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An Incorporated Comparison: Fernand Braudel's Account of Dutch Hegemony in a World-

Ecological Perspective
Author(s): Jonathan Leitner
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 30, No. 2 (2007), pp. 97-135
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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AnIncorporated
Comparison
Fernand Braudel's Accountof Dutch Hegemony
in a World-EcologicalPerspective
*
JonathanLeitner
theend ofhischapteron Amsterdam in ThePerspective of
the
TowardWorld, Braudel discusses
core-periphery relations (1984: 246-
66), in effectpresentingthe outlinesof whatPhilipMcMichaelhas
termedan incorporatedcomparison(1990; 2000) of the world-
economyunderDutchhegemony, viathecore'srelations withitsmain
peripheries(the Balticcountries,particularly Sweden and Finland;
and theEast Indies)and semiperipheries (Franceand England).Per
Braudel, the purpose of examiningthe four case studies of
Amsterdam's peripheriesand semiperipheries- its"inferior and sub-
ject economies"-was to showthe"overall situation . . . how a world-
economyfunctioned by makinguse bothof thehighvoltageat the
centreand oftheweaknessesand complianceofothers"(1984: 263).
In otherwords,theEuropeancapitalist world-economy underDutch
hegemony(ca. 1625-72) was constituted by Amsterdam's various
peripheriesand semiperipheries makingup the whole, at least in
termsofthegoodstheyproducedandtheirrelations withAmsterdam,
ratherthanjusta matterofAmsterdam's dominancebeinga given(cf.
McMichael,1990: 386).
The fourbriefstudiesweretodemonstrate how"a dominant econ-
omycan exploitsubordinateeconomies, while not its
soiling own
hands withthe less profitableactivitiesor typesof production,or
even,mostofthetime,directly supervisingthelesserlinksinthechain
oftrade"(Braudel,1984:248).
In termsofincorporated comparison, itis closerto the"singular
form. . . focuspng]on themultilayered character ofa socialconfigura-
tion ratherthanon its replicationacross time"(McMichael,1990:
comparisonspecif[ying]a single
393); and it is also a "[c]ross-space
ofWisconsin-
♦JonathanLeitnerreceivedhisPh.D. in SociologyfromtheUniversity
Madison,wherehe was a studentof Stephen Bunker.
review,xxx,2,2007,97-135 97

98 JonathanLeitner
conjuncture as combining particular partsofa global

spatially-located
configuration" (McMichael,2000: 671)- or as Braudelputsit,he is try-
ing to "have a fixed perspective" on a systemthatwas admittedly in
motionand containingperipheraland semiperipheral regionsthat
werethemselves aggregations of smaller regions marked bydifferent
sortsof economicactivities (1984: 250). Overall then, is trying
he to
showhowAmsterdam's hegemonywas constructed via thepolitical-
economicrelationswithitsseveralperipheries, because"[t]hesolution
variedfromregionto region,dependingon thenatureand effective-
ness of the dominationexertedby the centraleconomy"(Braudel,
1984: 248).
Yetin sketching Amsterdam's semiperipheral and peripheral rela-
he the
tionships, underemphasizes world-ecological componentthat
Mooreidentifies elsewherein Braudel'swork(Moore,2003c).Moore
findsin Braudel'sTheMediterranean "an activeand dialecticalrelation
betweenworld-economy and what[Moore] would call 'world-ecol-
ogy,'"or morespecifically "thatecogeographical processespermeate
the ever shifting relationsof region,state,and world-economy ...
[i.e.,]world-economies and world-ecologies are dialectically
bound"
(Moore, 2003c: 432).
Kinsersimilarly findsin TheMediterranean an "interworking of
physicaland biologicalconditionswithsocialand economicendeav-
ors Braudel'sgeohistory relatesthesystemic qualitiesof natural
forcesto thoseofsocialforcessuchthatthetwoare seen to evolvein
relationto each other"(Kinser,1981: 78, 79; see also Chew,1997:
384).
FollowingArrighi on Braudelianconceptualinterpretation (2001:
122), compatible interlocutors of Braudel'swork can us
help figure
out how Dutchhegemonicpraxisorganizedvariouslocal ecologies
aroundtheworld(in particularMoore,2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2003a;
2003b; 2003c; and Bunker& Ciccantell,1999; 2003a; 2003b; 2005;
also Ciccantell& Bunker,1998;2002;Bunker,2003).Mooreaddresses
thecapitalistworld-economy's (or rather,ecology's)historical ecore-
gionalization and geographical expansion,stemming fromcapitalism's
initialdevelopmentin westernEurope as a responseto soil fertility
constraints, a momentthatbecamea modelbyvirtueofitsnumerous
repetitions in theAmericas.BunkerandCiccantell workoutwardfrom
thephysicalmechanicsofmatterand spacewithinthecapitalist world-
economy'sgenerative sectors,and howtheseaffect attempts toascend
theworld-economic hierarchy,including hegemonic transitions.
These

AN INCORPORATED COMPARISON 99
wereobviously keyfortheDutchin theirownascentand hegemonic

praxis,butalso constrained theirattempts toestablish settler
colonies,
in
particularly the Americas. What one finds in examining core-
the
peripheryrelationsengenderedbytheDutchin theirhegemonicpe-
riod-and particularlywhenone does so via Braudel'swork-is that
theirvariousagentsofcapital,and variousrelatedsemiperipheral and
peripheralactors seekingthemselves to ascend in theworld-economy,
repeatedlyhad to deal withseveralfactors.Theyhad to deal with
metabolicriftsinagroextractiveproduction (paceMoore),and/orwith
issuesoftransport and circulationofgoods ofvarying valuesand vol-
umes(paceBunker& Ciccantell)in theirefforts to (re)organizepro-
ductionand circulation to theiradvantagein thevariouslocalesthat
comprisedthe UnitedProvinces'(U.P.) peripheralsupplyzone (cf.
O'Hearn, 2005: 126). The generalgoal was to establisha networkof
complementary
ecologically supplyzones fortheirprimary goods.
BRAUDEL ON THE AGROECOLOGICAL PRECONDITIONS

OF DUTCH ASCENT AND THE ECOREGIONAL
COHERENCE OF CORE-PERIPHERYTRADE
The conceptofecologically-complementary tradeis

interregional
implicitin what we are of
thinking as Braudel's incorporatedcompari-
son of Dutch core-periphery relationsin the seventeenthcentury
(1984: 248-66); elsewherein thechapterhe refersto the"coherence
oftradewithintheDutchempire"(Braudel,1984:216).Thoughmade
in referenceto theEast India Company's(VOC) Asianactivities, the
idea holdsfortheBaltic,WestEuropean,and transatlantic tradesin
whicha coherencewas attemptedvia exchangewithdisparatelocal
ecologiesthatsuppliedresourcesto makeup forscarcity withinthe
U.P. Scarcity a
withinthecorewasarguably bigpart of whatdrovethe
processin thefirstplace,and notonlyfortheDutch:"thedistinctive
featureofthecapitalist world-economy is thesystematicexpansionof
the exploitationof naturevia a divisionof labor on an increasingly
global scale" (Bunker& Ciccantell,1999: 107), a processarguably
promptedbythegeneralmetabolicrifts inlatefeudalWestEuropean
agriculturalproduction(Moore,2000a; 2002; 2003b:313-22; see also
Foster,1999).
Braudeldiscussesthisinitialscarcityearlyin theAmsterdam chap-
in
ter, examining the structural
preconditions of the"Dutchmiracle";

100 JonathanLeitner
theseconstraints wereparticularly ofphysicalgeography and itsloca-

tionaland agroecologicalimpacts(1984: 177-80;see alsoVries,1974:
24-28, 69). Small,sandyand oftenbelowsea level,theNetherlands'
agricultural shortcomings werenotedbycontemporaries evenintothe
mid-eighteenth century (Braudel,1984: 177). ButtheDutchadapted
to theconstraints: observersalso notedtheextensive pasturesandthe
windmills to draintheland,particularly afterseasonalflooding. Dutch
was
agriculture quite diverse, varying between provinces and with ur-
ban and maritimeproximity. Braudelpointsto a keyadaptationby
Dutchfarmers: "[s]incelandwas scarce,bothagriculture and animal
husbandry had to stake on
everything productivity." Dairyproductivity
of "as muchas threepailsof milka day"per cowwas a resultoflive-
stockbeing "betterfed [in the Netherlands]than anywhereelse."
Dutch"[a]griculture had becomeclosetogardening," withproductiv-
ityincreases resulting from "ingenious" rotationmethods andmanure
use thatincluded urban wastes (1984: 178). CitingVries (1971),
BraudelconcludesthatDutchagriculture hadadvancedfarenoughby
1570 thatit "playfed]a role in theearlystagesof thecountry'seco-
nomictakeoff"(1984: 178).
Per Vries(1974), despiteearlyimprovements, agriculture in the
northern Netherlands was stillexpensiveand risky. The drainedpeat
bogsweresubsidingas earlyas 1350-1400(as peatwas an important
sourceof fuel;Vries,1974: 202-05), an "ecologicalshock"thatled
peasantsto startcultivating summergrainsandraisinglivestock (Bavel
& Zanden,2004: 508). But grainproductionwas inefficient under
theseconditions, something that"peasantsendured. . . outofphysio-
logicalnecessity." Theywouldreadilyundertake"moreproductive ac-
tivities"
as soon as international tradeallowedthemto,whichbeganto
happen during1500-70 (Vries,1974: 71), if not somewhatearlier
(Bavel& Zanden,2004: 508-09,516). Peatlandsubsidenceinthefour-
teenthcentury(and concurrent problemsthat
political/institutional
prevented further drainageinvestments) (Bavel& Zanden,2004:522)
made it impossibleto growenough bread grainto maintainself-
sufficiency,which"musthave inducedtheruralpopulationto com-
mercialize"and also takeon nonagricultural activities
during1350-
1450 (Bavel& Zanden,2004: 508-09).
Bytheearly1560's "theNetherlands trulydid dependon foreign
grain,"with Balticimports at fiveto sixtimesabove 1500levels(Vries,
1974:71). In turn,"[o]ncegraincouldbe regularly imported, thepeas-
antsbegandevotingtheexpensively won,arablestripsto theproduc-

tionofindustrial crops,"likeflax,hemp,hops,andrapeseed;horticul-
turebecameimportant laterin thecentury (Vries,1974:72). Livestock
also
husbandry grew, both in terms of herd size and quality(Vries,
1974: 136-37,140). Cattlequalityimprovements stemmed froma bet-
terbovinediet,whichin turnstemmedin partfromimprovements in
tradethatbrought"alternative and supplementalfodders"like oil-
cakesmade fromrapeseedand coleseed pulp; but also fromclover
beingintroducedas a feedcrop(Vries,1974: 141-42). Duringthesev-
enteenthcentury, permanentpasturelandswerealso improvedvia
betterdrainageand regularmanuring. Vriesconcludes"thatthepre-
dominantly naturalpasturesoftheearlysixteenth century, relianton
thedroppingsofgrazingbeastsforfertilizer, weretransformed in the
seventeenth centuryby the deliberate of
sowing grasses and by sys-
tematicfertilization" (1974: 142).
Atthesametimepastureproductivity wasimproving, so wascrop
viaincreasing
fertility manureapplications. Vriescallsthis an "escape
"
from[the]famous'viciouscycle' whereina region'smanuresupplies
decreaseas thehumanpopulationincreases,sincedemandforgrain
also increases,withpasturein turnbeingconvertedto arableland,
hence livestockherdsize decreases,ergothe manuresupplyas well
(1974: 149).Thiswasbasicallya versionofthemetabolicrift, inwhich
humanagricultural demandson thesoil outstripthesoil'sabilityto
replenishitself,particularly as thehumanpopulationbecomesurban-
izedand is removedfromthesitesofagricultural production(Moore,
2000a; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; Foster,1999).Initiallya questionof
urban-rural relations, as capitalismglobalized thisbecame an issueof
nutrients being"pumpedout ofone ecosystem in theperiphery and
transferred to anotherin thecore. In essence,theland was progres-
sivelymined,untilitsrelativeexhaustionfettered profitability," there-
byforcing "to
capital seek out freshlands,the incorporation ofwhich
inaugurated a newphase ofcapitalistdevelopment on a worldscale"
(Moore, 2000b: 413-14; see also 2003a: 148; 2003b: 350-51). This
phenomenonpromptedgeneralWestEuropeanoverseasexpansion,
and wasa specificpromptto Dutchtradeexpansionin theBaltic.Im-
portedgrainfromeasternEurope in turnallowedthe "market-ori-
entedfreeholding" Dutchagricultural sectortospecialize"inhorticul-
ture,dairying, and industrial crops"ratherthanstaplecrops(Pelizzon,
2000: 91; also Vries, 1974: 71-72, 152, 164-73; Braudel,1984: 179;
Moore,2003a: 129).

