Journal Pre-proof

A novel encryption scheme for securing biometric templates based on 2D

discrete wavelet transform and 3D Lorenz-chaotic system

Dhanesh Kumar, Anand B. Joshi, Sonali Singh

PII: S2666-9501(21)00092-4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rio.2021.100146
Reference: RIO 100146

To appear in: Results in Optics

Received date : 12 June 2021

Revised date : 28 August 2021
Accepted date : 6 September 2021

Please cite this article as: D. Kumar, A.B. Joshi and S. Singh, A novel encryption scheme for
securing biometric templates based on 2D discrete wavelet transform and 3D Lorenz-chaotic
system. Results in Optics (2021), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rio.2021.100146.

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 Journal Pre-proof

A novel encryption scheme for securing biometric templates based on

2D discrete wavelet transform and 3D Lorenz-chaotic system
Dhanesh Kumara , Anand B. Joshia,1 , Sonali Singha
a
Department of Mathematics and Astronomy, University of Lucknow,
Lucknow, U.P., India

of
Abstract

pro
This research paper proposes a novel encryption and decryption scheme for biometric tem-
plates using two dimensional discrete wavelet transform (2D-DWT) and three dimensional
(3D) Lorenz-chaotic system. In the proposed scheme two levels of 2D-DWT are used for the
decomposition of the group representation of the different biometric templates and then sub-
stitution and permutation are applied using some mechanism and 3D Lorentz-chaotic system.
The encryption scheme is applied on the different sub-bands of each level of decomposition,
and for the decryption, the reverse process of the encryption is used. The experimental re-
re-
sults, biometric template matching, security analysis, and statistical analysis of the proposed
scheme are given to validate the robustness of the scheme. The security analysis shows that
the brute-force attack is not possible in the proposed scheme.
Key words: 2D Discrete wavelet transform, 3D Lorenz-chaotic system, Haar transform,
Biometric template encryption, Decryption.
lP
1. Introduction task. Therefore, It is an important task to
develop a scheme for the security of biomet-
In the present era of digitalization, biomet- ric template in the process of communication
ric template authentication is highly used in via unsecured networks (like the Internet).
almost all the digital platforms, i.e., in smart To promote the broad utilization of biomet-
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mobile devices, laptops, attendance systems
(in the class, manufacturing company, etc.),
and even in granting access in certain re-
stricted and secured areas (such as investi-
gating agencies, POLICE, Central bureau of
investigation, etc.). Biometrics [1] is the digi-
tal measurement of physical or behavioral hu-
Jou
ric schemes; security, and secrecy of its data
during transmission or storage is necessary.
Steganography scheme, watermarking
scheme, and cryptographic scheme can be
used to gain the biometric template security
and secrecy [2–9]. In recent years, for the
encryption of these biometric templates,

man characteristics (such as fingerprint, face, optical cryptosystems or digital cryptosys-

