NANDINI SAPTHAPATHY V. P.L. DANI AND ANR.

1: A CASE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Any citizen facing criminal charges has the right to remain silent in order to avoid further
incrimination, as stated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The relevant provision in the
Criminal Code is section 161(1). Every individual who is interrogated by law enforcement
officials has an obligation to deliver truthful answers. Additionally, the right against self-
incrimination is guaranteed to them under sub-clause (2) of the same section. The validity of the
actions brought forth under section 179 of the Indian Penal Code, which establishes penalties for
furnishing false information to a public official, was called into question in this instance.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In connection with a case filed against her under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) & (e) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act and Under Section 161/165 and 120-B and 109 I.P.C., the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack, directed Nandini Satpathy, a former chief
minister of Orissa and a minister at the national level, to appear at the Vigilance Police Station,
Cuttack, for examination. The investigation involved questioning her in reference to a lengthy
list of questions that The scope of the crimes necessitated a wide-ranging inquiry, and in order to
conduct a thorough examination, it was necessary to ask numerous questions. The
constitutionally protected right to testimonial tacitness is sure to be trampled upon by an overly
cautious, overly sensitive, or overly meticulous police officer. The respondent’s justification is
that the appellant has no “right of silence,” however the appellant has this exact gripe. The
appellant, the former Chief Minister of Orissa, was charged under section 179 of the Indian Penal
Code in a case brought before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Cuttack. After the Magistrate became aware of the
crime, he or she issued an appearance summons to the appellant. The appellant took this to heart
and took her case to the High Court, arguing that the charges against her were based on her
refusal to police interrogation, which was protected by Article 20(3) of the Constitution and
section 161(2) of Cr.P.C., and thus the proceedings could not have been validly conducted. The
appellant chose to appeal to the Supreme Court after the High Court rejected the case.
Positioning the issue in light of and Section 161 (2). Getting back to the essence of the
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AIR 1977 SC 1025
Constitution that upholds the prohibition of self-incrimination. Both and cover almost the same
region. As a matter of fact, we lean towards the opinion of the Cr.P.C., leaving aside the issue of
terminology extension. Refers to the constitutional clause with a parliamentary twist. According
to the learned Advocate General, the prosecution failed to take any action in the preliminary
phases of the case before attempting to present the recorded incriminating statement of the
accused. While we do not believe that the American decision-making he cited imposes such a
restriction, the landmark Miranda v. Arizona(1) judgement did expand the embargo to include
police investigations. In addition, our provision does not justify such a truncation. A vital
safeguard might be undermined by such a restricted interpretation. This provision that binds the
lips into acceptable silence primarily involves two questions: (i) Is the person being called upon
to testify accused of any offence? And (ii) Is he being forced to testify against himself? ‘Accused
of any offence’ and ‘to be witness against himself’ need to be given a broader meaning in order
for a constitutional requirement to be understood in its entirety. Based on precedent in the United
States, the learned Advocate General correctly acknowledged that the Code could, by its very
wording, encompass not just allegations that have been filed with the police but also those that
are likely to give rise to criminal charges. When applied to, this broader reading brings the
constitutional language closer to the clear expression of the ban in. To “expose himself to a
criminal charge” is a meaningful use of the word in the latter section. The wording “exposed to”
and “imminently exposed to” clearly encompass both current and future situations where the
individual could face criminal charges. The phrase “accused of any offence” in Article 20(3)
must be understood as “formally accused in,” not as though the charges are imminent or even in
the future. ‘To be witness against himself’ has broader connotations than just the legal system. Of
any. Disclosure of facts or information that could incriminate you. Fulfils the role of bearing
testimony against one’s own actions. Since the expression is not expressly limited to the forensic
stage, we must interpret it to encompass all stages where information is furnished and materials
are collected. In other words, even the police level of investigation is embraced. This is the exact
meaning of Section 161(2). This provision provides protection during the oral examination
conducted by law enforcement officials. In a nutshell, the safeguard zone contains both the
Constitution and the Code. The Constitution is more permanent than the Code, which is subject
to amendment. Hence, we can’t only rely on, but must also consider, the more basic safeguards
afforded by, which are, however as comprehensive, provided in. We are getting closer to the
Miranda privilege of exclusion in this position, which protects individuals from being
incriminated not only against self-incrimination but also against police questioning and
interrogation in custody. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act expresses the Miranda
exclusionary rule, which states that interrogations conducted in a custodial setting are inherently
coercive; nevertheless, this section pertains only to confessions, which is a more limited notion
than self-crimination. The competing assertions that must be resolved were half-mentioned
earlier. Practically speaking, there is a conflict between the public interest in enforcing criminal
detection and the constitutional rights that individuals facing charges have. As has been
happening in the United States since Miranda, society’s interest in convicting criminals has
waned and the focus has retreated from protecting the accused, but this might change depending
on the circumstances. ‘Respect for (constitutional) principles is weakened when they leap their
rightful bounds to interfere with the legitimate interests of’society in enforcement of its
laws........’, writes one American legal magazine of recent times. In Couch v. United States, 409
U.S.322, 336 (1972), the court decided that... Therefore, we must maintain a relative and non-
abstract constitutional perspective. This is particularly important in light of the fact that the
application of principles in achieving humane justice is impacted by social variables such as the
growth of crime due to technological technologies. The system of torture by investigators and
courts from the Middle Ages to the Modern Era is the driving force behind the unwillingness to
enable forced self-crimination, regardless of whether we look at the Talmudic law, the Magna
Carta, the Fifth Amendment, the requirements of other constitutions, or Article 20. Since the rule
of self-incrimination was not considered unjust in the court of Star-Chamber, the English rule of
the accused’s privilege of silence may be seen as a harsh reaction to that decision. As Holdsworth
pointed out, the interrogation of the defendant was the meat and potatoes of the criminal process.
The revered idea of immunity from questioning for the accused was born out of the prevailing
horror and dread at the time. Based on what Sir James Stephen has noted: “For at least a century
and a half the (English) Courts have acted upon the supposition that to question a prisoner is
illegal This opinion arose from a peculiar and accidental state of things which has long since-
passed away and our modem law is in fact derived from somewhat questionable source though it
may no doubt be defended (Sir James Stephen (1857).” Prior to assessing the significance and
invulnerability of the anti-self-incrimination promise, two crucial factors should be taken into
account. First, we must not forget that the dread of police brutality resulting in coerced
confessions is real. Modern global history does not support that, and neither does recent Indian
history. “Minds behind Bars,” an article published in the December 1977 issue of the Listener,
recounts an incredible tale: “The technology of torture all over the world is growing ever more
sophisticated—new devises can destroy a prisoner’s will in a matter of hours-but leave no visible
marks or signs of brutality. And government-inflicted terror has evolved its own dark subculture.
All over the world, torturers seem to feel a desire to appear respectable to their victims. There is
an endlessly inventive list of new ways to inflict pain and suffering on fellow human beings that
quickly crosses continents and ideologies through some kind of international secret-police net
work.”