102 JonathanLeitner
As Braudelsees it,therewas moreat workthanjust agricultural

advances:priorurbanization wasimportant foragriculturalcommer-
cializationand in turna sortofruralurbanization, withbothofthese
trendsmakingtheaffected ruralareas"dependent,likethetowns,on
producefromoutside"(1984: 178).As itbecamedependenton grain
imports(for"atleasthalf"itssupply)a commercializing Dutchagricul-
ture"tended"to producecashcrops,e.g.,"flax,hemp,rape,hops,to-
bacco and dye-plants likewoad and madder"(Braudel,1984:178-79).
In turn,cash-cropping made "Dutchpeasants. . . necessarily depend-
ent on the market"forfood,fuel,and othersupplies;"[t]husthey
weredrawnoutoftheirruralisolation,"withfurther urbangrowthin
the (increasingly wealthy)countryside thatin turnallowedforthe
growth of markets (Braudel, 1984: 179).
Thiscoevolutionary processofagricultural specialization,urbani-
zation,and international tradeexpansionalsoinvolvedtheDutchfind-
inga wayto quiteliterally seal up themetabolicriftviainternaltrade
in fertilizer
betweenthe burgeoningurban areas and the manure-
starvedruralareas:"Urbanization and industrialization,
stimulitoag-
ricultural also
intensification, providedthesourcefornewfertilizers.
By the mid-seventeenth century mostcitieshad franchised mentocol-
lectrefuseand selland deliveritto farmers" 1974:
(Vries, 155),while
variousindustrial enterprises did similarlywiththeirwasteproducts
(Vries,1974: 150). This actually turned intoa majorinternaltradebe-
tweenurbanand ruralareas overthecourseof thesixteenth-eight-
eenthcenturies, allowingDutchfarmersto becometheheaviestma-
nureusersin Europe,withattendantincreasesin crop yield(aided
somewhatbynewcroprotationpatterns)(Vries,1974: 150-52).What
we also see therefore is a regionally and ecologicallycoherenttrade
first
pattern established withinthenorthern Netherlands thatnotonly
helpedbridge the metabolic gap thathad as
opened up, Moore has
helpedidentify, but that also helpedprovidethefoundations ofDutch
hegemonicascent,per Bunkerand Ciccantell'swork.
YetBunkerand Ciccantellalso see "thecriticalcompetitive advan-
tageunderlying Dutchascent"as accessvia theRhineto Germany's
agricultural forestresources,whichinitially"providedthe raw
and
materialsneeded forDutchshippingand shipbuilding" (2003a: 15;
2003b: 354). Withrawmaterialssecured,theDutchstatesubsidized
shipbuilding becauseDutch"firms lackedthe[financial]resourcesto
develop the technologies"thatwould ultimately make the U.P.'s
and
shipbuilding shipping the most competitivewithin theEuropean

world-economy
capitalist (Bunker& Ciccantell, 2003a: 15;also2003b:
355). Considering marineresources,BraudelpositsthattheU.P. "was
aboveall thecreationofthesea" (1984: 188),in particular theNorth
Sea and its fisheries, led by herring(Braudel, 1984: 189). During
1600-50, the herringfisheryrelied on 1,500 boats and 12,000
fishermen; "[s]oldall overEurope,saltand smokedherring were'the
DutchGold Mine'" (Braudel,1984: 189). More importantthanthe
trade'sprofitswasitsstructural locationintheDutcheconomy:peran
Englishman's1661 observationin context of the Anglo-Dutch
hegemonicstruggle, "Theherring tradeis thecauseofthesalttrade,"
"
whichbothallowedtheDutch to have 'whollyengrossedthetradeof
theBalticsea, forthattheyhave thebulkygoods to load theirships
with'-and the Baltic tradewas afterall the true source of Dutch
wealth"(Braudel,1984: 189-90),atleastup through the1590's(Israel,
1995:316-17).
But theherringand cod fisheries, alongwiththeBaltictrade,in
turnreliedon Dutchsuperiority in shipbuilding (Braudel,1984: 190-
93). Bunker and Ciccantell also point out that as Dutchcontrolex-
panded in variouseconomicsectors,e.g.,theherring, grain,and re-
exporttrades,"thedifferent partsof the economystimulatedeach
other"(1999: 111). And further, thoughshipbuilding and shipping
werebased on thecostadvantagesprovidedbyeasilyaccessedperiph-
eral resources,thesegenerativesectorsthen"restructured] agricul-
turalproductionsystems and theuse oftimberintheRhineandBaltic
regions,reshapingtheseareasintoextractive peripheries" (Bunker&
Ciccantell,1999: 111).
As Dutchtradeexpandedgeographically, itincludedmoregoods:
the Baltictrade,whichinitiallyinvolvedthe Dutch fisheries, soon
connectedBaltic"grain,timber,pitch,tar,metals,hemp,flax,and
fish"withwineand saltfromwesternFrance(Barbour,1963:14),and
Portugalas well(Pelizzon,2000: 159). Startingwithinthenorthern
Netherlandstherefore, and thenwithinEurope,the Dutch tied to-
gether differentecologicalzones,withsalt,wine,and oliveoil from
southernEuropeand theMediterranean, as wellas "colonialgoods"
likesugar,spices,tea,and tobacco(Vries,1976:120),beingexchanged
forBalticgrainand timber.The Dutchaccomplishedthisfeatbetter
thantheirseventeenth-century competitorsto the extentthat"the
proportion of Dutch shipsentering theBalticinballast(thus,without
tradegoods) was regularly 30 percentbelow thatof Englishships"
(Vries,1976: 120). As the workof both Moore and Bunkerand

104 JonathanLeitner
Ciccantellemphasize,local environments in bothof theseEuropean

regionswerealteredtofacilitate expandedproductiontomeetDutch
demand,and in some instancesalteredto challengeor at leastcoun-
teractDutchhegemony. Soon enough,environments outsideEurope
werealteredperthedictatesofEuropeancapitalas well,whichinturn
also founditsactivities
constrainedbythephysicalcharacteristics of
therawmaterials beingextracted, theenvironments beingaltered,and
theeverlongerdistancesrequiredfortransport (Bunker,2003:21-27;
Bunker& Ciccantell,2005: 25-36), as wellas "internal" competition
and varying of
degrees indigenous resistance.
Though Braudel doesn't
articulate
explicitly or formalizethe dynamics involved(1984:248-66),
theevidenceis there(or at leasthintedat) forexplication(cf.Moore,
2003c;Arrighi, 2001:120).
AMSTERDAM'SMAJORSEVENTEENTH-CENTURYPERIPHERIES
TheBaltic(Sweden,
Finland,Danzig)
Swedenwas "at once precociousand retarded,"a "politicalunit"

thatdatedto theeleventhcentury but "economically backward"and
dominatedbyLubeckmerchants (Braudel,1984:250). Thoughon its
to
way being a "national economy,"thishappenedquiteslowlydue to
its large size, relativelylow/sparsepopulation,poor roads and
communications, and "perhapsthecrudestofSweden'sinadequacies"
thattheBaltic,"theessentialarea fortransport," waseffectively under
Dutchcontrol(Braudel,1984:251,204;also Boxer,1990:101).A pop-
ulationand economytoo smallfortheSwedishstatemachinery needs
keptthe Swedes dependenton Dutch and particularly Amsterdam
capital (Braudel 1984: 251-52; Wilson, 1967: 565; 1968: 75-76;
Wallerstein, 1980: 206, 209, 217). Dutch capitalwas involved in pro-
duction,extraction, and "theemployment ofcheappeasantlabour
Amsterdam controllednotonlytheproductsofthenorthern Swedish
forests. . . butalso all theactivity
oftheminingdistricts ofBergslag. . .
[including the related industries
of] blastfurnaces and foundries, the
cannon and shotfactories"(Braudel,1984: 252). This "impressive"
complexofresource-based industry "helpedSwedenachievepolitical
power, but not economic independence"(Braudel,1984:252).
Sweden'spoliticalpowerstemmedfromtheearlyestablishment of
a centralizedbureaucracythatallowed for "a degree of fiscalex-

ploitation. . . whichalone made possiblethe imperialist policiesof

GustavusAdolphus[in the early17thcentury]and his successors"
(Braudel,1984:251). Hence Swedenwasan early(theearliest?)mod-
ernsemiperipheral state(see Wallerstein, 1980:203-21;Chase-Dunn,
1989: 241; Terlouw,2003: 9-10), but Swedishascentwas arguably
constrained byecologicaloverstretch duringitsseventeenth-century
wars.The Swedishstatefounditselfin a negativepolitical-ecological
dialectic,makingwar to get grain,in order to keep makingwar
(Myrdal,2003). Myrdalsees Sweden's rapid populationgrowth(a
tripling)fromthe mid-sixteenth to earlyeighteenth centuriesas an
aberrationvis-à-vis Europe overallafter the sixteenthcentury(2003:
7); furthermore, it was concentrated in the country'snongrain-
producingurbanand industrial regions,thanksto its"tremendously
dynamic"nonagrariansectors,especiallyitsmineralexports.Thisin
turnprompted"a morediversified economy... an economicupsurge,
whichcaused a demand for more people"-but food production
remainedstagnant, "as it did in mostof Europe"(Myrdal2003: 7), a
situationmostlikelyexacerbatedbySweden'srecurrent poorharvests
and even outright"catastrophic"crop failuresthroughoutthe
seventeenth century (Utterstrôm, 1988:60). The resultwasmostlikely
"a significant decrease" in both quantityand qualityofavailablefood,
witha rise in grainpricesbetweenthe sixteenthand seventeenth
centuries;Swedenbecamea majorgrainimporterbythemid-seven-
teenthcentury, "mainly... ofconscripted grainfromtheprovinces"
and including"grainthatbeforehad gone to WesternEurope,and
especiallyto theNetherlands Afterabout 1650 all thegrainfrom
theBalticprovinceswasdirectedtoSweden"(Myrdal,2003: 9-10). In
an attemptto make up forfood shortages,the Swedishstatewas
"forced... to seizegrain-producing
effectively areas"to itssouthand
east(Myrdal,2003: 6, 11-12).
Militaryconquestdid not necessarily solvetheunderlying prob-
lem,however."The debitside ofthisadventure" wasrecurrent grain
shortage(apparently exacerbated by the LittleIce Age and general
climaticfluctuations in certainyears)(Myrdal,2003: 10; Utterstrôm,
1988:60-66, 76). ContinuedgrainshortagesdrovetheSwedishstate
to repeatedconquests,ultimately leadingto imperialoverstretch and
thelossofthenewprovincesin theearlyeighteenth century (Myrdal,
2003: 12-13). The Swedish state was therefore stymiedby constraints
theDutchhad managedto turnto theiradvantage.Not untilit lost
mostofitseasternBalticpossessionsto RussiaaftertheGreatNorth-

