The Strugglefor Existence.

3"I

est and purestchannelthroughwhichthe life-forcereaches

us, thenit will be the superman'sdutyto preparehimselfto
receivethis life-forcein religiousmeditationand prayer,and
it will be for him too to free his life fromany brutishre-
emergenceof the earlierselfishinstincts.This threefoldaim
is well givenin the followingprayer:
"O God,enableme to feelmyonenesswithall thingsin Thee. Burnout
of me my baseness and make me whollypart of Thy pure flame. Help
me to prove my brotherhoodby constant,joyful service."'

By livingin thisspiritalone can we makefortheemergence

of the superman,in whomlife mustnot be merelyintensive,
but also extensive-so muchso, indeed,thattherecan be no
single supermanin the fullestsense until all human society
consistsof supermen.
MABEL ATKINSON.

ARMSTRONG COLLEGE, NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF ETHICS.

The evolutionarypoint of view has had more than one
importantresult for philosophicalthought. Not the least
important amongthesehas been the conceptionof the evolu-
tion of evolution. Not only can we trace in the historyof
thoughtthe evolutionof the conceptionof evolution,but we
findourselveswith a consciousness whichwe conceiveof as
evolved; the contentsand the formsof these contentscan
be looked upon as the productsof development. Among
thesecontentsand formsare foundthe temporaland spatial
qualities of things,of the world. The very time process
as well as the space of the universelies in experiencewhich
is itselfpresentedas the resultof an evolutionthatarises in
and throughspatial conditions,which is firstand foremost
a temporalprocess.
*The peculiarityof this situationlies in the fact that the
involutionappearsin the immediatefindingsof science. Our
Winslow Hall, "Applied Religion,"p. i22.
312 InternationalJournalof Ethics.

geologicaland biologicalsciencesunhesitatinglypresentepochs
antedatingman in termsof man's consciousness, and biology
and scientificpsychologyas unhesitatingly presentthat con-
sciousnessas an evolutionwithinwhich all the distinctions
must be explainedby the same generallaws as those which
are appealedto to accountfor animal organs and functions.
It is truethatoccasionallya scientistsuch as Poincarerecog-
nizes that even the numbersystem,as well as Euclidean
space,is but a construction whichhas arisenand maintained
itself because of its practicaladvantages,though we can
draw no conclusionsfromthesepracticaladvantagesto their
metaphysicalreality. If this positionbe generalized,there
resultsthe conceptionof an evolutionwithinwhichthe en-
vironment-thatwhich our sciencehas presentedas a fixed
datum in its physicalnature-has been evolved as well as
the formwhichhas adapteditselfto thatenvironment;that
the space withinwhichevolutionhas taken place has arisen
by the same laws; thatthe verytimewhichmakesan evolu-
tion presentablehas arisen in like manner. Now, to a cer-
tain extentthe conceptionof an evolutionof environment as
well as of the formhas domesticateditselfwithinour bio-
logical science. It has become evidentthat an environment
can exist for a formonly in so far as the environment an-
of the organism; thatthe organ-
swersto the susceptibilities
ism determines thus its own environment;thatthe effectof
everyadaptationis a new environment which must change
with that whichrespondsto it. The full recognition, how-
ever, that form and environment must be phases that an-
swer to each other,characterforcharacter, appearsin ethical
theory.
In a certainsense this is found in the statementwhich
genetic psychologymakes of the developmentof the con-
sciousnessof the individual. Here therecan be no evolution
of the intelligenceexceptin so far as the child's world an-
swers to increasedpowersof consciouscontrol. The world
and the individualmust keep pace with each other in the
life historyof the individual. But the child comes into a
worldwhichreceiveshimas a child. The worldof the adult,
 The PhilosophicalBasis of Ethics. 313

