Control and Regulation of Electrodes in an

Electric Furnace from a FMEA

Blanca Rodríguez**, Joaquín Santos*, Miguel Strefezza*, Leonardo Contreras*
*Universidad Simón Bolívar, Departamento de Procesos y Sistemas. Sartenejas, Baruta, Edo Miranda, CP1080
Venezuela (Tel:+58-212-906-3319; e-mail: jsantos@ usb.ve; strefeza@usb.ve; leocon@usb.ve)
**Siderúrgica del Orinoco Alfredo Maneiro, Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela (e-mail:
brodriguez@sidor.com)

Abstract: Some steelmakers companies use Electrical Arc Furnaces (also well-known as Fusion Furnaces) for
the liquid steel fabrication, Sidor is one of them. The efficiency in the furnace will depend on how it is operated
and also on the regulation processes during the calibration adjustment of the electrodes when they are moving
up and down. The correct calibration control loops for the electrodes movement, helps to reduce its wear away,
also reduce the wearing down of the refractory material and help to improve the use of the electrical energy.
The overall contribution of these three aspects is to reduce manufacturing costs. From a maintenance
perspective and starting with a FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), a new regulation approach was
developed to obtain a better control of the Sidor Furnace named 1, this was achieved establishing a regulation
according to profiles and load regulation, from alternating electric current to impedance factor.
Keywords: Control, electrodes, furnace, FMEA, maintenance, melting.

1. INTRODUCTION
An electrical arc furnace (EAF) is a furnace that heats charged
material by means of an electric arc and produces the fusion or
melting process transforming the received electrical energy, into
heat (Astigarra 1995). The electrical energy comes from a
network of high voltage alternating current that arrives into a
main transformer and from there goes to the secondary one and
ended up feeding the electrodes. Three electrodes are arranged
upon the refractory-lined vessel containing the charge and water-
cooled, and covered with a retractable roof, through which the
electrodes enter the furnace. The electrical arc between
electrodes jumps going through the load, all this causes that each
electrode in an alternative mode became cathode and anode., the
valve, see Fig. 1. Every electrode has its own PLC dedicated to
create the regulation of the close loops circuit controlling each
one of the electrodes move up and down automatically for
regulation of the arc. When a stable regulation is achieved
during the up/down process, this contributes to diminish the
electrodes wear, also the refractory material will wear in a
uniform way, which extends its useful life in service. The
stability generates three more benefits, extend the life of
refrigeration panels, reduce electrode broken rate during
operation and save electrical energy consumption.
Current Transformer Yokogawa
A
Level 2
Measurement
mA ABB PC Regulation

charge material is directly exposed to the electric arc, and the transformer Voltage transformer

current in the furnace terminals passes through the charged * * V

PLC-Modicon

material. 3
mA ABB

Rack PLC – Room

2 1
Carry
In order to guarantee the operation of a system is necessary to electrode
mast
Level 1 – PLC

Rack PLC – Room

have their components working correctly (Smitth, 2001), using
this approach a model to regulate and set up the electrical arc
furnace was considered. The methodology of Failure Mode and Servo-valve
Effects Analysis (FMEA) was used to support the model. This
methodology help to verify any component on the system that * The same arrangement
In
Out
may fail through any one of the failure mode established. The For electrodes 2 and 3
Circuit