106 JonathanLeitner
ernWarof 1700-21(see Wallerstein, 1980:219-20)didSwedenbegin

to emulateDutch strategiesmore substantively, expandingitsmer-
chantfleetin bothnumber(more thandoublingin the 1720's) and
averagesize.The Swedishfleetsubsequently began"toventure outside
the Baltic,"into and even across the Atlanticby the early1730's
(Braudel,1984: 252).
Unlikemuchof Sweden'sotherpre-1720territory, lostto Russia
and Prussia,Finlandremainedan internalperiphery of theSwedish
state(Kaukiainen,1993:349),and an extremeperiphery vis-à-vis
west-
ernEurope(Braudel,1984:253),towhichitexportedforest products,
particularly tar(one oftheSwedishstate'sthreeseventeenth-century
"nearmonopolies"alongwithcopperand iron[seeWallerstein, 1980:
a
210]), byproduct of 1-1.5 million felled treesannually ca. mid-seven-
teenth-century (Braudel, 1984: 253-54). Finland'star marketwas
structured in a "three-sided arrangement": peasantproducers,who
tradedwithmerchantexportersforcash,whichthestatein turnex-
tractedfrompeasant-as-taxpayer (Braudel,1984: 253).
Kaukiainengoes intogreaterdetailabout thetartradeand also
helpsfurther revealtheworld-ecological promptings toDutchtradein
the region(1993). Finland'sdistancefromwesternEurope's "con-
sumptioncenters"keptitoutofthecapitalist world-economy/ecology
untilthe 1600's.Tar becameitsfirstmajorexport,"intendedmostly
forthe Netherlands," withdirectshipmentsbetweenthe U.P. and
Finlandcomprisingperhaps4% of the U.P.'s Baltictradevolume
during1597-1651(Bogucka,1973:444-45). Albeit"a realbulkgood,"
tarhad a highervalue relativeto itsvolumeand could "be shipped
[more] economicallyfrom furtherafield" than bulkier timber
(Kaukiainen,1993: 343; see also Bogucka,1973:444). Bythe1630's,
Finland"hadascendedto thenumberone positionamong"European
tarproducers,and was to become "earmarked... as a supplierof
forestry productsto thecore"(viaSweden)overthenexttwocenturies
(Kaukiainen,1993:343). WhileDutchmerchants easilyhad themost
shippingcapacity to move bulk goods liketar,Finnish merchants "had
littlecapitaltobuildtheships. . . neededtopursuean activetartrade
withwestEuropeancustomers," a situationexacerbatedbytheslow
turnoverof capitalin the tarindustry, again due to itsbulk,which
made "maritime transport . . . thebottleneck in thiscommodity flow
. . . whoevercontrolledthetransport controlledthewholeflow,"i.e.,
theDutch(Kaukianen,1993: 347; also Ôzveren,2000: 64-65).

Tar wasa keyinputforthecontemporary shippingindustry: "the

principalsubstancefortheimpregnation ofwoodenhullsand hemp
rope"(Kaukiainen, 1993: 342-43; also Ôzveren,2000: 64), hencean
almoststrategic resourcefortheDutch,forwhomshipbuilding was
the
arguably key"generative sector"driving their ascent,initiatedby
easyaccesstoRhinebasintimber(Bunker& Ciccantell, 2003a: 15-18;
2003b: 352-59; Barbour,1963: 14, 26, 87). Again,whilethe Dutch
shippingindustry's growthstemmedfromtheBaltic'sotherexports, it
startedoffin dialecticalrelationshipto timber,whichwas a ship's
maininputand thesourceoftar,in turnan important inputintoship
construction and maintenance (Kaukianen,1993:342; Ôzveren,2000:
64). Kaukiainen points out that Baltictar'sseventeenth-century de-
mandwasdrivenbybotha navalarmsraceand "thespiraling costsof
shipbuilding whichin manyinstancesresultedfromtimbershortage"
(1993: 343), which in turnpromotedbettermaintenanceof existing
shipsvia tarapplicationto hullsand rope (Ôzveren,2000: 64). This
sector comprisedpart of the broader secular trend of western
Europe's burgeoningpopulationand industries,leading to both
depletionof nearbytimbersourcesand increasinggraindemand
(Kaukiainen,1993:342), whichhelpeddrivethecommodity frontier
forthesebulkmaterialseastwardthrough the Baltic basin (Moore,
2000b).
The portofDanzig(nowGdansk)is in sharpprima faciecontrastto
Finland.Thoughsubjectto Swedishmercantile legislation(Braudel,
1984: 104;Kaukiainen,1993:346-47), Danzig'smerchants "contrived
betterthananyof the otherHanseatic towns to keep the precious
rights of itsstaple":foreign merchants were prohibited from trading
thereforPolishgoods,givingDanzig merchantsa monopolyon all
Polishgoodscomingthrough theport,especially grain(Braudel,1984:
254). Danzig became, with Riga,"die most important exporting [port]"
forPolishgrainca. 1597-1651(Bogucka,1973: 440-41). The trade-
offfor Danzig merchantswas "strictexternalcontrolexertedby
Amsterdam," particularlyovergrain'sprice(Braudel,1984: 254-55;
also Barbour,1963: 91-92). Yet in turnDanzighad "a stranglehold
over"thepeasantsin itsPolishhinterland, whowere"reducedonce
more to serfdom"(albeit first
by theirlocal nobles who had "few
alternative sourcesofincome"and neededworkers)(Vries,1976:56)
as theywereelsewherein theeast,e.g.,Riga-but notin Sweden,or
forthatmatterFinland,which(notbeingmajorgrainproducers)both
retainedfreepeasantries(Braudel,1984: 255-56; see also Pelizzon,

108 JonathanLeitner
2000: 97-98; Wallerstein, 1980:134-40). Danzigmerchants ultimately

controlledthe largelandlordsby advancepaymentsforgrain"and
providingin exchangeforgraintheluxurygoods oftheWest. . . the
merchant was [therefore]able to dictatethetermsoftrade"(Braudel,
1984: 256).
Braudel sees the Danzig merchantsas having"exploitedand
betrayedthegreatPolishhinterland, mouldingitto [their]ownends"
(1984: 256). Amsterdam's needs had much to do withproviding
Danzig merchants this opportunity, giventhata quarterof its six-
teenth-century grainsupplywas fromtheBaltic.Bytheseventeenth
century, there "was widespreadsoil exhaustionin easternEurope's
grainexporting regions"(Moore,2003a: 156). Butthiswasas mucha
matterof grain'sagroecologyin westernEurope,developingin re-
sponse to the socioecologicalcontradictions of feudalism(Moore,
2002: 303-10; 2003a: 105-15;2003b:313-15). CitingBraudelamong
others(see 1981: 108-45), Moore pointsout thateasternEurope's
"secondserfdom"and generalperipheralization fromthe fifteenth
century onward was a resultof wheat'slow yieldand highland/labor
ratio(2003a: 122-25), whichin turnled to a "wheat-livestock com-
plex," since wheat needed the extra manure to help maintain its
fertility,whileincreased wheat production was then used to feedthe
additionallivestock(see also Moore,2002: 311-12; 2003c: 440-42).
However,wheat(cereals more generally)and livestock"wereeco-
nomically interdependent butnotecologically thanksto
articulated,"
theworld-agricultural economy'sincreasing geographicspecialization,
withtheresultthat"localnutrient cyclingwassignificantly
disrupted,"
i.e., the metabolicrift.Not just in Poland, "[b]ythe sixteenthand
seventeenth centuries, therewaswidespreadsoilerosion,soilexhaus-
tion,and deforestation" in manyregionsthatwitnessedtheadventof
capitalistagriculture (Moore,2003a: 124).
France
Francefounditselfin a similarpositionto theBalticregion.Or

perhapsworse-in theseventeenth centuryitwas"literally
subjugated
by the tiny Dutch Republic."Everyport along the coast between
Flandersand Bayonnesaw "increasingnumbersof Dutch vessels,
usuallymannedbyveryfewhands. . . tirelessly loadingwine,spirits,
salt,fruitand otherperishablegoods, or even linens and grain"
(Braudel,1984:256),withsaltand winethenreshippedtotheBalticin

exchangeforgrainand otherbulkproducts(Bogucka,1973).Unlike
theBaltic,Francesupplieda widervariety ofgoodsthatweregenerally
higher in value to their
volume, and over a generallyshorterdistance,
whichwas likelyof some importance:Braudelspecifically pointsout
that"thegoodsexportedfromtheFrenchChannelportsor thoseon
the Atlanticwere too oftenperishable"(1984: 257). Perhapsmore
important was Dutchtransport capacity,a "steadystreamof ships"
thatwas their"trumpcard"in securingperishablegoods awayfrom
competing localmerchants (Braudel,1984:257). Politicsalso helped:
"ifa Frenchboatattempted tocarrywineorlocalfoodstuffs directlyto
Amsterdam, itcameup againstsystematic opposition"(Braudel,1984:
257; see also Boxer,1990: 103).
Per Braudel,theFranco-Dutch economicrelationship was "a dia-
logueon unequalterms,"sinceDutch"tradenetworks and creditma-
chinery could changepolicy at will"(1984:258). The French therefore,
"despite. . . superiorresources"were in the same positionas the
Swedes,evenundertheaggressively mercantilistregimeofLouisXIV
and Colbert(Braudel, 1984: 258; see also Wilson,1967: 522-31;
Wallerstein, 1980:94-95, 117). Mattersdid notsignificantly improve
"untilthe 1720's"when"commercialcapitalismin Francebegan to
shakeoffforeigncontrol,withtheemergenceofa category ofFrench
merchants ofinternational standing"- thoughevenbytheend ofthe
eighteenth century, over one-third of Bordeaux'stradewas stillre-
portedly"underDutchcontrol"(Braudel,1984: 260).
Thereare deeperreasonsforFrencheconomicsubordination to
theDutch,examined in Braudel's other works. Predominantly rural,
France'seconomicstructure wasmorefocusedon primary production
and hadinsufficiently developedurbanmarkets, whichtheDutchwere
betterable to provide(see Braudel,1990:456-59). Braudelalso sug-
gestsreasonsgroundedin thematerialgeography ofproduction:the
vineyards oftheGaronne and Dordogne Basins (1990: 321-24),geo-
graphically tributary to Bordeaux (see Braudel, 1990: 471), wereex-
porting wine to as
England early as the eleventh to thetwelfth centu-
ries (resumingan old Roman-eratrade).The hightransportcosts
involvedcompelledthemtoproducethehighest qualitywinepossible,
hence theywere"pushed . . . into a modernization processthatcan
alreadybe describedas capitalist Exportfollowedtheeasiestand
cheapestroutes,usingwaterways andsea-passages whenever possible,"
and appliedtootheragricultural productsinsouthwest Franceas well,

