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Tribal (Land) Rights and Industry Accountability: A Case of Mining in Jharkhand

Conference Paper · July 2004

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 Tribal Land Rights and Industry Accountability: A Case of Mining in Jharkhand1, India

by Hasrat Arjjumend
Sr. Programme Officer
PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH IN ASIA [PRIA]
Jharkhand Resource Centre
Gilanpara, Dumka – 814 101 Jharkhand

ABSTRACT

Worldwide the land has been considered the chief livelihood resource through which the ever-vulnerable tribal populations
can only escape the onslaught of extinction. Like elsewhere in the world and Indian subcontinent the lands owned by the
tribes have been increasingly alienated by varied factors including industrialization. The present paper examines the tribal
lands alienation by mining industry (small scale) in Santal Pargana of Jharkhand and the violation of rights of tribes to land
and livelihood by the state and industry. The empirical study covered 57 stone mines and associated stone factories in 3
villages of Dumka district. Despite the existing stringent land laws in Santal Pargana and at national level the district
administration granted leases to private mine owners on tribal lands. The mine owners have deceitfully manipulated the
tribals’ social behavior and land relations, and applied various illegitimate methods including coercion, cheating, bribing,
intoxicating, betrayal, luring, etc. in the bid to acquiesce the lands for mining. Commons have also been encroached apart
from the cultivated lands neighboring the mining operations. Process of massive degradation has adversely affected the
farming and other livelihood activities, water sources, habitats and the environment. When the state patronized and
promoted the land alienation and turned blind eye to the tribal rights, the people individually and collectively responded or
responding appropriately in order to address the intrusion of industry till their doorstep. Some have easily succumbed, while
others strongly resisted or aptly negotiated. At times when the state as well as industry failed to comply with the
accountabilities to the people, the tribal people themselves have dealt with the mining industry multifariously. However, the
state as the custodian of citizens has to be accountable to the people and thus protect the rights of the tribes. Industry can
also not overlook the land rights of the tribes and the accountability frontiers.

INTRODUCTION

Past two decades have observed vindicate evolution of the concepts revolving around ‘good
governance’ in the service delivery and the exercise of power and in that of ‘development’. With time
a shift in ‘livelihood based approach’ of development to ‘rights based approach’ of development has
also been witnessed. It unanimously demanded to define or redefine the accountability of
development actors and institutions leading to debates at various forums. It thus poses pressing need
to consider what a rights based approach to accountability might look like. Considering the emanation
of state-market-civil society continuum in neo-liberal model of global governance, it is not only the
state as development actor of which the accountability ought to be reexamined but also the
accountability of market (industry) actors should be ascertained in particular relation of realization of
rights of whose lives it affects.

As part of IDS-PRIA study2 “realizing rights and claiming accountability”, this paper intends to explore
how the issues of tribal people’s rights over their land are dealt with by industries that encroach upon
their land. Usually the tribals become victims of industrial enterprises despite the existence of state
legislations expected to ensure the inalienability of tribal people’s right over their land. Land has been
considered the chief livelihood resource through which the ever-vulnerable tribal populations can only
escape the onslaught of extinction. Paper focuses on tribal lands alienation by mining industry (small
scale) in Santal Pargana3 of Jharkhand and the violation of rights of tribes to land and livelihood by the
state and industry. The empirical study covered 57 stone quarries and associated stone factories in 3
This paper had been presented in ‘IInd PRIA International Conference on Citizenship and Governance’
held on 19-21 February 2004 at Hyderabad, India; and subsequently published in INNOVATIONS IN
CIVIL SOCIETY, Vol. 4 No.1, July 2004.

1
villages of Dumka district. Despite the existing stringent land laws in Santal Pargana and at national
level ensuring tribes’ claims over land, the district administration granted leases to private mine
owners on tribal lands. Process of massive degradation has adversely affected the farming and other
livelihood activities, water sources, habitats and the environment. At times when the state as well as
industry failed to comply with the accountabilities to the people, the tribal people themselves have
dealt with the mining industry multifariously. However, the state as the custodian of citizens has to be
accountable to the people and thus protect the rights of the tribes. Industry can also not overlook the
land rights of the tribes and the accountability frontiers.

In Santal Pargana region of Jharkhand there are three main areas4 of stone mining from which one,
located along Shikaripara-Rampurhat road, was selected for the study. In this pocket the mining
operations have been done in about 9-10 villages, of which 3 villages ⎯ Chitragarhia, Sarasdangal and
Makrapahari ⎯ were selected for intensive studies. The sample villages (Chitragarhia, Makrapahari
and Sarasdangal) have 51 quarries covering 152.23 acres of cultivable land of 276 survey numbers. The
related investigations were made in all the existing mines in sample villages. Primarily the tools like
semi-structured informal interviews, observation, group discussions, informal discussion, probes and
secondary literature had been used for gathering the information on various attributes of research.
Field studies were undertaken from November 2003 to February 2004. The study has been conducted
on the Santal and Paharia tribes.

FINDINGS

Process for Violation of Tribal Rights

As far as the case of stone quarries is concerned, the lessee has to initially apply to the Mining Officer,
Dumka. Application is lodged under Section – 10(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act 1957 for obtaining the Certificate of Approval. The procedure actually takes place
under Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1972 (made under Section 15 of above Act of Parliament).
The Mining Officer forwards the application in prescribed Form-A to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) for
the grant of mining lease. The lessee has to deposit all preliminary expenses, security deposits, fees,
etc. The DC finally grants the mining lease usually on raiyat5 lands for 5-10 years under Rule-11 of
Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1972. Subsequently, the DC also grants quarrying permit to the
lessee under Rule – 28 & 28A in the raiyat lands, and under Rule – 30 in reserved and protected forest
areas. Rule – 21 embodies the conditions under which lease is granted.

Manipulation of Tribal Rights

In the process of granting leases for mining on tribals’ lands the local administration has absolutely
flouted and violated the statutory provisions available at international, national and state level. It
seems that government rarely refers the international conventions India ratified (Universal Declaration
of Human Rights6, ILO Convention 1077 & 1698), when dealing with the tribal lands. Even great serious
has been the ignorance of legal provisions provided by Indian state through Fifth Schedule9 of
Constitution of India, Panchayat Provisions10 (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996, and landmark
Samatha Judgment11 of Supreme Court, 1997. Meant for preservation of environment and habitat of
tribal areas the mining related provisions in Environment (Protection) Act12 1986 are also routinely
violated.

Most serious concern is that the DCs of Dumka, and elsewhere in Santal Pargana, instead of protecting
the tribal land rights had/ have themselves violated the strict legal provisions under Section–20 of
Santal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1949, hereinafter known as SPTA, which is
superseding legislation13 over all existing law directly or indirectly dealing with land affairs including
2
mining laws. DCs unanimously looked only at mining related laws and rules and granted the mining
leases under section-46(i) of Bihar Act 1947 (which was considered ultra vires with the enactment of
SPTA) while completely ignoring SPTA consciously or unconsciously. Section-20(1) of SPTA clearly
prohibits the raiyat to transfer his land by sale, gift, ‘lease’ or any ‘contract’ or ‘agreement’. Section-
20(5) even instructs the DC to recover and restore raiyati lands of STs transferred in contravention of
Section-20(1)&(2) by any fraudulent method. Succeeding observations sufficiently demonstrate how
the mine owners, with the collusion and patronage of local/ district administration, deceived/ coerced
the tribal families for taking away their lands. And, moreover, it is not the matter that DC or his/ her
subordinates/ representatives do not know the underlying facts, but it has been observed that the
government officers many a times guide mine owners how to overcome tribal resistance. Often the
officers and police help the investors to occupy the lands.

Quarry and Crusher Owners Cheat the Tribes

The person interested in lease on a tribals’ land usually approaches the landowner family through a
local fixers (the byproducts of capitalistic economy and external or internal colonialism) who generally
belong to tribal community from the same village or neighbouring village. It is nothing but an irony
that the landholder and leaseholder rarely come face to face, so many tribal families have even not
yet seen the actual leaseholder or mine owner. The middlemen help the mine owners exploit the
tribals by materializing the deal of the land, say, valuing Rs. 200,000 for maximum Rs. 2,000.
Bargaining for such a deal begins from Rs. 200 only. Those tribals who never saw that much money
easily get lured and become ready for giving up the land to excavation. Often a pressure is also
mounted on the landholder through various means. Say, in case the landholder denies or resists, the
investor party again comes to the landholder and threaten with the pretence that DC/ SP14 have
ordered the lease. So, ultimately, under pressure the landholder, unknown of all betrayals, readies to
give the land on lease.

It is observed that the tribals generally do not come back from their words; rather they abide to their
words. This humanely character (‘innocence’ in this wicked world) is frequently encashed and misused
by non-tribes, government officials and middlemen. Some families have not yet got any amount of
compensation, but still trust that they would get the money. Instances of cheating are countless.
Tribals have fallen prey to the betrayals in the business of land transfers.

Coercion and belligerent take over of lands is another remarkable phenomenon that is practiced by
the miners. Say, one family gave lands on lease to a mine owner, the adjacent landholder either
spontaneously gets convinced that his land would later become unusable/waste if not given, or he is
repeatedly reminded of the consequences of that sort. Ultimately, the landholder has to give up his
land, and whishes through negotiations to get as much amount as he can. In case the landholder
denies initially giving lands on lease, his land is circumvented by various means. At the last the
landholder surrenders and comes on to negotiation. In this case, naturally, the landholder receives
lesser than what he might have received earlier. Sometimes, though rarely, a landholder outrightly
denies to give lands, he then surely suffers all throughout as his lands are either forcibly occupied
under mining operation or made totally unusable by way of throwing stone/boulders, debris, refuse,
etc. or by damaging crops, or by discharging water into the plot. Middlemen also play catalytic role in
the coercion process.

When the landholder agrees, forcibly or willingly, to give his land(s) on mining lease and subsequent
quarrying he is called to Dumka for signing or thumbing the lease papers and affidavit etc. on
agreeable day. The landholder(s) is(are) given the bus fare and one meal. The money is given either
prior to the day of lease agreement or on the same day at Dumka. Many families sign or thumb the
affidavit etc. right at their home; and some do on the blank stamp/ ordinary papers. Moreover, none
of the landholder, who gave land on mining lease, has been given copy of the lease documents. In fact
3
the tribals do not dare to demand the copy of the lease documents. They also do not know what
conditions are written in the lease papers on which the mining lease is granted. What amount of the
compensation paid on paper to the landholder remains completely unknown to raiyat. It was
commonly reported by the tribal families that the amount mentioned in the lease papers has never
been given to land owner by any leaseholder.

