42

YEMEN
The case of politics, tribes, and instability
Bakeel Alzandani

Introduction
Before and after doctoral study in the US, during my field trips to Yemen in the 2000s to study
the resilience of political structures there, spending time with the country’s tribes was necessary.
Tribes are very much part of the country’s political system. They influence it and they are, in
a way, in ongoing struggle with it. The state attempts to dominate Yemeni politics. So do the
tribes. It takes time and travel to many parts of Yemen to obtain information and learn about
how tribes and state form Yemeni politics. No pioneering work as such has yet been done on
Yemeni politics, and this is where I think there is much room for improving work done by good
scholars, Yemeni and non-Yemeni. I personally wanted to focus on the extent to which tribal
politics (internal dimension) influenced state politics such as political parties, and civil society
(external dimension). Do, for instance, differences between the tribes (size, wealth, sect, and
foreign relations) serve as an important factor in the study of state-tribe politics? Addressing this
question is not easy. To explore the subject properly, one needs to have the trust of tribes and
be accepted as a trusted researcher who is regarded as neutral, moral, and even apolitical. At the
same time, it is difficult to be apolitical in Yemen, as tribes have their own politics, even if they
are not too involved in state politics. And this does not mean they do not have political views
on the state or other tribes, even if they try not to compete for a share of the resources the state
gives to tribes under various conditions.
In my own ongoing research (which has been interrupted by the war in Yemen, as I cannot
visit the country for political reasons), I have pondered the tribal pattern of politics. In each tribe
one finds different expectations from the state.

1 There are tribes that see the state as the right place to be. Absence from the state is taken
to be dangerous to the tribe and its people. All that is offered by the state—whether official
posts, seats in parliament, party links, security and military posts, funds, or jobs—must be
pursued. The question is how to do that: formally or informally, and peacefully or via use
of “harder” methods such as flexing muscle.
2 There are “shy” tribes that leave politics to others and are happy to play a secondary role to
tribes that are more powerful. The politics of these tribes is about ensuring they receive a
share of the resources the state gives, in return for cooperation or a non-hostile attitude.

592
 Yemen

3 Tribes of neutral position are very difficult to find in Yemen. When one talks to the tribes,
however, all state that they are neutral actors. Neutrality brings no benefits, and therefore,
even when tribes declare to be neutral in their statements, in their politics, they are not.

Thus, from observations in my ongoing study of tribes and politics in Yemen, these “profiles”
seem to be the most obvious whether in contemporary and traditional politics. This continuity
is one notable feature of Yemeni politics. When researching the difference between contem-
porary and traditional politics, one has to use these profiles as criteria. The “trade-offs” are the
same. However, the mechanisms of such trade-offs have changed. Political parties have grown
into tribal “agents”, in some instances. Parties are controlled by tribes, not the opposite. This
has added a new dimension to politics: a modern form of organization that would not survive
without the tribe (Bakr 1995). However, the tribe can do so without the party. Parties and their
leaders played cooperative roles such as mediation, reconciliation, lobbying, and bargaining for
better deals or same share of resources. In other instances, parties and their leaders acted to
defend their own interests, including those of the tribe very opportunistically to force conces-
sions from the state.This side of politics can be aggressive, especially when demanding a share of
threatened resources and positions. Sometimes, defending party and tribe are not that different
from each other. This is the case even when the ruling party (the state) seems to be dominant
and other parties look weak and dependent. Much work remains to be done to develop a cohe-
sive explanation of the relationships between tribes (tribe–tribe) and between them and politics
(tribe–state). This could help scholars understand Yemeni politics and types of tribal profiles.
In this chapter, I argue that an examination of the interplay between tribal and party struc-
tures, loyalties, and patronage is key to understanding Yemeni politics. I briefly examine the
country’s trajectory of persistent instability, from unification and its failure, to secessionist move-
ments, to the 2011 uprising against the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, to his comeback
in 2017 and re-alliance with the Houthis, from the perspective of this tribe–party dynamic.
I conclude with some advice to researchers on Yemeni politics, particularly those conducting
fieldwork.

Political parties in Yemen: a research puzzle

Why do we study political parties in Yemen and tribes? Partly because it is part of the “search
for Arab democracy” (Sadiki 2004), or at least understanding the complexities of Yemeni and
Arab authoritarianism, generally. More particularly, I think the answer to the question can be
found in the fact that Yemen’s elites gave us Yemenis false hopes. The years before unification
many believed in the dream of returning at last partly the idea of “Arabia Felix” or happy Arabia
(Retsö 2002)—what Yemenis call al-yaman al-said. According to some,Yemen should be treated
as part of a larger “Arabia” (Carapico 2004). There were high expectations that Yemeni elites
would persist with electoral reform, and lead the country to higher achievements, economi-
cally, democratically, and regionally. May 22, 1990, the date of unification of the two halves (the
Yemen Arab Republic in the north, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the
south), renewed hope of a better future for a country with so much potential (vast surface area,
large population, and plenty of goods to trade internationally, oil, coffee) (Al-Qasimi 1991).
From unification to the 2011 uprisings, Yemen failed in three ways: 1) political reform never
took off in a solid way and did not surpass what Sadiki (2009b) calls “electoral fetishism”, a
phrase used to describe routine elections that never result in democratic institutions; 2) unifica-
tion was imposed by force in the 1994 war, and this caused problems which still complicate
politics in Yemen; and 3) the failure to unify a country with naturally social, geographical,