110 JonathanLeitner
particularly those"directedtowardsexternal markets" (Braudel,1990:

321-23).
ThoughboththeBordeauxand Balticregionswereperipheralto
theU.P.,in theformerthedifference wasnotnecessarily forcedbythe
socioecologicalcontradictions of the metabolicrift(Moore, 2000a;
2002; 2003a: 105-15),i.e., appearstohavebeen as mucha matter
it of
geographyand climateprovidingcapitalwitha good opportunity.
Perhapstoo obviously, Braudelpointsoutthat"oilandwine,products
of warmclimates"willalwayshave a marketin colderclimatesthat
" 'cannot
producethem.So a tradebecomesestablished. . . [andulti-
mately] becomes routine'"(1982: 456-57). However,thedistancesin-
volved(relativeto availabletransport technology) forceda protocapi-
talistmodernization of theproductionprocess,in orderto maintain
demandedquality(Braudel,1990:321-22,334).Thiswasnotprecisely
a matterof the Dutch interposingthemselvesinto whathad been
largelya tradewiththeEnglish,whosetradewithBordeauxfocused
on "vintages ofhighquality," whereas"[t]heDutchwantedspirits, ei-
therforfortifying wineor as purealcohol"(Braudel,1990:329). As a
result,theseventeenth-century Dutchdemandforspirits(especially
"brandy distilledfrom quiteordinarywines")led to a changein the
agroecology largepartsoftheFrenchAtlanticbasin,includingthe
of
Garonne,Adour, Charente,and Loire watersheds.It specifically
prompted"thewidespreaddevelopment ofhigh-yielding butmediocre
vines"peasantsweresoon planting, withthefurther resultthat"there
wasno labourto tilltheproperty ofthebourgeoisie"(Braudel,1990:
329). And despiteitslowerqualityinputs,harderspiritsshipped"[i]n
smallerquantitiesforthe same price"as wine,i.e., theywereeffec-
tivelyhigherin value;as wellthey"wereeasierto ship"and less per-
ishable,whichin turnpushedbrandyproduction wellinland(Braudel,
1990: 325).
There is a relateddimensionin discussinglocal agroecological
changein responseto core demand,via thedifference betweencom-
modities,e.g., wine and grain,which Braudel discussesas representa-
tiveof "twoeconomicworlds"(1982: 456-57). Bywayof theAbbé
Gailani'sDialogueson theGrainTrade(1770), Braudelbringsup that
grainis a low value,highbulk commodity, "therefore expensiveto
transport," perishable,and mustbe harvested and shippedinsummer
"whentheseas are roughand theroadsimpassable"(1982: 456). Fur-
ther,"'wheatgrowseverywhere. Thereis nota kingdomwithoutit.'
And no kingdomhas a monopolyin it either"(Braudel,1982: 456),

whichmeantthat"thegraintradewas,witha fewexceptions,dis-
persedamongthousandsof dealers"withprofitsalso dispersedac-
cordingly (Braudel,1990: 556). The Netherlandswas an exception,
withAmsterdam becomingEurope's "majorredistribution portfor
grain"by the mid-sixteenth century, much of thiscoming from the
Baltic,withtheDutchcontrolling 70% of theregion'sbulk trade by
1560 (Braudel,1984: 207). Again,thisin turnallowedtheDutchto
specializeinhighervaluetypçsofagricultural commodities whilerely-
ing on the Balticregionfortheirgrainsupply;as earlyas the mid-
sixteenth century, whiledairying and farming wereimportant to the
Dutcheconomy,the Baltic(and Frenchand Iberian)carrying trade
was "of fargreaterimportance," along withthe NorthSea fishery
(Boxer, 1990: 6). Nor was storage greatproblemfortheDutch,given
a
Amsterdam's abundantwarehouses- indeed,"[sjtorageandwarehous-
inglay at the heart ofDutch commercial strategy"(Braudel,1984:238;
see also Barbour,1963: 88).
Braudelmakesthispointfroma peripheralperspective, positing
thattheonlywayto profitfromthegraintradewas on a large(inter-
" thatit
and difficult
national)scale,makingit 'too vastand so ... risky
engendersmonopolyby very its nature'" (Gailaniquoted in Braudel,
1982:457)- a monopolylargelyheldin theseventeenth century bythe
Dutch,particularly in localitieswhereDutch tradersoperated,e.g.,
Danzig(see above). Braudelin thisinstancecomparesgrainto wine
and oil,both"productsofwarmclimates"thatconsumerswellto the
northwillalwaysdemand,hence"'[t]radein theseis steady,constant
and regular,' " "
allowing 'smallmerchants ofmodestmeans'" tomake
a profit(Gailaniquoted in Braudel,1982: 457)-not least,we might
add,fortherelatively highervaluepervolumethatwineand oil have
relativeto wheat.Giventheprofitsand theirinvestments in upriver
vineyards (again, Braudel, 1990: 321-24), along with "the longcom-
mercialintercoursebetweenthe two peoples," these "modest" (or
likelynot, with wine) merchants in turnhad enough of an interestto
maintainthetrade,withseventeenth-eighteenth-century Frenchmer-
policyagainsttheU.P. "evokpng]criesofprotest. . . especially
cantilist
fromthewinemerchants ofBordeauxand theexporters ofcrudesug-
arsofNantes"(Barbour,1963:99). course, Of Barbour alsopointsout
thatFrenchmercantilism versustheDutch,at leaston Colbert'swatch
(1660's-70's), "was not without effect"(1963: 99).

112 JonathanLeitner
England
Dutch competitiveadvantageswere ultimately surmountedby

England,starting in themid-seventeenth century withthefirstNavi-
gationActs(Braudel,1984:260). Beyondtradeandfinancemeasures,
England's natural resource scarcityrelativeto the Dutch also
promptedpolicies thatwere importantto its ascent.In line with
Wilkinsonarguingthatthe Englishindustrialrevolutionwas stimu-
latedbya lackofwood frompriordeforestation (1988), and thenin
turnfurther stimulated bythetechnological innovations requiredto
mineand transport coal (also Wrigley, 1962: 1-12; Pomeranz,2002:
435-37), Bunkerand Ciccantellpushtheargument backintimetothe
seventeenth-eighteenth centuries(1999: 111-14; 2003a: 18-20). In
additionto industrialdevelopment,Britain'searlier"dynamicmer-
cantiledevelopment . . . wasverymuchthesourceandtheresult"ofits
timberscarcity (Bunker& Ciccantell,1999: 112).Theylookinsteadat
England'smaritime competition withtheDutch,a particular aspectof
its general mercantilism.English maritimestrategyemphasized
military competition, "[i]ncontrastto theDutchintensefocuson the
of
development cheaptransport" (Bunker& Ciccantell, 1999:112;see
also Barbour,1930). England'smilitarized maritimestrategy was a
responseto "itscostdisadvantage"in acquiringadequate rawmate-
theDutch(withtheirnearbyGermantimberand back-
rialsvis-à-vis
hauled Baltictimber),witha subsequentresortto capturingDutch
ships(Bunker& Ciccantell,1999: 111-12; see also Barbour,1930:
270-72).
Whateverthisstrategy's primafaciesuccess(Bunker& Ciccantell,
1999: 112; also Barbour,1930: 289-90; Ôzveren,2000: 32; but cf.
Barbour,1930: 271-72), buildingwarships"forstrength and maneu-
verability"meant givingup cargospace(Barbour, 1930:263),andalso
requiredveryspecific woods: large oaks used forhullsand tallpines
used formasts(Bunker,2003: 223; Bunker& Ciccantell,2003a: 18;
see also Ôzveren,2000: 32; Carlton,1939)."English plankofsufficient
length(withouttapering)and freefrom'waniness'fortheselarge
shipswasdifficultto findnearthesea, or nearnavigablerivers"in or-
der to keep transport costsdown;in turn,Englishmerchant shipsize
1
The Dutch were indeed willingto use militaryforceto furthertheirmercantile
aims,e.g., theexpressedpurposesof theIndies companiesas instrumentsofboth"trade
and war." See Masselman (1961: 461); Wilson (1968: 206-29); Boxer (1990); Adams
(1994: 332-36); Loth (1995: 708).

AN INCORPORATED COMPARISON 1 13
was further depressed,since "[vjesselsof 100 tonsor less could be

builteconomically witha minimumofimportedsupplies"(Barbour,
1930:270). Maintaining theirmorerawmaterially-specific and techni-
callycomplicated fleetwasone ofthepromptsforEnglishcolonialex-
pansion, of course tied as well to the sortof local depletion(see
Wallerstein, 1980: 99) thatdrovecommodity frontiers(and colonial
settlement, or at leasttrade)outwardfromwesternEurope (Moore,
2000b)- as Braudel observes,"[e]veryfleet, inno matter whatcountry,
requiredforitsconstruction thedestruction ofenormousexpansesof
forest"(1981: 363).
Thisis anotherpointwhereEnglishecologicalshortcomings vis-à-
visFrancewereactuallyto theiradvantage:France'slargergeographic
sizemeantithad muchlargerdomestictimber supplies(albeitinferior
in quality),and was not compelledto go overseas,whiletheEnglish
wereinsteadcompelledtodo so (Wallerstein, 1980:99-100; Braudel,
1990:522),pushingthecommodity frontierfortimberbotheastward
throughtheBalticand eventually acrosstheAtlantic toNorthAmerica
(Chew, 1992: in
24-35; Carlton,1939), spite of the costs.2Relying
largelyon inferior domesticwoodloweredthequalityofFrenchnaval
construction, and meant generally slowershipsthantheEnglishpro-
duced (Braudel,1981: 363). And again,lackof domestictimberalso
promptedEnglishcoal use,a "morefarreachingconsequence"given
thesubsequentboostto English/British industrialization
(Wallerstein,
1980: 100),with"Britain'srelatively earlyIndustrializationbased on
low-costcoal ... an essentialelementofBritain'sriseas a hegemonic
core power"(Bunker& Ciccantell,1999: 113; 2003a: 18-19; see also
Wilkinson, 1988:81-85; Braudel,1984:553),as theypulleddecidedly
ahead oftheFrenchand Dutch.
Asia
& Southeast
TheEastIndies/South
BraudelsuggeststhattheDutchrelationship withtheEastIndies,
unlikeits relationshipwiththe European peripheries,was a core-
peripheryrelationship startedfromscratch(1984: 262),as wellas be-
inga much more profitabletradefora longertimethanwerethein-
tra-Europeantrades certainlythe transatlantic
or trades(Braudel,
1982:447; also Israel,1995: 316-17). AlthoughlatertheEast Indies
2 timbershipmentsalso promotedearlyshipbuildingin
High costsof transatlantic
NorthAmerica.See Ôzveren (2000: 38, 42, 44-45, 47) and Braudel (1981: 363).

