Divine Transcendence and The Problem of Anthropomorphism in Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi's Kalam

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DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF

ANTHROPOMORPHISM IN FAKHR AL-DIN
AL-RAZl’S KALAM
BY
MOHD FARID MOHD SHAHRAN
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
International Institute
of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC)
International Islamic University
Malaysia
SEPTEMBER 2006
ABSTRACT
As a religion which upholds divine transcendence as its fundamental element in

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at divine knowledge, Islam is against any attempt to liken God with the
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characteristics of others particularly humans. The strong disavowal of

anthropomorphism shown by Muslim theologians (the mutakallimun) especially
that against anthropomorphism brought by certain marginal schismatic sects
throughout the history of Islamic thought has proved this uncompromising
stance. This dissertation analyzes the refutations of one of the important later
Asharite mutakallimun, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (1149-1209) against the literal
views of the anthropomorphists who invested God with various anthropomorphic
qualities. Advancing mostly philosophical and logical arguments, al-Razi,
through one of his important theological works, Asas al-Taqdls, set out to prove
that the principle upon which the anthropomorphists maintained that God is a
body and situated in a direction is unfounded and antithetical to the concept of
divine transcendence. He argued that the anthropomorphic views which stem
from the literalism and sensible-imaginal approach of some mar inal Islamic sects
CfQ
have produced a description of God that completely shattered the principle of
divine unity which is the foundation of Islamic understanding of God. Apart
from providing an analysis of his arguments against anthropomorphism, this
study also discusses al-Razi’s understanding on the nature of divine attributes
and how divine transcendence based on his analysis of relevant material from the
Qur’an and hadith transpire in his discussion of attributes. Since
anthropomorphism also springs from the false understanding of the ambiguous
verses of the Qur’an (mutashdbihdt), this study examines al-Razi’s views of
muhkamdt and mutashdbihdt and the role of ta \vll (allegorical interpretation) as
the appropriate device in understanding the meaning of those ambiguous verses.
It also demonstrates how al-Razi, who believes that there should not be
contradiction between the Scripture and the established rational principle, applied
ta\vil in comprehending some of the verses of the Qur’an and the Prophetic
traditions.
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APPROVAL PAGE
The dissertation of Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran has been approved by the following:
Mohamad Zaini Olhman

Supervisor
Ssekamanya Siraje Abdallah

Internal Examiner
Alparslan Acikgenc
External Examiner
Yahya Miehot
External Examiner
Ab Rahim Ismail
Chairman
iv
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own investigations, except
where otherwise stated. I also declare that it has not been previously or concurrently
submitted as a whole for any other degrees at HUM or other institutions.
Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran
Signature Date
v
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA
DECLARATION OF COPYRIGHT AND AFFIRMATION OF

FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH
Copyright © 2000 by Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran. All rights reserved.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM
IN FAKHR AL-DlN AL-RAZFS KALAM
No part of this unpublished research may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the copyright holder
except as provided below.
1. Any material contained in or derived from this unpublished research may

only be used by others in their writing with due acknowledgement.
HUM or its library will have the right to make and transmit copies (print or
electronic) for institutional and academic purposes.
The HUM library will have the right to make, store in a retrieval system and
supply copies of this unpublished research if requested by other universities
and research libraries.
Allirmed by Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran.
Signature Date
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“A ah wi l up to suitable ranks and degrees, those of you who believe and

who have been granted knowledge.” - al-Mujadilah 58:11
First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge Associate Prof. Dr. Zaini Othman
whose supervision and continuous encouragement has brought to the completion
of this dissertation. Without his comments and advice, this dissertation would
have never been able to take its present form.
My heartiest gratitude also goes to Prof. Dr. Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas
whose sagacity and erudition brought me first to 1STAC in my journey to pursue
knowledge. The interesting series of academic courses plus the resourceful
library of the institute under his leadership provided me a lively intellectual
atmosphere. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud who
has been my constant mentor and teacher in the institute.
I wish to acknowledge my colleagues especially Dr. Mohd Zaidi Ismail and Dr.
Mohd Sani Badron who, through their stimulating discussions, have continuously
provided me with fresh insights in intellectual matters.
My genuine indebtedness also goes to my parents for their enormous sacrifice

throughout my life. No words can express my feelings towards them, nor can
anything I do compensate such sacrifice. This study would have been impossible
without the support of my wife, Arba’iyah Mohd Noor, who is at the same time
striving to complete her own Ph.D. dissertation. Finally, I wish to dedicate this
dissertation to my children, Aishah Sofia, Sarah Arifah and Abbas Fakhri with
sincere prayer that they will one day be better than their father in seeking true
knowledge.
“And Allah has full knowledge and is well-acquainted with all things.” (al-
Hujurat 49:13)
vii
CONTENTS
iii
Abstract in Arabic
iv
Approval Page
v
Declaration Page
vi
Copyright Page
vii
Acknowledgements
xi
List of Abbreviations
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Al-Razi as a Champion Against Anthropomorphism
Objective of this Study
10
Previous Studies and the Scope of this Study
15
Sources of the Study
Methodology and Significance of this Study
Plan of the Study
CHAPTER ONE: DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF
ANTHROPOMORPHISM: A THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 19
Introduction: Rational and Scriptural Basis of Divine Transcendence... 19
Terms Employed to Designate Divine Transcendence 23
God’s Immanence and the Problem of Anthropomorphism 27
The Polemic of Anthropomorphism: Main Groups 29
i. The Anthropomorphists (Mushabbihah ) 29
1.1. Main Views of the Mushabbihah 32
1.11. Epistemological Method of the Mushabbihah 35
ii) TheMutazilah 37
iii) Ibn Hanbal 40
111.1. BilaKayf. 44
111.11. The Hanabilah 47
iv) The Ashairah 51
iv.i. Abu Hassan Al-Ashari 51
iv.ii Abu Hamid al-Ghazali 58
Conclusion 63
CHAPTER TWO: DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN AL-RAzI’S KALAM 66

Introduction 66
Conception of the Attributes 67
viii
The Polemic Concerning the Nature of Divine Attributes.................... 70
Al-Razi’s Views on the Nature of the Attributes and their
Relation to the Essence....................................................................... 79
The Eternal and the Originated......................................................... 82
Classification of the Attributes......................................................... 86
Divine Transcendence as Reflected in al-Razi’s
Classification of Attributes............................................................... 90
Unicity (wabdaniyyab)
M
Eternity (Qidam)
<1
Baqa ’ (Permanence)........................................................................... 100
God’s Being Distinct from Originated Things
(Mukbalafatubu li al-Hawaditb)...................................................... 101
CHAPTER THREE: TEXTUAL AND RATIONAL BASIS OF THE

DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE...................................................................... 104
Introduction......................................................................................... 104
Kitab Asas al-Taqdls......................................................................... 105
The Arrangement of Kitab Asas al-Taqdls.................................... 108
The Importance of Asas al-Taqdls................................................... 109
Rational Proofs of Divine Transcendence......................................... Ill
The Rational Principle Underlying the Musbabbibab’s Notion of
God........................................................................................................ Ill
Al-Razi’s Counter Arguments........................................................... 117
God as an Existent beyond Sense Perception.................................. 118
God as an Existent without any Resemblance (sbablb)................ 120
Classification of Existents.................................................................. 121
The Cause of the Principle (Tllat al-Hukm)................................... 124
Negation of the Spatial and Bodily Aspects with regard to God. 127
Characteristics of Spatial Bodies........................................................ 127
Textual Arguments on the Transcendence of God......................... 132
Surat al-Ikblas......................................................................... 133
CHAPTER FOUR: MUHKAMAT, MUTASHABIHAT,

AND THE ROLE OF TA WIL IN RAZES THOUGHT........................... 140
Introduction......................................................................................... 140
The Mubkamdt and Mutasbabibdt in the Qur’an......................... 140
Qur’anic Origin: Surah Al‘Imran, Verse 7.................................... 142
The Legitimacy of Interpreting the Mutasbabibdt......................... 147
Can There be Anything in the Qur’an that is Beyond our
Knowledge?.......................................................................................... 149
Linguistic and Technical Meaning of Mubkam and Mutasbabib.......... 153
Ta \vll as a Method for Understanding the Mutasbabibdt..................... 154
ix
The Importance of Reason as the Source of Ta wil: An
Epistemological Analysis 159
Rational and Traditional Proofs 161
Solution to the Contradiction between Rational and Traditional
Proofs 168
Ibn Taymiyyah’s Response 170
CHAPTER FIVE: AL-RAZI’S TREATMENT

OF THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC VERSES 174
Introduction 174
God’s Image and the Form of Adam 175
God’s Face 181
The Vision of Allah (Ru’yat Allah) 186
The Affirmation of Direction (al-jihah) with regard to God. 192
God’s Hand 198
Conclusion: Al-Razi’s General Method in Treatin
CfQ
the Anthropomorphic Verses 200
CONCLUSION 203
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Arbain Al-Razi, Kitab al-Arbain ft Usui al-Din
Asas Al-Razi, Asas al-Taqdls
Controversies Fathalla Kholeif, A Study on Fakbr al-Din al-Razi

and His Controversies in Transoxiana
El First Encyclopedia of Islam
EI2 Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition
Fakbr al-Din Salih Zarkan, Fakbr al-Din al-Razi wa Ara’ubu al-

Kaldmiyyab wa al-Falsafiyyab
Farq Al-Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayna al-Firaq
Fas I Ibn Hazm, al-Fasl ft al-Milal wa al-Abwa’ wa al-

Nibal
Ibanah Al-Ash'ari, al-Ibanab ‘an Usui al-Diyanab
Irshad Al-Juwayni, al-Irsbad ila Qawdti al-Adillab ft Usui

al-Ftiqad
Lawdmi Al-Razi, Lawdmi al-Bayyindt Sharh Asma’Allah

Ta‘ala wa-al-Sifdt
Maalim Al-Razi, Maalim ft Usui al-Din
Mabahitb Al-Razi, al-Mababith al-Mashriqiyyah ft ‘Ilm al-

Ilabiyydt wa al-Tabi‘iyydt
Mabsul Al-Razi, al-Mabsul ft ‘Ilm al-Usul
Maqalat Al-Ash'ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyyin wa Ikhtilaf al-

Musallin
Masail Al-Razi, al-Masall al-Khamsunft Usui al-Din
xi
Matalib Al-Razi, al-Matalib Aliyah min al-Ilm al-Ilahi
Milal Al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal
Muhassal Al-Razi, Muhassal Afkar al-Mutaqaddimin wa al-

Mutadkhkhirin min al-TJlama’wa al-Hukama’wa
al-Mutakallimin
Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah
Nihayat Al-Shahrastani, Nihayat al-Iqddm fi Tim al-Kalam
Sharh al-Aqald Al-Taftazani, Sharh alAqarid al-Nasafiyyah
Tafsir Al-Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir
Tahafut Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Faldsifah
Ta \vil Ibn Qutaybah, Ta \vil Mukhtalif al-Hadith
Theology Yasin Ceylan, Theology and Tafsir in the Major

Works of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi
xii
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Qur’an is replete with messages of the transcendence of God. Apart from
emphasizing the unity of God (tawhfd), many verses expound the absolute
dissimilarity between God and His creatures.1 The mutakallimun, concurring
with this enormous stress laid by the Qur’an, affirmed that divine transcendence
(tanzih) is one of the underlying principles in arriving at the understanding of
God. However, the Qur’an, as well as the Prophetic traditions, also employ
anthropomorphic (tashbih) language in describing some of God’s qualities and
actions. God, for example, is described as having ‘limbs’ such as hands,2 face3 and
eyes.4 He is also described as sitting (on the Throne),5 descending (to the earthly
heavens),6 forgetful,7 feeling angry8 and happy.9 Verses with these descriptions,
known as those whose meanings are not clearly established (ayat mutasbabihat),
depict a somewhat different aspect of divine reality compared to the verses which
emphasize the absolute uniqueness of God. As far as the history of kalam is
concerned, this contrasting description of God was not in the beginnin felt as a
tension or contradiction but later on, due to geographical expansion of Islamic CfQ
territories and conversion of people from various religions into Islam, there
1 Such as the verse, “Nothing is like unto Him” (laysa ka mitblihi shay*), al-Shura 42:11, and
“There is none like unto Him” (lam yakun labukufuwan a had), al-Ikhlas 112:4.
2 Al-Qur’an, Sad 38:57, al-Fath 48:10.
3 Al-Qur’an, al-Qasas 28:88.
4 Al-Qur'an, Hud 11:37, Ta Ha 20:39, al-Tur 52:38.
5 Al-Qur’an, Ta Ha 20:5.
6 Based on a Hadith which says, “God waits until three quarters of night and He descends to the
earthly heaven and says, “Is there any one who seek my pardon or make a prayer, until the
dawn,” Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawhid \va Itbbat Sfat al-Rabb (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-
'Ilmiyyah, 1983), 126.
7 Al-Qur’an, al-Tawbah 9:67
8 Al-Qur’an, al-Nisa’ 4:93
9 Ibn Maj ah, “Masajid”, no. 800, Sunan. Ed. Muhammad Fuad 'Abd al-Baqi (Bayrut: al-
Maktabah al- 'Ilmiyyah, 1954), vol.l, 262.
1
emerged different sects which insisted on taking the literal meaning of the
mutashdbihat. They soon began attributing anthropomorphic qualities to God.
Thus, the unity and transcendence of God, which is the pristine pillar of Islamic
theology, began to be challenged by these anthropomorphic interpretations.
Although this challenge did not become a major threat to the mainstream Islamic
theology, it compelled the mutakallimun to provide a considerable amount of
substantial and systematic arguments in refuting these ideas.
Apparently, there were many modes of interpretations in dealing with the
anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an ranging from crude emphasis of the
literal meanin to the allegorical.10 At the two opposite extremes, there are the
CfQ
ta ctil (divesting God of all attributes) of the Mu tazilah and the Jabmiyyab who
gorically reject any anthropomorphic meanings regarding God’s attributes

pr-b
CD
while at the same time, introducing allegorical interpretation (ta’wil) of the
mutashdbihat verses of the Qur’an. The meanings intended by God in these
expressions, according to them, are conveyed metaphorically; God’s hand is His
power, God’ eye is His essence, and so on. On the other extreme, there were
those who resolutely stuck to the literal meaning and insisted that there are no
other meanings conveyed by these expressions beside the literal ones. Taking
God’s words as absolute and immutable, they confined themselves to accepting
only the literal implications of the expressions. The extreme among them went
to the extent of affirming a physical size of God, that God, for example, is no
larger than the Jabal Qubays in Mecca.11 They were called the musbabbibab,
10 R. Strothman, “Tashbih,” El, vol. 8, 685. Abrahamov identifies three different ways adopted by
Muslim scholars in treating the anthropomorphic expressions. First, those who adopted the literal
meanings of these expressions saying, for example, that God has a face, hands and that He sits on
His throne. Second, those who interpreted these expressions in a figurative way. Thus, God’s
hand implies His power and His sitting on the throne means His rule over the world. Third, who
accepted the sacred text as it is without trying to interpret its modality (kayflyyah'). Binyamin
Abrahamov, “The Bila Kayfa Doctrine and Its Foundations in Islamic Theology,” ARABICA,
Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Tome XLII, No. 3 (Nov. 1995): 365.
11 This is the view of Abu al-Hudhayl, one of the early Mu tazilah. Maqalat, vol.l, 281-282.
2
those who perform tashbib, namely comparing and making God similar with His
creation, especially man, by ascribing human characteristics to Him.
Tashbib emer ed in various degrees as reflected in the different names
CfQ
and designations rendered by heresiographical scholars and mutakallimun to
those who uphold it.12 In general, they were called mushabbibah due to the fact
that they made God similar to His creation by ascribing some of their
characteristics to Him. This assimilation, however, varies depending upon the
nature of the assimilation. Broadly classified, there were at least two forms of
tasbbib prevalent in the history of Islamic thought.13 The first form is plain
literalism wherein the literal meanings of the anthropomorphic expressions were
upheld and metaphorical meanings were rejected. The theological implication of
this position is the affirmation of God having all the anthropomorphic qualities
including the ‘organs’ mentioned in the Qur’an. This view was held by the
extreme segment of the Hanabilah whose anthropomorphic tendency was
rejected even by other scholars from the same theological school. It was
evidenced, for example, in the criticism of Ibn al-Jawzi (d.1210), one of the
prominent Hanabilah, ainst their views.14 The second form of
anthropomorphism is what we term as ‘philosophical literalism,’ a literal approach
that is further substantiated with rational and philosophical arguments. This
approach is best represented by the Karramiyyah and some Shi T individuals such
as Hisham b. al-Hakam and Hisham b. Salim al-Jawaliki who, although started
from the literal understanding of the Scripture, were later on influenced by some
philosophical ideas such as the idea of the eternity of the world. Based on the
12 The mujassimab, for example, were called as such due to their ascription of body (jisrri) to God;
the Hululiyyah were so-called due to their subscription to the idea of divine incarnation (hulul).
Others, however, derived their names from their leaders such as the Karr amiyyah, Hishamiyyah,
Bayaniyyah, and Azaqirah. SeeFarq, 18-40; Maqalat, vol.l, 281-290.
13 These two forms of tasbbih are also al-Razi’s main object of criticism which will be analyzed
later.
14 Ibn al-Jawzi, Daf‘Sbubab al-Tasbbib bi Akuff al-Tanzib, ed. Hassan Saqqaf (Amman: Dar al-
Imam al-Nawawi, 2000).
3
anthropomorphic qualities mentioned in the Qur’an, they try to justify their
ascription of these qualities to God by applying the philosophical concepts of
substance, accidents, atom and body.15
The musbabbibah position, however, must be differentiated from the
position of the early generations of the Muslims (al-salaf) who took a safe and
precautions stand in approaching the problem of anthropomorphism. Their
position was often associated with Malik ibn Anas’s saying that “God’s sitting on
the Throne is known, but its modality is unknown, and belief in it is obligatory
while inquiring about it is an innovation” (al-istiwa’ ma qul al-kayf majbul al-
Iman bibi wajib wa al-su’al anbu bidab).16 Later on, this principle was
developed and known as bila kayf (without modality) in which the
anthropomorphic attributes are accepted without further inquiry regarding their
modality. Although the fine line dividing the salaf and the musbabbibab is
sometimes regarded by their adversaries, the Mu tazilab, as obscure, due to their
rejection of allegorical interpretation (tahvil), one discernible difference, as
pointed out by al-Razi, is that the salaf maintain that the meanings that are
intended by God through these anthropomorphic expressions are not literal,
hence the meanings must be entrusted to God (tafwidma haba ila Allah).17 The
musbabbibab, on the other hand, adhere and insist on the literal and
anthropomorphic meanings and further support their position by their own
rational construction.
15 For further views of the Karramiyyah and these individuals, see al-Farq, 18-36; Milal, 88-96;
W.M.Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1985), 79-81; A.S.Tritton, Muslim Theology (Bristol: The Royal Asiatic
Society, 1947), 74-78, 108-112.
16 Milal, 65; al-Baghdadi, Usui al-Dih (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1981), 113.
17 Asas, 208.
4
AL-RAZI AS A CHAMPION AGAINST ANTHROPOMORPHISM
Among the mutakallimun who had been actively involved in the polemic against
anthropomorphism was Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad bin 'Umar b. al-Husayn,
better known as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, one of the most important Ash'arite
>
mutakallimun of the twelfth century. staunch critic of the mushabbihah
views especially those prevailing at his time, al-Razi took the task of defending
the divine transcendence through his systematic refutation of the
anthropomorphic ideas of the mushabbihah especially in his theological work
Asas al-Taqdis. Born in Rayy, northern Persia in 1149, al-Razi (d.1209) was a
famous mutakallim of the thirteenth century. He was a celebrated scholar of his

19 and was regarded as the reviver of Islam in the twelfth century.20 Both
time,18
he and al-Ghazali were esteemed as the founder of the new school in kalam
which was mainly characterized by its maximal employment of logico-
philosophical tools in kalam. Although he was known mainly as a mutakallim,
al-Razi’s brilliant and encyclopedic mind enabled him to write in many fields of
knowledge such as philosophy, logic, fiqh, physics, medicine and astronomy. Ibn
Khallikan rightly acknowledged al-Razi’s great intellectual ability when he
remarked that the latter was the “greatest authority on the Greek sciences of his
time and surpassed all his contemporaries in theology, metaphysics and
18 Information regarding the life and works of al-Razi can be found in many sources some of
which will be continuously mentioned in this introduction. Among the important works that
provide biographical information on al-Razi are Salih Zarkan, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi wa Ara’uhu
al-Kalamiyyah wa al-Falsafiyyah (Egypt: Darul Fikr, 1963); Yasin Ceylan, Theology and Tafsir
in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dih al-Razi (Kuala Lumpur: 1STAC, 1996); Seyyed Hossein
Nasr, “Fakhr al-Din al-Razi”, in M. M. Sharif, (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy,
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), 642-656; Tony Street, ‘Concerning the Life and Works of
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’, Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society: A Festschrift in Honour
of Anthony H. fohns, ed. Peter G. Riddell & Tony Street (Leiden: Brill, 1997); G. C. Anawati,
“Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,” EI2, vol. II, 751-755.
19 Al-Razi was also known through other titles such as Imam al-Fakhr and Ibn al-Khatib. He
was bom in a family of scholars and had his father Diya’ al-Din, a well-known scholar of Rayy
as his first teacher. Later on, he studied various disciplines in Rayy and Maraghah under
Muhammad al-Baghawi and Majd al-Din al-Jili (who was also the teacher of Shihab al-Din al-
Suhrawardi) and Kamal al-Din al-Simnani. Theology, 1.
20 Nasr, “Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,” 642.
5
philosophy.” His analytical and philosophical mind can be seen, for example,
through his critical commentaries on a number of Ibn Sina’s works such as al-
22 In kalam, he wrote many monumental works

Isharat and Uy un aTJTikmab.21
such as Mufassal, Arbam fi Usui al-Diri, Matalib Aliyab and Mabahitb al-
Masbriqiyyab, which propound important aspects of kalam, putting him at par
with his predecessors such as al-Baqillani, al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali who had
contributed to the refinement of the Ash'arite kalam. Al-Razi’s independent
approach is also apparent in his disagreements with his predecessors on a number
of issues based on his own justified arguments. His important contribution to
the enrichment of later Ash'arite kalam is also evidenced by the influence of
some of his theological ideas on later Asha rite mutakallimun, such as ‘All al-
Jurjani and Sa cl al-Din al-Taftazani.23 Al-Razi was also known as a mufassir
through his voluminous Qur commentary, Tafsir al-Kabir, which is
re arded as a systematic tafsir due to the great emphasis he placed on describing
the interconnections between the Qur’anic chapters and verses. This is also
associated with his belief in the unity of truth between philosophy and religion.24 25
As far as anthropomorphism is concerned, al-Razi was strongly opposed
by the musbabbibab especially the Karramiyyab. Equipped with strong logical
and philosophical tools together with his courage and convincing eloquent
oratory, he held debates with the leaders of the Karramiyyab and converted
many of them into the fold of Abl al-Sunnab wa al-famaab.26 At the same
21 Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A yan, trans. MacGuckin De Slane (London: Johnson Reprint
Corporation, 1843), vol. 2, 652.
22Although critical of Ibn Sina, al-Razi was also influenced by many of Ibn Sina’s philosophical
ideas. He was also influenced in physics by another scholar, Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi.
23 See Chapter Four, 168-169.
24 Theology, 6.
25 See information about Karramiyyab in Chapter One, 29, n.53.
26 See the introduction of M. Saghir Hasan Ma’sumi, Imam Razfs c Ilm al-Akhlaq, being an
English translation of his Kitab al-Nafs \va al-Ruh wa Sharh Quwabuma with introduction and
commentary (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1970), 6.
6
time, his continuous attacks on their views during his travel in many places,2
had also stirred great hostility among the Karramiyyab against him. They, in
turn, leveled severe allegations against him, and even threatened his life. Similar
hostile attitude towards him was also shown by the Hartabilab and the Isma ills
due to his bitter criticism against their doctrines.27
28 29
Apart from his criticisms against the musbabbibab in his theological
works, al-Razi composed specific work, Asas al-Taqdis2 which was
particularly intended to refute the two forms of tasbbib we mentioned above. In
this work, he underlined the paramount importance of preserving the divine
transcendence by advancing substantial rational and traditional proofs against the
major premises underlying the views of the musbabbibab. Arguing that God is
an existent beyond the reach of human senses, al-Razi further drew attention to
the stark differences between the transcendent understanding of God and the
notion of body (jism) and direction (jibah), the two main qualities which were
attributed to God by the musbabbibab. He made use of the already established
kalam discussion of body (/ism), substance (jawbar) and accident (arad) to show
that God is essentially different from the characteristics of bodies. These bodies
are homo eneous, located in a certain direction and in need of each other and all
CfQ
these are important indications of the physical nature of corporeal beings, which
are utterly inappropriate to the divine nature. In principle, al-Razi maintained
that any attempt to locate God in a direction as attempted by the musbabbibab,
27 Al-Razi’s intellectual life was very much coloured by his travels into various places as well as
having patronized by several rulers. After completed his studies in Rayy, he traveled to
Khawarizm where he held debates with the Mu tazilah. He then moved to Transoxiana and was
accepted at the Courts of the Ghur rulers, Ghiyath al-Din and Shihab al-Din. After receiving
antagonistic and hostile opposition from certain scholars, he left Ghur to Ghaznah where he
stayed for a while in the Court of Ghaznah. He finally settled in Herat where he taught under
the patronage of Khwarizm Shah ‘Ala’ al-Din until the end of his life.
28 Ma’sumi, 11-14; Theology, 3.
29 Ed. Ahmad Hijazi al-Saqa (Bayrut: Dar al-Jil, 1993).
7
would only end up attributing to God characteristics which are impossible to
Him.
God, al-Razi argued, is an existent beyond the grasp of human senses. As
Supreme Being, He has neither any equal nor resemblance (nazir wa sbabib).
The uniqueness of his existence is affirmed both by reason and the Scripture,
hence, no physical principles can be applied to the existence of God. Once the
divine transcendence is upheld, it follows, epistemologically, that the
anthropomorphic verses or expressions in the Scripture cannot be taken literally.
In line with this position, al-Razi put forward an important epistemological
principle that if there is any contradiction between the Scripture with the already
established rational principle, the latter must be maintained. The acceptance of
the former will only lead to the impingement upon the divine transcendence
which has already been firmly established. Furthermore, inconsistency in a
scriptural message is unacceptable since it would denigrate its integrity as a
divine message. As way out, al-Razi maintained that the mutasbabibat verses
must be dealt with in the strong precaution of preserving the divine
transcendence by using the methodology of ta Xvil, an allegorical interpretation of
a verse. Nevertheless, ta\vil must be based on the proper identification of the
ambiguous verses (mutasbabibat) and appropriate assignment of their meanings
based on the verses which have established meaning (mufikamat) and
substantiated by conclusive proofs. Above all that, ta\vil should only be carried
out by qualified people. Al-Razi admitted that tafwid, namely to entrust the
meaning of the mutasbabibat to God, as done by the salaf, is the safest way in
dealing with anthropomorphic verses, yet this should not prevent those who are
deeply rooted in knowledge and those who believe that the whole meaning of the
Qur’an is comprehensible from establishing the appropriate meaning of these
verses.
8
OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY
The subject we are dealing in this study can be briefly phrased as the problem of
anthropomorphism (tashbih). In particular, this study is an analysis, through one
of al-Razi’s works, Asas al-Taqdis, of a methodology in interpreting or
understanding the meaning of the anthropomorphic expressions concerning
certain qualities of God mentioned in the Scripture and in the Prophetic traditions
with an underlying emphasis in preserving the divine transcendence. In
achieving this objective, this study aims, first, at examinin al-Razi s views on
CfQ
divine transcendence through his views on the divine attributes. It also seeks to
elaborate his defense of divine transcendence through his refutation, scripturally
and rationally, of the views of the Musbabbibah regarding God. It then analyzes
al-Razi’s method of interpreting the anthropomorphic verses.
Due to the interrelated subject matter of the study, this research dwells
not only within the realm of kalam but also encroaches into another important
field in Islam, namely, tafsir. Simply put, it begins with kalam but ends with
tafsir. Since the principle of divine transcendence is mostly elaborated in kalam,
the theological discussions leading to its establishment is the main concern of this
study, while the problem of understanding the anthropomorphic expressions
through the discussion of mufkamat and mutasbabihat falls under the domain of
tafsir. The selection of al-Razi as its intellectual figure and this topic in
particular is, to us, duly fitting. For our scholar was well known as both
mutakallim and a mufassir. In kalam, as mentioned before, he was an eminent
and notable later Ash'arite scholar whose theological ideas have left repercussions
in the theological discussion of the later mutakallim un. While in tafsir, his
magnum opus, Tafsir al-Kabir, has been regarded as the greatest work both in
volume and importance, encyclopedic in nature combining various disciplines in
9
one work.3 In addition, al-Razi’s mastery of language, philosophy, and kalam
has great significance in his discussion concerning the way the anthropomorphic
verses should be comprehended.
PREVIOUS STUDIES AND THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no specific study on al-Razi’s views
regarding divine transcendence and anthropomorphism. Neither is there any
particular analysis of al-Razi’s Kitab Asas al-Taqdfs apart from al-Saqa’s
comments as an appendix in his edition of this work.3 Nevertheless, within
more general and comprehensive study on al-Razi’s theological thought, this
subject is included, for example, in Salih Zarkan’s comprehensive study on al-
Razi’s theology, Fakhr al-Dfn al-Razf wa Ara’uhu al-Kalamiyyah wa al-

