World Development, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 767-777,1992. 0305-750X/92 $5.00 + 0.

00
Printed in Great Britain. Pergamon Press Ltd

In Tribute to the Golden Age of the South’s

Development

SURENDRA J. PATEL*
Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
and
Sardar Pate1 Institute of Economic and Social Research, Ahmedabad

Summary. - Many countries in the South are in deep crises. The crises have spread despair.
There is a danger of forgetting altogether the South’s spectacualr economic and social sprint for
two generations since 1950. There was no parallel in the past to this upsurge -in terms of either
its pace, size or spread; or the sheer numbers of people and countries involved; or the length of
the period. This essay pinpoints the main landmarks of this monumental transformation against
the background of the North’s advance in the 19th century, and post-1950 perceptions of
development economics. It pays tribute to the transformation in the hope that the lessons still to
be distilled from it will forge the future strategies to build upon the South’s strengths and
overcome its weaknesses

Then Prometheus gave wisdom, which is strength, growth. Structural adjustment, whether masked
to Jupiter by a human face or not, is leading to a sharp
And he tamed fire which like beast of prey, worsening of conditions of life for the hungry, the
Most terrible, but lovely, played beneath poor, the disadvantaged-women, children, and
The frown of man; and tortured to his will
the homeless.
Iron and gold
The prophets of “doom and gloom” are now
EIegave man speech, and speech created thought. riding high. Their loud wailings are drowning the
Which is the measure of the universe; flicker of hope the South may have for its future.
And Science struck the thrones of earth and They are beginning to wipe out even the memory
heaven. of what the South collectively achieved in the
Which shook. but fell not four decades since 1950. The clock of history has
He told the hidden power of herbs and springs, already pushed into the past the story of these
And Disease drank and slept. Death grew like decades. It is on the verge of being forgotten.
sleep
The achievements of those decades are a story
without parallel in world development history. It
To defy Power. which seems omnipotent;
To love, and bear; to hope, till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates
Percy B. Shelley. Pronwthrrts Urlhound, 1817 ‘I would like to acknowledge the support of the United
Nations University, World Institute for Development
Economics Research (Helsinki, Finland); the Sardar
Pate1 Institute of Economic and Social Research
1. INTRODUCTION (Ahmedabad, India); and Dalhousie University and
Saint Mary’s University (Halifax, Canada).
There is an air of despair all round. The East An earlier version of this essay was discussed in 1990
at seminars at the Sardar Pate1 Institute of Economic
and the West have now joined the South’ in a
and Social Research. at the Starnberger Institut (Starn-
crisis which has become truly universal. But the berg, Germany) and at the Sixth Conference of the
crisis is the most severe for the South which is Canadian Association for the Study of International
burdened by heavy debts, declining terms of Development (Victoria. Canada). I am indebted to the
trade. mounting deficits, reverse transfer of participants in these discussions for their comments
resources to the North, and negative or zero which have proved valuable in revising the paper.

767
 7hX WORLI) IIEVELOPMENI

tells of the South bettering the Wyear record of

the North’s 19th century (182C1900) advance.
The South did this in half the time. at twice the
growth rates, and with five times the North’s
population in the 19th century. It even excelled
the North‘s rapid pace during 1Y50-YO. This
record is truly remarkable. Hence this essay pavs
a tribute to that Golden Age of the South’s
development. to honor these decades lest the\
arc forgotten.
The essay begins with a brief review of 1’9th
century Europe’s advance, which could serve ~5 ;I
frame of refcrencc for the South. The next
zectlon takes up the postwar expectations tot- the
South’s development. These are then conrrastcd
in Sections 1 and 5 with the actual economic and
social advance of the South during lcFGL~O. The
concluding section suggests that we can perhaps
look back to the South’s past and forward to itx
flltLlrc. wlth Ilop" ~ as Sl1elley‘s /‘1-01~1(‘//1(‘1~.\
1 !,rl)o~rrrtl. cited ahove. did for F~Liropc