In Chitragarhia village an interesting process was noted down that several mine owners got leases in
the name of landholders by promising them to make the partners in the mining operation. Most of such
landholders either work in the same mine as labourer or work in some other’s quarry. But necessarily
they are not mine owners. Such families include Kerap Soren (actual owner: Pappu Gupta), Charlis
Tudu (actual owner: Munna Gupta), Jagarnath Marandi (actual owner: Manu Chattopadhyay), Devilal
Tudu (actual owner: Aditya Nath Goswami) and Somlal Hambrom (actual owner: Mihir Mandal and
Subeer Bhattacharya).

Extension of Mines outside the Leased Area

It is also a common observation in the sample villages the quarries are not restricted to the plots
wherein lease is granted. Since the rocks generally are contiguous recognizing no geographic
boundary. When the stone goes to finish in the leased out plots the mine owners influence the
possessor(s) of adjacent plots, and in most of the cases the mine owners succeed taking adjacent lands
for mining commonly without any lease or agreement. So the mine having lease, say, on 2 plots
(survey numbers) is practically expanded on 5 plots. There are one or more plots a mine also occupies
for heaping the debris. Sometimes the land owner is given bit of compensation, and quite many times
the overburdened dump is made surrounding the mine that gradually slide into adjacent plots (under
cultivation or lying waste).

In Chitragarhia village it was observed that as many as 6 mines have encroached upon grazing ground
(CPR) and spoiled almost entire 69 bigha15 area of gochar16 (plot no. 1034). As a matter of fact the
stone mining in Shikaripara area started during 1966 from this gochar land only. The villagers do not
know the exact name of the company, and the Department of Mining has no record of mining
operations that have taken place so far on this CPR as no lease is possible on the grazing land.
Whosoever occupied the CPR and performed mining operation he did it without any lease and
perfectly against the law, SPTA 1949. Instead, quite many quarries either have taken gair mazrooa
khas17 lands on lease from government or have just occupied without any lease. It is important to note
that the khas lands in the villages belong to the government (Revenue Department) and are usually
settled to poor landless families of the village by headman (pradhan). Pradhan of the village has
powers equivalent to the court of land settlement so as the matter of settling khas is concerned. More
significant is that no person (to whom the khas land is settled) is permitted in SPTA 1949 to give such
lands on lease or to hand it over to other person. But, abysmally, the khas lands on which the leases
are granted have been given on lease by the patta holders (to whom the lands were settled). In about
half of the cases the mine owners managed the village headman (pradhan) and got leases on the khas
lands.

It must be, at this juncture, noticed that grant of any kind of lease, mining operation, crusher
installation, and allied activities on tribal lands are all illegal and against the provisions of SPTA, Fifth
Schedule, PESA and Samatha Judgment and international legislations meant to protect the tribal land
rights.

Pittance of Compensations

Considering the grant of lease on raiyat land especially of a tribal a scandalous crime and violation of
Constitution of India and all agrarian laws, the question of compensation paid to titleholders does not
4
arise. Nevertheless, the reality is reverse and thousands of families have lost their lands to the
combine of industry and state. The compensation paid to the landholders is meager in comparison to
the real value of land. Unarguably the leaseholders show in official records far more amounts to have
been paid. In contrast, the actual payments to landholders remain to be pittance. This amount ranges
from Rs. 200 to Rs. 1,000 per bigha per annum, depending on the materialization of the deal. A
considerable portion of the money goes into the pockets of middlemen. Evidently, some families cried
for a long or are still crying for the partial or full payment. Many families have been given nothing
except the false promises; while others have been given the petty cash, domestic usables, ration,
animals, cycle, motorcycle, roofing material, house construction material, clothes, wine,
employment, or alike in return of taking away their lands for mining. The process of duping the tribes
is well known now. All this is happening despite the fact that the provisions made under Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 guarantee under its Section–24A of the
compensation18 to the landholder. The Section–24A reads as below:

Subsection (2): “The holder of mining lease……shall be liable to pay compensation in such manner
as may be prescribed to the occupier of the surface of the land granted under such license or lease
for any loss or damage which is likely to arise or has arisen from or in consequence of the mining
operations.”

Impacts of Alienation of Land Rights

Land & Livelihoods

The land alienation essentially has primary impacts on the livelihood of the tribes. ‘Land is life’ for
the tribes. Tribals consider land as the mother of people; land thus forms a major part of their being
⎯ food, water source, culture, religion, health, and everything. In the study area with the course of
expansion of ‘catching up development’ the tribes learnt better agriculture and were growing food
and staple crops in their lands. They also have learnt to rear domestic animals like cows, bullocks,
goats, poultry birds and pigs. Subsistence economy of the tribal families had (has) to revolve around
the pieces of cultivable lands or wastelands. In Chitragarhia village the grazing lands were once full of
seasonal grasses where the livestock of entire village had to graze. The individual lands of the families
were plain and under cultivation of kharif19 and rabi20 crops such as paddy, maize, beans, pulses,
pigeon pea, oilseeds, vegetables, millets and other water-resistant crops. Every family had bullock(s)
and to grow sufficient food in the lands. The topography of the area supported the regeneration of
groundwater aquifers that enriched the moisture contents in the soil. Otherwise too the irrigation
sources like wells and ponds were plenty to fetch the crops. Paddy fields in the village had to yield
even higher than the paddy yields in neighbouring West Bengal, where lands are supposed to be
superior and well drained. Almost identical were the situations in Makrapahari and Sarasdangal area.
The village Sarasdangal still has maintained productivities of the cultivated lands in the area outside
mining operations. The cultivated lands of Makrapahari were terraced and made fertile after long
practices of local land management. However, some lands were standing waste with immense biomass
for supporting livelihoods in the form of grazing, grasses, fuel, hutment material, and other household
needs. In total, every farmer was self-reliant and secured with surplus food for round the year.

‘Commons’ in the villages are subsistence resources of the poor. As the CPRs (chiefly grazing grounds)
have been taken over by the mine owners the tribal families fall short of grazing spaces for their
livestock, which contributes substantially to the household economy. The grazing lands have almost
vanished in Chitragarhia and Makrapahari villages. People now tend to halve the number of grazing
animals like cows, bullocks and goats, which is squarely affecting the livelihood base. Moreover, with
the disappearance of cultivated lands and ‘commons’ shortage of biomass has started to appear,
which is further stripping the tribal lives. Families of Makrapahari had to rear 40-45 cows per family as
5
because there was plenty of biomass to herd the cattle. Now since the hill has degraded as a result of
mining a family hardly manages to rear 10 cows. Many families are bound to do stall feeding of the
animals. So it is the remarkable loss the tribes of Makrapahari have to incur.
It is, according to villagers, 10-15 years old story when cycle of converting the ‘masters’ into ‘slaves’
began. Families, whose lands have been taken away either for excavation or dumping the debris, have
lost the lands forever as it have completely spoiled and exhausted. Mining pits of 15-30 meters depth
cannot be used for either purpose. They cannot be made water tanks again because of greater depth.
In respect of depth of pits none of the mine owner stick to the Rule-29(1) of Bihar Minor Mineral
Concession Rules 1972 in which the maximum depth of the mining pit has been fixed 6 meters (though
once can dig exceeding 6 meters on permission of government). Anyhow the lands have lost forever.
Now coming to the stacking and heaping of the debris from mines, which has been mounded
haphazardly. Condition (5) of Part-VII of Form-D in Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1972 bars the
mining leaseholders to throw the refuse/ debris from excavation at any place unless specified or
approved by DC. The overburdened dumps are de facto on the raiyat lands, CPRs, khas lands, village
roadsides, main Shikaripara-Rampurhat road, etc. Various raiyats have although been compensated
(with meager amounts) for the occupation of their lands for this purpose, yet many families have lost
their lands without their consent to the menace of debris. Huge mounds (mountainous) of the debris
are commonly visible in all 3 sampled villages. It is sure that the mine owners are not going to remove
or (scientifically) stabilize/reclaim the overburdened dump, and the tribal landholder has at all no
capacity to remove or stabilize/reclaim the debris. Resultantly, the families again have lost the lands
forever to the heaping/ stacking of refuse.

Another serious concern has been the sliding/ slipping of the loosely piled debris from specified plots
into the adjacent plots of lands, which is further making the additional lands unusable. Havoc is
occurring actually when it rains and the debris washes off into the croplands silting, degrading and
polluting the topsoil of the cultivated lands. Those neighbourer farmers who did not give lands for any
type of mining activity are worse victims, as they even did not receive that meager money.
Productivity of the neighbouring agricultural lands has retarded considerably in consequence of the
siltation/ pollution. Note that the land resources are common to and linked with other resources like
water, forests, etc. Degradation of the land is disinvestment in the stock of land. Perpetuation of this
disinvestment would threaten the livelihood security in the long run. This would happen due to the
differences between the equilibrium and actual rate of extraction or the replacement (social) and
actual cost of using land.

Labour Works

Quarry labourers constitute about half of the population of labour workers from outside, generally
Pakur of Santal Pargana and Murshidabad of West Bengal. Many landholders, despite the promises of
giving employment, have not been given proper employment in the mines. Nevertheless, for other
local villagers the employment engagements are also not satisfactory. There is no dearth of men and
women, whose lands have been occupied for mining or who belong to the same village where mining
operation is going on, who have been denied of employment in the quarries. Moreover, the conditions
of labourers in the mines are merciful as the workers perform in highly unsafe environment and at
risks. Even no drinking water is provided coupled with no toilet for women workers. Every worker does
everything in the mine: boulder splitting, loading, exploding, explosive carrying, drilling and so on. No
categorization of workers is there as per the nature of work. Obtaining minimum wages, identity card,
group insurance and proper health services are distant dreams.

While on the crushers there is hardly any local worker employed, all chelli (small pieces of stones)
workers remain women from outside. In keeping out the local workers from crushers the factory
owners have plain excuses that the local workers do not regularly and efficiently work due to their
drinking habits. So based on this pretext they hire the external labour. It is actually because the
6
owners, as and when they want, deny the employment and have ease to get rid off labour-related
accountabilities. It is the fact that the local labourers may organize in the time to come. But it is
never true that local worker is weaker than outsider. After all the promises of providing local
employments have gone futile. The entire mining belt looks a colony of capitalist masters.