fromthe point of view of descriptive psychology,is an in-

dependentenvironment withinwhichthe childand his world
evolve. Withinthe fieldof ethics,on the otherhand, the
moral individualand his world cannot consistently be pre-
sentedas themselveslying inside anothermoral field. The
growth of moral consciousnessmust be coterminouswith
that of themoralsituation. The moral life lies in the inter-
action of thesetwo; the situationrises up in accusationof
the moralpersonality whichis unequalto it, and theperson-
ality rises to the situationonly by a process which recon-
structsthe situationas profoundly as it reconstructsthe self.
No man has foundmoral powerwithinhimselfexceptin so
far as he has founda meaningin his world that answered
to the new-found power,or discovereda deeperethicalmean-
ing in his environment thatdid not revealnew capacitiesfor
activitieswithinhimself. Moral evolutiontakes place then
as does that of the child; the moral personalityand its
world must arise pari pass, but, unlike the psychologist's
statement of the development of the child,it does not lie in-
side a largerdetermining environment.
I am not ignorantof evolutionary ethics,nor that every
typeof ethicaltheoryin these days has feltitselfbound to
interpret the development of moralconsciousnessin termsof
customand institutions.Thus we seem to postulatenot only
a community moral consciousness, a moral world whichde-
terminesthe growthof the moral consciousnessof the in-
dividual, but also we imply that this determiningmoral
environment goes back into a past thatantedatesmoralcon-
sciousnessitself. From this point of view, morality,i. e.,
controlby community habit,has determined the development
of individualmoral consciousnessas tyrranically as the in-
tellectualworld has controlledthe growthof intelligencein
the membersof society. But this paradox disappearswhen
we recognizethat this controlby the communityover its
membersprovidesindeedthe materialout of whichreflective
moral consciousnessbuilds up its own situation,but cannot
exist as a situationuntil the moral consciousnessof the
individualconstructs it.
314 InternationalJournalof Ethics.

It is anotherstatement of the same thingthatmoral con-

sciousnessis the most concreteconsciousness-themost in-
clusivestatement whichcan be givenof immediateexperience.
or physical,no type
There is no phase of activity,intellectual
of innerexperience,no presentation of outer reality,which
does not findits place withinthe moraljudgment. There is
nothingwhichmay not be a conditionor an elementof con-
duct,and moral consciousnessreachesits climax in the esti-
mationof every possiblecontentof the individualand his
situation. There is no other type of consciousnesswhich
mustnot abstractfromotherphases to assure its own exist-
ence. One cannotcarryout an acute analysisand respondto
the beautyof the object of analysis,one cannotswell with
emotionand dispassionatelyobserve. But we place every
phaseof our experiencewithinthesweepof conscience;there
is no one of thesephases of consciousnesswhichhas not its
legitimatefunctionwithinthe activitywhenviewedas moral.
It is buta stepfurther to claimthattheabstractions of science
and the expressionsof the emotionand the directionof at-
tentionin perceptionand inferencemustfindtheirfunctions,
and hence theirreason for existence,in the act; and that
moralityinheresin the act alone, but in none of these func-
tionsof the act (if I may be allowedtwo meaningsof func-
tion in the same sentence).
It is, of course,possibleto make this a metaphysical doc-
trine. If one findsrealityin immediateexperienceand ad-
mits that the various intellectual,aesthetic,and perceptual
processesexist only as parts and functionsof an act which
is the ultimateformof immediateexperience,thenthe recog-
nitionof the ethicalstatement of this act as its fulleststate-
ment would found metaphysics upon ethics. The presenta-
tion of such a doctrine,however,would demandfirstof all
a discussionof the meaningof the terms"immediateex-
perience,"of "reality,"and the "cognitivestate" that an-
swersto it. I have no wish to enterthisdebatablefield,that
is looselydefinedby thetermpragmatism.
There are, however,certainimplications of modem ethical
doctrinewhich fall withinthe lines which I have indicated
 The PhilosophicalBasis of Ethics. 3I5