The 19th ccntlll-y was the age ol hope <IIlCI

p1-ogrc’ss for Iluropc. We will begin with ;I ~rc\ic\\
Of EurL~pe’s advallce during this period so ttliLt it
ca11 then hc comparei with what the South
achie\cd later, To catch the temper of the time\.
we tul-n to the setting of Kome in 1817. Shclleb
lust 16. had comt to Rome leaving behind the tc;g
and rain of t~ngland.
The long. blL>ody Napoleonic Wars had c‘omc
to an end. Its dead wet-e cc~untcd and hurlcti
kuropc IC;IS beginning all over again 10 hope
The Industrial RevolL1tion. the promise ot prep-
gress. \\‘;I\ in ~LIII swing. The Roman spring
wa\ an intoxicating inspiration ior Sliellc~. [tic
iromantlc. L~nrepcntant reformer. His crcatiGt\
WI\ at if\ height. A few weeks of ~ntc’n~
composition. and his most p\sion;itc lyric
dr;mia. /‘~o/,~c,d~cJrc.c Orll~/fr,rt/. \\ ith A\i:i <,\
I’l-ollletllcu\‘ Ilcloved. w;i\ borii. It ~‘a:, thy
cjpcning salvo in his salute IO the dawn of rhc~
\pringtinic of humanity.
Beethoven too was inspired by the nc’\\ winds.
In tones ringing with hope. he composed hi\
“Overture to Prometheus.” Two of the greatest
artists of F,LLrope, Shelley and Hcethovcn. had
p~~lled the curtain down on the past and ~ng 01
their hopes for the times to conic’.
‘l‘ime~ were hard in Europe in the e;uly 10th
ccnturv. l.ifc was short. brutal. Death \+;Is alwa\\
at the doorstep. for infmts. ;iclults and the ;qgcLl
alike. Most Europeans wci-c pocir. ill-ted. ill-
house~i. ill-clad. and illiterate. Standard\ of liking
 TRIBUTE TO THE SOUTH’S DEVELOPMENT 169

cedented, as described by Kuznets in his study, 3. POSTWAR DESPAIR FOR THE SOUTH
Modern Economic Growth.s
The advance was not orderly. This fact is too The North has always had an underlying
often overlooked, or even forgotten. There were despair for the South. But that is not really even
many economic ups and downs, many cycles. a North-South phenomenon. The industrialized
There were three long economic crises - in the have generally dismissed the abilities of the
second and the last quarters of the 19th century, industrializing, their potential rivals. Moreover,
and in the period between WWI and WWII. when the industrializing do industrialize, the
There were also some 1.5 depressions and nearly industrialized have a hard time accommodating,
40 recessions. Schumpeter distinguished them by let alone welcoming, the newcomers on the world
the names of the authors who identified them - stage. A mixture of arrogance, fear and jealousy
Kondratiefs, Juglars and Kitchins.’ must be responsible for such attitudes.
There were wars, big and small, among the These prejudices were all too visible in the
small states of Europe. There were also wars of British comments on German products exhibited
colonial conquest. There was much destruction at the Great Exhibition, the First World Fair,
of men and means. All these economic and held in London in 1851. The lead article in the
military disturbances notwithstanding, the engine special “Exhibition Supplement” of a famous
of Europe’s advance rolled on relentlessly. British journal ridiculed the low level of division
The 80-year advance of Europe during 182s of labor (beginning where Adam Smith began)
1900 may be even more relevant for comparison among the Germans; their products were trivial,
with the South’s, For then, the nations of the uniform, imitative. The article then concluded:
North were all newly industrializing countries,
the unrecognized NICs of the 19th century. What they exhibit gives a painful impression of an
emasculated industry Such an exhibition, like
(They did not know then that that is what they
their toys. is better adapted to children and the
really were. The title was to be invented in the vulgar than to mature and enlightened beings.”
post-WWII period to single out a few ministates
from the rest of the South.) Great Britain, the The comments on Japanese products and
pioneer of the Industrial Revolution, was joined management in the early phase of its industraliza-
by a succession of newcomers: Belgium and tion were similar if not more brutal. particularly
France in the 1820s; Germany, the United States, on the competence of its management. An
Canada, Denmark in the 1860s; Norway. Australian expert invited by the Japanese Gov-
Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan and ernment in 1915 stated:
Russia in the 1890s.
Inferior goods, irregularity and indifferent ship-
In the 19th century too, as now, development ments have caused no end of worry First class
did not begin in all countries at the same time. It managers are required to wake things up and get
was uneven among countries and over time. Each out of the go-as-you-please style that seems univer-
new entrant standing on the shoulders of those sal at present.“’
who started earlier. demonstrated its learning
In these respects, the South has probably
prowess by attaining a progressive acceleration in
suffered even more. Most of its countries were
its rate of growth.
What did the North achieve in these X0 years‘? colonies, being “civilized” by the European
This can be expressed in simple overall terms. empire builders. A disdainful attitude on the
Europeans’ part was to be expected. Even within
The North’s total GDP rose about six times in
these years, growing at about 2.2% per year - the South, there were conservatives who hank-
ered for the days of colonial rule.
lower for the first 40 years, and higher for the
second. Its real per capita GDP expanded 2.7 The skepticism on the South’s ability to
develop following decolonization spread to more
times, increasing at 1.25% per year.
These achievements richly deserved all the respectable levels - even to academics. Pessim-
tributes they received. then as well as later. For ism was universal. Hope itself was crippled.
they were until then simply unprecedented. Literature on the South’s failures, disasters,
Hobsbawm called that period “The Age of crises, and inabilities mushroomed. When the
Capital.“’ South was in gloom, its “developers” were in
Over a hundred years earlier, Marx
and Engels had welcomed the rule of capital in bloom. When the South was in bloom, they sang
the most glowing terms: of its impending doom.
Their skepticism has too often bordered on
During its rule of a scarce one hundred years, [it] worries, concern, even on despair. The develop-
has created more massive and more colossal pro- ment profession in general has been much more
ductive forces than have all preceding generations at ease when the South was in crisis. It could then
togethe’r.’ analyze, diagnose, prescribe and describe. Pro-
770 WORLD I>EVEI.OPMEN 1