114 JonathanLeitner
becameperhapsthemostimportant DutchcoloniesinAsia(andglob-
ally;Adams,1994:346),and at theveryleastwerethemaingeograph-
ical sourceoftheVOC's latersuccess(Braudel,1984:220-22),at the
beginningoftheseventeenth century theEastIndieswereinitially still
very much an external arena, "a stillunfamiliar world ... so compli-
catedand so different fromEurope,"whichpresentedDutchtraders
with"difficulty ... of makingone's wayintoa tradecircuit, let alone
it"
dominating (Braudel, 1984: 263).
The keyto dominatingtheEast Indies' tradecircuits, or at least
thosethatpassed throughBantam,turnedout to be "controlof the
Moluccanspicetrade. . . thesinequa nonforentryto all thecurrents
oftrade"in theregion(Braudel,1984:263). Yet once thiswasaccom-
plished,theDutchwenttoo farin "insisting]on controlling everything
in theEast-restricting production, ruining nativetrade,impoverishing
and decimating thepopulation"(Braudel,1984:263), to saynothing
of tryingto maintaincontrolover local agentsthousandsof miles
fromAmsterdam (see Adams,1996).Indeed,theVOC directors' lack
of controlovertheirlocal officials in Asia was arguablya proximate
cause of the problemsBraudelsees as a consequenceof too much
DutchcontrolovertheIndies(Adams,1996)-thoughone couldalso
saythatitwasan expectedconsequenceofcapitalist production being
introducedinto the region,withits cyclesof humanand environ-
mentaldegradationandgeographic expansion(Moore,2000a;2003c).
Takingadvantageof local dissatisfaction withthePortugueseto
establishthemselves inSoutheastAsiaand particularly theEastIndies
at theend of thesixteenth century(Reid, 1990: 9; Loth,1995: 709-
10),Dutchexchangewiththeregion'speoplesinitially focusedon very
light,high value commodities (e.g.,spices and tea) and tookplaceover
muchgreaterdistances,ergothe preciseoppositeof thebulk-based
pre-1590'sBaltictrade(Israel,1995:311-12; Masselman,1961:457).
Pepperwasarguablytheprimeexample:greatquantities wereexport-
ed to Europe in thesixteenth-seventeenth centuriesand itwas "the
most importantsingleexportof SoutheastAsia" duringthe four-
teenth-eighteenth centuries,"exportedin tentimesthequantity" as
themoreexpensivespicesfromtheMoluccaslikecloveand nutmeg
(Reid, 1990: 15; also Braudel,1981: 222; 1990: 563-64; Wolf,1997:
236). Pepperwas also "a cash crop grownexplicitly forthemarket,"
involving decisions "to plantand tend carefullyfor three yearsbefore
thefirstharvest, diverting timeand capitalfromothercrops,"and in-
volving the labor in both cultivationand thenmarketing "ofthousands

ofSoutheastAsians... in responsetoworlddemand"withproduction
seeingits"greatest expansion"duringca. 1520-1670(Reid,1990: 15,
17-19). Such wide cultivationmeanttheVOC had "littlechanceof...
gaininga monopoly"oftheAsianpeppersupply,withtheEnglishalso
majorplayersin thepeppertrade(Reid, 1990: 17).
Indeed,theVOC's "finespice"trade(mace,nutmeg,cloves,and
cinnamon)wastheir"onlyeffective andpermanent monopoly" inAsia
(Braudel, 1984: a
218), process startedin 1614 and "expanded consid-
erably" after 1650 (Boxer, 1990: 103-09; also Wilson, 1968:208-09;
Reid, 1990: in
14), response both to spicecompetition between dispa-
rateDutchtraders(Adams,1994: 332; Reid, 1990: 9, 21) and to the
"virtualmonopoly"ofnativerulersand merchants (Masselman,1961:
457-59). Once the Dutch monopoly was established,however,the
spice tradebecame less of a classicprestigegoods tradebetween
world-systems (Chase-Dunn& Hall, 1993: 859) and morea matterof
capitalistplantationagriculture, whichentailedaltering localpolitical
ecologiesto suititsdemands:
The processwas identicalin each case: productionwas con-
finedto a smallislandterritory, closelycontrolledand exclu-
sivelymarketed, whilecultivation oftheproductelsewhere was
prevented. Thus Amboyna became the cloveisland,the Bandas
themaceand nutmegislandsand Ceylonthecinnamonisland.
Such monoculture renderedtheseislandsalmostentirely de-
on
pendent regularimports of food and textiles (Braudel,
1984:218).
Thisis ofcoursea lateriteration(cf.Haydu,1998) ofthatearliermo-
mentin theEuropeancapitalist world-economy, whenlargeandinten-
sivemonocultural crop specialization was "concentrated
first in the
periphery . . . [and]destabilized localecosystems" (Moore,2000a: 138).
By the mid-seventeenth century,the VOC was makingenormousprof-
itsthanksto itsspicemonopoly(thoughalso payingenormousover-
head;Loth,1995:735-36),selling"spicesinEuropeatabout17times,
and in Indiaat about14 times"thepricepaid in theEastIndies,"with
none of theprofitat all passingintoAsianhands"(Reid, 1990: 11).
Additionally, as Braudelalluded,theVOC wasalso quitewilling to
use violence,withits"capacityto muster massive force . . . key to its
success"(Adams,1996: 19;also Loth,1995:708).Theseeventswereas
muchabout controlling agroecologyas controlling humanpopula-
tions:e.g.,massacring theBanda Islandersin 1621,forcibly removing

116 JonathanLeitner
thesurvivors (Boxer,1990: 109;Wolf,1997:238; Loth,1995:7l3n20,

725-26),3and thendestroying the island'snutmegtrees,whichre-
quired "regular control" of seedlings(Loth,
perpetually-sprouting
1995:727). Similarly,theVOC "systematically uprooted"clovetreesin
the1650's-60'sbeyondtheirownholdingsin theMoluccas(Braudel,
1984: 218); and forcibly occupied islandssuch as Macassar(in the
Celebes) and Cochin(offIndia) to preventcompetition in boththe
spice tradeand of
production particularspices. "Even in Ceylon,an
islandreallytoo big to patrol,and held onlybyexpensivegarrisons,
cinnamonplantationswere confinedto restricted plotsin orderto
limitsupply"(Braudel,1984:218; also Reid,1990:14).Butdespitethe
VOC's greatlengthsto maintainthissectoralmonopoly-at great
expense-(Braudel,1984:221; Wolf,1997:239; Loth,1995:735-36),it
wasdefeatedbyspace (cf.Bunker,1989),becausemuchofitsarea of
operations(fromthe Cape of Good Hope toJapan)was outsideits
formalcontrol.Traditionalexternalarea-typetrade "whereinthe
Companyhad no chance of securinga commercialmonopoly,was
nearlyalwaysthemostimportant" overboththepuremonopolyand
de
negotiated factomonopolytrades(Boxer,1990: 105; Loth,1995:
710).
BraudeVsGeneralization
Whatevertheirlaterimportanceto Dutch colonialism,Braudel

sees theEast Indiesas less important thantheEuropeanperipheries
(1984: 266), which accounted forabout 80% of all Dutchtrade(cf.
Israel,1995: 311-12, 316-17). For Amsterdam, "[s]uccesswas only
possibleifthe inferiorand subjecteconomies were accessible... on a
regularbasis,"and proximity mattered:"thepresenceoftheseneigh-
bouring countries- developed,competitive, althoughin an inferior
position,"i.e.,basicallysemiperipheralas Braudel suggestsa bitlater,
callingthem"secondrankpowers"that"nourishedtheenergyand
effectivenessofthecentre"(Braudel,1984:263,266;see alsoTerlouw,
2003: 6-8; cf. Bunker& Ciccantell,2003a: 15-18; 2003b: 352-59).
Further,theseintra-European linksweremaintained without theneed
5
A "virtualextirpation"thatreportedly"horrified"the VOC's board of directors
whentheyheard ofit,albeitwith"no more thana mildrebuke"to themainperpetrator,
J.P. Coen, theirregionalmanagerand chiefadvocateof an aggressiveDutch/VOC pol-
icyin Asia (Boxer, 1990: 109-1 1; see also Wilson,1968: 208-09; Masselman,1961:462ff;
Loth, 1995: 721-26; Adams, 1994: 336).

forcoercion,thanksto "theattraction and mechanisms ofexchange,

theinterplay ofcapitaland credit"(Braudel,1984:263, 266).
Coercion,including violence,andsubjugation,"
"force, wasinstead
"
savedforthe 'true'periphery, on theoutermarginsofa
something
world-economy" (Braudel, 1984: 266), e.g., SoutheastAsia forthe
Dutch.He concludesthatone mightas welluse thetermcolonialism
forthistypeof coerced core-periphery relationship, whichalso in-
cludedSpainin LatinAmerica,EnglandinIndia,andevenVeniceand
Genoa as earlyas thethirteenth century in theirMediterranean colo-
nies, or rather "the outer margins of the areas theyexploited"
(Braudel,1984:266). As well,overallDutchresorttoforcewasderiva-
tiveofthelocaland commodity-specific ecologiesencountered byex-
panding Dutch capital(cf.Bunker,1992; 2003: in
219-27), particular
theecologyoffinespicesand theirlocationon a fewkeyislands,their
statusas highvalue(hencelowvolume)luxury goodson theEuropean
market, and eventhemeteorological conditionsoftheIndianOcean
(see Masselman,1961:458-59)- besidespriorPortuguese andincreas-
ingEnglishcompetition- which led the VOC's representativesto act
frequently in a quitebeastlymanner.It waspotentially too profitable
forthemnotto,and despitebeinghorrified by Dutch brutalityin the
EastIndies,Braudelis nonetheless "entertained by calculated,ex-
the
traordinary and sometimesgrotesquewebofinterlocking purchases,
cargoes, sales and exchanges"thattied Dutch tradein South and
SoutheastAsia to theEuropeanworld-economy and especiallyother
parts of the Asian world-economy (1984: 219).
ButwhiletheVOC tendedtowardtheuse offereein maintaining
itsmonopolies,theWestIndiaCompany(GWC) in theAmericaswas
notalwaysinterested in outrightcoercivecolonialismon thefarwest-
ernedgesoftheEuropeanworld-economy. NordidithavetheVOC's
success-as Braudelentitlesa separatesectionintheAmsterdam chap-
ter,"Successin Asia,lackofsuccessin America"(1984: 220). He sug-
geststhat:
Hollandcouldhavebuiltup an empirein Americaifshe had
reallywantedto,and ifshehad restricted theflowofmigrants
to theeast-an impossibleconditionperhaps,as no doubtthe
Dutchconcludedaftertheirunsuccessful experiencein Brazil
(1984: 232; in
italics the original).

118 JonathanLeitner
in
Butwhathappenedto theDutchin theAmericasis also explainable
dynamicsof expandingcapital and
termsof the world-ecological
hegemonicascent/decline.
BRAZIL AND NEW NETHERLAND:

THE GWC'S MAIN AMERICAN(MISAD)VENTURES
Perhapsbecause theywereneverquite as important to Amster-

dam'sand theU.P.'s standing inthecapitalist
world-economy,Braudel
doesn'tincludetheAmericasinhisanalysis, or incorporated
compari-
son, of Amsterdam's peripheries(1984: 248-66),thoughhe does ear-
lierdiscuss"thelimitsof Dutchsuccess"in theAmericas,or rathera
"[f]ailurein theNewWorld"fromwhichtheGWC "neverrecovered,"
particularlytheloss ofBrazil(1984: 232-35),followingthe"ruinous"
expenseofholdingitin thefirstplace (Bachman,1969:37; also Rich,
1967: 335-36; Wilson,1968: 210).
Brazil
The GWC was directedto fighttheIberiansin thewesternhemi-

sphere,part of "a concertedglobal policy"whereinoverseasmer-
chantswould"concentrate]theirforces... to combatrivalpowers"
(Delâge, 1993: 105). The goal was "to breakintothegreatblockof
LatinAmerica,"the "weaklink"of which"in 1621 was Portuguese
America"(Braudel,1984: 232; also Meuwese,2003: 30). The com-
pany'sinitialcapitalization waslargerthantheVOC's,/7.55millionvs.
/6.46 million(Bachman,1969: 37n35),and it was granteda 24-year
trademonopolyovertheAmericas(Bachman,1969:25), a tradeand
navigation monopolyin theAtlantic, and theauthority
"toadminister
justice,make treaties. . . and maintainan army"(Klooster,2002: 172;
also Boxer,1990:27). ButitcouldneverfullycontrolBrazilduringits
30-year involvement (1624-54).Despitecapturing severalcoastalcities
in the1620'sand 1630's,muchofthePortuguesecolonystillretained
its "freedomof manoarre, withitsplantationowners,itssugarmills
and itsblackslaves"(Braudel,1984:233).The GWC'scoastalholdings
were"in a permanentstateof siege,"as holdingthe coast did little
economicgood fortheGWC,thanksto theinteraction ofgeography
and technology, whichin thisinstanceredoundedagainsttheDutch
(cf.Bunker& Ciccantell,2003b: 352-59); whileone of thepillarsof