iris, hand geometry, palmprint, etc.).
Biometric techniques have inherent advan-
tages over traditional personal identification
number techniques, identification cards, and
passwords; but ensuring the security and in-
tegrity of biometric template is a challenging
1
Corresponding author
E-mail address: anandiitd.joshi@gmail.com (Anand
B. Joshi).
Preprint submitted to Results in Optics
tems, or a combination of both optical and
digital cryptosystems are used by various
researchers in different transform domains
such as hybrid transform [9], Fourier trans-
form [10–13], cosine transform [14], wavelet
transform [15, 16] and Arnold transform [17].
Paunwala and Patnaik [7] proposed a ro-
bust biometric watermarking method for bio-
metric template protection. In this method,
the fingerprint and iris features vector are
August 28, 2021
 Journal Pre-proof
used as a watermark. The watermark is em-
bedded in low-frequency AC coefficients of se-
lected 8 × 8 DCT smoother blocks, in this
DCT-based watermarking method. Blocks
are classified based on the human visual sys-
tem. The solution of two issues in the de-
sign of the multi-modal system: the biomet-
ric template protection and fusion strategy
of
are addressed by authors, in this method.
In [9], Rakheja et al. proposed an iris tem-
plate protection based on the double image
encryption scheme using a 3D-Lorenz sys-
pro
tem and modified equal modulus decomposi-
tion in the hybrid transform domain. In this
method, the hybrid transform is produced by
the combination of Walsh transform, Kekre
transform, and fractional Fourier transform
of different orders. In this technique of dou-
ble image encryption, the iris templates are
encrypted in the secondary image.
re-
Rakheja et al. [15] also proposed a hybrid
iris biometric template protection technique
using the 4D-hyperchaotic system based on
modified equal modulus decomposition in the
hybrid multi-resolution wavelet transform do-
lP
main. In this scheme, the permutation keys
for scrambling are produced by The 4D hy-
perchaotic system. Where as, Ajish and Ku-
mar [18] proposed an iris biometric template
protection using double bloom filter based
feature transformation. In this technique, the
rna
number of bits set to one in the bloom filter
based feature transformation is very less and
it increases the false acceptance rate. The to-
tal bits set to one in the double bloom filter
based feature transformation is double that
of the bloom filter based transformation and
it enhances the accuracy of matching of the
Jou
transformed iris template. This technique re-
duces the exponential increase in the size of
the transformed iris template.
In paper [19], Barrero et al. presented a
methodology for the estimation of the main
parameters of such techniques, based on a
statistical analysis of the unprotected bio-
metric templates. Furthermore, to increase
verification accuracy and privacy protection,
a general approach for a protected weighted
feature level fusion is proposed. Also, they
2
show how the weighted feature level fusion
preserves the accuracy of the unprotected
score level fusion, while it adds privacy pro-
tection to the system.
Khan et al. [20] presented a chaotic secure
content-based hidden transmission technique
of biometric template data. In this tech-
nique, encryption and data hiding techniques
are used to improve the security and privacy
of the transmitted biometric templates. En-
cryption is applied to the biometric templates
before hiding into the cover images to make
them secure, and then biometric templates
are hidden into the cover image.
In this paper, we have proposed an en-
cryption and decryption scheme based on 2D-
DWT and 3D Lorenz-chaotic system. The
encryption scheme is applied in such a way
that the original biometric templates can
never be reconstructed without using the pro-
posed decryption procedure. The encryption
and decryption, both schemes applied to the
frequency domain, and we reconstruct the
original biometric templates by reversing the
encryption process.
The road map of the remaining sections of
the paper is as follows: some basics related
to the proposed work are given in section 2.
The proposed scheme and its implementation
are given in section 3. Section 4 addresses the
simulation and experimental results. Biomet-
ric template matching is given in section 5.
Section 6 discusses the security analysis. Sec-
tion 7 discusses the statistical analysis. The
comparison analysis is given in section 8. Fi-
nally, the conclusion is drawn in section 9.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. 2D Discrete wavelet transform
In the area of pattern recognition [21], im-
age processing [22, 23], document analyses,
etc. wavelet transform (WT) plays an im-
portant role. The WT [24, 25] (such as Haar,
Daubechies, Meyer wavelets, etc.) is a new
mathematical tool developed in the middle
of 1980s. In a WT, the signals are decom-
posed into component wavelets. A WT can
be used to decompose the signal into compo-
nent wavelets.
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In the image processing, an image is com- horizontal direction and the output of each
posed of a discrete sample (pixels). The dis- filter is down-sampled by a factor of 2 and
crete wavelet transform is an implementa- then the intermediate signal Lr1 and Hr1 is
tion of the discretely sampled wavelet. In obtained. After that, each column of these
this paper, the Haar wavelet is used. Alfréd new signals Lr1 and Hr1 is analyzed by low-
Haar in 1910 [26] proposed the Haar se- pass φ(n) and high-pass ϕ(n) filter in verti-
quence. This wavelet represents a sequence of cal direction and the output of each filter is
square-shaped functions which together form down-sampled by a factor of 2 to produce four

of
a wavelet basis. The Haar wavelet trans-
form [24] can be expressed by matrix form
as I 0 = HIH T , where I is an image matrix
of order M × M , H is Haar transform matrix
new sub-bands LL1 , LH1 , HL1 , and HH1 as
shown in Fig. 1. All these sub-bands con-
tain all of the information in the original sig-
nal. If the 2D-DHWT is utilized to the sub-

pro
of order M × M and I 0 is the resulting trans-
formed matrix of order M × M that contains
the Haar basis functions, hm (z) which is de-
fined in z ∈ [0, 1] where m = 0, 1, 2, ..., M − 1
can be decomposed uniquely as:
band LL1 again, we get four new sub-bands:
LL2 , LH2 , HL2 , and HH2 . If we repeat this
process t times then 2D-DHWT yields the
sequences of sub-bands LLt , LHt , HLt and
HHt .

m = 2t1 + t2 2.2. 3D Lorenz chaotic system

For chaotic sequences, the iteration func-
where t1 is the highest power of 2 contained in
m and t2 is the remainder that is, t2 = 2t1 −m.
The Haar basis function is defined by Eq. 1,

re- tions are used by many authors. In this pa-
per, we are using a special ordinary differen-
tial equation as a chaotic sequence with cer-



1
 t1 /2
if m = 0 and 0 ≤ z < 1, tain parameters. Lorenz [27] proposed three

 2 if m > 0 and t2 /2t1 ≤ z <


 coupled ordinary differentials equations with
1 (t2 + 0.5)/2t1 ,
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hm (z) = √
M 
 −2t1 /2 if m > 0 and (t2 + 0.5)/2t1 ≤ z < three parameters a, r, and b which is defined






(t2 + 1)/2t1 , as follows:

0 otherwise. 
(1) 
u̇ = a(v − u)
The transformation matrix of the 2D- v̇ = ru − v − uw (4)
discrete Haar wavelet transform (DHWT) is 