fessional reputations were built in such times. A population growth). and not “about 2 per cent”
few examples may be cited for illustrative pur- as the Expert Group stated. The lower figure
poses. (I .25’%) implicit in the Group’s calculations, it
The tone for what the South could do was set was thought, was too low - attractive neither to
as early as 1951. The United Nations had an the donors nor to the South. The Expert Group
important provision in the Preamble to its simply raised it. Fortunately for the Group’s
Charter. It called for employment of “inter- conclusions. the much higher estimates of popu-
national machinery for the promotion of the lation growth ~~~ 2% or more per year -- were
economic and social advancement of all pew not then available to the Expert G;oup. If they
pies.” A major step in this direction was the had been available, the Expert Group’s estimates
convening of the first United Nations Expert of the expected per capita income would have
Group to propose measures for the development been near zero. What a large effort for so litttc an
of the countries of the South.” achievement!
In its report. Meusurrs ,for r/w Eco~2omi~ The Expert (iroup was not disturbed that It\
Lh&ymeru of Utderciewloped Ke,gims (UnL recommended !I(‘( investment of 20’%, of the
ted Nations, 19Sl), the Expert Group struggled national income of the South (which could
with estimates of investment and financing amount to a gro,\.\ investment of some 17 30”;, )
needed for raising employment and output in was to yield ;I mere 7.5’!G1 growth of occratl
agriculture and industry in the South (including national output. The implicit )I(‘! capital/output
China). It concluded that the South needed ;I HC/ I-atio \\‘;I\ X: I: and the probable gross capital)
investment in these two sectors of $19. I billion, output ratio would bc I?: I. The Group W;IS noi
which was equal to about 20% of the South‘s concerned about how the LJS Congress could bc
estimated national income of $96.0 billion in persuarlcd to allocate as much as 3% ot \IS
1949. Since these poor underdeveloped countriex national income to the South.” In compari\oll
were caught in the “vicious circle of poverty.” the Marshall Plan absorbed mmc 2% of its (;I)P
quite in vogue then, it was considered imposGblc But then, those were heady days for clcvclop
for them to saw such ;I large amount. Ncr ment. Now. \vc’ are better informed about
domestic savings for the South 21sa whole wcrc :II clevetopment economics. Such fantasies of high
that time estimated to be only $5.2 billion. 01 c~~l~it~il/outI”lt ratio4 and external aid and such ;I
ahout 5% of the South’s national inconic\. iuggling of figure\ would not now be cntertainctl
The Marshall Plan for the reccm\truction and iit c\cil a1 economics undergraduate lcvc’l.
recoverv of war-devastated countries in EuroI” l‘hi\ \vas ako the period when India prcparc’~I
was an ideal model. Why not call upon ttx it\ I+rst t3t.c \I’c;ir Devclopmcnt Plan. The Plan
developed countries to assist the South? At leaf would tatc‘r act AS ;I model for many other South
one-half of the needed investments the (iroup countrie\. It too was color-ed bb current thinking
I-ecommended would have to hc financed from ;iboul the incapability of the poor countries 10
the outside. Domestic savings. It L+‘;ts tiopcd. develop rapidly. It therefore set the ovcratl target
would be raised from five to IO”,, ot natiomtl cjt India’\ economic growth iit ;I c’erv modc\t
income to cover the rest. _.
’ I<‘,* [‘c” vt’;ll
The only possibtc funding source in those year5 1‘0 p\c :-I fla\ OI- ot ths time in the 1Y.50\ a110
wax the United States. The task wa:, to con\ incc Carl\ lO(~Os. I cite here the views of I.ewi5 ;lnd
the United State5 to furnish such “aid.” ‘l‘hc KuLnct\. both Nobel prize winner-\. L.cwi\. writ
Expert Group therefore concerned itself with the ins in the late t VSO\,concluded that a growth rate.
benefit5 that could he achieved when thexc ot ‘.4” I, is so dltficutt to obtain that it I\ rc:lll\
investments were undertaken. But its response’ qmtc ai ambitious target.“‘”
on this point w;~s rather cagey. Its conclusion is ;I I\vcnty yc;ii-\ l;i(cr. howcvci, hc vu to rithcul~
classic illustration of asking too much to achicvc those who had al-gucd cai-ticr- that ttic p0~~1
too little. The Group concluded: counlrtc\ \iiiipt\ ccluld not yrcn4 ta\l