ISSUES INVOLVED

The text explores the rights of suspects to remain silent when accused of any crime, the
prohibition against self-incrimination, and the scope of Section 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure
Code. It also discusses the concept of mens rea and the exclusionary rule in Section 179 I.P.C.,
and the limits of the benefit of the doubt in the context of Section 161(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code and Section 179 of the Indian Penal Code. The text also explores the potential
for self-incrimination and the limits of the benefit of the doubt.
CONTENTIONS
• An accused person is not included in the term “any person” in section 161(1) of Cr. P.C.
• Since the appellant is in the middle of multiple ongoing or previously charge-sheeted
cases, questions that serve as links in the prosecution’s chain can potentially subject the
accused to criminal charges.
• The accused has the right to remain silent if he or she believes that speaking out could
bring charges against them. Submitted by the party in question
• Until the matter reaches court, Article 20(3) does not take effect, in contrast to S.161(2).
OBSERVATIONS BY THE SUPREME COURT

According to Article 20 (3) of the Constitution, no individual may be forced to testify against
themselves. According to Section 161 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [CrPC], an
individual is obligated to provide an investigating officer with truthful answers to all questions,
with the exception of those that prove their own guilt. We cannot afford to write off fear of police
torture leading to forced self-incrimination in the interest of protecting fundamental rights
enshrined in our Constitution, the Supreme Court said, acknowledging that there is a rivalry
between society interest in crime detection and the constitutional rights of an accused person.
The court also acknowledged that the police had a difficult job to do, particularly when crimes
were growing and criminals were outwitting detectives. An accused person has the right to
remain silent during questioning if answering could lead to an admission of guilt in the case
under investigation or any other offence. The Supreme Court upheld this right, noting that any
statement given voluntarily and freely by the accused is admissible and potentially invaluable to
an investigation, but that the use of any form of pressure, whether subtle or crude, mental or
physical, direct or indirect but sufficiently substantial, to obtain information violates the
constitutional guarantee of fair procedure.