Water Sources

When the mine pits go deeper the tectonic water oozes out into the pit, which is continuously pumped
out of the pit. Since the groundwater aquifer uses to be contiguous and only identifies its own spatial
boundaries. The uninterrupted oozing and pumping out of the water from the pit makes the
groundwater level fall in the harvesting structures like wells. Chitragarhia and Benagarhia villages
have been facing acute shortage of drinking water now. In Chitragarhia village handpumps have dried
for last 5 years. In rainy and autumn season few water comes in the handpumps on 1 hour intervals, it
dries up from February onwards. About half a km away is located a drinking well, which also dries up
in summer due to heavy withdrawal. People then fetch water from the pond of Benagarhia Mission
(half km away) for non-drinking household uses. Village shortly will be water deficient zone as the
natural drainage of the water has totally dismantled and the runoff is heavy across remaining
fallow/waste lands. Likewise, village pond near Sarasdangal has got drudged with the debris from the
quarries. The pond was source of water for non-drinking household uses and cattle drinking and
bathing. Thus the mining operations have adversely affected the water sources including spring and
streams.

Blasting in the mines is integral activity of extraction of minerals. However, it causes cleavages in the
rocks and the structures such as wells, buildings, dams, etc. get cracked. In Chitragarhia village the
newly constructed wells and the masonry structures in houses have damaged due to blasting
operations. Particularly the water harvesting structures like wells have serious implications if cracked
as a result of explosions.

Secondary effect of drinking water problem was documented in Chitragarhia village where an
epidemic of water-borne diseases like diarrhea, dysentery, cholera and jaundice broke in July-August
2002 that claimed several lives. The epidemic broke first in Muslim habitation and then traveled to
Santal populations. Recently in November 2003 two casualties took place as consequence of jaundice.

Makrapahari village lost 5 natural streams ⎯ Bhim nala, Tatko nala, Sinje nala, Dundu nala and Madai
nala ⎯ in the hands of mines on the hill. They had to irrigate hundreds of acres of lands during kharif
season. But now following the degradation of the hill and its natural vegetation the streams have
almost dried up. One quarry spoiled the origin and course of two streams. Similarly, other quarries
have destroyed the course of big perennial stream in Sarasdangal village that used to irrigate hundreds
of acres of lands in both kharif and rabi seasons. Resultantly, the important irrigation sources of the
villages have vanished forever as direct consequence of mining activity.

Tribal Habitat

Evidently the mining destroys the tribal habitats. Samatha Judgment of apex court has referred mass
of literature on the impacts and placed the verdict well in the interest of protecting habitats of tribes.
Apparently the natural habitats in the mining belt of Shikaripara are more or less devastated by the
quarries and stone crushers. Forests are supposed to be the homes of tribes; however, the trees and
natural vegetations act as necessary components of ecosystems in which indigenous people live.
Chitragarhia village was from the beginning existed with scarce or no forests. But Makrapahari village
was surrounded by hilly ecosystem that provided the village suitable habitat. The trees and vegetation
on Makrapahari hill have been destructed by the mining activities. The local Forest Department once
tried to do afforestation on the degraded hill. The vested interest commercial lobby misguided the
7
tribal families of Makrapahari and Sarasdangal that government will acquire their lands permanently
after plantations. As a result no plantation could be done on the abandoned hill.

Environmental Impacts

Foremost environmental impact of the mining activity is visible in the form of dust, which not only
affects the crops but also the human health. In the crop fields the fallout is heavy and attracts further
assessment of the degree to which it affects plant photosynthesis/ respiration causing low
productivity. Farmers of Chitragarhia expressed that the dust flying as a result of trucks movement is
highly dangerous. The consequences will appear tomorrow. The entire Chitragarhia village is affected
by the dust generated as a consequence of trucks movement on kulhi (central path of village). Dust
problem is at height in the stone crushers. Either side of factory upto half km the stone dust affects
everything it hits. The agricultural fields and the residential houses are most affected. Occupational
environment of the crushers and the mines uses to be highly unsafe as the workers pose to heavy
intensity of stone dust. Similarly, the environmental protection legislations as provided by
Environmental (Protection) Act 1986 have been flouted both by stone crushers and the mines. The
mine owners have not even registered their operations in regional office of Central Pollution Control
Board, the statutory body meant for enforcing the environmental legislations to monitor and regulate
the industry from degrading the environment. The said office has also not yet commissioned the
pollutants or ecosystem surveillance in any of stone quarrying belt of Santal Pargana.

In the mines the interior environment is highly unsafe for the workers. According to Mines Act 1952,
there should be separate men carrying different types of explosive materials e.g. gelatin, detonator
and firer. But here the single person is specified for the task. Bolder man also handles the drilling
work and the explosives. Last year 4 casualties took place in Haripur, nearby village, as a result of
explosive mishandling. Storage, handling, usage and disposal of explosives in the mines are of
paramount concern as the rules in Indian Explosives Act and Mines Act are straightforwardly violated.

Tribal responses: Struggles for Accountability

As land alienation is not new for the tribes the response of tribal communities has a long history in
Santal Pargana. Famous Santal hul (rebellion movement) of 1855 against the British was the outcome
of perpetual exploitation of the tribes by diku21 and imposition of strictures on the tribes by the
colonial rule. The causes though were many including prevalence of falsehood, the extortion of the
moneylenders, corruption of administration, and the oppression of the police. Presence of Bengali and
diku immigrants who had flocked in to carry on trade and money lending among Santals was one other
reason. The movement was nothing but the response of the tribes to the rampant injustice. Significant
to remember is that the rebellion movement was apparent and visible, but the tribal resistance and
responses against the injustice and in seeking the accountability of various actors still continue in the
societies that do not appear. It could be the case that such resistance does not become adequately
precipitate as popular struggle to be commonly known by the mass.

Tribal responses thus on the matter of encroachments on their lands by the mine/ crusher owners vary
in nature. The resistance of the tribes is not visible though, but it is there. In the sample villages this
has been observed closely and documented case wise with its consequences.

Tribal Responses Protecting Rural ‘Commons’

Chitragarhia village has about 69 bigha land of the grazing ground (plot no. 1034) that was once the
source of herding the animals for entire village. Giving the way to massive degradation in the area a
quarry was first time opened in the CPR around 1966. After sometime the mining closed down in the
8
land, but a decade past around 1976-77 the quarrying again started in the land. Now quite many
quarries are operational in the grazing ground (gochar). The villagers particularly tribes reacted most
on the illicit excavation of the commons, the ultimate resource of grazing the livestock. Initially
people attempted to stop the mining operation in the land, but when they could not succeed they
resented heavily in 1997 and demanded immediate eviction of the miners from the CPR. Babulal Kisku,
Vrindavan Goswami, Rosan Kisku and Bhagat Murmu led the struggle. From the beginning the Muslims
of the village have been in the trading type of occupations and were in close contacts of the business
people around. The mine owners played cleverly and invoked the Muslims to convert the resistance
into an inter-community conflict. So the same had happened and under the patronage of industry the
Muslim community lodged an FIR in police against tribes mounting false charges. Thus the original
struggle against the mining lobby turned into an inter-community quarrel. Except Babulal Kisku all the
struggle leaders were managed by mine owners through giving employment, middlemanship and petty
cash. Lone Babulal Kisku could not stand long and, alongwith many other persons entered into a
compromise with the Muslims. Noticeably, in the compromise papers signed in Dumka’s SDO court it
was mentioned that the mine owners would pay as penalty of encroaching the gochar to the aam
sabha22 of the village. Communities would later decide the usage of the money in village’s common
fund. But, disappointingly, none of the mine owners counter signed such a settlement; hence they
were totally unaccountable to decision of the communities and were free from any such obligation.
Since then the entire gochar land has degraded by illegal mining with no upsurge of any resistance. In
due course of time the mining lobby has grown as huge power structures in Chitragarhia.

Similarly, in the same Chitragarhia village the people tried to stop the trucks that not only have badly
spoiled the main path (kulhi) of the village but also create air and noise pollution. Once the villagers
impeded the trucks passage through the village, which then adversely affected their employment in
the mines and day-to-day livelihood. So they withdrew this resentment. Again for demanding the
construction of new road they boycotted the last assembly election at 5 polling stations. That
struggle, surprisingly, was in the interest of mine owners. Now the tribes have accustomed to the
state of affair.

The above struggle of Chitragarhia village was initially fierce capitalizing over few motivational factors
such as strengthened social capital, committed and well-accepted leadership, collective perception of
common livelihood interests at stake and least opportunity cost. Chitragarhia village traditionally is a
tribal village, where Muslim community settled quite anew. Since the external colonizing forces (the
commercial mineral exploiters) till then had not disorganized, disempowered and dismantled the
tribal families, the tribals of the village were relatively united and conscious to their identity and
resources. Informal institutions, lineage bonds, Kinship, socio-religious structures, collectivism and
secured livelihood base (of cultivated lands) formed the appreciable shape of social capital.

Although the advent of Muslim community in the village and resulting gradual annihilation (not
assimilation) of tribal culture from nuclear and peripheral frontiers weakened the mass of social
capital among the tribal people. Yet, it was adequately placed to spawn a struggle for protecting
common livelihood resources.

Struggle around CPR evolved was perhaps not because the tribals were heavily dependent on common
grazing land (gochar), but because common land was the source of collectivity notions in the
community, asserting customary tenure rights, symbol of cultural intactness, coming together of
herders for interacting, conscience of social networks and, no doubt, belongingness feelings of
individuals to the resource. Instead, the vast grazing ground was the ‘critical link’ in the whole
ecosystemic make up of the village. People had the awareness of this sort in their conscious or
subconscious mind. Moreover, comparing with today, the opportunity cost of struggling for the CPR
was considerably less at that time. Most of the families had cultivated farmlands and productive
homesteads. Unlike today they were less dependent on quarries or had comparatively lesser economic
9
interests in the mining operations. It all provided the tribal families a spatial base to rise against the
mining industry. People’s resistance in defense of their land rights took shape when it found
appropriate leadership.
Leadership is an important element of a struggle movement. No doubt the leaders in this struggle
were more educated, informed and externally connected. Noteworthy, however, is that out of 4
leaders, only two were from within the tribal community of the same village. One, Vrindavan
Goswami, was an outsider, who had high degree of vested interests. The same was the case with
Bhagat Murmu. Present profile of both the outsiders reveals that they wanted thought this struggle to
personally attain favorable change in the power relations with the mining owners and to mobilize the
accrual of personal benefits from mining activity. This is also reflected in the fact that as soon as the
struggle reached the climax, they sighted their aspirations fulfilled by way of achieving the bargaining
capacity. Subsequently, they left the struggle and met with the mine owners. Though the struggle was
one of the rare in the stone mining area of Shikaripara block, the weak and dubious leadership caused
the struggle circumvented. Babulal Kisku was though committed and feisty, but the strategic pruning
by industry of his powers and ability to lead also forced him ultimately to compromise. Muslim
community, having quest of acquiring power, resources and recognition through the goodwill of
industry owners and having stark desire to ensure dominance over village resources and affairs, acted
as safety valve between the tribals and mine owners. Using this alien community (alien because
Santal’s worldview considers them diku, the outsider exploiter) the industry managed the whole set of
struggle in their favour and thus surpassed the accountability of any sort.