The real per capita growth following t’rom the

Iispcrt (iroup’s calculations would have tlccn
ant\ t .‘5” o ( 2.S”i1 income growth minus t .7”.>
 TRIBUTE TO THE SOUTH’S DEVELOPMENT 771

(1966), most of which was ready in draft by late performance by the South, described below.
19_5Os,Kuznets stressed in general the advantages
of the latecomers to industrialization. But when
he came to the underdeveloped countries, he was 4. THE SOUTH’S ECONOMIC SPRINT
worried by the adverse influence of two factors: SINCE 1950
the very existence of the North, its policies and
its economic dominance over the South, and the We may begin with the setting in the 1950s.
constraints of the traditional social structures of India had just become independent. China soon
the South. He therefore concluded: followed with its liberation. These events greatly
strengthened the incipient national liberation
we find it difficult to avoid the judgement that struggles throughout the colonies. Empires much
the orientation of the under-developed countries of larger than ever known in the past crumbled in a
today must contain many elements that are few years. The colonies liberated themselves.
inconsistent with. hence obstacles to, modern
New countries were born. New governments
economic growth.”
were established. People’s aspirations were high.
By the 1970s such pessimism was on the way Their visions reached out beyond the distant
out-for a while. The South had done quite well horizon.
by then - indeed much better than what Lewis We may now summarize the main economic
and Kuznets had earlier expected. They too advances achieved by the South during 195@90.
reflected the new mood of the 1970s. Receiving There was, of course, unevenness among coun-
the Nobel prize, Lewis stated: tries in their rates of advance. An analysis of this
unevenness is critical for identifying its causes
I think the LDCs have demonstrated beyond doubt
and working out new strategies according to the
their ability to use physical and human resources
specific requirements of each country. But this is
productively.”
not the main concern here. We are simply
Kuznets had an occasion to review the 22-year presenting the broad sweep of change in the
(195@72) growth experience of the South. The South as a whole.
per capita growth rates in the South, he found,
were “quite high in the long term perspective of
both less developed countries and the developed (a) Overall economic growth
countries.” Bewildered by the persistent negative
reporting on the South by journalists as well as The actual development record of the South
most academics, he then asked: contrasted sharply with what most had expected
of it in the 19.50s. During 195&-80, the South
If growth rates in the per capita product of the
LDCs over almost a quarter of a century were
raised its overall output at an annual average of
impressively high, one may ask why the reaction to 5.3%) and per capita output at about 3%. During
them in the general flow of news about these the 30 years from 1950. the combined GDP of all
countries in the persistent concern about critical South countries increased 4.7 times, and per
conditions with respect to supplies of economic capita GDP 2.4 times.
goods, seems to ignore these growth achievements. These three decades during 195&80 were the
[He wondered] why no litanies of praise [were sung] most remarkable period in the one-century his-
for these economic miracles. Instead, there were
tory of economic development. World output
only references to dangers of collapse in the Third
and trade expanded at unparalleled rates. As
World.”
shown in Table 1. both the eastern and western
The earlier despair about the “dangers of regions of the North and the South participated
collapse” in the South began to give way. The in this worldwide wave. The tidal wave of growth
performance of some of the South countries also embraced the South. until then by-passed
started to be described as “economic miracles” - by past development.
in Brazil, South Korea, China, even on occasion With the slowing of the world economy in the
Pakistan. 1980s the development scene changed radically.
We may close by citing the view of Streeten et There was a general decline in growth rates for
al. (1981). They considered the post-war de- all the major groups of countries. The rate for the
velopment record of the Third World a “specta- South fell sharply - from 5.3% during 195(X30,
cular, unprecedented and unexpected success.“” to only 3.8% for 1980-87. Preliminary estimates
Spectacular and unprecedented it was indeed. for the next three years suggest that the average
But the last adjective - “unexpected” - under- may well be about the same as for 198s-87 (about
lined how ill-prepared the profession of develop- 3.8%) or some 30% below that of the preceding
ment economics was for the impressive economic three decades.“’
772 WORLD DEVEL.C)PMEN’l

Population GDP ,n Annu4 growth ~)f

in millions hillions 9; <iDP in ‘%
19%-x0 I c)X(ki7

The South
China & India

The North
West
East

World

Sources: Data up to 1980 and for lYXt~x1.5 tor West and East from UNC‘TAD
(1987). Supplement. ‘Tables 6.1 and 6.2: other post-I~80 figures hased on
data in World Bank (198X). pp. 2. 23. 1x9, 224
‘Data on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union excluded from World and
North GDP and its rate of growth. Population and GDP data rounded to the
nearest zero
I- 1965-80.
$198(~XS.

