Golden Sunlight 2,281 1.73 127 3,650 1.67 196
5,610 1.56 281 4,279 1.24 170
Donlin Gold (50.00%) - - - - - -
270,668 2.24 19,503 270,668 2.24 19,503
South America
(Mineral resources)
Cerro Casale (75.00%) 898,202 0.60 17,434 898,202 0.60 17,434
222,485 0.35 2,529 228,576 0.34 2,530
Pascua-Lama 324,626 1.47 15,384 324,626 1.47 15,384
157,465 1.28 6,459 157,465 1.28 6,459
Veladero 172,003 0.86 4,737 188,626 0.85 5,117
171,971 0.70 3,872 164,387 0.68 3,588
Lagunas Norte 69,650 1.27 2,833 90,800 1.28 3,751
19,383 0.69 429 33,795 0.70 757
22
Exhibit 5 (continued) Summary of Gold Mineral Reserves and Mineral Resources
Australia Pacific
(Mineral resources)
Porgera (95.00%) 17,049 5.49 3,008 23,134 4.10 3,051
34,256 3.68 4,050 36,592 2.75 3,238
Kalgoorlie (50.00%) 89,067 1.22 3,482 91,793 1.26 3,718
23,634 1.51 1,146 25,185 1.49 1,204
Cowal 41,470 1.17 1,555 47,875 1.18 1,816
48,915 1.09 1,708 63,328 1.08 2,203
Plutonic (0.00%) - - - 442 9.22 131
- - - 4,204 6.53 883
Kanowna Belle (0.00%) - - - 2,616 4.85 408
- - - 3,392 4.70 513
Africa
(Mineral resources)
Bulyanhulu (63.90%) 24,769 7.65 6,090 27,775 7.77 6,937
7,923 8.49 2,163 7,556 10.65 2,588
North Mara (63.90%) 15,114 2.69 1,308 16,043 3.17 1,634
11,477 2.87 1,060 18,672 3.32 1,991
Buzwagi (63.90%) 13,267 1.35 574 17,813 1.45 828
30,885 1.30 1,289 36,291 1.29 1,506
Nyanzaga (73.90%) - - - - - -
62,208 1.31 2,621 71,943 1.31 3,032
Other
proven and probable 12,422 0.27 107 25,338 0.27 217
mineral resource 239 0.13 1 870 0.18 5
Total
proven and probable 2,113,635 1.37 93,017 2,413,440 1.34 104,051
mineral resource 1,889,133 1.55 94,324 1,976,285 1.56 99,362
Source: Barrick Gold Corporation Annual Report 2014, pp. 87-88, 93.
23
Exhibit 6 Appendix B to the Letter of December 23, 2010 to Human Rights Watch
1. Operational/logistical changes implemented or to be implemented within the PJV Asset

Protection Department (APD):
• Introduce security personnel monitoring systems via individually assigned radios to all
security personnel allowing real time tracking of locations and actions of security personnel
and logging of data for future investigations, if required;
• Review of security personnel shift pattern to mix the compositions of patrols;
• Develop phased approach for ensuring a secure perimeter of pit via use of various instruments
(fence, cameras, guarding, etc.);
• Identify areas for further fencing/security controls (such as certain dump areas);
• Installation of in-car cameras in security vehicles: an in-car camera vendor has attended site
and conducted testing on camera requirements, options, and design. Installation of in-car
cameras is expected on a pilot and longer-term basis in the near future for all security vehicles;
• Implementation and expansion of CCTV and thermal CCTV for enhanced monitoring in pit
and dump areas;
• Identification and implementation of integration strategies with Community Affairs (such as

dedicated Community Affairs personnel being placed in security patrol vehicles (or separate
vehicles at APD disposal) as first response to certain incidents); and
• Installation of additional lighting on portions of the fence perimeter
2. Supervision/oversight changes implemented or to be implemented regarding APD personnel