Consequences of the collapse of this struggle in Chitragarhia are of great significance from the
viewpoint of deliberate disarray or disabling of the institutions likely to claim or enforce the
accountability. Eventually the demoralization from previous defeat in the struggle, growing
materialistic attitude towards the natural resources, unprecedented hammering on the traditional
institutions, induced cleavage of families, imposition of drinking culture, decaying land based means
of livelihood and rising dependence on the mining activity, weakened collectivism, withdrawing
support institutions and structures and its shifting commitment from people to industry, and
multiplying size and power of mining industry in the village led to no reappearance of people’s
struggle as yet. Whatever the shape of struggle emerged thereafter was the manifestation of the
manipulated form of very notion of struggle for accountability and, not to surprise, was irrigated/
sponsored by the industry itself. Hence, obviously it has to cater the interests of the industry rather
than challenging it or demanding the accountability from the industry.

State’s response in this struggle for preserving the commons also needs little focus. When the leader
of the struggle, Mr. Babulal, was charged with false allegations and the opposite party i.e. Muslim
community took the case to police station and then to Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) court, the state
preferred to stay along the powerful and vested interest lobby. Neither police nor SDO inquired
whether the framed charges were true or false. Rather under the influence of industry owners, the
whole case was transformed into a case of inter-community rivalry and conflict. Lastly, in the quest of
quickly disposing off pending cases, the SDO did not seriously look into the implications and relevance
of language written in compromise deed. When there was a clear mention in the compromise deed
that the mine owners, who encroached on gochar land, had to pay penalty for illegitimately
excavating the CPR to aam sabha (village council), notice was not taken by SDO to hold industry
owners accountable or at least he didn’t call them for counter signatures on the inter-community
compromise deed. Thus compromise was accepted for the sake of compromise. Besides, the struggle
via inter-community dispute, remarkably, brought in the knowledge of the state that gochar was
encroached by the mining industry, the state, as it has legal obligations, did not act upon. All it
reflects that the state had, and has, silent consent on the land alienation and encroachments of
commons by the mining industry.

10
Nonetheless, another attempt of petty struggle was also made by the tribals in Chitragarhia that
revolved around environmental health concern. Village residents, chiefly tribals, prohibited the
passage of trucks through common main path (kulhi). This time the industry had not to put more
energy in countering the struggle. The pathway the industry strategically followed in the village
enabled it not only to obliterate the livelihood resources ⎯ land, water, and biomass ⎯ and farm
employments, but also to inject absolute dependence among the tribal families. Resultantly, the tribal
vulnerability and uncertainty in keeping lives intact rose. All it provided to the industry with the ease
to diffuse the struggle, and with the better articulations while dealing with such struggle. Therefore,
when the people this time saw their employment ⎯ the last livelihood resort for most of the families
⎯ at the stake, they calmly withdrew the struggle for accountability.

In the third struggle, that used the electoral boycott as weapon/ strategy, the mining industry
apparently backed up the movement; because it was matching their solo interests and was not against
it. The struggle was against the state. It interfaced the state demanding the road construction on
which the trucks transporting stone ply. Since the struggle had to interface the state, which unlike
industry was situated at distance, the people adopted totally distinct strategy to claim for the
accountability of the state. And in the electoral democracy the fitting strategy to make the
governance structures responsive is the boycott of election. Quick result of the struggle was
appealing, but the response of the state in the ling-run was passive and null. For the construction of
village approach road, as government classifies it, had never been the priority of the state. As for the
industry owners this approach road was, and is, extremely important for the movement of trucks.
State was already quite aware of this fact; so it responded passively thinking that the mine owners
would spontaneously take care off.

Comparing above three episodes of formal/informal struggles of the tribals in Chitragarhia exhibits an
interesting shift/ twist in the nature of struggles apart from changes in its morphology and anatomy.
First struggle was sharply in the interface of industry that strived for the industry accountability in
relation to tribal lands. Spatial and temporal expansion of first struggle was also greater than the
second struggle. Tendency of struggle to interface the industry had shrunk in the second movement. It
was naturally the outcome of industry’s concentrated efforts to weaken the grounds on which any
struggle/ resistance stands. Also in third episode the current of resistance was turned towards the
state, which is situated far away and much difficult to chase. Thus as today the mining industry in
Chitragarhia through variety of modes has manipulated in its favour the social, economic and political
relations of the society. Those who did not succumb to manipulated situations or who did not
negotiate with the industry in lieu of foregoing their lands have ended up into frustration.

In Makrapahari village there were 5 streams arising out from the hill on which the mining has taken
place. These streams had to irrigate hundreds of acres of lands during kharif season. But now
following the degradation of the hill and its natural vegetation the streams have almost dried up. The
residents of Bada Makra (hamlet of Makrapahari) only bemoan the loss of water sources but they never
acted upon this matter. It means that their resistance could not pool up and come out to prohibit the
degradation of the natural resource. It also reflects that the villagers succumb to the situations and
did not try to negotiate with the mine owners taking the matter of permanent damage of common
ecological resource.

Unlike Makrapahari, the residents of Sarasdangal opposed several times the destruction of Bada nala
originating from hill of Makrapahari and flowing 2 km down towards Sarasdangal and Haripur. First, the
quarry of Madan Rathi attempted to obstruct the course of this perennial stream. Tribals of
Sarasdangal objected and punished Madan Rathi for the same and asked him to clean up the
watercourse. Unfortunately, the quarry of Gopal Singh cut the stream from centre leaving even no
mark of it. Villagers again resisted him. He promised to rebuild the channel aside his quarry, which he
never did. Simultaneously, quarry of Kishore Singh on hill completely dug the origin of the stream. In
11
front of powerful mine owners the villagers could not succeed, and, lastly, they surrendered. No
further negotiation proceeded.

Preceding instance of Makrapahari cannot be mistaken that the tribal community showed neutrality to
the concern of their communal resources. Community inaction in this case has to be discoursed in
different dimensions. First of all, it is the industry’s past experiences of dealing with tribal people
elsewhere that essentially helped the mine owners to tackle the tribal families. A plethora of
strategies and approaches was employed by the mine owners in Makrapahari and Sarasdangal to
manage tribal resistance. For example, the mining activity did not attack prima face the core of the
resources, but gradually moved in from periphery to the core.

Actually, the resources at the periphery are generally of low value to the people and have least
priority in the need of conserving/ sustaining them. As the journey of resource exploitation proceeds
from periphery to the core, a sense of materialism develops among the non-monetized cultures of
tribes, who then begin to assign monetized economic value to the natural resources in their access/
control/ possession. In case if some vital resources like water stream does not have direct economic
value in context of industrial expansion, hereinafter the mining, the people forego their stake in such
resources for benefiting from other deals of economic activity. Similar happenings occurred in
Makrapahari and Sarasdangal villages. In Makrapahari the people did not come forward to struggle for
preservation of water streams or for at least holding the industry accountable for their rights over
common water resource because they chose to forego the common resource vis-à-vis receiving
employment in the mining operations. Another explanation of the passiveness of community also needs
attention as it relates to the causative factors of mobilization. Geographically the hamlet Bada Makra
is located on north facing slopes of the hill. And north-facing slopes of the hills generally do have
greater diversity and magnitude of resources including high moisture content in the soil, greater
abundance of water sources and less evapotranspirational loss. Today the degraded water streams in
the village do not seem to affecting much the village surface or groundwater aquifers meant for
irrigation or potableness. The majority in the village does not visualize the farsighted impacts of this
degradation. Moreover, the rate of engagement in the mining activity is such that pooling up of
resistance is difficult today.

Encroachment of the water stream induced mobilization upto a level in Sarasdangal village. This
struggle precipitated around the common minor water body needs to be explained from two prominent
angles. In Sarasdangal a limited number of families have given up lands for mining, whereas the water
stream had to irrigate lands of large number of families. So the majority had stake in that particular
water resource. To claim their rights over the common water resource the majority organized that
sidelined the vested interests of even those who co-opted the process of exploitation of minerals.
Initially the people succeeded in their endeavor of claiming accountability of industry in that
particular matter. But as the time passed by the mining industry in Sarasdangal agglomerated to
overpower or to manage all existed community institutions likely demanding the accountability of the
industry. In making the community institutions ineffective or weak, the non-tribals of Sarasdangal
played active role. Industry also applied strategy of circumventing the tribal families as it did in
Chitragarhia. Some tribals, as middleman or local fixers, including village headman started working in
the very interests of the industry. It thus caused lastly the decay of institutions in Sarasdangal that
rose to claim for tribal rights over the natural resources.

Tribal Response on Individual Cases

Addressing the encroachments on community resources become an issue of collective action that takes
time to come into being provided the community gets momentum. The individual response, however,
appear quickly. The same has happened in the case of encroachments on and occupation of tribal

12
lands in the sample villages. Yet, the responses of the tribes in the sample villages were mixed,
diverse and conditionally guided. Several cases are described in subsequent para.

Crusher owner, Rajendra Shah, has grudgingly been dumping stone dust on a piece of land (plot no 40)
belonging to Srijal Tudu of Sarasdangal. In fact the tribal family has familial graveyard on the
particular land. Annoyed of this forcible occupation of land and desecration of burial ground, the
tribal family resented dozen times. A year ago Srijal Tudu called upon tribal council23 that fined the
encroacher with Rs. 5,000 and instructed the crusher owner to remove with immediate effect the dust
from burial ground. In spite of honoring the verdict of tribal council the crusher owner is still dumping
the dust on the lands. The affected family frequently reminds the crusher owner to remove the dust
heap from the land, but the calls of tribes fall on deaf ears. The family now wants to discuss the
matter in tribal council again and do not want to surrender the land; and do not want to receive even
the money in return of this piece of land. Very apparently the family has attached sentiments with the
piece of land as their fathers/ forefathers are buried under.

