University of Hawai'i Press

Inside/Outside: Merleau-Ponty/Yoga
Author(s): Sundar Sarukkai
Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 459-478
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400273
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INSIDE/OUTSIDE: MERLEAU-PONTY/YOGA

SundarSarukkai
ofScienceUnit,National
Philosophy ofAdvanced
Institute Studies, Institute
Indian
ofScienceCampus,Bangalore

The binaryof insideand outsideis a consequenceof a dualityinherent in many

philosophical traditions. that and
Anyphilosophy critiques attempts go beyond to
thisdualityof transcendence and immanencehas to deal withthesenotionsin a
radically different way. It is pertinent to noteherethatarticulating a philosophical
concept of a 'side' is itselfproblematical. What I intend to do here is to reflect on the
notionof 'inside'froma phenomenological standpoint. I believe that this is most
clearlymanifested inthespace whereyogaand phenomenology meet.
Among the phenomenological traditions in Western philosophy, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty's thematization of the body and the world allows for a more complex
understanding ofinsideand outside.Buteven in hisphilosophy thereis a recurring
ambiguity intheuseofinside/outside. Inthefirst sectionofthisarticle, I discusscertain
explicituses of these terms in Merleau-Ponty's writings. While his philosophy appar-
ently forecloses the of
possibility understanding the 'in' and 'out' as polar elements, his
of
explicitusage inside/outside, inner/outer, and other synonymous terms needs tobe
clarified.Alongwiththisis hisrepeatedreference to dimensionality, thickness, cor-
and
poreality, depth-terms that seem to rephrase this in/out dichotomy. Itis not clear
whether theserephrasings add clarity to thefundamental ambiguity oftheseterms.
Although such an is
ambiguity seemingly alwayspresent, I believe thatit is
possibleto continueto use termslike insideand outsideeven while working
from'within'Merleau-Ponty's philosophy-ifa phenobnenological readingofyogic
practices(essentially isanas and praniayma) is allowed into his discourse. I will
argue forthis positionbythematizing notion the of 'inner body' without the neces-
saryconsequenceofgivingintothetranscendent/immanent duality.I willarguethat
itis thephenomenological experienceofdimensionality, a termcommonly used by
him,thatshouldbe identified withthe'inside'.Thisconclusionis further reinforced
through a phenomenological understanding ofthepracticeofyoga.Yoga, particu-
larlyHatha Yoga, in itsemphasison techniquesof body controland breathing,
allowsfora richphenomenological interpretation oftheinnerbody.The emphasis
on the innerbodyalso leads us to considerthecategoriesofeatingand breathing
alongthetrajectory ofphenomenological experiences. Thepossibility of'perceiving'
theinnerbodythrough theseyogicmethods an
suggests additionto Merleau-Ponty's
examplesof'reversibility', namelythereversibility ofconsuming/consumed.
Inside and Outside in Merleau-Ponty
A close readingof the chapter "The Intertwining-TheChiasm" in his book The
Visible and the Invisible,and some workingnotes in the same book, highlightsa

PhilosophyEast & West Volume 52, Number4 October 2002 459-478 459
? 2002 by University
of Hawai'i Press

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 fundamental ambiguity in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy ofthebody.'Thishas to do
withthethematization ofdimensionality and relatednotionslikecorporeality, depth,
inside,and outsidewithrespecttothebody,theworld,andtheirphenomenological
implications.
On theone hand,termslikeinner,outer,inside,outside,interiority, and exteri-
oritymay seem to negateMerleau-Ponty's philosophy about the of
unity thebody
and theworld.Insideand outside,forexample,musthave a reference pointor a
boundary through which theyget defined as such. The problem with usinga term
like'outside'lies in Merleau-Ponty's viewthatthebodyis theworldand theworld
thebody:"Wherearewe to putthelimitbetweenthebodyandtheworld,sincethe
worldisflesh?"2According tothisview,itwouldbe incorrect to lookattheworldas
being outside the body. 'Outside' seems to a
imply rigid demarcation betweenthe
thing and the surrounding world. This is exactly what he is arguingagainst.Is it
therefore possible to talk of an 'inner' body without the implication thattheworld
and thebodyareseparate?
The needto addresstheissueoftheinnerbodybecomesclearerwhenwe con-
siderMerleau-Ponty's shifting reference to thenotionsofinside/outside, dimension-
ality,corporeality, and
thickness, depth. It does seem that in places uses these
he
words'synonymously' withone another. Amongthese,dimensionality playsan im-
portant role. The of
dimensionality body the is what makes itvisible,as muchas it
is the dimensionality of thingsthatallowstheirvisibility. Butwhatis thisdimen-
sionality?
ForMerleau-Ponty itis thephenomenon thatis primal;thus,itis notenoughto
talkof dimensionality as a theoretical or objectiveterm.Followinghim,we can
ask,whatis thephenomenon of dimensionality? In trying to explicatethisnotion
of dimensionality, itbecomesdifficult notto refer to termslikeinside/outside. To
attempt to understand thistensionin usingthesetermswithoutgivingintotheir
dualisticmeanings, we can lookatcertainexplicitcomments byhimon thisissue.In
the "Intertwining" chapter and in some working notes there are morethana few
examples of this.
In thischapterthereare manypassingbutexplicitreferences to ideasof inner
and outer,beginning with"a visible... is rather a sortof straits betweenexterior
horizonsand interior horizons."3 Thereare moreremarks abouttheinsideand out-
sideofthebody that follow: "This can happenonly myhand,whileitis feltfrom
if
within, is also accessiblefromwithout....",His use of'mass',traditionally usedto
associatedimensionality withideas of substance,matter, and so on also attests to
thisambiguity aboutdimensionality: "Betweenthemassivesentiment I haveofthe
sack in whichI am enclosed,and thecontrolfromwithout thatmyhandexercises
overmyhand...."5 Noteheretheimageofan enclosedbodyand thesack as the
outersheathof the 'innerbody'.
Merleau-Pontygoes on to consider the relationshipbetween the seer and the
visible.The veryactionof perceivingemphasizesthedistancebetweentheperceiver
and the perceived."It is thatthe thicknessof fleshbetweenthe seer and the thingis
constitutive as forthe seer of hiscorporeity....Itis forthe
forthethingof itsvisibility