development was done taken the Electrical Furnace 1 as pilot Hydraulic

cylinder

plant. Also it is necessary to understand how combining, the

electrodes regulation system, controlling the hydraulic power
system that move the electrodes, and understanding the influence
of the refractory material, it is possible to contribute with the
furnace performance. The tilting process of the furnace, as well
as the opening and closing of the roof, and the up/down
movement of the electrodes, all are done using a hydraulic
power system. The electrodes are automatically raised and
lowered by a positioning system, which use hydraulic cylinders.
The control is done with PLCs acting on the hydraulic servo-
Figure1. Functional diagram of the electrode regulation system
2. MAINTENANCE MODEL FOR THE ELECTRODES
REGULATION
The FMEA is applied to the components and system showed in
figure 1. First step is to gather the related technical information
about systems and components, from this point the equipments
are arranged in systems, set., subsets and components, the next
step is to classify the equipment in four type of categories: • Over duty failure or over load failure
hydraulics, mechanics, electrics and electronic. Every
component is identified with a potential and effect failure mode,
subsequently the severity and potential consequences are Table 2. Components with tendency to fail
established, identifying potential causes, determining occurrence ZONE: Cylinders to up/down electrodes F1,F2,F3
SYSTEM Electrodes movement regulation
and calculating criticality (Crespo, 1995). Combining criticality SET Hydraulic power station
value with failure severity a flowchart is developed to be used as COMPONENTS FAILURE CRITICALI FREQUENC C* INDE
MODE TY Y F X
a tool for taking decisions, see Fig. 2. In figure 2, criticality 1 do (C) (F)
not stop production, criticality 2 it is not fixable but is not FIXATION BASE LOSE RESTRAIN 3 2 6 3
DEFORMATION 5 1 5 4
affecting the production, criticality 3 affects the production, 4 1 4 5
criticality 4 stop production or will affect it; criticality 5 stop HYDRAULIC OIL LEAK 1 1 1 8
CYLINDER ROD SCRATCH 1 1 1 8
production. DEFORMATION 4 1 4 5
HOSES AND LEAKS 1 1 1 8
FITTINGS WEAR OUT 1 1 1 8

The intention to group the failure modes is to identify and

analyze all possible failure modes in order to show unusual
failures which can happen unnoticed in certain occasions. The
potential consequences when a failure appears, is analyzed
through brainstorming sections with the team work.

The consequences are evaluated in occurrence terms; this one is

defined as the probability that a cause in individual happens
resulting in a failure mode during the operational life of the
system or equipment. The table 3 shows how are the evaluation
criterion and the occurrence classification. Those cases where
intermediate values are obtained, the immediate one superior is
assumes. When the failure probability was not known, an
occurrence with value 10 was taken.