above; that are of interestquite apart fromtheirrelation

to metaphysicaland logical speculations. The implications
to whichI referare those that flowfromevolutionary doc-
trineon the one side and fromthe identification
of purposive
activitywithmoralactivity,and the recognition that our in-
telligenceis throughand throughpurposive. The firstim-
plicationthatflowsfromthispositionis thatthe fundamental
necessityof moral action is simplythe necessityof actionat
all; or statedin otherterms,thatthe motivedoes not arise
fromthe relationsof antecedently given ends of activities,
but ratherthatthe motiveis the recognition of the end as it
arises in consciousness. The other implicationis that the
moral interpretationof our experiencemustbe foundwithin
the experienceitself.'
We are familiarwiththreeethicalstandpoints, thatwhich
findsin consciouscontrolover action only the furtherde-
velopmentof conductwhichhas alreadyunconsciously been
determined by ends,thatwhichfindsconductonlywherere-
flectivethoughtis able to presenta transcendental end, and
thatwhichrecognizesconductonly wherethe individualand
the environment- the situation- mutually determine each
other. In the firstcase, moral necessityin conduct,for the
consciousindividual,is quite relative. It dependsupon the
degree of recognitionwhich he reachesof the forcesoper-
ating throughhim. Furthermore, the motive to act with
referenceto the end of the fullestlife of the species is one
which is primarilyquite narrowlyindividualistic, and de-
pends for a social interpretation upon the communityof
whichthe individualis a member. Moral necessityin con-
duct fromthis point of view is quite independentof the
activityitself. So far from being the most fundamental
realityit is a derivativeby which,throughwhat it is hard
not to call a hocus pocus, the individualacts, for what is
only indirectlyhis own-a distant end, througha social
' The full analysis of positionassumed here has been
given by Prof.
JohnDewey in his article,"The Logical Conditionsof a Scientific
Treat-
ment of Morality,"in Vol. III, of the Decennial Publicationsof the
Universityof Chicago.
3i6 InternationalJournalof Ethics.

dresser. It is, of course,natural that this point of view

should mediate the process of trainingby which men are
to be led unwittingly to sociallyworthyaction,ratherthan
the immediateconductof the individualwho findshimself
face to face with a moral problem. It is the standpointof
the publicistand the reformer of social institutions.
But if we admit that the evolutionary processconsistsin
a mutual determination of the individualand his environ-
ment-notthe determination of the individualby his environ-
ment,moralnecessityin conductis foundin the veryevolu-
tionarysituation. The possibilityof intelligent actionwaits
upon the determination of the conditionsunder which that
action is to take place. The statementof these conditions
becomesthe end, when it is recognizedthatthe statement is
in termsof the activitiesthat make up the personalityof
the individual. The contentof the end is the mutualityof
statementof personality, i. e., the tendenciesto activity,in
termsof thepersonalities who make up the environment, i. e.,
the conditionsof the expressionof the activities. It is be-
cause the man mustrecognizethe publicgood in the exercise
of his powers,and statethe publicgood in termsof his own
outgoingactivitiesthathis ends are moral. But it is not the
public good which comes in fromoutsidehimselfand lays
a moralnecessityupon him,nor is it a selfishpropensity that
driveshim on to conduct.
It is inconceivablethat such an outsideend should have
any but an extraneousposition. It could never come into
a personalityexcept by the door of its own interest. The
end couldnot be a social end. Nor could a purelyindividual
propensitythroughthe agency of communitytrainingbe-
come social. The moral necessitylies not in the end acting
fromwithout,nor in thepush of inclination fromwithin,but
in the relationof the conditionsof actionto the impulsesto
action. The motiveis neithera purelyrational,externalend,
nor a privateinclination, but the impulsepresentedin terms
of its consequencesover against the consequencesof the
otherimpulses. The impulseso conditioned, so interpreted,
becomesa motiveto conduct. The moralnecessityis thatall
 The PhilosophicalBasis of Ethics. 3I7

activitywhich appears as impulseand environment should

enterinto the situation,and thereis nothingwhichensures
this completeness of expressionexceptthe full interrelation-
ship of the self and the situation. That one fullyrecognized
the conflictwhich the impulseinvolvesin its consequences
with the consequencesof all the othersocial processesthat
go to make him up, is the moral dictum. From the recon-
structions thatthis recognitioninvolvesthe immediatestate-
mentof the end appears. To enforcethis dictumis simply
to live as fully and consciouslyand as determinedly as
possible.
The moral necessityfor educationis not an ideal of intel-
ligencethatlies beforeus of the clear refulgence of the intel-
lect. It is the necessityof knowledgeto do what is trying
to be done, the dependenceof the uninformed impulseupon
means,method,and interpretation. The necessityof upright-
ness in publicaffairsdoes not restupona transcendental ideal
of perfection of the self,nor upon the attainment of the pos-
sible sum of human happiness,but upon the economyand
effectiveness, and consistencydemanded in the industrial,
commercial, social, and aesthetic
activitiesof thosethatmake
up the community.To push reformis to give expressionto
all these impulsesand presentthem in their consequences
over against those of all the other social impulsesout of
whichan organismof personalities arises.
There is abroad a feelingof lack of moralforce; we look
before and after-to our ancestors,our posterity-forin-
centiveto rightconduct,whenin factthereis no moralneces-
sity whichis not involvedin the impulsesto conductthem-
selves. To correctone abuse we mustemphasizethe interests
it jeopardizes. There is no reservoirof moral power,ex-
cept that which lies in the impulsesbehind these interests.
To correctthe sin of the individualis to awaken through
the consequencesof the sin the normalactivitieswhichare
inhibitedby the excess. It is thishealthful,aggressive,moral
attitude,whichit seemsto me is encouragedby the recogni-
tion that moral consciousnessis the most concrete,the most
inclusiveof all. Here we must abstractfromnothing,and
318 Journalof Ethics.
International