593
 Bakeel Alzandani

demographic, ideological and sectarian elements of pluralism. It is in this history that one finds
the origins of ongoing violence today in Yemen. Partly, that history goes back to the division
within Islam (e.g. the Zaidis whose Imams had ruled the north in the ninth century), the Otto-
mans who created a short-lived kingdom (Kingdom of Yemen), and the British, who contrib-
uted to division through the creation of a state, in an already divided south, before they left in
1967. Five years later, a republic in the north obtained independence. The north-south divide
never really stopped before and after independence of the republics of the north (with Arab and
Saudi backing) and the south (with Soviet support and Marxist ideology) (Badib 1990). Hence,
1972, 1979, and 1994 are all wars that left distrust between and resulted in political setbacks for
the two halves, even after unification in 1994. I make the following observation here. Yemen
shares with other Arab countries a common component of state failure to reduce corruption
and poverty, and address issues of social justice. Political turmoil and popular unrest results from
people speaking out against worsening living conditions and political exclusion (Sadiki 2000).
One factor that has helped Yemeni unification is weak regional and international actors:
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 helped the process of unification in 1990 as the south
lost an important international sponsor (Ben Haarib 1990). Today, regional players who seek
influence in Yemen (e.g. the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Iran, Saudi Arabia) and local actors
(Houthi militias) undermine peace-making in the country, and, of course, unification. Plans for
confederation or federation never met with agreement between north and south. The Houthis
add a new dimension of complication, and a regional power (Iran) that is happy to conduct war
by proxy in Yemen, indefinitely. Elites, northern and southern, and key players, including the late
President Ali Abdullah Saleh, are partly responsible for failing to consolidate unification. What
Yemen lacked was the institutions to deepen unification (Shamiry 1984).The division was obvi-
ous in the way political reform was executed through a process that relied solely on sharing of
votes only. Northern parties (Saleh’s General People’s Congress [GPC], and the Yemen Alliance
for Reform, known as Al-Islah) won most of the seats for that part of the country and so did
their counterparts in the south (Yemeni Socialist Party; [YSP]). Nasserist and Ba’athist parties
were left a minority of seats (Table 42.1). This actually deepened division, not unification. The
way the vote ended up being cut up in the 1993 elections was evidence of lasting north-south
divide, not proof of a new era of a united Yemen (Carapico 1993). Even the 48 seats won by
independents joined the Deputies’ Council (Majlis Al-Nuwab) or parliament, either as GPC or
as YSP deputies.

Table 42.1 Election results, 27 April 1993—Majlis Al-Nuwab,Yemen

Political Party Number of Seats

General People’s Congress 122

Al-Islah 62
Yemen’s Socialist Party 56
Independents 48
Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party 6
The Truth Party 2
United Democratic Front 1
Nasserist Correction Group 1
Nasserist Popular Union 1

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1993)

594
 Yemen

Division is endemic, and it is political. Elites have made it. Thus, the puzzle of studying
political parties in Yemen is significant for three interconnected dimensions: tribes, division, and
authoritarian politics.What makes the puzzle interesting is the fact that tribes are actually unify-
ing structures, but they are at the same time divisive. So are political parties: they bring Yemenis
together under the same political umbrella, yet they have played a major role in dividing Yem-
enis. There is a reason for this. They bring together people who are already socialized into tribal
identities. Authoritarianism complicates Yemeni politics because its worst features, especially of
power monopoly and patriarchy, predispose members and leaders to direct loyalty to patrimonial
figures. Here we have a combination of traditional and modern influences. So, Yemenis hold
elections but “without democracy”. Their tribes unify them, but patrimonial patterns of leader-
ship mean they undermine leadership of political parties. People vote along tribal affiliation first.
Tribal elders are mediums for doing deals with the state: seeking goods that they distribute to
keep followers loyal, and submissive. Tribal identities are not easy to shake off.
In my ongoing research of political parties and tribes, I have learnt that political party for-
mation was a secretive affair in pre-unification Yemen before 1990, due to the fear of political
persecution at the hands of the ruling party’s intelligence services. The GPC had dominated
northern Yemen and the YSP ruled southern Yemen, and they both wanted to limit any poten-
tial opposition to their control of their territories. However, many political organizations existed,
pre-unification, with the dominant parties of the GPC and YSP. The Baathists, nationalists, Nas-
serists, and Islamists contributed to a diverse political stage without a democratic transforma-
tion. Outside of Yemen, other political organizations conducted their political activities out of
the reach of the security apparatus of the GPC in northern Yemen and of the YSP in southern
Yemen.