Falsafiyyah.32 In this work, Zarkan deals with the divine transcendence under
the subject of negative attributes (sifat salbiyyah) which includes the
purification of God from any physical qualities. Another similar work is that by
Yasin Ceylan, Theology and Tafsir in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dih al-Razf33
These two published works also prove to be invaluable to access al-Razi’s
theological views as a whole.
There are also several articles which partially discuss al-Razi’s view on
some aspects of the problem of divine transcendence and anthropomorphism.30
30 Also known as Mafatih al-Gbayb, this Quranic commentary (32 vols., al-Qahirah edition) is
re arded as the most extensive exegesis based on individual opinion and reasoning (tafsir bi al-
tn
ra V). Its vast discussions cover various kinds of knowledge, including many views of different
sects such as the Mu tazilab, the philosophers, Karramiyyab. The extensive nature of this work
is evidenced, among others, in al-Razi’s discussion of Surat al-Fatihah in which he said that from
this particular chapter alone, 10,000 problems can be extracted. As reported by al-Dhahabi, Abu
Hayyan in his work Bahr al-Muhft remarked that this work “has everything in it except tafsir”
(This statement is also attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah). Al-Husayn al-Dhahabi, al-Tafsrr wa al-
Mufassirun. (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-Kutub al-Hadithah,1986), vol.l, 289-296.
31 See appendix in al-Razi, Asas al-Taqdfs, ed. Ahmad Hijazi al-Saqa (Bayrut: Dar al-Jil, 1993),
229-245.
32 Egypt: Darul Fikr, 1963.
33 Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996.
10
Shalahudin Kafrawi has written an article Fakhr al-Dih al-Razfs Sources of
Ta’wil: Between Revelation and Reason34 in which he focuses on the role of
revelation and reason in his tafsir. Ta \vil, as a manifestation of the central role
of reason in the interpretation of revelation, dominates the whole article.
Another article which investigates al-Razi’s view on ta\vil and the relation
between reason and revelation is written by Nicholas Heer, The Priority of
Reason in the Interpretation of Scripture: Ibn Taymiyyah and The
Mutakallimun35 Although the central focus of the article is the refutation of Ibn
Taymiyyah of the views of Asharite mutakallimun especially al-Razi, Heer
began by discussing the view of al-Razi on the issue. The Ash'arites’ position
with re ard to the conflict between reason and scripture, according to Heer, is to
CfQ
invariably give priority to reason over scripture and al-Razi was among those
who strongly emphasizes this principle. Binyamin Abrahamov discusses the
view of al-Razi on the transcendent aspect of divine essence and attributes in his
article “Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on the Knowability of God’s Essence and

Attributes.”36 He argues that al-Razi, like al-Ghazali, in his later works changed
his mind concerning human’s knowledge of God’s essence and adopted the
philosophical position that His essence cannot be known. Another relevant
article is Binyamin Abrahamov’s “The Bi-la Kayfa Doctrine and Its Foundations
in Islamic Theology” which elaborates the position of bild kayf especially among
the mutakallimun37 He maintains that the arguments based on the bila kayfa
doctrine had a dual function. One the one hand, they served as a weapon against
anthropomorphism and against figurative interpretation, and on the other, they
34 In Islamic Quarterly: A Review of Islamic Culture, vol. XLIII, no. 3 (Third Quarter, 1999).
35 In Literary Heritage of Classical Islam:Arabic and Islamic Studie in Honour of fames A.
Bellamys, ed. Mustansir Mir (Princeton: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1993).
36 ARABICA, Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Tome XLIX, no. 2 (2002).
37 Ibid., Tome XLII, Fascicule 3 (Nov. 1995).
11
aimed at strengthening the thesis of the unknowability of God’s essence and
attributes.38
The subject of anthropomorphism alone has become the interest of several
people. R. Strothman wrote an article under the heading “tasbbib” in the First
Encyclopedia of Islam in which he analysed the words relating to the issue such
as tasbbib (likening God to His creatures), tamtbil (giving simile to God), ta\vil
(allegorical interpretation), tanzib (keeping God pure) and ta ‘til (divesting God of
attributes). Maintaining that the anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an have
been interpreted in various degrees, he also admitted the difficulties in
approaching the question since none of the Muslim theologians openly declare
that they are anthropomorphists but rather everyone asserts tanzib as opposed to
tasbbib.39 Nevertheless, the issue of anthropomorphism, according to him, hinges
upon two extreme positions, namely, tasbbib, held by many groups such as the
Karramiyyab and some of the Hanabilab, and ta ‘til which is held by the
Jabmiyyab and the Mu tazilab. He analysed views of some theological figures
who were involved in these polemics such as Jahm bin Safwan, the earliest
muattilab, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who introduced the bila kayf method, and
Hisham b. al-Hakam, a stark exemplar of the anthropomorphists. Strothman,
however, differentiates between tasbbib and tajsim claiming that the latter is less
severe since the mujassimab like Hisham b. al-Hakam usually add the phrase
“not like our body” in their views when comparing God with human beings.40
William Montgomery Watt wrote two articles entitled “Some Muslim
Discussions of Anthropomorphism” and “Created in His Image: A Study in
Islamic Theology,” both found in his book, Early Islam.41 In the first article,
Watt points out that tasbbib was first raised by the Mu tazilab and Jabmiyyab
38 Ibid, 378.
39 Strothman, “Tashbih”, El, 685.
40 Ibid, 687.
41 Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990.
12
by way of accusing the main body of the ‘orthodox’ Muslim belief of the heresy
of tashbih. Nevertheless, Watt maintains that the Mutazilah and Jabmiyyah
were not influenced by Greek philosophy, but they merely found in the armory
of Hellenistic thought useful weapons against their opponents. The emphasis on
the otherness of God vis-a-vis tashbih, according to Watt, is the contribution of
later theologians in developing one important factor in the Qur’anic conception of
God. As for the method of ta \vil, which to Watt had a much narrower sense than
the word ‘metaphor’ in English, it has become the solving mechanism especially
to the Mu tazilab and the Jabmiyyab in their treatment of the anthropomorphic
verses. On the other hand, there is another method that of bila kayf, or
balkafiyyah, a doctrine which prescribes that we are justified in using mundane
predicates of God without explaining exactly how they apply to Him. By
clinging to the text of the Qur’an and regarding it as the very word of God, the
orthodox, who were very much associated with this method, affirmed that if the
Qur’an spoke of God’s hands and face, then God must have hands and face.
How God, who is incorporeal, can have hands and a face may be difficult to
understand, but this difficulty is not a valid reason for rejecting the words of
Scripture. According to them, one must maintain both the authority of the
Scripture and the incorporeality of God even one cannot reconcile them
intellectually. Watt continues to examine the employment of this method by
the Asbairab and how at a later stage they preferred ta’wil to balkafiyyab. In
his other article entitled “Created in His Image: A Study in Islamic Theology” in
the same collection, Watt evaluates the view of the mufassirun regarding the
Prophetic tradition, “Verily God has created Adam according to his form” (inna
Allah khalaqa Adam ala suratibf) which implies the similarity between the
image of God and the form of Adam. Asserting that this issue has been the
interest of many scholars including theologians, philosophers and Sufis who have
42 Watt, “Some Muslim Discussion,” 88.
13
given various kinds of interpretations, he concludes that the view that rejected
the similarity between God and man won the day.43 Watt concludes that the
study has introduced us to one of the deep tensions in Islamic thought - the
tension between those who hold God’s absolute uniqueness, and those who
believed that there is an affinity between God and man.

In his translation of Kitab al-Mustarsbid44 of al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim
(d.860), an early Sbfab figure, Binyamin Abrahamov has given in his
introduction, resourceful analysis regarding the issue and history of
anthropomorphism. His introduction also includes the discussion of the Qur’an
in al-Qasim’s writings and al-Qasim’s ways of interpretation of the Qur’an which
reveal the basic arguments in refuting the musbabbibab. In his refutation of
tasbbib, al-Qasim, according to Abrahamov, seems to have followed the
Mu tazilab with regard to both content and method; for example, the use of
ta \vil, the discussion of words, prepositions and homonyms, providing pieces of
evidence from the ordinary use of language and from poetry.45 In this six-chapter
work, all efforts are focused on the writer’s refutation of the view of the
musbabbibab particularly that which is based on the Quranic verses, such as the
view that God is in the heavens, God has a soul like the human soul, God is light
just as created light, God is composed of parts, God’s face is like the human face
and that God can be seen in the Hereafter.
Since there has been no specific study of al-Razi’s view regarding divine
transcendence and anthropomorphism, the present work intends to do so. Apart
from tackling the issue of anthropomorphism, this study also examines al-Razi’s
conception of divine attributes which becomes the basis of his thought regarding
divine transcendence. By doing so, this study, at the same time, attempts an
43 Ibid., 99.
44 Under the title Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur’an in the Theology of al-
Qasim Ibn Ibrahim (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1996).
45 Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, 8.
14
evaluation of the later Asbairah position regarding anthropomorphism and how
it differs especially from that of its founder, Abu Hassan al-Ashari. Since the
Asbairah were different from the Mutazilah in their theological approach, it is
also the interest of this study to examine the theological differences between
these two schools.
SOURCES OF THE STUDY
The sources of this study can be divided into four categories: Al-Razi’s own
works, the works of the mutakallimun before and after him, secondary sources
on al-Razi, and other secondary sources. In the first category, the main source of
this study is al-Razi’s Kitab Asas al-Taqdis. Several other kalam works of al-
Razi also serve as our main cross-references. Among the important ones are al-
Muhassal, Arba m fl Usd al- Dm and Ma alim fl Usd al-Dih. We also
depended heavily on al-Razi’s Tafsir al-Kabir, also known as Mafatih al-Gbayb,
especially in examining his interpretations of anthropomorphic expressions in the
Qur’an. As to the works of other mutakallimun, we referred mainly to some of
the works of A sb arf mutakallimun before and after him for comparison such as
al-Ashari’s Maqalat al-Islamiyyih and al-Ibanah, al-Ghazali’s Tahafut al-
Falasifah, and al-Shahrastani’s Nibayat al-Iqdam. Al-Taftazani’s Sbarh al-
Maqasid, and al-Jurjani’s Sbarh al-Mawaqif were consulted mostly for the
verification of al-Razi’s influence on later mutakallimun.
Several secondary sources were also of great help in our study. The ones
on al-Razi are Salih Zarkan’s Fakbr al-Dih al-Razi wa Ara’ubu al-Kalamiyyah
wa al-Falsafah,46 Yasin Ceylan’s Theology and Tafsir in the Major Works of
Fakbr al-Dih al-Razi,47 48Fathalla Kholleifs Fakbr al-Dih al-Razi4* and
Muhammad al-Uraybi’s Muntalaqat al-Fikriyyab inda al-Imam al-Fakbr al-
46 Egypt: Dar al-Fikr, 1963.

47 Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996.
48 Iskandariah: Dar al-Maarif, 1969.
15
Razi.49 Other sources which are not directly related to al-Razi nevertheless have
provided some insights regarding the issue constitute the last category of our
sources. These includes writings on kalam and Islamic philosophy as a whole
such as William Montgomery Watt’s Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An
Extended Survey,50 Harry A. Wolfson’s The Philosophy of Kalam,51 Alnoor
Dhanani’s The Physical Theory of Kalam,52 and Majid Fakhry’s A History of
Islamic Philosophy 53
METHODOLOGY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY
Our study focuses on the textual analysis of al-Razi’s Asas al-Taqdis, a work
which contains his arguments against the anthropomorphists. This textual
analysis is preceded by a theological and historical survey on the issue followed
by a conceptual deliberation on al-Razi’s view on divine transcendence which is
exemplified by his discussion on divine attributes. In analyzing the text, other
kalam works of al-Razi, as alluded before, were consulted for corroboration and
cross-reference. Hence, the issue that was analyzed in the text was further
examined with the help of other materials relevant to the text.
The significance of this study lies in the following: First, it portrays the
later Ash'arite theological method in comprehending the issue of
anthropomorphism. As the mainstream theological school in Sunni kalam which
have survived and flourished throughout Islamic history, it is important to note
that the Ashairah, as observed by Pines, were able to acquire this position due to
“the solutions they offered to the theological problems associated with creation,
49 Bayrut: Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani, 1992.

50 Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985.
51 Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1976.
52 Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994.
53 New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd edn, 1983.
16
divine knowledge and revelation.” 4 Al-Razi was one of the important Ash'arite
mutakallimun. who contributed to this solution. Second, this study offers an
alternative method to the extreme position in the understanding of certain verses
of the Qur’an prevailing among some Muslims today. A more moderate
interpretation of the Qur’an, as will be shown by this study, will prevent
Muslims from either falling into the abyss of anthropomorphism due to their
strict literalism, or of making God unknowable to mankind by stripping Him of
any attribute. Thirdly, the present study throws some light on the views of
mutakallimun. re arding the relation between reason and revelation and how this
CfQ
epistemological problem should be dealt with in Islam.
PLAN OF THE STUDY
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The introduction, as discussed, explains
the sources and significance of the study. The first chapter provides the
background of the issue by surveying theological views on divine transcendence
and anthropomorphism prior to al-Razi. It gives the rational and scriptural basis
of divine transcendence in Islam including the terms used to indicate divine
transcendence in the Islamic tradition. It continues with an ideological map of
the main theological schools directly involved in the polemic concernin CfQ
the
problem of anthropomorphism commencing with the views of the musbabbibab,
followed by responses against anthropomorphism by different sects, such as the
Mu tazilab and the Jabmiyyab, before it concludes with the views of the
Asbairab prior to al-Razi.
The second chapter deals with al-Razi’s conception of divine attributes
including the definition of attributes and their difference from divine names. His
view on the nature of attributes and their relation to divine essence reflects his
54 Shlomo Pines, Studies in Islamic Atomism, translated from German by Michael Schwarz
(Jurusalem: The Magnes Press, 1997), 1.
17
A sb hr?" inclination as well as his difference, contrary to some claims, with the
Mu tazilab. This chapter further analyzes al-Razi’s classification of attributes
and the position of divine transcendence in his classification and how his position
on transcendence impinges on his classification of attributes and consequently
serves as a strong foundation for his attack on his adversaries.
The third chapter examines al-Razi’s rational and traditional proofs of
divine transcendence, and his arguments for rejecting anthropomorphism. He
refuted two of the most important premises underlying the views of the
anthropomorphists regarding God: first, that God is a body (/ism) or a substance
(jawbar) and second, that God occupies space (mutahayyiz'). We regard this
chapter as the most important one in this study since it focuses on al-Razi’s main
arguments against the Musbabbibab as exemplified in his work Asas al-Taqdis.
Chapter four analyzes al-Razi’s view on muJjkamat and mutasbabibat, the
two important categories of verses mentioned by the Qur’an. It aims at knowing
how al-Razi viewed these two categories and elaborates his method in identifying
and categorizing the verses. This is followed by his views on the way to deal with
the mutasbabibat. This chapter also evaluates Razi’s idea of ta’wil which is
considered as an alternative method in dealing with anthropomorphic expressions
in the Qur’an.
The final chapter demonstrates how al-Razi applied the method of ta \vil
in his explanation and commentary of the anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an
which appear to be in conflict with the epistemological basis that he has laid
down. A few anthropomorphic expressions that appear in the Qur’an are
selected as examples in elucidating the use of ta ’wil in arriving at an
understanding of anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an.
18
CHAPTER ONE
ANTHROPOMORPHISM: A THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION: RATIONAL AND SCRIPTURAL BASIS OF DIVINE

TRANSCENDENCE
It goes without saying that divine transcendence has been an essential aspect in
describing the attributes of God among the mutakallimun. as well as theologians of
other religions.1 God is described as being unique and bearing no resemblance to
any corporeal and human characteristics. This concept has a firm basis both from
the rational and scriptural point of view. Rationally, the idea of a transcendent God
is harmonious with reason such that any exercise of reason, if it is carried out with
valid and appropriate way will lead to the co nition of the transcendent God.
CfQ
Hence, the Greek philosophers already propounded this idea by maintaining that
among the constituent elements of the notion of God is that He must be
transcendent Being and that He exists apart from both man and the world.2 Harry
Wolfson described the ancient origin of this doctrine in his history of philosophy
and religion:
The conception of God as a being who is above knowledge and

description has been common in religious philosophy ever since Philo.
This conception is generally represented as a philosophic principle
supported by appropriate scriptural quotations.3
1 See the informative survey on divine transcendence in Ian Richard Netton, Allah Transcendent:
Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology (Surrey:
Curzon Press, 1989); Fadlou Shehadi, Al-Ghaz all’s Unique and Unknowable God (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1964). For the analysis of transcendentalism and anthropomorphism in the Greek, Christian and
Modern Philosophy, see Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1941).
2 Etienne Gilson, “The Idea of God and the Difficulties of Atheism,” in The Great Ideas Today -
1969, ed. R.M. Hutchins & M. J. Adler (Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica Inc., 1969), 239.
3 Harry Austryn Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed. Isadore Twersky &
George H. Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), vol.l, 98.
19
The philosophers view God’s uniqueness as a direct logical consequence of
the notion of a perfect and simple God. Being the First Cause, God is said to be
pure, incorporeal and free from matter. He is One, simple in all respects, and
transcends every category and classification that human reason can comprehend.
He does not have any genus or differentia, the two elements necessary for
definition of any concept.4 Plotinus, the most important figure in the philosophy
of Neo-Platonism, described God as One, beyond all thought and all beings,
ineffable and incomprehensible, neither essence nor bein nor life can be predicated
CfQ
of Him. He is so transcendent that whatever we say of Him merely limits Him and
we cannot say what He is, but only what He is not.5 He is thus unnamable since
any attempt at expressing Him must of necessity result in a judgment and since a
judgment is made up of several terms, we cannot say what the one is without
turning his unity into some sort of multiplicity.6
Similar emphasis on divine transcendence is apparent in the views of early
Muslim philosophers. Al-Farabi conceived God as the First Cause whose
existence is the most excellent and precedes every other existence. His existence,
therefore, is different in its substance from everything else for “if they have the
same existence there could be no difference and distinction between them.”7
Identifying perfection with uniqueness, al-Farabi also ar ued that if some other
CfQ
things apart from the First Existent were to exist, the existence of the First would
not be perfect.8 Ibn Sina, another great philosopher of Islam, viewed that since
4 Shehadi, 40; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, History of Islamic Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1996), 241.
Similar understanding of God was held by the Neo-Platonists who later left a strong influence on
Medieval, Islamic and Renaissance thought. Thomas Mautner (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy
(London: Penguin Books, 1997), 431.
5 Frederick Coplestone, History of Philosophy (New York: Image Books, 1993), vol.l, 464; Sharif,
vol. 1, 213.
6 Gilson, God and Philosophy, 45.
7 Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, Mabadi’Ara’Ahl al-Madfnah al-Fadlah, trans. Richard Walzer (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985), 60-61.
8 Ibid., 61. See also Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2nd edn, 1983), 117.
20
God is simple, there cannot be multiplicity in Him either essential or accidental.9
For this multiplicity would become His constituents or parts while God has neither
constituent nor part:
The Necessary Existent cannot have different kinds of parts, each

standing by itself and forming a unit, such as wood and clay in a
house. Nor can such parts be separated in idea (ma ha) but not in
essence (dhat) in the manner matter and form are separate in natural
bodies.10
Based on this simplicity of Necessary Existent, it follows that He must be
without equal and should be characterized negatively through the exclusion of all
similitude to other beings such as havin no enus differentia, definition, place,
CfQ
CfQ
subject, opposite, species, companion, receptivity of motion, or receptivity of
partition.11 12Although these views of the Muslim philosophers were sometimes
regarded as an ‘alienation’ of God from the knowledge of man and have made God
more unknowable to man, they somehow reflect the way reason attempts to
conceive the transcendent aspect of the Divine. Among the mutakallimun, the
Mu tazilah came closest to the philosophers with their description of God divested
from any notion of additional attributes (ta ctil). Anchored by an unwavering
principle of the unity of God, they viewed that since the essence of God is one and
eternal, no other eternal entities should co-exist with the divine essence. God is,
9 Ibn Sina, Danish Nama-i Ala’I, translated, commented and analyzed by Parviz Morewedge,
Metaphysics of Ibn Sina (London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1973), 58. Fakhry, 153-154.
10 Ibn Sina, Danish Nama-i, 53.
11 Ibid, 223; Fakhry, 153-154.
12 Netton, after having surveyed the ideas of the Muslim philosophers concerning divine
transcendence, concludes that the language of transcendence they were using is “in fact the mirror
of a gradual intellectual, theological and linguistic alienation from the Qur’anic Creator
Paradigm...from a Qur’anic God who creates, acts in time, guides mankind, and who can in some
way be known to an utterly remote, unknowable God...” Netton, 27. Similar emphasis on divine
transcendence was later found in the ideas of Jewish and Christian theologians such as Maimonides
(d. 1204) and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Maimonides, the most important Jewish philosopher of
the Middle Ages, for example maintained that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes.
Chapter on ‘God’, The Great Ideas, A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World, ed.
Mortimer J. Adler (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 1952), 396.
21
therefore, known mostly from negative attributes, which mainly affirm what
13
should not be ascribed to Him.
Scripturally, the idea of divine transcendence is emphasized in several
Qur’anic verses which affirm the otherness of God and deny the resemblance of
God with anything other than He. The most important verse is the affirmative,
“Nothing is like unto Him” (laysa ka mithlihf shay*). This verse ains utmost
CfQ
importance amon CfQ
the mutakallimun. as a proof in stressing the absolute
transcendence of God especially from the anthropomorphic meanings. Commentin
CfQ
on this verse, al-Razi remarked, “scholars of tawhia, ancient and recent, argue on
the basis of this verse, against the [errant] views that portray [the essence of] God
as corporeal (/ism), composed of organs and parts, and that He exists (hasilari) in
place and direction.”15

13Apart
14 from this verse, other emphatic verses stressing the
uniqueness of God and the denial of the resemblance of divine essence with other
anthropomorphic qualities are those in Surah al-Ikhlas which describe God as One
and thus contrary to the Christian belief of God the “father” and having
“begotten-son,” and the denial of God bearing any likeness (kufu9) with others.16
Other verses say: “No vision can grasp Him;”17 18

“They
19 cannot encompass Him with
their knowled “Praise and Glory be to Him, for He is above what they
attribute to Him,” 9 and “Glory to Him! He is high above all that they say, Exalted
and Great.”20 While in the Hadith, the emphasis on divine transcendence transpires
among others in the following Hadith that denies the fact that Prophet
Muhammad was seeing Allah:
'Aishah said “If anyone tells you that Muhammad has seen his Lord,
he is a liar for Allah says, ‘No vision can grasp Him’ (al-Anam 6:103),
13 See our discussion on Mu tazilah in this chapter, 37-40 and in Chapter Two, 71-74.
14 Al-Qur’an, al-Shura 42:11.
15 Tafsir, vol. 9, 582.
16 Al-Qur’an, al-Ikhlas, 112:1-4.
17 Al-Qur’an, al-Anam, 6:103.
19 Al-Qur’an, al-Anam 6:100.
20 Al-Qur’an, al-Isra’ 17:43.
22
and if anyone tells you that Muhammad has seen the Unseen (al-
Ghayb), he is a liar, for Allah says, ‘None has the knowledge of the
Unseen but Allah’ (al-Naml 27:65) ”21
Divine transcendence is also expressed in the names and attributes of God.
Among the Beautiful Names of God (al-Asma’ al-Husna) enumerated in a Hadith
by Abu Hurayrah,22 some are more emphatic of divine transcendence than others
such as al-Quddus (the Holy), al-Salam (the Flawless), al-All (the Most High),
al-Mutaali (The Most Exalted), al-Aziz (The Eminent), al-Jalil (the Majestic),
al-Majid (The Glorious), al-Wahid (the Unique). While amon the attributes of
CfQ
God bearing strong element of divine transcendence are eternity (qidam),
everlasting (baqa9), unicity (wahdaniyab), being distinct from originated things
(mukbalafatubu li al-hawadith). Although all these divine names and attributes
share the aspect of divesting God of imperfection, yet each of them, as elucidated
by al-Ghazali in his Maqsad al-Asrta, has their individual meanings.23
21 Bukhari, “al-Tawhid,” Sahih, no.7380, vol.15, 395. The edition we are using for Hadiths compiled
by Bukhari is the commentary by al-Qastallani, Irshad al-Sarili Sharh Sahih Bukhari (Bayrut: Dar
al-Fikr, 1990).
22 Bukhari, “Daawat” Sahih, no.70, vol.13, 475. See further elaboration and comments on this
Hadith in al-Qastallani, Irshad al-Sari, 475-479.
23 Al-Ghazali, Maqsad al-Asna fi Sharh Asma’ Allah al-Husna, trans. David Burrell and Nazeh
Daher (Cambridge: The Islamic Text Society, 1992), 24. In this work, al-Ghazali explained the
meaning of each of the Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God and how these names can also be
‘shared’ by human beings in the sense that they can imitate, at certain levels, the names and
attributes of God as prescribed by the famous tradition “takhallaqu bi akhlaq Allah”(adorn your
conduct with the decorum that is Godly). In the early part of the work, al-Ghazali also deals with
the theologico-linguistic matters namely on the difference between name (ism), the one named
(musamma), and naming (tasmiyah). This work of al-Ghazali compares with Fakhr al-Din Al-
Razi, Law amic al-Bayyinat Sharh Asma’ Allah Ta ala wa-Sfat. In this work, al-Razi also
enumerated each and every name of God, but he dealt with more issues by dividing this work into
three main categories, the principles and premises (al-mabadf wa al-muqaddamat) in which he
deals with important concepts such as the difference between names and attributes and the views
and methodology used by various groups on these two, on the classification of attributes; the
objectives (maqasid) which contain his enumeration and explanation on the meaning of all the
divine names; and the attachment and conclusion (lawahiq wa al-mutammimat) which deals with
names that do not occur in the Qur’an in regard to God’s essence.
23
TERMS EMPLOYED TO DESIGNATE DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE
The eneric term commonly used in characterizing the transcendence aspect of
UQ
divine names and attributes is tanzib. The word tanzib, which originates from the
basic root n-z-b-, conveys the meaning ‘to make something remote.’24 It refers to
physical remoteness25 but when applied to God, it means to purify Him from any
equal partners (and ad) and from any elements of imperfection and deficiency that
Al-Razi defined it as the sanctification of God’s essence
can lessen His Highness.26 27
from corporeal and bodily attributes as well as purifying His actions from
blameworthy attributes. 27
Semantically, the meanin of tanzib is also conveyed by two other terms,
tasbfh (glorification) and taqdis (sanctification). In fact, if we compare these
terms with the term tanzib, the latter two occur more frequently with various
denotations in the Qur’an. Both terms are used in Surat al-Baqarah to
demonstrate how the angels glorify God: “While we do celebrate (nusabbihj thy
praise and glorify (nuqaddisu) your Name.”28 29
Both terms also appear in the prayer
of the Prophet, “[God] The Most Glorified and The Most Pure, the Lord of the
Angel and the Spirit” (subb uh quddus rabb al-malalkat wa al-ruhj. The term
tasbfh also comes with different verbal denotations such as sabbaha and the
nouns such as subhana, sabha, sabihat. Although the basic meaning of sabbaha
is “to make something remote,” the term tasbfh has later gained a more specific
meaning of glorifying God in religious rituals (ibadat) either through verbal
expressions, action or intention (niyyab).
24 Ibn Manzur, Lis an al-Arab (Bayrut: Dar al-Sadir, 1990), vol. 13, 548.
25 Ibn Faris, Mujam Maqayfs al-Lugbab (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1999), vol. 2, 555.
26 Murtada al-Zabidi, Taj al-Ar us, ed. ‘Abd. Karim al-'Azabawi (Kuwait: Mu’assasah al-Kuwait li
al-Taqaddum al-‘Ilmi, n.d.), vol. 36, 525.
27 Samih Daghim, Maws u at Mustalahat al-Imam Fakbr al-Dfn al-Razf (Bayrut: Maktabah
Lubnan Nashirun, 2001), 187.
28 Al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah 2:30.
29 Al-Raghib al-Isfahani, Mufradat A Ifaz al-Qur’an, ed. Safwan ‘Adnan Dawudi (Damshiq: Dar al-
Qalam, 1992), 392.
24
As for the term taqdis, it appears in the Qur’an through the nouns al-quds,
al-quddus, al-muqaddas and the verb nuqaddisu. Al-Quddus, one of the Beautiful
Names of God, is defined by al-Ghazali as:
...the One who is free from every attribute which a sense might
perceive, or imagination may conceive, or to which imagination may
conceive, or by which the conscience may be moved, or which
thinking demands....the Holy is the one who transcends every one of
the attributes of perfection which the majority of creatures thinks of
as perfection....30
Despite these specific meanings, tanzih, taqdis and tasbih are defined by
Muslim linguists interchangeably. Al-Zabidi, in his famous work, Taj al-Ards,
which recorded many definitions from authoritative Muslim linguists, defined
tasbih as “to glorify God and divest Him from all evils” (ta zim Allah wa
tanzihuhu an kulli suj.31 32 33 34the word taqdis is also used in defining the term
While
tanzih namely “to worship and purify God from any partners, resemblance and
form of defections which are not possible to Him” (tabid wa taqdisuhu an al-
andad wa al-ashbah wa In definin
CfQ
taqdis, again the term tanzih is employed, “tathir wa tanzih Allah azza wa
jail a.” A similar vein can be observed in al-Tahanawi and Jurjani when they
defined tasbih and taqdis as “to divest God (tanzih al-Haqq) of the deficiencies of
contingency (al-naqals al-imkari) and characteristics of origination (al-am ar at al-
huduth) and from imperfections in re ard to the essence and attribute.” Apart
CfQ
from corresponding, interchangeable meaning given by the linguists to these three
30 Al-Ghazali, Maqsad al-Asna, 59.

