Killing Women

Killing Women
A Critical Study of Gender Equality

in the U.S. Criminal Justice System Regarding
the Most Severe Form of Punishment
Sally Erisman
Supervisor: Carlo Pinnetti
Malmö University, Department of Global Political Studies
Human Rights III
Spring Semester 2012
Abstract
About 1 in 10 murders in the United States are committed by a woman. Meanwhile,

only about 1 in 50 death row inmates are women. This initially suggests that women are
favored in capital cases. There have been two predominant viewpoints attempting to
explain the statistical imbalance: on the one hand there is Rapaport’s theory of gender-
related crime in relation to existing legal directives on what warrants a capital sentence;
and on the other hand is Streib’s theory of chivalry, that women are receiving lenient
treatment in capital cases because they are women. This study has examined both theories,
and tested their validity, by analyzing statistics and other material supporting or opposing
their respective claims. The entire study has been carried out through a feminist theoretical
perspective, questioning how “gender” plays an active part in capital cases, and relating
committed crime to the victim, subsequently finding that even though Rapaport and Streib
advance different theories, neither theory supports a claim that favoritism is incorrect.
Keywords: capital punishment, death penalty, equality, United States, women
Word count: 15,479
I
Killing Women Erisman
Contents
Abstract I
1. Introduction 2
1.1 Purpose of the study 4
1.2 Research question 4
1.3 Method 5
1.3.1 Statistical analysis 5
1.3.2 Legal case study 7
1.4 Theory 8
1.4.1 The basic elements of feminist theory 9
1.4.2 Differences within the theory 10
1.4.3 This study’s theoretical selection 11
1.5 Delimitations 12
2. Material 13
2.1 Historical review 13
2.2 Crime-based theory 14
2.2.1 Executive clemency 16
2.2.2 Gender-related capital crime statistics 18
2.3 Chivalry theory 24
2.3.1 Origins of chivalry concepts 24
2.3.2 Application of chivalry in criminal justice 25
2.3.3 Evil Woman Theory 26
2.4 Dominance and power structure 27
2.4.1 Different voice and dominance theory 27
2.4.2 Rescuing subordination 29
3. Analysis 31
3.1 The inequality rationale 32
3.1.1 ”Male” crimes 32
3.1.2 Sentencing and execution 33
3.1.3 The ranking of severity 34
3.2 The fallacious appreciation of women 37
3.2.1 The practice of chivalry 38
3.2.2 The downside of chivalry 39
3.3 Chivalry vs. consideration 40
3.4 Conclusion 42
3.4.1 Future research 43
4. References 44
Appendix A – Federal laws providing for the death penalty 48

Appendix B – Death sentences imposed on females 49
1
1 Introduction
In a statistical review by the Death Penalty Information Center covering the years
1973-2011, it was found that about 1 in 10 murders in the United States are committed by
a woman. Meanwhile, if one were to look at all death sentences handed down during the
same time period, women have accounted for about 1 in 50. There is no arguing whether
or not there is a statistical imbalance between the sexes; the disagreement lies in
determining the reasons for the imbalance. United States law does not actively encourage
selective treatment of either sex, nor are jurors supposed to treat men and women
differently in cases involving a possible capital sentence, suggesting that the origins of the
disproportion may be found elsewhere. As a result, a number of theories have been
constructed to explain these figures, and answer the questions of why women are
sentenced to death to a substantially less degree than men.
There have been two predominant viewpoints attempting to solve this question.
One approach focuses on the nature of the crimes themselves, by looking at possible
surrounding factors, primarily what crimes warrant a death sentence, and whether or not
the corresponding gender distinction can be found in those figures. This theory has
attempted to uncover gender-related patterns of criminal behavior, to determine if there
are certain crimes, in this case capital crimes, which are especially male or female. The
content of this research has included an overview of the relationship of the perpetrator to
the victim, the level of heinousness of the murder, and most importantly, the relationship
between male and female, and domestic and public. The general idea is that a gender-
related imbalance of death sentences given to men and women can be explained by
gender-related crime, in relation to the outlines of the law of what warrants a capital
sentence.
The other major approach has a different focus from the nature of the crime itself,
rather seeking to prove that women are being held to a different standard than men in a
criminal justice setting, more or less regardless of the nature of the crime. Most
supporters of this theory are concerned with what they believe to be greater leniency
offered to women than to their male counterparts. They find that women are granted
2
lighter sentences because they are women, and that their crimes are accordingly often
perceived as less severe.
Such a claim has inevitably generated a counter-reaction, or alternative branch, to
the theory, which finds that women are being judged and subsequently punished
differently, especially regarding possible capital crimes, but these women need to meet a
certain criterion related to perceptions of gender in order to receive special, i.e. positive,
treatment. Otherwise, they might – contrary to receiving leniency – be judged more
harshly.
Criminal justice has traditionally been very much of a man’s world, with little effort
to take a woman’s perspective into account. While both approaches to explain the
statistical inequality are in constant debate, both theories have been used with varying
frequency to explain the outcome as an alleged bias in favor of women. In the overall
pursuit of gender equality as the main objective, this concern of gender-related partiality
in cases of capital punishment is in great need of further exploration. As equality is of
extreme importance to the field of Human Rights, an alleged bias needs to be proven or
discredited, which is the purpose of the study1.
The introductory chapter will continue with section 1.1, containing an explanation
and purpose of the study – why it is needed, and how it intends to contribute to this field
– followed by the research question in section 1.2. Section 1.3 will address the decision to
base a lot of the research on statistical analysis, and the study of legal cases, as well as
provide some explanation for the selection of other theoretical material. After that,
section 1.4 will present the basic principles of feminism, a theory with great focus on
discussions of gender-related inequality, which will be further elaborated and discussed in
the final analysis. The last part of the introductory chapter, section 1.5, will briefly make
known the necessary restrictions made to the study.
Following the introduction, the material will be presented. Chapter 2, section 2.1
and will contain some brief historical information on especially noteworthy capital cases,
1
Note: Most papers written on capital punishment are about the pros and cons of the death penalty itself.
I feel it necessary for me to disclose that I am very much against the death penalty, and believe it to be an
inhuman punishment – in many ways even a glorified form of torture – and a direct violation of human rights.
While this study might reflect this opinion of mine, I will refrain from discussing the legitimacy of the
punishment itself, so as to not have it become another abolition paper. Therefore, to all my fellow death penalty
opponents, forgive me if I use words like eligible or warranted when referring to capital punishment.
3
followed by 2.2, which presents the crime-based theory about the capital sentencing of
women is related to the crimes themselves; the existing discretionary guidelines for
sentencing; and statistics on the capital sentencing in the current death penalty era. The
following section, 2.3, will present the opposing theory, stating that women are treated
differently in capital cases because of their gender, not because of the nature of the crime.
The last part of the material chapter, section 2.4, will provide some alternative feminist
views on women and dynamics of power in a criminal justice setting. The final chapter,
3, will contain the analysis of the material, where the presented material will be discussed
through a feminist theoretical perspective, followed by a conclusion, and finally a
recommendation for future research.
1.1 Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to critically investigate existing opposing theories as to

why there is such a large statistical gap between men and women on death row in the
United States. By reviewing the empirical and theoretical material behind their
conclusions, this study is an attempt to uncover the errors or inadequacies of their
reasoning, as well as provide an alternative interpretation.
There is a wide range of existing work about racial discrimination related to capital
punishment, but in comparison, gender inequality seems to be mentioned to a
significantly smaller degree; sexism even less. This study, however, will place principles
of gender equality and selective treatment in capital cases in direct focus, as gender and
women have been widely overlooked in this debate despite the displayed statistical
differences between how men and women are treated and sentenced in the courts. The
discussion as to why this imbalance has occurred has largely been constructed through a
preconceived view that women are benefitting disproportionally to their male peers from
this imbalance. It is this notion that this study intends to explore.
1.2 Research question
 Are women being favored in capital cases in the United States?
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1.3 Method
The study is conducted through a combination of legal method and statistical

analysis. The combination of the two methods has allowed a both general and
individually applicable conclusion, by presenting detailed information about specific
cases, as well as a broad understanding of the greater scope of the issue.
1.3.1 Statistical analysis
Statistics can be used to create a base for a study, i.e. generate a platform from
which one can further investigate and explore. By reviewing the statistical raw data of
one or just a few aspects, one can expose a greater, more general problem. Statistics can
enable the researcher to draw generalizing conclusions about figures taken from a
representative group of the entire population, instead of actually including each
individual separately in the study. It serves as an excellent component in any research
that is trying to reach a scientific conclusion in a productive way (Delorme 2006:1).
Statistics can also be very helpful in generating potential research questions, and
help visualize a problem, especially a comparative one. To this study, where inequality
and comparative analysis of men and women are the main focus, the statistical records
have been crucial, as they have both provided substantial and vital information, as well as
generated a discussion about possible interpretations of their content. In short, they have
in a clear way demonstrated existing imbalances, which have been further explored with
complementing material.
Statistical reliability can vary greatly due to certain factors, e.g. the number of
participants in proportion to the entire group of interest to the study, or the process of
how the participants in the study have been selected. Many feel that a random selection
would be the most fair and unbiased, as it would not subjectively reflect the researcher’s
purpose of the study. However, a random selection could at the same time be misleading,
e.g. by excluding some sub-categories of the population, thus yielding results that fail to
reflect the entire population. With that said, the validity of any statistical analysis
increases by increasing the percentage of the sampling group to represent the entire
population or targeted area of the study (CSUN 2007; Delorme 2006:1,7). In the case of
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this particular study, the statistics used are not subject to this concern, as there was a non-
discriminatory selection of participants. They have been made up by information in the
modern era of capital punishment, during which time we can assume that detailed and
correct documentation has taken place. Therefore, no selection of participants has been
made, but rather all subjects involved have been included.
The statistics used in this study have been extracted from previous studies on
gender and the death penalty, as well as from, the United States Department of Justice
(USDOJ) and the Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) database. The DPIC is a
widely recognized non-profit organization, which is often cited in accredited media such
as the New York Times, BBC, and Reuters. The organization has been acknowledged by
both pro and con death penalty associations as a highly reliable source of objective
information on capital cases (Stewart 2008; DPIC1).
Statistical data cannot account for the reasons behind their content; rather, such
data disregards all environmental surroundings. Statistics can thus come across as very
shallow and narrow, and have been criticized, especially by constructivists, as “short-
sighted” and even dangerous, as it excludes all contexts (Moses 2007:246). In accordance
with this critique, this study finds that statistical analysis is an insufficient method on its
own, and has required other material, largely found in previous research. Such material
has been used to create a foundation for statistical interpretation, analytical discussion
and the final conclusion. The previous studies used have primarily been the work of
Elizabeth Rapaport and Victor L. Streib. Rapaport is an accredited author and scholar,
with a Ph. D. in philosophy, and a J.D. in law and public policy. Her work is highly
respected, and often quoted in other publications on the topics of feminism and law
(USFCA 1999). Streib is a law professor, and former prosecutor and defense attorney,
whose work has been referred to in several Supreme Court hearings (ONU 1999). Both
authors are commonly referred to in studies about gender and criminal justice, but with
very different views on equality and discrimination and the mechanisms that drive them.
For the purpose of this study, these two authors have provided two opposite views of or
approaches to the same problem, i.e. different interpretations of the same statistical data.
The figures discussed in this study can briefly be described as statistical differences
between men and women sentenced to death; what crimes are most represented on death
row, and the relationship between the male or female perpetrators and their correlating
victims. These statistics were included in this study partly due to the fact that they formed
the basis of the two opposing theories of Rapaport and Streib, and partly due to how they
6
help illustrate the errors of these theories. This study will show that the selection of
statistical information affects the outcome of a study, as well as how the interpretation of
statistics is largely influenced by the purpose of the study and subjectivity of the
researcher.
1.3.2 Legal case study
Statistics only provide a very limited range of information, including neither the
surrounding factors – e.g. historical aspects of the death penalty other than numbers – nor
specific cases to examine more closely. Therefore, this study has in addition to statistical
analysis, incorporated some elements of the legal method (Shelton 2006:322), in order to
provide a more in-depth understanding of capital cases in the United States. This study
has not conducted a single case study per se; rather, it has incorporated information from
several capital cases which were selected for their relevance to this study, primarily
capital cases of women, but also others which have in some way shown to have had a
significant impact on courts’ perceptions of gender discrimination.
Unlike statistical material, reviewing a specific case can allow focus to be placed on
the descriptive qualities rather than the bottom line. A case study is a qualitative method,
in contrast to the quantitative statistical analysis, that does not focus on the general
applicability of the subject, but rather asks the question “why” when a concern has
already been established. A specific case can help display possible scenarios of a certain
problem, generate problem questions and create an understanding of which areas require
extra consideration. It can also provide a level of authenticity and applicability to both
the researcher and the reader in the otherwise sometimes very abstract nature of scientific
research (CSU 2012).
One of the cases which I will discuss is that of Karla Faye Tucker. Her case shows
how the issue of gender cannot be ignored as playing an active part in a capital case. It
depicts how a female predator, on capital trial, is not only discussed in terms of the crime
she committed, but in terms of questioning her very womanhood. This opens up for
further elaboration, for instance on our perceptions of what “feminine” actually is.
The critique against the case study method has perhaps more to do with comparing
a case study to other methods of research when it in fact holds unique qualities. Its
primary benefits are perhaps not reliability and validity, but rather depth and verifiability.
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Like the possible implications of the statistical method, studying a specific case often
draws criticism for being highly subjective – from the initial selection to the analysis of
the results (CSU 2012). Consequently, not only the Tucker case, but all the capital cases
that were included in this particular study were very intentionally selected based on the
purpose of the study. However, they serve primarily as catalysts for further discussion
rather than as empirical evidence. In social science, a case study is better off being
included in the broader scope of the legal method, rather than attempting to have it
suffice on its own.
Apart from the specific court cases, this study will include further exploration of the
legal framework by looking at existing regulations and guidelines available for those who
serve as judges and jurors in capital cases, and well as the very stipulation of what
constitutes a capital crime. The application of legal sources and argumentation, and
reviewing both theory and practice of the legal framework, will provide a broad
understanding of the judicial process in capital cases – from sentencing to execution.
The legal method faces some critique as a research process due to the breadth of the
method – that due to the vast quantity of information, it can result in a very shallow
study (Gray 2010:86), which does nothing to provide the reader with anything directly
applicable, or for that matter new and exciting. Moreover, the breadth of the scope might
create some unclarity, e.g. in cases of overlapping laws (Shelton 2006:322). Because of
this risk, this study has not considered the individual state laws in relation to federal law,
rather generalizing the United States and the death penalty as a whole; as well as using
specific court cases and statistical data for a more focused direction.
The limited qualities of statistical raw data and the explicit and descriptive qualities
of examining specific legal cases, combined with a broader spectrum when reviewing
within the scope of the judicial system, have collectively provided a general, yet focused
discussion of the gender-related inequalities within the United States criminal justice
system, with regards to the death penalty.
1.4 Theory
When considering matters of sexism, gender inequality and possible