Tribes unite and divide Yemenis and Yemen

In this section, I show the strong connection between politics and tribes. I show how tribes
make politics and the state. The state, then, gives them the resources to stay in power and
powerful. The role of tribes is sometimes more significant than that of political parties, which
themselves have never been able to ignore tribes. Unification of Yemen was made possible on
the basis of a power-sharing agreement involving the two ruling parties of the GPC and YSP,
represented by Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Salem al-Beid, respectively. New political organiza-
tions were formed following the unification of Yemen along different ideological, tribal, and
political interests, including the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the Liberal Party, and the Unionist
Forces. Left-wing organizations were created and led by Nasserists and socialists. On the Islamist
end of the spectrum, the parties were formed like the Sunni Muhammadiyah Groups and the
Islamic Labor Party (Gochenour 1984). Because of the flexibility of the party formation law, the
Yemeni political scene experienced a rapid transformation due to the proliferation of political
parties. The establishment of numerous political parties in the early period of unification was a
sign of the lack of centralization and the inability of a single party to dominate Yemen without
the support of other political organizations.Yemeni society was divided according to a complex
tribal system, and the success of political parties depended on creating a clientelist network of
supporters based on distribution of material resources and official positions in the party and in
government and tribal solidarity.
Saleh’s time in power from governor of northern Yemen to 2010 was evidence of his abil-
ity of bring various groups and forces in Yemeni society together under a common agenda.
The tribal structure heavily influenced the balance of power that Saleh tried to maintain in a
decentralized country (Sadiki 2009a). The GPC was not a political party in the normal sense

595
 Bakeel Alzandani

of the term. Yemeni political parties, including the GPC, acted as coalitions advocating for the
varied interests of tribes whose leaders wanted a share of state resources that was then distrib-
uted among their followers. Electoral success for the GPC, in fact, took advantage of the limita-
tions of Yemen’s tribal structure. Allegations of electoral manipulation were levelled at Saleh and
his interference in the Supreme Commission of Elections and Referendum (SCER) that was
responsible for organizing elections and maintaining the voter registry. National elections were
said to have been rigged in favour of the GPC, and electoral laws were amended to eliminate the
competitive potential of the various political forces and currents (Carapico 2003).
Different ideological orientations among Yemeni political parties ranging from 20–50,
according to some estimates, show the lack of a dominant ideology (Al-Yemeni 2003). Many
of these political parties have their basis in Islamist, nationalist, or leftist trends. But the complex
tribal system is the predominant factor in garnering popular support among Yemenis and chal-
lenging their opponents. The importance of the tribe in Yemeni politics is due to the weak-
ness of civil society organizations formed on the lines of profession and class interests. Political
organizations have been created to defend and advocate an Islamist agenda or as a vehicle for
tribal solidarity to get state resources in a decentralized society (Al-Dhahiri 1996).Yemen’s rul-
ing party after the unification of the country is a clear example of the important function of
the tribes for political parties to get and remain in power. The GPC was founded in 1982 under
the chairmanship of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and dominated Yemen in a diverse political and tribal
alliance until 2011. The former ruling party did not have a clear ideology.
Saleh’s GPC attempted to create and maintain political parties that were dependent on his
clientelist network of politicians and tribal leaders in a process called “multiplying parties”
(Dresch 2000, p. 211). Political allegiance and obedience to Saleh was made possible as a result of
the alliances he made for the purpose of maintaining a balance of power among Yemen’s various
tribal groups and confederations.The Islamist Islah (Reform) was also included in Saleh’s politi-
cal balancing act. He had assigned the role of his allies, the Muslim Brotherhood, to confront its
opponents; after unity, they considered the political battle of their duty alone (Longley 2007).
Although Islah is known as the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Yemen, it has leaders from the
hardline faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as tribal and Wahhabi leaders (Schwedler
2004). The role of tribes in ideological movements can be seen in Islah’s formation in 13 Sep-
tember 1990 by Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and Muhammad ibn
Abdullah al-Yidumi. It was previously known as the Islamic Front, which emerged with Saudi
support in 1979.
The al-Ahmar family come from the powerful Hashid tribal confederation that also includes
Saleh and some of his most important allies (Dresch 1989). The effectiveness of Saleh’s strat-
egy of using Islamists against socialists where Ahmar were given the responsibility to strike the
Socialist Party morally, and they succeeded in inciting the Socialist Party and calling it a Marxist
party.The elements of the Reform carried out assassinations of numerous leaders in the Socialist
Party (Halliday 1995).
Secessionist breakaway attempts in 1994 were stopped when Saleh’s pro-unionist alliance
defeated the socialist forces in Yemen’s south. Military groups from GPC and the Islamist Islah
cooperated to protect the unification of Yemen agreed in 1990. The YSP dominated the south-
ern Yemen from the late 1970s, and its leadership became unhappy with the outcome of the
power-sharing agreement guaranteeing Yemen’s unification (Al-Sarraaf 1992). Al-Beid’s resig-
nation from the GPC-YSP coalition led to the civil war of the mid-1990s. After the end of
this conflict, the YSP’s Marxist-Leninist agenda was revised. Political cooperation between the
CPC and Islah led to the formation of a formal coalition government from 1994–1997. Islah
obtained the second largest share of parliamentary seats behind the GPC in Yemeni elections.

