Khallaf Et Al 2024 A System Dynamics Model For A National PPP Program The Egyptian Project Portfolio

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A System Dynamics Model for a National PPP Program: The Egyptian Project
Portfolio
Conference Paper · March 2024

DOI: 10.1061/9780784485286.051
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Construction Research Congress 2024 507
A System Dynamics Model for a National PPP Program: The Egyptian Project Portfolio
Rana Khallaf1; Jose Guevara2; Paula Mendez-Gonzalez3; and Gabriel Castelblanco, A.M.ASCE4
1
Associate Professor, Structural Engineering and Construction Management Dept., Faculty of
Engineering and Technology, Future Univ. in Egypt. Email: rana.khallaf@fue.edu.eg
2
Associate Professor, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Universidad de los Andes,
Bogota, Colombia. Email: ja.guevara915@uniandes.edu.co
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by CASA Institution Identity on 03/18/24. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
3
Independent Researcher and Interamerican Development Bank Consultant, Bogota, Colombia.
Email: pa.mendez62@gmail.com
4
Assistant Professor, M.E. Rinker, Sr. School of Construction Management, Univ. of Florida,
Gainesville, FL (corresponding author). Email: gabriel.castelbl@ufl.edu
ABSTRACT
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a prevalent delivery method for large global
projects. Previous research has examined individual Egyptian PPP projects; however, there is a
notable absence of comprehensive analysis from a PPP program perspective, which is crucial to
gain deeper insights into the program’s overall outcomes, including total number of projects, the
invested capital value, and the extent of public funding. This paper proposes a system dynamics
model for a national PPP portfolio focusing on Egypt to address this gap. It aims to provide a
tool for practitioners and policymakers to study the entire PPP system and the factors affecting it.
Four causal loops show how policymakers and investors must balance economic growth with
social acceptability to develop effective infrastructure strategies. The findings demonstrated an
excessive reliance on the Egyptian PPP program in the energy sector and unsolicited proposals.
Hence, policies focused on strengthening public capacities to procure PPP projects may be
needed to counteract this tendency and enhance competition. The Egyptian PPP program can
also benefit by prioritizing investment in critical infrastructure projects, particularly in sectors
historically underfunded in the PPP program, such as ICT, which is critical for fostering the
benefits of Industry 4.0. This paper analyzes the national PPP program dynamics and offers PPP
decision-makers valuable approaches to improve project portfolio outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been on the rise in Egypt since initiating the first
project in 1998. Establishing a PPP Central Unit in 2006 also helped the PPP movement. This
movement also spread due to the delivery method's benefits to the public sector, such as reducing
the financial burden and using the private sector's expertise and financing. However, this method
does not come without its difficulties. One of the main complexities facing PPPs is the multitude
of stakeholders and their differing interests (Biziorek et al. 2023; Castelblanco and Guevara
2022; Marcellino et al. 2022). For example, the public sector focuses on value-for-money,
retained risks, and future revenue streams (Castelblanco et al. 2024; Li 2007; Ortiz et al. 2023;
Rojas et al. 2023).
On the other hand, the private sector mainly focuses on the risks they are responsible for and
the revenue generated to recoup their investment (Castelblanco et al. 2023; Guevara et al. 2023;
Salazar et al. 2024). These dynamics also manifest at a national scale since many stakeholders
© ASCE
Construction Research Congress 2024