31 Al-Zabidi, Taj al-Ar us, vol. 6, 449.
32 Ibid, vol. 36, 527.
33 Ibid, vol. 16, 358.
34 Muhammad 'All al-Tahanawi, Kashshaf Istilahat al-Ftmun (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub aPIlmiyyah,
1998), vol. 2, 329; 'All Muhammad al-Jurjani, al-Tarffat (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-Kitab al-Misri,
1991), 71. Al-Tahanawi defined tanzih as the affirmation that “God being alone by His names,
attributes and His essence as what He Himself deserves it,” Kashsbaf, vol. 4, 266, while al-Jurjani
described it as “to diverse God from the attributes of human” (tab ‘Id al-Rabb an awsaf al-basbar),
al-Ta rlfat, 81.
25
terms, they also concurred with the fact that the kinds of imperfection that should
be divested from God through these terms are mainly those which are corporeal,
anthropomorphic and originated.
In al-Razi’s explanation, a more refined meaning of the three terms can be
noticed. Compared to taqdfs and tasbfh, he assigned a more generic meaning to
tanzih. This can be seen clearly when he defined tasbfh as “divesting His essence
of corporeal attributes” (tanzih dhatihf an sifat al-ajsam), while taqdfs as
“divesting His acts of blameworthy attributes and stupidity” (tanzih ‘afalihf an

sifat al-zamm wa na at al-safah).35 This would mean that for him, taqdfs and
tasbfh are two precise ways of expressing the transcendence of God (tanzih), one
relating to the essence and the other to the action. This is perhaps the reason why
al-Razi specifically used the term taqdfs and not tanzih as the title of his book,
Asas al-Taqdfs in which he attacked the anthropomorphists’ position in dealing
with the anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an. The only incongruity is that if for
al-Razi, it is tasbfh rather than taqdfs that refers to the act of divesting His
essence of corporeal attributes, then the work should be entitled Asas al-Tasbfh.
Apart from these three terms, there are other terms, which are also
employed in expressing divine transcendence. Among them is tawhid which
means, “to make something one.” However, as a religious terminology, tawhfd is

defined as the act of believing that God is One and Unique.36 It is an affirmation of
what is stated by the kalimat al-Tawhfd that “There is no other God but Allah”
following the recurrent affirmations of the Qur’an of its importance such as in
Surah al-Ikhlas, “Qul huwa Allahu ahad” (Say, “He is Allah, the One”) and “wa
ilahukum ilabun wahid” (And your God is the One God, al-Baqarah 2:193). By
affirming the Oneness of God through its various levels (maratib),37 it is at the
35 Tafsf, vol. 1, 391.

36 Al-Tahanawi, Kashshaf, vol. 4, 310. On the linguistic elaboration on the term wahid and ahad,
see al-Raghib al-Asfahani, Risalah fi Zikr al-Wahid wa al-Ahad, ed. 'Umar al-Sarisi (Amman:
Jami'at al-Isra’, 1992).
26
same time an act of divesting God of every anthropomorphic attributes. However,
the emphasis in the meanin of tawhid is more on the affirmation that all God’s
CfQ
attributes, names and acts are but one reality. This broader meaning of tawhid is
apparent in the works of the mutakallimun. when the whole discussion of the
principles of religion (usul al-dm) including God’s existence, His attributes,

Prophethood and matters related to Hereafter are also known as ilm al-tawhld.3s
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the divine transcendence
in Islam is established through number of terms used in emphasizing the
transcendence of God, the most general of which is tanzih. Other terms which are
also in use are taqdis, tasbih and tawhid. In general, all these terms convey the
meaning that God is far from any corporeal and anthropomorphic attributes. They
also imply the purification of God from any imperfections such as having partners
(sahib), a son (walad) and blameworthy acts. Although these terms are sometimes
employed interchangeably to indicate different aspects of the divine transcendence,
they reflect in general the perspicacious attempt by the mutakallimun to fit the
terms with the various aspects of divine transcendence.
GOD’S IMMANENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM

Apart from the considerable attention placed by the Qur’an on the uniqueness of
God, some verses also indicate the immanent aspect of God which reveals the
intimate facet of the divine attributes. The Qur’an, for instance, describes God as
39 and who is active in

Supreme Being who is nearer to man than his jugular vein,38
creating and sustaining His creations.40 This immanent aspect of God also portrays
to human beings the known aspect of Him vis-a-vis the unknowable aspect
discussed before. Furthermore, there are also verses that allude to the nearness of
38 Titles of some works on usd al-din which contained the term tawhid are indicative of this
broader meaning such as Kitab al-Tawhid of al- Maturidi, Ibn Khuzaymah and Muhammad
Abduh. See further, D. Gimaret, “Tawhid”, in £72, vol. 10, 389.
39 Al-Qur’an, Qaf 50:16; al-Waqiah, 56:85.
40 Al-Qur’an, al-Rahman 55:29.
27
God through anthropomorphic attributions, known as verses with ambiguous
meaning {ay at mutasbabihat).41 In these verses, God is described as sitting on a
throne, having hands.
(makara). Several Hadiths also report that God is angry, happy, 8 cheerful
(tabasbbasba), 9 and having form.50

41 42Naturally,
43 44 45 46
the47question
48 49 that arises is how
to reconcile between the two opposite descriptions of God, the one alluding to the
transcendence (tanzib) of God, that God is absolutely unlike anything, and the
other indicating His similarity to human qualities (tasbbib). “If God is utterly
unique and unknowable,” puts Shehadi, “how can anything at all be said to Him
and if anything said, on what ground?”51 In the attempt to answer the above
questions, the history of Islamic thought has recorded continuous polemics among
various Muslim theological sects. This worsened with the expansion of Islam into
the lands of the ancient world in which people from the religions which previously
subscribed to anthropomorphism converted into Islam such as the Jews, Christians
and Zoroastrians who brought with them the mental categories of their inherited
cultures which already accustomed to thinking in terms of divine immanence,
particularism and concreteness thus could not absorb the radical idea of divine
transcendence.52
THE POLEMICS OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM: MAIN GROUPS
i. The Anthropomorphists (Mushabbihah)
41 Also known as sifat khabariyyah, attributes which are affirmed based on the descriptions in the
Qur’an and Hadith.
42 Al-Qur’an, Sad 38:57; al-Fath 48:10.
44 Al-Qur’an, al-Nisa’ 4:164.
45 Al-Qur’an, al-Tawbah 9:67.
46 Al-Qur’an, Al 'Imran 3:54; al-Tariq 86:16.
47 Al-Qur’an, al-Nisa’4:93.
48 Ibn Maj ah, “Masajid”, Sunan, vol.l, 262.
49 Muslim, “Tawbah” Sahih, vol. 17, 63.
50“Verily God has created Adam according to His form” (Inna Allah khalaqa Adam ala suratih!
Muslim, Sahih, no. 7092, vol.17, 175-176.
51 Shehadi, 8.
52 Ismail Raji al-Faruqi, Islam and Other Faiths, ed. Ataullah Siddiqi (Leicester: HIT), 48.
28
The extreme literal approach taken by some sects led them into committin
CfQ
tasbbib, an act of comparing and assimilating God with the attributes of other
beings especially humans. The term musbabbibab (anthropomorphists) is a
eneric term under which, more specific denotations were used by Muslim
CfQ
heresiographers to refer to a particular group with an anthropomorphic bent such
as the mujassimab, those who ascribed bodily attributes to God and the
Karramiyyah, those who attributed to God certain direction and spatial
characteristics.53 Strothman differentiates between the tasbbib and tajsUn arguin
CfQ
that mujassimab like Hisham b. al-Hakam was not really a musbabbib since he
usually added the qualification “not like our body” in describing the bodily nature
of God54 but this, however, will beg the question of the universality of the term
“body”. There were also other anthropomorphic sects who were named after the
names of their leaders, such as the Hishamiyyab, Bayaniyyab and Azariqab.55
Most of the musbabbibab sects did not survive in history due to the direct
confrontation of their views with the principle of the transcendence of God held by
53 The Karramiyyah group was founded by Muhammad bin Karram, a person who appeared to be
ascetic and pious yet was described by the Sunnites of his time as a person “whose exterior is fine
but whose interior is vile.” Farq, vol.l, 21. Al-Shahrastani included them among the Sifatiyyah
(those who affirmed attributes of God), Milal, 92. In the tenth and eleventh centuries they were an
important political force in some regions. Among the views of Ibn Karram and his sect was that
God is a body, having an end and limit below where he comes in contact with His Throne. They
also opined that the Throne is the place of God and God physically touches the Throne. It follows
that God, according to them, is no larger than His Throne on the side where He touches it and no
part of Him overhangs it! Those among them who believed in God’s nearness to the Throne
maintained that His being a body means that He exists by Himself. From this idea, they developed
the view that ‘any two things which exist by themselves must either be in contact with each other
or separate from each other. Further, God, for them, is a unit of essence and a unit of substance,
His names are only accidents existing in a primordial body. They believed that it is possible for a
number of accidents to inhere in God’s essence. Apart from al-Shahrastani’s al-Milal and al-
Baghdadi’s al-Farq, their rational arguments are treated at length by al-Razi in his Kitab Asas al-
Taqdis, and some scattered views of the Karramiyyah in al-Razi’s Muhassal and Arba m. Further
references to the Karramiyyah’s views can be found in Suhayr Mukhtar, al-TajsFn ‘inda al-
Muslimin: Madbhab al-Karramiyyah (Al-Qahirah: al-Qahirah University, 1971); W. M. Watt,
Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1985), 79-81; A. S. Tritton, Muslim Theology (Bristol: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1947), 108-112;
C.E. Bosworth, ‘Karramiyyah’, EI2 (4), 667.
54 Strothman, “Tashbih”, 685.
55 Maqalat, vol. 1, 281-290; Farq, 18-40.
29
the majority of the Muslims. Since their works were scarcely extant, we can only
read their views through the works of the mutakallimun and the Muslim
heresiographers. As a matter of fact, the musbabbibab did not form a particular
school since their views are mostly associated with individual figures especially
from the Sbfab.56 We, therefore, do not subscribe to the view that the
musbabbibab, theologically, gained its strength in the early period of Islam under
the leadership of Ibn Hanbal.57 58This is due to the fact that, Ibn Hanbal, as we will
show later, was not an anthropomorphist as he maintained the bila kayf position
which is different from tasbbib.53 There are also proofs which indicate that Ibn
Hanbal also employed allegorical interpretations in dealing with anthropomorphic
expressions.59 It was the extreme views of some of his followers that implicated
the allegation of anthropomorphism against Ibn Hanbal.60 However, we concur
with the fact that later, especially by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the
musbabbibab had gained some ground in influencing certain quarters of the
Muslims due to the rise of some individuals with their anthropomorphic views
regarding God. This can be seen from the considerable coverage of their views in
the heresiographical works of Muslim scholars within this period such as al-Milal
wa al-Nihal of al-Shahrastani,61 al-Farq bayna al-Firaq of 'Abd al-Qahir al-
Baghdadi,62 and Ibn Hazm’s al-Fasl fi al-Milal wa al-Abwa’ wa al-Nihal!63
56 Tritton, 48.
57 Wesley Williams, in his article, “Aspects of the Creed of Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal: A Study of
Anthropomorphism in Early Islamic Discourse,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, no.
34 (2002): 442, argued that after Ahmad Ibn Hanbal assumed leadership of the traditionist camp
during and immediately following the mihnah, anthropomorphism achieved “orthodox” recognition.
To substantiate his arguments, he also tries to prove that Ibn Hanbal, through his view of some
verses and HadUh, was indeed an anthropomorphist. Ibid., 443-444.
58 Al-Razi, I tiqad Firaq al-Muslimm wa al-Mushrikih (Al-Qahirah: Maktabah al-Kulliyyat al-
Azhariyyah, 1978), 99.
59 Al-Ghazali, Faysal al-Tafriqah, trans. & intro. Sherman A. Jackson under the title On the
Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Al-Ghazalfs Faysal al-Tafriqa (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 101-102. On the elaboration of this proof, see pp. 43-44 of this chapter.
60 See elaboration of the views of the Handbilah in this chapter, 48-51.
61 Milal, pp. 88-96.
62 Farq, vol. 2, 18-36.
30
Though the musbabbibab were somehow placed in a different classification within
these works, their views are, no doubt, afforded great length. Al-Shahrastani
placed the musbabbibab and the Karramiyyah under the general heading of
Sifatiyyah (the Affirmists of divine attributes) under which also includes the
64 This is based on the wider classification between those who affirm the
Asbairah.63
attributes, regardless of their validity, and those who reject them such as the
Mu tazilah and the Philosophers. As for al-Baghdadi, although he dealt
independently with the Karramiyyah and the musbabbibab, yet he re arded all of
CfQ
them as sects that erred from true Islamic teachings.65 While Ibn Hazm did not
specify any sect, he discussed them by section (fasi) which included the topics on
taw hid and the denial of tashbib, the notion of divine attribute, istiwa’ and
others.66
The increasing influence of the musbabbibab is also evident in the special
attention given to this group in the form of refutations and debates by some
prominent scholars like al-Razi in his Asas al-Taqdfs, and al-Amidi in his Gbayat
al-Maram. In the Asas al-Taqdfs with which we will be dealing thoroughly in the
last three chapters of this thesis, al-Razi put forward various rational and
traditional arguments in refuting the anthropomorphic position of the
Karramiyyah. While in Gbayat al-Maram, al-Amidi assigned one of his eight
theological laws (qanuri) to refute the arguments of the anthropomorphists.67
Apart from these works, there were also celebrated debates reported to have taken
place during this period between the Karramiyyah figures and the Ash arI scholars
among which was the debate between Ibn Haysam, the famous follower of Ibn
63 Fa si, vol. 2, 277-292. Further analysis of the methodology of treating the sects within these three
works can be found in the introduction of the translation of Abu Mansur al-Baghdadi’s Farq by
Kate Chambers Seelye, Farq, 1-17.
64 Milal, 88-96.
65 Farq, vol. 2, 18-36.
66 Fa si, vol 2, 227-292.
67 Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, Ghayat al-Maram fi cIlm al-Kalam, ed. Hassan Mahmud 'Abd Latif (Al-
Qahirah: Lujnah Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami, 1971), 157-200.
31
Karram, and Ash‘arite scholar, Ibn Furak. Another one was between Ibn Haysam
and another Ash‘arite scholar, Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayini with the presence of the
Ruler at that time, Sultan Mahmud Ibn Sabkatkin.68
i.i. Main Views of the Mushabbihah
Although the mushabbihah come under various names and denominations, as
classified by al-Baghdadi, they are divided into two main groups.69 The first are
those who liken the essence of God to the essence of what is other than He. This is
due to their literal understanding of some Qur’anic verses which imply bodily
characteristics to God as well as the quality of other creations such as light and
time.70 Among those who liken the essence of God to the essence of human bein
CZ)
bn
are the Sabafyyah, one of the Shiah extreme sects, who identified ‘All with the
essence of God.71 The extremity of their views was so evident when some of them
who were executed by being burnt at the stake at the command of ‘All himself,
replied, “Now we know that you are God for none but God punishes with fire!”72
Al-Ash‘arl reported that some mujassimah groups ascribe to God various
attributes of the human being and other creations, that God has a body, that He
can be measured (miqdar), that He is situated in a place (makari) and that He
moves (yataharrak). Some of these opinions were attributed to a number of

Rafidah73 and Mutazili scholars such as Hisham bin al-Hakam,74 Abu al-
Hudhayl75 and Ibn Rawandi.76 Hisham, who is regarded by Tritton as the finest
8 Suhayr Mukhtar, 87-88.

69 Farq, vol. 2, 30.
70 Such as the verse “Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth” (al-Nur 24:35) and “and
nothing but time (al-dahr) can destroy us” (al-Jathiyyah 45:24).
71 The Sabatyyah are the followers of 'Abdullah ibn Saba’ who exaggerated with respect to ‘All,
maintaining that he was a Prophet. ‘Abdullah even exaggerated further by saying that ‘Ali was
God. He spread propaganda of this belief among erring Kuffites. The story of this group was
reported to ‘Ali who ordered a number of them to be burnt in two pits. Farq, vol.2, 41.
72 Farq, vol. 2, 31. Most of these groups were related to the extreme group of Rafidah, a Shiah sect.
73 The Rafidah also known as Imamiyyah were one of three most important Shiah groups apart
from the Ghaliyah and Zaidiyyah. They were so-called due to their rejection (rafada) of the
leadership of Abu Bakr. They agreed that the Prophet explicitly declared the leadership of ‘All in
32
example of anthropomorphist figure,7 was reported as saying that God’s
measurement is seven times the length of a human arm (sab at al-asbbar) while
Abu al-Hudhayl was saying that God is smaller than Jabal Qubays, the highest
mountain near Mecca!78 * * * groups are the Bayaniyyah who liken God to light,
74 Other
the Mugbjriyyab who liken God to human beings and the Hululiyyab, who held
that God inheres in their Imams.79
The second group comprises those who liken the attributes of God with the
attributes of what is other than He. Al-Baghdadi included in this group
individuals from the Mu tazilah, such as al-Nazzam,80 who drew a similarity
between the words of God and the words of the human being, position that
emerged from their contention that the Qur’an is created. According to the
replacement of himself. They also held that most of the Companions of the Prophet went astray
when they did not make allegiance to 'All. Maqalat, vol.l, 88-89.
74 He was among the heads of the Rafidah who wrote many books and was good in oratory. Fast,
vol. 2, 269, n.4. Al-Baghdadi nevertheless still considered him within the fold of Islam since he
affirmed the obligatory character of the precepts in the Qur’an and the binding force of the
fundamentals of the law of Islam. Farq, vol. 2, 32; Among his theological belief is that God knows
through an originated knowledge (Um muMatbj Qadi 'Abd Jabbar, Sharh Usui al-Khamsah, ed.
'Abd Karim 'Uthman (Al-Qahirah: Maktabah Wahbah,1965), 183.
75 Abu al-Hudhayl Hamdan b. al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf was an early Mu tazilah. He was born in 748
and died in 840. He was called ‘Shaykh of the Mu tazilah’ due to his wide influence amon the
tn
Mu tazilah. He was a fluent speaker and vigorous in his argument. Apart from his
anthropomorphic views, he viewed that God is knowing with His knowledge and His knowledge is
His essence; He is powerful with power and His power is His essence and so on. He also opined
that there are acts of will which have no substrate, and that by these acts God is willing. Milal, p.
46; M. M. Sharif, vol. 1, 207-208.
76 He was a respected early Mu tazilah. Among his views are that human reason is sufficient to
determine the knowledge of God and the distinction between good and evil, that miracle is absurd,
and that the world is eternal. Fakhry, 96.
77 Tritton, Muslim Theology, 50
78 Maqalat, vol.l, 281-282. See also Farq vol. 2, 32-33. In relation to Hisham’s views, Strothman
seems to defend his tajsjm in his article on tashbih, by differentiating between tashbih and tajsjm
in the sense that tajsjm is allowed as long as it is affirmed that the body which is ascribed to God is
different from the human body. Strothman, 687.
79 Farq, vol. 2, 31.
80 Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Sayyar, called al-Nazzam lived during the reign of al-Ma’mun. He was
the student of Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf and was also a poet. He studied Greek philosophy well and
made full use of it in his works. His views include the denial of God’s power over evil, denial of the
will of God, the theory of latency and manifestation (kumun \va buruz) which prescribes that
creation is to be re arded as a single act of God by which all things were brought into being
tn
simultaneously and kept in a state of latency. From the latent state they were brought gradually
into the state of manifestation. Sharif, vol.l, 208-211.
33
Mu tazilab, since God does not possess real attributes, which are eternal, the
Qur’an, as the speech of God is therefore not eternal but created. Some
Mu tazilab and Karramiyyab also held that God’s will is of the same genus and is
created just as the human will.81 Although in principle the Mu tazilab were in
opposition to the musbabbibab, especially in regard to the treatment of the
anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an, in this case some of them agreed and
arrived at the same conclusion. This irony can be explained by saying that the
tasbbib that al-Baghdadi claimed these Mu'tazilites individuals were holding is
rather a loose kind of anthropomorphism. For it only relates to the issue of God’s
speech (kalam Allah), while these Mutazilite individuals were strongly against the
notion of bodily God held by other anthropomorphists.
Van Ess proposes another detailed categorization of anthropomorphism
based on the verses of the Qur’an.82 He divided it into four main categories: (i)
anthropomorphism proper that concerns God’s outward appearance namely His
shape, eyes, hands and face. These descriptions, according to van Ess, are mostly
metaphorical in meanin but were interpreted by a number of Shi'ite theologians in

CfQ
the anthropomorphic sense; (ii) God’s actions such as sitting on the throne, His
descending and approaching humankind. The Prophet Muhammad’s night journey
(isra9), mostly elaborated in the Prophetic traditions is also described by some
scholars in anthropomorphic tone; (iii) God’s feelings and passions, for example,
his mercy (rahmab), wrath (gbadab) satisfaction (rida) and cunning (mnfcr); (iv)
Passive anthropomorphism which indicates God as being the object of perception

and that He can be heard and can be seen.83
81 Farq, vol.2, 34-35.

82 Josef van Ess, “Tashbih wa Tanzih”, EI2, vol. 10, 342-343.
34
i.ii. Epistemological Method of the Mushabbihah
As stated earlier, the starting point of the mushabbihah’s understanding of God is
their literal interpretation of the Qur’an where the anthropomorphic verses are
taken at face value. This is evidenced, for example, through their own affirmation,
as reported by al-Shahrastani:
The anthropomorphists maintain that, “We do not add anything of

ourselves, nor do we pursue questions which the early community
had not raised.” They further say, “What is between the two covers
is God’s word. This is also what we affirm.”84
By implication, this literal interpretation of the Qur’an brought about
unexpected problems to the musbabbibab. The Karramiyyab, for example, based
on the literal understanding of God’s sitting on the throne (istiwa9) and some
Hadiths concerning the same issue, were forced to accept the existence of
directions in relation to God. When the meanin of “God is established above the
CfQ
throne”85 and “He descends to the earthly heaven” (nazala ila sama’ al-durtyaf6
were taken literally, they concluded that the directions of ‘above’ and ‘below’ can
be ascribed to God. They further added that since God sits on the throne, He can
thus be above the Throne and there is a part of Him that is touching the throne.87
As consequence, the Karramiyyab affirmed the direction of ‘above’ with regard
to God but denied the other five. 8 They even said that that part of God which
touches the Throne is not bigger then the Throne itself in size.89
34 Milal, 91.
86 In the Hadith narrated by Abu Sa'id and Abu Hurayrah, the Prophet says, “God waits until three
quarters of the night and then He descends to the earthly heaven and says, ‘Is there anyone who
seeks my Pardon or makes a prayer,’ until dawn.” Bukhari, “al-Tahajjud bi al-Layl” Sahih, no.
1145, vol.3, 223.
31 Milal. 92.
88 'Abd Allah Baydawi, Taw Hi' aI-Anwar min Ma tali ‘ al-Anzar, along with Mahmud Isfahan’s
commentary Matali‘al-Anzar, Sharh Tawali 'al-Anwar, ed. & trans. Edwin E. Calverley and James
W. Pollock (Brill: Leiden, 2002), vol. 2, 756.
89 Milal, 92.
35
Apart from strict literalism, the unrestrained usage of the faculty of
imagination (kbayaliyyab) and the senses (tissiyyab) in comprehending the reality
of the essence of God is another epistemological cause that brought about the
musbabbibab’s anthropomorphic leaning. As they encountered expressions in the
Qur’an regarding God’s anthropomorphic attributes, they compared them to
human attributes and since what is God’s is not to be found in the physical world,
imagination takes over. This can be seen, for example, in the inclination of some
of them to come up with a whimsical description of God such as that of Muqatil
bin Sulaiman who said based on the literal meaning of the word al-samad in Surah
al-Ikhlas, that God is solid and massive, not hollow, hence He does not need food
and sexuality. While Dawud al-Jawarlbi viewed that God can only be massive in
the lower part and has to be hollow from His waist upward since His speeches
come from His mouth.90 Attacking this false method, al-Razi maintains that the
knowledge of God’s acts and attributes is beyond the power of imagination (al-
kbay aliyyab) and sense experience (al-Jfssiyyab).91 If the knowledge of God’s acts
and attributes is beyond the grasp of imagination and sense experience, it is a
fortiori that the knowledge of the essence of God, which is more abstruse, is to be
beyond the comprehension of these two faculties.92
The musbabbibab also utilized a rational principle which they adopted
from those employed by the philosophers in defending their anthropomorphic
view. We will discuss at length their rational principle in Chapter Three when
analyzing al-Razi’s Kitab Asas al-Taqdfs. But, in brief, they based their arguments
on a physical principle which explains the nature of substance and accidents, two
basic kinds of existents in the Islamic cosmological doctrine. The nature of the two
is that either one inheres in the other as in the case of accidents which inhere in
90 Josef van Ess, “Tashbih wa Tanzih”, EI2, vol. 10, 342.

9iAsas, 22-23.
92 Ibid., 23-24. Further explanation of al-Razi’s psychology can be found in Razi, Kitab al-Nafs wa
al-Ruh wa Shark Quwahuma, trans. & intro. M. Saghir Hasan Ma’sumi under the title Imam Razfs
Ilm al-Akblaq (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1970).
36
substance, or that they are distinct from each other in a direction as in the case of
substance or body. To the musbabbibab, this principle is applicable to all
existents. Since God and the world are two existents, and God does not inhere in
the world, He must, therefore, be distinct from the world in a direction. Al-Razi
rephrased these arguments as follows: Since God and the world are two existents
(rruiwj udayn), it is necessary for reason to conclude that either one of them is
subsisting in the other, or that they are mutually distinct (mubdyin). For God to
be subsisting in the world is tantamount to incarnation (Au/z3) which is
categorically impossible. Hence God must be distinct from the world in a

direction.93
ii. The Mu tazilah
The Mu tazilah were well known for their strong defense of divine transcendence.
They were called ‘People of Justice and Unity’ (Ahl al-Adi wa al-Tawhfd) due to
their strict insistence on the unqualified Unity of the divine essence. Thus, they
regard transcendentalism to be a necessary prerequisite of tawhid. Among the
important implications of this doctrine of unity is their denial of the existence of
divine attributes.94 With regard to their response to anthropomorphism, it is
recorded that, together with the Jahmiyyah 95 they were the first who raised the
issue by accusing the main body of the faithful of heresy in the form of tashbib,
of likening God to the creatures.96 Using mostly rational arguments and also
93 Asas, 21.
94 This issue will be dealt further in the next chapter.
95 Jahmiyyah were the followers of Jahm b. Safwan who developed a consistent negative theology
on the basis of Neoplatonic philosophy where God is beyond being. Josef van Ess, “Tashbih wa
Tanzih”, EI2, vol. 10, 343. According to Watt, very least were known regarding this group to the
extent that no name are known of any members of this sect. Most of their references were known
through the opponents. W.M. Watt, “Djahmiyyah”, EI2, vol.2, 388.
96 W. Montgomery Watt, “Some Muslim Discussions,” 86. In his work al-Radd ala al-Jahmiyyah,
Ibn Hanbal regarded both Mu tazilah and Jahmiyyah as identical since their views concur in such
matters as the denial of Beatific Vision and other divine attributes, the createdness of the Qur’an
and the problem of ta \vil. But they nevertheless differ in some other matters such as free will and
predestination where Jahmiyyah believed in predeterminism (mujbirah) while Mu'tazilah believed in
Qur’anic verses such as the phrase “There is nothing like unto Him”97 98
and “Sight
reaches not to Him,” they disproved any attempt to imply any physical view
regarding God. They rejected attribution to God in a literal sense of anything that
suggested that He had characteristics of a body. Hence, we read al-Ash'ari’s
account of the Mu tazilah doctrine in his Maqalat, which begins with their long
statement of denial of anthropomorphism:
The Mu tazila agree that God is One; there is nothing like him; He
is hearing, seeing, He is not a body, not a form, not flesh and blood,
not an individual (shakhs), not substance nor attribute; He has no
colour, taste, smell, no heat, cold, moisture nor dryness, no length,
breadth nor depth, no joining together nor separation, no movement,
rest nor division; He has no sections nor parts, no limbs nor
members; He is not subject to directions, left, right, in front of,
behind, above, below; no place comprehends Him, no time passes
over Him; inadmissible for Him are contiguity, separateness and
inherence in places; He is not characterized by any attribute of
creatures indicating their originatedness, nor by finitude, nor
extension, nor directional motion; He is not bounded; not begetting
nor begotten; magnitudes do not comprehend Him nor veils cover
Him; the senses do not attain Him; He is not comparable with men
and does not resemble creatures in any respect; infirmities and
sufferings do not affect Him; He is unlike whatever occurs to the
mind or is pictured in the imagination; He is ceaselessly first,
precedent, going before originated things, existent before created
things; He is ceaselessly knowing, powerful, living, and imagination
does not comprehend Him; He is not heard by hearing; (He
cu
(Z)
thing, not as the things, knowing, powerful, living, not as (men are)
knowing, powerful, living; He is eternal, alone, and there is no
eternal except Him, no deity apart from Him; He has no partner in
His rule, no vizier (sharing) His authority, no assistant in producing
what He produced and creating what He created; He did not create
creatures on a preceding model; to create a thing was no easier and
no more difficult for Him than to create another thing; He may not
experience benefit or harm, joy or gladness, hurt or pain; He has no
free will (qadariyyab). While regarding faith (imari), Jabmiyyab hold that it constitutes only
strong belief in the heart while Mu tazilab hold that it includes belief, utterance and acts. Mahmud
Subhi, Fi Ilm al-Kalam: Mu tazilab (Bayrut: Dar al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1985), vol. 2, 112-113.
98 Al-Qur’an, al-An'am 6:103.
38
limit so as to be finite; He may not cease to exist, nor become weak
or lacking; He is too holy to be touched by women or to have
consort and children."
As elaborated by Qadi cAbd al-Jabbar, the spokesman of Mu tazilah, the
basic premise which precede the denial of God having the above attributes is that
they are all attributes of the body. God cannot be a body since a body constitutes
length and depth and all these cannot be attributed to the eternal God.99
100 He
further said:
If He the Exalted is a body, he will be originated, while the eternity