Dutchhegemonywas its efficient merchantfleet,thosesame ships

"couldnotmoorin theshallowinletson thecoastwherethesmaller
Portuguesevesselscameand wentas theypleased"(thoughthePortu-
gueseshipswerenonetheless vulnerable elsewhere), hencepreventing
theDutchfrom"get[ting] theirhandson Braziliansugar"(Braudel,
1984:233).
ButtheDutchweregetting theirhandson Braziliansugarinother
ways. A further irony, or "odd paradox,"was thattheGWC's control
ofnortheastern Brazilactually"interrupted theflowofBraziliansugar
to Amsterdam. . . and the price went up" (Braudel, 1984: 233),
Amsterdamhavingbecome one of the Europeanworld-economy's
mainsugar-refining and marketing centersfollowingtheexpansion
and relocation of the refiningindustryfromAntwerpin the late
sixteenth century(also Braudel,1982: 193; Meuwese,2003: 25-26).
Just before theGWC'sformation (1609-21),Dutchtraderscontrolled
betweenone-third and two-thirds oftheBrazil-Europe carrying trade
(Bachman,1969:50; Boxer,1990:23; Wolf,1997: 197;Emmer,2003:
8-9), including"about halfof the sugarexportsfromPortuguese
Brazil"(Emmer,1972: 731). Amsterdam in turnhad a sugarrefining
an
boom, "operation . . . almost as profitable as theproductionofthe
raw material"(Braudel, 1981: 226). The city'ssugarrefineriesin-
creasedfromfourto 25 during1594-1622(Meuwese,2003: 27; Rich,
1967: 334; Bachman,1969: 50), on thewayto becomingits"leading
industry" in themid-seventeenth century (Barbour,1963:62,68),with
40 refineries by1650 and 61 in 1661. Amsterdam becamearguably the
Europeanworld-economy's "singledominantsugarmarket," at least
untilthemid-1660's(Braudel,1982: 193).Andall thislikelyinspiteof
theGWC's formalconquestof northeastBrazil;and thecompany's
1654 ejectionfromtheredid notreversethegrowthin Amsterdam's
sugarrefining industry.
Indeed,theindustry's basic structure remainedthesameregard-
lessofthepoliticalcontext:Portuguese Brazilians werestillinvolvedin
sugarproduction, "remaining as technicians and managers evenwhen
theDutchownedtheplantations or mills"(Rich,1967:336-37). The
GWC's Brazilianadministrators kept trying"to attractPortuguese
coloniststo theDutchside,because theywereinvaluableas experi-
enced sugarplanters"(Meuwese,2003: 272); whiletheDutch"were
aboveall merchants and factors" as theyhad beenbeforetheputative
conquest(also Wolf,1997: 150, 197). Regardlessof formalpolitical
control,theDutchhad alreadywoneffective controlofBrazil'secon-

120 JonathanLeitner
omyvia controlover the sugartrade(Wallerstein, 1980: 158nl46).

However,theGWC wantedtomonopolizethetradeviadirectcontrol
ofBrazil'ssugar-growing regions,thereby outallotherDutch
shutting
firms(Meuwese,2003: 30), whichantagonizedthoseotherinterests
enoughto ultimately prompttheStatesGeneralto refusetheGWC
themilitary resourcesneededto suppressrebelliousPortuguesecolo-
nists(Adams,1994: 338-40; Boxer, 1990: 99, 112-13; Rich,1967:
338).
While the GWC's directorstook the blame for losing Brazil,
Braudelsuggestsithad moretodo withthesizeand socialcomplexity
oftheindigenouspopulations:"Wasnottherealmistakeperhapsto
thinkthattheNew Worldcould be takenoverliketheislandsofthe
FarEast-Amboyna,BandaorJava-whosenativepopulations couldbe
ill-treated
withimpunity?" (1984: 235).
As well,theDutchin Brazilfacedperhapsmoreconcertedopposi-
tionfromtheirEuropeancompetitors, including"Englandwhichen-
couragedPortuguese resistance, andSpanishAmericawhichwasmore
solidthanappearancessuggested"(Braudel,1984:235). Braudeleven
suggests"thatlittleHollandwassimplynotbigenoughto swallowthe
Indian Ocean, the Brazilianforestsand a sizeablechunkof Africa"
(1984: 235).
More prosaicallyperhaps,the logic of sugarproductionin the
capitalist
world-economy undercuttheDutchpositioninBrazil.Sugar
monoculture"perpetuatedtheunbalanceof theBrazilianeconomy"
withfood importsincreasingthe cost of living(Rich, 1967: 337).
DutchBraziliansugarproductionwas so monocultural thatit even
displacedfoodproductionfortheslaveswhoworkedthecane fields
(Braudel,1981: 226-27). Further,the largepopulationof enslaved
Africans "madeitimpossibletoreproducethemetropolitan universe"
in Brazil,furtherremovingincentivesforrelatively well-offDutch
citizensto immigrate, especiallygiven the increasingnumbers of
runawayslaveslivingfreely inorganizedcommunities (Klooster,2002:
178). These problems,partly a result
of the ongoingguerillawar,led
PortuguesesugarplantersunderDutchrule"toborrowlargesumsof
moneyin orderto revitalizetheirsugarmills,"takingon largedebt
loads thatexacerbatedfinanciallosses caused by sugar'sdeclining
priceon theAmsterdam market;"[b]ytheearly1640's,theirdebtshad
risento suchheightsthatmanyPortugueseplanterssawarmedrevolt
againstthe Dutch as the only way out of financialdependency"
(Meuwese,2003: 184),withactualopen rebellionstarting in 1645.

Therewas also an agroecologicallogicto theplanters'economic

reverses.Because sugarcanedriesout veryquicklyafterbeingcut,it
had to be milledand boiled "within48 hours As a consequence,
the labor processof sugarproductionwas highlyrationalizedand
time-conscious," involving elementsof thedeskilling laterprevalent
underhistorical capitalism(Moore,2000b:415; 2003a: 144-45), yet
also saddlingcapitalwithhighlabor costs,hence theresortto slave
labor.As Mooresuggests, "resting upon a laborprocesswithlowskill
requirements, slavery waspossiblelargelyto theextentthatthephysi-
cal organization ofthelanditselfwasprogressively simplified"(2003b:
356). Along witha large labor force,sugar productionalso "de-
manded. . . expensiveinstallations The cane had tobe crushedby
rollersarrangedinvariouswaysand workedbyanimals,waterpower,
wind The sap of theplantsrequiredtreatment, preparation,pre-
cautionsand longheatingin coppervats"(Braudel,1981: 226).
These highcostsand barriersto entrywerecoupledwithrather
lowprofits, typically4-5% (Braudel,1982:191,273).On topofwhich,
sugarproductionrepeatedly provedunsustainable ina singlelocation:
"sugarmonoculture rapidlyexhaustedsoilfertility througha process
of highlyunequal,and veryrapid,ecologicalexchange,"ultimately
forcing geographical expansionin ordertomoveproductiontomore
fertilelocales(Moore,2000b:413; also 2003a: 144).Thiswasthetrans-
Atlanticreproduction of medievalwesternEurope's"metabolicrift"
(Moore,2003b:356). Braziliansugarproduction wasanothermoment
in the historyof sugar's expandingcommodityfrontier(Moore,
2000b):Brazilitselfhad becomea sugar-producing colonyafter1550
in thewakeofsoilerosion,decreasing andincreasing
soilproductivity,
slavemortality on Madeira,following morethana centuryof sugar
productionbythePortugueseon plantations fundedbyGenoeseand
Flemishcapital(Moore,2000b:415-17; 2003a: 145-48; 2003b:348-
51).
sugarproductionrequiredconsiderablefuel-
Besidessoilfertility,
woodforrefining thecanejuice byboiling(one-and-a-half totwoacres
offoresttoone acreofcane).Thiscausedrapiddeforestation, thereby
drivingup fuelwood's In
price. seventeenth-century firewood
Brazil,
became"secondonlyto slavesas thelargestitemin themillowner's
budget";andwhencombinedwithincreasing soilerosion(due inpart
to a contemporary beliefin thefertilityofvirginforestsoil) (Moore,
2003b:351-52),"contributed toa largernumberofplantation failures
in theperiod"(Moore,2000b:422; also 2003b:352). In general,sugar

122 JonathanLeitner
plantersthroughout thecapitalist
world-economy werealwaysheavily
in debt,and tended"tooverexploit landand labor,"thekeydynamic
pushing the sugar commodity frontier's
geographicalexpansion
(Moore,2003b:351). In turn,ecologicaland humandegradationen-
tailedbycapitalist
plantationagriculture"undercutBrazil'spositionas
a leadingsugarproducer.Dutchcapitaland expertisemovednorthto
Barbados"(Moore, 2003b: 352; also Meuwese,2003: 211; Braudel,
1982: 273), whichperhapswouldhave happenedeven iftheDutch
werenotformally ejectedfromBrazilin 1654(Wallerstein, 1980:162-
63; Wolf,1997: 151; but cf.Braudel,1981: 225; 1982: 293). Again,
Dutchcapitalwasheavilyinvolvedin theBraziliansugartradewellbe-
foretheGWC's conquestof thenordeste, and likelywouldhaverein-
vestedelsewhereonce productioncostsstartedrisingand yieldsfall-
ing,regardlessofformalpoliticalauthority.
NewNetherland
By comparison,theGWC "spentfarmoreresourcesin thecon-

quest of the sugar regions of Brazil" than in supportingNew
Netherland(Meuwese,2003: 320). Too farfromthe Spanishand
Portugueseto be a militaryoutpost,itinsteadfocusedon a furtrade
withtheregion'svariousindigenouspeoples,a "modestyetreliable
undertaking" thatcould help offsettheinvestorriskentailedbythe
Braziliancampaignand otheranti-Iberian activities
(Bachman,1969:
55; also Condon, 1968: 60). Certainlyitwas dwarfedbythevalueof
Braziliansugarexports:during1600-21 (albeitbeforethe GWC's
creation),/60,000worthofNorthAmericanfurversusover/3million
of Braziliansugar (Meuwese,2003: 40). By its lateryears,the fur
trade'smaximumannualexportvaluewasstillonly/300-350,000; and
evenwhenadded to tobaccoexportsfromthecolonyof/400,000in
1664,New Netherland'sexportsmade up a relatively smallpartof
totalDutchAtlantictrade,whichalreadystood at/4-7.5 millionas
earlyas 1600-20 (Jacobs,2005: 261).
The furtrade'smodesofextraction and productionweremandat-
ed by the fur-bearingmammals'biologyand ecology,the animal
equivalentof Moore's pointthat"theindustrialcharacterof sugar
productionwasmandatedbytheecologyofsugarcane"(2000b:415),
(moregenerally,Bunker,1992).The beaver(Castorcanadensis) wasar-
guablythe mostimportantspecies,"[t]hemaintargetof theNorth
American[fur]trade. . . especiallyafterthedeclineof theanimalin