discriminations, the decision to conduct this study through a feminist theoretical
8
perspective seemed highly appropriate, as the theory questions socially, historically, and
profoundly engrained ideas of qualities and behavior that are associated with a person’s
sex. The decision for selecting this theoretical approach was also greatly influenced by
the fact that the author of the one theories in question, Elizabeth Rapaport, is a feminist
scholar; and the fact that the author of the other theory in question, Victor Streib, has
faced much critique for ignoring aspects of gender. By selecting another theoretical
approach, the outcome of this study would likely have been much different. To fully
understand this selection of theoretical approach, this section will provide some brief
history of the feminist theory, as well as describe the key elements of its take on reality.
1.4.1 The basic elements of feminist theory
The first International Women’s Conference was held in Paris in 1892. Before then,
“feminism” was not part of the English language (or any other language for that matter)
vocabulary, but now it came to mean “the struggle for equality between genders”. Today,
“feminism” is sometimes used as the term to describe the political and social women’s
right movement primarily in the United States and Europe, but for others it refers to the
principle of an oppressed gender. There is, however, a clear distinction between the
feminist movement in action, largely concerned with women’s rights; and feminist theory,
which includes all inequalities and sexism – facing both women and men. It is important
to recognize that “feminism” is therefore not limited to women’s rights. Ensuring or
depriving women of the same rights as men in the legal or legislative sphere does not
necessarily result in an equal society. Rather, societal structures, cultural practices, and
our general consciousness regarding issues of oppression, equality and sexism are what
really effect change, and that is what feminist theory is about (Chafetz 1997:97-98; SEP
2003).
While acknowledging the original and strictly biological definitions of male and
female, feminist theory also focuses on masculine and feminine, i.e. both the biological
and the behavioral aspects. The notion of gender varies within feminist theory, but an
overall thought is to say that what we consider “feminine” and “masculine” personalities
develop at an early age on an unconscious level to be further enforced in a social setting
that evolves it into a personality and ego. These gendered personalities reflect the
stereotypical behaviors to which the child is exposed, and certain qualities are then
9
perceived as male and female. In other words, if children at the earliest stages in life were
to be exposed to an alternate, gender neutral, environment – one that does not enforce
these gender personalities – they might become more resistant to future exposure to
gender stereotyping. This stereotyping is an assumed collectiveness among the gender
one belongs to – that one shares characteristics with all others within that group –
characteristics that at the same time separate one gender from the other. According to
feminism, such a distinction will inevitably be flawed, as it does not take into account
other aspects within one’s gender that may overlap to the opposite gender – such as race,
culture and class. Moreover, it is an unnecessary focus, as even if there were distinct
qualities among the separate sexes, the importance is to recognize that one is not above
the other (Baym 1995; SEP 2008).
1.4.2 Differences within the theory
While some feminist theorists would say that the main purpose of the feminist
discourse would be to end the oppression of women, others apply a much broader scope
to include ending all oppressions affecting women. This would include everything from
race and religion to age and class. There are many reasons to believe that fighting other
injustices than those against women specifically is in fact necessary to fulfill feminist
goals. Some feminists consider this extensive view of oppression to be a struggle separate
from feminism, even if they are co-dependent in their common goal to end all forms of
domination and inequality. The broadness of the theory has left some scholars feeling
that there is a need for new terms to divide certain aspects of feminism into smaller
concepts. One example of this is the not yet broadly established “womanism”, referring
to the subcategory of women of color (SEP 2003).
Some feminists focus more on sexism than anything else, and believe that this is the
only place where men and women can truly come together in a mutual understanding
and effort to overcome existing power dynamics. This focus allows the theory to move
away from problems with defining the different concepts of feminism, and merely place
all its focus on its main goal – equality. Oppression, the primary obstacle for equality, can
be described as a social structure that limits one set of people: that enables one group by
limiting the other, not in a single instance, but as a pattern, creating a profoundly
understood societal structure. Oppression does not emerge overnight, but has great
10
historical bearing and is profoundly engrained, both with the oppressor and the
oppressed. What separates sexist oppression from other oppression is that we can say that
oppression – in many shapes and forms – harms women, but sexist oppression harms
women because they are women. This element is why sexist oppression has a greater
platform within the feminist discourse than other forms of oppression (SEP 2003).
Feminist theory has two elements: the normative quality, i.e. the moral claims of how
women should have the same rights and that we’re all equal under the law; and the
descriptive quality , which describes the situation like it is today, that women are currently
oppressed to varying degrees worldwide for their gender and don’t experience the same
benefits men do because of it. One could say that the descriptive component looks at the
how and what, while the normative asks why. Feminist theorists often have
disagreements regarding both components: either on what constitutes “equality”,
“justice”, and “oppression”; or what the actual problems are out there today for women
to face regarding these issues. Mainly, the disagreement can be found in determining the
reasons behind the injustice, and how to rectify them. In mainstream society, one can
assume that not everyone, not even all of those who would like to see more equality
between the genders, would fully accept both the normative and the descriptive qualities.
Someone might agree with the principles of equality, and justice for all, without
reviewing themselves and the life they lead, where inequality can be found all around
them, while others might want to involve themselves in a specific feminist concern, but
not have any greater moral considerations about life and society overall. It is important to
include both qualities in the discourse, if for no other reason than that applying
normative qualities to the theory would probably merely attract the scholars, the
philosophers, and be confined within existing social and political relations. But the
descriptive quality of the theory is something that is very specific and to which more
people can relate (SEP 2003).
1.4.3 This study’s theoretical selection
Existing notions of gender infiltrate every part of our lives. Consequently, feminist
theory can be applied to any scholastic research, but most appropriately, one in social
science. For the purpose of this study, the selection of feminist theory has enabled the
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research to be conducted through normative critique and analysis, illustrating the severe
outcomes of allowing these existing notions to color the judicial process in capital cases.
The decision to use Rapaport’s feminist approach was due to the descriptive
qualities of her work, possibly influenced by her experience in criminal law; as well as the
normative qualities of her work, possibly influenced by her philosophy background. Hers
is, however, not the only theoretical approach in this study. Other feminist theories have
also been briefly included, such as Carol Gilligan’s “Difference Theory”; the opposing
“Dominance Theory” by Catharine MacKinnon; in addition to the more general feminist
critique of criminal justice by feminist scholars such as Renée Heberle. Together, they
have helped this study avoid excessive generalizations about probable feminist responses
to the material at hand.
1.5 Delimitations
Statistics of manslaughter, compared to those about murder, have needed to be