National output in several countries in crisis be kept in perspective. Is it really as grave as the
(e.g.. Bolivia. Nigeria. Venezuela, Zambia) fell Great Depression of the interwar period or the
during the IYXOs by as much as 2530%. equal- Long Depression in the last quarter of the IYth
ling declines which were experienced only during century’? By any stretch of the imagination can it\
the Great Depression. World Bank data for gravity be placed next to WWI and WWII?
lYX(~X6 show that overall GDP declined in 17 I will attempt here a broad assessment of the
countries. In 41 countries, the average growth South’s achievement during IYSO~YOusing sev-
was below 3’%, indicating that per capita real eral yardsticks: (i) the needs of the South; (ii)
output must have fallen in most of these coun- plan targets of individual Third World countries:
tries. The scope of the crisis is underlined by the (iii) the past performance of these countries: and
fact that out of X7 developing countries for which (iv) comparison with the growth of the North
data are reported by the World Bank, per capita during the postwar period and its historic trans-
GDP actually declined in 58 countries.-’ After a formation in the more than 100 years since IX70
brief honeymoon with optimism, despair for the (including past achievements of a few individual
South was back in business - with a vengeance. countries of the North).
Yet taking the four decades since lY50 Points (i) and (ii) can be dealt with togethcl
together, the South’s total GDP had increased at rather briefly. The South’s achievements slnct’
about 4.0% per year. and per capita GDP at lY50 were certainly lower than what It needed for
_.
T 7%. By IYYO, its total real output had thus significantly raising its people’s well-being. In
expanded 6.X times and per capita GDP some 2.Y most cases they wcrc: also lower than the plan
time\ over the lY50 levels. Not so bad. one would targets of individual countries.
4av. A comparison with the South’s past pertorn-
ancc would. however. present a very differcnr
picture. During IXYO-I950 the South’s per capita
development as a whole could not
for the group
have been higher than 0.5% per year.‘.’ Mo\t
evidence suggests that it was lower. Two c,t the
The current concentration on the crisic facing largest countrk in the South were stagnant OI
the South has been responsible for obscuring the declining. China was shattered by a destructive.
scale of the South’s achievemcnta. Crisis mongers protracted civil war. India’s growth did not keep
have had a field day. Pe\simista have turned into pace cvt’n with its population increase.“ Other
prophets. The crisis is indeed critical for the countries had an uneven record. In \omc‘ \m;~l/
future of the South. The crisis should nonethelcs\ countries, there \va\ ;i limited dcvclopmt~nt 111
 TRIBUTE TO THE SOUTH’S DEVELOPMENT 773