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same reasonthatI am at theheartofthevisibleand thatI am farfromit:because it
has thickness and is thereby naturally destinedto be seen bya body."6He usestwo
for
'synonyms' dimensionality here: thickness and corporeity. He continues,"the
thickness ofthebody,farfromrivaling thatoftheworld,is on thecontrary thesole
meansI have to go intotheheartof the things, by makingmyself a world and by
makingthemflesh."7
The bodyallowsthe'outside'to be drawnentirely withinitand "communicates
to thethingsuponwhichitcloses ... thatdivergencebetweenthewithinand the
without thatconstitutes thenatalsecret."8 Thisreference tothewithin andwithout is
furtherand moreexplicitly mentioned inthefootnote at theend ofthisline,where
he writes,"In any case, once a body-world relationship is recognized,thereis a
ramification ofmybodyand a ramification oftheworldand a correspondence be-
tweenitsinsideand myoutside,betweenmy insideand itsoutside."' How does one
makesenseofthisrepeatedreference to insideand outside?I believethatas faras
thebodyis concernedthenotionofinsideand outsidedoes notrepudiate theinter-
twinement of the bodyand the world.Thus,althoughthesetermsare apparently
loadedwiththedualismthathe would liketo reject,he continuesto use thembut
attempts to suggestmorecompleximagesoftheirrelationship.
Soon after,Merleau-Ponty refersto thingsas "not flatbeingsbut beingsin
depth."10 A few lineslater:"What we call a visibleis ... thesurfaceofa depth,a
crosssectionupon a massivebeing...."" The use of 'depth'and 'massive'again
pointsto theirconnectionwithdimensionality, buttheiruse does littleto dispelthe
miasmasurrounding theseterms.C. Vasseleupointsout thatsincethe massiveis
used as a "pre-subjective, elementalcorporeality," itshouldnotbe seen as "matter,
or mind,or substanceofanykind."12
The notionofthevisible,oftheseerand theseen,getsimplicated in a revers-
This
ibility. idea of reversibility
plays a central role in Merleau-Ponty's idea ofthe
flesh.He givesthe examplesof touching/touched as also thatof hearingmyself/
othersand in thislatterexampleonce again explicitly mentionsthe outsideand
inside."Likewise,I do nothearmyself as I heartheothers....I haverather an echo
of itsarticulated existence,itvibrates through my head rather than outside."'13But
thisfailureofcompletereversibility is nota fault;itonlyattests to a bodilysynthesis.
Thissynthesis occurs"because I hearmyself bothfromwithinand without."14
In hisworking notestherearemoreallusionsto inside/outside. Inreemphasizing
the noncoincidence oftheseerand thevisible-thereis alwaysa chiasmbetween
them-he notes:"Thethings touchmeas I touchthemand touchmyself: fleshofthe
world-distinct frommyflesh:thedoubleinscription outsideand inside.The inside
receiveswithout flesh:nota 'psychicstate'butintra-corporeal, reverse oftheoutside
thatmybodyshowsto thethings."15 Thus,he pointsto thedialecticofseparation
and union.
There is thus in Merleau-Ponty'susage of inside/outsidean ambiguityin their
meanings.When he mentionsthe dream as 'inside' he qualifiesitthisway: "the in-
ternaldouble ofthe externaldouble is inside."'6 His ideas on the invisiblealso carry
with it these notions,thus implyingthe inside as non-corporeal.For example: "the

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 invisibleiswhat,relative tothevisible,couldnevertheless notbe seenas a thing(the
existentials ofthevisible,itsdimensions, itsnon-figurative innerframework).""17 This
ambiguity persistsin a laternoteon the chiasm:"chiasmmybody-the things,
realizedbythedoublingup ofmybodyintoinsideand outside-and thedoubling
up of thethings(theirinsideand theiroutside)."18 The associationof insideand
outsidewithrespectto thingsbetraysthe ideas of corporeality/dimensionality in-
herentin hisusageofinsideand outside.Iftheinsideworld,or "mindas theother
sideofthebody"19onlyrefers tosomenon-corporeality, thentheyshouldbe absent
in things.By referring to the thingsand theirinsideand outside,Merleau-Ponty
makesthisambiguity moreexplicit.Butat thesametime,inthesamenote,he says,
"thereis insideand outsideturning aboutone another."
His comments on theinteriority ofthebodyas "theconformity oftheinternal
leafwiththeexternalleaf,theirfolding backon one another," having"neverbeen
apart,"20 to
seems place this as a
interiority non-corporeal Hereitseems
interiority.
to be synonymous withinvisibility, and thefoldingback equivalentto the revers-
ibilityof the visibleand the invisible.Butthisnotionof interiority is dif-
or internal
ferent fromtheexplicituse oftheinsideofthebodyin itscorporeality.
Thereis yetanotherinterpretation ofthe'inner',one dominantly relatedto ideas
of innerlife.Manywriters continueto viewMerleau-Ponty as a philosopherofthe
'inside'.In an editedbookdealingwiththisaspectofMerleau-Ponty's philosophy,
D. Olkowskinotesthatthereis a sustainedengagement in Merleau-Ponty's oeuvre
of
withtherelationshipcontinuity between "the "interior"aspects ofthe subjectand
the"exteriority" oftheworld."21Butthenotionof'inside'hereis circumscribed by
thephenomena ofinnerlife.Theassociationoftheinnerwiththeinner(psychic)life
also leadsGalenJohnson explicitly to cautionagainsttheuse ofanyimagesofspa-
tialization inunderstanding theidea ofinner.22 Butnowhereinthesediscussions do
we findanydetailedattempt to explicatetheidea ofthe'inner'body.The lackof
sucha discussion suggests thesewriters
that viewthebodyas a homogeneous entity,
because of whichthereis littlepossibility of articulatinga phenomenology of the
innerbody.
I believethatthemostimportant reasonforthiscontinuedambiguity regarding
thenotionofinnerwithrespectto thebodyis to be foundintheabsenceofa tradi-
tionof livedexperienceofthe innerbodyin theWest,one thatcould have been
used by Merleau-Ponty in a mannersimilarto thecase histories ofSchneider.23 In
contrast,thephenomenological experiences ofyogastrongly suggestthepossibility
ofa livedexperienceoftheinnerbody.The nextsectionwilldiscussthedifferent
waysinwhichwe can understand thisnotionoftheinnerbody.

TheInnerBody

I begin withthe claim thatit is possible to have phenomenologicalexperiencesof

the innerbody. To explicate thisclaim, we need to explorethe idea of dimension-
ality,a termcommonlyused by Merleau-Ponty.We also need to incorporatetwo
commoncategoriesassociated withbodilyexperience,namelyeatingand breathing.

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Surprisingly, he does notdiscussthesetwo categoriesin detail,butit is clearthat
theyare of fundamental importance in any philosophyof the body. (I associate
excreting witheatingand breathing here.)Whatdistinguishes thesetwo'activities' is
theirdefining in
presence any thematization of the body while at thesame time they
provideus withwhatI believeare the mostcompellingreasonsforbelievingin a
transcendent world.These categoriespointto the necessity of enlarging Merleau-
Ponty'svocabulary and expanding themeaningofinteriority ofthebody.
Beforeproceeding further,we haveto ask whether theuse of inside/outside by
Merleau-Ponty, as described in the previoussection, violates hisexplicitattempts at
breakingthe transcendence/immanence duality.Althoughat firstreadingit may
seemso, I do notbelievethisto be thecase.
Merely'voicing'theinside/outside does notnecessarily implythisduality.One
can holdon totheformulation ofthefleshas theelementofbeing-of bodyand the
worldintertwined as flesh-andalso thenotionofinside/outside. Thisusageleadsto
thedichotomy onlyifthereis a corresponding ontology of a transcendental world,
removedand disjointed from thebody.Inthiscontext theuse ofinsideandoutsideis
a wayto designate theboundary betweentheobjectand theworld.Theuse ofthese
termsby Merleau-Ponty does notnecessarily implyan ontologicaldivisionof the
objectand theworld.Infact,as he mentions in hisnotes,theinsideand outsideare
two leaves "foldingback on one another"and "whichhave neverbeen apart,"24
thusoffering one suggestion on how to imagineinside/outside withoutthecorre-
spondingdualisticontology.
FromMerleau-Ponty's standpoint, the idea of innerbody makeslittlesense.
Thereisjustthebody:no innerand outerbodies.Beinga bodyalso impliesbeingin
dimensionality. The idea of innerbodyhas gainedcurrency onlywithinthedualist
tradition, notablythescientific one. Innerbodyis understood as thecollectionof
organs,bloodvessels,and so on thatconstitute and makepossiblethebody.Itis an
X-rayed body.FollowingMerleau-Ponty, thereis no philosophical meritin isolating
thisX-rayed body as a or it
separateentity using argue to fora 'category' called inner
I
body. wouldsupposethatforhimtheheartis an organlikethehandexceptthat
therearedifferent modesofpresentation oftheseorgans.Butusingtheword'organs'
is itselfto givein to a biologicalmodel.So theapt explanation would be thatthe
handand theheart(andthewholebody)areone and shouldnotbe seen as a setof
separateorgans.It seems to me thatforMerleau-Ponty therelationship of 'inner
organs'to thebodyis similarto thatofthebodyand theworld:whereare we toput
thelimitbetweeneitherofthem?
Thus,ifI wantto discusstheidea of innerbodywhiletrying to staywithinhis
philosophy, I cannot beginwiththe biologicalbody,because it is notthe 'inner'
body.Butthereis something else I can do: reflecton thenotionofdimensionality
thatMerleau-Ponty refersto so frequently. The primordiality ofdimensionality hides
withinitthisnotionofinnerbody.
One may respondhere by sayingthatI am investingtoo much in the notionof
'inner'. It may be argued thatthereis reallyverylittleat stake in thisusage of inner
and outer once we see the body as 'unified'. My response would be to say that