596
 Yemen

The YSP had boycotted the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1997 and 1999 that led
to the continued electoral successes of GCP and Islah, and their domination of Yemeni politics.
Islah was a reliable ally again in the conflict between Saleh’s government and the Hou-
this beginning in 2004. Thus, Abdullah al-Ahmar was elected to the position of parliamentary
speaker until 2007 because a voting bloc was created from the coalition government and after its
dissolution. Saada in northern Yemen was the location of a war led by General Ali Mohsen al-
Ahmar, who was a senior member of the ruling party GPC and also linked to Islamist Islah and
Salafi politicians and militias. Growing Islamist power made Saleh fearful and led to a “cold war”
of sorts between the GPC and the Islah Party at the start of the twenty-first century (Schwedler
2006). Political rivalries in Yemen continued as a result of the formation of the Joint Meeting
Parties (JMP) bloc in 2002. Opposition parties such as the YSP, Popular Forces Union Party,
and Zaydi al-Haqq Party were its founding organizations, followed by Islamist Islah and Nas-
serists joining in 2005. Their support for Saleh’s presidential contender showed the increasing
weakness of the president’s ability to keep together his clientelist network of tribes and Islamists.
The JMP became a coalition of socialists and Islamists who were united by their opposition to
Saleh’s continued reign (Phillips 2007). Although the leadership of Islah expressed their backing
for the opposing presidential candidate in 2006, Abdullah al-Ahmar decided to break with the
consensus of his party and supported Saleh for another term as president.

The politics of the GCP, Houthis and southern forces: divisive politics
The divisions within Islah were also seen in the splitting of the GCP following Saleh’s resigna-
tion and comeback to political life between 2012 and 2017. Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who
had succeeded Saleh as president of Yemen, organized and participated in a national dialogue
that was aimed together signatories in a peace agreement based on a national consensus during
2014. A federal system allocating autonomy to the country’s main political actors was agreed that
also recognized the right of southerners to determine their own internal affairs. However, two
factions emerged by the end of 2014 from within the ruling party. Saleh’s faction was opposed
to Hadi’s faction in escalating violence after the former president’s assets were frozen in 2014
following the United Nations Security Council’s decision. Saada’s Houthis who were once one
of Saleh’s most bitter enemies (Glosemeyer 2004) entered into an alliance with him against his
former allies.The Houthis were not a political party in the strictest sense. It was a northern Yem-
eni political movement that combined armed weapons with an ideological platform inspired
by its Zaydi political history. The Houthi-Saleh alliance pushed back the military forces of Hadi
and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and took over most of Yemeni territory, including the capital Sanaa.
As the anti-Saleh demonstrations intensified, the popular Southern Movement that was founded
by former military and security officers forced into retirement also backed this protest cam-
paign and Secretary General Abdullah Hasan al-Nakhbi announced the temporary suspension
of its demands for secession (Aljazeera 2011). The Southern Movement’s political positions had
changed in response to the events that challenged Yemen’s balance of power among its various
tribes, militias, and political parties. Different factions in the separatist group vary from those
demanding total independence and view the Sanaa government as an occupier, to others who
would be content with equal autonomy in a federal national system.

Tribes and patronage

This view is not unique: tribal rivalries and alliances in Yemen are the principal dynamics of poli-
tics in the country. Political actors have created and developed relationships with various tribes at