Directives from the Supreme Court

No one has the right to force or encourage an accused person to make a statement that might
incriminate them.The individual facing accusations has the right to stay silent and is also
protected from being incriminated against themselves. The individual being questioned has the
right, if desired, to be accompanied by an attorney during the interrogation. Regardless of
whether an accused individual is in prison or under arrest, it is necessary to inform them of their
right to see a lawyer during questioning. It is a violation of Section 160 (1) CrPC to summon
women to the police station for questioning. Forcing suspects to sign statements admitting guilt
violates the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination and breaches provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Such statements are also inadmissible as evidence in
a court of law and can result in a prison sentence of up to seven years. The accused’s freedom to
present evidence against herself is a fundamental aspect of a fair trial.

JUDGEMENT

The Privy Council and this Court have held in numerous cases that the scope of Section 161 does
include actual accused and suspects and the court in the present case was in agreement with the
decided cases. ‘Any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the
case’ includes an accused person who fills that role because the police suppose him to have
committed the crime and must, therefore, be familiar with the facts. The supposition may later
prove a fiction but that does not repel the section. Nor does the marginal note ‘examination of
witnesses by police’ clinch the matter. A marginal note clears ambiguity but does not control
meaning. Moreover, the suppositious accused figures functionally as a witness. ‘To be a witness’,
from a functional angle, is to impart knowledge in respect of a relevant fact, and that is precisely
the purpose of questioning the accused Under Section 161, Cr. P.C. The dichotomy between
‘witnesses’ and ‘accused’ used as terms of art, does not hold good here. The framers’ foresight
prevented self-incrimination before it even started by not limiting it to the trial stage in court.
True, compelled testimony already obtained is excluded. But the preventive blow also falls on
pre-court testimonial coercion. The condition, according to recent decisions, is that the person
compelled must be an accused. Intelligent constitutional anticipation avoids both the
procurement of self-incriminating testimony in advance and its subsequent exhibition. Not all
relevant answers are criminatory; not all criminatory answers are confessions. Tendency to
expose to a criminal charge is wider than actual exposure to such charge.

The orbit of relevancy is large. Every fact which has a nexus to any part of a case is relevant, but
such nexus with the case does not make it noxious to the accused. Relevance may co-exist with
innocence and constitutional censure is attracted only when inference of innocence exists. And
an incriminatory inference is not enough for a confession. Only if, without more, the answer
establishes guilt, does it amount to a confession. The setting of the particular case, the Context
and the environment i.e., the totality of circumstances, must inform the perspective of the Court
adjudging the incriminatory injury, and where reasonable doubt exists, the benefit must go in
favour of the right to silence by a liberal construction of the Article. We, however, underscore the
importance of the specific setting of a given case for judging the tendency towards guilt. Equally
emphatically, we stress the need for regard to the impact of the plurality of other investigations in
the offing or prosecutions pending on the amplitude of the immunity. ‘To be witness against
oneself is not confined to particular offence regarding which the questioning is made but extends
to other offences about which the accused has reasonable apprehension of implication from his
answer. This conclusion also flows from ‘tendency to be exposed to a criminal charge’.

‘A criminal charge’ covers any criminal charge than under investigation or trial or imminently
threatens the accused. The law states that everyone, including accused individuals, has the right
to a private space where they can live freely without being constantly monitored or subjected to
crypto-coercion. Various forms of gendarme duress, such as environmental pressures,
psychological and physiological stresses, and lengthy and manipulative interrogation, all
contribute to the pathology of coerced confessions. In cases where reasonable doubt exists, the
benefit of the doubt must be granted to the accused. Section 161 enables the police to examine
the accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) goes back to the stage of
police interrogation-not, as contended, commencing in court only. The provisions of Article
20(3) and Section 161(1) substantially cover the same area, so far as police investigations are
concerned. The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is
under way, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or
imminent, which may deter him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter.