excluded from this particular study due to the applied restrictions on the length. These
restrictions have also made it necessary to make some drastic cuts as to what to include
in this work. Primarily, factors such as race and sexual orientation have had to be
eliminated from the study. Racial bigotry, or prejudice regarding sexual orientation, may
very likely have greatly influenced capital crime procedures – factors which have not
been allowed consideration in this very limited study.
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2 Material
This chapter will present information related to women, crime, and the death
penalty. It will also include the two opposing theories on the gender-related, statistical
imbalance of death row inmates, as well as feminist theoretical views related to criminal
justice. This chapter starts with a brief historical summary, primarily to illustrate the
origins of the legal guidelines for determining and evaluating capital cases, followed by
the content of Rapaport’s theory and statistical data. The chapter then moves on to the
opposing theory by Streib. The last part of the chapter provides some additional
theoretical aspects of equality, followed by the analysis.
2.1 Historical review
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court had received concerns about possible
violations of the 8thAmendment of the United States Constitution (hereinafter referred to
as the Constitution), and they decided to review four capital cases. The cases were 2 rape
cases, 1 murder case, and 1 accidental killing. The accidental killing was the case of
Furman vs. Georgia (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 1972), where Furman, who
suffered from psychotic episodes, fatally shot someone when he accidently fired a gun as
he tripped over a cord when breaking into a house (Pope 2002:268-269). The Supreme
Court found that capital punishment was used in a discriminatory way on the basis of
“race, religion, wealth, social position, or class” (Barron 2006). The Court’s ruling was
far from unanimous, establishing that Furman was not eligible for the death penalty by a
narrow 5 to 4 majority decision. After reviewing all four cases, the Court found the death
penalty was arbitrary in its entirety, as it showed no consistency in penalizing, and had
great discriminatory elements, and they issued a nationwide moratorium (Pope
2002:269). “Gender” was never formally discussed as a possible discriminatory factor,
but Supreme Court Justice Marshall did state in the official records that:
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“There is also overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed against men and not
women. It is difficult to understand why women have received such favored treatment since the
purposes allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are equally applicable to both sexes.”
(Marshall in Reza 2005: 180)
The problems with capital punishment were things that the Court considered to be
fixable – that state representatives would have greater influence in the criminal justice
process and lawmaking. The Court would also impose limitations on jury discretion
during sentencing with new and improved guidelines for determining capital cases. Only
a few years later, in 1976, the Court found that the necessary revisions had been made,
and that the death penalty could no longer be considered arbitrary. They allowed states
to reinstate capital punishment as they saw fit, which 35 states chose to do, even if the
state representatives still reflected a mainly white, male, middle-or upper-class, as many
states still had highly engrained practices of racial segregation, and women were still
much underrepresented. (Pope 2002:272-273)
Given the large number of states that chose to reinstate this punishment, the Court
found justifications for their decision on grounds that it reflected a great community
wish. However, the decision on whether or not to reinstate the death penalty was up to
state legislators, and the Court did not question whether or not these legislators in fact
represented their community. Nevertheless, they concluded that juries were now able to
provide an objective, non-discriminatory application of the death penalty. What makes
this all the more interesting is that a capital jury at that time did not consist of randomly
selected individuals of a community, but was only allowed to be made up of those
supportive of capital punishment in the first place (Pope 2002:272-273).
2.2 Crime-based theory
In developing her theory that any leniency shown towards women is based on the
nature of the crime itself, rather than on actual consideration of gender, Elizabeth
Rapaport focused on the post-moratorium application of the guidelines of the Supreme
Court. The revisions implemented by the Court in light of the Furman case consisted of
rather leaving it up to the discretion of the jury and the judge. The Court implemented
weighing factors when determining whether or not a case should be up for capital
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punishment – factors which were supposed to be highly scientific, to assure the equality
and fairness of the justice system. There are three components in these guidelines for the
jury to abide by in determining if someone is eligible for capital punishment: 1) prior
criminal record, 2) the severity of the crime, and 3) the level of culpability that can be
determined (Pope 2002:277-278; Rapaport 1991:372).
The revisions by the Court not only limited the discretion of the jurors, but also
completely rejected the death penalty for certain crimes previously eligible if they could
not be proven to have resulted in the loss of a life, such as espionage, trafficking etc. The
mandatory death penalty sentence for certain crimes was also replaced by more
discretionary sentencing – further limiting what crimes were eligible for the death penalty
to crimes with an excessively aggravated nature (Rapaport 2010:555-556).2
States vary in determining what the aggravating and mitigating factors might be,
and it is left to the discretion of each state court to make that interpretation, but most
states have also passed statutes covering such required factors. Generally, it can be said
that the types of murders that can be categorized as eligible for the death penalty are: 1)
predatory murder; 2) killing to resist law enforcement or legal consequences (for instance
killing a police officer, a corrections officer or other law enforcment person); and 3)
murders that were committed with extreme heinousness and brutality:
1) Predatory murder is murder that is committed for some gain. Usually it involves
financial gain, but it can also be other factors such as sexual. These murders are
sometimes committed through a hired third party, and as such the offender might
be convicted even if he or she did not actually carry out the murder. Hiring
someone would in fact show the planned nature of the crime, which could be
interpreted as one of the aggrevating factors.
2) Resisting law enforcement includes murders carried out to prevent oneself from
being arrested. States differ on which of these kinds of cases are to be considered
capital offenses. For instance, in some states this goes beyond those I already
mentioned, to include all government officials.
3) In determining the heineousness of the crime, jurors consider the very nature of
the offense, for instance if it was a multiple-victim case, the process of the kill –
methods such as the use of explosives, or poison are considered especially harsh –
along with any other act of torture (Rapaport 1991:376-377).
2
Note: For a complete list of the federal statues on the provision for the death penalty, see Appendix A.
15
2.2.1 Executive clemency
The reforms regarding the discretionary guidelines and restrictions on judges and
jurors have not managed to do the same for executive powers which have been spared
and protected by the Constitution. This authority is subject to very little inspection and
has therefore a lot of power with little to no examination or legal review. Before the
Furman case, there was neither the extensive appeal process there is today, nor the same
possibilities to have one’s sentence commuted or even pardoned. Today, each U.S. death
penalty state has some procedure outlined for clemency (Rapaport 2001:974-975). In 15
states (DPIC2), that power is solely the authority of the governor, with the exception of
the United States President, who has had the opportunity to exert that power provided to
him by the Constitution (U.S. Constitution, 11th amendment, section 2). Contributing
factors to a Governor’s decision might reflect personal or political bias, for instance, that
a liberal governor might free someone convicted of narcotics possession, while a
conservative governor might free someone convicted of a gun-related offense. An
executive decision can, in other words, have more to do with political conviction rather
than the severity of the crime (Rapaport: 2001:969,1001).
Two-thirds of all death sentences have been commuted, but very few of those by
executive power (Rapaport 2001:975-976). The probably most well-known or frequently
discussed female capital case was that of Karla Faye Tucker in Texas. Tucker and her
boyfriend, Danny Garret, broke into the home of Jerry Dean to rob him, primarily of his
motorcycle. When they entered his home in the middle of the night, they both brutally
assaulted Dean – Garret with a hammer, Tucker with a pickax. They later discovered
Dean’s girlfriend, Deborah Thorton, in the next room, and Tucker proceeded to “pick”
her as well. According to Tucker herself, both victims begged to be killed during the
picking. The following day, when police searched the apartment, they found the pickax
still inserted in Thorton’s chest. While in custody, Tucker revealed that she felt sexual
pleasure from the picking, and she apparently told her sister that “I come with every
stroke”. The heinousness of the crime was taken into special consideration by the Court,
along with the sexual gratification, and the pecuniary motive. They found that due to her
“turbulent past”, and “disturbingly unfeminine manner”, she would never be able to be
reinstated in society (Rapaport 2010:34-35).
In Tucker’s case, it was former president (then Governor) George W. Bush who
had the option of stopping the planned execution. This event was surrounded by a lot of
16
media coverage and speculation as to whether or not it would benefit his political career
retirement (Rapaport 2001:967-968).
“If you believe in capital punishment for one, you believe in it for everybody. If you don’t
believe in it, don’t believe in it for anybody.” (Karla Faye Tucker in Cruishank 1999:1113)
Tucker explicitly stated that the issue of gender was not relevant in her case, but this
might have been an effort to save her own life. This statement was made in the last phase
of her appeals, when only a commutation from the Governor could spare her life, and in
light of the media attention given to this case, largely regarding the fact that Karla was a
woman, Bush made a statement that gender would not factor into his decision. By
undermining the gender issue, some have argued that this might have been Tucker’s
attempt to appeal to Bush’s better graces (Cruishank 1999:1114).
Since the Tucker case, many other governors with this power of commutation have
been equally, if not more, convinced that allowing a female to be executed under their
watch would no more bring into question their capabilities and political integrity than it
would to commute her sentence, as this might raise questions of gender bias (Rapaport
2001:967-968). However, since 1973, 271 out of 8,392 death sentences have received
executive clemency. Out of those, only 11 were women (DPIC2). Most women received
their clemency from Governors close to retirement (Rapaport 2001:968). In fact, since
1976, there have been five occasions when a retiring Governor has granted clemency for
all death row inmates at once, accounting for over 200 of 271 clemencies (DPIC2).
A couple of years after Tucker’s death sentence, another capital case stood out, and
once again was of interest for the Supreme Court in light of the 8th and 14thAmendments
of the Constitution. This time, the accused was a man, Warren McCleskey, who was
found guilty of robbery and murder in the state of Georgia, who claimed that there was a
clear racial bias in the state of Georgia to the disadvantage of blacks. However, the
Supreme Court found that while they could recognize that the system was not perfect, no
system was, and that failing to issue a capital sentence to McCleskey would unduly affect
other similar cases, perhaps even regarding lesser punishments, all in the name of
discrimination (Rapaport 2010:7-8).
17
“The claim that [McCleskey's] sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims
based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gender."
(Supreme Court Justice Powell in Rapaport 2010:8)
The outcome of the case was the consensus of the Supreme Court justices that no one is
to be spared from their punishment on the ground of discrimination, if he or she cannot
prove that the discrimination was deliberate. Furthermore, that it would be absurd if
claims of racial discrimination would lead to claims regarding gender discrimination
(Rapaport 2010:7-8).
2.2.2 Gender-related capital crime statistics
There have been a total of 1,295 executions in the United States since 1976
(DPIC4); 3,189 persons remain on death row (DPIC5), and 58 of those are women
(Streib 2011: 7). Since the Furman case, 174 women have received a death sentence in
the United States: of those, 12 have been executed; 104 have had their sentenced
reduced, received clemency, or died of natural causes; and currently, 58 women remain
on death row (Streib 2011:8-9). For a complete list of these 174 sentences, see Appendix B.
The DPIC annually releases a compilation of death penalty statistics in the United
States, this year with the help of extensive research conducted by law professor, attorney,
and author Victor L. Streib. One out of ten (10%) of those arrested for murder are
women; about one out of 50 (2.1%) of those receiving a death sentence are women; one
out of 67 (1.8%) of those currently on death row are women; and about 1 out of 100
(0.9%) of those actually executed in the modern death penalty era (post-moratorium) are
women. Below is an annual breakdown of men and women death sentenced since the
Furman case (see Table 1):
18
Table 1: Death sentences for female offenders 1973-2011
Total Death Female Death Portion of

Year
Sentences Sentences Total
1973 42 1 2.4%
1974 149 1 0.7%
1975 298 8 2.3%
1976 233 3 1.3%
1977 137 1 0.7%
1978 185 4 2.1%
1979 151 4 2.6%
1980 173 2 1.1%
1981 224 3 1.3%
1982 265 5 1.8%
1983 252 4 1.6%
1984 285 8 2.8%
1985 266 5 1.8%
1986 300 3 1.0%
1987 289 5 1.7%
1988 290 5 1.7%
1989 259 11 4.2%
1990 252 7 2.7%
1991 267 6 2.2%
1992 287 10 3.5%
1993 289 6 2.0%
1994 315 5 1.6%
1995 318 7 2.2%
1996 320 2 0.6%
1997 276 2 0.7%
1998 300 7 2.3%
1999 279 5 1.8%
2000 231 7 3.1%
2001 163 2 1.3%
2002 159 5 3.2%
2003 144 2 1.4%
2004 125 5 4.0%
2005 128 5 3.9%
2006 115 4 3.5%
2007 115 1 1.8%
2008 111 3 2.7%
2009 106 2 1.9%
2010 112 2 1.8%
2011 78 5 6.4%
Totals: 8,392 174 2.1%
Source: Streib 2011:8-9
19
With the exception of the year 2011, with the highest number of female death
sentences in the current death penalty era – more than three times the post-Furman
average – women have since 1972 accounted for less than 5% of all capital sentences each
year, and out of the total amount of 8,392 people, only account for 174, or 2.1% (Streib
2011: 8-9).
Elizabeth Rapaport has conducted a string of studies about women and capital
punishment throughout the past two decades, and she believes that the statistical
imbalance can be explained by the existing legal directives, and indeed her theory is
based on relating gender bias to the nature of the crime itself, including the felon’s
criminal background. Looking at the implemented guidelines from the Supreme Court to
the jurors in determining capital cases, when it comes to the first of the factoring
components – prior convictions – men are much more likely to have prior convictions for
violent crimes; in fact, more than 95% of all violent crimes committed in the U.S. are by
men (Rapaport 1991:372; 2010:10). As for determining the severity of the crime, the judges
and jurors are asked to take into consideration excessive violence, torture, or extremely
heinous features of the offense. Such factors are left to the discretion of the court, and are
inevitably treated very subjectively. It can be noted that similar to dominating the
statistics on violent crime, men account for a much higher degree of excessively violent
murder. Moreover, one factor which can be more objectively measured when
determining the brutality of a killing is to consider the number of murder victims in the
case. This component is substantially more common with a man as the offender rather
than a woman. In fact, from 1976-1987, close to 93% of all multiple-murder suspects
were men. This suggests that a statistical imbalance can in fact be explained in an
objective way (Rapaport 2010:373). The third aspect – determining the level of culpability – is
where the main difficulty lies, and where subjective notions of the jurors have greatest
influence. This entails looking at ulterior motives, for instance pecuniary gain or escaping
punishment, but also at the behavioral patterns of the suspect and possible mitigating
factors present. This will be further elaborated on in section 2.3.
In light of the revision by the Supreme Court, murder, as a crime on its own, is very
seldom considered a capital offense, and when looking at the nature of the crimes, while
women commit 1 in 10 murders, they very seldom commit felony murders, i.e. a murder
committed together with another serious crime – another felony. Nationally, felony
murders make up over 75% of all capital sentences in the U. S., and in some states, that
20
number is well over 80%. The largest category of felony murders represented on death
row is robbery murder – a crime where men are 24 times more represented as the
offender than women. Other felonies can be rape, burglary, arson etc. These are all
factors taken into account when determining sentencing (Rapaport 1991:370; 2010:9-10).
In one of Rapaport’s studies, where she focuses on the first decade after the
reinstatement in 1976, she looks at the statistics of men and women and the categories of
murder they commit, specifically those types that are most likely to lead to the death
penalty. According to her research, out of all 172,961 murders (including domestic
killings) committed during those years, women were responsible for 14.3%. They
accounted for 6.2% of all felony murders and or multiple-victim murders – those that
have been determined by the Supreme Court to be considered the most severe, and that
are most likely to become capital cases (see Table 2).
Table 2: Types of Murder Most Eligible for Capital Punishment,

Committed 1976-1987
Males (%) Females (%)
Robbery murder 96.0 4.0
Rape murder 96.1 3.9
Multiple-victim murder 92.8 7.2
All felony murders 93.8 6.2
Stranger murder 96.1 3.9
Total murders 172,961 85.7 14.3