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 merely callingthebodya unified ordimensional beingonlypostpones theinevitable
question of the bodilyexperience of the 'inner'. The idea of inner that I am suggest-
inghereis one thatis basedon thephenomenological experience ofdimensionality
itself.Andsincethisexperiencearisesfromthebodyand is constructed in it,we
cannotescape thereference to ourownexperienceof'inner'body.
According to Merleau-Ponty, theperception oftheworldis dependenton and
shapedbythewaywe perceiveand use ourbody.We understand theworldas we
understand thebody.Thisviewwhenextendedtotheideasofdimensionality would
imply that our 'perception' of the dimensionalitythingsof and the world is itselfbe-
cause of our perception of our own dimensionality. But how do we experience this
'phenomenon' ofdimensionality?
Ifour perception oftheworldis theconsequenceofthebodyand itsmotility,
thenwe understand the dimensionality of the worldby firstexperiencing and
the of the
understanding dimensionality body.Merleau-Ponty's example of the per-
ceptionof a house is usefulhere.Everyact of perception, spatialand temporal,
continues to contribute to ourperception ofa house.Thus,we 'know'thebackofa
houseorofa cube becauseofourperception fromdifferent perspectives. Butthisis
notenough. I believe that before we 'know' the back of the cube, we 'know'of
its'inside';we are awareofthedimensionality 'separating' thefront and theback.
'Inside'standsforthis'distance'.Insideis nota 'side'. Itmerely capturesa qualityof
It
'sides'. captures the boundedness of sides and the of
invisibilityperspective itself.
So, beforewe are aware of the back of the object, we are already aware of the
dimensionality oftheobjectthatcreatestheidea of'back.' Givena line,we do not
presume a backside. Thereis no backsidetoa linebecausewe recognizethelackof
dimensionality in it.
Andhowis itthatwe recognizethis'dimensionality' ofobjectsso readily? Can it
be becausewe first recognizethedimensionality ofourbodyand,moreimportantly,
this
experience dimensionality? I know I have a back notonlybecause I see others
likeme havinga backbutalso becauseI experience thebackthrough thesensations
itgenerates. By thisexperience of the back I also experience'dimensionality'.
Thusthebasic pointto whichwe are attracted is that'dimensionality' is phe-
nomenologically accessible.The idea of dimensionality firstarisesthrough a 'per-
ception' of the inner body that allows us to grasp the notion of dimensionality itself.
One ofthewaysto understand this is to view the inner as
body being in a reversible
relationoftouching/touched withthe'outer'ofthebody.Dimensionality is impli-
cated in the 'non-coincidence' of thefront and back onlybecause itcan also be
perceivedas theexperienceofthe inside.Now we are in a positionto statethis:
insideis thephenomenological experience ofdimensionality. Thisidea ofinsidehas
no allegiance to the notion of side and thus is not indebted to ideasofboundary and
separation. Ifone can talkoftheinside without the idea of and
boundary ontological
separationthenthereis no contradictiongeneratedin the use of inside even while
subscribingto Merleau-Ponty'sphilosophyof the body.
It is throughthisphenomenologicalexperienceof dimensionality thatwe finda
way to talkabout insidewithouta necessaryimplicationof an inside/outsideduality

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and without beingcircumscribed byconstraining notionsofsides.In understanding
insideas a phenomenological moment, notonlyis theidea ofdimensionality clari-
fiedbutalso theidea ofinside.Itis possibleto talkofsucha moment onlybecause
thebodyhas alreadyexperienceddimensionality in itseveryday 'perception' of its
innerbodyand the 'space' thatgoes to constitute thisinnerbody.Thisis whatI
meanwhenI claimthat'inside'is nothing morethanthephenomenological experi-
ence ofdimensionality. Andthepracticeofyogaallowsus to geta holdon thisex-
perienceina consciousmanner.
This view is also the reasonwhythe objectified'external'space, the space
aroundus, is seen as 'outside'rather thaninside.External space has no phenome-
nologicalconsequence when itis seen as a mathematical three-dimensional space.
The phenomenological experienceof space arisesoutsidethisparticular construc-
tionof mathematical space. In a mannersimilarto the associationof insideand
dimensionality, thereis an associationoftheoutsideand depth.Itiswell knownthat
forMerleau-Ponty depthis the'first dimension'and notthe'third'dimensionafter
length and breadth. The primordiality ofdepthmanifests itselfin some kindofper-
ception and experience. Edward in
Casey, discussing depthand voluminousness in
the contextof Merleau-Ponty, arguesthatWilliamJamesand JamesGibsonwere
among those who this
emphasized primordial natureofdepth.25 James, forexample,
considereddepthas "feltvolume."26The shifttowardtheseexperiencesof depth
constitutesitsphenomenological moment.
I wouldliketo borrowthisnotionofdepthtocompletemyconstruction ofinside
and outsideas phenomenological experiences. Outside, in this rewriting, is the
phenomenological of
experience 'depth'. It is being 'outside' that generatesthe
notionofdepth,thesenseofdistanceand space itself. Depth is not boundedwithin
the inside.Itdoes notarisein a boundeddomain.Depthis space, externalspace,
differentfrominternal space, notthrough someontologicaldivisionbutessentially
a
through particular experience of the body.The bodyexperiencesinsideand out-
side in qualitativelydifferentways. Thus myconclusion:whatdimensionality is to
inside,depthis to outside.I mustadd herethatthisis nottheidea ofdepththatis
presentin Merleau-Ponty or,forthatmatter, in Casey.Thereis no separation ofthe
'inside'and 'outside'withtheirspecial connectionsto dimensionality and depth,
respectively.ButI wouldarguethattheidea ofdepthand relatedphenomenological
experiences ofit(including thedepthcues and so on) isessentially linkedtotheidea
of externality.
The experienceof dimensionality is capturednotonlyin the prac-
tice of yoga but also in the mostbasic humanactivity of eatingitself.Thereis
an undeniableintertwining betweeneatingand the insideand, correspondingly,
withexcretion and theoutside.Eatingis thefirst and finalproofoftranscendence.
Merleau-Ponty's exampleoftheinfant and itsrelationship withitsmother seemsto
be grantingthis point. As M. C. Dillon notes: the infant's"mouth recognizes the
transcendenceof Motherrightfromthe start."27So, to understandthe entanglement
of eatingand insideis notto reduceit onlyto itsliteralmeaning.Rather,
eating
opensup thissilentdimensionality,
fillsitwiththefullness
oftranscendence.
We eat
the worldand the worldeats us.

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 The bodyexperienceof eatingis equivalentto thephenomenological experi-
ence ofdimensionality and thusis intertwined withthenotionof'inside'.The pro-
cess ofeatingis nevervisibleto us. Further actionsrelatedtoeating,suchas mashing
thefood,swallowing, and so on,areall eventsinthe'darkside'ofthebody.We can
never'see' ourselveseating,butwe experienceitall thetime.We experienceswal-
lowingthefood;we experienceitspassagethrough thefoodpipe intotheregionof
thestomach.Theseexperiencesall constitute an experienceofdimensionality, an
expression of the 'inside'of the body. We are usuallyunaware of theseprocesses
exceptintimesofpainand distress oftheinnerbody.Butpracticeslikeyogaallow
us a continuous, consciousgraspoftheinnerbody.
As witheating,so also withbreathing. The transcendence associatedwith
breathing is notso clearlymanifested as in thecase of But
eating. breathing is liter-
allythe same as eating when seen on the order of consumption. BeforeI enterinto
thediscussionon consumption, I wishto exploreherethe linkbetweenbreathing
and the insideof the body,namelythe experienceof dimensionality. The phe-
nomenological of
experience breathing is most powerfully capturedby the yogic
practiceof Thisexperienceis akinto a modeofperception oftheinner
bodyitself.pran.ayama.