Similarly, Love Kant Jha has thrown the debris of his quarry on Sibu Kisku’s lands. Belonging to
Sarasdangal Sibu Kisku initially tried to negotiate with the mine owner for compensating the loss by
way of giving employment in his quarry. The mine owner replied to acquire the land without giving the
employment. Resistance of landholder is perpetuating as he repeatedly stops him throwing debris on
the lands. Underlying the resistance there is a will of the landholder to negotiate with the miner for
monetary compensation of the loss. Getting employment is the strong factor behind the mobilization
of the family for claiming the land right.

Classical case of tribal resistance can be traced in the case of Madan Rathi’s explosive house being
constructed in Karbatola of Sarasdangal. At the time of construction when the box of explosive
material was brought to fix in the masonry structure the local residents of hamlet objected heavily
and disallowed the construction of explosive house in the vicinity of habitation. The tribals then called
upon a meeting of tribal council in new school building. People asserted their complete denial for such
hazardous construction. The village headman, Solomon Marandi, and few middlemen argued in favour
of the mine owner. The tribal council at the end decided not to allow Madan Rathi for building any
explosive house close to human habitation. Even when the tribes are still facing outrage of powerful
lobby of miners and the police they are adamant for their rights. Now the mine owner is trying to
coerce and negotiate through police, but the tribals are thoroughly resisting.

The foresaid struggle has though been evolving around individual’s land, but has been the consolidated
body of mobilization of the entire community residing in particular hamlet. People have collectively
taken a position. The goal of the struggle is quite clear: “no explosive house in the vicinity of
habitation”. Strategies of the struggle have been evolving in accordance of the situations the people
confront. In the beginning the tribals straight confronted the industry, but now they have been facing
both the industry and the state. So the interface is dual. People find the state more difficult to deal
with than the industry. People posed tough to the mine owner as they not only ceased the
construction of explosive house but also brought the industry into tribal council, which ruled against
the industry. Now when the industry has been using the state (the police) as shield as well as arbitrary
appropriator, the tribals feel weaker. They knocked the higher police officers demanding justice and
rights. Primarily they face a challenge to shun off the fabricated charges falsely mounted on them.

An important method the corporate employ for counter posing the tribal resistance at village level is
that they employ the landholder or his heir or the influential person from the community. The
influential or elite person acts as ‘diluting agent’ and ‘informer’. If any kind of the resistance likely
emerges from any corner of the village it is managed and diluted. Such an example was distinguishably
noted in Sarasdangal village. The village headman, Solomon Marandi, is the supervisor in Madan Rathi’s

13
quarry. Instead of protecting the interests of tribal community, he supports the interests of miners by
giving silent consent on all illegal and arbitrary transfer of lands for mining operations.

There is one more important dimension of this struggle. In fact the leadership of this struggle has
linkages with a larger struggle of labour rights that is operating under the banner of Sarasdangal
branch of Jharkhand General Mazdoor Union (affiliated to AICCTU). The trade union has political
affiliation with Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML). Further, there are two
ramifications of this dimension of the struggle. One, the mining industry in this area is first timely
confronting the labour mobilization. Till now the mine owners succeeded maintaining zero labour
resentment. Now when the trade union is trying to organize the mine/ crusher labourers and has
started claiming for labour rights, the industry owners, powerfully organized, want to abolish and
evade the trade union. Coercion and assertion on the trade union leadership is one strategy of the
mining industry. Therefore, in this struggle of land, particularly the leadership is targeted and pushed
down. Second, the hegemonic state, currently ruled by rightist nationalist party, has deep rivalry with
the ‘red flag’ ideologies or institutions. Police in this case is acting as an agency repressing the tribals
for their sin of being led by the leftists. Adding to the struggle for land rights, the issue got space in
the meeting of CPI(ML)’s District Committee held on 30 January 2004 in Dumka.

In Sarasdangal village Prabhu Kisku has agitated severely against M/s Rajlaxmi Stone Works in response
to land degradation due to mining operations. His lands are not under cultivation for 3 years as a
consequence of stones thrown off onto his lands. In the beginning he negotiated with the mine owner
and got Rs. 1200 and Rs. 1800 during 2001 and 2002, respectively. But this year he has decided not to
allow the quarry to encroach upon his lands. Prabhu Kisku’s lone crusade relies upon his personal
strength ⎯ education, general awareness, political awakening and capacity to articulate. Like others
he initially tried to negotiate with the mine owner, but later he started resisting the silent succumb.
This struggle is focused and informal but has serious implications. For others he may emerge as the
role model of claiming the accountability of the industry. Keeping the dominance of vested interests
and prevalence of the culture of materialism and monetization of fixed land assets, it is premature to
conclude whether this farmer could withstand longer struggling for accountability. Self-reliance is
added characteristic he has.

Unlike companion mine owners M/s Rajlaxmi Stone Works ceased to dump the debris in the lands of
Somlal Hansda on prohibiting doing so. Behind the positive impact of Somlal’s resistance, there are
two factors. One, the mine in question is comparatively new in the area, hence tended to provide with
some space for mobilization of landholder. Other, the stronger factor, the farmer is relatively
informed, the leader in trade union, and economically sound. The internal and external factors
interacting the family fully enabled the cultivation of mobilization for accountability claims.

Another classical example of peasant’s resistance was observed in Chitragarhia village. Manoj Kumar
Bhagat has encroached since 1989 upon the cultivable lands (plot no. 1021) belonging to Babulal Kisku
and his family. The debris of the quarry slides or slips off into his lands. Babulal strongly deny the
degradation of his land by the mine owner. Recently, on 27 December 2003 he gave statements in
Hindi daily ‘Hindustan’ that his lands (plot no. 988) were being captured by the mining mafia and
degraded profoundly. Noticeably, Babulal Kisku himself has history of affinity with the localized
struggles. Over a period of, say, 10–15 years, the family developed resilience, self–reliance, political
awakening and connections and bargaining power, and gained firm economic and negotiational footage
in the village and nearby. Being a mine owner himself, Babulal has the strength to deal tough with any
outsider mine owner. He now seldom escapes manipulating the structures of state or civil society in
defense of his citizenship claim. He has learned to use the available redressal mechanisms and to
mobilize the resources in pushing for industry accountability.

14
Tribal Responses: Engagement, Succumbing, Negotiation

Resistance and resentments likely emanate when the process of land alienation takes place, which
take shape of struggle sometimes. In relation to land alienation, it is, however, not always necessary
that the tribals resist or struggle. Quite often the tribals accept the grand changes in the materiality,
social relations and subjectivity of divine nature they worship. Display of such acceptance uses to be
engagement, succumbing or negotiation. Let us look into each of them.

Engagement of Tribals

Government always articulates that the industrial development creates employment and strengthens
local economy. Although these popular claims of the state, and industry too, are under intensive
debate and public scrutiny, yet the engagement of a fraction of local population is the reality. Many of
those who lost their lands for mining have got employment in the mines.

Areas inhabited by the tribes are considered to be inaccessible and isolated. Pragmatic look on such
human habitations clues that the criterion of determining a set of population and its territories
backward, remote, inaccessible or isolated considers the modernity and material culture as scales. So
are the popular definitions of poverty. Plurality of nature, extent of resources in unexploited stage,
human-nature relationships, social capital, resource–people interactions are hardly taken into account.
But in case of commencement of stone mining in Shikaripara area, the functions of nature (abundance
of minerals) played much role to attract the ‘mainstream development’ ⎯ the commercial
exploitation of minerals for larger economic gains. It will be partial to say that all tribal families
became prey to the mining industry. Several factors worked behind the readiness of the tribal families
for engaging in the mining activity. Foremost reason links to the diffusion of material culture among
the tribals dwelling even in so-called backward/ remote villages during the post-independence period.
Past two decades have observed rapid changes in the behavior of tribal populations too. Role of
cultural invasion, penetration of market, imposition of ‘under-development syndrome’ and
marginalization by coexisting caste communities or the local elites cannot be ignored in generation of
scarcities and in inequitable distribution of resources. Deliberate attempt of interventionist state to
dispossess, disenfranchise and disempower the people especially tribes tended to create new demands
for material resources and the dependence on external agencies. Resultantly, the mantra of ‘catching
up’ development is welcomed by at least few, if not all, of the tribal families. Be it Chitragarhia,
Sarasdangal, Makrapahari or any other village, the newly emerging demands for material resources
(other than what they have) compelled some tribal families engage and acquire the monetary benefit.

Empirical evidences show that those who gave up lands for mining in Sarasdangal and Makrapahari
mostly have cultivable lands elsewhere too. When they saw the opportunity to gain economically and
to get regular employment in return of foregoing their land rights, the tribal families engaged with the
mining industry. It is a different matter to what extent they engaged or got benefits. It was not the
case that people had no employment prior to giving up the lands for mining operation. People in all
sample villages had plenty of farm employment. But the monetized gains (of material semblance)
lured the tribal families. Those who have got employment in mining activity satisfy their quench for
quick money, which immediately enters the cycle of market from the hands of tribal families.

Interestingly, few tribal families in each village opted engaging in fixing the deals. Accumulation of
earned money forced these tribals to transform their class to act as intermediaries. Not only they
remain engaged but they also keep others engaged. Immaterial (for the sake of imagining the
engagement) if they catalyze the violation of tribal rights.

Very few tribal families have been able to invest in peripheral economic activity such as shop. One
tribal family in Nangal Bhanga, one in Makrapahari, one or two in Chitragarhia and few in Sarasdangal
15
were found engaged in the shop keeping. However, many tribal families have engaged in selling the
country liquor on roadside. The non-tribals usually own big shops and other accessory occupations that
have developed around the mining operations in the area.

Tribals Succumbed to Industry

After a while though number of tribal families, if not organized, either negotiate or succumb to the
land alienation. However, this negotiation or succumbing undercurrents lot many adverse conditions
either with the land itself or with the family. Sometimes the lands are not so much productive and the
economy based on that is not handsome. Family loathes to cultivate the lands and to invest in
maintaining the land assets. In such cases the compensation amounts lures the family. Undoubtedly,
this is the shortsightedness of the families as to forego their basis of livelihood, which they realize
later. In other cases financial necessities or emergencies force the families to forego the lands. Many
have lost the lands in helplessness as the adjacent lands were occupied first and protecting their lands
was extremely difficult. Yet another set of people lost their lands for enjoying the liquor, luxuries (for
them), entertainment or other bad habits.

