Paul A. Tharp Jr. (Eds.) - Regional International Organizations - Structures and Functions (1971, Palgrave Macmillan) (10.1007 - 978!1!349-01303-6) - Libgen - Li

Regional International Organizations I Structures
and Functions
Editor
Paul A. Tharp Jr.
Regional International
Organizations I Structures
and Functions
Palgrave Macmillan
Copyright © 1971 by St. Martin's Press
All rights reserved
For information, write:
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.10010
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:
ISBN 978-1-349-01305-0 ISBN 978-1-349-01303-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-01303-6
To my mother
Martha Mason Tharp
AFF1LIATED PUBUSHERS: Macmillan & Company, Limited, London-also at Bombay, Calcutta,

Madras and Melbourne; The Macmillan Company of Canada, Limited, Toronto.
PREFACE
In this age of rapid and sometimes frightening change, it taxes the abilities of both
the layman and the social scientist to keep abreast of domestic and international
political developments. This book offers a brief introduction to the political processes
of several regional international organizations, which collectively represent one of
the most significant and unheralded changes in international politics since 1945.
For more than four centuries the world political system has been structured along
the lines of the nation-state; and in the last two decades the number of nation-states
has more than doubled. Nevertheless, many observers feel that the nation-state is
being replaced by more inclusive, transnational political associations arising out of
both regionalism and the universal, international organizations of the United Nations
system.
The last twenty-five years have witnessed a fantastic increase in the number of
international organizations. The United Nations system has grown to an organization
of almost two dozen major agencies and development programs in addition to the
parent institutions of the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social
Council, Trusteeship Council, World Court, and the office of the Secretary-General.
Before World War II the Pan American Union and the British Commonwealth only
could be considered major international organizations outside of the League of
Nations framework. Now more than twenty major regional, intergovernmental,
organizations collectively embrace every continent, every major racial and ethnic
grouping, every ideological position, and every status of economic development.
In addition to the major organizations themselves, numerous subgroups within many
of them have formed associations of their own. Furthermore, literally hundreds of
private international associations have been formed in recent years to express the
growing interests and concerns of private persons and groups in the conduct of world
politics.
The proliferation of international organizations does not indicate the immediate
demise of the nation-state. We can say, however, that these developments in the
world political system indicate a movement toward forms of political, economic, and
social development that transcend national boundaries. We may be witnessing a
process of political evolution as profound as the change from feudalism to the nation-
state that occurred in Europe several centuries ago.
The evolution of international organizations is, to be sure, gradual. Even with the
rapid pace of change in today's world, it may take generations to move from the
nation-state system to some other form of political structure. Moreover, many inter-
national organizations, both regional and universal, will fail and disappear in the
coming years, as happens in any evolutionary change.
In other words, the current forms of regional and universal international organi-
zations mark the beginning of fundamental changes in world politics. We cannot
predict the final form this evolutionary process will assume, but we can note its
inception. Although some of the organizations treated in this book may disappear,
they are proper subjects for our analysis now.
This book was planned for use in junior- and senior-level courses in contemporary
international relations, general international organizations, the United Nations (as a
supplementary text), and in specific courses on regionalism (as either a main or a
supplementary text) .It would also be useful in similar courses at the graduate level.
No attempt has been made to update the articles reprinted here; changes, properly
indicated, have been made in the texts or notes only where some clarification was
required.
I wish to express my thanks to the authors and copyright holders of the various
articles and selections for their permission to include this material in the present
anthology. And particular thanks are due to Mrs. Patricia Berko Wild for "Radicals
and Moderates in the Organization of African Unity: Origins of Conflict and Bases
for Coexistence"; and to Dr. Richard D. Baker for "Latin American Economic Inte-
gration." Both of these essays were written especially for this volume.
I also want to thank Mrs. Geri Rowden of the Oklahoma University Political
Science Department staff for her invaluable assistance in preparing this manu-
script.
Paul A. Tharp Jr.
Norman, Oklahoma
Contents
PREFACE v
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 1
Interest articulation and aggregation 2
Socialization 4
Rule making 5
Rule adjudication 7
Conclusion 8
CHAPTER II
INTEREST ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION 10
Interest group activities in the EEC I Leon N. Lindberg 11
Bureaucratic political activism in LAFTA I Ernst B. Haas and
Philippe C. Schmitter 21
Radicals and moderates in the OAU I Patricia Berko Wild 36
CHAPTER Ill
SOCIALIZATION 51
An end to European integration? I Ronald lnglehart 52
Political culture and integration in Southeast Asia I Werner
Levi 73
Political culture and integration in Scandinavia I Amitai
Etzioni 81
CHAPTER IV
RULE MAKING 93
The rule-making system of the European Community I Leon N.
Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold 94
The rule-making system of the OAS I Ann Van Wynen Thomas and
A. J. Thomas, Jr. 109
ReformoftheOAS 1 William Manger 141
COMECON: The institutional structure I Andrzej Korbonski 152
CHAPTER V
RULE ADJUDICATION 160
Rule adjudication and integration in the European community I
Stuart A Scheingold 161
The organization of African unity and the Algerian-Moroccan border
conflict I Patricia Berko Wild 182
CHAPTER VI
A SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 200
Economic integration in Central and West Africa I Bahram
Nowzad 201
Latin American economic integration I Richard D. Baker 230
Common defense considerations and integration in Southeast Asia I
Bernard K. Gordon 243
United States policy toward regional organization I Joseph S.
Nye 254
SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS 273

Regional International Organizations I Structures
and Functions
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
To present several different regional organizations in a common framework, this

book uses a simplified and modified version of the structural-functional approach
of Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell that was developed for the comparative
study of the political institutions of nation-states. 1 Although the regional systems
to be examined in this book are underdeveloped in comparison with the elaborate
governing structures found in modern nation-states, the same processes of political
interaction analyzed in the Almond and Powell framework can be identified and
studied with regard to these regional systems. The processes examined in the essays
collected here are interest articulation and aggregation, socialization, rule-making,
and rule-adjudication. 2
The functional approach begins with the concept of human society as a system of
behavior. 3 A given political unit, whether it be a city, nation-state, or international
organization, is seen as an organic entity having certain structures that order or limit
the social, economic, and political relationships among the human members of that
society. These structures may be formal political institutions, such as courts and legis-
latures, or social institutions such as class, caste, or family relationships. These struc-
tures are related to each other in a complex web of interactions which, taken as a
whole, is referred to as a social system of behavior. To maintain the existence of the
system as a whole, the structural mechanisms of the system must perform certain
functions through a complex mode of division of labor. A social-political system must
react to the pressures generated within its population and must formulate public
policies that respond to these pressures if it is to maintain itself in a state of equilibrium
or homeostasis. Of course, each different system has its particular style of governing.
A democratic political system may more often respond to pressures by granting, within
limits, the demands that are pressed. Totalitarian societies may more often respond
in a repressive manner in order to maintain the system within the rigid boundaries
established by the ruling elite. But obviously no totalitarian system is totally repressive
and no democratic system is totally permissive. Moreover, there are numerous grada-
tions between these extremes. Yet every system must perform the same functional
steps; it is the different methods of doing so that result in the diversity of governing
styles.
INTEREST ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION

A political system has been characterized as the authoritative source of the allocation
of values for a society. 4 This simply means that a political system is the focal point for
the distribution of wealth, power, and status for members of the society. Since men are
2 REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/STRUCTURES AND FUCTIONS
not all alike, different groups of people wishing different patterns of distribution can
be found in all societies. Even in today' s most monolithic society, Communist China,
there exist competing power groups.
The phrase "interest articulation and aggregation" refers to the general process by
which demands of various groups are formulated and transmitted to the political
system for action. For the most part we think of interest groups only in terms of labor
unions, business or professional associations, or other affiliations composed of private
(non-governmental) individuals. But such associations are not always private in na-
ture. The governing structures of the political system contain officials who identify
with, indeed may formally belong to, these groups. In the United States interest groups
usually do not rigidly ally themselves with a political party although some of their
leaders may serve in the government under a particular party label. In the political
systems of Europe, Mrica, Asia and Latin America interest groups are often directly
allied with political parties. Moreover, it is not uncommon for a government to sponsor
or organize a major interest group, thus giving it semi-official status. This practice
is most obvious in the Sino-Soviet bloc but can also be found in far more democratic
states such as Mexico. Since the late 1930's associations representing functional
interests like labor, manufacturing and agriculture, have emerged within the PRI,
Mexico's dominant political party.
The study of interest articulation and aggregation in regional intergovernmental
organizations need not be limited to unions, business or professional societies. There
are also groups of states-often referred to as "blocs" or "factions" -representing
different political positions or "poles" within many organizations. In the Organization
of Mrican Unity, for example, several groups of states sharing similar value positions
can be identified. 5
The function of interest articulation and aggregation is performed through a com-
plex network of communications between the members of the interest groups and the
formal institutions of the government. This network serves two vital purposes. First
of all, the government cannot exist in a vacuum if it is to respond to pressures from the
whole system. But in addition, the network of interest associations facilitates the
function of socialization that is to be discussed shortly. The network may promote a
sense of personal identification between the individual member of the political system
and the values and goals of the system as a whole, as manifested in the policies of the
rule-makers. By means of the network the governing officials can manipulate impor-
tantslogans and symbols to mobilize support for the general maintenance of the system
or to exhort popular effort for achieving systemic goals.
For the observer of any social system, its interest group structures and activities
provide information about the nature of that system. First, the mode of interaction
between private members of the system and the governing authorities will tell us
something about the extent of democratic participation. Second, the scope, nature,
and intensity of interest group activities may serve as indicators of the degree of private
identification with and support for the government in particular, and the system as
a whole. But caution must be exercised with regard to the last point. In many systems
interest group activity is not permitted, or is subjected to party or governmental con-
trol, or is conducted on a very informal, face-to-face basis within the confines of some
INTRODUCTION 3
ruling class or elite structure. Despite these difficulties, theorists of political integra-
tion study interest articulation and aggregation for clues to the extent of private identi-
fication with a given political system.
The growth of viable interest group structures in international organizations is
facilitated bythepresenceofthreefactors. One, in each member state of the organiza-
tion there should exist a number of well-organized interest associations representing
a wide range of moderately specialized business, labor, agricultural, and professional
interests. Two, these associations should be able to search out and combine with their
exact counterparts in the other states of the organization in order to form transnational
interest associations of the same type as each domestic group. Three, the interests
represented by the various domestic groups should not be too similar; there should be
some diversity in interests and activities between members of the same transnational
interest association. This last point may be crucial. Destructive, competitive rivalries
often result from situations where persons, already suspicious of each other due to
previous nationalistic antagonisms, must compete with their foreign counterparts
for a limited share of exactly the same market. This is the situation facing the devel-
oping countries of the world whose economies are based upon supplying raw food-
stuffs and mineral resources to the industrial systems of the United States and Western
Europe. Ideally, similar national groups within a regional setting should be able to
exchange goods, services and political support among themselves; they should com-
plement each other's needs. For example, if there existed a growing electronics in-
dustry in several states of the organization, it would be ideal if the electronics firms
in state A produced tubes and transistors, the manufacturers in state B produced
turntables and speakers, and the companies in state C were adept in the assembling
and marketing of these component parts as stereo sets.
Unfortunately, this type of interest group environment does not yet exist outside
of the developed areas of the world. Many observers feel that the success of regional
developments in Afro-Asia or Latin America will depend upon the ability of-interest
group leaders in these areas to transcend their own fears and limitations of their polit-
ical environment in order to create viable transnational associations.
SOCIALIZATION
Reduced to its simplest terms, the concept of socialization refers to the process of
inculcating individual members of the system with the values of the social system.
Individuals are induced to identify with and give their political loyalties to the system
asawholeandtherulingauthoritiesinparticular. Thisiscrucialtoallpoliticalsystems,
whether they be democratic, totalitarian or authoritarian. Even in systems where
the mass population is apathetic or has been coerced into loyalty, there may be several
competing elite groups, or factions within a single elite, which, if alienated from the
system, can force severe disturbances to develop.
Socialization is performed at different levels of individual cognition and by different
appeals. The ideologies of capitalism and communism appeal to the economic well-
being of the individual member. Other appeals, such as patriotism, religious, cultural,
and ethnic ties are more subjective but can be exceedingly effective.
For at least two reasons, the function of socialization may be even more crucial to
4 REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS
the success or failure of international organizations than it is to the continued existence

of nation-state systems. First-with the probable exception of the Communist Bloc
organizations-regional and universal international organizations are voluntaristic
in nature. The organizations possess little coercive force either to bring new members
into the association or to enforce the will of the system. Second, the international
organization movement is trying to bring about a shift in loyalties from a weB-en-
trenched mode of political organization, the nation-state, to vague and uncertain
substitutes at the international level.
The process of socialization may be aided by structural arrangements within the
political system per se. For example, in both the European Community and the Nordic
Council conscious efforts have been made by the organizations to increase the migra-
tion of people between member states, to allow for the more efficient use of man-
power. Common social security and workmen's compensation benefits, and the aboli-
tion of stringent passport and visa laws represent attempts to facilitate such migration.
Increased personal, daily interaction of private citizens may result in the destruction
of parochial loyalties and antagonisms and the development of transnational identifi-
cation congruent with the values and goals of international integration.
The migration technique is probably more effective in shifting loyalties and atti-
tudes at the level of the mass public. Other structural devices are more conducive
to elite involvement. Again, the European Community provides an example. The
Court of Justice of the European Community has the authority to hear pleas from
private individuals and corporate entities in certain types of cases. This is a significant
departure from traditional international legal practice, wherein only states had
standing to sue. If personal participation in the system is related to eventual identifi-
cation with the system, then this provision of the law of the European Community is
important for two reasons. First, since such pleas may be directed against the political
authorities of the Community and the member states, private groups gain an addi-
tional avenue of participation in the overall decision-making process of the Com-
munity. 6 Second, this may give individual persons a feeling of "legitimacy" Vis-a-vis
the system. By legitimacy, we mean the development of the attitude that the system
itself is equitable and responsive to the needs of the individual and that the aggrieved
party has the opportunity to receive justice at the hands of the system.
Thus socialization has a broad functional role to play based on diverse appeals, and
is performed by many different structures within the system. Fidelity to the values and
goals of the system may be induced through objective (economic) or subjective (re-
ligious, ethnic) appeals; the development of closer interpersonal relationships within
the general population of the system; and the creation of a sense of legitimacy for the
system itself. The function is performed by government structures, by the interest
articulation and aggregation network, and by diverse cultural agents such as the
schools, churches and fraternal organizations.
RULE MAKING
Basic human relationships are complex enough to require some degree of structural
regulation in the form of laws and norms. In primitive, non-hierarchical political
systems, of which international politics is an example, there are virtually no formal
INTRODUCTION 5
rule-making structures. Rules are arrived at through custom or the ad hoc arrange-
ments among individuals. The defects of this type of system are obvious: The content
of the rules is vague and may vary according to time and place of application; and the
rules may be slow to change or, at the other extreme, may alter immediately at the
will of a strong member of the society or upon an extraordinary event.
When formal rule-making structures are established, either by consent of the gov-
erned or by the unilateral assumption of power by an individual or a group, several
changes in the nature of the rules may be observed. First, the rules become public;
there now exists an authoritative source from which members of the system can as-
certain the content of the rules and note which norms of behavior will be enforced by
the governing structures of the system and which (like "rules of etiquette" or social
conventions) will not. Second, the content and subsequent application of the rules
become standardized. Third, a process is established whereby the rules may be
changed and these changes made public. 7
These distinctions between primitive, non-hierarchical systems and systems with
some form of structured, rule-making apparatus are not the only ones we can note.
In structured, rule-making systems there are differences between organizations
operating on confederal principles and those based on a more centralized form of
government, such as federal or unitary systems.
Traditionally, international organizations have been based on confederal prin-
ciples.
1. The rules formulated by the organization represent unanimous or near-unani-
mous consensus of the members. 8
2. While, legalistically, one may argue the contrary, the members retain the free-
dom of action to leave the organization and to revoke their consensus to the existing
rules.
3. Even if a state remains in the organization, it may assert the right to interpret
unilaterally the rules to which it has consented.
4. The executive-bureaucratic structure of the organization is given little or no
power to formulate and implement rules.
5. Delegates to the rule-making structures are instructed by their states as to the
manner in which they should perform rather than acting as independent representa-
tives.
6. The organization has no direct relationship with private citizens of the member
states.
In other words, the entire rule-making, enforcement and interpretation process
is dominated by the individual states. The members of a confederal system retain
a freedom of action -limited only by a member's power to impose its will on others-
similar to the range of behavioral discretion possessed by members of primitive, un-
structured systems.
Of the existing international organizations, only the European Community clearly
represents an example of an organization which has a rule-making system more
centralized than a confederal system. Yet we cannot specify the exact degree of cen-
tralization of the European Community. The Council of Ministers is clearly confederal
in nature. The voting rules still preserve the requirement of a high degree of consensus
before major policies will be adopted. On the other hand, the Commission and Court,
with their limited rule-implementation powers, represent a step in the direction of
federalism. Therefore, the term "supranational" has come into use to describe a state
of centralized decision-making greater than a confederal system but less than a full
federal system.
Unfortunately, a legalistic analysis of the treaty which establishes a given organiza-
tion presents an inaccurate picture of the degree of centralization of that organization.
The best but most difficult procedure to determine the system's integrative status is
to study it in action. It is especially important to observe the executive-bureaucratic
structure of an organization. Is this structure granted the authority to formulate and
implement major policies within a general framework established by the member
states? Does the selection and tenure process give the organization's officials a sig-
nificant degree of freedom from interference from the member state governments?
Do these officials have a major voice in the expenditure of funds?
These questions are vague and the criteria for measuring the evidence gathered
through their analysis are not exact. However, these and similar questions are the
necessary preliminaries to more exact analysis of the structural integration of the
rule-making process in emerging international regional organizations. 9
RULE ADJUDICATION
The rule-adjudication function refers to the authoritative interpretation of the rights
and duties of the system's members under the laws of the system. This is a function
usually performed by impartial, judicial agencies such as courts of law and panels
of arbitration.
From one point of view, the rule-adjudication function is simply an extension of the
rule-making function, rather than a separate function of the system's governing
structures. This is a valid position in the sense that nearly all court interpretations
modify existing law to some degree, which is a natural result of constant refinement
and application of the law to new, specific situations. At times the process of modifi-
cation is not gradual. Some courts exhibit a willingness to actively participate in policy-
making by announcing decisions that may drastically alter the existing law. The be-
havior of the United States Supreme Court since 1954 is an example. Also, one might
argue that, since laws are expressed in words and words are often imprecise, a law is
an unknown factor until it has been given content through judicial interpretation.
Despite the above arguments, rule adjudication can be analytically regarded as a
separate systemic function, though closely related to rule-making. Rule-making
structures are politically partisan in nature. The framework of the system's rules may
vary widely as a result of interactions between competing groups in the rule-making
structure. In other words, rule-making structures exist to make changes in the rules
on the basis of shifting, competing political forces. 10
Judicial structures exist to preserve and enforce rules of behavior and to provide
continuity for the future through the act of applying old laws to new situations.
Although, as mentioned above, court interpretations usually involve some modifica-
tion of the law, the basic purpose of interpretation is to use existing law to settle a
INTRODUCTION 7
specific case and to establish rights and duties for the future under that law. In addi-
tion, the concept of judicial impartiality precludes-in theory at least-the type of
partisan considerations involved in the creation of rules. Nor is judicial impartiality
simply a slogan of abstract morality. It will be recalled from the discussion of sociali-
zation that the concept of an impartial legal system can be a crucial factor in creating
a sense of legitimacy about the political system as a whole.
Again, it is possible to note different ways in which the function of rule-adjudication
may be performed.'' First, arbitration is the settlement of disputes through the
medium of a panel of judges (or a single judge in some instances) selected by the parties
to the dispute and the decision in the case is based on a legal framework formulated
by the parties in advance of the legal proceedings. Although the parties are free to
negotiate the general rules upon which their case will be decided, international
custom and conventions require that the litigants be consistent with existing laws
generally applicable to their type of case. Second, formal adjudication is the submis-
sion of disputes to a regularly constituted court to be resolved on the basis of existing
procedural and substantive rules as applied by that court. Unlike the panel of arbitra-
tors, a regularly constituted court of law is composed of judges who are appointed
through an institutional process outside of the direct control of the litigant parties.
In arbitration, the parties can manipulate the framework of the laws before their case
is heard; in formal adjudication the parties accept the existing framework as estab-
lished by prior legislative or judicial actions.
Both methods of performing the adjudication function have the following features
in common: The parties submit their disputes to a third-party agent for an objective,
impartial treatment of the conflict; and the third-party agent is granted the right,
though not necessarily the power of enforcement, to render an authoritative judg-
ment, based on a review of the law and facts applicable to the case, in favor of one of
the parties. The judgment need not be totally in favor of one party over the other.
Arbitral panels, in particular, may be given, or assume, the discretion to formulate
compromise decrees in an effort to reconcile the extreme demands or feelings of the
parties. A similar result can be reached in the more formal process of adjudication by
recourse to principles of equity to soften the impact of the rigorous application of the
law.
Therefore, the essential difference between the two modes of rule adjudication is
that arbitration is quite flexible while formal adjudication is more structured. Arbitra-
tion is a compromise betweenrule-makingandrule adjudication. It permits each party
to minimize his potential losses or his opponent's gains through the selection of judges
and rules oflaw to be applied. Arbitration is consistent with the practices of primitive,
unstructured systems andconfederalorganizations. Formal adjudication is associated
with more centralized forms of government.
Again, these theoretical distinctions are not easy to separate in practice. For exam-
ple, the International G:JurtofJustice, a formal agency of adjudication associated with
the United Nations, retains some aspects of arbitral behavior. Judges of the G:Jurt are
selected with the purpose of maintaining a rough geographical and ideological balance
on the G:Jurt. Moreover, there are provisions allowing parties before the World G:Jurt
-as it is commonly called-to select a limited number of judges of their own choosing
to participate in that particular case. Finally, as will be seen in the selection by Profes-
sor Scheingold, courts of formal adjudicationcanmanipulateinterpretationsofthelaw
and apply rules of equity to arrive at compromise decisions very similar to those of
arbitral panels.
CONCLUSION
I have tried in this essay to convey a sense of change in the pattern of international
politics which has become increasingly noticeable since 1945. This change is the rapid
growth of all types of international organizations. While much of our attention has
been focused on the United Nations system of organizations, this book is an effort to
examine some of the less heralded but extremely important developments in inter-
national regionalism. The functional approach outlined above is designed to serve
two purposes. First of all, this approach permits a unified study of the decision-making
processes and structural characteristics of several, diverse organizations. Secondly,
these functions are also criteria by which we can measure the current state of and
future prospects for political integration in these organizations.
1 GabrielA Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1966).
• Other functions, such as rule application, recruitment, and political commwrication, were not included
because representative materials outside of the European area are lacking. It seemed preferable to use
functional categories whereby several regional organizations could be compared.
• David Easton was one of the first political scientists to apply systems analysis to political life and today
remainsoneoftheforemost theorists in this field. Aimngbis various writings, I find the following to be most
usefulasanintroduction to the concept of systems theory: David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965).
• This now famous and widely accepted definition of a political system was formulated by Easton and
explained at length in his first major work, The Political System (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1953); also
see Easton, A Framework, pp. 47~7.
5 This will be somewhat apparent in the article by Mrs. Wild, which appears in this book in the chapter on
interest articulation. Numerous studies of factions within regional and wriversal international organizations
areappearingnow. Some examples are: 'Thomas Hovet, ]r.,Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960); Robert Owen Keohane, "The Framework of Influence," International
Conciliation, No. 557 (March1966); BranislavGosovic, "UNCI'AD: North-South Encounter," International
Conciliation, No. 586 (May 1968); 'Thomas B. Millar, "The Commonwealth and the United Nations," Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 16 (1962), pp. 736-757; and Arthur Lall, "The Asian Nations and the United
Nations," International Organization, Vol. 19 (1965), pp. 728-748.
• A very comprehensive review of the jurisdiction and case law of the European Court of Justice may be
found in the two-volwne work by D. G. Valentine, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (2
Vols.; London: Stevens and Sons, 1965). For a shorter, political science-oriented approach to the Court
see Werner Feld, The Court of the European Communities, New Dimension in International Adiudication
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).1ndividuals and business enterprises do not possess an all-embracing
privilege to sue member state governments or the various authorities of the Commwrities. The appeals pro-
cess is a tortuous labyrinth of complex jurisdictional rules. Nonetheless the mere fact that private persons
or corporations possess any power to challenge national and supranational political authority through a
judicial system is in itself a major development in international relations.
7 A more detailed analysis of the political-legal consequences of the shift from an unstructured to a struc-
tured system may be found in R L.A. Hart, TJie Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 77-
120.
• In practice, the unanimity principle is modified by most organizations. Certain problems may be desig-
natedasproceduralandrequireonlya simple majority. Other common schemes for voting include the use of
weighted majorities-two-thirds, three-quarters majorities, etc. -and in some cases dissenting states may
be excused from taking certain actions agreed upon by the others in the organization.
INTRODUCTION 9
9 A succinct listing and review of the criteria for distinguishing between confederal and federal types of
systems may be found in Ernest Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1958), pp. 32-59.
10 Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach in their book, The Political Foundations of Inter-
national Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961 ), pp. 3-29, discuss the differences between rule making
and rule adjudication in more detail.
11 The similarities and dissimilarities of arbitration and formal adjudication may be seen in Gerhard von
Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 461-481.
CHAPTER II
INTEREST ARTICULATION AND

AGGREGATION
Leon N. Lindberg
Interest group activities in the EEC
Professor Lindberg demonstrates how closely the pluralistic environment

of the European Common Market approaches the optimal model of interest
groupinteractiondiscussedinChapteri.Aiso,themainthrustofthisselection
is to point out the noticeable increase in interest group activity of a trans-
national nature during the formative years of the Common Market. Attention
is particularly called to the different ways in which these groups attempt to
influence the process of decision-making in both the member-state govern-
mentsandtheorgansoftheEEC,andtolindberg'sdiscussionofthepossible,
crucial shifts in loyalties of the relevant elites toward the supranational orga-
nization.
Economic integration will lead to political integration only if it involves matters of

immediate concern to significant elites, i.e., if it involves some marked change in the
conditions of their environment. This principle has already been established with
respect to political elites, and we have seen how the Treaty of Rome has affected the
governmentaldecision-makersofthesixMember States: how the distinction between
foreign policy and domestic policy has begun to break down, and how a Community
view has begun to develop. A similar change is taking place among socio-economic
elites, and the purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the extent to which
economic interest groups have restructured their expectations and their activities in
response to the changed conditions of their environment.
We expect to find two major patterns of reaction: on the one hand, measures of
adjustment taken by firms, or groups of firms, to adapt to the changes in competitive
conditions broughton by the institution of a Common Market, and, on the other hand,
changes in political organization and tactics to adjust to the fact that new decision-
making centers are being created. Developments in both these areas have far ex-
ceeded expectations.
MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT
At the level of the firm, the Common Market has been accepted as an imminent reality.
The main preoccupation of most firms, large and small, in all sectors of the economy
and in each Member State, is with programs of rationalization and investment de-
signed to prepare for the coming of the Common Market. 1 Its impact is revealed in two
major trends: first, in the internal policy of firms, and, second, in structural changes
affecting the relationship between firms. 2
From: Tlw Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, by Leon N. Lindberg, pp. 94-103,
© 1963 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Reprinted with the permission
of the publishers, Stanford University Press.
11
Internal policy
The purpose of the first set of reactions was to prepare for the coming of the Common
Market by improving competitive positions and lowering costs by means of a rational-
ization of production methods, a redistribution of work, increased specialization,
etc. There is a new urgency in the area of technical research and an ever-increasing
concern with the training of staff, especially in modem management techniques and
in marketing. 3 Several new schools of business administration (patterned after the
Harvard Business School) have been set up for the specific purpose of training "Euro-
pean" executives. Business and commerical groups have shown great interest in the
question of harmonizing laws concerning incorporation and the rights of companies.
Because this is a long-range affair at best, research has been concentrated upon the
possibility of creating a new type of company, constituted in such a way that it could
be incorporated under identical terms in each of the six countries. The [EEC] Commis-
sion has also shown interest in this area. 4
Elaborate preparations are being made in anticipation of increased exchanges of
products among the Six. According to one observer:
Business firms are establishing commerical networks of agents, distributors, and concession-
aires in the Community, which, if not yet active, are making preparations for the future con-
quest of markets. The newspapers in each of the Community countries are filled with publicity
concerning products manufactured elsewhere in the Community. All of this is new because
exporting firms were never sure in the past whether they were going to get import permits from
neighboring countries or not. Now they have an almost absolute guarantee that the import
policyoftheother countries of the Six will become more and more liberal as time goes on. Conse-
quently they are prospecting markets and organizing outlets to an extent which they would
never have considered a short while ago. 5
Investment programs are being undertaken to build plant and equipment designed
for a large market of 170 million. New factories and subsidiaries are being opened,
often in other countries of the Community. 6
Commercial publicity uses the Common Market as a sales argument, stressing
sales of products from the other Common Market countries, or using the argument
that the Common Market requires rationalization to sell equipment goods. 7 An
interesting example is the sales campaign of the Brussels department store "A 11nno-
vation," in which hundreds of products from the other Common Market countries
were sold at the prices that would prevail if all duties had disappeared in intra-Com-
munity trade. 8
Banks and other credit institutions have set up special services to advise businesses
about the problems and opportunities of the Common Market. Numerous syndicates,
such as the "Syndicat Euralliance" 9 and the "Syndicat Europeen d'Etudes et de
Financement" (Eurosyndicat), 10 have been formed by banks in several countries so
as to pool information and market research facilities, and to ensure collaboration in
the area of investments. Individual banks have made great efforts to increase their
capital reserves for investments both within the Six and in the Overseas Territories. 11
A large number of investment societies have been set up, both at the level of the Six
and in each country, specifically for the purpose of financing economic expansion in
the Common Market. 12 Alongside this expansion of investment from within the
Community, there is a marked increase of American investment in the Six. Taking
advantage of the Community's rapid rate of growth and of the fact that trade restric-
tions are likely soon to disappear, American firms are opening subsidiaries or build-
ing factories at an ever-increasing rate. According to a study of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, of326 American enterprises opened in Western Europe between 1958 andmid-
1960, 267 were in the Common Market and these especially in the chemical and
mechanical construction industries. 13
Structural changes
Two related structural transformations have taken place. First, there has been a
greatly accelerated rate of mergers and concentrations between firms at the national
level. 14 Newspapers, trade journals, and publications like Agence Europe regularly
publish long lists of such agreements, and examples galore might be cited. No statistics,
however, are available on their relative incidence, nor is it known to what extent they
may involve restrictions on trade such as price-fixing or market-sharing. 15
Second, the Common Market has also given rise to an ever-expanding network of
various kinds of agreements between firms of the several EEC countries: for the
coordination or specialization of production, for the utilization of common sales
organizations, for the creation of joint affiliates or new enterprises, and for the ex-
change of patents and technical information. 16
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

In terms of political activity, economic interest groups have continued to rely for the
most part on traditionally developed channels of access to national policy-making
centers. However, the volume of their contacts with administrators and parliamen-
tarians has greatly increased in direct relation to the extent to which their vital inter-
ests have been affected by provisions of the Treaty. 17 At the same time, however,
there has been widespread awareness that the establishment of the EEC and its cen-
tral institutional system poses new problems of access, that more and more decisions
would betaken in the context of a new decision-making system. Accordingly, national
interest groups have sought to organize at the level of the EEC, to develop regularized
contacts with their opposite numbers in the other Member States, and to seek access
to the new decision-making centers. As the Commission points out, "one of the most
striking signs that the various branches of the economy have become 'Europe-minded'
and that the markets of the six countries are becoming increasingly interlocked has
been the proliferation of professional, industrial, agricultural, commercial and crafts
associations in the countries since the Treaty of Rome was signed." 18
By late 1961, there were 222 regionally-organized economic interest groups,
all but a handful of which had been created since 1958. This did not include the
several groupings among the so-called "liberal professions." 19 The distribution is as
follows:
Industry 89 (excluding industries dealing with food and drink)

Commerce 42 (excluding trade in agricultural products)
Handicrafts 6 (including two groups related to industry and two related to trade)
Agriculture 82 (including trade in agricultural products and organizations of agri-
cultural workers)
Trade Unions 2 (excluding a large number of specialized groups)
Banking 1
Total 222
It is not possible here to analyze all these groups in detail. They vary in character
from groups meeting for sporadic round-table discussions or exchanges of view, to
legally-constituted associations with formal statutes and permanent secretariats.
They may be "peak" associations representing national confederations of industry
(UNICE, Union of Industries of the European Community), of trade (COCCEE,
Committee of Commercial Organizations in the Countries of the EEC), of farmers
(COPA, Committee of Agricultural Organizations of the EEC), of trade unions
(European Regional Organization of the ICCTU, the International Conference of
Christian Trade Unions, and the European SecretariatoftheiCFTU, the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions), of artisans (the Committee of Handicraft
Associations in the Six Countries of the EEC), of consumer cooperatives (the Commit-
tee of National Organizations of Consumer Cooperatives in the Common Market),
or of bankers (the Banking Federation of the European Community). Or they may
group together associations of special industries (mining, foodstuffs, beverages,
textiles, shoes, clothing, wood, leather, paper, rubber, chemical products, nonferrous
metals, foundries, mechanical and electrical equipment, construction, and electric
power), or of trade in the same products, or of workers in the various professional
internationals. 20 Agriculture is the most extensively organized, with 82 groups formed
at the EEC level: nine organizations of farmers, six of agricultural cooperatives, 36 in
agricultural foodstuffs industries, 27 in trade in agricultural products, three organi-
zations of workers, and one organization of consumer cooperatives. 21
These organizations may have large, highly competent secretariats with extensive
budgets, or they may maintain only a part-time secretary-general; they range from
organizations which can act independently and even take decisions that are binding
on their natural constituent federations or confederations, to organizations which only
collect and transmit information. Their stated purposes or goals are similar: to
establish a liaison between groups representing a given sector in the several countries
of the EEC, to promote the interests of their particular sector before the institutions
of the EEC (Commission, Council, Assembly, Permanent Representatives, ESC),
to do this by trying to achieve common positions on as wide a range of issues as possible,
to exchange information and make technical studies of problems faced by the sector
at the European level, to develop centralized statistical and documentary services,
and soon.
We have already seen that the Commission has encouraged the development of
these groups, actively fostering it, in fact, in the case of agriculture. 22 Contacts take
place on an irregular basis, at large-scale meetings or round tables. One such meeting
is described as follows:
In the industrial sector, a first exploratory meeting between the officials of the Onnmission's
staff and those of the European federations representing the various branches and those of the
UNICE took place on 20 December 1960. This meeting was devoted to the study of problems
related to the achievements and the prospects of the Common Market, to the development of
internal Community trade, to the external relations of the Community and to tax questions,
as well as to the problems raised by competition. . . . Exploratory meetings have taken place
with the trade organizations of the textile industry. Among the problems raised the accent has
been placed by the trade organizations on the disturbances in the market deriving from the
abnormal conditions of competition is certain non-member countries. . . . As far as crafts
and small industry are concerned . . . discussions bear on all the questions concerning the
work of craftsmen and, in particular, policy, statistics and the right of establishment in this
field. 23
Many of these groups channel a large proportion of their energies through the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, depending on whether or not it is currently occupied
with an issue affecting their interests. This has been particularly true of the trade
unions' and farmers' organizations in regard to the debates over a common agricul-
tural policy. Efforts have also been made, with apparently indifferent success, to
contact the Permanent Representatives and the Council; 24 accordingly, with regard to
the institutions representing the governments, most contacts take place through
regularized channels at the national level. In such cases the common position of the
regional group, if one has been reached, will be conveyed to the national Ministers
by representatives of the respective national member groups.
The sheer number of these groups and the scope of their activities are significant
indications of the extent to which economic interest groups have been "activated."
We have here a parallel development to that already traced at the level of national
administrators: Thousands of interest-group leaders from the six Common Market
countries are traveling to Brussels, are getting to know each other, are often engaged
in a process of trying to reach a compromise and take common positions. A regional
interest-group bureaucracy is being created, which already shows signs of develop-
ing a distinct vested interest in increasing its attributes vis-a-vis the national constit-
uent groups. Nevertheless, these regional groups will be of limited significance for
political integration unless participation in them comes to represent a fundamental
restructuring of expectations and tactics. To what extent have collective needs at the
regional level taken priority over national differences? Do the necessities of "inter-
nationallobbying" force compromises of initial positions? Do interest group officials
become more "Europe-minded"? Is all agreement between national groups purely
tactical or do groups seek to work out agreements on basic principles? Are conflicts
solved on the basis of the "lowest common denominator," "splitting the difference,"
or "upgrading common interests"? To what extent are the regional groups given actual
powers of initiative or decision?
No definitive answers can be given to such questions at this point. Most of these
groups have been in existence for only a few years. The vital interests of relatively few
are as yet directly affected by decisions of the Community institutions.
Preliminary indications reveal that as a general rule national considerations con-
tinue to shape the character of participation in these regional interest groups. Common
positions are reached when interests coincide, but otherwise decision-making is of the
lowest-common-denominator type, with final agreement rarely exceeding what the
least cooperative participant is willing to grant. Meetings of such groups resemble
the classical diplomatic conference between formally instructed delegates of sover-
eign entities. We would thus expect that the narrower the interests of a given group,
the more likely it would be to develop a significant cohesion at the regional level. For
example, the jute producers of the EEC are strongly united around their mutual inter-
est in excluding imports of jute from Pakistan. 25 Nevertheless, these groups are
undeniably a significant expression of a political adjustment to a new situation and a
de facto acceptance of that situation. As Haas concluded in reference to regionally
organized groups in the coal and steel industries, "while they have not made homo-
geneous groups of their affiliates, they nevertheless represent the political adjust-
ment to a regional governmental agency which is accepted as given, from whom
favours must be asked and advantages extracted, or whose policies must be opposed
'en bloc."' 26
Thus, such an organization as UNICE (Union of Industries of the European Com-
munity), made up of the peak industrial confederations in each country, has been es-
tablished in order "to create, maintain and develop ... the spirit and the bonds of
solidarity; to stimulate the working out of an industrial policy in a European spirit. " 27
Similarly, the aim of the Banking Federation of the European Community is "joint
action by the banking associations to facilitate attaining the European aims fixed by
the Treaty of Rome in the field of banking activities." 28 The existence of these groups
with permanent staffs, as well as the greatlyincreasednumberofinteractions between
interest-group leaders in a given sector, has led to the gradual development of at least
a preliminary procedural consensus. And, as Haas points out, "if a procedural consen-
sus prevails we may expect the members to be more responsive to one another than to
non-members. Even if they cannot agree on the substance of any policy, their mutual
responsiveness enables them to debate any issue and to view this assembly as a forum
for frank discussion and continuous communication." 29 Thus the members of UNICE
undertake to keep the Secretary-General of the organization informed and to consult
with each other prior to taking a position before any of the institutions of the Com-
munity. 30 They do this in the common realization that if they present conflicting po-
sitions, the EEC institutions would "have the choice of picking from the bouquet of
positions presented the most agreeable one." 31
Such a procedural consensus may already exist and have institutional expression.
This is the case with the two trade union associations which, in addition to a tradition
of internationalism, were already organized at the level of the Six to deal with the
ECSC. 32 Both have reorganized to accommodate the creation of the two new Commu-
nities (the EEC and Euratom). 33 However, the resulting organizations have not been
based on, nor given rise to, any wide-ranging substantive consensus. Neither the
European Organization of the ICCTU nor the European Secretariat of the ICFTU has
been given any significant powers of initiative or decision, and they serve as little more
than liaison bureaus. As the Secretary-General of the latter organization observed:
It is, moreover, very difficult to ask our governments to give up certain sovereign rights to Euro-
pean authorities when we ourselves continue to preserve our national trade union rights to such
a degree that one can speak only of trade union collaboration but in no way of trade union inte-
gration.... We find ourselves faced with the choice of losing on the European level what we
have won at the national level as regards rights of consultation and of codetermination, or of
leading our movement as a directing element in the battle for a free, prosperous, and united
Europe. 34
Nevertheless, a procedural consensus is well-developed in these two organizations,

and the regional secretariats are actively engaged in seeking to maximize the amount
of substantive consensus, thus creating the potential for a higher level of conflict
resolution.
One can expect that over time the necessity for lobbying will force groups to empha-
size collective needs rather than national differences. Such a development can be ex-
pected as the central institutions of the EEC become more active, as the types of actions
taken involve the harmonization oflegislation and the formulation of common policies
(rather than the negative process of eliminating barriers to trade), and as given groups
become aware that their interests can no longer be adequately served at the national
level alone. This can already be seen in the agricultural sector, which is the most highly
organized. The Commission had been engaged actively since mid-1958 in the elabo-
rationofits proposals for a common agricultural policy, envisaging the ultimate estab-
lishment of a single market and a single agricultural policy for the six countries. All
groups involved in agriculture-whether producers, distributors, workers, or con-
sumers-stand to gain or lose a great deal, and have actively sought to influence the
content of these proposals. Practically all the groups involved agree that there should
be a common agricultural policy, but all are concerned that it approximate their par-
ticular needs and desires as far as possible. Already one can detect a growing feeling
of solidarity among the farmers' organizations of the EEC (organized in COPA) as a
result of their long efforts to achieve a maximum common position and to influence
the Commission. COPA's decision to concentrate on trying to influence the ESC's opin-
ion on the Commission's agricultural proposals has forced them to negotiate inten-
sively inside the organization and to compromise with the trade union members in
opposition to business and industrial interests:
Both farmers' and farm workers' organisations have devoted attention to the work of the Com-
munity's Economic and Social Committee and its agricultural section. Many of the represen-
tatives attending COPA have also attended the meetings of the Agricultural Section, either as
official representatives or as "technical advisers" (who are permitted to speak but not to vote).
Through their participation in COPA, as well as through their earlier participation in the Euro-
pean Confederation of Agriculture and in the International Federation of Agricultural Pro-
ducers, the representatives of farmers'organisations have acquired considerable solidarity.
Over the draft proposals of the Commission, for example, they arrived at an agreement among
themselves on thegenerallinesoftheadviceto be given bytheESCtothe Commission and to the
Council of Ministers. After a compromise had been reached in the agricultural section between
the farmers' groups and the trade union group, the resulting statement was accepted, with only
a few amendments, by the full ESC by 72 votes to 19 (mainly by industrial representatives) ab-
stentions. . . . Tiris advice, although very general and vague, was mainly in support of the Com-
mission's draft proposals and reflected little of the criticisms of those proposals heard so fre-
quently among the member countries of the Community. 85
As a result of these activities, and in anticipation of the future, COPA has recently re-
organized in an effort to effect closer collaboration and set up a stronger central author-
ity.
A President and a Praesidium (one representative from each country) have been
established to flank the COPA Assembly and to provide the cohesion necessary to
strengthen the organization's voice before the Commission and in the Economic and
Social Committee. The Praesidium disposes of a certain amount of political initiative,
although major decisions still require unanimity. 36 The first President is Edmund
Rehwinkel, influential head of the Deutsche Bauemverband (DBV). It seems clear
that these organizational changes represent a recognition that the interests of agri-
culture can be adequately defended only by giving up a certain amount of national
autonomy.
Interesting also is COPA's success in establishing itself as the spokesman for the
interests of all agricultural producers. Most of the organizations at the regional level
that are grouped according to product (beets, hops, wine, etc.) have agreed to partici-
pate in COPA .Assembly meetings and to submit their position papers to COPA before
sending them to the Commission. Although the substantive consensus achieved to date
byCOPAis quite modest, a potentially significant procedural consensus is developing
rapidly. The meetings of the Assembly involve a frank and relaxed exchange of views
and seem to manifest a genuine desire to reach a maximum of agreement. Of some
interest was COPA's position on acceleration. The DBV was unalterably opposed to
acceleration, whereas it was supported by the others. Yet under the presidency of
Rehwinkel a compromise solution was found, which stated that "COPA does not op-
pose the principle of acceleration in spite of the particular difficulties it presents for
agriculture." 37
Of greater importance is the declaration of October 13, 1960, in which COPA ex-
pressed apprehension lest progress on a common agricultural policy be delayed or
called into question by de Gaulle's notion of an "Europe des patries." The organization
renewed its support for a "European" solution to the agricultural problem: "COPA
feels that the elaboration of a common agricultural policy cannot be effected on the
basis of a lowest common denominator of existing national policies, but that we must
develop a policy which is adapted to new common circumstances and which at the
same time assures tangible results to agricultural producers." 38
That this process of meeting together to hammer out common policies has what we
have called latent effects (the development of multiple perspectives, personal friend-
ships, a camaraderie of expertise) is readily attested to by COPA members. Such con-
sistent COPA participants as Edmund Rehwinkel of the DBV, Constant Boon of the
Belgian Boerenbond, Luigi Anchisi of the Italian Confederazione Nazionale Colti-
vatori Diretti, Georges Breart of the Assemblee Permanente des Presidents des
Chambres d'Agriculture (France), and Albert Genin and Pierre Halle of the FOO.era-
tion Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (France) are all influential in
their respective agricultural organizations. We may expect therefore that the orga-
nizational experiences at the regional level will affect national policy-making. As pro-
gress is made toward a common agricultural policy, this process will be accelerated.
TheConsultativeCommitteeswhichweresetupinl962,whenthefirstconcretemea-
sures of the common agricultural policy came into force, and which consist of repre-
sentatives of agricultural producers and of labor and commerce, will probably impose
upon these groups the need for still further internal coordination.
1 See the numerous examples cited by Malvestiti in EEC Commission, Bulletin, No. 3 (1959), pp. 5-17.
See also Hasbrouck, "Common Market at the Grass Roots."
2 SeeEECCommission,GeneralReportl960, p.131.
• De Vleeschauer.
• See Willemetz, pp. 38ff.; and ECIS, Communautes Europeenne, August-September 1960.
5 Ouin, in Stein and Nicholson, p. 168.
6 ECIS,Etudesetanalyses, No.16.
7 EEC Commission, General Report 1960, p. 130.
• Advertisement in Le Soir, January 3-4, 1960. An official of the store told me that the losses incurred
in these price reductions were shared equally by the store and by the various suppliers, all of whom were
anxious to get a foot in the Belgian economy.
• Groups:SocieteGeneraledeBelgique,AmsterdamscheBank,andtheDeutscheBank.See"LesBanques
et Les Bourses dans le Marche Commun," in ECIS, Communaute Europeenne, December 1960.
10 Groups: Banque Lambert, MM. Rothschild Frires, Berliner Handels Gesellschaft, Ia Compagnie Fi-
nanciere, Pierson-Helding-Pierson of Amsterdam, Medrobanca (Milan), Ia Compagnie d'Outre-Mer, and
Bayerische Staatsbank. Ibid.
11 E.G., La Compagnie de l'Outre-Mer, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credit Lyonnais, etc. For an exten-
sive list see ECIS, Etudes et analyses, No.I.
12 E.G., Eurunion, with capital of one billion Belgian francs, created by members of Eurosyndicat (see
note 11). Forextensivelistsof groups set up in each of the several countries, see citations in notes 10 and 11.
Also "Les Banques belges, grande industrie dans le MarcheCommun," Le Monde, April14, 1960.
18 "Investissements ammcains dans Ia Communaute," in ECIS, Communaute Europeenne, November
1960. Note the evolution in these figures on U.S. investment projects abroad (millions of dollars):
1959 1960 1961
EEC 157.3 269.2 355.5
Other European countries 222.0 231.7 295.2
Total world 934.7 1,126.5 1,304.3
14 Thistrendisencouraged by the governments concerned, especially in France, wheretaxreliefis given to
firms wishing to regroup with a view to combating Common Market competition, and especially for the pur-
poseof organizingexportsonajoint basis.Agence Europe, January 2, 1959.
15 See EEC Commission, Mouvements. One of the services of the Commission tries rather unsuccessfully
to keep up with these agreements by making lists of them as they occur. Long lists may be found in ECIS,
CommunauteEuropeenne, May,June, and July, 1960.
16 E.G.,notetheagreementsbetweenRenaultandAlfaRomeo,FiatandN.S.U.,PeugeotandMercedes-
Benz, Montecatini and Pechiney, etc. For long lists see citations in note 15. For the incidence of such mea-
sures,seeAgenceEurope, October 9, 1961,whichcites the followingestimatesfromastudyreleased by the
Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag: 880 affiliates created in other EEC countries; 610 agreements for
technical cooperation; and 480 agreements for participation in EEC firms.
17 Most interest groups have specialized departments and staffs who are charged with the responsibility
of following the work of the Community institutions, and of making contact with them and with the various
national Ministries concerned.
18 SeeEECCommission,Bulletin, No.4 (1961), p.ll.
19 Organizations exist at the EEC level among medical, paramedical, and pharmaceutical professions
(physicians, pharmacists, dentists, and veterinary surgeons); the legal profession (solicitors, tax consul-
tants, etc.); and the technical professions (engineers, consultant engineers, chemical engineers, architects,
chartered accountants, surveyors, and real estate agents). There is also a Standing Conference of the Cham-
bers of Commerce of the EEC countries and a workingpartyonEuropean Integration of the Union of Inter-
national Fairs. Ibid., p.13. SeealsoAgenceEurope, October9, 1961.
2° For a full listing of all groups with summary information on members and purposes (exclusive of trade
unions and agriculture), see EEC Commission, Repertoire des organismes communs.
21 EEC Commission, Bulletin, No.4 (1961), p. 14. For a listing of these groups see EEC Commission,
Repertoire des organisations agricoles.
22 "The European trade organizations are themselves a valuable instrument in the merging of the markets
and in co-operation across the national frontiers." EEC Commission, Bulletin, No. 4 (1961 ), p. 15.
23 EECCommission,Bulletin, No.4 (1961), pp.12-13.
24 See Stein, "The New Institutions," in Stein and Nicholson, p. 90.
25 There has been a similar development in the shoe industry, which has set up the "Comite de Liaisons
et d'Etudes de Ia Chaussure," a committee with statutes permitting majority decisions in policy matters.
Its aims are to present common opinions and to protect markets against third countries (especially Hong
Kong, India, and Japan). Caze, pp. 409-16.
26 Haas, Uniting of Europe, pp. 353-54.
27 UNICE, Statuts, Article 5.
28 Agence Europe, November 10, 1960.
29 Haas, Consensus Formation, p. 5.
30 UNICE, Statuts, Article 12.
31 Nagels, p. 446. Also quoted in Stein, "The New Institutions," in Stein and Nicholson, p. 84.
32 For details see Haas, Uniting ofEurope, pp. 355-89; Scheingold; Brouland; and Beever, pp. 93-204.
33 See Beever, pp. 70-77. Also Tessier, pp. 242-46.
34 Secretariat Syndical Europeen, "Rapport," p. 27.
35 Robinson, p. 136.
36 COPA, "Reglement interieur."
37 COPA, "Position de l'Assemblee du COP A."
38 COPA, "Declaration de l'Assemblee du COPA."
Ernst B. Haas
Philippe C. Schmitter
Bureaucratic political activism in LAFTA
In Latin America, as is the case in muchofthe rest of the developing countries,

private interest groups have not yet developed a web of organizations and
communications among themselves. Their perceptions of one another re-
main parochial and competitive.
However, Haas and Schmitter suggest that the lack of pluralistic interest
associations may be compensated for by a dynamic bureaucratic elite which
may be slowly developing in each of the member states. It is suggested that a
combination of coordinated national planning and more active political
leadership on the part of these Tecnicos may create a mood of integrative
behavior and patterns of interdependent relationships that will draw other
elites into the regional framework. One tactic already attempted along these
linesofbureaucraticleadershipin LAFTAwasthecreationofeconomic"sec-
tors" to function as forums in which the leaders of private businesses and
associations would be induced to coordinate their policies on a transnational
basis. The authors also demonstrate that some growth in transnational inter-
est group activities has occurred in LAFTA.
In the few pages preceding the opening of this excerpt, the authors review
the general history of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the
growth of inter-zonal trade in the early years of the organization. For addi-
tional background on LAFTA. see Dr. Baker's article, Chapter VI, infra.
REGIONAL INTEREST GROUPS

But perhaps of greater significance for the integration process is the rapid prolifer-
ation of regional pressure groups. Interests ranging from petrochemicals to canned
foods, from office equipment to wine, from iron and steel to paper have formed asso-
ciacionesorinstitutos, most with permanent headquarters in Montevideo, to "advise"
LAFTA on the liberalization of barriers and on the possibilities for concluding com-
plementarity agreements. Of these, only the Instituto Latino-americano del Fierro
y del Acero antedates the implementation of the Treaty [of Montevideo]. All the rest
have formed in response to the opportunity and/or threat of the new body of regional
obligations.
Many of these regional interest groups have been created as a consequence of the
From: The Politics of Economics in wtin American Regionalism: The wtin American Free Trode Asso-
ciationAfterFour YearsofOperotion, pp.l3-17 ,45-50,58-64, by Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter,
copyright © 1965 by the University of Denver and published herein by permission of the authors and the
University of Denver acting through the Graduate School of International Studies. The original may be
found, undertheabovetitle,in The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies
Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volumeill,Monograph#2, published by the UniversityofDenver,l965.
21
meetings of"economic sectors" called by the PECt.> in 1963. It is too early to estimate
whether these co-opted groups will attain a degree of corporate independence and
viability, or merely act as clearing houses for commercial transactions. The groups
which formed more or less spontaneously, however, have not hesitated to initiate pol-
icies and press demands on the PEC and Conference, although they have frequently
had difficulty in arriving at a common line of action. It took two meetings of the copper
producers to agree that all copper purchases should be made preferentially within
the Zona'!.>~.> on the basis of private agreements between suppliers and consumers, and
that only temporarily. Chilean copper refined outside the area should be considered
of zonal origin. 1 Iron and steel producers, in collaboration with ECLA'!.>- and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have been working on a complementarity
agreement, but to date have been unable to agree on a definite project. The continued
existence ofbilateral treaties covering steel products and the determination of certain
countries to embark on programs of self-sufficiency (notably Argentina) have not only
prevented the drafting of a complementarity agreement, but have blocked the grant-
ing of concessions in the annual national lists. The fourth Congress of the Instituto, in
fact, refused to go on record supporting the inclusion of iron and steel products in
LAFTA negotiations, as the Mexican delegation proposed, on the grounds that this
was strictly a matter of national policy. 2
LAFTA's most dynamic interest group has been the Latin American Association of
Shipowners (ALAMAR). After hammering out substantial internal differences-be-
tween Atlantic and Pacific Shippers over the location of its headquarters, between
large-tonnage andsmall-tonnagefirmsover voting arrangements, and between Brazil
and the rest over the nature of zonal preferences-ALAMAR presented the LAFTA
Advisory Committee on Transports with a lengthy declaraci6n de principios. The
declaration, which was incorporated almost without change in the Committee' sAnte-
proyecto de Convenio General, would reserve all except 10 per cent of zonal com-
merce to ships of LAFTA members, permit the establishment of bilateral quotas on
upto40 percent of mutual trade, promote harmonization of norms, guarantee equality
of treatment and establish a system of penalties for infractions. 3 In the face of such
self-conscious regional discrimination, North American shipping companies protested
strongly, even threatening reprisals. The United States Federal Maritime Commis-
sion and the State Department registered disagreement. No Latin American country
has yet signed the Anteproyecto.
In another instance, ALAMAR, its strength undoubtedly bolstered by the presence
of numerous state shipping firms in its ranks, demonstrated its vitality. When Peru
levied an additional port tax on foreign ships, ALAMAR protested to the PEC on the
grounds thatsuchalevywould be contrary to the proposedAnteproyecto which was to
be discussed a month later. The PEC supported the request and asked members not
to apply new taxes until the establishment of a joint maritime policy had been dis-
cussed. 4
""PEC" stands for the Pennanent Executive Committee of LAFI'A, a committee made up of the per-
manent representatives of the member states.
"""Zona" refers to the geographic zone of the Treaty.
""" "ECLA" stands for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.
Two peak associations have been formed to coordinate the efforts of national trade
and industrialist organizations at the regional level. To a certain extent they repre-
sent a regional projection of differences of interest present within the business and
entrepreneurial sectors of the more developed Latin American countries. 5 Both sup-
port regional integration, but in distinctive manners.
The first of these was the Latin American Association of Industrialists (AILA). It
tends to group representatives of the older, better-established trade associations such
as the Confederaci6n de Camaras Industriales (Mexico), Confederacao National da
Indtlstria (Brazil) and the Uni6nindustrialArgentina, groups which in turn represent
the interests of larger, older firms whose internal market position is secure and who
often work with, or are branches of, foreign firms. Many of these firms, especially
where surplus capacity exists, are export-conscious and support the idea of an expan-
sion of markets through liberalization of trade barriers, but are wary of high rates of
zonal protectionism and of centrally-planned complementarity. Hence, AILA's pro-
gram stresses the importance of the role of private enterprise, the fuller utilization of
concessions, the adoption of a common nomenclature, the protection of patents
and trademarks, and the need for a general harmonization and simplification of
customs procedures. 6
The second group, the Association of Latin American Entrepreneurs Participating
inLAFTA (AELPALALC), seems to recruit more from trade associations such as the
Confederaci6nNacional de Ia Industria de Transformaci6n (Mexico), theFederacao
dasindustriasdo Estado de Sao Paulo (Brazil) and the Confederaci6nEcon6mica Gen-
eral (Argentina), which represent newer firms, less established in internal markets,
more dependent on state assistance and protection, and more wary of foreign control
and competition. It also apparently recruits from individual firms. 7 A list of the de-
mands put forth by AELPALALC a tits first convention illustrates our contention. One
series of requests was concerned with institutional innovations considered helpful
to businessmen in the normal conduct of trade; here we find calls for an export insur-
ance scheme, a register of all LAFTA industrialists, a mechanism to link industrialists
with the IDB, more intensive complementarity agreements and a more extended pri-
vate and public banking network for the Zone. A second set of demands, however, im-
plied a very definite growth in the powers of LAFTA itself; the industrialists de-
manded the creation of a payments union, a monetary compensation mechallisin
among the member countries, a common external tariff for raw materials, the harmo-
nization of export-import regimes, commercial policies and foreign exchange regu-
lations, as well as the evolution of LAFTA into an agent of the member countries de-
fending their interests vis-a-vis the European Economic Community. 8
WhilesomeobserversnotedthatwithinLAFTA, "difficulties ... have been lately
emerging at the industrial entrepreneurial level ... [that] mainly involve conflicting
claims of representative authority," 9 there is no indication that LAFTA has recognized
exclusively the claims of either group. Even if the pattern of demands of the Empre-
sariosis more conducive to an expansion ofLAFTA functions, the risk of incurring the
censure of the considerably more powerful Industrialista group cannot be ignored.
Whether this split will neutralize the pressure-group activity of these region-wide
groups, leaving the field to the more specialized trade associations, or whether LAFTA
authorities can use these differences to build up support groups in the more industri-
alized countries, remains to be seen.
The difficulties implied in the organization of cohesive regional interest groups,
given the pattern of uneven economic development and heterogeneous group struc-
tures, is illustrated in the case of banking. Neither private bankers nor the represen-
tatives of central banks have succeeded in forging important LAFTA-wide links. Na-
tional monetary experts in the member countries have long urged the importance of
coordinated central banking and of zonal credit arrangements, as well as the installa-
tion of a LAFTA clearing and payments mechanism. But the LAFTA Secretary-Gen-
eral has declined to show interest in the scheme. The first "joint action" of Latin Ameri-
can central bankers did not occur untill964, in the context of the annual meeting of
the International Monetary Fund. And at that time they merely agreed to oppose in-
ternational arbitration arrangements over conflicts arising from the expropriation of
foreign-owned properties. While it is customary in Latin America to blame the lack of
regional monetary cooperation on the International Monetary Fund, the basic reason
seems to lie in the disparate national monetary experiences and in the preoccupation
with national problems of inflation.
Because of the difficulties encountered at the level of central bank cooperation, the
Mexican Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latino-americanos (CEMLA) is currently
seeking to organize a regional federation of private bankers. The PEC's Advisory
Commission on Monetary Affairs is cooperating. The proposals before the region's
commercial banks deal with various investment projects and practices involving joint
action by several banks. But close observers are far from optimistic as to the success
of these ventures. 10
The generally encouraging phenomenon of a proliferation of regionally-oriented
pressure groups is thus clouded by the passivity and purely symbolic existence of
some of them and by the difficulties encountered in the more dynamic and indepen-
dent ones in aggregating the divergent interests of their members in a regional policy.
The nagging (but admittedly as yet unconfirmed) suspicion persists that these insti-
tutos and asociaciones of producers are much less interested in LAFTA as an institu-
tion upon which to exert pressure for advantages and opportunities denied by more
restrictive national governments, than in insuring the protection of acquired positions
and/or dividing up the emerging markets of non-producers.
This survey of regional interest group formation also suggests an explanation of why
certain business groups takeLAFTAmore seriously than others. ALAMAR is the kind
of group which can normally be expected to effect a shift of loyalties and expectations
to a regional center because of the unique protective umbrella which central policy
would lend to the members. The fact that state-owned merchant marines are part of
the picture complicates the internal bargaining of the group but does not detract from
its dependence on regional protection vis-fl..vis competition with American, European
and Japanese shipping. But commercial banking is in a different position. It operates
in a general setting of financial scarcity. The largest commercial banks tend to have
strong traditional ties with foreign trade activities outside the LAFTA region. In short,
trade associations which aggregate diffuse and heterogeneous interests are not a
promising vehicle for spurring zonal transaction rates. If these associations cannot
decide to opt clearly for zonal protection at the expense of traditional trade with
Europe and the United States, their contribution to regional integration is unlikely to
be very powerful ....
SECTOR MEETINGS
The pattern of demands coming from private economic groups and the type of adjust-
ment such formations make with respect to an integration program is of potentially
crucial importance to politicization. Private producers may, in a commitment to
national protection, simply oppose tariff liberalization. On the other hand, convinced
that new benefits or inevitable adjustments confront them, they may advocate a more
rapid pace of progress toward a common market or a regional economic development
policy. In either case their influence on decision-making could be crucial. There is,
however, a third possibility: adjustment to the growth of a larger market by means
of cartel agreements which afford the associated nations mutual protection, without
necessarily implying a growth in output, efficiency, or the magnitude of trade and
without implying lower prices or greater powers of economic regulation on the part of
LAFTA . There is much evidence that in the first four years of freer trade this has
indeed been the pattern of response of the private industrial sector. This is all the
more crucial for an understanding of the integration process if we keep in mind that
business groups constitute the only non-governmental aggregates who have so far
evinced an interest in politicized economic integration. Trade unions and political
parties have thus far played no role, though certain faltering steps have been taken
to gear them to the process.
Sector meetings are convened by the PEC, though a few of them came about as a
result of independent action by trade associations which antedate LAFTA. Basically,
however, it is true that the growth of a multilateral business consciousness and the
growth of awareness among producers that there can be a "regional" rather than
purely national economic policy is the result of LAFTA's existence. This develop-
ment was intended by the PEC and by the Second Conference. As Comercio Exterior
put it:
These meetings have as their principal objective the establishment of the necessary contacts
between theproducersof the Zone for the exchange of information, the encouragement of more
active participation of private enterprise in the problems of negotiation, and making known
the needs in raw materials, equipment, and machinery of each country. They should give pro-
ducers a basic knowledge of LAFTA and promote the necessary conditions for planned indus-
trial development. In order to insure the continuity of studies and understandings reached at
these meetings, it is deemed convenient to promote the formotion of regional organizations,
formed by representative members from each industrial sector. 11
Table 1 summarizes the record of industrial sector meetings. If we consider that the
PEC decided as late as 1963 to take seriously the commitment toward equipping
LAFTA with a network of voluntary organizations, which is implied in the passage
quoted, the scope of meetings is truly impressive. Of the twenty-one "sectors" which
had met at least once through 1964, thirteen went ahead with the organization of
permanent regional trade associations. Two of them are made up entirely of state
N
0)
TABLE 1. Evolutionofsectormeetings in LAFTA 1961-1964
NUMBER
OF NUMBER YEAR NEW DEMANDS
MEETINGS OF OF MEETINGS MADE OF PERMANENT ASSOCIATION
INDUSTRY HELD COUNTRIES ORIGIN SCHEDULED LAFTA FORMED
Electronics 1 5 1963 yes ? Latin American Institute of Electric and

Electronic Industries
Petroleum 2 7a 1964 yes yes Congress of State Petroleum Enterprises
Automobiles 2 4 1963 yes no none
Hydraulic valves 1 ? 1963 ? no none
Railroads 2 sa 1964 yes yes Latin American Railway Association
Railway Materials 1 ? 1964 yes yes none
Shipowners 3 s 1963 yes yes Latin American Association of Shipownersb
Chemicals 2 ? 1963 yes yes Latin American Federation of Chemical
Industries
Pharmaceuticals 1 ? 1963 yes yes Latin American Association of
Pharmaceutic Chemicals
Paper and Cellulose 2 7 1963 ? yes Latin American Association of Wood Fiber
Manufacturers
Glass s 7 1962 yes yes Latin American Association of Glass
Producers
Machine Tools 2 5 1963 yes yes Latin American Association of Machine
Tool Producers
Office Equipment 2 5 1963 yes yes none
Agricultural Machinery 1 ? 1964 yes no none
Textiles 1 sa 1964 yes yes none
Rubber 1 ? 1964 ? yes none
Construction Machinery 1 ? 1964 yes yes none
I ron and Steel 6 ? 1961? yes yes Latin American Institute of Iron and Steelb
Copper 3 ? 1962 yes yes Latin American Copper Association
Food 2 ? 1963 yes yes Latin American Association of Food
Canning Industries
Wine and Grapes 2 ? 1962 ? no Latin American Wine and Grape
Organization
Electrical Equipmentc 0 - 1965 - - none
Printing Machineryc 0 - 1965 - - none
Ball Bearings and Chainsc 0 - 1965 - - none
c - 1965 - - none
Gauges and Meters 0
Source: Comercio Exterior, Monthly '1nforme de Ia ALALC".

Legend: : Boliviaand/orVenez uelaalsoattended.
Trade association organized before sector meetings were called.
c First meeting to be held in 1965.
? Data not available.
- Not yet detennined by the participants.
~
enterprises (oil and railroads) and one is a mixture of private and state organizations
(ALAMAR). Obviously, there are tremendous variations in the frequency and inten-
sity of contacts among the sectors. Even the setting-up of a trade association is not
final and convincing evidence of an integrative breakthrough. To evaluate the
significance of these meetings, the results obtained and the consensus defined must
be examined.
We consider as the greatest evidence of commitment to the continued intense inte-
gration of the Latin American economies the conclusion of generous and sweeping
complementarity agreements, i.e., agreements which go beyond the limited mar-
keting arrangements that are no more than the local variant of a sales cartel. Such
arrangements should include understandings about the placement of new productive
capacity, an appreciation for expanding markets, some idea as to investment coordi-
nation and the protection of the entire Zone against third countries through substantial
preferences. So defined, there is no single case of success on record. The two comple-
mentarity agreements now in force (radio tubes and data processing machines) were
concluded by the firms concerned and had nothing to do with sector meetings called
by the PEC. The proposed-but unratified -glass agreement comes close to the idea
sketched. The same is true, to a much lesser extent, of the zonal preference agreement
strongly advocated by the shipowners. Finally, even though the chemical industry has
failed to reach agreement on a comprehensive complementarity agreement, it did
agree to press for the adoption of a LAFTA-wide quota system for the orderly sale of
surplus production, giving special consideration to the less developed countries.
A second pattern of demands is one step further removed from the ideal integrative
impact we have set. Here the participants have failed to agree on even a modest
complementarity agreement. However, they did succeed in reaching consensus at a
lower level, but still beyond mere identification with the safety and isolation of a
protected national economy. Such sectors, typically, advocate the conclusion of some
kind of zonal preference arrangement, i.e., a specified lowering of tariffs among the
participants and the retention of a higher external duty. They also favor preferential
purchasing and supplying contracts among the producers of the region and the elimi-
nation of special national taxes which discriminate against other Latin American
suppliers. Sometimes they also agree on a specific list of items to be presented by their
governments for the negotiation of annual concessions. Often they agree to the
exchange of information and technical aid. Innocasedothesedemandsreach the point
of a truly integrated regional market. In most cases they look more like special sales
and production cartels designed to yield immediate benefits to producers who might
eventually find themselves in competition. But they do involve -and this is crucial for
our purposes-the first stimulus of an institutional nature to make common policy
across national boundaries. 12
Still less significant with respect to politicized economic integration is a group of
sectorswhichhasfailed even to agreetothesemodestdemands. No project of common
interest emerged, let alone a complementarity agreement. Yet the participants were
sufficiently impressed with the existence of LAFTA to feel the need for permanent
organization, or at least the desirability of additional meetings. Such sectors, then,
agreed merely to consult again and to study the problems posed by LAFTA. 13 They
did see the need for a regional pressure group.
Is there no single sector which so defines its future and its needs as to require
stronger LAFTAinstitutionsandnewtasks?Theonlyevidencediscovered along these
lines, apart from the sweeping demands for task expansion on the part of the more
dynamic of the two LAFTA-wide associations of entrepreneurs, came from the Iron
and Steel Institute and the sector meetings in the mechanical, construction and rubber
industries. These industrialists saw the need for a regional payments mechanism, the
desirability for more credit facilities and-in the caseoflron and Steel-the possibility
of a regional foreign exchange equalization fund to compensate steel producers who
sacrifice foreign exchange in substituting regional steel imports for European or
American purchases.
The dominant attitudes displayed thus far by industrialists, therefore, are cautious
and non-adaptive to the regional dynamic. The most that can be said is that an intense
process of interaction has been launched by the threat of future changes and that
certain of the groups have soughtto adapt in the form of cartel-like practices of dubious
relevance to the economic welfare of the region as a whole. However, it is quite clear
that even if no net welfare gain can be registered in the short run, this form of adapta-
tion does involve a widening focus of economic calculation in that it substitutes a re-
gional protectionism for a national one. A further difficulty is created by doubts that
the opinions expressed at sector meetings are really representative of important
strands of regional opinion. In the judgment of the PEC's Advisory Commission on
Industrial Development:
... Various delegations insisted on the ... lack of representativeness of the entrepreneurs
which participate [in thesectormeetings ], as well as on thefactthatmanytimes the position sup-
ported in the meetings is not coincident with that of the government to which they belong and
that, occasionally, theydon'tevensupport thepointofviewwhichcorresponds to all the interests
of the sector trade association whom they are supposed to represent. ... 14
Thus far, then, the principle of sector meetings and discussions has been a pre-
requisite step looking toward the eventual introsification of the integration process
andlittlemore.lt has disclosed the minimal area of agreement among businessmen in
some fields. It has shown their desire forthekindof protection which will safeguard the
interest of each while discriminating against third countries. It will- in the context
of the new approach to complementarity agreements-undoubtedly stimulate the
conclusion of a new spate of such instruments. And it clearly showed an almost unani-
mous concern with eliminating the most-favored-nation provision from the comple-
mentarity principle, a concern rewarded with compliance on the part of the Confer-
ence. In the meantime, the potential for integration inherent in the sector meetings
remains to be exploited by the tecnicos who in principle make economic policy. As a
Mexican official put it:
It is hoped that from these preliminary contacts [of businessmen in sector meetings] will arise
not only new agreements by sectors, but also strong pressures upon Latin American govern-
ments, so that they focus their respective development programs on a progressively more
integrated regional market and so that they initiate-by coordinating them-the necessary
activities for eliminating the isolation in which the economies and national economic policies
have continued to develop. 15
Whether the tecnicos will eventually succeed in so manipulating the private sector
will concern us in the concluding section. So far they have failed in developing a viable
decision-makingstyle that would make LAFTA's institutions into dynamic promoters
of regional integration. "Rather victims of a weakness inherent in their condition of
subordination to politicians, governments and entrepreneurs, the tecnicos have
arrived, or are arriving at the maximum limit which their traditional method of
operation permits. Consequently, the way out has to come, must come, from other
sources. " . .. 16
TECNICOS AND CREATIVE ADAPTATION

Thus, in the spring of 1965, the ball has once more been passed to the economist-civil
servants who sparked the economic integration effort in the first place. Asymmetrical
social and political pressures prevented their full success in 1960 and asymmetrical
disappointments now give them their second chance. In Western Europe a super-
ficially similar process occurred between 1955 and 1957. Disappointment with the
slow progress of political unification resulted in a decision, at the Messina Conference
of 1955, to approach unity obliquely by way of a politicized common market. The
political leaders agreed on general-and very vague-principles and left the drafting
of the appropriate detailed rules to the leading economic civil servants of their respec-
tive ministries. These were joined, as in Latin America through the services of ECLA,
by the recognized specialists in the politics and economics of regional integration,
the "European technocrats" associated with Jean Monnet and the European Coal and
Steel Community.
The process used in the drafting of the Treaties of Rome became known as the
"Messina Method." Does it depend merely on the services of leading national and
supranational technicians loosely instructed by their governments? The Messina
Method worked because it combined three attributes: the recognized expertise of the
technicians and their secure civil service status, the existence of an institutionalized
communications pattern between national ministries and interest groups deeply
concerned with their policies, and the presidency of a respected, resourceful and
committed advocate of European political unity over the committees which did the
drafting. This advocate was Paul-Henri Spaak, a leading national politician and not
a tecnico. Spaak's participation assured that the work of the technicians did not evolve
in a vacuum and that constant contact with political decision-makers was retained.
We have argued that politicized economic integration in the Latin American setting
can obey the same dynamic as the European prototype only if certain functional
equivalents can be discovered at the analytical level." One of these is the principle of
reciprocity, of temporarily unequal sacrifice, to be compensated for by eventual-and
very ambiguous-repayment. Nothing need be added to assert the reality of this
principle in LAFTA. The other possible functional equivalent is the capacity for
creative adaptation displayed by the tecnicos. Unlike the Messina Method, these
men cannot clearly rely on a complex and manipulable network of relationships with
"Editor's Note: The authors are alluding here to the lack of a pluralistic interest group environment in
Latin America and are suggesting that this can be overcome only by conscious effort and sacrifice by the
parties involved. This point is also discussed in Chapter One, supra.
private interest groups. Until President Frei made his proposal they had no counter-
part in a Spaak and in support from national politicians. We must now re-examine the
tecnicos in order to assess the probabilities that we are really on the threshold of
politicized economic integration in Latin America.
The potential for a creative adaptation exists. The convergence of "learned" atti-
tudeson the part of the more-developed coupled with their demonstrated responsive-
ness to the special demands of the lesser- and middle-developed, set the stage for
transcendence-a fundamental redefinition of norms and goals which would un-
doubtedlyinvolve LAFTA members and institutions in new tasks, new delegations of
authority and greater interdependence. Two ingredients have been lacking: an inte-
grative strategy and the common political will to carry it out.
Leadership in Latin American regional integration demands not the sort of techno-
cratic competence and anonymity characteristic of Western Europe, but a self-con-
scious political strategy for exploiting the interdependency hidden behind short-term
contradictions. The tecnicosunderstand this interdependency well and are now aware
that they cannot expect itto assert itself automatically. This means they cannot leave
the setting of integrative priorities exclusively to national politicos. To date, however,
their leadership effort has been too institutionally diffuse and too concerned with
reinforcing their own values to have had a broader impact. As Prebisch himself notes:
" ... sufficient progress has been made to work out a system of ideas, a dynamic view
of economic and social development leading to practical action. Now the task is to
promote public discussion and above all to gain the ear of political and trade-union
leaders." 17 The future of LAFTA as the focus of regional integration will depend not
only upon this announced effort "to gain the ear" of key decision-makers and win
them over to the ECLA doctrine, but to present them with a series of immediate
projects which exploit the growing, but limited, convergence of the major powers and
the special fears and hopes of the smaller ones. A full-scale attemptto build immediate
automaticity into LAFTA is bound to fail. A more modest effort to reach agreement
initially in a limited "priority" sector, would be a better "reform-mongering" strategy.
One could thenrelyon the imbalances generated by this admittedly imperfect solution
to cause a spill-over into areas in which agreement at present seems impossible.
Latin American tecnicos have not fully succeeded in devising such an integration
strategy. It may well be, as Miguel S. Wionczek suggests, that "there exists among
[experts] a surprising degree of agreement, in spite of certain discrepancies of doctrine
and procedure, on what it is necessary to achieve in order to make LAFTA into an
efficient instrument of integration." 18 These experts, however, have not been able
to transform this consensus into viable decisional structures. Partly this is because
they belong to a wide variety of institutions, national and international, each with its
separate loyalties and vested interests. 19 They have failed to concentrate their efforts
in an attempt to make LAFTA an exclusive and efficient instrument of integration.
More importantly -and this is certainly a reflection of their fragmented loyalties as
well as doctrinal discrepancies-they have long been unable to agree on a common
program, an order of priority. Their original hopes that trade liberalization and
voluntary complementarity would set off an automatic integration process-"that the
LAFTA, once in movement, would advance firmly and would convert itself into an
important instrument of regional economic development" 20 -were frustrated. A

much more realistic conception of the integration process has since developed in which
"the advance toward the common market will entail a continuous series of coordi-
nation efforts, which will not be spontaneously generated, [our emphasis] but will
grow out of carefully devised measures adopted at the national or international level,
as the case may be." 21 No adaptive democratic forces can be expected to come to the
automatic assistance of the integration process. This is, indeed, a very important
theoretical lesson which the first four years of LAFTA have taught the tecnicos; but
its operational corollary is the need for a much greater, much better-coordinated
effort on their part at devising and programming integrative measures. 22
Even if the tecnicos could agree on such a plan of action, it is unlikely that it would
be enacted into binding commitments. The primary weakness in the Latin American
integrative process has always been a lack of articulation between tecnicos on the one
hand and national decision-makers on the other. There are essentially two tactics by
which the former can attempt to bridge the gap and insure that the latter, heretofore
absorbed in stop-gap responses to crises or short-term satisfaction of favored clientele
groups, will in some predictable way be responsive to their more long-term projects
and demands.
The tecnicos can encourage the formation of political groups favorably disposed
to their efforts, which, in Wionczek's apt phrase, "can act as a counterweight to vested
political and economic interests." 23 This fifth-column approach is particularly evident
in the promotion of regional pressure groups through sector meetings. There is much
less evidence that they have tried to create new, or "infiltrate" existing, political
parties. Christian Democratic victories in several countries would certainly increase
integracionistahopes, as in Chile. Given the nature of "publics" in Latin America, it is
hard to imagine how a large-scale pro-integration propaganda campaign could be
effective. The policy of relying on "progressive business sectors" may be beginning to
pay off: "The really interesting thing [about the Third Conference] . . . is that the
impetus is comingnotfromgovemments, but from businessmen. Officials say they are
being pushed into this more radical approach by the insistence of businessmen." 24
However, the situation is hardly uniformly encouraging. As we noted above, the
response pattern of trade in general and regional pressure groups in particular is highly
uneven. A recent commentary on the latter accents "the immaturity or passivity of
many of the entrepreneurial associations constituted in relation to LAFTA and the
atmosphere of discord which reigns in some of them. " 25 As an antidote to what we feel
are the unrealistic expectations which integracionistas have placed in the Latin
American entrepreneur, we cite this recent comment by W. Paul Strassman:
In conclusiononemightrecall that a few generations ago British, American and Scandinavian
industrialists behaved in about the same way as Latin American industrialists today. Family
firms, nepotism, paternalism, repression of labor, bribing of public officials, empires of fraud,
panic before sizeable reforms and sanctimonious acquiescence afterward have been character-
istic of most pioneering industrialists, however creative, in all economic history. 26
ADAPTATION, TECNICOS AND POLITICOS

The first four years ofLAFTA, thus, leave us with a blurred picture as far as the forging
of an alliance between the governmental technician and the regional-minded indus-
trialist is concerned. While an alliance is certainly in the forefront of the technicians'

minds it has so far failed to materialize in operation.
To make it materialize the politicos must lend their power to an institutional break-
through as a result of which the dynamic industrial entrepreneur can play the role in
which the tecnicos have cast him.... The form which the current alliance between
dynamic politicians and the technicians has taken is the Herrera Plan.
This proposal recasts the projective resolutions of the LAFTA Conferences in a
direction long advocated by many tecnicos. It is the work of highly respected economic
technicians, but their leader is himself an economic specialist with a very solid basis
of his own in Chilean politics. Perhaps Herrera is cast for the part of Latin America's
Spaak.
In brief, the Herrera Plan, backed up by the prestige of Chile'snew Christian-Demo-
cratic majority, proposes a new treaty establishing a Latin American Community. It
advocates the principle of sector integration much more directly and energetically
than did the Bogota Conference, hoping that strategically-situated "dynamic"
branchesoftheeconomywill, if integrated, expand so rapidly as to pull the remainder
of economic life into modernity, beginning with steel and heavy industry. A connnon
external tariff is needed innnediately, as well as accelerated tariff disarmament
internally on the basis of strategic sectors. Once more, a regional payments system
is demanded; but this time the demand is put squarely in terms of a central banking
apparatus common to all LAFTA countries. Further, a Central University Council
and a Latin American Information Agency are to be created to assist in a massive
continental literacy campaign. All this is to be achieved by 1971. By 1975 these
institutions and plans should have resulted in a coordinated industrial develop-
ment plan for the entire region and completed the process of tariff elimination for
strategic industries. A third stage involves the elimination of tariff barriers for non-
strategic items and will end with the establishment of a complete common market,
including a central monetary and fiscal policy and full convertibility. At the same time
the Plan calls for the launching of a compulsory secondary education program for all
urban dwellers. 27 The scene seems set for the kind of manipulated breakthrough
which our functional equivalent calls for.
A more ambitious spill-over potential into the field of politics can hardly be imag-
ined. Hence it is far from fanciful to interpret the halting steps toward a Latin Amer-
ican Parliament as an unintended consequence of the hopes and frustrations expe-
rienced in terms of LAFTA's first four years, even though Latin American political
parties must achieve some national and regional cohesion before the consequences of
such a Parliament could make themselves felt.
Butthefactremains that even when political actors have "learned," even when they
are presented with a"carefully devised" decisional strategy by a determined group of
promoters, these processes must be complemented by a will to act. In developing
societies in particular, it is doubtful that mere knowledge about what should be done
will be sufficient to induce action. To override reliance on traditional means of prob-
lem-solving and dependencies on special interests, a crisis is needed. Only then can
reluctant decision-makers argue the manifest necessity to do something.
We are not certain that the current crisis is sufficient to induce the type of creative
response Frei and Herrerahaveinmind. To force national politicians to act upon the
integrative strategy presented to them by the tecnicos a more general economic crisis
seems necessary. This must be coupled with a mutually perceived lack of outside
alternatives. IfEEC fails to respond to Latin American complaints of discrimination,
if no commodity stabilization agreements are reached, if developed countries refuse
to lower barriers on industrial products from developing countries, if massive United
States aid is not forthcoming, LAFTA members will have to fall back on their own
resources. Theconvergenceinleamedattitudes among the more developed members
then makes it likely that such a crisis will result in a shared response rather than a
scramble for special advantages.
1 ComercioExterior, Nov. de 1963, p. 802. [Editors note: In an earlier footnote the authors identify this
particular ComercioExterior (there are several journals in Latin America by that name) as a publication of
the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior de Mexico.)
2 Ibid., Agosto de 1964, pp. 565-569.
3 Ibid., Nov. de 1963, pp. 806-808; Die. de>1963, pp. 920-921; Febrero de 1964, pp. 84-85; Abril de
1964,pp. 244-245; SuplementodeJuniode 1964, pp. 60-63.
• Ibid., Mayo de 1964, p. 153.
5 Foranexcellenttreatmentofthisconflictas it emerged in Mexico, see Sanford A. Mask, Industrial Revo-
lution in Mexico (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1950). According to Raymond Vernon the antag-
onismbetween"new"and"old"groupshadnearlydisappearedby1960(Vernon,TheDilemmaofMexico's
Development, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 172-175). However, differences in atti-
tudes toward central planning seems to have revived it. See Comercio Exterior, Abril de 1964 and Julio de
1964 for the respective positions.
6 See Argentina Fabri~ 30 de Abril de 1962; La Integraci6n Econ6mica Latinoamericana, op. cit., pp.
875-876; ComercioExterior, Sept.de1963,pp.632-633; Oct. de 1963,pp. 745-748.
7 Hispanoamericano (Tiempo), 31 Agosto de 1964, p. 38.
8 See Comercio Exterior, Oct. de 1963, pp. 711-713, 736-744; Doscientos Millones, Oct. de 1963, pp.
34-42.
• Review of the River Plate, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 543. Both associations of industrialists enjoy consultative
representationatthe annual sessions of the LAFTA Conference, as does the Latin American regional organ-
ization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ORIT).
10 Wionczek,ininternational Conciliation (January 1965), pp. 41-44.
11 Comercio Exterior (June 1963), p. 400, in commenting on Resolution 55 (II).
12 Sectorswhichhaveput forth demands of this type include the following: food canners, copper, iron and
steel, machine tools, office furniture, textiles, paper and cellulose, pharmaceuticals, railway equipment.
13 Sectors in this category include the following: railroads, electronics, wine and grapes, state petroleum
organizations.
14 Comercio Exterior (June 1964), Supplement, p. 54. It was also suggested that in the future delegations
invited to sector meetings include, in addition to representatives of private enterprise, managers of state
enterprises and government delegates. The Advisory Commission itself recommended to the PEC that new
sector meetings and their agenda be subordinated to the development priorities worked out in the Commis-
sion and that such meetings be limited. They should pay special attention to the needs of less developed
members and countries lacking a given sector altogether should be represented by government officials.
15 P. GarCia Reynoso in Wionczek (ed.), Integracwn de America Latina (Mexico: Fonda de
Econ6mica, 1964), p. 166.
16 Enrique Angulo, "Conference de Alto Nivel para Salir del Estancamiento," in Tres A nos en Camino
de la Integraci6n. op. cit., p. 6.
17 Raw Prebisch, Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America, p. 14. The strategy of "re-
form-mongering" we suggest here for givingpoliticalleverage to the tknicos is developed in detail by A. 0.
Hirschman, Journeys Into Progress (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963).
16 M.S. Wionszek (ed.), op. cit., pp. xxix-xxx.
19 For a very critical portrait of the Latin American economista which stresses his lack of deep convictions
and opportunism, see Daniel Cosio Villegas in Jose Echevarria and B. Higgins (eds.), Social Implications
ofEconomicDevelopmentinLatinAmerica, Vol. I, (Paris: UNESCO), 1963.
20 Phicido Garcia Reynoso, "Perspectivas para la Indllstria Quimica en la ALALC," Comercio Exterior,
Enero de 1964, p. 25.
21 Prebish, op. cit., p. 102.
•• There have, of course, been many proposals for new tasks sponsored by tecnicos, most of which have
beenreflectedin the many suggestions debated, rejected or amended in the one hundred and fifteen resolu-
tions adopted by the Conference. For economic arguments in favor of such new tasks as a regionalfomento
agency, linear tariff reductions, a regional payments mechanism in lieu of the various special export and im-
port finance schemes, a common external tariff and the coordination of development plans, see: H. S. Perloff
andR. Almeida, La lntegraci6n Econ6mica Regional en el Desarrollo de America Latina, Sii.o Paulo. Oct.-
Nov.1963 (CIES/345); and theessaysbyM. S. Wionczek, B. Siegel, and S. DellinM. S. Wionczek(ed.),
op. cit.
28 Wionczek(ed.),op. cit., p.xxxi.For an argument that tbisispossibleonlythrough the medium of newer
"national" interest groups, and not in reliance on established forces depending on trade contacts with in-
dustrialized countries, see Wionczek, International Conciliation, pp. 60-62.
•• Review of the River Plate, Oct. 22, 1963, p. 90. For similar evaluations of the evolving role of business-
men, see Aruilisis, 6 de Enero de 1964, p. 24; "Integration in Latin America," Bank of London and South
America Quarterly Review, Vol.IV,No.l,January 1964, pp.1-15. Seeour''Mexico and Latin American
Economic Integration," op. cit., and the literature cited there for the Mexican response.
25 Enrique Angulo, "Conferenciade Alto Nivel para Salir del Estancamiento," in "Tres Aiios en Camino
de la IntegraciOO.," op. cit., p. 6.
•• ''The Industrialist" in}.]. Johnson (ed.), Continuity and Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1964), p. 185.
27 For such details of the Herrera Plan as are currently available, see Comercio Exterior (February 1965 ),
p. 97. The economists who cooperated in its drafting were, in addition to Herrera himself, Helio Jaguaribe,
Aldo Ferner, Rlmulo Almeida, Joseph Grunwald, Raymond Mikesell and BenT. Moore. It is generally ex-
pected that the tecnicos called on by Frei to relaunchLAFTA will endorse this Plan or some version of it.
Patricia Berko Wild
Radicals and moderates in theOAU: origins of

conflict and bases for coexistence
The following illustrates the traditional form of interest articulation and

aggregation in international organizations. In the Organization of African
Unityseveralgroupsofstatessharingsimilarvaluesonawiderangeofissues
can be seen interacting with one another along the lines of a classical multi-
polar, balance-of-power type of international system. Some of the groups
have becomeformallyorganized and maybe the nuclei of future sub-regional
integration movements on the African continent.
ltisalsointerestingtonoteinMrs.Wild'sarticletheconservativenatureand
functions of the OAU. This seems to be a paradox in that most Americans
probably see the African political scene as being dominated by militant and
revolutionary states. Yet I believe that the OAU might be compared to the
post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe in some respects. The OAU seems to
have worked for the preservation of existing political systems and borders in
Africa either bydi rect action or inaction (in the case of Biafra) with the notable
exceptions of the European-dominated governments in southern Africa
which the "black" states have vowed to overthrow.
INTRODUCTION: REFLECTIONS ON STUDYING INTER-STATE