Europe by the end of the sixteenthcentury"(Wolf,1997: 159; also

O'Brien, 1993: 78, 81; Jacobs,2005: 20, 30, 191, 198). Beaverfur's
value to the European capitalistworld-economy primarily derived
fromitsinnerlayeroffur,used forthefelthatsfashionable inwestern
Europe ca. 1550-1850 (Wolf, 1997: 159-60). Unlike those"finefurs"
thatwere "used on the pelt,"beaverfurwas insteada "staplefur"
(Rich,1955:307; see also Price,1970:850), a rawmaterialinputinto
whatwas stilllargelya craftindustry.4 Beaverhatmaking was an ar-
tisanalprocess,"long and complicated"withmanydistinctsteps,
mostlyperformed byhand,notmachine(WhiteOak Society,2001).
Similarly to thesoil depletionpromptedbymonocultural sugar-
cane production, beaveroverhunting couldwelllead to localizedex-
tinctions;at theveryleastthecreaturescouldbecomemuchmoredif-
ficulttofind,especiallysincetheirreproductive biologyprovedfragile
relativeto human demand (Innis, 1970: 3-6; see also Jackson&
Decker,2001).WhenNorthAmerica'sindigenouspeoplesdeveloped
a demandforEuropeantradegoods(metaltoolsand woolencloth,as
wellas themorenotoriousfirearms defen-
and alcohol),C. canadensis'
sivefortifications werelittlematchforindigenouspeoples' hunting
techniques, which involvedbreakingtheice withaxes and
"typically
settingdogsafterthefleeingprey"(O'Brien,1993:80)- winterbeing
theoptimaltimeforthehunt,amongotherreasonsbecause theice
made it easierto approachthedens and thebeaver'scoat was at its
thickest.
If not fullya luxurygood, a beaverskinin New Netherlandwas
valuableenoughrelativeto itsvolumeto ensureprofits(Kardulias,
2002: 4), but did not requirelarge-scaleEuropeansettlement. Light
weightand highly valuable,furwaseasilyand economically exported
in itsrawform.Whilethatin itselfmayhavehamperedthedevelop-
mentofa colonialhatmaking industry evenin theabsenceofmercan-
tileregulations, shipscomingover from Europe were loaded with
largeamountsofsuppliesneededforthetrade,inparticular manufac-
turedgoods desiredbytheindigenouspeopleswho did mostof the
hunting/ trapping. As one ofBunkerand Ciccantell'stheoretical pro-
genitors(see Bunker,1992)explains itin thecontextof Canada's simi-
lar (indeed,geographically adjacent)furtrade,"Beaverskinswere
light,and thegoods whichwerebroughtout fromFrancebulkyand
4
Though some furswere even outrightindustrialinputsforcore manufacturers,
e.g., deerskin(Dunaway,1994: 226-27; 1996: 32-33).

124 JonathanLeitner
heavy.'Most of the shipsgo laden to Canada and returnlightor

empty'"(Innis,1970: 58). In otherwords,therewas verylittleroom
forprospective Europeansettlers on one ofthesetransatlanticsupply
vessels.
Furalso depressedEuropeansettlement whenitwasthedominant
commodity in both French and Dutch North Americancoloniesbe-
causeofitslowEuropeanlaborrequirements-the popula-
indigenous
tiondid mostofthefur-getting work.PerKardulias,thisinvolvement
wasa formof"craftspecialization," i.e.,"anynon-subsistenceactivity,
engaged in at least on a semi-permanent bybasis whichindividuals
provideforsomeoftheirneeds"(2002: 3). Karduliassees thisas par-
ticularlytrueforhunting(2002: 5), whichhadgonefrombeinglargely
a subsistence activity tobeingthemeansbywhichindigenouspeoples
couldgeneratea "mediumofexchange"to tradeforEuropeangoods
theyhad come to value (withthe subsequenttradeitselfarguably
markedbyunequalexchange)(Delâge, 1993:78-162; cf.Cook,1994;
Axtell,1992: 125-51).Whilefurhunting/ trapping wasmostlycarried
out by men,preparingthefurfortrade(i.e., transforming it intoa
malleablerawmaterialforEuropeanhatmakers) wasmostlya female
job:
[t]o make the skinpliable,the fleshside was oftensmeared
witha concoctionofdecomposedanimalbrainsand liver,set
aside forseveralhours,and thenvigorously rubbedbetween
thehands(Kardulias,2002: 5).
The highestqualitypeltswerealso thenwornas robesbynativepeo-
plesfor15-18 months,allowingtheguardhairsto dropout,"leaving
onlythedownfur,"whichwas further curedbythehumanwearer's
sweatand cutaneousoils,makingthefur"idealforthefelting process"
in Europeanhatproduction(Kardulas,2002: 5; also Innis,1970: 14;
Rich,1955: 313).
The GWC stillneeded agricultural and supportworkers,which
entailedEuropean settlers.However,the companymaintaineda
relativelytightmonopolyoverthefurtradefromdie early1620'suntil
1640(Trelease,1997:41-42; Bachman,1969:151).Thisgaveevenless
opportunity for an intrepidcitizenof the U.P. (or elsewherein
Europe) to make a profit,
ergoevenlessincentiveto comethanother-
wise giventhe U.P.'s relatively highstandardof living(Vries,1985:
674-76; Jacobs, 2005: 46-47), a generalproblemthroughoutthe
Dutchseaborneempire(Boxer,1990:245-46;cf.Vries,1985:668-70;

Jacobs,2005: 400, 478). Indeed, the U.P. was "a consistentnet re-
cipientof migrants"during1580-1800 (Vries,1985: 667; see also
Braudel,1984: 184-88),and at leastsomeofthesepeople apparently
endedup in NewNetherland, as thecolony'sethnicEuropeanpopu-
lationalwayscontaineda sizeableminority ofnon-Dutch, particularly
Protestantrefugees(Cohen, 1981; Rink, 1981; 1986: 139-71; cf.
Jacobs,2005: 75-76,91-92).The GWC also startedimporting African
slavesforfarmlaborersby 1628 (Rink,1986: 101),a prefaceto both
NewAmsterdam's laterroleas a minorslaveentrepôtand theGWC's
workas a majorslavetrader(Rink,1986: 163-64,169;Emmer,1972:
729-38; Kammen,1975: 58-60; Burrows& Wallace, 1999: 48-49;
Jacobs,2005: 380-81).
In responseto theStates-General's concernaboutlowpopulation
relativeto nearbyEnglishcolonies(Rink,1986: 134; Bachman,1969:
71-72, 148; Delâge, 1993: 244), theGWC directorsgradually liberal-
izedthecolony's trade from the late 1620'son, to attractmore private
(or at leastprivately-sponsored) for
settlers, whom immigration wasan
expensiveundertaking (Jacobs, 2005: 45, 74, 112-15;Rink, 1986:97-
105;Bachman,1969:122-23).Some amongthedirectors alsowanted
to makethecolonya replacement sourceforBalticrawmaterialslike
timberand grain(Jacobs,2005: 215), and perhapsprovidetheother
Atlanticcolonieswithcloserand cheapersupplies(Bachman,1969:
57-71; Klooster,2002: 174;Jacobs,2005: 43, 112-13, 127,214-15).
Indeed, eventsin BrazilpromptedNew Netherland'sfurthereco-
nomicliberalization (1640), as bothcolonieshad the"problemofin-
ducingsuchimmigration, a military necessity"(Bachman,1969: 144,
146; see alsoJacobs,2005: 205). But while(subsistence)agriculture
would become mostNew Netherlanders' major occupation(Rink,
1986:150;Jacobs,2005: 217,233),muchofthelargeamountoffertile
arableland stillhad to be deforested, "a time-consuming affair In
the earlyyearshardlyenough foodstuff was producedto feed the
colonists," whoin turnboughtmaizefromindigenouspeoplesas late
as 1640 (Jacobs,2005: 219-20, 224n70).
In contrast,thefurtrade'srelatively easyprofits attracted"thefor-
tuneseekingprivatemerchant whocameon hisownaccountor as an
agentforan Amsterdamcompany,"who thenbid up the price of
tradegoods as wellas fur(Condon, 1968: 151; also Trelease,1997:
60-61). The Amsterdam merchantfirmsthatstartedtradingdirectly
withNewNetherlandwereparticularly interested in thefurtrade,in
orderto offsetthehighcostsand risksentailedbytransatlantic ship-

126 JonathanLeitner
ping (Rink, 1986: 208-09; cf.Jacobs,2005: 46). Competitionin-

creased,withfurpricesalso bidup bypriorNewNetherlanders enter-
the
ing trade; whilethisbenefited indigenous it
traders, hamperedthe
colony'sagricultural production(Condon, 1968: 150; Delâge, 1993:
108). Especiallypost-1650,whentheGWC stoppedsellinggoods to
colonists(Kammen,1975: 57), European settlerswere also paying
muchmoreforprovisions importedbyprivatemerchants, in
resulting
a further impetus to enter thefur trade"because the onlytransport-
able specietheycouldobtainwasfursand tobacco,whichoftenmade
up theentirecargoesreturning fromNew Netherland"(Rink,1986:
210-11), a of
variant the Innisian furtradetrap(see above).Indeed,
afterbeingliberalized, thecolonialeconomygradually becamedomi-
natedbyjust fourfrequently-partnered Amsterdammerchantfirms
(Rink,1986:208-09,211;Matson,1998:15;Jacobs,2005:70,255-56).
Thus"depriv[ed]. . . ofcapitaland theopportunity todevelopa viable,
colony-based merchant community" (Kink, 1986: 213), New Nether-
land's economicgrowthwas arguablystunted.5 Nor was ithelpedby
GWC prohibitions againstmost industrialdevelopment: approvedin-
dustrieswerefordomesticconsumption, buteventhosewerelessim-
portant to thecolonialeconomy than and smallretailers
crafts (Jacobs,
2005: 233-40).
Fur exportspeaked in 1657,withsome 84,000beaverand otter
peltssentdown the Hudson fromthe main tradeoutpostsof Fort
Orange/Beverwyck (Trelease,1997: 131;Jacobs,2005: 200-01; also
Burke,1991: 284; Delâge, 1993: 142). This is a relatively dramatic
increasecomparedto 1624-35, duringwhicha grandtotalofjust
under 100,000 beaver and otterpelts were shipped out of New
Netherland(Bachman,1969:94, 129-31,141-42; Brandâo,1997:86;
Jacobs,2005: 198-200).Fortheoverlapping period1625-40,perhaps
75,000-90,000peltswereshippedfromFortOrange(Jacobs,2005:
200), whilea contemporary estimatefor1644-53 positeda figureof
80,000 beavers"killedannuallyin the whole of New Netherland"
(Burke,1991: 284).
The consistentfurvolumewas largelybecause theDutcharmed
theirmainindigenoustradingpartners, theHaudenosauneeLeague
(a.k.a. FiveNationsIroquois)and particularly theMohawks,eastern-
mostof the fivenationsand closestto the Dutchcolony(Trelease,
5
ThoughJacobs pointsout thatby the late 1650's, "partof the shipping[between
the Netherlandsand New Netherland]was alreadyfinancedby New Amsterdammer-
chants"(2005: 257).