597
 Bakeel Alzandani

various intervals.Yemen has long been divided according to religious, ideological, economic, and
tribal lines. Clientelism and patronage have left their mark on how the tribes have vied for con-
trol over political office, resources, and territory (Phillips 2008). It was tribal support that partly
made of Ali Abdullah Saleh a leader. This is a hypothesis I stated previously. Thus, Saleh was able
to deftly negotiate the complex process of bargaining with the most influential Yemeni political
parties and tribes depending on the situation. Unification of north and south Yemen in 1989
further brought into closer proximity different tribes in a wider space of competition. However,
getting power with tribal support is something; using tribal support to promote democracy is
something else. I believe that this is one puzzle which remains without little research: the eleva-
tion of Saleh to a position of power holding together a previously divided country did not bring
democracy (Al-Shahari 1990). Of course, one must not just blame tribes for everything bad hap-
pening in Yemen. One reason for tribal involvement in politics the fact that a unitary state had
been absent in Yemen. One repercussion of this is that no singular political culture existed for the
process of centralization. Saleh was sensitive to the need to retain his power through a patronage
network that distributed largess and positions in various government ministries. Partial domi-
nation of Yemen could be accomplished because of the essentially divided and decentralized
centres of political power in a tribal environment (Glosemeyer 1999). But Saleh’s attempts to
consolidate his control were characterized by challenges such as the failed secession of the south
in 1994 and the war that he waged to assert authority.The combination of the lack of an effective
modern state and autonomous tribes led to the partial dominance of Saleh’s regime-based politi-
cal bargaining. This created an unstable status quo (Longley 2010b). Nation-building in this part
of the Arabian Peninsula has been an interrupted process (Wedeen 2008). External intervention
(Gause 1990) and local divisive factors have pushed Yemen in the direction of the apparent col-
lapse of state structures. However, this account ignores the history of Yemen with its tradition of
Zaydi imamate in the north and Ottoman and later colonial rule in the south.Tribes have played
an instrumental role as political actors contributing to either stability or instability, depending on
the circumstances. In either case, they have helped the strengthening of authoritarian rule. They
wanted to maintain resources obtained from power holders, and power holders, especially the
late Ali Abdullah Saleh, wanted allies—and fighting tribes that kept him safe in power.
Tribes and power holders have made this kind of trade-off among the most important rule
of Yemen’s political game. The rule of law has not traditionally depended on a central political
authority exercising a monopoly on the means and use of violence. Policing and security func-
tions were a critical part of the very existence of tribes, and their ability to secure concessions
from political authorities in the political bargaining process depended on their effectiveness.
These political authorities, including Saleh himself, were eager to get the loyalty and support
of various tribes and clans. Political settlements such as the unification of Yemen at the end of
the Cold War rest on an uneasy equilibrium of conflicting parties. As Clive Jones argues about
Yemen, there is a “political field” that is:

constantly renegotiated or indeed contested amid a patrimonial order that (1) has
privileged particular tribes to ensure regime longevity and (2) extended or withheld
material largesse to actors, both tribal and political, to ensure immediate gains. Even
with the removal of Saleh and his immediate entourage from power, the character of
this political field remains beholden to a tribal order.
(2011, p. 906)

Successful political action requires direct engagement with an entrenched decentralized social
system. A patronage system distributing wealth, arms, territory, and official positions to tribes

598
 Yemen

has often occurred at the expense of institution-building within the state (Sharif 2002). The
periphery is empowered at the same time as the centre’s hold is secure, as long as the clients are
satisfied with their share of national resources and have confidence in the patron’s future.

The Arab Spring protests and the end of Saleh’s regime

Another hypothesis, in light of the preceding, may be that Saleh failed to limit the power of
the tribes; instead, they ended his power. The new protests in Yemen during 2011, which were
inspired by the successful examples of mass demonstrations and the overthrow of the presidents
of Tunisia and Egypt, give an important background against which one can analyze the end
of Saleh’s regime. Decades of inept neo-patrimonial rule, poverty, and instability under Saleh’s
rule helped foment revolutionary calls (Phillips 2011). Popular demands for democracy, human
rights, and the end of Saleh’s reign were increasing in volume and numbers. Political activists
had mobilized their fellow citizens around a set of core objectives that echoed those being made
in other parts of the Arab Middle East in this period (Al-Sakkaf 2011). The response coming
from Saleh and his forces to the protests and their demands contrasted starkly with the pledge he
made not to run for office again. Counter-protests attended by pro-Saleh tribes were organized
by the Saleh regime, attempting to display its popular credentials. Conciliatory rhetoric was not
enough to mollify the deeply sceptical protesters and Saleh’s loyal tribal allies who defected to
the increasing ranks of those calling for the struggling president to resign and a new transitional
government be installed. A new coalition of groups was formed in complete opposition to Saleh.
Former rivals such the tribes of Mikhlaf, Murad, Jadaan, and al-Ans, the Houthis, and Yemenis in
the south, including the separatist al-Hirak al-Janoubi (the Southern Movement), and the north
were united in a common cause expressed in peaceful protests throughout Yemen’s public places
(Perkins 2017, p. 310).
The uneasy equilibrium that Saleh kept balancing was tipping against him probably due
to the contradictory strategy to persuade the protesters he would step down from office after
2013, organizing pro-Saleh counterparts and using violence against anti-Saleh protesters. By
the spring of 2011, the targeting of protesters appears to have provoked General Ali Mohsen
al-Ahmar, a senior member of Saleh’s ruling clique, to defect to the opposition and pledge to
protect protesters from any further violence at the hands of the regime. The al-Ahmar family
leading the Hashid tribal confederation also threw its weight behind the increasing pressure
for Saleh to leave power. Islah Party, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, declared
its support for political change and participated in anti-Saleh mass demonstrations. Large-scale
violence in Yemen soon gripped the country. Saleh lost support from within the regime and
among important segments of the tribal structure. He was even the subject of a failed assassina-
tion attempt that further revealed his insecure hold on political power without essential tribal
backing in his patronage networks. Saleh’s response to losing political and tribal allies was his
increasing reliance on his immediate family and of his clan, the Sanhan Hashid, which had not
yet defected. Growing isolation of Saleh within the Hashid tribal confederation left him with
Yahya Saleh, his nephew, in the Central Security Service and Ahmed Ali Saleh, his son, in the
Republication Guard (Jones 2011, p. 907).