RELATIONS WITHIN THE OAU
This article presents an analysis of the persistent ideological conflict between radical
and moderate governments within the Organization of African Unity with a view to
distinguishing areas of common interest that would permit the continued existence
of the Organization. What is the nature of this ideological confrontation? How has
the radical-moderate conflict threatened to break up the OAU in the past? Why do
radical African governments choose to remain in the organizational fold? In seeking
answers to these questions, one must keep in mind some facts of African political life.
The concept of national interest and the fluidity of blocs. Mrican governments are
presently constructing nation-states within inherited boundaries encompassing
diverse ethnic and political elements. Aside from a commitment to economic develop-
ment and to the establishment of governmental authority within these boundaries, 1
the national interests of African states are at present still to be determined by the
ruling politicians, military clique, or charismaticleader. These leaders must base their
decisions on inadequate data supplied by fledgling government ministries. Personal
whim and accident also play a part in decision-making. 2
In view of the high rate of turnover in ruling personnel due to numerous changes in
government, 3 it is not surprising that states sometimes shift gears in international
affairs and alter the composition of political blocs. For example, prior to the ouster of
36
KwameNkrumahas President of Ghana in 1966, Ghana was notorious for supporting

radical subversive elements undermining governments all over the continent. Nkru-
mah had justified his interventionist foreign policy with his belief in the need for
African political union. The new rulers of Ghana tried to improve relations with
neighboring governments and did not pursue policies based on Nkrumah's brand of
Pan-Africanism. 4 As another case in point, the traditionalist monarchy of Libya was
overthrown by a military junta in 1969. The new regime has assumed a revolutionary
position and has aligned itself with Algeria and the UAR. 5
At the time of the creation of the OAU in May 1963, hard core radical states were
Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the UAR. 6 In 1967, the radical core states were
Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and the UAR. 7 Thus it is obvious
that the composition of ideological blocs is not stable.
The importance of ideology. Ideology plays an extremely important role in the
political life of many African countries. It serves to legitimize the rule of politicians
andmilitarymen who may have led theircounL-ies' independence movements or have
attained power by coup d'etat, but who are unable to lead their countries quickly
into the promised land of economic development. In the confusion resulting from the
modernization process, ideology may serve as a guide to action and as a kind of social
cement. As projected on the international scene, ideology enables a government to
assume the desired image for the benefit of its domestic constituency. 8
Some governments manage to maintain two foreign policy postures simultaneously.
The revolutionary government of Algeria, for example, enjoys profitable commer-
cial relations with France, its former colonial ruler, while pursuing a vehemently
anti-colonial and leftist policy in Africa. 9 lt is only the second policy that concerns the
OAU.
Most important to this study is the role played by ideology as a link among African
countries situated in different parts of the continent, uniting them on certain political
questions considered by the OAU. Within the Pan-African movement, radical states
are distinguished from moderates by their extreme militancy in the struggle to eradi-
cateremnantsof colonialism, neo-colonialism, and white supremacy from the African
continent. These ideologically motivated governments view the existence of colonial
or neo-colonial governments anywhere in Africa as direct threats to their own exis-
tence. Radical states view foreign policy as an extension of their domestic commitment
to the creation of a "new order." 10
Secrecy of diplomatic proceedings. Useful studies of the activities of African states
at the United Nations have utilized minutes of meetings and vote counts as a basis for
defining political blocs. 11 A student of the OAU, however, has the problem of ana-
lyzingpolitical bloc activities within the Organization in the face of deliberations often
conducted in secret. At the Fifth Assembly of Heads of State and Government in
September 1968, for instance, the secrecy of the proceedings was underlined by the
adoption of a resolution permitting little information to reach the press 12 ; and Kwame
Nkrumahhas complained that OAU"Negotiations are conducted behind closed doors
and surrounded by a mysterious cloak of diplomatic protocol, making knowledge of
the proceedings inaccessible to the general public." 18
This analysis is therefore based on the overt political acts of Member States, on some
published speeches, OAU resolutions and other documents in their final form, and on
reports of qualified observers.
ORIGINS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE OAU

The First Conference of Independent Mrican States, held at Accra in April 1958,
was attended by eight Mrican countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan. The Conference condemned colonialism and racism,
supported the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) against France, declared
a policy of non-alignment in world affairs, and decided to coordinate Mrican policies
on international political questions. 14
The Second Conference of Independent Mrican States, held at Addis Ababa in
1960, was attended by thirteen states: Provisional Government of Algeria, Camer-
oun, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan,
Tunisia, and UAR. The participants expressed deep-seated ideological differences
regarding the form Mrican unity was to take. Ghana proposed, and Guinea alone
supported, Nkrurnah's ambitious plan for African political union. The Nigerian
spokesman opposed the idea of union as being premature, and advocated a loose
association of sovereign states. 15
In spite of this basic disagreement and of numerous inter-state squabbles, the
Independent Mrican States maintained a facade of unity until the fall of 1960, when
a number of unrelated events led to the formation of competing political alliances: 16
Nigeria acceded to independence and challenged Ghana's claim to leadership. Mo-
rocco quarreled with Tunisia over the latter's recognition of Mauritania's right to
exist as a separate sovereign state. 17 Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR did not send repre-
sentatives to the third regional conference of the ICFTU (International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions) held in November 1960. 18 Leftist militants believed that a pro-
jected All-Mrican Trade Union Federation (AATUF) must not be affiliated with the
ICFTU. 19 Intheend,anAATUFwasfoundedinMay 1961 with officers from Morocco,
Guinea, Algeria, Mali, Kenya, and the UAR, but the majority of Mrican trade Unions
did not join the AATUF. 20
Another cause of dissension was the accession of thirteen French Mrican countries
to independence. Members of the original Pan-African organization criticized some of
these states for various sins, including failure to oppose French policy on Algeria,
sending Mrican troops to combat the FLN, support for Western policies, signing
defense pacts with France, and opposition to Lumumba in the Congo. Ghana, Guinea,
Morocco, and the UAR were supporting dissident movements in some formerly French
territories. 21
Finally, the Congo morass spurred the formation of competing Mrican alliances.
Mter the Kasavubu-Lumumba split and the dissolution of the Central Government
in the Congo, thirteen Mrican states met in August 1960 and were able to agree on
approval of United Nations policies in the Congo. The participants were not able to
agree, however, on methods for dealing with Tshombe and the Katanga secession. 22
Later on, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UARsupported the Gizenga Govern-
ment in Stanleyville, while another group supported the Kasavubu Government in
Leopoldville. 23 The secessionist province of Katanga was considered a vehicle for
neo-colonialist penetration of Mrica, and nearly all Mrican states eventually approved
the use of force by the UN in order to end that secession. 24 The radical states, however,
approved of the secessionist movement led by Lumumba's successor in Stanleyville. 25
For those states, ideological considerations overshadowed the principle of respect
for the territorial integrity of states.
COMPETING ALLIANCES
In October 1960, a conference of French-speaking West African states took place at
Abidjan.OnlyGuineaandTogow ereabsent,whileMalisentanobs erver. Theconfer-
ence decided to try to facilitate direct negotiations between Algeria and France. It
recognized the right of Mauritania to separate existence, and supported Kasavubu
against Lumumba in the Congo. These twelve states met again at Brazzaville in
December 1960. After further deliberations the following March and September, the
African and Malagasy Union (UAM) was formed. It established the African and
Malagasy Organiz[.tion for Economic Cooperation (OAMCE), the African and
Malagasy Post and Telecommunications Union (UAMPT), Air Afrique, and the
African and Malagasy Defense Union (UAMD). 26
The creation of the UAM led to the formation of a radical alliance at Casablanca in
January 1961. Ghana, Guinea, and Mali sought to escape isolation in face of the
moderate alliance. Morocco, not really a radical, sought support for its claim to Mauri-
tania. At the same time, the Moroccan Government was under pressure from domestic
leftist opposition. Representatives from these states and from the Provisional Govern-
ment of the Algerian Republic and the UAR, as well as a Libyan minister and a Ceylon-
ese ambassador, attended the Casablanca Conference of non-aligned states. The
Conference supported Lumumba, announced that participants wculd withdraw
their troops from the UN command in the Congo, and enunciated its radical proposals
for African unity in a Casablanca Charter. 27
The moderate alliance was enlarged through efforts originally intended to coordi-
nate the Congo policies of all African states at a meeting held at Monrovia in May
1961, and not attended by Casablanca Group members. The Monrovia Group in-
cluded Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and the
twelve UAM members. 28
Efforts to strengthen the Casablanca Group were impeded by strained relations
among the members. When President Olympio of Togo was assassinated in January
1963, Ghanaian interference was suspected, and Ghana was isolated, as was Morocco
by its persistent claim to Mauritania. Algeria attained independence in July 1962 and
lost interest in the alliance. The Casablanca Group had fallen apart by the time of the
Summit Conference at which the OAU was created; 29 at that conference, the moder-
ates were clearly in the majority.
THE OAU COMPROMISE CHARTER

The Summit Conferenceoflndependent African States was held at Addis Ababa May
15-25, 1963 in response to an appeal issued in December 1962 by the Inter-African
and Malagasy Organization. 30 A Preparatory Conference of Foreign Ministers, held
May 15-23, 31 was charged with the formulation of plans for the establishment of an
Organization of African States. 32 A committee constituted for this purpose, chaired
by the Senegalese Foreign Minister, 33 was invited to study a variety of proposals
including the Casablanca Charter, the Lagos Charter, a plan submitted by President
Nkrumah of Ghana, and a draft Charter prepared by the Ethiopian Government. 34
Thecommitteeencounteredgreatdifficultyin effecting a compromise among these
proposals. 35 The Casablanca Charter reflected an ideal of political union, and had
gone so far as to establish (on paper) a unified African High Command. 36 A more con-
servative policy was advocated by the Monrovia Group, which had adopted the Lagos
Charter in December 1962. 37 The Monrovia powers desired an African organization
that would provide a framework for cooperation based on the participation of sover-
eign states. 38 Indirect opposition to the Lagos Charter, President Nkrumah advocated
immediate political union. In his view, any delay in effecting political integration was
dangerous, since individual African states would be vulnerable to the machinations of
neo-colonialist powers. 39 The draft Charter presented by the Ethiopian Government
reflected the influence of the Organization of American States example and closely
resembled the Lagos Charter. 40
When the committee appointed by the Foreign Ministers failed to devise a formula
for reconciling these divergent views, the Foreign Ministers recommended that the
Heads of State and Government consider the Ethiopian draft Charter and postpone
the consideration of other proposals until a future conference of Foreign Ministers. 41
TheHeadsofStateand Government, however, were determined to approve a Charter
during the Sununit Conference. President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast
expressed the feeling of most African leaders when he stated that all Africa was
waiting for a response to its expectations of unity. 42
Sensitive to the pressure of African and international opinion, the Heads of State
and Government appointed a Special Committee of Foreign Ministers to draft a com-
promise Charter. 43 The Charter of the new Organization of African Unity, signed
by thirty states on May 25, 1963, 44 resembles the Ethiopian draft. There was practi-
cally no support for President Nkrumah's plan. The address made by Emperor Haile
SelassieofEthiopiaadvocatinggradual union, permanent arrangements for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes, an African defense system based on joint military planning,
and cooperation with the United Nations, 45 was echoed by most of the delegates.
Thus the OAU Charter states that the purposes of the Organization are inter alia
"to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States" and "to defend their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity, and independence." In order to achieve the purposes
of the Organization, "Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general
policies . . .". 46 Coordination of general policy was to constitute the basic function
of the OAU, while unity remained the cherished, albeit remote, goal.
RENEWED IDEOLOGICAL DISSENSION: THE

CONGO CRISIS OF 1964
During a brief honeymoon periodfollowingthecreationofthe OAU, political alliances
were dissolved in an atmosphere of good will and optimism. The Casablanca Group
had already disbanded. The short-lived Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (UAS), which had
been part of the Casablanca Group, dissolved after the establishment of the OAU.
The African and Malagasy Union (UAM), part of the Monrovia Group, disbanded in
early 1964 asaconsequenceofOAUCouncilResolution5(1), adopted in August 1963.
This resolution stated that regional or sub-regional groupings should be based on

geographical, economic, social, and cultural factors common to the states concerned;
some non-UAM states had strongly protested against the continued existence of the
UAM as a political organization which did not meet the latter criteria. 47
The renewed Congo crisis of 1964 put an end to this "era of good feeling". The
consensus of the Organization completely broke down when the OAU was confronted
with the problem of assistance to the Tshombe regime in the Congo.
At the first ordinary meeting of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment in July 1964, Premier Tshombe had been a notable absentee. A preparatory
conference of OAU Foreign Ministers had voted to exclude Tshombe from that
meeting, since he was regarded as an "imperialist stooge". The fact that Tshombe was
receiving aid from Portugal worried the OAU, since the Angolan rebel government
was based in Leopoldville. 48
Differences among African states as to the policy to pursue regarding the Tshombe
regime recalled their activities with respect to the United Nations Congo Operation.
Some radical governments had not hesitated to pursue interventionist foreign policies
and to oppose UN operations which might have favored an anti-Lumumba govern-
ment in the Congo. Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR had espoused the
Soviet position on this issue up to March 1961, although they later disassociated them-
selves from the Soviet view. 49 These attitudes were to loom large when the OAU
attempted to deal with the renewed Congo crisis in 1964.
In spite of an avowed aversion to the Tshombe regime, it appeared at the OAU
Council meeting in September 1964 that African states were determined to meet
their responsibilities with regard to the Congo situation. Premier Tshombe had
requested that African troops be dispatched to the Congo, where they might ensure
order in calm areas of the country, thereby freeing government troops for combat
areas and eliminating the need for foreign mercenaries. In the impassioned debate
that followed this request, a number of divergent views were expressed. Some states
(including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Senegal) would have granted the request for
troops. These states were most concerned with safeguarding Congolese sovereignty.
They proposed that the OAU mediate between the Tshombe regime and hostile
neighboring states Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville. Premier Tshombe alone would
be asked to attempt reconciliation with the Congo rebel movement. On the other side,
OAU"interventionists" (Algeria, Kenya, Mali, and UAR, among others) asserted that
Tshombe's request for troops had given the OAU the right to intervene in a more
radical manner. No African troops should be sent to the Congo, they declared, since
these troops would soon become Tshombe's "black mercenaries". They recom-
mended that an OAU committee be created to mediate between the rebels and the
Tshombe regime, and that a gathering of all political forces be held in order to create
a provisional government and hold free elections. Kenya went further, and proposed
that an OAU office be established in the Congo for the purpose of supervising an
amnesty, disarming combatants, and assuring law and order. There was even a
proposal to create an OAU trusteeship over the Congo. 50
In its final resolution, the OAU Council recommended the following: (1) an immedi-
ate cease-fire; (2) an end to the recruitment of mercenaries and expulsion of those
already in the Congo; (3) an appeal to the Congolese factions to effect national recon-
ciliation by establishing a Government of Union to maintain order and supervise free
elections; (4) the creation of an ad hoc committee, under the chairmanship of Premier
Kenyattaof Kenya, to assist Congolese leaders in achieving national reconciliation, to
bring about the resumption of normal relations between the Congo and neighboring
countries, and to advise the OAU on aid to be extended to the Congo; (5) the creation
of a committee to visit capitals of countries intervening in the Congo in order to ask
them to desist; (6) an appeal to Member States to refrain from undertaking any activity
which might aggravate the situation. 51
When Premier Tshombe objected to the provision that a committee mediate be-
tween the rebels and his regime under Point 4 of the above resolution, 52 it appeared
that the committee would have to confine itself to mediating between the Tshombe
regime and the Governments of Burundi and Omgo-Brazzaville, 53 a task which would
have been in keeping with the OAU Charter injunction regarding non-intervention in
the internal affairs of Member States. In fact, the OAU resolution departed from this
principle. By its appeal for the creation of a Congolese Government of Union, and by
the establishment of a committee to mediate between the rebels and the Tshombe
regime, the OAU had elevated the rebels to a position of near equality with the legiti-
mate Government of the Congo.
In the months following the OAU meeting of September 1964, the OAU became
the victim of internal dissension which threatened to destroy it. As soon became
apparent, the OAU resolution had gone unheeded by many Member States and the
Organization had become paralyzed in the face of a problem involving an East-West
confrontation. Some Member States actively aided the Congolese rebels. OAU com-
mittees were ineffective, and some African states called upon the United Nations
to intervene.
Certain African states had resolved to assist the Congolese rebels, at a secret confer-
ence held after the OAU meeting of September 1964. This conference had been
attended by the Heads of State and Government of Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville,
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, and the UAR. They decided that the survival
of the Tshombe regime constituted a threat to revolutionary African regimes, since
a Congo led by Tshombe would become a base for counter-revolutionary plots di-
rected against their governments. They expressed the view that Western powers could
exert strong pressure on African regimes, thereby paralyzing the OAU in the Congo
situation. In case of such paralysis, the revolutionary statesmen planned military
intervention on behalf of the Congolese rebels. In early December 1964, after
the United States-Belgian rescue operation in Stanleyville, this intervention was
launched. Egyptian military experts and "advisors" left Cairo for an unknown desti-
nation in Africa. Algerian, Malian, Guinean, Ghanaian, and Sudanese officers set out
on the same route. Large shipments of arms were sped to the guerrilla forces in the
Congo. The governments of Congo-Brazzaville, Uganda, Tanzania, and Sudan al-
lowed their territories to be used for military preparations designed to aid the Congo-
lese rebels. All of these states were scornful of the OAU's decisions and adamant in
their opposition to countries such as Nigeria, which attempted to justify the United
States-Belgian rescue operation, viewed by many African states as overt military in-
tervention. 54
The OAU committees were notable for their lack of effectiveness. After one OAU
committee had obtained a promise from the United States Secretary of State that the
United States would not provide Tshombe with additional military materiel, the
committeemistakenlyfeltit could relax. The ad hoc mediation committee did not take
advantage of Tshombe's permission to travel freely in the Congo; radical African
states asserted that this hesitation favored the United States-Belgian operation in
Stanleyville, which had been launched while negotiations were still taking place in
Nairobi with the participation of Mr. Kenyatta, the Foreign Minister of the Congolese
rebel provisional government, and the United States Ambassador to Kenya. 55
That the Congo problem had split the ranks of Member States was further demon-
strated by verbal attacks levelled against the supposedly neutral figure of the OAU
Administrative Secretary-General during the first weeks of December 1964. Some
moderate African governments alleged that the Secretary-General, Mr. Diallo Telli
of Guinea, had abused his mandate by criticizing the Belgian-American rescue opera-
tion. These states asserted that Mr. Telli preferred to cooperate with certain states
such as Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and the UAR, while he ignored all those he held
to be too closely associated with the West. Mr. Telli, they insisted, was nothing more
than the instrument of President Sekou Toure of Guinea. 56
TheOAUparalysis becamecleartotheworldwhenonNovember30, 1964 fourteen
African states (Sudan, Mali, Algeria, Kenya, UAR, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Guinea,
Ghana, Dahomey, O:mgo-Brazzaville, Somalia, Uganda, and Burundi) requested an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the United
States-Belgian "military intervention" in the Congo, a move supported by the Soviet
Union. At the same time, the OAU mediation committee appealed for a conference of
African Heads of State and Government. 57
A Fourth Special Session of the OAU Council of Ministers was held in New York
from December 16-21, 1964. The weakness of the OAU atthis point is reflected in the
feeble Council resolution, which reaffirmed its earlier resolution on the Congo, ap-
pealed for a solution in an OAU framework, and asked the United Nations Security
Council to recommend an African solution and to cooperate with the OAU. 58
In the aftermath of the second Congo crisis, with its exposure of OAU weaknesses
and of the increased machinations of radical states, the old moderate alliance was
reconstituted in February 1965. The new Afro-Malagasy Common Organization
(OCAM) consisted of former UAM members: Cameroun, Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauri-
tania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Rwanda (in UAMsince March 1963 ), and Togo (in
UAM since July 1963 ). Congo-Leopoldville was admitted to OCAM in May 1965, an
event responsible for Mauritania's departure from OCAM inJ uly 1965. 59 The OCAM
has not, however, functioned mainly as a political organization, but rather as an
economic and cultural association. Nor did radical states organize a formal political
alliance after the Congo debacle. 60
Tension between the two camps and among the radicals themselves nearly pre-
vented the OAU from holding its Second Assembly of Heads of State and Government
in Accra in October 1965. 61 Although the divisive Congo issue had disappeared when
Kasavubu replaced Tshombe shortly before the Accra meeting, 62 disputes between
radicals and moderates continued to plague the OAU.
EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING IDEOLOGICAL

TENSION IN THE OAU
Ideological disputes among OAU Member States have occurred since the 1964 Congo
crisis on the following issues:
The OAU Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa. Liberation of
African territories from colonial or white supremacist domination is a major goal of
theOAU. The OAU Liberation Committee was the first OAU organ to be established.
With headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, it is responsible for coordinating military and
financial assistance to rebel movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissao, Mozambique,
Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia (formerly Southwest Africa), Djibouti, Sao Tome,
and Principe. 63
Radical states were dismayed by the Liberation Committee's decision at its incep-
tion to designate rebel movements' host countries as coordinators of military and
financialassistance,leavingtheOAUwithfewrebelresponsibilitiesinthatdomain. 64
The Committee's effectiveness has also been hampered by infighting among the
rebel movements themselves, with radical states supporting radical or socialist wings
of these movements and moderate states lining up on the other side. Moreover, some
governments have been more able or willing than others to commit their material and
human resources to the liberation struggle. 65
That these difficulties continue to plague the OAU is revealed in resolutions and
declarations adopted by the Organization in 1969. In February 1969 the Council
resolved, inter alia:
1. That in view of the fact that little progress has been made in the liberation struggle during
the period from September 1968 to February 1969, that a review of the strategy of the
armed struggle should be effected. The Ad hoc Committee of Seventeen Military Experts
should therefore be ronvened to study ways and means of implementing such a strat-
egy ....
2. Since there is a necessity for Member States of OAU to associate themselves more closely
with the activities of the Liberation Committee, it would be appropriate that all members
of OAU attend the meetings of the Committee as observers without participating in the
debates. The Liberation Committee will reserve the right, in order to rontinue safeguard-
ing the secrecy of its work, not to circulate documents to tlwse Member States wlw have
diplomatic relations with Portugal and the regirrws ofPretoria and Salisbury ....
5. That the Administrative Secretary General in ronjunction with the Sub-Committee
appointed by the Advisory Committee on Budgetary matters should,
(I) Investigate the root-cause of non-contribution by Member States of Special Fund and
the reasons accounting for the loss of enthusiasm in the Liberation Committee. . .. 66
A "Resolution on Decolonization and Apartheid," adopted by the Council of Min-

isters in September 1969, recommends, inter alia:
a) that all the liberation 17Wvements be required to form a common fighting front in order to
achieve an early and speedy victory over the forces of oppression and exploitation;
b) that no assistance be extended to liberation movements not recognized by OAU;
c) that more substantial aid be extended to the liberation movements materially, financially
and diplomatically;
d) that better use be made of the information media of OAU Member States, to promote
psychological warfare in the territories under foreign domination;
e) that a new and well-conceived diplomatic and political offensive be launched by OAU
Member States at all levels within international organizations to achieve the utlimate aim
of the liberation of Africa. 67
Rhodesia. Linked tothequestionofthe Liberation Committee's role, the Rhodesian

issue has perhaps been the most divisive since the second Congo crisis. Prior to the
Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, the moderate
OAU majority had sought to forestall such an event by trying to persuade the British
Government to force the Salisbury regime to adopt a constitution providing for uni-
versal suffrage. 68 When this OAU tactic failed, the Organization resolved to formulate
plans for assisting the Zimbabwe people with military force. Moreover, the OAU
declared that Member States should break off diplomatic relations with the United
Kingdom on December 15, 1965,ifbythatdatetherebellion were not crushed. At that
time only ten Member States severed relations with the U.K. They were Algeria,
Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Tanzania, and the
UAR.e9
Israel. At its Sixth Ordinary Session held in September 1969, the OAU Assembly
adopted a resolution in which it recalled its earlier resolutions sympathetic to the
UAR (AHG/Res. 53 (V) and AHG/St. 2(IV), reaffirmed "its solidarity with UAR",
and reiterated its appeal "for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab terri-
tories occupied since 5 June 1967 ... ". 70
Some Member States evidently would prefer not to extend their anti-colonialist fer-
vor to the Middle East. After an OAU Council meeting held in Addis Ababa in Febru-
ary 1968, where a pro-UAR resolution had been adopted, an important official in the
Ivory Coast Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying that at least fifteen OAU members
did not approve of that resolution and that it had been passed under "abnormal condi-
ti.ons." 71
In spite of OAU resolutions condemning Israeli occupation of Arab lands after the
Six Day War in 1967, Israel at present has diplomatic representatives in 26 African
countries. Israel has continued its ambitious technical assistance program in Africa,
where it has 265 development experts all over the continent. Malawi and Liberia, in
particular, have openly declared their sympathy for Israel. In January 1970, Israel
instituted its first direct air link to black Africa with an El Al flight between Tel Aviv
and Addis Ababa. 72
At the Islamic Summit Conference held in Rabat, Morocco in September 1969, five
African states (Senegal, Chad, Niger, and radicals Mali and Guinea) objected to a
Libyan proposal for economic and diplomatic sanctions against Israel. 73 One there-
fore wonders what debates occur behind closed doors at the OAU when resolutions
condemning Israel are adopted by the Organization.
Africanrefugees. TheproblemofrefugeesinAfricaislinkedtotheproblemofinter-
state subversion. Radical states have been known to give aid to political refugees seek-
ing to overthrow their home governments. For this reason, the OAU Charter contains
a strong injunction against fostering subversive activities in independent African
countries. 74
Recent OAU resolutions on African refugees stress the humanitarian efforts of
Member States in assisting refugees in cooperation with other international agencies.
An OAU Bureau for Placement and Education of Refugees was established after
an October 1967 conference sponsored by the OAU, the UN, and the Dag Hamar-
skjold Foundation. The Bureau helps refugees in finding employment in their adop-
tive countries. In February 1969 the OAU O:lunciladoptedan OAU O:lnvention on the
treatment of refugees in Africa. The O:lnvention was approved by the OAU Assembly
in September 1969. 75 A O:luncil resolution adopted in August-September 1969 states
that the refugee problem cannot be solved by African countries alone, and asks for
increased assistance from international agencies, including the UN High O:lmmis-
sioner for Refugees. 76
In spite of the official determination of OAU responsibility toward refugees in
Africa, earlier discussions had revealed the deeper currents of friction over this issue.
In October 1965 the Assembly adopted a resolution which
. . . recalls that Member States have pledged themselves to prevent refugees living on their
territories from carrying out by any means whatsoever any acts harmful to the interests of other
states Members of the Organization of African Unity . . . . 77
A O:luncil resolution of September 1967 notes the heavy burden placed on states
receiving large numbers of refugees and expresses the hope that refugee problems
would not cause friction between states. The resolution urges Member States to
accede to the 1951 UN O:lnvention on the Status of Refugees as well as to the Protocol
of]anuary 1967, and to apply them to refugees in Africa. The resolution asks the OAU
committee on refugees to aid countries of origin and of asylum to find means of re-
turning refugees to their homelands in conditions of security. 78 Is there a means of
returning political refugees to their homelands to face hostile governments in condi-
tions of "security"?
The African labor movement. Prior to the creation of the OAU, the African labor
movement had split into two opposing unions, the "revolutionary" and "anti-imperi-
alist" All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) and the African Trade Union
O:lnfederation (ATUC). Several abortive attempts have been made to unite the two
unions under OAU auspices. 79
In March 1969 the eighth O:lnference of African Labor Ministers adopted a resolu-
tion expressing the hope that the African trade union movement would unite in the
near future. The two unions then agreed to meet toward the end of September 1969 to
create a Pan-African Trade Union free from non-African influences. 80 This writer can
find no evidence that such a Union has been formed.
An OAU O:luncil resolution, adopted in August-September 1969, authorizes the
OAU Secretary-General to strengthen the Secretariat of the O:lnference of African
Labor Ministers. It reminds Member States of the necessity to unify the efforts of
African representatives at the International Labor Organization (governments,
employers, and workers) for the defense of African interests in the ILO. 81
The Nigerian civil war. Inspiteof thenear-unanimityof OAU members on this issue,
ideological divisions arose in part because of non-African aid to Biafra and to the
Nigerian Federal Government. OAU resolutions urged the preservation of Nigerian
unity and strongly supported the Nigerian Federal Government. 82
Only four African states recognized Biafra. They were Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tan-
zania, and Zambia. 88 Communist China announced its support of Biafrain September
1968. 84 Most important to Biafra were the efforts of France and Portugal to under-
write the Biafran military effort. 85 Portugal used Sao Tome as a base for U.S., Rhode-
sian, and French aircraft carrying arms to Biafra. Relief supplies also passed through
Sao Tome. Portugal hoped to aggravate the Nigerian conflict and demonstrate its
thesis that a European presence is necessary to ensure peace in Africa. 86 It has been
reported that Israel and South Africa also aided Biafra. 87
In face of an initial British embargo on arms shipments to Nigeria, military aid for
the Federal Government arrived from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, the UAR,
and Sudan. Britain eventually joined the latter in supplying arms to Nigeria. 88 After
the Biafran surrender in January 1970, the Nigerian Ambassador to Moscow stated
that Soviet assistance had ensured a Federal Government victory "more than any
th
oers ingletbing.... "89
Some African states chose to be more" anti-colonialist" than others in their support
for the Nigerian Federal Government. While ideological lines were blurred by the
Communist Chinese and Tanzanian support for Biafra, the threat to Nigeria, to the
rest of independent Africa, and to the liberation movements was underlined by
Portuguese, South African, ana Rhodesian efforts to aid Biafra. Moreover, the exis-
tence of a large united Nigeria was a source of pride to Africans. Algeria's President
Boumediene has stated that imperialists aimed "to disintegrate and shake to its
foundation the great African state, the unity andcohesionofwhichweareall proud." 90
REASONS FOR COEXISTENCE

The radical-moderate confrontation which has threatened to destroy the OAU is still
operative in African international relations. In view of the predominance of moder-
ates in the Organization and the radicals' disappointment with OAU decisions and
weaknesses, whydotheradicalsremainin theOAU?Howcan theOAU claim to repre-
sent all Africa in international affairs?
Pan-Africanism is a major component of the radicals' ideology. The radicals' mili-
tant anti-colonialism is based on the theory that only a united Africa can prosper and
defeat the forces of neo-colonialism attempting to undermine their regimes. This
ideology serves as an article of faith, a guide to action, and one source of legitimacy for
revolutionary governments. In this context it is unthinkable that radical regimes bolt
the OAU. They are locked into the OAU concert by their own ideologies.
• The willingness of OAU members to construct sound foundations of unity is dem-
onstrated by the supervisory role assumed by the OAU in economic and cultural af-
fairs. TheCommissionforTechnicalAssistanceinAfrica(CCTA), founded in 1950 by
colonial powers and later Africanized, had been absorbed by the OAU by January
1965. Its functions were taken over by the OAU Scientific, Technical, and Research
Commission. 91 The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the OAU agreed
tocooperateinanaccord signed in November 1965. TheOAU views its own Economic
and Social Commission as a policy-making body and the ECA as a technical organ. 92
The UNESCO Conference of African Ministers of Education was absorbed by the
OAU Commission on Education and Culture. 98 The Conference of African Ministers
of Labor was made a permanent part of the agenda of the OAU Economic and Social
Commission. The OAU coordinated Member States' policies toward the UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 94 The OAU is presently working on
means of establishing a program of intra-Mrican technical assistance. 95
The first Pan-African Cultural Festival, held in Algiers from July 21 to August 1,
1969, revealed the sincerity of OAU members' expressed desire to build cultural
bridges between Arab and Black Mrica. 96 The major theme of the Symposium on
African Culture was the concept of Africanity, largely formulated by Algerians. This
concept expresses the essence of Mrican unity in the shared experiences of a colonial
past and the current stresses of the modernization process. It prescribes the utilization
of African cultural values in the struggle for eoonomic development and political
liberation. 97
The OAU Charter reflects the actual concert pattem of African international
relations. 98 Within the OAU there is no state stronger than all the others which might
put teeth into Charter provisions and OAU decisions. 99 The only force binding Mem-
ber States is the opinion of other states. 100 The OAU cannot therefore interfere with
the activities of radical governments. The latter are able to enjoy the benefits of "unity"
while pursuing their own interests. The reverse is also true. The moderate states are
able to enjoy their majority status while defending the political status-quo and fore-
stalling the construction of supra-national political institutions.
The loose association of states in the OAU will remain the practical expression of
African unity for the foreseeable future. The OAU can exist as long as radicals and
moderates share basic commitments to African liberation, African unity, and eco-
nomic development. At the same time, as long as there remains an ideological schism
between radicals and moderates, supra-national political institutions cannot be con-
structed.
1 Only Ghana, Mora:oo, and Somalia have questioned officially the necessity of maintaining boundaries
inheritedfromtheoolonialera. See Saadia Touval, "The Organizationof African Unity and African Borders",
International Organization (Winter 1967), pp. 102-27.
• See I. William Zartman, International Relations in tlw New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, lnc., 1966), pp. 59-81.
3 During 1969 the following governmental changes occurred: A military junta overthrew the Sudanese
Govemment.ln Libya a military junta overthrew the regime of King Idris I. 1n Ghana the military junta in
power since 1966 relinquished power to civilians. The President of Somalia was assassinated and an army-
police junta assumed power. The President of Dahomey was ousted in a military ooup. See Tlw New York
Times Ganuary 30, 1970}, p. 49.
4 ColinLegum, "WhatKindofRadicalismfor Africa?",ForeignAffairs, January 1965, 246; and W. Soott
Thompson, "New Directions in Ghana",AfricaReport (November 1966}, pp. 18, 19.
5 TlwNewYorkTimes,January17,1969, pp.1,6;andJanuary22, 1969,pp.1, 14.
6 See below, pp. 7, 8.
7 I. William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State Systeminlnternational Relations",International Or-
ganization (Summer 1967), p. 563.
8 See I. William Zartman, "Nationallnterest and Ideology" in Vernon McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy
(N.Y., Washington, & London: Frederick A Praeger, 1966}, pp. 25-.54.
9 The New York Times, February 22, 1970, pp. 1, 14.
10 ZartmaninMcKay(ed.),A/ricanDiplomacy, pp. 46, 47.
11 For example, see David A. Kay, "The Impact of African States on the United Nations", International
Organization (Winter 1969), pp. 20-47.
12 Africa Report, N:ovember 1968, p. 21.
1• Kwane Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (New York: lnternational Publishers, 1969},
p.37.
14 Colinl.egum,Pan-Africanism: AShortPoliticalGuide (New York: FrederickA. Praeger, 1962), pp. 41,

42.
15 Ibid., pp. 45-47.
18 Ibid., . 48.
17 Ibid., pp. 48, 49.
18 Ibid., pp. 48, 85.
19 Ibid., p. 83.
20 Ibid., pp. 88, 89.
21 Ibid., pp. 48, 49 .
•• Ibid., p. 48.
•• Ibid., p. 49.
"Peter H. Judd, "The Attitudes of the African States toward the Katanga Secession, July 1960-January
1963," ColurnbiaEssaysininternationalAffairs: TlwDeans'sPapers, 1965 (New York and london: Colum-
bia University Press, 1966), p. 253.
25 Ibid., p. 247.
28 Zartman, International Relations in tlw New Africa, pp. 27, 28.
27 Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
28 Ibid., pp. 30,31; andl.egum,Pan-A/ricanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 52.
29 Zartman, International Relations in tlw New Africa, pp. 32, 34.
30 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ''The Addis Ababa Charter" ,International Conciliation No. 546, p. 7.
31 Ibid., p. 3:
•• Ibid., p. 9.
ss Ibid., p. 5 .
•• Ibid., p. 10.
35 Ibid.
38 Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, p. 188.
• 7 Clyde Sanger, "Towards UnityinAfrica",ForeignAffairs, January 1964, p. 270.
38 Robert C. Good, "Changing Patterns of African International Relations", Tlw American Political
Science Review (September 1964), p. 633.
39 SCIAS/GEN/INF/36, Actes de la Conference au Sammet des Pays Independants d'Afrique (Addis
Ababa: May 1963), pp. 436-61.
40 Boutros-Ghali, pp. 9, 10.
41 Ibid., p. 11.
42 SCIAS/GEN/INF/31, p. 399.
•• Boutros-Ghali, p. 14 .
•• Ibid.
45 SCIAS/GEN/INF/3, pp.191-206.
48 CluJrteroftlw Organization ofAfrican UnityinBoutros-Ghali, p. 54.
47 Immanuel Wallerstein, ''The Early Years of the OAU: The Search for Organizational Preeminence",
International Organization (Autwnn 1966), pp. 775-76.
48 Tlw Economist, July 18, 1964, p. 256.
49 Ernst B. Haas, "Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Na-
tions",inMortonA. Kaplan(ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (N.Y.:John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962),
pp.289,290,297.
50 Tlw Economist, September 12, 1964, p. 1003.
51 Africa Digest, October 1964, p. 38, and OAU Council ResolutionS (ill), September 1964.
52 Tlw Economist, September 12 1964, p. 1003.
53 Africa Digest, October 1964, p. 38.
54 SimonMalleyin/euneAfrique (December 13, 1964}, p. 6.
55 Hamadi BenMilad in/eune Afrique (December 6, 1964), p. 7.
56 /eune Afrique, December 13, 1964, p. 10.
57 TlwNew York Times, December 1, 1964, p. 8.
58 ECM/Res. 7 (IV), December 21, 1964.
59 Wallerstein,p. 776.
80 Zartman in International Organization (Summer 1967), p. 563.
81 Wallerstein, Africa: Tlw Politics of Unity (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 100-02.
82 Ibid., p. 102.
63 OAUReview, Vol. I, No.2 (November 1969), p. 13.
64 Zartman, International Relations in tlw New Africa, p. 36.
65 L. Gray Cowan, "Political Determinants" in McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy, p. 138.
68 CM/Res. 175 (XII). Italics mine.
67 CM/Res. 206 (XIII). Italics mine.
68 Wallerstein, A/rica: The Politics of Unity, pp. 98, 99.
69 Ibid.,p.107.AndSomalia, whichhadbrokenrelationswith U.K. earlier. SeealsoECM/Res.13 (N).

70 AHG/Res. 57 (VI).
71 Africa Report, Aprill968, p. 21.
72 EfremSigal, '1sraelandAfrica",A/ricaReport (February 1970), pp. 6-8.
7• Mid East, December 1969, p. 24.
74 VernonMcKay, '1nternationalG>nflictPatterns"inMcKay(ed.),A/ricanDiplomacy, pp. 9, 10.
75 OAU Review, November 1969, p. 14.
76 CM/Res. 202 (XID).
77 AHG/Res. 26 (ll).
78 CM/Res. 104 (IX).
79 Wallerstein in International Organization (Auhnnn 1966), pp. 785-86.
80 OAUReview, November 1969, p. 30. This writer has found no evidence that the two unions have met
and united. The OAU Secretariat in New York is unable to provide information on this subject. Algerian
diplomatsattheAlgerianMission to the UN assure the writer that the unions have not united.
81 CM/Res. 194 (XID).
82 See AHG/Res. 51 (N), AHG/Res. 54 (V), andAHG/Res. 58 (VI).
8 3 A/rica Report, June 1968, p. 38.
84 A/rica Report, November 1968, p. 36.
85 LawrenceFellowsin The New York Times, January 18,1970, Section4, p.l.
86 Rene Pdissier, "Sao Tome: Outpost of Portuguese Cblonialism and Lifeline to Biafra", Africa Report
Oanuary 1970), p. 27.
87 Lawrence Fellows in The New York Times, January 25, 1970, Section 4, p. 6.
88 Lawrence Fellows in TlwNew York Times, January 18, 1970, Section 4, p. 1.
89 The New York Times, January 21, 1970, p. 1.
90 CitedinAfricaReport(November 1969), p. 21.
91 Wallersteinininternatronal OrganizatWn (Auhnnn 1966), pp. 776-78.
92 Ibid., p. 779 .
•• Ibid., p. 783.
94 Ibid., pp. 783-84.
95 OAU Review, November 1969, pp. 19-26, and CM/Res. 195 (XID).
96 Cblin Legum, ''The Pan African Cultural Festival, Confrontation at Algiers," Mid East (December
1969), p. 15.
a
97 Ibid., p. 18, and ''Disrours du President Houari Boumediene prononce !'occasion de l'ouvep du
premier Festival Culturel Panafrician," Documents: Les Discours du President Boumediene, 1 juillet
1969-19 septembre 1969 (Algiers: Algerian Ministry of Information, n.d.).
98 Zartman in International OrganizatWn (Summer 1967), pp. 557-58. I tis not a true ooncert pattern as
there is no agreement on norms. See Zartman, p. 559.
99 Norman}. Padelford, "The Organization of African Unity" ,International Organization (Summer 1964),
p. 541.
100 Ibid., p. 535.
CHAPTER Ill
SOCIALIZATION
Ronald lnglehart
An end to European integration?*
Here is an exhaustive, yet concise, review of the current status of social and
political integrationwithintheareaoft he European Community. Dr. lnglehart
also contrasts his findings with those of Karl Deutsch and his associates, who
in the mid-1960's had predicted a slowing down and eventual stagnation of
European integration in the decade of the 1970's.
The tone of lnglehart's article is somewhat optimistic and is based in part
on a time-lag theory. In other words, the full potential of European integra-
tion may not be fulfilled until European youth and students, in particular,
reach positions of responsibility and leadership in the next two decades.
"European Integration has slowed down since the mid-50's, and has stopped or
reached a plateau since 1957-58. " 1 This is Karl Deutsch's first major conclusion in a
recent summary report of findings from a study which he and a number of colleagues
have been executing over the past few years. 2 The study appears to be one of the most
ambitious and interesting political research projects undertaken in recent years; its
findings should be widely useful. In reaching this conclusion, Deutsch's interpretation
is not merely that integration has stopped in the relatively narrow realm of formal
govemment decisions; on the contrary, he contends that the process has come to a halt
in the "European political environment" as a whole.
Deutsch bases his case on an analysis of trade flows and other transactions, content
analysis of the elite press, public opinion surveys and elite interviews. An examina-
tion of much the same data, in connection with a study of political socialization in
Western Europe, has led me to a radically different conclusion. Far from finding a
stagnation of integrative processes since 1958, I would argue that, in some respects,
European integration may have moved into full gear only since 1958. In this article I
will first present some new evidence concerning attitudes among the younger gener-
ationin The Netherlands, France, West Germany and Great Britain; I will then review
Deutsch's findings in this context.
I. ATTITUDES AMONG WESTERN EUROPEAN YOUTH

I hypothesize that important changes in political socialization may have been taking
place in recent years, as a result of the postwar European movement, the increases in
trade, exchange of persons, and the erection of European institutions. If this is the case,
"I wish to thank Samuel Barnes, M. Kent Jennings, Warren Miller and David Segal for their valuable
criticisms of an earlier draft of this article. I am also grateful to Karl Deutsch for generously giving access to
research reports from his study. The interpretations reached here are, of course, my own.
From: American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (March 1967), pp. 91-105. Reprinted by permission
of the author and the Review.
52
SOCIALIZATION 53
we might expect to find differences between adults and youth in their orientations
toward European integration. To test this hypothesis, I made a secondary analysis of
two cross-national studies of adult attitudes, made in 1962 and 1963. I will compare
these data with material which I collected in 1964 and 1965 through surveys of the
school populations of France, The Netherlands, West Germany and England. 3 My
sampling technique consisted of selecting several schools in each country which were
considered representative of the important social and economic groups, on consul-
tation with educational authorities in the respective countries. Self-administered
questionnaires were given to all members of specific classes in these schools, under
the supervision of a teacher. 4 The questionnaires incorporated a number of items from
the two adult surveys just mentioned. The data indicate that a gap does exist between
adults and youth in relative degree of "Europeanness."
In response to the question, "To what extent are you in favor of, or opposed to, the
efforts being made to unify Europe?" adults compared with youth (ages 13-19) as
follows:
TABLE 1. Overall percentage "strongly for" or "for" European unification
NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN
Adults 1962 87% 72% 81% (65%) 5

Youth 1964-65 95 93 95 72
Among youth of the three European Community countries, this is about as near to a
unanimous verdict as one is likely to come in survey research. The response is over-
whelmingly favorable to European unification by a majority which swamps all differ-
ences of social class, sex, religion, etc. Among adults in these three countries, a sub-
stantial degree of hesitation exists, especially in France; it virtually vanishes among
the younger generation. English youth is far from unanimity, but does give a fairly
solid majori!f in support.
The foregoing question merely indicates support or opposition to European "unifi-
cation" as a general idea. Whathappenswhenwepinour respondents down to specific
measures? A series of questions was asked concerning concrete proposals for Euro-
pean integration. We find that the favorable percentage declines in every case; a
strong majority gives lip service, at least, to the general idea of "unification" but is less
emphatically in favor of given specific proposals. A factor analysis of our secondary
school data revealed that a number of these responses clustered together, evidently
indicating a "Europeanness" dimension. Using the four highest-loading items which
are common to both surveys, let uscomparethe responses of youth with those of adults
in 1963 (Tables 2 and 3).
The Netherlands (in which the adult population already displayed a relatively high
level of support for European integration) shows a relatively small age group differ-
ence; but over the four measures, our samples of French and German youth show
pronounced increases in Europeanness relative to the adults in those countries.
English youth lag behind here, as in our other comparison, although there is an
indication of some increase in Europeanness relative to the adult population of
54 REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS I STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS
TABLE 2. Percentage "for" four proposals: adults v. youth
1. "Abolish Tariffs?"
Adults 79% 72% 71% 70%
Youth 87 83 89 74
2. "Free Movement of Labor and Businesses?"
Adults 76 57 64 52
Youth 64 65 75 65
3. "Common Foreign Policy"
Adults 67 50 60 41
Youth 80 71 74 56
4. "Use Our Taxes to Aid Poorer European Countries?"
Adults 70 43 52 63
Youth 82 68 72 57
TABLE 3. Average percentage "for" four measures
Adults 73% 56% 62% 57%

Youth 78 72 78 63
Difference +5 +16 +16 +6
Normalized
Difference 6 19 36 42 14
Britain. 7 Striking as these generational differences are, they become even more
interesting when we break down the adult responses according to age group:
TABLE 4. Average percentage "for" four measures, by age group
AGE GROUPS NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN
55 andover 70% 47% 52% 49%

40-50 73 58 63 57
30-39 71 59 64 61
21-29 72 58 67 60
16-19 (youth sample) 77 72 78 63
In the Netherlands, the most notable feature of this pattern is its stability among dif-
ferent age groups. Dutch youth are more European than the oldest adult group (55
and over), but the difference is one of only 7 percentage points: an average of 77 per
cent "For" among the teenagers, as compared with 70 percent among the oldest group.
The gap between the "55 and over" Germans and the teen-age Germans is much
larger: fully 26 percentage points separate the two groups, building from a base of
52 per cent. This seems to confirm other findings of striking differences among age
groups reported for that country. One hears less talk of a "generations conflict" in
France, yet in regard to the European issue, my data indicate that among the French
SOCIALIZATION 55
there is almost as great a change from middle-agers to teen-agers as in the case of

Germany: anincreaseof25 percentage points in over-all support of the four European
integration measures. The increase from oldest to youngest age group in England is
intermediate: 14 percentage points.
While the average levels of support for these concrete proposals are considerably
below the landslide approval of European "unification," we might tentatively draw
the conclusion that the youngest generation in each of these countries is significantly
more favorable to European integration than the group 55 and over-the age group
which now holds most top-level positions of political power in these countries. Two
relative discontinuities are particularly interesting in the age-group pattern: first,
we notice that in France, Germany and Britain, the "over 55" group is markedly less
European than the group immediately bordering it: there is a sharp drop of 8 to 11
percentage points. On the other hand, we find no sizeable gap between the oldest
Dutch group and thenextyoungergroup,inregard to Europeanness. Indeed, the "over
55" group in that country is within two points of the "21-29" group. This contrast
between Dutch stability and the rather sharp changes in the age group patterns of her
neighbors cannot readily beinterpretedin terms of a life cycle explanation and it leads
us to a very interesting alternative interpretation.
Theagegroupwhich was 55 and older in 1963 was at least 10 years old at the end of
World War I. These individuals were exposed to the period of intense nationalism
which preceded that war, and to the powerful fears and suspicions the war aroused
during a relative impressionable stage of life. Alone among these four countries, Hol-
landdidnotparticipatein World War I-nor was she deeply involved in the preceding
great-power rivalries. If one's concept of nationality tends to be established early in
life, 8 then the sharp decline in Europeanness which we find among this age group in
each country except the Netherlands might be attributed to a residue from experi-
encesinchildhoodandyouth.lt seems plausible that the effect of a major war on one's
feelings of trust and kinship with the "enemy" people (e.g., the French toward the
Germans) is strongly negative.
The "over 55" group in France, Germany and Britain had a powerful dose of the in-
fluences of World War I in its early years: The corresponding group in Holland
was much less affected by them. And thenextyoungergroup (this time in all four coun-
tries) also showslessof the effect which we might attribute to that period: The median
year of birth for this group is 1916. The oldest members ofthe younger group would
have had some exposure to World War I (and their Europeanness would be lessened
accordingly); but to a large extent this group was too young to be directly aware of
World War I, and had reached adulthood before the outbreak of World War II. Karl
Deutsch reports a phenomenon which seems to fit in with this interpretation. Draw-
ing on data from a series of elite interviews in France, he reports:
Typically,ageacrountsforlessthan5percentofthevarianceintheanswersfound. Within these

limits, the "middle elites" -those in their fifties and hence the generation of the 1930's and
World War IT -tend todifferfromboththeireldersandjuniors, who in tum often resemble each
other. This middle elite group is somewhat more nationalistic and more closely identified with
the de Gaule regime. The junior elite-those under 50 -are more intemationalistic, more in
favor of alliances, and still more opposed to an independent foreign policy for France. 9
While Deutsch refers to the relatively nationalistic group as "the generation of the
1930's and World War II," they might also be described as "the generation of World
War I": in their fifties in 1964 (the time of the interviews), the Great War was prob-
ably felt as the important event of their childhood. They were 4 to 14 years old at the
War's end. The next younger group was unaware of the war, while most of the older
group had already passed through their most important years of political socialization
by that time.
Moving down the age group tables, we notice little further increase in Europeanness
among the adult population. This would be surprising if we were to work on the as-
sumption that younger people are naturally more open to new ideas (a favorite
assumption of intuitive life-cycle interpretations). Again we would attribute this
peculiarity to the psychological residue of a major event-in this case, World War II.
The median year of birth of the youngest adult group is 1938: By 1945, its members
were 3 to 11 years old, and had experienced blitz, occupation, and devastation during
the most impressionable years of life. The "European" atmosphere of the post-war
years should also have made a relatively great impact on this youngest adult group-
but apparently not enough to make them significantly more European than the older
adult groups.
Except for the oldest group, none of the age groups discussed so far is a "pure" cate-
gory from the standpoint of historical experiences. To some extent they overlap, con-
taining individuals who were socialized during periods which we would consider
optimal (from the standpoint of developing Europeanness) as well as individuals who
were exposed to powerful negative influences during the years of childhood and early
youth. The youngest group of all (those in the 16-19 year old category) do constitute
a "pure" group in this sense. All of these individuals were hom in 1945 or later; they
have gained their first political perceptions in a world where European organization
seems natural and right, and nationalism seems archaic and dangerous. It is among this
youngest group that we find (as we did with the oldest group) a relatively great discon-
tinuityfromthelevelofEuropeannessoftheadjacentgroup. This discontinuity is most
marked in France and Germany; it exists also in TheNetherlands; but it is very slight
in England. The latter finding may be highly significant. I conclude that at least two
elements are necessary for the establishment of a strong sense of Europeanness:
1. The absence of divisive memories (but this is not enough in itself).
2. A sense of positive participation in substantial common activities. Britain has
not participated in the institutions of the European Community. Youth in the other
threecountries,however,havegrownupwithsomeawarenessofa commonendeavor,
and this may explain, at least in part, their greater degree of backing for European
integration measures.
II. AGE, COHORT AND HISTORICAL PERIOD

Projecting from the foregoing data, we might anticipate that the current generation
of youth in these countries will manifest a relatively "European" outlook when they
become adults, because this accords with conditions obtaining at that point in time
when their basic political orientations were instilled. At this point, let me introduce
an hypothesis which will make more explicit the relationship which I believe exists
SOCIALIZATION 57
between certain distinctive aspects of the attitudes of a given age cohort and the period
in which the group received its early socialization. The central element in this hy-
pothesis is something which we might call "structural inertia" in concept formation.
Taking this view, we would regard the socialization process as one in which percep-
tions become ordered into increasingly complex conceptual structures. Only a few of
the infant's earliest perceptions-those related to basic needs- will give rise to sub-
jectively important symbols. Most other stimuli will be disregarded as "noise." Sub-
sequent perceptions which are regularly associated with these symbols may take on a
derivative importance; these will tend to become relatively permanent, to the extent
that a relatively large number of perceptions are associated together around a given
basic symbol. To change a central part of the system would require a disassembly and
reintegration of the whole structure. Accordingly, adult learning has been contrasted
with infant learning as the "recombination of a smaller number of larger subassem-
blies of memories or habits .... " 10 When one has reached adulthood, only a very
important event, making a deep and continuing impact on the individual's life, would
justify the cost of such a conceptual reorganization.
My expectation on the basis of this hypothesis is that the full impact of the post-war
European movement hasnotyetmanifesteditself among the adult population. I would
anticipate a time lag between certain types of major political outputs and the resulting
feedback into the political system, because of the gap in time between the early
political socialization of individuals, 11 and the point at which they become politically
relevant. We might diagram the basis of this time lag as shown in Figure 1.
A major event (war, or the establishment of new political institutions let us say) oc-
curs at time X -during the adult years of generation "1 ," bringing about a relatively
superficial attitudinal change in that generation. It has occurred during the late child-
hood of generation "2" and influences the basic political orientation of that age group.
Its political feedback, however,maynot be felt until time Y, when that generation "sur-
faces" into political relevance. (This point is arbitrarily indicated as age 21). Such a
time-lag effect would only be expected to operate in connection with relatively early-
established and persisting aspects of political socialization. Provisionally, I interpret
these data on development of a sense of European political identity according to this
model. 12
It is, of course, impossible to predict with certainty what attitudes a given age group
will express in a decade or two. My interpretation would be far more convincing if I
were able to support it with longitudinal data based on national probability samples
made at several different points in time. This is a goal forfurther research. On the basis
of the evidence we have examined, however, we might infer tentatively that the
younger generation has a stronger tendency to support the concept of a federal Europe
than do older age groups in these countries. The Europeanness of the youth samples
presumably represents a basic orientation, rather than a re-orientation in conformity
with current experience.
Ill. DECAY OR STABILITY IN AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES?

We find age group differences, then, as predicted by our model. But will these dif-
ferences persist? From the perspective of the exceptionally stable American political
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SOCIALIZATION 59
community (which has experienced a relatively slowly changing political consensus

for about a century) one may be tempted to assume that these age-group differences
will decay-that by the time the current European youth are as old as today's adults,
they will hold the same attitudes. To be sure, a life cycle interpretation may provide
a valid explanation for many or most of the age group differences which have been
found in survey research, especially among societies which are not undergoing rapid
social change. On the other hand, it is clear that this is not true in all cases, even in
Western societies. 13
Therelativeimportanceofdecayinage group differences probably varies according
to at least three sets of circumstances: (1) The type of attitude involved. Preferences
in popular music, for example, may be very largely governed by life cycle factors;
political party preference, or matters of even more fundamental self-identification
may be much less so. (2) The age at which the given orientation is established. Accord-
ing to our concept of structural inertia, those attitudes which are earliest established
should be hardest to change. Orientation toward the political community seems to be
established relatively early in life. (3) The causes of the given set of age group differ-
ences: are they attributable to different reactions to the same environmental condi-
tions at different points in the life cycle, or are they due to different conditions of early
socialization? If the latter, we might expect decay to be relatively unimportant, par-
ticularly if the changed conditions persist.
IfEuropeanness were a matter of teen-age rebellion, for example, we might be jus-
tified in assuming that it would diminish with increasing maturity. Our interviews
gave little indication thatEuropeanness was regarded by youth as a form of rebellion. 14
On the contrary, it seemed to be generally regarded as an enlightened and highly
respectable orientation. Analysis by social status reinforces this impression; far from
being a deviant position, "Europeanness" is likely to be found among those of higher
status and those who are most integrated into the community. My interpretation links
the age group differences which seem to exist regarding Europeanness with the fol-
lowing differences in the conditions of early socialization:
a. Absence of a major intra-European war from the younger individuals' exper-

ience.
b. A marked increase in intra-European transactions, with a possible reduction
in the psychological distance between the groups concerned.
c. Development of European institutions which perform important functions and
are widely regarded as beneficial.
All these factors have distinguished the early socialization of European youth from
thatoftheoldergenerations. Moreover, theycontinuetooperate; we might well argue
thattheirimpactislikelytoincrease rather than disappear as the current crop of youth
grows older. These do not appear to be transient stimuli, felt only at a certain stage of
life, but persisting factors. Although they probably reach their greatest degree of
effectiveness in orienting (presumably malleable) children, they may also have some
effect in resocializing adults in the same direction. The fact that adult age cohorts
appear to have become somewhat more European during their mature years suggests
that one might reverse the question about decay, and ask "How much more European
are these younger people likely to become by the time they are 30 or 40 years old?"
By their very nature, our data cannot give a conclusive answer to this question (or its
reverse).Itwould be rash, however, to flatly assume that a decay in Europeanness will
take place.
IV. STABILITY OF ATTITUDES OVER TIME

At this point one might reasonably ask if it is plausible that individuals respond to sur-
vey questions such as these because of events in their childhood and youth: Just how
stable are these attitudes? To deal with this point, let us review the manner in which
public support for European integration has varied over a decade's time. During that
period, the question about "making efforts toward uniting Europe" has been asked
repeatedly in three of the countries included in our survey. The following percentages
of adult samples responded that they were "for" these efforts: 15
TABLE 5. Percent of adults "for" efforts to unite Europe
SEPT. OCT. FEB. DEC. APR. OCT. JUNE FEB.

'52 '54 '55 '55 '56 '56 '57 '62
W.Ger. 70% 82% 73% 69% 79% 82% 79% 81%
Britain 58 78 67 66 65 64
France 60 63 49 45 53 67 55 72
As we see, support for European integration fluctuates from year to year, even from
month to month. Are we justified in attributing variations in Europeanness among
different age groups to the effect of events which took place as much as 50 years ago?
Despite the manifest fluctuation, there is a certain underlying stability. Although
varying proportions of the population favored "efforts toward unifying Europe" at
varying times, in every case the German adults gave the highest level of favorable
response among these countries; and in five of the six cases where comparative data
are available, the British adults ranked second. 16 The levels of support for European
unity rise and fall simultaneously in the three countries-perhaps in response to im-
portant events in the international environment.
There is also a degree of consistencyinresponsepattemswhen we break them down
according to social categories within these countries. In nearly every case, the upper
socio-economic groups give a stronger favorable response than do the lower groups. 17
Moreover the adherents of certain political parties have consistently been more favor-
able to uniting Europe than those of other parties. Although the overall level of support
rises and falls, the same social groups (and, I infer, the same individuals) tend to be
relatively strong orrelativelyweak in support for European unification. Certain major
events come to mind as plausible causes of this rise and fall: I will make a few conjec-
tures about them.
The first two polls in the above series were made in 1952 and 1954-immediately
after the Korean War, formation of the ECSC and during the efforts to form a Euro-
pean Defense Community. There was, probably, a sense of common danger, and a
SOCIALIZATION 61
feeling that European unification was moving ahead successfully. Optimism about
the imminence of European unification seems to be associated with expressions of
support for European unification. 18 The collapse of the EDC project (and perhaps a
diminishing sense of military danger) had the converse effect -leading a decline in
pro-European sentiment in 1955 and early 1956. 19 Subsequent rises in the level of
sentiment supporting European unification might be associated with the impact of
the Hungarian revolt and the Suez invasion in late 1956; and with a generally opti-
misticclimatecreated by the establishment and rapid implementation of the Common
Market, by 1962.
The question about "efforts toward unifying Europe" was not asked in the 1963
cross-national survey of adults, but there are strong indications that de Gaulle's veto
of British admission to the Common Market dispelled the mood of high expectations,
bringing a period of relative pessimism which perhaps persists today. One piece of
evidence consists in the factthatthere was a sharp drop in levels of support for the four
key European integration proposals discussed earlier in this paper. Average levels of
support for the four measures declined as follows:
TABLE 6. Levels of support for integration proposals,

1962-1963
(FEB.) 1962 (FEB.) 1963
The Netherlands 78.5% 73.0%

West Germany 68.2 61.8
France 58.8 54.4
Great Britain
(data not available)
Between January, 1961 and December, 1965, the percentage of Germans who "ex-
pect some day to see the countries of Europe united to constitute a United States of
Europe" dropped from 36 per cent to 29 per cent. This decline in optimism was es-
pecially marked among people over 45 years of age. 20 Moreover, despite the prover-
bial optimism of youth, the young people in our samples are much less likely to view
European unification as something which will beattainedin the near future than were
adults in the 1962 samples. In response to the question "Do you believe that Europe
willbecomeunified? ... IfYES,inhowlongaperiodoftime?"thefollowingresponses
were obtained:
TABLE 7. Expectations of European unification
NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY

"NEVER"
OR"OVER" WITHIN OVER WITHIN OVER WITHIN
20YRS." 15 YRS. 20YRS. 15 YRS. 20 YRS. 15 YRS.
Adults(1962) 57% 43 51 49 42 58
Young (1964-65) 82 18 83 17 78 22
The adults were about evenly split (in 1962) between those who saw European unifi-
cation as something quite close at hand, and those who felt it would come only in the
remote future or never. About four-fifths of the youth in all three countries saw it as
something relatively remote (and the stalemate which existed in European politics
at the time of their responses made their position seem fairly realistic). We believe
that this factor probably acted to deflate the level of support for European integration
expressed by the younger people in 1964-65. Nevertheless, despite an apparent
realization that European unification had bogged down, the youth in our samples
gave a relatively strong measure of support for "European" proposals. This shows up
even when we compare their responses in 1964-65 with the adult responses from
1962. 21 Basing our comparison on the same four key proposals described earlier in
this paper, average levels of support were as follows:
TABLE 8. Average percentage "for" four measures
Adults (1963) 78% 59% 68%

Youth (1964-65) 77 72 78
In this comparison, the youth in our Dutch sample are actually slightly less European
than the adults; I attribute this to a reaction to the veto of British admission (and other
lesser events) which intervened between the times when the two surveys were taken.
In the other two comparisons, the younger generation is substantially more European
than the adult age groups, despite the fact that the outlook in 1964 was decidedly less
auspicious than it had been in 1962.
V. RELATIVE STABILITY OF ATTITUDE AMONG DIFFERENT

AGE GROUPS: THE IMPACT OF THE DE GAULLE VETO
The existence of data from two cross-national surveys of attitudes toward European
integration, made within a year of each other but giving responses both before and
after the veto of British admission to the Common Market, gives us an opportunity to
check the relative stability of support for "Europe" among different groups in the adult
population of Western Europe. And some intriguing patterns emerge when we com-
pare responses to nine questions which were asked in both the 1962 and 1963 inter-
national surveys.
Over the six EEC countries there is a net decline of slightly more than 6 per cent
from 1962 to 1963 in the average level of support for the nine European integration
proposals. For the most part, this does not reflect a movement into opposition, but a
shift from being "for" to "no answer." The percentage giving no answer increased an
average of about 8 points from the first survey to the next, so that the percentage
"against" actually declined slightly.
The increase in the proportion not answering, from 1962 to 1963, seems to be an
emotional response to a discouraging event; it can scarcely be attributed to a decline
inknowledgeorpublicinterest. On the contrary, during the year intervening between
the two surveys, the negotiations for British entry brought forth very extensive cover-
SOCIALIZATION 63
age of the European integration question by the mass media, and almost certainly
increased public interest in the topic. Viewed in this context, the rather large increase
in the percentage not answering (which would normally seem paradoxical) makes
sense: Apparently a number of new converts had been made to the European cause
during the course of the negotiations. They were recruited largely from among the
previously uninformed -and were the least stable adherents.
The veto of British admission on January 14, 1963 suddenly made the outlook for
the cause seem bleak. Reacting to this, many of those who had been "for" Europe
were apparently jolted off the bandwagon (especially the newer converts, I hypothe-
size). They were discouraged, but they did not go so far as to register an opinion
against European integration, however. Instead, they abstained from answering.
This is reflected in the substantial and consistent increase in "no answer" responses
in each country. By abstaining, these individuals avoided the psychic pain of acknowl-
edging that they were "for" what appeared to be a losing cause.
In which countries was the shock most keenly felt? Expressed as a percentage of
those originally "for" each measure, the average decline for the respective nations
was: Germany, 15.0 per cent; Belgium, 13.6 per cent; The Netherlands, 10.4 per
cent; France,6.2 percent; andltaly,5.1 percent. In the 1962 survey, the most Euro-
pean country was The Netherlands, followed closely by Belgium and Germany, with
France and Italy lagging behind. To an extent, the most European countries suffered
the greatest decline from one survey to the next (which I will refer to as "fall-out").
We might explain this phenomenon as follows: A large share of the population of
anynationismoreor less apolitical; theconsensusfavorableto a given measure in such
a country will therefore contain a higher proportion of £air-weather friends, who have
been only faintly interested in the measure, but indicate that they favor it because
it is perceived as widely accepted. If 90 per cent of the population of a country ex-
presses itself as favorable to a given proposition, we may be sure that a good share of
them- perhaps 20 per cent or 30 per cent of those favorable- have only the vaguest
attachment to the measure.
In this connection, we may note that the French level of support was already rela-
tively low in 1962, apparently fairly near a level where only persons with some
genuine conviction would express themselves as favorable to a given proposal for inte-
gration. France was thus less vulnerable to a decline in support, as a result of a dis-
couraging event, because sufficient opposition was being voiced within the political
culture so that apoliticals were less sure which was the "proper" response. 22
But when we look at the data more closely, we find that the relative attrition is not
simply due to having had a comparatively large proportion of the population giving
nominal support; some persisting element of a nation's political culture seems to be
equally important. For we find a relative stability in The Netherlands (the most Euro-
pean country in 1962) as compared with Germany. In 1963, the latter country had
dropped sharply, to a level below France, although still ahead of Italy. 23 By contrast,
Holland was still clearly in the lead after the veto. While she did experience consider-
able decline, it was substantially less than that in Germany. I hypothesized that "fall-
out" is caused chiefly by defection of the bandwagon riders; but this group may contain
two types of individuals: those whose commitment to a given position is relatively
superficial because they are weakly involved politically; and those whose conunit-
mentis unstable because they are expressing agreement with a popular or fashionable
trend without its being in harmony with the outlook instilled in their primary political
socialization.
Our previous analysis has pointed to The Netherlands as an example of stable inter-
nationalism, over the three generations for which we have data. Internationalism has
deeper historical roots there than among her neighbors. 24 Non-participation in World
Warl may be an additional factor which would help to maintain a relatively even pat-
tern among the Dutch adult age groups. This may explain the relatively small degree
of"fall-out" in The Netherlands, despite the fact that disappointment there must have
been especially sharp in reaction to de Gaulle's veto: Holland was the country which
was most keenly in favor of British admission, among the Six. 25
The relative importance of "fall-out" is greater in Germany. Apparently the Ger-
man consensus favoring Europe was a particularly vulnerable one, containing a rela-
tively large proportion of persons who were expressing internationalistic views which
were not in harmony with their primary attitudes.
To check thevalidityofthisinterpretation, let us examine the responses of different
age groups within these countries, and the degree to which they shifted from 1962 to
1963. This age-group analysis so far has suggested that the adults who received their
primary political socialization in the interwar period, and the youth socialized after
World War II, are relatively strongly European. According to my interpretation, it is
these age groups which have underlying concepts of nationality which are most nearly
akin to the currently-expressed Europeanism. I would predict, therefore, that these
age groups should show the least "fall-out." 26
Let me point out that a normal expectation would be that the older group would
show less "fall-out" from one year to the next: (1) They would be expected to have a
relatively inflexible mentality; (2) They have held their opinions longer, and should
be relatively "immunized" to change. 27 My prediction, however, is to the contrary:
I hypothesize that the older group has a more nationalistic basic concept of political
identity, and that these individuals are consequently more vulnerable to change as
the result of a blow to a bandwagon mentality.
A comparison of relative rates of "fall-out" indicates that there is very little differ-
ence between the older and the younger groups in The Netherlands-once again
reflecting her history of a relative internationalism over the past three generations.
Since both groups had about the same inner orientation, Dutchmen of 40 and over
suffered just about the same degree of set-back as did the younger Dutch adults. On
the other hand, the older Frenchmen and Germans suffered a substantially greater
degree of "fall-out" than did their younger compatriots. This suggests that they exper-
ienced a greater degree of dissonance between expressed and inner orientation than
did the younger group.
Note that the younger German group is more stable in its Europeanism than the
younger Dutch group: Evidently nationalism in Germany exists mainly among those
aged forty and over. 28
This ~alysis suggests that the younger adults (particularly in France and Germany)
have a more stable conunitment to European integration than do the older adults.
SOCIALIZATION 65
TABLE 9. "Fall-out" from 1962 to 1963 by age group, four key measures
2(}-39 40+ 2o-39 40+ 2o-39 40+
Abolish Tariff: -10% -14% -5 -15 -5 -11

Free Movement Labor, Bus. +8 +9 -1 -2 -8
Common Foreign Pol. -13 -5 -8 -11 -13 -11
Aid European Countries -10 -7 +8 -1 +2 -1
Average Pointsof"Faii-Out" -6.3 -6.5 +1 -7 -4.5 -7.8
Despite the fact that (under favorable conditions) both groups may express approxi-
mately the same level of support for "European" proposals, there appear to be fewer
bandwagon-riders among the younger group. I attribute this phenomenon to differ-
ences in the early socialization of the different age categories.
VI. THE EVIDENCE OF OTHER INDICATORS

Let us return now to the question posed at the start: Has European integration in gen-
eral come to an end? If not, why is it that two analyses (Karl Deutsch's and mine) have
come to such opposite conclusions?
Deutsch, of course, does not draw upon political socialization data in concluding
that European integration has levelled off or come to a halt; not having this material
available may have led him to underestimate the degree to which the integrative
process has continued. But the difference in results cannot be attributed to this alone.
My own analysis relies partly on an assertion that the overall European political en-
vironment is currently favorable to formation of a European outlook, and that it has
grown more, not less so since 1958.
In making his argument, Deutsch draws on some imaginative and sophisticated
analysis; it is worth reviewing in detail. He bases much of his case on an examination
of "structural integration." He states: "An analysis of trade data going back as far as
1890 suggests that in the 1957-58 period Europe reached the highest level of struc-
tural integration it ever had," Deutsch argues, in effect, that although the total amount
of trade among the members of the European Community has increased since 1958,
this fact must be discounted because the rate of increase has been no greater than the
general rise of trade and productivity. His interpretation might be debated on a variety
of grounds. In the period 1958-62, total trade among the countries of the European
Community increased by73 percent. 29 At the same time, these countries experienced
their most impressive four years of economic growth in modem history 30 -a growth
which may have been stimulated in part by the extraordinary increase in Community
trade. Are we to discount the importance of the trade increase because of the simul-
taneousoccurrence of economic growth? This line of reasoning by itself would lead us
to conclude, for example, that the United States was less than half as "integrated"
with Western Europe in 1957 as it was in 1929-at the height of isolationism. 31 Amer-
ica's foreign trade increased substantially during the intervening period but GNP
increased even faster.
In regard to the economic sphere, Deutsch's argument is useful, though not compel-
ling. 32 When he shifts the analogy to other spheres, however, his conclusions become
dubious, particularly where the psychological dimension of the transaction is crucial.
Deutsch states, "The absolute increases after 1958 in trade, travel, postal correspon-
dence and the exchange of students are accountable for from the effects of prosperity
and the general increase in the levels of these activities. There have been no increases
in integration in regard to all these transactions beyond what one would expect from
mere random probability and the increase in prosperity in the countries concemed." 33
Does the fact that these changes have been accompanied by rising prosperity mean
that "integration" has not been taking place?34 I would argue that the chief signifi-
cance of these trends lies not in the extent to which they have produced "structural
integration" in the sense in which Deutsch defines it, but in the degree to which they
reshape the political aspirations of the major groups in the society. For example, are we
toregardanincreasein the number of students being educated abroad as offset by the
fact that there has been an increase in higher education within these countries? On
the contrary, there is every reason to believe that both tendencies are contributing
to the process of European integration. Virtually every opinion survey from which
data are available indicates that a relatively high level of education is associated with
a stronger degree of support for European unification. 35 Assume that we were able
to demonstrate that increases in the exchange of students and in higher education
generally bothencouragethedevelopmentof a sense of European citizenship; assume
also that these increases in educational activities can be attributed entirely to rising
prosperity. We would then have demonstrated the (unsurprising) point that prosperity
encourages political integration; we would not have shown that integration is not
taking place.
Similarly, let us assume that travel in other EEC countries makes an individual
more favorable to European integration; is this effect nullified by travel in other
places?Theabsoluteincreaseinexchangeoftourists amongEEC countries since 1958
has been very sizable; the influx of EEC tourists in 1963 compares with that in 1958
as follows: Italy, 176 per cent; France, 348 per cent; Germany 139 per cent; Belgium-
Luxemburg, 138 per cent; The Netherlands, 146 per cent. 36 There are indications
that this trend is strongly favorable to the process of European integration. 37 In 1963,
over six million German tourists visited Italy (equal to the total influx of tourists into
the United States from all nations that year), a figure which represents one out of every
nine Germans. At the same time, there were about three million visitors from France,
a million from The Netherlands, two-thirds of a million from Belgium. To be sure, the
rate of increase has levelled off in recent years. But this may be because the process
is reaching a saturation point. Overall, in 1963, and again in 1964, about one out of
every twelve citizens from her EEC partner countries visited Italy. This is comparable
to the proportion of Americans who visit Florida in a given year. 38
It is also true that rates of travel to countries outside the European Community have
increased markedly since 1958; presumably this should act to encourage integration
with those countries as well. But there is no reason to assume that an increase in
"Europeanness" can come about only through a relative exclusiveness vis-a-vis the
outside world. Conceivably, the two might increase concomitantly. In fact, as we shall
see presently, this seems to be the case.
SOCIALIZATION 67
Deutsch's distinction between structural integration and probabilistic integration

is useful; but he tends to overstress the former at the expense of the latter. Further-
more, he seems tooverlookthepossibleexistenceof a threshold effect. Deutsch would,
no doubt, agree that the EEC area has already reached a relatively high level of struc-
tural integration (his data indicate that, in general, a 70-80 per cent level has been
attained) .It is quite conceivable that this is a high enough level for political integration
to take place, even if further increases in these exchanges do not rise above random
probability rates. Deutsch would further probably agree that the development of a
sense of community is central to the process of integration. 39 Material on "structural
integration" provides a relatively indirect indication as to whether this process is tak-
ing place. Nevertheless, although Deutsch himself uncovers a more direct kind of evi-
dence of such crucial changes in orientation, he tends to underplay its importance.
Let me cite some of these cases: He finds that "Friendly feelings in French mass
opinion about Germany, and in German mass opinion about France, increased sub-
stantially to roughly one-half of the Germans and Frenchmen polled in 1963-4. Feel-
ings of mutual trust increased much less, to about one-fifth of the respondents in each
country." 40 He also finds an increase in agreement on accepting European unity be-
tween the two countries since 1958; and that elites in the two countries agree on most
major issues -and furthermore, seem to be converging over time. Deutsch states that
"Factor analysis of many French and German opinion poll results between 1954 and
1962 indicated a marked increase in the similarity of image between the two coun-
tries .... In particular, there was a marked increase in the importance of an image
of a United Europe in both French and German opinion. Most of this increase occurred
between 1957 and 1962 ."He then notes that "In regard to accepting European unity,
at least in general terms, Frenchmen and Germans agreed to a greater extent in 1962
than they had done in earlier years." 41
Deutsch tends to discount this primarily on the basis of three points: First, the people
ofthetwoconntriestrustthe U.S. morethaneachother; and Britain trusts both of them
more than they do each other. Here again we encounter in its most explicit form an
assumption which also seems to underlie Deutsch's reasoning about "structural in-
tegration." It might be legitimate to discount indicators of increased European inte-
gration on the ground that these interactions have also risen with regard to the outside
world; this could be justified if, and only if, European integration and Atlantic integra-
tion (and international integration in general) take place in different psychological
directions,onetendingtodevelop atthe expense of the other.lf "Europeanness" were
a traditional form of nationalism, this assumption might be justified. But, in fact, the
available evidence indicates that this is not the case: They seem to lie on a common
psychological dimension. As an individual is converted to a European (or Atlantic)
point of view, he tends to become more favorable to other forms of internationalism
as well. An openness to Atlantic unity and toward rapprochement with Eastern
Europe has characterized theMonnetEuropeans for a number of years; 42 this orienta-
tion also seems to characterize the pro-Europeans among the general population. My
surveyofyouthin Western Europe found the following correlations betweenrelatively
strong support for European federation and for United States association with the
EEC: 43
Netherlands France Germany Britain

Q= +.38 +.70 +.58 +.51
The tendency for partisans of European federation to favor world government was
generally weaker, but consistently positive:
Netherlands France Germany Britain