Table 3. Criterion of evaluation and classification for the

Figure 2. Procedure to determine failure severity. occurrence of the failure mode.
ZONE: Cylinders to up/down electrodes F1,F2,F3
The failure frequency is associated with two sources of SYSTEM Electrodes movement regulation
information, one is the manufacturer information upon suggested SET
COMPONENTS FAILURE
Hydraulic power station
CRITICALITY FREQUENCY C*F INDEX
replacement before a failure occurrence and the other comes MODE (C) (F)
FIXATION BASE LOSE 3 2 6 3
from the historical data collected, considering interruption times RESTRAIN 5 1 5 4
and MTBF (medium time between failure) statistical analysis. A DEFORMATION 4 1 4 5
HYDRAULIC OIL LEAK 1 1 1 8
guide to establish a criterion to ponder the frequency failure is CYLINDER ROD SCRATCH 1 1 1 8
DEFORMATION 4 1 4 5
shows in Table 1. HOSES AND LEAKS 1 1 1 8
FITTINGS WEAR OUT 1 1 1 8
Table 1. Guide to ponder frequency failure
CLASS PERIOD GRADE Beside the classification of the occurrence is also necessary to
VERY HIGH LESS THAN A MONTH 5 value the risk. The first step to analyze the risk is to quantify the
HIGH BETWEEN ONE AND THREE MONTHS 4
MEDIUM BETWEEN THREE AND SIX MONTHS 3 severity of the effects. The effects are quantified in a certain
LOW MORE THAN SIX MONTHS 2 scale and for this model the scale goes from 1 to 10, being level
NEGLIGIBLE MORE THAN A YEAR 1
10 the most severe and level 1 the less severe. It is assumed that
In order to determine in a greater scope which component or all the effects will take place when the failure mode happens;
equipment are susceptible of a failure with a high impact in the therefore the most severe effect has precedence when the
system operation, an analysis is done. The most susceptible potential risk is evaluated. The table 4 shows the evaluation
equipment to failure will be directly related to the criticality and criterion and the severity classification proposed in this model to
the failure frequency. An example resulting from this type of value the failure effects.
analysis is showed in table 2.
In order to determine severity it must be taken into account, if
The failure modes were established in five categories: the failure mode interrupts or not the operation, if it hits the
quality of the product, if it happens with previous warning or
• Total failure not, and something very important: how it has impact in the safe
• Partial failure operation of the equipment, the safety of the operators and the
• Intermittent failure impact on the environment (ILAFA, 1988), (SIDOR, 2003),
• Failure occurrence before expected (MMI, 1986).
 Table 4. Criterion of assessment and classification level for the
severity of the failure effects.
Effect Effect severity for the FEMA design
Dangerous The failure affects the safety operation of the
without process, occurred without a warning, and can cause
warning injuries to the operator.
Dangerous The failure affects the safety operation of the
with warning process, occurred with a warning and can cause
injuries to the operator.
Very high The failure affects the safety operation of the
process, and occurred with a warning.
High It does not affect the operation but it works with a
smaller performance to the design or to the plant
requirement.
Moderate Minor interruptions on the process, with some
functions diminished
Low Minor interruptions on the process.
Very low Process interruptions and very some anomalies
regarding aspect, noise, vibration, etc.
Minor Process interruptions and very few anomalies
regarding aspect, noise, vibration, etc.
Very minor Without interruptions but some anomalies regarding
aspect, noise, vibration, etc.
None The failure effect has not effect.
After having the failure effects defined by levels, it is necessary
the evaluation criterion and the classification for detecting the
failure mode or failure cause. The table 5 shows this.
Table 5. Criterion to evaluate and classified failure cause
Detection Criterion for detection of the failure mode or failure cause
Almost They are not known ways to detect the failure mode or the failure
impossible cause.
Very Very remote possibility that with the actual checking and
remote controls, it will be possible to detect the failure mode or the
failure cause.
Remote Remote possibility that with the actual checking and controls, it
will be possible to detect the failure mode or the failure cause.
Very low Very low possibility that with the actual checking and controls, it
will be possible to detect the failure mode or the failure cause.
Low Low possibility that with the actual checking and controls, it will
be possible to detect the failure mode or the failure cause.
Moderate Moderate possibility that with the actual checking and controls, it
will be possible to detect failure mode or failure cause.
Moderately Moderately high possibility that with the actual checking and
high controls, it will be able to detect the failure mode or the failure
cause.
High High possibility that with the actual checking and controls, it will
be able to detect the failure mode or the failure cause.
Very high Very high possibility that wit the actual checking and controls, it
will be possible to detect the failure mode or the failure cause.
Almost Almost total certainty that with the actual checking and controls,