of God is already established. It is impossible for bodies to be
separated (infikdk) from originated characteristics namely union
(ytima*) and disunion (iftiraq), movement (al-Jiarakah') and rest (al-
sukunf101
Consistent with the above divine transcendence, the Mu tazilah viewed that
the anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an and Sunnah should be interpreted in an
allegorical way (ta\viT). The failure to do that would result in God losing His
attributes of being the Creator and the Everlasting; if God were like created things,
He could be neither the Creator nor the Everlasting. Hence, for the Mu tazilah, all
statements concerning God that imply bodies are symbols with a higher meaning,
for the deity is simple and formless. Thus, by God’s eyes and eyelids and sight we
are to understand His power of overseeing all things and His all-encompassing
knowledge. God’s hands mean the effectual nature of His energy, for it is with our
own hands that we accomplish our most useful and valuable work, and so on.102
From the principle of the Unity of God held by the Mu tazilah, the following
beliefs necessarily result as corollaries: the denial of the Beatific Vision, since vision
is not possible without place and direction, of Him is therefore neither
99 Maqalat, vol.l, 235-236. With slight modification, we follow the translation of W. M. Watt, in
The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oxford: OneWorld, 1998), 246-247.
100 'Abd Jabbar, 218.
101 Ibid.
102 Watt, The Formative Period, 248.
39
possible in this world nor in the Hereafter; belief in the created speech of God, that
the Qur’an is an originated work of God and that it came into existence together
with the prophethood of the Prophet of Islam; God’s pleasure and anger are not
attributes but states, because anger and pleasure are states and states are mutable,
whereas the essence of God is immutable.103
iii. Ibn Hanbal
Ahmad bin Hanbal is undoubtedly one of the most important figures in the early
phase of the history of kaldm. Strict and rigorous in his position especially against
the ultra-rational tendency of the Mu tazilah and the Jahmiyyah of his time, he
profoundly influenced the development of kaldm to the point where strains of his
thought can be deciphered from the strict theological understanding of his
followers, the Handbilah throughout history to the modem day Wahhabi

theology.104 Among traditional scholars, he was considered the paragon of orthodox
theology due to his persistence in his defense of doctrines outlined by Tradition
(the Qur’an and Hadith) and his great perseverance ainst the series of
prosecutions by the establishment of his time against him.105
Ibn Hanbal’s religious position is strongly associated with Hadith. His
doctrine is characterized by the spirit to make both the Qur’an and Hadith the sole
authorities in the field of dogma. This comes as no surprise since he was, in the
first place, a compiler of Hadith, of which he reportedly memorized 700,000.106
His collection of Hadith, al-Musrtad, is one of the exceptionally important works
103 See further Maq al at, vol.l, 235-244; Sharif, vol.l, 199-219; Watt, The Formative Period, 209-250.
104 On Wahhabism, see Louis Alexander de Corancez, The History of the Wahhabis, trans. Eric
Tabet (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995); Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (New York:
Oneonta, 2002); Natana J. Delong, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
105 In the reign of al-Ma‘mun, who took the Mu tazilah’s doctrine of ‘the createdness of the Qur’an’
as the official State doctrine, Ibn Hanbal was imprisoned for his uncompromising insistence that
the Qur’an is the eternal, uncreated word of God. See further Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tarikh al-
Mazahib al-Islamiyyah (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-Fikr af Arabi, 1989), 496.
106 Abu Ya'la, Tabaqat al-Hanabilah (Bayrut: Dar al-Ma rifah, n.d), vol 1, 6.
40
in the field of Hadith. Al-ShaffI, the great faqih and imam madhhab,
acknowledged Ibn Hanbal as the most knowledgeable man in Hadith and rijal (the
narrators of Hadith) and used to refer to him regarding these matters.107 Even his
important work on aqidah bears the name of al-Sunnah which is strongly
indicative of his strict, uncompromising position on the Tradition in this field.108
Due to his strict adherence to the text, what is beyond the text, as far as
the knowledge of God is concerned, is to Ibn Hanbal unreliable and considered
innovation (bidam, position that is also linked closely to the position of the
Companions of the Prophets. For Ibn Hanbal, the tradition (Sunnah) does not only
mean conforming to the prescriptions given by the Prophet but also to refrain from
what the Prophet did not do and from what he forbade:
The fundamental principle of Sunnah, in our opinion, consists in

clinging to that which the Companions of the Prophets of God
conformed to, following their example, and abstaining from heretical
innovations.10
This is perhaps the reason why Ibn Hanbal never had systematic kalam
doctrine of his own. His doctrinal works are in fact a collection of Qur’anic verses,
Hadiths and narrations from earlier scholars. He even warned his questioners
against the danger of codifying his thought since this would conflict with the
principles laid down by the Qur’an.110 Parallel to this position, Ibn Hanbal rejected
the use of ta’wil (allegorical interpretation) particularly in kaldm since ta’wil is an
107 Ibid.
108 Ibn Hanbal considered the body of Hadiths as the most immediate, protected and direct
injunctions from God, to thus be the highest authority in matters of religion. Their preservation
through the mechanism of isnad, which is phrased by Azmeh, as the “power of uninterrupted
traditions” has become the strong point in strengthening the position of Ibn Hanbal and later on
that of the Hanabilah. Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Orthodoxy and Hanbalite Fideism.” Arabica: Revue
D Etudes Arabes XXXV (1988): 259.
109 Quoted in Ibn Qudamah, Tafrim al-Nazar fl Kutub Ahl al-Kalam, trans. George Makdisi
under the title Censure of Speculative Theology (Cambridge: E.J.W Gibb Memorial, 1985), 15. It is
under this pretext that Ibn Hanbal considers the Mu tazilah and the Jahmiyyah as men of
innovation (ahi al-bida ) and hence, could neither lead a prayer nor become a judge. Abdullah b.
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, al-Sunnah (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1985), 10.
110 H. Laoust, Ahmad bin Hanbal, EI2, vol.l, 274.
41
opinion, and it is not lawful to give an opinion on the attributes of God, because
sometimes by interpreting the verse in a way not intended by God, we would fall
into perversity.111
Based on the above epistemological foundations, it is not difficult to predict
Ibn Hanbal’s position on the issue of divine attributes and anthropomorphism. For
Ibn Hanbal, to believe in God is to believe in the descriptions of God that appear in
the Qur’an and what has been described by the Prophet. The attributes that were
mentioned in the Qur’an must be affirmed as realities including those of the
mutashabihat. His comment on the term wajb (face of God) runs as follows:
God, may be extolled and exalted, has a face unlike shapes which are
formed and substances which are limited, but face which He
described in this verse, “Everything will perish except his face” (al-
Qasas 28:88). Whoever changes the meaning of the verse, deviates
from it. It is a face in reality and not in a figurative way.112 113
Elsewhere, he asserted:
In one of the sound Hadiths about the Messen er of God, it is said:

CfQ
“The Prophet has seen his Lord.” This is transmitted from the
Messen er of God himself...Belief in that and counting it is true is
CfQ
obligatory. 113
111 As a matter of fact, this position in Islamic tradition is called tafwfd, to entrust the meaning to
God, or tawqif to hold up the meanings. Both convey the idea of the affirmation of dogmatic
articles without a qualification that would carry one beyond the bounds of one’s given textuality.
According to Azmeh, it is based on the assumption that the sense of the divine statement is
comprehensible to us only within the terms of the very statement. Yet to the critiques of this
method especially among the rationalists, this kind of strict, literal position is described as
hashwiyyah, which literally means useless and prolix discourse, the term generally used to refer to
the People of the traditions (ashab al-haditb) who uncritically interpret the meaning of crude
anthropomorphic traditions. This kind of preaching style dogma is a form of knowledge which is
devoid of epistemic content. It is a purely affirmative form of expression and belongs properly to
an act of devotion more than to one of intellection. Al-Azmeh, “Orthodoxy,” 256, 266; EI2, vol.3,
269.
112 Binyamin Abrahamov, “The Bila Kayfa Doctrine and Its Foundations in Islamic Theology,”
ARABICA, Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, Tome vol. XLII, No. 3, (Nov. 1995): 366.
113 Watt, W. M., Islamic Creeds, 31.
42
Regarding istiwa’, he affirmed that “God was on the Arsh (Throne), and
the Kursiyy (Footstool) was the place of His Feet.”114 As with other
anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an, Ibn Hanbal affirmed their existence
without much explanation:
God is hearing undoubtedly, and seeing undoubtedly. He is knowing

and not ignorant, generous and not mean, forbearing and not hasty,
remembering and not forgetting, awake and not sleeping, near (with
His favour) and not ne lectful. He moves and speaks and considers
CfQ
(or observes); He sees and laughs; He rejoices and loves and dislikes;
He shows loathing and good pleasure; He is angry and displeased; He
is merciful and pardons; He impoverishes and enriches and is
inaccessible. He descends every night to the lowest heaven as He
wills. “There is nothing like Him, and He is the hearing and seein
CfQ
(one) (al-Shura 42:11). The hearts of human beings are between two
of the fingers of the Merciful; He turns them as He wills, and
bestows on (or holds back from) them what He wants. He created
Adam by His hand in His image. The heaven and the earth on the
day of resurrection are in His hand. He places His foot in Hell and it
shrinks, and by His hand he takes from Hell a group of people.11
Despite this strict adherence to the Scripture, Ibn Hanbal is still, in some
places, forced to resort to ta’wil, especially in responding to the rational groups.
Al-Ghazali, in Fay sal al-Tafriqah, pointed out that Ibn Hanbal have figuratively
interpreted three Hadiths: first,“The Black Stone is the right (hand) of God on
earth,” second, “The heart of the faithful is between two of the All-Merciful’s
fingers”, and third, “Indeed, I find the breath of the All-Merciful (nafs al-
Rahman) coming from the direction of Yemen.116 Elsewhere, after affirming that
God knows everything and nothing is hidden from Him, Ibn Hanbal added:
If any innovator and opponent tries to prove (the opposite) by God’s

words, “We are nearer to him than his neck vein” (Qaf 50:16), and
“He is with you wherever you are” (al-Hadid 57:4), and “there is no
meeting of three except where He is the fourth...and He is with them
114 Ibid., 36.

115 Ibid., 37.
116 Al-Ghazali, Fay sal al-Tafriqah, 101-102.
43
wherever they are’ (al-Mujadilah 58:7), and similar ambiguous verses
of the Qur’an, then say (in reply to him) that these mean (God’s)
knowledge.117
Though Ibn Hanbal was very strict in affirming the existence of this sifat
al-khabariyyah, it is this exceptions of ta \vd that, among others, has become the
basis of others not to brand him as a mushabbih. Al-Razi defended Ibn Hanbal’s
position from the attack of the Mutazilites affirming that the latter upheld divine
transcendence and was far from being a mushabbih. Ibn Hanbal, maintained al
Razi, put his faith and trust regarding the meanin of the verses on God without
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ascribing any similarity between God and human being.
iii.i. Bila Kayf
The literal affirmation of anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an and Hadith
is, however, qualified by an important qualification that is the denial of the
knowledge of the modalities of these qualities, known as bila kayf (without
knowing how). This expression can be traced from the famous statement of Malik
b. Anas (d. 995) regarding the istiwa’ that “God’s sitting on the Throne is known,
but its modality is unknown, the belief in it is obligatory and the inquiry about it
is innovation” (al-istiwa’ ma lum al-kayf mojhul al-iman bibf wajib wa al-su’al
119 Nevertheless, it was Ibn Hanbal who developed it into a doctrine

anhu bid ah ).118
which was later closely associated with his school of thought.120 In relation to this,
the doubt raised by Joseph Schacht regarding the association of Ibn Hanbal with
this doctrine by arguing that there is no evidence that the latter was using the term
in his works121 is, for us, unfounded. For Ibn Hanbal did allude to this fact in his
Kitab al-Sunnab and Manaqib, by saying that “one must believe in God without
seeking to know the mode of the theologomena [divine essence] and leave to God
118 Al-Razi, I tiqadat, 99.

119 Abrahamov, “Bila Kayfa Doctrine,” 366.
120 Ibid.
121 Wesley Williams. “Aspects of the Creed,” 448.
44
the understanding of his own mystery, renouncing the vain and dan erous
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122
subtleties of dogmatic theology.” Even if we take the view of Schacht that Ibn
Hanbal did not use the term, Schacht is still mistaken, for person may not
necessarily use a specific term when discussing a certain theme especially, as in the
case of bila kayf, when the term was coined later and thus not necessarily used
verbatim by earlier scholars like Ibn Hanbal. What matters more is the content of
the doctrine. And this is true in the case of Ibn Hanbal especially when we take
into account his strict literalism when dealing with anthropomorphic verses in the
Qur’an.
Reverting to the idea of bila kayf, it can be observed that this doctrine is
based on a few textual presuppositions. First, as alluded to earlier, the principle
that the Qur’an and the Hadiths of the Prophet are the highest authority in
religion. This position is based on another premise, namely, that the Qur’an is
perfect and contains everything that is needed by the Muslims.122 Moving from
123 124
that, the third presupposition is that one should not say about God’s attributes
more than what the Qur’an and the Prophet have made clear. This also implies
that, as far as the knowledge of God and His attributes are concerned, those
matters outside the pronouncement of the Qur’an and the Hadiths are extraneous
and even considered innovations. Moreover, the Qur’an has made it clear that
there is nothing like Him, which means that the attempt to contemplate about
the nature of the Godhead is utterly useless. Hence the proper way to deal with the
anthropomorphic verses is to follow the consensus or ijmac of the Companions of
the Prophet and their Followers (tabi un), that is, to keep silent on those areas upon
which the Prophet also kept silent.
122 H. Laoust, “Ahmad bin Hanbal,” 274.

123 Based on the Qur’anic verse which says, “But with His knowledge, there is not a grain in the
darkness of the earth, nor anything fresh or dry but is inscribed in a Clear Book.” Al-Anam 6: 59.
124 Al-Qur'an, al-Shura 42:11.
45
Another strong argument used by the Hanabilab in defending the MJ kayf
doctrine is the verse of the Qur’an which affirms that only God knows the
meaning of these verses:
He it is Who has sent down to you the Book. In it are the verses basic
or fundamental (of established meaning). They are the foundation of
the Book. Others are not of well-established meanin But those in
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whose hearts is perversity follow the part thereof that is not of well-
established meaning, seeking discord, and searching for its hidden
meanings. But no one knows its true meanings except Allah. And
those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say, “We believed in the
Book; the whole of it is from our Lord. None will grasp the Message
except men of understanding.”125
This verse is a reminder to Muslims not to tamper with the meaning of the
anthropomorphic verses since only God knows their meanings. However, there is
also another interpretation which may invalidate this argument, namely, that by
considering the ‘vraw’ as an attached conjunction (yvaw al-ataf), which gives the
meaning that only God and those who are deeply rooted in knowledge are those
who know the meaning of this verse. Yet the Hartabilab’s reply to this, through
the ton ue of Ibn Taymiyyah, another staunch follower of Ibn Hanbal, is that even
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if this interpretation is granted, these two different contradictory meanings are still
valid. For both meanings actually refer to two different aspects: the first refers to
the meaning of the words, which is known to those scholars, and the second refers
to the modality (kayfiyyab) of these words, which only God knows. In fact, it is
the combination of these two interpretations, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, that

became the basis of the doctrine bila kayf.126
We may also, thus far, observe at least two important criteria underlying
the bila kayf methodology in approaching the anthropomorphic expressions of the
Qur’an. First, it is a strict adherence to the authority of the Qur’an in the sense
that the literal meaning of the verses must be upheld absolutely. This is in line
125 Qur’an, Al 'Imran 3:7.

126 Abrahamov, “Bila Kayfa Doctrine,” 374.
46
with the position of the Hanabilah as the Upholders of the Traditions (Ahl al-
Had.ith') as compared to the usage of the rational way. Once the Qur’an affirms,
for example, that God has face, the affirmation must be absolute. Second, it is the
total negation of corporeal qualities to God. The word ‘kayf in Arabic specifically
refers to an inquiry into the corporeal features of a thing. Hence, in order not to
fall into anthropomorphic attributions to God due to a preceding strict and literal
affirmation of meaning, this affirmation is immediately qualified by the denial of
any form or modality in regard to the mentioned attribute. In other words,
however similar the attributes of God to the human qualities, the underlying
principle must be denial of the real similarity. Among the implication of this
qualification, as stated by Abrahamov, is an attestation to man’s inability to know
God’s essence.127 While Arberry viewed that this qualification as a recognition
particularly by Ahmad ibn Hanbal of the limitation of human reason thus offering
resolution to the conflict between reason and revelation in Islam.128 129
iii.ii. The Hanabilah
The position of Ibn Hanbal was later developed by his followers, the Handbilahn)
Although the Hanabilah shared the same strict inclination with Ibn Hanbal, it is
noteworthy to point out the diversity within this school especially the inclination
of some of its members to go overboard either in using the rational approach of
ta or to be more strict and consequently fall into the abyss of
anthropomorphism.130 As put by Abu Zahrah, Hartabilah can generally be divided
into three main groups: (i) those who inclined towards the rational approach which
127 Ibid., 367.

128 A. J. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1957), 22.
129 Among the prominent Hanbalite figures after Ibn Hanbal are both his sons Salih (d. 879) and
‘Abdullah (d. 903), Abu Dawud al-Sijistani (d. 888), Abu Hatim al-Razi (d. 890), Abu Bakr al-
Khallal (d. 923), al-Barbahari, Abu Yala al-Farra’ (d. 1066), Abu al-Wafa’ Ibn 'Aqil (d. 1119), Abu
al-Farraj Ibn al-Jawzi, Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudamah (d. 1223), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1350) and Ibn
al-Qayyim al-Jawzi (d. 1729). In modern times, this school is also associated, though with certain
reservations, with Muhammad ‘Abd Wahhab. (d. 1792).
130 Abu Zahrah, Tarikh al-Mazahib al-Islamiyyah (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-Fikr al'Arabi, 1989), 79.
47
is closer to the Ashairab and the Mutazilab; (ii) Those with the strict literal
approach thus falling into the trap of anthropomorphism that is in variance with
the teaching of Ibn Hanbal; (iii) those in the middle position who emphasized the
importance of the text while not ignoring the utilization of reason. As an example
of the Hanabilab who were rationalists, we read the attack by Ibn Qudamah
(d.1223) against his fellow scholar, Ibn 'Aqil (d.1119), who, according to the former
was influenced by the Mu tazilah in using ta’wil on the anthropomorphic verses.131
Ibn ‘Aqil, who was also in favour of al-Hallaj’s mystical pantheism, was also
reported to be forced to revoke his belief by reading his retraction letter before
reat assembly with the presence of state authorities and witnesses.13 As to the
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anthropomorphic inclination among the Hartabilab, it is evidenced from the fact
that some of them were severely criticized by Ibn al-Jawzi (d.1200), an
authoritative Hanabilab jurist, for committing tashbih. Ibn al-Jawzi denounced
them and denied the fact that these people were the followers of the early
generations (salafiyy un) as they claimed themselves to be and that their views
were not the views of Ibn Hanbal.133 By treating the problem of divine attributes at
the level of the senses Ibn al-Jawzi asserted that their discussions degraded to the
level of laymen (aw am) thereby destroying the good name of their own madbbab:
I observe among our people (ashaburta) those who were saying about
the fundamentals [of the religion] which are not appropriate, and this
refers to the writings of three persons: Abu 'Abdullah bin Hamid, his
friend al-Qadi [Abu Ya'la] and Ibn al-Zaghuni. They wrote books
that have disgraced the [Hanbalite] school. I saw that they have
descended to the level of common people and have taken the
attributes at the level of senses (ala muqtada al-hiss).134
131 See Ibn Qudamah, 21.

132 George Makdisi, Ibn Aqil: Religion and Culture in Classical Islam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1997), 5.
133 Abu al-Farraj Ibn al-Jawzi al-Hanbali, Daf' Sbubab al-Tanzib bi Akuff al-Tanzib, ed. Hassan
Saqqaf (‘Amman: Dar al-Imam al-Nawawi, 1992), 97-99; Abu Zahrah, Tarikb al-Mazabib al-
Islamiyyab (Al-Qahirah: Dar al-Fikr alcArabi, 1989), 193.
134 Ibn al-Jawzi, Dafe Sbubab, 97-99.
48
Ibn al-Jawzl even reckoned them as innovators of the Hanbalf school.
Qadi Abu Yada (d. 1066), one of the three persons referred by Ibn al-Jawzl who
wrote al-Mu tamad fi Usui al-Dih, was also spoken ill by some fuqaba’ of the
Hanabilab, saying that he had “disgraced the Hanabilah in a way that even the
1
ocean water cannot wash it.”
A much earlier Hanbalite, Ibn Khuzaymah had written book Kitab al-
Taw hid wa Ithbat Sfat al-Rabb in which he affirmed that God possesses form
(surah), a face, eyes, hands and other limbs mentioned by the Qur’an. Maintaining
that he is the follower of Ahl al-Sunnab wa al-Athar, as other Hanbalites, Ibn
Khuzaymah insisted that he only argued based on what have been underlined
(mastur) by the Qur’an and authoritative Hadi ths.135

136 He thus described God, for
example, as having two hands as mentioned by the Qur’an and both of this hands
are right hands as reported by the Hadith.137 138

He affirmed that like human beings,
God has a face but God’s face is everlasting (based on the verse wa yabqa wajhu
rabbika) and veiled by light (based on the Hadith which says that God’s face is
veiled by a light which whenever it is unveiled, the face of God will burn
everything that is beheld by His sight (la’ahraqat sabahat wajbihi kullu sbay’
adrakabu basarubu), while the face of human beings will perish.139 As we will see
later, it is these literal views of Ibn Khuzaymah as well as those of other literalists
from the Hanbalites that became the points of attack by al-Razi.
Another Hanbalite scholar who also came under strict scrutiny with regard
to his position on anthropomorphism was the famous fourteenth century polemist,
Ibn Taymiyyah. He was responsible for spreading Hanbalism in the later stage of
its historical development. Like other Hanabilah, he rejected ta ’wil as the mean of
Qur’anic interpretation, arguing that its acceptance will imply that revelation is not
135 Ibid.
136 Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawhid, 21.
137 Ibid., 27.
138 Al-Qur’an, al-Rahman 55:27.
49
clear guidance as it is suppose to be and the Prophet did not fulfill his role as the
interpreter of the Qur’an.1 This position, which arose from his rejection of
figurative expression (majaz) in Arabic language, has led him to hold that all
expressions used in the revelation are used in the real sense (haqiqab') including
141 Consequently, as reported by Ibn Hajar, Ibn

the anthropomorphic ones.140
Taymiyyah had mentioned certain words concerning doctrine which imply
anthropomorphism.142 For example, in one of his sermons where he had cited the
Hadith of Allah’s descent (to the nearest heaven), he apparently climbed down two
steps from the mimbar and said: “like this descent of mine (ka nuz Hi hadha).”143
In Ta’sis fi al-Radd Asas al-Taqdis, written by Ibn Taymiyyah as a reply to al-
Razi’s views against the extreme Hanabilab, he affirmed that God is at the top of
the Throne when he was discussing regarding the issue of istiwa’. He ar ued that
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al-arsh in the linguistic sense means al-sarir (elevated seat or couch), so named
with respect to what is on top of it (yva dbalika bi al-nisbab ila ma fawqihi), just
as a roof is so named with respect to what is under it (ka al-saqfibi al-nisbah ila
ma tahtibi). Therefore, if the Qur an attributes throne to Allah, it is then
140 Siraje S. Abdallah, “Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah on the Legitimacy and Status of 'Ilm al-
Kalam,” (Ph.D. dissertation, ISTAC, HUM, 2000), 97. For Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticisms on the
priority of reason especially in al-Razi’s work, see Chapter Four, 171-174
141 Ibid., 100.
142 Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, al-Durar al-Kaminab fial-A yan al-Mi‘at al-Tbaminah (Bayrut: Dar al-
Jil, n.d.), vol. 1, 154. According to Ibn Hajar, people considered Ibn Taymiyyah as an
anthropomorphist [mujassim] because of what he mentioned regarding the anthropomorphic
qualities of God in his al-Aqfdah al-Hamawiyyah and dX-Aqidab al-Wasadyyab and other books
of his, such as Allah’s hand, foot, chin, and face being literal attributes of Allah (sifat haqiqiyyah
lillah) and that He is established upon the Throne with His essence. Nevertheless, it is also reported
that Ibn Taymiyyah had repented of his own free will from all the above on the 25th of Rabi ‘al-
Awwal of the year 707H, and that it was witnessed by a huge array of scholars and others. Ibid.,
148.
143 Ibid. This view of Ibn Taymiyyah which was based on the Ibn Batutah’s report, however, was
disputed by the JJanabilab through the following arguments: i) that all the writings of Ibn
Taymiyyah regarding God’s descent (haditb al-nuzuT) did not at all mention what Ibn Batutah
claimed he was uttering, ii) there is a conflict between the date of the incident claimed by Ibn
Batutah that is in the month of Ramadan 726H and the date Ibn Taymiyyah was imprisoned (early
Sha'ban 726H) until he died in 728. iii) Even if the saying of Ibn Taymiyyah took place, he might
had said with a negation, ‘not like this descent of mine’ (la ka nuzuli hadha) but the negation
might not being heard by Ibn Batutah. Ahmad b. Hajar al Batami, Naqd al-Kalam al-Muftori’ ala
al-Hanabilah al-Salafiyyin (Doha: Maktabah Ibn Qayyim, 1993), 42-45.
50
known that this Throne is, with respect to Allah, like the elevated seat is with
respect to other than Allah. This makes it necessarily true that He is on the
Throne.144 Regarding the charge that the Hanabilah ascribed body to God, Ibn
Taymiyyah in the same book maintained that the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the
consensus (of scholars) nowhere say that all bodies are created (lam tantiq bi anna
al-ajsam kullaha muhdathahf nor that Allah Himself is not a body (yva anna
Allah laysa bi jismf None of the imams of the Muslims have ever said such
&
thing. Therefore, he claimed, if he also chooses not to say it, it does not expel him
from religion nor from shariah.145
iv. The Asha irah
The position of the Asha irah can be regarded as the middle course between the
two extreme positions of the Mu tazilah and Jahmiyyah, on one hand, and the
mushabbihah, on the other. In what follows, we will analyze the views of two
major Ash arI figures prior to al-Razi on this issue. They are Abu Hassan al-
Ash’ari, the founder of the school and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, the leader of the
later Asha irah movement. Both of them not only represent the two stages of the
development of Ash’ari kalam146 but also had dominantly coloured the whole
spectrum of this school’s position on this issue.
iv.i. Ab u Hassan al-Ash ari
Trained in the school of speculative theology of the Mu tazilah, Abu Hassan al-
Ashari utilized excellently his masters’ apparatus against them, at the same time
reaffirming the main principles of traditional theology which so far were associated
144 Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari, Maqalat a/-Kuwthur/’(Al-Qahirah: Maktabah al-Azhariyyah li

al-Turath, 1994), 395.
145 Ibid.
146 As far as the history of Ash arf kalam is concerned, it’s development can generally be divided
into two stages; the early school (al-awwalurf) which started from the time of it’s founder al-
Ash'ari onwards and the later school (al-muta’akhkhirun) whose inception was marked by the
coming of al-Ghazali. See Muqaddimah, 466; Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, A Commentary on
the ffujjat al-Sddiq of Nur al-Dih al-Raniri (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture, 1986), 211-213.
51
mainly with Ibn Hanbal. His reverence for Ibn Hanbal is obvious in the outset of
his most important theological treatise, al-Ibanab, in which he also laid down his
important sources in kalam:
The belief we hold and the religion we follow are holding fast to the
Book of our Lord, to the Sunnah of our Prophet, and to the traditions
related on the authority of the companions and the successors of the
imams of the Hadith; to that we hold firmly, professing what Abu
'Abdullah Ahmad bin Muhammad Ibn Hanbal professed, and avoiding
him who dissents from his belief, because he is the excellent imam
and the perfect leader, through whom God declared the truth,
removed error, manifested the modes of action, and overcame the
innovations of the innovators, the deviation of the deviators, and the
skepticism of the skeptics. The mercy of God be upon him, for he is
an eminent imam and an exalted, honoured friend.147
Based on the foundation laid down by Ibn Hanbal, al-Ash'ari developed
further the simplicity of the traditional theology to become something with a more
strong rational foundation to the extent that it finally emerged as a school in itself.
Klein, in assessing this contribution of al-Ash’ari, comments that the latter has:
drafted the kalam into the service of orthodoxy, took a mean

position-half way between rationalism and anthropomorphism-and
paved the way for the subsequent rationalization and
intellectualization of Islam. 148
The difference between al-Ash’ari and Ibn Hanbal is obvious in a few
respects. While Ibn Hanbal, due to his simplicity in approach, did not present his
own theology in a systematic way, al-Ash'ari, on the other hand, had a complete
theological system presented in a few of his major works such as al-Ibanab fTUsd
al-Diyanah, al-Luma c and Maqalat al-Islamiyyih. Secondly, in presenting his
theological arguments, al-Ash'ari, unlike Ibn Hanbal, also utilized speculation to
arrived at his conclusions. For that matter, Hadith was not the main concern of
Ash'ari compared to Ibn Hanbal.
147 Ibanah, 49.
52
With regard to the divine attributes, al-Ash'ari had in principle a similar
position to Ibn Hanbal, namely, to affirm in the absolute manner, the existence of
divine attributes. Ibn 'Asakir (d.1175), the historian of Ashairah regarded al-
Ash'ari as “the most redoubtable champion of the affirmists (mutbbit un) who
avoided the extremes of ta ‘til and tashb ih.”149 Al-Ash'ari’s affirmative position is
demonstrated mostly in his al-Ib anah fl Usui al-Diyanah, a work which manifests
virtually almost the same strict literal position of Ibn Hanbal. However, it is
important to note that, compared to his other theological works such al-Luma 'and
Risalah Istihsan al-Khawd fl Ilm al-Kalam ,150 al-Ibanah is highly combative in
tone and has less speculative arguments. This is due to the fact that al-Ibanah, as
affirmed by Ibn 'Asakir, is his first theological work after his conversion from
Mu ’tazilah151 and it is purposely written as a refutation against the latter.152 Bein
polemical work against supra-rational school of the Mu tazilah, a strict
affirmative position is highly expected. McCarthy, a researcher of al-Ash'ari who
even doubts that al-Ibanah in the form which we have it is a genuine work of al-
Ash'ari, gives another contextual justification of this different tone of al-Ibanah.
He viewed that the difference in style and approach could be explained on the basis
that “Ibanah is really a kind of conciliatory gesture which al-Ash'ari made to the
Hanabilah.”153 As a matter of fact, if this reason is granted, we may safely suggest
149 Richard J. McCarthy, The Theology of Ash drI (Bayrut: Imprimarie Catholique, 1953), 148.
150 Compared to al-Luma‘ and Risalah Istihsan al-Khawd fi Ilm al-Kalam, al-Ibanah is
characterized more by a strict, literal and combative style, a method which is closer to that of the
Hanabilah. In al-Luma for example, the style of al-Ash'ari is rather in a dialogue form. He tackled
various philosophical and kalam issues and seemed more appreciative towards both disciplines.
151 McCarthy, 231. See also Ibanah, 29. A. J. Wensinck who also agreed with this view explained
that since al-Ibanah is one of the earliest writings after his conversion it bears his desire to
proclaim his return to the traditional faith and to defend it on scriptural and traditional ground. A.
J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1932), 93.
152 At the outset of al-Ibanah, al-Ash'ari pointed out his audience rather clearly, “To begin with,
there are many deviators from the truth among the Mu tazilah and ahi al-qadr whose straying
desires have inclined them to the acceptance of the principles of their leaders...” Al-Ash'ari
continued to summarize their tenets and subsequently refuted them. Ibanah, 46.
153 McCarthy, 232. See also lb anab, 28.
53
that al-Ashcari’s view in al-Ibanab must not be his final position on this issue, as
claimed by certain quarters.154
In al-Ibanab, as alluded to before, al-Ash'ari held strictly to the bila kayf
position of Ibn Hanbal by affirming the anthropomorphic attributes of God as
literally expressed by the Qur’anic verses:
...God is seated on the Throne as He said in the Qur’an, “The