Source: Rapaport 1991:371
Stranger murder is significantly dominated by men, specifically 96.1%. We find

much greater equality between the sexes when it comes to domestic homicides.
Rapaport’s study shows that during the same time period, over 90% of murders
committed by women were against an intimate (spouse, child, etc.), or other person
known to the suspect. Table 3 breaks down the categories of murders by male and female
suspects. As we can see, the gap between intimate murder and stranger murder is 65.5%
to 5% for women, for men, the same gap is only 22.1% to 20.4% (Rapaport 1991:371).
Table 3: Proportion of Murder Victims by Relationship, 1976-1987
21
Relationship of Victim to Suspect Murder by male suspects (%) Murder by female suspect (%)
Intimate: 22.1 65.5
Spouse, lover, ex 11.8 48.9
Child 2.7 10.4
Other family 7.6 6.2
Acquaintance, friend, other known 47.1 26.9
Stranger 20.4 5.0
Unknown 10.2 3.3
99.8% 100.0%
In a similar study, Rapaport found that of those men and women on death row,
domestic killings account for 12% of the men, and 48% of the women (see Table 4). This
she says is due to the fact that stranger violence is considered much more heinous than
domestic violence. Reasons for this she finds are that in domestic killings, the victim is
considered to have part in the killing, for reasons such as abuse or abandonment, while
stranger killings seem much more unprovoked, and therefore more frightening. They are
generally thought to be cold-blooded and calculated, assuming that felony murders are
planned and intentional when in fact they often are not (Rapaport 1991:381). Stranger
killings may also be regarded as more severe due to the element of future danger–
allegedly that there is a greater risk that people who kill strangers may kill again.
Domestic killings are believed to be the result of a more targeted anger with a specific
objective, less likely to continue after completion. This does not, however, consider the
future possible danger to other family members (Rapaport 2010:63). That we regard
stranger violence as more severe than domestic violence, Rapaport argues, is the reason
for the statistical imbalance between men and women on death row – not an alleged
leniency (Shatz 2011:19). This theory is in stark contrast with the theory proposed by
Streib, as we will see in section 2.3.1 below.
Motives behind domestic killing have a clearly dinstict gender separation as to what
is more frequent, according to Rapaport. Women are likely to kill an intimate due to fear
or an act of self-defense. Such crimes seldom become capital cases unless there was some
other gain as a motive linked to the kill (Rapaport 1991:370; 2010:10). For men, domestic
killing is largely motivated by jealousy and separation – usually when a woman has left
her male partner, and he proceeds to stalk her and kill her. Being a victim of infidelity,
and the sense of abandonment, can be conceived as mitigating factors, i.e. lessening the
severity of the crime. Separation killings by men are often reduced to manslaughter due
22
to the emotional trauma the offender has suffered, pushing him into a state of panic –
even without a temporary insanity plea, and even with a lack of remorse (Rapaport
2009:1540; 2010:61). North Carolina, Illinois and Florida have gone so far as to include
exemption clauses for their use of capital punishment for just such circumstances of
separation killings (Pope 2002:275). In contrast, those women who do end up on death
row for domestic murder, the motive behind the crime has primarily been pecuniary,
whereas for men, domestic killings have primarily had a retaliatory motive (see Table 5).
Domestic Death Row – Gender and Motive, 1978-1989*

Table 4:
Men (No.) Men (%) Women (No.) Women (%)
No. of death sentences 699 54
Total in which killer and
victim were intimates 83 12 26 48
Table 5:
Men % Women %
Pecuniary motive 13 69
Retaliatory motive 48 8
Other 39 23
Total 100 100

*Because of the relatively few women on death row, while she focused on men sentenced in Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania, she needed to include women sentenced nationally.
Domestic homocides rarely became capital cases unless there was a pecuniary gain,
there were multiple victims, or the violence was particularly heinous (Rapaport
1991:378). Considering that women statistically account for much more intimate murders
than stranger murders, some suggest that this is the result of some leniency specifically
towards women. Meanwhile, women are also the more often than men killed in the
home; in fact, women in no other place than a domestic setting are more likely to become
a murder victim (Shatz 2011:39). Domestic murder is an extremely limited part of the
much broader problem of domestic violence, where women are the primary victims
(Rapaport 2010:63). In a statistical compilation by USDOJ, they found that from 1998-
2002, murder accounted for less than 0.5% of all cases of domestic violence; women were
23
the victims of about 85% of all spouse- or partner-inflicted abuse; and men were the
violent actor in about 75% of all reported domestic violence cases (USDOJ 2005:1).
To summarize the Rapaport theory, gender bias in capital crimes and sentencing is
clearly argued to be based on the nature of the crime only, and her theory dismisses or
discounts the notion of any leniency shown towards women on the basis of consideration
of their gender as such.
2.3 Chivalry theory
One of the most widely endorsed theoretical approaches attempting to explain the
statistical imbalance between men and women within the U.S. criminal justice system is
the “Chivalry Theory”. In contrast to other presumably disadvantaged social groups, for
instance African-Americans and the poor, it has been claimed that women have
benefitted from their social stance because of their gender. This is the basis of chivalry
theory, which thus takes an entirely different approach to Rapaport’s theory, i.e. that
leniency towards women is based on the nature of the crime itself.
2.3.1 Origins of chivalry concepts
Chivalry – a code of conduct traced back to the Middle-Ages, was a set of norms for
men to on how to behave when there was no real existing governance. Initially, chivalry
was a standard for how to act with honor at for instance a time of war, not on the basis of
gender, but of class. However, with time, it came to be understood as a grace exclusively
bestowed upon women, for the sake of being women (Shatz 2011:2-4).
As late as the 1960s, the Supreme Court validated Florida state laws that relieved
women from participating in public responsibilities, specifically jury duty, as they had
other obligations in the home and with their family. This was clearly a case of chivalry
granted exclusively towards women, emphasizing the public and private spheres as
platforms in which gender separation was explicitly accepted. After loud critique from
the gradually growing feminist movement in the 1970-early 80s, the Court responded by
shifting their views, finding that women would not benefit from being treated differently,
not even by “positive” special treatment – even calling it unconstitutional, as it would
24
suggest that women, as an entire gender, suffered from some handicap that ultimately
made them inferior to men (Shatz 2011:5-6).
2.3.2 Application of chivalry in criminal justice
The developments in the Court’s attempts to curb the possible influences of chivalry
did not, however, terminate notions of chivalry nor, some would say, chivalrous
behavior. The chivalry hypothesis suggests that because women are weaker, and more
dependent on male influences and protection, they can’t be fully responsible for their
actions, nor be regarded as equally culpable as their male counterparts. This was first
introduced and discussed in the 1970s, in relation to an overwhelming consideration that
women would be more agreeable and able to rehabilitate (Heberle 1999:1107; Herzog,
Oreg 2008:45). The theory was further elaborated by Victor Streib in the late 1990s, and
he is now considered to be the author of the theory.
Streib believes that the statistical inequality can be traced to a gender bias within the
U.S. criminal justice system. He calls the legal proceedings for women being tried for
capital cases “rare and inconsistent” and even irrational. He believes that we are inclined
to show more sentiment towards a woman capital offender than to a man (and this goes
for judges and jurors as well), regardless of the nature of the murder in question, and that
the criminal justice process “take[s] it easy on women” (Streib 2006a), for expressing
what he calls a “female quality of emotionality” (Streib 2006b:5). Streib suggests that in
order to rectify this imbalance, women ought to be judged on the same grounds as men,
but that unfortunately society will not condone a change in procedure that would seem to
punitively affect women because of the existing chivalry attitude (Streib 2006a).
Criminal Justice and Sociology professors Sergio Herzog and Shaul Oreg have
written a paper further elaborating Streib’s theory, and exploring the sexist nature of this
chivalry. They claim that chivalry can be found in all levels of criminal justice procedures
– that whenever judgment is within the discretion of the court, women benefit from it and
receive lesser punishments than men do. They also found that in accordance with a social
understanding that women are weak and need protection rather than punishment, they
are less responsible for their wrongdoings, and are much more the “victims of an
environment that has failed to provide the necessary guidance and supervision that
women generally deserve.” (Herzog, Oreg 2008:47-48)
25
2.3.3 Evil Woman Theory
Herzog and Oreg did, however, find that the concept of chivalry was not
universally applicable, because in many cases they found that women sometimes received
harsher treatment than men, especially in capital cases. This discovery gave rise to
“Selective Chivalry”, more commonly called “Evil Woman Theory”, suggesting that
leniency can be found only in cases where the woman in question has performed in
accordance to her stereotypical gender role. In other cases, she does not receive any
chivalrous treatment, as she is considered to be in direct defiance of her own identity.
Such defiant behavior could be a mother killing her own child; or even a woman with a
tough appearance, and particularly a woman who maintains her innocence and shows no
remorse. She needs to fit certain gender criteria in order to receive these benefits of
chivalry, e.g. she should be financially subordinate to her male peers, be heterosexual,
and hopefully be a married housewife (Herzog, Oreg 2008:48-49). Traditionally, a
woman killing her “master” was considered not only to have committed murder, but also
treason (Shatz 2011:41).
A woman is thus not merely judged for the crime she has committed, but her very
femininity is questioned. Feminist professor and author Renée Heberle says that if a man
were to commit the same crime, there is nothing to suggest that his masculinity would be
similarly questioned. If anything, the only related concern would be that perhaps he took
his masculinity too far (Heberle 1999:1106; Herzog, Oreg 2008:50). In this sense, women
much more than men need to portray themselves in a certain way – as a good mother,
loving wife, even an obedient daughter – in order to avoid a harsh sentence, and in fact
there appears to be a difference is the average punishment for men vs. women who kill
their parents (Pope 2002:275). Other factors such as race and economy certainly also
elicit prejudice and discrimination, but the evaluation of the offender’s social stance is
never so bluntly exposed and incorporated in the judgment as when it comes to gender
(Heberle 1999: 1106; Herzog, Oreg 2008:50).
Heberle studied two cases of filicide: Darlie Lynn Routier and Susan Smith. In both
cases, the prosecutor failed to prove that the deaths were premeditated. When studying
the court materials from both cases, Heberle found that Routier, who kept swearing her
innocence, is described as “remote and cold”, and most importantly, she is described as
not motherly. Meanwhile, Smith, is described weak and vulnerable, incapable of being in
control of her emotions, much like a child. Unlike Routier, Smith’s identity as a mother
26
is never questioned. Smith received a life sentence, Routier a death sentence, and is
currently on death row awaiting execution (Heberle 1999:1106; Streib 2011:14).
Herzog and Oreg find two distinct types of sexism: hostile sexism and benevolent
sexism (Herzog, Oreg 2008:51). Hostile sexism views women as inferior or even
duplicitous. Sociology professor Otto Pollack, in his controversial “Criminality of
Women”, stated that since women are capable of concealing their menstruations and
faking their orgasms, they are also capable in concealing criminal behavior. Therefore,
women are getting away with severe crimes (Heberle 1999:1103). Pollack’s theory falls
very well into the concept of hostile sexism. Benevolent sexism, which as the term
suggests is considered a positive bias towards women, embodies more traditional views
of women as the primary caretakers of their children and the home, valuing their
feminine qualities as strengths that men do not possess. They do, however, very much
correlate, both expressing an existing male dominance and maintaining a patriarchal
societal structure. These two types of sexism have also been referred to as “the carrot and
the stick” of the criminal justice system, which in accordance with the Evil Woman
Theory work together to keep women in line with their gender identity (Herzog, Oreg
2008:51).
To summarize Streib’s chivalry-base theory, the focus is clearly placed on leniency
shown towards women based on the fact that they are women, arising from deep-seated
traditional and social perception of women as needing to be treated more gently than
men, regardless of the nature of the crime itself.
2.4 Dominance and power structure
2.4.1 Different Voice and Dominance Theory
Traditionally, feminism has aimed to question and crush established notions of

what constitutes “female” and “male” qualities – as a factor in criminal behavior or in
any other societal aspect. But in the early 1980s, Carol Gilligan wrote a book
contradicting this belief, where she found unique characteristics belonging to the
respective sexes, and that emphasizing our distinct qualities is the only way to create a
society that equally embodies both, rather than the male dominance we see today.
27
Specifically when it comes to law, Gilligan claims that while men are primarily
focused on duties, rationality, and justice (“the ethic of justice”), women are more
empathetic and caring (“the ethic of care”). The male ethic of justice is clearly the
dominant method of legal practice, where circumstantial elements in a crime have little
or no significance in a legally just outcome, even in a capital case (Pope 2002:260-261).
Ethics of care, in contrast, constitute a different voice which feminists claim could
influence the otherwise cold and dispassionate environment of criminal law with a
broader approach – specifically by giving more attention to relationships and
interdependencies existing within a criminal case (Pope 2002:263). However, Gilligan
also claims that even though more and more women have “infiltrated” the otherwise
highly male arena of criminal law, women have assumed an existing male approach to it,
rather than adding their feminine qualities to the mix – enabling an “ethic of justice”
dominance to prevail and preventing it from being tempered by the “ethic of care” (Pope
2002:362).
As a critique to Gilligan’s theory, we have Catharine MacKinnon’s “Dominance
Theory”. MacKinnon says that further emphasizing a supposed difference between
genders simply enhances any existing inequality, rather than fights it (Pope 2002:264).
An alleged concept of gender characteristics must be removed altogether, rather than
appreciated and valued as positive, but distinct qualities. Instead of focusing on “gender”
as a way to measure equality, she stresses that feminist efforts should go towards
concepts of “dominance” and “powerlessness”. By this she means that women have been
made powerless, in a legal setting as well as any other, and the challenge is to gain
power, any means necessary (Ukeles 2007:27-28).
There is a continued male dominance in the U.S. criminal justice system, where in
the higher legal institutions such as the Supreme Court, women are far from represented
according to their percentage of the United States population. Even in more local state
judicial systems, women are significantly underrepresented. Furthermore, capital
punishment is still being discussed from a U.S. Constitution perspective – written entirely
by white men (Pope 2002:258). “Different Voice Theory” and “Dominance Theory”,
while not in agreement, find common ground in acknowledging the predominantly male
presence in the legal system.
28
2.4.2 Rescuing subordination
Aristotle believed that punishment should not be distributed equally based on