‘Compelled testimony’ as evidence includes evidence procured not merely by physical threats or
violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring
interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like-not legal penalty for
violation. “So, the legal perils following upon refusal to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be
regarded as compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect of prosecution may
lead to legal tension in the exercise of a constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is
running a calculated risk. A police officer is clearly a person in authority. Insistence on answering
is a form of pressure especially in the atmosphere of the police station unless certain safeguards
erasing duress are adhered to. Frequent threats of prosecution if there is failure to answer may
take on the complexion of undue pressure violating Article 20(3). Legal penalty may by itself not
amount to duress but the manner of mentioning it to the victim of interrogation may introduce an
element of tension and tone of command perilously hovering near compulsion.

Self-incrimination or tendency to expose oneself to a criminal charge is less than ‘relevant’ and
more than ‘confessional’. Irrelevance is impermissible but relevance is licit but when relevant
questions are loaded with guilty inference in the event of an answer being supplied, the tendency
to incriminate springs into existence. The accused person cannot be forced to answer questions
merely because the answers thereto are not implicative when viewed in isolation and confined to
that particular case. He is entitled to keep his mouth shut if the answer sought has a reasonable
prospect of exposing him to guilt in some other accusation actual or imminent, even though the
investigation underway is not with reference to that. The element of mens rea is necessary for
Section 179 I.P.C. to be satisfied. In cases where there is no intentional refusal but only innocent
withholding or omission, the offence is not proven. If the accused raises reasonable doubt with
his explanation, he should be allowed to benefit from it and cannot be forced to prove his case, as
doing so would force him to give up the very privilege he is fighting for. What seems like
harmless information could actually be innocuous or harmful when seen in a broader context.

The right to consult an advocate of his choice shall not be denied to any person who is arrested.
This does not mean that persons who are not under arrest or custody can be denied that right. The
spirit and sense of Article 22(1) is that it is fundamental to’ the rule of law that the services of a
lawyer shall be available for consultation to any accused person under circumstances of near
custodial interrogation. Moreover, the observance of the right against self-incrimination is best
promoted by conceding to the accused the right to consult a-legal practitioner of his choice.
Article 20(3) and Article 22(1) may, in a way, be telescoped by making it prudent for the Police
to permit the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to be present at the time he is examined.
Over-reaching Article 20(3) and Section 161(2) will be obviated by this requirement.

If an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by his side when his examination
goes on, this facility shall not be denied. The symbiotic need to preserve the immunity without
stifling legitimate investigation persuades to indicate that after an examination of the accused,
where lawyer of his choice is not available, the police official must take him to a magistrate,
doctor or other willing and responsible non-partisan official or non-official and allow a secluded
audience where he may unburden himself beyond the view of the police and tell whether he has
suffered duress, which should be followed by judicial or some other custody for him where the
police cannot teach him. This is not mandated but strongly suggested.

The SC ruled that This case dealt with the interpretation and application of certain constitutional
provisions, namely article 20(3) and section 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In its
decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-incrimination applies not only to
those who are actually accused of a crime, but also to those who are presumed to be accused. The
Court went on to say that this right takes effect even during police questioning.

CONCLUSION

For the benefit of the courts, the Supreme Court has differentiated between the terms “witness”
and “furnish evidence,” with the former encompassing statements from one’s own knowledge
and the latter referring to merely presenting documents required by the court, meaning that
protection under Article 20(3) cannot be invoked. The right to remain silent over any issue that
tends to incriminate oneself is granted to both accused and suspects under the Indian
Constitution. Article 20 clause 3 has been meticulously crafted to protect the accused from
further self-incrimination only if any statement of his might lead to prosecution. This article
extends its privileges to include a person who is being forced to testify as a witness, as well as
searches and seizures in which neither the accused nor the searched party is compelled to
participate. If a statement is made, even if it is only a confession, and evidence of material
support is found, then that statement cannot be protected under Article 20(3). The law forbids
torturing an accused person into making a statement or confession, and no duress can be used to
coerce information out of them. In such a situation, the statement would be null and the
privileges under Article 20(3) would apply. Involuntary administration of mental processes, such
as in narco-analysis or polygraph tests, is deemed to be a violation of Article 20(3).