But, some families negotiated

As has already explored that the middlemen usually mediate the process of land transfer. The
middlemen basically bring down the compensation rates while negotiating with the landholder family.
Generally the people of Chitragarhia and Sarasdangal gave up lands in meager amounts of
compensation that range between Rs. 200 and Rs. 500 per bigha for a year. On the contrary the people
of Makrapahari village commonly received the compensation of Rs. 1000 per bigha for a year.
Fascinatingly, Parvati Marandi of Makrapahari succeeded in getting Rs. 5000 per bigha for a year from
Gauri Shankar Bhagat.

These examples unveil that the quantum of negotiation and its win-loose nature wholly depended on
tribal family’s bargaining capacity ⎯ encapsulated in the level of education/ awareness, level of self-
reliance, intensity of the material needs and stake in the land. Activeness of community networks and
the pattern of the culture of engagement also determined the extent of bargaining capacity at village
level. Makrapahari reflected high gradient of bargaining power in comparison to other two villages.

In Chitragarhia village few families have succeeded in negotiating with the mining industry. First wife
of Charlis Tudu, Marie Neela Murmu, gets Rs. 500 per week from the mine owner in return of foregoing
3 bigha land. Gopal Tudu, Singrai Tudu and Police Tudu also receive a fixed amount of money from
the mine owner in replacement of their 3 bigha land. Devilal Tudu is also believed receiving some
amount from Aditya Nath Goswami.

Best negotiation occurred in Chitragarhia between M/s Ramkrishna Stone Products and Chunda Kisku
and his brothers Babulal Kisku and Munsi Kisku. Chunda Kisku gave his above 9 bigha land for
excavation and made the industry partners accept his share of investment. In return of the land costs
the landholder family agreed upon 30 percent share in the profits. The mining operation is undergoing
successfully. From the initial profits partners bought a compressor, motorcycle, mobile phone, etc.
and built an explosive house, which cost Rs. 600,000. Munsi Kisku looks after the accounts, and the
tribal family has employed a tribal manager of their confidence. Same principles the tribal family
applied while dealing with quarry partners of M/s Jai Maan Tara Black Stone, Sumant Roy, Arun Gupta
and Abbas Ansari. After the lease in January 2002 the quarry could not operate for more than 3
months. Babulal Kisku smelled no transparency in the accounts of the quarry in which he invested his
lands. Actually, at the time of deal it was decided that the other partners would spend on assets,
building construction, working capital and land purchase (additional). Opposing the agreement his
colleague partners paid Rs. 8,196 as rent of the compressor, on which Babulal objected. So the quarry
16
closed down right in 2002 following the dispute. Why did Babulal apply such an appropriate strategy to
address the land alienation at his doorstep? He nicely responded, “When I saw the lands surrounding
me all dug and destroyed I thought I’ll also get lost in this storm. I was conscious of saving myself. So I
quickly made partnership with the miners and began earning out of it. Whereas my fellow tribes have
perfectly decayed.” Nevertheless, the point is that how many tribals have such bargaining capacity
and awareness about obtaining their rights. Consequently, Chitragarhia village has completely ruined
in the hands of mining lobby.

Above instances of direct negotiations and engagement of tribal families in the mining activity
reorient us to realize the positive results of industry–tribals interface. It is not sure that conflicts
would not have occurred or will not occur. If the disincentives convert into incentives, conflict into
consensus, risk into opportunity, tension into happiness, and so on, what is the harm in partnership?
But everything converges on as how much bargaining powers a tribal families/ community has in
negotiating the partnership/ participation/ engagement.

Nonetheless, empirical evidences of negotiations highlight the importance of direct interface of tribals
and industry while ignoring the state that works as mediator, moderator, protector or promoter. It is
an attractive proposition particularly when the state’s effectiveness (not prevalence) is diminishing
especially in favour of marginalized and powerless. However, in context of emerging accountably and
citizenship models, this proposition needs to be debated.

IMPLICATIONS

Rights are entitlements. Legal rights are rights based on legal principle and involve entitlements
backed by the law. About ‘natural rights’, the political theory maintains that an individual enters into
society with certain basic rights and that no government can deny these rights (Columbia Electronic
Encyclopedia 2003). Marshall (1950) had a bearing that access to basic social welfare and resources
was a right per se, and that social rights are essential to enable all people to participate in social and
political life (Ellison 1997; Turner 1999). But what difference the rights make?

Rhetoric and Reality of Citizenship and Participation

Rhetoric of participation under decentralization and engagement scheme is proved futile particularly
when state deals with the tribals and their citizenship rights vis-à-vis the industry. Despite the
enancted Constitutional safeguards and affirmed powers under PESA and SPTA to the tribals to veto
the land transfer, the government did not attempt to invite ‘participation’ of the people while leasing
out raiyat lands or khas lands to mining industry in Dumka. Actually the production of affidavits, that
really were the outcome of cheating/ betraying/ luring the tribals and were not based on the informed
decisions of the tribals, has been considered the willful consent of the landholders and hence the
participation of tribals. This is perfectly wrong interpretation of the ‘participation’. Had the tribals
been involved in the micro planning of industrial development in the villages and they been supported
to either run own quarries or become partners in the mines, it would have been served the spirit of
participation. Contrarily, the citizenship rights of tribals have been violated by the state itself.

It seems the state, under the pressure to invite capital, is hell bent on suppressing the people’s rights
over livelihood resources while throwing away their Constitutional safeguards. If any voice is raised
claiming the accountability of the state and corporate, it is silenced by applying brutal police force.
Since it is a scheduled area, the protection of the tribal people is the responsibility of President and
Governor, as mandated in Indian Constitution (Bijay 2002). Here was the beginning of the most
indecorous situation in a democracy. The innocent tribal people found themselves pitched against the
17
might of the state, which ironically under the Constitution had been charged with the responsibility
for their protection and advancement. State is graduating only to serve the interests of those ‘haves’
while ignoring ‘have nots’. There may be two reasons: state either has developed a ‘corruption
syndrome’ to illegitimately share monetary gains out of the economic activities, or the economic
actors have overpowered the state. In both the situations the state has been reflecting its
inefficiency.

Proving to be notoriously incompetent the state has entered into partnerships with organizations of
market to effect the governance of globalization. Institutional changes making for an accountable and
effective government do not seem to be forthcoming (Rao 2003). Laws and policies are interpreted so
as to enable this appropriation of the livelihood resources of local people and indigenous communities
(Das 2003). In the present form of governance, on the other hand, the state represents a confluence of
political and economic interests that need not necessarily represent the interests of the poor and the
marginalized (Tandon 1994). So the state continues progressively to prefer taking side of market
interests rather than disposing off its welfarist functions in the interests of people. Money influences
governance. Political parties and bureaucrats make sure that corporate interests are not hampered by
rules. This is a losing game because the state is heavily weighted in favour of corporate and powerful
(Vombatkere 2004).

Implications of above notions have been actively observed. First of all, in order to enable the mining
industry to operate the state in Dumka intentionally ignored all international, national and state level
statutory frameworks that provide with safeguards to the tribals, and indiscriminately applied the
mining rules and provisions (amended) in Bihar Act 1947, that are ultra vires against the PESA and
SPTA. Unscrupulous promotion of economic expansion, unwarranted favour in policies (e.g. Jharkhand
Industrial Policy 2001, National Mineral Policy 1993) for industrialization to lure the investors and
resulting efforts to loosen or omit the statutory hurdles express the distinct behaviour of state serving
the corporate and the powerful. Current incidence in the study area to support the drawings is of the
arbitrary establishment of an explosive house nearing tribal habitation and associated response of
state against the people ⎯ the dual victims. In this case the state also seems proactive, as it has been
coercing the tribals to allow the industry occupy their lands and establish hazardous explosive house
close to habitation. Moreover, whatever illegitimate, illegal and unethical the industry owners have
been doing in the studied tribal villages has been undergoing under due patronage of the local state
and happening in best of state’s knowledge.

What do the tribals perceive about the state when they need to approach or face the state? When an
official reaches the village where mining activity is going on, the tribal people generally perceive him
neutrally or they recognize him as diku. As for long they have been frequently seeing the outsiders and
officials visiting their village for the purpose of either taking away their lands or assisting the mining
industry. But when these people need to visit the government offices in a bid to defend their rights or
to seek state’s support in guarding their livelihood, what response they receive is indifferent from the
outrageous responses the marginalized and weak use to do. In fact the state behaves as it did in British
times (as the legacy is perpetuating). Poor, marginalized and weak are often required to wait for
hours outside the office of a government functionary, or to win a support of a local fixer or ‘dalaal’ to
gain entry to the one official who can help them. If the state ‘sees’ these people, at least officially, in
terms of various fixed categories (e.g. scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, below poverty line,
registered unemployed), the people ‘see’ the state only dimly and after much wasting of time and
money (Corbridge et al. 2003). Forget about any big change, these tribal people even cannot obtain
map or parcha (record of right) of their land. Another, interesting as well, example is the copy of
affidavit and lease deed, which absolutely no tribal landholder has in possession. If a tribal landholder
approaches the government offices to acquire the copy of these vital documents they are, by sure,
denied of entertaining their requests. Fear of the government is still perpetuating among the tribals,
which is usually manipulated by the mine owners in their favour. As soon as the investor robs the tribal
18
landholder that he obtained permission of Deputy Commissioner and or police officers, the tribal
family gets demoralized and stops resisting.

Association of the tribal families with the dominant political party, however, arms them with power to
deal with the state. If the marginalized people have access to important political power centre they
can expect the accessibility to the state. It is likelihood that they will be spoken roughly or even
abusively. Only those tribal families who have political linkages with mainstream parties like Bhartiya
Janta Party, Congress or Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, get such type of privilege. In contrast, those who
have linkages with leftist parties are bound to face the outrage of both state as well as industry.

By chance, if there is a dispute between the tribals and the industry, it is likelihood that state would
protect tribal interests. It had happened in the cases of Chitragarhia village where state diluted
tribals’ assertness. Opposite to what expected from state, the state appears to be hostile throughout
for all kinds of assertness, if any, of the tribals to claim their rights and to hold the state or industry
accountable for its actions. Therefore, there is no doubt in it that if the people have to be at lost end
if they seek accountability or rule of law.

What Happened to Mobilization?

Market no doubt has risen as parallel structure in governance system. It is partially because the
industry, an integral unit of production system in larger domain of market, has got material resources,
information or knowledge and power to subscribe the state’s functions. Tribal communities, on the
other hand, have been under constant onslaught. So the interface of industry and tribes is
characterized with an exogenous gorge of power, resources and information. To see prudently, they
look standing on the poles apart. So the heavier weighted one, of course the industry, takes over the
counterpart.