crime, but be individualized and given in proportion to a person’s worth, based on their
position in societal hierarchy. Not surprisingly, he found that a patriarchal society – both
publicly and domestically – is the most proper and preferable form of governance
(Horowitz 1976:187). His concept of woman as “a mutilated male” (Horowitz 1976:184),
and inferior to men has been an enduring notion lingering thousands of years, and
remaining an active part of society today – as a matter not limited to size and physical
strength, but to include capabilities of the mind (Coughlin 1994:29)3.
Along the lines of “Chivalry Theory”, there is a widespread idea that women have
been relieved from the same legal consequences their male counterparts would face, on
the grounds that women cannot be expected to resist pressures from their male partners –
even if it includes criminal activity – an excuse not afforded to men. This suggests that
women lack the responsibility in maintaining authority and the capability of lawful
conduct when there are unlawful influences by their male partners (Coughlin 1994:5-7).
The U.S. criminal justice system shows signs of wanting women to embrace their
victim status. Up until the 70s, there was such a thing as the “marital coercion defense”,
which only applied to married women. The theory, and correlated legal defense, noted
that regarding minor threats, women were able to maintain self-control, but when facing
greater threats, women would abide by the will of their husbands. Not only did this
defense underline an already established theory that women are psychologically weak in
relation to men, it made some great assumptions about the relationship between a man
and a woman in a marriage (Coughlin 1994:29-31).
This defense has since been replaced by the current “Battered Woman Syndrome”,
in an attempt to minimize the severity of the committed crime. In brief, the defense
entails that if a husband, or other strong male figure, is present at the time of a crime
committed by a woman, she can be assumed to have acted on behalf of the male – under
his will – which would require the prosecutor to prove the independent action of the
woman. This “male presence” has even been broadly interpreted as a mere psychological
one, rather than physical (Coughlin 1994:29-31). This defense could also include bringing
3
Note: Aristotle went to far as to draw the “conclusion” that because of their natural inferiority, women
have fewer teeth than men. As Bertrand Russell would later point out, if Aristotle had ever bothered to
open Mrs. Aristotle’s mouth and count, he might have seen the error of his conclusion (Russell 1952: ch.1).
29
light onto how to look at women who have killed their male partners as an act of self-
defense: it enables a possibility for the actual kill to have happened at a relatively calm
time, for instance, when the abuser is asleep, as she would not have been able to act had
her abuser been in a conscious state with full physical capabilities (Shatz 2011:11). The
approach of using a legal defense like this has been both encouraged and condemned by
feminists (Coughlin 1994:1). It highlights abuses against women which are commonly
overlooked, serving as a mitigating factor that may save her from a death sentence, but it
also enhances the gender stereotype of the weak woman, and a less fully equal person
than a man in the eyes of the law (Shatz 2011:14-15).
The “Battered Woman Syndrome” defense is built on the concept of a rational
actor. A rational actor is easily determined when it comes to killings in self-defense – the
actors applied force to defend themselves against an outside aggressor. The rational actor
is a “normal actor” who very much considers the impending outcome and acts to ensure
his/her place in the future – a means of survival. In contrast, the irrational actor acts not
out of self-defense but for other reasons. This actor is abnormal, often with some
disability, and is neither capable of rational decision-making, nor able to control his or
her behavior (Coughlin 1994:13-15).
The primary way to refer to a woman’s history of abuse as a contributing factor in
her committing a crime is to have a psychologist testify about the stressed, damaged
mental state of the woman in question. This includes portraying the woman as having
mental issues, with symptoms of weakness, making it impossible for her to separate
herself from an abusive partner and whatever criminal conduct that led to, thereby
making her an irrational actor (Coughlin 1994:5-7,89). A system for how to take into
account a history of abuse, or severe psychological pressure inflicted upon a female
offender, without stripping her of her rational capabilities, and her authority, has yet to
be established.
30
3 Analysis
This chapter discusses the presented material, and how it related to feminism and
equality. It provides an alternative interpretation of Rapaport’s statistics, and questions
the conclusions she has made based on those statistics, i.e. the gender-based theory. It
also critiques Streib’s theory of chivalry, and discusses the assumption made about
“different” and “lenient”, all leading to a final discussion on domestic and public
hierarchy, which will summarize the key misconceptions about the alleged favoritism
shown towards women in capital cases.
In light of the Furman case, the Supreme Court’s concern about discrimination
was evidently so great that they felt a nationwide moratorium was imperative, both to
correct existing shortcomings of the existing laws and to establish guidelines to ensure
fairness and justice in criminal capital offense procedures. That they ignored or failed to
include gender as a possible variable reflects neglect and inadequate concern regarding
gender inequality, with women, as in the case of minority groups, being particularly
vulnerable to discrimination.
Gender, like any other form of discrimination, is subject to prejudice and
intolerance, in this case based on presumed thoughts and attitudes associated with a
person of a certain sex. Neither this nor gender-related factors, such as surrounding
elements of power and dominance, were discussed as possible fragments of what was
otherwise considered to be a discriminatory, even arbitrary, death penalty system. This
resulted in the failure to discuss or implement gender, or gender-related factors, in the
revised guidelines. Moreover, this failure has yet to be rectified, i.e. the guidelines have
not been revised in this respect, thus allowing wide speculation when faced with possible
gender bias as to how it has occurred and on what grounds.
The McCleskey case further enforced this ignorance, with a view that
discrimination can only be a considered a relevant cause for concern if it was intentionally
applied. As prejudice and discrimination are inevitably intertwined, clearly this
statement, and the overall opinion of the Supreme Court, express that there was no
understanding that that a person’s views and opinions about gender are generally
31
constructed at a very early age, at a subconscious level, and have often never been
modified since.
The revised and intentionally improved guidelines for determining a capital case
from other criminal offenses were designed to be more factual, with clear components as
to what may warrant a capital sentence. Mainly, they envisioned leaving less judgment to
the discretion of the courts. However, if we look at the revised guidelines, only one of the
three contributing factors is entirely factual, without discretion: the possible existence of a
prior criminal record. The other two components – the severity of the crime and the level
of culpability – are both left to the interpretation of those judging that particular case.
Inevitably, this makes existing statistical inequalities difficult to evaluate and interpret,
and thus to establish as the outcome of a gender bias.
3.1 The inequality rationale
Determining the severity of the crime, and the guidelines on how to evaluate any
aggravating factors present, are the most important components of Rapaport’s work, and
what she claims are the factors that can explain and legitimize the statistical imbalance
between men and women in terms of capital punishment. By reviewing her statistical
data, and her understanding of those figures, this study has found that she has made
some debatable selections of material and questionable interpretations in an attempt to
fully validate her theory.
3.1.1 ”Male” crimes
In short, Rapaport believes that the nature of the murders that men generally
commit is so distinctly separated by frequency from those committed by women that a
distinct separation of genders on death row is perfectly reasonable. Aggravated murders –
such as multiple-victim murder, prior convictions, and felony murder – are the crimes
that are far more likely than other murders to lead to a death sentence. Meanwhile, these
are all crimes that are significantly dominated by male offenders.
These three components are conceivably those most in accordance with the
Supreme Court’s goal of remaining factual in a judgment process in determining a capital
32
crime. They can be largely based on actual practice and criminal history rather than jury
discretion. A man on trial for a potentially capital crime is much more likely than his
female peer to have a previous conviction of a serious nature, as men are significantly
more frequently found guilty of violent crime than women. Men are also the main
culprits when it comes to multiple-victim murders, and the same goes for the third
category of murder, felony murder. The latter is the most frequently represented crime on
death row, and in all these three categories of murder, men account for about 95% of the
total statistics.
In this instance, Rapaport has ignored some crucial aspects in her own statistics.
From 1976-1987, 2,471 death sentences were imposed: men accounted for 2,429 of those
(about 98.3%); women for 42 (about 1.7%) (see Table 1). During those years, women
accounted for 3.9% of all stranger murders, 6.2% of all felony murders, and 7.2% of all
multiple-victim murders. Correspondingly, men accounted for 96.1% of all stranger
murders, 93.8% of all felony murders, and 92.8% of all multiple-victim murders. These
figures compile to a statistical separation of 94% for men vs. 6% for women when it
comes to stranger murders, felony murders, and multiple-victim murders.
The statistical data proves the point that male offenders of such crimes outweigh
their female respective offenders by a landslide. However, this speaks only for a gender-
related crime rate, i.e. the number of crimes men and women commit which are eligible
for the death penalty. In light of the death penalty distribution within the same years, we
see a much larger gender distinction, indicating that of those found guilty of such crimes
have received a death sentence at a different rate depending on their sex. If Rapaport’s
theory were entirely accurate, the statistical gap between men and women regarding
murders of such aggravated nature would have to be even greater, or the death penalty
rate of women some percentage points higher, to reflect the actual crime rate, as the
statistics show us a gender gap of 94% vs. 6%, compared to 98.3% vs. 1.7% for men and
women.
3.1.2 Sentencing and execution
When it comes to the statistical interpretation of execution rates related to gender,

while it would hurt her case in a debate with Streib, Rapaport does acknowledge that
women are more often than men granted executive clemency. Out of 8,392 death
33
sentences (see Table 1), there have been 271 executive clemencies: 260 for men, and 11
for women. These instances account for about 6.3% of all female death row inmates, as
opposed to 3.163% males, clearly illustrating the difference. The extent of Rapaport’s
consideration to this kind of inconsistency stops here, not reflecting further upon the
other proceedings of death penalty cases. This study however will.
Since 1976, there have been 1,295 executions: 12 women, and 1,283 men. This
means that of all executions carried out, women have accounted for about 0.9% and the
remaining 99.1% have been accounted for by men. Of the 8,218 men on death row
during this period, 15.6% (1,283 inmates) have been put to death. Of the 174 women on
death row in the same time period, 6.89% (12 inmates) have been executed. Meanwhile,
there are 3,189 persons currently on death row: 58 women (about 1.8%), and 3,131
(about 98.2%) men. This means that of the 174 death sentences imposed on women,
subtracting the 58 remaining female death row inmates, and the 12 females executed, one
is left with 104 women who have had their sentences reduced by other means than
executive clemency. Following the same procedure with the male inmates, we find that
3,804 men have had their sentences reduced by similar means. The statistical conclusion
we can draw out of this, is that while men have had their sentences reduced (by other
means than executive clemency) about 46% of the time, women, in contrast, have had
their sentences reduced almost 60% of the time. Unless future research can prove that
women are substantially more frequently convicted despite their innocence, gender
appears to be the common denominator and underlying factor.
3.1.3 The ranking of severity
If we instead turn to the factors that might warrant a murder conviction becoming a
capital offense, other than the above-mentioned three, and we look at the heinousness of
the actual act, we find some support for Rapaport’s initial justification for the statistical
gender gap. Even though this component can partially be based on certain aggravating
factors outlined by the guidelines of the court, such as formerly mentioned methods of
killing, e.g. poison or explosives, the practice of implementing this component is largely
left up to the courts’ discretion, and reflects a common perception that the murderer-
victim relationship cannot be considered more heinous whether a relationship was
already established at the time of the crime. In other words, killing a stranger is
34
considered more severe than killing an intimate. This fact is the most prominent point
that Rapaport attempts to make in her work in accounting for the statistical differences
between men and women and the death penalty.
Rapaport’s statistics present that from 1976-1987, women committed 14.3% of all
murders (about 24,733); and men accordingly accounted for 85.7% (about 148,228) 4. Out
of those, 65.5% of the female murders were against an intimate (= about 16,200); and for
men, the intimate murder victim rate came to 22.1% (= about 32,758); making the total
amount of intimate murders about 48,959 vs. about 124,002 non-intimate murders. The
total amount of all murders during those years was 172,961: intimate killings hence
accounted for about 28% of all murders, as opposed to about 72% non-intimates (see
Tables 2 and 3).
Rapaport finds that 12% of men and 48% of women on death row have been
sentenced for an intimate murder (see Table 4). Adding the figures for both men and
women shows that only about 14.5% of those on death row have received their sentences
due to an intimate murder, leaving 85.5% due to a non-intimate murder. While the
statistics in Tables 4 and 5 are documented with a start and finish date two years after the
previous study, there is nothing to indicate that there were any drastic changes in terms of
gender-related death penalty rates within these two more current ones, and therefore, for
this study, they can be used as a rough approximation.
From 1976-1987, a total of 2,471 death sentences were given: 42 women, 2,429
men (see Table 1). If 14.5% out of those on death row were sentenced for an intimate
murder, that equals about 358 domestic death row inmates at that time, and about 2,113
non-domestic death row inmates. Comparing these calculations to the total number of
intimate murders during the same time period, we find that only about 0.7% of intimate
murders result in capital sentences. Correspondingly, comparing the total of non-intimate
murders with the actual death sentences given, the rate of such murders resulting in death
sentences is 17%. This tells us that a non-intimate kill is more than twice as likely to
result in a death sentence as an intimate kill. However, Rapaport’s theory is that the
statistical differences between men and women on death row can be explained by
differences in the crimes they commit, and that this relates to the fact that women, as
opposed to men, are primarily the culprits in intimate murders rather than stranger
murders and, as has been proven, stranger murder is more likely to result in a death
4
Note: the use of exact figures for the percentages and approximate figures for the actual number of murders
throughout this section reflects Rapaport’s presentation of the data.
35
sentence, thereby accounting for the relatively few women on death row. Here Rapaport
faces some difficulty.
Elaborating on Rapaport’s statistics found in Tables 2-4, we can also roughly
calculate the probability of an intimate vs. a non-intimate murder, committed by men vs.
women, resulting in a death sentence. See below:
Women
Total intimate kills: about 16,200
On death row: 42
Out those 42 women, 48% were sentenced for intimate killing,
ergo, 20 (20.16) female intimate murderers on death row
= 0.124% of female intimate murders result in a death sentence.
Total non-intimate kills: about 8533

Out of those 42 women, 52% were sentenced for non-intimate
killing, ergo, 22 (21.84) female non-intimate murderers on death
row
= 0.255% of female non-intimate murders result in a death
sentence.
Men
Total intimate kills: about 32,758
On death row: 2,429
Out of those 2,429 men, 12% were sentenced for intimate killing,
ergo, 291 (291.48) male intimate murderers on death row
= 0.889% of male intimate murders result in a death sentence.
Total non-intimate kills: about 115,469

Out of those 2,429 men, 88% were sentenced for a non-intimate
killing, ergo, 2,138 (2137.52) male non-intimate murderers on
death row
=1.851% of male non-intimate murders result in a death sentence.
36
These results once more illustrate how a non-intimate murder is more than twice as likely
to result in a death sentence, regardless of gender. Hence, the statistical analysis has
confirmed Rapaport’s position that domestic murder is not taken as seriously as stranger
murder. But what she does not acknowledge is that these statistics also show that in both
instances men are significantly more likely than women to get the death penalty,
regardless of any hierarchical assessment made to rank the severity of homicides.
What we can make out of Rapaport’s theory is that there are several instances in
which women appear to be in less risk of a death sentence than their male counterparts: a
statistical imbalance which cannot be accredited to merely a male or female category of
the crimes committed. But Rapaport does illustrate how the statistical gap between
intimate and non-intimate capital sentencing does not reflect intimate and non-intimate
murder, thereby proving how the special concern shown to the public sphere (which
includes stranger murder), as opposed to the domestic sphere (particularly intimate
murder), is closely connected to capital cases and subsequent sentences.
3.2 The fallacious appreciation of women
The flaws of Rapaport’s theory – that she claims that there is no leniency granted
women nor men, while not accounting for instances suggesting otherwise – creates a void
which opposing views, such as Streib’s theory of chivalry, may fill. Not only are women
significantly less frequently sentenced and executed in proportion to their own gender,
they appear to some degree also to be spared even for crimes that are generally likely to
be accounted for by men, and that commonly comprise all capital cases. The latter
particularly indicates that there is something other than a male and female type of
criminal behavior that would explain the statistical differences between men and women
on death row. The high rate of clemency, executive and non-executive, suggests that
some element, other than the outlined directives, plays a part in both determining capital
cases, as well as fully enforcing their content. Moreover, if a gender-related imbalance
can be made in all these instances, without reasoning which can be backed up by
empirical evidence, we can assume that gender has been one, if not the only, variable
creating the distinction. However, there are reasons to doubt that chivalry could account
for the remainder of the women.
37
3.2.1 The practice of chivalry
The unaccounted-for, statistically smaller number of female capital proceedings are

perhaps as Streib suggests – rare and inconsistent – when compared to those of men. This
interpretation seems especially valid in the light of the empirical data, which have
illustrated those capital crimes that men primarily commit (felony murder), as well as the
capital crimes that women primarily commit (intimate murder) (see Table 3), are both
more likely to result in a higher rate of death sentences for males than for females.
Since the death penalty rate for women in relation to the crime statistics shows
inconsistencies when compared to their male peers, we can assume that, in contrast to
Rapaport’s theory, gender-related discrepancies occur during capital trials. That stranger
murder is considered more heinous, largely explained by the non-provocation factor,
greatly reflects a view that intimate murder, or domestic murder, can be explained or
even excused. As presented by Rapaport in chapter 2.2, in cases of domestic murder,
mitigating factors might even include feelings of abandonment as a mitigating
circumstance, in a predominantly male category of retaliatory murder. In contrast,
women have primarily turned to the possible mitigating factor of self-defense, attempting
to illustrate how their crime was not predatory, but necessary. Self-defense could in this
sense be considered a highly rational act. It involves taking into consideration the history
of the danger facing her – the current situation as well as possible future outcomes – and
then weighing all these components to determine the best, or at least most available,
means for survival. But the Battered Woman defense can at the same time be used as an
explanation of the irrational woman, turning to stereotypical feminine traits along the
traditional perceptions of women as weak, both physically and mentally, when facing a
male aggressor.
Chivalry theory suggests that in capital cases, there is a common view, and
subsequent treatment, of women as weak and in need of male protection, illustrated by a
view that a criminal act by a woman has arisen as a result of a dominant male figure who
plays a prominent role in her life. Such a consideration complicates matters for feminists,
as this would inevitably require women to surrender their rightful claims as capable,
equal members of society, and rational actors. Therefore, there is no consensus among
feminists about the use of this defense, as it on the one hand may promote capital
processes to be more in tune with the reality of male dominance, while it might further
38
authorize unequal treatment of men and women, and greatly contribute to benevolent
sexism.
Chivalry Theory embodies the historically acclaimed tradition of believing men and
women to be separated by distinct qualities, capabilities, and weaknesses. Different Voice
feminists would in fact support such notions, and emphasize gender differences,
promoting what they call feminine qualities in the justice system in terms of “ethics of
care” (see section 2.4.1). However, it seems that in an approach to reach the primary goal
of equality, showing leniency towards women and not men emphasizes existing
patriarchal structures by suggesting that women cannot be held accountable to the same
standards as men. It seems inevitable that this will in turn suggest that they can similarly
expect certain limitations, and are consequently not entitled to the same privileges or
societal participation as men enjoy, e.g. “relieving” women from jury duty (see chapter
2.3).
Such limitations, undervalued or ignored by Streib, are what can be explained as
the major flaws of his theory. In order to justify his claim of gender bias in the criminal
justice system, including capital cases, Streib ignores the entirety of the scope of chivalry.
While it would seem that there are cases in which the death penalty cannot be linked to
the actual crime, but rather be influenced by other factors, e.g. gender, the explanation
that statistical inequality is solely due to chivalrous treatment of women is all too
simplistic an approach. Furthermore, this cannot be shown to justify his claim that
whenever judgment is in the hands of the discretion of the court, women will receive
chivalrous treatment.
3.2.2 The downside of chivalry
Herzog and Oreg recognize this misconception in their construction of Selective

Chivalry Theory, which can briefly be described as the acts of chivalry granted only to
those women who conform to the existing notions of gender and womanhood, assigned
to women for their sex – i.e. the carrot and the stick (see chapter 2.3.3). In short, the
carrot is the incentive for women to adapt to what are commonly perceived as feminine
qualities, such as vulnerability and emotionality. The stick is the punishment for those
women who show traits not in line with this notion of her gender, such as strength and
composure. In other words, these women face double-judgment – for the crime they
39
committed, and for violating their gender role. Therefore, any chivalry bestowed upon
women, while benefitting them in that particular instance, also contributes to the double-
judgment position they are put in the first place, and in this sense validates sexist
oppression.
Women are not only subject to having their femininity questioned, but are also the
target of hostile sexism, where women are believed to not only be inferior to men, but
also be two-faced and manipulative by nature. Regarding capital cases, we can assume
that any women woman who is unwilling or unable to conform to the perceived traits of
her gender will be especially targeted by this hostile sexism. Furthermore, the Dominance
Theory perspective of the powerlessness of women and the dominance of men in a
criminal justice setting can be illustrated by cases of this selective chivalry.
Heberle’s study of the Smith and Routier cases illustrates this significance of
appearance, as Smith was perhaps granted chivalry due to her conformity to the accepted
“female” model, unlike Routier who did not and perhaps therefore was additionally
penalized for it. The Tucker case also shows signs of an existing consideration in a capital
process of preconceived perceptions of distinct gender-related personalities. That the
Court felt that Tucker’s “disturbingly unfeminine manner” (see chapter 2.2.1) was of any
relevance in evaluating her case, predicting her capability to be reinstated in society, and
finally determining her fate, is proof of that. These cases have illustrated the danger of
differentiating men from women – feminine from masculine – as it discounts the fact that
the two are hierarchically ranked in society, even when not technically ranked so by the
law.
3.3 Chivalry vs. consideration
The concept of chivalry is commonly associated with the concept of leniency. But
neither is to be confused with consideration. The reasons behind the substantially higher
numbers of men on death row for non-intimate crimes than women have largely been
explained. But the statistical differences regarding intimate murders are more difficult to
account for, possibly giving validation to Streib’s theory of leniency granted to women.
Streib claims that the only way to rectify the statistical imbalance is to treat women like
men in the criminal justice system. This discounts the great value society places on
40
domestic authority, and ignores the domestic violence aspect by assuming that there is no
possibility that the reason behind the statistics is not that women are more successful in
“excusing” their criminal actions, but because they are to a much greater degree the
victims of domestic violence. This would seem to be at least a partial validation of
Rapaport’s theory, that women domestic murderers are more often “excused” than men,
and is perhaps not a case of leniency, but rather a justified consideration of the
surrounding circumstances.
Both of the generally male and female mitigating defenses are difficult to prove –
feelings of abandonment vs. acts of self-defense – and in the hands of the defense attorney
to sufficiently establish, and for the judges and jurors to recognize. However, it is clear
that women risk facing a harder time justifying their mitigation factor, as the common
perception of self-defense is that it is an act of immediate reaction to an attack. While
both pleas attempt minimize the perception of the act as a heinous crime by illustrating
that the victim played a part in his or her own death, abandonment cannot be defended
through most feminist reasoning, as it incorporates essential elements of dominance and
oppression.
The main reasons behind male and female domestic murder are retaliatory vs.
pecuniary respectively (see Table 5). That pecuniary gain was a motive in 69% of the
cases of death row women, as opposed to 13% of death row men, cannot be considered
just another statistical difference in predatory crime, but can in terms of equality suggest
that women evidently find themselves in more desperate need of money than men do.
Through a feminist consideration of oppression, monetary inequality certainly applies as
a contributing factor, where men are positively affected by this power structure, and
women suffer from it. This element of the statistical data needs, however, much further
discussion as well as more empirical evidence in order to be fully understood and
explained.
Even though domestic killings are the only type of murder where women
proportionally come relatively close to the number of men, men are overrepresented as
the perpetrators, not the victims, in domestic violence, and subsequently have less to fear
in the domestic environment. That non-intimate murder is more than twice as likely to
result in a death sentence says a lot about the discounting of domestic violence. The fact
that women make up 85% of the victims of domestic abuse, and that men account for
more than twice as many intimate killings as women, are significant aspects that need
proper consideration, not leniency.
41
If we consider both theoretical efforts attempting to explain the statistical