are involved. Hence, understanding the performance of a national system of PPPs is crucial
(Biziorek et al. 2024; El Kawam et al. 2024; Pagoni and Patroklis 2019). Previous research has
focused on studying individual Egyptian PPP projects rather than the entire national program.
Hence, a comprehensive analysis from a PPP program perspective is absent, which is needed to
gain deeper insights into the whole program and its overall outcomes. Such a holistic analysis is
essential in providing public sector decision-makers with a more nuanced understanding of the
policy implications and in formulating targeted recommendations to enhance the overall
development of the PPP program in Egypt. This paper proposes a System Dynamics (SD) model
for a national PPP portfolio with a focus on Egypt. It aims to provide a tool for practitioners and
policymakers to study the entire PPP system and the factors affecting it.
Public-Private Partnerships in Egypt. Public-private partnerships have become a common
delivery method for projects worldwide. They have become especially attractive for projects in
Egypt over the years due to their many benefits. They have been used in diverse sectors, such as
water, wastewater treatment, transportation, and ports. According to the World Bank database,
24 projects were signed as PPPs in Egypt between 1998 and 2021. These projects include:
• Seven airports: El-Alamein Airport, Marsa Alam Airport, Hurghada Airport, Borg El
Arab Airport, Luxor Airport, Cairo international airport, and a bundle of five regional
airports.
• Four ICT-related projects:
• Eight port projects: Sokhna (2 phases), Suez Canal (2 phases), Alexandria International
Container Terminals, Damietta Port, Sokhna Port Bunkering, and East Port Said.
• Two treatment plants: New Cairo Wastewater Treatment Plant
• One waste management plant: Port Said waste management plant
• One water treatment plant: Gabal al Asfar Water Treatment Plant
• One railway: Cairo public monorail
However, the literature shows this is not an exhaustive list of PPPs contracted in Egypt.
Other reprojects include the Tahrir garage, Nile River Bus Ferry, Abu Rawash wastewater
treatment plant, Mouwassat specialized university hospital, and Smouha Maternity University
Hospital (Kamel et al. 2017). This portrays the diversity of the projects. These projects are
usually driven by two factors, a financial one and a technical one. The financial driver alleviates
some/all the financial burden from the government, while the technical one benefits from the
private sector's expertise. These diverse projects come with complexities emanating from the
multiple parties involved. This multitude of parties in a PPP requires that we study them and the
dynamics involved. To do so, SD has been proposed as a modeling technique to portray the
stakeholders involved, the dynamics, and the factors affecting these unique projects.
Previous research has analyzed PPPs in Egypt from multiple perspectives. Kamel et al.
(2017) provided a historical background of PPPs in Egypt and discussed Law 67/2010, which
provided a legal framework for PPPs. Othman and Khallaf (2022) studied the critical success
factors and barriers affecting renewable energy. Badran (2013) identified the top 59 risks
affecting PPPs and grouped them into nine categories. However, research is missing in analyzing
Egyptian PPPs based on actual data from a program perspective.
SD in PPP Research. SD is a popular modeling and simulation technique for complex
problems. It considers the dynamics relationship between complex and continuously changing
systems and enables an understanding of their performance over a period of time (Castelblanco
et al., 2022). It is driven by circular causality, which shows up in stocks, flows, and feedback
loops. Previous literature has used SD to study PPPs for qualitative or quantitative measures.
© ASCE

According to Pagoni and Georgiadis (2019), research on SD for PPPs can be classified into
several topics, which are demand forecast (Alasad et al. 2013), construction risks (Nasirzadeh et
al. 2008a, Nasirzadeh et al. 2008b, Nasirzadeh et al. 2008c) concession period (Khanzadi et al.
2012); allocation of construction risks (Nasirzadeh et al. 2014); concession price (Xu et al.
2012); infrastructure performance (Páez‐Pérez and Sánchez‐Silva 2016); construction risk
assessment (Boateng et al. 2012); financial assessment (Sihombing 2017); and construction price
(Ismail Kassim et al. 2015).
Pagoni and Georgiadis (2019) proposed a SD model to assess national PPP projects
regarding social and financial sustainability. Xu et al. (2012) developed a SD model to determine
the concession price for highway projects. Khanzadi et al. (2012) and Kamel et al. (2017) used
SD to determine the concession period for BOT projects. The latter focused on BOT projects in
Egypt. Nasirzadeh et al. (2008a) used SD to assess the effect of risks on the project performance
during the construction phase. Alasad et al. (2013) created an SD model for demand forecasting
in toll road projects. Li (2007) proposed a SD model to assess the applicability of financing
schemes while considering the benefits for the public, private, and society. Most of the literature
has focused on the concession duration, risks, or financing aspects of a specific PPP or PPP type.
Therefore, this paper provides a unique viewpoint on PPPs at a national level to observe the
underlying dynamics between the factors involved. The following section describes the
methodology followed in this paper.
METHODOLOGY
This paper proposes a SD model for understanding the behavior of complex relationships
within Egypt's national PPP program portfolio. It includes the entire framework of endogenous
and exogenous variables in the system to depict its behavior. Several factors were obtained from
the literature that affects PPP at the national level to identify the feedback loops that explain the
behavior of the PPP program and subsequent quantitative simulations.
SD was chosen purposely due to its potential as an effective practitioner learning tool. One of
its standout in comparison to traditional quantitative modeling approaches is the ability of SD to
represent causal relationships and feedback loops visually. It offers practitioners an intuitive
understanding of the intricate factors that shape the concession period. By presenting these
interactions and their impact on the final result, SD aids in identifying vital influential factors.
Moreover, SD seamlessly integrates quantitative simulations, providing insights into how the
system evolves, thus enhancing the practitioners' comprehension of the dynamic nature of the
system.
The development of the Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) for the Egyptian PPP program began
with a review of the literature on PPPs and infrastructure development at large. Based on the
literature review, the initial version of the CLD was developed. This version was refined through
accurate data from the Egyptian PPP program. Quantitative simulations were conducted using
Vensim software to understand the Egyptian PPP program's behavior. The simulations focused
on four key variables: the number of PPP projects developed, the capital value invested by the
private sector, the revenues paid by the public sector and users, and the cumulative public budget
required for paying the revenues to the PPPs in the long term. The simulations were conducted
separately for each infrastructure sector to identify their individual contributions to the whole
program.
SD Model. A CLD was created to understand complex systems and the interplay between the
procurement of PPPs, infrastructure gap, economic growth, and social acceptability in Egypt.
© ASCE

Four causal loops were identified, as shown in Figure 1. The R1 and B1 loops show how
infrastructure gaps can be closed efficiently through PPPs while creating a reinforcing cycle of
increasing GDP and more PPP procurement. The R2 and B2 loops illustrate how social
acceptability is affected by the number of PPP projects developed and their financial burden.
Understanding these loops is critical for policymakers and investors to design and implement
effective infrastructure development strategies that balance economic growth with social
acceptability.
Figure 1. CLD
The first reinforcing loop (R1) represents a virtuous cycle where increasing the PPPs'
procurement leads to greater GDP and more tax collections, enabling more PPP procurement.
The more PPPs procured, the greater the multiplier effect of infrastructure investment, which
leads to higher GDP per capita. This, in turn, results in higher tax collections, which increases
the public sector's ability to procure more PPPs, thus closing the infrastructure gap. The first
balancing loop (B1) creates a stable equilibrium where PPPs are procured to close the
infrastructure gap. The greater the infrastructure gap, the greater the need for PPPs to complete
it. However, as more PPP projects are procured to address the gap, the gap shrinks, reducing
demand for PPPs.
The remaining two loops (B2 and R2) relate to the coexistence of opposite behaviors in the
social acceptability of PPPs. B2 creates a stable equilibrium where the social acceptability of
PPPs is balanced against the financial burden on users and the public sector. As the social
acceptability of PPPs increases, more projects are developed. However, as more PPPs are
developed, the financial burden rises on users and the public sector, eroding social acceptability.
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in developing new PPP projects. Simultaneously, in R2, the
more PPPs supplied, the more jobs are created, leading to increased social acceptability. This, in
turn, incentivizes the development of more PPPs and the greater capital value invested by the
private sector, leading to higher revenues in the long term that the public sector and users must
pay. This erosion of social acceptability creates a disincentive for procuring new PPPs.
© ASCE

Table 1 shows that the Egyptian PPP program has reached a significant size with a total
capital value of over $15 billion. The average concession period ranges from 9 to 30 years, with
railways having the most prolonged concession period of 30 years. The Egyptian PPP program
relies significantly on unsolicited proposals in most sectors except energy (see Table 1).
Contrasted with solicited proposals, in unsolicited proposals, private companies submit proposals
to the government without any prior request from the public sector typically to address the public
sector's lack of innovation and institutional capacity. Previous literature has pointed out multiple
issues derived from a high reliance on unsolicited proposals (Castelblanco and Guevara 2020;
Nyagormey et al. 2020; Osei-Kyei et al. 2020). While unsolicited proposals have the potential to
bring innovation and new ideas to the table, they also entail relevant weaknesses, such as the lack
of competition in the tendering process. In the case of unsolicited proposals, however, there may
be no competition, and the government may not have any benchmark for the price or quality of
the proposed project, resulting in not achieving the best value for money, lack of transparency,
and accountability (Nyagormey et al. 2020).
Moreover, unsolicited proposals may trigger conflicts of interest due to existing relationships
with the government officials responsible for evaluating the proposal. Due to their existing
relationship with the private company, government officials may be more inclined to approve the
proposal, regardless of its merits, jeopardizing fairness and transparency (Osei-Kyei et al. 2020).
Unsolicited proposals can also lead to a lack of alignment between the government's priorities
and the private company's agenda (Castelblanco and Guevara 2020). This may result in a waste
of resources and a suboptimal outcome for the public sector funding PPPs since this unsolicited
proposal focuses primarily on the private sector's return. Lastly, evaluating and processing
unsolicited proposals requires significant time and resources from the public sector and may
divert resources away from other essential areas, leading to delays in implementing critical
infrastructure projects.
Table 1. Summary of the Data Set
Average Total
Average Capital Percentage Capital
Number Concession Value of Value
Infrastructure of Period (million Unsolicited (million
Type Projects (Years) USD) Proposals USD)
Airports 7 28 79.66 100 398.30
Energy 33 24 142.08 18 4688.73
ICT 4 15 414.90 100 1659.60
Natural Gas 2 25 344.50 100 689.00
Ports 8 29 345.01 75 2415.10
Railways 1 30 5018.85 100 5018.85
Waste 4 9 175.73 50 527.19
Treatment
TOTAL 59 24 277.62 47 15546.77
The Egyptian PPP program has procured 59 projects in airports, energy, ICT, natural gas,
ports, railways, and waste treatment (World Bank). Figure 2 shows that the PPP program had a
slow start; however, the number of projects gradually increased over time, driven predominantly
© ASCE