here we cannot appeal fromourselvesto a power without

ourselvesthat makes for righteousness.In the fulnessof
immediateexperience,withthe consciousnessthatout of the
struggleto act must arise all power to mediateaction,lies
salvation. In like mannerevolutionin moral conductcan
appeal to no environment withoutto stamp itselfupon the
individual; nor to him to adapt himselfto a fixedorderof
the universe,but environment as well as individualappears
in immediateexperience;the one coterminous withthe other,
and moral endeavorappearsin the mutualdetermination of
one by the other.
Nowhere is this point of view more needed than in the
struggleswhichfillour industrialand commerciallife. The
individualis treatedas if he were quite separablefromhis
environment;and stillmoreis the environment conceivedas
if it were quite independent of the individual. Both laborer
and the societywhichemployshim are exhortedto recognize
theirobligationsto each other,whileeach continuesto operate
withinits own narrowradius; and becausethe employerre-
gards the labor unionas a fixedexternalenvironment of his
and would have all the relationsbetweenlaborerand
activity,
employerdeterminedby the methodin which he bargains
and does business,he becomesa narrowindividualist;and
because the laborerwould determine these same relationsby
the methodswhich he has used in buildingup this union,
he becomesa socialist. What will take thatand otherallied
problemsout of the vicious.circlesin whichtheyare at pres-
ent found,is the recognitionthat it is the incompleteness
with which the different social interestsare presentthat is
responsiblefor the inadequacyof the moral judgments. If
the communityeducated and housed its membersproperly,
and protectedmachinery,food, market,and thoroughfares
adequately,the problemsat presentvexing the industrial
world would largelydisappear. We resentthe introduction
of the standardof life into the questionof the wages; and
yet if the social activitiesinvolvedin the conceptionof the
standardof life were given full expression,the wage ques-
tion would be nearlyanswered. Every such problemis the
 The PhilosophicalBasis of Ethics. 319

inevitableindicationof what has been left undone,of im-

pulses checked,or interestoverlooked. We turn back to
historyand talk about the evolutionof man as if his en-
vironmentwere not the projectionof himselfin the condi-
tions of conduct,as if the fulfillment of the Law and the
Prophetswere not the realizationof all that is in us. The
sources of power lie in that which has been overlooked.
Again and again we are surprisedto findthatthe moralad-
vance has not beenalong the straightline of the moralstrug-
gles in whicha sin seemedto be faced by righteouseffort,
but by the appearanceof a novel interestwhichhas changed
the whole nature of the problem. If we were willing to
recognizethat the environment which surroundsthe moral
self is but the statementof the conditionsunder which his
different conflictingimpulsesmay get their expression,we
would perceivethatthereorganization mustcomefroma new
pointof view whichcomesto consciousness throughthe con-
flict. The environment mustchangepari pass withthe con-
sciousness. Moral advance consistsnot in adapting indi-
vidual naturesto the fixedrealitiesof a moral universe,but
in constantly and recreatingthe world as the
reconstructing
individualsevolve.
The second implicationto whichreferencehas been made,
is that we must findthe interpretation of moral conscious-
ness withinthe act. The appeal to a moralorderwhichtran-
scends eithermetaphysically or temporallythe moral situa-
tion; the besettingassumptionof the moralistthat a moral
reconstruction can be made intelligibleonly by a perfect
moral orderfromwhichwe have departed,or towardwhich
we are moving,have verygrave practicalconsequenceswhich
it becomesus to consider. In the firstplace these assump-
tions rob our moral consciousnessof the intellectualinterest
whichbelongsto themof right. If moralityconnotesmerely
conformity to a given order,our intellectualreactionis con-
finedto the recognitionof agreementand disagreement, be-
yond that the moral reactioncan be only emotionaland in-
stinctive. There may be, indeed, intellectualprocessesin-
volvedin statingthismoralorder,but such statement is con-
320 International
Journalof Ethics.