plantation products and minerals, mostly for on industrial output for several countries for the
supplying the growing requirements of the 1870s to 1890s show that it grew at 1.3% in
North. In others, there was either stagnation or France, 1.7% in Great Britain, 2.9% in Ger-
decline. many, 3.1% in Sweden, and 4.7% in the United
We may even suggest by a little statistical States.26 It is a general feature of early economic
exercise that the South’s real per capita growth growth that industry expands at a rate faster than
during 1950-90 might be regarded as equal, or overall GDP. The South’s recent record would
perhaps even superior to its experience over the then seem to be superior to that in these North
long stretch of 3,00&4,000 years of its past countries. We may also compare the South’s rate
history. To illustrate, we may extrapolate back- of growth with that of Japan during its classic
ward to 1950 the South’s average real per capita period (1885-1936). Japan’s GDP expanded at a
income of $685 in 1985. Since it increased 2.5 little less than 3% per year during this period.”
times during 195&85, its real level in 1950 would This was two-thirds of the rate achieved by the
have been, for example, $275 in 198.5 prices. South as a whole during 1950-90.
We may now imagine, for illustration, that the What do all these comparisons mean’? They
South countries had succeeded in raising their show that the growth rate (5.3%) achieved by the
per capita incomes at least 2.5 times over the South during 195&80 was unparalleled in the
3,00&4,000 years of their history - or by about history of the economic growth of nations.
the same proportion as during the 35 years during Moreover, this high average growth rate was
195&X5. In that case, incomes would have been maintained for 30 years. The South was a big,
at the initial point of this long journey no more indeed a very big group. Its 130 countries
than $110 in 1985 prices. accounted for 3.65 billion people in 1985. In
But according to the World Bank data, there comparison, the North’s population, when it
was only one country (Ethiopia) which in 1986 began its development in the 19th century, was
had a per capita GDP of $120, a level which very small - barely 300 million.
could then be taken as the minimum for simple The advance of the South as a whole was
human survival.‘J Below this level, survival indeed the most sustained and widespread
would be impossible. We could then take $120 development “miracle” of the 20th century.
real per capita output as the minimum for perhaps of all history.
survival - a level which is slightly higher than Moreover. we must not forget that the South
our (derived) estimate of the South’s per capita has been treated here as a whole. Achievements
“income” at the dawn of its history. Above that of individual countries varied very widely. Some
minimum were the fruits of progress. passing did very well. and some pretty poorly. Eight
through many ups and downs, as the fortunes of countries attained an annual growth of 6.5%,
individual civilizations rose and fell. and as the sustained for 30 years during 1950-80. They
centers of culture shifted from place to place over raised their total GDP 8-15 times, and their per
time. capita GDP 4-S times. Their combined popu-
Looked at this way, the South’s recent overall lation was 1.3 billion, or twice that of the devel-
achievement - a 2.5 times rise in real per capita oped West. Thus, the “miracle-makers” were not
output-would equal the maximum advance the just the so-called four baby tigers. In reality, the
South countries could have made over their long elephants in the South too had begun to learn the
past. That it was attained in just 40 years gives us tiger’s sprint. Some people have been too myopic
a measure of its significance. One need not rush to notice this.
to read absolute precision in these figures. They The process also brought about significant
do, however, underline that South’s record of structural transformations in the South:
economic growth during 195&90 was indeed -an increase in urban population and decline
impressive. It needs no apology. in the rural;
As for point (iv), we may now compare the - a decline of the share of agriculture from
South’s recent achievement with the long-term 40% in 1950 to only 17% of total output in
development of the North. Based on Maddison’s 1980;
data for the combined growth of 16 North - a corresponding increase in the share of
countries during 1870-1986, it can be concluded industry from 16% in 1950 to 36% in 1980;
that the historical growth rate of the North for - an unprecedented expansion in the share
these 116 years was some 2.7% per year for total (and real volume, of course) of resources
GDP, and 1.7% for per capita GDP.‘? devoted to capital formation and development
The South’s achievement may also be com- (including health and education), both private
pared with growth at selected periods in a few and public - from lO-15% of total output in
individual developed countries. Van Duijn’s data 1950 to 35-40% in 1980;
774 WORLD DEVELOPMENI

~ a corresponding decline in the share of a few years below the average in the North. Lt:
consumption; for females increased even more than for males
- a significant change in the composition of nearly everywhere in the South.
exports leading to a decline in the share of The advance in education was also spectacular.
primary products; and We hegIn with literacy rates.‘” In the mid-IYth
~~-an increase in the share of manufactures in century, literacy rates in the North ranged tram
both exports and imports. about ht)‘%, in Engtand and the United States to ;I
These forms of structural differentiation within low of 20% in Spam. 10% in Italy and even lowed
the South followed from its accelerated develop- in the rc‘st of Southern Europe. The average III
ment, described earlier. They merit a much the North could not have been above 3’k IN
closer examination and analysis. Hut this is not Iti iund 50’!0 in IYOO.” The comparable level in
the place for it.‘” the South was about 30% in lY50. Hut hv the
1980s. it had riwn to 50% in Africa. 70% in Asi;
;md X0”<, in Latin America.
l‘hc North ol lY60 had 56’k of the world total
yrcjss number cut literate persons ((iN1.P) with
5. STILL MORE SPECTACULAR SO(‘IAI CVll> -II”:, for the South.‘- By IYX5. rhc South‘\
ADVANCE share h;tcl I-iscn to hY)‘%,and that ot the North hatl
\h1-lln!i to 3 I”,I. It should he noted that Ill~IIC
The South‘s economic achievements wer-c 1u1- liter:itc\ accouutcd for ;i much Iargct- 4iarc lhan
pressive. But people do not live hy l~ead alone. tcniale literates ;I feature which is still CI-VIII?
The xivnnce in the social field. ;I\ has been 0111 ICI 1)~ altcrcd
graphically shown by M. Pate1 in his rc’ccnt stud! in the 35 vcars during 105CkX5, ctlucatlon 111
prepared for UNICEF. was still morca the South y’intcd ahead. Total enrollmen( at xl1
spectacular-.“’ We will focus upon the achie\c- It~\~cls rose from sonic Yl million to 0X-l million
meuts iu health and education. which scrvc both Ons-tifth of the cntirc population of the Soutl\
as goals mtl nican4 of development, \%;I\ ;ittending 4omc kind ot school 1llC
There is no single indicator which can t>v used comp;~~-;~hl~ ratlo in lY50 was ;I\ ION ;I\ (I~c’-
to U~~;IWI-C’ advances in health. Data on the siktccnth. Pi-imar\ school enrollment hcc;iw
decline in infant mortality rate‘s (IMRs) ;~nd nc;i~-l\ uii~vcr~l ~~ irising from onlb SO mill~c~n 111
death rates in general and on the increase in lift- IO0 ~(0 475 million by lYX5. Sec;)ndar> school
t?xpectancy may he us4 as I>~~C)ilCl prowv indic;lb cnrc~llmcnt rose from IO million in lY50, ot- uiidc~
tars. Death rates in ttw South Ilaw Mien Irc)nl one-third 1n the North. to IX4 million in Ic)Si. OI
‘75-X) per thousand in the lY5Os 10 ICI5 in the lvb~cc that in the North.
IYXOs. Several countries, Including China, ha\c
brought them below 10. or not much dlffcr-cnl
from the level of 7-10 current 111 the North t101ii iindc~ one million 1n I’)50 to nc;irl\ 3>
The IMR in the low-income countries only 40 mlllic>ll in IYS5. l‘he South ;ts a whole had in IYio
yea1-s ago WilS as high as 700 per thousand Its\ than one-tiith the tertiar) cnrollmcnt ot IIlk.
ahout the same as the rate in the North in the North 1%~IOS!. the ratio had shot up to 5:rl 01
mid-IYth century. In ius1 36 vc’ars, the South almosl cqualling the North. In this sprint. I~rnai~~
brought it down to 7O.hy IYk OI- equal 10 the cnrollmcnt w;,\ much lower than the m;~Ic OIIC.
lY40 levrl in the Not-th. The IOO-year procclss ill but CXC~ the gcncler gap was rial-rowing.
the North was telescoped into less than 40 yt~~uc I Ic.rc ;lI-c‘ extraordinary ild\‘LlllCt%\. In Ihc IJ1-k)
in the South. Infant mortality rates in the North ccss the Nol-th-South educational distance II;I~I.O-
ranged around 30 per thousand in IYhO. Eighteen wtxi significantly. In 1950. the South Wil4 bchiikl
SOlllh countries wjith a comhincd pOpUlilti~~l1 01 the North t>y h(-k70 years in primark enrollment
1.15 billion had reached this range h) IOXh. 11 ;md &L-50 years in secondary and I;ighei- cni-oil
may he expected that by the yea’ 7000. the IMK mcnt. By mid-IYXOs. the South had on (I pc‘~
iu 70 lowincome countries will IX 2(&10. 01 capita enrollment basis equalled (or w~-pa~wtl)
about the same as the IYXO level in EuropL%. Ihe ccmiparablc tlcveloped-countr\i Ic\cl iii 12i.b
The decline in death rates and infant mortalit! mar-y education. because of ;I larger relet aill age
rates IS reflected in higher life expectancy (LE) in gl-oL;p. It hxi reached mid-lY50 Jcvelopc&
the South. LE rose from around oi- hclow 10 country levels ~ii secondary education and llt2ilrl\
years in 1950 to 60 years or over I>\, the m~cl ;~ttaliic‘d the lY50 enrollment Iwel\ cd tcrtiarb
IYXOs. Twenty years were added to t6e avrragc cduc;itwn 111 the developed countrie\.
life of ;I citizen of the South. 111 several South
countries. I.[! has alreadv reached 70 vc;lr\. OIII\
 TRIBUTE TO THE SOUTH’S DEVELOPMENT 775

Table 2. Educational advance in the South, 1950-85

South North Ratio South/North

1950 1985 1950 1985 1950 1985

I. Enrollmenf (mil.)
Primary 80 475 110 105 0.7 4.5
Secondary 10 184 31 88 0.3 2.1
Tertiary 1 25 5 31 0.2 0.8
Total 91 684 146 224 0.6 3.1

II. Enrollment per thousand population

Primary 49.0 125.0 149.0 95 0.3 1.3
Secondary 6.0 48.0 41.0 79 0.1 0.6
Tertiary 0.6 6.6 7.2 23 0.1 0.3