by Energy PPPs as the most active infrastructure type boosted since the mid-2010s. The high
capital value of these projects shows the potential for the private sector to invest in the country's
energy sector and the importance of energy infrastructure for the country's development.
Complementary ports and airports also had a significant number of projects initiated over time
with a steep growth.
Figure 2. Projects procured by the sector
In analyzing the capital value invested by the private sector for PPPs, some notable trends in
the PPP capital value invested were unraveled. For example, railways became the infrastructure
sector receiving the highest capital investment from the private sector, followed by energy (see
Figure 3). This contrast with the number of projects in which Railways had the least
representative participation. Moreover, both infrastructure types have been strengthened
significantly since the mid-2010s. Ports constituted the third most representative infrastructure
sector according to the capital value invested by the private sector, with a steady development
since the early 2000s contrasting with most of the remaining infrastructure sectors.
Figure 3. Capital Value Invested by the Private Sector
© ASCE

Figure 4 presents the revenues paid by the public sector in the long run for each infrastructure
type. As a result of the concentration on PPPs procured in railways and energy in the mid-2010s,
PPP program revenues increased sharply between years 25 and 30 (when most of these projects
started the operation phase), after which they gradually decreased. This behavior is problematic
for the public sector because it increases the fiscal pressure in a short period, contrasting with the
behavior of the rest of the infrastructure types that effectively distribute the revenues in the long
term.
Figure 4. PPP Revenues paid by the Public Sector and Users
Figure 5 shows the net public budget invested for retributing the particular purpose vehicle
considering the accumulation of the revenues paid minus the capital value invested by the private
sector for developing the PPPs. Overall, three infrastructure types are the main drivers of the PPP
program based on this indicator: ports, energy, and railways.
Figure 5. Cumulated Public Budget for PPP Payments
© ASCE

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations. This study proposed a SD model to understand

the interplay between PPPs, infrastructure gaps, economic growth, and social acceptability of
PPPs from a national program perspective. Four causal loops were identified, representing a
virtuous cycle and a stable equilibrium for PPPs to close the infrastructure gap efficiently while
increasing GDP and tax collection. Two balancing loops showed how the social acceptability of
PPPs is affected by the number of PPP projects developed and their financial burden.
Based on the findings presented in the paper, the following section discusses the policy
recommendations. Since the energy sector is the most active infrastructure type in the Egyptian
PPP program, policymakers need to increase the focus on sustainable energy in PPP projects.
Policymakers should prioritize sustainable energy solutions to maximize the social benefits of
these projects. This includes promoting renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power,
which can provide long-term economic and environmental benefits (Guevara et al. 2022; Ruiz
and Guevara 2021; Salazar et al. 2021). Moreover, future research should analyze this
infrastructure sector in the Egyptian PPP program.
Policymakers and investors should carefully consider the social acceptability of PPP projects,
as it can significantly impact their success in balancing infrastructure development with social
acceptability. Understanding the causal loops identified in the model proposed can assist in
designing and implementing effective infrastructure development strategies that balance
economic growth with social acceptability.
Policymakers should encourage competition in the tendering process to ensure that the best
value for money is achieved and to increase transparency and accountability in PPP projects by
critically assessing the convenience of such excessive reliance on unsolicited proposals. Policies
focused on reducing the dependence on unsolicited proposals and promoting solicited proposals
are highly recommended. Moreover, the public sector must enhance clear evaluation criteria and
benchmarks for the price and quality of proposed projects. Policymakers should also prioritize
investment in critical infrastructure projects, particularly in industries historically underfunded in
the PPP program, such as ICT. This infrastructure type is critical for fostering the benefits of
Industry 4.0. By implementing these policy recommendations, policymakers and investors can
promote sustainable infrastructure development that balances economic growth with social
acceptability, encourage competition and transparency in the tendering process, and prioritize
investment in critical infrastructure projects that can have a significant impact on the country's
development.
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Conference Paper · March 2024

Jose Guevara Paula Méndez-González

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Table 1. Summary of the Data Set

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Figure 2. Projects procured by the sector

Figure 3. Capital Value Invested by the Private Sector

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Figure 4. PPP Revenues paid by the Public Sector and Users

Figure 5. Cumulated Public Budget for PPP Payments

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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations. This study proposed a SD model to understand

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Castelblanco, G., E. M. Fenoaltea, A. De Marco, P. Demagistris, S. Petruzzi, and D. Zeppegno.

Construction Research Congress 2024

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