ẇ = uv − bw
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obtained by substituting the inverse transfor-

mation kernal which is given by Eq. 2. where a, r, b, u, v, w ∈ R and a, r, and
1
h0 (z, m) = √ hm (z/M ) for z = 0, 1, 2, ..., M − 1. (2)
b are the positive system parameters. When
M a = 10, b = 8/3 and r > 24.74, the dynamical
For m = 0, 1, 2, ..., M − 1, the resulting orbit will be chaotic. For r = 28; u, v, and
transformation matrix is given by Eq. 3. w solution curves for these equations circle
  around two equilibrium points and the pro-
h0 (0/M ) h0 (1/M ) ··· h0 (M − 1/M )
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h1 (0/M ) h1 (1/M ) ··· h1 (M − 1/M )

jections of its phase portrait are shown in Fig.
  2. In the proposed scheme, the parameter r
H0 = 

h2 (0/M )
..
h2 (1/M )
..
···
..
h2 (M − 1/M ) 
.. ,
. . . . and the initial conditions on u, v, and w are
hM −1 (0/M ) hM −1 (1/M ) ··· hM −1 (M − 1/M ) considered to be the secrete keys, for getting
the permutation and substitution sequence.
1
H = √ H 0. (3)
M
3. Proposed scheme and implementa-
In case of two dimensional discrete signals tion
I(m, n) of size M × N , the basic operation of
2D-DHWT is as follows: each row of the two This section proposes a novel scheme for
dimension signal I(m, n) is analyzed by low- biometric templates encryption. Fig. 3 shows
pass φ(m) and high-pass ϕ(m) filter in the the block diagram of the proposed encryption
3
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Figure 1: Block diagram of up-to 2nd level decomposition of 2D-DWT.

re-
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(a) (b) (c)

Figure 2: In first 1500 iteration, the projections of phase portrait of the 3D Lorenz-chaotic system 4 with a = 10,
r = 28, and b = 8/3. (a) In u − v plane, (b) in v − w plane, and (c) in u − w plane.

procedure, and Fig. 4 shows the block dia- v, and w into integers as:
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gram of the proposed decryption procedure.

3.1. Key generation
Take Fingerprint (Fp ) and Face (Fc ) of size
p × q1 , and Hand geometry (Hg ), Iris (Ir ),
Palmprint (Pp ) of size p × q2 where q1 = q22 .
Jou
U = floor(u × 1014 )mod m2 n2 , (5)
V = floor(v × 1014 )mod m1 n1 , (6)
W = floor(w × 1014 )mod M N, (7)
where floor(z) returns z to the nearest inte-
gers less than or equal to z and (c)mod d
returns the remainder after division.

Let I be the group representation of biomet-
ric templates of size M ×N , where M = 2×p
and N = 2 × q2 and the size of sub-bands
obtained after 1st level of decomposition is
m1 × n1 and the size of sub-bands obtained
after 2nd level of decomposition is m2 × n2 .
Step 1: Iterate Eq. 4 to generate ran-
dom sequences u = {u1 , u2 , u3 , ..., um2 n2 },
v = {v1 , v2 , v3 , ..., vm1 n1 }, w =
{w1 , w2 , w3 , ..., wM N }.
Step 2: Now, Converting the sequences u,
4
Step 3: Sort the sequences 5–7 and get
three sorted sequences U , V , and W . Find
the positions of the values of U , V , and
W in U , V , and W and mark down the
transform positions i.e., P = {P (i) :
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m2 n2 }, Q = {Q(i) : i =
1, 2, 3, ..., m1 n1 }, and R = {R(i) : i =
1, 2, 3, ..., M N }, where U (P (i)) = U (i),
V (Q(i)) = V (i), and W (R(i)) = W (i).
Step 4: Now, the position sequences P , Q
are transform into row vectors M1 , M2 , and
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R is transform into matrix M3 of size M × N changing the sign, the negative magnitude
and generate keys K1 , K2 , and K3 given by becomes positive and vice-versa, i.e., contrast
Eqs. 8–10, reversal.
Step 4: This step involves the permutation
K1 = M1 , (8) of sub-band LL02 and the sub-bands obtained
K2 = M2 , (9) from Step 3. Take the sub-bands LL02 , LH20 ,
K3 = (M3 )mod 256. (10) HL02 , HH20 and reshape these sub-bands into
a row vector W2α (α = 1, 2, 3, 4) of length
3.2. Encryption procedure

of
(m2 × n2 ),
The encryption process of our approach
 1
starts with group representation of biomet-  W2 ←− LL02


ric templates in a group I of size M × N . W 2 ←− LH 0
2 2
Mathematically, the group representation is