0= +.42 +.38 +.49 +.29
If this is true, the relevant question is whether two given countries are in fact coming
to trust each other and agree with each other to a greater extent as time passes. The
existence of relatively high levels of trust for the United States is certainly interesting
but it does not diminish the significance of the increasing levels of trust and agreement
on European unification between France and Germany.
Deutsch's second reason for discounting the foregoing evidence is that elites in
France and Germany show different levels of support for NATO and arms control
proposals. But the process of integration implies a continuing convergence-not
necessarily that the integrating partners have reached the same absolute level at a
given time.
The third point which Deutsch cites centers on the decline of interest in NATO and
in arms control proposals-by governments, in the press, and among the general
public. In view of the decline of a sense of threat of Russian invasion, this change in
attitude is perfectly comprehensible: The problem is less interesting because it seems
less important. In the early 1950's, European "unification" was largely manifested in
NATO, amilitaryresponse to a military threat. Today it connotes economic and social
integration to a much greater extent, as exemplified by the European Community.
Deutsch's elite interview data indicate that at present support for European integra-
tion is not dependent on a sense of military threat. 44 Nevertheless, he uses evidence
of declining interest in military matters to support his contention that European in-
tegration has come to a stop. One might hazard the guess that Deutsch's conclusion
may have been unduly influenced by the study of top-level decision-making. It is at
precisely this level that European integrative activity has been most effectively
blocked since 1958 (but even here one cannot overlook such important bits of progress
as the agreement to unify the three European Community executive bodies, and the
agreement on a common agricultural policy). In broader spheres of European society,
I would argue, the process of integration has been going on.
At least a limited amount of reorientation in favor of "Europe" seems to have taken
place among the adult population since 1958. But perhaps more important are the
changes which seem to characterize the outlook of the generation which has been
undergoing formation since the end of World War II, and especially since the creation
of the European communities. There are indications that their Europeanness is more
stable than that of older-age cohorts, and it seems to persist even under rather adverse
conditions. I would argue that this is true because, for them, a European outlook is not
a superficial reorientation, but reflects their earliest political perceptions. Before
the end of the 1970's, a majority of the voting population in the Common Market conn-
SOCIALIZATION 69
tries will consist of people who entered primary school after World War II. It is not
inconceivable that the entry into political relevance of new elements will tend to
further change the political environment in important ways.
All of the foregoing calls into question the projections which have been made con-
cerning the likelihood offurtherprogress toward erecting the institutional framework
for a United States of Europe. At this level, I agree, there has been relatively little
progress in the last several years. But there are, after all, certain blocking factors which
currently act to prevent much change in this sphere- the most important being the
attitude of the present French government. 45 It is dubious whether de Gaulle will
remain in power much beyond 1970. Deutsch's evidence indicates that French elites
on thewholeareagood deal more favorable to European integration than is de Gaulle
himself; 46 it therefore seems quite conceivable that with the passing of tl1e General
from supreme power, they may be considerably more responsive to the pressures for
European political unification than he himself has been'~~'
"Editor's Note: lnglehart has correctly predicted the post-De Gaulle French Government's attitude
toward British entry into the market and integration in general. At the present time there are negotiations
aimed at admitting Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, Norway and Denmark.
1 "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment," Amenean Political Science
Review, vol. 60 (1966), p. 355. Deutsch's collaborators are listed in a footnote on p. 354. The same footnote
indicates that fuller versions of the findings will be published in two forthCOilling books.
2 Deutsch does not seem to be alone in t:akimz this general view. Sen. Frank Church suggests that "Euro-
pean sentiment may have shifted toward a different arrangement, that what might have been achieved in
the vision of such men as Jean Monnet when Europe lay prostrate after the war may no longer represent
a practical possibility," see"U.S. Policy and the New Euorpe," Foreign Affairs, 45 (1966),p. 52.
• The data collection was supported by a Fulbright grant, with additional aid from the Dutch Ministry of
Education. The analysis has been supported by a National Science Foundation Cooperative Fellowship.
• Total numbers of questionnaires obtained are as follows: France: 700; The Netherlands: 3,100; West
Germany: 700; England: 500. Each social type is not included in proportion to its occurrence in the overall
population. In order to correct for this fact, I will base my comparisons on samples which are weighted to
compensate for the relative shortage of working-class students. I weighted our SES groups according to the
proportions of manual to non-manual occupations indicated in the adult surveys (approx. 2:1). My esti-
mates, therefore, can only be regarded as a spot check on the overall distribution of attitudes. I resorted to
this approach because funds did not permit obtaining a probability sample, and no alternative data were
available. In a more extensive analysis, I examine other factors which seem to influence support for Euro-
pean integration, and attempt to control for them also. See Ronald lnglehart, The Socialization of "Euro-
peans·: unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967.
'In the three most recent surveys in which this question was asked of British adults (1955, 56, and 57)
the percentage favorable ranged from 64 per cent to 66 per cent.
6 Normalized according to the Effectiveness Index described by Carl I. Hovland et. al. "A Baseline for
Measurement of Percentage Change" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, The language of Social
Research(Glencoe, 1955), pp. 77-82.
7 Does this imply that youth is more cosmopolitan than adults as a general rule? Not necessarily. The
example of the Hitler youth might be cited as an indication that the reverse relationship is also possible. My
interpretation is simply that, because of the specific influences present in their early socialization, this
particularcropofyouthhas beenorientedinamore European and less nationalistic direction than preceding
age cohorts.
8 See, for example, Jean Piaget, "Le developpement chez I'enfant de !'idee de patrie et de relations avec
l'etranger," Bulletin International de Science Sociale, UNESCO, 1961, pp. 3, 605, 621. Piaget concludes
that the conceptofnationalityisfullydevelopedbyage 14. Cf. Robert Hess, Judith Torney and David Jack-
son, TheDevelopmentofBasicAttitudesand Values Toward Government, Part I(Chicago, 1965), p. 380;
and Gustav Jahoda, "Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality" British Journal of Educational Psy-
chology, June 1963.
"Deutsch, "Arms Control," op. cit., p. 358.
10 D. 0. Hebb,citedinKarlDeutsch, TheNervesofGovernment(NewYork, 1963), p.166.
11 That is, the socialization which takes place in childhood and youth.
12 The concept also seems useful for interpreting political activity in other areas-notably Red China.
Peking's recent mobilization of teen-agers to enforce conformity on the part of their elders may be linked
withdifferencesintheearlypoliticalsocializationofyouth as contrasted with the adults. Fragmentary as our

evidence is, there seem to be indications of a wide cleavage between the older and the youngest generations
in the population at large, regarding their degree of commitment to the Maoist vision for Chinese society.
Itisprobablynoteworthy that the current teenage group has received its basic political socialization entirely
since 1949, the year of Communist victory on the Mainland. This regime has given intense attention to the
indoctrination of a new set of societal values. Apparently, the program of thought reform has not achieved
the desired degree of communist piety through reorientation of adults in the general population. Its efforts
have only now begun to reach fruition in the production of a highly-committed age cohort, capable of being
usedasguardiansoverlessfirmly Maoist groups. A parallel to the European phenomenon also seems to exist
in the American context; it could be interpreted as due to a differential impact of this country's post-war in-
ternationalismondifferentagecohorts. A nation-wide survey of highschool seniors and their parents in 1965
produced evidence of a possible intergenerational shift in the direction of more cosmopolitan political atti-
tudes. Ranking the relative salience which four levels of government had for them (international, national,
state and local), fully65 per cent of the students rated international politics in first or second place; only 42
per cent of the parents did so. SeeM. Kent}ennings, Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Govern-
ment (paper presented to the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, April1966).
13 There are indications that an age-specific pattern in American political party preferences may be linked
to the differential impact which the Great Depression had on different age groups. These differences appar-
ently have not decayed. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes,
The American Voter (New York, 1960), pp. 153-156.
14 The relative Europeanness of the youth in our samples probably springs from naivete or adolescent
rebellion to only a very limited degree. The fact that they have a relatively pessimistic (and perhaps realistic)
view of how long it will take for Europe to become "unified" -and the fact that they have a level of knowl-
edgewhich compares favorably with that of adults-tends to make an explanation in terms of naivete some-
what untenable. Our interviews indicated, moreover, that rebellion is not an important theme in connection
with European integration. Despite the widespread prevalence of a stereotype of youthful rebellion, the
available evidence suggests that it is important only in exceptional individual cases, as far as political views
are concerned. See M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, Family Structure and the Transmission of
Political Values (paper presented at the 1966 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
New York City, Sept. 6-10). Cf. Eleanor Maccoby et. al., "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion
Quarterly (Spring 1954), pp. 23-29.
15 1952-57 figures from USIA surveys cited in Donald Puchala, Western European Attitudes on Interna-
tional Problems, 1952-61 (New Haven, 1964), p. 9; 1962 figures from European Communities Information
Servicesurveycitedin Sondages, #1, 1963, p. 8.
16 Prior to the establishment of the EEC, British adults were consistently more favorable to European
unification than were the French (see Table4). Participationinacommon (and successful) endeavor seems to
have broughttheFrenchadultsabouteven withBritishadultsinEuropeanness, while a reversal of the earlier
relationship seems clearly reflected in the outlook of youth in the two countries. States of public opinion
apparently can be outputs as well as inputs in relation to government decisions.
17 The patterns of age group responses cannot readily be compared due to the variety of categories used
from survey to survey, and because of the excessive breadth of the categories.
18 In the factor analysis of responses from youth in the four countries, an item tapping the student's estimate
of the length of time which will elapse before Europe is "united" had consistent (although only moderately
high) loadings on the "Europeanness" factor; the direction of the relationship was always such as to indicate
that an optimistic time estimate was linked with support for integrative measures.
19 There is an apparent flaw in this timetable: the defeat of EDC in the French legislature came before
the October, 1954 survey. However, at that tirneitwas widely believed that the London Conference estab-
lishing the Western European Union would produce an even greater measure of European unification than
would have emerged from the EDC a union which would, moreover, include Britain). An IFOP survey in
October, 1954 found that 52 per cent of the Frenchmen surveyed thought that the London Conference was
a move toward European unification, as against 17 per cent who thought it was a simple military alliance.
A plurality of the former group felt that WEU would go farther in this direction than EDC. These expecta-
tions were, of course, false; they seem to have produced a short-lived bubble of optimism about European
unification. SeeiFOP surveys cited by Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion" in D. Lerner and R.
Aron, France Defeats EDC (New York: 1957), p. 101.
20 Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung (Verlag fiir Dernoskopie, Allensbach, 1957); and Informations-
dienst, Institut fiir Demoskopie, January, 1966, cited in Jacques-Rene Rabier, L'Opinion publique et
l'Europe (Brussels, 1966), p. 19.
21 Let me emphasize, however, that in my opinion the comparison with the 1963 adult data is definitely
the more appropriate intergenerational comparison. Unfortunately, a different set of age-categories was
usedincodingthis adult data, from those which were used with the 1963 adult data; we cannot make direct
comparisons between adult groups. These age categories, of course, have a different relationship to periods
of socialization than did the previous data.
"It may also be speculated that the French were relatively less discouraged by the de Gaulle veto because
SOCIALIZATION 71
it was, in a sense "their" veto; it was the French who were keeping the British out, and who could, perhaps,
reverse themselves. To the Germans and Dutch, on the other hand, there may have been a greater sense of
helplessness. Ameasure they strongly favored had been defeated by a man over whom they had no political
control.
23 The Italian case is somewhat special. This cotmtry had a considerably lower level of political information
than did any of the other EEC countries. A rather large "non-mobilized" segment of the Italian population
had never pronounced itself as favorable to these measures in the first place, and hence did not fall away
from supporting them in the face of the veto. Germany continues to rank ahead of France on the most im-
portant European measures in 1963, however (i.e., those loading highest on the Europeanness factor). We
eliminate Luxemburg from this analysis because of the small sample size for that country.
24 She has, for example, favored a free-trade policy ever since the end of the Napoleonic Wars; her interest
in international law dates back to Grotius, and was recognized (and perhaps strengthened) by the location
of the World Court in The Hague.
25 This was trueofpublicopinion, as well as of official Dutch policy. Indeed, an absolute majority of Dutch
adults polled innnediately after the veto said they would prefer a Common Market with Britain but without
France,ifitwerenecessarytochoose. See Sondages, #1, 1963,p.l08.
26 I select this28 per cent of respondents from this age group at random, since there is no finer age-identifi-
cation available. To the extent that the predicted age-group differences hold true within this 15-year age
group, this method will result in underestimating the age-group contrasts-for I will be including a certain
number of cases which dilute the differences between the younger and older halves. This is a fairly close ap-
proximation torecodingaccordingtoconsistent (and more usable) age groups -and despite its imperfection,
a fairly striking set of age-group contrasts does result.
27 See The American Voter, op. cit., pp. 161££.
28 This holds true of the younger French group as well; as indicated in the foregoing pages, the situation
in that country is not quite comparable with the Dutch and German cases in relation to the veto of British
admission.
29 EEC Statistical Office, Foreign Trade Monthly Statistics, No. 4, Brussels, 1962, p. 9. This was a con-
siderably higher rate of increase than obtained in the four years preceding 1958, See Economisehe Stati-
stische Bericht, Rotterdam, Jan. 16, 1964.
30 OECD General Statistics 1958-62 (Paris, 1963).
31 V.S.DepartmentofCommerce,HistoricalStatisticsofthe U.S. (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 550,552.
32 As presently constructed, the "index of relative acceptability" of foreign trade may reflect a general
tendencyforforeign trade to decline in proportion to GNP, as nations become highly industrialized. A primi-
tive extractive economy, sellingafewplantationcropsorrawmaterials abroad and importing nearly all man-
ufactured items, will be relatively dependent on foreign trade; a large and advanced industrial economy
may be less so. As indicated by the American record, isolationism can accompany the early stage, and in-
ternationalism the latter stage. This is not accidental: America's high degree of involvement in world affairs
at the present time is not weakened by her high domestic productivity -on the contrary, to a large extent,
it is made possible by it.
33 Op. cit., p. 355.
34 Political "integration" has beendefinedastheattainment within a territory of a "sense of community"-
a belief that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of "peaceful change"; and of
institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable
expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area, Princeton, 1957, p. 5.
35 See, for example, Galluplntemationai,L'Opinion publiqueet l'Europe des Six (Paris, 1962), pp. 29-32.
36 Calculated from OECD, Tourism in Member Countries, 1965 (Paris, 1965); and OECD, Tourism in
Europe, 1959 (Paris, 1959).
37 SeeSondages(1963),#1,p. 38; cf. Inglehart, op. cit., Ch. 8.
38 About one in fourteen out-<Jf-state Americans visited Florida in 1961. See Florida Council on Econoruic
Development, Statistical Abstract of Florida (Tallahassee, 1962), p. 90.
39 See his definition, footnote 34.
40 Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control," op. cit., p. 357.
41 Ibid., p. 357.
42 See, for example, Declaration of the Action Comruittee for a United States of Europe, June 1962.
43 See Ronald Inglehart, op. cit., Ch. 3. I use Yule's Q as a measure of association. Figures are for ruiddle-
class youth only.
44 See Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control," op. cit., p. 361.
45 Leon Lindberg goes so far as to argue that de Gaulle's boycott oftheEECin1965-66 does not even repre-
sentanattempttohalttheprocessofintegration;itis,rather, a struggle over the form and content of decision-
making procedures among actors who accept the European Community system. He presents persuasive
evidence that the Common Market has developed such powerful support among econoruic elite groups that
it is now irreversible -and recognized as such by de Gaulle. If Lindberg is correct, this is a highly significant
development -and one which, necessarily, must have taken place since 1958. See Leon Lindberg, "Integra-
tion as a Source of Stress on the European Commwrity System," International Organization, vol. 30 (1966),
pp. 233-266.
•• A plurality of them favor supranational European integration (Deutsch, "Arms Control," op. cit., p.
358); 72 per cent of French leaders agree that the military security of their country rests upon the deterrent
force of the Urrited States and "the idea of a national deterrent is unpopular among the elites in France, where
it is official government policy." (Ibid., p. 363.) Finally, "a large majority of French leaders (63 per cent)
agree thatBritainoughtto he included in an integrated Europe." (Ibid., p. 360.)
Werner Levi
Political culture and integration in Southeast Asia
This selection attacks the problem of socialization from still another angle.
There has been a notable lack of development of regionalism in Southeast
Asia, even when compared with the minimal developments in Africa and the
Arabstatesofthe Middle East. Levi's review of the problem suggests that one
keyfactor, ifnotthekeyfactor, in this lack of integrative behavior is the failure
of a common identity to emerge among the diverse peoples of Southeast
Asia. Levi documents the numerous appeals to cultural and political unity
since the early 1950's and the underlying ethnic cleavages that have made
this unity impossible to achieve. His discussion ends with an analysis of the
formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although
Levi concludes that the organization was born out of defense considerations,
he suggests the possible emergence of a "novel synthesis of nationalism and
Asian ism" in the region. What are some implications of this development, if
indeed it isoccurri ng, for international pol itics?The five members (Indonesia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) occupy slightly different
positions vis-8.-vis the Western Bloc of the Cold War. Indonesia, Malaysia,
andSingaporeareneutralist, with pro-Western leanings. The Philippines and
Thailand are members of SEATO. Although the organization may be charac-
terized as moderately pro-Western, does the association of these particular
states imply a more independent course of action for Southeast Asian states
in the diplomacy of the Cold War? The organization may also be evidence of a
reconciliation between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, which have
been split by irredentist demands upon each other over the last few years.
One last point of theoretical interest should be mentioned. Levi cites, with
some degree of approval, the notion that national identification will likely
precede regional identification. Does this mean thatthe process of socializa-
tion is a step-by-step operation? I see two implications here. First, at the level
of mass publicopinion, international regional identification is too remote from
the tribal Iives of the people to be reached without passing through the more
cognitively immediate stage of national identification first. Second, elite
groups must resolve their own differences before coherent national policies
and goals wi II emerge which will permitthatstateto pursue rational objectives
at the regional level. Therefore, does the development of ASEAN indicate
theattainmentofasignificantdegree of national cohesion in the five member
states consistent with the above hypotheses?
From: Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia, pp. 63-73, © 1968. Re-
printed by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
73
Cultural ends as a basis for regional organization did not prove any more successful
than political or economic ends, though they were more frequently and openly talked
about than any others. They appeared to their protagonists less controversial and,
hence, more achievable. For this reason they also proved useful as face-saving devices
when plans for other regional organizations had to be abandoned. A conference end-
ing in disagreement on everything else could always be rescued from catastrophe by
consensus on the desirability of exchanging teachers and students, and it could also
be given an optimistic opening on the same note. Nehru, typically, inaugurated the
All-Asian Conference in 1947 with references to the "great streams of culture" flowing
across Asia, "the long past of Asia," and the "thousand memories" which revive when
Asians meetinassembly. The theme was a favorite with all Asian statesmen when the
occasion called for emphasis on Asian brotherhood. But whether it had any appeal to
the masses or any unifying effect was highly doubtful. The attempt was made here to
develop a consciousness of what Robert Redfield called a "Great Tradition" for the
Asian area, the Asian Greater Harmony or total synthesis of conflicting ideas, to serve
as support for Asian regionalism. Such a Great Tradition, however, is for the "reflec-
tive few" who are aware of it, while the "Little Tradition" is for the "largely unreflec-
tive many" who live it, and take it for granted. Each tradition affected the other, but a
deep gulf separated the theoretical adherents from the practitioners. 1 Characteris-
tically, the alleged unity of Asian culture was cited by the Asian intellectuals but
seemed to impress no one else. It could be argued, of course, that this adequately
served the purpose of advancing regionalism, since the makers of foreign policy came
exclusively from intellectual circles. But this argument then raised the real problem,
namely that the Great Asian Tradition was essentially a fiction. At best, such a tradi-
tion could be found only by abstracting the diverse Asian cultures to such a degree that
it became indistinguishable from any other Great Tradition. In this form it could not
serve Asian leaders for Asian purposes. The difficulty was actually that in many coun-
tries of the region there was as yet not even a national culture sufficiently distinctive,
unified, and widespread to serve as a foundation for national unity. In addition, the
advancement, maintenance, or revival of national cultures (in the narrower sense of
the concept) was a completely neglected item in development planning. However,
regardless of the reality or unreality of a Great Tradition, these appeals to "streams
of culture," springing from somewhere and flowing to somewhere else across the map
of South and Southeast Asia, left no noticeable impact.
On the contrary, they shocked some Asians and annoyed others. "No greater
catastrophe can be imagined," wrote M. N. Roy of India, "than a resurgent Asia with
its vast population, marching to re-establish a world order wiping out the achieve-
ments of European civilization of the last five hundred years." 2 Others saw in these
appeals symbols of the rivalry between India and China for leadership in Southeast
Asia. Yet others resented them, when they emanated from Indians or Chinese, as re-
flections upon their indigenous culture. As time went on, cultural affairs became sub-
servient to political intentions in Asia, as they had been in Europe for many decades.
Emphasis upon them merely served to highlight the heterogeneity of the region.
This left the even broader and vaguer "sense of Asian solidarity" as the foundation
SOCIALIZATION 75
for regionalism. There was nothing in this sentiment that could be organized or
institutionalized. The hope was merely that it would be powerful enough to overcome
divisive influences and somehow induce Asians to cooperate, especially in the face of
common dangers from the outside. Reaction against colonialism had produced this
sentiment originally-giving it a distinctly racist element-and many Asian leaders
liked to credit it with much of the success in the struggle for freedom. It had the quali-
ties of a myth and probably inspired the leaders and small sections of the people in their
nationalist endeavors. It was an expedient instrument in the struggle for indepen-
dence that had been discovered after the struggle had begun and that was shaped to
serve its function. To be effective, to make that solidarity convincing and substantial,
the peoples of South and Southeast Asia had to have favorable images of each other.
The leaders therefore emphasized those aspects from the history and behavior of their
peoples which could create mutual sympathy. Memories of happy events in the com-
mon history were revived. There were references to cultural and religious affinities,
to mutual influences through cultural borrowing and lending, to characteristics which
set Asians apart from their colonial masters, and to Asian spirituality versus Western
materialism. When the colonies became states, the choice of these factors had to be
careful. In all too many instances the awakening of "historic memories" could have
resulted in the renaissance of ancient feuds and hostilities before the benefits of soli-
darity might be felt. This danger could not have escaped the notice of the national
leaders, nor could there have been too much depth to their own sense of solidarity,
especially when they were highly Westernized. The masses, especially outside the
urban centers, appeared to share no such sentiment of solidarity at all; and there was
no reason why they should. Preoccupied with their daily lives in the villages, they could
not afford to be concerned with a distant past or people in far away lands. Outside
border areas, there was nothing in their experience to develop a sense of cohesion or
relationship even withneighboringpeoples. The farfetched examples cited to demon-
strate social affinity-an Indian traveller going to China two thousand years ago, or
some Cambodian potsherd dug up in northeastern Thailand -were quite ineffective.
How weak and hollow these sentiments of solidarity really were became evident when
the clash of national interests and national policies required hostile rather than fra-
ternal feelings. In Indonesia, for instance, the image of the fellow Islamic state of
Malaya was quickly changed to that of a running dog for imperialism; Vietnamese
were asked to reminisce about the "traditional inferiority" of Cambodians; and
Cambodians were reminded of either Chinese expansionism or ancient cultural
bonds, depending upon whether the Royal Government inclined more toward China
or toward the United States!
Thus, solidarity waned during the postcolonial era, giving way in many cases to in-
tense hostility as incompatible interests asserted themselves. At the same time, many
Asian leaders learned that they had mistaken a unity resulting only from the existence
of acommonenemyfor a broad,general feeling of Asian brotherhood. They had failed
to realize that expedience had produced the sense of solidarity, and that it could not
now stand as an independent support for unified action or to suppress clashing inter-
ests. "The unanimity of enthusiasm which made Bandung possible is no more," wrote
Mrs. Lakshmi Menon of India in 1961. 3 This meant that the spiritual prerequisite of
regional organization was as inadequately fulfilled as the more objective need for
joint purpose.
Some general conclusions emerge from an examination of different forms and pur-
poses of regionalism in Asia. In the absence of compelling interests or sentiments
requiring organized regional cooperation, the formation of regional institutions
among Asians themselves was inconceivable. States do not simply create the ma-
chinery for regional cooperation in the abstract so that it may be available when the
need for it arises. They always readily perceive a tbreatto their identity in any arrange-
ment suggesting international or supranational decision-making or enforcement.
They want to be certain that the price paid for collective action is worth any loss in
freedom of maneuver. In the Asian case, these considerations weighed unusually
heavily because the gap between low need for regional organization and high sensi-
tivity to sovereignty was extraordinarily broad. The insouciant manner in which the
Asian leaders entered into the discussion of Asian regionalism at the beginning of their
careers has therefore no relationship to the disturbing reality. Other factors which
have historically been helpful to the creation of regional organizations could under
the Asian conditions, whether favorable or not, play only a subordinate role.
There was, for instance, no homogeneity among the peoples of South and Southeast
Asia in their social structure, their political systems, their ways of life, their religions,
orin almost any other respect. They shared many problems, but very few of the means
to solve them. Interaction between these peoples-which might have levelled off
some of their differences-was also very sparse. The majority lived in essentially
self-contained villages, and even the contacts between the national leaders were
sporadic. Reversing the experience elsewhere that intense and close communication
produces pressure for institutionalized cooperation, the Asian leaders appeared to
have hoped that a regional organization might produce the desired communication.
Geographic proximity, which might normally help to stimulate regional organization,
was at least balanced, if not outweighed, by the fact that each state remained oriented
toward its own former colonial master. The types of "regional" integration, further-
more, which these powers had sometimes imposed upon their colonial peoples were
likely to discourage rather than encourage popular enthusiasm for regional organiza-
tions. The precedent for cooperation provided by the struggle for independence, upon
which so many hopes of the leaders for regionalism seemed to rest, turned out to be
very weak indeed. What substance there had been to it was greatly exaggerated and
idealized, and not even of a quality to inspire mere systematic consultation among
governments in the postcolonial period. Organization of a national cooperative and
collective effort was so urgent a need on the arrival of independence, that a similar
enterprise on the international level began to appear premature. There was suspicion
in Asian minds that the pervasive talk about regionalism was mere lip service to an
idea fashionable in the post-World War II era. When Singapore's foreign minister,
Rajaratnam, stated, after the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
that to give life to the new organization, "we must marry national thinking to regional
thinking," he referred to a mentality which did not yet really include regionalism
as a concept. Buthealsowas speaking of astagewhichhadinfact not yet been reached
SOCIALIZATION 77
by the Asian masses: national thinking. This was doubtless the situation to which
Sukarno, and before him Sun Yat-sen, had referred when they argued that "Inter-
nationalism cannot flourish if it is not rooted in the soil of nationalism."
Perhaps the idea of an Asian union or an Asian regional organization was never as
widespread as outsiders believed. 4 Its propagation was certainly premature, though
the idea resulted in much attention to the new states- which remained its greatest
merit and achievement. It had demerits as well, however. Failure to implement the
idea demonstrated the inability of so many Asian states to cooperate and highlighted
the conflicts dividing the region. It was unfortunate for relations with the Western
world as well that in the absence of other unifying items, anti-Westernism in one form
or another was kept alive. Several Asian governments blamed Western interference
for their inability to cooperate. This was probably not based on hostility to the West
so much as on the need of a pretext for Asian unity. This unity was in tum needed to
support policies each state thought desirable, though usually for different, selfish
reasons. Nevertheless, the Western nations were given reason to suspect every Asian
conference, which, of itself, perpetuated the anti-Western posture of several Asian
states. The positions were somewhat reversed after about 1960, when the Western
powers would have liked to see concerted action against Asian threats from outside
the region, especially from China; but by this time the Asians themselves had aban-
doned hope for broadly-based regionalism. Nevertheless references to Western im-
perialism or neocolonialism continued without leading to any cooperative anti-West-
em effort and, paradoxically, accompanied by increasing demands for Western aid
in economic development and military security. Apparently the statesmen of the new
Asia were gaining confidence about the existence of their states. Occasional appeals
to Asian union and solidarity could still be heard at Asian meetings. But they sounded
hollow and like survivals from the past. By the middle of the 1960's the idea of an
Asia-wide regional organization had been discarded as a practical policy, while
economic regionalism was urged by outsiders more than the new Asian governments.
The formulation of foreign policy among the nonaligned states (other than Indonesia
after Sukarno) remained influenced by a conviction that the highest possible degree
of sovereignty was a desirable goal and that progress in political and economic develop-
ment could still be achieved at an adequate rate without any limitations imposed by
regional obligations. All the governments were aware, of course, that nations outside
the region were the prime suppliers of the power and wealth they needed. But only
some governments-those of Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan-were willing
to cooperate with these nations in regional organizations such as SEATO or CENTO,
or on an enduringly committed basis (Malaysia, Singapore). They were joined, even-
tually, by Indonesia, for reasons of her own after the political demise of Sukarno. These
states cherished their independence no less than all the others. But their own particu-
lar weaknesses and strong exposure to increasing political pressures in the late 1960's
enhanced the value of collective reactions. Several dramatic events took place or were
anticipated. China exported her Cultural Revolution; Great Britain announced an
early withdrawal from east of Suez; American negotiations with North Vietnam
inspired grave doubts about a continued United States presence after the end of the
Vietnam War. The possible results of these changes and the worsening international
situation in SoutheastAsiamadethesestates again more eager and amenable than the

South Asian states to commitments either toward each other in cooperative arrange-
ments or toward helpful outside nations. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore expressed these
views clearly when he pointed out at Tokyo in 1967 that a pooling of regional re-
sourcescouldimprovethesecurity and economic development of these states. The old
idea of a Southeast Asian regional organization continued to offer itself as probably
the best solution of the international problems facing that region. Meanwhile India,
always neglectful of Southeast Asia, began to look to Japan for closer cooperation.
In this respect the creation of ASEAN was highly significant. Whatever its weak-
nesses as a functioning regional organization for the avowed purposes, it was a clear
indicator of how the participating governments evaluated their political situation and
what they considered a desirable direction for their foreign policies. The difference
between ASEAN and earlier creations of Southeast Asian regional organizations lay
in its political and military implications -admitted at the creation of the organization
and made clearer in the course of time. The wording of the Declaration establishing
ASEAN itself stated that the members "are determined to ensure their stability and
security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve
their national identities." In giving their comments, all the signers of the Declaration
referred to the need for collective action to prevent Southeast Asia from becoming a
battlefield for the politics or armies of outside nations. The economic and cultural
cooperation envisaged by ASEAN was generally and officially interpreted as an
indispensable contribution to the region's political stability and security. 5 The pos-
sibilitythatASEAN might develop into acollectivedefensearrangementwasofficially
mentioned within a few hours of the organization's creation 6 and much elaborated
upon later. All the editorials appearing in the newspapers of the member countries
took up and embellished the theme outlined by the government officials. Any doubt
that the creators of ASEAN related it, hopefully, to a future defense agreement were
eliminated by later statements and suggested plans. A number of developments sub-
sequent to the creation of ASEAN encouraged some of the participating governments,
most prominently the Filipino, to abandon some of the caution still noticeable when
ASEAN wasformedinAugust 1967 and to reveal its political intentions. Great Britain
advanced her military withdrawal from Southeast Asia to 1971, leaving a "defense
gap" that neither the United States nor Australia seemed willing to bridge. This mea-
sureobligedMalaysiaand Singapore to seek alternative sources of strength. Indonesia
became less uncertain about her position in international issues related to security in
theregion. ThailandandthePhilippinesgrewincreasinglyscepticalaboutthemilitary
value of SEATO.
President Marcos of the Philippines made Qfficial visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Thailand earlyinJanuary 1968 the occasion for openly proposingASEAN's expansion
into a collective defense system. He found ready support in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia, and, it seemed, slightly less enthusiasm in Thailand. 7 The phraseology
used by President Marcos especially and to a lesser degree by the Thai government in
discussingthisplan("for Asia'ssake,""Asianself-reliance," etc.) made it emphatically
clear that the enterprise was to be of, for, and by Asians. It was another bid to demon-
strate the independence and pure "Asian-ness" of the member states and their deter-
SOCIALIZATION 79
mination to resist outside interference, especially from the Chinese. In pursuit of this
line, therewasevenmentionof"openingthedialogue" with the Soviet Union (which
Malaysia did.) 8 ASEAN and the subsequent plan for its expansion were praised as an
evolution from narrow nationalism to a more generous internationalism, but also as
a successful move to greater Asia-consciousness and solidarity. 9 But whether in fact
the many barriers erected in the past by nationalism to regional cooperation -let alone
integration-were now being lowered, or whether the new spirit symbolized by
ASEAN was merely a temporary, and even somewhat panicky adjustment to an out-
side threat suddenly perceived as greater than any threat from clashes of interest
within the region could not be known.
There was no dearth of appeals from many statesmen for regional cooperation.
There was an abundance of references to hostile outside forces (clearly aiming at
China) and the new spirit of self-reliance pervading Southeast Asia. Yet at the same
time the public was warned not to expect a favorable impact from ASEAN too soon.
Doubt was expressed by Tungku Abdul Rahman about its usefulness as long as his
country was quarrelling with the Philippines over Sabah. There was even talk of
turning the annual Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast
Asia into a permanent institution as a substitute for ASEAN. Conceivably, the tense
situation in Southeast Asia during the late 1960's was the catalyst precipitating a
novel synthesisofnationalismandAsianism. The process had been furthered by Japan
for several years, quietly and determinedly, through the sponsorship of many official
and unofficial Asian conferences and institutions. 10 Simultaneously in academic
and journalistic circles the international position of South and Southeast Asia had
become the object of much discussion and analysis, whose conclusion had invariably
been that the states in the region would have to develop their power potential col-
lectivelyif they were to survive in independence and possess influence in international
affairs.u The planned withdrawal of British forces from the region-rather in-
significant in itself-had served as the occasion to clarify this need in Asian minds.
Regionalism in Southeast Asia was more openly than ever before advocated as a
tool of power while in South Asia, especially India, the tendency remained to en-
visage a more broadly based Asian organization for essentially nonpolitical purposes.
Regionalism was still suffering from a conflict between nationalist nearsightedness
and visionary Pan-Asianism. But as the expansion of Chinese power and influence
forced the states in the region to focus on defense interests, inevitably recognized as
common, there arose the slight possibility that in some form a purely Asian regional
organization might yet be created.
1 Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago, 1956), p. 70.

2 Independent India (April6, 1947),p.179. The particular nature of Asian nationalism, opposing tradition
for the sake of modernization and at the same time reviving it for the sake of nation-building made any talk
of"Asianism" quite llllrealistic. See Gmmar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations
(New York, 1968), vol. ill, 2109-19.
• "Our Policy," Seminar, No. 19 (March 1961), p. 19.
• K. P. Karunakaran,India in World Affairs 1950-53 (New Delhi, 1958), p. 26.
5 The statements by Rajaratnam of Singapore, Tun Abdul Razah of Malayasia and Khoman Thanat of
Thailand can be found in Bangkok Post (August 9, 1967). Malik of Indonesia is quoted in Bangkok Post
(August 11, 1967).
6 Malik on his way home from Bangkok said the possibility existed of discussing defense matters at
ASEAN's next meeting. Straits Times (August 11, 1967).
7 AsianRecorder(April2S-29, 1967);Bangkok Times(January12,13,14, 1968); Straits Times (January
20, 28, 1968); S.M. Ali, "Bridging the Gap," Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. LIX (February 6, 1968),
227-29. Tungku Abdul Ralunan announced that "the question of our defense arrangements is something
wecannotpostpone," and Indonesia seemed to suggest that the conversion of ASEAN into a regional defense
pact was urgent. Economist, vol. CCXXVI (February 24, 1968), 25. There was also much talk in Malaysia
about neutralizing all of Southeast Asia. See the Malaysian newspapers ofJanuary 24-28, 1968. For critical
reviews of such a proposal see Bangkok Post (January SO, 1968) and, for Indonesia's criticism, Malay Mail
(January 27, 1968).
8 Acting President Suharto of Indonesia said that ASEAN was the expression of the principle that "Asian
problems should be solved by Asian nations themselves throughregional cooperation." Indonesian News and
Views, No.13/67 (September, 1967), p. 3. The Malaysian prime minister stated on Independence Day 1966
that "If Malaysia is to become a permanent and cohesive national unit, she must be regarded by her neigh-
bours as a specifically Asian country, and not as a creation and protege of Britain which some of them still
suspect her to be." Economist Intelligence Unit No.4 (December 1966), p. 3. At this time also, Malaysia
began to establish commercial relations with the Soviet Union and ambassadors were exchanged between
the two countries in 1968. The "Asianization" of Thailand's foreign policy is described by F. Joyaux, ''La
Politique etrangere de la Thailande en Asie," Politique Etrangere, vol. XXXI (1966), 340-43. The Philip-
pines had begun the process of "Asianization" much earlier. This theme was brought out very strongly also
duringaSeminaronEconomicandPolitical Cooperation between South and Southeast Asian Nations which
opened at the UniversityofSin_gaporeonFebruary 15, 1968. Singapore's prime minister and foreign minister
made clear that there was no illusion about the dependence of the region upon the policies of the major na-
tions. But they also maintained that through regional cooperation the regional states could have some influ-
ence upon their own fate-if the leaders could overcome their narrow nationalism and reconcile it with
regional cooperation. The Mirror (Singapore), (February 26, 1968).
9 However, thememberstatesindicated clearly that India, Pakistan and Taiwan were not welcome to join
ASF..AN, while informal invitations were extended to all smaller states of South and Southeast Asia. In May,
1967 the Indian Government suggested a more broadly-based Asian organization than the (then) planned
ASEAN. This suggestion remained "dormant" until the Indian government reawakened it once more in
January 1968 but, apparently, with equally little success. Times of India (January 16, 20, 1968). In spite of
all the renewed eagerness for regional organization in Southeast Asia the smaller states were still suspicious
of their larger neighbors. Furthermore, India had, over the years, done little to establish close relations with
Southeast Asia. For somediscussionsoflndia'srelationswith the region see Ton That Thien, India and South
EastAsia1947-1960 (Geneva, 1963);A. B. Sbab,ed.,India'sDefenceandForeignPolicies (Bombay, 1966),
pp. 94-123; D.P. Sinhal, ''Indian Policy in Southeast Asia," Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol.
XII (1966), 258-70; Patwant Singh,India and the Future ofAsia (New York, 1966 ), 166-76. The Commu-
nists condemned ASEAN as "a tool of American imperalism." American Consulate General, Hongkong,
Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 4000 (August 14, 1967), p. 41.
10 Japan sponsored conferences on development problems in Southeast Asia, on trade, on agriculture.
She created an interparliamentary union for the region, a news bureau, and similar organizations. She
even succeeded in arranging the simultaneous attendance of representatives from Cambodia, South
Vietnam, and Thailand. William Lange, "Asiatische Interessengemeinschaft ohne Nicht-Asiaten," Aussen-
politik, vol. XVII (1966), 503-8; A. B. Santos, "Japan has finally stopped apologizing for the Pacific War,"
The Asia Magazine (Singapore), vol. VII (November 19, 1967), 9.
11 Examples are: Sisir Gupta, "Structure and Stability," Seminar, No. 96 \August, 1967), pp. 12-16; C. S.
Venkatachar, "The Changing Balance of Power: A View from Asia," Journal of Development Studies, vol.
II (1966), 174-88;Alastair Buchan, "AnAsianBalanceofPower," Australian Journal ofPoliticsandHistory,
vol. XII (1966), 271-81; Romesh Thaper, ''External Presence," Seminar, no. 96 (August, 1967), pp. 20-23.
There was an undertone of anti-Westernismandnationalismin some of these speculations. The Communists
quickly discovered it and tried to use it for their purposes. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Siidostasien zwischen
Nationalismus and Kommunismus," Moderne Welt, vol. VII (1966), 235-54.
Amitai Etzioni
Political culture and integration in Scandinavia
The following provides an interesting contrast to the situation described by

Levi. The Scandinavian area is one in which a high degree of regional social-
ization already exists. Despite some differences in ethnic origin and language
the states of this region have developed political, social and economic sys-
tems that are quite compatible.' This situation is reinforced by policies pro-
moting integrated programs among the states, including the virtual abolition
of passports, free mobil ityof labor, common social security plans and mobility
of capital. Yet despite this high level of regional cooperation there appears
to be very littledesiretoform a supranational governing system for the region.
In 1969 the states of the Nordic Council formed NORDEK, ostensibly as a
move toward a common market. As of this date, though, this change appears
to be in name only.
Supranational political integration in the region is hampered by at least two
factors. Sweden and Finland are neutrals while Iceland, Norway, and Den-
mark are committed to NATO. In addition, the states of the area are not in a
position to absorb the products of each other's economic system. Instead, the
traditional trading patterns of the region have been with the Common Market
states and Great Britain. But there also is a more subjective, general lack of
commitment to political integration which Etzioni analyzes as an "unfocused
identitive power." This concept bears careful scrutiny as a possible explana-
tion for this paradox of low Scandinavian political integration.
The decision-making style of the Nordic Council also reflects the ambiva-
lent status of integration in the region and provides us with still another vari-
ation upon the rule-making function discussed in Chapter I and presented in
the articles of Chapter IV. The organization can scarcely even be considered
asconfederal in nature. The central organization simply arrives at a consen-
sus among the delegates present and then the national legislatures of the
member states pass uniform laws carrying these policies into effect.
UNFOCUSED IDENTITIVE POWER

There exists among the citizens of the Nordic countries an awareness of a common
Nordic identity and a sense of Nordic solidarity. Scandinavians tend to refer to other
Scandinavians not as foreigners, though they might designate them as Danes, Swedes,
or Norwegians. Citizens from all the Nordic countries are proud that two of their
number have been chosen to serve as Secretary General of the United Nations. 1 In-
From: Chapter Six, pp. 211-228, from Political Unification: A Comparatioo Study ofLeaders and Forces,
by Amitai Etzioni. Copyright © 1965 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
81
deed, in various international organizations, delegates from the Nordic countries

identify themselves and are identified by others as a unit for certain purposes. There
is always one Nordic member on the governing board of the International Labor Or-
ganization who is considered to represent all Nordic interests, and similar practices
are followed by the World Health Organization and various other organs of the United
Nations. 2 When a Nordic delegate is elected to office in the United Nations, the reports
of the election usually assert explicitly that he was selected as the (unofficial) repre-
sentative of all the Nordic states. 3 The Nordic countries, their citizens stress, are all
small and relatively lacking in power when compared to such giants as the United
States, the USSR, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. Collaboration makes it
possible for them to speak with a greater impact in international affairs than if each
one were acting on its own. 4 Cooperationindiplomaticas well as other matters among
the Nordic countries is believed to be almost automatic-the result of shared values
and common interests. The Nordic countries are frequently thought to constitute a
natural area for collaboration because of similarities in historical background, lan-
guage, religion, political and legal systems, economic level, and international status.
In short, there is a consciousness and even an ideology of regional cooperation. More-
over, deliberate efforts are made to increase cooperation.
The intensification of the sense of Nordic solidarity and the expansion of the areas
of Nordic cooperation are objects for direct concern to various voluntary associations
in all the Nordic countries. During an eighteen-month period from 1957 to 1958,
Nordisk tidskrift, the official publication of the Nordic Association, carried notices
of seventy-seven meetings that were directed toward increased Nordic cooperation. 5
This was an average of over four such meetings per month. The platforms of the major
political parties of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden all pledge to work for an increase
in Nordic collaboration. 6 Further, there exists in all five Nordic countries an associa-
tion with quasi-governmental status whose avowed purpose is the encouragement of
Nordic cooperation- the Norden Association. 7
The Norden Association has a total membership of over 120,000, and its activities
extendintoanumberof areas, including education, the arts, the sciences, and politics.
The Norden Association publishes periodicals and books and sponsors lectures about
the Nordic countries to expand its members' familiarity with the other countries in the
region. Under its aegis, a program has been undertaken for revising history textbooks
so that each country's past role, especially in Nordic conflicts, may be more accurately
presented. 8 The real concern is of course not historical revision per se but reduction
of Nordic antagonisms. The Norden Association has also set up a Language Board in
the hope of retarding divergences among the Nordic languages; it administers several
programs for increasing contacts among citizens of the several Nordic countries; it
arranges student and teacher exchanges and visits between families of similar back-
ground and position in different countries in the area. In the cultural field, a number
of joint institutions have been established, including aNordic Institute for Theoretical
Nuclear Physics at Copenhagen and a Nordic college for journalists at the University
of Arhus in Denmark. 9 Television programs are produced cooperatively. Publishing
firms have close affiliations.
All these similarities, activities, and contacts seem to be of limited value in signif-
SOCIALIZATION 83
icantly deepening or expanding the scope of the Nordic union. There are several
reasons that account for this limitation. Contacts between the various countries seem
primarily to involve educated elitist groups, such as teachers, lawyers, jurists, scien-
tists, and labor union leaders. Further, the sense of affinity encouraged by such con-
tacts and by the broad network of Nordic cooperation is not tied to support for any
shared institutions, to say nothing of supranational organs: It is what psychologists
call a "nonspecified" sentiment. The educational systems of the five countries as well
as their cultural institutions, from museums to libraries, have a national and not a
regional structure. Even the Norden Association, whose aim is regional unification,
is organized along national lines; it is five separate organizations; delegates from
these national organizations meet together to harmonize activities, but there is no
regional headquarters. In this, it is very much like the Nordic Cultural Commission
and the Nordic Council itself.
The ideology of cooperation seems to be stronger than the actual measure of co-
operation. Thus, while Scandinavians tend to insist, somewhat defensively, that they
cooperate so effectively that no regional institutions are required and that their mode
of voluntary cooperation is superior to that of a regional superstate, a point to which
we shall return below, it is of interest to note here that the historical consciousness of
the various Nordic nations hold memories that agitate against regional bodies,
whether or not these are needed for effective cooperation. Foremost among these
memories are the histories of the various unions that the area knew in the past. Those
include the Kalmar Union (1389-1523 ), which in its original form encompassed the
subgroupings Sweden-Finland (until 1809), Denmark-Norway (1375-1814), and
the Union of Norway and Sweden (1814-1903). Such unions have left a legacy of
antagonism that is still a salient factor in relations within the Nordic union. 10
The various efforts at achieving independence have given rise to rather strong feelings
of national consciousness, feelings superseding any sense of Nordic identity. As
ProfessorJohnH. Wuorinenhaspointedout, the individual Norwegian, Swede, Dane,
or Finn feels rather deeply "that the people whose language he speaks, whose past he
shares and whose ways of thinking are much like his, are his people and stand apart
from others in culture, traditions, language, and mores in general. 11 In addition, a
mild apprehension of Swedish predominance has some effect on the actions and de-
cisionsofNorway, and to a lesser extent Denmark, with respect to the Nordic union. 12
Norwegian and Danish opposition to the Swedish-proposed defense alliance of
1948 -though it was determined by other causes- also reflected an uneasiness over
an alliance in which Sweden would be the dominant member; it would supply the
bulk of the arms, and the commander-in-chief of the joint Nordic forces would in all
probability be a Swede. 13 Further, in the matter of the Nordic common market, Nor-
way's hesitance can in part be traced to its apprehension of Swedish influence. Norway
was concerned that the implementation of a common market or customs union would
require some sort of supranational agency, possibly dominated by Sweden, to co-
ordinate programs and to enforce rulings. This development, Norway felt, would
compromise its independent status. 14 This was also one reason it opposed the estab-
lishment of a Nordic bureaucracy in connection with the Nordic Council. 15
In intra-Nordic business arrangements, some antipathy toward Sweden is also
occasionally expressed. Both Danes and Norwegians complain about Swedish pre-
eminence in the operation of their joint airline, SAS, whose initials a Norwegian
jokingly alleged stand for "Svensk Alt Sammer" or Altogether Swedish. 16 (Sweden
has a larger investment in SAS than the other countries; SAS headquarters are in
Stockholm and its president, Curt Nicolin, is a Swede.) Norwegians and Danes were
astounded to find out that of the ten largest corporations in Scandinavia, nine are
Swedish, as are most of two hundred-odd corporations whose 1963 turnover was
higher than 100 million kroner ($19 million).
Despite Norway's great need for outside capital to develop its resources and build
up its industry, there is great reluctance to accept investments from Sweden. Nor-
wegian business circles were opposed to the Nea power-plant arrangement whereby
Norwayproducedhydroelectricpowerfor Swedish consumption; cheap and plentiful
water power is seen as Norway's major asset, and there is strong objection to sharing
it with Sweden. 17 A proposal for the development of Norwegian copper deposits by
a Swedish company was firmly rejected in Norway; the enterprise was viewed as an
attempt at Swedish "infiltration" of Norwegian industry. This attitude prevailed
despite the fact that Norway would have controlled 40 per cent of the company and
despite the fact that without Swedish capital Norway could not hope to develop the
area under consideration. 18
Six centuries of Swedish domination of Finland have left a residue of antipathy
toward Sweden on the part of Finland, though probably in the prenationalist period
little awareness of Finnish separation existed and the main manifestation of tension
was between Finns and the Swedish aristocracy in Finland, rather than between the
two countries. There is also some ill feeling between Danes and Norwegians deriving
from the long association of the two countries: For over four hundred years the Danish
language and Danish culture were dominant among Norway's urban, educated, and
official classes, and Norway's attempt to create a distinct nationality involved the
reduction of these Danish influences. 19 For their part, Swedes feel themselves supe-
rior to the other Nordic countries, less superior to the Danes, more to the Norwegians;
the Swedes see themselves as more sophisticated and cosmopolitan and their country
as having greater stature in international affairs. 20
One interesting indication of the limited scope of Scandinavian cooperation may
be seen in the fact that while authors who write about this cooperation are abundant
with superlatives, an examination of publications dealing with various general prob-
lems of the Nordic countries- such as the Norseman or the Scandinavian Times (for
English-reading publics) as well as publications in the Scandinavian languages-
rarely mention a Scandinavian country besides the one being examined, when ques-
tions other than cooperation are discussed. That is, one gains the impression that
cooperation is not a major dimension of most domestic matters, and hence unless
such international matters as trade or diplomacy are examined, the problems of each
country can be treated independently. When parallel areas in the other countries of
the region are mentioned, they are presented as points of interest and comparison;
they are not treated as part of the same problematic area, one to be faced regionally.
Moreover, surprisingly little space is devoted to the reporting and analysis of regional
cooperation. There is considerably more belief in Nordic similarities and cooperation
SOCIALIZATION 85
than there is in one Nordic reality. From time to time, an occurrence brings this fact
to the consciousness of the people of the region. In 1964, a book by an American psy-
chiatrist, Dr. Herbert Hendin, entitled Suicide and Scandinavia, created a lively
public debate. One of the points emphasized was that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden
"are essentially a homogeneous area, all welfare states, sharing such relevant factors
as religion and climate-yet while Denmark and Sweden (and Finland) have some of
the world's highest suicide rates, Norway has one of the lowest." The book was viewed
by Scandinavians, however, as "above all a healthy reminder that the three peoples
are really far more different than their ways of life would indicate." 21
The same point is illustrated by the development of Nordic languages. Basically
the Scandinavian languages are very similar to each other, and from this viewpoint
the region has fewer communication problems than most. 22 Citizens of the three
countries who come into regular contact are largely accustomed to each other's lan-
guages. The proceedings of the Nordic Council and of various regional associations
are carried on in all three languages without translations. According to one inter-
viewee, the differences are as small as those between the English spoken by an Amer-
ican and that of an Australian. He said, "they are limited largely to those of pronun-
ciation and some grammar." Other observers recognize slightly greater differences.
Gunnar Leistikow stated that, "Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes can become accus-
tomed to the sound of each other's languages within a few weeks. 23 David Philip
stated that "the educated citizen of one of the three countries can quite easily read
books written in one of the two languages of the other countries, and even follow
fairly easily a conversation or a lecture in one of the other Scandinavian languages." 24
The Scandinavian Times was less charitable:
It was a season, then for rediscovery of the Scandinavian community. Even language bar-
riers-caused chiefly by laziness, for Danish, Norwegian and Swedish are essentially alike-
seemed to fall. At the Stockholm festivities, Danes and Swedes conversed merrily- in English. 25
Among the three Scandinavian countries, the Norwegians are slightly favored, as
they understand Swedish and Danish more readily than the speakers of these two
languages understand each other. 26 The two other Nordic languages are more dis-
similar. No Scandinavian who is not trained in either Icelandic or Finnish will under-
stand these languages, nor do the citizens of these countries understand another
Scandinavian language unless they have studied it. Icelandic is most akin to the "Old
Norse," as the early pronunciation and vocabulary of a language once widely spoken
in the region is designated. 27 While the Scandinavian countries assimilated large
influxes, first of German, then of Latin and French, the Icelanders absorbed few new
words and those only by translating them into their own linguistic tradition.
While Icelandic roots at least rest on the same lingual foundation as the three Scan-
dinavian languages, those of Finnish have a quite different tradition. Finnish is not a
Scandinavian language but is part of the Finnish-Ugrian group (as is Hungarian); it
is akin to Estonian and to some Russian languages. An untutored Scandinavian can
understand part of Icelandic, but little Finnish. These language barriers, however,
pose few problems for Nordic communication. Most Icelanders speak some Danish
(which is the first foreign language taught in their schools), and many Finns speak
Swedish.
Nevertheless, over the years the Nordic languages have grown farther apart. The
various national independence movements of the nineteenth century were espe-
cially important in increasing linguistic differences. Norway made a conscious effort
to reduce the Danish elements in its language. More recent changes in the Norwegian
vocabulary were, in general, not paralleled by similar changes in the Danish one;
also, a reform of orthography made Norwegian written as it is pronounced, while
Danish orthography still follows historical traditions. At the same time, the Finns
were making efforts to reduce the amount of Swedish spoken in their country, and
Icelandic textbooks, which used to be in Danish, are being replaced by texts written
in English, which is gaining as the second language of the island. 28
Some measures have been introduced to reduce the existing differences among
Scandinavian languages and to prevent the development of new ones through the
agency of the Language Boards established in each country of the region under the
auspices of the Norden Association. (Danish upper-case nouns, for example, have
been changed to lower-case, in keeping with Swedish and Norwegian traditions.)
But the success of such measures has so far been rather limited.
The question arises under what "regional" conditions, if any, the differences among
the languages would decline. While there is no conclusive study of the subject, the
history of European nationalism seems to suggest that, in the case of languages as
similar to each other as the Scandinavian languages are, the various dialects and local
tongues combine elements when the educational systems of various localities "merge"
(students and above all teachers are ecologically mobile), and when careers, in general,
are pursued in one social structure that brings together people from a variety of local-
ities and imposes on them basically uniform language requirements. All these condi-
tions are lacking in Scandinavia, as educational systems and social structures are
fundamentally not regional but national. We, of course, do not imply that a region-
state should be formed in order to reduce minor differences in language; but should a
region-state be created or approximated for other reasons, we would expect Scandi-
navian languages gradually to merge. This, in our judgment, should not be expected
to take place in the present union, even if tourism among the countries should be
doubled and other interpersonal contacts tripled.
In sum: The great similarities in cultural, social, and ethnic background and the
many historical bonds do not in themselves a union make. Their effect on the relations
among the countries in a region depend on what is made of them. Large cleavages
can be minimized, as were those between the United States and the USSR during
World War II, and smaller differences can be emphasized, as are historical ones in
the area under study. The Nordic countries have built out of a common past a set of
separate units that may even be said to have a national consciousness of its own. While
thelastfewdecadesof cooperation have reemphasized the shared heritage of the past
and the affinity of the present, the balance between regional sentiment and national
sentiments still favors the national ones. The fact that there are no effective regional
institutions and symbols as there are national ones (the kings, the parliaments, the
SOCIALIZATION 87
constitutions, supreme courts, etc.) both expresses and reinforces the superiority of
national over regional identification. History is thus used to justify separateness and a
rather jealous preservation of national sovereignty. Hence a broader and deeper
regional integration, at least one that is more institutionalized and has its own symbolic
power and unifying drive, is not present. (All Scandinavians interviewed said it is
"impossible.")
While there are many shared values, mores, sentiments, and ideas in the Nordic
area-the first among them being a consciousness of shared identitive assets-they
are not related to a network of Nordic institutions and symbols. They are not used to
establish one, nor are they significantly deepened or extended by such institutions
and symbols. The role regional institutions could play in bringing about a shift to the
priority of regional bonds over national ones --especially since identitive similarities
(not to be confused with identitive bonds) are at so high a level- deserves some addi-
tional elucidation.
HARMONIZATION VERSUS INTEGRATION

There is no region in Europe and few exist in the world where culture, tradition, lan-
guage, ethnic origin, political structure, and religion -all "background" and identitive
elements -are as similar as they are in the Nordic region. Nevertheless, a United
States of Scandinavia, or other forms of a regional political community, are not devel-
oping and seem unlikely to develop. The mere existence of homogeneity can provide
only a convenient backdrop; it is not in itself a source of a drive toward greater inte-
gration. But since attempts have been made to expand and significantly deepen
Nordic integration -attempts that, if successful, would probably have led toward a
regional political community-the question of why these failed must be answered.
Our answer here is in conflict with the position held by many of the citizens of the
region.
The Scandinavian position is essentially that harmonization of the activities of the
five national states is both the highest level of cooperation the region is capable of
supporting and is a superior form of cooperation to that of a regional superstate. There
can be little argument with the first statement. In one form it is tautological, as the
inability to form a political community is derived from the fact that none has been
formed so far. Surely no one would argue that a political community has been formed
or that signs indicate one is about to be formed.
Interpreted differently, this statement is taken to suggest that no political com-
munity could be achieved even if greater and different kinds of efforts to bring about
such a community were made. This might be a valid observation: as suggested above,
the Nordic countries are a group of small powers caught in the political and economic
orbits of a number of big powers; they are not free to set the level of regional integra-
tion they desire. In a sense, each is more integrated into a non-Nordic system than into
the Nordic one, at least as far as power considerations go. In the view of the member
countries (with the exception of Finland), the level of integration of the Nordic region
is notforcibly held down, but is a voluntary Scandinavian decision to keep integration
at a relatively low level in order to avoid certain "costs": risking a showdown with
the USSR (Finland's concern); giving offense to Britain (Norway's concern); or moving
away from the continent (Denmark's concern). But the costs seem to be of such magni-
tude that-unless they change considerably because of some changes in extra-Nordic
systems- they make a Nordic political community rather difficult to create.
The fact that the Nordic countries are highly democratic further strengthens our
statement. Less democratic governments could ignore the economic plight and psy-
chological deprivations that large segments of their populations might suffer, espe-
cially in the short run, if they would actively pursue political unification. A Scandi-
navian government that wouldfollowsuchacoursewould in all likelihood be replaced
by a government more responsive to the people. The people seem to be unwilling to
make any major sacrifices for so abstract a goal as political unification, especially
since present systems seem to work well; hence it is felt that there is little need for
greater integration.
Actually, each country is quite jealous of its national sovereignty, and the regional
mode of cooperation is highly responsive to these jealousies. Little attempt is made to
use regional institutions to advance regional sentiments. The fact that the Nordic
Council did not establish a permanent secretariat is an illustration of the union's high
responsiveness to its individual members' desires; no such organ was set up largely
because of their apprehension that the council would thereby become to some degree
independent of the constituent members and therefore less responsive to national
pressures. 29 Further, part of the opposition to the Nordic common market was based
on a belief that the imposition of common tariffs would require some form of supra-
national enforcing agency endowed with the power to apply sanctions to the member-
states. 30
. Thus the Nordic regional system is highly responsive to its component units: It main-
tains without any modification the level of integration of which the member nations
approve; it does not act as an independent lever to bring about a higher level of inte-
gration. Hence we conclude that from the viewpoint of unification, the Nordic struc-
ture is clearly not merely a highly responsive, but an overresponsive structure: It
limits the development of regional foci of identification and of a center of allocative
processes not just to the level the region would tolerate, which is both prudent and in
the long run inevitable; it also acts as a reflecting mirror instead of as an active agent.
No wonder this is a stable but scarcely growing union! The Nordic countries seem to
prefer the losses involved in maintaining full sovereignty over whatever gains dele-
gating some powers to a regional body might entail.
The prevailing Scandinavian attitude toward supranationalism is illustrated in the
following: During the negotiations over a Nordic common market, when a minority
report to the Nordic Council meeting charged that the establishment of a common
market would lead to wider and possibly supranational unification, the majority
did not extol the virtues of this kind of union but chose to deny that it had this potential
or that any such aim could be pursued by the respective governments:
The assertion that a common market of the scope provisionally envisaged should lead to an
economic union and further, to a political union with supranational bodies and major losses of
competence fornational political authorities is mistaken, improbable and contrary to the wishes
of the three governments. 31
SOCIALIZATION 89
Supranationalism is clearly a political liability. But the fact that it is unpopular or

that there is no felt need for it cannot in itself be taken as evidence that no need would
be served by greater integration or that increased integration through intraregional
efforts -difficult to envision as it is-is impossible. People in general tend to accept
"satisfying" rather than optimal solutions. 32 Since there is no war and none seems
imminent, a state of affluence prevails, wide-ranging welfare-state services are avail-
able, and next to no unemployment exists, the citizens are, in general, somewhat
apathetic and express few felt needs. "Because everything is all right, things work
well, nobody feels a need for federation," said an interviewee. "Unification is exceed-
ingly little discussed," said another. At least theoretically, much economic benefit
could derive from an economic Nordic union, increased security from a non-aligned
Nordic camp, and higher status from a regional union, and still the people would be
unaware of these benefits until they came about.
Moreover, a felt need is often greatest after the opportunity to act has been for-
feited, that is, after a crisis has already occurred. Thus the Scandinavians very much
felttheneed for a union when they faced the pressures of Nazi Germany, but creating
one on short order was then impractical. The same is true for periods when the USSR
suddenly increases its pressure on Finland. Finally, the felt need of a population is
determined at least in part by its leadership. Hence the question arises why the Scan-
dinavian leadership sees the present mode of regionalism as not just the only possible
one, but also a superior one.
The idea that harmonization of national states renders a more effective mode of
cooperation than a unified political community is the one most open to question. This
statement seems to be an ideology that attempts to "explain" the somewhat embar-
rassing facts that despite all the identitive ties, differences in utilitarian interests
prevented the development of a Nordic common market, and deep differences in the
conception of national security and experience prevented the foundation of a Nordic
defense union-organizations that, respectively, could have been the economic and
military foundations of a Nordic political community. On strictly methodological
grounds, one ought always to suspect statements that imply that an existing arrange-
ment is not only the best possible one, but also one that maximizes a whole set of val-
ues. And this is what most Scandinavian spokesmen, both experts and laymen, sug-
gest.
More specifically, it is claimed that the Nordic countries' system of cooperation,
in which national units harmonize their activities but do not surrender control over
any of these activities to a regional body, allows them to act jointly and voluntarily at
the same time. To the degree that similarities of interests and outlook exist, they are
reflected in informal consultations, a tradition of compromise, and a genuine desire
to cooperate, as well as in a few institutional links of the consultive kind. Such bodies
as the Nordic Council and regular meetings of ministers provide the opportunity to
work out a coordinated course of action. To the degree that no such consensus exists
or can be formed, the system allows each country to pursue its own course. "We have
all the advantages of federation, without the disadvantages," stated one interviewee,
an official of the Swedish government. The argument both in tone and in substance is
quite similar to the "freedom in unity" used to support the similarly informal, consul-
tative, voluntary (but also not quite effective or extensive) cooperation of the British
Commonwealth. Ina typical release, the Danish Information Officepointedoutthat:
It is characteristic of Nordic cooperative endeavors that they avoid all political abstractions
and all speculations regarding final goals. Rather, they aim at the solving of concrete, practical
problems, advancing step by step andacceptinggladlyeveryconquest, no matter how small. 83
When one then points out that the Nordic countries cooperate only on matters that
have no great importance, such as some marginal educational, cultural, scientific, and
welfare matters, and thattheydonotforma united regional bodyinmattersofdefense,
foreign policy, or economics, one gets the response that because of international
factors (such as Soviet influence over Finland) and matters of an economic nature
(such as real and assumed weaknesses of the Norwegian economy), no higher level of
integration could be attained, whatever the institutional arrangement. The level of
integration that can be attained through harmonization has reached the point of de-
clining marginal utility and little progress can be expected unless a new unifying
factor is introduced, (or unless progress is generated by extraregional processes or
powers).
A third, and strong, possibility is that, because the Nordic countries are compara-
tively close to each other in terms of background, values, and sentiments, the estab-
lishment of a set of regional institutions could serve to overcome other unfavorable
factors and unfreeze the unification process. Such institutions could provide a strong
focus of regional action and loyalities, which might tip the scales to overcome the
nationalist suspicions and feelings of superiority that now stand in the way of more
effective and more extensive regional cooperation. (If the countries were farther
apart, a mere institutional change would be less likely to prm.ide such a focus). It is
precisely because of basic similarities of values and interests that a regional decision-
making body andcivilservicecould be highly successful. No proof can be given for our
proposition that if the Nordic area were to command a set of supranational institutions,
a considerably higher level of integration could be attained. It might even be suggested
that if such institutions did exist, this in itself would imply that a major barrier to the
advancement of unification, thestrongadherencetonationalsovereignty, had already
somehow been weakened. But let us assume that such an institutional structure has
come into being without any significant changes in any other circumstances, through
one of those accidents with which history abounds. What effects might such an insti-
tutional structure have?
First of all, it would provide a set of regional symbols to focus identification, to pro-
mote regionalism over nationalism. Till now, nations have effectively monopolized
the conditions Durkheim stated as needed for a society: "to worship" itself. Each
Scandinavian country has all the marks of sovereignty from a king to a parliament.
Identification with the region, on the other hand, is a highly intellectual and abstract
matter, with few permanent symbols. The sporadic, short, and dull sessions of the
Nordic Council, which hardly command enthusiasm, symbolize harmonization, not
regional integration.
Secondly, Nordic institutions would provide a focal point around which transna-
SOCIALIZATION 91
tional interest groups, parties, and labor unions could direct their efforts in order to
create regional cleavages (for example, Nordic labor versus management) that cut
across national ones. Thirdly, they would provide a "neutral" regional civil service
committed to the welfare of the region and not to any particular segment of it, capable
of working out compromises that would not require one nation to make concessions
to another but that would require all of them to make some concessions to the com-
munity-at-large.
The Scandinavians claim that no regional decision-making institutions are needed,
because the national ones, anxious to cooperate, are acting as if such institutions did
exist. For instance, in the area of legislation, one Danish official pointed out:
This considerable wriformity in Scandinavian legislation is brought about by appointing

inter-Scandinavian expert committees who prepare the texts of bills which the individual gov-
ernments then submit to their legislatures for discussion and adoption. Thus, by enacting iden-
tical laws in the parliaments of the various countries common legislation is, in fact, achieved
even though no Scandinavian parliament exists to legislate for the entire territory. 34
But this line of analysis takes an extremely passive view of the role of institutions
in the growth of a community. It suggests that to the degree that a consensus exists it
can be expressed, and to the degree it does not none should be forced. But there is a
third possibility, that of creating a new, additional consensus through give-and-take
in regional bodies; this is easier to come by when the participants realize that a con-
sensus must be reached or no action will be taken, a pressure that commonly operates
in national parliaments. Leaving it up to the national legislatures to volunteer region-
alismwithoutsuchpressuretend s, as we have seen, to sharply limit the areas in which
consensus is reached. While many identical laws are passed by the parliaments of the
various countries, their number hides the fact that policy on crucial matters is not
agreed upon and cooperation on others is slow and cumbersome.
While it is difficult to see at this point any social movement-surely not any pro-
vided by the timid Norden Association-that would lead to the formation of an effec-
tive regional institutional structure, extraregional processes might provide an even
more "congenial" background for Nordic unification. The lower the Cold War ten-
sions, the closer the United States and the USSR move toward general accommoda-
tions, and especially to the degree that European tensions are diffused, the easier it
willbecomefortheNordicNATO countriesandthenon-NATOone stomovetowarda
higher level of regional integration. Similarly, the development of the EEC will have
considerable effect on the Nordic community. The EEC provides an example of a
unification process that is partially supranational; the more successful it is, the more
likely imitations in other regions will follow. Also, the more successful the EEC turns
out to be in forming a political union of its own, which omits Nordic countries, the
more likely they are to seek their own political unification. After all, EFTA itself
was hom as a response to the EEC. Similarly, if the EEC were to fail or regress to
become just a part of a much larger free trade area (including both the present EEC
and EFTA countries), there still would be room, though not much motivation, for the
accelerated unification of subareas, as for instance the Benelux union. The most
divisive effects on the Nordic region will be generated as long as some Nordic coun-
tries continue to expect to become members of theEECwhileothersexpect to stay out,

as seems to be the case at the present time.
In sum: The Nordic area is not, as it is often put, one of a high predisposition toward
unification because of the great similarity of identitive assets of member countries and
the ideology of cooperation they share. These are offset by extraregional factors,
commitments to national sovereignty, and lack of leadership. An effective regional
institutional structure could have tipped the scale, but one has not been created.
1 Norman J. Padelford, Scandinavian Views of the United Nations. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Inter-
national Relations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, mimeo, pp. 1-3.
2 Salvesen, "Cooperation in Social Affairs," p. 350 and 351.
3 Svennevig, "The Scandinavian Bloc," p. 147.
4 Helge Seip, "The Pursuit of the Possible in Scandinavian Cooperation," The Norseman, vol. 14 (1956),
p. 146.
5 Lindgren, "International Cooperation in Scandinavia," p. 98.
"Walter H. Mallory (ed.). Political Handbook of the World 1960. New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, Inc., 1961, pp. 55-56 (Denmark); p. 150 (Norway); and pp. 181-182 (Sweden).
7 See Wendt, "The Norden Association."
8 Haakon Vigander, Mutual Revision of History Textbooks in the Nordic Countries. Paris: UNESCO,
1950.
"Private communication with a Norwegian diplomat. On this point, see Max Sfk'ensen, "Le Conseil
Nordique," RevueGeneroledeDroitinternationalPublic, 58 (1955). Third Series, Vol. 26,No. 1, pp. 64-(i9.
10 John H. Wuorinen, "Scandinavia and the Rise of Modem National Consciousness," in Edward Mead
Earle, (ed.), Nationalism and Internationalism: Essays Inscribed to Carlton/. H. Hayes. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1950, p. 461.
11 "Scandinavia and the Rise of Modem National Consciousness," p. 462.
12 Burbank, "Scandinavian Integration," pp. 146-147 and Padelford, "Regional Cooperation in Scan-
dinavia," p. 598.
13 Private communication with a Norwegian diplomat.
14 Dolan, "The Nordic Council," pp. 524-525.
15 Anderson, The Nordic Council, pp. 59ff.
16 Private communication with a Norwegian diplomat.
17 "WillNorwayExportPower?'', The Norseman, Vol.12 (1954),pp. 78-79.
18 Burbank, "Scandlnavian Integration," pp. 146-147; "Swedish Mining Plans," The Norseman, Vol. 11
(1953), pp. 307-308.
19 Wuorinenin "Scandinavia and the Rise of Modem National Consciousness," pp. 463-464.
20 Private communication with a Norwegian sociologist.
21 Both quotations are from the Scandinavian Times, May-June 1964, No.3, p. 200.
22 The Scandinavian Year Book for 1953, p. 24.
23 "Cooperation Between the Scandinavian Countries," in Henning Friis (ed.), Scandinavia Between the
East and the West. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950) p. 309.
24 David Philip, "The Originality of Scandinavian Culture," The Norseman, Vol. 13 (1955), p. 79. Italics
provided.
25 Scandinavian TiTi/Ws, No.2 (March-April1964), p. 10.
'"Lindgren, Norway-Sweden, p. 276.
27 '1celand," The Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 14, pp. 637 ...(i38.
28 Gunnar Myrdal, "Psychological Impediments to Effective International Cooperation," Journal of
Sociol Issues, supplement no. 6, 1952.
29 Anderson, The Nordic Council, pp. 59ff.
30 Dolan, "The Nordic Council," pp. 524-525.
31 Anderson, The Nordic Council, p. 206.
32 On this tendency see James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1958,
p. 141.
33 Danish Foreign Office Periodical, March 2, 1956.
34 Strahl, p. 114.
CHAPTER IV
RULE-MAKING
Leon N. Lindberg
Stuart A. Schei ngold
The rule-making system of the European

community
The rule-making processes of the European Communities described here

demonstrate the supranational character of this highly developed regional
system. The rule-making function, which includes administrative regulations
and rulings, is shared in the Communities by two organs. A delicate balance
of power exists between the Co unci I of Ministers, representing the wi II of the
member states' governments, and the Commission, representing the inter-
estsoftheorganization and composed of internationally oriented bureaucrat-
politicians. The Commission formulates policy, which then must be approved
by the Council before it is implemented by the Commission. In addition to
these two organs, there is a sub-system of advisory counci Is and committees
of permanent, ambassadorial-level officials to review and negotiate differ-
ences in opinions among the various participants before final disposition of
policy proposals is made. The advisorycounci Is in particular permit represen-
tatives of private interest groups to interact with the political authorities of the
system.l nterest group pressure is also broughtto bear on the system through
national and transnational associations in the manner described in Chapter
II and amplified by the two authors of this selection.
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
Decision-making structures: appearance and reality

There are four basic institutions in the Community system: a supranational Com-
mission, a CouncilofMinistersrepresentingthe governments, a European Parliament
in which sit members of the national parliaments, and a Court of Justice. 1
The Corrunission is the one institution that actively seeks to represent "the Com-
munity interest." Its fourteen members 2 are appointed for four-year terms by agree-
ment among the member governments, but they are in no way responsible to the
governments. They are supposed to act independently as guardians of the treaties,
as animators of the integration process and as representatives (or even discoverers)
of the collective interests of all the member countries. The Commission and its staff
(dubbed "Eurocrats") thus constitute a sort of European civil service-a Eurocracy
From: LeonN. Undberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the
European Community, pp. 82-98, © 1970. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey.
94
RULE-MAKING 95
-although, as we will see, it is more politically active than most civil services. As the
scope of the Community has expanded, so have the Commission's activities and re-
sponsibilities, as evidenced by the steady increases in its staff size and administrative
budget. (See Table 1.)
The Council of Ministers is the institution in which representatives of the national
governments meet in order to try to concert their behavior and make collective deci-
sions on matters within the scope of the Community. Ministers of Foreign Affairs or
Economic Affairs meet for general and for very important questions, and specialized
ministers (e.g., Agriculture, Transport, Finance) come together when more technical
matters are involved. Normally, the Council does not itself originate policy proposals;
rather it acts on the basis of studies and proposals that come from the Commission
and its staff. Proposals are then examined in the light of individual national interests
and the process of seeking some balance among these interests is begun. There are
complexrulesgoverningvotingin the Council, but by and large all important questions
are in fact decided by unanimity, even though a number of majority voting procedures
also exist. This puts a premium, as we shall see, on the success with which the national
representatives develop "efficient" procedures for bargaining.
TABLE 1. Eurocracy staff and administrative budget
(MILLION$)
YEAR STAFF BUDGET
1955 550a 8.0
1959 2,870 44.0
1962 3,726 53.5
1964 4,127 58.7
1966 4,463 69.5
1968 4,882 86.0
aThe staff figure for 1955 is Haas's estimate of the High

Authority. The Hildl Authority components for 1959 and
1962 are straight line estimates based on the difference
between the 1955 estimate and 1964 figure (when precise
data are available).
Sources: Budgets of EED and Euratom as published in
loumalOfficieldesCommunautesEurop6ennesandFinancial
Reports of the High Authority of the ECSC.
The European Parliament is made up of 142 delegates appointed by the national

parliaments of the member governments: thirty-six each from France, Germany,
and Italy, fourteen each from Belgium and the Netherlands, and six from Luxem-
bourg. It is supposed to provide for parliamentary control and surveillance of the
activities of the Commission and Council. 3 It meets in plenary session an average of
seven or eight times a year, and in many ways resembles a national legislature: Atten-
dance is good, members are seated by political party and not by national delegations,
and debates take place on concrete issues and range over the entire scope of the Com-
munity. There is an extensive committee system in which much of the work is actually
done- preparation of studies, resolutions, and the like. The more active committees
may meet an additional three or four days a month.
The Court of Justice is made up of seven judges appointed for six-year terms by
agreement among the governments. Its primary function is to act as a kind of supreme
court for the Community. Appeals may be brought to it by individuals, firms, Commu-
nity institutions, or member governments. Appeals may be made against acts of the
Council, the Commission, or a member government that contravenes the Treaty or
its obligations. Individuals, firms, Community institutions, and governments are all
legally bound by the Court's rulings, for it is the final authority on matters of Treaty
interpretation.
What are the relationships among these institutions and how do they work in prac-
tice? On a first examination of Figure 1 the formal relationships on the Community
level appear-to resemble those of a continental European parliamentary system. There
is a" cabinet" (the Council of Ministers) that makes the great bulk of the authoritative
decisions. It is assisted by a civil service (the Commission). These decisional activities
are restrained in different ways by two other institutions, which round out the system:
a parliament, and a court. 4 But this picture is complicated by the fact that this apparent
parliamentary system is linked to six national parliamentary systems as well.
In formal terms it also appears that the relationships between the national political
systems and the Community system are clearly articulated so as to provide for the
kinds of democratic controls we associate with parliamentary regimes. National
electorates choose parliaments, which in tum have the power to legislate and to control
cabinets which are selected from their memberships. The cabinets determine what
specific policy positions to take with regard to Community matters, and then the
Minister of Foreign Affairs or Economics or Agriculture will negotiate in the Council
ofMinisters with the other governments. When a final decision is reached the cabinets
are responsible to the parliaments for the concessions they may have made in Brussels.
But organigrams and descriptions of formal relations seldom suffice to describe
the realities of power and influence in any political system, and it is no less so in the
European Community. In the next section we will discuss in some detail how Commu-
nity-level decisions are actually made. Let us first say something about relationships
between that system and the national political systems.
The post-World War II period has seen a general decline in the vitality of European
national parliaments, and this is nowhere more obvious than in European Community
decision-making. In ratifying the Community Treaties the six parliaments in fact
created a new policy-making system over which they would have in the future very
little control. In the decision-making areas encompassed by the Community, such
authoritative decisions as are taken jointly do not require ratification by any national
parliaments, no matter how important and fundamental they might be, and the ability
of any national parliament to control its cabinet's negotiators effectively is severely
limited by the highly technical nature of most of the subject matter and by the fact
that final Community decisions are delicately balanced compromises that cannot be
undone after the fact, except at the price of calling the whole integration movement
\"1Q~Q'i.~';.
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't\~C'I.~00 ~1\'\.1<:)\
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FIG. 1. Formal institutional relationships in the European Community ~

into question. Several of the general causes of the secular trends associated with the
long-term decline in the rule-making and control functions of European national
parliaments, reach a kind of apotheosis with the European Community. Most notable
among these are the onset of the welfare state with its politics of technical expertise
and problem solving, and the steady increase of administrative and executive power.
Thus cabinets and civil services are virtually autonomous of legislatures when it comes
to determining national positions on Community problems. Here is bureaucratic
decision-making par excellence.
To partly fill the resulting" control gap" the treaties established a European Parlia-
ment which must be consulted by the Council and the Commission and which has
final authority to dismiss the Commission. But the Commission is not the final deci-
sion-making body. Such powers are reserved for the Council of Ministers in which
the representatives of the national cabinets meet, and the European Parliament has
no power over the Council at all. The body that does influence Council decisions and
participate intimately in the decision-making process is the Commission, yet another
administrative-technocratic body, this time at the Community level. The European
Parliament, as the national parliaments, has then been little more than an onlooker
when it comes to actual decision-making. The system's anomalies can be summed up
as follows:
Structurally, the institutions of the European Economic Community are very nearly as Janus-
like as the treaty that gave them birth. There is a legislature (the European Parliament) which
doesn'tlegislate; an administrative organ (the Commission) which both initiates legislation and
administers it; a cabinet (the Council of Ministers) which is responsible to no one; and a supreme
rourt (the Court ofJustice) which is supposed to act as if these glaring weaknesses and strange
anomalies didn't exist. 5
In fact, it is no exaggeration to view the whole policy-making process in the Commu-

nity as a dialogue between the Council representing the national cabinets, and the
Commission, appointed originally by the governments but acting autonomously in
terms of its own view of the "interests" of the Community as a whole. Figure 2 depicts
the key political relationships within the Community. Inside what we might call the
Community political arena (indicated by the double-lined circle) are the essential
actors as a result of whose constant and intensive interaction (the Community dia-
logue) come final Community decisions. Outside the circle are others who seek in
various ways and by means of various strategies to have some influence on what goes
on inside. Let us turn now to an analysis of the nature of this Community dialogue.
We will begin by first describing the path that a typical piece of "European legislation"
takes through the system, so as to indicate how the various relationships are expressed
inaction. Then eachofthemajorparticipants in the dialogue (the Commission and the
Council) will be discussed in some detail. We will describe the methods they use, the
resources at their disposal, their successes and their failures.
How European legislation is made 6

As we have said, the heart of the decision-making process is a complex pattern of
formal and informal relationships among cabinet members and civil servants of the
European
Parliament
POLICY
DECISIONS Economic and
Social
Committee
European European· level

Coun of Justice Interest Groups
---
Community level
Foreign i--
~----- --- National Level
Governments - -
National
:Il
Parliaments cr
m
I
I
National I National ~
Interest Courts zG)
Groups Political
Panies
~
FIG. 2. Actors In the Community legislative process

six participating countries, and between them and the members of the supranational
Onnmission and its staff. This European "legislative process" typically operates as
follows:
1. The Commission's staff perceives the need for some sort of action, because the
Treaty requires it, a government or interest group has sought it, or because the Com-
mission itself desires it.
2. They will consult with academic experts, national civil servants and perhaps
with interest group representatives, European Parliament committees, or members
of the Economic and Social Committee, so as to get an initial idea of the problems,
pressures, and possibilities in the area under consideration.
3. The Commission and its staff then prepare a formal proposal upon which they
willagainconsulttheEconomic and Social Committee, interest groups, and probably,
committees of the European Parliament.
4. The proposal is then sent to the Council of Ministers which in turn transmits it
to one of a number of study groups made up of national civil servants.
5. These study groups examine the proposals in the light of the individual national
interests involved. A representative of the Commission usually attends. National
interest groups and national parliaments may express themselves at this stage. There
is usually substantial conflict at the national level as to what positions shall be taken
by anygovernmentin the Community negotiations, for the governments are not mono-
liths. Individual national ministries often see conflicting interests in European legis-
lation -as they do in national-level legislation-and often Ministries and their client
interest groups seek to forge alliances across national boundaries to promote a partic-
ular European policy, as for example when Ministries of Agriculture and agricultural
pressure groups unite to oppose the budgetary conservatism of Ministers of Finance.
As we shall see, the existence of such disparities of interest within each nation is an
important determinant of the Community's bargaining and decision-making style.
6. These national studies typically lead to a list of conflicts of interest among the
governments (and often within each government) that need to be resolved before a
European decision can be taken. Such lists are ordinarily sent to the Committee of
Permanent Representatives: high-level representatives of each government who
meet almost continuously in Brussels and who prepare the Council's agenda. A mem-
ber of the Commission meets with them and may alter the Commission's proposals
in order to facilitate agreement.
7. All conflicts that cannot be ironed out in the Committee of Permanent Represen-
tatives are sent on the Council. Here once again the Commission participates. H na-
tional positions can be reconciled with each other and with the Commission's pro-
posals, a final European decision will be made.
Indeed, in some ways it is quite an oversimplication to describe this process as a
dialogue between Commission and Council, even though that describes its essential
nature for our purposes. But there are any number of other interactions going on
simultaneously. For example, representatives of national bureaucracies meet con-
stantly with each other in a myraid of committees to examine problems posed by in-
tegration and to consider alternative solutions. The Commission's staff will also meet
with such technical experts, either singly or collectively. The six governments them-
RULE-MAKING 101
selves also negotiate and bargain with each other either bilaterally or multilaterally
inordertoreachagreementonmatters before the Council. Figure 3 is a summary flow
chart representation of the relationships among the various participants in the legis-
lative process at the several stages of that process. The numbers correspond to those
in the text above.
Activity within this inside network is steady and intense and appears to grow in
volume each year. For example, in 1964 cabinet ministers of the six members met in
the Council of Ministers on 36 separate occasions, spending a total of 67 days in high-
level Community bargaining. In 1960 they had met 15 times for 29 days. The number
of special committees, study groups, etc., set up to bring Community and national
bureaucrats together at earlier stages of the decision-making process, increased from
127 in 1960 to 210 in 1964. Thus, as we have already documented in greater detail
earlier in this chapter, more and more national officials and civil servants spend more
and more time either actually in Brussels or working with Community problems at
the national level. And interest groups are forced to pay attention to this new decision-
making system by organizing both at the national and at the Community level. Special
professionshavesprungupforthepurpose of keeping track of, reporting on, studying,
or defending one's clients in this new system. Even the popular press devotes substan-
tial attention to it. In sum, a whole new political arena is coming into existence, one
that centers on European policy-making rather than national policy-making. As a
result, new relationships among individuals and groups may be forged that will cut
across national lines and that may one day serve as the basis of a genuine sense of
"European" identity.
While control or direct participation in decision-making on the part of parliaments
is clearly absent from this system, it would be too much to say that it completely lacks
responsiveness. Cabinets and the Commission do operate within broad policy con-
straints as determined by the composition of the parliaments and the positions of the
different political parties. Similarly, both cabinets and the Commission must be atten-
tive to interest group demands and preoccupations. This is particularly important
for the Commission, which, in order to get its proposals accepted by the Council, must
appeal to asmanygroupsinasmanycountries asitcan. The Commission, in fact, main-
tains dose anddirectcontactswithnational and Community-wide interest groups and
political parties as one way of promoting its proposals and perhaps overcoming na-
tional resistance.
Actors in the dialogue: the supranational commission, its roles and

capabilities
It is not surprising to find a transnational decision-making system in which repre-
sentatives of the governments, normally acting by unanimous vote, make the final
decisions. What is striking about the European Community is the scope of the things
that are discussed and the fact that a supranational body, the Commission (and before
1958 the High Authority of the ECSC) sits in the Council with the governments as a
virtual bargaining equal, and that it has consistently been instrumental in shaping
the decisions which have emerged. With occasional fluctuations in effectiveness this
role has been sustained since 1952. The Commission survived the crisis provoked by
...... Stages in the Decision-Making Proc~
2 INTRODUCTION I
I EVALUATION, DELIBERATION, AND BARGAINING ----r- DECISION
Community level Economic & Social

interest groups Committee
foreign countries \ European Parliamentary European
Commission Commission
etc. \ Committees Parliament
I
'\ \ ,, It__---~
I '\ \ I \ \ I
I \ '\ I
' \ \ I
j_ ~~
_t_ . ~-\.
WJ Commission Commission Council
Staff f-. Staff makes of
Originates Studies Proposal Ministers Representatives I
I
t I
I / I I
1 I I I
study
I / I Community level
1------l--- -1--- ------f----- ~~roups~ - + - - - - - - LI -----
/ National 1 National level
1 Bureaucrats
National /
Cabinets or
Bureaucracies
I I
I
' I
,
\
I
I
I I ' \ I
t \
I I / \ I
I I '\ I
\
Interest Groups I I
Parliaments National Cabinets
I Interest National I
Foreign governments and
etc. Groups Parliaments I
I Bureaucracies
1'----~ I
I
Consultation, pressure, etc. bargaining required
_____.,.... = formal action
FIG. 3. The legislative process in the European Community

RULE-MAKING 103
de Gaulle's veto of the British application for membership in 1963 and his six-month
boycott of the Community institutions in 1965-66 to achieve a major success in the
1966 agricultural negotiations and in the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations con-
cluded in 1967.
If we define power traditionally, that is, in terms of formal authority or the ability
to impose sanctions or the possession of a monopoly of legitimate force, then it is clear
that the Council is all-powerful and the Commission is powerless. But political scien-
tists have tended to move away from such formal or "negative" definitions of power.
In this revised view, power can be defined "positively," that is, as participation in
decision-making, as objective success in getting one's preferences or goals accepted
by others. By such a standard the Commission has wielded and continues to wield
substantial decision-making power in the Community process. Most decisions of
the Council must be made on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, which thus
has most of the "power" of initiative. The Commission, not the Council, is the body
with a European perspective and the command of the technical expertise required
for intelligent policy proposals. If the Council wants to amend the proposals it must
secure the Commission's agreement unless there is unanimity in the Council on anew
text.
Of course, if the Commission wants to see its proposals accepted, it must secure the
assent of the governments. To the extent that both the governments and the Commis-
sion prefer a decision to a deadlock, both would seem likely to have incentives for
bargaining and the exchange of concessions. By and large, integration has moved
forward in those areas where a sufficient number of governments were convinced or
could be convinced that joint action was necessary or desirable and where it was pos-
sible to offer compensatory rewards to those who might see their interests damaged.
This has not always been possible, ... but as our discussion so far has indicated, the
system has been working in many areas and joint decisions have been produced that
constituted more than a mere lowest common denominator of what the governments
might have originally wanted. Such successes need to be explained, for our normal
expectations of a joint decision-making system among nations of such disparate
histories would have been more nearly a situation of deadlock. One basic ingredient
has been the way in which the Commission (or High Authority) has operated in a given
situation or issue area. To have said that the Commission can move the system and
influence decision is not to say that it always does.
Hthe Commission is to play a role it must make creative use of the resources it has
for influencing the behavior of the governments. This means, above all, playing an
active rather than a passive role and making proposals that are well designed tech-
nically, with both the common goals of all the members and the specific needs or prob-
lems of individual nations taken into account. It should not come as a surprise that the
Commission and High Authority have not always succeeded in operating optimally.
There is a high premium on particular political skills in institutions like these, oper-
ating in as fluid a system as the European Community. Such skills are unevenly dis-
tributed among Commissioners, and since the Commission's internal organization
provides for considerable decentralization of policy responsibility the requisite skills
may or may not be brought into play, depending on the policy area involved. Also per-
sonnel may change. Politically adept Connnissioners like Jean Monnet or Walter
Hallstein may leave and be replaced by men with less vision and tactical skill.
What kinds of skillsarewetalkingabout?Can we draw up a list that would describe
the "ideal" Connnission? On the basis of the record over the first sixteen years of the
Community's existence, we would stress the following as necessary if the Connnission
is to realize its optimal potentialities. 7
1. Goal articulation. The Commission can articulate long-term goals for the Com-
munity that can in turn be legitimated in terms of some belief in a European common
interest. This would include public advocacy of specific proposals by invoking long-
term goals as one way to mobilize supporters and neutralize opposition.
2. Coalition building. The Commission can take the initiative in identifying prob-
lems to be solved by joint or coordinated action, and in making specific proposals.
Proposals are typically developed through intensive consultation and compromise
with client groups and with relevant national bureaucracies, so as to assure full in-
formation and expertise, and to build a policy consensus and a coalition of supporters
at the national level.
3. Recruibnentandorganization. The Commission can recruit its staff so as to maxi-
mize prior national contacts and experience, technical expertise, and, at the higher
levels, political experience and prestige.
4. Expand scope. The Connnission can be alert to the possibilities of convincing
governments and present or potential client groups to redefine their goals and pur-
poses in the direction of more joint activity. Calls for new policies, new tasks, new
powers for Community institutions can also be justified in terms of their usefulness to
the governments and to national goals.
5. Brokerage and package deals. The Connnission can play an active and construc-
tive role in intergovernmental bargaining at all levels and stages of the decision-mak-
ing process. It can do so only by fully understanding the positions of each government
and the possibilities that exist for movement and compromise on the part of each. It
defends and explains its own proposals, but also makes changes where necessary to
accommodate specific national demands. The Connnission can also act the role of an
"honest broker" by seeking to help construct a final "package deal" that optimizes the
joint gains of the member governments.
What should be clear from this list is that the European Connnission should not be
considered as simply an administrative-technical body. Were it to become one, as is
possible since the governments appoint the members and may so choose, it seems
likely that the integration movement would lose much of its force. The skills we have
listed are political skills par excellence. Another thing that should be clear is that the
"power" of the Commission depends primarily on thewayin which it is able to interact
with national political authorities and with interest group and other elites. Observers
have usually described the Community institutional system in terms of conflicts be-
tween supranational power and national sovereignty. To do so is to assume that each
gain in capability at the European level necessarily implies a loss of capability at the
national level. We reject this "zero-sum" interpretation. European integration, al-
thoughitmayinvolveconflicts,ismore accurately seen as a way in which new forms of
decision capability are created to cope with new problems and to achieve new goals.
RULE-MAKING 105
Our basic point has been that the relationship between the Commission and the Coun-
cil, as between the European Community and the national political systems, is more
nearly a symbiotic relationship than a competitive one. The Community emerged, in
part at least, as a result of the inability of national systems to process certain kinds of
economic, social, and welfare demands. Its continued growth will be a function of its
ability to provide decision capabilities that national governments acting alone cannot
command. National governments, on the other hand, continue to provide a source
of support and legitimacy for the Community institutions. They also play a vital role
in collecting and transmitting specific demands to the institutions, and in absorbing
most of the negative reactions from those groups who are disadvantaged by the dis-
locations attendant to the Community-engendered processes of economic moderni-
zation.
Actors in the dialogue: the governments, the rules and norms

governing their behavior in the council
In the foregoing discussion of the Commission it was necessary to consider in some
detail its relationship to the Council, for its roles and powers largely derive from its
interactions with that body. In this section on the Council it will be seen that it too de-
pends on the Commission, but more importantly, it will be our argument that the role
the Council plays in the integrative process will depend on the kinds of interactions
thatdevelopamongthesix different governments as they try to concert their behavior
in response to Commission initiatives. Along with the development of new decision
structures and interaction patterns, can we also discern the development of new pat-
terns or norms of behavior in the relations among these countries?
If acollectivedecision-makingsystem of this scope is to persist or to grow, we would
expect participants in it (in this case the six governments) to gradually develop stable
sets of rules and conventions governing the way in which conflicts are to be resolved,
the procedures and tactics that are acceptable or unacceptable, and who is to have
primary responsibility for negotiating differences or establishing authority. Failure
todosowouldmean that decision makers would have to argue each time about how to
goaboutdoingthings, as well as about the things themselves. 8 Given limited resources
of time, energy, and skill, this would almost certainly place serious limits on theca-
pacity of the system to produce collective decisions. Thus, agreement on some set of
"rules of the game" constitutes a vital resource for any decision-making system. With
regard to the European Community, to what extent can we answer the following sorts
of questions in the affirmative? Can we point to the emergence in the Council and
among the governments of a style of bargaining based on the mutual predictability of
behavior, a perception of common interests, and a spirit of compromise and adapta-
tion to each other's interests and preoccupations? Do the governments really bargain
with each other, offering significant concessions and exchanges in the interests of
joint action? Or do they merely present each other with nonnegotiable demands or
faits accomplis? Are the power-based and rank-conscious relationships among states
that we generally associate with international politics being replaced by more con-
censual ones?
We cannot, unfortunately, give unequivocal answers to such questions. The domi-
nant experience since 1952 has been one of a gradual emergence of a distinct "pro-
cedural code" that came to be called "the Community method." 9 It consists roughly
of the following expectations and practices:
1. The governments show frequent and strong commitment to the Community by
stressing the expectation that it will persist, that substantial rewards and benefits
are to be expected, and that withdrawal or failure are out of the question.
2. Thegovernmentsaccept the Commission as a valid bargaining partner and accord
itadegreeoflegitimacy as spokesman and advocate of the interests of the collectivity.
They expect the Cbmmission to play an active role in building a policy consensus in
the Council of Ministers.
3. Thegovernmentsdeal witheachotherina spirit of problem-solving. It is assumed
that collective decisions are desirable, and negotiation is about how to achieve them,
not whether they should be sought.
4. The governments, as well as the Commission, are attentive and responsive to
each others' interests, preoccupations, and goals. They avoid making unacceptable
demands or proposals, and divisive issues are usually postponed.
5. The governments and Commission show themselves willing to compromise and
make short-term sacrifices in the common interest or in expectation of future long-
term gains.
6. All agree that unanimous agreement is the rule and that negotiations should
continue until consensus is achieved and all objections have been either overcome
or "losses" in one area compensated for by "gains" in another. Issues are not seen as
separate and unrelated to each other but in the context of a continuous process of de-
cision. It is thus possible to engage in side-payment and logrolling behavior, whereby
trades can be made within an area or across a wide range of policy areas (e.g., agri-
cultural concessions in exchange for approval of a new form of indirect taxation).
Bargaining is thus likely to be complex, laborious. and time-consuming, and it is
characterized by so-called marathon negotiations which result in package-deal out-
comes. Marathon negotiations refer to the penultimate bargaining sessions of the
Council of Ministers when all the unresolved problems in a particular decision area
(or in several areas) are put on the table simultaneously. They may go on practically
around the clock and for a week or more until it has been possible to agree to some
combination of heterogeneous items that all can accept as more or less equitable.
These package deals are usually constructed by the Commission, which is in the best
position to know (or guess) exactly what combinations of concessions and achieve-
ments each government can be brought to accept.
But beginning in 1963 this "code" was "violated" dramatically and repeatedly by
General de Gaulle whenever it suited his purposes to do so. He threatened French
withdrawal from the Community if his demands were not met. He mounted a bitter
campaign against an active and independent role for the Commission. French bar-
gaining was punctuated by threats, the making of extreme demands, a general dis-
regard for the interests of her partners, and an unwillingness to make meaningful
concessions. 10
As a consequence, the system was plunged into a succession of crises attended by
prolonged periods of stagnation in the decision-making process: in 1963 over de
RULE-MAKING 107
Gaulle's veto of the British membership application; in 1965 over his boycott of the
Community institutions; and again in 1967-68 over his refusal to reopen membership
negotiations with Britain. The effect of each of these crises has been to further erode
the procedural consensus that had emerged. While it has still been possible to take
some important decisions in a few areas, notably agriculture and commercial policy,
and while no other country has seriously considered withdrawal, the "procedural
code" appears to automatically govern fewer and fewer decision situations. It has
often seemed as if everyone were trying to keep engagements to the minimum re-
quired to keep the system going. Only time can tell if this vital decision-making re-
source can be replenished now that France has a new political leadership. Until it is,
marathon negotiations will probably occur and package deals will emerge, but they
will be more and more difficult and the probabilities of failing to make needed deci-
sions or to meet deadlines will increase.
Some costs and benefits of this kind of system

Given the decision-making system's complexity and ambiguity, a number of doubts
must naturally arise about its overall efficiency, its flexibility, and its equitableness.
With what regularity can it be expected to cope effectively with the problems brought
to it?Will it be able to produce roughly comparable gains and impose commensurate
sacrifices on each of the participating nations? The future of the Community would
certainly be in doubt if it were to consistently fail to achieve appropriate joint decisions,
or if one or two nations were to reap most of the benefits of integration. These are
clearly basic problems for the future of the Community and much of the analysis in
this book will be devoted to them. We will consider them only briefly here. First of all,
it must be agreed that the system of "marathons" and "package deals" is time-consum-
ing and tedious. But its inefficiency in this regard should be balanced against its effi-
ciency as a promoter of consensus by means of the gradual juxtaposition of national
positions leading to the redefinition of individual national interests in terms of some
notion of a collective goal or benefit. Of course, even in that perspective, the record
is mixed, as we have seen. Besides being time-consuming, the intricate negotiations
and carefully balanced bargains that marathons and packagedealsinvolvealsoimpose
a potentially serious rigidity on the system. Once a decision is taken as part of a package
deal it cannot be easily reversed or changed should circumstances warrant, for that
might upset the original delicate balance of gains and sacrifices. Thus it is, for example,
extremelydifficultfor the Community to amend its internal legislation in order to offer
concessions in international bargaining like the Kennedy Round, or to provide for the
difficulties applicants for membership in the Community are likely to encounter.
Finally, hardly any decision can be considered as "routine" in a system in which equiv-
alenceofbenefitsis as important as in the European Community. De Gaulle's breaches
of the Community operational code had the effect of making the bargaining partners
even less willing than before to make sacrifices in the present in anticipation of a
future gain. But it will almost certainly become more difficult to avoid doing this
in the future, especially if the Community system is forced to tackle problems of gen-
eral economic stability, full employment, balance of payments, etc. It is also likely to
become more difficult (as Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out) to calculate equivalences
when you deal with areas of policy that have high political saliency, and where mone-
taryortradeorproduction values cannot be assigned. The general success the Commu-
nity has enjoyed to date in providing a rough equality of benefits and sacrifices may
bemuchhardertosustainin the future. Indeed, the necessity to maintain equivalence
in the short run may prove a barrier to further integration. Whether or not the Com-
munity can move to a system of long-term balancing of gains and losses will depend on
the extent to which events continue to push the member countries together and the
extent to which political leaders, elites, and mass publics in these countries come to
identify with and trust each other.
1 The Community institutional system is actually much more complex than this if we take into account all
of the ancillary bodies that have been set up for special purposes. They are not included here since they are
not essential to our purposes. For a partial listing and good, brief discussion see Richard Mayne, The Institu-
tions ofthe European Community (London: Chatham House, Political and Economic Planning, 1968). See
also W. Hartley Clark, The Politics of the Common Market (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1967).
• After July 1, 1970, the membership will be reduced to nine. This is the number that was found most effi-
cient in the originalEEC Commission. The increase to fourteen came in mid 1967 as a result of the fusion of
theECSCHighAuthority, the Euratom Commission, and the EEC Commission into the present single Com-
mission. [Editor's Note: This reduction from fourteen to nine did take place on schedule.]
•For more extensive treatments see Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Kenneth Undsay, European
Assemblies (London: Stevens, 1966), Murray Forsyth, The Parliament of the European Communities (Lon-
don: Chatham House, Political and Economic Planning, 1964), and Leon N. lindberg, "The Role of the
EuropeanParliament~anEmer~EuropeanCommunity,"ini.awmakersinaChangingWorld,ed.Elke
Frank (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).
• There is also a consultative body representing economic interest groups, the Economic and Social Com-
mittee.
5 Stuart A. Scheingold, "De Gaulle v. Hallstein: Europe Picks Up the Pieces," The American Scholar,
35 (Summer 1966), 478.
6 ForanexcellentdiscussionseeStephenHolt, TheCommonMarket: TheConflictofTheoryandProctice
(London: Hamish Hamiliton, 1967), Cbs. 4--a. For further details see Leon N. lindberg, The Political
Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), Cbs. 4, 5 and
passim
7 This discussionis based on Haas, The Uniting ofEurope, passim, and Lindberg, The Political Dynamics
ofEuropeanEconamic Integration, passim See also Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Ch. 5.
8 DavidEaston,ASystemsAnalysi8ofPoliticalLife (New York:John Wiley& Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 191.
9 Lindberg, Political Dynamics, passim, and Haas, The Uniting of Europe, passim
1°For some details see Nina Heathcoate, "The Crisis of European Supranationality," Journal of Common
Market Studies, 5 (1967); John Newhouse, Collision in Brussels: The Common Market Crisis of30 June
1965 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967); and Leon N. Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of
Stress on the European Community System," International Organization, 20 (Spring 1966 ).
Ann Van Wynen Thomas
A.J. Thomas, Jr.
The rule-making system of the OAS
The Organization of American States is described by the Thomases as a tra-

ditional"confederal" organization. However, the OAS does not exhibit all of
the characteristics of the pure confederal form of organization. In the tradi-
tional, confederal international organization, the parliamentary or general-
assemblytype of organ is not given a major policy-making role. Usually these
"popular" assemblies function as forums for the exchange of ideas and gen-
eral debateoverdesi rable, vague goals of the organization. Yetthe Thomases
assert that the Inter-American Conference (now renamed the General As-
sembly under the 1967 amendments) may actually possess a law-making
competency which is quite unique for this type of body. Moreover, the OAS
has no true "Council of Ministers" in the traditional sense. The term "Council
of Ministers" as a rule is applied to a regular meeting of the foreign ministers
of member states to determine policies of the organization; these are high-
level political figures second in importanceonlytothe prime minister or presi-
dent of the country. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs intheOAS meets at irregular intervals and under certain circumstances.
The foreign ministers meet to consider "problems of an urgent nature" or to
take action in regard to "threats to peace and security of the Hemisphere";
the ministers do not exercise a continuing policy-making function. The organ
of the OAS which is referred to as the Council (now renamed the Permanent
Council under the 1967 amendments) is composed of each state's permanent
ambassador to the organization. Under the pre-1967 Charter the Counci I was
the hub of the system through its powers to oversee the activities of the bu-
reaucracy, to coordinate the efforts of various technical agencies, and to
formulate and implement general policies in the interim between meetings of
the Inter-American Conference. Also the Council could act as an emergency
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Its status under the
1967 Protocol is ambiguous.
lnotherwords, the function of rule-making is shared by three major organs,
the Inter-American Conference (the General Assembly), the Council (the
Permanent Council of each state's ambassador to the organization) and the
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Although the OAS
is clearly confederal in legal structure, it may contain the potential for supra-
national development if the states would ever accept the Ii mited law-making
From: Tlw Organization ofAmerican States, by Ann V. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., pp. 39-42, 63-
72, 79-80, 83-86, 89-92, 96, 101-110, copyright © 1963 by Southern Methodist University Press. Re-
printed by permission of the publisher.
109
competency claimed for the Inter-American Conference (General Assembly)

by the Thomases. In brief, their argument is that certain types of resolutions
passed by the Conference become immediately binding upon the members
as rules of inter-American international law. This is in contrast to traditional
i nternationallaw wherein resolutions of conferences become law only after
being drafted in treaty form and ratified by states.
The OASis presented in this book for three reasons. First, it is the oldest and
one of the largest regional organizations in existence. In various forms this
system has been in existence since the 1890's and its history presents many
examples of the obstacles of regional integration. Second, the OASis a con-
federal organization in contrast to the supranational European Community,
although within the present OAS system one can find some potential for
supranational development. Third, the system is in a state of transition and the
outcome will be of extreme importance and interest to students of interna-
tional politics.
SCOPE AND NATURE OF POWERS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN

CONFERENCE
Article 33 of the Charter of Bogota declares:
The Inter-American Omference is the supreme organ of the Organization of American States.
It decides the general action and policy of the Organization and determines the structure and
functions of its Organs, and has the authority to consider any matter relating to friendly relations
among the American States. These functions shall be carried out in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Charter and of other inter-American treaties.
This wording seems to confer a vast and almost unlimited power upon the Inter-Amer-
ican Conference. In the past the functions of the hemispheric international confer-
ences were similar to those stated in Article 33, although they were not quite so broad.
Nor, in reality, are they as broad as they would seem from the wording of Article 33,
for the Charter itself sets out in some detail the policy of the organization as well as the
structure and functions of all of its organs. Moreover, amendments to the Charter must
be adopted at specially convened inter-American conferences and then ratified by
two-thirds of the number of states of the organization. 1 Previous conferences had not
been subject to such restrictions, for prior to the Ninth Conference the inter-American
organization was not treaty based. 2
Furthermore, despite the far-reaching competence set out in Article 33, limitations
are placed upon the powers of this assembly by the fact that it is, after all, a diplomatic
gathering and is thus limited by established rules governing such meetings. Actually,
the Charter in describing the competence of the Inter-American Conference places
emphasis on two principal functions. By its terminology the Inter-American Con-
ference is the organ to decide or to formulate general policy for the organization and to
act as its constituent body. 3
RULE-MAKING 111
Policy-making
Under its power to decide the general action and policy of the organization and to
consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American states, the
conference has the power to study any question within the scope of the Bogota Charter
or other inter-American treaties as well as any other inter-American problem. 4
Through discussion at a conference the delegates may exchange viewpoints on the
interpretation of facts, on the interpretation of law, and on the best solution of prob-
lems. The powers of the conference are not limited solely to the realm of discussion,
for the conference is not restricted to mere debate. Discussions and considerations are
carriedoninorderto arrive atachoiceordecision by which the conference sums up the
debates or sets forth the consensus. The use of the word decide in Article 33 clearly
indicates this to be true, and the decisions at which the deliberations of a conference
arrive take the form of general treaties or conventions to be submitted to all member
states for ratification, or of declarations, resolutions, or recommendations to member
states or to the organs of the OAS. Moreover, in order to consider a matter or to arrive
at a decision on policy,itisnecessaryto obtain the facts and other information relevant
to the question at hand. Consequently studies may be initiated by the conference,
and reports and information may be requested of the appropriate organs of the OAS.
The injunction in Article 33 to the effect that the conference must exercise its func-
tions in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of Bogota and other inter-
American treaties creates no serious restriction upon the deliberative powers of the
conference to discuss, study, and recommend, for the existing treaty provisions run
the entire gamut of inter-American relations. Consequently the deliberations of a
conference may range over an enormous area. Prior to the Charter, the treaties which
were drafted at conferences and the resolutions, declarations, and recommendations
which were passed by conferences had set forth the great purposes and principles
now contained in the Charter and had defined the ends to be attained through indi-
vidual or collective action of the American republics in all fields of inter-American
co-operative endeavor. The continuation of this far-reaching competence is envi-
sioned by Article 33, and thus the deliberative powers of a conference extend to the
consideration of principles for the promotion of inter-American co-operation in the
political, legal, economic, social, and cultural fields.
Is the conference empowered to consider and recommend measures for the main-
tenanceof peace in a specific case of a dispute or situation in which an American state
becomes involved, which endangers hemispheric peace or otherwise disrupts friendly
relations? There would seem to be nothing to prevent a conference from so doing, in
view of the authority granted to consider any matters relating to friendly relations
among the American states. Prior to the adoption of the Charter of Bogota, however,
the International Conferences of American States seldom sought to settle an existing
dispute, a notable exception being the Chaco controversy between Paraguay and
Bolivia. 5 Nevertheless, the basic treaties of the OAS do not contemplate such action
as a usual function of the conference. In the first place, the regular conference meets
too seldom to exercise such a function efficiently, and, although an extraordinary
inter-American conference might be called, any inter-American conference is in
reality too unwieldy and time-consuming to be used as an organ for the settlement
of disputes. Second, the power contemplated for the Inter-American Conferences
seems to extend primarily to the establishment of general and permanent rules of
inter-American cooperation, not to decisions upon the course of action or special policy
for a specific emergency situation. Third, the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement
(the Pact of Bogota), also adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American
States, provides the procedures for the settlement of any disputes, including recourse
to the International Court of Justice, 6 that might arise among the American states
before they reach such a serious stage as to create a possible danger to the peace. And
finally, the conference is not granted power to take sanctions against states where a
dispute reaches such proportions as to endanger the peace and security of the con-
tinent. By the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio
Treaty), adopted in 1947 and incorporated in the Charter of Bogota by reference in
Article 25, this power is specifically given to the Organ of Consultation or to the Pro-
visional Organ of Consultation-the Meeting of Foreign Ministers or the Council. 7
Nevertheless, the conference can interpret and construe the instruments of the inter-
American organization and can call the attention of the above mentioned organs to
situations likely to endanger the peace and security of the Americas. This it did at the
Tenth Conference when it declared the menace of international communism to be
such a danger. 8
Policy-making as legislation
Article 33 of the Charter of Bogota empowers the Inter-American Conference to
decide the general action and policy of the organization. The use of such words might
suggest that the Inter-American Conference is a legislative body for the American
community. It is not, however, a true legislative organ; it is a diplomatic assembly.
Consequently, the delegates to the conference obtain and must follow the orders and
instructions from their home governments; each delegation taking part in the confer-
enceis possessed ofone vote; the conclusions of the conference are ordinarily not bind-
ing on any state whose delegation dissents therefrom, even in the face of approval by
a majority vote; and, of high import, normally the labors of a conference require rati-
fication according to internal constitutional processes of each state before they es-
tablish a legal obligation in the international sense. Thus, to equate such a body to a
legislative assembly as known on the national level denies fact.
Nonetheless, it must be conceded-that the Inter-American Conference is in some
measure a rudimentary legislative organ which does bear a touch of resemblance to
a national parliament or legislature. It is the highest forum for discussion of all matters
within the scope of the OAS. It is a forum where problems of hemispheric importance
are debated, and its composition is a guarantee that each member state shall have the
opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, through the medium of the conference system,
inter-American legislation has been developed. 9 Through the drawing up of multi-
lateral law-making treaties and conventions which are signed by the delegates and
submitted for ratification to the member states of the organization, the conference
system has been and continues to be a device for international legislation among the
American nations. The final conclusions of many of the Inter-American Conferences
RULE-MAKING 113
have taken theformofnumerouslaw-makingtreaties by which the American commu-

nity has sought to stipulate new rules for its future international conduct, has defined
or abolished existing rules, and has created inter-Americaninstitutions. By this meth-
od the basic principles of the inter-American system have in large part evolved. 10 As
a rule, there is no element of authoritative command in a treaty drafted by and signed
at a conference. 11 Inter-American treaties become binding only between the powers
whichconsenttothem (assuming that a sufficient number of ratifications are received
to fulfill the treaty's stated requisite to bring it into force), leaving the other nations
free to remain outside the agreement and to be governed by existing law. 12 Conse-
quently, the efficacy of the conference as a procedure for the advancement of the rule
oflawininter-American relations is not found in the mere drafting and submission of
treaties by the conference, but rather in their later ratification by member states.
The record on the completion of the law-making process by the obtaining of the
requisite ratifications is not brilliant. Of some seventy-seven treaties and conventions
submitted to member states by the regular or special conferences, only two have re-
ceived unanimous ratification so as to be binding on all of the states. 13 Fortunately
these are the two most important: the Charter of Bogota 14 and the Inter-American
TreatyofReciprocal Assistanceo£194 7 (The Rio Treaty). 15 In addition to establishing
the organizational elements of the system, these two instruments define basic and
fundamental principles and incorporate obligatory rules of inter-American regional
law. Almost one-half of the remaining treaties were ratified only by eleven or fewer
than eleven nations. Many of the treaties ratified were later denounced by ratifying
states, and a number of them were ratified with debilitating reservations to important
provisions. Therefore, the American community of twenty-one republics of the West-
em Hemisphere can hardly be said to have created through the conference system a
vast body of binding law. Still, it must be admitted that the record of the inter-Ameri-
can system on ratification of treaties compares favorably with that achieved by other
international bodies. 16 And even though few treaties have been unanimously ratified,
a number of treaties have been ratified by a sufficient group of states to bring the
treaties into force and thus create anew body of law among the ratifying nations.
The conferences have also pursued inter-American objectives by passing several
hundred resolutions, declarations, and recommendations, many of which have de-
fined the basic principles and policies of the inter-American system. The resolutions,
declarations, and recommendations are included in the final conference documents
and are often in a form similar to that of treaties, except that no provision is made in
them for submission to the member states for ratification. 17 Often this failure to in-
clude provision for ratification appears to be the only difference between the resolu-
tions and declarations of a conference and treaties or conventions. Many such con-
ference resolutions and declarations are couched in terms of legally binding language
and set forth specific norms of behavior. Through these instruments the conferences
have attempted to modify rights as well as to provide for the assumption of new obliga-
tions. From the first inter-American conference, rules of inter-American conduct
have been formulated by this process and a number of such rules have later been
incorporated into more formal treaties or conventions. 18
The early conferences sought to set forth the more important obligations in treaty
form; but because of delays in ratification of such treaties or complete failure by some
states to ratify them, fundamental principles were soon incorporated instead into
conference declarations and resolutions, particularly in time of emergency. At the
Lima Conference of 1938, for example, not a single treaty was included in the final
conference documents. Rather the vital conclusions arrived at by the conference were
set forth in resolutions and solemn declarations. 19 By this process the difficulties in-
herent in the treaty method were avoided, the resolutions and declarations apparently
being intended to go into force and effect when signed by the conference delegation
of the consenting states. There is little doubt that the delegates to the conference
felt that all signing members would undertake to fulfill the commitments assumed
in the resolutions and declarations. 20
Still, the binding nature of resolutions or declarations has, from a juridical stand-
point, been open to controversy and doubt. A number of authorities take the position
that a mere conference resolution or declaration, no matter how strong the language
used therein, does not have the force of law as would be the case if the same language
were used in a ratified treaty. 21 It is claimed that resolutions and declarations at best
create only moral obligations, notlegal obligations. If this be true, then resolutions and
declarations cannot be equated with international legislation. On the other hand,
there is a strong body of authoritative opinion which declares that resolutions and
declarations are juridical in nature and have an obligatory force upon signatory na-
tions. This viewpoint is substantiated by the Act of Chapultepec signed at the Inter-
American Conference on War and Peace in 1945, wherein it is stated that the Ameri-
can states had been incorporating in their international law since 1890 certain basic
principles by means of conventions, resolutions, and declarations. 22 This statement
would seem to place resolutions and declarations on the same level as formal treaties,
for no distinction is made between the three. And, if true, it would mean that resolu-
tions and declarations which incorporate basic principles are in the same category as
treaties, and that, as a result, signatory states have obligated themselves to follow
a prescribed line of conduct. Thus in the inter-American system resolutions and
declarations of this sort are equivalent to international legislation.
Fenwick, noting the declaration of the Act of Chapultepec as well as the practices
of the American states which have often demanded compliance with principles
created by resolutions and declarations even to the extent of calling to account on
occasion nations which violate such principles, concludes that certain conference
resolutions and declarations are legally binding obligations upon signatory nations. 28
He therefore asserts that Inter-American Conference resolutions and declarations
are sources of international law. 24
United States Secretary of State Hughes was also of the opinion that resolutions
of an international conference, depending upon their wording and character, may be
considered as binding. As chairman of theWashington Conference on the Limitation
of Armaments, he observed:
... certain of the resolutions adopted by the committee, and on its recommendation adopted
by the Conference, are put in treaty form, and other resolutions are not put in that form. The
distinction is that those engagements which it is deemed require the sanction of a treaty are
RULE-MAKING 115
put in the form of a treaty and proposed for execution by the Powers. In other cases, the resolu-
tions are of a character not requiring such sanction in the form of a treaty, and are deemed to
be binding upon the Powers according to their tenor when adopted by the Conference. [Italics
supplied.] 25
If these opinions are correct and if resolutions and declarations of an Inter-American

Conference when couched in legally binding terminology and when intended to set
forth a rule for future conduct are juridical commitments, it must follow that to a
limitedextentthelnter-American Conference is a real international legislative organ.
For, by the expression of its will in the form of a simple resolution or declaration, it
can create norms automatically binding upon a state once that state's authorized
conference delegation agrees to the terms of the resolution or declaration by signa-
ture. Aformidable body of legal arguments can be marshaled for this viewpoint under
present-day international practice and procedure.
An instrument which creates or modifies law applicable to the relations of states
which are parties to it may go under many denominations. The classical title is that
of treaty-an agreement between states or organizations of states creating legal
rights and obligations between the parties. Treaties themselves, however, go under
a variety of names which indicate a difference in procedure or a greater or lesser
degree of formality. A conference resolution or declaration which is an agreement
between signatory parties intended to create rights and obligations among them
could be called a treaty. The label is unimportant from a legal point of view so long
as a binding international agreement is intended. 26 However, those agreements
designated by the formal name of treaty or convention by the conferences are always
submitted to the member states of the OAS for ratification, while declarations and
resolutions are not so submitted but seem to be considered as binding upon adoption.
Does this difference of procedure prevent juridical effect? Although it is usual that
legally binding international agreements are customarily concluded subject to rati-
fication, this is not necessary under international law and an obligatory agreement
may be brought into effect by mere signature. 27 Hudson is of the opinion that a state
is bound by an agreement drawn up at an international conference when the agree-
ment is signed by the duly authorized representative of the nation unless the instru-
ment expressly states that ratification is required. In such cases, then, signature alone
is the expression of a state's consent to adhere to the obligation. 28 Starke is in accord
with Hudson, feeling that under modern international practice a treaty which is not
subject to ratification or which is silent on the issue of ratification becomes binding
upon signature. 29 Following the line of these authorities, it may be said that resolu-
tions and declarations can impose an international legal duty when signed at the
conclusion of a conference.
As opposed to these authorities, it must be admitted that strong reasons can be
advanced and opinions of other international jurists set forth to bolster the conclusion
that declarations and resolutions which seek to create, modify, or extinguish inter-
national rights and duties are not legally binding by signature alone and are not in-
tended to be. The very fact that the declaration or resolution method is often utilized
instead of resort to the more formal treaty method is indicative that declarations and
resolutions are in lieu of or a second best substitute for a formal treaty agreement.
Had there been a definite intent to bind, the delegates would have resorted to the
more formalized instrument subject to ratification and, upon such ratification, the
juridical nature of the obligation would be beyond dispute. This argument is further
strengthened by the fact that certain principles which are of a contentious nature
at the time of a conference are deliberately placed in the form of declarations or reso-
lutions to avoid the possibility of a long delay in ratification or failure to receive any
ratification at all. 30 By proceeding along the declaration or resolution route, the con-
ferences indicate knowledge of a lack of juridical force as distinguished from moral
or persuasive character.
Theverymannerinwhichtheinter-Americansystemhasworkedinthepastdemon-
strates the lack of intention that these instruments should be tantamount to inter-
nationallegislation. Historically the desired rules of conduct have been formulated
and reformulated in succeeding conference declarations. After much repetition
through affirmation and reaffirmation in such resolutions or declarations, eventually
many of the principles were incorporated into formal treaties or conventions and
submitted for ratification. 31 Had the resolutions or declarations been regarded as
binding in and of themselves, the final step into formal treaty would have been un-
necessary. From this perspective, it may be said that the principles contained in inter-
American conference declarations and resolutions are exemplary of what the law
ought to be, as distinguished from the actual law itself which comes into being only
through a properly ratified treaty.
The most serious drawback to the contention that conference resolutions and
declarations are legally binding on signatory states is the fact that the ratification
of these instruments has not taken place. Although, as stated above, one group of
competent international authorities takes the position that an agreement which is
silent concerning ratification becomes binding upon signature, 32 most publicists,
while recognizing that ratification is not always essential to establish a legal obliga-
tion, hold that such an instance is the exception rather than the rule, and state that
international law regularly requires ratification unless the instrument expressly
provides that it will be binding upon signature alone. 33 In other words, ratification
is a necessary prerequisite to legal responsibility unless expressly dispensed with.
Under the internal laws of most of the nations of the Americas, it is indeed difficult
to escape this prerequisite of ratification, for the constitutions generally require that
treaties can only be ratified by the executive after such ratification has been autho-
rized by the legislative branch of the nation through consent and approval of one or
both houses. 34 If formation of a state's consent must under general international law
follow the constitutional requirements of its internal law, it becomes a matter of con-
stitutional law within each state whether any legally binding agreement may be con-
cluded without ratification by the executive and without the consent of the legislative
body. Under such an approach, a treaty which has not fulfilled the constitutional law
requirements of the signatory state, would be ipso facto invalid. 35
In the United States, in spite of the fact that the constitution specifically refers to
treaties as being made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, 36 many international agreements are made by the President or by govern-
RULE-MAKING 117
mental departments without Senate advice or consent. 37 These agreements are

known as executive agreements and have been recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States as having juridical force even though Senate approval was not
obtained before they went into effect, and even though there often seems to be no
substantial distinguishing feature between an executive agreement and a treaty. 38
Such an agreement, it has been declared, meets with the constitutional processes of
the United States and is binding upon the nation. Nevertheless, if the view is taken
that ratification is indispensable at international law unless expressly dispensed
with in the instrument, such an executive agreement would not be binding until rati-
fied unless it was made in person by the head of the state. 39 Therefore some doubt
is cast upon the binding effect of conference resolutions and declarations even with
respect to the United States, unless they are ratified in some manner by the execu-
tive. 40 Of course, no difficulty is encountered as to their immediate binding effect
if the other position is accepted, namely, that an international agreement becomes
a legal obligation upon signature alone unless the instrument specifically requires
ratification.
In any event, the argument that executive agreements which create or modify
rights are binding in the inter-American system becomes less persuasive when con-
sideration is given to the fact that Latin American constitutional law does not seem
to give the same weight to executive agreements without legislative consent as does
that of the United States. To the contrary, it would seem that most Latin American
constitutions expressly provide for an exclusive procedure of legislative approval
to all international agreements. The term executive agreement is not used in any
Latin American constitution except that of Haiti which, in Article 79, provides that
not only treaties and conventions but also executive agreements are subject to the
approval of the Haitian Congress. In all the Latin American nations with the excep-
tion of Venezuela, Colombia, and Nicaragua, treaties are required to be submitted
to the approval of the legislative branch as a condition for their validity. In the Ven-
ezuelan Constitution of 1953 the broad and ambiguous terms of Article 81, paragraph
3, coupled with Article 108, paragraph 4, would seem to have given the Venezuelan
president, in practice, the power to make all types of international treaties and agree-
ments without the need of parliamentary approval. The 1961 Venezuelan Constitu-
tion, Article 128, places some limitations on this broad presidential power but still
authorizes certain classes of executive agreements. The Colombian Constitution in
Article 120, paragraph 9, and the Nicaraguan Constitution in Article 195, paragraph
8, do permit peace treaties to be made by the President of each of those nations with-
out legislative approval. But all other treaties are subject to such approval in both
nations. There is a possibility that executive agreements might be considered valid
in many Latin American countries when they are promulgated by a presidential
decree law by a de facto government or by such a decree law of a de jure government
in cases where the nation has been declared to be under a state of siege. This has
occurred, although not frequently. 41
If the constitutional law of a nation determines whether a particular international
agreement may be validly concluded, the proposition emerges that conference resolu-
tions and declarations which attempt to be law-making in nature cannot be considered
as legally binding unless the constitutional process of legislative approval is met. If

this is a requisite, it is difficult to presume that the parties intend to create a binding
international agreement upon mere delegate signature at a conference.
Acceptance of this latter statement may give rise to the conclusion that conference
resolutions and declarations are entirely without legal significance. This would be
erroneous. They are, in any event, an indirect fountain or source of inter-American
law. To the extent that they are respected and followed by the American republics
and that a continuous habit of compliance with their terms has grown up with the
conviction that the action of compliance is obligatory-to that extent the rights and
duties incorporated in such instruments translate themselves into customary inter-
nationalobligations. Even though not binding when adopted by the conference, they
may become binding through custom. 42 This is probably what was meant by the
statement of the Act of Chapultepec that American international law had been cre-
ated by resolutions and declarations.
Although the obligatory force of certain resolutions or declarations may be subject
to dispute, it is evident beyond cavil that prior to the Charter of Bogota, conference
resolutions or declarations which were concerned with the organization of the Union
of American Republics and its organs were of a juridical character. The Union of
American Republics was itself created by a resolution, the famous Resolution of
1890. 43 This resolution, which was actually a recommendation, was not legally bind-
ing by its adoption at the conference, for Point 14 of the resolution required the gov-
emmentsoftheAmericanstates topresenttheir adhesion or nonadhesion to the terms
proposed. After a majority of the governments had adhered, the Commerical Bureau
was formed; and finally consent through adherence was forthcoming from all the
republics. No state was bound prior to its adherence, adherence in this instance being
similar to the act of ratification. Consequently, the Union began its existence on the
basis of a mere conference resolution, but such a resolution had to be ratified by an
exchange of notes of foreign ministers and thereby closely resembled a formal treaty.
If this resolution was ratified by a mere exchange of notes by the foreign ministers 44
of the republics only, with no submission to the legislative branches for approval (and
apparently in most instances there was no such submission), it lends force to an argu-
ment that certain executive agreements are recognized in Latin America.
Point 16 of the Resolution of 1890 permitted amendments to and modifications
of the plan of Union to be made by a majority vote of the members. 45 Accordingly,
thereafter all resolutions of the organization were immediately binding on adhering
members.
Resolutions by the conference are also clearly obligatory in character when they
are made in accordance with a method agreed upon by the organic charter of the
organization, for here the states have previously given consent through their ratifi-
cation of the organic pact. 46 As supreme organ of the OAS it would seem that the
Inter-American Conference is a legally constituted body to interpret inter-American
treaties and the powers conferred by them upon the organization. Its resolutions of an
interpretative nature may be said to be legally binding, even to the extent of what
may be in effect an amendmentto the treaty. For example, most treaties must be con-
RULE-MAKING 119
eluded in accordance with the internal constitutional methods established by the

domestic law of each state. In order to overcome objections of the men composing
the organ designated by the domestic law to assent to the treaty, a treaty establishing
andempoweringaninternationalorganizationis often drawn up in vague and general
terms. Once the ratification is fait accompli, and the international organization has
come into existence, the organization may adopt interpretive resolutions which are
far more specific than would appear from the general terms of the treaty. Although
it has been said that resolutions are not legally binding, nevertheless in determining
what is provided in a general provision of a treaty, a resolution interpreting the general
provision would clearly establish the "intent" of the parties, and any state which had
agreed to the resolution would be stopped from denying that the interpretive resolu-
tion was descriptive of the "intent" of the parties. . . .0
THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS
The second type of conference established by the Charter is the Meeting of Consulta-
tion of Ministers of Foreign Mfairs. This organ is designed to provide on short notice,
in time of emergency, a representative meeting of the ministers of the executive
branch of the governments of the member states to which policy formulation in the
field of foreign affairs is entrusted. Through this meeting discussion and resolution
can be had to meet the circumstances calling for immediate action. 47 The Charter,
in providing for this organ, again followed a traditional pattern, incorporating into
the basic instrument an organ which had developed previously as a device by which
consultation on matters of peace and security could be effected with celerity. The
principle of consultation itself was agreed upon at the special Buenos Aires Confer-
ence of 1936. The threat of war in Europe lent urgency to a provision leading to com-
mon consultation by the American states to meet any impending threat to the peace
of the continent. The Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablish-
ment of Peace established theprincipleof consultation by the states of the hemisphere
with a view to co-operative action to maintain the peace of the continent, should that
peace be threatened by any source either within or without the hemisphere. Here
a principle of hemispheric collective security came into existence, but the convention
failed to provide machinery for consultation. 48 Not until the Eighth Conference at
Lima in 1936 was agreement reached that the consultations were to be effected by
means of the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers. The Declaration of Lima stated:
Fourth. That in order to facilitate the consultations established in this and other American
peace instruments, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, when deemed
desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation
and without protocolary character. Each government may, under special circumstances or for
special reasons, designate a representative as a substitute for its Minister for Foreign Affairs. 49
• Editor's Note: 1be authors further assert (p. 73) that even states which wte "no" on an "interpretive"
resolution might be ultimately bound to accept that interpretation through the principle of majority rule.
This, I think, is very unlikely to be asserted in practice.
With modem modes of transportation available, this agency could be called when
urgency required and assembled in a brief period so as to meet any pressing situation.
The conflict which menaced became actual in 1939, necessitating the calling of
three wartime Meetings of O:msultation at the crisis periods presented by the war
to the peace and security of the American continent. The first meeting was held in
Panama in 1939 after the GermaninvasionofPoland, 50 the second was held at Habana
in 1940 followingthefallofFrance, 51 and the third at Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942,
to cope with the situation created by Pearl Harbor and the entrance of several Ameri-
can nations into the war. 52 The fourth meeting was held in 1951, several years after
theendofWorld War II, and was occasioned by anew danger to the peace and security
of the hemisphere-the aggressive policy of international communism. 53 The fifth,
held in Santiago, Chile, in August, 1951, was an emergency conference convened to
consider Caribbean tensions brought about by political and military upheaval in that
area. The sixth and seventh were held at San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1960, to consider
charges of aggression by Venezuela against the Dominican Republic and the problem
of communist penetration into the hemisphere; and the eighth was held in January,
1962, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, to give attention again to the intervention of in-
ternational communism into the hemisphere by way of Castro's Cuba.... 54
Nature and scope of powers under the charter

Article 39 of the Charter of the OAS declares: "The Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems of an urgent
nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of
Consultation." Thus, two broad functions are assigned to the meeting: to consider
urgent problems the solution of which cannot await the utilization of the more cum-
bersome machinery of an Inter-American Conference, and to act as the Organ of
Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in deciding
upon the specific action to be taken in the field of security whenever a particular
case arises.
Problems of an urgent nature

By stating that the Meeting of Consultation is to be held to consider common prob-
lems of an urgent nature, the Charter attempts to limit the broad competency con-
ferred by Resolution CVII of the Lima Conference which did not require that an
urgent or emergency situation exist before a meeting might be held. Article 39 does
restrict the holding of a meeting unless an element of urgency is present, but it is
doubtful if the scope of powers has been considerably reduced otherwise; for by the
granting of competence to consider problems of common interest to the American
states a whole Pandora's box of almost unlimited capacity is opened, restricted only
by the necessity of urgency. In actual practice the meetings held prior to the Charter
were always held to consider some urgency. It would seem that the word urgency as
used here does not mean that there must always be some threat to the peace to war-
rant the calling of a meeting, but that other questions may be urgent and in need of
prompt and immediate decision.
RULE-MAKING 121
It has been said that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers does not have the power to
alter the structure of the organization, and if it decides the policy of the organization
it does so for a specific emergency and not as a general and permanent rule, as does
the Inter-American Conference. Nevertheless, the results of the Fourth Meeting of
Consultation indicate that this is still a body with broad policy-formulating compe-
tency.
This meeting was held "to consider a problem of an urgent nature and of common
interest to the Americas." The emergency was the recently inaugurated Korean con-
flict and the growing threat of international communism. The "problem of common
interest" was the need for the adoption of measures to insure the political, economic,
and military defense of the hemisphere. 55
The thirty-one declarations, resolutions, and recommendations covered a wide
variety of topics butwereprimarilyconcerned with political and military co-operation,
internal security measures, and emergency economic co-operation. The Declaration
of Washington recognized the aggressive activities of international communism and
announced the determination of the American republics to remain steadfastly united
in the emergency, to maintain peace and security, and also to insure respect for the
fundamental freedoms of man. It expressed strong support of the United Nations as
themosteffectivemeansofmaintainingpeace, security, and well-being of the peoples
of the world. Other decisions taken included the support of the United Nations "Unit-
ing for Peace Resolutions"; Inter-American Military Cooperation, which placed
emphasis on the role of the Inter-American Defense Board in this respect; the Impor-
tance of Maintaining Peaceful Relations among the States; provisions concerning
military conscription of students (which recognized cultural advantages arising from
the exchange of scholars and recommended that military conscription should not
interfere with this exchange); Reaffirmation of Inter-American Principles Regarding
European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas; the Strengthening and Effective
Exercise of Democracy; strengthening of internal security through governmental
action and technical studies directed by the Pan American Union; Improvement of
the Social, Economic and Cultural Levels of the Peoples of the Americas (with special
reference to participation bythelnter-AmericanEconomicand Social Council and the
Inter-American Cultural Council); factors involved in economic development re-
latingto strategic materials, scarce essential products, allocations and priorities, prices
and transportation; and a draft resolution on the Statute of an Inter-American Court
of Justice, transmitted to the Council of the organization for study.
Here again was broad policy-making, and although the conclusions were confined
to what might be called "emergency" measures to meet the threat of international
communism, still many of these resolutions were of a general and permanent nature,
to deal with an emergency which seemed likely to continue for a long time.
The Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the second since the advent of the Charter
ofBogobi, took place in Santiago from August 12 to 18, 1959. The emergency situation
which necessitated that meeting was brought about by political unrest in the Carib-
bean, createdinlargemeasure by revolutionary fervor to overthrow dictatorships. 56
Confronted with a deteriorating situation, the Fifth Meeting was proposed by the
governments of the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Peru to consider the whole prob-
lem of current tensions of the Caribbean area with a view to the restoration of peace
and security, confidence, and friendly relations among the republics of the region by
co-operation through theOAS. Two principal problems-political unrest in the Carib-
bean and effective exercise of representative democracy in the Western Hemisphere
-were considered. Issues emanating from these two problems were non-interven-
tion, human rights, representative democracy, and the relation of economic develop-
ment to political stability. The Declaration of Santiago and twelve political resolutions
covering inter-American problems were formulated and signed at the conference.
The two most important documents were the Declaration and the Resolution on the
Inter-American Peace Committee.
The Declaration of Santiago expressed support for democratic institutions, con-
demned dictatorship, and stressed respect for human rights. It affirmed that the
American governments should be the product of free elections and that perpetuation
in power by force was incompatible with the effective exercise of democracy. The
Declaration also reaffirmed the doctrine of non-intervention. By so doing, it con-
demned foreign-based invasions to help overthrow the hemisphere's dictatorships.
More specific and special powers were granted to the Inter-American Peace Com-
mittee, which was assigned to inquire into Caribbean tensions, to investigate foreign-
based invasions and the reasons therefor, and toreporttotheEleventh Inter-American
Conference to be held in Quito. The committee was empowered to take action in the
performance of its assigned duties at the request of governments or on its own ini-
tiative, although in either case its activity was made subject to the express consent of
states involved if investigations had to be made in such states' territories. 57
The Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held at San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1960, did
not convene under the competency to consider urgent and common matters, but
rather as Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. Immediately following this
Sixth Meeting, the Seventh Meeting was held at the same place, this one again under
the powers toconsiderurgentandcommon problems. The agenda covered four topics,
all related to the strengthening of continental solidarity in the face of extracontinental
intervention by the international communist movement. Some thirteen resolutions
were approved, the most important of which was Resolution I, which condemned
interventionorthreatthereofby an extracontinental power; declared that the accept-
anceofthethreat of extracontinental intervention by any American state endangered
American solidarity and security; and rejected the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers
to make use of any political, economic, or social situation in an American state, since
such an attempt clearly endangered hemispheric unity and hemispheric peace. 58
Outside the realm of policy-making, does the scope of the phrase "problems of an
urgent nature and of common interest to the American States" permit the summoning
of a Consultative Meeting to consider any dispute or controversy between states which
would not fall within the terms of the Rio Treaty-i.e., one which would not threaten
theinviolabilityortheintegrityoftheterritoryorthesovereigntyorpoliticalindepend-
ence of an American state? It seems clear that it was not the intention of the delegates
to create under the urgency competency a body empowered to consider all disputes.
It was not contemplated that the meeting should be a court of summary jurisdiction. 59
RULE-MAKING 123
On the other hand, the term urgency is not limited to instances where there is a threat
to the peace, and a Meeting of Foreign Ministers could be utilized in instances where a
dispute took on an urgent character calling for prompt decision. Of course, the deci-
sion of the Meeting of Consultation in such a case would take the form only of a non-
binding recommendation of the disputants ....
Organ of consultation
Not only does the Meeting of Foreign Ministers gather to consider urgent problems
of common interest, but it also functions for the specific purpose of serving as Organ of
Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to decide
what action is to be taken in the field of security whenever a particular case arises.
Article 11 of this treaty specifies: "The consultations to which this Treaty refers
shall be carried out by means of the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
American Republics which have ratified the Treaty, or in the manner or by the organ
which in the future may be agreed upon." The last clause of this provision was placed
in the article so that it would not bind the forthcoming reorganization which took
place at the Ninth Conference. 60 The Ninth Conference confirmed Article 11 by
providing that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers should serve as the organ of consul-
tation. 51
There was some controversy at the Rio Conference as to what agency should be
made the forum for consultation and decision under the treaty. It was suggested that
consultation should be carried out through the Governing Board of the Pan American
Union, or that a special organ should be created. 62 In view of the fact that the action
contemplated by the treaty was most serious in character, the final decision was that
the consultation should be carried out by the top spokesmen for foreign affairs of the
American states, 68 although Article 12 granted to the Governing Board of the Pan
American Union the power to act as Provisional Organ of Consultation until the
Meeting of Foreign Ministers as Organ of Consultation could take place.
In its role as Organ of Consultation under the provisions of the Rio Treaty, the func-
tion of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Mfairs becomes executive in nature, to
the extent that it is charged with the enforcement of peace in the hemisphere.
Article 3 of the Rio Treaty requires that the Organ of Consultation shall meet with-
out delay in the event of an armed attack by any state against an American state, in
order to agree upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken by the
American states. Article 6 of this treaty is broader in its requirement of consulf:i!tion,
for it requires a meeting of the Organ whenever the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereigntyorpoliticalindependenceof any American state is affected
by an aggression which is not an armed attack, or by an extracontinental or intra-
continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace
of America. The Organ of Consultation is called upon in case of aggression to agree on
measures whichmust be taken to assist the victim of the aggression, or, in any case, the
measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of
the peace and security of the continent.
Article 43 of the Charter of Bogota, in line with the Rio Treaty, requires a Meeting
of Consultation to be held in case of an armed attack within the territory of an Amer-
ican state or within the region of security delimited by treaties in force. This article
refers only to situations arising under an armed attack. Article 25 of the Charter,
however, is broader and includes all the situations which may arise under the Rio
Treaty. The latter article incorporates the Rio Treaty, and thus the Meeting of Con-
sultation acts as Organ of Consultation under all the circumstances set forth in the
Rio Treaty and not merely in the event of an armed attack. 64
This organ is then intended as the enforcement or police agency of the OAS, en-
trusted with the power to order the member states to take the collective measures
or sanctions provided for in the Rio Treaty in thefieldof security whenever a particular
case arises. It has the power to decide the collective coercive measures which are to
be taken by the member states in any dispute or situation that reaches such a serious
stage as to create a danger to the peace. 65 Its decisions in situations arising under
Articles 3 and 6 of the Rio Treaty are legally binding upon the members. In conse-
quence members may be called upon to participate in enforcement actions in the
event of violations of or threats to the peace with the exception that a member state
may not be compelled to use armed force. The obligatory effect of the decisions of
the Consultative Organ is borne out by Article 20 of the treaty, which declares: "Deci-
sions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8 shall be
binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole
exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent."
Therefore when two-thirdsofthevotingmembersat a Meeting of Consultation decide
that the chiefs of diplomatic missions should be recalled from a country, or diplomatic
or consular relations broken, or economic relations, transport, or communications
interrupted, each of the parties is bound to carry out the decision even though it may
have voted against it. The Organ of Consultation may also decide that the sanction
necessary in thesituationis the use of armed force. Although no state may be required
to use armed force, this does not affect the validity of a decision by the organ to use
armed force. It simply permits each state to decide of its own free will to employ this
punitivemeasureinaccordancewiththedecision. Any such use after a decision by the
organ would, of course, be legal if in harmony with the United Nations Charter. 66
Voting provisions in international bodies and the obligatory effect of decisions
reached by such agencies on the participating states have long been troublesome
problems. With the extension of international co-operation, nations have often
assumed that the principle of equality of states required equality of representation
and unanimity in reaching all important decisions. Such an assumption has made
organized co-operation exceedingly difficult, if not well nigh impossible.
Prior to the Rio Treaty, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers proceeded for the most
part in accordance with the assumptions springing from the state equality doctrine.
Equality of representation was maintained. A slight departure was made in that deci-
sions were as a rule taken by majority vote, but, in practice, unanimity was always
sought and usually obtained, and, in any event, a decision of the Meeting was con-
sidered binding only upon concurring states. 67
When the time came to create a system of collective security for the hemisphere
based upon a definitive treaty, practical effectiveness of such a system demanded a
change. Collective security would be but a myth if any sort of unanimity of voting
RULE-MAKING 125
were to be required before collective action could be taken to meet aggression. A

ruleofunanimitywould permitonedissentingstateto block the taking of enforcement
measures by the others-a veto.
On the other hand,if something less than unanimity were to be adopted, for example
a majority or two-thirds vote, and if the old rule were to remain, parties not concurring
in thedecisionsoftheConsultativeOrgan would not be bound by the measures agreed
upon. This in turn would obstruct collective security, for sanctions, particularly of an
economicordiplomaticnature, could hardly be effective if a leading state or two were
not bound to take the measures agreed upon and decided not to do so. Concession was
called for. Prior to the conference in 1947, the Governing Board of the Pan American
Union initiated a consultation among the American governments. Point II was con-
cerned with voting arrangements for agreeing on collective measures, i.e., whether
the agreement should be by unanimous vote, by two-thirds of the parties, or by a ma-
jority. In addition the question was put as to whether the collective measures agreed
upon should be binding for all of the contracting parties or only for those concurring. 68
Most of the nations favored the rule that collective measures be taken by a two-thirds
majority. 69 Fourteen governments stated that the measures so agreed upon should
be obligatory for all, and six were of the opinion that they should be obligatory only
upon concurring states. 70
The attitude of the substantial majority of American governments as to voting was
incorporated into the Rio Treaty. Article 17 declares: "The Organ of Consultation
shall take its decisions by a vote of two-thirds of the States which have ratified the
treaty." Thus once consultation is initiated all decisions are taken by a two-thirds vote
of the ratifying states. This represents a middle ground between a unanimity rule
and a majority rule. It assures that the decisions calling for action are backed by a
majority sufficiently high to represent the collective will of the Americas, and still
avoids the possibility that a small minority can block the operation of the treaty. 71
Issues which would require a two-thirds vote would be the existence of an armed
attack under Article 3, the existence of an aggression and the determination of the
aggressor under Article 6, the existence of other situations that endanger the peace
of the Americas and affect the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sov-
ereignty or political independence of an American state, matters connected with
Article 7, and the collective measures to be taken under Article 8-their nature,
timing, and extent.
Asnotedabove,astatemusthaveratified thetreatyinordertovote. In the case of a
situation or dispute between American states, Article 18 also excludes from voting
those states directly interested. States "directly interested" are those which are imme-
diate and initial parties to the dispute. 72 This article embodies the principle that
parties to a dispute should not judge their own case; but it should be noted that it is
applicable to disputes between American states exclusively. If the situation or dispute
occurs between an American state and a non-American state, the American state di-
rectly interested would not be deprived of the vote. 73
The quorum necessary in the Organ of Consultation consists of the number of votes
necessary for taking decisions-i.e., the number of two-thirds of the ratifying states. 74
Despite the fact that the majority response to the consultation of the Governing
Board indicated that the measures agreed upon by a two-thirds vote in the Organ of
Consultation should be obligatory on all contracting parties, an adjustment was made
under the terms of the treaty. The obligation was accepted to comply with decisions
of two-thirds of the parties of put into effect the punitive measures enumerated in
Article 8, with one exception-no state may be required to use armed force without
its consent. . . .t>
THE COUNCIL
The Council is the permanent executive organ of the OAS and is endowed by the
CharterofBogobiwithimportantpowers of a political, supervisory, and co-ordinating
nature.lt is the successor of the former Governing Board of the Pan American Union,
which was created in 1902 to supervise the management of the International Bureau,
later the Pan American Union, and which was joined together with the administrative
offices of the Pan American Union as a single composite body. As the Governing
Board of the Pan American Union, this body is one of the oldest organs of the organ-
ization. A principal change effected by the Chapter was to separate the Governing
Board from the Pan American Union and to change its name .... 75
Political functions-as provisional organ of consuhation

The Rio Treaty obligates the states who are parties to the treaty to assist an Amer-
ican state subjected to an armed attack immediately in meeting the attack. Although
each state is free to determine the immediate measures it will individually take, the
obligation to assist in some way is clear. Article 3 of the treaty provides that in case of
armed attack, the Organ of Consultation is to meet without delay to examine the
above-mentioned measures and to agree upon the measures of a collective character
that should be taken.
A second type of situation contemplated under the Rio Treaty which may bring into
being collective security measures is concerned with an act or threat of aggression
which is not an armed attack orin which there may be any other fact or situation that
might endanger the peace of America and that affects the territorial integrity, sov-
ereignty, or political independence of an American state. Article 6 commands that
when any such situation arises the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in
order to agree on measures which, in case of aggression, must be taken to assist the
victim, or, in any case, measures which should be taken for the common defense, for
the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.
Article 11 makes the Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics which have ratified the Treaty, the Organ of Consultation; but Article 12
declares that the Governing Board of the Pan American Union may act provisionally
as Organ of Consultation until the meeting of the Organ of Consultation takes place.
The terms of Article 13 require the consultations to be initiated "at the request
addressed to the Governing Board ... by any of the signatory states which has ratified
the Treaty." Article 15 makes the Board an organ of liaison among the American
"Editor'sNote:Althoughstatesdonothavetosupplyarmedforceswithouttheiroonsent,dissentingstates
are obliged to enforoo diplomatic and economic sanctions undertaken by the organization pursuant to the
articles of the Rio Treaty mentioned above. Seethe original textofthisexoorpt,p. 93.
RULE-MAKING 127
states and between these states and the United Nations in all matters concerning
the treaty.
Although the Rio Treaty granted carte blanche authority for future change in the
Organ of Consultation and the Provisional Organ, 76 the Charter of Bogota in its re-
organization of the inter-American system continued these two agencies in their re-
spective positions as articulated by the former treaty, with the Governing Board of
course becoming the Council. Article 52 of the Charter bears this out in part, in these
words: "The Council shall serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation when the cir-
cumstances contemplated in Article 43 of this Charter arise."
Article43 refers to the case of an armed attack only, which is but one of the situations
contemplated in the Rio Treaty-that set forth in Article 3. To find authorization for
the Council to act provisionally in situations other than armed attack, i.'3., those sit-
uations set forth in Article 6, it is necessary to direct attention to Article 25, which by
its language incorporates the provisions of the Rio Treaty by reference. 77 Therefore,
the Council is empowered to act provisionally in all of the situations contemplated in
the Rio Treaty. The provisional competence granted is in recognition of the fact that
in certain cases measures of collective security may be urgently necessary and cannot
await the delay involved in the actual convocation of the non-permanent agency,
the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. 78
It may then be reasonably concluded that once the Council sets itself up as Provi-
sional Organ of Consultation by the assumption of jurisdiction over a case arising
under the Rio Treaty, its competence is identical to that of the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers, although from a literal interpretation of the basic instruments this is an
interim competence enduring until the foreign ministers can assemble. 79 In such
instances its powers of settlement are the same. It may determine which of the states
that are parties to the dispute is the aggressor; insofar as two contending American
states are concerned, it can call upon them to suspend hostilities; it can call upon these
states to take other necessary measures to re-establish and maintain inter-American
peace and security and to solve their conflict by peaceful means; and it can call for
the application of sanctions, including the use of armed force. Moreover, the Council
as Provisional Organ can, in order to ascertain the facts in the case, request information
orcarryoutits own investigations through the use of committees which may be sent to
thesceneoftheconflictor aggression. That the Council has these broad powers is made
clear by its actions in the actual cases which have arisen before it. In those cases it has
requested additional information from the contending parties; has sent investigating
commissions to the countries involved to obtain on-the-spot information; has ordered
the disputants to abstain from further hostilities; has called on each government to
eliminate conditions which led to the dispute; and has made other specific recom-
mendations to them for settling the issue. The Council has requested the American
governments to place at the disposal of the investigating committee aircraft to make
pacific observation flights over the regions affected by the dispute, and in the Cuban
missile crisis even recommended the use of armed force. 80
Not only does the Council as Provisional Organ have the competence assigned to a
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, but it can be asserted that the measures taken in that
capacity are valid measures not subject to later ratification by the foreign ministers
as a condition of their legality. This is brought out in the proceedings of the 1947 Con-
ference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, where it was stated
that the resolutions adopted by the Provisional Organ are not themselves provisional
so as to require future ratification, although the Meeting of Foreign Ministers may
revokeormodifyresolutionsofthe Council when and if such a Meeting is convened. 81
Neither the Council as Provisional Organ nor the Meeting of Foreign Ministers as
Organ of Consultation is empowered to settle every dispute among the American na-
tions. Read hastily, the terms of Article 6 might seem to confer an almost unlimited
jurisdiction by permitting action whenever the peace of the Americas is threatened.
It would follow, if this were true, that any dispute at almost any stage might threaten
peace. Upon more careful scrutiny, however, it will be seen that Article 6 not only
requires, prior to an assumption of jurisdiction, an aggression or situation that en-
dangers the peace, but also requires that this aggression or situation affect in some
way the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of an American state. Such a literal interpretation was given to the ar-
ticle in the Haiti-Dominican Republic case of 1949 when Haiti charged an aggression
of amoral order against the Dominican Republic. The Council decided not to convoke
the Organ of Consultation in part on the ground that the dispute did not affect the
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or the political inde-
pendence of Haiti. 82 The Council is not a court to decide each and every case which
might be presented to it by the member states. Atcertainstagesof a dispute it is incum-
bent upon the parties to resort to negotiation or some procedure of pacific settlement.
Nevertheless, any dispute, even though it concerns a purely legal question such as a
violation of a rule of international law or the breach of a treaty, might well reach a
stage whereby a situation is presented which would fall within the terms of the Rio
Treaty. At that point the Council may step in to take measures to maintain or restore
peace.
Once the Council takes cognizance of a case and constitutes itself as Organ of Con-
sultation, its competence, as discussed above, is plain; but there is an area where its
competence is shadowy and not clearly set forth by the provisions of the applicable
treaties. This clouded area concerns the Council's power when a case is presented to
it but prior to its determination to convoke a consultative meeting; i.e., what are the
Council's powers between the time of the presentation of a case to it and the issuing
of a convocation? It is manifest that the Council has no power in this preliminary stage
to take action as to the substance of the dispute. 83 Nevertheless, it would appear in-
disputable that doubtful cases can occur, so that the Council may have to establish
certain facts in order to determine whether there actually exists one of the situations
contemplated in the Rio Treaty, making convocation necessary. To determine these
factsitmustpossess power to obtain information, even to the extent of undertaking an
investigation of its own before calling the Organ of Consultation or constituting itself
as such provisionally. 84
The contention has been made that the Council is required to convoke automati-
cally when a member state requests it to do so and invokes Article 3 or 6 of the Rio
Treaty; that the Council is not required to determine whether the circumstances
alleged bythecomplainingmembercomewithin the purview of the treaty. To support
RULE-MAKING 129
this view it is claimed that an assumption of power by the O>uncil of an investigation

and adjudication of the question as to whether a case is a proper one for the application
of the treaty would extend its political authority in a manner not contemplated. 85 It
cannot be denied thatsuchanauthoritywouldextend the O>uncil's power as a council,
as distinguished from provisional organ, for despite the fact that it may be said that
the O>uncil would not be examining here with a view to fixing responsibility and set-
tling the case, still discussion and investigation could not help but involve incidentally
the question of responsibility and fault, and such an airing of the facts might well bring
pressure upon the disputants to settle the dispute by voluntary agreement. 86 Still,
it is evident that the treaty does imply the possession of such power by the O>uncil.
Under the Rio Treaty, the decision to convoke comes within the purview of O>uncil
action. No provision is made for convening a meeting automatically upon request of
a member state only. Article 13 requires the consultations "provided for in Articles
3 and 6 ... to be initiated at a request addressed to the Governing Board [O>uncil)
by any signatory state which has ratified the Treaty," and Article 16 declares that the
Council shall make its decision as to convocation by majority vote.
InthecaseofanarmedattackthisprocedureismodifiedbyArticle42oftheCharter
of Bogota. The language used in thatarticledaescreate an almost automatic procedure
for convoking a Meeting of Foreign Ministers immediately when an armed attack
occurs and at the same time calling a meeting of the O>uncil. Apparently dispensed
with as prerequisite is a request by a member state or a vote of the O>uncil. Doubtless
the O>uncilcouldoverrulethechairman's action byvote,if, upon meeting, it found the
circumstances did not warrant a convocation.
In cases arising in situations other than armed attack as set forth in Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty, the procedures are by no means automatic. Here the original provisions
of the Rio Treaty are still applicable, requiring consultation to be initiated by the re-
quest of a ratifying state to the O>uncil and a majority vote by that body for decision.
Unlike the case of actual armed attack which unquestionably creates the need for
ameeting,doubtmaywell be present as to whether the facts of a case warrant a meet-
ing under Article 6. It is self-evident that a convocation should not be called without
justification and unless there is some relatively serious situation. Moreover, Article
6 requires a judgment to be made. The O>uncil must decide whether an aggression
which is not an armed attack or some conflict or situation that might endanger the
peace of the Americas has occurred. It must also be determined whether this aggres-
sion, conflict, or situation affects the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the
sovereignty or the political independence of an American state. To make other than a
blind judgment as to Article 6 will usually require the possession of a great deal of
information and a careful examination of the facts, for in many cases the question of
contravention of this article will not be at all obvious.
Even in the case of an armed attack the chairman might not feel inclined to call a
convocation without obtaining additional information unless the facts he had at hand
demonstrated clearly, convincingly, and unequivocally that an armed attack had
occurred.
The ability to obtain pertinent facts must then fall within the implied powers of the
O>uncil in this preliminary stage, and to obtain and clarify such facts the O>uncil can
indulge in extended discussion and debate; it can request information from the
parties; and it can conduct its own investigations by appointment of investigating
committees which may conduct their investigations at the scene of the alleged aggres-
sion. To take a contrary view could make for an unintelligent decision to convoke and
could give rise to possible consultations unjustified and improper under the terms of
the Rio Treaty.
Although an investigative power prior to convocation appears beyond dispute, the
Council has been hesitant to use it. In no case arising before it has the Council con-
ducted a thoroughinvestigationofits own at this stage. In most of the cases the Council
has proceeded to call a Meeting of Foreign Ministers sine die, and constituted itself as
provisional organ after a rather summary presentation of the facts. Not until it had
declared itself provisional organ did it actually send out investigation committees to
obtain on-the-spot, accurate, and complete information. Its proceeding in this manner
has been criticized on the grounds that it would have been more logical to investigate
all the facts first to ascertain if they warranted consultation. The criticism is particu-
larly apt in view of the fact that the Council accepted the charges of violation after a
summary investigation which convinced it that the situation was of sufficient gravity
to justify it in constituting itself as provisional organ, but at the same time the Council
indicated that the situation was not of such seriousness to warrant an actual convoca-
tion of foreign ministers, for it did no more than provide a pro forma convocation; i.e.,
itcalledaMeetingofForeignMinisterswithout setting a date or place. This procedure
implies a beliefon the part of the Council that it has no power of an investigative char-
acter until it has convened as provisional organ. It further indicates that the Council
is not empowered to act provisionally until it has proceeded to call a Meeting of the
Organ of Consultation, even in instances where the Council apparently is of the opin-
ion that there is no necessity for an immediate convocation of the foreign ministers.
It is manifest that the Council qua Council possesses investigative competence in
the preliminary state. But the answer to the second issue, that of convocation of the
foreign ministers as prerequisite to Council provisional action, is not so clear. Article
12 of the Rio Treaty declares that the Council may act provisionally until the meeting
of the Organ of Consultation takes place. Htaken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 6,
which require the Organ of Consultation to meet without delay or immediately, there
may be an indication here that the Council must call a Meeting of Foreign Ministers
before it can act provisionally. In addition, it is clear from the debates at the Rio Con-
ference that the Meeting of Ministers is to be the normal organ of consultation. Be-
causeofthefearthatthe CouncilmightsupersedetheMeeting,Article43 was inserted
in the Bogota Charter, requiring a meeting to be held without delay upon the convo-
cation of the chairman of the Council in case of armed attack. 87 Nevertheless, the fact
that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers is the normal organ of consultation does not
mean thatitis to be the forum in all cases. This issue as to the essentiality of a Meeting
in all situations was left in some confusion by the debates, but from an examination of
the proceedings of the Rio Conference, the conclusion can be reached that a Meeting
of Foreign Ministers would not always be warranted. For example, one delegate
states:
RULE-MAKING 131
. . . in practiceitwill happen that in ninety per cent of the cases the provisional character attrib-
uted to the intervention of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union will extend to the
complete solution of the disputes, whenever the latter are not of the type to justify the Meeting
of Foreign Ministers. 88
The relator for the Third Onnmittee, which recommended Articles 11 and 12,
declared:
... as supreme organ of consultation we have established the Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
TheOnnmitteeisnotunmindfuloftheexcellence ... oftheGovemingBoard ... butconsiders
that the unleashing of active measures ought to be the direct responsibility of the Governments
... The Governing Board ... will have to assume the role of Organ of Consultation in cases of
inevitable urgency, or in others in which the subject matter, without being insignificant, does
not justify the Meeting of Ministers. 89
This language makes it plain that a Meeting of the Organ of Consultation would not
always be considered essential. Still, the Council has proceeded in actual cases as if
itisalwaysincumbentuponitto call a Meeting of Foreign Ministers before provisional
action can be taken. It has, however, reached the same result in many of these cases
asifithadnevercalled theMeetingofForeignMinisters, for it has only gone through
the form of calling a meeting and then, acting provisionally, has dealt with the prob-
lems presented and solved the controversy by acting exactly as the Organ of Consul-
tation. Because of the expense involved in an actual Meeting of Foreign Ministers and
the inconvenience to the ministers themselves, the Council would seem justified in
conducting itself in such a manner on the ground of expediency in a situation which
is not so grave and urgent as to warrant a convocation and which can be settled by the
provisional organ itself orin instances where the urgency is so immediate and vital that
delay cannot be permitted. Nevertheless, by proceeding in this way, it would seem to
contravene the language of the Rio Treaty which requires an immediate meeting. 90
Since any agency necessarily must possess authority to pass upon the scope of its
own competence in the first instance, the Council's interpretation which apparently
requires a constituting of itself as provisional organ before it can act under the Rio
Treaty, and, further, which requires at least a pro forma convocation of the Meeting
of Foreign Ministers when it constitutes itself provisionally, will stand as correct until
challenged and disavowed by a superior organ-the Inter-American Conference or
a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. 91
It must be emphasized that this interpretation by the Council of its powers is the
most important event that has taken place in the field of collective security of the
OAS.It often makes the Council the real political executive of the organization, for in
most cases presented to it and accepted by it the Council, upon convening provi-
sionally, has called a Meeting, but failed to fix a time and place of meeting. It has then
proceeded tosettlethedisputeand to cancel the Meeting. In the case of the 1954 com-
munist menace in Guatemala the Council did see fit to call a Meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters and to set a time and date. In this instance the Council did not constitute itself
as provisional organ. It never became necessary to hold the Meeting and it was post-
poned sine die because the danger to the peace and security of the continent by com-
munist infiltration was allayed by the success of the revolutionary junta and its acqui-
sition of power as provisional government of Guatemala. 92
In the 1960 conflict between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic the Council
once again saw fit to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, and again the convoca-
tion was not pro forma, for a time and place for the Meeting was set. At this Meeting
of Foreign Ministers enforcement measures under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty were
unleashed against the Dominican Republic on the grounds of that nation's aggression;
while at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in 1962, the Foreign Ministers were
actually convened by the Council, and theMinisterssawfittoimposean arms embargo
upon Cuba and toexcludeCubafrom participation in the OAS -a sanction or measure
not specifically provided for in inter-American instruments, but voted by a two-thirds
majority on the ground of Cuban incompatibility with the inter-American system. 93
The words of the relator of the Third Committee mentioned above in effect de-
scribe the Council's authority. In the light of that language coupled with the practices
of the Council to date, the following conclusions can be drawn:
In a case "in which the subject matter, without being insignificant, does not justify
theMeetingofMinisters," the Council will proceed as it has been doing by constituting
itself provisionally and calling for a pro forma convocation only. In those situations of
armedattackorofotherextremely serious nature, particularly where "the unleashing
of active measures" in the form of sanctions may be thought to be necessary, an actual
Meeting of Consultation will be called, although in situations not admitting of delay
the Council can clearly take all necessary measures to deal with the problem until the
Meeting of Foreign Ministers can convene. This latter case was well exemplified by
the Council's action during the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962 (discussed in
Chapter XVII), when, because of extreme urgency, the Council acting as provisional
organ recommended individual and collective measures, including the use of armed
force, to defend the Americas against the threat of nuclear attack.
Political functions-problems of an urgent nature and of common

interest
Article 39 of the Charter of Bogota provides that the Meeting of Consultation of
MinistersofForeignAffairs shall be held not only to serve as the Organ of Consultation,
but also in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to
the American states. Moreover, Article 40 requires that for such a meeting to be con-
vened a member state must request it. This request is to be addressed to the Council,
which shall then decide by a majority vote whether such a meeting shall be held. What
then is thepoweroftheCouncilhere?Obviouslyithasno authority until some member
state requests that a Meeting of Foreign Ministers be held. When such a request is
forthcoming the Council's authority is restricted to a determination by a majority vote
as to whether the requested meeting will be held. This, however, is not as simple as
it would appear to be. Again the Council is faced with a decision as to whether the
situation behind the request falls within the terms of Article 39. Does the situation
involve a problem of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American states?
Resolving this question is its sole competence here. But to resolve this question, to
RULE-MAKING 133
arrive at an intelligent decision, extended discussion, debate, and examination of the

detailsandfactsofthesituationmay be in order. It may even become necessary to con-
duct an investigation by the apJX>intment of a special committee to gather the facts so
as to determine whether the problem is urgent and of common interest. There seems
to be no restriction on the competence of the O)Uncil to resolve the issue, for its implied
JX>wer of inquiry and investigation appear to be broad. 94
The Council has in fact been presented with a problem involving its competence
here. In 1949 a note of the Chilean government was presented to the Council con-
cerning the case of the ex-President ofVenezuela, Romulo Betancourt, who had been
granted asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Caracas. The note charged that the
Venezuelan military junta had failed to grant a safe-conduct for the ex-President and
that this failure contravened the principle of the right of asylum and the democratic
tradition of America. The note then requested the Council to assemble to examine the
matter and to take steps with the junta to obtain respect for the right of asylum. A
similar note from the Guatemalan government was also presented to the Council. 95
This, then, was a presentation of a juridical question to the Council-that of a breach
ofinternationallawrightortreatyrightof asylum. Venezuela immediately challenged
the competence of the Council in this situation; charged that Chile's action constituted
intervention in a matter which did not concern it; and asserted that the safe-conduct
of the ex-President had been granted. Since the safe-conduct had been granted the
Council resolved not to consider the matter "because the reason which determined
the situation before it had disappeared." 96 Because of a dispute in the Council as to
its competence, a special committee of seven Council members was apJX>inted to study
the Council's authority in this matter. 97 The committee then reJX>rted that "definitive
interpretation of any matter involving the competence of the Council is, of course, the
function of the governments themselves, to be executed either through the Inter-
American Conference or in the manner that the governments considered fitting."
Itthendraftedaresolution thattheinter-American Council of Jurists should prepare a
study on the competence of the Council as set forth in the applicable instruments. Such
a study, which would have no legal force, was to be used as a guide for the governments
in formulating their opinions on the subject. This resolution was accepted and the
views of the Council of Jurists were requested. 98 To date that body has been unable to
complete its deliberations. 99
A memorandum of the Mexican member of the Council accompanied the reJX>rt of
the special committee which sought to clarify the crux of the problem involved. The
principle eXJX>unded was as follows:
. . . The Council is not invested by the Charter or by any other juridical instrument with power
to take upon itself the study of questions arising in connection with the observance or interpre-
tation of any international obligations, except when, under the circwnstances envisaged in the
Rio Treaty, such questions reach the stage where they represent a real threat to the peace of the
continent. loo
The memorandum of the United States proceeded in a different direction. It de-

clared that questions concerning the Council's competence in any given case involve
interpretations of basic inter-American agreements, and that such questions should
be decided by the Council or by one of the two higher organs. The United States mem-
ber also stated thatitwould beundesirabletodrawuprigidrules concerning the Coun-
cil's competence, for its competence depended not only on the subject matter of the
case at hand, but also on the circumstances under which it was raised. Further, it was
asserted that any government had the right to bring any question it desired to the
Council, and any case presented merited a fair hearing as to whether Council action
was authorized. 101
The power of the Council to study questions arising in connection with the obser-
vance or interpretation of international obiligations is limited to discussion and in-
vestigation to determine the justification for calling of a Meeting of Consultation. In
the asylum case, the Council could clearly have discussed the problems involved even
though such discussion would perforce have concerned an issue of international
obligation -the right of asylum. The discussion, however, would have to be centered
around the one question-whether the situation was of a nature of sufficient urgency
and common interest to have justified a meeting. 102
Here, as in those situations requiring discussion and investigation under the Rio
Treaty, prior to the Council's constituting itself as provisional organ, a broad power
ofinquirymustexist, even though, incidentally, in the course of the inquiry, the Coun-
cil may find a violation of customary or conventional international law, and even
though the investigation, again incidentally, may have the effect of bringing about a
withdrawal of the request for a Meeting of Consultation.
The Council may not under this power of inquiry, in this instance, decide the merits
ofthecaseand pass judgment in the form of a decision on the parties, nor can it recom-
mend any action to be followed by the parties. The investigations are held only to de-
termine if the meeting should be held under Article 39. 103 Any recommended action
other than a decision as to the need for holding the meeting must come from the Meet-
ing of Foreign Ministers. Only if the situation is one falling within the terms of the Rio
Treaty, which threatens the peace of the Americas and which meets the other condi-
tions required by the treaty, can the Council make decisions and order the parties to
take measures to maintain or restore the peace.
Non-political functions
Not only does the Council exercise political functions under the Rio Treaty and the
Charter, but the latter instrument grants it diverse authority in non-political fields. 104
The Charter grants to the Council a wide supervisory function, i.e., the power of con-
trol and regulation of other organs and agencies of the OAS. Article 51 imposes upon
it responsibility for the proper discharge by the Pan American Union of the duties
assigned to that body. The Council also must approve the administrative structure of
the Pan American Union, and it sets general personnel standards. 105 Moreover, the
Council elects the secretary general of the organization 106 as well as the assistant
secretary general, 107 and may, by a two-thirds majority vote, remove either officer. 108
It directs the Pan American Union in the promotion of economic, social, juridical, and
cultural relations among all the member states. 109 The Council, then, like its predeces-
sortheGoverningBoard,is charged with the surveillance of the Pan American Union.
Although the three organs of the Council-the Inter-American Economic and So-
RULE-MAKING 135
cial Conncil, the Cultural Conncil, and the Conncil of Jurists -are granted technical
autonomy, 110 still they are subject to the general supervisory power of the Conncil.
The Conncil formulates their statutes, but not their regulations. 111
The Conncil also has important duties in relation to the Specialized Organizations.
Article 53 directs the Conncil to draft and submit to the governments proposals for
the creation of new specialized organizations or for the combination, adaptation, or
elimination of existing ones; to draft recommendations for the co-ordination of their
activities and programs after consultation with them; and to conclude agreements
with such specialized organizations which will determine the relationship between
them and the organization.
Not only does the Conncil have responsibility to co-ordinate the inter-American
specialized organizations, but among its fnnctions of co-ordination and collaboration
arealsothepowers to draft recommendations to the governments for the co-ordination
of the activities and programs of the Inter-American Conference and the Specialized
Conferences; to conclude agreements for co-operation with other American organiza-
tions of international standing; and to promote and facilitate collaboration between
the OAS and the United Nations and between the Inter-American Specialized Or-
ganizations and similar international agencies. 112
The financial duties of the Conncil concern its responsibility for budgetary arrange-
ments of the Pan American Union. Article 54 calls upon the Conncil to establish bases
for fixing the quota which each member is to contribute toward the maintenance of
thePanAmerican Union. In establishing these bases, it is required to take into acconnt
the ability of each nation to pay and the determination of eachconntry to make a contri-
bution in an equitable manner. 118
TheConncil prepares its own regulations 114 and the program and regulations of the
Inter-American Conference and the Meeting of Consultation. 115 It fixes the time for
the Inter-American Conference, 116 and if such Conference cannot be held at the place
designated, designates a new place. 117 The Conncil, along with certain other organs,
may call for a meeting of a Specialized Conference. 118
Finally, the Conncil has fnnctions in the field of pacific settlement of disputes as
provided in the Pact of Bogota.
1 Art.111, Charter of Bogota.
• For discussion of the Inter-American Conference, see lleras, ''Report on the Ninth International Con-
ferenceofAmericanStates,"IAnnalsofOAS 1 pp.33-34 (1949); The Report of the Delegation of the United
States, Nintlilntemational Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, March SO-May 2, 1948, pp.
17-19; Whitaker, "Development of American Regionalism: The Organization of American States," Inter-
national Conciliation, No. 469 March, 1951, pp. 139-140.
• Charter of Bogota, Arts. ,'33 and 111.
4 Id., Art. 33.
5 The question of establishing peace between Paraguay and Bolivia was discussed at the Seventh Con-
ference in 1933 and the conference activities aided in bringing about an armistice of short duration between
the belligerents. See "Resolution LXIX, Peace in the Chaco, Seventh International Conference of American
States,"InternationalConferencesof American States, 1st Supp.l933-1940 (1940), p. 84. See also Wilgus,
The Development of Hispanic America, p. 755 (1941).
• The Report of the Delegation of the United States, Ninth International Conference of American States,
Bogota, Colombia, March SO-May 2, 1948, p. 186 et seq.
7 RioTreaty,Arts.3,6,8, 11, andl2.
8 "XClll, Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States
against the Intervention of International Communism," The Report of the Delegation of the United States,
Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954, p. 157.
9 Oninternationallegislationingeneralseei Hudson, International Legislation, "Introduction," pp. xiii-lx

(193l);seealsoEagleton, Internationa1Government,pp.l83-209 (3rded.l950).
10 See "Resolution VlllonReciprocalAssistanceandAmericanSolidarity,"ReportoftheDirector General,
Congress and Conference Series No. 47, Pan American Union, 1945, p. 30. See also Sanders, "Sovereignty
and Interdependence in the New World," 18 Dept. State Bull. 155, p. 165 {1948); Fenwick, "The lnter-
AmericanRegional System," 39 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 490, p. 496 (1945).
11 "The effect of a treaty depends on whether or not the treaty is subject to ratification ... As a rule ... ,
theresponsibilityforfinaldecisionis too great to be undertaken by a diplomatic representative. The govern-
ment of a state may wish to reserve to itself the last word on the subject, or may be constitutionally required
to leave the matter with another branch of the government, as, for example, parliament or congress. Thus a
ratification clause is included in most treaties. H a treaty is subject to ratification, signature means no more
than that the delegates have agreed upon a text and are willing to accept it and refer it to their govermnents
for such action as those governments may choose to take in regard to acceptance or rejection of the treaty".
Thomas and Thomas, International Treaties 33 (monograph 1950).
12 Formal ratification is accepted procedure for inter-American treaties and conventions. See Fenwick,
Internationa1Law435 (3rd ed.l948); Fenwick, supra note 10, p. 496.
13 These computations are based on the 1957 publication of the Pan American Union, Inter-American
Treaties and Conventions, Signatures, Ratifications and Deposits with Explanatory Notes.
14 Id., p. 42.
15 Id., p. 81.
16 On this problem of ratification after signature by conference delegates in other international organiza-
tions see Eagleton, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 193-94.
17 PAU, Handbook for Delegates to the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Co-
lombia,March30, 1948, at20 (1947);Fenwick,supranote lO,p. 496.
18 Fenwick, ibid.; Sanders, supra note 10, p. 165.
19 Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, December 9-27, 1938, International Con-
ferences, 1st Supp, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 215 et seq.
20 At least such was the attitude of the United States. Argentina apparently adopted no such attitude as to
theDeclarationofLima. See Smith, Yankee Diplomacy, pp. 43-45 (1953).
21 See Note, "TheBindingForceofLeagueResolutions,"XVIBrit. Y. B. Int.L.l57 (1935), where issue is
taken with the position that League of Nations Resolutions could be considered binding to an extent to bring
about a change in international law. See also I Podesta Costa, Derecb:> Internacional Publico 367 (3rd eel.
1955).
22 Report of the Director General, op. cit. supra note 10, p. 30.
•• Fenwick, op. cit. supra note 12, p. 205.
•• Id., p. 79. Fenwick declares that such resolutions and declarations "have been regarded ck facto as
creating binding obligations ... "
•• V Hackworth, A Digest oflnternational Law 33 (1927).
28 Fawcett, in "The Legal Character of International Agreements," XXX Brit. Y. B. Int. L. 382 {1953),
establishes that no particular form is necessary to validity. That which is requisite is an intention of the
parties to create legal obligations between them. For examples of various types of international agreements
see ll Accioly, Tratado de Derecho Internacional Publico 412-15 (1946); ill Antokoletz, Derecho lnterna-
cional Publico 252-54 (4th eel. 1944); Jones, "International Agreements Other Than 'Interstate Treaties'-
Modem Developments," XXI Brit. Y. B. Int. L.lll, p.ll5 (1944).
27 See Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations 126 (1948); Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 133 (1946); I
Oppenheim, International Law906 (8th eel. Lauterpacht, 1955); Blix, "The Requirement of Ratification,"
XXXBrit.Y.B.Int.L.352(1953);McDougal&Lans,"TreatiesandCongressional-ExecutiveorPresidential
Agreements:InterchangeablelnstrumentsofNationalPolicy,"54 YaleL.}.l81,534,p. 321 (1945).
•• Hu::lson, op. cit. supra note 9, p. xiii.
•• Starke, An Introduction to International Law, p. 306 (3rd eel. 1954). Blix, supra note 27 discusses in a
lucid and complete manner the practices of states, decided cases and the opinions of writers concerning the
requirement of ratification. He concludes that treaties enter into force in accordance with the express or
clearly implied intentions of the parties, or in case of doubt by signature. In his opinion ratification is not
needed unless the parties expressly or impliedly so intend, and when ratification is intended it is set forth
expressly or by very clear implication.
30 See Fenwick, supra note 10, p. 496.
31 Sanders, supra note 10, p. 165.
32 See line of authority cited supra notes 28 and 29.
ss See "Harvard Draft Convention on theLawofTreaties,Article 7(d)" and comment thereon with citation
of authorities, 29 Am.]. Int. L. 657, p. 763 et seq. (1935).
Article 5 of the Habana Convention on Treaties declares: "Treaties are obligatory only after ratification
... even though the condition is not stipulated in the full powers of the negotiators or does not appear in the
treaty itself." International Conferences of AmericanStates1889-1928 (edited by Scott, 1931), p. 417.
Antokoletz is of the opinion that ratification is an essential element even though the treaty is silent in this
RULE-MAKING 137
respect. ill Antokoletz, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 257. Accioly and Podesta Costa are in accord. ll Accioly,
op. cit. supranote26,p.437 ;IPodestaCosta,op. cit. supranote21,p. 373. Oppenheim is generally in accord
althoughhe recognizes certain exceptions. I Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note27, p. 906.
84 Ratificationisactuallyaprocedurecarriedoutbytheexecutivepowerofastate, usuallythe head of state.
However, because of constitutional requirements necessitating consent or approval of the legislative body
thetenn "ratification" has been sometimes used to describe the action of the state. Some authors, therefore,
call ratification by the executive international ratification and the approval by the legislative organ of the
state constitutional ratification. Blix, supra note 27, p. 352.
85 Thisviewhascomeintointernationallawinthetwentiethcentwyandsomestilldoubtthatinternational
law requires approval of a treaty by the legislative branch to render the treaty valid. See for example Fitz-
maurice, "Do Treaties Need Ratification?" XV Brit. Y. B. Int. L. 113 at 134 (1934). See also McDougal &
Lans, supra note 27, p. 323-31. Jessup is of the opinion that the constitutional law of the state determines
whether an agreement comes into force without ratification. Jessup, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 126. Jones
takes the position that if the constitutional law of the other contracting party requires ratification the treaty
cannot be invoked unless ratification has been forthcoming. Jones, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 133. Fenwick,
op. cit. supranote12,p.436,statesthatamajorityofwritersbelieve that a treaty which has not been ratified
with observance of constitutional requirements is invalid.
86 Constitution of the U.S.A., Art, ll, Sec. 2.
87 Their constitutional validity is well established by the Supreme Court of the United States in such cases
as U.S. v. Behnont,301 U.S. 324 (1937) and U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). McDougal and Lans, supra
note 27, point out, p. 324, that U.S. adherence to international organizations in the past was almost always
carried out by executive agreements. At p. 272 they say that declarations of Inter-American Conferences
which attempt to create obligations have been treated as executive agreements with no submission to the
U.S. Senate.
88 See Schwartz, American Constitutional Law 107-S (1955).
89 I Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 27, p. 906.
40 McDougal&Lans, supra note 27, p. 320 seem of the opinion that under U.S. practice ratification by the
Presidentisgenerallynecessary, but that it may be informal and no particular fonnneed be followed.
Blix, supra note27, p. 357, speaks to the effect that the consent of the parties can be established not only
by formal ratification by the executive, but also by proclamations, by publication, or by an exchange of tele-
grams or of notes.
However ,ratificationmaynotcomeabout in a tacit manner, i.e., arising from implication by the inactivity
of the state. It would seem that a ratification must be in writing, expressing confirmation of the treaty, and
havefinality.Jones,op.cit.supranote27,p.357.Acciolycommentsthatratificationcanbetacit, but through
unequivocal acts such as a becinnin2of execution of the treaty. IAccioly, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 411.
Gomez
41 For discussion, see Ot3Iora, "Treaties and Executive Agreements in Latin America" (Unpub-
lished Comment, 1959).
Most jurists of Latin America seem to believe that international agreements are subject to legislative ap-
provalforvalidity.Forexample,TenaRamirezinhiswork,DerechoConstitucionalMexicano(3rded1955),
states emphatically, p. 420 that executive agreements are subject to the approval of the Senate because the
Mexican Constitution, unlike the Constitution of the United States proviaes that the Senate shall have this
power not only in connection with international treaties but also in connection with any "diplomatic con-
vention."
However, Antokoletz recognizes that not all international agreements require legislative approval in
Argentina. Such approval is necessary for all such agreements that directly or indirectly affect a constitu-
tional principle or that create new international obligations, or that pertain to public monies. mAntokoletz,
op. cit. supra note 26, p. 258.
Podesta Costa asserts that since 1930 the executive power of Argentina has ratified certain international
agreements without congressional consent when such agreements do not concern matters essentially legis-
lative in character. IPodestaCosta,op. cit. supra note 21, p. 374, f.n. 1.
42 See I Podesta Costa, id., p. 30.
48 "Report of Committee on Customs Regulations Bureau of Information, First International Conference
of American States," International Conferences 1889-1928, op. cit. supra note 33, p. 36.
•• Schmeckebier, International Organizations in which the United States Participates, p. 78-79 (1935);
Kunz, "The Pan-American UnionintheFieldoflnternational Administration," 31 IowaL. Rev. 58, p. 76-79
(1945); McDougal& Lans, supra note 27, p. 271.
If this resolution was ratified by a mere exchange of notes by the Foreign Ministers of the republics only
and with no submission to the legislative branches for approval, it lends force to an argument that executive
agreements are recognized in Latin America.
45 Supra note 43, p. 39.
•• SeeiPodestaCosta,op. sit. supra note 21, p. 30.
47 Art. 39, CharterofBogota.FordiscussionofthisorganseeLleras,supranote 2, pp. 33-36; Kunz, "The
Bogota Charter of the Organization of American States," 42 Am. J. Int. L. 568 (1948), pp. 575-576; Report
ofDelegationofU.S.A.,NinthConference,op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 17-19; PAU, Handbook for Delegates
to the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, March 30, 1948, pp. 30-S1
(1947). Historical background of the procedure of consultation and the consultative organ is discussed in
Blackmer, UnitedStatesPolicy and.tfw Inter-American Peace System1889-1952, pp. 71-106 (1952); Ball,
TheProblemoflnter-American Organization, pp. 52-69 (1944).
••International Conferences, 1st Supp., op. cit. supronote 5, p. 188.
49 Id., p. 309.
50 PAU, Report on the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Panama,
September23-0ctober3, 1939 (Cong. & Con£. Series No. 29, 1939).
51 PAU, Report on the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics,
Habana,July 21-SO, 1940 (Cong. & Con£. Series No. 32, 1940).
52 PAU, Report on the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Rio
de Janeiro, January 15-28,1942 (Cong. & Con£. Series No. 36, 1942).
53 "Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., March 26 to April
7, 1951," 3 Annals of OAS 126-57 (1951).
54 On the Santiago Meeting, seeXIlDept. StateBull.136, 299, and342 (1959); on the San Jose Meetings
seePAU, 1960 AnnualReportoftheSecretaryGeneraloftheOAS 16 (1961); on the Punta del Fste Meeting
seeXLVDept. StateBull.,pp.1069-1071 (1961);N.Y. Times,}an.26,28,31,Feb.1,4 (1962).
55 On the Fourth Meeting see supro mte 53. And see Fenwick, ''The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of
MinistersofForeignAffairs," 45 Am.}.lnt.L. 335 (1951).
56 See"U.S. SupportsCallforMeetingofOASForeignMinisters,"XIlDept. StateBull.128 (1959).
57 ''Declaration of Santiago," XIl Dept. State Bull. 342 (1959); "Resolution on Inter-American Peace
Committee," XIl Dept. State Bull. 343 (1959).
58 On the Sixth and Seventh Meetings see PAU, Annual Report of the Secretary General1960, pp. 6 et
seq. (1961).
59 See infra pp. 126-7 et seq. on powers of Council.
60 See Report of the Delegation of the U.S.A, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Con-
tinental Peace and Security, Quitandinha, Brazil, August 15-September2, 1947, p. 29 (1948).
61 Art. 39, Charter of Bogota.
•• See Report of Delegation of the U.S.A, Confermce for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and
Security, op. cit. supro note 60, pp. 28-29.
63Jbid.
64 ReportofDelegationofU.S.A,NinthConference,op. cit. supramte2, p. 22.
65 See infra pp. 264-69 on collective security. [Editors Note: these pages (264-269) of the original work
are not included in this excerpt.]
66 See supra pp. 48-58, andinfrapp. 269-71. (Editor's Note: 11lese pages of the original work are not in-
cluded in this excerpt.]
67 On voting in Inter-American assemblies, see Fenwick, ''The Voting Procedure in Inter-American Con-
ferences," 19481nter-American}uridical Y.B. 91, and see PAU, Report of the Director General on theRe-
sultsoftheConference(lnter-AmericanConferencefortheMaintenanceofContinentalPeaceandSecurity)
pp. 48-49 (1947).
68 PAU, Consultation on the Principal Points of the Treaty to be Signed at Rio de Janeiro 2 (194 7).
89 All but Argentina, which desired a unanimous vote, and Uruguay, which favored a majority vote only.
Id., p. 8.
70 The latter were Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, U.S.A. Id., p. 9.
71 See Report of Delegation of U.S.A, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental
Peace and Security, op. cit. supro note 60, p. 33.
72 Id., p. 32. See also Report of the Director General, Results of the Conference, op. cit. supro note 67, p.
47-48.
73 ReportofDelegationofU.S.A, id. pp. 31-S2.
74 Art. 19, Rio Treaty.
75 ThismodificationreflectedthefactthattheGoverningBoardhadceasedtobeamereBoardofDirectors
of the Pan American Union. It had over the years come to be an executive body with varied functions of a
political, advisory, and co-ordinating character.
78 Art. 11, Rio Treaty.
77 Art. 25 of the Charter of Bogota provides:
''Iftheinviolabilityortheintegrityoftheterritoryorthesovereigntyorpoliticalindependenceof any Ameri-

can State should be affected by armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an
extra-rontinental conflict, or by a conflict between twoormoreAmericanStates,orby any other fact or situa-
tion that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of con-
tinental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the
special treaties on the subject."
78 See Report of the Delegation of the U.S.A., Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Conti-
nental Peace and Security, op. cit. supro note 60, p. 29.
RULE-MAKING 139
79JbicJ.
80 On cases arising and discussions of actions taken see PAU, Applications of the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance 1948-1956 (1957).
81 This is borne out by remarks of the Uruguayan delegate inserted in the record of the 3rd committee and
generallyacceptedbythemembersofthecommittee.SeePAU,OpinionontheScopeofPowers of the Coun-
cil of the Organization of American States (OENSec.l/VI. 2 C.I.J. 59 Emilish 1961) wherein it is stated at
page lOthattheCouncilis the Provisional Organ of Consultation, not just t1ie Council acting in a provisional
capacity. Therefore its actions are valid in themselves and need not be submitted to a higher organ for ratifi-
cation.
82 For remarks on the Haiti-Dominican Republic Case see Fenwick, "Application of the Treaty of Rio de
Janeiro to the Controversy Between Costa Rica and Nicaragua," 43 Am. J. Int. L. 329, p. 322 (1949).
88 See Fenwick, "The Competence of the Council of the Organization of American States," 1949 Inter-
AmericanJuridical Yearbook 21, p. 32.
8• "Annual Report of the Secretary General of the OAS for the Fiscal Year 1949-1950," 3 Annals of OAS
1, p. 7-8.
85 Ibid.
86Fenwick, supra, note 83; Freeman, "The Political Powers of the OAS Council," Law and Politics in the
World Community252 (Compiled and edited by Lipsky, 1953), p. 275.
87 See ReportofDelegationofU.S.A, Ninth Conference, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 22.
88 As quoted in Freeman, supra note 86, p. 265.
89 Ibid.
90 Fenwick notes aclearviolationbere and speaks to the effect that if this type of procedure is to be main-
tained modification of the treaty smuld be made. Fenwick, supra note 83, p. 32.
91 SeeFreeman,supranote86, p. 277. AndseecompetenceoftheCouncilin this respect as outlined by the
Juridical Committeeinitsopinionon thepowersoftheCouncilofthe OAS op. cit. supra noteS!, pp. 7-8.
92 See Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, op. cit. supra note 80, p. 151;
Resolution of the Council Postponing the Meeting. id., p. 154.
98 See infra the 1960 Venezuelan-Dominican Republic case, pp. 318-19; see supra pp. 80, 93 and infra
pp. 325-27 on the Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (Editors Note: These citations to the
original text are not included in this excerpt.]
94 See Fenwick, supra note 83, pp. 34....'35; Freeman, supra note 86, pp. 272-74.
95 See "Asylum and Safe-Conduct for the Ex-PresidentofVenezuela," 1 Annals of OAS 216 (1949).
96 Id.,p.217.
97 Ibid.
98 "Annual Report of Secretary General for Fiscal Year July 1, 1948-June 30, 1949," 2 Annals of OAS 31
(1950).
99 Considerationwasgiventothis by the First Meeting of the Council of Jurists, seeAmplitud de las Facul-
tades del Consejodela Organizacim delosEstadosAmericanos, DocumenlDs Considerados por el Consejo
Interaniericano de Jurisconsultos en suPrimeraReunim, Rio de Janeiro, mayo22-junio 15, 1950 y Someti-
dos al Consejodela Organizaci6n.Atthisfirstmeetingitwasresolved tocontinue the discussion of the subject
atthesecondmeetingoftheCouncilofJuriststobeheldinBuenosAires.Id., p.162. See alsoPAU, Report of
the Executive Secretaryof the Inter-American CouncilofJurists,pp.l2-17 (1950),andsee PAU, Opinion on
the Scope of the Powers of the Council of the OAS op. cit. supra note 81. Here the Inter-American Juridical
Committee in 1961 sets forth its ideas on the Council's competence in certain areas and requests that the
Councilor the Council of Jurists or the Committee be authorized to prepare a draft resolution on the powers
of the Council.
100 See Annual Report, supra note 98, p. 31.
101 Id.,p.Sl,andPAU,OpinionontheScopeofPowersofthe Council of the OAS, op. cit. supra note 81, p.
13.
102Ibid. Fenwick, supra note 83, p. 35.
10s Fenwick, ibid.
10• For summary of the powers of the Council in the nonpolitical field see Report of Delegation of U.S.A.,
Ninth Conference, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 23-24.
uo Art. 58, Charter of Bogota.
mArt. 62, Charter of Bogota.
us The bases of financing were approved by the Council in 1949. Under the approved system, the maxi-
mum annual quota to be assigned toanyonestateis set at 66 per cent of the total assessment. The remainder
is apportioned on the basisofthecapacityofeachmembertopay and that capacity is determined by the posi-
tion of each state, in relation to other American states, on the current United Nations scale of contributions.
2 Annals of OAS 161-e2 (1950). As of 1960, only Oille, Colombia, and the United States had paid in full.
The total delinquency of the Latin American nations by the end of 1962 amounted to $8.5 million and the
OAS had a previous deficit of $2.4 million.
114 Arts. 55 and 38, Charter of Bogota.
us Art. 41, Charter of Bogota.
ue Art. 35, Charter of Bogota.
William Manger
Reform of the OAS: The 1967 Buenos Aires protocol

of amendment to the 1948 charter of Bogota: an
appraisal
Professor Manger presents a much less optimistic view of the OAS system
and both its current and futural prospects for supranational growth. In Feb-
ruary 1970, the new Charter of the OAS came into being, incorporating the
major changes discussed in Manger's article. In his opinion, these changes
have seriously weakened the supranational development of the OAS and
have made it a far more conventional, traditional international organization.
I myself am oftheopinion that judgment should not be made of the new sys-
tem until we have had the opportunity to see it in operation over the next few
years. As the European Community's experience has shown us, the consti-
tutional frameworkoftheorganization is often less important than the manner
in which the political authorities interact in the day-by-day formulation and
implementation of policy. However, Professor Manger is a skilled observer of
the latin-American scene and his remarks must be given some weight and
contrasted to the opinions of the Thomases.
On February 27, 1967, representatives of the member nations of the Organization of