Merciful is seated on the Throne,”155 and He has a face, as He said,
“but the face of your Lord shall abide resplendent with majesty and
glory,”156 and He has two hands, without modality (bila kayfa) as He
said, “I have created with My two hands”157 and as He said “Nay!
Outstretched are both His hands,”158 and that He has an eye, bila
kayfa as He said, “Under our eye it floated on.159 ”160
Since his adversary in this work was mainly the Mu tazilab who basically
denied altogether the independent existence of divine attributes, al-Ash'ari seems
did not differentiate between anthropomorphic attributes and other attributes. For
immediately after the above paragraph, al-Ash'ari continued:
and that anybody who thinks that the Names of God are other than
Him, he is in error; and that God has knowledge, as He said, “in His
knowledge He sent it down161”...162
154 The issue regarding the time al-Ibanah was written has become a point of dispute and
controversy between the researchers of al-Ash'ari. The point of contention is whether it is an early
work of al-Ash'ari after his conversion from the Mu tazilah position or it is his latest work in his
life. The date of al-Ibanab is indeed crucial especially in deciding the position and methodology of
al-Ash'ari with regard to the issue of tasbbib. There were strong claims by the so-called neo-
Hanbalite and the modern Wahabis that al-Ibanab was actually the last work of al-Ash'ari, which
implies that al-Ash'ari had denounced kalam and converted into strict Hanbalism in his later life.
Quoting Ibn Kathir, they divided the life of al-Ash'ari into three phases; His Mu tazili life, his
early conversion in which he still upheld the tavvil position on anthropomorphic attributes and
finally his move back to the real Salafi Hanbalf position which is manifested in his last work, al-
Ibanab.
155 Al-Qur’an Ta Ha 20:4.
156 Al-Qur’an al-Rahman 55:27.
157 Al-Quran, Sad 38:75.
158 Al-Qur’an Sad 38:75.
159 Al-Qur’an al-Qamar 54:14.
160 Ibanah, 50.
161 Al-Qur’an al-Nisa’ 4:164.
162 Ibanah, 50.
54
Another indication that shows how near al-Ash‘ari’s position was to that of
Ibn Hanbal is in the issue of istiwa’. Al-Ashcari, in this case, even affirmed the
direction of ‘above’ with regards to God when he substantiated his position that
God is above the sky by using the oft-quoted Hanbali argument that this [that
God in the direction of ‘above] is one of the reasons why Muslims raise their hands
when asking supplication from God.163 The Hadith of rtuzul which describes that
God descends to the lower heaven,164 is also quoted by him in proving the fact that
God is in the direction of above.165
Parallel to this position, Al-Ashcari slammed the method of allegorical
interpretation in understanding anthropomorphic expressions, as done by the
Mu tazilah. As a pure Arab whose genealogy can be traced to one of the Prophet’s
companion, Abu Musa al-Ashcari, he used this authority to dismiss the use of
some meanings as an interpretation of the anthropomorphic expressions in the
Qur’an. He argued that in the Arabic language and in the use of Arabic
conversation, one may not say that “I have done this and so with my two hands”
to mean with “my two graces,” for it is not in line with the usual classical Arabic
language. Even if one argues that this usage is based on the consensus of the
community (ijma\ the Muslims, according to al-Ashari, would not agree upon
this position. As to the argument that this is based on analogical reasoning (qiyas),
al-Ashari rejected this view and regarded it as baseless.166
Al-Ashari argued that the meaning of these anthropomorphic expressions
must be construed in their specific forms since the context in which the
expressions take place is specific. Hence, he dismissed the Mu tazilah argument
that istiw a’ must be interpreted as “to have power over something” (istawla y
163 Ibid., 83.

164 The full version of the Hadith runs as follows: “God descends every night to the lower heaven
and says, “Is there any who has a request? And I will grant it him. Is there any who asks
forgiveness? And I will forgive him - until dawn arrives”. It is reported by Abu Hurayrah and Abu
Sa'id al-Khudri, Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawhfd, 126.
165 Ibanab, 83-84.
166 Ibid., 89-90.
55
God’s being seated on the Throne cannot mean His having the
mastery that is common to all things; and it is necessarily true that its
meaning is a being seated that belongs particularly to the Throne not
to all things.167
This is generally the position of al-Ash'ari in al-Ibanah. No lengthy
clarification is given in support of a particular view and not much rational basis is
put forward in substantiating the arguments. On the other hand, the attempt of
rational justification is disallowed. Most of the views are focused more towards
affirming the existence of the divine attributes rather than affirming the
transcendence aspect of God which is also equally important as far as al-Ashari’s
kalam is concerned. To explain this phenomena we are again directed to
contextually view that since his adversaries, against whom al-Ashcari’s refutations
are directed to in al-Ibanah were the Mutazilah who had taken an extreme
transcendence position regarding the divine attributes to the extent falling into
ta ctil, it seems that it is not al-Ashari’s concern in this work to emphasize the
transcendence aspect of divine attributes as compared to the affirmative aspect
(thub ut). For that matter, we will look at his other works to find out al-Ashari’s
views on the aspect of tanzib.
A stronger emphasis on the transcendence of God appears in al-Ash'ari’s
other important work, al-Luma f. In the chapter on God’s existence and attributes,
al-Ash ari answered the question, “Why do you claim that the Creator is unlike
creatures?” by bringing forward a highly logical and philosophical answer:
If He were like them, His relation to temporal production would be

the same as theirs. And if He were like them, He would have to be
like them either in all respects or in some one respect. So if He were
like them in all respects, He would be temporally produced, as they
are, in all respects. And if He were like them in some one respect, he
would be temporally produced in that respect in which He was like
them. But it is impossible for the temporally produced to have pre
167 Ibid., 84.
56
existed eternally. And God Most High has said; “There is nothing
like unto Him” (42:11); and, “No one is His equal” (112:4).168
In an answer to another question, “Why do you deny that God Most High is
body?” he explained:
We deny it because the speaker must mean: Why do you deny that
God is long, broad and united? - or he must mean calling God a body,
even though He be not long, broad, united and deep. Now if he
means, why do you deny that he is long, broad and united? - as that
is said of the bodies of which we have experience - why this is
impossible, because the united is not one thing. For the numerically
least of unions is that of two things, since the thing which is one
cannot be united to itself. But we have shown above that God is one
thing. Hence it will be false to say that He is united. On the other
hand, if the speaker means: Why do you not call God a body, even
though He be not long, broad, and united? Because it is not for us to
assign names, and we may not call God by a name which He has not
pplied to Himself and which has not been pplied to Him by His
Apostle and on which and the meanin of which there is no
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consensus of the Muslims.169
Through the above explanation, it is clear that the view of al-Ash ari
regarding the divine attributes is based mainly on two important methodologies,
namely affirmation of the attributes, on one hand, and tanzih and the denial of
tashbih, on the other. Though the same basis is used by Ibn Hanbal, the
difference between the methodology of al-Ash ari and Ibn Hanbal can be seen
from the former’s strong rational emphasis on the denial of tashbih aspect which
seems wanting in the latter and his followers. In Klein’s words, “al-Ash'ari is as
much a conservative and a traditionist as Ahmad; but has a far more acute mind,
and cannot be satisfied with Ahmad’s obscurantism.”170 This is also perhaps the
reason, apart from the tashbih inclination of the Hanabilab, why al-Ash'ari’s
position was later established as an independent school rather than being conceived
168 McCarthy, 9.
169 Ibid.,11-12.
™ Ibanah, 35.
57
as one under the Hanbalites. In fact, al-Ashari himself had some disagreements
with the Hanabilah against whom he later wrote his tract, Risalah fi al-Istihsan
al-Khawdfial-Kalam.
iv.ii. Ab u Hamid al-Ghaz all
Abu Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Tusi al-Ghazali (d.llll) was the one who led
the second stage of Ashari kalam characterized mainly by a more rigorous

employment of formal logic in theological discussions. 171 His defense of this
rational tool is apparent not only in his offensive works meant to destroy his
adversaries’ arguments, such as Tahafut al-Falasifah and al-Radd ala al-
Batiniyyah, but also in his explicative tracts such as Qawaid al-Aqald, Risalah
al-Qudsiyyah and Iqtisad fi al-I tiqad. Due to this highly discreet use of logic by
al-Ghazali, we can see a more thorough, systematic and refined arguments in his
kalam compared to any of his predecessors, which is the reason why he gained the
title of ‘The Proof of Islam’ (Hujjat al-Islam).
Epistemologically, al-Ghaz all viewed that both aql and naql have their own
respective functions in channelling knowledge to us, position that was, in
principle, not that alien to the Asharite mutakallimun before him. Yet, what sets
him apart is that, for him, knowledge that comes through naql must also be within
the ken of reason, otherwise the meaning of the revelation must be interpreted
through ta\vH. This epistemological principle reveals his concern in seeking an
absolute harmony between reason and revelation in Islam. It also implies his
continuous emphasis on the aspect of the transcendence of God which was much
171 See Muqaddimah, 466; al-Attas, A Commentary, 211-213. The mutakallimun from the early
school were more associated with the dialectical method which was known at that time as adab al-
kalam or adab al-jadal. This method, also termed as al-naqd al-jadalf (in contradistinction to the
method al-naqd al-falsafi of the later theologians), was used mostly through the form of query
and answer (su’al wa jawab), i.e. in the style “if somebody says, we answer” (wain qala qallun
qulna ) or “one cannot say that...because we would answer” (yva la yuqalu inn a... li ’anna naquliT).
See Josef van Ess, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology”, Logic in Classical Islamic Culture,
ed. G.E. Griinebaum (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), 22.
58
impaired by the wrong understanding of tajsim - inclined to by some sects of his
time such as the mushabbihab, Batiniyyah and to some extent the Hanabilah.
No doubt, this epistemological principle influenced tremendously his notion
of divine transcendence. As alluded to before, the emphasis on the transcendence
of God indeed gains a higher position in al-Ghazali’s exposition of kalam. In his
Risalah al-Qudsiyyah, al-Ghazali maintained that belief in God is based on the
pronouncement, “There is no god except Allah, Muhammad is His Messenger” (la
ilab ilia Allah, Muhammad Rasul Allah). This two-part formula, in turn, consists
of four important pillars: confirmation of the essence of God, of His attributes, His
works (afal) and the truthfulness of His Messenger.172 All these four parts consist
of ten fundamentals. In affirming the first pillar of belief, which is the essence of
God, half of the ten fundamentals (arkan) assigned by al-Ghazali related to the
manner of affirming the transcendence of God especially in the form of denying
God’s anthropomorphic characters. These five components are, the affirmation
that God is neither a substance (jawbar), nor a body (jism), nor an accident (arad),
that He is not limited by direction (jibah) nor settled in a location (makan), and
Under the second pillar, the affirmation

that He can be seen (in the Hereafter).173 174
of the attributes of God, again among the important underlying divine attributes is
that God is exalted above and immune from any incorporation in originated things
(munazzahan an hulul al-hawadith)™
In explaining further the sub-section that the essence of God is exalted
above the notion of limitation by any direction, the different approach brought
about by al-Ghazali appears clearly when he denied the impossibility of ascribing
God with the ascription of the notion of direction by pointing out the relativity and
originated nature of the notion of direction:
172 Al-Ghazali, Risalah Qudsiyyah, ed. & trans. A. L. Tibawi under the title ‘Al-Ghazali’s Tract on
Dogmatic Theology’, The Islamic Quarterly, vol. 9 (1965): 95.
173 Ibid.
174 oa
59
...direction is either up or down, right or left, front or behind, and
these were created by Him through His creation of man. He created
him with two extremities, the one rests on earth and is called foot,
and the other, its opposite, is called head. The notion of up was
originated to indicate what is above the head and the conception of
down to indicate what is near to the location of the foot. Even if an
ant creeping along a ceiling: what is down in relation to its position is
still up in relation to ours...all directions are therefore originated
through the fact that man is originated...Is it possible then that He
was in all eternity limited by direction which is originated or that He
becomes limited by direction after He had none?...All this is
impossible for the mind to conceive. For the conceivable is that
whatever is limited by direction is also limited by space like
substance, or is limited by substance in the same way as accidents
This view indicates refinement of arguments within the later Ash ari
mutakallimun. in their exposition of the divine attributes. If al-Asff arl before this,
due to the acceptance of the literal meaning of the anthropomorphic verses of the
Qur’an, affirmed the notion of direction ‘above’ with regard to God, al-Ghazali is
more cautious and elaborative in explaining the issue. This also shows stronger
emphasis, on the part of al-Ghazali, to stress the more harmonious explication of
the divine reality between the Qur’anic text and the rational principles which are
not fully developed in the views of his master al-Asff arl.
For that matter, as far as anthropomorphic expression is concerned, al-
Ghazali was compelled to resort to an interpretive position. When dealing with the
Qur’anic meaning of istiwa’, for example, he stressed:
The eighth fundamental is the knowledge that He most high is

settled upon His Throne, in the sense which He most high intended
by settlement. [This is a sense] which is neither inconsistent with
His ma nificence nor implies any of the characteristics of [the finite
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such as] origination and annihilation. It is in the sense which He

intended by His saying in the Qur’an “Then He lifted Himself
(istawa) to Heaven when it was smoke.” That was in no other way
except by His Omnipotent power as the poet said, “Bishr has gained*
175 Ibid., 102.
60
control over Iraq without sword or bloodshed.” Such interpretation
was forced upon the people of truth (ahi al-Jyaq). Likewise those
who seek the hidden meaning were forced to resort to interpretation
of the verse, “He is with you wherever you are” which generally is
interpreted to mean “by His omniscience.” Similarly the words of
the Prophet, “The heart of the believer is between the two fingers of
the Merciful” were interpreted to mean “subject to His
omnipotence...” Otherwise, if the apparent meaning [on all these
matters were adopted] it would necessitate the impossible, and what
leads to impossible is itself impossible.176
Notice how al-Ghazali began by asserting the traditionists’ premise that the
nature of istiwa9 is actually according to what is intended by God Himself. Yet, for
him, this meaning is not something totally unknown to us, as what was repeatedly
claimed by the Hanabilah who quoted the Prophet’s Hadith on the authority of
Malik b. Anas.17 On the other hand, we can comprehend the meanin through the
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use of the word linguistically either in the Qur’an or on other occasions. On top of
that, what seems more important for al-Ghazali is that the meaning must not
impair the understanding of the nature of divine Reality as expounded by other
Qur’anic verses, a principle which manifests itself clearly in the pillars of faith
(ark an al-iman). Even worse, this understanding must not lead to an ascription to
the divine essence of something that is unworthy. Hence, istiwa’:
...if taken to mean settlement or possession, it would necessitate that

He who settles upon the Throne or possesses it, is a substance in
contact with the Throne and that He is either equal to it in size, or
lar er or smaller. But this is impossible, and what leads to the
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impossible is itself impossible. 178
In anticipating the critique of the Hanabilah, al-Ghazali has excellently
demonstrated how ta \vil is permissible not only in comprehending the
176 Ibid, 102-103.

“God’s sittin on the Throne is known, but its modality is unknown, the belief in it is obligatory
tn
and the inquiry about it is innovation” (al-istiwa ma turn al-kayf majbul al-iman bihfwajib wa al-
su ’al anhu bid ah).
178 Al-Ghazali, Risalah Qudsiyyah, 103.
61
anthropomorphic expressions, but is also a valid methodology in dealing with these
matters. Drawing his arguments from metaphysics which seems wanting within
the Hanabilab, al-Ghazali identified five levels of existence the ignorance of which,
have brought various Muslim sects to charge one another as unbelievers. The five
levels are ontological (wujud. al-dhatf), sensory existence (JJlssi), conceptual

existence (khayalf), noetic existence (aqlf) and analogous existence (shabab f).1S0
While there is no room for ta^vil for the things with ontological existence, any
rational interpretation of expressions in the Scripture or Hadith which refers to any
of these levels other than the ontological is valid and cannot be regarded as tellin
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lies about the Qur’an or the Prophet. With the introduction of these levels of
existence, al-Ghazali is giving more rooms to ta’wil at the same time trying to
place things into context and identify the final limit beyond which person will
fall into the abyss of unbelief (kufi).
179 In regard to the use of ta ’wil, we are very much aware of al-Ghazali’s warning against the usage
of this method in understanding the verses of the Qur’an in his work, Iljam al-Aw am. Yet as the
title clearly indicates that this warning is addressed to the general masses of the Muslims, plus the
nature this study is for the higher level of understanding, the view we take still stand.
180 Ontological (wujud al-dbati) refers to the real, concrete existence of things external to both the
senses such as the existence of heavens and earth, animal and plants. Sensory existence (Jussi)
refers to the things that acquire form through the visual power of the eye, while they have no
existence outside the eye, like the Prophet saw Gabriel on several occasions. This is due to the
extreme purity of the inner self of someone. On the lower level, it is like a person who sees the line
of fire when he move an amber in a circular motion. Conceptual existence (khayali) refers to the
physical image of things that are normally perceived through the senses in instances where these
things themselves are removed from the reach of the senses. For example when we close our eyes
after seeing an elephant, we can still see the form of an elephant. Noetic existence (aqli) refers to
instances where a thing possesses a functional nature (ruh), haqiqah and ma ha, but the mind
isolates its essence without positing any physical image of it in the imagination, the senses or the
outside world. For example, one can perceive the physical image of a hand through the senses, or
one can simply conceptualize it in the imagination. Hand also connotes an essence which is its
epseity namely the ability to size and to strike. The ability to seize and to strike them is the ‘noetic
hand’. Analogous existence (sbabahi) refers to instances wherein a thing itself does not exist,
either as an image or in reality, either in the outside world or in the senses, the imagination or the
mind, but something analogous to it that possesses some quality or attribute peculiar to it exists.179180
Al-Ghazali, Faysal al-Tafriqab, trans. & intro. Sherman a. Jackson under the title ‘On the
Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Al-Ghazali’s Faysal al-Tafriqa’ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 93-96.
62
From the above explanations, we can make some important observations
with regard to al-Ghazali’s overall methodology in dealing with the transcendence
of God and the understanding of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an.
First, with regard to the issue of divine attributes, al-Ghazali is still loyal to the
Asharites’ affirmative position as opposed to the ta ‘til position of the Mu tazilah,
which means that he affirmed the existence of the attributes to the essence.
Second, there is a stronger emphasis by al-Ghazali on the transcendence of God in
particular against the anthropomorphic implications. This consequently leads to
the third observation, namely, that there is a continual insistence on the rationally
harmonious exposition of the divine nature with the employment of allegorical
interpretation (taw/l) by al-Ghazali in treating the anthropomorphic expressions.
This insistence will become more obvious later when we deal with al-Razi’s views
on a similar topic.
CONCLUSION
From the above theological mapping of the main groups, we can observe that in
dealing with the issue of anthropomorphism, Islamic sects in general are divided
into three main divisions. 181 First, those who strongly emphasize divine
transcendence, hence interpret the anthropomorphic expressions in a figurative
way. Second, those who emphasize the superiority of revelation, the result of
which is the adoption of the literal meanings of these anthropomorphic
expressions. The extreme among them fall into tashbih, the act of comparing and
assimilating God with human attributes. The third are those who accept the
meaning of these expressions as they are without trying to interpret their modality
181 It is important to note that this classification is based on the methodology taken by these groups.
It, therefore, must not be taken in its strict sense since there may be individuals who, as far as
general methodology is concerned, adhere to one group but are also employing some specific
methodology of others. Hence, we might encounter that in some cases there are exceptional cases
such as in the example of Ibn 'Aqil and Ibn al-Jawzi who are Hanabilah yet employed the first
approach. On the other hand, there are individual in Mu tazilab who also being included in the
mujassimab group such as Hisham bin al-Hakam and Ibn al-Rawandi.
63
and quality (kayfiyyab). The first group escapes the complication of the problem
by moving away from the literal, anthropomorphic meanings toward their
allegorical meanings. This is the position of the Jahmiyyab but was later more
associated with the Mu tazilah who were more systematic in their articulation of
ideas compared to the Jahmiyyab.132 However, the second and third groups, i.e.,
the musbabbibah and bi la kayfiyyah, though proceeded from similar startin
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point namely a literal understanding of anthropomorphic verses, arrived at slightly
different conclusions. The former, due to their tenacious adherence to the text,
ended up describing God with various anthropomorphic qualities. To this group
belong the majority of the mujassimab and musbabbibah and some segments of
the Hanabilab. While the latter group, though still in some way branded by some
as committing tasbbib through the terms hashwiyyah, uncritical interpretation of
the anthropomorphic verses, they were somehow restrained by the qualifying
mechanism of balkafa, position associated to the early generation of Muslims

183
(al-salaf) which later on was developed by Ibn Hanbal.
Between these groups, there were also those who, epistemologically,
combined the two approaches hence cannot strictly be placed within the above
divisions. Such position can be said in regard to the Asbairah. Although the
approach of the leader of this school, Abu Hassan al-Ash'ari was closer and more
akin to Ibn Hanbal’s approach, the later Ashairah managed to strike middle
round in their theological views between the ta ‘til of the Mu tazilah and the
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tafwid or literalism of the Hanabilab. This role was mainly played by al-Ghazali
but later on as we will show in this study, it is continued by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.* *
182 The Jahmiyyab and Mu tazilah are two sects which were associated with the denial of the
attributes of God and the usage of allegorical interpretation. Although they were together in this
aspect, they somehow differ in other aspects such as in the case of the human acts, in which,
Jahmiyyab believed that human actions were pre-determined by God while the Mu tazilah believed
that human beings create their own actions which is more consistent with the denial of divine
attributes. See Milal, 41, 72-74; Farq, vol.2, 13; W.M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy, 46-55.
183 Watt, Islamic Philosophy, 98-99; Williams, 442.
64
A deeper analysis of the method used by these sects will also reveal to us
that they actually center around two important epistemological inclinations: those
who emphasize more on the role of revelation, and those who stress reason. Unlike
the experience of the Western philosophical tradition, which reached the extent of
conflicting these two sources of knowled e, 184 the problem in the history of Islamic
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theology is characterized by the degree of emphasis given to these two channels of
knowledge. Concerning divine attributes in particular, those sects which stress the
superiority of revelation will accordingly incline towards ithb at, the affirmation, in
the absolute sense, all the divine attributes expressed by the revelation including
185 On the other hand, Islamic sects with a strong
the anthropomorphic ones.184
rationalist tendency would adopt tanzih, that is to remove altogether
anthropomorphic meanings from divine attributes, while at the same time try to
prevent any complication arising from the apparent tension between reason vis-a-
vis revelation. The de ree of inclination among these groups towards these two
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inclinations is, of course, different depending on the strength of their
epistemological and religious backgrounds.
184 See the conflict between Christianity and Science, faith in reason for example, in David C.
Lindberg & Ronald L. Numbers (eds.) God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between
Christianity and Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); David Jasper & T.R.
Wright (ed.), The Critical Spirit and the Will to Believe (Humpshire, 1989).
185 It is to this inclination that al-Shahrastani alluded to by the term Muthabbit un (the Affirmists)
with Ashairah as the leaders, but also includes the musbabbihah such as the Karamiyyah. Milal,
88-96.
65
CHAPTER TWO
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
IN AL-RAZI’S kalAm
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter, we have traced the historical and intellectual
background of the issue of divine transcendence and the problem of
anthropomorphism including the views of various groups either in support of
anthropomorphism or in opposition to it. Since this issue centered mainly around
the discussion of divine attributes, particularly the nature of those attributes
which are based on the divine and Prophetic reports (sifat khabariyyab\ this
chapter will further analyze al-Razi s thought concernin the divine attributes
CfQ
which include the definition of attributes and their difference from divine names.
Also, it will discuss al-Razi’s views regarding the nature of divine attributes and
their relation to divine essence. Further, it will look into his classification of
attributes and the position of divine transcendence in his classification and how
his position on transcendence influence his classification of attributes and
consequently stood as a strong foundation for the attack against his adversaries.
This discussion becomes the basis of the topic in the following chapter, namely
al-Razi’s view on the transcendence of God as expounded in his Kitab Asas al-
Taqdfs. A clear understanding of al-Razi’s conception of divine attributes in his
theological system will enhance our knowledge of comprehending the reason for
his position with regard to anthropomorphism.
CONCEPTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES

Derived from the verb wasafa which literally means ‘to furnish’ (halla),1 the
term sifah is defined as ‘a mark or a characteristic inherent in something
1 Ibn Manzur, vol. 9, 356-357.
66
described, by which the latter is known’ (al-amarab al-lazimab bi dbat al-
mawstf alladbf yurafu bib a) 2 3It also denotes something that subsists in an
essence artm bi al-dbat) or in a locus (al-mahall). Although as a noun, the
term sifab does not occur in the Qur’an, the verb wasafa is mentioned thirteen
times,4 mostly to indicate improper and false descriptions used by the unbelievers
for God,5 such as in the verse “and they falsely, having no knowledge, attribute
to Him son and daughters. Praise and glory be to Him, for He is above what
they attribute (yasifun) to Him.”6 The absence of the term sifab in the Qur’an
led some mutakallimun to deny the existence of God’s attributes as in the case of
Ibn Hazm, an early tenth century literalist (zahiri) mutakallimun of Spain.7 He
also viewed that the application of the term sifab to God is an innovation in
religion (bidab) because it was not mentioned by the Prophet and the
Companions.8
The non-presence of the term in the Qur’an, however, is not a strong
reason for other mutakallimun to reject the existence of the divine attributes.
What seems to be more important was the ontological status of the attributes
rather than its terminological occurrence in the Qur’an. This can be seen
through the fact that the continuous debate between the Asbairab and the
Mu tazilab regarding the nature of divine attributes was centered more on the
relation between the attributes and the divine essence, that either the attributes
existed in addition to the essence or they were identical with the essence. In
2 Al-Jurjani, al-Tarifat, 145.