pro

 W 3
←− HL 0
explained below. 
 4
2 2
( W2 ←− HH20
I1 = [(Fp )( p × q1 ), (Fc )( p × q1 ), (Hg )( p × q2 )]
I2 = [(Ir )( p × q2 ), (Pp )( p × q2 )] (11) Shuffle the row vectors {W2α : α =
I = [I1 ; I2 ](M ×N )
1, 2, 3, 4} by key stream K1 and get the
0
where [·] represents matrix and inside the ma- scrambled row vectors W2α . After that,
0
trix , and ; represent elements in rows and transform these row vectors W2α into matri-
columns of the matrix.
Step 1: Apply 1st level 2D-DHWT on I and
get sub-bands {LL1 , LH1 , HL1 , HH1 }.
Then apply 2nd level 2D-DHWT
re- ces LL002 , LH200 , HL002 , and HH200 with each of
size m2 × n2 .
Step 5: Now, apply the 2D inverse DHWT
on {LL002 , LH200 , HL002 , HH200 }. One obtains
on sub-band LL1 and get sub-bands LL1 . Mathematically, it is given as,
{LL2 , LH2 , HL2 , HH2 }. Mathematically,
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00 00 00 00
2D inverse DHWT[LL2 , LH2 , HL2 , HH2 ] = LL1 ,
2D-DHWT(I) = [LL1 , LH1 , HL1 , HH1 ]
2D-DHWT(LL1 ) = [LL2 , LH2 , HL2 , HH2 ] where LL1 is new approximation coefficient
of 1st level wavelet decomposition.
Step 2: The LL2 sub-band values are dif- Step 6: The above process is repeated on
ferent from the other frequencies so, it is im- new and remaining old 1st level of wavelet de-
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portant to set the values in this sub-band to
an amount that is similar to the rest of the
other sub-band values. For that, we are di-
viding the LL2 sub-band values by amount
of m2 × n2 , where m2 × n2 is order of this
sub-band, i.e.,
LL02 = LL2 /(m2 × n2 )
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composition, i.e., on {LL1 , LH1 , HL1 , HH1 }.
Step 7: In this step, we are dividing the
LL1 sub-band values by amount of m1 × n1 ,
where m1 × n1 is order of this sub-band, i.e.,
LL01 = LL1 /(m1 × n1 ).
Step 8: Now, changing the sign of sub-

Step 3: In this step, we are changing the bands LH1 , HL1 , and HH1 simply multiply-
sign of remaining sub-band values, simply ing by (−1),
multiplying by (−1), i.e., 
 0
 LH1 = LH1 × (−1),
0

LH2 = LH2 × (−1), HL01 = HL1 × (−1),


HL02 = HL2 × (−1), HH10 = HH1 × (−1).


HH20 = HH2 × (−1).
Step 9: This step involves the permuta-
The reason behind changing the sign of the tion of sub-band LL01 and the sub-bands ob-
sub-band is that the magnitude of the sinu- tained from Step 8. Take the sub-bands LL01 ,
soidal corresponds to its contrast. So after LH10 , HL01 , HH10 and reshape these sub-bands
5
 Journal Pre-proof
into a row vector V1µ (µ = 1, 2, 3, 4) of length Step 2: First, apply 1st level 2D-DHWT in
(m1 × n1 ), Eq. 13 and then apply 2nd level 2D-DHWT,
 1 1st level 2D-DHWT(R0 ) = [LL00 00 00 00
1 , LH1 , HL1 , HH1 ] (14)

 V1 ←− LL01 ,

V 2
1 ←− LH10 , 2nd level 2D-DHWT(LL00 00 00 00 00
1 ) = [LL2 , LH2 , HL2 , HH2 ] (15)

 V13 ←− HL01 ,

 4 Step 3: Convert [LL002 , LH200 , HL002 , HH200 ]
V1 ←− HH10 .
into row vectors and shuffle these row vec-

of
tors using the inverse of key stream K1 , then
Shuffle the row vectors {V1µ : µ = 1, 2, 3, 4}
obtain [LL02 , LH20 , HL02 , HH20 ].
by key stream K2 and get the scrambled row
0µ Step 4: Now, reveal the original values
vectors V1 . After that, transform this row
0 from LL02 and reverse the sign of remaining
vector V1 µ into matrices LL001 , LH100 , HL001 , and

pro
coefficients, i.e.,
HH100 with each of size m1 × n1 .
Step 10: Now, apply the 2D inverse DHWT  0
on {LL001 , LH100 , HL001 , HH100 }. We get en- LL2 = LL2 × (m2 × n2 )


LH = LH 0 × (−1)
0 2
crypted R matrix, 2
HL2 = HL02 × (−1)



2D inverse DHWT[LL001 , LH100 , HL001 , HH100 ] = R0 HH2 = HH20 × (−1)

Step 11: Calculate the minimum value of

the matrix R0 , let γ be the minimum value.
Step 12: Let η = −γ + λ, where 1 ≤ λ ≤
5. Compute the corresponding pixel values of
re- Step 5: Apply 2D inverse DHWT,