1997:94-96, 126;Jennings, 1984: 100;Rink,1986:126;Delâge,1993:

134).6In turn,theHaudenosaunees,as muchfortheirownparticular
demographicand culturalreasons(e.g.,populationreplacement for
lossesinpreviouswarsand fromdiseaseepidemics)alongwithpurely
"economic"ones (i.e., a desireforEuropeangoods,whichwas also
subjectto culturalmotives),expandedtheirhuntingterritories at the
expenseof theirvariousAlgonkianand ethnicIroquoianneighbors
(Trelease,1997: 120; Richter,1983;Jennings,1984: 98ff;Trigger,
1985: 261-65, 271; Delâge, 1993: 142-54; Brandâo, 1997; Starna,
2003:24-27; Starna& Brandâo,2004).TheirrelationswiththeDutch
weremostlypeaceful,sincebothsideswishedto maintainthetrade,
but "generallythe Dutch describedthe characterof the Indiansin
negativeterms,"whiletheHaudenosauneeswerefullyawareof "the
value theDutchplaced on utilitarianism" in theirrelations(Jacobs,
2005: 29; also Fernow,1877-87: XIII, 109;Jennings,1984: 47, 52;
Richter,1992:95; Delâge, 1993: 114; Brandâo,1997: 89).
By thelate 1650's thelocal fursupplywas apparently depleting
(Trelease, 1962: 1985:
42; Trigger, 260-61). After the 1656-57 peak
therewasa suddendeclinein NewNetherlandsfurvolume(Fernow,
1877-87:XIV, 444; Burke,1991: 284; Richter,1992: 96), perhapsin
partalso due toa glutofbeaverpeltson theAmsterdam marketinthe
late 1650's (Jacobs,2005: 201-03; see also Brandâo,1997: 84-88).
By 1660, the New Netherlandfurtradewas perhapsat 15-20,000
pelts,less thanhalfof threeyearsbefore(Naroll,1969: 58). New
Netherlandsfursupplywasalso suppressedbytheHaudenosaunees'
territorialexpansion,whichled to further conflictswithAlgonkian
nationsin New Englandand Canada; and the fighting precluded
hunting in turn(Trelease,1997: 131; Burke,1991: 284-85).
In termsofEuropeancoregeopolitics, NewAmsterdam's location
interferedwith the EnglishNavigationActs (Delâge, 1993: 269;
Burrows& Wallace,1999:72),themselves a directchallengeto Dutch
hegemony(Wallerstein, 1980:76,96; Wilson,1968:39). NewNether-
land's conquestwas therefore a necessityfortheEnglish,giventhe
realityofworld-economic competition. EnglishNewYorkalsohadthe
virtueof a being a closer source for England's Caribbeansugar
coloniesto acquire"slavesand food in exchangeforrawsugarand
6
The Dutch (privatetradersas wellas theGWC) chargedtheHaudenosaunees "ex-
orbitantprices"forthosefirearms, e.g.,40 timesas muchfora musketand 5-6 timesas
much fora pound of gunpowder,as compared to the standardprice (Brandâo, 1997:
88).

128 JonathanLeitner
molasses,"especiallyconsidering thatNewAmsterdam was "theonly

cityofanysizebetweenBostonand Havana"at thatpoint(Burrows&
Wallace,1999: 72). New York Citybecame a more diversified port
undertheEnglish,thanksto theexchangeof commodities between
different ecologicalzones,e.g.,tropicalsugarfromtheCaribbeanfor
temperate grainfromthenorthern mainlandcolonies(a tradedesired
by some of the GWC board [see above],but neverquite attained).
Such inter-bioregional trade,albeitlargelywithinEurope,had argu-
ablybeen thekeyto Dutchascentand a foundation foritshegemonic
statusin theseventeenth century; theEnglishwouldfollowthemodel
on an everlargerscale in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies,
part of the ratcheting of
up hegemonic ascentand maintenance over
thepast600 years,as risinghegemonshaveneededto securegreater
amountsof raw materialsover largerdistancesand widerspatial
territories(Bunker& Ciccantell,2003a; 2003b;2005: 26-36; Bunker,
2003: 250-55).
POLITICAL-ECOLOGIC LIMITS TO DUTCH HEGEMONY
Butas Braudelrealized(1984: 232-35),and as we haveseenbyex-

aminingtheDutchcoloniesin Braziland NewNetherland, therewere
particularlimits to this expansion,especiallyfor individualfirms.
Sucessfully respondingto the challengesof food and raw material
supplyhelpedmaketheDutchhegemonicwithin theEuropeanworld-
economy, albeit with variationsacross the timespacesof their
"SeaborneEmpire,"due to thedifferent commoditiesinvolvedand
presence, or rather lack of
thereof, strongEuropean competitors
and/orstrong(and/orcooperative)indigenouspeoples. Whilethe
VOC's efforts in SoutheastAsia werehighlysuccessful, whatwitha
monopoly established in variousspices,high value and low volume
luxurygoods thatbroughtgreatprofits (and institutional
corruption)
(Adams,1996). The VOC, or moreaccuratelyitslocalagents,had few
qualmsaboutusingviolenceto establishmonopolies,at theexpense
of Portugueseand Englishtradersand especiallythenativepopula-
tions.As Braudelpointsout,suchviolencewasbyand largelimitedto
the"true"peripheries, and byimplication was not necessaryforthe
maintenanceof Dutchhegemonyoverthe Baltictrade(1984: 266).
The situationin the Americaswas ratherdifferent however,where

Dutchinterests facedgreaterEuropeancompetition, thoughwereable

to relyon noncoercedindigenouslaborin resourcegathering.
Braudelidentifies theGWC's generaldisinterest in settlercoloni-
zation,along withan uncontrolledflowof migrantsto Asia (1984:
232),as keyreasonsbehindthegeneralDutchfailureintheAmericas.
No doubttheseplayeda part,buttradewith(and productionin) the
Americaswasratherdifferent thanwiththeBalticanditsbulktradeor
theEast Indiesand itsluxurytrade:distanceswerelongerthanwith
theBaltic,butshorterthanto SoutheastAsia.Particularly withNorth
America, trade involved Dutch acquisition luxurygoods as in
of
SoutheastAsia,butgoodsnotquiteas luxuriousintermsofvaluerela-
tivetovolume;norweretheindigenouscivilizations on theotherside
ofthetradeas denselypopulatedand productive ofeconomicsurplus
as in Asia,hencenotas muchprofitwas to be madevia Dutch/Euro-
pean insinuation intointernal tradeintheNorthAmerican indigenous
world-systems as "inside theAsian world-economies whichwerea thriv-
ingworldof theirown"(Braudel,1984: 216; italicsin theoriginal).
Brazilwas perhapsbetterintegrated intotheEuropeanworld-econ-
omyviaplantationagriculture, buttheGWC was evenless equipped
to succeedtherethanin northeastern NorthAmerica.
At theveryleast, the constellationof industrialand financialor-
ganizations and practicesalongwithspatiomaterial advantages relative
to otherwesternEuropeanlocales (see Bunker& Ciccantell,2003b:
352-59) thatcontributed to DutchhegemonyovertheEuropeancapi-
talistworld-economy and relativesuccess in tradewiththe Asian
world-economies werenotenoughto ensurethesuccessofDutchen-
terprisein America.Indeed,it appearslikelythatsaid constellation
ultimately militated againstDutchsuccesswestoftheAtlantic:Dutch
emigrants weremore inclinedto go east thanwest(Braudel,1984:
232) and themoresuccessfuland politicalpowerfulVOC was disin-
clinedto putup withanyimpertinence fromtheGWC,cuttingitoff
fromstatefiscalresourcesin itshourofneed (Adams,1994).
Arguably moreimportant froma world-economic standpoint than
Portugal'sreclamation ofBrazilwasEngland'ssolidification of control
along the eastcoast of North AmericawithNewNetherlandstakeover
(1664), a move at least in partmeantto intimidate theincreasingly
independent NewEnglanders(Jacobs,2005: 179),afterthedecadesof
civilwar in Englandand concurrent(benign)neglectof the North
Americancolonies.Froma morestructural standpoint, NewNether-
land'sconquestremoveda readymeansforEnglishcolonistsin New

130 JonathanLeitner
England,Virginia, and theChesapeaketosidesteptheNavigation Acts

(Delâge, 1993: 269; Burrows& Wallace, 1999: 72), whichwere es-
the"institutionalization"
sentially ofcolonialeconomicsubordination
to England (Wallerstein,1980: 236). This was of course part of
England'sstrategy of hegemonicascent,in whichit used the Navi-
gation Acts in hand withthe mainlandNorthAmericansettlerand
Caribbeanplantationcoloniesas a meansto outcompetetheDutch
and their Baltic complex (O'Hearn, 2005: 118; also Bunker &
Ciccantell,2003a: 18).The ecoregional"coherenceoftradewithin the
Dutchempire"thatwe'veextendedfromBraudel(1984: 216),witha
core city/region drawingon complementary peripheriesforitsfood
and rawmaterials, wasthusrepeatedbytheEnglish.Buttherepetition
wason a largergeographicand ultimately materialscale,one moment
in theprocessof "cumulatively sequentialrestructuring"of thecapi-
talistworld-economy that hegemonic aspirantsmust undertake
&
(Ciccantell Bunker, 2002: 64-66; Bunker& Ciccantell,1999: 108;
2003a: 7; 2003b:340-41; 2005:32-35).ThisexpandedEnglish/British
complexwasalso ultimately subjecttoand drivenbythesametypesof
of
physicaldynamics depletionand environmental degradation(e.g.,
Moore,2000b) thathad been drivingtheEuropeancapitalistworld-
economysince its inception-indeed,arguablycaused its inception
(Moore,2000a; 2002; 2003a; 2003b).
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An Incorporated Comparison: Fernand Braudel's Account of Dutch Hegemony in a World-

This content downloaded from 129.64.99.141 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 07:24:15 AM

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conjuncture as combining particular partsofa global

This content downloaded from 129.64.99.141 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 07:24:15 AM

wereobviously keyfortheDutchin theirownascentand hegemonic

BRAUDEL ON THE AGROECOLOGICAL PRECONDITIONS

The conceptofecologically-complementary tradeis

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theseconstraints wereparticularly ofphysicalgeography and itsloca-

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This content downloaded from 129.64.99.141 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 07:24:15 AM

As Braudelsees it,therewas moreat workthanjust agricultural

This content downloaded from 129.64.99.141 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 07:24:15 AM

This content downloaded from 129.64.99.141 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 07:24:15 AM

Ciccantellemphasize,local environments in bothof theseEuropean

Swedenwas "at once precociousand retarded,"a "politicalunit"

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ploitation. . . whichalone made possiblethe imperialist policiesof

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ernWarof 1700-21(see Wallerstein, 1980:219-20)didSwedenbegin

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Tar wasa keyinputforthecontemporary shippingindustry: "the

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2000: 97-98; Wallerstein, 1980:134-40). Danzigmerchants ultimately

Francefounditselfin a similarpositionto theBalticregion.Or

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particularly those"directedtowardsexternal markets" (Braudel,1990:

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Dutch competitiveadvantageswere ultimately surmountedby

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was further depressed,since "[vjesselsof 100 tonsor less could be

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This content downloaded from 129.64.99.141 on Tue, 8 Oct 2013 07:24:15 AM

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thesurvivors (Boxer,1990: 109;Wolf,1997:238; Loth,1995:7l3n20,

Whatevertheirlaterimportanceto Dutch colonialism,Braudel

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forcoercion,thanksto "theattraction and mechanisms ofexchange,

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BRAZIL AND NEW NETHERLAND:

Perhapsbecause theywereneverquite as important to Amster-

The GWC was directedto fighttheIberiansin thewesternhemi-

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Dutchhegemonywas its efficient merchantfleet,thosesame ships

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omyvia controlover the sugartrade(Wallerstein, 1980: 158nl46).

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Therewas also an agroecologicallogicto theplanters'economic

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By comparison,theGWC "spentfarmoreresourcesin thecon-

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Europe by the end of the sixteenthcentury"(Wolf,1997: 159; also

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heavy.'Most of the shipsgo laden to Canada and returnlightor

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ping (Rink, 1986: 208-09; cf.Jacobs,2005: 46). Competitionin-

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1997:94-96, 126;Jennings, 1984: 100;Rink,1986:126;Delâge,1993: