The Case of India

Author(s): T. N. Madan
Source: Daedalus , Summer, 2003, Vol. 132, No. 3, On Secularism & Religion (Summer,
2003), pp. 62-66
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027861

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 T. N. Madan
The case of India
IJritish India was partitioned in 1947, at
the very moment the nation became in
dependent of England.1 Partition fol
lowed the failure, despite prolonged ef
forts, of the British government and the
Indian National Congress (the oldest
and largest organization of 'freedom
fighters') to convince the Indian Muslim
League (arguably the most representa
tive political body of Muslims) that -
notwithstanding the validity of separate
religious identities in their own context
- the political, economic, and social in
terests of all the peoples of British India
would best be served by establishing a
state based on the principle of a com
mon nationhood.
Since consensus could not be reached
and nobody wanted to prolong colonial
rule, a decision was made to divide the
country and to create, besides an inde
pendent India, the new state of Pakistan,
meant to be a homeland for the majority
T. N. Madan is professor of sociology emeritus at
the Institute of Economic Growth in Delhi, India.
He is the author of "Modern Myths, Locked
Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in In
dia" (1997) und "Pathways: Approaches to the
Study of Society in India" (1994), and the editor
of "Muslim Communities of South Asia : Cul
ture, Society, and Power" (1995) and "Religion
in India" (1991).
62 D dalus Summer 2003
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(about 75 percent) of the Muslims of the
subcontinent. Several hundred autono
mous Indian principalities were expect
ed to accede to one or the other new
state on the basis of territorial contiguity
and the religious composition of the
population. Much faster than most peo
ple expected, the process of 'integration'
of princely states was completed within
a year. Only the Muslim-majority Kash
mir state, which acceded to India in Oc
tober of 1947 following Pakistan's effort
to annex it by force, became a problem
that still awaits solution.
As soon as Pakistan was created, its
first head of state, Mohammed Ali Jin
nah (1876 -1948), who had led the move
ment for partition, quite ironically ar
gued for the creation of a secular state,
saying that religious identities were irrel
evant for citizenship rights. But this ex
cellent idea died with him a few months
later, and his successors proclaimed Pak
istan an Islamic state. And that is the
way it has remained ever since, although
not without controversies about the im
plications of this choice.
i As Nikki Keddie has noted in her paper in
this volume, recent scholarly contributions to
the debate on secularism in India (mostly but
not exclusively by Indians) have grown into a
large body of publications. In my reading of it,
this corpus comprises three distinct points of
view. What follows is a brief elaboration of the
same.

In India, by contrast, a more successful
variant of secularism emerged. That the
new nation's leader, Jawaharlal Nehru
(1889 -1964), an avowed secularist and
socialist, would opt for a secular state
was only to be expected. What is note
worthy is that its republican constitu
tion, promulgated in 1950, deliberately
avoided the terms 'secularism' and 'sec
ular state.' It rather depended upon
clearly worded provisions guaranteeing
equality of citizenship rights and free
dom of conscience and protecting the
cultural and educational rights of reli
gious minorities.2 Incidentally, an
amendment in 1976 added the words
'secular' and 'socialist' to the characteri
zation of India as a democratic republic
in the preamble of the constitution.
In the years immediately after the
trauma of partition, religious toleration
and secularism were regarded in India as
self-evident verities. The dismay over
violent religious conflict did not, howev
er, mean that Indians turned their back
on religious belief and practice anymore
than the Europeans did in the wake of
the wars of religion in the seventeenth
century. There was a tension between
secularization and religiosity, however.
Eleven years after independence, Nehru
told Andr? Malraux that the two greatest
problems he had faced as a nation
builder were "Creating a just society by
just means... [and] a secular state in a
religious society. "3
Nehru himself was an agnostic, and
his overall assessment of the role of reli
gion in human history was negative. He
considered the cultivation of scientific
temper and the technological approach
2 T. N. Madan, "Freedom of Religion," Eco
nomie and Political Weekly 38 (11) (15 March
2003): 1034-1041.
3 Quoted in Andr? Malraux, Antimemoirs (Lon
don: Hamish Hamilton, 1968), 145.
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The case
essential to the making of a modern
of India
society,4 but he knew that his mentor,
Gandhi, a man of religion par excellence,
had a deep rapport with the people, and
considered respect for all religious faiths
the first principle of a good society. Oth
ers whose advice Nehru respected, most
notably the eminent philosopher S. Rad
hakrishnan who became the country's
second president, also maintained that
an India bereft of religiosity was incon
ceivable and that, therefore, an Indian
concept of religious pluralism had to be
elaborated. Pursuantly, and perhaps in
his own mind as a temporary measure,
Nehru defined the secular state as one
"which honours all faiths equally and
gives them [their followers] equal op
portunities."5 His admiration for Lenin
notwithstanding, he abjured the Leninist
and Kemalist paths of coercion.
lNehruvian secularism developed
cracks as one-party dominance in In
dian electoral politics declined through
the 1960s. In the years that followed,
India moved in the direction of a multi
party state, governed in different regions
and at different times by secularist par
ties on the left as well as communal par
ties (with their membership drawn
exclusively or primarily from one reli
gious community) on the right. In the
middle, the Congress Party vacillated
and showed a willingness to accommo
date the interests of one religious com
munity or another, and to otherwise in
dulge in opportunist politics, in order to
stay in power.
4 T. N. Madan, Modem Myths, Locked Minds :
Secularism and Fundamentalism in India (New
Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1997), 238 - 247.
5 S. Gopal, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru : An Anthology
(New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1980),
330-331.
D dalus Summer 2003 63
T.N.
Madan Things came to a head in the early
on 1980s when Hindu revivalism, Muslim
secularism separatism, and Sikh fundamentalism
& religion gained salience, mutually reinforcing
one another through a convergence of
political, economic, and social stresses.
The churning of politics was soon
matched by more widespread ideologi
cal controversies.
While some secularist intellectuals in
the Nehruvian mold called for a reasser
tion of the principles of the Enlighten
ment (including scientific temper as well
as the primacy of science and technology
as instruments of social transforma
tion), others boldly questioned these
principles, drawing attention to the
flawed character of 'the modernity proj
ect' and advocating the revival of tradi
tional cultures. Ashis Nandy wrote in
1988 about the importance of "the recov
ery of a well-known domain of public
concern in South Asia - ethnic and, espe
cially, religious tolerance - from the heg
emonic language of secularism."6
A year earlier I had argued that the
idea of privatization of religion, which is
central to the ideology of secularism,
had succeeded in the West because of
certain antecedent developments within
Christianity itself, most notably the Ref
ormation. But the acceptance of this idea
was problematic in India because the
country's major religious traditions did
not assume any radical antinomy be
tween the sacred and the secular. As I
have said, secularism in South Asia, un
derstood as interreligious understanding
and the equality of citizenship rights,
could succeed only if we "take both reli
gion and secularism seriously, and not
reject the former as superstition and re
6 Ashis Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and
the Recovery of Religious Tolerance," repub
lished in Ashis Nandy, Time Warps : The Insistent
Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts (New Delhi :
Permanent Black, 2001), 61.
64 D dalus Summer 2003
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duce the latter as a mask for communal
ism or more expediency."7 In effect, I
was advocating a religio-secular society
of the sort described by Martin Marty.
Ignoring significant differences be
tween my position and Nandy's, some
secularist critics castigated us for hold
ing views that, they said, could only pro
vide support to the proponents of Hindu
political and cultural domination who
take shelter under the abstract principle
of equality of rights that could, given
that Hindus account for nearly two
thirds of India's population, only mean
permanent majoritarianism. The point is
not that my position or Nandy's is im
mune to criticism, but that the secular
ists apparently claimed that privilege for
themselves; for them, secularism is sim
ply India's destiny.
As it happened, Partha Chatterjee (the
third contributor to the secularism
debate in India mentioned by Nikki Ked
die) pointedly asked in 1994 if secular
ism is "an adequate, or even appropriate,
ground on which to meet the political
challenge of Hindu majoritarianism"
because "the Hindu right... is perfectly
at peace with the institutional proce
dures of the 'Western' or 'modern
state.'"8 The best way to protect minori
ty cultural rights, which are a central
concern of Indian secularism, Chatterjee
suggested, is toleration "premised on
autonomy and respect for persons" but
made "sensitive to the varying political
salience of the institutional contexts."9
While the upholders of the orthodoxy
of the 1950s continue to consider every
7 T. N. Madan, "Secularism in its Place," The
Journal of Asian Studies 46 (4) (1987) : 759.
8 Partha Chatterjee, "Secularism and Toler
ance," in Rajeev Bhargava, ed., Secularism and its
Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1998), 345-346.
9 Ibid., 375