Rise of the Houthis and Saleh’s comeback

The Houthis had fought a war with Saleh’s forces in the decade before the Arab Spring appeared
in 2010. The protests against Saleh eventually weakened his hold on power that was based on
the patronage network among the various tribes of Yemen (Longley 2010a). Many senior tribal

599
 Bakeel Alzandani

figures who had proved to be reliable allies in the fight against the Houthis now defected from
Saleh’s ranks and declared their public support for the protesters and the end of his regime. Con-
flict mediation by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) eventually negotiated and imposed
a deal in summer 2011 that would lead to Saleh stepping down and making way for his vice-
president, Abdrabbuh Mansour al-Hadi, to become president in a new unity government. Anti-
regime protests, defections from the Yemeni ruling tribal clique, and external interference in a
period of months disturbed the balance of power Saleh worked very hard to create and man-
age for over 30 years. The Yemeni strongman finally signed the GCC-sponsored agreement in
November 2011. Yemen’s new government lacked both firm control over the security forces
and popular support within a divided tribal society, as Saleh’s relatives still occupied powerful
positions.
Al-Hadi faced the dilemma of coming to terms with political actors who wanted to protect
their own interests. Southern separatists and northern Houthis further complicated al-Hadi’s
attempt to consolidate his own powerbase through a series of meetings with these actors on
autonomy for their regions. However, assassinations of key political figures and continued fight-
ing between the GCC-backed government and the Houthis stoked fears of an impending
civil war. An already precarious centre was further weakened, creating an opportunity for the
Houthis to emerge from the periphery to attempt to become Yemen’s chief powerbrokers. The
Houthis defeated Yemeni government forces and occupied Sanaa. Saleh’s comeback as a power-
broker was ironically prepared by his former Houthi opponents, who formed an alliance with
him against al-Hadi’s government and its allies such as the Islah Party. Ali Mohsen, Islah, and
the al-Ahmar family were targets for the Houthi militias backed by Saleh as an example of the
former president’s tactic of playing off political actors against each other in an unstable equi-
librium (Brehony 2015, p. 241). Hadi’s government was a central political authority exercising
severely limited physical control over territory, facing decentralized tribal forces, which persisted
to weaken all efforts to unify the country’s different actors.

Notes for future scholars

There are ethics for research in any region of the world. In my own country, I could not inter-
view members of my own Alzandani tribe. Access is easy. I can also secure the cooperation of
informants for interviews and focus group-based research data collection. The difficulty is that
I do not expect to be given information that can be described as “objective”. One’s expertise
when researching one’s own community and own country faces challenges. Individual research
participants cannot forget about interpersonal relations, especially tribal bonds. The difficulty is
double-edged: collecting data in an authoritarian country with strong tribal affiliation makes
access to “objective” information almost impossible. Moreover, serious concerns about ethi-
cal conduct of research are true in Yemen. For example, I was able to speak informally with
members of Al-Islah from my own tribe. However, I use the information obtained for my own
knowledge of Yemeni politics and the interconnection between state and tribe. I cannot use it
for research papers.The way a Zandani addresses me, owing to common tribal bonds, makes the
information obtained unusable academically. That information is not processed—it is shared in
good faith and on the basis of trust. That trust is the unwritten code of data collection: not for
publication. Tribes own the information not the researcher. Very formally, we researchers with
PhDs coming from Arab or Western universities may feel “free” to research once the appropriate
ethical guidelines and review boards for research of human subjects are secured. My experience
says otherwise. They are not sufficient. I felt far more at ease collecting data from non-Zandani
tribes. There are internal ethics of tribal relationships of trust, word of honour, moral etiquette,