and practices:
• Automatic reporting to Security Control Centre (SCC) on every occasion there is (A) a
confrontation with or detention of an illegal minor or trespasser, (B) a weapon discharge;
• Hiring of additional female APD staff members;
• At the earliest opportunity, all female detentions to include female APD staff member as
oversight until detainee is released or conveyed to Police;
• Regular situation reports to Chief Duty Officer reporting illegal minor and trespasser numbers,
engagements, and confrontations;
• Daily presentation to management with corresponding trespasser numbers, times, and

locations displayed during the presentation;
• Sector patrols implemented with Sector Commanders/Supervisors reporting on activities

within their sector;
• Leadership training for all Supervisors, including field supervision and oversight training;
• Enhanced supervision and oversight over security personnel on ore stockpiles and dumps;
24
• Regular monitoring of detainees prior to transfer to Police custody and verification of same on
a daily basis by APD Management; and
• Investigations group engaged on every occasion an illegal minor or trespasser is found to be

injured.
3. Structural/reporting changes to APD implemented or to be implemented:
• Establishment of off-site reporting to country or regional management by the investigations

department with regard to serious offences and policy breaches (including Code of Conduct);
• Establishment of better ties with the local communities via the creation of community liaison
groups (staffed by a mix of APD and Community Affairs personnel) and working with public
security on community outreach;
• Engagement with the Police to identify potential opportunities for enhanced community police
presence in the Porgera Valley;
• Education campaigns, liaison with women’s’ groups, local educational institutions, etc.;
• Working with Community Affairs to ensure broader and more effective community/outreach,
including review of existing resources and information flow and skills
development/enhancement efforts of outreach officers;
• Integrate Country Security Manager into PJV Safety and Security Governance Committee;
• Implement formal security/risk assessment process and audit protocol;
• Creation of a new “Security Operations Manager” position to work under the Country Security
Manager and provide additional senior management oversight of APD operations;
• Confirm and formalize dual reporting of APD Manager to both on-site function (General
Manager) and off-site function (Security Operations Manager); and
• Additional diversity and leadership training for APD management.
4. Policy/procedural changes implemented or to be implemented:
• Review of all APD policies and procedures and identification of areas for improvement;
• Operational and legal review of existing APD practices and interactions with public security
providers, including the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding agreed with the Royal Papua
New Guinea Constabulary; and
• Engage with Police regarding the provision of 3rd Party Training in Human Rights (with a focus
on sexual violence) to Police personnel prior to deployment in the area.
Source: “Gold’s Costly Dividend: Human Rights Impacts of Papua New Guinea’s Porgera Gold Mine,” Human Rights Watch
Report, 2010, pp. 93-94.
25
Exhibit 7 United Nations Global Compact
Human Rights
Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed
human rights; and
Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labour
Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining;
Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and
Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
Environment
Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;
Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and
Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.
Anti-Corruption
Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and
bribery.
Source: United Nations Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.
26
Exhibit 8 Selected Human Rights from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis
of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of
sovereignty.
Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the
organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for
his dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working
hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit. (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and
to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Parents have a prior right to choose
the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
Source: Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
27
Exhibit 9 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
13. The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises:
(a) Avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities,
and address such impacts when they occur;
(b) Seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their
operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not
contributed to those impacts.
29. To make it possible for grievances to be addressed early and remediated directly, business