total it will be able possible to detect the failure mode or the failure
certainty cause.
After the effects and severity have been determined, the
following step is to identify the causes of the failure mode. The
identification must begin with the failure modes producing the
more severe effects and the causes are specific things in terms of
which it must be corrected or be controlled. With the FEMA, is
assumed that the systems have suitable engineering design
(Mannesman, 1971), (Elonka, 1986).
The maintenance model using FEMA will need the priority risk
number (PRN) which is the mathematical product of the impact
of a group of effects (severity), the probability of causing the
associated fault with those effects (occurrence) and the ability to
detect the fault before this gets to happen (detection) (Pérez et al,
1999), (Granela, 2000), (Huerta, 2001). This number can be
expressed as:
Level
PRN =S*O*D (1)
10 Where: S = Severity
O = Occurrence
D = Detection
9
Table 6 shows the application of FEMA to one device of the
8 electrodes regulation system, the servo valve that commands the
cylinder movement of the carry electrode mast. In table 6 the
7 PRN of each one of the failure mode observed, facilitate the user
how to identify the failure modes with greater risks.
6
The priority risk number point out the most serious risks and
5 lead to the remedial action, also give a course of the aspects that
4 are due to review. The PRN scale for this model goes from 1 to
3 1000. The data value average obtained was 106 and three groups
were created: low (105 or less), average (106 to 500) and high
2 (501 or higher).
1
3. CONTROLING THE ELECTRODE MOVEMENT
The electrodes have three independent controllers type PID for
each elevation system with the purpose of controlling the
electrical arc. The control is made through the reading of the
variables of current and tension on the secondary one of the
transformer.
Level
10 The automatic control movement is done in two forms: the first
is controlling electrical current and the second is controlling by
9
calculated impedance, both techniques have advantages. The
first is used when the fusion process is in liquid state, in this
8 stage is advisable to place directly as a control variable the
7 electrical current, since the electrodes have less disturbance with
the contact surface. The regulation by impedance is advisable to
6
use during the first stage of fusion, since this is very unstable
5 due to the fact of this is the beginning of melting the scrap-metal
and a more greater precision is needed to have, then the control
4
variable is the impedance, this one is calculating in each cycle of
the PLC making the controller adjustment to this variable.
3
2 A control technique was developed combining two types of
regulation:
1
• Regulation by impedance: which is used in the first stage of
the fusion or after some interruption on the furnace operation
occurred. The impedance is calculated in each cycle of the PLC
(20mseg) through the reading of electrical current and tension in
the transformer.
• The regulation by electrical current: This is activated
considering that the solid load of the furnace has been fused and
is in “flat bath”. It is Also used when being selected the
regulation by impedance in anyone of the three phases, a
discrepancy greater to twenty (20) percent is obtained in the
tension of the secondary one with respect to the theoretical, the
Table 6 values, were calculated according to the TAPs (on-load
tap changer) position during the transformer operation. When the
 Table 6. Example of FEMA applied to servo valve phase 1
EQUIPMENT SAP FUNCTION POTENTIAL FAILURE ACTUAL EVALUATION FIT AND REFINING
DESCRIPTION NUMBER FAILURE MODE FAILURE FAILURE HECKING O S D PRN
EFFECT CAUSE
82224 To transform or to 1. External leaks 1. Under yield in 1.Misalignment in 1. Leaks 8 3 1 24 1. Fitting
SERVO VALVE PHASE 1 change the the fluid connectors, inspections. 2 10 9 180 adjustment
analogous entrance proportion breakage of 7 4 1 28 even without
signal into a pipes 1 4 1 4 leak
hydraulic 2. Internal leaks 2. Does not stay in 2.Wearing down 2. Displacement 2 8 8 128 2. Change of
exit (flow or the set point in the verification 2 10 10 200 servo valve
pressure). In order hydraulic block of the servo 3.Adjustment of
to give to a high one the hydraulic
degree of 3. Mechanical set 3. Does not stay in 3. Out of setting 3. Verification set point
exactitude or point moved the set point of the 4.Adjusment of
precision in the mechanical the electronic
movement of the set point of set point
arms carrying the the servo 5. Change the
electrodes. valve fluid filter on
4. Electronic set 4. Does not stay in 4. Out of setting 4. Verification the servo
point moved the set point of the entrance
electronic set 6. Take the
point of the viscosity of
servo valve the fluid
5. Dirt in the 5. The internal 5. insufficient 5. Verification corresponding
nozzles system spool with filtration of the of the filter one to use in
displacement hydraulic fluid condition the servo
problems valve
6. The internal 6. Problems in 6. viscosity of the 6. periodic
spool does the route of hydraulic fluid control of the
not move the internal below the hydraulic
spool specified fluid
viscosity