American States, meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, signed the Protocol of Amend-
ment to the 1948 Charter of Bogota. It will become effective when ratified by two-
thirds of the signatory states.
The Protocol reflects the current mood toward the inter-American regional system,
and perhaps toward international organization in general. Contrasted with the 1948
Charter, the Protocol has its elements of strength and of weakness. The spirit of
internationalism today, however, is much weaker than it was in 1948, and from the
standpoint of the Organization theelementsofweaknesswithin the Protocol are much
greater than the elements of strength. If and when these amendments become effec-
tive, the OAS will move farther into the eclipse toward which it has been drifting
for more than a decade. This, obviously, is not the intent, but it will be the inevitable
effect of the coming into force of the Protocol.
The Buenos Aires Protocol is not an easy document to read. It is not distinguished
for clarity or precision. It can be understood only if it is placed side by side with the
Charter, and even then the full import of what was done at Buenos Aires is revealed
only by a close and careful analysis. 1
The move to amend the Charter was inspired primarily by a desire to reaffirm and
From: The!oumaloflnter-Arrwrican Sttulies, Vol. X (January 1968), copyright© 1968 by the University
of Miami Press. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.
141
broaden the economic principles of the inter-American regional system, and to

strengthen the mechanism through which these principles are to be given practical
effect. Paralleling this sentiment was an equally strong desire, not to say determina-
tion on the part of certain governments, to lessen the authority of some existing inter-
American agencies, to create new ones, and to redistribute the functions of the
Organization.
The Protocol thus goes beyond the economic modifications that were its original
inspiration. It has its positive as well as its negative features, and it must be examined
not only in the light of the additional powers that it seeks to confer but also those that
are taken away and redistributed.
There is no doubt that with the modifications introduced by the Protocol the OAS
will be a far different institution than it is under the Charter. Nor can there be any
doubt that, viewed in its overall perspective, the Organization structurally and func-
tionally will be weaker under the Protocol than it could have been under the Charter;
not, be it remarked, than it is under the Charter, but than it might have been. Its
potential as a positive force in the international relations of the Western Hemisphere
is considerably lessened.
The Charter modifications, extending over several years and three conferences,
were not formulated in the most propitious atmosphere. The spirit of Pan American-
ism during that time was at the lowest level in several decades. Dissatisfaction, doubt
and distrust, and a feeling that existing institutions were not functioning as they
should, was the prevailing mood. Whether it is the Organization that failed the
governments or the governments that failed the Organization is a moot point. But the
mood for change was strong, and in such an atmosphere changes may as easily be un-
favorable as favorable, weakening rather than strengthening the Organization. That,
unfortunately, will be the effect of the Buenos Aires Protocol on the OAS. 2
Structurally, the Organization under the Protocol will lose much of the unity and
cohesion that it was expected to have under the 1948 Charter. Prior to Bogota the
inter-American system was a loose association of unrelated institutions and agencies.
The 1948 Charter was essentially a work of codification that brought those agencies
together in what was expected to be an integrated, coordinated, regional system.
Much of this is undone by the Protocol. There is no permanent, continuing body en-
trusted with the authority and charged with the responsibility to hold it together and
give it direction.
Functionally, the Protocol introduces procedures that cannot possibly work. It en-
trusts administrative responsibility to policy-making ad hoc organs. By emphasizing
separation and decentralization, agencies of the Organization are given a degree of
autonomy that can only result in rivalry and friction, as each seeks to build itself up at
the expense of the others.
Perhaps the Organization has never had the unity that the framers of the Bogota
Charter envisaged, but the weaknesses of the Charter are not likely to be corrected
by reverting to the situation that existed prior to 1948.
THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION

Thefar-reachingchangesoftheBuenos Aires Protocol are most conspicuously observ-
able with respect to the Council of the Organization. The future role of the Council
RULE-MAKING 143
will be far less significant than it has been in the past. As to the reasons for these
sweeping changes, here again it might be asked whether it is the Council that has
failed the governments, or the governments that have failed the Council.
By the terms of the 1948 Charter the Council became, in effect, the permanent
executive body of the Organization. It had ties with all the other organs of the Organi-
zation-the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation, the Specialized
Conferences, and the Specialized Organizations-ties that gave it a considerable de-
gree of authority and responsibility. Subordinate to the Council, although enjoying
technical autonomy, were the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the
Inter-American Council of Jurists, and the Inter-American Cultural Council. The
Council of the OAS was also responsible for the proper discharge by the Pan Ameri-
can Union of the duties assigned to it. It was the liaison between the OAS and the
United Nations. And, finally it was the Provisional Organ of Consultation under
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the source of so much of the
political authority exercised by the Council during the past twenty years. In a very
real sense the Council was the hub around which the inter-American regional system
revolved.
In the light of historical antecedents it is understandable that, when the Charter
of Bogota was drafted, the Council expected to play a major role. The history of the
inter-American system is largely a history of the Council since its inception in 1902
at the Second International Conference of American States.
By the terms of the Buenos Aires Protocol the Council has been deprived of most
of the powers entrusted to it in 1948. It has been legislated out of existence, not only
in name but also largely in fact. It is no longer the Council ofthe Organization, but one
of several coequal Councils. It ceases to be the permanent executive body, the hub of
the system. Itisdeprivedof any meaningful supervisory power over the Pan American
Union or, as that agency would be called, the General Secretariat. Its ties with the
technical councils have been cut, its relations with the Specialized Organizations and
Specialized Conferences all but obliterated. As one contemplates the future workings
of the Organization it may be anticipated that the Council will also lose its status as
the Provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty.
By the terms of the Protocol the present Council is given the title of Permanent
Council of the Organization. After long debate it was also grudgingly designated as
the Preparatory Committee of the General Assembly. This may prove to be a saving
clause, for it is almost inevitable that the General Assembly will find it necessary to
delegate considerable authority to its Preparatory Committee. Unfortunately, this is
a function that the Permanent Council shall fulfill "unless the General Assembly
should decide otherwise." Given the prevailing attitude toward the Council it may be
assumed that should these functions become too important, the Assembly will decide
to set up another body to serve as its Preparatory Committee. In any event, this pro-
vision of the Protocol is not a very solid foundation on which the Council may base a
program of positive and constructive action.
The Buenos Aires Protocol appears to attribute many functions to the Council, but
a careful reading will reveal that these are attributes of form and not of substance.
The Council is no longer the permanent executive organ of the Organization. Its
powers arelargelyadreferendumsubjectto approval by the General Assembly. What
has been taken away from the O>uncilisfar more significant than what has been given
to it or what it has been permitted to retain.
The downgrading of the O>uncil is explained in part by the desire to upgrade the
technical O>uncils-to place them all on an equal level and to make them all directly
responsible to the General Assembly. This, however, is only part of the answer.
THE COUNCIL AND INTER-AMERICAN PEACE AND SECURITY

There has long existed among some influential members of the Organization a feeling
of antipathy toward the O>uncil, with its seat in Washington. It is a sentiment that has
manifested itself in several ways, above all with respect to the exercise of political
authority.
Prior to World War II there was a general consensus that the O>uncil or, as it was
then known, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, should not have politi-
cal power; that its principal function should be to oversee the administration of the
Pan American Union and to carry out the resolutions and recommendations of the
Pan American O>nferences. In the restructuring of the inter-American system fol-
lowing that war the political role of the O>uncil tended to overshadow its other activi-
ties. It became the Provisional Organ of O>nsultation under the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and in this capacrty undertook to deal with issues of
a high political order affecting the peace and security of the member states. The terms
of this treaty are so sweeping that the Organ of O>nsultation may commit a state to a
course of action with which it may not be in agreement.
The Pact of Rio de Janeiro, as the treaty is frequently called, was drawn up in 1947
when inter-American relations were at the highest level in history. It is inconceivable
that such a treaty, and above all one entrusting such powers to the O>uncil of the
Organization, could be drawn up today. In fact, as far back as 1948, in the very act of
drafting the Charter of the Organization at Bogota, a number of delegations began
to have second thoughts on the decision taken at Rio de Janeiro the previous year and
suggested the desirability of modifying the Reciprocal Assistance Treaty merely to
take away from the O>uncil its powers as provisional organ of consultation. As the
delegate of Chile put it at that time, "it is not good that all inter-American activities
should have their seat in Washington." Instead, he proposed that the Provisional
Organ of O>nsultationshouldrotateamongthedifferent capitals of the member states
of the Organization.
This proposal was not adopted, but the feeling voiced at that time has persisted. If
anything it has been aggravated in recent years by the several fourteen-to-six deci-
sions, someofthemadopted by the O>uncilin its capacity as Provisional Organ of O>n-
sultation, requiring governments to take action that some obviously were unwilling
to take, and that in at least one instance one government (Mexico) has refused to take.
The Buenos Aires Protocol may be the first step in a depoliticization process and in
returning the O>uncil to its earlier nonpolitical role.
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance is not directly affected by the
proposed modifications to the Charter. It may be expected, however, and this sugges-
tion has already been made, that once the Buenos Aires Protocol is ratified, a move
will be initiated to modify the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. In any event, it is
RULE-MAKING 145
doubtful whether in the future the Oluncil will have much occasion to serve as the
Provisional Organ of O>nsultation. In disputes between American states it is more
than likely that instead of invoking the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, recourse will
be had to the newly established procedures of pacific settlement set forth in the
Buenos Aires Protocol.
Much emphasis has been placed on those articles of the Protocol relating to pacific
settlement. They have been interpreted as entrusting to the Oluncil real authority in
the solution of controversies among the member states. The articles do make impres-
sive reading, but in contrast to the procedures that at one time existed they constitute
a regression rather than a forward step in the field of peaceful settlement.
By the terms of the Protocol, the Permanent Oluncil "shall keep vigilance over the
maintenance of friendly relations among the Member States" and "shall effectively
assist them in the peaceful settlement of their disputes." An Inter-American Olm-
mittee on Peaceful Settlement shall function as a subsidiary organ of the Oluncil, in
accordance with an elaborate procedure set forth in the Protocol. These procedures
appear to give the Oluncil considerable power, but eliminating the verbiage and
analyzing the essentials, the Oluncil is reduced to a channel of communication. It can
receive a request for its good offices from one party to a dispute and transmit it to the
other. It can function, however, only if both parties agree to avail themselves of its
facilities. If one refuses the tender of good offices, the Oluncil shall limit itself to sub-
mitting a report to the General Assembly.
These provisions parallel closely the statutes of the existing Inter-American Peace
Olmmittee, which the new Olmmittee will undoubtedly replace. How effective they
are likely to be may be judged from an examination of the latter and the two statutes
under which it has operated.
The Inter-American Peace Olmmittee was also established to "keep vigilance"
and to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The original status of 1950 gave
the committee broad initiative. It could function at the request of either party to a
dispute, with or without the consent of the other, and it could also act at the request
of a state not directly involved in the controversy. Under these broad powers the
committeerenderedeffectiveservicedown to 1956, when new statutes were adopted,
or perhaps better said were imposed upon it, quite similar to those that now appear
in the Buenos Aires Protocol; the Peace Olmmitteetodaycan act only when requested
by a directly interested party, and then only with the consent of the other party to the
dispute. Since 1956 the Olmmittee has ceased to be an effective peace-keeping
agency; it has continued to exist only because of other duties that have been entrusted
to it. As the committee wryly observed in a report submitted to the Fifth Meeting of
Olnsultationin 1959: "The Olmmitteewishes tostatethat sinceMay9, 1956, the date
on which the new statute entered into force, no case has been submitted to it for con-
sideration.... The Olmmittee considers that this fact may be due to the changes
introduced into the statute."
In the field of pacific settlement the Buenos Aires Protocol possesses more the ap-
pearance than the reality of authority; a delegation of form rather than of substance.
It is more than likely that by virtue of these articles the Council will have lost the real
authority that it now has under the Rio Treaty for an illusive power that it will rarely
have the opportunity to exercise. The delegates at Buenos Aires were well aware of
the realities of the situation, when the representatives of several countries confronted
byinternationalissues (which they wished to have brought before the Council and thus
sought to give it greater initiative) met with the adamant opposition of other countries
that were determined that the Council should not function without their consent.
The principles and procedures of the Protocol are more restrictive than those that
atone time prevailed. Their incorporation in an international treaty will merely serve
to solidify them and thus make more difficult the return to the more liberal principles
of an earlier period. To repeat, the Protocol constitutes a backward rather than a for-
ward step in the field of pacific settlement.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In place of the Inter-American Conference the Buenos Aires Protocol creates a new
organ, the General Assembly. This is a constructive step. The Inter-American Confer-
ence, which laid the bases of the Pan American system at the first meeting held in
1889-90 and which traditionally has been considered the supreme organ of the sys-
tem, has lost its raison d'etre, partly because of impotency and partly because the
accelerated tempo of international relations since the Charter of 1948 was adopted
demands that the policy-making organ meet at more frequent intervals.
By the terms of the Bogota Charter the Inter-American Conference was expected
to meet every five years. Actually, in the nineteen years since Bogota only one such
meeting has been held, the tenth at Caracas in 1954. The failure to hold the eleventh
has been due to internal conditions in the country that had been selected as the seat
of the conference, and also to international differences between that country and one
of its neighbors. Ordinarily such a breakdown in the established machinery would
pose a serious problem, but the vacuum thus created has been filled by frequent Meet-
ingsof Consultation of AmericanForeignMinisters to deal with urgent issues confront-
ing the hemisphere. The Meeting of Consultation, the second in the hierarchy of OAS
organs, has largely superseded the Inter-American Conference in the hierarchical
structure.
Like the Inter-American Conference, the General Assembly will be the supreme
organoftheOrganization.lt will decide the general action and policy of the Organiza-
tion, determine the structure and functions of its organs, and consider any matter
relating to friendly relations among the American states. There are, however, innova-
tions of afunctional and jurisdictional nature in the Protocol that can only raise doubts
as to how efficiently the Assembly will be able to operate and how effectively it will
be able to fulfill some of the duties entrusted to it.
The Assembly, the Protocol provides, shall meet annually at the place selected in
accordance with the principle of rotation. At first glance this may appear to be advan-
tageous in putting the Organization in direct touch with the various countries and their
peoples. But the organization of an international conference is, under the best of cir-
cumstances, a major undertaking. To expect that one will meet annually and in dif-
ferent countries will tax to the utmost the capacity of the General Secretariat, not to
mention the wasteful extravagance involved in setting up an elaborate secretariat to
service such meetings, first in one and then in another part of the continent. The re-
RULE-MAKING 147
sults may be gauged from the experience of the United Nations, which concluded,
after one attemptofthisnature, thatthereisnoplacelike the permanent headquarters
to hold the sessions of its General Assembly. A redeeming feature of the Buenos Aires
Protocol is the provision that if for any reason the General Assembly cannot be held
at the place chosen, it shall meet at the General Secretariat. It may be expected that
this will become the rule rather than the exception, if some of the Latin American
members of the Organization can overcome their antipathy to having too much inter-
American activity centered in Washington.
Even more unrealistic are those provisions of the Protocol that describe the func-
tions of the Assembly. In addition to serving as the policymaking organ, the Protocol
also assigns to the General Assembly many of the supervisory and coordinating func-
tions at present exercised by the O:>uncil of the Organization; for example, acting on
the program-budget of the Organization, considering the annual reports and coordi-
nating the activities of the several agencies, and serving as the liaison and promoting
cooperation between the OAS and the UN. This may be one way of lessening the role
of the O:>uncil, but it is not a way to improve the efficiency of the Organization. Super-
vision, coordination, and direction demand permanent, continuing activity, and can-
not adequately be performed by an ad hoc body meeting for four, six, or at most eight
weeks a year. Here again there is a saving clause in the Protocol that makes it possible
for the Assembly to delegate many of these "housekeeping" functions to its Prepara-
tory O:>mmittee, which, at least for the time being and unless the Assembly should
decide otherwise, shall be the Permanent O:>uncil of the Organization. Force of cir-
cumstances almost inevitably will compel such a delegation of functions, a course that
would not only enable the General Assembly to devote its time to matters more ap-
propriate to the supreme organ of the Organization, but would also restore to the
Permanent O:>uncil the supervisory functions that it now performs and that, at least
in a measure, would justify its existence.
THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION

No modifications are proposed to the Charter provisions relating to the Meeting of
O:>nsultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but the Protocol will undoubtedly have
repercussions on this second most important organ of the inter-American system.
The Bogota Charter provides that Meetings of O:>nsultation shall be held [annually]
"in order to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common interest to the
American States, and to serve as the Organ of O:>multation...." The provision that
it shall meet annually may well be expected to lessen the need for the frequent re-
course to the Meeting of O:>nsultation that has characterized inter-American relations
in recent years. The problems of an "ur~nt nature" for which a Meeting of Consulta-
tion might be convoked would have to be of extreme urgency if they cannot await the
annual meeting of the General Assembly and thus be considered by the supreme
organ of the Organization.
In the same manner that the failure of the Inter-American Conference to function
served topromoterecoursetoandenhancetheprestigeoftheMeetingof O:>nsultation,
so the establishment of an annual General Assembly will lessen the need of recourse
to the Meeting of O:>nsultation. Such meetings, it may be expected, will hereafter be
called primarily to serve as the Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This is indeed an important function, but even here
issues between American states, which heretofore have been considered under Arti-
cles6 and 7 of the Rio Treaty, may be expected to have applied to them the procedures
of peaceful settlement embodied in the Protocol. In short, just as the Protocol will
lessen the influence of the Council as the Provisional Organ of Consultation, so also
will there be less need to convoke the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the principal
Organ of Consultation. Recourse to the Rio Treaty may well be restricted to situations
involving direct aggression and armed attack envisaged in Article 3 of the Treaty.
THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT

The effect of the Protocol on the General Secretariat is contradictory. The office itself
continues to be what it has always been, the secretariat of the Organization and its
central, permanent organ. The position of the Secretary General in some respects is
strengthened, in others it is weakened.
The term of office of the Secretary General is shortened from ten to five years, but
whereas in the Charter the Secretary General is ineligible for re-election, in the
Protocol he may be re-elected not more than once. The net effect is more than likely
to be a continuation of the ten-year occupancy of the post unless the incumbent should
prove particularly inept. A qualified Secretary General should have no problem in
being reelected, and even one less qualified should have little difficulty, for the ad-
ministration of a budget of eighteen to twenty million dollars on which the Organiza-
tion is now operating offers no little opportunity for political advantage.
The Secretary General is more independent of the Permanent Council under the
Protocol than under the Charter. His responsibility for the administration of the
General Secretariat is to the General Assembly, which meets only once a year, and he
is therefore relieved of thecontinuingsupervisory authority that heretofore has rested
with the Council.
Even more important is his freedom in the formulation of the annual program-bud-
getoftheOrganization. Heretofore the budget has been the product of close collabora-
tion between the Secretariat and the Council before going to the governments. Under
the Protocol the Secretary General will prepare the program-budget, submit it to the
Permanent Council in its capacity as the Preparatory Committee of the General
Assembly, and then to the Assembly itself. But the budget that goes to the Assembly
will bethatofthe Secretary General. The CouncilmaysubmittotheAssembly a report
on the draft program-budget with the recommendations it considers appropriate,
which raises the possibility that two budgets may be presented before the Assembly.
The principal responsibility of the Secretary General under the Protocol, as under
the Charter, is to administer the General Secretariat. The principal prerogative of an
administrator is the rightto designate those who shall assist him in the administration.
This continues to be the rule, but in twoofthemoreimportant posts within the General
Secretariat, those of Executive Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs and Execu-
tive Secretary for Education, Science and Culture, the appointments shall be made
"with the approval of the respective Council." How this agreement shall be reached
is not clear, but it is almost certain to involve considerable politicking and log-rolling.
RULE-MAKING 149
There is in this provision the possibility that the administrative authority of the Sec-
retary General may be weakened, not only with respect to these two officials but the
numerous personnel under them.
No changes of a substantive nature are made in the non-administrative role of the
Secretary General. As under the Charter he has the right to speak in meetings of the
Organization butdoesnothavetheright to vote. The impression, widely held, that the
post of Secretary General carries with it great political influence with authority to
roam the continent and be the arbiter of international disputes is wholly unfounded.
He has never had such authority and it is not given to him under the Protocol. It was
most unlikely that in the formulation of the Protocol there would by any disposition to
give to the Secretary General powers that were being taken away from or denied to
established organs. This does not mean that the Secretary General cannot exert con-
siderable influence in international issues, but it is a influence that derives from a
quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy, an ability to work in close, unobtrusive collabor-
ation with the appropriate organs of the Organization, and to win the confidence of
the member governments as an objective, impartial international functionary.
Substantively of little importance, but indicative of the prevailing mood, is the de-
cision to drop the name "Pan American Union," a name that the General Secretariat
has borne for decades and that has become so widely and generally accepted as to be
almost synonymous with the organization itself. The dropping of the name "Pan
American Union" is a reflection of a certain pedestrian mentality that has long existed
and now apparently has prevailed. The name has long provoked a critical reaction
from not a few so-called Latin American intellectuals, who associated it with "Pan"
movements withimperialisticimplications, such as Pan Germanism, Pan Slavism, etc.
Critics of the Pan American movement not infrequently have referred to the Pan
American Union as the colonial office of the United States, situated in the shadows of
the WhiteHouse and the Washington Monument. Henceforth the General Secretariat
oftheOASwill be nameless. This will not change its character, and whether the name
Pan American Union is so firmly established as to overcome this attempt at suppres-
sion only time will tell.
ECONOMIC STANDARDS
A principal objective of the Buenos Aires conference was to strengthen the economic,
social, and cultural standards of the Bogota Charter, to spell out in greater detail the
obligations that the member states were to assume, and to improve the machinery
through which these objectives are to be achieved. Of these three areas, major empha-
sis was focused on the economic.
In each area the Protocol enlargesconsiderablyon the Charter provisions ofBogota.
The Economic Standards in the Protocol, for example, encompass fourteen articles
and more than a thousand words, in contrast to the two articles and fewer than one
hundred words of the 1948 instrument. In the drafting stages preceding the Buenos
Aires Conference more attention was given to the Economic Standards than to other
parts of the Protocol. Even after what was considered to be a definitive draft project
had been drawn up by a special committee meeting in Panama, further prolonged
negotiations on the Economic Standardswereconductedin Washington to make them
more acceptable to the United States. The result was a draft and a finally approved
Protocol less strong than many member states had hoped for.
Despite the extended terminology, the Protocol embodies no firm commitments,
nor does it give to the Organization any real authority to adopt decisions binding on
the member states. To implement the objectives set forth in the Economic Standards
the states merely "pledge themselves to a united effort," or "agree to dedicate every
effort," or"should make every effort," or "agree to join together in seeking a solution."
The one positive, unambiguous statement in the Economic Standards is the one in
Article 32 in which the member states agree to "cooperate as far as their resources
may permit and their laws may provide," a provision that leaves to each individual
state the determination of what it shall do and shall not do.
The obligations thus assumed under the Protocol are moral rather than legal, and
their fulfillment depends largely on the spirit in which they are approached. Today,
the spirit of inter-American economic cooperation is running at a high level, and if this
should persist the Economic Standards may well serve as guidelines in a long-range
program of economic development. At the same time it must be recognized that be-
tween the positiveness of Article 32 and the vagueness of the other articles there is
room for differences of opinion between those who may believe they have obtained
more than they actually have, and those who may consider they have committed them-
selves to less than others may believe. In this respect the Protocol may lay the ground-
work for a continuation of the fruitless economic debate that has characterized inter-
American relations during the past twenty years.
A transitoryprovisionoftheProtocol stipulates that the Inter-American Committee
on the Alliance for Progress (ClAP) shall act as the permanent executive committee of
thelnter-AmericanEconomicand Social Council as long as the Alliance is in operation.
The ClAP had become a focal point in the Alliance for Progress, and it is most appro-
priate that it should be incorporated into the structure of the Organization. It has
achieved this position because of the caliber of its representatives, and the confidence
they have instilled in the governments of their capacity to render effective service.
The Protocol thus recognized an existing fact; it does not, however, confer any addi-
tional powers on the ClAP. Its authority is recommendatory and not executive in
character. Atthe present timeitis the practice of agencies of the United States to with-
hold grants and loans for Alliance for Progress projects until they have received the
approval of ClAP. It would have been gratifying if such a provision had been incor-
porated in the Protocol, thus making it a continental policy rather than a unilateral
practice. This, however, would have been a concession to internationalism, contrary
to the mood of the moment.
In summation, the advocates of international organization will find little in the

Protocol of Buenos Aires to give them satisfaction or encouragement. The Protocol
reflects the mood of the times, and the current mood is not toward more internation-
alism but toward more nationalism, not to a strengthening of international organiza-
tion but to a lessening of the authority of international agencies and a reaffirmation of
national individuality and sovereignty.
RULE-MAKING 151
The Protocol represents a step-indeed a considerable step-in the direction of

returning the inter-American regional system to the position it occupied before World
War II. As reflected in the Protocol, the spirit of collective responsibility and collective
action is less strong today than at any time in recent decades. As a political institution,
an effective medium for the solution of international differences, the Organization is
reduced to the status of an international post office. In the realm of economic coopera-
tion, despite the emphasis on economic developments, its authority has not been
materially enhanced.
The spirit of the Buenos Aires Protocol is that the OAS should have an elaborate
mechanism, an elaborate fa~ade; that it may discuss, perhaps that it may propose;
but the member states shall dispose in accordance with what each in its individual
capacity deems to be in its own national interest.
The Protocol is now before the signatory states for ratification, and the approval
of a two-thirds majority is required to make it effective. This, it has been estimated
on the basis of past experience with the ratification process, may require four or five
years. The best hope of the friends of international organization is that the ratification
process will be slow and prolonged, that before the two-thirds majority is obtained
there will be a revival of the true spirit of Pan Americanism, and that the Protocol will
never go into effect.
1 See Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, ''Protocol of Buenos
Aires." Treaty Series 1-B, Pan American Union, 1967, Washington, D.C.
2 The motivations for the changes will be touched upon only incidentally in this awraisal, which will deal
essentially with the changes themselves and their likely effect on the Organization rather than their causes.
Thereasonsforthechanges, thepositionsoftheseveralgovernments, offer a broad field for further and more
detailed study.
Andrzej Korbonski
COMECON: The institutional structure
The third organization, COMECON-the Eastern European communist bloc

trade organization-is not a supranational organization. At first glance this
may seem paradoxical, si nee we of the West are used to thinking of any com-
munist organization as an extremely structured-indeed totalitarian-form
ofgovernment. However, thisconfederal structure is consistent with present
communist international law, which regards the state as the highest expres-
sion ofthewi II of that state's people. Soviet jurists argue that, given the nature
of the ideological cleavageoftoday's international system, there is no higher
form of political consensus than the principle of national self-determination
and no higher source of law than the positive law of individual states. There-
fore, no international organization may make rules that bind a state without
the express consent of that state.
The interesting fact in Korbonski's account of COMECON is the fusion of
the functions of interest articulation and aggregation and rule-making. Con-
sistent with communist domestic political practices, the function of rule-
making, and the entire process of governing in general, is dominated by the
party structure that is the dominant agent of interest articulation and aggrega-
tion as well. Therefore, in order to comprehend the ways in which political
functions are performed in communist systems, it is necessary to strip away
the fac;;ade of the formal structure of government and to examine the political
interaction of various factions within the party structure.
The institutional framework of COMECON was officially described in some detail

for the first time in the COMECON Charter published in 1960, eleven years after the
formation of the organization. 1 The absence of any detailed framework with clearly
defined powers indicates that it was modeled after the typical Soviet administrative
agency, in which the institutional setup and the extent of prerogatives are left deliber-
ately vague in order to render it impotent. 2 It is also possible that there was no need
for an elaborate organization as long as the extent of COMECON activity was re-
stricted to a relatively small number of functions. Until the recent reorganization of
COMECON's supreme authorities, the most important decisions concerning the or-
ganization were taken at periodic meetings of Communist Party leaders of COM-
ECON countries. 3 Even today the task of COMECON authorities is largely the im-
plementation of decisions made at these conferences. The growing complexity of
COMECON may, however, require a larger, more specialized organization with
progressively expanding authority.
From: International Conciliation, No. 549 (September 1964), pages 13-24, published by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, New York, and reprinted by pennission.
152
RULE-MAKING 153
COMECON can be described as an international organization, but it is not yet a

supranational organization such as the European Coal and Steel Community or the
European Economic Community. According to the Charter, the member countries
are not required to surrender any of their sovereignty. Each member state possesses
one vote, and all decisions must be approved unanimously. However, in principle, a
state which declares itself "non-interested" cannot veto an action agreed to by others
(e.g., on specialization of production in sume sector) .It can only refuse to participate. 4
Apparently some members took advantage of this provision even before Romania's
recent opposition. 5
The highest COMECON authorities have been unable to issue instructions and
regulations directly binding on national agencies and individuals in member states.
Their decisions must first be ratified by members and then incorporated into the na-
tionallaw of each country. Apart from the Charter, other legal provisions were actually
adopted in this manner-the "General Terms of Delivery of the COMECON, 1958,"
regulating delivery of goods and methods of settling differences among members, and
the 1960 "Convention on Immunities and Privileges of COMECON." It may be as-
sumed, however, that sooner or later an attempt will be made to overcome this obstacle
and to grant the authorities additional powers.
little is known about the actual decision-making process within COMECON. Until
recently it looked as if the real power within the organization resided in the triangle
USSR-East Germany-Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union often played the role of
arbiter, and Czechoslovakia and East Germany just as often managed to win their
point by acting in concert against the remaining countries. This has been explained
primarily in terms of the Soviet Union's power and the high level of economic develop-
mentofthethreecountries. According to some writers, for some time it was customary
for all important decisions to be discussed first by the three countries and then brought
into the plenary session of the COMECON Council. 6 This view makes sense in the
light of the continuing emphasis on specialization within COMECON, which is likely
to benefit mainly these three countries.
THE COMECON COUNCIL

According to the Charter, the supreme organ, the COMECON Council, has the
statutory power to discuss all problems within the jurisdiction of COMECON and to
make recommendations and decisions on various issues. 7 As indicated above, this
authority in fact did not amount to much, and in 1962 a special Executive Committee
was added to the institutional hierarchy and equipped with additional powers. On the
basis of past performance, it can be said that the work of a Council session consists
mainly of discussing questions submitted to it by the various organs of COMECON
(for example, the Secretariat and Standing Commissions) as well as by individual
member states, and of providing directives for the future work of the various agencies.
Occasionally, Council sessions have taken place simultaneously with meetings of
Communist Party and government leaders from member countries. The obvious
purpose was to implement decisions taken at the highest level.
In theory, ordinary plenary sessions are expected to take place twice a year, 8 but
Table 1 shows that there were no Council sessions from November 1950 to March
TABLE 1. COMECON council sessions, 1949-63
_.
(11 NUMBER OF
.c:.
PARTICIPANTS
NO. DATE PLACE MEMBERS OBSERVERS MAIN TOPICS DISCUSSED
1. April26-27, 1949 Moscow 6a - Creation of Secretariat

2. August25-27, 1949 Sofia 7b - Exchange of information and bilateral cooperation
3. November 24, 1950 Moscow Be - Expansion of foreign trade
4. March 26-27, 1954 Moscow 8 - Initial steps to coordinate plans
5. May26, 1954 Moscow 8 - Coordination of plans
6. December7-11, 1955 Budapest 8 - Coordination of plans
7. May 18-25, 1956 East Berlin 8 2d Coordination of plans and start of specialization
8. June 18-22, 1957 Warsaw 8 3e Coordination of plans and multilateral clearing
9. June 20-23, 1958 Bucharest 8 4f Development of sources of raw materials
10. December 11-13, 1958 Prague 8 4 Coordination of plans for chemicals
11. May 13-16, 1959 Tirana 8 4 Coordination of national plans for 1961-65 and establishment
of a common grid
12. December 10-14, 1959 Sofia 8 4 Approval of Charter and coordination of plans
13. July26-30, 1960 Budapest 8 4 Coordination of 20-year plans and cooperation in agriculture
14. February 28-March 3, 1961 East Berlin 8 4 Specialization; cooperation in transportation; norms and
standards
15. December 12-15,1961 Warsaw 7g 1h Specialization in output of ships and chemicals
16. June6-7, 1962 Moscow ai - Establishment of Executive Committee and publication
of "Basic Principles of the International Socialist
Division of Labor'"
17. December 14-20, 1962 Bucharest 8 - Approval of multilateral payments and creation of
International Bank
18. July 24-26, 1963 Moscow 8 - Coordination of plans for 1966-70
~Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. f North Vietnam and Mongolia attended as observers; Yugoslavia was absent.
Albania joined in April1949. ~Albania did not attend.
~East Germany joined in September 1950. . China, North Korea, and North Vietnam did not attend.
China and Yugoslavia attended as observers. ' Mongolia joined as full member.
e North Korea attended as observer.
Sources: W. vonKnorre,Zehn]ahreRatfurgegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe(COMECON), op. cit., pp. 6 and 12; New York Times, 22 December 1962 and 27 July 1963; F. L.
Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist Bloc: A Survey," Soviet Studies, Vol. XI, No. 2, October 1959, pp. 174-179; and A. Stupov, ed., Eko-
nomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo i vzailmopomoshch sotsialisticheskikh stmn, op. cit., pp. 18-43, and 45.
RULE-MAKING 155
1954. Between December 1955 and June 1958, the Councilonlymettwice. The first
interval was clearly due to the lack of interest in the organization during Stalin's last
years and to the difficulties of the transition period following his death. The second can
perhaps be explained by the unsettled political situation that followed the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and was not brought under control until the
1957 Moscow meeting of the eleven ruling Communist Parties.
The Council meetings are held in different capitals of COMECON states and are
attended bydelegationsfrom the member countries as well as by observers from other
countries who have been invited by the full membership. 9 The Council has held eigh-
teen official meetings (see Table 1). Sessions have seldom lasted longer than three or
four days, with the exception of the seventh, which lasted a week. 10 This can mean
either that there was relatively littletodiscuss,orthat all controversial issues had been
thrashed out in bilateral or multilateral conferences among Party leaders. The last
officiallyreportedsessionof the Council took place in July 1963. The recent formation
oftheExecutiveCommitteemaymean that the Counci) will meet less frequently than
before.
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Executive Committee was formed at the Moscow meeting of Communist Party
leaders from COMECON countries in June 1962. It replaced the former statutory
body, the Conference of Representatives of Member Countries, and, as the highest
executive organ of COMECON, was entrusted with the implementation of policies
agreed upon at the plenary sessions of the COMECON Council. It is composed of
permanent representatives of each country who hold the rank of Deputy Prime Minis-
ter and are expected to devote themselves entirely to COMECON work. The chair-
manship of the Committee rotates every four months. According to press reports, the
Committee has met more or less on schedule every two months since its formation. 11
The Committee's functions include coordination of national economic plans, in-
vestment programs, and trade policies as well as over-all direction of scientific, tech-
nological, and economic research. Directly subordinate to the Committee is the Office
on Joint Problems of Economic Planning, with a membership consisting of the deputy
chairmen of national planning commissions. The chief task of this Office is to provide
data for the Committee'scoordination of plans and to maintain liaison among national
planning commissions. 12
According to official comments from COMECON sources, the Executive Com-
mittee was to be endowed with far greater powers than the Conference of Represen-
tatives. 13 There was talk of amending the Charter in order to incorporate the new
body, but no such amendment has taken place. One may speculate that at the June
1962 meeting of Party leaders of the COMECON countries the Soviet Union envis-
aged the new Committee as a supranational body. 14 Such a move may have been
blocked by overt resistance from Romania and a lukewarm reception from Poland
and Hungary. Thereisnoevidencethatsuchadecision was actually reached. The new
Committee therefore does not appear to differ significantly from the old Conference
of Representatives, although it is quite possible that it received additional powers to
deal with a number of questions previously handled by the plenary sessions of the
Council. With the growth of COMECON agencies, more controversial questions were
likely to come up for discussion, and it was felt that some of these could not wait for
the plenary session of the Council, which meets only twice a year and is not equipped
to deal with details.
THE SECRETARIAT
The creation of a Secretariat was foreshadowed in the statement announcing the for-
mation of COMECON in January 1949. But it was not until the seventh Council ses-
sion in May 1956 thatthe Secretariat came to the forefront of a resurgent COMECON.
The task of the Secretariat, according to the Charter, is to prepare the agenda for the
plenary sessions of the COMECON Council andmeetingsof the Executive Committee
and other agencies, coordinate the work of the Standing Commissions and other ad hoc
committees, and conduct research and prepare reports and statistical data.
The headquarters of the Secretariat is in Moscow. There appears to be confusion
about its size, perhaps as a result of various statements made about the numbers of the
citizens of member countries "participating" in the work of COMECON organiza-
tions. Some sources claim that the number of employees exceeds two thousand, 15
while others estimate the number at four hundred. 16 The lower figure appears more
credible, unless experts attending commissions, working parties, and other bodies
are included. Thereislittledoubt, however, that the number of Secretariat employees
will increase with the growth of the organization itself. 17
It has been impossible to obtain detailed information about Secretariat total costs,
the allocation of expenses among individual member states, geographic distribution
of employees, and recruitment policies. 18 Available evidence indicates that the
Secretariat performs roughly the same functions as the secretariats of other interna-
tional organizations.
The Secretariat is headed by Secretary N. V. Fadeyev, the former Soviet Minister
of Finance, assisted by three Deputy Secretaries. These officials are able to influence
COMECON proceedings by directing the Secretariat's coordinating functions and by
attending the meetings of COMECON organs. The composition of the Secretariat is
therefore of special interest; it is probable that nationals of individual member states
attempt to obtain preferential treatment for their countries in such sensitive areas as
international specialization or joint investment projects.
THE STANDING COMMISSIONS

The Standing Commissions comprise the fourth major organ of COMECON. They
are composed of experts drawn from the member states, and their main task is to work
out details of policies agreed upon by the higher authorities, namely, the Council
and the Executive Committee. Table 2 indicates that most of the Commissions deal
with fairly narrow branches of economic activity. They are mainly concerned with
coordination of production plans, establishment of priorities for outputs of certain
key products, formulation of foreign trade agreements, and selection of new invest-
ment projects.
Although there is no statutory definition of their jurisdiction, the Standing Commis-
sions have the right to submit proposals to plenary sessions of the Council and to the
RULE-MAKING 157
TABLE 2. COMECON standing commissions, 1956-63

YEAR OF
NO. FIELD OF ACTIVITY CREATION HEADQUARTERS
1. Coal 1956 Warsaw

2. Electricity 1956 Moscow
3. Oil and Gas 1956 Bucharest
4. Ferrous Metallurgy 1956 Moscow
5. Non-ferrous Metallurgy 1956 Budapest
6. Chemicals 1956 East Berlin
7. Machine Building 1956 Prague
8. Agriculture 1956 Sofia
9. Foreign Trade 1956 Moscow
10. General Economic Questions 1958 Moscow
11. Transportation 1958 Warsaw
12. Building and Construction 1958 East Berlin
13. Light Industry 1958 Prague
14. Atomic Energy 1960 Unknown
15. Statistics 1962 Unknown
16. Coordination of Research 1962 Unknown
17. Standardization 1962 East Berlin
18. Finance and Foreign Exchange 1962 Unknown
19. Electronics 1962 Unknown
20. Geology 1962 Unknown
21. Food Industry 1962a Unknown
a Until1962, one commission handled both light indushy and food production.
Source: F. L. Pryor, The Communist Foreign Trade System, op. cit. pp. 255-257;
N. Fadeyev, "Strany SEV krepyat ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo, Mirovaya
Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, No. 10 (1963 ), p. 10.
Executive Omnnittee and are expected to provide annual reports of their activities
as well as their plans. Each Commission has a secretariat of its own, responsible to,
and financed by, the Secretariat of COMECON. The chairmanship of each Commis-
sion is usually held by a representative of the host country. 19
The Standing Commissions, according to Article VIII of the Charter, are created by
plenary sessions of the Council (see Table 2). The first twelve Commissions were
formed at the seventh session in May 1956. Since then Commissions have been dis-
solved or absorbed by others, and additional Commissions have been formed. 20
The growth in the number of Standing Commissions can be taken as an indicator
of progress toward integration within COMECON. The creation of the first twelve
Commissions coincided with a new stage in the activity of the organization. Prior to
1956, experts from different countries met periodically to discuss various problems,
but these meetings were organized ad hoc, and the liaison among COMECON mem-
bers was very tenuous The creation of the Standing Commissions in 1956 provided a
permanent framework for mutual discussion for the first time, and thus laid a base for
theforthcomingexpansionofCO MECON activities. Not only are the Standing Com-
missions handling additional areas of economic activity, but they recently seem to have
been given more authority to deal with the most pressing matters in certain key sec-
tors. 21 Additional Commissions presumably will be created in the course of the next
few years to accommodate the growing amount of coordination among COMECON
economies.
The expansion of COMECON's institutional setup provides an ever-broadening

forum for discussion of mutual problems that brings the weaker members closer to-
gether.lt was an axiom of Stalinist policy to apply the rule of divide et impera to East
Central Europe, but there are indications that a reverse process has been in existence
for a number of years. By working together in various COMECON agencies, repre-
sentatives of East Central European countries have had the opportunity to learn
more about each other and to realize that by forming a united front they can mitigate,
to a large extent, the superior power of the senior member.
COMECON is also beginning to acquire vested interests ofits own. The longer it
exists and the more it expands, the harder it will be for the Soviet Union to abolish
COMECON without antagonizing the rest of the membership. Actually, present in-
dications seem to point to the fact that the Soviet Union is interested in maintaining
and even expanding the organization. The quiet shelving of the Soviet proposal to
strengthen the authority of COMECON does not indicate that other members were
opposed to the proposal as such but rather to specific policies that the organization
was about to undertake.
The formation of an International Bank, which began operations on 1 January
1964, is indicative of the continuing interest in expanding the institutional framework
of COMECON. This, in tum, is likely to increase the stature of the organization and
make it a significant factor in the economic as well as the political life of East Central
Europe.
1 Treaty Series, Vol. 368,1960, (New York: United Nations, 1961), pp. 264-285.
2 R. Jaster, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe," World Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 3,
April1962, pp. 506-508.
3 Such conferences were heldinMoscowinMay 1958, February 1960,June 1962, and July 1963.
4 See United Nations Doc. E!CONF. 46/17, 8 January 1964, p. 5.
5 According to some reports, Bulgaria refused to follow COMECON's recommendation concerning the
creation of aluminum industry. Comecon and the Economy of Eastern Europe (Vienna: Kreditanstalt
Bankverein, June 1962) p. 2.
6 K. Pritzel, Die wirtschaftliche Integration der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands in dem
Ostblock und ihre politischen Aspekte (Bonn: Bundesministerium fiir Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1962 ), pp.
157-158. A 1956 directive of the COMECON Secretariat concerning specialization stipulated that con-
struction of new plants throughout COMECON was to take place on the condition that Czechoslovak and
East German capacities be fully utilized.
7 According to Article IV of the Charter, recommendations refer to econcmic, scientific, and technical
cooperation, while decisions are supposed to be made with regard to organizational and procedural matters.
For further discussion, see V. Morozov, "Equality: Cornerstone of the Socialist Countries," International
Affairs (Moscow), Vol. IX, December 1963, pp. 6-7.
•Emergency sessions can be called at the request of at least one-third of the membership.
9 In some cases, ohserver participation does not seem to have been extended to all COMECON bodies.
10 There is little doubt that this session was one of the most crucial meetings in the life of COMECON.
It
not only created twelve Standing Commissions, thus bringing experts from different countries to work to-
gether on a permanent basis for the first time, but it also initiated the program of specialization by allocating
the production of about 600 types of machines among individual members.
11 The twelfth meeting of the Committee took place in Moscow on 21-25 April1964, Pravda, 26 April
1964.
12 UnitedNationsDoc. E/CONF.46/17, 8 January 1964, p. 5.
13 Morozov, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
RULE-MAKING 159
14 N. S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development of the Socialist World System," World Marxist
Review, Toronto, Vol. V, September 1962, pp. 10-11.
15 W. von Knorre, Zehn Jahre Rat fii,r gegenseitige Wirtscliaftshilfe (COMECON), Wiirzburg: Holmer
Verlat, 1961, p.15. The estimate apparently came from Swedish sources.
16 As of the winter of 1964, the Secretariat was supposed to have employed 420 persons. Prior to June
1962, thefigurewasabout200. P.Jaroszewicz, "Okierunkachpracy RWPG," Zycie Gospodarcze (Warsaw),
Vol. XIX, No. 426 January 1964, p. 6. The author is the Polish delegate to the Executive Committee. In the
period 1960-61, over 10,000 persons were supposedly employed in COMECON agencies. E. Hoffmann,
Comecon, der gemeinsame Markt in Osteuropa (Opladen: Leske, 1961), p. 16.
17 One indication of potential growth is the fact that a new headquarters for the Secretariat is being con-
structed in Moscow. According to COMECON press accounts, the new building was to be twenty-seven
floorshighandscheduledtobecompletedin1965.ZycieGospondarcze, Vol.XVIII,No. 82,11 August 1968,
p. 1.
18 Apparently the cost of maintaining the Secretariat is allocated among the members by plenary sessions
of the Council. ThenumberofSecretariatemployeesfromeachmembercountryis determined by its popula-
tion. Soviet citizens are supposed to account for 70 per cent of the employees. Knorre, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
Jaroszewicz, op. cit., states that Poland's share was about 15 per cent.
19 Knorre, op. cit., pp. 18-14. Little is known about the size of individual commissions. In some cases they
have been said to employ as many as200persons, although this may again illustrate some confusion between
"employees" and officials of member countries participating in the work of the Commissions. F. L. Pryor,
"Forms of Economic Cooperation in the European Communist Bloc: A Survey," Soviet Studies (Glasgow),
Vol. XI, No.2, October 1959, p. 180.
10 The Geology Commission and the Wood, Cellulose, and Paper Commission-both created in 1956-
'veredissolvedin1959. (Knorre,op. cit., p.14.)TheGeologyCommission was re-created in 1962. According
to Polish sources, by spring 1964 twenty-five Standing Commissions were in existence. Z. Keh, "Waznieisze
problemyWSJJO).pracyw RWPG," Zycie Gospodarcze, Vol. XIX, No. 11, 15 March 1964, p. 1. It has been
possible to identify only twenty-Qne Commissions in Table 2. Conceivably the existence of some Commis-
sions (e.g., armaments industry) was never made public.
11 FollowingtheJune1962meetingofParty leaders of COMECON countries, it was decided to "improve"
the work of certain Commissions, particularly those dealing with machine building, chemical industry, and
foreign trade. TheseCommissionsweretocreatea special executive committee, composed of delegates with
the rank of vice-minister, which was to meet two to three times a year. A. Bodnar, "Rok 1962 -przelomowy
wrozwoju RWPG," Gospodarka Planvwa (Warsaw), Vol. XVIII, January 1968, p. 16.
CHAPTER V
RULE ADJUDICATION
Stuart A. Scheingold
Rule adjudication and integration in the European

community
In this chapter, we again find the European Community as the international

organization with the most fully developed example of a particular function.
In terms of its constitutional structure, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Community is a true court of formal adjudication. However, Professor
Scheingold demonstrates that the Court's decisions reflect a generous
awareness of the need for political flexibility in the law. One way to achieve
this flexibility is to circulate the rough draft of the Court's opinion among the
judges, allowing each to modify the exact language of the opinion according
to his perception of the case. This provides the opportunity for decisions by
consensus to emerge which may also represent a viable compromise be-
tween theviewsofthe litigants. TheCourtalso has used procedural technical-
ities to avoid a substantive decision on a case unti I the issues have been nar-
rowed and clarified through political negotiations in other organs of the
system.
In other words, the results of the formal adjudication process may approxi-
mate the element of compromise found in decrees reached through arbitra-
tion. This is importantfortwo reasons. First, international organizations, even
the European Community, lacksignificant, coercive measures of law enforce-
ment. Obedience to the organization's laws is largely voluntary. Overly rigid,
legalistic decrees might alienate key elite groups, private or public, to the
extent that they would directly or indirectly disregard the law. Secondly,
even if the alienated elite groups comply with unpopular decrees, the ulti-
matetransferoftheirpoliticalloyalties to the new organization (socialization)
might be severely endangered.
ThisdoesnotmeanthatthejusticesoftheCourtaremanipulatingthelawfor
the sake of expediency. As stated in Chapter I, most court decisions involve
the function of rule-making as well as rule adjudication. This is doubly true in
the early days of a developing system. Each new decision is the first of a kind
and may establish a long-range pattern of political interaction. Yet the exact
nature of the organization is still developing. If the early decisions are too
legalistic and rigid, discontinuities may arise between the legal framework
and the evolving political structure and purpose of the organization. There-
fore, the judges are forced to play the dual role of judge and politician consis-
tent with the dual need for a fixed body of law and a flexible system.
From Stuart A. Scheingold, The Rule of Law in European Integrotion, pp. 273-309, copyright © 1965
by Yale University Press. Reprinted by pennission of the publisher.
161
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
For purposes of this discussion, we need not develop a sophisticated "rule of law"
model. The basic issue is the distinction between polar methods of resolving conflict:
law and negotiation. Successful negotiation is anchored in mutual adjustment, with
the concessions made by each party likely to be in direct proportion to influence. Law,
on the other hand, is based on established rules, and it is these norms which determine
how a conflict will be resolved. 1
In practice, the distinction between the legal and the negotiated settlement is not
likely to be nearly so marked. The application of established rules is a notoriously
inexact process, and negotiation always precedes and often continues in parallel with
litigation. Nevertheless, the dual goals of the judicial process are the development
of predictable patterns of rules and equal application of these norms to all parties sub-
jectto the legal system. It is this double standard-stable rules and equal protection-
that we must now apply to the O>al and Steel O>mmunity in general, and the O>urt
of Justice in particular.
By and large, the rule of law has been established within the O>al and Steel O>m-
munity. TheO>urthascertainlynot buckled before political pressure, and its adoption
of functional methods has provided a solid foundation for a workable system of rules.
The judges have regularly asserted the primacy of the law, and they have generally
sought to explain and defend their decisions, thus providing guides for the future.
These favorable conclusions must, however, be qualified if we are to gain a balanced
picture of the O>urt's accomplishments.
Judicial caution
Both the milieu in which the O>urt operates and the traditional attitudes of the
continental judges tend to moderate judicial activism. A hesitancy to assume a public
and educative role is bolstered by the anonymity which cloaks judicial decisions. The
connection between anonymity and judicial caution is indirect, stemming from the
fact that as a general rule continental courts are without dissenting and concurring
opinions. In the absence of these two devices, whatever may be their shortcomings,
judicial decisions resemble a patchwork quilt rather than even-textured, well-rea-
soned arguments. Before signing a decision, each judge is eager to insert a particular
point or perhaps soften the phrasing of a holding to make it more acceptable. At any
rate, judgments can seldom become consistent and persuasive documents.
It is this difficulty, perhaps, which accounts for some of the criticism I encountered
when speaking with attorneys for the enterprises as well as with officials of the mem-
ber governments and the High Authority of the European O>al and Steel O>mmunity
(HA). They charged the O>urt with excessive and confusing obiter dicta. Ironically,
the judges who favor the O>urt's obiter dicta practices defend the extra words as the
appropriate way of clarifying the O>urt's position and thus avoiding additional litiga-
tion.
It is difficult to generalize on the practical results. The O>urt has often used its obiter
dicta to good advantage. Even in marginal situations -like scrap and cartel litigation
-ageneralideaofthe attitude of the O>urt emerges. However, in such cases, the pre-
cise position of the judges is left in doubt, and this doubt tends to foster additional
litigation. The multinational character of the Courtof]ustice compounds the problem.
National judicial traditions call for different sorts of decisions, ranging, for example,
from the extreme brevity of the Franco-Belgian style to the longer discursive judg-
ments characteristic of Italy and Germany. 2
Finally, the judges are painfully aware of the dynamic character of the Community
project and, to a lesser extent, of the essentially economic nature of the rules they must
propound. For these reasons, they are again reluctant to assume an active position.
Among the members of the Court with whom I spoke there was real concern that too
audacious a resolution to current conflicts might restrict the future growth of the
Community. Yet these pressures do not weigh upon the Court in a uniform manner;
they may vary with the nature of the issue presented for litigation.
The brink of politics

Where the jurisdiction of the Community is clear the Court has generally been will-
ing to indulge in extensive and illuminating explorations of the treaty. On the other
hand, the judges have had major difficulties with suits raising issues bearing on the
partial character of the Community. The other problem area for the Court has been,
of course, suits growing out of the Community's rather awkward efforts to adapt the
treaty to changing conditions. Yet even in these matters the Court has often taken firm
and unequivocal stands.
The judges did not let partial integration stand in the way of an impressive resolu-
tion of the rail rate cases. The decisions of the Court brought unity and clarity to a vague
and diffuse article of the treaty and, at the same time, cleared away substantial obsta-
cles to transport harmonization. As in the miners' bonus and the trucking cases, the
judgments tended to force the treaty to its integrative limits. Treaty rules were
pressed, even though the result was to expose weaknesses in the system, weaknesses
stemming directly from the partial commitments of the member governments.
In thus probing the limits of the treaty, Court action compels member governments
to face the logic of integration. The miners' bonus decision, for example, obliged the
German government to make some unpalatable adjustments. By the same token, the
Dutchgovernmenthas been put under pressure by the judgment in the trucking cases.
On the other hand, the Court failed to operate in the same forthright manner in the
Vloeberghs case. The national coal import monopoly, ATIC, remained free to continue
its restrictive operations. Why? The explanation seems to lie in the nature of the prob-
lem of partial integration. The treaty's failure to deal with such matters as fiscal and
commercial policy was not an oversight; a positive political decision is required to fill
this gap. Individual enterprises are in no position to make these decisions, or to in-
fluence them substantially. Accordingly, the Court's unwillingness to permit enter-
prises to precipitate constitutional crises is both understandable and appropriate.
Moreover, [ . . . ] the treaty itself, in restricting enterprise access to the Court, makes
a similar kind of distinction. 3
Analogous, in this sense, to the obstacles of partial integration are the difficulties
of coming to grips with problems of change. Here again the Court has generally as-
serted therulesofthetreatyinastrongand unequivocal manner. On the two occasions

when attempts weremadeto amend the treaty, the Court took a firm stand in the face
of substantial political opposition. Before taking a closer look at these two matters,
let us examine the one instance in which the Court's answer to the problem of change
was to avoid the issue completely.
The judges rejected on procedural grounds the suits brought by the German coal
companies against the Community's emergency measures to deal with the Belgian
coal crisis. They held that enterprises were not entitled to challenge executive action
undertaken on the basis of Article 3 7, action based upon "the political responsibilities
of the Governments of the Member States and of the High Authority, particularly in
that which concerns the reconciliation of the general interest of a Member State and
the general interest of the Community." 4 The rationalization program for the Belgian
coal industry was the result of high level political negotiations. The program was the
response of the Community to genuine political and economic crisis. Since the enter-
prises are hardly in a position to offer constructive alternatives to the emergency
action, it is not surprising-and again, let us recall their second-class status-that
they should be denied an opportunity to block action agreed upon by the member gov-
ernments.
On the other hand, the judges have not hesitated to stand against agreements ar-
rived at by the member governments, even when they have been stamped with the
Council of Ministers' seal of approval. The Court, as we know, rejected proposals to
amend bothArticles56 and 65. While in both instances the Court successfully blocked
the proposed change, there is little doubt that it was more successful in asserting the
claims of the treaty in regard to readaptation procedures than with respect to cartels.
The reasons for the contrast are patently clear; they are partially political and par-
tially legal. Legally, the Court was on strong ground when it refused to accept the
reservations added by the German government- an obvious attempt at a de facto
continuation of the transitional period. In contrast, the interpretation of the treaty on
which the Court based its rejection of the cartel amendment is open to attack. Polit-
ically, the differences between the two situations are instructive. In both cases the
problem was to adjust an inadequate treaty to the demands imposed by changing
economic conditions. Moreover, in both instances, a major revision of the treaty which
would not have been subjected to judicial review was considered time-consuming
and hazardous. But at this point the similarity between the two situations ends.
It was clear that the German government stood alone in its opposition to a legally
acceptable scheme to extend the possibilities of readaptation assistance. In the cartel
dispute, in contrast, the Court took on not just one or two member governments, but a
unanimous decision of the Council of Ministers. Given the fluid character of integra-
tion and the strong national bias of the Community's institutions- a bias reinforced
bythetentativeoperationsof the HA-it is not unrealistic to look at the Council as the
de facto constituent organ of the Community. This impression is reinforced by the
makeup of the European Economic Community in which "almost all the rules spelled
out in the Treaty may be changed by the Council, aided by the Commission and com-
pelled to submit its desires to the consultative deliberation of the parliamentary
Assembly. Formal amendment seems unnecessary. "5
All this is simply to suggest that there are times when a bold assertion of the rules of
the treaty is not in order; when, on the contrary, arbitral-type solutions are more appro-
priate. Arbitration resolves the immediate dispute but entails no obligation for the
future, nor is it necessarily consistent with decisions previously rendered. The arbitral
decision either defers to the political authorities directly, or, by avoiding -or treating
ina restricted fashion- the substantive issues, leaves open the future course of action.
In any case, the result of arbitration is, on the one hand, to allow the political authorities
freedom of action to deal with the problems and, on the other hand, to shut the enter-
prises off from effective legal relief.
There is no intent, in this analysis, to suggest that the Court is altogether at liberty
in politically awkward situations to shirk its obligations to the rule of law. The Court's
reluctance to articulate effective rules for steel pricing practices has already been
criticized,0 and undeniably the refusal of the judges to deal with the substance of the
suit brought by the German enterprises against the general levy is vulnerable to
attack. 6 Certainly the issues raised were of general and far-reaching importance. The
significance of executive access to an independent purse hardly requires elaboration.
Yet, we are not faced with an unresolved political question or with the adaptation of
the treaty to the changing demands of integration. If the treaty provisions are ambigu-
ous, the ambiguity is that of the unprovided case, the classic opportunity for judicial
activism. Moreover, it should be recalled that the enterprises and not the member
governments pay the Community's bills. Accordingly, in this instance, the protection
of the law should have been extended.
PROSPECTS
Thelegalsystemofthe Coal and Steel Community may be said to have burst full grown
upon the scene. The Community has been spared the Hobbesian anarchy which has
so long characterized the international legal order. Not only has there been no resort
to physical violence, but effective limits have been placed on other sorts of self-help.
However ,it is clear that the Court has come under increasing pressure in recent years
as a result of weaknesses in the Community political system. Since these weaknesses
have their counterparts in the structure of the Court, and since the Court, too, is part
of the Community system, itisnotsurprisingthatapplicationoftheruleoflaw has been
tentative and incomplete.
Legal rules have not been applied to all conflicts nor has the protection of the law
been fully extended to the enterprises. While the enterprises are thus partially ex-
cluded from the protection of the law, the Court has certainly opened up an effective,
if limited, grievance channel to the enterprises; neither the HA nor the member
governments have escaped judicial censure. That confidence in the Court of Justice
continues is demonstrated by the tribunal'scrowdeddocket, which includes the ample
beginnings of a body of Common Market litigation. In part, this willingness to overlook
the Court's weaknesses is attributable not only to concrete gains achieved by litigation,
but to an assumption that the tribunal-still in its judicial infancy-will remedy what-
ever defects have appeared.
"Editor's Note: See the original text, pp. 75-83, for a discussion of these cases.
Law and politics

Undoubtedly, as the Court matures solutions will be found to some of the problems
that now plague the judges. However, it seems unlikely that any legal system-par-
ticularly at the constitutional level-can support a pervasive and unyielding applica-
tion of the rule of law. The United States Supreme Court, for example, finds shelter
from time to time in a vaguely defined category of political questions. Despite sporadic
efforts to stabilize this category andinvestitwithafixedmeaning, the concept remains
amorphous. The failure of the Supreme Court to develop a stable and well-defined
category attests tothedeterminationofthejudges tomaintainafreehand and suggests
that the category cannot by its nature be formalized. The temper of the times, the
prestige of the Court, and the availability of alternative solutions are often more im-
portant determinants of the "political" than the nature of the dispute itself.
Continental doctrine accepts the proposition that certain questions are political
and thus ought not be dealt with by courts. 7 However, a significant number of officials
with whom I spoke held that explosive political problems could be defused simply by
bringing them before a court. It is, no doubt, true that legal procedure in general and
the judicial process in particular do perform this service. Within limits tensions can be
reduced by a measured dose of legal tranquilizers, 8 but it is not surprising that the
judges of the Court of Justice who are caught in the cross fire between law and politics
are cognizant of these limits. President Donner has indicated his-and presumably
the Court's-awareness of the problem. He has also suggested that there are those
whom the Court serves who are not sufficiently sensitive to these difficulties:
By virtue of the principles admitted in the law of the Conununity, according to which the judge
interprets, himself, with authority, the rules relative to his own competence, it is incumbent
upon us to put in concrete form the principles and dispositions requiring the separation of
powers. Experience shows that the application of these abstract and rather vague norms to
concrete cases can vary according to the period, to the place, and to the subject. Only those who
know the two provinces can fix the limits between that which is proper to the political and
administrative powers and consequently must be respected by the jurisdictions.
. . . There is these days a fatal tendency which envisions too rigid a distinction between the
governmental and administrative fnnctions, on the one hand, and the judicial fnnction on the
other. 9
While it would be premature to say that the Court of Justice has explicitly formulated
and applied a political questions doctrine, the seeds of such a doctrine are certainly to
be found in the refusal of the Court to permit the German coal firms to challenge the
isolation of the Belgian market.
Law and politics: regional integration

Whatever may be the normal dimensions of the conflict between law and politics,
it is clear that they are enlarged by the nature ofregional integration. It can be argued
with some truth that the crux of the problem in the Coal and Steel Community is insti-
tutional. If the political institutions could respond to the changing demands of integra-
tion in the prescribed manner, the integrity of the treaty could be preserved. Substan-
tive change would be softened by procedural stability, and the Court of Justice would
be in the clear. This argument, while sound as far as it goes, passes over real problems.
The procedural difficulties of the Community stem directly from deep-seated sub-
stantive failings. Judicial review must make its peace with the partial and fluid charac-
ter of the Community system. Ordinarily, judicial review rests on a constitutional
document which is both complete and stable; it designates and regulates all relevant
relationships among the parties. Even in a federal system the constitution seeks a
definitive distribution of power, and so can be used as a standard for resolving all
disputes. A category of political questions, which offers an avenue for sidestepping
certain sensitive issues, does not detract from the essential integrity of the constitu-
tional document.
In the Coal and Steel Community the picture is altogether different. It is not just
that the system is partial; federalism, too, is a partial system. Nor is it that the system
is bound to change; the evolutionary character of federalism is too well known tore-
quire repetition. Whatreallymatters is that the Coal and Steel Community is purpose-
fully tentative. The limits placed on Community authority are experimental; the
boundary traced by partial integration is, in reality, the Community's growing edge.
It is not only that integration is likely to follow an evolutionary course-this dynamic
is actually the instrument of integration.
The "expansive logic of partial integration" is, in other words, an organic kind of
development, not readily amenable to a system of prior rules. Moreover, because the
member governments are determined to keep a firm hand on the progress of integra-
tion, the Community has been hobbled with incomplete institutions which are often
unable to respond in a constitutional manner to the changing demands of integration.
It is the assumption of the leaders of the European movement that an autonomous
Community will slowly develop as the integrative process advances-in other words,
that the organic nature of the process will ultimately wrest control from the Member
States. Nonetheless, in the Community system as it now stands, organic growth must
coexist with national control. 10
The rule of law is thus caught between two opposing but equally hostile forces: on
one side, theclaimsofthemembergovernments and,on the other, the fluid mechanics
of integration. Each in its own way offers formidable obstacles to settled norms. How-
ever, the effectiveness of the Court of Justice will not depend on the extent to which
it can purge itself of these influences. Pristine adherence to traditional standards is
likely to thwart the Community's legal experiment. Only by understanding the forces
which buffet the Court, and by continuing to bend before them at appropriate times,
can the judges live a reasonably legal life in relatively uncongenial surroundings. The
judgesoftheEuropeanCommunitiesmust,inotherwords,treadaparticularlynarrow
path between law and politics....
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE CONTRIBUTION OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW
The preceding ... focused on the underlying conflict between the commitment of the
legal system to stable and determinate rules and the singularly fluid process of regional
integration. It was demonstrated that legal rules have not been applied to certain
categories of Community disputes and it was suggested that insofar as the lacunae
reflected weaknesses in the political system, judicial prudence was appropriate. But
how will these limitations in application of judicial review affect the contribution the
Court can make to the development of the Community? Indeed, what specifically is
that contribution? ...
Generally speaking, the Court of Justice plays both an active and a passive role in
the political process which is guiding the growth of the Community. The active contri-
bution of the Court flows directly from its case law, which will be shown to have
leavened the fluid process of integration with a vital measure of stability. Secondly,
it will be argued that by its very existence the Court of Justice effectively and posi-
tively influences the bargaining process which is the driving force of integration. Let
us first study the active participation of the judges in the community building process.
A FRAMEWORK OF ORDER
There can be no doubt about the rather disruptive character of the integrative process.
The Coal and Steel Community is dedicated to changing the commercial, economic,
and ultimately the political methods of the enterprises and member governments.
Almost without exception, the litigation analyzed in earlier chapters resulted from an
unwillingness to change established practices: sales cartels, national subsidies, trade
protection, secret rebating. Given thestakeof a judicial body in a substantial degree of
stability, the awkward position of the Court of Justice-particularly at the outset-is
patently clear.
However, even in its early stages, the Community cannot operate in a setting of un-
restricted change. Both the businessman and the politician must be offered the vital
minimum of securitytopennit effective planning and policy making. Certainly, assur-
ance of the continued pursuit of common goals is essential. Otherwise, the numerous
immediate sacrifices make no sense at all. In more general terms, there must be a
reciprocal certainty that other members of the Community will not
pursue their ends by means selected only on the basis of instrumental efficiency. Though the
choice of means on this basis may result at times in co-operative combinations, these combi-
nations are by definition subject to immediate dissolution, if, for example, exploitation or an-
nihilation becomes more advantageous for any one member. Hence a state of indeterminate
flux mther than a system of action exists. 11
The following discussion will seek to demonstrate the distinctive manner in which
judicial review has contributed to this necessary stabilization of the integrative
process.
Legitimation and interpretation

The Treaty of the Coal and Steel Community does not simply evidence a positive
commitmentto acommongoal.Itreveals thedimensionsofthatjoint effort by defining
the structure of a specific system of action. If the rules that the Court formulates are to
contribute to the development and stabilization of patterns of behavior, they must be
integrally linked to the goals and methods of that system of action. To put it more sim-
ply, the judgments of the Court must be both clear and convincing.
The successful decision involves legitimation and interpretation. 12 Interpretation
makes habitual performance possible by rendering the rules of the Community de-
terminate. In applying the general and potentially discordant norms of the treaty to
specific conflicts, the Court supplies a vital lubricant to the operations of the Commu-
nity: The immediate dispute is resolved and the rule is made clear, not just for the
parties to the dispute but for the entire Community.
Legitimation, on the other hand, is an important element in motivating habitual
performance. Settled norms may provide a significant social lubricant, but litigants
are not likely to be so easily satisfied; they must be convinced that the judgment is
correct. The Court must argue persuasively that the rules it articulates are, on the one
hand, functionally effective and, on the other, that they correspond to the methods
of the Community as they were sealed in the original compact. By thus demonstrating
thatlegalnorms serve the common goal in an already agreed upon manner, the judges
make a strong case for compliance and thereby serve the cause of stabilization.
However, the norms articulated by the Court fall into distinctive categories, and
both the degree of stabilization attainable and the techniques for its attainment differ
according to the category being considered. Essentially we are faced with three kinds
of norms: the primary roles of the treaty, which impose duties and grant rights to the
enterprises and member governments; the values of the Community, which define
in a more general way the integrative consensus; and the secondary roles- the rules
of the game-which grant the power to make and change rules and even to redefine
the initial consensus. 13 In the discussion which follows the contribution of the Court
of Justice in each of these areas will be considered. Specifically, we shall examine the
potential for stability and the progress made by the Court in that direction.
The methods of integration: primary rules

The Treaty of the Coal and Steel Community is quite specific; it is made up princi-
pally of primary rules which are immediately applicable, requiring only direct execu-
tive action. 14 Given this specificity, it stands to reason that the rules are going to be
put under enormous pressure by the process of integration. There is no chance at all
that the framers of the treaty could have foreseen the twisting course of integration
with sufficient clarity to have set forth anything but a most tentative set of primary
rules. What chance is there, then, to put tolerable limits on the inevitable changes?
The most fundamental element of stability is the relationship of these rules to the more
general goals of the treaty. In other words, while the rules themselves may change,
the ends they serve are likely to be more permanent. It is for this reason that, through-
out this study, emphasis has been placed on the relationship of means to ends -on the
functional solution to legal conflicts within the Community.
In analyzing the litigation, the Court was constantly tested by functional standards:
Had it adopted an empirically grounded, teleological approach? In each of the prob-
lems considered an attempt was made to sketch the substantive relationship between
the litigation and the goals of the treaty. The decision was then judged primarily in
terms of whether or not it took account of, and accommodated itself to, this relation-
ship. Since the preceding chapters0 of analysis of litigation have explored this particu-
lar judicial task, there seems no reason to attempt a recapitulation here. Suffice it to
,. Of complete work, from which this selection was excerpted.

say that the Court has generally abandoned the strict textualism of 1954 decisions on
the Monnet Margin and accepted, in its stead, functional techniques.
The minimum contribution of functional methods is to ensure that norms will not be
self-defeating. It is this kind of service that the Court performed when it held that the
HA was entitled to withhold the benefits of the Belgian coal program from some enter-
prises, provided only that the denial served the objectives of the program. However,
the judges have gone beyond this significant minimum, indicating how programs
(for example, the scrap scheme) and specific rules (for example, the transport regula-
tions) serve the goals of the Community. In doing this, the Court certainly stamps the
rule in question with a significant measure of legitimacy. Moreover, by developing
the functional relationship between specific rules and Community goals, the judges
provide a solid foundation for stable norms. While the dynamic nature of integration
may dictate frequent changes in given rules, the Court's functional analysis furnishes
a blueprint of legally permissible dimensions of those changes. The primary rules of
the Community are likely to be ephemeral, but the commitment to goals will, it is to
be hoped, be more enduring.
Community values
The means-ends relationship sketched in the preceding section is not self-contained.
The link between primary rules and goals is not simply empirical, or objective. The
adoptionofmeansobviouslyinvolves a value choice, and in Articles 2 to 5 of the treaty
the fundamental principles of the Community, the values which were to guide the
process of integration, are set forth. This value commitment is more enduring than the
attachment to detailed primary rules and more specific than the generalized pursuit
of integration.
The Court's job is to transform these values into operative standards for judging
primary rules. The task is complicated by the rather ambivalent character of these
values, 15 but the judges, as we shall see, have grappled with the problem quite suc-
cessfully.WhilethevaluesoftheCommunityarespelledoutatsomelengthinArticles
2 to 5, the key provision is Article 2. The second paragraph indicates both the orienta-
tion and the ambivalence of the treaty:
The Onnmunity must progressively establish conditions which will in themselves assure the
most rational distribution of production at the highest level of productivity, while safeguarding
the continuity of employment and avoiding the creation of fundamental and persistent distur-
bances in the economies of the Member States. 16
The Court of Justice has taken its cue from the italicized words. Again and again, the
judges have attacked both major and minor obstructions to the market process. While
sympathetic to temporary measures to avoid "fundamental and persistent distur-
bances" or to protect "the continuity of employment," the Court has consistently
shaped therulesofthetreatyto serve the rationalizing force of a free common market.
The judges have strenuously resisted subsidies, which of course distort the normal
conditions of competition and inhibit a rational adjustment to the common market.
In the rail rate cases it was held that transport subsidies for weak or poorly placed
industries were contrary to the treaty and must be eliminated-even at the cost of
some unemployment. 17 As a matter of fact, let us recall that the unity which the Court
imparted to Article 70 in the rail rate cases was predicated on purifying the market
process. 18 It was by a similar line of reasoning that the German miners' bonus was
rejected in 1961. The rejection was based largely upon what the tribunal termed
"the essential ends" of the common market as defined in Article 2: "the most rational
distribution of production at the highest level of productivity." 19
The Court accepted the isolation of the Belgian coal market and the consequent
distortion of the common market. However, the measure was endorsed only because
its goal was to further the ends of Article 2. 20 Much the same point was made some-
what obliquely in the first Belgian coal cases (8 & 9/55). The Court held that to grant
the benefits of the coal levy to all Belgian coal producers, without reference to ratio-
nalization, would be to make the scheme an illegal subsidy. 21 Again, somewhat indi-
rectly, the judges invalidated the exemptions from thescraplevywhich were accorded
for "group scrap" because it was held that these exemptions, based on financial ties,
encouraged cartels. 22
In the cartel area the Court has pressed the claims of the free market with particular
vigor. In its initial rejections of the direct access criteria, the Court's distaste for cartels
was inferential. Even in 1960 when the judges snatched the initiative from the HA
by eliminating one of the direct access criteria and forcing the executive to better jus-
tify the remaining criterion, the Court was rather circumspect. However, in rejecting
the proposal to amend Article 65, the judges took a particularly bold and uncompro-
mising stand against cartels and in favor of a competitive market. It is true that in its
two most recent decisions the Court's position has become more flexible. No doubt
this change of direction signals a curtailment of the judicial assault on cartels. Yet the
Court's new posture seems to be dictated by the economic reality of the coal market,
not by diminished enthusiasm for a competitive market. Suffice it to recall the Court's
expressed determination to protect "the measure of competition necessary to safe-
guard the fundamental requirement of Article 2." 23
Taken together, the decisions of the Court disclose a tribunal committed to a free
market economy and to the general efficacy of the rationalizing pressure of natural
market forces. In paying tribute to Judge Rueff on his retirement from the Court,
President Donner noted: "Your economic views were clearly allied to the conception
of the authors of the treaties and upon which the E.C.S.C, especially, was founded." 24
Given Judge Rueffs fervent commitment to liberal economic principles, the remarks
of the President of the Court hardly require amplification.
The Court's attachment to competition and a market economy is bounded by a
vigorous and uncompromising assertion of the principle of equal treatment. The rules
of fair trade are not necessarily in contradiction to a free market. Certainly, destruc-
tive competition must be suppressed, and the elimination of subsidies is a prerequisite
to a market economy. However, the Court's stress on published rates and alignment
has evidenced a clear choice of equal treatment over maximum competition. 25
The judges' inflexible insistence on fair trade is open to criticism on a number of
grounds. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that a limited assertion of fair
trade would be altogether consistent with the Court's commitment to a competitive
market. However, by pushing their stand beyond reasonable limits, the judges have
to some extent detracted from an impressively consistent implementation of the fun-

damental principles of the treaty. Symptomatic of the difficulties that the Court has
created for itself has been its failure, to date, to make a very convincing application of
functional techniques to problems of discriminatory pricing. 26 However, this depar-
ture from the general pattern has been confined to a restricted series of problems.
The judges' reading of the major portion of the treaty will certainly be shaped by the
requirements of a competitive market. This judicial orientation imposes limits on the
changes which may be made in primary rules, thus imparting reassuring continuity
to the treaty.
The structure of integration: secondary rules

The ultimate goal of the treaty, integration, is certainly permanent. Were this goal
to be abandoned, the treaty would obviously have to be scrapped. It is, after all, this
very general commitment to integration which transforms the relations among mem-
ber governments and enterprises from one of indeterminate flux into a system of
action. 27 However, without exception, all the intermediate goals as well as the Com-
munity values are tentative. While circumscribing changes in the primary rules and
thus contributing a measure of stability, these goals and values can also be modified.
Yet even at this juncture order is possible.
Probably the most characteristic contribution of law to any social system is its sup-
port of procedural regularity, the respect it confers on the rules of the game: Who shall
have the power to change rules and what procedures must be followed? The judges
have shown considerable concern for structural questions. The Court's most explicit
defense of the Community system per se came in the first Meroni decision (9 /56) and
served as the cutting edge of its sweeping attack on the HA's administration of the
scrap program: "The power balance which characterizes the institutional structure of
the Community is a fundamental guarantee accorded by the Treaty, particularly to
the enterprises and associations of enterprises." 28
Perhapsmoreimportantthansuchageneralized defense of the system has been the
Court's continuing preoccupation with the powers of the HA. Certainly the problem
of defining the proper constitutional role for the Community's supranational execu-
tive is the most vital procedural issue with which the judges have been faced. In this
matter, the Court of Justice has given legal support to a vigorous-although not un-
restricted -application of HA initiative and discretion. While it might seem that sup-
port of executive intervention is not in accordance with a commitment to liberal eco-
nomic principles, there is in fact no inconsistency. Specifically, the executive action
supported by the Court has almost without exception been taken to bolster the
strength of the free market.
It is perhaps an irony of economic integration that central intervention is necessary
if a free market is to be established. Direct barriers to trade, like tariffs and quantita-
tive restrictions, must be removed, and other distortions of trade-often the product
of member government intervention-must be eliminated. As we have seen, the six
countries of the Coal and Steel Community had more than their share of such distor-
tions and alert policing operations were a necessary prerequisite to establishing a free
common market. Even the more positive programs of the HA have been accepted by
the Court primarily on the basis of their contribution to a healthy free market. Both
the transitional program for Belgian coal and the emergency operation undertaken
on the basis of Article 37 were required to prepare Belgian coal to compete in the
common market. The scrap program, too, was in the service of the regular supply con-
ditions necessary for a sound market.
Admittedly, the Court substantially freed HA's investment opinions from legal
restraint, but the executive's authority over investment is meager indeed. Of more
significance, at least potentially, was the refusal of the judges to interfere with the
HA's power to tax. However, in this instance the Court's endorsement was only luke-
warm, if that. The judgment avoided an appraisal of the arguments raised by the
German firms, taking refuge in a procedural rejection of the German suit; the Court
remains uncommitted as to the dimensions of executive authority. Finally, let us recall
how very cautious the HA has been in asserting its powers. In a practical sense, there
has just not been any threat of dirigisme.
The real conflict between initiative and procedural regularity revolves around the
problem of executive discretion. Here, it would seem that the Court has been most
aware of the fluid nature of integration and has accordingly allowed considerable dis-
cretionary authority. The judges have, for example, refused to confine the utilization
of HA powers to the purposes of the articles in which they were authorized. The mea-
sure in question must bear some positive relationship to the goals of the article under
which it is ostensibly taken. 29 The Court may even require that the ruling be directly
motivated by the purposes of that article. However, the simultaneous pursuit of other
goals is perfectly proper. As early as the Monnet Margin cases, the Court held that
pricing powers could be used for other goals. Similarly, the judges have recognized
that the financial mechanisms of the scrap program might purposely influence the
investment plans of the enterprises. As noted earlier, 80 this sort of interpretation tends
to give each HA power of life of its own- a life based on objectives beyond those in-
corporated in the article granting the power.
Certainly the most significant avenue to broad executive discretion was the judicial
determination that the HA could temporarily subordinate certain of the fundamental
principles of the treaty. 81 The executive has been charged with the duty of reconciling
the individual interests of the enterprises and the member governments with the gen-
eral or Community interest. 82 On the other hand, the Court's willingness to back HA
efforts to establish a free market and promote Community goals is not unrestricted.
It is the Court which stands as the final arbiter of the general interest, testing the execu-
tive'sreconciliationof Community interests. Moreover, the judges have demonstrated
a genuine concern for fair administration of HA programs and have at times been
sharply critical of procedural shortcomings. The Court has stated that reasonable
standards of administration call for prompt HA response to investment proposals, 88
and has indicated a continuing concern for clear and detailed justification of all execu-
tive decisions.
Recall also that the avalanche of scrap litigation stems directly from the Court's
condenmation of the HA's failure to keep adequate control of the powers delegated
to the scrap office. Moreover, the judges insisted strenuously on the importance of
procedural purity in the first trucking rate cases. In both of these latter situations
the decisions expressed an explicit judicial determination to maintain the integrity of

the system established by the treaty. Given the Court's permissive attitude toward
executive action, a narrow construction of procedural requirements should offer wel-
come security to both the enterprises and member governments-eliminating the
temptation of administrative short cuts. In other words, the judges seem to have com-
bined a necessary measure of flexibility with a real determination to maintain the
balance of the Community's institutional structure.
The integrated social system