enterprises should establish or participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for
individuals and communities who may be adversely impacted.
31. In order to ensure their effectiveness, non-judicial grievance mechanisms, both State-based and
non-State-based, should be:
(a) Legitimate: enabling trust from the stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, and
being accountable for the fair conduct of grievance processes;
(b) Accessible: being known to all stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended, and
providing adequate assistance for those who may face particular barriers to access;
(c) Predictable: providing a clear and known procedure with an indicative timeframe for each
stage, and clarity on the types of process and outcome available and means of monitoring
implementation;
(d) Equitable: seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have reasonable access to sources of
information, advice and expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair, informed
and respectful terms;
(e) Transparent: keeping parties to a grievance informed about its progress, and providing
sufficient information about the mechanism’s performance to build confidence in its
effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake;
(f) Rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies accord with internationally
recognized human rights;
(g) A source of continuous learning: drawing on relevant measures to identify lessons for
improving the mechanism and preventing future grievances and harms;
Operational-level mechanisms should also be:
(h) Based on engagement and dialogue: consulting the stakeholder groups for whose use they are
intended on their design and performance, and focusing on dialogue as the means to address
and resolve grievances.
Source: United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
28
Endnotes
1 “The Voluntary Principles,” website maintained by Foley Hoag LLP, the Secretariat for the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/, accessed March 20, 2015.
2 “The Road from Principles to Practice: Today’s Challenges for Businesses in Respecting Human Rights,” Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 4.
Intelligence Unit, 2015) p. 16.
Intelligence Unit, 2015, p. 5.
5 Sinclair Dinnen, Law and Order in a Weak State: Crime and Politics in Papua New Guinea, Pacific Islands Monograph Series 17
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001).
6 CIA, State Department, “Country Note: Papua New Guinea,” February 20, 2012.
7 “Papua New Guinea: Trade Statistics,” Global Edge website, Michigan State University, Broad College of Business,
http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/papua-new-guinea/tradestats, accessed March 22, 2015.
8 Market Explorer tool, website maintained by The Economist through the Economist Intelligence Unit,
http://www.eiu.com/home.aspx#introduction, accessed March 20, 2015.
9 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results,” Transparency International website,
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results, accessed March 19, 2015.
10 Gordon Peak and Sinclair Dinnen, “Police Development in Papua New Guinea: The Need for Innovation,” Security
Challenges 10, no. 2 (2014): 33-51.
11 Deana Mitchell, “Crying Meri: Violence Against Women in Papua New Guinea,” ABC News, June 7, 2013,
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/06/crying-meri-violence-against-women-in-papua-new-guinea/, accessed
March 18, 2015.
12 “PNG: Violence and Death Still a Reality for Women,” Amnesty International website, December 17, 2013,
http://www.amnesty.org.au/svaw/comments/33629/, accessed March 22, 2015.
13 Mahlet Atakilt Woldetsadik, “Domestic Violence as a Way of Life: The Reality for Papua New Guinea’s Women,” Rand
Corporation, December 31, 2014, http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/12/domestic-violence-as-a-way-of-life-the-reality-
for.html, accessed March 15, 2015.
14 Margit Ganster-Briedler, “Gender-based violence and the impact on women’s health and well being in Papua New Guinea,”
Contemporary PNG Studies: DWU Research Journal 13 (November 2010:.
16 “The Mine, Its People and the Future,” Porgera Joint Venture Report, from PEAK Association Inc.’s website,
http://www.peakpng.org/resources/Porgera_Report.pdf, accessed March 22, 2015.
17 Jane Perlez and Kirk Johnson, “Behind Gold’s Glitter: Torn Lands and Pointed Questions,” New York Times, June 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/24/international/24GOLD.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed March 22, 2015.
18 Human Rights Watch, “Gold’s Costly Dividend: The Human Rights Impact of Papua New Guinea’s Porgera Gold Mine,”
report, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2011/02/01/gold-s-costly-dividend, accessed November 10, 2015.
19 Barrick Gold Corporation website, http://barrick.com/, accessed March 22, 2015.
20 Human Rights Watch, “Gold’s Costly Dividend.”
21 James Nickel, “Human Rights,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014), ed. Edward N. Zalta,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/rights-human.