TheIdea oftheInner(Body)in Yoga

Firstof all, itmustbe mentioned thatthereare differentmeaningsassociatedwith

yogaas well as different kindsofyogasuchas Raja yoga,Hathayoga,and so on.
Although thiswordis derivedfrom theSanskrit yuj,meaningunion,itis notalways
circumscribed by it. As S. C. Banerjipointsout, different textsconveydifferent
meaningsof yoga.28Forexample,the Bhagavadgtat suggestsyoga as a meansof
attaining unionwithGod.29Banerjilistssomeofthesedifferent meaningsofyoga:
skillin work,desirelessaction,acquisitionoftrueknowledge, indifference
to plea-
sureand pain,addition(in arithmetic), and conjunction (in astronomy).30It is im-
portant to noteherethatin the primary and mostimportant manuscriptof yoga,
namelyPataijali's Yogasutras (hereafterYS),yoga"does notmeanunion,butonly
effort."31The effortis thatwhichis describedclearlyinthesecondsatraofthe YS:
"yogais therestriction ofthefluctuations ofmind-stuff."32
In thefollowing discussionon yoga,I willbe concernedonlywiththetextsof
Pataijali's YS and Svatmarama's Hathayoga-Pradipika (hereafter HYP) and some
relevant commentaries on them.I willalso restrict myselfto an elaborationofthe
ideas of inner/internal/inside in thesetexts,afterwhichI will undertake a phe-
nomenological interpretationoftheyogicpostures.
The notionof the internal occursexplicitly in boththe YS and the HYP The
and mostimportant
first reference to thisis intheunderstanding ofthemindas an
'internalorgan' of the body. Bhojaraja's commentary on the YS refersto the mindas
the internalorganthatis always open to fluctuations.33 Vacaspati also makes a ref-
erence to the effectthatthe mind-stuff is used "as a partialexpressionforthe inner
organs It mustbe mentionedherethat,strictly speaking, in
(antahkarana)."34 karana

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antahkarana is means/instrument ratherthana physicalorgan.Butthe use of the
word'organ'derivesitsforcefrom theclassification ofthemindas an internal organ
thatis similar totheorgansofsenseand action,an associationthatrepeatedly occurs
inSdmkhya texts.Itis also pertinentto remember herethatthesetextsusuallyrefer to
elevenorgans:fiveofthesenses,fiveofaction,and mind.35 The mindis open to
fluctuations, and YS 1.6 listsfivekindsof these:evidence,misconception, fancy,
sleep, and memory.36 The 'effort'
of yoga is to hinder these modifications and to
leave the internal organ free from such changes.Patafijalisays that exercise and
dispassion(1.12)hinderthesechanges.Thus,concentration (as theeffort,as yoga)is
thepathto stilltheever-distracted mind.
Sincethemindis an internal organand yogaan effort to restrictthefluctuations
ofthemind,we mustexpectyogato be able to suggesthowone can control(a) an
organand (b) thatwhichis internal. Thisimpliesthatrightin theverydefinition of
yogathereis alreadyan involvement intheidea ofinner(body).
Butat thispointit is stillnotclearas to the meaningof 'internal'used in the
contextofthemind.Is theinternal inopposition to externalorgans?Is themindin-
ternalbecause itis not'seen'?Further in
on, s0tras 11.17and 11.18, thereis a definite
clue thatcan answerthisquery.In thesesitras,it is mentioned thatone of the
'afflictions'thathinderconcentration has to do withthe 'visual'.The suspicionof
the'visual'arisesbecauseofthepossiblecontamination and distraction ofthemind
by the objects-of-sight.
BeforeI discussfurther theimplications oftheseobservations, theexplicituse of
internal in thecontextof mustbe noted.In Book II, s0tra29, Patafijali
pranayama
givestheeightaids foryoga.Out ofthese,I willbe concernedonlywiththethird
and fourth ones,namelyasanas (postures) and pranayama (controlofbreath).Satra
11.46introduces the asanas by emphasizing thestableand pleasantnatureof pos-
tures.37 The postureshouldbe comfortable, itmusthave "no cause of pain,"and,
whenthisis accomplished, the"obstaclesto meditation no longerprevail."38 It is
worthwhile the of
noticing importance postures in the of
yogicproject ultimately
stillingthefluctuations ofthemind.Although therelationof internal organsto the
variousasanas is notdetailedin the YS,therealimport of itis clearlyexplainedin
thevariouscommentaries on the YS and HYP I believethatwe can mounta strong
argument to the effectthat the controlofthephysical, internalorgansofthebodyisa
modelfortheultimate controlofthemind(as an internal organ).Thisisexplainedby
theimportance givento asanas and pranyamain thepracticeofyoga.Itis notan
accidentthatthepostureshaveto be 'steady'inthesamewaythatthemindhas to
be steady.I willarguein thenextsectionthattheasanas allow fora phenomeno-
logicalexperience(and control)oftheinnerbody.As a naturalcorollary, then,the
practiceof yoga allowsforthe phenomenological experience(and control)of the
'inner'mind.
Followingthesatrason posturesin BookII are stras 50 and 51 on theregula-
tion of breath, These sitras use the ideas of internaland external
pran.iyama.
explicitly.In sotra50, the restraint
ofthe breathis classifiedas external,internal,and
steady/suspension. The idea ofexternaland internalis withrespectto the body,as is

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 madeclearinVacaspati'scommentary whenhe statesthatexternality is inferred by
thecausingof the "motionin a blade of grassor a piece of cottonin a windless
spot,"and internality inferred byan "internal touch"thatbegins"at thesole ofthe
feetand extendstothehead."39Theexternal referstotheprocessoftakingintheair
fromoutside;theinternal corresponds expellingtheinternal
to airto theoutside.40
Thismakesexplicitthepointthattheinternal and external areto be understood with
respectto the physicalbody. There is a subtle distinction made in the next sitra,
sttra51, wherea fourth pranayama is introduced. Thefirst three haveto
do withrestraining breathafterinspiration and expiration, and suppression
pran.ayaamas ofbreath
a
"by single effort." The fourth pranayama is also suppression of breath that occurs in
awarenessofboththeinternal and external spheres/fields/objects.
Let me briefly summarizethe notionof the internalin the YS. The mind/
mind-stuff is the internal organ-of what?Although notmade explicit,it is clear
thattheinternal is withreference to thebody.Thiscan be adducedfrom theuse of
internaland externalin prniayama,theclassification of organs(ofthe body),the
powerofobjects-of-sight to createfluctuations inthemind,thefocuson bothexter-
naland internal objects thatis clearly with reference tothebody,and also,finally, in
the suggestion thatmindcan be freedfromthe bodyand roam'outside'it after
reachingtheappropriate yogicstate(111.38). Thisexplicitphysiology oftheinneris
also inherent in sttra111.29, whichoffers a "planofthebody"to theyogi.Vyssa's
commentary on this satra adds thatthe yogi can apprehend thestructure ofthebody
aftersamyamaon the navel.41He further describesthegeneralphysiology of the
body,namely that the corporeal elements are seven: skin,blood,flesh,fat,bone,
marrow, and semen.Whatis important to notehereis thateach one oftheseis seen
as beinginterior to theother.Sanrkara's subcommentary also makesthisclear:"The
orderof the listis, thateach is exterior to theone whichit precedes"42-skin is
theoutermost, thenblood,and so on. The idea ofinternal is also predicated on the
priorityto visionand sight.The languageof perception is itselfdominantly visual
although references to sound occur intermittently. This priority accorded to vision is
something that the YS shares with Western in
philosophy general, where metaphors
ofvisionhaveshapedthecourseofitsmanydiscourses.43 Theinternal andtheinner
arethusinthedark,andthemind,being'internal', is also placedwithin thetensions
of the visibleand the invisible.Since myconcernhereis withthe innerbody,I
merelywishto pointoutthatyoga,as a practice,is mostimportantly a methodto
grasp the invisible internal, because of which the grasping of the inner body,orthe
'organs'oftheinnerbody,is a natural consequence of itsdiscourse.
We shouldremember herethatthephilosophical ideasofthebodyinyogaare
takenoverfrom theSamrnkhya philosophical system. Inparticular, thedistinction be-
tweenthegrossand subtlebodyis one thatis first detailedintheSarnkhya texts.As
Sinhanotes,yoga"is thepracticeoftheSamrkhya, whichis thetheory."44 The ideas
of grossand subtle body can be foundin the (SPS) of
to notethatsatra111.34
Kapila. (Itis also interesting Sam.khya-Pravachana-SOtramto asanas,
in the SPS, which refers
is exactlythe same as the sttra(11.46)in YS in whichasanas are introduced.)Book III
of the SPS deals in detail withthe moregeneral natureof the body. Sitra 111.7states