It should be abundantly clear from the foregoing analysis that the Court of Justice
has gone a long way toward establishing a firm foundation for a system of rules. The
judges have manifested a flexible attitude toward specific textual rules but have
worked to confine change within limits dictated by the purposes, methods, and values
set forth in the treaty. By explicitly formulating and articulating the links among these
factors, the Court has provided guides for the participants and thus offered to the
process of integration that necessary minimum of stability which was discussed at the
opening of this chapter. 34
However, this process is only the means to an end: The goal is an integrated social
order at the supranational or regional level. 35 What is the nature of the Court's contri-
bution to this ultimate goal? Of course, a stable pattern of norms, which makes behav-
ior mutually predictable, is a kind of indispensable minimum for a viable social sys-
tem. 36 But in addition, by identifying and implementing the values of the integrative
commitment, the Court has helped to create a mutually intelligible framework for
communication. In other words, even if the values articulated by the Court are not
universally shared, misunderstandings as to the terms of the discourse about integra-
tion are avoided. Similarly, the Court's functional techniques have breathed life into
the specific goals of the Community. By constant exploration of the relationship b&
tweenindividual problems and these goals, common aims have become more concrete
and determinate, and the reasons for abiding by Community norms more compelling.
Finally, it must be noted that the Court's functional inquiry has extended to secondary
as well as primary rules; the position of the HA in the Community's institutional ap-
paratus has been critically analyzed and its potential as well as its limits spelled out.
What finally emerges, then, is not merely an undifferentiated set of rules but a
series of supports necessary to the development of a viable social system. The Court
has helped to specify the who, the what, the how, and to some extent the why of the
emerging Community system. 37 Understandably, the normative base is not complete
at this early date in the life of the Community. Still, the direction is clear, and the
purposeful and structured stability that the Court is imparting to the rules of the Com-
munity seems likely to make a vital contribution to the building of an integrated
common market.
BARGAINING: THE CORPORATIVE ELEMENT

Let us now tum to the passive contribution of the judges. Simply stated, we shall view
the Court as a "fleet in being." Even without asserting rules, the Court has been able
to influence the Community's political process. While the active and passive contri-
butions of the Court are separable, both in theory and in fact, they are certainly inter-
dependent. The passive role depends on the threat of judicial veto; only because the
Court has established a reputation for finn adherence to rule of law standards has it
been able to influence the bargaining process.
The political process

We have seen that the Community's political process is dominated by the Council
of Ministers. In other words, the "federal" organ in the institutional structure, the
High Authority, has been subordinated. Supranationalism, insofar as it envisaged
the imposition of fixed Community norms on enterprises and member governments,
has been replaced by a process of negotiated settlement conducted by the member
governments. While at this early stage any conclusions are necessarily tentative,
the success of the techniques adopted by the Coal and Steel Community is hard to
deny. Both in its own right and as a catalytic agent in the creation of the Common
Market and Euratom, the integrative achievement of the Schuman Plan is impressive.
The methods developed by the Community seem to be leading in the proper direction
at a reasonable rate of speed. 38
In this connection, the distinctive nature of the Community system must be noted.
It is true that supranationalism has been considerably watered down and that the
rules established are rather plastic. Still, the Community should not be mistaken
for the ordinary international organization, whose member states are characterized
by a fierce determination to guard national interests-a determination backed by
an effective veto power: "The symbiosis of interministerial and federal procedures
has given rise to a highly specific, and certainly corporate, series of techniques whose
tendency to advance integration is patent even though it is neither clearly federal
nor traditionally intergovernmental. " 39
The point is that decisions are made at least in part with an eye to the Community
and its welfare and advancement. A procedural consensus guards against permanent
obstruction by the member governments, and a substantive consensus has emerged
which commits the governments to the realization of Community goals. 40 The HA
contributes to this process by capitalizing on its technical competence:
It has been extremely difficult for recalcitrant governments to resist the facts and recommenda-
tions put before the Onmcil by the High Authority, partly because government experts had
been bound to the accuracy and relevance of the necessary statistics while they were being
compiled.•'
The Court of Justice is in a position to influence the Community bargaining process

in a similar way. That is to say, the constant threat of judicial veto, when combined
with a continuing commitment to the goals of the Community, can keep negotiated
settlements within acceptable limits.
Out-of-court settlement
What evidence is there that the Court of Justice has influenced the bargaining
process? While difficult to document, the most striking evidence is provided by the
settlement of suits withdrawn before the Court could render a judgment. Given the
secrecy which cloaks out-of-court negotiations, it is difficult to determine the precise

basis of the final agreement. However, enough information is usually available to
make possible a satisfactory, if not absolutely reliable, analysis.
For the most part, only suits resulting in judgments have been treated in this study.
Aborted litigation was included in the tabulation in Chapter 14, 42 but only in two
instances have these suits been discussed. The HA's efforts to control the operations
of ATIC were analyzed in some detail in Chapter 13, 43 and the German steel asso-
ciation's prodding of the executive in the Dutch trucking rate cases was noted in
Chapter 8. 44 However, as the listing below indicates, a considerable number of suits
have been settled out of court.
The cases listed are rather a mixed bag. The suits range over a large proportion of
theproblemswhichhavefaced the Coal and Steel Community, and they have reached
the Court along a variety of paths. However, the twelve cases fall readily into two
groups: (1) Suits stemming from a HA decision to which an enterprise or a member
government objected; (2) Suits which sought to prod a reluctant HA to act. In either
situation the imprint of the Court is unmistakable. The HA always responded to the
prodding with vigorous executive activity. Moreover, in all instances, the party which
had reason to expect an adverse decision from the Court of Justice ended by making
some concessions. Finally, in most cases the bargained settlements evidence the
influenceoftreatyrules. Let us examine the suits in more detail, focusing on the above
categories.
TABLE 1. Out-of-court settlement

NUMBER
OF THE
LITIGATION SUBJECT MATIER PLAINTIFF WITHDRAWN
3/53 Coal price ceilings, Belgium France 1953
4/53 Coal price eQualization, France Belgium 1953
2/55 Coal import monopoly,
Luxembourg Luxembourg 1955
11 & 12/55 Scrap-pig iron bonus Assider & I.S.A. 1956
3/56 Scrap-double pricing Italy 1957
4/56 Ruhrcartel Coke industry, Italy 1956
5/56 ATIC France 1957
2/58 ATIC France 1961
39/58 Trucking rates-publication Steel industry, Germany 1959
22/59 General levy Macchiorlatti 1960
43/58 &26/59 Rail rates-discrimination Steel industry, Lorraine 1960
35/59 Price discrimination-gas coke Coke industry, Italy 1962
Executive initiative
Four of the twelve suits fall into this group, and the lesson of legality is clearest in
the Luxembourg (2/55) and the Macchiorlatti (22/59) cases. The details are not al-
together clear with regard to the Italian enterprise suit, but only reservations about
Macchiorlatti's rather dim chances before the Court seems to account for the with-
drawal. 45 Luxembourg dropped her suit against aHA order to dissolve its coal import
monopoly when the government's legal advisers made it clear that the case would
be lost. 46 Without the threat of a judgment, there can be little doubt that Luxembourg
would have put up stiffer resistance to the HA's dissolution order. The government
had already resisted similar pressure applied by its steel industry-far and away the
overwhelming national economic factor.
The legal quality of the above settlements seems beyond question. The same is not
true of the two remaining suits in this category (5/56 and 2/58). Both involve ATIC
and both were of questionable legality. 47 The background "presence" of the Court
does indeed reinforce the position of the party standing on the firmest legal ground.
But that party must be willing to take advantage of the leverage thereby provided.
InitsnegotiationswithATIC, theHA wasneverinterestedinsqueezingall the benefits
out ofits advantageous position. Still, it cannot be denied that each settlanent pushed
ATIC a little closer to the rules of the treaty, thus again evidencing the beneficial
impact of the Court of Justice on the bargaining process.
Prodding the HA
The HA was permissive in its dealings with ATIC largely because of its go-slow
policy for dealing with the Community's cartel problems. There are instances-some
in the cartel field- that illustrate how a cautious HA can find itself trapped between
opposing parties with the threat of judicial veto hanging over its head. While the re-
sults of such situations vary, the record indicates that the HA is vulnerable to this sort
of prodding. The outcome depends almost entirely on how insistent the "trouble-
maker" is. If he is willing to rock the boat with dedication, the cause of the treaty is
virtually certain to be advanced.
It was the suit filed in 1958 by the German steel association (39/58) that led the
HA to withdraw a questionable concession it had made on the publication of trucking
rates. 48 Moreover, after the Court had invalidated the HA decision withdrawing
the concession, it was the threat of the steel association to file a suit that stimulated
the HA to take advantage of the opportunities for action which were opened up by
the judgment. 49 Similarly, a group of French steel enterprises galvanized the HA
into action when they pressed their claim against the Bundesbahn in the Court of
Justice (43/58 and26/59). The enterprises wanted the HA to force the Bundesbahn
to compute the rates for Ruhr coal going to the Lorraine over the shortest route,
through Venloon the German-Dutch border. Although the suit was finally rendered
superfluous when the German government introduced trainload rates, 5° the HA's
response to the legal attack was a vigorous campaign to negotiate a settlement.
But what happens when the injured party is not interested in advancing the rules
of the treaty? In two cases, involving the Italian coke industry, the interests of the
injured party were clearly separable from the legal principles involved. In one case
(4/56), again involving the early stages of the HA's cartel program, the executive
was clearly vulnerable to charges that the three "separate" coal sales agencies were,
in fact, operating as a single cartel, contrary to provisions of Article 65. Consequently,
the HA took the initiative and managed to bring off a negotiated settlement. The
Ruhr made concessions on the one point which interested the Italians- access to the
short supply of Ruhr coal. The suit was then withdrawn, and questionable operations
of the cartel continued unhampered and untested. 51
The other case was similar but more complicated. The Italian coke makers again
appealed to the Court (35/59) in an effort to win concessions from the producers of
gas coke in Germany. It was claimed that gas coke was being "dumped" on the Italian
market, causing appreciable disturbances. When the HA refused to act the suit was
filed, but once again both sides preferred to avoid a judgment. A compromise was
reached giving the HA continuing authority to collect information on shipping and
pricing practices and to arbitrate disputes which arise. 5 2 Obviously, the settlement
bypasses Community rules and gives the HA ad hoc responsibility for dealing with
subsequent disputes. 53
There remain four out-of-court settlements which have not been discussed. While
they could have been divided between the two basic categories, they differ from the
other cases in that the legal merits of the questions are very much in doubt. Since these
settlements are of little importance for our purposes, they can be disposed of in rather
summary fashion. Suffice it to say that in three of the four instances the parties ob-
tained some relief. In the fourth case, the failure to gain concessions can be attributed
to the vulnerable position of the plaintiff. With a legal skeleton in the closet, it appar-
ently seemed wiser to retreat. In short, these cases again demonstrate the impact of
legal pressure on the political process. 54
In closing, we may note the likelihood of innumerable out-of-court settlements
which cannot be documented because they never even reach the initial stages of
formal litigation. When an attorney advises a client that a suit would be useless, a
species of out-of-court settlement is taking place. Whether such advice follows pre-
liminary conversations withofficialsoftheHA, orwhethertheattomeydecides simply
on the basis of his own reading of the treaty and prior decisions of the Court, the re-
sult is the same: The law becomes the accepted standard of action. A responsible,
well-informed bar and a stable jurisprudence are the necessary prerequisites of this
kind of development. 55
What are we to conclude from these twelve out-of-court settlements? Clearly, the
success of the suit as a bargaining technique indicates a general respect for the author-
ity of the Court. The result is that bargaining strength in Community negotiations
is roughly proportional to legal strength. Although there is no way of being assured
that out-of-court settlements will be in accordance with the treaty, the choice is in the
hands of the injured party. With the threat of a vigorous assertion of legal rights hang-
ing over negotiations, real concessions may be obtained. Certainly the position of the
HA in its bargaining with enterprises and member governments is strengthened.
Even if it prefers accommodation to a strict application of Community rules, the
executive can still use its legal leverage to record substantial gains. Recall the case
of ATIC: A hesitant HA, unenthusiastic about going as far as a Court decision, still
managed to extract real if not conclusive concessions. Recall also the bargaining over
the amendment to Article 65. Although the amendment was finally rejected by the
Court, it was clear that both the provisions of the treaty and predictions of the atti-
tude of the Court had a significant impact on the final proposal.
These conclusions are substantiated by interviews with responsible officials at the
HA and the Commission, the executive organ of the Common Market: Both find that
the threat to begin legal proceedings is a potent weapon against both the enterprises
and the member governments. One highly-placed Common Market official, who also
had considerable experience in the Coal and Steel Community, indicated that the
passive role of the Court is among its most important attributes. He contended that
the existence of the Court tends to force negotiations and settlements to cluster around
the treaty.
The advantage of the bargaining process over the judicial process is its flexibility.
Out-of-court settlements can be forced into constitutional paths, but undesirable
rigidity can be avoided. If political decisions do not follow the precise course which
a rule of law commitment would call for, emerging practices are channeled and sta-
bilized. This productive interaction between the judicial and the political processes
thus fits well into the regional pattern. In this sense, the Court becomes the perfect
partner in the Community's corporative political process.
THE ESSENTIAL DILEMMA

There can benodoubtthattheCourt ofJustice is an integral part of the Coal and Steel
Community's institutional structure and that it is making a positive contribution.
The rules promulgated by the Court provide direction and stability; its commitment
to the rule of law offers security; and its presence exercises a salutary effect on the
political process which is the driving force of integration. Yet, linking these three
roles is a basic contradiction-an interesting sort of irony-which is a continuing
threat to the Court.
In order to maintain the momentum of the Community's political process, depar-
tures from the federal pattern are often necessary. Since the Court is in no position
to take the integrative initiative, it has been suggested that the judges must adopt
a rather permissive attitude toward these departures. Generally speaking, the argu-
ment has been thatsolongas the political process is keeping the Community on course,
the Court must give rather a wide berth to the political authorities.
The problem is that the Court's possibilities for influencing the political process
rest on its continued ability to project a vigorously federal image. This is best illus-
trated by the cartel dispute. The judges chose to make an uncompromising defense
of Community rules and procedures, assuming at times a position open to criticism
for its inflexibility. Still, in retrospect, it seems clear that in the cartel field the Court
has exercised a deep and continuing influence on the bargaining process. This influ-
ence has been because of, not in spite of, its strong stand.
What are we to conclude? Logically, there is no resolution. Perhaps, as integration
progresses and theweaknesseswhichgiverisetotheCourt's difficulties are remedied,
the judges will be able upon occasion to take the initiative in awkward situations.
Until that time the Court is well advised to remain in the wings, giving the political
dynamic of integration its head.
To date, the Court has managed to escape being tom apart on the horns of the
resultant dilemma. Perhaps judges have an intuitive ability to avoid a collision course
with the political authorities. More likely, it is the fortunate vagaries which surround
the application of rules that make judicial life bearable: Stabilization does not imply
a social deep freeze in which rules calcify and perfect security is attained. On the
other hand, even in the early stages of integration we have learned that the political
process cannot be perfectly plastic. At any rate, despite occasional-and generally
appropriate- retreats from the rule of law, the judges have been able to foster the
necessary respect for the judicial process.
1 The same idea has been expressed in terms oflaw and politics as follows: "Perhaps the purest analytical
concept of law is that in which an impartial judge objectively applies a pre-established rule to decide a con-
troversy. And perhaps the purest analytical concept of 'politics' is that in which the stronger influence or
interest regulates the social distnbution of values. Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. KatzenoaCh, The
PoliticalFoundationsofinternationalLa w(NewYork: Wiley, 1961), p. 3.
2 The multinational composition of the Court has created no problems which are of basic relevance to this
study. Consequently, there has beennoattempttotouchon themultitudeofbothersome and time-consuming
difficulties of this sort which have plagued the Court since it first began to sit. Suffice it to say that the com-
parative technique has become part and parcel of the Community process and has resulted -with varying
degrees of success-in a synthesis of the legal concepts of the six member states; it is generally felt that the
French tradition is dominant. For the most explicit example of comparative jurisprudence, see Advocate
GeneralLagrange'sstudyofdetoumemen tde pouvoir, 3/54, Assiderv. H.A., 1 Rec.123, 143-75 (1955).
3 See author's The Rule of Law in European Integration, pp. 43-44.
• 2 & 3/60, Niederrheinische Bergwerks AG v. H.A., 7 Rec. 261, 289 (1961 ).
5 Haas, p. 309, italics supplied.
'It is not my intention to question the procedural grounds upon which the judgment stands. This analysis
seeks simply to determine when the judges are entitled to sidestep sensitive problems. Even if the Court
felt that these procedural shortcomings were compelling, some obiter dicta guidance would have been
possible.
7 In French administrative ll!w the notion is embodied in the category, acte de gouvemement. See M.
Waline, Droit administratif (8 ed. Paris, Editions Sirey, 1959), pp. 190-99, and Charles E. Freedeman,
The Conseil d'EtatinModemFmnce (New York, Columbia University Press, 1961 ), pp. 116-17 and 126-27.
See also Hans G. Rupp, "Some remarks on Judicial Self-Restraint," Ohio State Law Journal, 21 (1960),
pp.503-15.
8 As Talcott Parsons has written, "One of the very important aspects of legal procedure is to provide a
mechanism for the 'cooling off of the passions aroused.... The important thing .is that a person under strain
should have some opportunity for 'tension release' that is treated as institutionally legitimate." "The Law
and Social Control" in William M. Evan, ed., Law and Sociology (Glencoe, ill., Free Press, 1962), p. 68.
9 From the address of President Donner at the swearing in of Judge Lecourt, 18 May 1962 (Document
#11, 444-mimeo., p. 2).
1°For a recent critique, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Discord in Community," in Francis 0. Wilcox and H.
FieldHaviland,Jr.,ed., The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp.
10-13.
11 D. F. Aberleetal., "TheFunctionalPrerequisitesofaSociety ," Ethics,60 (1950), p.103. Italics supplied.
12 Talcott Parsons, in Evan, ed., Law and Sociology, pp. 58-59.
13 For a fuller treatment, see Chapter 1, complete work.
14 The E.C.S.C. Treaty thus stands in contrast to the Common Market Treaty which is classified
as a
traite cadre, a framework treaty. See Paul Reuter, "Juridical and Institutional Aspects of the European
Regional Communities," Law and Contempomry Problems, 26 (1961), 382.
15 Scheingold, op. cit., pp. 16-19.
16 Italics supplied.
17 3-18, 25 & 26/58, Barbara Erzbergbau AGv. H.A., 6 Rec. 367, 407 ...{)8 (1960 ).
16 Scheingold, op. cit. pp. 145 and 148.
19 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. H.A., 7 Rec. 1, 39-40 (1961 ).
20 2 &3/60,NiederrheinischeBergwerksAG v. H.A., 7 Rec. 261,288 (1961).
21 8/55,FederationCharbonnieredeBelgiq uev. H.A.,2 Rec.199,314 (1956).
22 32 & 33/58 Societe nouvelle des usines de Pontlieue-Acieries du Temple v. H.A., 5 Rec. 275,
306·07
(1959).
23 13/60,Comptoirsde Ventev. H.A., 8 Rec.165, 212 (1962).
24 Document#11440, p. 3 (mimeo).
25 Scheingold, op. cit., Chs 3 and 4.
"Ibid.
27 Supra, note 11.
28 9/56,Meroni&Co.,IndustrieMetallurgi sche, S.P.A. v.H.A.,4Rec. 9, 44 (1958).
29 6/54, Netherlands v. H.A., 1 Rec. 201,227 (1955).
30 Scheingold, op. cit., p. 129.
31 Ibid., p. 128.
32 Ibid., p. 123.
33 1& 14/57,SocietedesusinesatubesdelaSarrev.H.A.,3Rec. 201,220-21 (1957).
34 Supra, p. 168.
35 For a discussion of this distinction-integration as a _process vs. integration as a condition-and its
general significance in thestudyofEuropean unity, seeLindberg,PoliticalDynamicsofEuropeanEconomic
Integration, pp. 4-8.
36 Aberle eta!., Ethics, p. 103.
37 The obvious resemblance to the functional theories of society developed by the sociologists is, of course,
not accidental. Many of the categories used in these functional theories, the so-called "functional prerequi-
sites of a society," are readily adaptable to the analysis of legal rules and thus provide an obvious link be-
tween the two disciplines. The well-known article cited above (note 11 ), "The Functional Prerequisites of a
Society," specifies, inter alia, the following categories:" a shared articulated set of goals," "the normative reg-
lationofmeans," and "role differentiation and role assignment" (pp. 104-11). The utility of these functional
prerequisites is described as follows: "Role differentiation specifies who is to act, wbile the common articu-
lated set of goals defines what is to be done. The normative regulation of means tells how these goals may be
won" (p. 108). Of course, this functional assessment rests on assumptions about the nature of society which
are not yet verifiable. However, the hypothesis is suggestive and provides clear and meaningful, if not
definitive, standards for gauging the work of the Court of Justice.
38 Needless to say, the usefulness of testing judicial review according to how well it fits into the political
pattern is entirely dependent upon whether or not the Community has been pursuing the proper course. lf
the path chosen is a blind alley, it could be argued that the Court would make its most valuable contribution
by swimming against the tide. On the other hand, in these circumstances it is unlikely that the Court would
be capable of forcing a more rigidly supranational pattern on the member governments.
39 Haas, Tlw Uniting of Europe, p. 526, italics supplied .
•• Ibid., p. 523.
41 Ibid., p. 524. This process has been much more pronounced in the Common Market. Working in the
same general manner, the Commission has exercised considerably more initiative and demonstrated more
skillinproddingtheCouncilofMinisters. SeeLindberg,op. cit., pp. 65-73.
42 Scbeingold, op. cit.
43Ibid.
••Ibid.
45 The firm questioned the HA's right to tax on the basis of estimates made by the executive of Maccbior-
latti's production. The HA had been forced to take these steps because the steel company had failed to for-
ward the necessary information.
•• A Luxembourg official who was involved in the litigation explained to me that the suit had been under-
taken against the advice of legal counsel and then, on more careful consideration, withdrawn .
., Scheingold, op. cit., pp. 233 and 240-41.
•• Ibid., p. 152.
•• Ibid., p. 162.
50Ibid., p. 146.
" See the Italian communication withdrawing its suit, dossier 4/56.
52 Europe CECA, 8 June 1962, p. 3.
53 It should be noted that gas coke is only peripherally a treaty product (see Annex #1 of the treaty). More-
over, there is good reason to believe that the pricing rules of the treaty will at least set a framework for the
negotiations.
54 Ofthe four settlements, two concern scrap: 3/56, bro~t by the Italian Govenrrnent, and 11 & 12/55,
filed by two Italian steel associations. (On the final compromise, see Europe CECA, 9 February 1956, p. 1.)
Theothertwocasesconcemcoalproblems. The French objected to the prices set by the HA for Belgian coal,
and when the govermnent filed suit (3/53) Belgium retaliated with a court attack (4/53) on some of the
practices of ATIC. For an explanation of the French withdrawal, see HA, Second Generol Report (1954),
p. 82. The Belgians, who backed off without concessions, explained their position rather cryptically in a note
to the Court withdrawing their suit (see the dossier, 4/ 53). In this latter case the Court was spared the dif-
ficult task of dealing with the HA's admission, in the written procedure, that the program under fire was in
itself illegal but that its elimination depended upon a prior solution to other problems.
55 It would be misleading to speak about a special bar of Community attorneys, because the Court is open
toanyattomeywhois permitted topleadcasesinhisowncountry. However, it is becoming clear that a rela-
tively small group of lawyers is devoting a rather large portion of its energies to the legal problems of the
European Communities.
Patricia Berko Wild
The Organization of African Unity and the

Algerian-Moroccan border conflict: A study of
new machinery for peacekeeping and for the
peaceful settlement of disputes among African
states
The traditional pattern of the resolution of international conflict through

arbitration is illustrated here. Actually, a careful reading of the case indicates
that more than simple arbitration is involved here; in practice, this is an ex-
ample of the combined use of arbitration, mediation and a committee of in-
quiry. Both the "ceasefire" committee and the arbitral committee appointed
by the OAU resorted to all of these methods in an effort to effect a settlement
betweenAigeriaand Morocco. Mediation and a committee of inquiry are dip-
lomatic means ofconfl ict resolution; a mediator suggests possible alternative
solutions to the dispute which the parties may accept or reject; and a commit-
teeofinquiryservesasatypeofjuryforthe determination of facts in dispute
upon which the parties may base a political settlement. Arbitration and adju-
dication, as we have already discussed, are legalistic forms of conflict reso-
lution in which a court or panel is empowered to issue a final judgment on
the case, binding upon the parties.
This case is rather typical of the practice of arbitration. Such cases fre-
quently end in negotiated settlements or a resumption of normal relations
before a formal pronouncement of the panel is made, with the panel itself
acting as a diplomatic intermediary between the parties. Atthe very least, the
agreementnecessarytoestablishthe panel in the first place may be sufficient
to suggest the terms of an eventual, voluntary settlement.
It is also interesting to note how the OAU presented itself as an impartial
third party in the dispute. The organization especially needed to dispel the
fears of Morocco, which considered the OAU to be pro-Algerian. Therefore,
this case again illustrates the close relationship between the functions of
socialization and rule adjudication; the system had to demonstrate its legiti-
macy and i ntegrityto the satisfaction of the two parties, Morocco in particular.
INTRODUCTION
The Algerian-Moroccan border conflict provided the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) with the firsttest of its machinery and procedures for peacekeeping and for the
From: International Organization, Vol. XX (Winter 1966), pp. 18-36. Reprinted by pennission of the
author and of International Organization.
182
peaceful settlement of disputes. The following examination of that dispute and of

its treatment by the Organization of African Unity is a case study of the operation of a
newly founded regional organization. The Organization of African Unity was ·en-
dowed with no supranational powers which might have enabled it to enforce its will
on the disputants in the Algerian-Moroccan case. The Organization had to function on
the basis of cooperation among its members. Yetthe Organization of African Unity was
more than the mere instrument of the foreign policies of its members in the Algerian-
Moroccan case. When individual African statesmen were disqualified from acting as
mediators by their respective preferences for one or the other of the disputants, the
existence of an organization representing all of Africa greatly assisted in the mitigation
of the conflict and contributed much to the peace of Africa.
This study begins with an examination of the deep-seated origins of the Algerian-
Moroccan conflict so that the success of the Organization can thus be measured against
the obstacles to peace between Algeria and Morocco. The study continues with a
description of the diplomatic evolution of the dispute and of the intervention of the
Organization of African Unity. It is hoped thatthis case study will illuminate the useful
functions of the Organization of African Unity as well as those of other regional orga-
nizations based on cooperation for the maintenance of regional peace and security.
ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

The governments of Algeria and Morocco inherited a difficult boundary problem from
the era of French colonial administration. Prior to the French conquest of Algiers in
1830, there were no fixed boundaries in North Africa. While Morocco was a sovereign
state at that time, Western concepts regarding boundaries had no meaning in the
religiously oriented society of Morocco. 1 The Islamic Arab concept of territory is
unrelated to considerations of geography and political organization. In the Islamic
view the confines of territory are related to theDar-al-Islam (House oflslam), an entity
which is inhabited by the Community of Believers (Umma). This entity knows no
fixed boundaries; as the Community of Believers expands, the Dar-al-Islam grows
larger. Moreover, boundaries created by men are provisional since they are temporal,
and the Community of Believers cannot recognize boundaries imposed by non-Islamic
powers. Considerations of race, language, and culture are added to the religious cri-
terion in determining the extent of Arab, if not purely Islamic, territory. 2 In recent
expansionist campaigns, Arab states, including Morocco, have based their territorial
claims on these traditional criteria while they have not hesitated to make use of West-
em arguments as well. 3
Against this background French authorities concluded a number of boundary agree-
ments with the sovereign Moroccan government between 1830 and 1912 defining the
boundary between Morocco and Algeria. The Treaty of Lalla-Max:nia of 1845 de-
scribed in detail approximately 100 miles of frontier from the Mediterranean coast to
the peak of Teniet-el-Sassi in the Atlas Mountains. South and southwest of Teniet-el-
Sassi, within a region of the Sahara, the border was defined according to the tribes
which inhabited the area. This method of delimitation really created frontier zones
rather than a definite boundary. Subsequent treaties 4 did not materially alter this
situation. The French authorities, by a ministerial decree of 1912, established an ad-
184 REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS I STRUCTURES AND FUNCTION
S
THE ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN FRONTIER.
01-1-....-.....,..,- ...~ooL,-1"1.....a•..,,,.......;~~VO Milos

0 100 200 300 Kms,
Oujd~ ALGERIA
Teniet-ei-Sa ssi '

ATLANTI C OCEAN
MOROCCO
Bou Denibo
OMarrakech
Delimited boundcry
- ••-··-··-·--·--t"'~i'indouf .; .. ·.: ·. ·.; ·:· ·: · Vamier Line
......
__________ .. __.,1
<zgz~1~:;!i¥ ---
Trinquet Line
Boundary claimed by Algeria

SPANISH SAHARA
'...::-··. Other international boundaries.
:
.
i
1
I
.., MAURITA NIA
........ .
----------._
\
-..., .. ?
Area in dispute
Location uncertain
Boundarirs adapted from Reyner, foUt'tfal of Modern

1 \ African Studiu, Vol. r, No. 3, Map t; and from Embassy
I ' of Algeria, ''The Truth on Hassi-Beida'' (Washington, D.C.,
t • October 1963).
ministrative frontier known as the Varnier Line between Teniet-el-Sassi and the town
of Figuig in Morocco. The Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1912, establishing a French
protectorate over Morocco, did not clarify the boundary situation. In the French view,
most of the region south and southwest of Teniet-el-Sassi was uninhabitable, and its
delimitation was unnecessary. In 1938 a French military administrator in Morocco,
Colonel Trinquet, proposed a new boundary which would have placed much of the
desert region within Morocco. While tbis plan was rejected by the French govern-
ment, the town of Tindouf (formerly Mauritanian and later placed within Algeria)
remained under Franco-Moroccan military administration until 1952. Difficulties
arising from the unresolved border rationalization have been further complicated by
the inconsistency of official Frenchmaps which have shifted the location of the Varnier
Line several times. 5 When Morocco became independent in 1956, its border with
Algeria remained only partially defined as it had been since 1845. 6
This legitimate boundary problem was further complicated by the discovery of
important oil and mineral resources in the Sahara. While large quantities of oil have
been discovered in the Algerian Sahara, concessions granted by the Moroccan
government to foreign concerns have not led to the discovery of oil in Morocco. One
million tons of 45 per cent manganese ore have been discovered at Jebel Gettara in
the Bechar region of Algeria. More than two billion tons of over 50 per cent iron ore at
GaraJebilet near Tindouf have not been exploited because of the refusal of the Moroc-
can government in 1958 to permit shipment through the Tarfaya region of Morocco. 7
In order to promote the exploitation of the economic resources of the Sahara, the
French government created the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions
(OCRS) in 1957. The OCRS originally included Mauritania, the Saharan region of
Algeria, Soudan (Mali), Niger, and Chad, and were administered by a French Dele-
gate-General. 8 The Statute of the OCRS was revised in 1959 and 1960 following the
granting of autonomy and later of independence to the territories of French West and
Equatorial Africa. 9 The EvianAgreementsofMarch 19, 1962, granting independence
to Algeria, abolished the OCRS and replaced it with a joint Franco-Algerian Saharan
Organisme. The Organisme was created to exploit the oil and mineral resources of
the Algerian Sahara with equal financial support from France and Algeria. Algerian
leaders made it clear that they had no intention of sharing the exploitation of these
resources with countries other than France. 10
Between 1956 and 1962 the Moroccan government refrained from negotiating
with France regarding the undefined border area, asserting that the delimitation of
the frontier should await Algerian independence. 11 However, in July 1961 the Moroc-
can government concluded a secret agreement with the provisional government of
the Algerian Republic which recognized "the territorial problem created by the
delimitation imposed arbitrarily by France" and which stated that "this problem will
be resolved through negotiations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Govern-
ment of Independent Algeria." 12
This agreement was later obscured when political considerations intervened to
complicate the frontier issue. These political factors involved, first, the role of irre-
dentism in Moroccan politics and, second, an ideological clash between the regimes of
Morocco and independent Algeria.
With regard to the irredentist policy of Morocco, the question of uncertain land
frontiers becameexcessivelyimportantinMoroccan politics after Allal al-Fassi, leader
of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, put forward claims to Morocco's "historic" fron-
tiers, a claim which included the Western Sahara as far as the Senegal River. 18 Be-
tween 1956 and early 1958, claims toMauritaniaand to other territories were avoided
by nationalist leaders other than al-Fassi. 14 Early in 1958, however, under pressure
from al-Fassi and the Istiqlal, the King of Mcrocco officially adopted the claim to
Mauritania. 15 It has been suggested that the acceptance by the King of the irredentist
policy may be explained by reference to domestic political problems. During the
period between Moroccan independence and the adoption of the irredentist policy,
national solidarity forged during the independence struggle gradually declined. It
was not until the complete breakdown of this solidarity, demonstrated by factional
struggles among political parties and by violence in the countryside, that the irreden-
tist issue was accepted by Moroccan politicians and by the King. 16 The irredentist
issue then provided a simple device for the purpose of blurring political differences
and stimulating patriotic feelings. 17 With the Mauritanian claim as the cornerstone of
Moroccan foreign policy, the official Moroccan preoccupation with irredentism led to
the isolation of Morocco in Africa. 18 In 1961 Morocco withdrew from a meeting at
Addis Ababa on African economic cooperation in protest at the participation of
Mauritania. Later in 1961 Moroccowithdrewforthe same reason from a meeting held
in Accra on radio and television. 19 Most important, Morocco was not represented at
the Summit Conference of Independent African States held at Addis Ababa in May
1963. 20
The irredentist posture of Morocco naturally constituted a menace to Algeria. Fu-
ture difficulties between Algeria and Morocco on this issue were foreshadowed in the
general debate during the seventeenth session of the United Nations General As-
sembly. While the Moroccan Foreign Minister stated that:
Since 1956, the date of the proclamation of its independence, my country has not ceased calling
on the Powers concerned to restore its territorial integrity and to give back all the parts of its
national territory which remain under various statutes outside its sovereignty. 21
President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria declared that
it is necessary that every Power should adhere unreservedly to the principles enshrined in the
United Nations Charter and abandon all expansionist ideas. 22
With regard to ideological differences between the two regimes, these are based
on hostility between the traditionalist monarchy of Morocco, which has adopted a
policy of economic liberalism, and the revolutionary socialist regime of Algeria. In
late 1963 most of the former colonial lands in Morocco were still owned by foreigners
while in Algeria all foreign lands had been nationalized. Algerian leaders have no de-
sire to emulate Moroccan policies, but a great many Moroccans are tempted by the
Algerian experiment, and a profound sympathy links the left-wing opposition in
Morocco to the Algerian regime. 28
The legitimate boundary issue was thus complicated by important economic and
political considerations. It is only against this background that one can assess the out-
come of OAU intervention in the conflict.
THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

In view of the unresolved border problem, it is not surprising that skirmishes took
place between Algerian and Moroccan troops immediately following Algeria's acces-
sion toindependencein]uly 1962. During the referendum on Algerian independence
held on July 1, 1962, it was reliably reported that inhabitants of Tindouf had marked
their ballots: "YES for Algerian Independence, BUT we are Moroccans." 24 Several
days after the referendum Moroccan troops attempted to occupy Tindouf but with-
drew when it was discovered that Algerian troops were firmly in control of the region.
A number of incidents ensued between Moroccan administrative officials, auxiliary
forces, and local tribes. 25 Mter a year of relative calm along the border, minor hostili-
ties broke out in August 1963. Moroccans were expelled from the Algerian side of the
frontier, Algerian merchants were expelled from Oujda (Morocco), Algerian troops
infiltrated the Tarfaya region of Morocco and occupied the town of Ghifa in Moroccan
territory, while Moroccan troops were massed along the frontier. During August and
September 1963, however, the Algerian and Moroccan governments apparently de-
sired to minimize the importance of these incidents. On September 13 the Algerian
Ambassador to Morocco attributed the hostilities to "uncontrolled elements." 26
The picture was radically transformed, however, when on September 30 President
Ben Bella alleged that Moroccan troops massed along the border were supporting a
Berber uprising against his regime. 27 On September 29, 8,000 Berber veterans of the
Algerian Army of National Liberation, under the leadership of Colonel Mohand ou el
Hadj, had joined with the illegal Front of Socialist Forces, led by Hocine Ait Ahmed,
to declare war on the Ben Bella regime from their stronghold in the Kabylia Moun-
tains. 28 Faced with this internal threat to his regime, President Ben Bella addressed
a public rally in Algiers on October 1 when he repeated his charges of collusion be-
tween Algerian dissidents and the Moroccan regime, denied accusations that he was a
dictator, and announced the immediate nationalization of all farm lands still in the
possession of foreigners. 29 Thus, while in mid-September the Algerian government
had attributed the frontier incidents to "uncontrolled elements,"bytheendof Septem-
ber President Ben Bella had found it politically expedient to adopt a more militant
tone.
On October 5 the Algerian and Moroccan Foreign Ministers met at Oujda in Mo-
rocco to consider the recent hostilities. They agreed that relations between the two
countries would be "normalized," that King Hassan and President Ben Bella would
meet in Algiers in the near future, that Moroccan troops would be withdrawn from the
border, and that a mixed commission would meet at Tlemcen, Algeria, to examine the
border problems. 30 On October 9, however, the Moroccan government announced
that Algerian troops had attacked the disputed border posts of Hassi-Beida and Tin-
joubwhileAlgerian spokesmen asserted that the attack had been launched by Moroc-
can troops at Colomb-Bechar in Algerian territory. 31
The hostilities quickly escalated. By October 14 the well-equipped Moroccan Royal

Army was firmly in control of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub. King Hassan, under pressure
from the Istiqlal to take strong measures against "Algerian aggression," was touring
the southern provinces of Morocco in an effort to build up anti-Algerian feeling among
the inhabitants of the region. 32 In broadcasts through Radio Maroc, Moroccan spokes-
men accused President BenBellaofhavinginitiated the hostilities in an effort to secure
his "dictatorship" while spreading "facism" in Africa. 33 On October 15 President Ben
BellaaccusedMoroccoofhavingviolated the Charters of the United Nations, the Arab
League, and the OAU, declared that King Hassan was a tyrant who was attempting to
liquidate Algerian socialism, and ordered general mobilization in Algeria. 34 Algerian-
Moroccan negotiations for a cease-fire, held at Marakkesh on October 15-17 failed
completely. 35 On October 20 Moroccan spokesmen reported the capture of an
Algerian Army helicopter with five Egyptian officers on board. 36 The arrival in Al-
geria of Soviet and Egyptian war materiel andEgyptianmanpowerwas reported while
France, Spain, and the United States were refusing military assistance to Morocco in
an effort to isolate the conflict. 37 A second front was opened on October 28 when
Moroccan troops approached Tindouf, 38 and on November 1 Moroccan spokesmen
announced an Algerian attack on Figuig, in Moroccan territory. 39
Against this background of open warfare between Algeria and Morocco with the
inability of the two countries to conclude a cease-fire agreement, a number of attempts
at mediation by third parties took place during the month of October 1963.
ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION BY THIRD PARTIES AND THE

"TRY OAU FIRST" ISSUE 40
After the failure of cease-fire negotiations between Algeria and Morocco in mid-Octo-
ber, efforts at mediation of the conflict were undertaken by African and Arab states-
men. At the same time the Moroccan government indicated a desire to submit the
dispute to the United Nations 41 while the Algerian government, in notes of October
14 42 and October 23, requested that an extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council
of Ministers be convened in order to effect an "African settlement" of the dispute. 43
Most notable among efforts at mediation by third parties were those undertaken by
President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, by President Carnal Abdel Nasser of the
United Arab Republic, by the Arab League, by President Modibo Keita of Mali, and by
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Prior to the failure of cease-fire negotiations be-
between Algeria and Morocco, President Bourguiba had addressed telegrams to the
disputants urging them to agree to a cease-fire. 44 He issued a second appeal on October
21, 45 but his attempttoconvoke a meeting of North African Foreign Ministers in Tunis
was to no avail. While the Moroccans agreed to attend such a meeting, 46 the Algerians
refused to negotiate before the evacuation of Moroccan troops from the disputed
frontier posts. 47 It is possible that President Bourguiba's mediation effort was doomed
to failure at the outset by the fact that relations between Algeria and Tunisia had been
strained ever since December 1962 when President Bourguiba had accused the Al-
gerian regime of harboring the Tunisian perpetrators of a plot against his life. 48 Presi-
dent Nasser, in a speech delivered at Suez on October 22, disclosed that he had ex-
tended invitations to the governments of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya for a
North African summit meeting. At the same time he deplored the "aggression com-
mitted against Algeria." 49 The obvious bias of President Nasser in favor of Algeria,
which was given concrete expression through Egyptian military assistance, 50 clearly
excluded mediation of the dispute by the United Arab Republic. Efforts at mediation
of the conflict by the Arab League met a similar fate since the Arab League was said to
be sympathetic to Algeria. 51 In this atmosphere of diplomatic confusion, the mediation
efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie and of President Modibo Keita were more success-
ful. The Emperor succeeded in persuading President Ben Bella and King Hassan to
meet with him and with President Modibo Keita at Bamako, Mali, on October 29. 52
TheBamakomeetingmarkeda turning point in the diplomatic evolution of the con-
flict since it constituted an important step toward effecting an African settlement.
PriortotheBamakomeeting, a fundamental diplomatic issue had arisen-whether or
not the dispute would be submitted to the United Nations, to the OAU, or to some other
organ. The Moroccan government had asserted its right to submit the dispute to the
United Nations 53 or to a North African summit meeting since the Tunisian President
was thought to be sympathetic to Morocco. 54 However, the Algerian view was sup-
ported by the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs who criticized the Moroccan atti-
tude during a press conference held on October 26 and stressed the "mission" of the
OAU in resolving differences among Africans. 55 Considering the diplomatic isolation
of Morocco in Africa and its absence at the Addis Ababa Conference of May 1963, 56
it is not surprising that the Moroccans were reluctant to seek an African settlement of
the dispute. At the same time the diplomatic position of Algeria was very strong in
Africa. The Algerians benefited from a certain sympathy evoked by their suffering
during the Algerian War of National Liberation. Moreover, with the prominent place
of irredentism in Moroccan policy, the Algerian government was aware that it could
base its legal arguments on the acceptance by the Addis Ababa Conference of the
principle of uti possidetis. 57 Thus, on the eve of the Bamako meeting the Algerian
government enjoyed a strong diplomatic position while the Moroccans, still in control
of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub, were in a strong military position. 58
The Bamako meeting, held on October 29-30, achieved a limited success. In its
final communique the four heads of state announced the following decisions:
(1) The immediate end of hostilities on 2 November at zero hours; (2) the creation of a com-
mittee composed of Algerian, Moroccan, Ethiopian, and Malian military officers, which would
define a demilitarized zone; (3) the supervision of security and military neutrality in the de-
militarized zone by Ethiopian and Malian observers; (4) the request for an extraordinary meet-
ing of the O.A. U. Council ofMinisters, for the purpose ofcreating a committee of arbitration to
effect a definitive solution of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute; (5) the cessation of hostile
propaganda attacks as of 1 November. 59
While the communique declares the satisfaction of the parties with the contribution
of the Bamako conversations to "the maintenance of peace and to the strengthening
of African unity," 60 neither the maintenance of peace nor a purely African settlement
of the conflict was immediately assured by the Bamako meeting.
OnNovember 1 theMoroccangovernmentannounced an Algerian attack on Figuig
and declared that Moroccan troops would not be withdrawn from Hassi-Beida and
Tinjoub. 61 On November 2 the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted that

Moroccan troops had attacked Beni-Ounif in Algeria, insisted that Algerian troops had
been ordered to observe the cease-fire, and declared that Algerian units would engage
Moroccan troops in battle only in case of legitimate self-defense. 62 The Algerian For-
eign Minister also delcared that Algerian troops had approached Figuig in reaction
to Moroccan incursions near Tindouf. 63 In addition to these skirmishes it appeared that
there was a profound misunderstanding among the disputants as to the meaning of
the Bamako communique. President Ben Bella assumed that the Moroccans would
evacuate Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub while the Moroccan Foreign Minister asserted that
these frontier posts were Moroccan and that Moroccan troops could not be withdrawn
from "Moroccan territory." 64 In these circumstances the success of the Bamako com-
mittee in creating a demilitarized zone was highly problematical.
In spite of the Bamako decision to request a meeting of the OAU Council of Minis-
ters, the "Try OAU First" question was not completely resolved by the Bamako meet-
ing. On November 3, after the fighting near Figuig entered its second day, the Moroc-
can Foreign Minister was lobbying at the United Nations where he was pressing for
a UN hearing. The Moroccan government had notified the Secretary-General of the
UnitedNationsof the most recent hostilities, but it did not officially request a meeting
of the Security Council. It appears that the attitude of Paris and of Washington, rather
than that of African statesmen, eventually discouraged the Moroccans from officially
informing the United Nations of the conflict. Spokesmen in both capitals expressed
the hope that the conflict would be settled in an African context. The United States
urged Morocco to abide by the Bamako agreement calling for a meeting of the OAU
so that the major powers would not be drawn into the conflict. 65 Thus, the determina-
tion of the Western powers to prevent an East-West confrontation over the Algerian-
Moroccan conflict coincided with Algeria's "African thesis" and assured the exclusive
utilization of the African machinery for peacekeeping and for the peaceful settlement
of disputes.
CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFLICT BY THE OAU

An extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers was held at Addis Ababa on
November 15-18, 1963. 66 The meeting had been officially convoked by the Organi-
zation on November 11 after two-thirds of the Member States had accepted the Bam-
ako proposal. 67 The legal basis of the meeting was Article XII, Paragraph 2, of the
OAU Charter. 68
On the eve of the meeting Moroccan authorities apparently feared that the outcome
would be unfavorable to Morocco. Before leaving Rabat for the conference, the new
Moroccan Foreign Minister, Ahmed Reda Guedira, stated that the Moroccan govern-
ment was submitting to the OAU meeting in the hope of averting a catastrophe with
Algeria, and he expressed the hope that the Moroccan case would meet with under-
standingin spite of the anti-Moroccan bias of most of the member states. 69 Statements
in the Moroccan press revealed Morocco's fear of diplomatic intervention by President
Nasser as well as an awareness of the strength of Algeria's diplomatic position. 70 In
contrast, Algerian press comment was optimistic, claiming that the decision to hold
the meeting was a victory for Algeria. 71 It remained to be seen whether or not the
Organization would deal fairly with the dispute.
The extraordinary session was opened on November 15 by Emperor Haile Selassie

who congratulated the member states on the fact that the OAU was about to provide
a means for the settlement of an African dispute in an African framework. The Em-
peror expressed optimism on the outcome of the meeting because, he declared, the
African heads of state and government had agreed to the peaceful settlement of border
disputes when they had ratified the OAU Charter and because the governments of
Algeria and Morocco had agreed to a peaceful settlement of their dispute at Bamako. 72
The Foreign Ministers quickly dissipated any fear that they might deal unfairly
with Morocco when they adopted the Bamako agreement as the sole basis of discus-
sion. They thus ignored the Algerian note of October 23, which might have prejudiced
the discussions. TheMoroccanrepresentativehadargued that the Bamako agreement
superseded the Algerian note. 73 The acceptance by the Foreign Ministers of the
Moroccan argument paved the way for an equitable treatment of the dispute.
The Council then invited the Foreign Ministers of Algeria and Morocco to present
their cases. The Moroccan case was stated as follows: Morocco had well-founded
territorial claims based on a number of treaties, including an agreement of July 1961
between the Moroccan government and the provisional government of the Algerian
Republic. Part of the boundary in the disputed area was not merely ill defined, it was
nonexistent, and a definitive delimitation of the boundary should be effected as soon
as possible. Moreover, Algeria had permitted the intervention of a third country which
hadsupplieditwithSovietarms, thus involving Africain the Cold War. 74
The Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, presented the fol-
lowing case for his country: The Algerian government had long-standing military
agreements with the unnamed third country, and Algeria had a right to purchase arms
from friendly states. Morocco was responsible for all incidents along the border after
Algerian independence. The expansionist aims of the Moroccan government were
well-known. These aims contravened the principles of international law accepted by
theOAU. In terms reminiscent of remarks made by African statesmen at Addis Ababa
in May 1963, Mr. Bouteflika declared:
To wish to impose unilaterally the least revision of the Algerian-Moroccan border is without
doubt to create a precedent or an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future of many African
states ....
Just as there is a dynamic of war or of peace, there is a dynamic of territorial claims. The Al-
gerian people and their Government believe it to be their duty to call your attention to . . . this
danger. The only remedy which will preserve security and ensure political stability on our Con-
tinent, is the . . . destruction at the outset of the seeds of division. 75
Thus, whiletheMoroccangovernment based its case primarily on the non-existence

of a boundary in the disputed area, the Algerians ignored that point of fact and pre-
sented their case in terms of the general problem of the maintenance of colonial bor-
ders. On the other hand, the boundary near Tindouf, object of Moroccan claims, was
clearly defined. Only the combat area near Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub lay along an
undefined frontier.
The final resolution of the extraordinary session, adopted on November 18, pre-
sents an admirable summary of the political and legal principles accepted by the
Council in considering the Algerian-Moroccan case:
The Council of Ministers, meeting in extraordinary session at Addis-Ababa from 15 to 18

November 1963,inconformitywithArticle XII, Paragraph2, of the O.A.U. Charter, in accor-
dance with the request contained in the joint declaration of Bamako of 30 October 1963 on the
subject of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute, considering that all Member States undertook the
obligation, under Article VI, to scrupulously respect all principles described in Article III of the
O.A.U. Charter,
Considering the imperative necessity to settle differences by peaceful means and in a strictly
African framework;
Reaffirms the . . . determination of African States to seek constantly, through negotiations

and within the framework of principles and institutions established by the O.A. U Charter, a
peaceful and fraternal solution to all differences which may arise among them; ... 76
The wording of the resolution appeared to establish the primacy of OAU institutions
over the United Nations in case of a breach of the peace in Africa.
At the same time the resolution created a special committee charged with effecting
a definitive settlement of the dispute:
Considering that the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, foreseen in

Article XIX of the Charter, has not yet been established, decides therefore to create the special
committee foreseen in Point 4 of the Bamako agreement and appoints for this purpose the
following countries: Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanganyika.
The mandate of the special committee thus constituted is that fixed by . . . Point 4 of the
Bamako agreement.
In conformity with the spirit of the Bamako agreement, the committee will establish its rules
of procedure and methods of operation. 77
The Special Committee of Seven was thus to function as would the projected Com-
mission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Its mandate was quite broad
sincePoint4 of the Bamako communique merely stated that an extraordinary meeting
of the OAU Council of Ministers was requested "for the creation of a committee of
arbitration for the definitive settlement of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute" 78
and that the Committee was free to establish its methods of operation. It appeared that
the Bamako cease-fire committee would continue to fulfill a peacemaking function
while the Special Committee of Seven would attempt to effect a peaceful settlement
of the dispute.
The extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers had achieved consider-
able diplomatic success. While it may be assumed that the Algerian government had
won a preliminary victory when the extraordinary session was convoked, the Moroc-
cangovernmenthadmetwithequitable treatment at the meeting. The Moroccan gov-
ernment considered the Council's acceptance of the Bamako agreement and its
rejection of the Algerian note as a victory for Morocco. Moreover, the creation of a
special committee for the purpose of settling the boundary dispute supported the
Moroccan thesis that no boundary existed in the disputed area. The Moroccans dis-
covered that their fears with respect to OAU intervention had been unfounded, and
they we.·e greatly reassured as to the possibility of achieving a basic solution of the
problem. 79
RESULTS OF THE OAU INTERVENTION

The diplomatic success of the extraordinary session was undermined by the persis-
tence of a military stalemate along the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. The Bamako
cease-fire committee had succeeded in obtaining a cease-fire, but it had not been able
to create a demilitarized zone. Algerian troops remained entrenched in the vicinity of
Figuig while the Moroccans persisted in their refusal to evacuate Hassi-Beida and
Tinjoub. Immediately following the OAU meeting, it appeared that the problem of
creating a demilitarized zone would have to be taken up by the OAU Special Commit-
tee of Seven since this problem was linked to the determination of ownership of the
disputed area. 80
When the Special Committee of Seven held its first meeting on December 2-5,
1963, at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny addressed ames-
sage to the opening session in which he advised the Committee to accord priority to
the problem of maintaining peace along the frontier. 81 The Special Committee pro-
ceeded to adopt its rules of procedure and methods of operation in conformity with
its mandate. It decided that its duties were, first, to determine the responsibility for
the outbreak of hostilities and, second, to examine the basic causes of the conflict and
to submit concrete proposals to the parties for its definitive settlement. 82 The com-
munique published at the close of the meeting did not, however, specify what progress
had been accomplished by the Committee. 83
The Special Committee met for a second time on January 23-28,1964, at Bamako.
It accepted documents presented by the Algerian and Moroccan governments and
presided over an exchange of documents between the disputants. 84
By early February 1964 there had been a slight improvement in relations between
Algeria and Morocco. Diplomatic relations were to have been resumed in December
1963, but the exchange of ambassadors had been postponed at the request of the
Algerian government. Algeria had made the resumption of diplomatic relations de-
pendent upon the evacuation of Moroccan troops from Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub and
upon a Moroccan guarantee of proper treatment for Algerian nationals residing in
Morocco. In the meantime Algerian troops had not been withdrawn from the vicinity
of Figuig. 85 By mid-February relations between the disputants had shown further
improvement. King Hassan and President Ben Bella had exchanged messages, if not
ambassadors, and discussions had been held between the Algerian and Moroccan
Foreign Ministers during an Arab summit conference. While the military stalemate
persisted, there had been no new outbreak of hostilities. 86
On February 20, 1964, the two governments announced that they had signed an
agreement which provided for the ending of the dispute and for the resumption of
diplomatic relations. On February 26, spokesmen in Algiers and Rabat revealed that
the agreement had been signed in the presence of the Bamako cease-fire committee.
Algerian troops were to be withdrawn from Figuig while the Moroccans would with-
draw to the positions which they occupied before October 1, 1963. The strategic
highlands near Figuig would be demilitarized. A no-man's-land would be created
along the border, but its exact delimitation was not madepublic.lt appeared, however,
that the fate of the mineral-rich Tindouf region would be decided by the OAU Special
Committee of Seven. Some observers commented that President Ben Bella and King
Hassan, having reaped the domestic political rewards of the conflict, were at last
ready to agree to a permanent settlement of the dispute. 87
It should be emphasized that the conclusion of the agreement of February 20 had
been facilitated by the efforts of the Bamako cease-fire committee. The OAU Special
Committee continued its work with less noteworthy success. During the second regu-
lar session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held at Lagos on February 22-29, 1964, 88
the Council again heard declarations by Algerian and Moroccan spokesmen. It studied
a report on the situation which had been presented by the Special Committee of Seven
and recommended that direct contacts be established between the Special Committee
and the Bamako cease-fire committee. 89
Relations between Algeria and Morocco improved considerably during April and
May 1964. In mid-April an exchange of prisoners took place. 90 On May 11 an Algerian-
Moroccan communique expressed satisfaction with the work of the OAU Special
Committee and established a mixed committee on an ambassadorial level which was
to meet on May 25. On May 29, at the close of these meetings, it was announced that
the two governments had agreed that: 1) free passage of persons and property be-
tween the two countries would be resumed; 2) as of June 8, nationals of the two coun-
tries who had been expelledfromeithercountryduring the hostilities of Autumn 1963
could return to their previous domiciles; 3) the victims of the events of Autumn 1963
would be compensated; 4) the property of victims would be returned; 5) all necessary
assistance would be granted to the victims so that they might resume their normal
activities; and 6) all restrictions placed by the governments of either country on the
liberty of nationals of the other country would be lifted. 91
The reconciliation between the two countries was further demonstrated by an ex-
change of ambassadors in the latter part of May and by Moroccan support, during
discussions held by African countries in Algiers on May 26-29, for a project providing
for the construction of a trans-Saharan road passing through Algeria. 92
Thisresumptionoffriendlyrelationsnotwithstanding, the OAU Special Committee
continued its deliberations. It met at Bamako from April24 to May 7, 1964, 93 and
again on October 20-30, 1964, in Algiers and Rabat. After this meeting the Commit-
tee announced that it was awaiting the final observations of the disputants before
submitting its final recommendations to the Algerian and Moroccan governments.
However, the final recommendations of the Special Committee have not been made
public.
More recently, in May 1965, President Ben Bella and King Hassan met at Saidia on
the Algerian-Moroccan border. Their meeting resulted in a significant detente in
Algerian-Moroccan relations. 94 While neither party had expected to find a solution
tothefrontierproblem at the meeting, they had hoped to effect a reconciliation which
would lessen the importance of the problem. Observers noted that during the pre-
ceding few months each government had taken care to refrain from interfering
in the other's domestic politics in accordance with the principle of nonintervention
imposed by the Addis Ababa Charter. 95 Thus, while no legal settlement of the border
dispute was effected, 96 relations between Algeria and Morocco were greatly im-
proved.
A DISCERNIBLE PATTERN IN THE OPERATION OF OAU

INSTITUTIONS
The OAU treatment of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict revealed a certain pattern in
the utilization of OAU institutions for peacekeeping and for the peaceful settlement
of disputes:
1) The use of a cease-fire committee to supervise peace and security in the combat
zone. While this committee was constituted before the OAU intervention took place,
the relative success of its operations might lead the Organization to recommend the
creation of such committees in the future. It was the Bamako cease-fire committee,
rather than the Special Committee of Seven, which succeeded in creating a demili-
tarized zone in spite of the fact that a legal settlement of the dispute had not yet been
effected. Itis perhaps not too much to say that the Bamako cease-fire committee came
under the aegis of the OAU, first, when the Council adopted the Bamako commu-
nique as the basis for its discussion of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute and, secondly,
when the Council recommended that direct contacts be established between the
Special Committee of Seven and the Bamako cease-fire committee.
2) The use of a committee of arbitration to effect a definitive settlement of the dis-
pute. The failure of the Special Committee of Seven to effect a legal settlement of the
border dispute may affect the usefulness of the projected OAU Commission of Media-
tion, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Agreements concluded between the Algerian and
Moroccan governments for the resumption of normal relations may indicate their
preference for direct bilateral negotiations rather than for solutions imposed upon
them by a supernational body. This preference for bilateral negotiations may lead to
the utilization of the mediation and conciliation procedures of the projected Commis-
sion to the exclusion of arbitration.
3) The use of an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. It was the Council
of Ministers, rather than the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which
dealt with theAlgerian-Moroccancaseinspiteofthe fact that the OAU Charter makes
provisionfortheconveningof extraordinarysessionsofbothorgans. This development
points to the conclusion that the Assembly functions as a purely deliberative body
while the Council may have assumed the role of an executive body with the authority
to take action in case of a breach of the peace in Africa. This distinction should not be
emphasized, however, since the fact that the Council is composed of foreign ministers
appointed by the heads of state and government implies tacit approval by the latter of
the Council's decisions.
The procedure of convoking a special session of the OAU Council in the Algerian-
Moroccan case points to yet another development which was not foreseen in the OAU
Charter. While the Charter provides for the convening of an extraordinary session
aftertherequestofonememberstateand with theconsentof two-thirds of the member
states, the extraordinary session of November 1963 was convened only after both
disputants had signified their consent to the session in the Bamako communique. The
Algerian request for such a meeting had apparently been ignored. This development
may mean that member states are reluctant to consent to an extraordinary session
without the prior approval of more than one of the disputants. It remains to be seen
whether or not an extraordinary session could be convened at the request of only one
of the disputants in similar cases.
It should also be noted that there was a delay of fifteen days between the publication
of the Bamako communique calling for an extraordinary session and the convening of
the session on November 15. In the interim, peace and security in the combat area
were assured by a cease-fire committee which was not then attached to the OAU. The
delay involved in obtaining the required consent of two-thirds of the member states
may prove to be a hindrance to the effectiveness of OAU peacekeeping activities in
the future.
4)Thetentative resolution of the "Try OAU First" issue. The fact that the Algerian-
Moroccan case was never submitted to the United Nations does not point to the con-
clusion that the OAU won the legal or political right to consider such cases to the
exclusion of the United Nations. The decision to bypass the United Nations in the
Algerian-Moroccancasewasdue to the reluctance of the Western powers to be drawn
into an East-West confrontation over the issue. In these circumstances an "African
settlement" seemed to be the only practical alternative. It remains to be seen whether
ornottheOAU could deal effectively, and to the exclusion of the United Nations, with
a dispute involving the major powers.
SUCCESS OF THE OAU INTERVENTION IN THE

ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN DISPUTE
The OAU did achieve considerable success in its handling of the Algerian-Moroccan
case. First of all, considering the inability of the disputants to initiate bilateral negoti-
ationsin the heat of combat as well as the failure of the Bamako committee to create a
demilitarized zone prior to the extraordinary session of the OAU Council, the OAU
intervention may have exerted pressure on the disputants to conform to the OAU
injunction regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes. The OAU meeting initiated
a "cooling off period" and brought the prestige of an African organization to bear on
a dispute which individual statesmen had not been able to mediate. The intervention
of a third party which represented all of Mrica became necessary when individual
Mrican and Arab statesmen were disqualified from fulfilling a conciliatory role be-
cause of their respective preferences in favor of one or the other of the disputants. The
Bamako communique, in calling for OAU intervention, recognized the need for an
Mricansolution which would go beyond the mediation efforts of Emperor Haile Selas-
sie and President Modibo Keita.
Secondly, the OAU Council achieved a notable diplomatic victory in their treat-
ment of the dispute. When the Moroccan fears proved to be unjustified, the OAU
Council contributed greatly to the utilization of the OAU machinery by other African
states in the future.
Finally, the failure of the OAU Special Committee of Seven to effect a legal settle-
ment of the border dispute must be measured against the highly complex problem of
defining the boundary in question. To the questionable legal status of the frontier,
a legacy of French administration, was added a deep-seated hostility between a self-
styled revolutionary regime and a traditionalist regime. Moreover, irredentism plays
an important role in Moroccan politics. Should the Special Committee succeed in ob-
taining a legal settlement of the dispute in these circumstances, it would be an astound-

ing victory for the OAU. Failure to effect such a settlement should not lead to the con-
clusion that the Organization had not met its responsibility in the Algerian-Moroccan
case. On the contrary, the fact that the disputants have cooperated with the Special
Committee, while announcing their satisfaction with its achievements, points to the
conclusion that OAU intervention in the Algerian-Moroccan case has been at least a
qualified success.
The relative success of the Organization of African Unity in the Algerian-Moroccan
case constitutes an example of effective action taken by an international organization
in order to safeguard regional peace and security. In the Algerian-Moroccan case,
cooperation among African states was a valid and vital basis for action. The usefulness
of the international organization in this instance is hardly open to question. It is hoped
that the Organization of African Unitywillmakeuse of this precedent in order to serve
again as protector of peace in Africa.
1 Anthony S. Reyna-, "Morocco's International Boundaries: A Factual Background," Journal of Modem

African Studies, September 1963 (Vol. 1, No.3), p. 315.
2 Maurice Flory, "La notion du territoire arabe et son application au probleme du Sahara,"Annuaire Fron-
r;aisdeDroitinternational, 1957 (Vol. 3), pp. 76-79.
8 Ibid., p. 84.
•TheProtocolofParisof1901, theAgreementofA!giersofAprill902, the Agreement of May 1902, and
tbeParisArrangementofMarch 1910.
5 Reyner,JoumalofModemAfricanStudies, Vol.l,No.3,3Hh'318.
"Ibid., pp.314-.'315. Seetbemaponp.l84.
7 1. William Zartman, "The Sahara-Bridge or Barrier?," International Conciliation, January 1963 (No.
541), pp. 15-18.
8 Ibid., p. 26 .
• Ibid., p. 28.
10 Ibid., pp. 00-.'3 1.
11 Jbid., p. 48.
12 LeMonde, October23, 1963,p. 2;andPermanentMissionofMoroccoto tbe United Nations, Texte du
Protocole d:Accord Maroco-Algerien du6 juillet 1961 relatif au probleme territorial (New York, October
20, 1963).
13 Neville Barbour (ed.),A Suroey ofNorth West Africa (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1962), p. 109.
14 Douglas Ashford, "The Irredentist Appeal in Morocco and Mauritania," Western Political Quarterly,
December 1962 (Vol. 15, No.4), p. 644.
15Jbid., p. 647.
18 1bid., p. 643.
"lbid., p. 649.
18 I. William Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1963), p. 37.
19 Ashford, WestemPolitical Quarterly, Vol.l5, No.4, p. 649.
20 Zartman, Government and Politia in Northern Africa, p. 37.
21 General Assembly Official Records (17th session), p. 295.
••Ibid., p. 408.
23 AzizMaaroufin/euneAfrique(Tunis),October27, 1963,p.l5.
24 Zartman, International Conciliation, No. 541, p. 48.
25 Ibid.
•• Maarouf, /eune Afrique, October 27, 1963, p. 15.
27 The New York Times, October 2, 1963, p. 1.
•• Algerian Ministry of National Orientation, Les Discours du President Ben Bella: An1100 1963, 1 er
trimestre 1964 (Annaba, April1964), pp. 154-156.
31 Maarouf,/eune Afrique, October 27, 1963, pp. 15-16. See the map on p. 184. Reports are oonflicting
regarding the instigators of these hostilities.
•• Manchester Guardian Weekly, OctoberS, 1963 (Vol.89,No.l4),p. 2.
•• Le Monel£, October 19, 1963, p. 2.

•• Algerian Ministry of National Orientation,LaRevolution Socialiste Vaincra (Algiers, 1964).
35 Le Monde, October 19, 1963, pp. 1, 2
•• Pennanent MisSion of Morocco to the United Nations, "Capture in Moroccan territory of an Algerian
army helicopterwithfiveEgyptianofficers on board'' (New York, October 1964).
37 The New Yotk Times, October30, 1963, pp.1, 3.
38 Manchester Guardian Weekly, October31, 1963 (Vol. 89, No. 18), p. 3.
•• Le Monel£, November 2, 1963, p. 1.
40 The phrase "Try OAU First" was inspired by Inis L. Claude's treatment of the "Try OAS First" issue in
"TheOAS, theUN,and the United States," International Conciliation, March1964 (No. 547),pp. 21-46.
41 Le Monde, October 23, 1963, p. 2.
•• Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter," International Conciliation, January 1964 (No.
546), p. 42.
•• Le Monel£, October 30, 1963, p. 2.
44 Le Monel£, October 19, 1963, p. 3 .
.. LeMonde, October 23,1963, p. 1.
•• The New York Times, October 23, 1963, p. 3.
47 Le Monde, October 23, 1963, p. 1.
•• Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa, p. 83.
•• Le Monde, October 24, 1963, p. 3.
50 See below, p. 191.
52 Boutros-Ghali, International Concilation, No. 546, p. 42.
53 See below, p. 190.
•• Le Monel£, October 27-28, 1963, p. 1.
••Ibid.
•• See the text which follows.
57 LeMoncl£, October30, 1963, p. 1.
··Ibid.
59 See ''Bamako Conununique'' in Algerian Ministry of National Orientation, De Bamako aAddis-Abeba
(Algiers, March 1964), p. 29. Author's italics.
60 Ibid.
61 Le Monde, November 2, 1963, p. 1.
62 De Bamako a Addis-Abeba, p. 32 .
•• Ibid., p. 31.
•• Le Monde, November 2, 1963, p. 2.
•• The New York Times, November4, 1964, pp.1, 9.
•• Boutros-Ghali, International Conciliation, No. 546, p. 42.
67 The Maghreb Digest, January 1964 (Vol. 2, No.1), p. 28.
•• Boutros-Ghali, International Conciliation, No. 546, p. 42.
69 TheMaghrebDigest, Vol. 2,No.1,p.28.
70 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
71 Ibid., p. 28.
72 Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid.
7s
"Ibid.
75 De Bamako a Addis-Abeba, pp. 39-41.
76 Ibid., p. 44. Author's italics.
77 Ibid., pp. 44, 45. Author's italics.
78Jbid., p. 29.
79 Le Monel£, November 21, 1963, p. 3.
80 Ibid.
•1 TheMaghrebDigest, Vol.2,No.1,p.30.
••oAV,LaRevuedel'O.U.A., May1964 (1st Year,No.1),p. 38.
83 The Maghreb Digest, Vol. 2,No.1,p. 30.
••LaRevuedel'O.U.A., 1st Year, No.1, p.38.
•• The Maghreb Digest, February 1964 (Vol. 2,No. 2), p.18.
•• The Maghreb Digest, March 1964 (Vol. 2,No. 3),p. 26.
• 7 The Maghreb Digest, April1964 (Vol. 2, No.4), pp. 30-31.
88 LaRevuedel'O.U.A., 1st Year,No. 1, p. 62.
••Ibid., p. 37.
90 TheMaghrebDigest,June1964 (Vol.2,No.6),p. 30.
91 The Maghreb Digest, July 1964 (Vol. 2, No.7), pp. 30-31.
•• Ibid., p. 31.
•• LaRevuedel'O.U.A., 1st Year, No.1, p. 38.
•• Le Monde, May 14, 1965.
95 Le Monde, May 13, 1965.
96 Le Monde, May 14, 1965.
CHAPTER VI
A SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The articles in this chapter are introduced as a group rather than individually.
The pieces by Mr. Nowzad and Dr. Baker are general surveys of recent devel-
opments in Africa and Latin America respectively. Both analyze the recent
proliferation of regional and sub-regional organizations in these two conti-
nental areas. This ferment is indicative of the ongoing efforts to mold viable
political institutions out of a confusing welter of nationalistic goals and aspir-
ations in these regions.
The excerpt from Dr. Gordon's book is not intended to be a general survey
of the Southeast Asian region but is included for its timely discussion of de-
fense considerations as a mobilizing factor for regional integration in that
area. Although most observers do not consider defense factors to be a sound
basis for long-range integration of regions, Dr. Levi'swritings (see Chapter Ill)
suggest that defense might bean integrative factor for the new Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Dr. Gordon pursues this point in much
greater detail. NATO, SEATO, the Arab League, inter alia, have not proven
successful as organizations with high integrative potential. However, the
threat of Chinese domination and the ambivalent nature of the possible post-
Vietnam role of the United States in the region have created a different set of
dynamic factors which may provide an initial impetus for integration among
the Southeast Asian states. This article, then, serves two purposes: It raises
the possibility that defense considerations might be a viable approach to
integration in this particular region; and it presents a contrast to the economic
and cultural approaches stressed in the other articles in this study.
The final article, by Professor Nye, presents current thinking in the United
States toward regional international organizations. No survey of regionalism
would be complete without some understanding of the attitudes of this coun-
try, which has traditionally supported regional movements in general and
certain movements in particular as part of its overall policy of containment
of Communism.
200
Bahram Nowzad
Economic integration in Central and West Africa
Inrecentyearseconomicintegrationamongdeveloping countries, in its various forms,

has become one of the more topical issues in the field of economic development, and
the subject has increasingly attracted the attention of policymakers in the developing
countries, as well as that of international organizations and various governments
among developed countries. Progress toward actual integration has been slight but a
number of organizations have been established, and numerous proposals for the
further promotion of integration among various groups of developing countries-in
particular for the creation of customs and payments unions-have been put forward. 1
The interest in economic integration among developing countries is due to several
factors, which to some extent are interrelated. First, economic integration has come
to be considered as an important instrument in the problems of economic develop-
ment. ThisisreflectedinResolution23 (II) adopted at the second session of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (New Delhi, February-March 1968):
"The countries participating in the second United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ... reaffirm that trade expansion, economic co-operation and integra-
tion among developing countries is an important element of an international develop-
ment strategy and would make an essential contribution toward their economic de-
velopment."2 Specifically, a major justification for integration is seen to be the
difficulties encountered by developing countries in their exports, the so-called export
frustration. Unfavorable terms of trade, protectionist policies in some importing
countries, uncertainty of overseas markets, commodity price instability, export sub-
sidies in other countries, the development of synthetics, etc., make it important for
the developing countries to develop additional markets for their products. However,
the achievement of independence by numerous countries in recent years, especially
in Africa, and the consequent fragmentation of previous colonial areas into a large
number of small, often extremely small, markets has compounded the difficulties
mentioned above, making it difficult to "go it alone" on the basis of national markets.
Thus, the answer is seen to be in a greatly expanded regional market that would ac-
commodate increases in production and also allow for greater import substitution. An
enlarged regional market would mean enhanced opportunities for investment, a
better utilization and allocation of resources, internal and external economies of scale
and increased efficiency resulting from specialization, the development of new indus-
tries, greater diversification of the domestic and the export sectors and a reduction in
economic dependence and vulnerability, a stronger bargaining position, and the in-
dustrial transformation of the economies of the member nations.
From: International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. XVI (March 1969), pp.103-133.
201
Furthermore, the postwar progress toward integration in Europe has made a con-
siderable impression on many countries, and the European Payments Union and
the European Economic Community (EEC) are frequently, if uncritically, cited as
models of integration in payments and trade, respectively, and their roles in the
economic recovery and progress of postwar Europe underscored. This has encour-
aged, in some quarters, the idea of a simple and causal relationship between integra-
tion and economic recovery or growth.
In summary, economic integration is seen as a method of providing a more viable
basis for economic growth and, more especially, for industrialization, while main-
taining the national independence of the countries concerned. 3 It is also recognized,
however, that integration will not provide a panacea for the problems of economic
development. For example, in the arguments favoring free trade among developing
countries within a system of high external tariffs against imports from third countries,
it is realized that many regions are economically too small to induce industrial invest-
ments even in a highly protected market. There is, furthermore, no suggestion that the
developing countries can dispense with their export markets and depend solely on
intraregional trade. As regards the procedural and institutional aspects of integration,
it is recognized that such a process would face serious obstacles and difficulties,
notably, political rivalries and nationalism, obstacles of a natural and topographical
character, difficulties connected with the variance in the level of development
reached by the various countries, and the possibility of excessive concentrations of
investment in particular areas and consequential disparities in the development of
different regions (i.e., the process of polarization).
This paper attempts to analyze the case for economic integration in Central and
West Africa and the problems and issues that arise in connection with this. A brief
description of existing institutions in this region is also included.
I. THE BACKGROUND TO INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AND

WEST AFRICA 4
The general case for integration in Central and West Africa

On a theoretical basis there might appear to be little to justify economic integration
efforts in Central and West Africa. The trade diversion effects could well outweigh the
trade creation effects; 5 the countries, for the most part, cannot be classed in Viner's
category of"sizable countries practicing substantial protection of substantially similar
industries" (see Appendix II); a high proportion of the foreign trade of these countries
is not with a potential union partner. However, a strong case for economic integration
in Central and West Africa can be argued on other grounds. One frequently adduced
is the extremely small size of most of the national markets (see Table 1), which con-
stitutes a serious constraint on industrial development and economic growth. Thus it
is argued that the resources for industrial development exist, but that the fragmenta-
tion of the region into narrow domestic markets inhibits their development and use.
Owing to technological and economic considerations, many of the region's resources
can be exploited only on the basis of large-scale production. Existing domestic mar-
kets, with some exceptions, would allow only the establishment of suboptimal in-
TABLE 1. Selected countries: population and gross national product (GNP), 1965
TOTAL GNP
(BILLION
POPULATION PER CAPITA GNP u.s.
COUNTRY (MILLIONS) (U.S. DOLLARS) DOLLARS)
Developed countries
Belgium 9.5 1,540 14.6
Denmark 4.8 1,740 8.3
France 48.9 1,620 79.2
Germany, Fed. Rep. 59.0 1,620 95.6
Netherlands 12.3 1,360 16.7
Sweden 7.7 2,130 16.4
United Kingdom 54.6 1,550 84.6
United States 194.6 3,240 630.5
Large developing countries
Argentina 22.3 760 17.0
Brazil 82.2 220 18.1
India 486.8 90 43.8
Turkey 31.1 230 7.1
Central and West African countries 11.79
Cameroon 5.2 110 0.57
Central African Republic 1.3 75 0.10
Chad 3.3 65 0.21
Congo (Brazzaville) 0.8 120 0.10
Congo, Dem. Rep. 15.6 65 1.01
Dahomey 2.4 60 0.14
Gabon 0.4 250 0.10
Ghana 7.7 230 1.77
Guinea 3.5 75 0.26
Ivory Coast 3.8 210 0.80
Liberia 1.0 180 0.18
Mali 4.6 60 0.27
Mauritania 1.0 150 0.15
Niger 3.3 70 0.23
Nigeria 57.5 80 4.60
Senegal 3.5 170 0.59
Sierra Leone 2.4 140 0.33
Togo 1.6 90 0.14
Upper Volta 4.9 50 0.24
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atlas of Per Capita
Product and Population, 1967.
dustries, and the adaptation of technology to small markets, where possible, would
be costly.
The limited size of the market in the great majority of the countries of this region is
evident from Table 1, which sets out estimates of the population and of the per capita
and total gross national product (GNP) of the countries concerned compared with
those of other countries, both developed and developing. While the data are subject to
a wide margin of error and represent rough approximations, they indicate that, with
the exception of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the populations of
the countries are generally small and that in all the countries per capita GNP is low.
On the basis of the figures presented in the table, the average population is 6.5 million 6
(or, excluding Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, almost 3.0 million),
and the weighted average per capita GNP is about US$95.
Various factors can be taken into account in assessing the size of the market of a
given economy (such as area, population and its distribution, and income and its
distribution). However, the two basic factors of population and GNP are sufficient
to show that, at least prima facie, the fragmented markets in Central and West Africa
do not provide a solid basis for industrial development and to suggest that integration
of the various markets would beimportantincreatinga potentiallymoreviablemarket
in the region. Theproblemof size is compounded if certain other factors are taken into
account. First, the level of urbanization, though increasing, is low, and the population
in many of the countries is spread over a large area (see Table 2). Second, transport
and communications facilities are inadequate, and many areas contain semi-isolated
communities with little economic cohesion. Thus, the national markets of the region
are more fragmented than might appear at first sight.
A question often raised in connection with market size is that if relative smallness
is a constraint to economic development, what is the explanation for the relatively
TABLE 2. Central and West Africa: area and population density, 1964
AREA
(HUNDRED SQUARE POPULATION DENSITY
COUNTRY KILOMETERS) (PER SQUARE KILOMETER)
Cameroon 475.4 11
Central African Republic 623.0 2
Chad 1,284.0 3
Congo (Brazzaville) 342.0 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2,345.4 7
Dahomey 112.6 20
Gabon 267.7 2
Ghana 238.5 32
Guinea 245.9 14
Ivory Coast 322.5 12
Liberia 111.4 9
Mali 1,201.6 4
Mauritania 1,030.7 1
Niger 1,267.0 3
Nigeria 923.8 61
Senegal 196.2 17
Sierra Leone 71.7 31
Togo 56.6 28
Upper Volta 274.2 17
Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Statistical Bulletin for Africa, 1967.
high degree of development attained by several countries that are relatively small in
landareaandin population (such as Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Sweden)? Among the answers advanced by proponents of integration among
developing countries is that these other countries developed in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, when international trade was relatively free and that,
in establishing anew industry, a country could include the markets abroad as part of
the market for the industry in question. There were, however, other factors involved.
Many of the smaller countries benefited from their proximity to larger countries, with
considerable economic intercourse and similar social structures. A second factor was
technological: Economics of scale did not mean quite the same then as they do now-
the level of technical progress was much lower, and the minimum efficient size of many
production units was smaller. Furthermore, the technological gap between various
countries was narrower and easier to overcome.
Such comparisons are of questionable value, however, as numerous other factors
outside the scope of this paper have been important to the economic growth of a
particular country, for example, the importance to New Zealand of the development
of refrigerated ships. The essential question is whether, under present conditions,
thesmallsizeofnationalmarketsis an impediment to more rapid growth and whether
integration would help to provide a solution. Enlargement of a national market and
the enhancement of investment opportunities are expected to have two major effects:
They would allow the utilization of unexploited resources and a better use of existing
resources and capacity by making possible economies of scale, a better division of
labor, and thus more efficient production. With regard to the utilization of available
resources, some comments are made in the next section. As to the better use of present
capacity, Table 3 gives an illustration of the extent of the problem at present. H they
could sell to a greatly enlarged market, many existing industries could operate closer
to capacity, and the dangers of future duplication of industries and of excess capacity
in the region might be lessened appreciably. Besides these possible benefits of eco-
nomic integration, other advantages have been claimed -notably, that the countries
involved are strengthened politically and, as a group, are in a stronger position to
negotiate with other countries and groups.
Economic structure and resources

Although there are considerable differences of ecology, climate, and resources
among them, the general economic structure of the countries of Central and West
Africa is similar to that of many other less developed countries. Agriculture-much
of it comprising subsistence farming-predominates in the region, although in some
countries mining accounts for an equal or larger portion of the estimated national prod-
uct, and in some other countries its relative importance is growing. The industrial
sectors are small, and a substantial part of existing manufacturing activities are con-
cerned with food processing. Commerce is generally the second or third most impor-
tant sector, while other services constitute a relatively small sector.
In the absence of a detailed survey of the available resources of the area and of
feasibility studies for their economic development, it is speculative whether the re-
source structure of the countries of the region is such as to provide possibilities for the
TABLE 3. Central and West Africa: industrial capacity and output in selected industries 1
PRESENT PRESENT PROJECTED

INDUSTRY UNIT CAPACITY2 OUTPUP CAPACITY2
Aluminum sheets and plates tons 5,000 3,100 15,000

Beer hectoliters 1,200,000 625,000 1,315,000
Bicycle assembly units 140,000 32,000
Cement tons 55,000 40,000 395,000
Cigarettes tons 2,400 1,800 2,400
Cotton fabrics million meters 22 9.5 50
Footwear million pairs 6.85 5.25 8.75
Meat and canned meat tons 17,500 14,000 22,000
Motorcycle assembly units 30,000 750
Plastic products4 tons 1,600 750 4,100
Refined oils tons 18,000 12,000 40,000
Refined sugar tons 47,000 33,000 69,000
Soap tons 22,500 14,500 29,400
Sparkling beverages hectoliters 590,000 235,000 615,000
Veneer wood cubic meters 80,000 61,500 110,000
Wheat flour tons 55,000 15,000 71,000
Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Problems ofPlan Implementation, E! AC.54/L.26
(Addis Ababa, 1968).
1 All the industries withtheexceptionofthe bicycleandmotorcycleassemblyplants are situated in Central
African countries; however, available information suggests that a similar situation exists in West Africa
for a wide range of industries.
'Annual.
'1965-66 for most products,1965 for bicycles and motorcycles.
• Bottles, sacks, piping, tableware, and apparel.
development of industries on the assumption that there will be a larger market. An

extensive general study, however, has been carried out by the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (ECA), 7 embracing surveys that are concerned with
industrial development; these studies indicate that, although extensive surveying
and prospecting still remain to be done, the region is endowed with sufficient resources
to make possible a considerable industrial development. The establishment of many
industries of strategic importance to economic development is technically feasible.
However, although in some instances small-scale industries could be established
within the national markets of individual countries, many of the more important in-
dustries are largescale, with a minimum size which would be considerably beyond the
scope of national markets and which would therefore be feasible only if the output
could be sold to other markets.
The above-mentioned study makes an industry-by-industry appraisal of the possi-
bilities of major industrial development in the region. For example, it comes to the
conclusion that there are possibilities in the following industries: iron and steel,
aluminum, other metal products, chemicals, and fertilizers. 8 However, the establish-
ment, on a regional basis, of the industries studied would not conflict with the develop-
ment of small and medium-sized industries, some of which could operate on the basis
of national markets. Examples of such industries are those that produce furniture,
plywood, and glass containers.
The above-mentioned industries provide some indication of the areas in which
industrialdevelopmentonaregional basis may be possible. Expansion in certain other
sectors would also be important and, in certain cases, a prerequisite. The two main
sectors are energy and transport. With regard to energy, the region is well endowed
in resources, but its transport facilities are inadequate and comprise a major obstacle
to economic integration. The existing transport network seems to have been based
mainly on military, political, or administrative considerations, or to have been devel-
TABLE 4. Central and West Africa: major exports as a percentage of total exports 1
Cameroon 58 Ivory Coast 80