discrepancy disappears the regulation became again by
impedance.
The use of each technique is going to depend on the load profile
done to the furnace. In Sidor two type of load were
predetermined: one is 100% of HRD (direct reduction iron) and
the other is 80% of HRD and 20% of scrap iron. The table 7
shows the selection of the regulation type depending on the type
of load.
Table 7. Profiles to select the type of regulation
this was done due to the fact this action move the system
towards the instability so it was decided not to use it. The control
became a PI controller; these parameters are subject to changes
and will depend on the performance of the furnace since the
conditions change, as consequence of mechanical replacement or
the alignment of a new electrode carrier. In cases where changes
occurred due to maintenance activities, it is necessary to check
the parameters and make new adjustments.
According to the type of regulation: impedance or current, the
wished operation points change according to the position of the
transformer TAP as seen in table 9 and 10.

REGULATION REGULATION PROFILE CONDICTIONS In order to guarantee protection to the transformer due to the
TYPE TO. OR
DELAYS different condition during the furnace operation, two (2) levels
REGULATION
LOAD TYPE Load 80 –
20
Active energy less or equal to eleven
(11) MWh
of protection in the secondary one exist:
BY Load 100 % Active energy less or equal to one (1)
IMPEDANCE MWh
INTERRUPCTION Less than an Last: two (2) extra MWh to the active
· Instantaneous protection
hour delay energy at the interruption moment · Time-lag protection
More than an Last: eight (8) extra MWh to the active
hour delay energy at the interruption moment (cool
furnace).
Table 8. Parameters of Control, by fusion stages
LOAD TYPE Load 80 – 20 Active energy higher to eleven (11) STAGE CONDITION PROPORTIONAL INTEGRAL DERIVATIVE
REGULATIÓN MWh (P) (I) (D)
BY Load 100 % Active energy higher to one (1) MWh
ELECTRICAL First of Energy F1: 2.2 F1: 0.04 All = 0
CURRENT INTERRUPCTIÓN Less than an Last: from two (2) MWh consumed Impedance smaller to 1 F2: 2.4 F2: 0.08
hour delay alter the interruption. MWh F3: 2.3 F3: 0.04
More than an Last: from eight (8) MWh consumed Second of Energy F1: 1.6 F1: 0.08 All = 0
hour delay alter the interruption. Impedance greater to 1 F2: 2.0 F2: 0.04
MWh and F3: 2.2 F3: 0.01
regulating
by
4. RESULTS Impedance
First of Current Regulating F1: 2.5 F1: 0.01 All = 0
According to the strategy of control used in the melting stages by Current F2: 2.9 F2: 0.0095
different parameters for tuning the control loops were founded. and TAP F3: 2.6 F3: 0.035
different
These parameters can be selected depending on each stage, from one (1)
which is defined based on the consumed energy (MWh). Second of Regulating F1: 2.7 F1: 0.008 All = 0
Current by equal F2: 2.5 F2: 0.008
Current and F3: 2.6 F3: 0.005
In table 8 the parameters values for control of each one of the TAP to one
PID depending on the fusion stages are showed. The values for (1)

the derivative action of the PID are in zero for all the selections,
 Table 9. Set point values for Regulation by Impedance. which is an integration of the values of energy sample in each
cycle of the PLC shows that did not happen interruption during
TAP WISHED WISHED WISHED this tap since the line is ascending in continuous way.
IMPEDANCE IMPEDANCE IMPEDANCE
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
(MOHMS) (MOHMS) (MOHMS) Table 10. Set values Point for Regulation by Current
1 9.987 9.987 9.956 TAP Wished current Wished current Wished current Phase 3
2 9.580 9.580 9.580 Phase 1 (kAmp) Phase 2 (kAmp) (kAmp)
3 9.800 9.800 9.800 1 61.8 62.0 61.0
4 8.726 8.726 8.726
2 63.0 63.0 63.0
5 8.726 8.726 8.726
6 8.626 8.534 8.760 3 63.0 63.0 63.0
7 7.695 7.695 7.695 4 64.0 64.0 64.0
8 7.695 7.695 7.695
5 64.0 64.0 64.0
9 7.587 7.500 7.695
10 7.160 7.160 7.160 6 67.0 67.0 66.0
11 7.160 7.160 7.160 7 66.0 67.0 66.0
12 6.772 6.682 6.772 8 66.0 67.0 66.0
13 7.000 7.000 7.000
9 66.0 67.0 66.0
14 7.000 7.000 7.000
15 8.000 8.000 8.000 10 66.0 67.0 66.0
16 8.000 8.000 8.000 11 68.0 67.0 66.0
17 8.000 8.000 8.000
12 70.0 70.0 68.0
18 8.000 8.000 8.000
19 8.000 8.000 8.000 13 70.0 70.0 70.0
20 8.000 8.000 8.000 14 70.0 70.0 70.0
21 8.000 8.000 8.000 15 52.0 52.0 52.0
16 52.0 52.0 52.0
They protection have been developed by software, programming 17 52.0 52.0 52.0
the PLC controlling the electrode regulation. 18 50.0 50.0 50.0
19 48.0 48.0 48.0
The instantaneous protection in each cycle of the PLC (20 20 46.0 46.0 46.0
miliseg) takes a sample from current and it is compared with the 21 44.0 44.0 44.0
established value on each TAP of the transformer, if the current
is equal or greater to the established, an alarm is generated.
The Figure 4 shows the TAP values, power and consumed
The time-lag protection makes the time-lag to 3 seconds, to energy, which is an integration of the samples values of energy
compare the real current with the established one in the time-lag in each cycle of the PLC, for a tap with a load of 100% HRD. In
table of currents associated to each TAP and, if this is equal or this case after one minute the move to TAP 1 and the control by
greater to this an alarm is generated. electrical current is established.