differences between men and women and the death penalty, we find that neither
Rapaport’s theory of gender-related capital crime, nor Streib’s notion of chivalry bias, can
account for the entire scope of capital cases. They have both been successful in explaining
the remaining numbers unaccounted for in each other’s theories, but they both appear to
have made some major errors and unfounded assumptions when applying them in cases
other than those selcted by themselves. This study has therefore found that while both
theories have merit, neither theory can be generally applicable in explaining the gender-
related statistical imbalance in capital cases.
What has been made evident is that both theories, even though not by their own
admission, have illustrated the flaws of such statements as Supreme Court Justice
Marshall’s about women and capital punishment – that “women have received [such] favored
treatment” (see chapter 2.1). The benefits of chivalrous treatment are at the expense of the
ideological core of feminism, i.e. equality. If the legal system were to regard domestic
violence as more severe than what it does today, it would most likely mean more women
on death row. However, in comparison it would also protect a lot more women from the
very domestic abuse that leads to these killings. Not considering the victim as an equal
party to the offender in a discussion of possible lenient treatment further supports a
patriarichal society where domestic privacy is so highly regarded that it neglects those
who are suffering under someone else’s dominance.
3.4 Conclusion
This study set out to investigate whether or not women are being favored in capital
cases in the U.S. After reviewing the two opposing theories of Rapaport and Streib, it has
been shown that both theories demonstrate a statistical imbalance between men and
women on death row, and that the two theories use different approaches to explain the
reasons for this, but in neither case can the statistical imbalance be shown to have
benefitted women. In certain specific cases, there is some validity to a claim suggesting
that men and women are treated differently when facing a possible death sentence, but
when giving greater consideration to the sex of the victim, it can be argued that the
different treatment has not fundamentally been unjust. Different treatment does not
42
necessarily mean chivalrous treatment, i.e. favoritism towards women, and with that in
mind, this study finds that the statistical imbalance cannot be proven to have favored
women.
3.4.1 Future research
The selection of statistics in this study was limited, and a broader selection is
recommended in order to further confirm the validity of the conclusion. For
instance, considering the element of domestic crime strongly supporting the
conclusion in this study, the validity of the conclusion may be tested, e.g. by a
comparison of men and women in domestic homicide and whether murder vs.
manslaughter cases are affected by gender. Nevertheless, this study reveals a
different understanding than what is provided by the two existing theories about
gender and capital punishment, by maintaining a feminist theoretical consideration
to equality.
43
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Publishing on behalf of the Law and Society Association, vol. 42, no 1, pp.45-74.
Horowitz, Maryanne Cline. 1976. “Aristotle and Woman”. Journal of the History of
Biology, Vol.9, No.2, pp.183-213.
Moses, Jonathan W; Knutsen, Torbjorn L. 2007. Ways of Knowing: Competing
Methodologies in Social and Political Research. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
ONU. 1999. “1996-2000: Victor L. Streib”. Ohio Northern University: Claude W. Pettit
College of Law. Retrieved from http://law.onu.edu/about/streib. Accessed April 2,
2012.
Pope, Amy E. 2002. “A Feminist Look at the Death Penalty”. Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol.65, pp.257-282.
45
Rapaport, Elizabeth. 1991. “The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination”. Blackwell
Publishing, Vol.25, No.2, pp.367-384.
Rapaport, Elizabeth. 2001. “Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection, and
the Politics of Gender in Women’s Capital Cases”. Buffalo Criminal Law Review,
University of California Press, Vol.4, No.2, pp.967-1007.
Rapaport, Elizabeth. 2009. “Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of
Capital Domestic Murder in the Post Furman Era”. University of New Mexico School
of Law.
Rapaport, Elizabeth. 2010. “Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty”.
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3.
Reza, Elizabeth Marie. 2005. “Gender Bias in North Carolina’s Death Penalty”. Duke
Journal of Gender Law & Policy, Vol.12, pp.179-214.
Russell, Bertrand. 1952. Impact of Science on Society. London: Unwyn Hyman.
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http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/feminism-topics/. Accessed March 29, 2012.
SEP. 2008.”Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender”. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/feminism-
gender/. Accessed March 29, 2012.
Shatz, Naomi R; Shatz, Steven F. 2011. “Chivalry is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and
the Death Penalty”. University of San Francisco. Retrieved from
http://works.bepress.com/steven_shatz/1/. Accessed April 6, 2012.
Shelton, Dinah. 2006. “Normative Hierarchy in International Law”. The American
Journal of International Law, Vol.100, No.2, pp.291-323.
Stewart, Steve. 2008. ”Execution and Death Row Statistics”. Office of the Clark County
Prosecuting Attorney. Retrieved from
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/links/dplinks.htm. Accessed April 1, 2012
Streib, Victor L. 2006a. “Rare and Inconsistent: the Death Penalty for Women”. CBS
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University Press.
46
Streib, Victor L. 2011. “Death Penalty for Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, Through
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http://www.usfca.edu/law/faculty/elizabeth_rapaport/. Accessed April 2, 2012.
47
Appendix A
Federal Laws Providing for the Death Penalty
8 U.S.C. 1342 Murder related to the smuggling of aliens.
18 U.S.C. 32-34 Destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles, or related facilities resulting in death.
18 U.S.C. 36 Murder committed during a drug-related drive-by shooting.
18 U.S.C. 37 Murder committed at an airport serving international civil aviation.
18 U.S.C. 115(b)(3) Retaliatory murder of a member of the immediate family of law enforcement
[by cross-reference officials.
to 18 U.S.C. 1111]
18 U.S.C. 241, Civil rights offenses resulting in death.
242, 245, 247
18 U.S.C. 351 Murder of a member of Congress, an important executive official, or a Supreme
[by cross-reference Court Justice.
to 18 U.S.C. 1111]
18 U.S.C. 794 Espionage.
18 U.S.C. 844(d), (f), (i) Death resulting from offenses involving transportation of explosives, destruction of
government property, or destruction of property related to foreign or interstate
commerce.
18 U.S.C. 924(i) Murder committed by the use of a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug-
trafficking crime.
18 U.S.C. 930 Murder committed in a Federal Government facility.
18 U.S.C. 1091 Genocide.
18 U.S.C. 1111 First-degree murder.
18 U.S.C. 1114 Murder of a Federal judge or law enforcement official.
18 U.S.C. 1116 Murder of a foreign official.
18 U.S.C. 1118 Murder by a Federal prisoner.
18 U.S.C. 1119 Murder of a U.S. national in a foreign country.
18 U.S.C. 1120 Murder by an escaped Federal prisoner already sentenced to life imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. 1121 Murder of a State or local law enforcement official or other person aiding in a
Federal investigation; murder of a State correctional officer.
18 U.S.C. 1201 Murder during a kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. 1203 Murder during a hostage taking.
18 U.S.C. 1503 Murder of a court officer or juror.
18 U.S.C. 1512 Murder with the intent of preventing testimony by a witness, victim, or informant.
18 U.S.C. 1513 Retaliatory murder of a witness, victim, or informant.
18 U.S.C. 1716 Mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or resulting in death.
18 U.S.C. 1751 Assassination or kidnapping resulting in the death of the President or Vice
[by cross-reference President.
to 18 U.S.C. 1111]
18 U.S.C. 1958 Murder for hire.
18 U.S.C. 1959 Murder involved in a racketeering offense.
18 U.S.C. 1992 Willful wrecking of a train resulting in death.
18 U.S.C. 2113 Bank-robbery-related murder or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C. 2119 Murder related to a carjacking.
18 U.S.C. 2245 Murder related to rape or child molestation.
18 U.S.C. 2251 Murder related to sexual exploitation of children.
18 U.S.C. 2280 Murder committed during an offense against maritime navigation.
18 U.S.C. 2281 Murder committed during an offense against a maritime fixed platform.
18 U.S.C. 2332 Terrorist murder of a U.S. national in another country.
18 U.S.C. 2332a Murder by the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
18 U.S.C. 2340 Murder involving torture.
18 U.S.C. 2381 Treason.
21 U.S.C. 848(e) Murder related to a continuing criminal enterprise or related murder of a Federal,
State, or local law enforcement officer.
49 U.S.C. 1472-1473 Death resulting from aircraft hijacking.
Source: DPIC6
48
Appendix B
Death Sentences Imposed on Females,
January 1, 1973, Through December 31, 2011
Year, Name, and Race of Sentencing Date of Date of Current
Offender Jurisdiction Crime Sentence Status
1973:
Ward, Mamie Lee North Carolina 07-19-1973 09-17-1973 reversed in 1976
1974:
Hunt, Rozell O. North Carolina 07-01-1973 06-10-1974 reversed in 1976
1975:
Boykin, Margie North Carolina 08-14-1975 12-01-1975 reversed in 1976
Dodds, Catherine Louisiana 01-27-1975 ??-??-1975 reversed in 1976
Glenn, Mabe California 03-??-1975 10-21-1975 reversed in 1979
Kozeak, Marie California ??-?? 1975 ??-??-1975 reversed in 1976
Lockett, Sandra Ohio 01-15-1975 04-??-1975 reversed in 1978
Osborne, Alberta Ohio 12-15-1974 06-02-1975 reversed in 1978
Sanders, Janet Oklahoma 02-24-1975 08-26-1975 reversed in 1977
Smith, Rebecca Georgia 08-31-1974 01-30-1975 reversed in 1983
1976:
Brown, Faye B. North Carolina 09-02-1975 01-05-1976 reversed in 1977
Jacobs, Sonia Florida 02-20-1976 08-20-1976 reversed in 1981
Wernert. Patricia Ohio 11-18-1975 11-22-1976 reversed in 1978
1977:
Smith, Benita Ohio 05-03-1977 11-30-1977 reversed in 1978
1978:
Anderson, Mary Texas 01-03-1978 08-29-1978 reversed in 1982?
Barfield, Velma North Carolina 02-01-1978 12-02-1978 EXECUTED ON
11-02-1984
Bracewell, Debra Alabama 08-15-1977 05-17-1978 reversed in 1981
Detter, Rebecca North Carolina 06-02-1977 09-26-1978 reversed in 1979
1979:
Binsz, Michelle Oklahoma 03-18-1979 10-23-1979 reversed in 1984
Burnett, Linda Texas 06-01-1978 03-20-1979 reversed in 1983
Cunningham, Emma Georgia 01-01-1979 10-26-1979 reversed in 1983
Tyler, Shirley Georgia 10-22-1979 12-04-1979 reversed in 1985
1980:
O'Bryan, LaVerne Kentucky 07-05-1979 09-12-1980 reversed in 1982
Perillo, Pamela Texas 02-24-1980 9-2-1980 & reversed in 1998
11-13-1984
1981:
Buttrum, Janice Georgia 09-03-1980 08-31-1981 reversed in 1989
Stebbing, Annette Maryland 04-09-1980 04-30-1981 reversed in 1985
Thomas, Patricia Alabama 02-28-1981 12-28-1981 reversed in 1990
1982:
Cannaday, Attina Mississippi 06-03-1982 09-23-1982 reversed in 1984
Ford, Priscilla Nevada 11-27-1980 04-29-1982 died of natural
causes in 2005
Foster, Doris Maryland 01-29-1981 2-8-1982 & commuted in
04-04-1984 1987
Smith, Nadean Oklahoma 07-04-1982 12-29-1982 EXECUTED ON
12-2-2001
Whittington, Teresa Georgia 01-02-1982 05-07-1982 reversed in 1984
1983:
Grant, Rosalie Ohio 04-01-1983 10-21-1983 commuted in
1991
Neelley, Judith Alabama 09-23-1982 04-18-1983 commuted in
1999
Summers, Sheila Nevada 09-14-1982 12-20-1983 reversed in 1986
49

Young, Sharon Ohio 06-12-1983 09-30-1983 reversed in 1986
1984:
Foster, Doris Arkansas 03-10-1983 04-13-1984 reversed in 1985
Jackson, Andrea Florida 05-16-1983 2-10-1984; reversed in 1997
2-21-1992;
& 12-13-95
Moore, Marie New Jersey 01-??-1983 11-19-1984 reversed in 1988
Perillo, Pamela Texas 02-24-1980 11-13-1984 reversed in 1998
& 9-2-1980
Tucker, Karla Faye Texas 06-13-1983 04-25-1984 EXECUTED ON
02-03-1998
Williamson, Celia Mississippi 03-23-1982 03-14-1984 reversed in 1987
Windsor, Karla Idaho 09-06-1983 02-28-1984 reversed in 1985
1985:
Beets, Betty Texas 08-06-1983 10-14-1985 EXECUTED ON
02-24-2000
Brown, Debra Ohio 07-13-1984 06-18-1985 commuted in
& 06-23-86 1991
Buenoano, Judias Florida 09-16-1971 11-26-1985 EXECUTED ON
03-30-1998
Houston, Judy Mississippi 06-03-1984 11-30-1985 reversed in 1988
Thacker, Lois Indiana 11-03-1984 06-27-1985 reversed in 1990
1986:
Brown, Debra Indiana 06-18-1984 06-23-1986 would be on
& 06-18-85 death row but in
Ohio prison
Cooper, Paula Indiana 05-14-1985 07-11-1986 reversed in 1989
Owens, Gaile Tennessee 02-17-1985 01-15-1986 reversed in 2010
1987:
Caillier, Carla Florida 11-20-1986 03-19-1987 reversed in 1988
Casteel, Dee Dyne Florida 08-20-1983 09-16-1987 reversed in 1990
Cox, Donna Sue (Allen) North Carolina 07-12-1986 10-30-1987 reversed in 1992
Dudley, Kaysie Florida 09-30-1985 01-27-1987 reversed in 1989
Foster, Lafonda Kentucky 03-09-1986 04-24-1987 reversed in 1991
1988:
Green, Elizabeth Ohio 01-04-1988 07-11-1988 commuted in
1991
Haney, Judy M. Alabama 01-01-1984 11-18-1988 reversed in 1997
Newton, Francis Texas 04-07-1987 11-17-1988 EXECUTED ON
09-14-2005
Wacaser, Nila Missouri 08-28-1987 05-31-1988 reversed in 1990
Walker, Altione Alabama 03-31-1988 12-15-1988 reversed in 1992
1989:
Allen, Wanda Oklahoma 12-01-1988 04-26-1989 EXECUTED ON
01-11-2001
Balfour, Susie Mississippi 10-07-1988 10-14-1989 reversed in 1992
Coffman, Cynthia California 11-07-1986 08-30-1989 now on death row
Harris, Louise Alabama 03-11-1988 08-11-1989 reversed in 2004
Jones, Patricia Oklahoma 04-??-1988 12-07-1989 reversed in 1995
Lampkin, Beatrice Ohio 11-04-1988 04-26-1989 commuted in
1991
Landress, Cindy Indiana 04-23-1988 06-26-1989 reversed in 1992
Plantz, Marilyn Oklahoma 08-26-1988 03-31-1989 EXECUTED ON
05-01-2001
Rivers, Delores Pennsylvania 01-30-1988 03-16-1989 reversed in 2005
Stager, Barbara North Carolina 02-01-1988 05-19-1989 reversed in 1991
Twenter, Virginia Missouri 05-04-1988 01-06-1989 reversed in 1991
1990:
Butler, Sabrina Mississippi 04-11-1989 03-14-1990 reversed in 1992
50