600
 Yemen

and confidentiality that complicate Western ethical guidelines and reviews. In fact, they almost
make them useless. This is where young scholars going on research field trips must have aware-
ness of these internal ethics: some information given in good faith or informally is meant to
remain unpublished. In my interviews with non-Zandani tribes, I am given far more “access”.
I was looked at as a researcher, not a tribal kin who is spoken to openly and given answers that
addressed my questions. Formal relations in this case pay off more than interpersonal relations
when researching tribes in Yemen. For non-Yemenis, it is again a different type of “access”.
There is always a cautious approach. Talking to researchers who come from non-Yemeni back-
grounds has advantages and disadvantages. Advantages that can be mentioned include respect for
inquiry about Yemen by people who come from far away. PhD degrees and learned individuals
are highly respected. However, there is always one disadvantage. The skill to collect useful data
requires respect of the people, environment, language, traditions, and opinions—even if they
differed from those held by the researcher. In particular, respect of local customs and Islamic
ways, modest behaviour, and knowledge of Arabic are important for being taken seriously in
the field. Failing in this regard, gives one the assumed “spy” treatment: lack of trust and cau-
tion. I am familiar with many cases of individual researchers who were, as a result of gaining
trust, having to spend longer time in the field and getting low-key information from low-key
informants. At times, these are assigned to these cases: one gets an interview, but is never given
usable information.
Further, from my own experience of fieldwork in Yemen, my feedback to young scholars,
Arab and non-Arab, is to be aware of the different types of regions, geographies, tribes, sects,
and levels of development.Yemen is very politically and socially complex and diverse. It is quite
challenging when deciding not just what questions to ask to different informants, but also how
to make the most of such diversity in research, especially when it involves many types of back-
grounds: social, political, regional, and religious. The challenge for the young researcher is huge,
and preparation of the interview component of the field trip must keep this diversity in mind.
This should help in the collection of quality data; that is, data which is representative of the wide
variability of Yemen’s politics. I stress this aspect of the research field trip: representativeness.This
gives researchers better understanding of questions and situations for which there are multiple
viewpoints. My purpose of this feedback is to alert young scholars to the interview phase of
research in Yemen. Because travelling from faraway places in the world to Yemen must result in
high-quality data. If data we collect through interviews is not accurate and useful for writing
our research, that will be a waste of time and funds. These may have to be found again to redo
the field trip. We all go to fieldwork having addressed our questions and designed them care-
fully. The same effort must be invested in organizing fieldworks in countries like Yemen, Egypt,
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq with vast geographies and diversity in a way that makes the research
data representative of such diversity. This enhances the quality of data and is of huge relevance
to accuracy. I have myself interrupted my interviews on politics and tribes because of the war.
My aim is to ensure my informants came from multiple tribes and regions, and with Yemen
being right now a conflict zone, that is impossible to accomplish at the moment. We all aim for
accurate data, and one way for verifying the quality of our data is to ensure it is representative in
places like Yemen. As a student of Arab politics, I find this very relevant and challenging when
visiting countries like Libya, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. Relying on one set of ideas from one region,
one pool of informants, religious or secular, liberal or conservative, and tribal or non-tribal,
undermines accuracy and data quality.Yemen is one of those countries that requires more than
one target population. For accuracy and representativeness, knowing the map of Yemeni tribes
(e.g. Hashid, Bakil, and Madhaj tribal confederations) is important. Tribes make the state and its
politics.

601
 Bakeel Alzandani

Conclusion
Political instability has been a stable feature of Yemeni politics. A call to de-mythologize the
country and its neighbours has been relevant for decades (Halliday 1974).This can only be done
through research that appreciates and seeks to further understand the local context. I have sug-
gested that attention to the overlaps between traditional and more modern organizational forms,
i.e. tribes and political parties, can help researchers investigating the unfolding of Yemeni history
to the present war (regionalized) war. State patronage and tribal loyalties, in an authoritarian
state with only surface-level democratic reforms (e.g. elections), are thus key to unlocking the
research puzzle of the continued disunity in the country. The 2011 revolution did not bring an
end to this complexity, even if southern secessionists—for an abrupt period—joined the youth-
led Arab Spring uprising. Indeed, a manipulation of both tribal loyalties and patronage helped
Saleh’s comeback as he worked together with his former enemies, the Houthis! External powers
(e.g. Iran) have also capitalized on the destabilizing impact of tribe–party divisiveness in Yemen.
Thus, it is important for researchers to note this aspect of the country’s politics. This requires
in-depth fieldwork to begin to grasp developments, strategizing, and power arrangements from
the perspective of local informants, e.g. tribes. Through an approach that heeds challenges of
access, confidentiality, and representativeness, scholars can move closer to producing work that
pays attention to the complexities of constantly changing politics in Yemen.