When the alarm of instantaneous protection is generated the 125

19
566
electrodes change to work from automatic way to manual and
raise at 100 % of the maximum velocity until reaching the 100
16
472
electrical current value of reestablishment.
90 12
When the generated alarm is the time-lag also the electrodes 378
POWER
change to manual way allowing these to rise until a value of (KW)
284 10
reestablishment of the electrical current, which will not let to 60

extinguish the arc in the phases. The adjustment of these TAP ENERGY
(KW)
protections occurred to be a commitment between the protection 190 40 6

of the transformer and the stability of the electrical arc, because

if the phase rises until reaching a very low current, then the arc is 96 20 3

destabilized, for this reason the electric current was adjusted to

avoid the electric arc be extinguished . The values of ENERGY
(MW/H)
POWER
(MW) TAP

protection, instantaneous as much time-lag and the values of 0:56 1:06 1:16 1:26 1:34 1:43 1.53 2:03 TIME(HOURS)

reestablishment depend on the position of the TAP of the

Transformer.
Figure 3. Loads 85 % HRD. 55 min. Power ON; Power
The Figure 3 shows the TAP behaviour of the transformer Average of 98 MW; Consumed Energy 90MW/h. Total Load
throughout the tap values, for a load with 85% of HRD and the 212 metric tons.
rest is scrap iron. The power shows the typical behaviour of the
melting stage and the flat bath stage. The consumed energy,
 111
minutes by tapping, which gave one additional tapping in a 24
30
hours operation program, this was achieved increasing the
average power from 90MW to 95MW and obtained through the
25
94 electrical arc stabilization on the meltdown bath. If the additional
tap achieved is quantified in terms of US$ this represent an
20 addition of 48,000 dollars to the production by day.
74
POWER
(MW)
142 114 27
15 55

119 96 24

TAP ENERGY
10 37 (KW/H)
96 76 19

POWER
(KW)
18 71 57
5 14

47 38 10
ENENGY POWER TAP
(KW/H) (MW) ENERGY
TAP
16:19 16:27 16:42 16:50 16:58 17:06 17:13 TIME (HOURS) (KW)
24 19 5

Figure 4. Loads 100% HRD.100MW Power average; 105 MW/h 12 8 3

Consumed Energy, 63 Power ON of min. Total Load 220 metric POWER ENERGY
tons. (KW) (KW) TAP

1:53 2:09 2:25 2:41 2:56 3:12 3:28 TIME (HOURS)

The Figure 5 shows a tap with interruption, the TAP variation is
noticed. The cut of the energy consumed that is the integration of Figure 5. TAP Transformer behaviour and the power before
the samples of energy taken in each cycle from the PLC, and the some interruption of the process
reestablishment of the power after the tap resumption. As it is
indicated in table 7 if the interruption of the process is less than REFERENCES
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consumed and then it goes to be regulate by current, if the acero, Mc Graw Hill, 1.995.
interruption of the process is greater to one hour it will start Smith, D.J. (2001). Reliability Maintainability and Risk, editorial
ageing with impedance during the first 8 MWh consumed and Butterworth Heinemann, sixth edition.
then it goes to be regulate by current, all this guarantee the arc Crespo, G. (1995). Síntesis curricular.
stability, due to that ILAFA, (1988). INSTITUTO LATINO AMERICANO DEL
FIERRO Y EL ACERO. Tecnología de control Ambiental
5. CONCLUSIONS en la Industria Siderúrgica.
The main target of the present work was to design a model for SIDOR, (2003). SIDERÚRGICA DEL ORINOCO. El Modelo
the electrodes regulation using the FEMA methodology, this was Organizativo del Mantenimiento en Sidor y Servicios.
achieved. The regulation system is one of the most important Primera Edición.
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impact directly in the life cycle of the electrodes, the refractory INDUSTRIAL, TOMO 1, compañía editora Continental,
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