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thatthegrossbodyis one "producedfromthefather and mother," whilethesubtle
bodyis notso sinceitis "producedatthebeginning ofcreation."45 Thesubtlebody,
referred to as the Liriga-SarTra, is made of seventeenelements(111.9) and the gross
body of five elements The
(111.17). principle definition ofthe body, whether subtleor
gross,is "that itis the House of The
Experience."46 grossbody servesas the vehicle
forthesubtlebody.Itis inthissensethatthe"Grossis also treatedas a Body."47 The
subtlebodyis notto be confusedwiththeSelf(111.13), is ofatomicsize (111.14),and
so on. Whatshouldbe notedinthecontextofthediscussionhereis thatthenotion
of internal body is notthatof the subtlebody.In fact,it maybe arguedthatthe
importance givento thesubtlebodyin Samkhyaand yoga negatesa seriouscon-
sideration ofthe notionofthe inneras in thedimensionality ofthebody.It is the
emphasis on asanas and primarily in the HYP, that makesa phenomen-
ology ofthe inner body(in terms of
prjn.yama, dimensionality) possible.
The YS does notdescribetheasanas,thevariousbodyposturesthatare now
commonly seen as a partofyoga.The predominant textthatdoes thisis the HYP,
wherethes0trasdetailthevariouspostures. In thistext,itis clearlystatedthat"the
interior is to be seen,"and sucha seeingis describedas a consequenceofsambhavT
mcidra.48 To see theinneris also toclose outtheouter,to subjugateall thesensesby
concentration. Once theexternal sensesaresubdued,thenthevoicesoftheinternal
body can be heard. In the right posturesand withtheabolitionoftheexternal senses
(senses that are open to the external),the HYP says the Nada can be heard (IV:68):
"jingling sound[s](likethatofornaments) ... are heardinthe(middleof)thebody"
(IV:70); "thesoundof [the]kettledrum"... (IV:73); the "soundof drumis heard
in ... thespace betweeneyebrows"(IV:74); "at theend,thesoundsofsmallbells,
flute,lute,and bees" (IV:85, 86). All of theseforma discourseofthe internal, of
theinnerbody.Alongwiththis,we shouldunderstand asanas as attempts to make
'visible'theinnerbody.Thismaking visiblethrough hearing, grasping,touching, and
controlling the inner organs is the phenomenological experience ofthe inner body.

Yogaand thePhenomenological ofDimensionality

Experience

I use yoga hereas Merleau-Ponty uses Schneider'scase studies.He reinterprets

Schneider'sexperiencesthroughnew philosophicalcategories.He does not use
eitherthe dominantmechanistic or psychologistic
explanationsbut arguesfora
position'between'them.Myuse ofyogato exemplify thenotionof'inner'workson
similarlines.I do notanalyzethediscourseofyoga; I do notbelievethatthisdis-
coursepayssufficient heed to the phenomenological importof itsown practices.
Nordo I wantto subscribeto a merebiologicalview of yoga as exercisesofthe
physicalbody.My interpretation oftheyogicpracticesis an intermediate position
betweenthesetwoextremes. Whatis of interest
to me,and of relevancehere,is a
phenomenologicalunderstanding ofyogic practiceswithrespectto the body and the
possible insightstheygive about the natureof the innerbody.
How can innerorgansbe grasped and controlled?As mentionedearlier,the YS
mentionsAsanasas one of the aids of yoga but does not listout the variouspostures

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 thatare now commonly associatedwiththepracticeofyoga.Vyasa'scommentary
on s0tra11.46listsa fewasanas,butitis theHYPthatdiscussestheasanas in more
detail.The HYP (1.33) mentionsthat"eighty-four Jsanashave been studiedby
Siva."49 The more complexpostures corresponding to themhdrasand bandhasare
also mentioned invariouss0trasoftheHYP.Following thedescription ofsomeofthe
asanas, Book II of the HYP deals mostly with pranayama.Prrnyamais notinde-
of
pendent asanas, and different of
practices breathing use different asanas. And
formostof theseasanas and pranayama, the beneficialaspecton the innerbody
is explained.Forexample,11.16says that"all diseasesare destroyed by proper
prngayama"; theMayOrasana curesdiseaseslikegulma(chronicenlargement ofthe
spleen)(1.31); Savisana removes fatigue (1.32);and so on. Performing these Jsanas is
to be involvedinan engagement withtheinnerbodythatis similar to grasping and
controlling themas we do withobjectsoutsidethebody.Inthiscontext, itis useful
to notethattheHYP also mentions sixactsforpurifying the(inner)body(11.21, 22,
23). Dhautiinvolvesswallowing a pieceofwetclothandthenwithdrawing it(11.24).
In 11.25it is mentioned thatthisprocessofcleaningcuresbronchialdisorders and
leprosy,amongotherthings.A methodof washingthatinvolvestakingin water
through the anus is called vasti(11.26).Netiinvolvesinserting threadthrough the
nasal passage(11.29), and itis remarked thatthis"destroys themultitude ofdiseases
(occurring) abovetheshoulders" (11.30).
Morecomplexmadrasand bandhasarealso integral to Hathayoga. Ten madras
are listedin 111.7 "whichdestroy senility and death."50 These madras and bandhas
are quitecomplexto perform, and foreach ofthemthecorresponding effects on
the bodyare mentioned. Forexample,111.55 mentionsUddTrynabandha, whichis
effected bythe"drawing backof [the]abdomenabove and below[the]navel."51It
is important to notethatmostoftheseasanasarestillpracticed bymanypractitioners
of yogatoday.Thiscontinuity allowsus to viewthesetextsas forming a partofa
livedtradition ofyoga.Infact,therearemanynewasanas,notlistedintheHYP that
havebeen introduced intothelargerliterature ofyoga.
My contention is thatthese postures (and in particularthemorecomplexband-
has)function as ifthey'makevisible'the'internal organs'.The influential bookon
yoga posturesby B.K.S. lyengar that details manyasanas has this to say about
bandhas:"Bandhameansbondage,joiningtogether, or catchingholdof.It
fettering
is also a posturein whichcertainorgansor partsof thebodyare contracted and
controlled."52 do
Notonly they make visible in the context of pointing but the vari-
ous postures also allowone to 'grasp'theseorgans.Thesepostures helpto 'contract
and control'certainorgansor parts of the inner body.Through these postures one
can literallygraspand manipulate a stomach, forexample,as we can manipulate the
hand.The asanasare specificintheiractionsand aregenerally correlated withspe-
cificorgans.Thus,thereare postures thatallowmanipulations oftheabdomen,kid-
neys, and various otherorgans.There are posturesthatincrease digestivepowers,
posturesthroughwhich the liverand spleen are activated,and posturesforregulat-
ing the thyroidgland, and so on. Forexample, the pose resemblinga locustresting