Aluminum 14 Cocoa 13
Cocoa 21 Coffee 41
Coffee 23 Tropical woods 26
Central African Republic 89 Liberia 87
Coffee 27 Iron ore 69
Cotton 20 Rubber 18
Diamonds 42 Mali 77
Chad 78 Cotton 19
Cotton 78 Groundnuts 29
Congo ( Brazzavi lie) 63 Livestock 29
Diamonds 31 Mauritania 92
Timber products 32 Iron ore 92
Congo, Dem. Rep. 64 Niger 65
Copper 51 Groundnuts 49
Diamonds 7 Livestock on the hoof 16
Zinc 6 Nigeria 55
Dahomey 57 Cocoa 16
Palm products 57 Ground nuts 14
Gabon 80 Petroleum 25
Crude oil 13 Senegal 69
Manganese 24 Groundnuts
Okoumelogs 33 dncluding oil) 69
Plywood and veneer 10 Sierra Leone 81
Ghana 62 Diamonds 60
Cocoa 62 Iron ore 21
Guinea 74 Togo 78
Aluminum 60 Cocoa 25
Diamonds 7 Coffee 21
Iron ore 7 Phosphates 32
Upper Volta 24
Cattle 16
Other livestock 8
Source: Data from national trade returns.
1 The purpose of this table is to give only a general illustration of the commodity structure of the value of
exports. Most figures concern 1965; different percentages would be obtained by taking other years. Also,
the figures represent recorded trade only.
oped primarily for promoting trade between the (former) colonies and the industrial
would. 9 An improvement and expansion of the existing transport network, especially
as regards new transport links within the region, would be vital to the economic inte-
gration of the area.
Foreign trade
Foreign trade plays an important role in the economies of Central and West Africa,
butitis not possible to generalize about its significance to their economic development.
National income data, where available, are inadequate: The export/GNP ratio, for
example, varies from less than 10 per cent to more than 50 per cent, and the ratios for
individual countries vary considerably according to the period selected. The above-
mentioned ECA report on Central Africa found ratios of between 15.2 per cent and
42.0 per cent. Another survey, using the latest available figures (mostly for 1965),
foundratiosofbetween5 percent and 75 per cent, taking into account Central as well
as West African countries.
Exports are predominantly composed of a limited range of agricultural and mineral
products, while imports comprise a wide range of consumer goods, capital equipment,
and food. Ofparticularnoteisthenarrowrangeofthe export sector. Table 4 shows the
relative importance of the major export products as a percentage of total exports, using
1965 data; in most instances two or three products account for 60-90 per cent of total
exports.
A third feature is the highly skewed direction of trade. It can be seen from Table 5
thatinmostcasesthemajorsourceofimportsandthemainmarketforexportscontinue
to be the former metropolitan country, mostly France or the United Kingdom. This is
true for all countries except, on the export side, Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, and Upper Volta, and, on the import side,
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea. Some of those countries have estab-
lishednewtradinglinks andfoundnewtradingpartners. For example, Guinea's major
trading partner is now the United States, while Ghana, Guinea, and Mali have estab-
lished trade ties with the state-trading countries of Eastern Europe.
Another feature of the region's trade structure is the contrast between the strong
trade links with the former metropolitan country on the one hand and the weak in-
traregional trade links on the other. With few exceptions, the proportion of exports
to, and imports from, other African countries would appear to be rather small. For
example, intraregional trade among the members of the Central African Customs
and Economic Union 10 accounts for about 5 per cent of their total trade. Thus, inte-
gration in Central and West Africa would be starting from what might almost be de-
scribed as a position of nontrade. It is to be noted, however, that intraregional trade
isprobablymoreimportantthan the statistics show, because a substantial amount goes
unrecorded. Thecombinationofuncontrollablefrontiers and import taxes encourages
contraband trade.
The foregoing data tend to strengthen the case for economic integration in the area
set forth at the beginning of this section. On the one hand, preliminary studies have
shown the area to be relatively well endowed in a wide range of resources, the eco-
nomic exploitation of many of which is not profitable on the basis of sales to domestic
TABLE 5. Central and West Africa: foreign trade, 1965 (In millions of U.S. dollars)
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Country Total Major market Total Main source
cameroon 119 57 (France) 134 77 (France)

Central African
Republic 26 10 (France) 27 17 (France)
Chad 27 12 (France) 31 14 (France)
Congo (Brazzaville) 43 15 (Germany, Fed. Rep.) 60 42 (France)
Congo, Dem. Rep. 382 184 (Belgium-Luxembourg) 259 77 (United States)
Dahomey 14 7 (France) 34 19 (France)
Gabon 105 48 (France) 62 36 (France)
Ghana 318 66 (United Kingdom) 448 116 (United Kingdom)
Guinea 51 12 (United States) 50 19 (United States)
Ivory Coast 277 104 (France) 236 147 (France)
Liberia 200 1 59 (Germany, Fed. Rep.) 620 1 400 (Japan)
Mali 16 5 (Ivory Coast) 43 9 (France)
Mauritania 66 17 (United Kingdom) 23 14 (France)
Niger 25 14 (France) 37 20 (France)
Nigeria 750 285 (United Kingdom) 766 238 (United Kingdom)
Senegal 129 104 (France) 164 87 (France)
Sierra Leone 82 55 (United Kingdom) 108 35 (United Kingdom)
Togo 27 55 (France) 45 14 (France)
Upper Volta 12 2 4 (lvoryCoast) 40 2 21 (France)
Source: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Direction of Trade, Annua/1961-65 (Washington).
1 Includes ships registered under Liberian flag.
2 1964 figures.
markets. On the other hand, it has been shown that most of the countries are mainly
dependent on external trade, characterized by a narrow range of exports to one or a
few countries. The intraregional trade is, with few exceptions, marginal.
The a priori argument for integration which follows is that the formation of a cus-
toms union would contribute to a better utilization of resources and an increase in
intraregional trade.
II. EXISTING REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

There is no dearth of regional and subregional institutions in Mrica, many of which
deal with the economic relations among the countries of the continent. The Mrican
organizations, inspired by a desire to cooperate on a regional or continental basis, are
supplemented by other arrangements linking certain groups of countries to the former
colonial power. 11
In Central and West Mrica there are four organizations devoted to economic inte-
gration-the Central Mrican Customs and Economic Union (Union Douaniere et
Economique de l'Afrique Centrale, or UDEAC), the Union of Central Mrican
States (Union des Etats de !'Afrique Centrale, or UEAC), the West Mrican Customs
Union (Union Douaniere des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, or UDEAO), and the
Economic Community of West Africa (ECWA). Two other organizations, concerned
with monetary matters, have a bearing on integration, namely, the two common cen-
tral banks of Central Africa and West Africa, respectively. Finally, most countries
of the region are jointly linked to the EEC through the Yaounde Convention. These
organizations are briefly described below.
The Central African Customs and Economic Union

The UDEACwas created by a treaty signed in December 1964 at Brazzaville, and
becameeffectiveonJanuary 1,1966. Its origins go back to June 1959 when the Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon signed a treaty estab-
lishing the Equatorial Customs Union (Union Douaniere Equatoriale, or UDE). The
purpose of the treaty was to maintain and strengthen ties among these four countries,
all previously part of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa. The treaty provided
for the free movement of goods and capital among member countries, the establish-
ment of a common external tariff, the coordination of fiscal and investment policies,
the introduction of the single tax (taxe unique) system, and the creation of a Solidarity
Fund. With reference to the third of the above goals, in 1960 the member countries
agreed not to change unilaterally the basis of certain specified taxes (those on indus-
trial and commercial profits and dividends and the internal turnover tax) and to modify
theirincometaxratesonly after consultation with other member countries. Moreover,
the member countries adopted almost identical investment codes and introduced the
taxe unique system. Under this system, the exporting country levies a production tax
on goods exported to the regional market (exempting the basic materials used from
anytaxorduty). This taxis levied at the time the goods leave the factory and is usually
lower than theimportdutyforthesameproducts. The importing country does not levy
any tax or duty on such imports, but receives from the exporting country a proportion
of the proceeds of the taxe unique. Such receipts are in proportion to the share of the
production consumed in the importing country. In essence, the effect of this tax is to
compensate the importing country for the tariff revenue lost by importing from a part-
ner country.
Inmid-1961 the Republic of Cameroon (now East Cameroon) became an associate
member of the UDE by signing a Convention of Association. While the Convention
provided for the adoption by Cameroon of most of the integration measures in effect
among the original members, it did not call for a total harmonization of customs duties
between Cameroon and the other members.
With the transformation of the UDE into the UDEAC inJanuary 1966, the way was
opened for a broader economic union. The new treaty goes some way beyond the
original one in providing for the unification of all import taxation and the customs
nomenclature, the establishment of common customs offices throughout the UDEAC
area, the unification of investment codes, a further harmonization of the internal tax
system, and the harmonization of development plans, industrial projects, and trans-
port policies. The taxe unique system and the Solidarity Fund are maintained.
Several steps toward economic integration have been taken, and others are in pro-
gress. A complete unification of most import taxes (duties and turnover taxes) has
been achieved; a common tariff applies to all imports entering the UDEAC countries
consisting of (1) duties for commodities originating in countries other than the orig-
inal members of the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States and the
EEC, (2) fiscal taxes levied on imports from any country, and (3) a turnover tax at the
rateo£10 percentofthevalueofimported goods plus import taxes; 12 goods circulating
within the UDEAC, on the other hand, are exempt from any import duty, except
where there is a differential in the rate of the supplementary tax between the country
of entry and the country of final consumption; the customs nomenclature has been
fully standardized (on the basis of the Brussels nomenclature); common customs of-
fices have been established throughout the union; the sharing and settlement of the
proceeds of customs duties takes place every three months; the Solidarity Fund is in
operation and a percentage of import duties and taxes levied on all imports into the
UDEAC is credited, for eventual transfer to member countries; transfers under the
taxe unique system described above are being made; a union-wide investment code
has been adopted; 13 and agreement has been reached for the location of one industry
within the UDEAC so that competing industries are not established in other member
countries. The latter concerns the establishment of a refinery at Port Gentil in Ga-
bon.14 Other projects (e.g., a cement factory and a bottle factory) are under con-
sideration.
The UDEAC suffered a setback in April1968 when its two landlocked members,
the Central African Republic and Chad, announced their intention to leave the Union
and to join together with the Democratic Republic of Congo to form the Union of Cen-
tral African States. 15 It is reported that this move was prompted by dissatisfaction over
the distribution of benefits, in particular the distribution of industrial projects-the
establishment of a refinery in Gabon and the favoring of Cameroon as a likely site for
the location of a bottle factory-which led the authorities in the Central African Re-
public and Chad to believe that coastal countries would reap most of the benefits in
terms of industrial projects. Moreover, the two countries were unhappy about the
operation of the taxe unique system and the distribution from the Solidarity Fund.
Althoughsomeprogresshas beenachievedandaninstitutionalframeworkhas been
set up for further integration, it is difficult to make an over-all assessment of the
UDEAC. The absence of adequate data prevents a calculation of the increase in intra-
regional trade resulting from the trade liberalization. While it is probable that, in per-
centage terms, the volume of this trade has increased, its relation to the total trade of
the member countries is still small in most instances. In the all-important sphere of the
harmonization of industrial projects and development plans there is only one concrete
example. In other fields (e.g., transport policies) the provisions for harmonization
largely have yet to be implemented.
The Union of Central African States

A protocol for the United States of Central Africa was signed in Bangui in February
1968 by the Governments of the Central African Republic, Chad, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. In Aprill968, a charter was signed in Fort Lamy, and the name
of the organization was changed to the Union of Central African States. Other coun-
tries may join the Union, and the possibility of eventual membership of Congo (Braz-
zaville), Rwanda, and Burundi has been mentioned.
The charter calls for the gradual establishment of a common market, and stresses
the "equitable distribution of industrialization projects." It also calls for the harmo-
nization of industrialization, development, transport, and telecommunications poli-
cies, with a view to promoting the balanced growth and the diversification of the
economies of the member countries.
Other provisions include the adoption of an investment code (Code Cadre) favoring
the landlocked regions and designed to help to overcome their natural disadvantages;
the creation of a Compensation and Investment Fund; the levying of taxes designed
to promote the consumption of goods produced within the Union; the creation of an
Investment Bank; and cooperation in the areas of education, security, hygiene, and
science.
Thereislittleinformationon the operations of the UEAC to date. Judging from the
provisions of the charter, it is evident that the Union has stressed an equitable distri-
bution of benefits, referring specifically to landlocked regions. However, in the light
of the Central African Republic's decision to rejoin the UDEAC, the future of the
UEAC is not clear.
The West African Customs Union

The UDEAO was established by a treaty signed in June 1966, which became effec-
tiveinmid-Decemberofthatyear. The new arrangements replaced an earlier customs
union established in 1959 by Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
and Upper Volta. As in the UDEAC, the aim of the treaty was to preserve the intra-
regional links existing prior to independence. The original treaty called for an abolition
of duties on intraregional trade and the distribution of the proceeds from common
duties levied on imports from third countries.
The 1959 treaty was never fully implemented. Disagreements arose regarding the
redistribution scheme, and customs barriers on regional trade were established by
most countries. Unilateral action in other fields, in addition to the disagreements just
mentioned, slowly jeopardized the union. The new treaty provides for a common ex-
ternal tariff. Intraregional trade is subject to a duty equivalent to 50 per cent of the
duties and taxes on imports from third countries. This tax may be increased to 70 per
cent on products of existing industries, for protective purposes.
Whilethecountriesofthe UDEAO may have moved closer together in certain other
spheres (e.g., monetary policy), their efforts at establishing a customs union must be
judged as relatively ineffective to date. In trade, there is no free movement of goods
among the countries of the region, and there are no provisions for a harmonization of
investment decisions, industrial plans, etc.
The Economic Community of West Africa

The Articles of Agreement for the establishment of this Community were signed in
May 1967 by Dahomey, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Ni-
geria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta. An Interim Council of Ministers
and a provisional secretariat were set up, and a first draft treaty was considered by the
Council in November 1967. Theultimateobjectiveofthis Community is to bring about
a common market among the members. The Interim Council meanwhile has put for-
ward proposals for the harmonization and coordination of policies concerning agri-
cultural production, industrialization, development planning, trade liberalization,
the definition and financing of joint projects, and education.
While it is too early to assess the contribution of the Economic Community of West
Africa tointegrationin the region, it is to be noted that it constitutes an attempt, for the
first time in this region, at economic cooperation and integration cutting across divi-
sions of language, history, and existing affiliations and institutions. Appendix I com-
pares the basiceconomicindicatorsoftheECWA with those of other groups in Central
and West Africa. Despite the margin of errors in the data, it is evident that the ECWA
has a much larger potential market and more widespread trading links than the other
groupings.
The common central banks, BCEAO and BCEAEC 16

The Central Bank of West African States (Banque Centrale des Etats de I 'Afrique
de l'Ouest- BCEAO) and the Central Bank of Equatorial Africa and Cameroon (Ban-
que CentraledesEtats de I 'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun- BCEAEC) are two
of the issuing banks within the CFA franc system. 17 The basic elements of this system
are the common central banks, the circulation of a common currency within the area
of each bank of issue, and the pooling of foreign exchange reserves, giving countries
in balance of payments difficulties access to the common pool. Furthermore, there is
a relatively uniform application of credit policy, common rules for government access
to central bank credit, and similar exchange and trade controls.
The BCEAO was created by an agreement signed in May 1962 by Dahomey, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. A parallel agreement
signed bythesecountrieswithFrance guaranteed the convertibility of the CFA franc 18
(issued by the BCEAO) into French francs and provided for the external reserves of
the countries to be kept in an Operations Account maintained by the BCEAO at the
French Treasury. Subsequently Mali left the BCEAO, setting up its own central bank,
and Togo joined the organization.
The seven members participate equally in the capital of the BCEAO (CFAF 2,800
million). The Bank is managed by a Board on which the member countries and France
are represented (two directors each, and seven directors, respectively). The policy
decisions of the Board are implemented by the national Monetary Committees, of
which there is one in each country.
Transfers between the member countries and France are permitted freely. As men-
tioned above, the external reserves are pooled in an Operations Account with the
French Treasury. Credit balances on this account receive interest, and debit balances
are charged interest. There are also special provisions to deal with a situation where
the Operations Account is seriously drawn down. Finally, there are provisions for
borrowing by the governments and domestic banks from the BCEAO.
The BCEAEC is basically the same as the Equatorial Africa and Cameroon Issue
Institution (Institut dEmission de I 'Afrique Equatoriale Franqaise et du Cameroun)
created in 1955 by Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazza-
ville), and Gabon. The name was changed toBCEAECin 1959. In most basic aspects
the BCEAEC is similar to the BCEAO: the Bank is administered by a Board (eight
directors from France, four from Cameroon, andonefromeachofthe other members);
there are Monetary Committees in each country, with wide powers pertaining to
monetary and credit policy; the BCEAEC has exclusive right of issue and its external
reserves are posted in an Operations Account with the French Treasury; and free
convertibility of the CFA franc into French francs is guaranteed.
The BCEAO and the BCEAEC have been of considerable value to their member
countries. They have a vehicle for monetary coordination and stability and for ex-
change rate stability through the maintenance of a common currency and the pooling
of reserves with free convertibility into a major currency.
The main contribution of the CFA system to integration is that it removes one of the
major problems that may arise in the formation of a common market. Integration
amongagroupof countriesisdifficultif some members ofthatgrouphave substantially
less stable economies than others in the group. The stability of monetary conditions
and the similarity of policies under the CFA system facilitate moving toward economic
integration.
Special links with the EEC

The more obvious advantages of special links amongagroupof developing countries
and a number of developed countries may embrace the preferential treatment ac-
corded to the exports of the less developed group in the markets of the developed
group; the provision of financial aid and technical assistance; the attraction of private
investment from the developed to the developing group; and the less direct advantages
thatresultfromclosecooperation between the two groups on a range of other matters.
The more obvious disadvantages are the diversion of imports from possibly cheaper
sources to producers within the associated group arising from mutual preferential
treatment; the discrimination against other developing countries; and the obstacles
which such special arrangements present with regard to developing countries that
wish to cooperate or to establish a union with other developing countries.
The association of the 18 African countries 19 with the EEC dates back to 1958 when
the EEC was established. The African countries were then either colonies or depen-
dencies of one or anothermembercountryoftheEEC. The first Convention of Associa-
tion was concluded in that year to cover a period of five years. During that period the
EEC, acting through the European Development Fund (Fonds Europeen de Deve-
loppement, or FED) provided some $581 million in aid to the eighteen associated
countries. About one half of that sum was spent on basic infrastructural projects and
one fourth on the modernization of rural areas. There were also expenditures on edu-
cation, health, technical training, town planning, and economic and technical studies.
Following independence, the associated countries entered into new negotiations
with the EEC, leading up to the signing of a new Convention at Yaounde, Cameroon,
in June 1963, covering the period June 1964-May 1969. Under the Yaounde Con-
vention the EEC was to provide a much greater volume of assistance ($730 million,
against $581 million- an increase of about 40 per cent); the aid was to take a greater
variety of forms and be used for a wider range of tasks, and the emphasis on technical
assistance would be enhanced. Moreover, the European Investment Bank, which
hitherto had confined its activities to the EEC member countries, was to extend loans
(sometimes at special rates) to the associated countries. 20
All but $110 million of the assistance under the Yaounde Convention was to be made
available in the form of grants. Most of the aid was to be devoted to increasing the
output of the countries, technical aid for investment projects, and technical coopera-
tion; the remainder was for infrastructure and diversification. The assistance may be
classified as follows: (1) Economic and social investment (infrastructure, develop-
ment of new crops and industries, technical assistance); (2) Technical cooperation
(mainly training programs); (3) Price stabilization (credits to stabilization funds in
times of recession); (4) Diversification (the provision of $230 million in aid to the
adaptation of products to world markets and to the extension of the range of products);
(5) Emergency measures (a reserve fund for assisting associated countries stricken by
natural disaster).
With regard to trade relations, the Yaounde Convention aims at the ultimate estab-
lishment of a nondiscriminatory free trade area between the EEC members and the
associated countries. All customs and quantitative restrictions will be abolished,
although the associated countries have the specific right to retain old tariffs and
quotas, or to create new ones, for the purpose of protecting infant industries. The
preferential treatment accorded by France to certain African countries is to be ended,
and the exports of all the associated countries to the EEC will come under the shelter
of the EEC's common external tariff. 21 By contrast, the associated countries have no
obligation to institute a common external tariff.
Considerable progress has been made toward the establishment of a free trade area
between the EEC and the associated territories. Tariffs on imports into the EEC were
eliminated on July 1, 1968, and customs tariffs on exports from the EEC to the associ-
ated territories have been removed. In the matter of quantitative restrictions, with a
few exceptions all quota restrictions on imports into the EEC have been removed, and
thequotasonimportsinto the associated countries have been fully liberalized on most
items from the EEC.
In view of the establishment of the ECWA, mention should also be made of the
arrangements between Nigeria and the EEC. Nigeria concluded an Association
Agreement in July 1966 by virtue of which most of Nigeria's exports will, when the
Agreement is ratified, enjoy free entry into the EEC; the exceptions are peanut oil,
palm oil, cocoa beans, and plywood, for which duty-free quotas will be established
each year. In return, Nigeria will grant preferences to twenty-six products from the
EEC, although restrictions may be maintained for budgetary purposes or to protect
infant industries. Nigeria will not receive aid from the FED. There are other aspects
relating to rights of establishment of businesses, and to current payments. It has been
estimated that the trade arrangements affect a relatively small percentage of the trade
betweenNigeriaand the EEC, and thus the importance of the Association Agreement
lies more in the precedent that it sets.
In essence the Yaounde Convention provides a system of mutual tariff preferences,

giving the associated countries a privileged access to one of the world's largest markets,
in return for the preferential access they grant to the EEC member countries, while
reserving for them the right to impose restrictions for protective purposes against
imports from that market. Moreover, it makes available to them a large volume of
economic and technical aid, most of it in the form of grants.
In the aid provisions of the Agreement there is emphasis on the primary sectors,
seemingly based on the principle of comparative advantage. Much of the technical
assistance to production schemes is designed to raise output of primary products, di-
versify crops, adapt traditional exports to world markets, and develop industries for
the processing of primary products. However, considerable sums are to be spent on
projects that will benefit industry directly or indirectly. The large expenditures on
infrastructural facilities, education, and technical training are in this category. There
is no provision in the treaty limiting the economic assistance to nonindustrial projects:
Article 15 explains the role of the EEC as "participating in measures calculated to
promote the economic and social development of the Associated States." Moreover,
Article 17 refers to aid being made available to production schemes of general interest
and for production schemes providing "normal" financial returns. Thus, although
much of the assistance may in effect go to projects concerned with agriculture, the
share going directly or indirectly to industry cannot be disregarded.
TheYaoundeConvention expires in May 1969, and thus the present arrangements,
and the benefits bestowed by them, cannot be regarded as permanent. However, it
seems likely that the Convention will be renewed for a further period.
Ill. ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Given that aseeminglyplausiblecase can be made for economic integration in Central
and West Africa, this section deals with some of the related main issues and problems.
The issues that arise from, and the difficulties that beset, the creation and operation
of a viable regional economic community are numerous and, in varying degree, con-
front all developing countries attempting integration. Most of these issues and prob-
lems cannot be considered in the abstract: They must be related to the particular
countries, policies, and institutions in question, in the light of prevailing conditions
and the choices and resources available to the region.
Cooperation
Integration inevitably involves difficult issues in harmonizing sectional and domes-
tic interests with those of the regional community. For these issues to be resolved and
for action that signals some merging of the prerogatives of national sovereignty, steady
political support is a necessity.
The existence, prior to the creation of an integrated community, of certain common
institutions for cooperation and for harmonization of economic policies may tend to
mitigate some of the difficulties. Most of the countries of Central and West Africa have
a common past, and they already have several common institutions, such as the two
common central banks, based on preindependence ties. Moreover, all but four of the
countries inquestionhaveacommoninterest as associated members of theEEC. Thus,
althoughitmay be asserted that the habit of cooperation in this region has been estab-
lished and joint efforts toward an economic community consequently made easier, it
remains to be seen whether the countries in question, having achieved political inde-
pendence in the recent past, will be ready to give up their national sovereignty to any
regional authority to the extent necessary for successful and lasting economic inte-
gration.
Size and composition

Given the propensity to cooperate, the size and composition of the union to be
created must be determined. Any consideration of the desirable size of a union must
take into account the fact that the larger the size, the greater will be some of the prob-
lems arising from integration. In particular, the risk of certain areas of the union re-
mainingrelativelyundeveloped will be higher. In Central and West Mrica the present
divisions and groupings are based on preindependence links, which, in turn, were a
result of historical factors. As mentioned above, the economies of most of these coun-
tries are heavily oriented toward the EEC, and in particular toward France. The prob-
lem turns on choosing between existing organizations as a basis for further integration,
with the prospect of expanding these organizations, or of establishing new organiza-
tions, on the grounds that the present divisions are not necessarily based on rational
economic considerations. For example, one of the striking factors about present group-
ings in Central and West Mrica is that two of the economically most important coun-
tries of the region, Nigeria and Ghana, are not parties to the existing economic organi-
zations, whereas each is surrounded by countries belonging to these organizations. It
might be assumed that any economic integration in the area should include these
countries. The logic of the above seems to be reflected in the efforts under way to ini-
tiate a new union in the area, i.e., the ECWA, discussed earlier.
Scope and strategy

The scope and strategy of integration constitute other points of cardinal importance:
in other words, What aspects should integration cover and how should it be brought
about? Several mutually reinforcing avenues for integration are open to developing
countries. The most obvious one is trade liberalization, which is also perhaps the most
readily accessible, as experience has shown. Agreement has to be reached concerning
commodities to be liberalized, the speed of liberalization, the basis for liberalization
(i.e., whether a selective commodity-by-commodity approach or a comprehensive
one), the level of the common external tariff, etc. Agreement on these matters is prob-
ably easier to reach than agreement in some other spheres, discussed below. In the
Central and West Mrican regions a considerable degree of trade liberalization has
already been achieved, especially among UDEAC countries where goods are traded
free from tariff duties. There seems to be room for further liberalization of intrare-
gional trade in Central and West Mrica, especially if new and larger organizations
are created which go beyond the present divisions. Trade liberalization is likely to
increase the presently low levelofintraregional trade. Given the structure and compo-
sition of the external trade of the countries of the area, however, trade liberalization
alone will have alimitedimmediate impact. Many of the import needs of the countries
of the region for the foreseeable future cannot be supplied by other regional partners,
andmanyoftheexportproductswill continue to rely on markets outside the region. In
sum, trade liberalization by itself is likely to help to raise the volume of trade in pres-
ently traded commodities and may also encourage trade in new commodities; this may
stimulate the development of new industries and lead to a better utilization of present
industrial capacity. However, larger benefits will be in prospect if trade liberalization
is coupled with the harmonization of development policies, especially industrial
policies.
The coordination of development policies covers many aspects. There is, first, co-
operation in development planning, implying the coordination of national economic
plans or planning on a regional level. This form of cooperation at the general policy
level is concerned with such questions as the basic objectives of development, the
broad breakdown of expenditures, and the sources of funds. Most countries in Central
and West Africa have economic plans. These plans at present are essentially no more
than general guides for desirable projects.
Of more importance and potentially greater benefit is harmonization at the indus-
trial and project level. Cooperation at this level concerns the choice of industries
(producingintermediateorfinalgoodsfordomesticconsumptionorforexport) and the
location of industries (in which countries plants should be situated, taking into account
inputs, markets, transport facilities, etc.; where auxiliary plants should be situated,
etc.). Other aspects (e.g., to what extent a particular industry should be vertically or
horizontally integrated; what combination of imports it should use; what type of en-
ergy it should employ) 22 would also be subjects for cooperation. In short, the major
aim of integration at this stage would be to achieve the best utilization of available
resources, given the general objectives of economic policy, by providing a better base
for existing industries, by encouraging new and complementary industries, and by
avoiding industrial duplication in a region that, even with the complete elimination of
trade barriers, would provide a narrow market for some time.
The coordination of investment policies at the industrial level presupposes cooper-
ation in the area of infrastructural development, such as energy, transport, and com-
munications. Without such cooperation, the attainment of some of the goals of integra-
tion may be frustrated. The development of transport in particular is an important
prerequisite for integration: By facilitating the intraregional transfers of goods and
labor, it will enhance the profitability of existing industries and aid the creation of
larger and more economic industrial units producing for the region as a whole. As
mentioned above, in general the system of transport and communications in Central
and West Africa is inadequate; numerous studies are being made to the possibilities
of improving the network of roads, railways, and communications. Improvements
in these fields are of particular importance to Central and West Africa for two addi-
tional reasons: First, as has already been stated, the area is large and sparsely popu-
lated, with many communities living in astateof semi-isolation. This is a major obstacle
to the cohesion of the area. Second, the area contains some landlocked regions. An
adequatenetworkoftransportconnectingwith theinteriorwould be essential in order
to allow all countries of the region to benefit from integration, especially as many of
the industries are likely to be located near the ports. In view of these considerations,
the construction of adequate communications and other infrastructural facilities is
essential.
Another sphere for harmonization is that of economic policies in general, and par-
ticularlymonetary and fiscal policies. Such harmonization would be imperative for a
full economic union with free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor, but
even before that stage is reached, cooperation in the monetary and fiscal fields would
facilitate the achievement of the objectives of integration. In Central and West Africa
few attempts have been made at harmonizatio:ri in fiscal matters, although, as de-
scribed earlier, some progress has been made within the UDEAC countries. In mone-
tary matters, most countries of the region belong to essentially the same monetary
system, under one of the two common central banks, and a common currency cir-
culates within each of the subregions. Thus, although the habit of monetary co-
operation is well established among the majority of the countries in the region, some
difficulties could arise if new groupings were formed that cut across the present
divisions.
External assistance
Technical assistance is required in numerous industrial, administrative, and educa-
tional areas and, with particular regard to integration, in the creation of the admini-
strative machinery at the national and regional levels. Moreover, external technical
assistance would be helpful at the regional policymaking level, in respect to the mat-
ters mentioned above (e.g., the speed and strategy of trade liberalization, harmoni-
zation of development and industrial projects, cooperation in fiscal and monetary
matters). In Central and West Africa, with few exceptions, close cooperation with
technical assistance from abroad has existed since independence, and many domestic
civil servants have had considerable experience in the field at the national level. The
main problem might be to increase the amount of technical assistance, widen its scope,
and channel it on a regional basis.
The fact that domestic savings in the countries of the region are inadequate to fi-
nance their development needs, and the consequent importance of external financial
assistance, is well known and need not be elaborated on. The success of integration
may initially imply an increased dependence on foreign aid, even though for many
proponents of regional integration one of the final objectives is a reduced dependence
on external assistance. In the interim period, the nature of external aid would change
by the gradual and progressive substitution of development aid, given on a regional
basis to regional entities and to industries, for aid disbursed on a national basis.
Related to the provisions of external finance in general is the role to be played by
private expatriate companies, which may consider their investments in terms of their
world-wide and metropolitan activities. On occasion these may entail some conflict
of interest for their operations in an individual country. Difficulties may arise in a wide
variety of fields, such as the activities into which foreign enterprises should be ad-
mitted, the level of profits and their repatriation or reinvestment, and safeguards
against the control of the economy, or large segments of it, passing to nonresidents.
In Central and West Africa, foreign enterprises are already firmly established in many
sectors (especially the industrial sectors) of several countries.
Distribution of gains
One of the most serious, and potentially most disruptive, difficulties that can arise
in economic integration discussions is the distribution of expected gains from integra-
tion. Disagreement on this issue can prevent the provisions of a regional union from
being implemented, or can weaken and destroy the union at a later date. Differences
in the level and the rate of economic development and the tendency, in an integrated
community, for investments to gravitate to centers where the existence of previously
established industries provides the advantages of external economies constitute the
root of this problem. This process of polarization may exacerbate the diversity in the
stages of development existing before integration. A similar process of polarization
may also result among a group of countries at approximately the same level of eco-
nomic development on account of other factors, such as geographic situation or the
existence or absence of infrastructure.
Difficulties regarding the distribution of gains may be especially serious where
industrial programs and investment policies are also to be integrated. Where a central
agency influences or takes the decisions regarding the priority of the industries to be
established, the location of these industries, the number of plants that may be estab-
lished (in order to avoid duplication), the problems of determining an equitable dis-
tribution of profits may be difficult to resolve.
Related to the problem of the distribution of gains is that of the distribution of losses.
For instance, one country may depend more heavily than others on customs duties as
a source of fiscal revenue, prior to integration; or, following integration and the
establishment of preferential duties, a country that depends heavily on imports may
changethesourceofitsimports to a higher cost producer within the community. In the
first instance the country in question would be likely to experience a decline in fiscal
revenue; in the second, as a result of trade diversion, import costs would rise, and this
would affect domestic costs and prices.
Oneofthedifficultiesinattemptingtomitigatesuchproblemsisthelackofmutually
acceptableobjectivecriteriaregarding the equitable sharing of gains and losses within
a regional community. One criterion could possibly be a reduction in the differences
in the levels of development of the member countries, but this criterion would present
difficult problems of measurement and might conflict with other objectives of eco-
nomic integration, such as the establishment and location of industries on the basis of
technological and economic considerations of efficiency.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, various ways may be devised to deal with the
problem. The provision of special quotas, exemptions, and tariffs, the establishment
of acommonfundforcompensatingcountries that are losing more than others, and the
creation of a development bank for investments in the relatively poorer countries are
among the means of bringing about a more equitable distribution of gains and losses.
However, once such instruments have been established, disagreements may occur
over their application.
Two instances of such devices are the taxeunique and the Solidarity Fund employed
in the UDEAC, as described earlier. The taxe unique is intended to compensate coun-
tries purchasing from within the union and to encourage union industries. The Solidar-
ity Fund appears to have been established for the purpose of redistributing customs
revenues to less favored countries. However, in spite of these attempts, two members
of the UDEAC announced that they would leave the union reportedly over the issue
of the distribution of gains. Similarly, the UDEAO has been unable to cope success-
fully with problems in this regard, and this partially explains the relatively slow
progress toward integration of that organization. These examples underscore the im-
portance of this issue in integration and of appropriate institutional arrangements.
Fiscal effect
A potential financial difficulty is the fiscal impact of integration. For many develop-
ing countries, import duties constitute an important, and in some the major, source
of revenue for the government, reflecting the fact that they are relatively easy to im-
pose and to collect. Table 6 shows, for West African countries, the importance of
import and export duties.
TABLE 6. West Africa: composition of tax revenue,

averages, 1963-65 (In percentages of total tax revenue)
COUNTRY IMPORT DUTIES 1 EXPORT DUTIES
Dahomey 73.4 5.4

Gambia, The 77.4 8.0
Ghana 40.1 15.1
Ivory Coast 36.9 26.9
Liberia 61.8 2.4
Mali 39.1 2.2
Niger 40.1 9.7
Nigeria 2 59.9 13.8
Senegal 24.1 3.5
Sierra Leone 60.0 6.9
Togo 3 69.1 16.7
Upper Volta 51.5 1.8
Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Prob-

lems of Plan Implementation-Economic Co-Operation in West
Africa, E/AC.54/L.26/ Add. 2 (Addis Ababa, 1968).
1 In considering the magnitude of import duties, there is always
a definitional problem: in some countries import taxes are clas-
sified under different categories.
2 1961-63.
3 1964-66.
In many Central and West African countries this problem has already had to be
faced, as many of the duties on intraregional trade have been reduced or eliminated,
and the duties on imports from the area's major trading partner-the EEC-are also
being reduced. While this problem may not be serious in the early stages of integration
in the region (owing to the low level of intraregional trade), to the extent that integra-
tion increases intraregional trade at the expense of trade with third countries, alter-
nate sources of tax revenue will have to be developed.
lntraregional payments
Mention must also be made of the payments problems that may arise in connection
with economic integration, although the subject of special regional payments relations
among developing countries is an extensive one requiring separate study. 23 Propo-
nents of the establishment of special regional payments mechanisms among develop-
ing countries have argued that the creation of a payments union is an indispensable
precondition for establishing a regional customs union or free trade area. They main-
tain that it would promote integration by facilitating trade liberalization, i.e., by
accommodating the balance of payments difficulties that would result from un-
predictable flows of trade released by the abolition of barriers. 24 This implies that
the payments union would have a common fund to extend balance of payments
assistance.
The payments systems in existence in Central and West Africa may be classified in
three categories: (1) countries with a common payments system as members of the
French Franc Area; (2) countries that are members of the sterling area; and (3) other
countries. Of the other countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia have
no restrictive prescription of currency regulations, while Guinea relies to a significant
extent on bilateral payments agreements.
At alaterstageof economic integration, and within a regional organization embrac-
ing more than one of the above-mentioned payments areas, the problem of intra-
regional payments may become an important one. However, at the present levels of
intraregional trade and those that may reasonably be expected in the foreseeable
future, and given the relatively free payments systems in effect in most of the coun-
tries of the region, the establishment of a regional payments union is not a prerequisite
for the creation of a regional customs union, even if it may be considered desirable on
other grounds.
Special preferential links

A feature peculiar to Central and West Africa is the existence of special links be-
tween the countries of the area and European countries. Most of the countries of the
region (i.e., the countries belonging to the French Franc Area) are linked to France
by virtue of special financial arrangements reflected through Operations Accounts
with the French Treasury. 25 These countries and the Democratic Republic of Congo
are also linked to the EEC through the Yaounde Convention, while Ghana, Nigeria,
and SierraLeonearemembersofthe sterling area. Nigeria, furthermore, is associated
with theEECthroughanAssociation Agreement. Although existing regional arrange-

ments do not conflict with these special links, it is difficult to say whether the estab-
lishment of acommunitycuttingacross these links would not have to surmount serious
obstacles. The Yaounde Convention is not explicit on this issue. Under Article 9 the
associated countries may form customs unions or free trade areas with third countries
provided that they "neither are nor prove to be incompatible with the principles and
provisions of the said Convention." However, under Article 7 the treatment accorded
by the associated countries to goods originating in the EEC countries "shall in no case
be less favorable than that applied to goods originating in the most favored third coun-
try." The implications of these articles have not yet been tested.
The proposed ECWA combines countries belonging to the Yaounde Convention
with others that are not members. It is as yet too early to know the direction and
impetus of this organization, and therefore difficult to say whether it will test the
above-mentioned provisions of the Yaounde Convention.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This study has considered certain aspects of economic integration with reference to
the countries of Central and West Africa. The argument for some kind of integration
among these countries would appear to be generally supportable: Most of the coun-
tries in questionhaveextremelynarrowdomesticmarkets, which inhibit the establish-
ment of new industries, and many of the existing industries operate below capacity.
Moreover, there is an implicit assumption that the economic gains from integration
cannot in present circumstances be derived through other means, such as a general
liberalization in the access to markets.
Clear as the case may be for steps to integrate the economies, integration will not be
a panacea for the development problems of the countries concerned, and it should not
constitute the only or overriding objective of economic policy in the area. There is no
full substitute, in the foreseeable future, for the trade of the countries of the region
with the advanced markets of the world, especially given the commodity structure of
their exports and the need for imports of capital goods and some raw materials for
industries established on a regional basis.
Available preliminary studies indicate that there are a number of possibilities for
the establishment of industries serving the region as a whole. The region has a variety
of natural resources, and the production of many consumer and intermediate goods
appears feasible. The free movement of goods within the region would be a spur to the
establishment of new industries and to the expansion of existing ones. But this, by it-
self, is not sufficient: Of utmost importance is the creation of an environment in which
industrial investment, both domestic and foreign, is attracted and coordinated. This
implies a mechanism that makes possible a region-wide investment plan, avoid-
ing duplications and encouraging complementary industries. This would serve to
make the best use of the region's resources. The role of such a mechanism would be
enhanced if economic aid could also be geared to the development needs of the whole
region.
The obstacles and difficulties of integration are not to be underestimated. This

paper has concentrated mostly on policies of a structural, economic, financial, and
administrative nature. However, the cardinal importance of political factors, namely,
the political will to cooperate, must be emphasized. The creation and successful im-
plementation of any regional economic community will ultimately be a function of
political decisions. Economic nationalism and policies of national self-sufficiency
could thwart moves towardintegrationandcooperation. As to economic factors, while
most of the considerations in this paper have been in relation to industry, the impor-
tance of the development of agriculture and mining must not be overlooked. The
development of these sectors would contribute to an enlargement of the market for
industrial products, as well as provide the funds for the establishment of new indus-
tries.
With regard to other preconditions, the outlook for the countries of Central and
West Africa may be considered favorable, on balance. The habit of cooperation is
already well established; the countries of the region have a similar past; several com-
mon institutions with varying degrees of operative success already exist; most of the
countries have a common monetary system and currency; all but a few are also associ-
ated with the EEC. Moreover, most are in the relatively early stages of development
when the problems of integration are probably easier to solve. On the other hand, the
countries vary in size and, in some instances, in the level of their economic develop-
ment; and there are differences oflanguage and in links with third countries.
Appendices
I. Central and West Africa: grouped basic statistics of economic organizations

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
POPU- PER
ORGANIZATION AREA LATION TOTAL CAPITA EXPORTS IMPORTS
(hundred
square (million
kilo- u.s. (U.S.
meters) (millions) dollars) dollars) 1 (million U.S. dollars)
UDEAC 2
Including Central
African Republic
and Chad 2,984 11.1 1.08 97 320 314
Excluding Central
African Republic
and Chad 1,083 6.5 0.77 118 267 256
UEAC3 4,246 19.9 1.32 66 435 317
UDEA04 4,387 23.0 2.38 103 539 577
EONA5 5,788 91.7 10.87 118 1,916 2,568
Sources: See tables in the text. Most of the figures refer to the year 1965.
1 Weighted average.
2 Union Douaniere et Economi]ue de I'Afrique Centrale -Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon.
3 Union des Etats de I'Afrique Centrale -Central African Republic, Chad, and Democratic Republic of
Congo.
• Union Douanibe des Etats de I'Afrique de l'Ouest-Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, and Upper Volta.
5 EconomicCommunityofWestAfrica -Dahomey, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta.
II. TWO APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The term economic integration is an imprecise one and may connote anything from a
general agreement to cooperate in certain spheres of economic endeavor or policy to
a full economic union. Between these two extreme connotations are the preferential
trade or payments organization, the free trade area, and the customs union. However,
most references to economic integration, especially with regard to the developing
conntries, relate to a customs union, supplemented perhaps by arrangements in con-
tiguous fields. In what follows, economic integration refers to customs unions.
Theoretical discussions of the benefits of economic integration and of the necessary
conditionsformovingtoward it may conveniently, if somewhat arbitrarily, be divided
into two categories reflecting a basic difference between the hypotheses used in the
analysis: The one is based on a static view of economic conditions and the analysis
proceeds from a rearrangement of policies and a reallocation of resources within that
framework, whereas the other approach bases its analysis on dynamic factors, i.e.,
economic growth. A further basic difference between the two approaches is that the
first takes a world view of the process of economic integration and assesses the benefits
and drawbacks on that basis, whereas the dynamic approach is toward an asymmetri-
cal view of international discrimination, looking at the question from the vantage point
of developing countries, and sometimes justifying this view with references to the
historicalimportanceofheavy protection in the development of the United States and
also of parts of the British Commonwealth.
The static view can be briefly summed up as follows. 26 The point of departure is the
given conditions of production and organization (allocation of resources, competitive
framework, etc.) with neoclassical assumptions regarding full employment, factor
mobility, returns to scale, etc. The prime goal of integration then becomes a more
rational and efficient use of resources, namely, a shift in the sources of supply. The
elimination of barriers within the union, and the establishment of a common external
barrier, will have a trade creation and a trade diversion effect. The former, which will
lead to an increase in the real incomes of the people of the union, will take place as
demand shifts to the more efficient suppliers within the union. The enhanced effi-
ciency is the result of a greater degree of competition, a higher degree of specialization,
and greater economies of scale made possible by the enlargement of the market. The
benefits mentioned above are particularly likely to occur if, prior to integration, similar
industries in the member countries were protected. The trade diversion effect results
from a shift of demand from low-cost producers outside the union to high-cost pro-
ducers within the union, brought about by the common external tariff barrier. This is
particularly so if, prior to integration, dissimilar industries were protected in the coun-
tries making up the union. 27
Thus, whether or not integration is worthwhile (on the basis of a global welfare
consideration) depends on the relative importance of the trade creation and trade
diversion effects. If the trade creation effect is greater than the trade diversion effect,
then integration is worthwhile; if the opposite is true, integration is not beneficial.
However, in certain instances a balance of disadvantage may be compensated for by
the external growth effects of integration; high economic growth in the union may in-
duce an import demand from third countries that will more than offset the reduced
demand resulting from the trade diversion effect.
The outcome of economic integration will depend, to a large extent, on the structure
of protection prior to integration: "Customs unions are not important, and are unlikely
to yield more economic benefit than harm, unless they are between sizable countries
which practice substantial protection of substantially similar industries. " 28 The bene-
ficial effects will also depend on the volume and direction of foreign trade prior to in-
tegration. 29 Given the volume of trade, a customs union is likely to increase welfare,
the higher the proportion of trade with union partners and the lower the total volume
of trade before integration.
The dynamic approach questions the assumptions, hypotheses, and criteria of the
conventional view. 30 It maintains that the latter is based on static welfare assumptions
and that this is irrelevant as far as the developing countries are concerned. The major
criterion for the developing countries is not simply a better allocation of existing re-
sources (although this benefit is acknowledged) but an acceleration of the rate of
growth. Thus, it may appear to be a matter of emphasis rather than a choice between
the two. If, in short, integration helps to achieve a fasterrate of growth, then it is bene-
ficial. Most of the arguments about trade creation, e.g., the benefits of an enlarged
market, are accepted equally by the two schools. The main exception would appear to
be about competition. In the static formulation, increased competition is one of the
benefits of economic integration because of its effect on efficiency. In the dynamic
version, one of the aims should be to avoid creating" excessive" competition, as many
of the industries in the developing countries are relatively new, and there would be
little sense in "stronger infants killing weaker infants." Thus, the problem is to ascer-
tain what degree of competition, under given circumstances, is the correct one, for
even infants need exercise if they are to grow satisfactorily.
The most vehement rejection of the static by the dynamic approach concerns the
trade diversion effect. In general, the trade diversion effects of a customs union among
less developed countries are considered to be of small importance. But the alleged
harmful effects of trade diversion, whatever their magnitude, are denied on other
grounds. According to the most extreme version, one of the aims of integration in less
developed countries should be to maximize trade diversion. This view is based on the
premise that in less developed countries there is widespread underemployment or
unemployment of resources, thus the opportunity cost of labor is near zero, and trade
diversion would bring about a higher level of employment and a better resource utili-
zation. Although this may foster inefficient production, the implied principle is that
inefficient production is better than no production at all. The more temperate view is
that in certain cases trade diversion may not be harmful, as it will divert increases in
demand andhelpto enlarge the market. Unlimited trade diversion would prove costly
in terms of the complementary capital needed and in terms of a misallocation of
domestic resources.
1 Among organizations created within the past two years are the following: the Andean Groupo£ the Latin
American Free Trade Association; the Caribbean Free Trade Association; the Eastern Caribbean Connnon
Market; the East African Connnunity; the Economic Connnunity of West Africa; the Union of Central Afri-
canStates; the special payments system to be established under the Regional Cooperation andDevelorment
Treaty Between Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey; and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the United Nations Conference on
TradeandDevelopmentonlts Second Session, 1D/L. 37 ,Annex I (New Delhi, 1968), p. 65.
3 In the economic literature evaluating the pros and cons of economic integration, as discussed in Appen-
dix II, more emphasis has been placed on the contribution of integration to economic growth than on static,
general welfare considerations.
4 For the purposes of this paper, Central Africa comprises Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, and Gabon. West Africa consists of Dah<mey, Ghana,
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, N,!geria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper
Volta. AlthoughRwandaandBurundi,on the basis of language and history, could be considered part of Cen-
tral Africa, their geographic position would suggest that they shoold look to East Africa (including the Mal-
agasy Republic) for any form of economic integration. Indeed, Burundi has applied to join the East African
Connnunity, composed of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
5 A definition of these terms is included in Appendix II.
6 This may be compared withthefollowingstatement: "Byasrnallnationl mean an independent sovereign

state,withapopulationoftenmillionorless,"S.Kumets,"EconomicGrowthofSmallNations,"inEconomic
Consequencesofthe Size ofNations, ed. by E.A.G. Robinson (London, 1960),p.14.
1 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Report of the West African Industrial Co-Ordination
Mission, E/CN.14/246 (Addis Ababa, 1964); United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Report of
theECAMissiononEconomicCo-OperationinCentralAfrica,E/CN.14/L.320/Rev.1(NewYork,1966).
8 Iron and steel: in West Africa a substantial plant on the coast supplemented by a smaller plant in the
hinterland countries; in Central Africa an iron and steel works based on lnga power capacity, iron and steel
works atOwendoor Pointe Noire, and, in the longer run, works in the Central African Republic. Aluminum:
large-scale production of aluminum in Ghana based on alumina from Guinea; production based on Sounda
power; production already under way in Cameroon for the world market and for a rollinlt mill serving the
regional market. Other metal products: Potential opportunities for further production ot metal products,
though more extensive studies are needed. Chemicals and fertilizers: Complex of basic chemicals and ferti-
lizers as one of the major industrial development possibilities of the region, including production of caustic
soda, ammonia, nitric and ammonium sulfate, sulfuric acid, paint, varnish, perfume, soap, and plastics.
9 See UnitedNations,EconomicandSocial Council,BackgroundPaperon the Establishment of an African
Common Market, E/CN.14/STC/20 (Niamey, 1963), p. 3.
1°Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon.
11 The main organizations in Africa are as follows: the African Development Bank, the Central African
Customs andEcmomic Union, the Central Bank of Equatorial African States and Cameroon, the Common
Organization of African and Malagasy States, the East African Community, the Organization of African
Unity, the WestAfrican Monetary Union, the Central Bank of West African States, the Conseil de l'Entente,
and the West African Customs Union. There is also the regional UN agency, the Economic Commission for
Africa. The Union of Central African States and the Economic Community of West Africa are recent addi-
tions to this list.
Besides the organizations listed above, there are numerous other cooperative arrangements, e.g., the Af-
rican GroundnutCouncil,Air Afrique, the Cocoa Producers Alliance, the Inter-African Coffee Organization,
the Transequatorial Communications Agency, and the Senegal River Committee.
12 During a transitionalperiod ending in 1972, countries may introduce a "supplementary tax," the rate of
which cannot be changed without prior consultation withothermanbers. This tax, replacing all other taxes
on imports, is to compensate for the differences in tariffs prior to unification.
13 The Common Investment Convention, published in December 1965, goes beyond the provisions of the
UDEAC treaty in that its coverage is far more extensive. The Convention provides for an approval system
and further stabilization of taxes.
14 Each country has subscribed5 per cent of the capital, with the remainder coming from abroad.
15 The separation of the Central African Republic and Chad from the UDEAC was to become effective on
January 1, 1969. However, in December 1968 the Central African Republic reportedly decided to leave the
Union of Central African States and to rejoin the UDEAC.
16 A full description of these institutions is given in "The CFA Franc System," StaffPapers, Vol. X (1963),
pp.345-96.
17 The others are those of the Malagasy Republic and certain minor French possessions.
18 CFA stands for Communaute Financiere Africaine (African Financial Community); the currency
symbol is CFAF.
19 Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of
Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta.
20 The FED can pay up to 3 per cent of the interest on such loans.
21 There are, however, special arrangements for certain specified products.
22 In practice, of course, many of these choices would be limited and determined by technological and
structural factors.
23 Briefly, it may be argued theoretically that trade liberalization will lead to an increase in the volume of
trade and consequently of payments, especially if capital transactions are also freed. This implies that the
likelihood of payments disequilibria wilfbe enhanced at a time when, by virtue of the trade and payments
hberalization, the protective and defense mechanisms of the balance of payments have been weakened.
This, therefore, calls for special provisions for dealings with payments problems arising as a direct result of
the establishment of a customs union.
24 See, for example, "African Payments Union," in United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa,
Economic Bulletin for Africa (New York), Vol. VI Guly 1966), pp. 63-78.
25 See Section II of this paper. The countries concerned are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper
Volta. These countries, plus the Malagasy Republic, have often been referred to as the CFA franc countries.
In 1962 Mali began issuing the Mali franc, but re-established an Operations Account with the French Trea-
sury early in 1968. Also, in 1963, the Malagasy Republic changed its currency to the Malagasy franc within
the established arrangements.
•• The two basic works are Jaoob Viner, Tlw Customs Union Issue (New York, 1950) and J. E. Meade,
The Theory of Customs Unions (Amsterdam, 1955). See also James E. Meade, Problems ofEconomic Union
(Chicago, 1953) andBelaBalassa, Tlw Theory ofEconomic Integration (Homewood,Dlinois, 1961). Fora
recent survey of the field, seeR G. Lipsey, "The Theory of Custom; Unions: A General Survey," Tlw Eoo-
nomic Jouma~ Vol. LXX (1960), pp. 496-.513.
07 The trade creation effect can be measured by taking the volume fi trade created and multiplying each
itembythedifferenceinoosts:thetradediversioneffectcanbemeasuredsimilarlybycalculatingthevolume
of trade diverted, andforthatvolumemultiplyingeachitem by the cost differential. These crude calculations
assume an elastic supply schedule.
26 Viner, op. cit., p. 135.
••Lipsey, op. cit.
80 See, for example, Sidney Dell, A Lntin American Common Market? (London, 1966) and Trade Blocs
and Comnwn Markets (New York, 1963); William G. Demas, Tlw Eoonomics of Development in Small
Countries with Spe_cial Reference to the CAribbean (Montreal, 1965); B. Balassa, Eoonomic Development
and Integration (Mexioo, 1965).
Richard D. Baker
Latin American economic integration
The economic development achieved by the Latin American states during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries followed the principle of natural competitive
advantage. Relying primarily on foreign direct investment, the economies specialized
in the production of export-oriented primary commodities. Transportation and com-
munication facilities, also mainly foreign-owned, served the export trade rather than
constituting networks capable of contributing to general domestic development.
Limited demand for manufactured goods was satisfied by imports and the production
of traditionally operated, small-scale artisanal workshops. The vast majority of the
population continued on the land under subsistence conditions involving little or no
participationinamonetaryeconomy.lncircumstancesofperfectinternational compe-
tition and parallel demand curves for primary and manufactured goods, this state of
affairs might have remained economically-although hardly politically-tolerable
indefinitely. Such circumstances, however, have not been characteristic of the inter-
national economy during the twentieth century.
Incentives to industrialize during recent decades derive from a number of sources.
Perhaps the most important of these, in the purely economic sense, have been the
dislocations and disruptions of traditional international trading patterns attendant
upon two world wars and the Great Depression of the 1930's; the development of
such preferential and restrictive trading blocs as the European Economic Commu-
nity; technologically-induced changes in demand; and the increasingly obvious dom-
ination of underdeveloped economies resulting from the widening financial, tech-
nological, and managerial lead enjoyed by the United States, and, to a lesser degree,
Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. More fundamental are the pressures
resulting from rapid population increase-over 3 per cent per annum for the area as a
whole-and an explosive rate of urban growth unaccompanied by corresponding
increases in employment opportunities. This growth provided a slum population
vulnerable to the political-economic blandishments of the mass media and the dem-
onstration effect of conspicuous wealth, and responsive to the increasing tendency
of politics to center around a nationalism largely conceived in terms of anti-imperial-
ism defined in essentially Leninist terms and directed primarily against the United
States. These factors, abetted by the example of the developed nations and the intran-
sigence of the agrarian reform problem, have led to the conviction that industrializa-
tion is the only effective solution to the problem of economic stagnation.
By the mid-1950's, comparatively advanced stages of industrialization had been
achieved in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and substantial progress had been made in
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. At the other end of the scale, most of the Central
American and Caribbean states, as well as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay, continued
to depend on their traditional primary exports, while Peru and Uruguay demonstrated
intermediate levels of growth. Even for the more highly developed states-with the
230
exception of Mexico-the economic prognosis was gloomy. Markets for traditional

primary commodities had entered a period of stagnation as to both price and volume,
with a consequent decline in the rate of capital accumulation. Rising demand for
such costly imports as capital equipment, sub-assemblies and consumer durables
resulted in severe balance-of-payments problems. Industry itself, heavily protected
by tariff and other restrictive devices, as well as relatively inefficient and costly in its
productionanddistributionmethods, entered a phase of excess capacity and declining
growth. More fundamental to the long-range outlook was the fact that none of the
countries (with the possible exceptions of Brazil and Mexico) possessed internal
markets actually or potentially capable of supporting, under competitive conditions,
heavy and durable-goods industries that depend for profit on the economies of scale
demanded by current technology. The prospect seemed one of increasing and indefi-
nite stagnation.
The diagnosis of this situation and proposals for solutions have originated primarily
within the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). As per-
ceived by ECLA, Latin America's traditional exports had suffered, and could in-
definitelybeexpectedtosuffer,adeclineinthetermsoftrade,witharesultantworsen-
ing squeeze on the capacity to import. Foreign exchange drains resulting from profit
repatriation and debt service indicated a limited role for private and public foreign
capital. The possibility of developing new export lines in manufactures seemed negli-
gible in view of the domination of international trading patterns by the United States,
Western Europe and Japan. Given these assessments and projections, ECLA con-
cluded that the most promising way out lay in regional integration, by developing first
a free trade area and then a common market. In summary, the ECLA argument holds
that the freeing of intraregional trade should immediately alleviate the market posi-
tion of industries already in need of an export component, and should provide a market
capable of supporting the development of industries in which economies of scale are
indispensable, especially heavy industry, producers' goods and consumer durables.
Increased competition would result in greater efficiency and lower prices. The capital
squeeze would be mitigated in two ways: In the shorter run, regional planning of
development would end the unprofitable duplication of facilities and permit the
rationalization of investment; and over the long haul, the development of heavy and
producers' goodsindustrieswouldreducetheimport coefficient of capital investment.
Lastly, a period of accelerated growth promising the eventual creation of a regional
economy comparable in size anddiversitytothoseofthemajor industrial powers could
be expected to encourage higher rates of domestic capital formation, discourage cap-
ital flight, and permit the more effective use of foreign public and private capital.
Whether consciously intended or not, the integration route to the solution of Latin
American problems offers results other than those suggested by economic forecasting
alone. On the less commendable side, increasing employment and living standards
suggest the possibility of indefinitely delaying drastic reforms in the region's archaic
social and political structures and in current patterns of income distribution, a pros-
pect that can hardly fail to appeal to the present dominant elites. On the other hand,
a Latin America capable of confronting the industrial powers on a footing of economic
and political equality is attractive to both the elites and the masses, who generally
share the conviction that they are the victims of an exploitative imperialism. The in-
fluences of nationalism, however, are ambiguous at best, as will be discussed in
evaluating the prospects of the Latin American Free Trade Association.
THE LATIN AMERICAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (LAFTA)

The Treaty of Montevideo, the founding instrument of the Association, was signed on
18 February 1960 by the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru,
and Uruguay, with subsequent accession by the governments of Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela. The stated objectives of the new organization
weretheexpansionofregional markets through gradual elimination of trade barriers,
the coordination and harmonization of the various economies, and, ultimately, the
creation of a common market. Explicitly stated in the treaty's preamble and implicitly
assumedinmanyof its operative provisions was the expectation that the achievement
of regional free trade would result in accelerated and more evenly distributed eco-
nomic development for the entire area. With what has proved to be excessive opti-
mism, the target date for attaining all of these objectives, save that of establishing a
common market, was set for 1973.
For the reduction of tariffs and other charges on regional trade, the parties com-
mitted themselves to a series of annual and triennial negotiations for agreement,
respectively, on National and Common Schedules of concessions. As to the first, each
party agreed to grant to the others tariff and other reductions equivalent to not less
than8 per cent of the weighted average applicable to third countries. Unlike the situa-
tion prevailing in the European Economic Community, however, the concessions
extended in the National Schedules are negotiated bilaterally on an item-by-item
basis; that is, they may be granted to one or more of the contracting parties in return
for reciprocal concessions but need not be granted simultaneously to all. In addition,
concessions granted in one round of bargaining need not be further liberalized in
succeeding sessions and may be withdrawn altogether if adequate compensation is
given. The potential for protracted and excruciating haggling inherent in this arrange-
ment is only too obvious.
The Common Schedule incorporates those products on which the parties collec-
tively agree to irrevocably remove all restrictions. As originally contemplated in the
treaty, Common Schedule negotiations were to take place at intervals of three years
and to culminate, not later than 1973, in substantially complete free trade within the
region.
In view of the emphasis on development and the ultimate goal of a common
market, the Montevideo treaty provides, on the basis of special negotiation in each
case, for a wide range of complementarity agreements. These would include the
harmonization of national policies relative to trade, planning, the treatment accorded
to capital, and economic legislation in general. In the area of industrial development,
complementarityinvolvestwotypesofcoordination: the rationalization of investment
in terms of geographical distribution, regional market potential, and efficient access
to requisite raw materials; and, on a regional basis, the development of specialization
within industrial sectors. Such agreements, as in the case of the National Schedules,
extend their benefits and obligations exclusively to the parties to them.
Given the widely differing levels of development among its members, LAFTA
incorporates a number of saving clauses and special exceptions. Three categories of
members are recognized: the so-called "big three" consisting of Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico; "countries of lesser development" -Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay;
and "countries of insufficient market" -Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. Although no special privileges or concessions have been worked out for the
latter group, a number of possibilities were specified in the Montevideo treaty for the
less developed states. These include the authorization of special advantages not
granted to other members; extended terms for the implementation of trade liberaliza-
tion agreements; the application of special non-discriminatory protections for activi-
ties the less developed countries consider vital to their economic development; special
collective arrangements to encourage the expansion of productive activities already in
existence, or to encourage new activities, particularly those intended for the indus-
trialization of raw materials; and the promotion of special technical assistance pro-
grams. If authorized by all the contracting parties, any member may apply special,
non-discriminatory restrictions on the importation of goods believed liable to have
severe repercussions on vital sectors of its economy. Special concessions may also be
granted to any member suffering balance-of-payments difficulties.
The treatment to be accorded agriculture constitutes a special problem. As the ex-
perience of the European Economic Community has demonstrated, wide differences
in productivity complicated by bitterly defended price support and subsidy systems
have made the agrarian sector exceptionally intractable. Given the preponderant role
of agriculture in the internal economies and foreign trade of most of the LAFTA coun-
tries, the difficulties are even less amenable to solution. Essentially, the treaty settled
for virtuous exhortation and, aside from a provision permitting the limitation of agri-
cultural imports to those needed to meet deficiencies in internal production or to
equalize internal and external prices, largely evades the issue.
Despite the ambitious character of its objectives, LAFTA has been most thrifty in
the provision of organizational structure. The principal policy-making organ is the
Conference of the Contracting Parties, in which each member has one vote. The Con-
ferenceholdsregular annual sessions and such other meetings as may be called by the
Standing Executive Committee, LAFTA's permanent supervisory body. Within the
Conference, the presence of representatives of two-thirds of the contracting parties
constitutes a quorum. As any proposal may be vetoed by the casting of a single negative
vote, the unanimity principle, for all practical purposes, applies.
The Standing Executive Committee is composed of one delegate and one alternate
appointed by each of the contracting parties. With respect to both the Conference and
the Committee, it should be stressed that we are dealing with strictly diplomatic
bodies. The delegates function exclusively as responsible representatives of the ap-
pointing states and neither individually nor collectively possess any surpranational
character.
The Standing Executive Committee is served by a Secretariat with headquarters
in Montevideo, Uruguay. Its director, the Secretary-General, is elected by the Con-
ference for a three-year term and is supported by a staff of technical and administrative
personnel classified as international civil servants. A multitude of technical study and
planning commissions andotheradhoc bodies have been created over the years but do
not constitute a formal or permanent part of the LAFTA structure.
By the end of 1969, LAFTA's list of accomplishments seemed sufficient to justify
some cautious optimism as to its prospects for survival. After nine rounds of negotia-
tions, approximately 18,000 items had been wholly or, in most instances, partially
freed of tariffs and the value of trade within the region had reached 1,800 millions of
dollars, an amount some 50 percent greater than the 1955 high and 170 percent above
the 1960 low. The composition of this trade, previously overwhelmingly composed of
raw materials, has also changed, nearly half now being manufactured and semi-manu-
factured products. A technical achievement of great present and potential value in
this area was the adoption of a commm customs nomenclature providing the neces-
sary foundation for a uniform ad valorem rate structure based on CIF values.
In the area of complementarity, progress is still largely prospective. To date only
four such arrangements have been negotiated, onedealingwithdata processing equip-
ment and theotherthreewith various types of electronic products. However, technical
studies in varying stages of completion are under way in industrial sectors where
production is at present insufficient or non-existent. Under consideration are pro-
jected agreements dealing with such products as fertilizers, petrochemicals, agricul-
tural machinery, paper products and glass.
Although not explicitly provided for in the Montevideo treaty, advances have been
made in three other areas. Given the impediments to trade occasioned by temporary
imbalances in bilateral accounts and consequent shortages of foreign exchange, the
most immediately significant of these advances was the establishment of a LAFTA
payments system based on bilateral arrangements between central banks and head-
quartered in Lima, Peru. Clearances under the system, originally required every two
months, have now been extended to three, with the prospect of still further extension
as the system develops.
Deficiencies in national and regional transportation facilities in Latin America are
notorious. With relatively few exceptions, existing facilities were designed to serve
the European-North American orientation of traditional export-import trade. Some
progress, although thus far not a great deal, has been made in improving this situation
on both a national and a regional basis, and its direct and indirect effects on the
achievement of LAFTA objectives should be favorable.
Lastly, there have been some improvements in the collection and dissemination of
commercial and financial information. This should help to partially offset the advan-
tage enjoyed by foreign capital in this respect.
Despite the gains noted, LAFTA has thus far proved a faltering and imperfect in-
strument for the attainment of its stated objectives. Notwithstanding the increases
cited, intraregional trade still amounts to no more than 11 or 12 per cent of the area's
total international trade, and substantial improvement, under existing circumstances,
seems improbable. Further, participation in the benefits achieved thus far has been
very uneven. During the first five years ofLAFTA's existence, approximately 80 per
cent of regional trade was accounted for by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, with a
particulargrowthinArgentina'sand Brazil's trade. Colombia and Mexico experienced
relatively minor gains, while Chilean and Peruvian participation declined. Bolivia
and Paraguay have gained few advantages, if any. Such liberalization as has been
achieved has served primarily to reinforce the existing competitive advantage of the
more highly developed states.
The item-by-item process of negotiating National Schedule concessions has proved
tobeafailure.Theprogramlostgroundwitheachroundofbargaininguntilitvirtually
came to a halt. As was to be expected, the greatest gains were made in the early years
in areas in which the various economies were least competitive. Now the influence of
the vested interests, both economic and political, has manifested itself with a ven-
geance. Thus far the emphasis has been on freeing primarily those products that all
or most of the countries have customarily imported from outside the area, a process
which has resulted in strengthening the traditional import substitution approach to
development. The domestic sectors of the economies have responded by frustrating
virutally all attempts to rationalize investment patterns and to introduce regional
competition that might have the effect of lowering costs and prices. Little or nothing,
save for declarations of principle, has been done in such areas as coordination of
development policy and harmonization of fiscal, social, and external trade policies.
The less developed states, as the more notable victims of this default, have com-
plained bitterly enough but without significant result. As for the Common Schedule,
its history is even less edifying. At the first negotiation restrictions were removed on
nearly two hundred items, but all subsequent attempts to expand the list have failed
completely.
LAFTA members continue to concentrate, as in the past, on strictly domestic de-
velopment regardless of competitive efficiency, the duplication of regional productive
facilities, or other requirements of regional rationalization. When an item is already
domestically produced or when there is some hope that it might be, there is great
reluctance to grant concessions and the wasteful competition for scarce capital con-
tinues unabated. That this should be so is hardly surprising. As noted above, the levels
of development differ drastically from country to country. Similar differences prevail
internally within each of the "big three." These situations, aggravated by serious
problems of unemployment and underemployment, result in almost irresistible politi-
cal pressures to pursue the short-run advantages of domestic development as against
the less certain longer-run advantages of regional unification. Further, the most
developed countries have more access to available foreign capital, possess greater
internal investment capacities, and are relatively superior in managerial ability and in
technology. Consequently, they are better equipped to penetrate and potentially to
dominate the regional market. Anticipating this possibility, the less developed coun-
tries have increasingly tended to resist liberalization of access to their own markets
as well as committment to complementation arrangements.
Of equal importance is the fact that the LAFTA idea has remained largely the prop-
erty of the economic technicians. The general public and the private business commu-
nity have at best been apathetic and at worst have opposed the specific measures by
which the organization'sobjectivesmight be accomplished. LAFTA has received little
promotion and less explanation in the mass media, particularly not in terms suscepti-
ble of popular understanding. The immediate threat to jobs and profits is far more
apparent than long-term benefits expressed in complex formulations and arcane ter-
minology. The problem is worsened by the hyper-nationalistic tone of Latin American

politics, regardless of the type of regime, resulting in highly emotional opposition to
any policy which seems or can be made to seem as entailing a diminution of national
sovereignty. Reactions of this sort have not generally been overcome by the seductive
idea of a unifiedLatinAmericacapableof dealing with the rest of the world on a plane
of equality.lt should also be borne in mind, although the facts cannot be documented,
that the reaction of the military, a dominant political factor in most of the LAFTA
countries, is likely to be ambiguous at best. National rivalries, although none carry a
perceptible threat of war, plus an acute recognition that modem military power rests
solidly on an industrial foundation, must necessarily make the soldiery hesitant about
agreements that might leave essential parts of military production in the hands and
territories of potential enemies.
The apathy and obstructionism of the business community require further explana-
tion. Whatever else may besaidofLatinAmericancapitalism, daring and adventurous
it is not. Generally speaking, business seeks quick returns and maximum security and
has usually attained both through official protection from foreign and domestic com-
petition. Such circumstances are conducive to concentration on the domestic scene
rather than vigorous exploration of regional possibilities. The role of business is also
affected by its lack of experience in the necessary organizational and managerial tech-
niques foroperationsonalargerscaleand by a general unwillingness to date to take on
the financial costs and the psychological strains of modernization. Recognizing these
limitations, at least in part, both business and governments fear that the actual
achievement ofLAFTA objectives may simply facilitate an invasion of United States
and other foreign enterprise, making it more rather than less difficult to control de-
velopmentinamannerconsistentwithindividualorregional sovereignty. Given these
factors, it is hardly surprising that LAFTA's impact on the pace, volume, and geo-
graphical distribution of new industrial development has been virtually nil.
InApril1967, in response to LAFTA's obvious defects, the lagging pace of develop-
ment and the many failures of the Alliance for Progress, the chiefs of state of the OAS
nations convened in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to diagnose the illness and prescribe a
cure. With an absence of realism and a plethora of rhetoric only too familiar to readers
of OAS pronouncements, the resulting Declamtion of Presidents of America called
for the initiation, in 1970, of a Latin American common market that was to be in full
operation by 1985. This would entail the creation of a customs union, the removal of
essentially all internal trade barriers, free (or relatively free) movement of capital and
labor, freely convertible currencies, policy coordination in all economic and related
social areas, and some degree of supranational decision-making with accompanying
surrenders of national sovereignty. It should be noted that the Declaration is an expres-
sion of principle and intent, not a treaty. Consequently, it obliges no one to do anything
and, thus far, this is indeed what has happened. It is hardly necessary to add that all the
difficulties encountered in the attempt to implement the LAFTA agreement apply
doubly and triply to the creation of that much more exigent arrangement, a true
common market.
LAFTA's future as anything more than a trade agreement of limited scope appears
precarious. At the 1969 session in Caracas, Venezuela, a protocol to the Montevideo
treaty was adopted which, if ratified, would institute a sort of general moratoriwn on
further progress until at least 1973. The stretch-out on the annual National Schedule
obligation would reduce the weighted average requirement, also untill973, from 8
percentto2.9 percent, and further postpone the expansion of the Common Schedule.
Nonetheless, the parties apparently consider LAFTA too valuable to abandon alto-
gether and it is probable that efforts will be made to rescue the organization and re-
solve at least some of the worst disagreements. At best, however, it is hardly probable
that LAFTA's own limited trade objectives can be achieved prior to the 1980's, and
serious consideration of a common market has almost certainly receded even further.
THE ANDEAN SUB-REGIONAL GROUP

In August 1966, concerned by the declining momentwn of LAFTA and their own
relatively minor participation in its limited benefits, the presidents of Colombia,
Chile, and Venezuela, and the personal representatives of the presidents of Ecuador
and Peru, with the subsequent accession of Bolivia, signed the Declaration of Bogota,
providing for the creation of a mixed commission to study the possibilities for estab-
lishing an integrated Andean group and an Andean Development Corporation. A
treaty establishing the Development Corporation was signed in February 1968, and
is in process of ratification. The pact creating the Andean Sub-regional Group was
signed in May 1969, as the culminating act of the sixth meeting of the mixed commis-
sion and is likewise in process of ratification.
The objectives of the Andean Group are essentially similar to those of LAFTA as a
whole but are to be achieved at an accelerated pace. In summary, the organization
proposes to: harmonize the economic and social policies of the member countries,
including applicable domestic legislation; institute joint programs for industrial
development; liberalize trade among themselves at a faster rate than that contem-
plated or achieved within LAFTA; establish a common customs tariff with respect
to third countries; accelerate development of the agricultural sector; apply regional
planning to the allocation of domestic and foreign capital resources; and integrate
regional communications and transportation systems. The members hope that
through programming and rationalizing the available factors of production they will
be able to secure not only industrial growth but diversification and regional speciali-
zation within the area. If successful, they would then be able to participate within an
expanded LAFTA or a general Latin American common market on more equal and
advantageous terms.
The Andean Group timetable, as presently envisaged, anticipates that by the end of
December 1970 a common policy relative to foreign capital, patents, trade names and
royalties will be in effect. Non-fiscal impediments to trade are to be entirely eliminated
by the same date and negotiations begun leading to the introduction, by December
31, 1975,of acommonminimwnextemal tariff. The reduction in regional tariffs is to
begin on January 1, 1971, and proceed in automatic annual increments of 10 per cent,
resulting in free intraregional trade by December 31, 1980. This process, if it works,
will be a notable improvement over LAFTA's item-by-item procedure. The pace of
liberalization is expected to be even faster where products included in joint industrial
programs are involved. December31, 1973 is the date specified for the presentation
of a draft proposal for a complete common external tariff schedule to go into effect
by the end of 1980. In recognition of the special problems that will be encountered
by certain economic sectors, some exceptions both to intraregional liberalization
and the common tariff have been recognized, but these are to be terminated by the
end of 1985 along with similar exceptions accorded to the less developed states of
Bolivia and Ecuador. The two latter countries are also to receive preferential con-
sideration in the allocation of new investment as well as various other privileges and
concessions.
Despite some appearances to the contrary, the Andean Group treaty has been
judged compatible with LAFTA obligations and objectives. Certainly, given the
reciprocity provisions of the Montevideo treaty, sub-regional concessions need not be
generalized until LAFTA in its entirety has reached an equivalent state of develop-
ment. Further, as noted above, wide differences in country size and stage of domestic
development have contributed heavily to LAFTA's difficulties and any arrangement
whereby these discrepancies may be reduced should ultimately contribute to the
economic unification of the whole area.
For the accomplishment of its objectives, the Andean Group will rely primarily on
three permanent institutions: a high commission with limited supranational powers in
the area of development planning and investment; a council for technical studies and
planning; and the Andean Development Corporation. The latter will have the ob-
jectiveof encouraging integrated development by assisting, financially and otherwise,
in the creation of new industries and in the growth, modernization and reconversion
of those already in existence. The Corporation's authorized capital is 100 millions
of dollars, to be derived from both public and private sources.
Itisobviouslytoo early to evaluate the Andean Group's prospects for success. Much
depends on the continued will of the governments concerned to vigorously back the
organization in the face of the domestic difficulties and dislocations which will inevi-
tably arise. Given the pronounced differences in their political systems, the long
history of instability, and the continued existence of such ancient animosities as those
arising from the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador, some pessimism would
appear justified. The most disquieting event to date is the defection of Venezuela. For
this FEDECAMARAS, the Venezuelan equivalent of our own National Association
of Manufacturers, must take the major share of the responsibility. Compared with the
other Andean states, Venezuelan production costs are disproportionately high, largely
a result of the upward pressure exerted on the wage-price structure by the dominant
petroleum industry. This being the case, it was feared that Venezuela would find
itself at a pronounced disadvantage both in attracting new foreign investment and in
penetrating the other markets. The business community further argued that Vene-
zuela is the only one of the Andean states with a history of currency stability and that
devaluations elsewhere would worsen the already unsatisfactory balance-of-pay-
ments situation vis-a-vis the other members of the group. Whatever the validity of
these arguments, and they would hardly appear insuperable, similar ones can be
expected to crop up elsewhere as soon as the strains of readjustment make themselves
felt.
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACOM)

The oldest, most successful, and institutionally the most complex of the Latin Ameri-
canexperimentswitheconomicintegrationis the Central American Common Market.
The organization, incorporating Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador,
and Costa Rica, originated out of a series of bilateral treaties entered into during the
1950's. These were followed by the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central
American Economic Integration (1958); the Agreement on the Regime for Central
American Integration Industries (1958); the Central American Agreement on the
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges (1959); the General Treaty on Central
American Economic Integration (1960); the Agreement Establishing the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration (1960); and a variety of protocols and other
special agreements. Even before the formal organization of CACOM, the Central
American countries had a number of regional organizations-the Organization of
Central American States (1951), concerned with political and cultural cooperation;
the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee (1952); the Advanced
School of Public Administration (1954); and the Central American Institute for
Industrial Research and Technology (1956).
Of the organizations comprising the official structure of CACOM, the most impor-
tant are the Central American Economic Council, the Executive Council, the General
Secretariat for Economic Integration, the Bank for Economic Integration, the Mone-
tary Union, and the Clearing House.
The Economic Council, staffed ex officio by the economics ministers of the various
countries, is CACOM's principal policy-making organ. It, in tum, is served by the
Executive Council, manned by the respective vice-ministers of economics, and by the
General Secretariat for Economic Integration, whose personnel enjoy the status of
international civil servants. The Bank for Economic Integration finances public, pri-
vate and mixed enterprises with capital subscribed by the respective governments
and augmented bysuchfundsasmay be secured from public and private international
sources. The Bank's activities have increased rapidly, with some two-thirds of its loans
having been allocated to private sector enterprises. Its Board of Governors, an auton-
omous policy-making unit, ismadeupof the various economics ministers and the pres-
idents of the central banks. The Monetary Union, supervised by the central banks,
has been concerned primarily with the coordination of monetary policy and with
planning for the ultimate creation of a common Central American currency. The
ClearingHouse, using the so-called Central American peso as its standard accounting
unit, handles payments covering virtually all intraregional trade and has substantially
reduced the restrictive impact of temporary shortages of foreign exchange. It is
financed by the various governments in allotments composed 75 per cent of national
currency and 25 per cent of United States dollars.
As with LAFTA, CACOM's principal successes have been in the expansion of
intraregional trade. Between 1961 and 1968, the increase was from 37 to 260 millions
of dollars, or approximately 700 per cent. In the process, over 95 per cent of the prod-
ucts traded have been freed of customs and other restrictions, the principal exceptions
being those items especially important to the internal revenue structures of the gov-
ernments. Nonetheless, trade within CACOM represents only about 20 per cent of
the region's total export trade. The composition of regional trade has also changed
substantially. Originally dominated by agricultural primary commodities, manufac-
tures-principally light-industry consumer goods-have assumed more than 50 per
centofthetotal. The benefits have been very unequally shared, however. El Salvador
and Guatemala dominate, especially in the trade in manufactures, with Costa Rica,
Honduras, and Nicaragua trailing badly. The effect on trade with third countries has
been most notable in the import area, where there have been substantial increases
in the proportional shares of capital equipment and other producers' goods. The com-
position of extraregional export trade remains largely unchanged. The continued
reliance on traditional primary exports-specifically coffee, bananas, sugar, meat,
and cotton-in conjunction with the costly import requirements of industry threaten,
through foreign exchange shortages, to curtail the pace of industrial development.
In addition to substantially freeing intraregional trade, CACOM, aided by the
adoption of a common customs nomenclature, has succeeded in establishing a common
regional tariff applicable to approximately 95 per cent of the products imported from
third countries. Those excluded, however, still make up over 20 per cent of such im-
ports by value.
In the area of industrial development, integration has progressed much less satis-
factorily. With little regard for efficiency or market adequacy, strictly domestic
development continues to be emphasized. The Agreement on the Regime for Central
American Integration Industries, referred to above, contemplated a decidedly dif-
ferent approach. Recognizing the total inadequacy of the domestic markets for sup-
porting the more sophisticated types of industry at even minimal levels of efficiency,
it was agreed that the total regional market should be opened under exceptionally
favorable circumstances to new endeavors in these areas. With appropriate regard
to geographical distribution, integration industries were to be granted a ten-year
monopoly in their product lines and immediate access to unencumbered regional
trade. In addition, special concessions were to be made on the importation of neces-
sary capital equipment, parts, and raw materials, and on taxation within the host
country. The CACOM organization as a whole would establish and supervise price
and quality controls in such cases. The original agreement has subsequently been
modified to provide that any manufacturer whose product already enjoys free trade
privileges may not be confronted with an integration industry in the same field which
would enjoy monopoly and free trade privileges on an exclusive basis. Thus far only
three integration industries have been established and, although studies are con-
tinuing under the auspices of the Central American Commission for Industrial Coor-
dination, increasing doubts have been voiced as to the desirability of this approach,
particularly by those who fear the loss of benefits derived from competition and the
probable losses to agricultural development through excessive concentration on in-
dustry.
Despite the failure of the integration industries scheme to show substantial results,
CACOMhas made important contributions to the development of industry by freeing
most regional trade. Industrial growth, which has been proceeding during the 1960's
at an annual rate of approximately 10 per cent, has mainly been based on preferential
access to the entire regional market. It should be noted, however, that the beneficiaries
have primarily beenEl Salvador and Guatemala. Further, most of the growth has been
accounted for by private foreign capital, a fact with potentially ominous political
implications. The severe balance-of-payments problems confronting El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Costa Rica render them even more vulnerable to domination by
foreign enterprise, assuming that comparable rates of growth are maintained.
On other points vital to the creation of a true common market no progress can be
reported. Thus, no agreements have been reached on the free movement of labor or
capital, areas in which great national disparities exist. The free movement of people
and supranational coordination of development and fiscal policies obviously entail
substantial concessions of sovereignty and exert severe strains on national identity.
In a region characterized by nationalistic politics, incompatible types of political
systems, and inconsistent social policies, there is little prospect that these obstacles
can be overcome in the foreseeable future.
The most disastrous threat to CACOM's survival thus far was the outbreak of war
betweenEl Salvador and Honduras in the summer of 1969. The basic cause of the
conflict was the treatment of Salvadoran citizens residing in Honduras by the govern-
ment and populace of the latter country. By any standard, El Salvador is over-popu-
lated while Honduras has the lowest population density in Central America. As a
natural consequence, Salvadoran peasants have for years migrated in large numbers
to the border regions of Honduras, where they usually established themselves as sub-
sistence farming squatters on vacant land. Honduranconcemoverthis potential threat
to its national identity was reflected in provisions of the recent land reform law which
denied titles or other forms of legitimate tenure to non-Honduran citizens. This was
followed up by what seems to have been a consciously adopted policy of arousing mob
violence against Salvadorans, the whole situation exploding into riot and murder after
a contested soccer game between the national teams of the two countries. Through the
interposition of the OAS an uneasy truce was established along the border but other-
wise the situation remains unresolved and dangerous. Since that time, Honduras has
prohibited the transit of Salvadoran goods on the Pan American highway, thus shut-
tingoffthe usual route to Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Guatemala remains open but the
effect on Salvadoran commerce has been serious. Both El Salvador and Honduras
attended the foreign ministers' conference in Managua, Nicaragua, in December
1969, where intensive efforts were made to find solutions. While this may indicate
a mutual desire to rescue the Common Market, the deliberations were largely unpro-
ductive and the future of the organization remains seriously in doubt.
THE CARIBBEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (CARIFTA)

In May 1968, the newest Western Hemisphere experiment in economic integration
was launched with the signing of the treaty creating the Caribbean Free Trade
Association. The members include Trinidad-Tobago, the leaders of the enterprise,
the Leeward and Windward Islands (British dependencies but full members nonethe-
less), Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados. As the population of the region is only about
four million and the economies almost perfectly competitive, it does not seem probable
that much can be, or was, hoped for from the scheduled 1973 freeing of trade. There
is a limit to the prosperity that can be generated through mutual exchanges of ba-
nanas, sugar and rum. A more pressing motive appears to have been the desire to
secure commitments on developmental aid from Great Britain, and perhaps other
members of the O:>mmonwealth, as a hedge against the possibility of British entry
into the European Economic O:>mmunity, an act that would erase trade preferences
presently enjoyed. This objective has been in part accomplished with the establish-
ment of the Caribbean Development Bank, to whose authorized capital Britain and
Canada have each agreed to contribute 20 per cent.
Aside from the Bank, progress to date has been virtually nil and the political situ-
ation suggests that the future will be stormy. Such prospects for development as these
underendowed and overpopulated countries may have depend heavily on intimate
cooperation with foreign capital and continued and increased dependence of over-
whelmingly black populations on white-owned and managed enterprises. The un-
popularity of this situation was abundantly demonstrated in the recent outbreak of
black power riots in Trinidad-Tobago. This, however, is no more than symptomatic
of the deeprooted and long-maturing racial character of politics in the region and of
the inherent inconsistency of its political and economic aspirations.
THE RIVER PLATE BASIN TREATY