References
Al-Dhahiri, Mohammad H. 1996. Al-Dawr al-Siyasi lil Qabilah fil Yaman: 1962–1990 [The Political Rôle of
the Tribe in Yemen: 1962–1990]. Cairo: Madbuli.
Aljazeera. 2011. Al-Hirak al-Janubi fil Yaman [Yemen’s Southern Movement], March 3. Available at:
www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2011/3/3/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D
8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86 [Accessed 6 March 2014].
Al-Qasimi, Khalid M. 1991. Al-Wahdah al-Yamaniyyah fi Muwajahat al-Tahadiyyat [Yemeni Unity in the Face
of Challenges]. Damscus: Dar Dimashq.
Al-Sakkaf, N. 2011. The politicization of Yemen’s youth revolution. Arab Reform Bulletin, April 27. Available
at: www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=43735 [Accessed 20 December 2018].
Al-Sarraaf, Ali. 1992. Al-Yaman al-Janubi: Al-Hayaat al-Siyasiyyah min al-Isti’maar ila al-Wihdah [Southern
Yemen: Political Life from Colonization to Unification]. London: Riad Elrayyes.
Al-Shahari, Mohammad A. 1990. Al-Thawrah wal Dimuqratiyyah wal Wahdah al-Yamaniyyah [Revolution,
Democracy, and Yemeni Unification]. Cairo: Dar Althaqaafah Aljadidah.
Al-Yemeni, Ahmed A. Hezam. 2003. The Dynamic of Democratisation—Political Parties in Yemen. Bonn, Ger-
many: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Badib, Said M. 1990. Al-siraa’ al-Su’udi al-masri hawla al Yaman al-Shamali [The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over
Northern Yemen]. Al-Saqi: Iranian and Arab Studies Center.
Bakr, S. 1995. Harb Al-Yaman: al-Qabilah Tantasir ‘ala al-Watan [Yemen’s War: Tribal Triumph Over the State].
Beirut: Al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah lil Dirsast wal Nashr.
Ben Haarib, Abdulrahman. 1990. Al-Wahdah al-Yamaniyyah [Yemen’s Unification]. Sharjah: Dar Althaqaafah
Alarabiyyah.
Brehony, Noel. 2015.Yemen and the Huthis: Genesis of the 2015, crisis. Asian Affairs, 46(2), 232–250
Carapico, Sheila. 1993. Elections and mass politics in Yemen. Middle East Report, 23(6), 2–7.
Carapico, Sheila. 2003. How Yemeni ruling party secured an electoral landslide. Middle East Report Online,
May 16, 2003.
Carapico, Sheila. 2004. Arabia incognita: An invitation to Arabian studies. In Madawi Al-Rasheed and
Robert Vitalis, eds. Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
London: Palgrave, 11–32.
Dresch, Paul. 1989. Tribes, Government and History in Yemen. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dresch, Paul. 2000. A Modern History of Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

602
 Yemen

Gause, F. Gregory III. 1990. Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Glosemeyer, Iris. 1999. The development of state institutions. In Remy Leaveau, Frank Mermier and Udo
Steinbach, eds. Le Yemen Contemporain. Paris: Editions Karthala, 79–99.
Glosemeyer, Iris. 2004. Local conflict, global spin: An uprising in the Yemeni highlands. Middle East Report
No. 232, 44–46.
Gochenour, D.Thomas. 1984.Towards a sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen. In B. Pridham, ed. Contem-
porary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1–19.
Halliday, Fred. 1974. Arabia without Sultans. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Halliday, Fred. 1995. The third inter-Yemeni war and its consequences. Asian Affairs, 26, 132–140.
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1993. Yemen: Parliamentary chamber: Majlis Annowab. Available at: http://
archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2353_93.htm [Accessed 5 March 2019].
Jones, Clive. 2011. The tribes that bind: Yemen and the paradox of political violence. Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 34(12), 902–916.
Longley, A. 2007. The high water mark of Islamist politics? The case of Yemen. The Middle East Journal,
61(2), 240–260.
Longley A. 2010a.The rules of the game: Unpacking patronage politics in Yemen. Middle East Journal, 64(3),
385–409.
Longley A. 2010b.Yemen’s multiple crises. Journal of Democracy, 21(4), 72–86.
Perkins, Brian M. 2017. Yemen: Between revolution and regression. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(4),
300–317.
Phillips, S. 2007. Evaluating political reform in Yemen. Carnegie Paper 80, Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace. Available at: www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=19024&pro g=zgp&proj=zdrl [Accessed 20 November 2014].
Phillips, S. 2008. Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarian-
ism. Houndmills: Palgrave.
Phillips. S. 2011. Yemen: Developmental dysfunction and division in a crisis state. Developmental Leader-
ship Programme Research Paper 14. Available at: www.dlprog.org/news-events/new-paper-yemen-
developmental-dysfunctionand-division-in-a-crisis-state.php [Accessed 1 December 2013].
Retsö, Jan. 2002. When did Yemen become ‘Arabia Felix’. Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 33,
Papers from at the thirty-sixth meeting of the Seminar for Arabian Studies held in London, 18–20
July 2002 (2003), 229–235.
Sadiki, L. 2000. Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization. International Journal of Middle East Studies,
32(1), 71–95.
Sadiki, L. 2004. The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
Sadiki, L. 2009a. Like father, like son: Dynastic republicanism in the Middle East. Policy Outlook 52, Car-
negie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id [Accessed 2 January 2019].
Sadiki, L. 2009b. Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Schwedler, Jillian. 2004. The Islah party in Yemen: Political opportunities and coalition building in a tran-
sitional polity. In Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press, 203–228.
Schwedler, Jillian. 2006. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Shamiry, Naguib. 1984. The judicial system in democratic Yemen. In B. Pridham, ed. Contemporary Yemen:
Politics and Historical Background. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 176–193.
Sharif, Abdo. 2002. Weak institutions and democracy: The case of the Yemeni parliament, 1993–1997. Mid-
dle East Policy, 9(1), 83–93.
Wedeen, Lisa. 2008. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.

603