3 Al-Tahanawi, vol. 4, 338.
4 Al-Qur’an, 16:62, 16:116, 12:18, 12:77, 21:18, 21:22, 21:112, 23:91, 23:96, 6:100, 37:159, 37:180,
43:82.
5 Ibn Manzur, 356.
6 Al-Qur’an al-An am 6:100. Other verses are al-Anbiya’ 21:22; al-Saffat 37:159, 180; al-Zukhruf
43:82. See further the analysis of this term in Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalam
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1976), 112-132.
1 Fa si, vol. 2, 283.
8 Ibid. Ibn Hazm claims that the term 'sifab was devised by the Mu tazilah and the masters of
the kalam who did not follow the true path of the early Muslim (salaf al-salih).
67
addition, throughout the polemics concerning divine attributes, the reality of
divine attributes is not only referred to by the term sifah, but also by other terms
such as ma ha (meaning/idea), hal (state), ashy a’ (things) and lazim

(concomitant)9 which were constantly used by the mutakallimun. Even the
Mu tazilah who advanced more philosophical and rigorous arguments in their
denial of the existence of divine attributes, still used the term sifah in their
explication of the reality of the divine attributes. This can be seen, for example,
from the fact that the subtitles of Shark Usui al-Khamsah by the Mu tazili
scholar 'Abd al-Jabbar also employed the word sifat when referring to divine
attributes.10 In fact, the earliest mention of the term 'sifah', occurs in the report
of the teaching of the founder of the Mu tazilah, Wasil bin 'Ata’.11
According to al-Razi, although there is no mention of the term sifah in
the Qur’an, its existence is already implied by the phrase 'Asma' al-Jfusna (the
Beautiful Names of God) which appears four times in the Qur’an.12 These Names
refer to God’s descriptions of Himself in the Qur’an, further enumerated by the
Prophet in a long Hadith narrated by Abu Hurayrah.13 Except the name ‘Allah,’
which is a proper name (ism alam) that refers to the essence, almost all these
names are derived from attributes.14 Since a noun or a name can either be
name of an essence or a name based on an attribute which describes the essence,
the meanin of attributes are, therefore, subsumed under names. In addition, all
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9 See in-depth discussion on these terms in Wolfson, The Philosophy, 112-132.

10 'Abd. Al-Jabbar, 151,182. Among the subtitles of this book under the general heading al-
Tawhid are ‘Words on the Divine Attributes’ (al-Kalam fi al-Sfat), and the ‘On the Way How
God Deserves the Attributes, (fi Kayfiyyah IstihqaqihiTa ala li al-Sfat).
11 Wolfson, The Philosophy, 118.
12 Theology, 88. The verses are al-Araf 7:180; al-Isra’ 17:110; Taha 20:8; al-Hashr 59:24.
13 In a long Hadith, Abu Hurayrah narrates that “to Allah belong Ninety-Nine Names, those who
enumerate them shall enter Paradise...” The Hadith continues with the enumeration of the
famous Ninety-Nine Names of God. See Law ami', 109.
14 Law ami', 109. According to al-Razi, the name ‘Allah’ is a proper name (ism alam) which
means it is conventional (mawduah) and is not derived from other name or attributes. It is the
name that is singled out by God to refer to Himself. Ibid., 108. Cf. Al-Ghazali, Maqsad al-Asna,
51.
68
words that yield meaning can be regarded as names. For, semantically, the word
‘ism’ is derived either from the word ‘al-sumuw' (exaltedness or prior) or from
‘al-samah’ (to mark),15 16

both 18 which can be applied to all words. For, as far as
17 of
its function as a signifier (dalil), word is prior to its signified meaning
(madia), while every word is also meant as a mark or a signification to
particular meanin Therefore, al-Razi maintained that “every meanin fu
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word, is necessarily a noun.” And in the Qur’an, the verse which says, “He
taught Adam all the Names” indicates the generality of the word ism when God
teaches Adam all the Names (al-asma9) including those which the grammarians
classify as verbs (ft /) and propositions (harf)}* Hence, for al-Razi, although the
term sifah does not occur in the Qur’an, its reality (haqiqab) is continuously
emphasized in the Scripture. This would imply that other descriptions of God in
the Qur’an such as al-Malik, al-Qadir, al-Qayy um, although regarded as names
of God, are ipso facto His attributes. In line with this view, early mutakallimun
such as Ibn Kullab,19 whose views were very much similar to those of the
Asha Irak, affirmed the similarity between names and attributes of God, thus
interchangeably employed both of them to refer to the various Quranic
descriptions of God.20
Despite this close affinity between the words ism and sifah, Al-Razi,
however, admitted that there are differences, in the strict sense of the terms,
between the meaning of these two especially when they are dealt with in
15 Law ami', 27.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Died in 845, 'Abdullah ibn Sa'id Ibn Kullab was the most influential mutakallimun in the ninth
century. He was Shafi T in fiqh and in kalam he argued against the Mu tazilah. His chief
contribution to kalam was his elaboration of the doctrine of the attributes of God. He asserted
that for each name, such as ‘Powerful,’ ‘Knowing,’ ‘Eternal’, there was an attribute of ‘Power,’
‘Knowledge,’ or ‘Eternity’ which later on became known as sifat ma aniby the Ashairah. Watt,
The Formative, 286-287.
20 Wolfson,The Philosophy, 118.
69
different disciplines. The rammarians specify the noun, as opposed to verb or
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proposition, to mean a single word which refers, by convention (bi al-wad),
O
rt
meaning without referring to a specific time (zaman). The mutakallimun, on the
other hand, view both terms in their relation to the essence. When we re ard the
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essence in relation to itself (min daythu hiya hiya) it is called ism, but when we
re ard the essence as being qualified with certain attributes (min daythu innaha
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< 21
mawsufab bi sifah mu ayyanah), we call it sifah. Hence, the terms ‘heaven,’
‘earth,’ ‘boy,’ and ‘wall’ are asma’ while ‘creator,’ ‘provider,’ ‘long’ and ‘short’ are
sifat. In this sense, ism can be seen as prior to sifah since it is the root (asalah),
while sifah is its derivative (mushtaqqab).21

22 23
In the scheme of existent things (mawj udat), attribute, in contrast to the
essence (dhat), is an accident (arad). In one of his classifications of existents, al-
Razi classified existent things into two main categories: those whose reality are
independent from known things (mustaqillah bi al-malumiyyah) and those
whose reality are dependent the known things. The first category is further
divided into that which does not need a substratum for it to reside which is called
essence (dhat), or that which does need a substratum to reside in, which is called
attribute (sifah). As for the second category, it refers to pure relations (idafat wa
al-nasab).
THE POLEMIC CONCERNING THE NATURE OF DIVINE

ATTRIBUTES
The majority of the mutakallimun did not dispute the fact that the Qur’an
enumerates many names and attributes of God. On the other hand, what became
21 Law amie, 28.

22 Ibid.
23 Al-Razi, Shark Uyun al-Hikmah (Tehran: Mu’assasah al-Sadiq li al-Taba'ah wa al-Nashr,
1994), vol. 3, 7-8. In another classification, al-Razi classified existents other than God into two
main categories, essence and attributes. The essence are sub-divided into two, mujarradat
(essence which are abstracted from any relation to bodies) and jasmaniyyat (bodies). While the
attributes are subdivided into rational (aqliyyah) and sensible (hissiyyah), the first is nobler since
it lasts while the second revolves. Law ami‘ 186.
70
the point of contention is the nature and status of these attributes especially in
relation to the divine essence. The question that was raised is that whether the
divine attributes, in particular the seven Sfat Ma ani, have a real, independent
existence vis-a-vis the essence. If this is so, how do these independent existents
affect the unity of the divine essence? These are amon the issues which became
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the polemics between various schools in the history of kalam. The theological
positions concerning this issue range from the diametrically opposed views of the
mutakallimun. namely the Mu tazilah (and the Philosophers) who denied the
existence of divine attributes, and those whom al-Shahrastani referred to as “the
Affirmers of Attributes” (al-Sfatiyyah), among whom, the Ashairah were the

25 Between and within these two poles, there are many other views
foremost.24
such as the view of the philosophers who accepted only negative and relative
attributes, the views of Abu Hashim of the Mu tazilah who re arded attributes
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as ahwal (states) which cannot be predicated either as existents or non-existent,
and the views of some Mu tazilf individuals who accepted only two divine
qualities namely Knowledge and Power.26 Before we embark on the discussion of
al-Razi’s views on this issue, we will first elaborate, as a background, the position
of the two major schools involved in this polemic, namely, the Mu tazilah and
the Ashairah.
who upheld the unity of God (tawhid) as the first pillar
The Mu tazilah,27 28
of their five theological principles (usul al-khamsah)2S denied the independent
24 Sfat Ma ani are the existents which subsist in the divine essence. They are power (Qudrah),
Will (Iradah), Knowledge (77m), Life (Hayah), Hearing (Sam), Sight (Basar), Speech (Kaiam).
The term ma ani is a plural form of maha, a term used by the mutakallimun to refer to the
reality of the attributes which is the cause (illah) of God being attributed as Knowing, Living,
Powerful and so on. It was first employed by the Mu tazilah such as Muammar but later on
became a common expressions in kalam. For further discussions on ma ha see Wolfson, The
Philosophy, 147-167.
25 Milal, 77.
26 Theology, 90.
27 See their position on anthropomorphism in Chapter One, 37-39.
28 The five principles are basic theological pillars elaborated by the early proponents of the
Mu tazilah in defining their theological position. Other four principles are: justice (adl), the
71
existence of divine attributes. They argued that since the essence of God is
without any division, there must be no other entity that co-exists with it.29 The
existence of something that is necessary and eternal, superadded to the divine
essence will only lead to the plurality of eternals as reflected in the statement of
Wasil b. 'Ata’ (d.l31H), the founder of the Mu tazilab,30 that “to assert the
existence of an eternal entity or an eternal attribute, is tantamount to saying

there are two Gods.”31 Since eternity is peculiar to the description of God’s
essence, eternal attributes that exist additional to the essence would also have
share in divinity.32
Denying the existence of attributes superadded to the essence, the
Mu tazilab maintained that God cannot be Knowing through (the attributes of)
Knowledge, Powerful through Power, Living through Life; otherwise this would
mean that His Knowledge, Power, Life and His essence are different existents
(mawjudat mutagbayyirab) which are eternals.33 Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1024), a
later spokesperson of the Mu tazilites, ar ued on the impossibility of the

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attribute of knowledge:
If God the Exalted is Knowing through the attribute of

Knowledge, it [the Knowledge] would either be known, or not. If it
is not known, it cannot be affirmed...if it is known, it either exists
or does not exist. It cannot be non-existent. If it exists, it is
either eternal or originated, and all these are false.34
promise and the threat (al-wa wa al-wa Td), the intermediate position (manzilah bayna
manzilatayn) and the commanding of right and the forbidding of evil (al-amr bi al-maruf \va
al-nahy an al-munkar). For the fundamental ideas of the Mu tazilab, see 'Abd Jabbar, Shark
Usui al-Khamsah; Sharif, vol.l, 199-219. As for the historical account of their doctrines based on
individual views, see Josef van Ess, Tbeologie und Gesellschaft im 2 und 3 Jahrhundert Hidschra:
Eine Gescichte des Religiosen Denkens im Fruben Islam, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), Band
3, 4 & 5; William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy, 46-55.
29 Milal, 39. Before the Mu tazilab, there were individuals who denied the existence of the
attributes such as Ja'd ibn Dirham and Jahm bin Safwan.
30 Matalib, vol. 3, 227.
31 Milal, 43.
32 Ibid., 42.
33Maalim, 158.
34 Qadi 'Abd Jabbar, Shark Usui al-Khamsah, 183.
72
Moreover, the existence of independent attributes would also imply that
the essence is in need of the attributes, and to be in need of something is a

quality impossible for God.35 If the essence and attributes are conceived as
different independent realities, this would lead to state of composition
(murakkab) in the divine essence, a condition which is contradictory to the
divine unity. This position, according to the Mu tazilab, if held by Muslims,
would make them worse than the Christians (al-Nasara) since the latter only
affirmed one essence with three different attributes with hypostatic existence
(oknum), while the Asbairab would affirm nine different things: one essence,
and at least eight attributes!36 37
In order to avoid pluralism in God’s essence, the Mu iazilah were of the
view that divine attributes are mere names or as modes (ahwaT). They also
re arded these attributes as being either relative in nature such as God is the
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Creator and Sustainer, or negative such as that He is free from matter.38 The
attributes are mere mental constructs and do not exist additional to the essence.
They are, in fact, the essence itself. Power, Life, Knowledge and other attributes,
therefore, are all identical with His essence. In the words of one of the earliest
Mu tazili of Basrah, All al-Jubba’i (d. 915):
35 Ibid., 157.
36 Ibid, 159. Cf. SharhalAqald, 51.
37 Wolfson, The Philosophy, 133. The theory of modes was expounded by Abu Hashim al-Salam
(d. 933), the son of al-Jubba’i. This theory is a modification of early theory of ma ha by another
early Mu tazili, Muammar ibn 'Abbad al-Sulami (d.842). Ma ha is described by the latter as
something that resides in the body that causes the existence of accidents such as motion, rest,
whiteness and blackness. From this, the term maha was used later by the mutakallimun to
designate the thing that causes God to be described as Knowing, Powerful and so on. While in
the theory of modes of Abu Hashim, hal is described as something that is attributed to God such
as Knowingness and Powerfulness, but it is regarded as neither existent nor non-existent. See
further Nihayat, 52-60; Wolfson, The Philosophy, 147-166, 167-182.
38 Nihayat, 51.
73
God the Most exalted deserves these four attributes, namely, of
being Powerful, Knowing, Living and Existing by His essence (li
dhatihf)39 40
To escape from the accusation of stripping altogether the divine attributes
from the essence (ta etil), the Mu tazilah represented the attributes with other
terms which were more indicative of their close identity with the essence. For
example, they affirmed that that which is related to known things (ma I um), as
far as the divine essence is concerned, is not knowledge itself but God’s
knowingness (L4/zmzyyu/?) which is, again, identical with God’s essence. The
same case applies to other relational attributes such as Qadiriyyah and
Hayyiyah.49
Another issue which is related to the nature of the attributes is the
problem of the relation between the temporal and the eternal being. This
concerns, in particular, the attributes which are related to the originated temporal
beings, such as God’s Knowledg which is related to the known things
(ma lum), and God’s Will, which is related to the things willed, and so on. The
question is that if the divine essence is eternal, are these relational attributes also
eternal while at the same time related to things, which are created, temporal and
ever-changing? If these attributes are, on the other hand, originated, can they
reside in something eternal, which is the essence? It is this paradox that led the
Mu tazilah to deny the existence of the divine attributes.
The contentions of the Mu tazilah can be observed as being in parallel
with the views of the philosophers who, in order to uphold the four
characteristics of the Necessary Being (Wajib al-Wigud), namely, necessity,
39 'Abd. al-Jabbar, 182. Among the proponents of the Mu tazilah, there were slight differences in
their sayings, yet the underlying principle was still the negation of the independent reality of
attributes. Abu Hashim, for example, expressed it as “God deserves the attributes...in His
essence ” (yasta/iiqquha li ma buwa alaybifidhatihi), while Abu al-Hudhayl said that “God is
knowing through knowledge which is Himself [His essence].”
40 Arba m, 159.
74
eternity, unity and perfection, arrived at the same conclusion of denying the
divine attributes. The philosophers viewed God as a simple (basff) and pure
(mahd) being, without any quiddity or essence (mahiyyab wa haqfqab). God
cannot be defined since He does not share any genus with anything else, hence
the intellectual and logical classification of genus and differentia cannot be

pplied to Him.41 They argued that if an attribute is predicated to God, it could
either be necessary (yvajib) or contingent (mumkin). If it is necessary, it would
either become rival to the Necessary Being and thus necessitate plurality and
composition in His essence, which will destroy His unity and simplicity
(basff), or, it will not be qualified as an attribute since an attribute is in need of
an essence and this is not the characteristic of a Necessary Being.43 Furthermore,

41 42
if it is contingent (mumkin), it will lead to the fact that God’s essence is both
cause (fail) and recipient (qabil) simultaneously. This is so because every
contingent needs a cause and the cause is the essence. Hence, the essence is both
the cause of the attributes and at the same time becomes the recipient of the
attributes, which is impossible.44 If this combination is within the essence, it will
lead to the composition of the essence but this will contradict the fact that the
essence is simple (basff). Furthermore, to be a recipient would mean that the
essence is in need of the attributes and that which is in need of something else is
originated. The philosophers also ar ued that an attribute does not enter the
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quiddity of an essence nor become constituent element of it. Hence, it is
always subordinate to the essence which is its cause. This makes the attribute an
accident, something caused and not eternal.45
41 Tabafiit, 123.
42 Ma talib, vol. 3, 228. To the philosophers, if God is composed of essence and attributes, this will
lead to the fact that the essence is in need of the attributes since every composition needs its parts
for it to be completed, and everything that is in need of something else is in itself contingent
(mumkin), hence in need of a cause. This is impossible in the case of God’s essence.
43 Matalib, vol. 3, 227-228.
44 Arba in, 157; Law ami' 31; Matalib, vol.3, 228.
45 Tabafiit, 114.
75
In sum, the views of the Mu tazilah and the philosophers regarding
divine attributes can best be grasped through Al-Shahrastani’s recapitulation of
their principle of unity:
The Necessary Existent can only be One. His existence is his

necessity (wujuduhu wujibuhu), and His necessity is His reality
(Jiaqiqatuhu) and His reality is His oneness (wahdatuhu). His
oneness is His particularity (takhassusuhu), and His particularity is
His specificity (ta ayyunuhu), without distinguishing necessity
with existence, and existence with reality and quiddity. And it is
from this [argument] they denied the attributes of God additional
to the essence ...
If the Mu tazilah, due to their denial of the divine qualities, were called
the muattilah or ‘those who divest God from any attribute,’ they were
confronted by those who were termed by al-Shahrastani as the Sfatiyyah, the

‘Affirmers of the divine attributes.’46
47 48 49
Although al-Shahrastani also included
within this group those sects who affirmed anthropomorphism, such as the
Karramiyyah and the mujassimah, the real opponent of the Mu tazilah, as far as
philosophical and intellectual expositions are concerned, were the Asha irah, who,
in the history of kalam, had leveled a severe criticism against most of the
principles upheld by the Mu tazilah. Another group, the Hanabilah who also
affirmed the existence of divine attributes, were mainly satisfied with their ‘bila
kayf position and did not come up with strong philosophical arguments in
answering the position of the Mu tazilah.
The Ashairah, based on scriptural proofs, argued that the divine
attributes exist additional to the essence. The Qur’an affirms that God has
„48 «N
knowledge in the verses, “He has sent it down with His knowled
female conceives or bears save with His knowledge.” God is also described as
46 Nihayat, 100.
47 Milal, 77.
48 Al-Qur’an al-Nisa’ 4:166.
49 Al-Qur’an al-Fajr 35:11.
76
having power through the verse, “The Lord of all might, the Unshaken,” 0 and so
51 Since these attributes have been singled out

on with regard to other attributes.50
clearly by the Qur’an, their existence cannot be said to be identical with the
essence. Due to these separate indications between God and His attributes, the
Ashairah maintained that these attributes are not identical with the essence but
are rather the medium through which God is related to His creatures. God,
therefore, is Knowing by virtue of Knowledge, Powerful by virtue of Power,
Living by virtue of Life, Willing by virtue of Will, and so on. Al-Ash'ari, in al-
Luma \ gave further proof of the existence of the attribute of Knowledge and
highlighted the flaw in the Mutazilites’ argument:
...He must be Knowing either by Himself or by a knowledg
CD
which cannot be Himself. Now, if He is Knowing by Himself, He
Himself would have to be Knowledge. For, if one said that God is
Knowing by a quality distinct from Him, he would have to say
that this quality is Knowledge. But Knowledge cannot be
Knowing, nor can the Knower be Knowledge, nor can God be
identified with His attributes...hence, since the Creator cannot be
Knowled e, He cannot be Knowing by Himself. And if that is
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impossible, it is certain that He is Knowing by a Knowledge which

cannot be Himself.52
The attributes cannot be conceived of as being identical with the essence
since it will lead to the confusion between the essence and the various attributes
which God described in the Qur’an. Furthermore, an absurd conclusion would be
obtained with re ard to the attributes themselves wherein the attributes of

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Knowledge, for instance, would be identical with Power and Life, and that it also
would be identical with the Knowing One, the Living One, and the Powerful
One. It would also lead to the conclusion that He who is of necessary existence
50 Al-Qur’an al-Dhariyat 51:58.

51 See the Ash'arite scriptural arguments in affirming the existence of these attributes in 'Abd al-
Qahir al-Baghdadi, Usui al-Dih, 90-109.
52 McCarthy, 19. The proof on the dependent reality of divine Knowledge is also applicable to all
God’s essential attributes such as Life, Power, Hearing, and Sight.
77
would not subsist in His own essence.53 While defending the position of the
Asbairab, al-Shahrastani attacked this strange conception of unity of the
Mu tazilab and the Philosophers through the following remark:
You say that He is Origin, Cause, Intelligent and Intelligible, but

there is no connection between these relations and if you can
postulate a plurality of relations, the mutakallim can postulate
attributes. To strip God of the latter is to strip Him of the
former.54
Despite the emphasis on the difference between attributes and essence, the
Asbairab also maintained that the attributes are not exclusively independent of
the essence in the sense that the two are seen as two separate entities. This is
because attributes are attached to the essence as accidents are attached to the
substance. Their existence is, therefore, accidental in the sense that they cannot
exist in themselves and need the essence as their substratum (rnahall).55 This
position of maintaining both the independent and identical aspect of the
attributes vis-a-vis the essence held by the Asbairab is oftenly described through
the statement that “the attributes, being together with the essence, is not the
essence, neither is it other than the essence ” (al-sifab ma a al-dbat la buwa wa
la gbayrubu). “This is how,” explained al-Razi, “our school’s predecessors
(ashaburta) described the relation between the divine essence and divine
attributes.”56 To them, this statement is neither paradoxical nor contradictory, as
criticized by the Mu tazilab for it explains the real nature of both the essence
and the attributes of God. The first part of the statement shows that the
attributes have an independent reality (baqfqab) that is different from the
53 Shark al Aqa Id, 51.

54 Nib ayat, 51.
55 Tahafut, 114.
56 Arbam, 164; Muhassal, 13. Cf. al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad ff al-I tiqad, trans. 'Abd Rahman Abu
Zayd (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1994), 65; al-Baghdadi, Usui al-Dm, 90.
78
essence, while the second part emphasizes the dependence of the attributes to the
essence due to their accidental nature.
The nature of the attributes, according to the Ashairah does not impair the
unity of the divine essence since the existence of the attributes is not the same as
the existence of the essence. The existence of the attributes is accidental and it
depends on the essence as their substratum.57 If the concern is that as accidents,
the attributes must have been caused by an efficient cause, as argued by the
philosophers, “there is no reason,” replicated al-Ghazali, “why it should be
regarded as impossible for the attributes to exist in the essence yet still be eternal
and independent of the efficient cause.” In other words, there is no problem of
having this kind of pluralism with regard to the essence of God since that is its
reality. In fact, as remarked by al-Taftazzani, there is no dispute amon the Ahl
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al-Sunnah on the question of the multiplicity and plurality of the attributes of
the Deity as to whether they are distinctly separate or not. The plurality of
eternal essence is impossible but not the plurality of “one essence and its
attributes.”58
We can, thus far, identify a few major issues that formed the core of the
ar uments of the contendin views regarding the nature of divine attributes.

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CfQ
First, the issue of whether the attributes are identical with the essence or they are
distinct and existing in addition to the essence. Second, the question of the
plurality of eternals that arises from the idea of the additional existence of the
attributes. Third, the relation between the eternal attributes, especially those
attributes related to some divine actions, with its objects that are originated and
plural. Related to this issue is the question of how the essence can be both the
cause and recipient of attributes, active and passive at the same time. These are
57 Tabafiit, 112.
58 Sharh alAqald, 52. For further elaboration on the position of the Ashairah on the affirmation
of God’s attributes, see lb anah, 94-106; Irshad, 46-77; al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad, TI-91.
79
the issues which we will further examine in the following paragraphs in the light
of al-Razi’s views on divine attributes.
AL-RAZl’S views on the nature of the attributes and

THEIR RELATION TO THE ESSENCE
Al-Razi, as the other Ashairah, affirmed the existence of attributes that are
superadded to the essence. For him, these attributes function as relations
between the essence and the object of that relation, such as knowledge (i7m),
which is the relation between the knower (Sim) and the things known (ma turn).
As it is necessary to affirm the existence of the essence (al-dhat), it is equally
necessary to affirm the existence of the relation (nisbab) and the attribution
(idafab):59
The knower (al- alim) is he who senses the [known] thing and it
becomes manifest [to his understanding]. Sense, perception and
manifestation cannot take place without there being a specific
relation between the knower and the known. And this relation and
connection, referred to as ‘ta alluq’ are necessarily affirmed.
Otherwise, God cannot be described as Powerful and Knowing.60
The connection or the relation alluded to above certainly refers to something
other than the essence. That is why, according to al-Razi, the proof of the
existence of the essence is other than the proof of God having the attributes of
Knowledge or Power. We need another differentiating proof (dalil munfasil) to
substantiate the existence of the attributes or relations apart from the proof of
the existence of God which mainly refers to the essence. In other words, we can
conceive the concept of God’s essence while being unaware of His attributes of
Living and Knowing. Elsewhere, al-Razi put forward this argument differently,
59 Arba ‘in, 156; Matalib, vol. 3, 224.

60 Matalib, vol. 3, 223.
80
that our knowledge of the existence of a Necessary Being does not lead us
directly to the knowledge of these attributes:
The decisive proof of this difference is that when we know the

cessation of things possible of existence (intiha’ al-mumkinat) to
the being-existent of Necessary Existence in itself, it does
necessitate knowing that God is Knowing, Powerful in a way we
have previously mentioned. That which is known is different from
what is unknown. Hence, God being Knowing and Powerful is not
ipso facto His essence.61
Hence, there is a clear distinction between our knowledge of God’s existence
that refers to His essence and our knowledge of the fact that He is attributed to
other attributes such as Knowledge, Power and Life. The denial of this relation
will subsequently lead to the denial of the fact that God is All-Knowing and All-
Powerful. To say that God is All-Knowing and All-Powerful is equivalent to

saying that God has Knowledge and Power.62 Furthermore, there is a difference
between the attributes of Knowing and Living that would prevent us from
conceiving both of them as identical.63 Both of them refer to different quiddities
(mahiyyat) categories (maqulat) and definition (Azdd).64 God’s Knowledge, for
example, encompasses the necessity (wajib), the possible (mumkin) and the
impossible (muhal), whereas His Power relates only to those which are possible
of existence.65 The objects of God’s Power (al-maqdur) could not remain as
they were (objects of Power) after they had existed since God has already
exercised His Power by bringing them into existence. If they still remain as the
object of Power, it will be superfluous, and hence, impossible, although they can
still be the objects of knowledge of God (al-ma I urn):
61 Arba m, 156. Law ami ‘, 34; Mas all, 51.

62 Matalib, vol.3, 223.
63 Ibid., 225.
64 Ibid., 227.
65 Theology, 95; Matalib, vol. 3, 226.
81
The Powerful (al-Qadir), if the object of His Power attains to
existence, He will not remain powerful in regard to bringing this
object into existence. For, bringing into existence that which is
already existing, is redundant and this is an impossibility (muhal).
Power has no effect on what is impossible, and the object of
Power, after it attains to existence, ceases to be one. However, it
would remain as an object of Knowledge (malum) after it has
attained existence...this necessitates difference between
Knowledge and Power.66
This argument falsifies the view that all the attributes are in fact one and
identical with the essence. God is, therefore, not devoid of attribution and cannot
be ascribed as only the essence, as held by the Mu tazilab, or to pure existence as
conceived of by the philosophers. In relation to that, al-Razi criticized the
Mu tazilah for looking at the principle held by the Asbairab in their statement
that “al-sifab ma a al-dbat la buwa wa la gbayrubu” from only the linguistic
and literal point of view through their claim that this statement is contradictory
and confusing. On the other hand, this condition should be perceived from the
context in which the discussion has taken place:
Our position is that if what you [those who oppose] meant by two
different things (al-gbayyirayn) are things which are independent
in their essence and reality (bi al-dbat wa al-haqfqab), we do not
accept [the situation] that essence and attributes are two things
different based on this interpretation. But if what you meant by
two different thin as two things, distinct one from the other or
CTQ
one is an attribute to the other and the other is the one’s attribute,
why did you say that an affirmation of two others which are
distinct based on this interpretation is false?67
In relation to the above issue, the accusation that the idea of the additional
existence of attributes is similar to the Christians’ idea of the trinity, is, for al-
66 Ma talib, vol.3, 226.

67 Arba m, 164-165. Al-Razi, similar to al-Ghazali, affirmed that the existence of two independent
eternal entities in the sense that one is the attribute of another is possible and will not impair the
unity of divine essence. Tabafiit, 112-113.
82
Razi, erroneous. The Christians’ Trinity attributes different independent eternal
entities to the three hypostases through their idea of the incarnation in the body
of Mary and Jesus, while the mutakallimun, as explained before, did not
subscribe to that idea.68
THE ETERNAL AND THE ORIGINATED
As we alluded to before, one of the strong criticisms by the Mu tazilah against
the theology of the Ashairah is regarding the nature of the relation between the
eternal essence and its attributes that are associated with the originated things.
How is it possible for the divine essence, which is eternal, to be the substratum
of originated things (cd-hawadith)? Al-Razi, on this question, affirmed that in
principle, it is impossible for the essence of God to be the substratum for any
originated things since this would violate the principle of divine unity.
Nevertheless, in the case of divine attributes, he qualified that an attribute can be
contingent in itself (mumkin li dhatiha) yet necessary through the divine

These attributes are contingent by virtue of being related to originated
essence.69 70
things, such as in the case that God is an Agent (al-Fail) who brings the world
into existence. To say that the attribute of bein an Agent as eternal is

CfQ
impossible since God cannot be attributed to being an Agent prior to the
existence of the world (as the effect of the Agent). For it is impossible for
something to be a cause without the act of causing effects (al-fail wa la fit
muhal). The same applies to other attributes such as Knowing and Seeing.
These attributes, in relation to contingent beings, can only be affirmed in God
when the contingent beings come into existence. For example, God can only be
said as Knowing and Seeing the world when the world already exists.71 In this
68 Law ami‘ 32.