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on the groundhelpsthosewitha slippeddisc. It also keepsthe bladderand the
prostate glandhealthy.53
Thereis an emphasison thenotionofinnerbodyinmanyofthesepostures. The
particular form of the posture seems to have been designed in order to be effective
on specificorgans.So, justas doingexercisesforthearmsbuildsthe muscleson
them,theasanas negotiate withtheinnerorgansinsimilarways.Thisleadsto quite
complex forms of thesepostures.Forexample,lyengar writesthatthepostureofa
boatwithoars is effective on intestines, whereasthepostureoftheboatalone acts
on the liver,gallbladder, and spleen.54Evenin the rulesfordoingthe exercises
thereis a cleararticulation ofgrasping and manipulating theinnerbody.Hereis one
direction forone ofthe postures:"Inhalecompletely. Tightentheentireabdomen
fromtheanusto thediaphragm. Pulltheabdomenbacktowardsthespineand also
up towardsthediaphragm."55
Thus,through performing theasanas we are able to access phenomenological
experiencescorresponding the innerbody.As any practitioner
to of yoga knows,
even at the basic levelthe practiceof theseposturesdrawsone's consciousness
'inward'.Inthecase ofmorecomplexbandhasthisis madeeven moreexplicit.
We shouldnotean important pointhere.lyengar's identification ofinnerorgans,
in the languageof modernbiology,does notconstitute thecompletephenomeno-
logicalexperienceofyoga.Thesepostures wereelaborateduponthousands ofyears
ago whenpresumably the innerorganshad notbeen mappedand taken intothe
orbitofthebiologicalbody.The onlyfeasibleexplanation abouttheeffect ofthese
postures on the respective partsof the inner body is that
there is an already available
phenomenological experienceoftheseinnerorgansthatis openedup bytheyogic
practice.Thephenomenological consequenceofthesepostures liesintheirabilityto
allowus a graspon theinternal 'structure'ofthebodyand place itinthe'same level
ofvisibility'as theexternal hand.
In theeightstepsofyoga,pranayama followsasanas. is concerned
Praryayma
withinhalation, exhalation,retention, and controlofbreath.Powerful yogicpowers
are ascribedto thepracticeofpranayama, and itis supposedto be dangerousifnot
learnedunderproperguidance.Thepracticeofpranayama is also essentially inward
likemostof the asanas. Whiledoingpranayamatheeyes are keptclosed so that
theouterworldwill notintrude on thesensesand violatethisinwardexperience.
lyengar statesthis "In
explicitly: the practiceof pranayamathe sensesare drawn
inwards."56 Likethe asanas, the practiceof pranayamais also one thathas an
essentialengagement withtheinnerbody,bothinthephenomenological aspectof
thispractice and in the beneficialeffects on specificorganslikethe liver,spleen,
pancreas,and theabdominalmuscles.57 Forexample,inthe Bhastrika (HYP 11.63),
the breathshouldbe "feltto resoundin heart,throatand up to skull."58In the
Shryabhedna (HYP 11.50), thebreathis feltfrom the"hairon theheadtothenail-tips
of toes,"59thatis, all over the innerbody. Once again, we note thatthe phenome-
nological experience of pranayamaallows a 'perception'of the innerbody. It also
makes possible our experience of the dimensionality that'fills'our body. A sketchy

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 accountliketheone abovemayseemlikea simplification ofthecomplexdiscursive
structureofyoga.However,myinterest is notto initiate a criticaldiscussionofthis
discourse,butrather tostatemybeliefthatpranayama andthemorecomplexasanas
should be seen as avenuesthatmake possiblea 'perception', in particular the
touching of the innerbody.Suchan idea mustinform Merleau-Ponty's philosophy
especiallysincehiscentralideaofreversibility is intrinsically
linkedwithperception.
Thus,I wouldreinterpret theyogicbodilypractices notinterms ofitsowndiscourse
butintermsofperception and thephenomenological experience ofthe'inside'.
I believethatthe idea of perception ofthe innerbodycomplements Merleau-
Ponty'sprojectregarding bodyand theworld.Therelationship oftheinnerbodyto
theouteris therelationship ofthebodyto theworld.'Before'theintertwinement of
thebodyandtheworldas flesh,thereis 'already'an intertwinement oftheinnerand
outeras bodyand flesh.The intertwining oftheinnerand outerbodyis madepos-
sible because the innerbodycan be perceivedand touchedin theactsofeating,
excreting,breathing,and so on.
As mentionedbefore,I suspectthatthereis comparatively littleimportance
giventothisidea inMerleau-Ponty primarily becauseoftheabsenceofa livedyogic
discourseintheWest.Itis surprising thatsuchinsightful workon thephilosophy of
thebodyneglectsa deeperreadingofeating,breathing, and excreting. The neglect
ofbreathing can perhapsbe understood because intheWestern tradition breathing
has becomean objectified act,a biologicalrhythm.60 IntheIndianyogictradition,
by contrast,thephenomenological understanding of breathing is refined to a high
degree. This phenomenological approach to controlled breathingfurther a
illustrates
an
way, opening intothe discourse of ofthe
interiority body even while we remain
withinMerleau-Ponty's project.And we remainwithinhis projectforthe simple
reasonthathis philosophy, amongthe Westernphilosophers, comes closestto
the
understanding phenomenological of
import yogicpractices.

ofConsuming
TheReversibility and Consumed

Perception,forMerleau-Ponty, relatedto the notionof reversibility.

is intrinsically
The importance ofthisideato himis bestcapturedbyhiscomment thatreversibility
is the"ultimate
truth."61 in Merleau-Ponty's
The idea of reversibility workowes its
genesisto thephenomenological understandingoftouching and touched,a simul-
taneousexperiencethatoccurswhenone handtouchesanother.This,extended
to thedomainof vision,suggeststhe reversibilityof theseerand seen. Lawrence
Hass notesthat"Merleau-Ponty's thesis
reversibility expressesreality as a reciprocal
envelopment betweenseer and seen, touchingand beingtouched,whichdefies
analysisthroughdisjunctivecategories,and yet providesthe verygroundfor
them."62
I arguedearlierthatyogic practices,both in body posturesand breathing,make
possible a conscious attemptto 'touch', 'grasp', and 'manipulate'the 'inner' body.
Thus, thereis a phenomenologicalsimilarity between the touching/touched of the
leftand righthand and thetouching/touched of the innerand 'outer'body. Because