fined,in the natureof the case, to apologeticand speculative

thoughtto thoughtwhichcannotbe a part of the immediate
moral consciousness.
A moral orderto which we must conformcan neverbe
built up in thoughtin the presenceof an exigency. There
are onlytwo typesof reactionin a practicalsituation. One
may respondto well-recognized cues by well-formed habits,
or one may adapt and reconstruct his habitsby new inter-
pretationof the situation. In the firstinstancewe have
habitualconduct,in the second that type of reactionwhich
has been most explicitlyworkedout by the naturalsciences.
Most of our action,of course,falls withinthe firstcategory,
and involvesno moral struggle. The second type,on the
otherhand, is that in whichpracticallyall our moral issues
arise. If a practicalscientificproblemarises, such as the
engineeringproblemsin constructingrailroads or driving
tunnels,we recognizethat the intellectualprocessby which
the problemis solved cannotbe a mere referenceto a per-
fectmodelof conductalreadyin existence. On the contrary,
just becausethe engineeris face to face witha real problem
he mustfindin the physicalsituationfactsof whichhe is at
presentignorant,and at the same time readjusthis habits;
in fact,it is the possiblereadjustment of the habit that di-
rectshis attentionin investigating the situation,and, on the
otherhand,what is discoveredservesto mediatethe forma-
tion of the new habit. In a word, thereis the typicalplay
of attentionback and forthbetweenperception and response.
In anysuchprocessthecriterion whichgovernsthewholeand
its two phases-three phases if we distinguish betweenper-
ceptionof the new data and the formation of the hypothesis
by whichtheyare interpreted and mediatedin the response
-can neverbe externalto the process. There existsas yet
no plan of procedurewhich the engineerdiscoversor re-
ceivesas a visionin the mount. The controlis foundin the
relationof the different phases of the act whichhave been
sketchedabove. It is the possibilityof reactionto a stimulus
thatholds the reactionin the fieldof investigation and it is
the continuedinvestigationof the field of stimuluswhich
 The PhilosophicalBasis of Ethics. 32I

keeps the reactioncontinuousand pertinent.The controlis

then that which was earlier referredto as the process of
evolutionin whichindividualand environment mutuallyde-
termineeach other. It is the criterionof action,whichuses
workinghypotheses, but which cannotpossiblybe identified
with an externalideal. This process,whethermet in the
field of mechanicalinvention,or the range of engineering,
or that of scientific
research,is recognizedas the most ab-
sorbing,mostinteresting, most fascinatingintellectuallywith
which the mind of man can occupyitself,and this interest
belongslegitimately to the solutionof everymoralproblem,
for the procedureis identicalintellectually.
Yet we succeedin robbingour reflective moral conscious-
ness of a great part of this interest. For thereis and can
be no interestin merelyidentifying certaintypesof conduct
with those foundin a given theory. For example,thereis
no intellectualinterestinvolved in merelyidentifying the
controlexercisedby a financierover an industrywith the
conceptof property,and justifyinghim in doing what he
will,withinthe limitsof the law, withhis own. There may
be a veryvigorousemotionalreactionagainstthe suggestion
thathe be interfered within thesevestedrights; or, on the
otherhand, against an institution of propertywhichpermits
such individualisticexploitationof social values, but there
is no intellectualinterestexcept that which is eitherapolo-
getic or purelyspeculative. It does not come into the moral
reactionto the situation. And yet the enormouscontentof
interestwhich does attach to these moral questionsis at-
testedby the social scienceswhichhave sprungup and ex-
panded in everycollege and university.
It is interestingto compare the intellectualtreatment
whichsuch problemsreceiveat the hands of the scientific in-
vestigatorand the pulpit. In the latterthereis at present
no apparatusfor investigation.The pulpitis committedto
a right and wrong which are unquestioned,and from its
point of view unquestionable.Its functionthen is not the
intellectualone of findingout what in the new situationis
right,but in inspiringto a rightconductwhichis supposed
Vol. XVIII-No. 3. 4
322 International
Journalof Ethics.