Hunt, Deidre M. Florida 10-20-1989 09-13-1990 reversed in 1992
Jennings, Patricia North Carolina 09-19-1989 11-05-1990 now on death row
MaHaley, Marilyn North Carolina 03-17-1990 12-17-1990 reversed in 1992
McDermott, Maureen California 04-28-1985 06-15-1990 now on death row
Smith, Rebecca South Carolina 07-17-1989 12-10-1990 reversed in 1992
1991:
Copeland, Faye Missouri 1986-1988 04-27-1991 reversed in 1999
Gay, Yvette North Carolina 05-30-1990 08-10-1991 reversed in 1993
Isa, Maria Missouri 11-06-1989 12-19-1991 reversed in 1993
Milke, Debra Jean Arizona 12-02-1989 01-18-1991 now on death row
Moore, Blanche North Carolina 10-07-1986 1-18-1991 now on death row
Smith, Geraldine Illinois 06-??-1987 02-20-1991 reversed in 1997
Williams, Dorothy Illinois 07-31-1989 04-18-1991 commuted in
2003
1992:
Alfaro, Maria California 06-15-1990 07-14-1992 now on death row
Cardona, Ana Florida 11-02-1990 04-01-1992 now on death row
& 6-10-11
Garcia, Guinevere Illinois 07-24-1991 10-09-1992 commuted in
1996
Hill, Doneta Pennsylvania 06-20-1990 4-9-1992 & reversed in 2005?
03-24-1991
Jackson, Andrea Florida 05-16-1983 02-21-1992; reversed in 1997
02-10-1984;
& 12-13-95
Phillips, Shirley Missouri 10-03-1989 04-06-1992 reversed in 1997
Wuornos, Aileen Florida 12-01- 01-31-1992; EXECUTED ON
1989; 05-15-1992; 10-09-2002
05-24- 05-15-1992;
1990; & 5-15-92
07-30-
1990;
& 9-11-90
1993:
Ballenger, Vernice Mississippi 07-10-1983 01-13-1993 reversed in 2000
Larzelier, Virginia Florida 03-08-1991 05-11-1993 reversed in 2005
Mulero, Marilyn Illinois 05-12-1992 11-12-1993 reversed in 1997
O'Donnell, Kelly Pennsylvania 11-11-1992 07-01-1993 reversed in 1999
Row, Robin Lee Idaho 02-10-1992 12-16-1993 now on death row
Thompson, Catherine California 06-14-1990 06-10-1993 now on death row
1994:
Carrington, Celeste California 01-26-1992 11-23-1994 now on death row
& 3-11-92
King, Carolyn Pennsylvania 10-??-1993 11-30-1994 reversed in 2010
Lyon, Linda Alabama 10-04-1993 12-21-1994 EXECUTED ON
05-10-2002
Pulliam, Latasha Illinois 03-21-1991 06-15-1994 commuted in
2003
Samuels, Mary E. California 12-08-1988 09-16-1994 now on death row
& 6-?-1989
1995:
Dalton, Kerry Lyn California 06-26-1988 05-23-1995 now on death row
Frank, Antoinette Louisiana 03-04-1995 09-13-1995 now on death row
Henderson, Cathy Texas 01-21-1994 05-25-1995 now on death row
Jackson, Andrea H. Florida 05-16-1983 12-13-1995; reversed in 1997
02-10-1984;
& 02-21-92
Sheppard, Erica Texas 06-30-1993 03-03-1995 now on death row
Spunaugle, Delpha Oklahoma 08-15-1993 03-31-1995 reversed in 1997
51

Young, Caroline California 06-18-1993 10-27-1995 died of natural
causes in 2005
1996:
Anderson, Melanie North Carolina 08-24-1994 09-26-1996 reversed in 2003
Pike, Christa Gail Tennessee 01-12-1995 03-29-1996 now on death row
1997:
Nelson, Leslie New Jersey 04-20-1995 05-??-1997 reversed in 2002
& 03-30-01
Routier, Darlie Texas 06-06-1996 02-04-1997 now on death row
1998:
Brookshire, Kelly Georgia 02-07-1997 11-20-1998 now on death row
Buenrostro, Dora California 10-25-1994 10-02-1998 now on death row
Gonzalez, Veronica California 07-21-1995 07-20-1998 now on death row
Holberg, Brittany Texas 11-13-1996 03-27-1998 now on death row
McCarthy, Kimberly Texas 07-28-1997 12-??-1998 now on death row
& 11-01-02
Riggs, Christina Arkansas 11-04-1997 06-30-1998 EXECUTED ON
05-02-2000
Williams, Jacqueline Illinois 11-16-1995 05-11-1998 commuted in
2003
1999:
Basso, Susan Texas 08-28-1998 09-01-1999 now on death row
Eubanks, Susan California 10-27-1997 10-13-1999 now on death row
Mata, Bernina Illinois 06-27-1998 10-28-1999 commuted in
2003
Parker, Carlette North Carolina 05-12-1998 04-01-1999 now on death row
2000:
Byrom, Michelle Mississippi 06-04-1999 11-18-2000 now on death row
Carlson, Doris Arizona 10-25-1996 03-31-2000 reversed in 2002
Caudill, Virginia Kentucky 03-15-1998 03-24-2000 now on death row
Johnson, Shonda Alabama 12-01-1999 01-19-2000 reversed in 2005
Kemmerlin, Chris North Carolina 03-24-1999 10-18-2000 reversed in 2002
Nieves, Sandi California 06-30-1998 10-06-2000 now on death row
Tharp, Michelle Pennsylvania 04-18-1998 11-14-2000 now on death row
2001:
Markman, Beth Ann Pennsylvania 10-04-2000 [2001] reversed in 2007
Nelson, Leslie New Jersey 04-20-1995 03-30-2001 reversed in 2002
& 05-??-97
2002:
Blackmon, Patricia Alabama 05-??-1999 06-07-2002 now on death row
Caro, Socorro California 11-22-1999 04-05-2002 now on death row
Carty, Linda Texas 05-16-2001 02-21-2002 now on death row
McCarthy, Kimberly Texas 07-28-1997 11-01-2002 now on death row
& 12-??-98
Michaud, Michelle California 12-02-1997 09-25-2002 now on death row
2003:
Lewis, Teresa Virginia 10-30-2002 06-03-2003 EXECUTED ON
09-23-2010
Roberts, Donna Ohio 12-11-2001 06-21-2003; now on death row
& 10-29-07
2004:
Andrew, Brenda Oklahoma 11-20-2001 09-22-2004 now on death row
Adrian, Wendi Arizona 10-08-2000 12-22-2004 now on death row
Berry, Kenisha Texas 11-29-1998 02-19-2004 reversed in 2007
Charbonneau, Linda Delaware 09-23-2001 06-04-2004 reversed in 2006
& 10-17-01
Rodriguez, Angelina California 09-09-2000 01-12-2004 now on death row
2005:
Diar, Nicole Ohio 08-27-2003 11-02-2005 reversed in 2008
52

Gobble, Tierra Alabama 12-15-2004 10-26-2005 now on death row
Johnson, Angela Federal (Iowa) 07-25-1993 12-20-2005 now on death row
& 11-05-93
Richardson, Chelsea Texas 12-11-2003 06-01-2005 reversed in 2011
Walter, Shonda Pennsylvania 03-25-2003 04-19-2005 now on death row
2006:
Chamberlain, Lisa Jo Mississippi 02-20-2004 08-04-2006 now on death row
Coleman, Lisa Ann Texas 07-26-2004 07-07-2006 now on death row
Fulgham, Kristi Leigh Mississippi 05-10-2003 12-09-2006 reversed in 2010
Holmes, Brandy Louisiana 01-01-2003 02-21-2006 now on death row
Snyder, Janeen Marie California 04-17-2001 09-07-2006 now on death row
2007:
Roberts, Donna Ohio 12-11-2001 06-21-2003; now on death row
& 10-29-07
2008:
Cole, Tiffany Ann Florida 07-08-2005 03-06-2008 now on death row
Lucio, Melissa Elizabeth Texas 02-16-2007 08-??-2008 now on death row
Montgomery, Lisa Federal (MO) 12-16-2004 04-04-2008 now on death row
2009:
Sarinana, Cathy Lynn California 12-25-2005 06-29-2009 now on death row
Scott, Christie Michelle Alabama 09-16-2008 08-05-2009 now on death row
2010:
Nelson, Tanya Jaime California 04-21-2005 03-26-2010 now on death row
Rottiers, Brooke Marie California 08-28-2006 10-22-2010 now on death row
2011:
Allen, Margaret Florida 02-08-2005 05-19-2011 now on death row
Cardona, Ana Marie Florida 11-02-1990 04-01-1992 now on death row
& 6-10-11
Carr, Emilia Lily Florida 02-14-2009 02-22-2011 now on death row
Forde, Shawna Arizona 05-30-2009 02-23-2011 now on death row
McAnulty, Angela D. Oregon 12-09-2009 02-24-2011 now on death row
Source: Streib 2011:10-16
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Killing Women

A Critical Study of Gender Equality

About 1 in 10 murders in the United States are committed by a woman. Meanwhile,

Keywords: capital punishment, death penalty, equality, United States, women

Word count: 15,479

Appendix A – Federal laws providing for the death penalty 48

1.1 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to critically investigate existing opposing theories as to

1.2 Research question

 Are women being favored in capital cases in the United States?

The study is conducted through a combination of legal method and statistical

1.3.1 Statistical analysis

1.3.2 Legal case study

When considering matters of sexism, gender inequality and possible

1.4.1 The basic elements of feminist theory

1.4.2 Differences within the theory

1.4.3 This study’s theoretical selection

Statistics of manslaughter, compared to those about murder, have needed to be

2.1 Historical review

2.2 Crime-based theory

2.2.1 Executive clemency

2.2.2 Gender-related capital crime statistics

Table 1: Death sentences for female offenders 1973-2011

Total Death Female Death Portion of

Source: Streib 2011:8-9

Table 2: Types of Murder Most Eligible for Capital Punishment,

Stranger murder 96.1 3.9

Total murders 172,961 85.7 14.3

Stranger murder is significantly dominated by men, specifically 96.1%. We find

Table 3: Proportion of Murder Victims by Relationship, 1976-1987

Domestic Death Row – Gender and Motive, 1978-1989*

Source: Rapaport 2009:1517

Total 100 100

Source: Rapaport 2009:1517

2.3 Chivalry theory

2.3.1 Origins of chivalry concepts

2.3.2 Application of chivalry in criminal justice

2.3.3 Evil Woman Theory

2.4 Dominance and power structure

2.4.1 Different Voice and Dominance Theory

Traditionally, feminism has aimed to question and crush established notions of

2.4.2 Rescuing subordination

Aristotle believed that punishment should not be distributed equally based on

3.1 The inequality rationale

3.1.1 ”Male” crimes

3.1.2 Sentencing and execution

When it comes to the statistical interpretation of execution rates related to gender,

3.1.3 The ranking of severity

Total non-intimate kills: about 8533

Total non-intimate kills: about 115,469

3.2 The fallacious appreciation of women

3.2.1 The practice of chivalry

The unaccounted-for, statistically smaller number of female capital proceedings are

3.2.2 The downside of chivalry

Herzog and Oreg recognize this misconception in their construction of Selective

3.3 Chivalry vs. consideration

If we consider both theoretical efforts attempting to explain the statistical

3.4.1 Future research

Year, Name, and Race of Sentencing Date of Date of Current

Year, Name, and Race of Sentencing Date of Date of Current

Year, Name, and Race of Sentencing Date of Date of Current

Year, Name, and Race of Sentencing Date of Date of Current

Source: Streib 2011:10-16

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