Sources: Pate], S. (1985a). pp. 1312-1317; Patel. M. (1989), Tables 1.1

and 1.2, pp. 23, 25. --

areas. But the sheer size of the numbers involved has not been abolished. The distribution of
is simply staggering. income, and more particularly of wealth and
economic power, is highly unequal. The econo-
mic distance among the countries of the South
6. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS has increased.
This is not the place, however, to explain or
Here are monumental achievements - both even to apologize for these and many other
economic and social - by the South. But weaknesses. They remain to be overcome in the
contemporary history has simply disregarded decades ahead. The overall record of the South
them. Our aim here was to set the historical during the past four decades nonetheless stands
record straight. Whatever may be the nature of without parallel in history. The lessons of this
the current crisis in the South and its outcome in rich experience remain to be distilled. They could
the years to come, one fact stands out in the help in forging future strategies for overcoming
postwar development experience. the South’s patent weaknesses and building upon
Neither in the rate nor in the scope is there a its strengths. Hence this tribute, lest we forget.
parallel in history for the South’s achievements The memory of the South’s Golden Age could
during 1950-90. No prophet of doom and gloom form the foundation of future hope and confi-
can detract from this record. dence.
It seems as if the vast masses of the South have I would like to conclude by citing from Nobel
been climbing upward in a virtuous growth Laureate Rabindranath Tagore’s Nuibaidya,
spiral in the post-WWII period. They have published when the 19th century was yielding to
written an obituary of the “vicious circle of the 20th. He immortalized his dream of future
poverty” - that is, people are poor because they India, and by extension all the poor and the
are too poor to save enough to invest in their oppressed of the world:
growth. The South was poor, and yet it saved, Where the mind is without fear and the head is
invested and grew! held high;
In concluding this discussion it may be noted Where knowledge is free;
that if there were ever a “golden age of growth,” Where the world has not been broken up into
the star performers in it were the vast popula- fragments by narrow domestic walls;
tions of the South. They outperformed both their Where words come out from the depth of truth;
own past and that of the North. The South has by Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards
perfection;
this act left behind the theater of the absurd and
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its
legitimately entered the world stage.
way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit:
The current crisis has spread gloom and de- Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-
spair. There are yet miles to go. There are too widening thought and action -
many poor people in the South. The scale of Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my
malnutrition and hunger is enormous. Illiteracy country awake.
776 WORLD DEVELC)PMF.N’l

NOTES

I. ‘l‘hc terms South, Third World, developing coun-

tries and less-developed countries: (LDCs) have been
used in this paper interchangeably. The North denotca
the developed countries. both in the West and the East

7. Hohbes (I651 ). chapter 1.

3. Kuznets (lY66). pp. 37&3YO; Patel. S (lY&I)

J Keyne\ ( 103 I )

5. Kuznets ( lY6h); aIs Landcs ( IYhO): Hronowshl

(1073)

(1. Schumpctcr ( lY3Y). ‘This 1,045page work L‘OIICC‘II-

tratcs on cvclcs. hut overlooks measurement ot overall
advanct>. in contrast. Kuznets ( lYh6) mcasurcs ad-
vancc. hut !gl”‘cs cycles. Thea peculiar division 01
labor 111 economics between analysi\ ot cyclch and
growth has hampered an integrated view of dc\clop
mcnt over time

s Mars and Engels (1964). p IO.

I I. I‘hc Group was composed of tlvc members

Albcl-to Haltra C’ortcL. Professor of Economa. Natio-
nat Unwcr\lty of Chile; D. I<. Gadgil. Dircctol-.
(;ohhalc Instltutc of Pohtics and Economics. Poona.
India; Gcorgc Hakim. Counsclol-, Legation 01 l.cb,i-
non. Washington. DC; W. Arthur Lewis. Proteswr ot
Political Economy. University of Manchcatcr. Eng-
land; and ‘I’heodore W. Schultz. Chairm;m. Depart-
ment 01 Economic\. Universit! ot C‘hicaFo. (ISA. Al
the quest ot the group. George IHahlm wrved ~14
(‘hall-. Though small in 4x. the Group asemblecl
lormibdahte talent. ‘l‘wo of its mcmbcra (Lcsi\ and
Schultz) wcrc later to rcccive Nohcl Prizes in Econu-
m,c\. and Gadgil wa)r to become the Minlsrcr (11
Planning in India

17. United Nations (I’)SI), p. 78: alw \cc ‘Iublc 2.

p 76 and pp 75%SO for more dctalls

Ii. United Nations (1051).p. 79. l’hc Group‘\ optlnr-

isrn ~ah unbounded. It stated: “These amounts xc‘
Inrge. but they are not beyond the capacltv of the
developed countries to provide. Ths national.incom~\
of the countries of Western Europe. Australasw, the
United States. and Canada aggregate about $350 billion
a year. If they were to transfer 2 percent of this amount
annually to under-devcloped countrie\, it v,ould tw
 TRIBUTE TO THE SOUTH’S DEVELOPMENT 777

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