A final note should be devoted to a potentially promising development in the River
Plate basin area. In Aprill969, the five countries sharing this river system-Argen-
tina, Brazil,Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay-met in Brasilia to signa treaty providing
for the integrated development of the region. The treaty, if ratified, establishes an
Intergovernmental Coordinating O:>mmission as a permanent organization charged
with the responsibility of promoting and coordinating multinational projects for the
development of the basin, subject to general directions from the respective ministers
of foreign affairs at annual meetings. If successful, this arrangement could give re-
newed impetus to LAFTA, or, perhaps, to a new and more viable sub-regional group.
However, long-standing suspicions and national rivalries, particularly between
Argentina and Brazil, suggest caution in appraising this development.
Bernard K. Gordon
Common defense considerations and integration

in Southeast Asia
ASEAN AND THE CONCEPT OF SUBSYSTEM IN SOUTHEAST

ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY
The creation of ASEAN must be seen as something of a triumph for aspirations that the
Thai Foreign Minister has entertained for several years. But it is potentially much
more than that, for ASEAN is the first general, indigenous, and politically neutral
effort in Southeast Asian regional cooperation.
Its characteristic as a potentially general, or multipurpose organization means that
ASEAN must be distinguished from regional groups devoted to a specific functional
purpose, such as the Mekong Development Committee and the Southeast Asian Min-
isterial Conferences on Education (SEAMES) and Transport. Such bodies have the
support of the particular ministries involved, and can probably achieve certain specific
cooperative tasks of importance-but there is little evidence that they attract wide and
high-level participation and interest in each government. In essence, and in contrast
to the sort of political support that led to ASA and ASEAN, such single-purpose ven-
tures are narrowly based.
The indigenous nature of ASEAN must also be stressed, for this is the single most
important characteristic missing from all other existing efforts at regional cooperation
in Southeast Asia. Even the newly created Ministerial Conferences on Transport and
Education just mentioned, to say nothing of the obvious cases of SEATO and the Co-
lombo Plan, have been fundamentally based on the support, and frequently the ini-
tiative, of states outside Southeast Asia. The ad hoc groups created by these Ministerial
Conferences commonly draw at least half their fiscal support from the U.S., and it is
altogetherunlikelythat they could exist were it not for the constant encouragement of
the U.S. This is not to condemn such efforts-but the judgment that ASA and ASEAN
reflect high-priority local interests stems from the consideration that those two orga-
nizations, in contrast to all others, are entirely the work of the Southeast Asian govern-
ments themselves.
Finally, much of the potential significance of ASEAN derives from Indonesia's
participation, which helps remove the "Western" stigma that afflicted ASA. ASEAN
represents a large departure in the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy, and for the
first time it is possible to expect that its considerable foreign policy energies can be
channeled within the region. For its own benefit, moreover, participation in ASEAN
opens the possibility for Indonesian collaboration with states that have had successful
developmental experience. Thailand and Malaysia stand out in this regard, and the
From: Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy,
© 1969, pp.l19-130, 150-152, and 164-165. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey.
243
244 REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS
August, 1967 statement of ASEAN's "aims and purposes" suggests that -like ASA-
the group will emphasize quite pragmatic goals. Of ASEAN's seven declared "pur-
poses," most aim for cooperation in fields directly related to developmental needs,
as this excerpt will show:
To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the
economic, social cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the edu-
cation, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries,
the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity
trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities in the raising of
the living standards of their people. 1
Within a few months after that Declaration was announced, the five governments
agreed to designate Indonesia as host of the "ASEAN Standing O>mmittee" during
its first year, and soon afterwards groups of experts began meetings in Djakarta. By
February of 1968 this O>mmittee had identified a series of projects on which initial
work was to proceed, and the list clearly suggests the purposes which the five nations
envisage for the new organization. 2
First efforts, for example, will concentrate on food production and supply, in which
ASEAN is expected to facilitate data exchanges and loans of specialists; trade expan-
sion measures, in which it will be the function of ASEAN to organize combined
ASEAN trade missions outside the region; meetings of business organizations in
order to achieve trade liberalization measures; and a variety of other personnel and
data exchanges in such fields as transport and telecommunications, publishing, and
so on. Moreover, a number of steps were taken to exchange defense information, and
early in 1968 several leaders offered suggestions for some form of defense and secu-
rity cooperation. 8
These steps represent a considerable change in the Asian political environment,
and it is important to understand the political forces responsible for elevating the
previously vague concept of "Asian regionalism" to its present level of interest. In
many cases the explanation is the simple recognition that the paramount task for
leaders in Southeast Asia-economic development-can probably be aided greatly
by collaboration with neighbors. Another major task these leaders increasingly face,
however, is the problem of providing for improved defense and security. For leaders
coming to grips with this problem for the first time, cooperation with neighboring
states seems almost as logical as economic cooperation. It is no accident, for example,
that Indonesian and Malaysian leaders have begun to take the lead in speculating
openly about "regional defense cooperation."
In both the Indonesian and Malaysian cases it appears that these new patterns of
thinking have been kindled by an important catalyst: the disappearance of certain
fictions that characterized the immediate postindependence and postwar era. In the
Malaysian instance the fiction was that Britain, because it had so gradually phased
out its colonial role, somehow would continue to look after the security of Malaya and
Singapore. But leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore must now face the fact that
Britain simply does not have the will or capacity to play that role. In the case of Indo-
nesia the fiction was the belief that a foreign policy consisted of repeated calls for
"Mro-Asian solidarity" against the imperialist West. But the recognition has grown in
Djakarta that the "West" is less a source of threat than a source of greatly needed
assistance. To the extent that a threat exists, it is now more clearly perceived in In-
donesia to emanate from Peking and its local supporters; the past exhortations for
solidarity among the "new emerging forces" are no longer seen as responsible ap-
proaches to the problem.
Thus, for different reasons, both Indonesia and Malaysia are forced to the recog-
nition that they must take steps to help ensure their security. Like Singapore and
Thailand they are unwilling to rely permanently on the United States for security,
and this has led all four to search for ways in which regional cooperation might con-
tribute to defense needs. With somewhat less urgency, Philippines governments have
also begun to seek closer ties in Southeast Asia. Presidents Garcia and Macapagal,
in particular, helped alter Manila's traditional relationship with the United States
and tried to establish a new Asian "identity." And early in 1968 President Marcos
himself suggested while visiting Indonesia that "an interim security arrangement
be made within the framework of ASEAN." 4
These foreign policy trends will be singled out in the next few pages, because they
point to new and systematic patterns of relationships among several Southeast Asian
nations. The system created as a result may have very great significance for politics
in the entire Asian region. This is the case despite the fact that some of the new rela-
tionships derived initially, not from a desire to cooperate, but from conflicts, or from
what appear to have been "special circumstances." Manila's new emphasis on South-
east Asia, for example, can mistakenly be explained away as a "special case" with
little meaning for the essential thrust of Philippines foreign policy. Policy under
Macapagal (his desire to upset Malaysia's plan to incorporate North Borneo) did, of
course, lead to the unprecedented and close relationship between the Philippines
and Sukamo's Indonesia. But although that specific objection is valid, it is essentially
beside the point. For Manila's foreign policy-like that of all but one country in
ASEAN-has been undergoing striking change in the mid-1960's, and the trends
already visible show no sign of being reversed.
The exception to that statement is Thailand, for whom the emphasis on Southeast
Asia represents not a striking change but a logical product of the main principle of
Thai foreign policy: that Thailand should never become too dependent on any great
power. Even in the period when Thailand forged its closest military relationships
with the United States, its Foreign Ministry gave equal attention to the ultimate goal
of forming some kind of Southeast Asian regional group. It has always been predict-
able that, when circumstances allowed, Bangkok would seek to reduce the sole de-
pendence implied in the American relationship.
Foreign Minister Thanat symbolizes this double approach. Most hawkish of all
men on the Vietnam war, he has nevertheless taken the lead in fostering the concept
of regionalism ever since he was approached by President Garcia and the Tunku with
the 1959 proposal that later becameASA. Thanat has always emphasized pragmatic
achievements as the product of regionalism, andasASAdeveloped between 1961-64,
the group showed the Thai imprint more than any other. The soundest planning for
regional economic cooperation has come from Bangkok, as many other articulate
Thais, reflecting Thanat's example, have also endorsed the concept. It was, moreover,
to keep the idea alive that Thanat has so often undertaken the role of diplomatic broker
in Southeast Asia, as a few illustrations will suggest.
Thailand's role in mediating Konfrontasi (Sukarno's "confrontation" against Ma-
laysia) was critical to its resolution, and the early and most difficult Indonesian-Malay-
sian contacts took place under Thanat's good offices in Bangkok. Earlier, in the Sabah
dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia, his ftmction was similar: He served as
a vital communications link. The former Vice-President of the Philippines referred
to Thanat during that period as "our ASAAmbassador." 5 Similarly, ... Thanat played
the vital role of "introducing" Indonesia into the new efforts aimed at creating a new
group. For example, when the Tunku had doubts about Indonesia, more likely than
not it was the Thai Minister who acted to allay those doubts. This was also the pattern
when President Marcos appeared to have some second thoughts regarding proposed
SEAARC terminology dealing with foreign bases. Here, Thanat was able to point to
his own membersip in SEATO and the military installations at Sattahip as evidence
thatASEAN (or SEAARC)would not compromise the continuing Thai and Philippine
security reliance on the United States.
These considerations are not mentioned simply to praise the Foreign Minister of
Thailand, although his record as a diplomat is certainly striking. 6 My purpose has
been instead to underline a point: that a deeply etched network of political contact
and communications was established during the I 960's in Southeast Asia, and every
indication suggests that the resulting pattern is becoming more and not less intense.
Events set in motion in 1963-64 (when Indonesia embarked on her conflict with
Malaysia) help explain this, for the Konfrontasi had an immense effect on each of the
five nations now in ASEAN. It was in many respects a catalyst for the international
politics of Southeast Asia, for it helped, as we noted earlier, to bring each of the states
there into far more "tight" contact and communications than ever before. ASA had
just begun to do that for three of them, but not necessarily on matters of high political
sensitivity. Konfrontasi, on the other hand, forced each of the region's top leaders to
reflect-much more than he had been required to do before- about his role in the
region's affairs.
The explanation for the catalytic importance of the confrontation, which can now
be seen more clearly in retrospect, probably derives from the severe tensions that
the conflict generated. In each of the three nations primarily concerned, many doubted
the wisdom of steps their governments had taken, and this led to more careful internal
scrutiny of national foreign policies and purposes than was ever required before.
Leaders like Macapagal ultimately backed away from their first policy directions,
and there is evidence that Sukarno and Subandrio, too, were searching for ways out
of the conflict just a few months after it began. Throughout the entire affair, each of
the states seemed to belookingformeans, at a minimum, to restore peaceful relations,
and if possible to forge some kind of regional cohesion after the dispute. In this respect
Konfrontasi was a severe learning experience, and it is quite clear that ASEAN-
probably the first genuinely important step in Asian regional cooperation- is a direct
by-product of the contacts and communications created by the Indonesian-Malaysian

conflict.
In Malaysia, for example, the confrontation experience reinforced the views of
those who already suspected that Malaysian foreign policy under Tunku had paid too
little attention to Indonesian sensitivities in the past; it is very unlikely that this over-
sight will be repeated. In the Philippines also a number of lessons were learned. One
was that Manila, if its leaders hope to establish their Asian "identity," must do much
to overcome the view that they are mere puppets of the United States. Another les-
son-and this was brought home to President Marcos in the months just before
ASEAN was formed- was that any lack of enthusiasm his government then felt about
Southeast Asian regionalism was not shared in Bangkok and Djakarta. The nego-
tiations thatled to ASEAN in the spring of 1967 showed that in the event of consensus
on the part of Indonesia and Thailand, very little foreign policy latitude remains for
Singapore and Malaysia. As a result, Philippines leaders, to the extent that they are
convinced they cannot count forever on the protective umbrella provided by the
United States (in trade and security matters, for example), have been forced to con-
clude that increasingly close cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbors is the only
feasible foreign policy posture for their country. As the Manila Times warned just
before ASEAN was formed:
Western, particularly American, presence in Asia is not going to be a permanent thing, and
farsighted Asian leaders are looking forward to the day when Western presence is removed, in
which case the Asians themselves should be prepared to fill the "vacuum" left by the with-
drawal.7
Aside from the fact that this is increasingly the view held by leaders in the five
ASEAN nations, an equally important consideration is that this conviction has led to
patterns of understanding and contact that would have been almost unthinkable in
the 1950's. ASEAN reflects this, and it reflects, too, the existence of a developing
system of nations in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Singapore comprise that incipient system, and even though their trade and eco-
nomic profiles do not yet heavily reflect this sense of"region" or "system" (after several
generations and even centuries of European-inspired commerce and production
this is hardly surprising), their political and cultural outlooks are oriented more and
more within the region. The change that has taken place was summed up well in
President Johnson's remark that "the nations of Asia are casting off the spent slogans
of earlier narrow nationalism ... one after another, they are grasping the realities
of an interdependent Asia." 8
The President's word "interdependent" precisely fits attitudes among leaders and
elites in the five ASEAN states -so much so that if a very large political change came
to any of them, it would be reacted to far more intensely today than even five years
ago. Putting this another way, it is reasonable to expect that a major political change,
say in Burma or Cambodia, would be felt less intimately in the ASEAN capitals than
would the same event if it came to one of the ASEAN states. Burma, Laos, and Cam-
bodia, in other words, are less intimately a part of the Southeast Asian subsystem that
has been developing in recent years. As ASEAN continues, and hence reinforces and
regularizes the patterns that already have been created, this system effect of inter-
dependence will be intensified. One outcome can already be anticipated and has
major implications for American foreign policy in Southeast Asia: It relates intimately
to the concept of regional dominance introduced earlier.
Consider as an illustration the possibility that Burma or Cambodia, through a
change in government leadership, might so alter its political orientation that it could
be concluded that effective influence over the nation's affairs resided with China. To
the extent that Burma or Cambodia had not become a part of the increasingly tight
system of relationships likelytoresultfromASEAN, such an outcome can be projected
to have significantly less meaning for the ASEAN states than it would were Malaysia
or Philippines the affected state. This is not to say that Thai leaders, for example,
would not experience increased anxiety if Burma or Cambodia became incorporated
within a Chinese sphere of influence.lt is to say that the shock effects of the "loss" of
Burma or Cambodia would be less intimately perceived in the ASEAN group, because
the "lost" state was not a participant in the existing patterns of communications and
political relationships. Ineffectthe "loss" of Burma or Cambodia would be felt through
an insulating layer -an insulation, however, which would not be present to dull the
perceptions of ASEAN members in connection with a system-participant like Malay-
sm.
If such a system were to exist, with the attendant in-group perception consequences
thatlhave suggested, one meaning for American foreign policy seems clear.lt suggests
that a Burma or Cambodia '1ost" to China's influence would very likely have far fewer
ramifications for the outcome of Southeast Asia as a whole than would be true were
any of the ASEAN states "lost" or similarly threatened. The further and systematic
development of ASEAN during the next decade suggests that the effective region of
Southeast Asia will have a meaning equivalent to those states participating in a regular
pattern of relationships. The present ASEAN group even now represents the over-
whelming bulk of population, land mass, and resources that comprise the geographic
Southeast Asia region. If the ASEAN group comes also to represent an interconnected
and interdependent regional subsystem, such that Southeast Asian events outside it
have few implications for the nature and shape of the subsystem as a whole, it will be
appropriate for the United States to restrict its security concerns with "Southeast
Asia" to the five nations and 200 million people in ASEAN. Put bluntly, if leaders in
the five ASEAN states were themselves to conclude that the "loss" of Burma and/or
Cambodia to Chinese influence did not portend a likely or necessary outcome for
them, this would in effect suggest that the "loss" of Burma and/or Cambodia was es-
sentially irrelevant to the structure of East Asian politics as a whole.
The implication for the United States, as we will suggest in a later chapter, is that
on the basis of regional relationships the United States can begin to discriminate
among the nations in Southeast Asia. For the concept of regional dominance with
which the United States is concerned in East Asia does not require that Americans be
concerned with outcomes in each and every one of the nations in that geographical
region. It implies that the United States must be concerned with likely outcomes for
the region as a whole, and if developing patterns of regional cohesion lead to a condi-
tion whereby some Southeast Asian states are essentially not a "part" of the region,
the relevance of those states to the national security interests of the United ·states can
accordingly be reduced very drastically.
LIKELY TRENDS IN ASEAN

But even at the present time, when the existence of a Southeast Asian regional sub-
system is just beginning to take shape, Southeast Asian trends toward cooperation
represent a positive development for the United States. For Southeast Asia, where
the interest in regional cooperation is strongest, is the weakest of East Asia's parts,
its nations are the most tempting to subversive efforts supported by China, and they
are the most susceptible to a variety of security threats. In a word, and in strong con-
trast to both India and Japan, the Southeast Asian nations are precisely the states that
can benefit most from cooperative efforts with their neighbors.
The main uses of regional cooperation for these nations will probably be found in
two fields, both ultimately related to stability and security in East Asia. It is likely that
the first uses of collaboration will relate to economic development, and it is important
to stress again that a large number of Asian and Western specialists strongly believe
that regional economic cooperation can bring marked advantages the the develop-
ment programs of relatively small states. States in Southeast Asia, with strong outside
support, are already operating on this assumption. 9
Based on these trends toward economic cooperation related to development needs,
it is prudent to expect that a somewhat more cohesive Southeast Asia is a likely out-
come before the 1980's. To deny this is to deny the meaning of important steps taken
since 1965, most notably the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (with
very strong Japanese and American financial support); the creation of ASEAN; and
(despite some irritants, as in the Sabah claim), the marked reduction in intraregional
political tensions. These steps reflect and represent the major political forces in South-
east Asian international affairs, and there are few indications that these forces will
decline significantly during the next decade.
Consequently, although it is impossible to predict precisely the outlines of economic
cooperation, it is reasonable to expect that by 1970-71 major planning steps will be
well under way to coordinate specific developmental efforts in Southeast Asia. 10 It
is likely that concrete measures for "harmonization" of industrial efforts, especially
in certain light-industrial fields, will be undertaken early. Similarly, early in the 1970's
measures can be expected to establish joint research centers, especially in fields re-
lated to the agricultural and industrial productivity of the region. Only in the late
1970's is it likely that intraregional trade patterns will be perceptively affected by
these and related steps. Nevertheless, it is possible to project that increased intra-
regional trade, especially in consumer goods and products of light and medium indus-
try, will result from industrial programs even now underway, and industrial harmoni-
zation and improved transport will accelerate this tendency.
By the early and mid-1980's, therefore, it is probable that Southeast Asia will show
considerably greater economic interaction than is presently the case. The necessary
first steps, for example in outlining the preferred and feasible forms of economic
cooperation, have been started in the 1960's. These have been the result of remark-
able political support for the concept of cooperation, even in a period when there has
been little or no real achievement to show. If achievements in economic cooperation

are reflected in accelerated rates of economic growth-and these are its present
justification-then it is reasonable to expect a continuation, and probably an enhance-
ment, of political support for regionalism. Simultaneously, an improvement in eco-
nomic conditions, although often a source of some dislocations and instabilities, should
help reduce the appeals on which insurgents and subversives have relied since the
1950's. This was the basic assumption which led Tunku Abdul Rahman and President
Garcia to propose ASA in 1959.
Yeteveninthefaceofprogress,it hasto be assumed that Southeast Asia will remain
a relatively fertile field for subversive efforts through the 1970's. Omsequently, and
although combating subversion is already a high-priority concern of several Southea'it
Asian nations, any visible benefits from patterns of economic interaction and political
consultation may bring an important side-effect: intensified interest in regional de-
fense measures. As I suggested earlier, interest in defense cooperation is already
apparent, although only at the earliest stages of discussion. Compared to cooperative
measures in trade and development, which could take concrete shape in the mid-
1970's (because they have already been talked about for a decade), regional defense
measures ought not be expected in the same time frame. Nevertheless, the lines along
which Southeast Asian defense collaboration could proceed are discernible even now;
they derive from the forces ... that give political reality to the concept of regionalism
in East Asia. Against that background, and having already suggested the relevance of
Asian regionalism to the U.S. interest in a multipolar Asia, we can now deal more
specifically with the relationship between security and regional collaboration. For
genuinemultipolarity in East Asia can be achieved only in an Asian political structure
in which the United States is not the only source of resistance to China's capacity for
direct and indirect influence ....
What, in essence, is the likely nature and purpose of security cooperation in the
region? The answer to that question is suggested by the nature of both national and
international politics in Southeast Asia: the likeliest form of defense cooperation is
a joint force to combat insurgency. Regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia
is unlikely, as we have stressed, to be closely patterned after collective security ar-
rangements in other areas. If security cooperation in Asia is to be relevant to the de-
fense needs of the region, it will instead have to represent a form of defense coopera-
tion both lesser and greater than that reflected in the OAS, in SEATO, and in NATO.
One of the major purposes of the OAS, for example, is its consultative function- it
is designed to mediate conflicts among Western Hemisphere nations. But the OAS
has never played a significant role against external aggression, and partly for that
reason it has not been necessary to create joint combat forces. Instead, and in a region
where there are numerous opportunities for border and similar disputes, the OAS has,
to a fairly high degree, developed procedures for intraregional "peacekeeping." 11
In Southeast Asia, and in the ASEAN context, informal peacekeeping arrangements
are likely to be a by-product anyway, and if formal arrangements were made for the
creation of a joint combat force, it is probable that a formal consultative machinery for
intraregional mediation would also be included. But that is about as far as the OAS
model is likely to apply in Southeast Asia; for unlike the Latin American nations, the
Southeast Asian states need to be concerned not only with a major external military
threat, but also with a China that is willing as well to assist indigenous insurgents.
This is the problem, after all, in Burma (and possibly Cambodia) today, in Malaya
earlier, and in Indonesia ... when China apparently helped ship in arms under cover
of ''building materials."
In theAmericas,on the other hand, the more immediate meaning of threat has been
perceived to emanate from nearby states of relatively similar power status. In that
environment it has been both unnecessary and unlikely to expect defense collabora-
tion among these states- unlikely because their defense forces and elites are often dis-
trustful of one another, and unnecessary because of the overwhelming protective in-
terest of the U.S.
This is quite different from the environment in Southeast Asia. There, defense col-
laboration would have to include at least some of the attributes of a familiar defensive
alliance, but there is only limited utility in analogies to NATO or SEATO. SEATO, as
we have seen, was never intended to be a defensive alliance with joint forces, but has
instead been a convenient umbrella for underlining the security commitment of the
United States. NATO, because it is the most highly developed of alliances, would
appear at once to be the model furthest removed from anything that might be con-
ceived in the Southeast Asian environment. For example, the threat which NATO
was designed to deter and combat -a large-scale conventional aggression-is almost
irrelevant to conditions in Southeast Asia; even were it to develop, the Southeast
Asian states will never have within their resources the capacity to meet that unlikely
event.
There is, nevertheless, an important similarity betweenNATO and a joint counter-
insurgency combat force that might grow out of ASEAN. It is a similarity that is too
easily overlooked becauseoftheenormousdifferences in scale between the European
and Southeast Asian security environments. Perhaps most obvious is the extent to
which thecooperatingstatesinASEAN and the states that formed NATO have shared
a common perception of the security threat in their respective regions. Common per-
ceptionof theRedArmythreatwas probably the critical element in the West European
environment in the 1950's; it helped make possible the creation of a NATO infra-
structure and the earmarking of combat forces for NATO purposes. Today a roughly
similar perception exists in Southeast Asia; there is little doubt that Southeast Asian
leaders believe that China, and China's support for internal dissident groups, repre-
sents the main threat to their nations' security. 12 But another similarity is just as im-
portant. This is the extent to which a joint counterinsurgency force would be most
appropriate to Southeast Asian threat conditions, for insurgency is likely to remain
the critical problem there. In Western Europe, by the same token, a target of many
NATO divisions was most appropriate to European threat conditions and the exis-
tence of the Red Army.
At the minimum, the security environment in Southeast Asia would be enhanced
by the constant availability of at least 50,000 highly equipped and specially trained
counterinsurgency forces. Moreover, each of the ASEAN governments has already
hadconsiderablenationalexperience with counterinsurgency operations, and on that
basis there are probably important lessons which Filipinos, Malaysians, Thais, and
Indonesians can impart to each other. The United States Government recognizes this,
for it has given some attentionalreadyto the potential for a special Counterinsurgency
Center in the Philippines. 18 Indeed, Filipino leaders welcome this possibility precisely
because it is recognized that joint training in counterinsurgency, drawing on existing
Southeast Asian experience, is likely to be very valuable.
But such a Philippines-American initiative, however valuable, would probably
represent considerably less than could be achieved and much less than needs to be
accomplished. For the collaborative environment in Southeast Asia now encourages
security cooperation on a basis wider than that represented by the traditional pattern
of bilateral American assistance. Indeed, bilateral relationships are increasingly
inhibited by the domestic environment in the United States, as well as by attitudes in
Southeast Asia. Thus, even if the United States sought to extend the scope of its com-
mitments (and that is hardly likely), Southeast Asian nations not already tied mili-
tarily to the United States would not be receptive to the offer. Singapore, Malaysia,
and Indonesia, to say nothing of Burma and Cambodia, well illustrate this point; even
in the wake of Britain's military withdrawal, leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore
stressed that although they hoped to design some alternative to the resulting "vac-
uum," they certainly did not intend to ask for direct American military guarantees. 14
Similarly, it should be clear by now that the negative view held of SEATO makes
that format, or anything too much like it, unsuitable as the framework for defense
collaboration of the sort proposed here. SEATO officials, of course, are quite con-
scious of the declining prestige and role of the organization, and it may be expected
that some of them will insist that any new proposal for defense cooperation in the
region be undertaken within their framework. But the SEATO label, it is even more
certain, would prevent the participation of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia in the
sortofjointforceproposed here. These and other considerations suggest that the most
appropriate format for security cooperation in Southeast Asia must have the political
endorsementoftheregion'smajor states, and theASEAN framework fits that require-
mentparticularlywell. 15 Because of its stronglyindigenousnature,moreover, ASEAN
seems especially consistent with an important objective of the United States: to en-
courage multipolarity in Asia.
1 This is from the text of the ASEAN Declaration, August 8, 1967.

• FromAntara, reporting the February 23, 1968 meeting of the ASEAN Standing Committee.
• Prospects for defense cooperation [are) ... discussed in a chapter [in author's Totoord Disengagement
inAsia ). It will besufficientheretopointoutthatproposalsforsecuritycooperationappear to have originated
with a speech of Indonesian General Panggabean, Chief of the Army Staff (see Djakarta Times, February
28, 1967). In March, 1968, General Suharto, the new Indonesian President, publicly endorsed the concept,
andaddedspecificallythatASEANcould provide the ''basis for defence understandings" (seeAntara, March
7, 1968). The same reports carried the endorsement of Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Deputy Prime
Minister. PresidentMarcosofthePhilippines, while visiting Indonesia, similarly called for ASEAN members
to "join in a defense arrangement ... on a basis consistent with the principles and purposes of ASEAN''
(Washington Post, January 14, 1968).
4 Antara, January 13, 1968.
5 Author's interview with then Vice-President Pelaez, Manila, July 1963. Five years later, in December,
1968, Thanat performed a similar function. He arranged for meetings at his home in Bangkok between
Malaysian anaFilipino leaders.
6 The degree of professionalism in Thailand's Foreign Ministry is equalled nowhere else in Southeast
Asia and is surpassed in Asia only by the Gaimusho, Japan's Foreign Ministry. Thai leaders, unique in their
region, reflect a deep and self-conscious foreign policy tradition, and those responsible for foreign policy
feel a deep sense of pride in the skills represented in the last century by King Chulalongkom, Prince Dam-
rong, and Prince Devawongse-pride in the fact that under those leaders Tbailand preserved her indepen-
dence.
'Editorial, Manila Times, July 15, 1967.
8 From the October 1966 speech in Honolulu.
9 A striking illustration came recently when the leadership of the Thai government visited the United
States. Accompanying the Prime Minister was not only Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, but Pote Sarasin,
now Minister of Development, and a potential premier in the future. In a speech to business executives, in
which foreign policy was not the topic of the day, Pote Sarasin concluded his remarks with an emphatic en-
dorsement of Tbailand's emphasis on Southeast Asian regionalism: "With regard to regional economic and
political cooperation, we are convinced that herein lies the future of Southeast Asia. Tbailand has already
taken the lead in promoting regional groupings such as ASEAN ... we are exploring the possibilities of a
product by product approach to regional economic cooperation" (Press Release No. 37, Permanent Mission
ofTbailand to the U.N., May7, 1968; emphasis added).
10 As an illustration, a number of transport and telecommunications projects were considered at the meet-
ings of the Ministerial Conference on Transport in Kuala Lumpur in September 1967, and the U.S. alone
has offered upto$5 million for feasihility studies in 1968...Q9 having to do with roads, railways, harbors, and
so on. Major additional funds will be sought from the Asian Development Bank, which has already made
clear its strong support for projects in this sector.
11 Detailed discussions, including treatment of the OAS role in the Honduras-Nicaragua conflict of 1957,
is found in Jerome Slater, A ReevalUation of Collective Security, the OAS in Action (Ohio State University,
Mershon National Security Program, 1965); Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (London,
1966); and Pan American Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance: Applications (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1964).
12 This is not to deny that Prince Sihanouk still identifies Thai, and especially Vietnamese, ambitions as
a potential threat to Cambodia, nor is it to deny that Malaysians are sometimes apprehensive about Filipinos
and Indonesians. All these considerations, however, become of much less significance when weighed against
the potential problem represented by China -as even Prince Sihanouk has often pointed out.
13 President Johnson appeared, in his statements to President Marcos in Washington late in 1966, to give
support to this proposal.
14 AsLeeKuan Yew put it, "Thesurestwaytogetinsurgencyis to have an American garrison" (Washington
Post, January 14, 1968, reporting on Lee's visit to London).
15 Although he has not spelled out specific applications, Donald Nuecbterlein has also given consideration
to the potential role of ASEAN in helping to meet Southeast Asian counterinsurgency problems. See his
"Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," Aswn Survey, VIII (September 1968 ), 806-16.
JosephS. Nye
United States policy toward regional organization
Regionalism has along history as an important instrument of American foreign policy.

Yet such a statement does not do justice to the variations in goals, means, and settings
that have affected United States policy toward participation in and cooperation with
regional organizations. These differences have been the cause of serious debate in the
past and are becoming so again as we approach the 1970's.
REGIONALISM IN OUR PAST

One of the earliest strands of United States foreign policy, one that has persisted with
varying strength to the present day, is the "Western Hemisphere idea," the notion of
the uniqueness of the WesternHemisphereanditsisolationfrom the rest of the world, 1
which was given form by James Monroe's disengagement of the Western Hemisphere
republics from theEurope-centeredinternationalsystem. However, the United States
did not demonstrate great interest in regional schemes such as the 1826 Panama con-
ference proposed by Sim6n Bolivar. Mter 1890 the International Union of American
Republics and its Commercial Bureau represented a pioneering example of a multi-
purpose regional organization, but it remained a weak and North American-domi-
nated organization. 2
It was not until the early twentieth century, in the aftermath of the United States
intervention in response to the collapse of the European balance of power in World
War I, that one finds in Woodrow Wilson's proposal of a policy of global collective
security "the first instalment of the conflict between regionalist and globalist ideas." 3
It is ironic that the language of Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
stating that the global doctrine of collective security did not necessarily interfere with
"regional arrangements" such as the Monroe Doctrine, was an insufficient bait to lure
the United States Senate (for which it was written) into ratification of the Covenant
but did become a convenient loophole for governments in the interwar period. 4 The
United States, in any case, returned to its traditional policy of hemispheric regionalism
as a counterpart to its isolationist European policy.
The major United States debate over policy toward regional organizations occurred
during the latter part of World War IT after the United States had been drawn once
again out of "isolation" and beyond hemispheric regionalism. If the formal outcome of
the debates as written into the United Nations Charter represented a globalist victory,
it was in a large part because of the success of Secretary of State Cordell Hull who
"represented a kind of residual Wilsonianism." 5 Arguments by writers like Walter
From: International Organization, Volume XXID (Summer 1969), pp. 719-740. Reprinted by per-
mission of the author and of International Organization.
254
Lippmann or statesmen like Winston Churchill abroad and Sumner Welles at home in
favor of establishing organizations on the basis of explicit recognition of regional
spheres of influence were rejected by Hull for fear that they "might lead to questions
of balance of power" and provide a means for another retreat into isolationism. 6 Such
globalist idealism seemed hypocritical to leaders of the United Kingdom who saw
Latin America as a United States sphere of influence even if the United States did not
call it such. However, by the time of the Quebec Conference of 1943 Churchill had
lost faith in the possibility of creating a strong European regional council and decided
that henceforth "the United States, rather than a revived and reorganized Europe,
would have to counterbalance Russian power." 7
Ironically, Churchill's decision was a harbinger of a coming change in the inter-
national system from a multistate balance of power to a bipolar structure that made
Hull's victory a hollow one and greatly diminished the importance of the subsequent
debate at the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization at San
Francisco. One of the effects of United States hemispheric policy in the 1930's had
beenanincreaseinLat inAmerican enthusiasm for hemispheric regional organization.
Becoming aware of the high costs and low benefits of the past interventionist policy
in Latin America and later faced by the threat of Axis powers' incursion into the area,
the United States had gradually accommodated Latin pressures to use inter-American
organization to introduce constraints on its freedom of action. 8 This experience of
the 1930's and of close cooperation during the war, plus a reluctance on the part of
some conservative Latin American elites to become too tightly enmeshed in an or-
ganization which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could use against them, led
to Latin pressures at the 1945 Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and
Peace at Chapultepec for revision of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to protect re-
gional organizations.
Thus at San Francisco, while resisting Egyptian efforts to define acceptable re-
gional organizations in such a way that they would resemble the recently formed
Arab League, Senator Arthur Vandenberg and America's Latin allies succeeded in
amending the proposed charter to ensure that inter-American organization would
not be jeopardized by the global organization. 9 Vandenberg argued that they had
"infinitely strengthened the world organization by thus enlisting, with its overall
supervision, the dynamic resources of these regional affinities" 10 while critics dep-
recated the resulting ambiguity in the language of the Charter. In fact, however, the
formal outcome of the debate was far less important than the changes in the setting of
international organization. After the onset of the Cold War and in response to Soviet
support for UN involvement in Western Hemisphere crises American statesmen
reinterpreted the relatively precise language of the Charter on "enforcement" action
by regional organization just as easily as they did the relatively ambiguous language
on "priority" for regional organizations. As Inis Claude so aptly describes, the Cold
War prevailed over the Charter. 11
In the decade following San Francisco American disillusionment with the United
Nations as a security system led to the creation of a series of military alliances and
organizations which came to be called "regional" although in some cases the degree
of geographical proximity involved was very slight. 12 The first of these "regional"
security pacts was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)
of 1947; but like the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) of the
following year this is best understood in terms of traditional hemispheric regionalism
as a sort of epilogue to the 1930's or, in Arthur Whitaker's analogy, as a glacier that
continued to move long after the snows that caused it had stopped. 13 The Rio Treaty
helped serve as a modelfor the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. However, the impetus
for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and later of the
establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) was not the traditional United States regional policy
but a growing involvement in the global politics of containment in a bipolar world.
Along with its direct participation in the quasi-regional military pacts the United
States also supported the economic reconstruction and regional integration of Western
Europe through the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The United States also encouraged,
or at least sympathized with, the Colombo Plan and made abortive efforts at the 1955
Simla Conference to stimulate similar regional organization in what it called "the arc
of free Asia." In the mid-1950's the United States was likened to "a switchboard for
most of the regional and joint efforts in the free world." 14
By the 1960's the setting for regional organization had changed. The process of
decolonization had greatly increased the number of third-world countries whose
existence dramatized the "development problem" and whose slogans frequently
stressed regional aspirations. This change was reflected in United States policy. In
Walt Rostow's words it was
one of the most important, if unnoticed, transitions in policy under President Johnson . . . that
we are now actively supporting the building of regional institutions and regional co-operation
in Latin America, Asia, and Africa as well as Europe. 15
At the same time the degree of detente between the United States and the Soviet
Union following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 both eased the direct security threat
in Europe and created a certain distrust of direct American dealings with the Soviets
at potential European expense. This situation provided leeway for policies, including
those of General Charles de Gaulle, which were less "Atlantic-oriented." Perhaps
even more important than the announcement by France in 1966 that it would with-
draw its forces from NATO assignment and command was the beginning by the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany)in the same year of a new policy of contacts
with the East which Pierre Hassner calls "the hour, so often falsely predicted, of a
search for alternatives to the policy of integration in the West and reliance on the
United States." 16 At the same time United States European policy turned away from
the "Atlanticist" schemes of the early 1960's, such as the creation of a multilateral
force (MLF) for NATO, toward an emphasis on detente which sometimes appeared
to Europeans to beat the expense of the Atlantic alliance. Whether the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia and the change of American administration have really altered
these trends or, as seems more likely, have merely delayed them, remains to be seen.
In any case, American policy toward regional organization was again under debate
in the late 1960's. In the eyes of its critics the Administration of Lyndon Johnson was
using the names of ephemeral Asian organizations to answer questions about its goals
in Vietnam at the same time that it was neglecting regional organization in Europe.
Thus critics charged that it had no overall policy toward regional organizations except
at the declaratory level. Whatever the merit of this criticism, anumber of critics, faintly
echoing the debates of 1943, have advocated a more consistent policy of support for
autonomous regional organizations without direct United States membership as a
means to a new structure of world order.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONTINUING PAST POLICIES

Beforeturningtotheproblemsraised by the question of a policy of support for autono-
mous regional organization as a principle of world order, we must look in more detail
at how the United States has used regional organizations in the past and at what the
costs and benefits of extending such ad hoc policies into the 1970's would be. In gen-
eral, one can identify four major clusters of interests that the United States has served
through participation in and cooperation with regional organizations since World War
II: 1) hemispheric influence; 2) containment; 3) economic development; and 4) con-
flict prevention and management.
Hemispheric influence
One of the major United States policy interests that has been served through re-
gional organization and certainly the most long-standing one has been the mainte-
nance of a sphere of influence (exclusion of what we define as hostile external influ-
ence) in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean region. This is not to
say that the only role of the OAS has been maintenance of a United States sphere of
influence, but this has certainly been one of the roles as the United States use of the
OAS in the cases of Guatemala in 1954, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Cuba
since Fidel Castro's takeover indicate. 17 It is instructive that at the time of the 1945
debates on the inclusion of a special clause in the UN Charter to protect the pan-Amer-
ican arrangements Vandenberg quotes Leo Pasvolsky, a staunch "globalist" opposed
to the inclusion of such a clause, as arguing that we would act despite a veto in a Pan-
American dispute requiring force. 18
A regional organization offers the dominant power a basis for signaling "hands off'
to an external power and the means to achieve collective legitimization of actions it
wishes to take in the region. A mistake by one superpower in its estimates of the other
superpower's intentions is a potential source of nuclear holocaust. However, explicit
agreements on spheres of influence that might prevent such a mistake are taboo in
the current system. 19 In these circumstances regional organizations such as the OAS
or theWarsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) can serve as salient points for tacit warn-
ings between the superpowers. Second, in cases in which the United States feels that
its security interests compel it to intervene to maintain its sphere of influence it can
tum post hoc to the OAS for at least partial collective legitimization, and in the bargain
overgrantingOAS approval the Latin states are given at least a minor degree oflever-
age over the actual continued conduct of the intervention. 20
There are several possible costs of using a regional organization for maintaining a
sphere of influence. First, as occurred in the Dominican Republic affair, intervention

may appear to achieve legitimization primarily in the eyes of United States elites and
publics rather than in the eyes of elites and publics abroad. If changing military tech-
nology in the 1970's reduces the military security value of a sphere of influence 21 and
increased polycentrism further reduces the meaning of "Communism" and thus the
psychological or political loss we might incur from leftist revolutions in Latin America,
the existence of the OAS may lead to a considerable lag in the evolution of United
States domestic opinion behind the realities of the need for or the possibility of a sphere
of influence.
Second, spheres of influence tend to be unilateral impositions which may be re-
sented by smaller countries and some elites at home as well as abroad. If the United
States public believes in the legitimacy of OAS actions far more than the Latin Amer-
icans do, this may mislead United States decisionmakers and prevent them from
making necessary responses and adjustments that might alleviate such resentment
short of costly violence. As evidence of such asymmetrical perceptions of legitimacy
onecancitethedifficultywith which the OAS has treated cases of alleged Communist
threat in the hemisphere and the refusal of the Latin states to allow the Organization
to develop any permanent or independent military capacity. 22 Nor is this situation
likely to change in what will probably be a period of increasing nationalism as eco-
nomic forces mobilize even greater proportions of the populations of Latin states in
the 1970's.
Containment
A second major foreign policy objective which the United States has pursued
through regional organizations has been the objective of "containment" -originally
of Soviet power, later broadened to containment of "Communism." Both economic
and military organizations have been used. Amongthelatterthe United States created
and participated in NATO-first the Treaty in 1949, then the highly developed Or-
ganization after the onset of the Korean War in 1950 -as a means of establishing a
credible commitment to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union. With
decolonization and increased focus on the power of the People's Republic of China
(Communist China) in Asia Secretary of State John Foster Dulles promoted the quasi-
regional Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), in which the United States was an observer,
and the quasi-regional SEATO,ofwhich the United States was anonregional member,
as a means of completing the ring around "the Communists." It has been suggested
that Dulles turned to these quasi-regional imitations of NATO because they were
easy to sell to Congress, because they were expected to allow easier access to weak
areas, and because they promised to limit American expense and responsibility. 28 In
any event, the opposition of neutralist Asian countries and their refusal to join made
the inadequacy of the quasi-regional pacts apparent even to Dulles, who soon limited
the United States commitment in SEAT0. 24
With theexceptionofNATO and the belated resurrection of SEATO for legitimiza-
tion purposes after the United States had run into increasing criticism of its Vietnam
policy, quasi-regional military "pactomania" proved to be a very brief phase in United
States policy. On the other hand, the objectives of containment have been pursued
through other forms of regional organization.
In Europe the United States supported the economic integration of the Six while
being cool to the ideas of a European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in part at least
because it was hoped that the former would lead to sufficient political integration to
support a defense capability that could become an equal partner ("the other end of a
dumbbell," in the image of the day) tied to the United States in the Atlantic alliance
half of a bipolar world. In Asia, after Dulles realized the failure of his pacts to attract
neutral countries, which were then scheduled to meet at Bandung, the United States
turned briefly to the idea of a regional economic organization supported by United
States economic aid ("something like the OEEC") as a means of keeping Communist
influence out of "the free arc of Asia." The regional organization aspect of the idea
wasdropped,however, after an unsuccessful conference in Simla, India, in May 1955,
at which the smaller Asian states proved reluctant to accept a regional body interfering
with their bilateral aid from the United States, particularly one that might be subject
to Indian or Japanese leadership. 25
More recently, the Johnson Administration turned to Asian regional organizations
ranging in scope from the Asian Ministers of Education to the Asian and Pacific Coun-
cil (ASPAC) as means of creating a sufficient sense of unity and common interest
among the countries bordering Communist China, so that they would no longer pre-
sent a "vacuum of power" into which the United States might be drawn, but could
become strong "partners" instead. 26 The United States hoped to reduce the burden
of containment by finding
in regionalism a new relationship to the world community somewhere between the over-
whelming responsibility we assumed in the early postwar years as we moved in to fill vacuums
of power and to deal with war devastation and a return to isolationism. 27
In assessing the benefits and costs of using regional organization as a tool for con-
tainment we cannot hope to settle differences of opinion over whether the goal of
containing the power of Communist China, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea), and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) in
Asia, and the goal of containing Soviet power in Europe are (or were) of equal (or any)
merit. We can, however, discuss the suitability of regional organizations as means to
those goals in the two settings.
The prime benefit of using military quasi-regional organizations for containment
is that by institutionalizing and preparing defense projects in advance the credibility
of the American connnitment to the protection of an area is underlined or enhanced
and thus so is the ultimate deterrent effect. However, United States membership in
an organization alone is not a sufficient guarantee of credibility. The quasi-regional
and poorly organized SEATO seems to have lacked credibility. Even in the highly
organized NATO, however, doubts about the credibility of the United States commit-
ment, even reinforced by the stationing of American troops, arose in some circles in
Europe, particularly after the Soviets obtained ballistic missiles capable of devastating
American cities while (despite various efforts at institutional engineering) NATO's
important nuclear retaliation capacity remained firmly in unilateral American hands.
A second benefit of using the regional organization instrument is the creation of im-
proved channels of communication both through regular conferences and through
personal contacts that lead to "interpenetration of bureaucracies." A third benefit

of the regional military alliance is the legitimization of "leverage" over partners' de-
fense policies. Although this leverage has always been imperfect and depends on the
need to control German power (independent of the Soviet threat) it also tends to vary
with the degree of agreement in perception of the imminence and nature of the exter-
nal threat. Consequently, to the extent that it does vary with the external threat and to
the extent that detente progresses and the international system becomes less bipolar
in the 1970's, the benefits sought through regional military organization are less likely
to be available.
The costs of the regional organization instrument are the obverse of its benefits.
Influence is a double-edged weapon and the need to work through an organization
may constrain America's freedom of policy. According to William and Annette Fox,
United States membership in regional alliances
has somewhat inhibited its policy from diverging radically from that of its partners, especially
when their support was sought for American-defined purposes. 28
On the other hand, in some cases, when the United States has changed its policy be-
causeofitsperceptionofthe security situation, the result has often been to exacerbate
relations with our partners. Changes in NATO strategy have tended to be American-
led and have not always been well received in Europe. 29 It is instructive of the costs
of this type of regional military organization in a period of diminished external threat
that former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's flexible defense doctrine of
1962led to concern among Europeans who feared that it might weaken the nuclear
deterrent. Ironically, this United States doctrine was not officially accepted by the
NATO Council untill968, after the departure of France had contributed to its obso-
lescence.
The prime benefit of the nonmilitary regional organization as an instrument of
containment has been the prospect of diminishing the burden on the United States
both economically and in terms of American domestic political costs. The theme has
been prominent since the early debates on United States support for European re-
gional organization as well as in the more recent Asian policy statements of the Johnson
Administration. There is the additional benefit that these economic and functional
organizations may be the only means available for a containment policy in situations
where local sentiment for nonalignment makes bilateral or regional military alliances
with outside powers unpopular. 30
The greatest cost of this policy is the risk of misperception of reality through the
"telescoping of time" -a failure to take fully into account the length of the stages
involved. The future image of a cohesive region capable of self defense may be sub-
stitutedforthedivisivecurrent reality, and the regional organization becomes a token
or symbol that helps obscure a more accurate perception of reality. While it is true that
political or cultural regional organizations may help establish a sense of regional
identity, the type of integration or organizational structure that can be built on iden-
tity alone tends to be "token integration at the international level"- helpful but hardly
sufficient as a basis for containment. It is also true that regional economic organizations
can unleash a number of dynamic forces which can bring about a "spillover" into a
higher level of integration in an area. There are difficulties with this, however, as a
basis for containment policy. Although we are still at an early stage in our knowledge
in integration theory, there are both theoretical reasons and practical evidence to
cause one to be wary about the extent of these forces outside of the Western European
context. 31 Moreover, even in Europe the rate at which economic integration might
lead to a level of political integration that would entail a common defense capability
seems to be much slower than was expected in the 1950's.
In short, the failure to see how very long the short run really is may obscure a full
realization of the problems involved in using nonmilitary regional organizations as
more than a minor instrument in containment; and this may lead to underestimation
of the costs of continuing a containment policy in the international system of the
1970's.
Economic development
A third major foreign policy objective for which the United States has used regional
organizations as an instrument has been economic development, first in the recon-
struction and expansion of the Western European economies, later in the various
parts of the less developed world. 32 There were two distinct aspects of United States
support for regional economic organizations in Europe.
First, American support for regional economic organization in Europe was partly
out of belief in the greater economic efficiency, including greater competition in
larger-sized markets than those typical of European states. Its willingness, however,
to support regional protectionist abridgements of its universalist principle of most-
favored-nation treatment in international trade and its readiness to suffer trade di-
version were limited in Europe to "the Six," among which it was felt that the higher
levels of economic integration would contribute toward political objectives as well.
The second aspect of United States support for regional economic organization in
Europe had to do with the problems and tasks of allocating American economic aid.
The desire to avoid being caught in the middle of constant disputes over allocation
and a desire to avoid charges of domination were already reflected in the phrase in
George Marshall's famous speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, that a uni-
lateral plan would be "neither fitting nor efficacious." The result was the formation
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, charged with reaching
agreements from a regional point of view on recommended distribution of American
economic assistance. 33
The United States was slow to extend this approach to less developed areas. Despite
a rather beguiling remark by President Dwight D. Eisenhower that what was good for
Europe might be good for Latin Americans, too, United States economic orthodoxy in
the 1950's led to a cool reception for Latin American schemes for Latin regional eco-
nomic organizations. 34 By the end of 1958, however, some United States leaders
began to see the need to reappraise economic policy toward Latin America. (This
perception was later enhanced by Castro's revolution but actually antedated it.) 35 In
addition, the United States was faced with a concrete opportunity to assist the Central
American Common Market (CACM) which, after careful cultivation by the UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) throughout the 1950's, had signed its
first major trade integration treaty in 1958. The decision to break with former eco-
nomic orthodoxy was dramatized by the particularly obvious necessity for a larger
market among such tiny states and the alternative prospect of unending instability
in an area of primary United States security concern. Subsequently, the United States
Agency for International Development (AID) established a unique Regional Office
for Central America and Panama (ROCAP) and by 1967 had granted some $100
million in support of regional projects. 36
Support for regional economic integration became accepted verbal policy after the
1961 Charter of Punta del Este that launched the Alliance for Progress. As Miguel S.
Wionczekhas argued, however, its peripheral priority before the 1967 Punta del Este
summit conference, at which the United States committed itself to support a Latin
American common market to be formed by 1985, meant that a variety of counter-
vailing private and bureaucratic interests frequently prevailed in practice. 37
In addition to support for Latin American economic integration the United States
has experimented with and is a member of other forms of economic regional organi-
zation, such as: the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in which the staff is
predominantly Latin American though the capital is North American; the Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (ClAP), based in part on the model
of OEEC, which carries out multilateral studies of country programs designed (albeit
somewhat imperfectly in practice) to be of assistance in the allocation of economic
aid; and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) which after
the 1967 reforms of the OAS Charter which reoriented the OAS toward economic
questions was raised to coequal status with the political Council.
In United States policy toward Mrica a convergence of Congressional concern over
the dangers of overcommitment, which led to imposition of a legislated limit on the
number of countries to which development assistance loans could be granted, and a
growing concern within the American administration with economic effects of the
proliferation of tiny Mrican states, led to a redirection of the AID program toward
promotion of regional economic organization. The catalyst for the change was the
Korry Report, 38 commissioned and received by President Johnson in 1966, which
will lead to some 40 per cent of United States aid to Africa for regional purposes. 39
In Asia renewed emphasis on regional economic projects, in particular United
States support since 1965 for the Asian Development Bank, was stimulated originally
by the political difficulties that America encountered over its Vietnam policy 40 (~t
ness President Johnson's 1965 speech at]ohns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Mary-
land). Subsequently, however, the potential economic effects of the organization, as
well as the prospect of getting Japan more involved in the region, have grown in
importance.
A major benefit of supporting organizations involved in regional economic inte-
gration orregional services is simple economic efficiency. Some ninety less developed
countries have populations under 15 million; sixty have markets under 5 million. At
low levels of per capita income these population figures represent markets which can
support only a limited range of efficient industry which the countries are bent on
having for political reasons. Some such states are hard pressed to support a full panoply
of services that go with sovereign status. The availability of this benefit is limited, of
course, by the difficulty of promoting regional integration among less developed

countries referred to above. In some cases atleast, an outside catalyst or source of funds
can increase the perception of regional economic cooperation as a non-zero sum game
involving an expanding pie, and thus may make a useful contribution.
A second benefit involves those regional economic organizations, including devel-
opment banks, which are involved in the distribution of aid resources. As the giving of
aid can sometimes appear demeaning and frequently involves considerable partic-
ipation in domestic processes, the use of regional organizations may provide a means
for recipient countries "to diminish their dependence and to increase the dignity of
their position while accepting the international ties required." 41
The potential costs of using regional economic organizations for aid to economic
development are the obverse of the benefits. Regional economic agreements may
merely establish uneconomic industrial protection and only slightly reduce ineffi-
ciency; divert resources and attention away from other (e.g., agricultural) uses; and
institutionalize the inefficiency in a way that may make it difficult to unscramble
later. Thus far these costs are mainly hypothetical, though there are some signs of
them in Central America. 42 The costs of using regional institutions in the allocation of
aid may be a loss of efficiency by the donor as well as a diminution of leverage in return
for gains in dignity and cooperation which prove to be only minimal, for, as John
Montgomery remarks, in this field "it is doubtless easier to give than to receive." 43 The
experience of ClAP thus far has not been wholly encouraging, and some African states
have complained about United States regional aid policies. 44
Whether the benefits of aiding economic development through regional organiza-
tions will exceed the costs will depend on levels of protection and capacity to cooperate
in particular cases. Thus far the benefits seem far greater than the costs. Some diffi-
culties may arise in the future, however, between the more protectionist Latin Ameri-
can vision and the generally liberal United States perception of a Latin American
common market. On the other hand, the rationality of the policy in the 1970's will not
be reduced if detente progresses and the need for political alignment leverage in the
aid relationship decreases.
Conflict prevention and management

A fourth major foreign policy objective for which the United States has used re-
gional organizations is the prevention and management of conflict. This policy in-
cludes two aspects: the use of regional organizations to promote "integrative solu-
tions" in which parties are able to resolve an existing dispute by agreeing on upgrading
a third or common interest; and "peacekeeping" in which no "common interest" is
found but pressure is put on the parties by outside conciliators, or intervening forces,
to cease fighting. In regard to the latter type of capacity the OAS, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), and the Arab League were relatively successful in playing an
independent role in dampening conflicts between their members in eleven out of
twenty-<>ne cases, not counting ones they did not try to handle. Two-thirds of the
successes, however, were achieved by the OAS where American leadership and logis-
tic capacity played a crucial role. 45 Moreover, nearly all of the OAS cases concern the
micro-states of the Caribbean area rather than the larger states of South America,
and there are grounds to believe that future OAS capacity in this role may be more
limited than it was in the past. 46 Outside the Western Hemisphere American policy
has employed UN peacekeeping procedures with the exception of a futile effort to use
NATO in the Cyprus dispute. Although former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has
applauded the performance of the OAU,and testified to Congress that United States
supportforregionalinstitutions in Africa "has to do with their ability to settle disputes
among themselves," 47 it is almost impossible to detect this concern as an operational
criterion among AID officials involved in implementing the policy.
On the other hand, the United States has frequently turned to regional organization
in hopes of providing "integrative solutions" to disputes in several areas. A strong and
consistent motive for American support for "small Europe" of the Six has been the
concern with "integrating" Germany and France and providing a context for success-
ful resolution of traditional conflicts such as the Saar dispute settled in 1955. United
States support of the Central American Common Market is an example of another
successful case. 48 On the other hand, attempts at promoting regional organizations as
a means toanintegrativesolutionoftheMiddleEasternsituationhave been unsuccess-
ful. 49 Similarly, President Johnson's 1965 announcement of support for the Asian
Development Bank, a regional aid program, and the ensuing increased attention to
the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin seemed
motivated in large part by the futile search for an integrative solution to the Vietnam
imbroglio.
The benefits of a policy promoting either of the two types of use of regional organiza-
tion for resolution of local conflicts are quite obvious. The more easily a dispute can
be contained or resolved intraregionally, the less the likelihood of involving the super-
powers and the less the burden on the United Nations system.
The costs are of several types. First, there is the possibility that a regional organiza-
tion of which the United States is not a member might impose a solution intolerable to
an American ally or in the case of the OAU or the Arab League might use any incre-
ments to its "peacekeeping capacity" for peacebreaking against what it considers
intolerable regional enemies such as South Africa or Israel. Alternatively, the price
of effective and acceptable regional peacekeeping action by the OAS may be a degree
of United States initiative which may lead to resentment among Latin countries.
Second, the aid given to promote an integrative solution may have a cost in terms of
interference with other criteria for giving aid such as economic efficiency or political
alignment. If the probabilities of an integrative solution are very low, these costs may
outweigh the benefits.
The prospect in the 1970's of achieving success in enhancing the "peacekeeping"
capacity of regional organizations, particularly outside the Western Hemisphere,
might depend on continued detente and the capacity of the superpowers to agree to
limit their involvement in the regions concerned. On the other hand, the rationality
of a policy of promotion of regional integrative solution would be unlikely to be af-
fected by changes in the international system, except perhaps if there should be a
return to tight bipolarity in whichcasealignmentmight become an important criterion
for aid.
PROJECTING THE FUTURE

As we enter the 1970's, there is a fifth major interest that the United States could
pursue through regional organization that is of a different order of magnitude: en-
couragement of change in the structure of the international system in accord with a
newvisionofworld order. One can claim to see hints of this in past policy. For instance,
in some versions of the "Atlanticist" regional vision the creation of a unified Europe
was desired as a means to change rather than preserve the bipolar structure of pow-
er. 50 More recently, there were signs that the Johnson Administration was attempting
to develop a doctrine of regionalism as a means of reconciling global involvement
with a need to reduce "the burden that America has had to bear this generation." 51
This might be interpreted as a policy of creating regional balances of power from
which the United States as the stronger superpower could stand back. Analogous to
the United Kingdom's nineteenth-century European policy, the United States would
intervene only occasionally to right the scales. Critics have pointed out that such a
role is excluded in fact; for as long as containent in the ideological sense has priority,
America could only intervene on one side of the scales. 52 Many of the same critics,
however, agree with the idea of supporting autonomous regional organization as a
means of encouraging change in the international system.
Though the names and detailed descriptions of the current international system
vary, 53 there seems to be general agreement that it is characterized by bipolarity in
the basic structure of military power but by much looser structures in the various func-
tional and geographic subsystems. A particularly interesting model that spells out the
political characteristics of the current system is the one constructed by Stanley Hoff-
mann. In Hoffmann's view the consecration of the nation-state (with UN membership
as a prime source oflegitimacy) and the change in the role of force, both because of the
potentional self-defeating costliness of an actual use of nuclear weapons and because
of the cost of ruling mobilized alien populations, have led to an "inflationary" type of
international system in which the maneuvers of small powers in the dominant poly-
centric layer are divorced from the ultimate (but muscle-bound) realities of military
nuclear power in the basic bipolar layer; and a possible multipolar layer has only begun
to emerge. In such a system milieu goals (the environment of the international system)
are more important than possession goals (direct territorial, economic, or other con-
crete interests); world politics becomes "internalized" as domestic problems are
linked with international forces, and the sources and types of power become more
diverse. "As the physics of power decline, the psychology of power rises." 54 Consider-
ations of prestige, informal penetration, and capacity to communicate effectively take
on added importance.
In Hoffmann's view of the future of this system the possible proliferation of small,
vulnerable, and thus unstable nuclear forces may present the superpowers with a
choice between costly policing or a retreat that would let the world disintegrate into
a series of jungles. The alleged benefits of certainty and control in a bipolar system 5 5
have already been greatly eroded by polycentrism and are likely to vanish completely
if there should be creeping nuclear proliferation. As a Great Power the United States
has an interest in preserving a degree of hierarchy in the system and in reducing the
current separation between the capacity of states to participate in world politics and
the responsibilities for world order which they are willing to undertake. The inflation-
ary system that allows weak states more freedom of action to use their power than
superpowers will likely lead to nuclear proliferation of the most dangerous kind. At
the same time the United States has an interest in increasing diversity, particularly
the emergence of China and the creation of an independent European power, for
multipolarity would increase diplomatic flexibility and allow the Great Powers to
devote more attention to each other rather than to policing their ideological "camps"
and being drawn by bipolarity into marginal conflicts. To help keep the international
system moderate and responsible the United States should encourage the creation of
separate hierarchies in the various functional areas of international relations; the
formation of an autonomus European power in world affairs; and the establishment
of autonomous regional organizations of the types that would involve local regional
powers in responsible leadership positions in economic, scientific, and peacekeeping
tasks in the rest of the world -all under the ultimate nuclear umbrella of two or three
superpowers and within thenormativestructureofthe United Nations and the various
global economic and functional agencies.
A possible objection to such a policy of support for regional organization as a means
of changing the structure of the international system might be made on the ground that
the setting of world politics of the 1970's will not be favorable to regionalism. In fact,
one's vision of the future of the international system depends upon the means one
chooses for projecting it. If we sketch the setting of the 1970's by projecting current
technological trends and their effects on defense considerations and economic trans-
actions, the setting may be uncongenial to regional organization. In Wohlstetter's
view,
the revolution in transport and commwrications casts doubt not only on the new isolationism of
a growing minority but also on the more respectable but rather mechanical regionalism that
may frequently be found in both the Democratic and Republican establishments: the grand
designs for Latin American common markets, Asian common markets, African wrions, eco-
nomic writies spanning the Middle East from Morocco to Afghanistan, and others. 56
More generally, one could argue that as the tight bipolar system of the 1950's has
loosened, some of the newly important subsystems have not had a regional basis. For
example, the recently politically important monetary subsystem with its Group of
Ten is nonregional, and the inclusion of Japan in the "Atlantic" Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964 may be typical of the future.
In a world of jumbo air freighters, giant supertankers, and large-scale data processing
that facilitates capital movements and multinational corporations, geographically
remote trading partners suchasJapanand the United States should be able to increase
mutual trade at least as rapidly as the regional European Economic Community
(EEC). In the defense field nuclear and missile technology has already reduced the
role of geographical distance in military security, and similar changes can be expected
to result from satellite technology. 57 In the view of Thomas Schelling a new type of
global geography may be taking over in which gravity, earth spin, and cloud cover
may become as important in the world of satellites as Suez or Gilbraltar were for
seapower. 58 In Wohlstetter'swords, "the upshot of these considerations of technology

in the 1970's is that basic interests in safety will extend further out than they ever
have before." 59
Thus one could conclude that a foreign policy for the 1970's that places heavy em-
phasison thepromotionofregional organizations will be mistaken because technolog-
ical trends indicate that the most important international systems of interaction-
whether economic or military-will not be regionally based. Such a conclusion would
be somewhat premature, however, for the early 1970's. Despite falling transport
costs geography will still have an impact on price. Despite missile and satellite tech-
nology local and conventional defense techniques will remain relevant. Moreover,
some technological changes may encourage regional organization. Communications
technology may make possible direct and inexpensive regional communications in
areas like Latin America or Africa where intraregional communications now often
have to go through New York, London, or Paris. In addition, inexpensive breeder
reactors may lead to nuclear proliferation of a type that encourages disengagement
by distant powers eager to minimize their risks, as Hoffmann argues.
If,insteadof projecting the setting of the 1970's on the basis of technological effects
on transactions and the geography of defense we predict the continuation of a number
of the political features of the current system, we get a very different picture of the
potential favorableness of the setting for regional organizations. We can extrapolate
from Hoffmann's model of the current system a number of the political characteristics
that could provide statesmen with incentives to tum to regional organizations as
useful tools for a variety of purposes.
1) With the diversification of power the prestige of regional leadership can become
a useful symbol of power as the foreign policies of France, Ethiopia, and the United
Arab Republic indicate in the EEC, the OAU, and the Arab League.
2) With the increased importance of domestic populations in world politics, yet
the enhanced legitimacy of national sovereignty, regional organizations may provide
an opportunity to appeal over the heads of governments to societal groups in other
states (despite the sovereignty clauses often written in the charters) as the successful
and unsuccessful efforts of the Ivory Coast and Ghana to influence their neighbors
through the Conseil de l'Entente and the OAU demonstrate.
3) With the devaluation of military force traditional military alliances may be less
attractive, but statesmen still feel the need to draw lines and introduce even a faint
element of predictability into their search for security by political alliances under the
guise of regional organization-witness ASPAC and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations.
4) With the predominance of milieu goals over possession goals regional organiza-
tions may be useful tools for shaping conditions beyond one's national boundaries,
whether it be the creation of more favorable conditions for economic development
aid, the establishment of regional balances of power, or a group's assertion on the
world scene of its collective identity.
5) Finally, with the increased importance of communications and signals regional
organizations may be useful as "no trespassing" signs or "firebreaks" that will help
to avert confrontations in a refragmented world, either between the superpowers
(e.g., the OAS and the Warsaw Pact) or between the weak (e.g., the OAU) and the
superpowers.
In short, as long as the international system of the 1970's maintains certain features
of the current structure, there will be a number of political incentives for the use of
regional organizations despite an ambiguous balance in the long-run technological
trends. Thus regional organization appears to be neither the "automatic" trend of the
1970's as some enthusiasts suggest nor a relic of the 1950's as the skeptics seem to
imply. At best the projected setting is ambiguous and thus enhances the room for
policy choices.
CHOICES ABOUT THE FUTURE

Simplified debates over "regional vs. global organization" are not very enlightening.
Not only are these not the only alternatives (there is also bilateralism) but most of the
policy goals outlined above require a mixture of approaches. Choices must be made,
however, aboutthepropermixture, and occasionally decisions must be made between
regional and global organization or between types of regional organization. We have
already mentioned the choice of the OAS over the UN in the field of hemispheric
security.
In the field of trade policy the United States allowed the meaning of Article 24 of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to be compromised in the 1950's
because of its belief in the beneficial political effects of European regionalism. 60
Similar conflicts might arise in the trade policy field over a large but partial European
trade agreement if that appeared to be the only way to associate the EFTA countries
with the EEC and over the question of special hemispheric trade preferences for
Latin America if the global United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) scheme fails. 61
In the security field conflicts may arise between the pursuit of detente and the
maintenance of NATO or over the value of autonomous European organization, such
as occurred in the recent dispute over whether the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EURATOM) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be
responsible for inspection in Europe under a nonproliferation treaty.
The outcome of such decisions will depend on the extent to which one decides to
promote autonomous regional organizations as a part of a long-run vision of world
order. This in turn depends on the probabilities involved in creating such an order.
We have argued above that on the basis of technological and political projections the
probabilities are ambiguous. In these circumstances a sense of timing becomes the
crucial factor for policy. While it is useful to have a clear vision at a high level of ab-
straction, a policy of promoting autonomous regional organizations must not be ap-
plied in doctrinaire fashion to all regions at all times in the same way.
Even if the creation of autonomous regional organizations without United States
membership or control is an appropriate goal for the end of the 1970's, too rapid an
implementation (e.g., an early American withdrawal from NATO or the OAS) or too
premature an implementation (e.g., "an Asian common market" modeled on the
EEC) couldhaveoppositeeffectsfrom those intended. Future organizational potential
must not be mistaken for current capacity. The important question is whether in the
early 1970's the various types of autonomous regional organizations (with the possible
exception of Western European organizations) can become sufficiently strong to bear
the burden that is expected of them. As we have argued above, the peacekeeping
record of organizations other than the OAS (in which the United States' membership
seems tomakewhat difference there is) has not been impressive to date. The capacity
of less developed countries to cooperate successfully in economic regional organiza-
tions with a scope broad enough to make a significant difference to economic develop-
mentor the promotion of integrative solutions has been limited thus far to two some-
what shaky cases, the East African Common Market and the Central American
Common Market. The management of regional balances of power under conditions
of proliferation of vulnerable nuclear forces (e.g., potentially the Middle East) involves
a complexity of considerable and possibly dangerous dimension. In short, policy-
makers may wish to encourage regional organization in accord with a long-run vision
when the costs are low butshouldnot necessarily opt for the regional alternative when
the costs in terms of other goals are high.
Not only must an American policy on regional organization in the 1970's take ac-
count of problems of timing; it should also be based on a clear perception of potential
conflicts between goals. The five foreign policy goals examined above are not always
complementary. Unless this problem is clearly perceived and priorities are deliber-
ately chosen, one goal may have costs in terms of another that nullify its benefits. We
have already noted the conflict between regionalism for ideological containment and
regionalism for the creation of a series of autonomous balances of power. In some
ways the regional organizations we have created in Asia seem designed to prevent a
Chinese sphere of influence. Containment may also conflict with a policy of support
for regional organization for economic development or for integrative solutions-
witness the 1967 American volte-face on a Mekong Committee commitment after it
was felt that Cambodia had become too close to Hanoi. 62 "Containment" in the ideo-
logical sense might also make it difficult for the United States to continue regional aid
to an East Mrican or Latin American common market if one of the members under-
wenta "Communist coup." A policy of regionalism for local peacekeeping might have
costs in terms of regionalism for economic development if, for example, United States
financial aid to the OAU or United States training of Mrican army units for OAU
peacekeeping led to an expensive guerrilla compaign against Portugal and South
Africa.
In conclusion, the setting for regional organization in the 1970's will be neither as
clearly favorable as the enthusiasts nor as unfavorable as the skeptics predict. There
will be scope for choice in our policy. In such circumstances a long-run vision is im-
portant if we are to escape the mere perpetuation of past policies which are beginning
to lose their relevance. It is mildly ironic that the vision of a more flexible and moderate
international system toward which regional organization would contribute might
make the debates of 1945 over Chapter VIII 63 of the UN Charter relevant again. The
United States might well wish to "un-rewrite" the Charter and go back to a system of
Security Council approval (and potential United States veto) of regional organization
enforcement actions before the United States embarked on a policy of giving peace-
keeping aid to the OAU or the Arab League. And the United States might be willing
to pay the price that would have been unthinkable at the height of the Cold War, i.e.,
Security Council approval (and possible Soviet veto) of enforcement actions in the
American sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.
Long-run visions, however, are not sufficient basis for short-run policy, and a doc-
trinaire support for certain types of regional organization that would ignore problems
of timing and fail to make distinctions between different areas would be mistaken.
We cannot, in the early 1970's at least, escape the frustrations and expense of attempt-
ingtoprovideleadershipinorganizations like NATO and the OAS until other security
systems evolve for those areas. Similarly, though we may wish to promote autonomous
regional organizations for economic development and conflict prevention and man-
agement, the promotion of effective organizations of which we are not a member is
only in small part within our control. United States policy toward regional organization
in the 1970's should be informed by a long-term vision of an improved world order,
but we must be careful not to mistake organizational symbols and future hopes for
current reality.
1 See Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1954).
• According to William Manger when the Commercial Bureau was under the United States Secretary of
State, it was more like an American agency than an international organization. See Pan America in Crisis:
T1w Future of the OAS (Washington: PuWicAffairs Press, 1961), p. 3. •
3 I. Claude, Jr., European Organization in the Global Context (Brussels: Institut d'Etudes Europrennes,
1965),p. 8.
• SeeB.Boutros-Gali, Contributionaletudedesententesregionales (Paris: A. Pedone, 1949), p. 8
5 Claude, p. 9.
6 Cordell Hull, TheMemoirsofCordellHull (2 vols;NewYork: Macmillan, 1948), Vol. II, p.1646.
7 WilliamHardyMcNeill,America,BritainandRus&W(London:OUP,1953),p.323.Subsequently,when
outofpowerChurchillcalledfor European unity, butitwasnevercompletelyclearwhat he meant by "unity"
or how he saw Britain's relation to it. Nor did his actions upon his return to power clarify the issue.
6 See Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbour Policy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1961).
9 See Ruth B. Russell, with Jeannette E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of
the UnitedStates1940-1945 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1958), Chap. 27.
10 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
1952).
11 Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The OAS, the UN and the United States," International Conciliation, March 1964
(No. 547).
12 For instance, the longest distance between the capitals of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
members (11 ,500 miles) is only slightly less than the longest distance between the capitals of UN Members
(12,400 miles). We shall refer to such organizations as "quasi-regional."
13 Whitaker, p. 155.
14 Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organizations and the United Nations," International Organization,
May 1954 (Vol. 8, No. 2), p. 206.
15 W. W. Rostow, "Regionalism and World Order,"DepartmentofStateBulletin, July 7, 1967 (Vol. 57,
No. 1464), p. 69. (Originally a conunencement address at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont, June
12, 1967.)
16 PierreHassner, ChangeandSecurityinEurope. Part I: TheBackground(AdelphiPaper,No. 46) (Lon-
don: Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1968), p. 2.
17 See Claude, International Conciliation, No. 547.
16 Vandenberg, p. 189.
19 SeeinternationalHerald Tribune, September 14-15,1968:
"SecretaryofStateDeanRusksaidlastnightthattheSoviet Union, through military force, had established
and maintained a 'sphere of dominance' in Eastern Europe. He made the statement in categorically deny-
ing again,that the U.S. government ever had any 'spheres of influence' agreement or understanding with
Moscow.
•• See Jerome Slater, "The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of
American States and the Dominican Crisis," International Organization, Winter 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1), pp.
48-72.
21 For an argument that spheres of influence are becoming obsolete see Albert Wohlstetter, "illusions of
Distance," Foreign Affairs, January 1968 (Vol. 46, No.2), p. 250.
•• See John C. Dreier, "New Wine and Old Bottles: The Changing Inter-American System," International
Organization, Spring 1968 (Vol. 22, No.2), p. 485.
23 Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "A Re-examination of Regional Arrangements," Journal of International Affairs,
1955 (Vol. 9, No. 2), pp. 80-81.
.. See Louis Halle, TheColdWaraslnstory(London: Chattoand Windus, 1967),p. 304.
25 See Lalita Prasad Singh, Tlw Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia: A Study of Asian International
Organizations (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966), pp. 9-11. I am also indebted to Robert Den-
ham for the research on this point.
•• See Bruce M. Russett, "The Asia Rimland as a 'Region' for Containing China," in Public Policy, ed. by
JohnD.MontgomeryandAlbertO. Hirschman, Vol.16 (1967),pp. 226-249.
27 Rostow,DepartmentofStateBulletin, Vol. 57,No.1464,p. 69.
•• WilliamT.R.FoxandAnnetteB.Fox,NATOand tlwRangeofAmerican Choice (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967), p. 125.
•• See Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press,
1968), p. 52.
•• There may besomeareaswhere local regional military alliances will be politically acceptable and might
gain legitimacy through formation of a regional organization. See, for example, recent discussions between
Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia, (The Economist, Marchi, 1969 [Vol. 230, No. 6549], p. 28).
31 See Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement, International
Organization, Autumnl968 (Vol.22,No. 4),pp. 855-880; and JosephS. Nye, (ed.),InternationalRegional-
ism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).
•• In general, development has beenconceivedofprimarilyinits economic dimensions. For some evidence
that regional organization can have an effect on "political development" as well see J. S. Nye, "Regional In-
tegration and Political Development," International Development Review, September 1967 (Vol. 9, No.3),
pp.l7-19.
•• For details see Ernst H. van der Bengel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integra-
tion as a Concern ofAmerican Foreign Policy (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1966).
34 Eisenhower allegedly told a cabinet meeting in 1953:
"Youknow, wesithereandtalk,all toorarely,aboutonecommodityinonecountry, out of all the American
republics. YetwhenwespeakoftheaffairsofEurope, we talk on a totally different level. Unity, unity, unity:
We say it over and over. And we think back to Charlemagne.... But what is true for one continent should
be just as true for another."
(Quoted in Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of tlw Eisenhower Years [New
York: Atheneum, 1963], p. 145.) .
35 See Robert Harrison Wagner, Latin America and tlw Economic Policies of tlw United States (Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University, 1966), pp. 256-293.
36 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Central American Regional Integration," International Conciliation, March
1967 (No.562),pp.50-57. Three-fourths of United States aid to the area remained bilateral. See also James
D. Cochrane, "United States Attitudes Toward Central American Economic Integration," Inter-American
Economic Affairs, Autumn 1964 (Vol. 18, No. 2), pp. 73-91.
37 Miguel S. Wionczek, "Latin American Integration and United States Economic Policies," in Robert W.
Gregg (ed.), International Organization in tlw Western Hemisphere (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University
Press, 1968), pp. 91-156. He cites United States resistance to regional shipping and payments schemes as
examples. See also Christopher Mitchell, "Common Market- The Future of a Conunitment: Punta del Este
and After," Inter-AmericanEconomicAffairs, Winter 1967 (Vol. 2l,No. 3), pp. 73-87.
38 Edward M. Korry, former Ambassador to Ethiopia, was commissioned by President Johnson to recom-
mend how AID could contribute more effectively to African development.
39 See Anthony Astrachan, "AID Reslices the Pie," Africa Report, June 1967 (Vol. 12, No.6), pp. 8-15.
See also RobertS. Smith, "New AID Policies for Africa," Foreign Service ]ourna~ February 1968 (Vol. 45,
No.2), pp. 16-19.
40 PbilipGeyelin,LyndonB./ohnsonandt/wWorld(NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1966),pp.276-278.
41 W. W. Rostow, "The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics," Department of State Bulletin, April
5, 1965,p. 495. (Address made at the UniversityofFreiburg, Freiburg, West Germany, March 15, 1965.)
42 See Roger Hansen, Central American Regional Integration and Economic Development (Studies in
Development Progress, No.1) (Washington:NationalPlanningAssociation, 1967), Chap. V.
•• John Montgomery, "Regionalism in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of Southeast Asia" (Paper prepared
for the Wingspread Symposium on Southeast Asia, September 1965).
44 See RaUl, saez S., "The Nine Wise Men and the Alliance for Progress," International Organization,
Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 244-269. Also see The New York Times, May 14, 1967:
"The Guinean President made clear his opposition to multilateral or regional aid concepts.... He said
this would subject him to economic neo-colonialism by the former colonial powers, particularly France."
45 For details see Joseph S. Nye, International Regional Organizations (Boston: Little, Brown, forth-
coming).
•• See Dreier, International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2.

"U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, on HR. 7099, Foreign Assistance Act
of1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session,May4, 1967, p. 855.
•• Witness, for example, the 1968 resolution of the Honduras/El Salvador border incident. See VisiOn,
August 2, 1968.
•• Although an ironic sequel to the United States proposal in 1957 of a Middle Eastern development bank
was that the United States finally gave in on its resistance to creation of a similar instrument in this hemi-
sphere. See John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York:
Harper&Row[fortheCouncilonForeignRelations], 1962).
50 See Karl Kaiser, "The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System: The Problem of Theory," Journal of
Common Market Studies, June 1967 (Vol. 5, No.3), p. 413; also George W. Ball, The Discipline ofPower:
EssentialsofaModem World Structure (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), Chap. XV.
51 President Johnson, "Four Fundamental Facts of our Foreign Policy," Deparbnent of State Bulletin,
September 26, 1966 (Vol. 55, No. 1422), p. 453. (Address made at Lancaster, Ohio, September 5, 1966.)
52 Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (Atlantic Policy
Studies) (New York: McGraw-Hill [for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968), p. 67.
53 See for example Wolfram F. Hanreider, "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, September 1965 (Vol. 9, No. 3), pp. 299....'308; R N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multi-
polarity, and the Future," ibid., September 1966 (Vol. 10, No.3), pp. 314....'327; Oran R Young, ''Political
Discontinuities in the International System," World Politics, Aprill968 (Vol. 20, No.3), pp. 369....'392;
Hoffmann.
5' Hoffmann, p. 65.
55 See Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Sunnner 1964 (Vol. 93, No. 3), pp.
881-909.
56 Wohlstetter,ForeignAffairs, Vol. 46, No.2, p. 250.
57 See The Implications ofMilitary Technology in the 1970's (Adelphi Paper, No. 46) (London: Institute
for Strategic Studies, March 1968).
58 Speech to Foreign Policy Association, New York, May 1968.
59 Wohlstetter, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No.2, p. 252.
60 See Gerard Curz.on,Multilaterol Commercial Diplomacy: The GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade
anditsimpactonNationalCommercialPoliciesandTechniques(London:Michael]oseph,l965),Chap.IX.
61 For examples of the latter type of demand see J. W. Clark, Economic Regionalism and the Americas
(New Orleans, La: Hauser Press, 1966).
•• See John D. Montgomery, "The Political Decay of Foreign Aid," Yale Review, Autumn 1967 (Vol. 57,
No.1), pp. 1-15.
•• Chapter VIII of the Charter is entitled "Regional Arrangements."
SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS
The following is a selected list of textbooks, specialized studies, and mono-

graphs that can be used in conjunction with this book. This list is not exhaus-
tive by any means; it is offered as a guide to students and teachers to readily
available materials in the field of regional organizations.
Standard textbooks in general international organization that devote

major chapters or sections to regionalism:
Blaisdell, Donald C. ,International Organization (New York: The Ronald Press Com-
pany, 1966). Tiris is a traditionally-oriented text in general international organiza-
tion with separate chapters on regionalism.
Claude, Inis L. Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, 3rd. ed. rev. (New York: Random House,
Inc., 1964). Tiris is an excellent historical and analytical treatment of international
organization, with separate chapters on regionalism and functionalism.
Goodspeed, StephenS., The Nature and Function ofInternational Organization, 2nd
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1967). Here is another traditional text
similar to Blaisdell, above. This contains a very lengthy chapter on regionalism.
Jacob, Philip E. and Atherton, Alexine L., The Dynamics of International Organiza-
tion (Homewood, ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1965 ). This book is a problem-oriented,
general, international organizations text. Regions are intermingled with United
Nations organs according to functions, activities and goals.
Plano, Jack C. and Riggs, Robert E.,Forging World Order: ThePoliticsofinternational
Organization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967). This work deals mostly
with the United Nations but does include some discussion of regionals intermixed
withastudyofU.N. organs similar to the Jacob and Atherton text mentioned above.
U.S. foreign policy and regionalism:

Haas, Ernst B., Tangle of Hopes: American Commitments and World Order (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.].: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969). This is a general international relations
text with the emphasis upon American foreign policy goals and perceptions of world
politics. There are separate chapters on regional security arrangements and the
general American involvement with various regional economic organizations.
Texts and readers devoted to regionalism in general:

Cobb, Roger W. and Elder, Charles,International Community: A Regional and Global
Study. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970). This book is mainly
theoretical in scope.lt strives to synthesize data and concepts generated by various
approaches to the study of regionalism, such as functionalism, political culture,
communications theory and general systems analysis.
273
Grieves, Forest L., Supranationalism and International Adjudication (Urbana, ill.:

UniversityoflllinoisPress,1969). Thisisarecentandexcellentstudyofthefunction
of adjudication at the international level. The study covers the International Court
of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the
European Community.
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1968 ). This collection of readings is organized into four problem areas:
the relationships between regions and between regions and world government;
regional security arrangements; Western Europe; and the developing states.
Russett, Bruce M., International Regions and the International System (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Company, 1967). This work is very similar to the Cobb and Elder
book mentioned above. The book covers a wide range of variables-economic,
cultural, geographic, and political-in an effort to isolate groupings of states pos-
sessing potential for integration of some degree.
Singh, Manmohan, "Regional Development Banks," International Conciliation,
#576 Ganuary 1970). I think the monographs published by the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace are invaluable to the student of international relations.
This one is an excellent discussion of the major regional banks, including their
decision-making processes, capital structures and political problems.
Wionczek, Miguel (ed.), Economic Cooperation in Latin America, Africa and Asia:
A Handbook of Documents (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969). This is a
valuable collection of documents on virtually all economic organizations in the
developing areas of the world, including such recent developments as the move-
ments toward integration in the Andean region and in North Africa.
International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
and Company, 1966). The editorial staff of Doubleday and Company compiled
this reader, which was one of the first to appear on the topic of regionalism. It offers
a wide variety of theoretical and descriptive articles. The organizations covered,
inter alia, are the EEC, LAFTA, COMECON and the British Commonwealth.
Regionalism in the developed states of Europe and the Atlantic

region:
Beer, Francis A., Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance
Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State
University Press, 1969). Students of regionalism will appreciate the difficulty in
studying NATO at this time. The organization is undergoing extreme stresses and
potentially profound changes. This book is one of the best of the recent works on the
subject of NATO.
Bliss, Howard (ed.), The Political Development of the European Community (Wal-
tham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1970). This is a valuable collection
of treaties, reports, and statements by political leaders of Europe in regard to the
institutions of the European Community.
Clark, W. Hartley, The Politics of the Common Market (Englewood Cliffs, N,J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967). Here is a concise, but very thorough review of all of the
SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS 275
majorinstitutions of the EEC, the impact of interest groups upon the system, public
opinion and the growth of transnational, European political parties within the sys-
tem.
Deutsch, Karl W. and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967). This is a major study in the field of elite attitudes
toward European economic and military integration. This is the work with which
Dr. Inglehart contrasts his findings in the article which appears in this volume.
Feld, Werner, The European Common Market and the World (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967). Although Feld is primarily interested in trading
relationships between the Common Market and other major trading states and
groups, he also presents an excellent summary of the decision-making process of
the EEC, including an analysis of interest group activities.
Hovey, J. Allan, Jr., The Superparliaments: Interparliamentary Consultation and
Atlantic Cooperation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966). This work
covers the present structures and powers and potential growth of the various par-
liamentary bodies associated with the Western European Union, the Council of
Europe, the European Olmmunity and the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development.
Korbonski, Andrzej, "The Warsaw Pact," International Condliation, #573 (May
1969). Dr. Korbonski consistently fills the void in our understanding of the Eastern
European organizations. "TheWarsaw Pact" is an excellent review of the decision-
making processes and policies of the Soviet Bloc's military alliance.
Morrisson, Clovis C., Jr., The Developing European Law of Human Rights (Leyden,
The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1967). This is an excellent work on a little-known
topic, the European Court of Human Rights. In addition to discussing the rule
adjudication function, this book also contains valuable information concerning;
the use of the legal system in the function of socialization.
Regionalism in Africa and the Middle East:

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, "The Addis-Ababa Charter," International Conciliation,
#546 (January 1964). Although this study may be somewhat dated, it still is one of
the best summaries of the legal structure of the Organization of African Unity and
the events which led to its founding.
Cervenka, Zdenek, The Organization ofAfrican Unity and its Charter, 2nd ed., (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969). This is an excellent, recent, general re-
view of the organization. In particular, information relevant to the interest articu-
lation and aggregation, rule-making and rule adjudication functions can be found
in this study.
Green, R. H. and Krishna, K. G. V., Economic Cooperation in Africa-Retrospect
and Prospect (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). This is a survey of several
integrative movements in Africa through the mid-1960's. Contains materials perti-
nent to the study of interest articulation and aggregation, socialization and rule-
making.
Hazlewood, Arthur (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in
Economic and Political Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Several
essays are collected here that cover both national and international integration in
Africa. In addition to movements in Black Africa, there is also a study of North
African integration.
Macdonald, Robert W., The League of A rob States: A Study in the Dynamics of Re-
gional Organization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965). This is
perhaps the leading work on the Arab League. All functions except rule adjudica-
tion are covered in the materials presented in this book.
Regionalism in Latin America:

Ball, M. Margaret, The OAS in Tronsition. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1969 ). This is one of the most recent, major texts on the OAS, including the changes
made in the 1967 amendments.
Cochrane, James D., "The Politics of Regional Integration: The Central American
Case," Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. XII (The Hague, Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). Despite the recent war in Central America, the Central
American Common Market continues to make some progress. This is one of the
most recent, extensive studies made of this organization.
Gregg, Robert W., (ed.), International Organization in the Western Hemisphere
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1967). This is a collection of papers
delivered at the Third Maxwell Institute on the United Nations in 1966. Various
aspects of the inter-American system are covered.
Wionczek, Miguel (ed.), Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences and
Prospects (New York: FrederickA. Praeger, Inc., 1966). This collection of articles
covers the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Central American Common
Market and the Inter-American Development Bank. The authors include such
experts as Felipe Herrera, Raul Prebisch and Sidney Dell.
Regionalism in Asia and Southeast Asia:

Black, Eugene H., Alternative in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1969). The former president of the World Bank and advisor to President
Johnson pursues his ideas for regional development in Southeast Asia.
Gordon, BemardK., The Dimensions ofConflict in Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs,
N.].: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966). This is a thorough analysis of the economic, polit-
ical and military problems of the area. Much of this 1966 book served as the basis
for his Toward Disengagement in Asia, from which the excerpt in this reader was
taken.
Singh, L. P., The Politics of Economic Cooperotion in Asia: A Study of Asian Inter-
national Organization (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1966). This
is the best single, general survey of Asian political and economic integration.

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Regional International Organizations I Structures

Paul A. Tharp Jr.

AFF1LIATED PUBUSHERS: Macmillan & Company, Limited, London-also at Bombay, Calcutta,

SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS 273

To present several different regional organizations in a common framework, this

INTEREST ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION

the success or failure of international organizations than it is to the continued existence

INTEREST ARTICULATION AND

Interest group activities in the EEC

Professor Lindberg demonstrates how closely the pluralistic environment

Economic integration will lead to political integration only if it involves matters of

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

Industry 89 (excluding industries dealing with food and drink)

Nevertheless, a procedural consensus is well-developed in these two organizations,

Bureaucratic political activism in LAFTA

In Latin America, as is the case in muchofthe rest of the developing countries,

REGIONAL INTEREST GROUPS

TABLE 1. Evolutionofsectormeetings in LAFTA 1961-1964

Electronics 1 5 1963 yes ? Latin American Institute of Electric and

Source: Comercio Exterior, Monthly '1nforme de Ia ALALC".

TECNICOS AND CREATIVE ADAPTATION

important instrument of regional economic development" 20 -were frustrated. A

ADAPTATION, TECNICOS AND POLITICOS

trialist is concerned. While an alliance is certainly in the forefront of the technicians'

Radicals and moderates in theOAU: origins of

The following illustrates the traditional form of interest articulation and

INTRODUCTION: REFLECTIONS ON STUDYING INTER-STATE

KwameNkrumahas President of Ghana in 1966, Ghana was notorious for supporting

ORIGINS OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE OAU

THE OAU COMPROMISE CHARTER

RENEWED IDEOLOGICAL DISSENSION: THE

This resolution stated that regional or sub-regional groupings should be based on

EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING IDEOLOGICAL

A "Resolution on Decolonization and Apartheid," adopted by the Council of Min-

Rhodesia. Linked tothequestionofthe Liberation Committee's role, the Rhodesian

REASONS FOR COEXISTENCE

14 Colinl.egum,Pan-Africanism: AShortPoliticalGuide (New York: FrederickA. Praeger, 1962), pp. 41,

69 Ibid.,p.107.AndSomalia, whichhadbrokenrelationswith U.K. earlier. SeealsoECM/Res.13 (N).

An end to European integration?*

I. ATTITUDES AMONG WESTERN EUROPEAN YOUTH

TABLE 1. Overall percentage "strongly for" or "for" European unification

NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN

Adults 1962 87% 72% 81% (65%) 5

TABLE 2. Percentage "for" four proposals: adults v. youth

NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN

TABLE 3. Average percentage "for" four measures

NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN

Adults 73% 56% 62% 57%

TABLE 4. Average percentage "for" four measures, by age group

AGE GROUPS NETHERLANDS FRANCE GERMANY BRITAIN

55 andover 70% 47% 52% 49%

there is almost as great a change from middle-agers to teen-agers as in the case of

Typically,ageacrountsforlessthan5percentofthevarianceintheanswersfound. Within these

II. AGE, COHORT AND HISTORICAL PERIOD

Ill. DECAY OR STABILITY IN AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES?

community (which has experienced a relatively slowly changing political consensus

a. Absence of a major intra-European war from the younger individuals' exper-

IV. STABILITY OF ATTITUDES OVER TIME

TABLE 5. Percent of adults "for" efforts to unite Europe

SEPT. OCT. FEB. DEC. APR. OCT. JUNE FEB.

TABLE 6. Levels of support for integration proposals,

(FEB.) 1962 (FEB.) 1963

The Netherlands 78.5% 73.0%