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thereis reversibility thatessentiallycharacterizes thisrelationoftouching/touched,
thereis no disjunction betweentheideasof innerand outerbody.Thus,thepossi-
bilityofperception oftheinnerbodynecessitates thetakingoverofitintothefolds
ofreversibility.
The discussionofyogaand thephenomenology oftheinnerbodyalso suggest
anotheradditionto theexamplesofreversibility as articulatedbyMerleau-Ponty. As
muchas touchingis a paradigmatic exampleofgrasping theinnerbody,thereis yet
anotherimageof consumption as a mode of perceptionof the innerbody.The
of and
examples eating breathing areexemplars thatsuggest thatthereis yetanother
categoryof reversibility thatour reflections on innerbodynecessitate. Thisis the
reversibilityofconsuming/consumed. Inthecase ofvision,Merleau-Ponty saysthat
to see is also to be seen. Although thissymmetry is neverpossiblein full,itis this
reversibilitythatis responsible fortheintertwining ofthebodyand theworld.Since
thebodyis implicated inthefleshoftheworld,perception itself"is therelationof
fleshto itself,"63thusestablishing a positionthatdoes notdemandtheextremes of
immanence or transcendence. Butalreadywithin thisviewofthebody/world there
is an underlying notionof'consumption'.
as
Just thereis seer/seen,touching/touched eatingimpliesan
reversibility,
eating/eaten reversibility.Eatingis the firstparadigmof the body's 'grasping'of
transcendence. At thispointit maybe usefulto reflectback on Merleau-Ponty's
Phenomenology ofPerception, wherehe emphasizestheontologicalimplications of
thedifference in pointing and grasping.64 In thecase ofeating,thereis notonlythe
concretegraspingof the worldbut also a processof consumingit and placing
it 'within'one's own body.Neithervisionnortouchaccomplishesthisas well as
eatingdoes. The consumption of'matter' is thefirstconsciousactofthechildwhen
itsucklesmilk.Consumption illuminates notjustthepossibility ofa transcendental
worldbutalso groundsitinthebodyconcretely.
Sincethebodyand theworldare nottwoobjectiveentities distinctfromeach
other,consumption implies cannibalism: the flesh'consumes' itself.
In fact,itis this
thatinspiresthe viewthatperception is inherently cannibalisticin character. Per-
ceptionis consumption-aself-consumption. This is also a naturalextensionto
Merleau-Ponty's understanding ofthebody.Inthe"Intertwining" chapter, he writes:
"Thussincetheseeris caughtup inwhathe sees,itis stillhimself he sees: thereis a
fundamental narcissism ofall vision.""65
Butthereis more!Visionis notmerelynar-
cissisticbut leads intothe worldof consumption and self-consumption-leads to
cannibalism.It is objectivethought thatmakesthe mistakeof separating thecon-
sumingand theconsumedbecauseevenas thebodyconsumestheworld,theworld
consumesthebody.The latteris exemplified in thevisibilityof excretion butalso
remainsmorethanthat.Becausethebodyand theworldsharetheflesh,consump-
tionbecomesthedominant marker notonlyofperception butalso of being-in-the-
world itself.66
Thus,the reversibility of the consuming/consumed should be seen on
the orderof the othermanifestations of reversibility.
What has thisgot to do withthe inside?Understandingeating merelyas a bio-
logical process 'inside' the body is once again to give into dualism. On the other

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 hand,thereare manyphenomenological experiences ofeating.Thisincludesfeel-
ings like hunger, pain,fullness, nausea,and so on. Theseexperiences ofeatingbe-
longto thephenomenological experiences ofdimensionality and are morepower-
fulthanseeingor touching.The latterare 'two-dimensional'; theyare 'pointers'
ofdimensionality and do not'grasp'itas such-once again underlining Merleau-
Ponty'sdistinction betweenpointingand grasping.One can have an illusionof
vision,buthowdoes one have illusionsofeating?Consuming theworldand expe-
it
riencing partas of the innerbody would be the phenomenological experienceof
dimensionality, thickness, and so on.
Thus,itis also withinthenotionofconsumption thattheideasofdimensional-
itylie. Is itpossiblefora 'dimensionless' bodyto 'consume',or,equivalently, is it
possible for us to eat a 'dimensionless' is
thing?Perception consumption and self-
consumption. Itis narcissism and cannibalism. The consumption oftheworld/body
also contributes to the'perception' ofdimensionality. Notonlyaretheexperiences
ofeatingthephenomenological experiences oftheinnerbodybuttheystandinde-
fenseofMerleau-Ponty's viewoftheinsideand outside.
The phenomenological experienceofbreathing, ofwhichpranayama is theex-
emplar, takes this one stepfurther. Itillustratestheconsuming/consumed reversibil-
ityand also focuseson the inside/outside ambiguity presentin his works.It is in
pranayama thatwe findthefullexpression ofthisreversibility,an understanding of
the unityof the senses,and the capacityof 'perceiving' the innerbodythrough
breathing techniques.Evenbeforewe can reflect on eatingwe are alreadydrawn
intothereversibility ofconsumption through ouractsofbreathing. Ata fundamental
levelbreathing is consumption-not merelyconsumption of air as 'matter' butas
elementinthewayMerleau-Ponty understands flesh.Breathing is thefirstexample
oftheconsumption offlesh.Theexpelledbreathfrom thebodyistheinhaledbreath
oftheworld-thebodybreathestheworldas theworldbreathesthebody.Theyare
bothimplicated in a reversiblerelationof consumption. Thisprocessis notmere
'transference' butbelongsto reversibility becauseofthepossibility oftheperception
of inner bodythrough breathing techniques. Andonce theinnerbodyis perceived
through breathing, thenbreathing is no longermerelya biologicalact butbelongs
properly to thedomainofperception.
Breathing and perception are linkedin a fundamental wayas is easilyseen in
in
themodalities whichperception getsmodified, as intimesofemotionaldistress
whenone feelsanger,joy, and so on. The perceptualexperiencein thesestates
is significantly different whencomparedto 'normal'states.In moments of anger,
forexample,one's breathing is verydifferent in comparison to the normalstate.
Breathing and healthare also co-constitutive ofeach other.67 The interesting con-
nectionbetweenbreathing and speechis yetanothermanifestation ofthecomplex
phenomenological consequencesofbreathing.68
The practicesof yoga asanas and pranayamahave many consequences. They
make possible a richerphenomenologicaldescriptionof the effectsof breathing,
of controllinginhalation,exhalation,and retentionof breath,due to which there
is heightenedsense experience,willfulcontrolover innerbody capacities, and, in

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general,newexperiences oftheinnerbody.Thesecannotbe explainedbythebio-
logicalmodelofbodyand breathing alone.So also,theyogicdiscourseinitsidealto
transcend thebodyinorderto achieveliberation cannotbe ofmuchhelpin under-
the
standing phenomenological implications practices.Whatis needed,then,
of its
is a freshinterpretationofthe notionof insideand outsidethatis modeledon the
perception and experienceof the innerbody.I have suggestedearlierthatunder-
standing 'inside'as thephenomenological experienceofdimensionality is one such
model.
I began by showingthatMerleau-Ponty in an ambiguous
uses inside/outside
manner.The absenceofthe idea of innerbodyin hisphilosophy compoundsthis
confusion. Yoga is most a and
definitelyphilosophy practice ofthe'inner'.I hopeto
have shownthatthe'inner'phenomenology ofyogaand Merleau-Ponty's philoso-
phycomplement each otherperfectly.

Notes

Thisworkwas supported in partbythe HomiBhabhaFellowship. I am gratefulto

MichaelWeinsteinfora criticalreadingof the manuscript and forhis comments.
DiscussionswithJamesMorleyin the initialstagesof readingMerleau-Ponty were
useful,and I thank him forthat.DhanwantiNayaktaught me much about yoga,for
whichI am indebted.Partofthisworkwas completedwhileI was a Fellowat the
IndianInstitute of AdvancedStudies,Shimla.The supportof thatFellowshipis
acknowledged.I also thankG. C. Pande forclarifying
gratefully some important
pointson the idea of innerin yoga.
1 - M. Merleau-Ponty, TheVisibleand theInvisible,
trans.AlphonsoLingis(Evans-
ton:Northwestern University 1968).
Press,
2 - Ibid.,p. 138.
3 -Ibid., p. 132.
4- Ibid.,p. 133.
5 -Ibid., p. 134.
6- Ibid.,p. 135.
7- Ibid.
8 - Ibid.,p. 135-136.
9- Ibid.,p. 136 n.
10- Ibid.,p. 136.
11 - Ibid.
12 - C. Vasseleu,Textures
ofLight(Londonand New York:Routledge,
1998),p. 60.
13 - Merleau-Ponty,TheVisibleand theInvisible,
p. 148.