2D inverse DHWT[LL2 , LH2 , HL2 , HH2 ] = LL0 1 ,

the encrypted image using Eq. 12,
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E(i, j) = mod((R0 (i, j) + η) ⊕ K3 (i, j), 256),
(12)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ M , 1 ≤ j ≤ N and ⊕ rep-
resents the bitwise XOR operator. Thus, the
encrypted template E is obtained.
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where LL0 R1 is new approximation coeffi-
cients of 1st level wavelet decomposition.
Step 6: The above process is re-
peated on new and remaining old 1st
level of wavelet decomposition, i.e., on
{LL0 1 , LH100 , HL001 , HH100 }. Now, convert these
sub-bands into row vectors and shuffle these

row vectors using the inverse of key stream

3.3. Decryption procedure K2 , then obtain [LL01 , LH10 , HL01 , HH10 ].
The block diagram of the decryption pro- Step 7: Now, reveal the original values
cedure is explained in Fig. 4 that reveals the from LL01 and reverse the sign of remaining
original biometric templates. The decryption coefficients,
process starts on the encrypted template E

using the same keystream K1 , K2 , and K3 LL1 = LL01 × (m1 × n1 ),


that are used in the encryption. One can de- LH = LH 0 × (−1),
Jou

1 1
crypt the ciphered template successfully just

HL1 = HL01 × (−1),
in the reverse order of the encryption proce- 

dure. HH1 = HH10 × (−1).

3.3.1. Mathematical formulation for decryp- Step 7: Apply 2D inverse DHWT,

tion
Step 1: Receiver obtains the encrypted 2D inverse DHWT[LL1 , LH1 , HL1 , HH1 ] = I
template E and calculate R0 using Eq. 13,

R0 (i, j) = mod(E(i, j) ⊕ K3 (i, j) − η, 256). Thus, the decrypted biometric templates

(13) are obtained from I.
6
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Figure 3: Architecture of the encryption method of the proposed scheme.
pro
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Figure 4: Architecture of the decryption method of the proposed scheme.
4. Simulation and experimental results
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The proposed scheme has been validated
with Fingerprint of size 128 × 64, Face of size
128 × 64, Hand geometry of size 128 × 128,
Iris of size 128 × 128, and Palmprint of size
128 × 128 which are shown in Fig. 5(a)–(e),
by performing simulation on a computer sys-
tem having Windows 10, Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-6200U CPU with a clock speed of 2.30
Jou
GHz and 8 GB RAM with MATLAB R2015a.
In our simulations, we have taken the 3D
Lorenz parameters a = 10.12763478, b =
2.67453268, r = 26.65347856, with initial val-
ues u0 = 2.54327643, v0 = 3.67457845, and
w0 = 1.23568790.
5. Biometric template matching
The different techniques used for the bio-
metric template matching are 1) Hamming
7
distance (HD), 2) Mean square error (MSE),
3) Peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), 4)
Structural similarity index metric (SSIM), 5)
Euclidean distance, 6) Levenshtein distance,
7) Series of comparison scores, and 8) Mul-
timodal fusion of matching scores [28]. The
most common methods used in our experi-
mental analysis are the HD, MSE, PSNR, and
SSIM methods.
5.1. Hamming distance method
The HD measures the similarity between
two bits patterns. The HD method counts
the number of bits that are the same in the
bit patterns. The value of HD ends up on
a decision that whether the two bit patterns
are generated from the same templates or not.
An HD value of zero indicates a perfect match
and a value of one indicates a perfect non
match. The HD between the decrypted bio-
metric templates and the original biometric
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(c) (d) (e)

(a) (b)

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(f) (g)

re- (j) (k) (l)

(h) (i)
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Figure 5: (a)–(e) Biometric templates, (f) group representation of the biometric templates, (g) encrypted
template, and (h)–(l) decrypted biometric templates.

templates is calculated by Eq. 16, tively.

M N
1 XX
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M N
1 XX 0 MSE = [Il (m, n) − Il0 (m, n)]2 ,
HD = I (i, j) ⊕ Il (i, j), (16) M N m=1 n=1
M N i=1 j=1 l
(17)
2
(255)
where 1 ≤ l ≤ k, M , and N are the size of PSNR = 10 log10 , (18)
the biometric template. MSE
where Il (m, n) represents the original tem-
plate and Il0 (m, n) represents the decrypted
Jou

5.2. MSE and PSNR method
MSE defines the error between the de-
crypted template and its corresponding orig-
inal template. PSNR is used as a qual-
ity measurement between the decrypted tem-
plate and its corresponding original. Higher
the value of PSNR shows better the quality
of the decrypted template.
The MSE and PSNR [29] between Il and Il0
are calculated by the Eqs. 17 and 18, respec-
8
template, M and N are the numbers of pix-
els of the frame.
5.3. SSIM method
The structural similarity index metric
(SSIM) [30] is a perceptual metric that quan-
tifies image quality degradation caused by
processing such as data compression or by
losses in data transmission. The resultant
SSIM value is a decimal value between 0 and
1, and value 1 is only reachable in the case of
 Journal Pre-proof
two identical sets of data and therefore indi- For key sensitivity analysis, we are slightly
cates perfect structural similarity. The SSIM changing the keys. For a slight change in
index between Il and Il0 is calculated by Eq. keys, we add ∆ = 10−15 in the system param-
19, eters and initial values. Due to the chaotic
properties, a slight change in system param-
(2µIl µIl0 + J1 )(2σIl Il0 + J2 ) eters and initial values leads to a dramatic
SSIM = ,
(µ2Il + µ2I 0 + J1 )(σI2l + σI20 + J2 ) change in the sequences, i.e., in keys. From
l l
(19) Figs. 6 and 7, one can see that the decrypted