69 Arba m, 120; Theology, 91.
70 Muhassal, 158.
71 Ibid., 159.
83
respect, these attributes are regarded as contingent. Ceylan, in analyzing this
argument of al-Razi, considers it as “unprecedented argument containing
difficulties.”72 This is because, by allowing the presence of temporal qualities in
God’s essence, al-Razi has here violated his own principle which deny the
temporally originated things to subsist in the essence of God73 as evidenced in the
case of his strong attack ainst the views of the Karramiyyah. However, al-
Razi seems to have his own justified arguments when he maintained the
contingency of the attributes in relation to the temporal things. He argued that
the contingent nature of the attributes is only applicable to the real attributes
which are followed by relations (al-sifat allati talzimuha al-idafat) such as
Knowing and Powerful.74 These are attributes which have their objects such as
the object of knowledge (malum) and the object of power (al-maqdur). These
attributes are eternals by virtue of being subsisted through the divine essence yet
in themselves they are contingent due to their connection with their objects.
Elsewhere, al-Razi maintained that in the case of relative attributes, what
changes is the relation of the attributes to something, not the attributes itself
since relations do not exist externally.75 This multi-facets justification makes his
argument more complicated compared the simpler yet firmer position of his
predecessor, al-Ghazali who insisted that both essence and attributes are eternal
based on the argument that just as the essence of the Necessary Being is eternal
72 Theology, 91.
73 Mu ha ssal, 158.
74 Theology, 93. Al-Razi classified attributes in general into three categories: i) real attributes (al-
sifat al-.haqfqiyyah') that are free from any relations (idafaty ii) real attributes that are followed
by relations such as the attribute of knowledge which is related to the known things, and power
which is related to the object of power (maqdury iii) pure relation, such as the condition of a
thing situated on the left or right. In the case of attributes with relation, changes will occur.
Nevertheless, in the case of real attributes, there will be no changes in them since any changes in
real attributes will mean that these attributes are not among the perfect attributes of God (sifat
kamaT) and this means that the essence of God is defective (naqis) before the existence of the
attributes. Furthermore, if the essence of God is receptive of temporal attributes, this receptivity
will be among the criteria of the essence and it is eternal with the essence. If the receptivity is
eternal, the existence of originated beings is also eternal and this is impossible. Arba m, 120.
75 Mu ha ssal, 159.
84
and independent of an efficient cause, His attributes are also eternal and
independent of an efficient cause, and there is no question of pluralism in this
sense.76
The fact that attributes are contingent in themselves yet can subsist
through the eternal essence seems already established in the theological thought
of the later Ashairab after al-Razi. They did not re ard this situation as
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something that would compromise the unity of the essence. Al-Taftazani, in his
commentary of al-Nasafi’s al-Aqald, pointed out that there is no absurdity in
comprehending that the attributes necessarily exist in the essence of the
Necessarily Existent, but in themselves they are possible existents since this
eternal attributes subsists in the essence of the eternal. The attributes, then can
be said to exist necessarily in Him (God), and are not separated from Him.
Therefore, according to al-Taftazani, we must say that Allah, taken with His
attributes, is eternal.77
In the exposition of the transcendent unity of existence (wahdat al-
wujud) by the Sufi metaphysicians whose ontology was closer to the Asharites’
kalam, the double nature of divine attributes is also maintained. It is expounded
within their conception of the manifold and diverse self-manifestation of the
Reality. As lucidly elaborated by al-Attas:
the Attributes have a dual aspect: one describes the Divine Essence
and is identical with it (because this aspect is in fact the first
aspect of the Divine Names); the other describes itself, or rather it
describes the Essence as qualified by it...the former is eternal; the
76 Tabafiit, 111-113, 129. Al-Ghazali also questioned the terms used by the philosophers such as
Necessary Being (Wajib al-Wujud), receptive cause (illab qabiliyyab), which to al-Ghazali were
not in line with the divine reality and thus misunderstanding of these term was the source of the
confusion of the philosophers. He even ridiculed them by saying that they were using
philosophical jargon like ‘possible’ (mumkin), contingent (ja^z), subordinate (tabi6 ), inseparable
accidents (lazirri), effects (ma lul), with the intention of scaring the laymen.
77 Sharh alAqald, 52. According to al-Taftazzani, not every eternal is a God, so the existence of a
number of gods is not to be implied from the existence of eternals. The term eternals should not
be used lest the estimative faculty (al-wabrri) go so far as to think that each of the eternals
subsists in itself and that the divine attributes are predicated upon it.
85
latter is non-etemal. It is from this latter aspect of the Divine
attributes that the realities of things are constituted.78
As for the question of God being the cause and recipient at the same time,
al-Razi did not see any contradiction on this matter, since in other cases such as
that God knows the universals, as propounded by the philosophers themselves,
God, in this case, is receptive to the objects which are caused by Him.79 For al-
Razi, to be a recipient did not necessarily indicate that the essence is in need of
the attributes. For, although the essence is the cause of the attributes, the
essence is being perfected by itself (mustakmilab bi nafsiba) not through the
attributes.80 Hence, in this case, the essence is not ‘in need’ of the attributes. The
philosophers too, added al-Razi, were not consistent in their view on this issue
since their view that God as the ‘First Cause’ already assumed positive
relationship with the caused world. This fact would contradict their own
principle that God cannot be active and passive at the same time.81
Al-Razi observed two basic reasons for the whole polemic on divine
attributes. First, the premise that unity (wahdab) is perfection while multiplicity
is an imperfection. This premise caused the exaggeration of unity to the extent
of denying the divine attributes. Second, the idea that an existent which is
powerful over all things, knowing all known things are more perfect than an
existent that does not have these attributes.82 This was the concern of those who
affirmed the existence of the divine attributes. Although the objective of both
78A1-Attas, A Commentary, 37. According to al-Attas, the sufis’ ontological doctrine, although
similar in some respects to Ash’arite theology, there are also some differences between them the
fundamental of which, is the question whether it is quiddity or it is existence that is
fundamentally real. The Ash antes is closer towards affirming the primacy of quiddity which led
them to the affirmation of the doctrine of God’s difference from originated things. The sufis, on
the other hand, affirmed the fundamental reality of existence, hence although they maintained
that God is different from originated things in point of determination and individuation, they are
not different in point of existence and reality. Ibid., 44.
79 Theology, 92.
80 Law ami \ 32.
81 Theology, 92.
82 Law ami‘ 33.
86
parties was to affirm God’s perfection and greatness and to deny His
imperfection, the former over-emphasized the Unity of God while the second
tried to save God from being stripped away of any attributes, making Him
unknown. 83
THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTES
The mutakallimun classified divine attributes based on various rounds. The
CfQ
most common among them is the classification of attributes into the necessary
(a I-wajibab or tbub utiyyab) and the negative (al-mumtani ah or salbiyyah)?4
However, given the complicated nature of the background of the polemic
concerning divine attributes, more refined classifications of divine attributes were
put forward especially by the later mutakallimun. Al-Razi’s classification can be
seen as one of them since it reflects response to the Mu tazilah’s denial of the
real and independent attributes. On the other hand, based on the affirmation of
existence of an independent attributes apart from the divine essence, al-Razi
classified divine attributes into three main divisions: attributes of essence (sifat
dhatiyyahf attributes that subsist in the essence (ma hawiyyab) and attributes of
action (fi liyyah)?5 Attributes of the essence refer to names (alqab) signifying the
essence such as the Existent (Mawjud) and the Eternal (Qadfmf or among the
negative attributes, the One (Wahid), the Rich (Ghaniy) and the Holy (Quddus).
These attributes of essence, affirmed al-Razi, are not the essence itself, neither
are they part within the quiddity of the essence (juz Un dakhilun fimahiyyat ai
dhat) but they are external to the essence. They are further divided into three:
either real (haqfqiyyah), relational (idafiyyah) or negative (salbiyyah). The real
attributes refer to attributes exist in the real sense apart from the essence such as* * *
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 36. In kalam, sifab wajibab are also known as sifab tbub utiyyab while sifab mumtani ah
are called sifab salbiyyah
85 Ibid.
87
existence. While the relational attributes signify those attributes that are re arded
CfQ
as pure relations, such as the condition of a thing in the left or right. In this case
the essence of the thing does not change but only the relation.86 87
This
88 kind of
attributes in relation to God, are infinite in number. 7 The ne ative attributes
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(sifat al-salbiyyah) refer to the qualities which are impossible to be ascribed to
God such as He being a body or an atom (jawbar), contingent or originated. Also
included in this class are the attributes that cannot be said of all other existents
such as being Holy (Quddus), Flawless (Salam), Self-sufficient (Gbaniyy), and
Unique (Wahid). These attributes will be dealt with in depth in the next chapter.
Regarding the attributes that subsist in the essence (sifat ma hawiyyab),
they allude to the realities/ideas (ma an) that subsist in the essence such as when
we say God is Knowing (‘Alim), Powerful (Qadir) and Living (Hayy).ss Al-Razi
did not seem to distinguish between sifat ma ‘ani and sifat ma hawiyyab, the
former being the cause and the latter being the effect or implication of the
ma ani as conceived by some Ash'arite mutakallimun after him.89 He,
86 Arba Tn, 120.

87Fakbr al-Din al-Razi, 226. Examples of these attributes are the object of worship (ma bud) and
object of gratitude (masbkur).
88 Ibid.
89 The Asharites who came later than al-Razi such as al-Sanusi further divided the sifat
ma hawiyyab into another class namely sifat ma ani referring in particular to the realities/ideas
that subsist in the essence. See Ibrahim al-Bayjuri, Hasbiyab alaMatn al-Sanusiyyab (Bangkok:
Maktabah Muhammad al-Nahdi, 1812), 24. Hence, while the attributes of ma hawiyyab are more
regarded as the effect of the divine essence having these ideas (ma an) that subsist in it, sifat al
ma ani describe the very realities from which of ma hawiyyab being implied. Seven ma ani which
are considered as fundamental are Power (Qudrab), Knowledge (Ilm), Will (Iradab), Life (Hayy),
Hearing (Sam), Seeing (Basar) and Speech (Kalam). The attribute of Power is affirmed through
the contingency (imkan) of the world and it’s coming into existence from non-existence. If, on
the other hand, the world is necessary, it cannot be related to the Power of God. The attribute of
Knowledge is known through the nature of His creation being wisely implemented (muhkimab)
and refined (mutqinab) such as the human body. While His attribute of Will is affirmed through
the proof that some of His creation is prior to others, although it is possible that the contrary is
the case. This priority and posteriority, in turn, needs a determiner (mukbassiss) who has a will.
The fact that God has Knowledge and Power proves that He has the attribute of Life. While the
attributes of Hearing and Seeing are proven by the fact that both of them are His attributes of
perfection (sifat al-kamal) without which He will be ascribed as deaf and blind, which are
88
nevertheless, affirmed the existence of these ma ani subsisting in the essence as
apparent in his contention with the Mu tazilah we have alluded before. Some
mutakallimun identified these attributes with the notion of modes (ahwal), an
ontological status between existents (mawjud) and non-existents (madum).
Explaining somehow the similar reason as those mutakallimun who affirmed the
sifat, these affirmers of ahwal maintained that the causes that resulted the
existence of these ahwal are the ma ahi subsist in the essence.*90
With respect to the attributes of action, they signify the process of

issuance of an effect from the divine power (sudur athar min qudrat Allah).91 92
Hence, the meaning of Creator (al-Khaliq) is none other than the coming into
existence of a creation through God’s power, while the meaning of Sustainer (al-
Raziq) is the arrival of the sustenance (rizq) to the human being through His
power. 92
With regard to those attributes which are derived from the divine names,
al-Razi presents a more comprehensive classification by dividing the attributes
into seven categories:
i) Purely real attributes, such as Existence (Mawjud) and Life

(Wy)-
ii) Purely relational attributes, such as an Object of worship (Ma bud)
and Object of gratitude (Mashkur).
iii) Negative attributes that are exclusively His, such as Self-sufficient
(Ghaniyy) and Unique (Wahid )
iv) Real as well as relative, such as Knowing (Alim) and Powerful
(Qadir).
v) Real as well as negative, such as Eternal (Qadhn) and Pre-eternal
(Azali).
vi) Relative as well as negative, such as the First and the Last.
impossible for Him. The same case applies to the attribute of Speech, since the opposite of it is
mute which is an imperfection Th A: hr al-Dm al-Razi, 82-83.
90 Law ami e, 44.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
89
vii) Real, relative as well as negative, such as Absolute Sovereignty
(Mutt)93
Another division of divine attributes is those which are called al-sifat al-
kbabariyyab (attributes known through their direct citation in the Qur’an and
Hadiths), mostly referring to the anthropomorphic attributes. These attributes
are further classified into the attributes of essence (dbatiyyab) which refer to
attributes such as eyes, hands, face, legs, fingers and thighs; and attributes of
action (filiyyah), indicating God’s acts such as sitting (istiwa9), ascending (nuzul)
and coming (majf)94 Al-Razi maintained that these anthropomorphic attributes
do not imply their literal meaning hence they must be interpreted to other deeper
meanings congenial to the principle of divine transcendence. To hold to these
anthropomorphic qualities in their literal, superficial meaning would definitely
lead to attributing a body (/ism) to the divine essence, which is tantamount to
polytheism and unbelief. He offered comprehensive way of making an
allegorical interpretation (tawil) of these qualities in his special book Asas al-
Taqdfs which will be the main concern of the following two chapters.
DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AS REFLECTED IN AL-RAZI’S

CLASSIFICATION OF THE ATTRIBUTES
Divine transcendence received special attention in al-Razi’s classification of
attributes. This is mainly due to two basic reasons. First, which is more internal,
is the continual stress of the Qur’an on the fact that God is unique and does not
Al-Razi maintained that the verses stressing the differences of

resemble others.95 96
God in the Qur’an are verses with clear and established meanings (muhkamat)?6
Hence, any other descriptions of God including those verses with obvious
93 Law ami 41-42. Cf. Al-Ghazali’s classification of attributes based on divine names in his
Maqsad al-Asna, 59-162.
94 Jabir Zayd al-Samiri, al-Sifat al-Khabariyyab bayna al-Mutbabbitm wa al-Mu’awwilfn
(Khartoum: Dar al-Sudani li al-Kutub, 1995), 56.
95 See Chapter One, 23-24.
96 Asas, 30.
90
meanings should not contradict this already clear principle. God must be purified
from any description, which will shatter His divine transcendence, hence any
kind of resemblance between God and the creations is not to be compromised.
Refuting the views of some groups among the theologians who held that the
essence of God, insofar as it is an essence, is similar with other essences, and that
the only difference is in some specific attributes (such as Necessary Existence,
Absolute Power and Knowledge), al-Razi insisted that the difference between
God and the creations is in re ard to the essence, not to the attributes, essential
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not accidental.97 He argued that if God is similar with other than He with regard
to the essence, then what is applicable to other things will also be applicable to
God, which is impossible.98
The second reason for al-Razi’s emphasis on divine transcendence is the
views of some heretical sects within the community of Muslims who propounded
the anthropomorphic idea of God, as well as to the idea of incarnation of the
Christians. Among the heretical sects are the Karr dmiyyah who held that God is
body and the Hanabilab who insisted on the literal meanings of the
anthropomorphic verses, the implication of which also led to the position of
tajsim. Others were the false Sufis who viewed that there is a union (ittihad)
between God and His creations. As for the Christians, they held that God was
incarnated in the body of Jesus. Responding to these sects, there were several
important affirmations put forward by al-Razi in emphasizing the divine
transcendence which also became the basic characteristic in describing the
attributes of God: that God is not a body (laysa bi jisrn), that He is exalted from
being situated in a place, direction (jihah) and space (al-hayyiz), that the
attributes are eternal and do not receive changes, that God is free from colours
97 Arba m, 96. Among those who hold to this view is Abu Hashim, the early Mu tazilab who
views that there are four attributes which make God different from other than Him: Existentness
(al-Mawjudiyyab), Knowingness (al-'Alimiyyab'), Powerfulness (al-Qadiriyyaby Livingness (al-
Hayyiyah). Ibid.
98 Ibid., 98.
91
(cdwari), odours (rawî'A) and tastes (/u rim), that He is free from sensual delight
(al-lazzab) and suffering (al-alam). These are basically responses to the
Karramiyyah who, in their description of God, ascribed these qualities to Him.
Against the false Sufis who held the principle of ittihad, al-Razi affirmed that
God cannot be united with other beings." If it were so, there would be logical
confusion as to the status of the two after the union. If the two still prevail after
the union, it cannot be said to be a union in the real sense. While if both do not
prevail, there will be a non-existence (udnm).99
100 As for the Christians, al-Razi
refuted that God is not a substance (jawhar) and that He cannot incarnate in
something either through His essence or His attributes.101
In what follows, we will deliberate on al-Razl’s views concerning divine
transcendence which mainly take place within his discussion on the negative
attributes. Al-Razi viewed divine transcendence as a foundation for the
discussion of the divine attributes as a whole in the sense that before asserting
that God has the attributes of perfection such as Knowledge and Power, it must
be affirmed that He is beyond any possibility of having any similarities with any
other being. Among the negative attributes in which divine transcendence is
distinctly discernable are Unicity (wahdaniyyah), Eternity (qidam), Permanence
(baqa9), Self-subsistent (qiyamuhu binafsihi), He is different from all other
realities (mukbalafah li sa’ir al-haqa’iqy In explaining further these transcendent
aspects of the attributes, we will therefore treat these attributes individually.
99 Al-Razi differentiated between the false and the true Sufis. In al-Masall, he remarked that
there were some groups of Sufis who claimed the love of God and held the idea of union with God
(ittihad). They quoted the passage from Abu Yazid al-Bistami which says, “Praise be to me,
How great am I” (sub han f mazamu sba’ni), and from al-Hallaj “I am the Truth” (ana al-Haq).
These false Sufis misconstrued the interpretation of the saying of Abu Yazid and al-Hallaj who
do not mean to imply the idea of union with God. “Abu Yazid,” qualified al-Razi, “was an arif
billah whose noble character is far from being associated with the school that holds to the idea of
union and incarnation (ittihad wa huld)”. Mas all, 41-42.
100 Ibid., 42.
101 Masall, 33-44.
92
Unicity (Wa hdaniyyan)
Wahdaniyyah conveys two basic meanings: the denial of partners and equals
As to
with regard to God, and the denial of multiplicity in the divine essence.102 103
the first meaning, the Qur’an stresses repeatedly that God is One, such as in the
verse, “and your God is the One God” (wa ilahukum ilahun wahid).1Q3 The
Qur’an repeats 13 times the phrase that affirms Allah as the One God (ilahun
wahid) while it is mentioned 29 times that there is no God other than He (la ilaha
ilia huwa). All these phrases often expressed in refutation of the polytheist
(mushrikun), the Christians, the Jews and the Dualist (the ancient Persians who
Unicity not only means that God is One but also He is

believed in two gods).104 105
transcendent and it is evident through the historical context of the revelation of

the famous verses of Surah al-IkhlasiQ5 in which the Prophet is commanded to
reply affirmatively to a group of Christians who inquire about the description of
his God that He is One (Allahu a had). When they replied that “you are one and
your God is [also] one,” the Prophet answered, “There is nothing like unto Him”
(laysa ka mithlihf shay106 In regard to the second meaning, the multiplicity of
the divine essence will imply composition in the divine nature which is a
characteristic of a possible being.
The Qur’an uses both ahad and whtid in describing God. Scholars differ
on whether both terms convey the same meanin As for those who view that
both terms are dissimilar, al-Razi mentioned three differences between them.
First, the meaning of wahid is more specific in the sense that its meanin is
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102 Fakbr al-Dfn al-Razi, 234.

104 EI2, vol. 10, 389.
105 According to al-Razi, this chapter concerns the knowledge of ‘the essence of God’. It is called
al-Ikblas (purity) because it contains purely the exposition of the negative attributes which are
the attributes to purify the belief in the essence of God (sifat al-jalal). This surab is also referred
to by others by names such as al-tawhid, al-tafrid, al-tojrid, al-najat, al-ma rifab, al-bara’ab.
Tafsir, vol. 11, 357.
106 There were also some other different reports, according to al-Razi, which said that it was the
polytheists, or the Jews, who had asked the Prophet about his God. Ibid., vol.11, 357.
93
included in the term a had. and not vice versa. Secondly, the term a had is more
emphatic in the sense that if we say, “no one can resist that person” (fulan la
yuqawimuhu ahad), it definitely excludes anyone. Thirdly, wahid is used in the

affirmative form while ahad is used in the negative.107 While these differences
may be applicable in the purely linguistic domain, it may not be applicable in
terms of their occurrences in the Qur’an. For the term ahad, which is said to be
used only in the negative form, appears in the positive form in Surah al-Ikhlas
(Qul huwa Allah ahad). Further, there is certainly an exclusive affirmation of
uniqueness of God in the term wahid—similar to the term ahad—referring to
God in many places in the Qur’an such as the verse “Say, ‘But in truth He is the
One God (ilahun wahid) and I truly am innocent of joining other with Him,”’108 109
and in the well-known ay at al-kursf, “and your God is One God” (wa ilahukum
ilahurt wahid).1 Therefore, we are inclined to the view that the terms ahad and
yra hid in terms of their explication of the divinity in the Qur’an, convey the
same meaning and regard the differences emphasized by al-Razi as more
linguistic in nature.
Described as a union (mojami) of all the negative attributes, the term
ahad, vis-a-vis the name Allah which is the union of the positive attributes,
according to al-Razi, encompasses the denial of all the qualities improper for God
such as being composite, occupying space, divisible, and subsisting in a
substratum:
As to the congregation of the negative attributes, it is the Oneness

of God (al-ahadiyyah). This is because the meaning of ahadiyyah
is the condition of a reality, in itself, which is free from any kind
of composition. For, every composed essence is in need of each of
its parts, and its parts are in need of each other...and that which is
in need of the others is possible in itself (mumkin li dhatihf) ... the
deity which is the creator (mabda*) of all the creations cannot be
107 Ibid., vol. 11, 359.

108 Al-Qur’an, al-An am 6:19.
109 Al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah, 2:163.
94
possible...when Oneness is affirmed, [it follows that] it is necessary
for Him not to occupy space (mutahayyiz) because for every thing
that occupies space, its right side is different from its left side, and
everything with this quality is divisible (munqasam), and the One
is impossible to be divisible...110
Apart from scriptural proofs, al-Razi advanced some other strong
philosophical arguments asserting the unicity of God.111 The basis of all these
arguments is that partnership in divinity implies imperfection and weakness
whereas Oneness signifies perfection. The oft-quoted amon them is the
CfQ
argument of the Asha Irak which is called the argument of reciprocal hindrance
(dalil al-tamdnu ci) and ar ument of successive occurrence (dalil tawarudf). The
CfQ
former refers to the fact that the multiplicity of gods will lead to contradictions
and disagreement between them and the latter proves the redundancy of their
actions if they agree on something.112 Both of these arguments are explained
through the following example: If there are two gods and both of them wish to
move a body, either one of the following three possibilities will happen: (i) that
both of them will move the body; (ii) both of them will not move the body; (iii)
or one of them will move it without another. The first is impossible because
since each of them can initiate the move, the movement by both of them will
negate this individual necessity. It also implies that both of them are in need of
each other, which is a sign of weakness in both of them. Furthermore, it is
impossible, as far as Necessary Existence (Wajib al-Wujud) is concerned, for one
J Tafsir, vol. 11, 361.

111 The knowledge of divinity, according to al-Razi, is divided into three: First, that which cannot
be attained by report (al-sam ) namely, those which the truth of the reports themselves are based
on them such as the knowledge of the essence of God, His Knowledge, Power and the truth of
miracle. These can only be attained by reason. Second, knowledge which cannot be reached
unless through reports and only their possibility can be affirmed by reason. Third, knowledge
that can be reached by both reports and reason. Included in this division is the knowledge of the
Oneness of God. Tafsir , vol. 11, 359.
112 Ma alim, 58. Dalil al-tamanu T has its Quranic basis that is the verse which says, “If there
were in the two of them [the heaven and the earth] gods other than Allah, these two would be
corrupted.” (Al-Quran, al-Anbiya’ 21:22)
95
effect to proceed from two causes (ijtimac al-mu’athtbiray n ala athar wahid).
Both gods also cannot move the body successively since this is an act of
redundancy (tahsil al-hasil). The second is obviously impossible since it shows
the weaknesses of both of them. If in the case where one of them wants to move
the body while the second does not, it is also impossible to assume that both
wishes are not accomplished, since that which prevents the wish of one god is, in
turn, the accomplishment of another s wish. In this case, if one od cannot move
CfQ
the body, it means that the wish of the other is accomplished. The third is
absurd because it proves that the second god is unable to move the body despite
the fact that He, like the first one, also has the same ability. 113
In another argument, al-Razi disproved the possibility of multiple gods
having identical attributes by asserting that if two gods share virtually the same
characteristics there will be no meaning to multiplicity. While if they only share
some of the characteristics such as their necessity (wujub) but differ in others,
this will imply that there is composition in God. Here, it shows that there are at
least two parts and this will logically lead to an infinity since every part can be
further divided due to the fact that there will always be the part which is similar,
namely necessity (al-wujub), and the other which is its particularity (al-
kbususiyyab) and individuation (ta ayyuri).113
114 This logical argument is called the
argument of equivocation and distinction (dalil al-ishtirah wa al-imtiy az).
Al-Razi also put forward another argument based on the logical principle
in denying multiplicity in the Necessary Being. If God were multiple, the
difference between them is either through their essences (bi al-dhatiyyat) or not
through their essences. If the former is the case, the Necessary Being will then
be genus under which there are species. This would imply that there are
113 MuAissal, 194; Arba m, 222; Matalib, vol.2, 135-136; Ma alim, 58; Mas all, 58; Sharh alAqald,
37-38; al-Bajuri, Shark Jawbarat, Y22-Y22; Fakbr al-Dih, 236.
114 Ma alim, 57-9; Arba m, 222; Mabahitb, vol.2, 474; Matalib, vol. 2, 119-20; Fakbr al-Dfn al-
Razi, 234-238.
96
differentia which distinguish all species. Since the differentia is the cause (al-
illab) of existence of the species under a genus, there would be double existence
(mawj udan marratayn) apart from the first necessary existence.115 Furthermore,
the second existence will imply that the existence of the Necessary Being is
dependent on the differentia:
the necessity of the existence by its essence (wujub al-wujud bi

al-dbat) in its very meaning is that the non-existence of others will
not necessitate its non-existence. But with regard to it being
constituted by a differentia, the non-existence of the differentia
will necessitate its non-existence. It is therefore [in this case like]
one which is not related to others and [at the same time] related to
others, which is absurd.116 117 118
On the other hand, if they are not different through their essences they
will be the species constituted by the individuals (al-ashkhas). This too is
impossible since it would be in need of a differentia in order to be distinguished
from the other individuals in the species. In this regard, the existence of
Necessary Being is necessitated not by itself but by others (wajib ligbayrihf).
The idea of composition in divine essence seems to be strong
philosophical point in refuting the idea of multiple gods. This is based on the
premise that every composition is contingent, hence is antithetical to the very
nature of the Necessary Existence. Therefore, while the first meaning of
wahdaniyyab denies partners to God and partnership implies contradictories, the
second meaning constitutes the denial of any composition in God’s essence. “It is
uncharacteristic of the Necessary Being,” asserted al-Razi, “to have parts that are
perceivable (hissiyyah), such as the body, or rationally deduced (aqliyyah) such
as the partition of bayula and forms (surah).99 * The argument is that if God is a
composite, He is in need of His parts and the parts, in turn, are also in need of
115 Mabahitb, vol.2, 474; Matalib, vol.2, 122.

116 Mabahitb, vol.2, 474; Matalib, vol.2, 121-123.
117 Matalib, vol.2, 122-123.
118 Mababith, vol.2, p. 477.
97
the other parts. Since every composite thing is possible (mumkinf it cannot be
the quality of a Necessary Being. On the counter attack by the Mu tazilah
regarding the position of the Ashairah on the composition of essence and
attributes, al-Razi made it clear that in this case, there is no multiplicity involved
since the essence is one and necessary in itself. What is other than the essence is
possible. The unicity remains despite the existence of the attributes.119
Eternity (Qidam)
Qidam, as understood by the mutakallimun, means without beginning.120 Hence,
when God is said as eternal, it means that He exists at each moment without any
point of beginning. Eternity can also be understood as “timeless” in the sense

that God exists beyond time.121 The most popular argument for the eternity of
God by the mutakallimun is the proof that is based on the notion of origination
(al-buduth). They argue that if God is not eternal, there will be an infinite regress
since originated things will continually need an originator ad infinitum.122 Al-
Baghdadi recapitulates the mutakallimun argument:
If the creator [of the world] is originated, He would be in need of

an originator. If His originator is also originated, there will be
need for a third originator, and this will continue until no end,
which is impossible. What leads to the impossible is itself
impossible. It follows definitely from this impossibility the
necessity of God being eternal.123
Al-Razi, nevertheless, disagreed with this argument. It can be refuted, for
example, by an argument that says that it is possible that the originator of the
world is also originated but the originator, on the other hand, was created by
119 Fakhr al-Dih al-Razi, 234.