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Sarukkai 475

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 14 - Ibid.
15 - Ibid.,p. 261.
16 - Ibid.,p. 262.
17 - Ibid.,p. 257.
18 - Ibid.,p. 264.
19 - Ibid.,p. 259.
20 - Ibid.,p. 265.
21 - D. Olkowski,"The Continuumof Interiority in theThought
and Exteriority of
in
Merleau-Ponty," D. Olkowski
and J.Morley,eds.,Merleau-Ponty,
Interiority
and Exteriority,
PsychicLifeand theWorld(Albany:StateUniversity of New
YorkPress,1999),p. 1.
22 - GalenJohnson, "Insideand Outside,"inOlkowskiandMorley, Merleau-Ponty,
and
Interiority Exteriority,p. 29. Fora treatmentoftheideaofinner(as thought,
psyche,rather than'body')buildingin Wittgenstein, see PaulJohnston, Witt-
genstein:Rethinking theInner(Londonand NewYork:Routledge, 1993).
23 - Schneider, who suffered a head injury due to a splinter
froma shell,suffered
frommanymentaldisorders.Merleau-Ponty used these disordersas case
studiesto arguethatthesedisorders could notbe describedcompletely by
eithertheempiricist views,and he developeda philosophy
or intellectualist
thatis inbetweenthesepositions.
24 - Merleau-Ponty, TheVisibleand theInvisible, p. 265.
25 - EdwardCasey, "The Elementof Voluminousness: Depth and Place Re-
examined,"inMerleau-Ponty ed.
Vivant, M. C. Dillon(Albany:
StateUniversity
of NewYorkPress,1991).
26 - Ibid.,p. 10.
27 - M. C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology(Bloomingtonand Indianapolis:
IndianaUniversityPress,1988),p. 167.
28 - S. C. Banerji,Studiesin Originand Developmentof Yoga(Calcutta:Punthi
Pustak,1995).
29 - Ibid.,p. 44.
30 - Ibid.,p. 1.
31 - Ibid.
32 - J. H. Woods, The Yoga-System of Patafijali(1914; Delhi: MotilalBanara-
sidas,1983). The secondsutraof BookI inthe Yogashtra saysyogais cittavrt-
tinirodha.
and G. S. Shastri,Yogashtras
33- J.R. Ballantyne (Delhi:AkayBook
of Patafijali
Corporation,1980),p. 10.

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34 - Woods, TheYoga-System
ofPatahfjali,
p. 6.
35 - To listthem:theorgansofsenseare theeye,ear,skin,nose,and tongue;the
organsof actionare theorganof speech,the hand,foot,anus,and genitals.
Thisis thelistingoftheelevenIndriyas, theeleventhbeingmind,as listedin
s0tra11.19 of Smrnkhya-Pravachana-Stram. Butfurtheron, mindas theinternal
organ is itself
subdivided
intothree divisions.
Thus s0tra11.38saysthatthereare
thirteeninstruments of
(karana) which ten 'external'
aretheorgansofsenseand
actionand three'internal'are associatedwiththemental(buddhi,ahamrnkara,
and manas).See theSamrnkhya Philosophy,trans.N. Sinha(1915; Delhi: Ori-
entalBooks,1979),pp. 252, 270.
36 - Ballantyneand Shastri, ofPatafijali,
Yogashtras p. 11.
37 - Woods,The Yoga-System ofPatafijali, and Shastri,
p. 191; Ballantyne Yogash-
trasofPatafijali,
p. 64.
38 - Ballantyneand Shastri, ofPatafijali,
Yogasutras p. 64.
39 - Woods,TheYoga-System
ofPatahfjali,
p. 194.
40 - See also T. Leggett,
TheCompleteCommentary on theYogaShtras
bySarnkara
(London and New York:
KeganPaul,1990),p. 276.
41 - Samryama is a technicalnameforthetriadof concentration, and
meditation,
samadhi(the lastthree
aids of yoga)and is described
in YS 111.4.
See Leggett,
TheCompleteCommentary p. 284.
bySanrkara,
42 - Ibid.,p. 335.
43 - Forexample,see D. M. Levin,ed., Modernity and theHegemonyof Vision
(Berkeley: of
University California
Press,1993). Fora discussionof Merleau-
Ponty'sengagementwithmetaphors of visionsee M. Jay'spiece in Levin's
book.
44 - N. Sinha,TheSamkhyaPhilosophy,
p. xi.
45 - Ibid.,p. 283. See also the Smrnkhya-Karika
of Isvarakrisna
forsimilardiscus-
sionson thesubtleand grossbody.
46 - Ibid.,p. 285.
47 - Ibid.,p. 288; s0tra111.11.
48 - Banerji,Studiesin Originand Development
of Yoga,p. 275.
49 - Ibid., p. 229.
50 - Ibid., p. 249.
51 - Ibid., p. 351.
52 - B.K.S. lyengar,Light on Yoga (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968),
p. 242.

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 53 - Ibid.,pp. 80-81.
54 - Ibid.,p. 88.
55 - Ibid.,p. 106.
56 - Ibid.,p. 241.
57 - Ibid.,p. 253. Mircea Eliade discussesbreathcontroland otherrespiratory
practicesassociatedwithTaoism.In thecase of "embryonic the
respiration,"
Taoistsbelievethatthe'place' ofeach breathis the"internal
organthatcorre-
sponds to each breath." See Mircea Eliade,Yoga:Immortalityand Freedom,
trans.WillardTrask(NewYork:PantheonBooks,1958),p. 60.
58 - Banerji,Studiesin Originand Development of Yoga,p. 357.
59 - Ibid.,p. 243; Hathayoga-Pradipika 11.49.
60 - Eliadedoes pointoutcertainsimilarities between and therespira-
of
torypractices Hesychastic monks. See Eliade, pran.yama
Yoga:Immortality and Free-
dom,p. 63. I am surethere are othermonastic communities in the West that
may have had or continueto have such But
practices. itcan be arguedthat
modernism intheWestshifted thebodydiscourseintodominantly thatofthe
scientificone,a movethatinevitably distancedthebodyfromitsphenomeno-
logicaldescriptions.
61 - Merleau-Ponty, TheVisibleand theInvisible,p. 155.
62 - LawrenceHass,"Senseand Alterity,"
inOlkowskiand Morley,
Merleau-Ponty,
and
Interiority Exteriority,
p. 91.
63 - Dillon,Merleau-Ponty's p. 170.
Ontology,
64 - See Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception, trans.Colin Smith(New
Press,1962). See also Dillon,Merleau-Ponty's
York:Humanities Ontology.
65 - Merleau-Ponty,
TheVisibleand theInvisible, p. 139.
66 - This is notto mistakethe fleshas corporeal.Evenas an elementof being,
consumption becomestheunderlying norm.
67 - Thereis also thisinteresting thetantric,
beliefwithinthe yogic,particularly
traditionthatthehealthofa personcan be gaugedbytheamountoftimeone
breathes through theleftor right An imbalanceinthisis relatedto the
nostril.
levelof illnessoftheperson.See, forexample,SwamiSivapriyananda, Secret
PowerofTantrik Breathing(New Delhi:Abhinav 1983).
Publications,
68 - There is also a fascinating insightintobreathingand its connectionwith
speech,namely,whenone is breathing, he/shecannotspeak.Thus,thereis
always a sacrificeof speech while breathingand vice versa. I do not want to
speculate on the implicationsof this here but merelypointout thatthe com-
plexityof breathingmanifestsitselfphenomenologicallyin diverseways!

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