Yet, the existing body of literature and the findings of this study come out with the mobilization
present of the tribals for claiming their rights, which tends to challenge the power relations,
inequalities and dominating institutions. Sporadic occurrence of resistance and struggles in studied
villages around the issue of citizenship rights and accountability is the reflection of apparent or latent
mobilization of the tribals. However, the fact cannot be denied that the resources, knowledge and
power are essential for the struggles. For instance, rights to the protection of property and livelihood
mean little if claiming such requires sufficient resources, power and knowledge to fight against
corporate interests in formal political arenas. This is particularly so when corporate interests are
portrayed as ‘common interests’ against ‘individual interests’ of landowners and community members,
a tension which introduces the notion of ‘competing rights’ (Human Rights Watch 1999). It is a
different matter, though, where the resources, knowledge and power originate. They may either
generate inherently or may be drawn from external environment. But, out of three constituents of
struggle process, the information is the critical connection that usually has to be drawn from outside.
In case of this study, this critical link was found missing. In studied villages, people are not even aware
of the PESA, SPTA or Constitutional provisions in order to demand for proper consultation or decision-
making rights. Other existed studies have also concluded in similarity: some of the tribals are either
called to the revenue offices or are assembled in one of the villages for a ‘consultation’ and a gram
sabha is supposed to have been convened.

In spite of multiple restrictions and regulations meant to ensure responsible and accountable
behaviour of the industry, the capitalist forces in the studied villages manipulated highly and violated
the norms. Tribals have been betrayed, fixed, coerced, lured, intoxicated, bribed, victimized,
managed, annexed, forced and induced to lose their lands for excavations. Power of money and
preeminence of material culture fully ruled and the tribals could not withstand the might of industry.
19
If the struggles rose to demand the accountability they have either been managed or pruned.
Leadership was managed or prosecuted. Industry has been trying hard not to let any mobilization, and
resulting struggle, spawn among the tribal people.

Who Will Protect Tribal Rights?

State does not care. Notion is true particularly for Jharkhand, if not for entire India. In case of leasing
out raiyat and khas lands in studied villages, the state took absolutely no notice of relevant provisions
in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Convention 107 and 169, and completely flouted the
laws prohibiting the transfer of tribal lands. So the inalienability of tribal land rights has been sucked
by the state itself, that otherwise conferred through the law the protection to the tribes. Let us track
down the progress made in relation to execution of law.

Clause (a) sub-section–3 of section–4 of Fifth Schedule of the Constitution empowers the Governor
having Scheduled Areas to constitute Tribal Advisory Council, which is entitled to advise the Governor
for the governing the tribal areas. But in Jharkhand the progress of Tribal Advisory council is gloomy
and dismal.

Clause (a) sub-section–2 of section–5 of Fifth Schedule again empowers the Governor to make
regulations for the peace and good governance in the Schedules Area, and in particular, prohibit or
restrict the transfer of land by or among the members of STs. As yet no such regulation has come into
existence since 1950 in Jharkhand (formerly South Bihar). Contrary to Constitutional safeguard the
then Governor of Bihar made a regulation, Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation 1969, not to prohibit or
impose restrictions (under Second Proviso 71A) on transfer of tribal lands, but to contradict the
provisions of Fifth Schedule of Constitution. As a result of misuse and abuse of provisions of regulation,
large-scale dispossession of tribals from their lands have taken place and have been taking place.
Moreover, there is no system of a real ‘report’ being sent by the Governor to the President to this day,
which is central to the discharge of the Constitutional responsibility by the Executive on either side, at
the Central Government or the provincial Government.

Notwithstanding the directives of Samatha Judgment of Supreme Court that stated that mining leases
in tribal areas should only be given to cooperatives of tribals, the government oversaw the tribal
cooperatives concept. In 2 years since Jharkhand was formed, over 120 stone mines and crushers have
been given licenses in Dumka district mostly to non-tribal investors and contractors (Rao 2003). In the
mines the tribal only work as daily wage labourers, rather than share holders in the benefits.
Irrespective of complexities in the procedures of land acquisition and for mine leases, in reality the
mining projects are sanctioned more with the view of encouraging and catering to the interests of the
mining industries rather than to protect the interests of the local communities.

As a matter of fact the focus is shifting. Such a shift in India’s economic reforms is reflected in the
series of recommendations to the New Mineral Policy 1993 coupled with a push for amendments in
enacted laws like labour laws, Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act 1973, Environmental (Protection) Act
1986, the Fifth Schedule, Land Acquisition Act 1894, Forest (Conservation) Act 1980, the PESA 1996,
etc., which indicates an increasing disrespect of the state towards the rights of communities.
Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2001 has also emphasized to liberalize the procedures of granting the
mining leases in this tribal state, and promised to aid the mining industry heavily.

Following the Samatha Judgment of Supreme Court and BALCO controversy the government at central
to state level is uninterruptedly attempting to amend the Fifth Schedule of Constitution and the PESA
so as to wage the land acquisition easier in tribal areas. Ministry of Mines not only circulated secret
letters but also lobbied heavily. In response of countrywide opposition of government’s move the
matter is for the time being freezed.
20
In defense of tribal land rights and notions of citizenship the prime redressal mechanism available in
Jharkhand is the land reform under Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 and under section-20, subsection-5 of
SPTA 1949. Land reform in Santal Pargana has two major components: distribution of government
lands to the landless and marginal farmers, and the restoration of alienated lands to the tribal
families. In a suit case of Pandeya Uraon vs. Ram Chandra, Supreme Court ordered: “The provisions of
section-71A of Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act 1908 (which has been held similar to section-20(5) of SPTA
1949) is beneficial in nature and the legislative intention is to extend protection to a class of citizens
who are not in a position to keep their property to themselves in the absence of protection. The Court
has to give a liberal construction to the protective mechanism which would work out the protection
and enable the sphere of protection to be effective than limit the scope”. No Revenue Court has
followed the directive of Supreme Court in order to restore the tribal lands. Deputy Commissioners
have also grossly neglected the provisions in SPTA and the order of Supreme Court to evict the
transferee of lands.

So far the progress in restoration of tribal lands in Dumka is tardy. Rao (2003) found in Dumka district
that while alienation of tribal lands is visible in every village, delays and costs of the legal process as
well as threats at the local level from the powerful prevent many tribals from going to courts. It is not
Jharkhand or Santal Pargana, actually, the unfulfilled efforts to solve tribal land alienation has a long
history in India, starting with Dhebar Commission’s major recommendations that all tribal land
alienated since January 26, 1950 should be returned to their original rightful owners. It took almost
two decades for the tribal ministers of all states to pass a resolution on April 1, 1975, containing the
spirit of Commission’s recommendations (Menon 2001). Tandon (1994) traces its ground in lack of
‘political will’ in the apprehension of getting the confluence of political and economic interests to be
hurt if land reforms were to be implemented.

The problem fundamentally lies elsewhere. Indeed, neo-liberal ideas in post 1980s brought in
prescription that crisis of welfarist state could be minimized by adoption of firm monetarist economic
policy associated with deregulation, privatization, drastic reduction in public sector and a profound
institutional restructuring of the state (Chandhoke 2003). India witnessed, as a result, restructuring of
the state (e.g. sector reform projects) that implied the creation of semi-autonomous agencies to
replace governmental centres of command and control functions; and the subcontracting of the state
functions to other agencies (quite often having influence of market).

Now the vital question arises, who will protect the tribal rights?

Today a debate is undergoing on the vital political questions: has the state disappeared? Has it been
hollowed out? Or has it been reinvented? Does governance, which presupposes cooperation instead of
conflict across a multiplicity of sectors, enhance efficiency? (Chandhoke 2003). Other theorists also
have started asking: what are the implications of governance for practices of democratic citizenship?
(Pierre 2001). Chandhoke (2003), in context of India, simplified these questions and put them ahead in
three sub-questions: Firstly, when the state has been de-centred and pluralized what happens to
citizen rights? Secondly, when the state has been disaggregated horizontally and vertically, which of
the many institutions that form part of the networks of governance take care of the enforcement of
civil rights? Thirdly, how do the organizations involved in governance view an individual and his/ her
rights? Do the governance institutions hold themselves as abound by citizens’ rights, or do they see
themselves restrained anyway?

Overcoming the hassle Newell and Bellour (2002) find one answer in holding the industry, as one
institution of the network of governance structures, accountable to the constituency in addition to the
state. In addition to changes in the relationship between government and business, which has been
particularly marked by an increase in privately managed resource flows and shifts in the relative
power and influence of states and markets, the civil society participation in public decision-making
21
has indeed significantly expanded. Such a shift actually generates mobilization for holding the
corporate sector to account for its actions (Newell 2000; Bendell 2000).

In light of above, thus, the international and national governance structures have so far evolved the
concepts of ‘corporate social responsibility’, which embodies no statutory bindings and legal
obligations on the industry to behave in an accountable manner when it interfaces the constituency
especially tribes and marginalized. ‘Corporate accountability’, different from ‘corporate social
responsibility’ or ‘corporate citizenship’, thus is an emerging notion in development thought; but it
has most relevant implications in terms of asserting the citizenship rights and claiming the
accountability from the industry. As an important shareholder in local, national and global governance
systems today, the industry also has obligations (legal, ethical, natural) to follow the path of
accountability, which is emerging out of various legislative/ statutory frameworks, guiding policies,
struggle processes, redressal mechanisms and social imperatives.

Towards Negotiations: Opportunities and Challenges

From the domain of neo-liberalization thinking, it is emerging that the people in civil society should
defend themselves, that is, they should not look to the state for either protection or succour. Explicit
cases of negotiation between the tribal people and the industry in Chitragarhia village generate scope
for venturing industry-people partnerships as an alternative of struggling for accountability.

But the scholars, such as Chandhoke (2003), perceive that this proposition carries rather serious
implications. For all those disadvantaged groups who were not in a position to ensure their social
reproduction, and who had not been enabled to do so by the welfarist state, were now thrown upon
the not so tender mercies of the market. When communities have very little bargaining capacity with
public sector companies, their vulnerability is much more severe when they have to negotiate with the
private sector. Manipulations in the name of negotiation are still suspected. India has many such
documented cases in which linked agencies diffused the core terms of negotiations and caused the
tribals lose the battle (MMP 2003).

Critique of negotiation scheme argues that there is an increasing pressure today on communities and
NGOs (as arbitrators/ mediators) to enter into a dialogue and negotiation with the mining industries.
Especially where NGOs are concerned the conflict over engagement ranges from positions of co-
option, earnest attempts at getting the best for the communities they work with, a soft option in
contrast to supporting a direct people’s movement, or simply a means of survival and livelihood for
the NGOs themselves.