22 Lynn S. Paine and Lara Adamsons, “Business & Human Rights,” HBS Technical Note 309-097, September 2011.
29
23 Bob Herbert, “In America; Nike’s Pyramid Scheme,” New York Times, June 10, 1996,
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/10/opinion/in-america-nike-s-pyramid-scheme.html, accessed March 20, 2015.
24 “NIKE and Child Labor,” American University TED Case Study, http://www1.american.edu/ted/nike.htm, accessed
March 20, 2015; and Sydney Schanberg and Marie Doringy, “Six Cents an Hour,” Time 19, no. 7 (June 1996): 38.
25 “Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission,” report prepared for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ottawa, January 2000, http://www.ecosonline.org/reports/2000/Human%20Security%20in%20Sudan.pdf; and Kyle
Bakx, “Oil, politics and human rights: A look back at Talisman,” CBC News, February 22, 2015,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/oil-politics-and-human-rights-a-look-back-at-talisman-1.2964715.
26 See, for example Wesley Cragg, “Ethics, Enlightened Self Interest and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human
Rights,” Business Ethics Quarterly, January 2012.
27 “The Alien Tort Statue,” Earthrights International website, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/alien-tort-statute, accessed
March 20, 2015.
28 Eric Posner, “The United States Can’t Be the World’s Courthouse,” Slate, April 24, 2013,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/04/the_supreme_court_and_the_alien_tort_sta
tute_ending_human_rights_suits.html, accessed March 20, 2015.
29 John Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (New York: Norton, 2013).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 The UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework for Business and Human Rights (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations,
2010).
33 John Ruggie, Just Business, p. 100.
34 Ibid.
35 John Ruggie, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights,” Human Rights Council report,
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
36 John Ruggie, Just Business, pp. 92-93.
37 Ibid., p. 103.
38 The text of the principles and a full set of interpretive documents can be found at the Business & Human Rights Resource
Centre website, http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles, accessed March 24, 2015.
39 Florian Wettstein, “Normativity, Ethics, and the UN Guiding Principles,” Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 2 (2015): 165-166.
40 Carlos López, “The Ruggie ‘process’: From legal obligations to corporate social responsibility?,” in Human Rights Obligations
of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?, eds. Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
41 Florian Wettstein, “Normativity, Ethics, and the UN Guiding Principles,” p. 177.
42 Barrick Gold Corporation, “The Porgera Joint Venture: Remedy Framework,” December 1, 2014,
http://www.barrick.com/files/porgera/Porgera-Joint-Venture-Remedy-Framework-Dec1-2014.pdf, accessed March 21, 2015
43 Barrick Gold Corporation, “Background: A Framework of Remediation Initiatives in Response to Violence Against Women
in the Porgera Valley,” October 22, 2015, http://www.barrick.com/files/porgera/Porgera-Backgrounder-Framework-of-
remediation-initiatives.pdf, accessed March 20, 2015.
44 Ibid.
45 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Re: Allegations regarding the Porgera Joint Venture remedy framework,”
letter, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/LetterPorgera.pdf, p. 6.
46 United Nations, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,”
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, p. 17.
30
47 Karen McVeigh, “Canada Mining Firm Compensates Papua New Guinea Women After Alleged Rapes,” The Guardian, April
3, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/03/canada-barrick-gold-mining-compensates-papua-new-guinea-
women-rape, accessed March 20, 2016.
48 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Re: Allegations regarding the Porgera Joint Venture remedy framework,” p. 7.
49 Porgera Joint Venture Remedy Framework, December 1, 2014, Appendix E.
50 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Re: Allegations regarding the Porgera Joint Venture remedy framework,” p. 7.
51 Barrick Gold Corporation, “Background: A Framework of Remediation Initiatives in Response to Violence Against Women
in the Porgera Valley.”
52 Barrick Gold Corporation, “Human Rights Compliance Program,” http://www.barrick.com/files/governance/Barrick-
Human-Rights-Compliance-Program.pdf, accessed March 20, 2015.
53 Barrick Gold Corporation, “Modern Mining Includes the World Around Us,”
http://www.barrick.com/responsibility/default.aspx, accessed March 20, 2015.
54 Sinclair Dinnen, Law and Order in a Weak State.
56 Human Rights Watch, “Gold’s Costly Dividend.”
57 “Neighborhood Watch: How the Restoring Justice Initiative Addresses Law and Order Challenges in the Porgera District,”
Barrick Beyond Borders website, http://barrickbeyondborders.com/people/2014/11/neighborhood-watch-how-the-
restoring-justice-initiative-addresses-law-and-order-challenges-in-the-porgera-district/, accessed March 22, 2015.
31