attempt to carry the debate forward as
an attack on secularism, others have
moved ahead in several directions. As I
have already mentioned, close attention
is being paid to the issue of minority
rights. It has been suggested that the
notion of toleration is inadequate and
that the state should be required to put
in place supportive structures that
enable minorities to prosper like any
body else without losing their cultural
identity.10 Others worry that this will
delay the emergence of a common civic
identity.11
uome Indian social theorists have ar
gued that the term 'secularism' has ethi
cal and political varieties : the former
variety " seeks the separation of religion
from politics by virtue of the contribu
tion it makes to the realization of some
ethical ideal" ; the latter seeks the same
separation but "merely because it makes
for a more livable polity."12 For political
secularism, "the right is prior to the
good" ; "it merely provides a way of liv
ing together, not a way of living together
well," which too is affirmed as a valid
project.13
It has been contended that in view of
its multiple connotations, secularism
has always been a fuzzy idea in India.
Earlier, ambiguity was considered its
strength, but many now believe that its
vagueness is a poor foundation for clear
?o Neera Chandhoke, Beyond Secularism : The
Rights of Religious Minorities (New Delhi: Ox
ford University Press, 1999).
11 Mukul Kesavan, Secular Common Sense (New
Delhi: Penguin Books, 2001).
12 Rajeev Bhargava, "What is Secularism For?"
in Bhargava, ed., Secularism and its Critics, 492.
13 Ibid., 498,508-509.
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The case
headed public policies. This in effect is a
of India
call to the Indian state to discharge its
responsibility to govern firmly and im
partially within the four walls of its con
stitution. After the Gujarat carnage of
early 2002, one can no longer be sure
that a blatantly partisan, although elect
ed, government will not bend the insti
tutions of the state to serve party objec
tives rather than to protect and promote
the common interests of the citizenry.
There is an urgent need to keep the state
itself under watch, lest "the war of all
against all" be unleashed under its aus
pices.
The institutions of civil society - espe
cially voluntary associations, which can
express general concerns, provide the
means for collective action, and mediate
between citizens and primary groups -
have a constructive role to play in fur
thering the goals of a tolerant society.
This role is perhaps best illustrated by
current controversies about religious lib
erty.
India's constitution grants citizens as a
fundamental right the freedom to "pro
fess, practice and propagate" their faiths.
The right of propagation has turned out
to be a thorny issue in the context of
mass conversions from Hinduism and
tribal religions to Buddhism, Christiani
ty, and Islam. The role of foreign mis
sionaries and funding has been high
lighted and even exaggerated by the
Hindu Right. Attempts by some of the
states of the Union of India to put severe
limitations on conversions - including
the assignment of district-level bureau
crats and judicial officers to determine if
force, fraud, or allurement has been em
ployed to effect the conversions - have
been criticized as a frontal attack on reli
gious liberty. It is arguable that citizens
groups backed (but not controlled) by
the state may be the best guarantors of
D dalus Summer 2003 65
T.N.
Madan freedom of conscience and the best pro
on moters - through educational, cultural,
secularism and other initiatives - of the secular
& religion ethos mentioned above.14
A serious problem in this context is
that some communities may contend
that religious liberty entails a plurality of
personal laws or civil codes. Indeed,
Muslims, the largest minority at 12 per
cent, have taken this stand. Needless to
say, such a stance jeopardizes those com
mon bonds of citizenship that are a criti
cal component of secularism.15
Despite the political difficulties it now
faces, secularism remains a primary
term in Indian political discourse today.
Communalism (or religious national
ism) and fundamentalism are defined
negatively in opposition to it. Those who
would go beyond secularism consider it
a benchmark.
Limitations of space preclude a discus
sion of 'fundamentalism' here, but I
share Henry Munson's distrust of the
term and its tendency to produce "an
arbitrary and misleading sense of unifor
mity." This is best illustrated, as he
points out, by the misidentification of
Hindu religious nationalism (which is
on an aggressive course) as fundamen
talism. But Hinduism does not have a
core revealed text comparable to the
Bible and the Koran. And the propo
nents of the ideology of Hindutva have
so far shown far more interest in the cul
tural and political domination of non
Hindus than in the religious life of
Hindus.

14 Madan, "Freedom of Religion," 1038.

15 John H. Mansfield, "Religious and Charita

ble Endowments and a Uniform Civil Code" in
Gerald J. Larson, ed., Religion and Personal Law
in Secular India (New Delhi : Social Science
Press, 2001).

66 D dalus Summer 2003

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