to be so plain thathe who runsmay read. The resulthas

been that in the great moral issues of recentindustrialhis-
tory,such as the child labor, woman's labor, protectionof
machinery, and a multitudemore,the pulpithas been neces-
sarily silent. It had not the means nor the techniquefor
findingout what was the rightthingto do. The scienceof
hygienethreatensthe universalissue of temperance,while
we can look forwardto the time when investigationmay
enableus to approachunderstandingly the prostituteand her
trade,and changethe social conditionswhichhave made her
possibleinsteadof merelyscourgingan abstractsin.
The loss to the community fromthe elimination of the in-
tellectualphaseof moralconductit wouldbe difficult to over-
estimateand thisloss is unavoidableas long as the interpre-
tation of conductlies outside the immediateexperience,as
long as we mustreferto a moral orderwithout,to intellec-
tuallypresentthe moralityof conduct.
In conclusionmay I referto anotherloss which moral
conductdependentupon an externalideal involves. The in-
terpretationof sin and wrongwithreference to a moralorder
externalto the conductfailsto identify the moraldefectwith
the situationout of whichit springsand by whosereconstruc-
tion it may be eliminated. An illustrationwill at once in-
dicate,I think,what I have in mind. The responsibility for
death and accidentupon our railroadscannotbe laid at the
doors of the systemand those that work it, if an abstract
doctrineof propertyand contractis used to judge the con-
duct of railroad managers and directors. The imperative
necessityof the situationis that responsibility should be
testedby the consequencesof an act; that the moral judg-
ment should find its criterionin the mutual determination
of the individualand thesituation. As it is, menwho would
risk theirown lives to save a drowningman, regardthem-
selves as justifiedin slaughteringothersby the thousandto
save money. Abstractvaluationstake the place of concrete
valuations,and as the abstractexternalvaluationsare always
theprecipitations of earlierconduct,theyare prettyuniformly
inadequate.
 Wars and Labor Wars. 323

But not only does an externalmoral ideal rob immediate

moralconductof its mostimportant values,but it robshuman
natureof the mostprofoundsolace whichcan come to those
who suffer-theknowledgethat the loss and the suffering,
withits subjectivepoignancy,has servedto evaluateconduct,
to determinewhatis and whatis not worthwhile.
GEORGE H. MEAD.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

WARS AND LABOR WARS.

"There has been an almostconstantstate of war betweenthe miners'
unionand the mineowners."-Gov. Sparksof Nevada to PresidentRoose-
velt,Dec. 26, i907.
"I renew my previous recommendation that the Congress favorably
considerthe matterof creatingthe machineryfor compulsoryinvestiga-
tion of such industrialcontroversies magnitudeand of
as are of sufficient
sufficientconcernto the people of the countryas a whole to warrantthe
Federal government in takingaction. . .. The creationof a board
for compulsoryinvestigationin cases where mediationfails and arbi-
trationis rejectedis the next logical step in a progressiveprogram."-
PresidentRoosevelt'sannualmessageto Congress,Dec. 4, I907.

That thereis a considerablefitnessin calling a strikeof

wage-earnersa labor war is shownby the verygeneraluse
of the phrase. War has been definedby militarywriters
as the applicationof forceto make a peace thatshall be con-
sistentwith desiredconditionsof existence. This definition
would applyto a laborwar,althoughin a laborwar the legal
weapon of coercionassumes a different form. "A collision
of interestsleads to war," writesthe eminentGermanstrat-
egist, GeneralVon der Goltz, in his militarytreatise; and
thushe suggeststo us the moreconcisedefinition-Awar is
a collisionof interests. And this is still very close to the
old definition by Grotius,the founderof international law,
who definedwar as "the state of those contending by force,
as such." Strikesare that,and nothingelse in the,world.
"Collisions of interests"do not take place usually with-
out effectingseriousdamage to society,whatevermay be the