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9-315-108

REV: AUGUST 11, 2020

Putting the Guiding Principles into Action: Human

— Aaron Regent, CEO Barrick Gold, 2009–2012

Mining in Papua New Guinea

— Corporate Watch, February 2007, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14381

The Porgera Gold Mine

Cathy Delaney, a senior HR employee at Barrick, said:

We had to respond—it was a matter of the type of company we wanted to be. My

The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

Achieving significant progress . . . would require moving beyond the Mandatory-vs.-

The Remediation Process

Developing New Policies and Procedures

A recent local initiative—called “Restoring Justice”—seemed to provide a promising way forward.

He could think of few problems that were more important.

HDI Human Life Mean Expected Gross EIU EIU Rule of

Exhibit 2a Barrick Gold Financial Highlights, 2011–2014

Revenues 10,239 12,527 14,394 14,236

Gold production (000s oz.) 6,249 7,166 7,421 7,676

Average realized gold price/ounce1 1,265 1,407 1,669 1,578

Copper production (Mlbs) 436 539 468 451

Exhibit 2b Barrick Gold Financial Highlights, 2008–2010

a) (In millions of US dollars, except per

Sales 10,924 8,136 7,613

Gold production (000s oz.) 7,765 7,397 7,657

Copper production (Mlbs) 368 393 370

Source: Barrick Gold Annual Report 2010, p. 5.

Exhibit 2c Barrick Stock Price, February 2005–February 2015

Source: Datastream, accessed March 2015.

Exhibit 3 The Porgera Gold Mine

Source: Wikimedia Commons, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9d/Porgera_Gold_Mine.JPG.

Exhibit 4 Average Yearly Gold Prices, 1969–2014

Source: London Gold Bullion Market Historical PM Gold Fix, http://www.goldprices.com/historical-gold-prices.htm.

Exhibit 5 Summary of Gold Mineral Reserves and Mineral Resources

For the years ended December 31 2014 2013

Tonnes Grade Ounces Tonnes Grade Ounces

Exhibit 5 (continued) Summary of Gold Mineral Reserves and Mineral Resources

1. Operational/logistical changes implemented or to be implemented within the PJV Asset

• Review of security personnel shift pattern to mix the compositions of patrols;

• Identification and implementation of integration strategies with Community Affairs (such as

• Installation of additional lighting on portions of the fence perimeter

2. Supervision/oversight changes implemented or to be implemented regarding APD personnel

• Hiring of additional female APD staff members;

• Daily presentation to management with corresponding trespasser numbers, times, and

• Sector patrols implemented with Sector Commanders/Supervisors reporting on activities

• Investigations group engaged on every occasion an illegal minor or trespasser is found to be

3. Structural/reporting changes to APD implemented or to be implemented:

• Establishment of off-site reporting to country or regional management by the investigations

• Implement formal security/risk assessment process and audit protocol;

• Additional diversity and leadership training for APD management.

4. Policy/procedural changes implemented or to be implemented:

Exhibit 7 United Nations Global Compact

Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;

Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and

Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;

Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and

Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

Source: United Nations Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.

Source: Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Operational-level mechanisms should also be:

20 Human Rights Watch, “Gold’s Costly Dividend.”

49 Porgera Joint Venture Remedy Framework, December 1, 2014, Appendix E.