Instead, the tribal rights have a bearing on this scheme too. Will tribals negotiate circumstantially
when they have no option other than making partnership, or will they yet have right to (self)
determine their future? All it attracts extensive discourse.

LESSONS AND ISSUES

Emerging Lessons

From the study the following lessons emerge:

To assert and realize the rights the resources, power and knowledge (information) are pre-
requisites. Claiming for accountability seeks changes in power relations between state and
industry, state and constituency, citizens and industry and civil society and state/ industry.
22
Interventionist state misinterprets the language of ‘rights’ and does not realize fully the
citizenship rights unless the citizens assert for the realization of their rights.
With the profusion of state-led or private corporation mediated development, the violation of
tribal rights and land alienation are commonplace. Liberalization of economy has further
intensified the violation of citizenship rights.
Tribal land rights are inalienable as pledged by Constitution of India, panchayat legislation on
scheduled areas and agrarian laws enacted in Jharkhand, which strictly prohibits the land
alienation and instructs the state to restore the alienated lands.
Industrial policy of Jharkhand promises blind promotion of mining activity and land acquisition,
while infringing on tribal rights through proposed amendments in agrarian law.
Mining activity in Dumka district is operating mostly on private holdings and community lands
of the tribals, which have been illegally leased out to the industry by violating the stringent
laws. The state has itself violated the laws.
Industry owners have manipulated the ground conditions in their favour by way of fixing,
coercing, intoxicating, luring, bribing, threatening and other fraudulent methods. State has
fully patronized and guarded the mining industry vis-à-vis the tribals.
Mining activity has heavily infringed and enclosed the livelihoods of the tribals.
Externalities of the mining activity are beyond threshold limits of set standards and,
spectacularly, are not even entertained to be so.
There had been the mobilization of the tribals that led to the struggles for community
resources and for claiming the industry accountability. But the struggles were in stages
annexed and suppressed by the industry, state or their combine.
Yet, the mobilization seemed addressing the realities of power and inherent inequalities
institutionalized in society. It also looked providing opportunity to redistribute the resources
particularly in case of commons when encroached by industry. Mobilization was also found
having provided the tribals with the space for enhanced engagement.
Tribal people also claimed for their individual land rights, and sought the accountability of the
industry in that connection.
Confronting various factors, the tribals under the influence of materiality opted ‘engaging’ or
‘succumbing’ to the milieu created by mining industry.
Only some, having bargaining capacities, could negotiate with the industry and made
partnership in the economic activity. The idea of negotiation, however, attracts scrutiny and
discourse.
In the changing forms of governance the industry has to be held accountable for its actions.
‘Corporate social responsibility’ or ‘corporate citizenship’ would no more suffice, so the
‘industry accountability’ has to be framed and enforced in relation to realization of citizenship
and rights.

23
Identified Issues for Accountability

Accountability of State

Strict adherence has to be ensured to statutory frameworks in following terms:

− The state should follow the international legislation and policy instruments that
Government of India ratified.
− Constitutional provisions need to be strictly adhered to especially the Fifth Schedule and
PESA in context of guarding tribal land rights.
− SPTA in Santal Parganas is of overriding substance so far as the tribal rights are concerned.
It has to be strictly complied with primarily by state itself not only to regulate land
transfers but also to restore the alienated lands.
− Manipulation and misinterpretation of national and state level laws must be ceased.
Mining activity on the tribal lands has to operate only in accordance of the rulings of Supreme
Court in Samatha Judgment, which means tribal families only can run mining operations on
their lands through tribal cooperatives.
Manipulation of tribal rights has to stop with immediate effect.
State should seriously examine the processes undercurrent at ground level in a bid to occupy
the tribal lands, and tribals’ claims and voices should be justifiably addressed.
Steps have to be taken to nullify the adverse impacts of mining, if it yet to be continued on the
government/forest lands or on non-tribal lands, on the lands and livelihoods of tribal people.
State should ensure all labour and environmental norms are not manipulated/ flouted by the
mining industry, and the local people are engaged, as the industry is obliged to do.
State has to provide support (structures) to the citizens, and address properly the struggles if
they seek accountability.
Tribals as citizens must be conferred rights of redress such as:
• Access to pursue litigation where industry is operational;
• Provision for legal challenge to industry’s decisions; and
• A legal aid mechanism to provide public funds to support such challenges.
In case tribals genuinely (using right to self determination) want to negotiate with the industry
by making direst partnership, the state has to provide with the support of varied types.
In nutshell, the state has to protect the citizenship rights of the tribals and their interests in
participating the activities at the social, economic and political arenas, rather than
subcontracting protective and welfare functions to the market actors.

Accountability of Industry

Industry before siting in a tribal area has to approach the communities and disclose its plans,
prospects, consequences, demands, schemes, etc. Fairness in dealing with the tribal
communities has to be maintained. Industry is liable to allow the involvement of civil society
24
 actors while dealing with the tribal communities. The decisions of the tribal communities need
to be remained uncoerced and finally agreeable.
Industry has to adhere to all existing laws regulating the tribal land transfers. Manipulation by
the industry in order to secure its interests has to be considered the violation of law. All types
of fraudulent methods of industry to occupy tribal lands have to be held violation of tribal
rights and irresponsible behaviour of the industry.
For actions of the mining industry done in contravention of Constitutional provisions, PESA,
Samata Judgment and SPTA, the industry has to be held responsible and accountable.
Letting alone the tribal land rights, the industry otherwise has to be held accountable to its
violation of mining rules as enforced by the state.
As the mining industry has degraded, infringed and encroached upon the lands, livelihoods,
environment and habitat of the tribals, the industry is responsible and accountable for the
losses and the social/economic/environmental costs, which the industry is liable to pay to the
tribal community.
As ruled by Samatha Judgment, 20 percent of industry’s profits have to be deposited in
permanent fund for the development needs of the community apart from reforestation and
maintenance of ecology, the industry has to be made accountable for such an obligation set by
the apex court.
Now once the industry has occupied tribal lands and its rehabilitation is next to impossible, the
industry should share the profits made out of mining operations. The landholder and the tribal
communities should be given leverage to decide the quantum of share.
Industry has to disclose fully its social, economic and environmental impacts, its strategies and
processes, and its compliance to the agrarian laws, Constitutional safeguards and social/
environmental standards.

NOTES
1. Jharkhand is the new state created from Bihar on 15 November 2000.
2. PRIA in collaboration of Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Sussex, UK has conducted study on “tribal
land rights and industry accountability with specific reference to stone mining in Jharkhand”. The study was
the part of a collaborative research effort coordinated by IDS’ Development Research Center (DRC) on
Citizenship, Participation and Accountability.
3. Santal Pargana is an important agro-climatic and socio-political region/ division of Jharkhand that comprises
six districts namely Dumka, Jamtara, Sahebganj, Pakur, Deoghar and Godda. Dumka is divisional headquarter
of the region.
4. Three belts of mining include: one along Pakur-Sahebganj railway line, one along Shikaripara-Rampurhat
road, and other around Kulkulidangal area of Shikaripara block. First lies in Pakur and Sahebganj districts,
and latter two exist in Shikaripara block of Dumka district.
5. Raiyat means the landholder having a record of right.
6. Article-3 and Article-17(2) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
7. Artcle-11, 12(1,2,3), 13(1,2) of International Labour Organization Convention 107.
8. Article-13(1,2), 14(1,2,3), 15(1,2), 16(1,2,3,4,5), 17(1,2,3), 18 of International Labour Organization
Convention 169.
9. Clause (a) and (b) of sub-section 2 of section 5 of Fifth Schedule under Article 244(1) of Constitution of India.
25
10. Clauses (d), (i), (j), (k), (l), and sub-clauses (iii), (vii) of clause (m) of The Provisions of Panchayats
(Extension to Schedule Areas) Act, 1996, hereinafter known as PESA 1996.
11. Samatha, an NGO working in the scheduled area of Andhra Pradesh, filed a case against the Government of
A.P for leasing tribal lands to private mining companies in the scheduled areas. The SLP [special leave
petition] filed in the Supreme court led to a historic judgment in July 1997 by a three judge-bench which
declared that government is also a 'person' and that all lands leased to private mining companies in the
scheduled areas are null and void. Some relevant rulings of the judgment included enlisted as 110, 112, 114,
115, 116 and 117.
12. Clauses (i), (iii), (vi), (vii) and (ix) of Sub-Rule 1 of Rule-5 of Environment (Protection) Rules 1986, which
were made under Environment (Protection) Act 1986.
13. The SPTA is superior legislation in Santal Pargana as it has repealed under its Section – 3 the various
enactments including: (i) Santal Parganas Settlement Regulation III 1872 [section 27, 28], (ii) Santal Parganas
Settlement (Amendment) Regulation 1934 [section 2], (iii) Santal Parganas Settlement (Amendment)
Regulation 1944 [whole]. This law is also superior in the view that it provided with in Section – 72 (Saving of
Special Enactments) that “…..When the provisions of any other law are repugnant to, or inconsistent with,
the provisions of this Act shall prevail.”
14. Deputy Commissioner and or Superintendent of Police.
15. Bigha is the local unit for land measurement. 1 bigha = one-fifth of an acre.
16. Gochar is significant common property resource used for herding the animals and which also provides
livelihood security to especially the poor of the village. The tenure is completely communal and even the
state cannot settle this land to anyone.
17. A category of land existing as buffer in the village and de facto used as common property resource, but is
owned by the state.
18. Provisions related to compensation are also made in Land Acquisition Act 1894 and Rehabilitation Policies,
but none of them apply in the case of mining of minor minerals in Santal Pargana.
19. Rainy season crops cultivated during June to September.
20. Winter season crops cultivated during November to March.
21. Outsider (non-aboriginal) person having tendency of exploiting the tribes. Aboriginals defined in SPTA include
Bauri, Dhangar, Dom, Hari, Kol, Kora, Mohuli, Paharia, Rajwar and Santal. In Santal worldview the diku is
simply the outsider/ exploiter.
22. General council of the village; aam sabha is interchangeably used also for gram sabha. Since Jharkhand has
no elected gram panchayats the gram sabha does not exist in study area.
23. Tribal Council is the customary enforcement and judicial organization of the tribals in the village, and it is
headed by pradhan. It in the absence of elected panchayat bodies has recognition of gram sabha, and its
decisions have validity in Rule-26 of Santal Civil Rules 1946. it is separate matter that neither the industry
nor the state is accountable to the decisions of the Tribal Council.

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