of
where µIl and µIl0 are mean of the origi-
nal template and decrypted template, respec-
tively. σIl and σIl0 are the standard devia-
tion of the original template and decrypted
templates are different from the original one.
Fig. 6(a)–(e) is the decrypted template of
Fig. 5(g) with slight change in system param-
eter a, i.e. a0 = a + ∆. Fig. 6(f)–(j) is the

pro
template, respectively. σIl Il0 is the covari- decrypted template of Fig. 5(g) with slight
ance between the original template and the change in system parameter b, i.e. b0 = b + ∆.
decrypted template, J1 = (k1 L)2 , J2 = Fig. 6(k)–(o) is the decrypted template of
(k2 L)2 and k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.03 and L = Fig. 5(g) with slight change in system param-
2number of bits per pixel − 1. eter r, i.e. r0 = r + ∆. Fig. 7(a)–(e) is the
The calculated values of HD, MSE, PSNR, decrypted template of Fig. 5(g) with slight
and SSIM between original and decrypted change in initial value u0 , i.e. u00 = u0 + ∆.
Fig. 7(f)–(j) is the decrypted template of Fig.
biometric templates are shown in Table 1.
From Table 1, one can see that the HD is
0, MSE is also 0, PSNR is ∞ and SSIM is
1 for all templates. It means that the de-
re- 5(g) with slight change in initial value v0 , i.e.
v00 = v0 + ∆. Fig. 7(k)–(o) is the decrypted
template of Fig. 5(g) with slight change in
crypted templates are perfectly matched with initial value w0 , i.e. w00 = w0 + ∆.
the original one, i.e., there is no loss of data
6.2. Cropping attack analysis
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during transmission.
The validity of the proposed scheme
Original Decrypted HD MSE PSNR SSIM against cropping attack is checked by con-
templates templates sidering the encrypted image (Fig. 5(g))
Fig. 5(a) Fig. 5(h) 0 0 ∞ 1
Fig. 5(b) Fig. 5(i) 0 0 ∞ 1 cropped with the various format as shown in
Fig. 5(c) Fig. 5(j) 0 0 ∞ 1 Fig. 8(a) and (g). The encrypted image (Fig.
Fig. 5(d) Fig. 5(k) 0 0 ∞ 1
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Fig. 5(e) Fig. 5(l) 0 0 ∞ 1 5(g)) is cropped with block size of 256 × 64
.
from left, and 256 × 128 from left, which are
Table 1: HD, MSE, PSNR, and SSIM values between shown in Fig. 8(a) and (g), respectively. The
biometric template and decrypted templates of Fig.
corresponding decrypted images are shown in
5
Fig. 8(b)–(f) and Fig. 8(h)–(l). Under crop-
ping attacks, the decrypted templates are still
visual and contain most of the original data.
6. Security analysis It shows that our proposed encryption scheme
Jou

is robust against cropping attacks.

6.1. Key space and key sensitivity analysis
In the proposed method, 3D Lorenz chaotic
system have positive system parameters a, b,
r and initial values u0 , v0 , w0 as secret keys
also 2D-DHWT have (m1 , n1 ) and (m2 , n2 ) as
secret keys. For the positive system param-
eter and initial values of 3D Lorenz chaotic
system, if the precision is 10−15 the key space
will be 1090 ≈ 2299 , which is large enough to
resists the brute-force attacks.
9
6.3. Noise attack analysis
In the transmission of the encrypted tem-
plate, the template can be affected by the ad-
versary. So, the performance of the proposed
scheme against noise attacks is necessary to
discuss. The result of the noise attack for
noise intensity k on the encrypted template
E is calculated by the Eq. 20,
En = E(1 + kG) (20)
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(c) (d) (e)

(a) (b)

of
pro
(h) (i) (j)
(f) (g)

re-
(m) (n) (o)
(k) (l)
lP
Figure 6: Key sensitivity analysis; (a)–(e) decrypted templates of Fig. 5(g) using a0 , (f)–(j) decrypted templates
of Fig. 5(g) using b0 , and (k)–(o) decrypted templates of Fig. 5(g) using r0 .

where En is the noisy encrypted template, tively.

and G is the white Gaussian noise with zero PM PN
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mean and one standard deviation. Fig. 9 dis- p=1 D(p, q)

q=1
NPCR = × 100%,(21)
plays the decrypted templates corresponding M ×N
to the noisy encrypted template with noise " PM PN
|E(p, q) − E 0 (p, q)|
#
1 p=1 q=1
intensity k = 0.1. UACI =
MN 255
× 100%,

(22)
0
6.4. Differential attack analysis where E and E are two encrypted templates
corresponding to two original templates with
Jou

The differential cryptanalysis is firstly pro- a one pixel difference. E(p, q) and E 0 (p, q)
posed by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [31, 32]. denote the pixel values at the position (p, q)
In the differential attack, the adversary may in both encrypted templates, respectively. M
change one pixel of original data to find some and N are the sizes of the templates, D(p, q)
meaningful relationships between the origi- is a bipolar array and given by Eq. 23,
nal data and corresponding encrypted data. (
0 if E(p, q) = E 0 (p, q)
In the case of biometric template encryption, D(p, q) =
1 if E(p, q) 6= E 0 (p, q)
(23)

the differential attack is analyzed by the num-

ber of pixels change rate (NPCR) and unified From Table 2, the proposed scheme has
average changing intensity (UACI) [33] tests, high NPCR and suitable UACI values, which
which are defined in Eqs. 21 and 22, respec- are close to the standard values 99.6094%
10
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(c) (d) (e)

(a) (b)

of
pro
(h) (i) (j)
(f) (g)

re-
(m) (n) (o)
(k) (l)
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Figure 7: Key sensitivity analysis; (a)–(e) decrypted templates of Fig. 5(g) using u00 , (f)–(j) decrypted templates
of Fig. 5(g) using v00 , and (k)–(o) decrypted templates of Fig. 5(g) using w00 .
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(a) (d) (e) (f)

(b) (c)
Jou

(g) (j) (k) (l)

(h) (i)

Figure 8: Experimental results of the cropping attacks.

11
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(c) (d) (e)

(a) (b)

of
Figure 9: Decrypted templates corresponding to noise intensity k = 0.1.

Template Entropy
and 33.4635%. Based on the comparison of Biometric template Encrypted template

pro
the experimental values and the theoretical Fig. 5(a) 5.8997 7.9979
Fig. 5(b) 7.8498
values, we can say that our scheme passes Fig. 5(c) 7.2456
both NPCR and UACI tests, so the proposed Fig. 5(d) 7.4145
Fig. 5(e) 5.0426
scheme is resistant to the differential attacks.
Table 3: Entropy values of biometric template and
encrypted template.
Biometric template Experimental values
NPCR(%) UACI(%)
Fig. 5 99.5510
Table 2: Experimental values of NPCR and UACI
performed on Fig. 5
re-
33.5774
10(a)–(e) shows the histogram of templates of
Fig. 5(a)–(e) and Fig. 10(f) shows the his-
togram of Fig. 5(g). Fig. 10(f) shows that
the histogram of the encrypted template is
fairly uniformly and different from the his-
togram of the original biometric templates.
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7. Statistical analysis Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against
histogram based attacks.
7.1. Entropy analysis The efficiency of our encryption scheme is
The statistical measure of the degree of un- also analyzed from 3D plots of biometric tem-
certainty in the encryption scheme is called plates of Fig. 5. Figure 11(a)–(e) displayed
entropy. The mathematical calculation for 3D plots of Fig. 5(a)–(e) respectively, Fig.
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computation of entropy is given by Shannon 11(f) displayed 3D plots of Fig. 5(g) and Fig.
[34], defined as follows: 11(g)–(k) displayed 3D plots of Fig. 5(h)–(l),
N respectively. Figure 11 shows pixel distribu-
X
H(x) = − P (xi )log2 P (xi ), (24) tion in original and decrypted biometric tem-
i=1 plate are same and arbitrary distribution of
its pixels, whereas encrypted biometric tem-
where P (xi ) denotes the possibility of appear- plate has uniform distribution of its pixels.
ance of the symbol xi .
Jou

Table 3 shows the entropy values of orig-

inal and encrypted template of the Fig. 5. 7.3. Correlation analysis
The entropy value of Fig. 5(g) is very close The pixel intensity distribution of adjacent
to ideal value 8. It shows that the proposed pixels in horizontal, vertical, and diagonal di-
scheme is secure enough to resist entropy rections in the case of the image is calculated
based attacks. by the correlation coefficient (CC) using the
7.2. Histogram and 3D plots analysis Eq. 25,
Pu Pv
Histogram shows the graph between pixel j=1 (Ii,j − I)(Ei,j − E)
i=1
CCIE = q P Pv P Pv ,
intensity and frequency of pixels for each in- [ i=1 j=1 (Ii,j − I)]2 [ u
u
i=1 j=1 (Ei,j − E)]
2

tensity value, in the case of the image. Figure (25)

12
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(a) (b) (c)

of
pro
(d) (e) (f)

Figure 10: Histogram analysis of the proposed scheme: (a) histogram of Fig. 5(a), (b) histogram of Fig. 5(b),
(c) histogram of Fig. 5(c), (d) histogram of Fig. 5(d), (e) histogram of Fig. 5(e) and (f) histogram of Fig. 5(g).

(a)
re-
(b) (c) (d)
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(e) (f) (g)

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Jou

(h) (i) (j) (k)

Figure 11: 3D-plots analysis of (a) Fig. 5(a), (b) Fig. 5(b), (c) Fig. 5(c), (d) Fig. 5(d), (e) Fig. 5(e), (f) Fig.
5(g), (g) Fig. 5(h), (h) Fig. 5(i), (i) Fig. 5(j), (j) Fig. 5(k), and (k) Fig. 5(l).

where Ii,j and Ei,j are the pixels in the ith -
row and j th -column of I and E, I, and E are
mean of I and E, respectively.
Table 4 shows the calculated value of
CC for original biometric templates and en-
crypted biometric template. In the case of the
encrypted image, for each direction (horizon-
13
tal, vertical, or diagonal), the CC is close to
0 but in the case of original biometric tem-
plates, the CC is close to 1. It indicates
that the pixels are highly correlated in orig-
inal biometric templates and less correlated
in the biometric templates encrypted by the
proposed scheme.
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Biometric Original template Encrypted template
template Horizontal Vertical Diagonal Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Fig. 5(a) 0.4770 0.4269 0.4027 −0.0232 0.0908 −0.0092
Fig. 5(b) 0.9444 0.9653 0.9284
Fig. 5(c) 0.9779 0.9849 0.9752
Fig. 5(d) 0.9665 0.9711 0.9500
Fig. 5(e) 0.8810 0.9010 0.8480
Table 4: Experimental values of the CC of the adjacent pixels in the original biometric templates and encrypted

of
template.

8. Comparison analysis tical attacks. The experimental results also

pro
The comparison analysis of the proposed
biometric templates encryption scheme with
some existing schemes [9, 19, 35, 36] is per-
formed to check the accuracy, authenticity,
and originality. We have compared the pro-
posed scheme in terms of the type of data,
transform domain, permutation, and substi-
show that the proposed scheme is resistant
to brute-force attacks. Also, the proposed
scheme has the ability to resist cropping,
noise and differential attacks.
Acknowledgment
Authors are thankful to the anonymous re-

entropy, PSNR of the decrypted image, at-

re-
tution technique, sensitivity to secret keys,

tack analysis, differential analysis, and corre-

lation analysis.
viewers and associate editor for their valu-
able comments and suggestions that greatly
improved the manuscript.

The proposed approach advances research Funding

in the 2D-DWT domain, as shown in Table
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5. It also does well in terms of key sensi- First author is supported by the Coun-
tivity, entropy, PSNR, cropping attack, noise cil of Scientific and Industrial Research
attack, and differential attack. (CSIR), New Delhi, India [Grant No.
09/107(0385)/2017-EMR-I].
9. Conclusion
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This paper proposes a new scheme for bio-

metric templates encryption using a crypto-
graphic algorithm in the frequency domain
of the templates. In this scheme, 2D-DWT
and 3D Lorenz-chaotic systems are used for
the encryption and decryption of biometric
templates. In the proposed scheme, encryp-
Jou

tion is done by changing the pixels in the

frequency domain of 2D-DWT, and the 3D
Lorenz-chaotic system is utilized to increase
the security of the cryptosystem. The decryp-
tion procedure is the reverse of the encryption
procedure. The simulation and experimental
results of the proposed scheme are given to
validate the feasibility and robustness of the
scheme. Statistical analyses like entropy, his-
togram, and correlation confirm the robust-
ness of the proposed scheme against statis-
14
 Journal Pre-proof
S.No. Performance Rakheja et al. Barrero et al. Ye et al. Huang et al. Proposed
parameters [9] [19] [35] [36] method
1. Data Iris Biometric Image Image Biometric
templates templates templates
2. Transform Hybrid Bloom RSA RSA with 2D-DWT
domain transform Filters cryptosystem AT domain
3. Permutation Yes No No Yes Yes
method
4. Substitution Yes No Yes – Yes
method
5. Sensitivity to Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
secret keys

of
6. Entropy 7.9977 – 7.9993 7.9979
7. PSNR of image1=190dB Not Not Not infinity
decrypted image2=infinity mention mention mention
image in dB
8. Attack Noise and Not Cropping Not Cropping
analysis Special mention attack mention and noise
attacks attacks

pro
9. Differential Not Not NPCR=99.6135 Not NPCR=99.5510
analysis mention mention UACI=33.4184 mention UACI=33.5774
10. Correlation Not Not H:0.0012 H:0.0141 H:−0.0232
analysis mention mention V:−0.0017 V:−0.1020 V:0.0908
D:0.0023 D:0.0363 D:-0.0092

Table 5: Comparison of our scheme with other relevant schemes: Rakheja et al. scheme [9], Barrero et al.
scheme [19], Ye et al. scheme [35], and Huang et al. scheme [36].

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 Journal Pre-proof

Conflict of Interest

To June 12, 2021

The Editor

of
Results in Optics

Dear Editor,

I would like to submit the manuscript entitled “A novel encryption scheme

pro
for securing biometric templates based on 2D discrete wavelet transform and 3D
Lorenz-chaotic system” by Dhanesh Kumar, Anand B. Joshi, and Sonali Singh
to be considered for publication as an original article in the Journal of “Results
in Optics”. We have no conflict of interest associated with this publication. As
corresponding author, I confirm that the manuscript has been read and approve
for submission by all the named authors.

Thank you for your consideration of this manuscript.

Sincerely,
Anand B. Joshi
Ph.D. (I.I.T. Delhi)
Assistant Professor,
re-
Department of Mathematics and Astronomy,
University of Lucknow, India
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Jou