120 Mu Vassal, p. 82.
121 Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9.
niArba m, 92.
123 Al-Baghdadi, Usui al-Dm, 72; Irshad, 20.
98
something eternal.124 In this case there will be no infinite regress. By this
counter-argument, al-Razi was referring to the philosophers’ idea of emanation
which views that the world is emanated from the Active Intellect (al-Aql al-
Fa (aT)125 which, in turn, was caused by another intellect up until the First
Intellect (al-Aql al-Awwal) which was emanated from God.
Realizing this difficulty of the mutakallimun who ar ued on the basis of
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eternity and origination (qidam wa buduth), al-Razi, on the other hand, looked at
the issue from the perspective of necessity and contingency (wujub wa imkarT).
Since God is necessary, He must be eternal, for the opposite would mean that His
existence is dependent on others and He will be receptive of non-existence.
Having the possibility of receiving non-existence is the quality of a contingent
being and this is contrary to God’s necessary existence. Therefore, it is affirmed

that God is eternal and subsisting.126 127This argument reminds us of his other
view that the proof of God’s existence is the contingency of the world, not its
origination. This is because for al-Razi, contingency is prior to origination in
terms of the explanation of the process of creation since it is the receptive cause
of the need (illat al-hdjah) of a creator. In other words, the need for a creator in
the contingent beings lies not in it being originated but in its potentiality to exist.
Thus, origination comes after the influence of the determinant which is
subsequent to the attraction of this influence by the receptive cause, which refers
to contingency.128 Al-Razi, in this case, was consistent in emphasizing the
124 Arba m, 92.

125 Also known as Agent Intellect.
126 Fakbr al-Dm, 290.
127 Arba m, 68. Al-Razi defined contingency as ‘that whose existence or non- existence is not
impossible (kawn al-sbay’ff nafsihibi hayth la yamtanicwujuduhu wa la adamuhu imtinacan
wajiban) and origination as ‘an existent which is preceded by non-existence’ (kawn al-wujud
masb uqan bi al-adarri). Ibid.
128 Arba m, 68; Theology, 83.
99
philosophers’ notion of contingency vis-a-vis the mutakallimuris notion of
origination in theological discussion.1
According to Cevian, the idea of eternity with re ard to God is so superior
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and self-evident that it no longer became a matter of disagreement among the
130 It is supported by the fact that all the divine attributes also
mutakallimun..129
share the unique quality of eternity. The only dispute was whether eternity was
re arded as a positive attributes (sifah ijabiyyah) existing additional to the

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essence, or as a necessary concomitant to the essence. Al-Asn ari and some of
his immediate followers regarded eternity as one of the positive qualities.131 Al-
Razi, nevertheless, following other mutakallimun, insisted that eternity was not
an attribute additional to the essence. He put forward two arguments in
supporting this position. First, if eternity is to be viewed independent from the
essence, then the Necessary Being will be in need of it for His perfection which is
contrary to the principle of the self-sufficiency of the Necessary Being. Thus,
eternity is an inherent quality in the very being of Wajib al-Wuj ud. Second, if
the Necessary Being is eternal due to an attribute which is separable, then this
independent quality of eternity would itself have to be dependent on another
eternity which again, by necessity, would be either self-sufficient or dependent.
If the first is the case, it would have to be identical with the Necessary Being,
which is a fallacy. While if the second is true, it would imply infinite regression
(tasalsul) or circular causation (dnvvr), both of which are absurd.132 This second
argument echoes the argument of al-Ghazali in Iqtisad. which points out the
implication of infinite regression if eternity is conceived of as an additional

quality to the divine essence.133
129 Theology, 100.

130 Ibid., 103.
131 Ibid., 101.
132 Ibid, 102
133 Al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad, 26. According to Ceylan, the reason why the theologians rejected
eternity as an independent attributes is that they wanted to stress that eternity must not be
100
Al-Razi viewed that eternity is a negative attribute. He refuted the
Mu tazilab who claimed the opposite on the basis that qidam is denial of a prior
non-existence of something, and to deny denial was for them positive
attribution. Following that, they argued that eternity cannot subsist on the
essence which is also eternal since it will lead to infinite regression (tasalsul).134
Al-Razi disagreed with the above view through the logical argument that eternity
is the denial of the fact that something is preceded by non-existence, and to say
that something is preceded by a non-existence is a positive statement. To deny
positive statement is to affirm the negative.135
Baq a (Permanence)
Al-Razi’s proof of the Attribute of permanence (baqa9) is closely related to the
proof of eternity (qidam) since the former is the denial of non-existence after
existence while the latter is the denial of non-existence before existence. Hence,
according to al-Razi, the proof for qidam is also the proof for baqa’.
As we have seen in the arguments for the eternity of God, the arguments
on divine permanence also centered on the fact that God is a Necessary Being,
whose very quality is in need of an endurance as its prerequisite. Similarly, the
notion of Necessary Existence in itself, must mean that it is, in the first place,
not receptive of non-existence. That which does not receive non-existence, must
be subsisting (abadf).136
Al-Razi disagreed with the Asbairab who were of the view that
permanence is an attribute that exists additional to its existence (zaldatan ala
wujudihf) which means that God subsists through the attributes of permanence
considered as a secondary property of God like other divine attributes. That is why eternity was
not the point of dispute between the mutakallimun and the philosophers. Theology , 102.
134 Arba Tn, 158; Matalib, vol. 3, 229.
135 Arba Tn, 164.
136 Al-Razi, MasaTl, 28.
101
(baqa9). To al-Razi, since God is an existent necessary in Himself (wajib al-
wuj ud), He cannot exist through something external to Himself. Since
permanence is closely related to His existence, God cannot subsist through baqa9
which is external to the essence. Furthermore, if God subsists through the
attribute of permanence, this would imply that the latter is itself necessary
existence in itself (wajib al-wujud li dbatibf), which is impossible. 138 This is in
line with al-Razi s view that baqa is a ne ative attribute which does not have
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real existence.
The notion of independent existence of baqa’ will lead to either infinite
regression (tasalsul) or circularity (dawr). If permanence subsists through
another attribute of permanence, it will lead to tasalsul, since this permanence
will further need another permanence. If, on the other hand, it subsists by the
essence, it will lead to circularity since the essence also depends on it. If it
subsists by itself, then it will be necessary existence by itself and the essence on
the other hand will be necessary through it, which is impossible.139

137 138
God’s Being Distinct from Originated Things (Mukhalafatuhu li al-

Hawaditb)
This topic will be dealt with in a more detailed manner in the next chapter,
particularly when we discuss al-Razi’s Kitab Asas al-Taqdfs. Nevertheless, to
put it briefly, for al-Razi, the distinction between God and other possible beings
is by their essence, not through an attribute, which is additional to the essence.140
By this, al-Razi was trying to put an absolute difference between God and others,
following the spirit of the Qur’anic verse which strongly affirms that, “There is
nothing like unto Him.” Any kind of essential similarity ascribed between God
and others would definitely impair the divine transcendence. Hence the
137 Samih Daghim, Maws uat Mustalahat Ilm al-Kalam al-Islami, vol.l, 283-284; Muhassal, 174.
138 Ma alim, 51. Muhassal, 174. This view is also the view of al-Baqillam and al-Juwayni with
which, al-Razi is in agreement.
139 Fakhr al-Dih al-Razi, '292.
140 Ma talib, vol.l, 313; Muhassal, 154.
102
difference must be essential and not accidental. If the difference is accidental,
there will be similarity between the essence of God and others, and this will lead
to the condition that the contingent does not need any cause, which is
impossible.141 This view is in disagreement with many other views. The
majority of the mutakallimun, said al-Razi, were of the view that the difference
between the essence of God and other contingent being was due to the attributes
possessed by the essence.142 The Mu tazilah and the philosophers had something
in common on this issue. The former, through the view of Abu Hashim in
particular, viewed that the essence of God is similar to other essences in their
essential nature. They only differ in terms of states (A#Z).143 While the latter
whose view can be seen in Ibn Sina’s writings, asserted that the essence of God is
identical with His existence. Existence is something that is shared by all existent
beings. The difference between them is that God’s existence is not accidental to
the essence while other existents are.144 Al-Razi, in this case, tried to emphasize
the absolute transcendence of God through the denial of essential similarity
between God and others. Following from this strict position, he also attacked the
position of the anthropomorphists, particularly the mujassimab, who viewed that
God is similar to other creations in terms of body but they are different in terms
of other attributes, just like a man and a horse are similar in terms of animality
but different in terms of other attributes.145 This is, to al-Razi, impossible due to
the fact that there are other necessary characteristics of the body such as
occupying place (mutaJyayyizab), finite (mutanahiyah) and composite
(murakkabY all of which are ainst the nature of eternal God.
141 Muhassal, 154.

142 Arba m, 96.
143 Ibid., 154. The states, according to Abu Hashim, are four: Life (al-Hayyab), Knowingness (al-
Alimiyyahy Existentness (al-Mawjudiyyah) and His being powerful (al-Qadiriyyah).
144 Ibid., 154.
145 Asas, 35.
103
CHAPTER THREE
TEXTUAL AND RATIONAL BASIS OF THE DIVINE

TRANSCENDENCE
INTRODUCTION
From the discussion in the last chapter concerning the divine attributes in general,
and the negative attributes (sifat salbiyyab) in particular, it becomes clear that the
transcendence aspect of God is undoubtedly an essential part in arrivin at the
CfQ
knowledge of God. This is due, inter alia, to the fact that the transcendence
aspect of God serves as the foundation of other attributes. As we have observed
and will continually encounter in al-Razi’s theological thought, the arguments for
the divine transcendence have been further strengthened and refined through the
responses given by the mutakallimun to the challenges from various external
factors including from those heretical groups which have undermined the
foundation of the divine transcendence. In al-Razi’s case, his confrontations with
the anthropomorphists such as the Karramiyyah and a segment of the Hanabilah
forced him to put forward a more refined and forceful philosophical argument as a
result of which, a stronger foundation of the divine transcendence in his kalam
works was established. Having stated that, it is our purpose in this chapter to
elaborate further on al-Razi’s proofs in establishing a stronger foundation of the
divine transcendence. We will examine al-Razi’s arguments, rational and textual,
that, in principle, attack two of the most important premises which underlie the
views of the anthropomorphists regarding God: first, that God is a body (/ism) or a
substance (jaw bar) and second, that God occupies space (mutahayyiz}. Our
approach is to first present the argument of the anthropomorphists and then
followed by al-Razi’s refutations.
104
KITAB ASAS AL-TAQDIS
Before we proceed, it is important to introduce the main reference we were using
in elaborating most of al-Razi’s arguments against anthropomorphism, namely, his
Kitab Asas al-Taqdfs (Book on the Basis of the Purification of God). According to
Ahmad Hijazi al-Saqa who edited this work,1 Asas al-Taqdfs, also known as
Ta’sis al-Taqdfs,2 which was dedicated to the ruler of his time, al-Malik Sayf al-
Din al-Ayyubl3 (reigned between 1199-1218), is a rejoinder to the writing of Ibn
Khuzaymah (d.923), tenth century Hanball scholar who wrote Kitab al-
Tawhid wa Itbbat Sfat al-Rabb containing the affirmation of the literal meaning
of the anthropomorphic attributes of God.4 We did not, however, come across any
statement from al-Razi throughout Asas al-Taqdis mentioning Ibn Khuzaymah’s
name, nor the specific objective of refuting Ibn Khuzaymah as claimed by al-Saqa.
Nevertheless, based on al-Razi’s strong comment on Ibn Khuzaymah’s Kitab al-
Tawhid in the work of the former, Tafsfr al-Kabfr, which clearly shows his
intense disagreement with the content of the latter’s work, there is a reason for us
to concur with al-Saqa’s claim. In this tafsfr, while commenting the verse “laysa
ka mitblibi sbay ’ ” (al-Shura, 42:11), al-Razi remarked:
Ibn Khuzaymah has cited argumentations of our predecessors

(ashaburta) regarding this verse (laysa ka mitblibi sbay9) in a book
called “al-Tawhid ” which is in reality a book of polytheism (kitab
al-sbirk).5 *
1 The edition of Asas al-Taqdfs by al-Saqa was published by Dar al-jil (Bayrut, 1993) based on
two manuscripts; first, a copy available at Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyab (23222 B), microfilm no.
20864 and Kurdistan Copy, no. 1328.
2 Fakhr al-Djh al-Razf, 28; Introduction by Ahmad Hijazi al-Saqa in Asas, 8.
3 Ibn Abi Usaybi'ah, Uy un al-Anba’ff Tabaqat al-Atibba’ (Al-Qahirah: Matba'ah al-Wahbiyyah,
1882), 23. In Asas, al-Razi mentioned the name of this ruler namely Abu Bakr bin Ayyub. Asas,
12.
4 This statement is given by al-Saqa in an appendix of his edition of Asas al-Taqdfs, 229. In this
appendix, apart from alluding to the contextual ground of the writing of Asas al-Taqdfs, he also
summarized al-Razi’s position regarding this issue as well as the criticisms made against al-Razi’s
views later by Ibn Taymiyyah. Al-Saqa also included in the appendix, his survey on the issue of
al-haqfqab wa al-majaz regarding God’s attributes in the Taural.
5 Tafsir, vol. 9, 582. This view of Ibn Khuzaymah is based on the Hadith which says that “God’s
face is veiled by a light which whenever it is unveiled, the face of God will bum everything that is
105
Al-Razi continued to explain what he meant by the above
statement:
...for he is a man of confused words, lacking in understanding (qalfl

al-fabm) and deficient in intellect (naqis al-aql). He says, ‘we
affirm that God has face and...at the face our Lord is light,
brightness (dya9*) *and
6 7beauty
8 (baba") that if its veil is uncovered, His
face will burn everything that his sight (basarubu) beholds. The
face of our Lord is denied of destruction and annihilation (al-balak
wa al-fana’y.An another chapter he says that the Qur’an indicates
that there is similarity between the essence of God and His creatures
in many attributes...6
In this work, Ibn Khuzaymah, following some of the Hanabilab, defended
the position of what he re arded as “the right way to comprehend the

CfQ
anthropomorphic expressions of God.” Affirming that God has limbs-a face,
eyes, hands that are both right, and that God is sitting on a Throne that is situated
above the seven heavens, Ibn Khuzaymah maintained that this is the right
position in arriving at the meaning of the anthropomorphic expressions. This
knowledge, added Ibn Khuzaymah, is known through the Book of God and what
is transmitted from the Prophet based on true and established chain of authorities
(al-asanfd al-tbabitab al-sahihab). In one of his sayings quoted in the
introduction of Kitab al-Tawhfd, he went to the extent of charging those who do
not comply with this position, namely, to affirm that God is sitting on His
Throne, and that He is sitting above the seven heavens (is taw a fawqa sab a
samawat), with being unbelievers and as such that they could be killed and their
property confiscated.9 With regard to the anthropomorphic verses, Ibn
seen by His sight” (la’ahraqat sabahat wajhibi kullu shay ’ adrakabu basarubu). Ibn Khuzaymah,
Kitab al-Tawhfd, 19.
6 TafsT, vol. 9, 582.
7 Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawhfd, (dhal).
8 Ibid, 21.
9 Ibid. This saying is narrated by al-Hakim from Muhammad bin Salih bin Hani’ who heard it
from Ibn Khuzaymah.
106
Khuzaymah held firmly to the principle also held by most of the Hanabilah, that
we have to affirm what God has affirmed regarding Himself without drawing any
resemblance between the divine characteristics and any of His creatures.10
Apparently, the reason why al-Razi did not specify Ibn Khuzaymah’s name
in Asas is that al-Razi regarded the latter as representing a larger group namely
segment of the Hanabilah whose literal approach and ideas regarding God are
excessive. 11 In few places in this book, before putting forward certain
arguments, al-Razi spelled out that it is to the Hanabilah that the said arguments
12 In general, al-Razi described the Hanabilah as those who

were directed.11
maintain that God possesses organs and limbs and therefore affirm parts and
divisions with regard to God (itarafubi kawnihi murakkaban min al-ajza’wa al-
ab ad).13
Apart from Hanabilah, another group that al-Razi explicitly mentioned in
Asas as his object of refutation is the Karramiyyah, a group that flourished in the
central and eastern part of the Islamic world from the ninth century until the
invasion of the Moghul.14 Compared to other sects, the Karramiyyah were quite
significant in the historical context of al-Razi’s theology mainly due to his
continuous polemic with this group. He even had a bitter experience with them
when his debate with a popular Karramiyyah figure, Majid al-Din 'Abd al-Majid
better known as Ibn Qudwah15 in the Ghurid capital, Firuzkuh on the year 1198
was reported to have caused a popular uprising among the Karramiyyah thus
forcing al-Razi to return to his hometown.16 Even his death was said to be caused
11 See our elaboration of the Hanabilah in Chapter One, 48-51.

n Asas, 19-20, 58.
13 Ibid, 20, 58.
14 See Chapter One, 32, fn. 48.
15 Ibn Qudwah was the leader of Karramiyyah after the death Ibn Haysam. He was the
contemporary of al-Razi and received support from some courtiers of Sultan Shihab al-DIn al-
Ghuri.
16 Theology, 3.
107
by him being poisoned by this group. 7 As a result of this long debate with this
sect, we thus find in al-Razi’s theological works, many ar uments of the
CfQ
Karramiyyah elaborated and refuted, as clearly exemplified in the As as al-Taqdfs.
Likewise, it is through al-Razi’s works also that the views of the Karramiyyah got
to be known by later scholars. As to the basic ideas of the Karramiyyah, al-Razl
explained that although they maintain that God is One, Infinite and Simple, they
specified God in a direction, which implies that He can be pointed by the senses
(mash ar ilayhi bi hasab al- hiss'):
...they [the Karramiyyah] are not saying about the organs and limbs
(al-a da’wa al-jawarfh) [like the Hartabilah] but they view that God
is specified (mukhtass) by those under the Throne. This sect also
assumes (yahtamilu) three directions regarding God; either God is
engaged to the Throne, or that God is distinct from it by an infinite
farness (bud), or God is distinct from it with a finite farness. Each
of these views is held by three different groups within the
Karramiyyah. They also disagree on whether God is specified by
these directions through His essence or through an eternal agent
(ma ha qadfm)...
Apart from refuting these two groups, another central concern of Asas al-
Taqdfs is to explain the proper way to comprehend the meaning of the
anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions in order to
maintain the transcendence and purity of the divine essence from any corporeal
and anthropomorphic qualities. In so doing, al-Razi focused on two important
points: to deny God as a body (jism) and to deny Him as occupying space
(mutahayyiz). This is followed by his explanation on how to understand the
anthropomorphic verses that occur in the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions.
This involves the identification of muhkamat and mutashabihat verses of the
17 Al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-Islam \va Wafayat al-Mashahir wa al-A lam, ed. 'Umar ‘Abd al-Salam
Tadmuri (Bayrut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1997), 215.
18 Asus, 68-69.
108
Qur’an and the proper implementation of ta \vil in understanding the
mutasbabibat.
THE ARRANGEMENT OF KITAB ASAS AL-TAQDS
Al-Razi arranged this work into four main sections. First, proofs that God is
exalted from the characteristic of body (jismiyyab) and occupying space (al-
hayyiz); second, the allegorical interpretations (al-ta^vil) of the ambiguous verses
from the Qur’an and the Hadiths; third, an affirmation of the position of the early
generation (al-salaf) who propounded the authoritative understanding of the
anthropomorphic verses; fourth, additional related issues. In the first section, as
pposed to the anthropomorphists’ view, al-Razi maintained that there is an

o
existent which cannot be grasped by the senses, and that it was not necessary that
all existents should have their equal (nazir) and resemblance (sbabib) in order to
exist. Next, al-Razi put forward numerous textual and rational arguments to
prove the fact that God is beyond body, space and direction. In the second
section, he enumerated all the anthropomorphic attributes that occur in the
Qur’an and Hadiths followed by the proper allegorical interpretations on the
meaning of each of them. In the third section, he advanced the views held by the
early scholars (al-salaf) concerning the issue including their position on the
interpretation of an important verse in Surah Ali 'Imran, verse 7, which mentions
the understanding of two kinds of verses mufkamat and mutasbabibat. Finally,
al-Razi deliberated over some extraneous issues, such as the differences between
the mujassimab and musbabbibab and their status in Islam.
THE IMPORTANCE OF ASAS AL-TAQD1S
The significance of this work lies in the fact that it represents the opinion of later
mutakallimun, especially the Asbairab against the views of the
anthropomorphists. Although there were also other theological works of the same
109
nature during later period, they only deal with the subject as part of the whole
theological works such as al-Shahrastani’s Nibayat al-Iqdam, Baydawi’s Tawali
al-Anwar, al-Baghdadi’s Usui al-Dih and Amidi’s Gbayat al-Maram. Asas al-
Taqdfs, on the other hand, was written with a specific motive, namely, to provide
substantial refutation to the anthropomorphists.
Given the background of al-Razi’s views on attributes, this work is also
seen as that which steers a middle course between ta til (denial of attributes) of
the Mu tazilab and the tasbbib of the musbabbibab. One may argue that al-
Razi’s method in this work is very much similar to the method of the Mu tazilab
especially on the employment of taXvil. Nevertheless, as we will see later, there
are some differences between al-Razi’s method and the method of the Mu tazilab.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Asas al-Taqdis, in terms of its strong
refutation against the anthropomorphists, is, in some way, comparable to al-
Ghazali’s refutation of the philosophers, namely in his Tabafut al-Falasifab. If al-
Ghazali in his Tabafut has destroyed the views and arguments of the philosophers
regarding God and the world, al-Razi in this work has demolished the
anthropomorphists’ foundation by presenting strong rational philosophical and
scriptural arguments against their views. Just as the Tabafut later received strong
reprisal from a great Muslim philosopher, Ibn Rushd through his work Tabafut
al-Tabafut, in the same way, Asas al-Taqdis of al-Razi has been refuted later on
by one of the most important spokesmen of the Hanabilab, Ibn Taymiyyah
through his works Ta’sis fiRadd Asas al-Taqdfs and Muwafaqat Sahih al-
110
Manq ul li Sarih al-Ma q ul.19
RATIONAL PROOFS OF DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE
Having briefly introduced this important work, we will proceed to analyze its
main content commencing with al-Razi’s rational arguments in upholding divine
transcendence. As have been mentioned, al-Razi’s main focus in this work was to
refute the arguments of two of his main adversaries, namely, the Hanabilah and
the Karramiyyah. Although these two groups had some differences in the details
of their doctrines, the similarity between them can be discerned at least in two
important points. First, they began their views with the literal understanding of
the anthropomorphic verses that mention God as having ‘organs and limbs’, and
that God is ‘in’ the heavens, sitting on His Throne. Second, which is the
consequence of the first, is that the views of both sects bear the implication that
God is a body. Specifically, the view of the Hanabilah that God has organs will
lead to the idea that God is composed of parts which is the characteristic of bodies
while the view of the Karramiyyah that God is in a certain direction implies that
God occupies space, which is also the nature of a body. The Karramiyyah, who
were more philosophical in their approach, even asserted explicitly that God is
either a body or a substance (jawhar), and that He is above the earth and that He
19 Ibn Taymiyyah is a well-known Hanbali scholar who upheld Ibn Hanbal’s traditional position
and attacked many of the Ashairah and Mutazilab views. (See our separate discussion on Ibn
Taymiyyah in Chapter Four, 171-174). Regarding the anthropomorphic issue particularly in
response to al-Razi’s ideas in Asas al-Taqdis, he wrote a rejoinder under the title al-Ta’sis fiRadd
Asas al-Taqdis. The content of Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation is also included as volume 24, 25 and
26 of another Ibn Taymiyyah’s work, the al-Kawakib al-Darimi Somewhat similar refutations of
al-Razi’s views are also available in the first volume of Ibn Taymiyyah’s famous work, Muwafaqat
Sahih al-ManqH li Sarih al-Ma qul (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1985), also known as Dar’
Ta arud al- Aql wa al-Naql. One-third of the content of the latter is also available in the margin
of his other Minhaj al-Sunnab al-Nabawiyyab fi Naqd Kalam al-Sbiah wa al-Qadariyyab.
Partial translation of Dar’Ta arud namely on the commentary of Risalah Adhawiyyab of Ibn Sina
is available in Yahya J. Michot, “A Mamluk Theologian’s Commentary on Avicenna’s Risalah
Adhawiyya: Being a Translation of a Part of the Dar’ al-Taarud of Ibn Taymiyya, with
Introduction, Annotation, and Appendices.” Journal of Islamic Studies, 2003, 2 parts. 14 (2): 149-
203 & 14 (3): 309-363.
Ill
was the locus of temporal events.2 Since this notion of body became the
underlying principle of both sects, al-Razi therefore devoted great effort toward
refuting the notion of the body with regard to the Deity.
THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE MUSHABBIHAH’S

NOTION OF GOD
The main rational principle held by the mushabbihah in their effort to justify God
as a substance serves as a background to al-Razi’s arguments on the transcendence
of God. Of the two sects mentioned above, the Karramiyyah were the real
proponents of these rational principles. They expounded their arguments in a
series of logical premises, which they claimed as and must be accepted
necessarily. From these principles, they came to the conclusion that God is a
substance (jawhar) and a body (jism), hence, He is qualified to be ascribed with
one of many directions. The Hanabilah, due to their bila kayf approach and strong
rejection of rational philosophical arguments in theology, satisfied themselves
mainly with a literal meaning of the verses.
The logical principle held by the Karramiyyah which led them to the
view that God is a body (substance) and that God can be specified by one of many
directions was put forward as follows: “For every two existents, one must either
subsist in the other (Jialan fi al-akhar) or be distinct and free from the other in
21 In Asas, al-Razi reproduced the words of Ibn al-Haysam,22
terms of direction.”20
one of the important proponents of the Karramiyyah regarding this
20 Nihayat, 43.
21 Asas, 70.
22 Ibn Haysam (d.1016) was the mutakallimun among the Karramiyyah who elaborated the
groups’ theology and technical vocabulary. He was the founder of the Haysamiyyah, one of the
seven sects of the Karramiyyah. He tried to rectify the anthropomorphic view of Ibn Karram by
saying that what the latter said regarding God as a body actually means that God subsists by itself
(al-Qaim bi nafsibi); Suhayr Mukhtar, al-Tajsfm inda al-Muslimm, 76; Bosworth,
“Karramiyyah,” 668.
112
principle in the latter’s argument against an Ashi ari
<■ i 1
scholar, i 23
Ibn Furak:
There is no doubt that for every two existents in the visible world (fi
al-shabid), it is necessary that one of them is attached to the other
(muhayithan li al-akhaf), or it is distinct from the other (mubayinan
anhu) in terms of direction.23
24
This principle seems to be the most important principle held by the
musbabbibab in proving the bodily nature of God. It also occurs in other
Ash'arites’ works such as in al-Shahrastani’s Nihayat al-Iqdam25 and al-Baydawi’s
Tawali (al-Anwar. Al-Shahrastani presented the principle as follows:
If two self-subsistent objects be supposed, they must either be side

by side or separate and so in local relation to each other. From this,
they argue that God must either be in the world or external to it.
‘Within’ per se necessitates proximity and contact, and ‘without’ per
se necessitates separation and direction.26
While in al-Baydawi’s words:
The intuition of reason observes that of [any] two existent things,

one either must be functioning within the other, as a substance and
its quality, or must be distinctly separated from [the other] in
direction, as are the heavens and the earth. But God, praise be to
Him, is not a substrate for the universe, nor does He inhere within
23 Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn al-Hasan ibn Furak al-Isfahani was born circa 941 in Isfahan and
studied in both Basra and Baghdad. In 982 he was invited to Nishapur by the Emir to teach in a
madrasah specially built for him. His presence in Nishapur is said to have led to a great flowering
of various studies there. He died in 1015 by poisoning reported to be done by the Karramiyyah
after he defeated them in an argument. His main work dealt with the application to God in Hadith
of anthropomorphic characteristics. Similar to al-Razi, he asserted as a general principle that it is
better to interpret these texts in accordance with the conception of God as transcendent, for which
there is a clear basis in revelation, then to do the opposite, by interpreting literally texts which
have not been fully understood, thereby endangering the conception of God’s transcendence. Watt,
Islamic Philosophy, 80-81.
24 Asas, 70.
25 Nihayat, 45.
26 Ibid., 45.
113
it, so He is entirely distinct from it in direction.2
This principle is not new in the discussion of kalam since it refers to a theologico-
cosmological principle referring to the nature of the originated being (muhdatb). To the
mutakallimun, existents are divided into: (i) the Eternal One (al-Qadim) whose existence
does not have the initial moment, and (ii) the originated or the created (al-muhdatb)
which has the initial moment of existence. The Eternal One refers to God while the
originated refers to the creation other than God (alam). The originated, in turn, are
divided into: (i) that, when it exists, occupies space and it is called substance or atom
(jawbar); (ii) that which does not occupy space, called accident. While the nature of
substance is that each of them is distinct from each other in terms of direction, the
accident subsists in the substance and therefore can be said as having the same direction
or place with the substance. Further, all substances are homogeneous in nature and there
is only one kind (jins) of substance. Accidents, on the other hand, consist of different
types and kinds, the amount of which was not agreed upon by the mutakallimun^
27A1-Baydawi, Tawali ‘al-Anwar, vol. 2, 758. Al-Baydawi also presented another rational argument
by the mushabbihab, which runs, “A body requires both a particular space and a particular region,
because of the fact that it is self-subsistent. God, praise to Him the Most High, has a
commonality with [a body] in this fact, and thus He also has a commonality with it in requiring
these two factors.” Ibid. Al-Shahrastani argued against this argument by highlighting the
confusion brought by the Karramiyyah through the word ‘self-subsistent’ by which they based
their argument. Nihayat, 46.
28 Alnoor Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalam (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1994), 16. This classification
was generally accepted by the majority of the mutakallimun, both Mutazilah and Ashairah.
Nevertheless, they disagreed on whether the non-existent (al-ma dum) can be an object or not.
The Mutazilah affirmed this view by saying that ‘objects which do not exist’ can be said to be
objects while the Ashairah denied it. This is because for the Mu tazilah, the true nature of an
object was its status as an object of knowledge which includes the non-existents (ma dum) while
for the Ashairah, the nature of an object is its status as an object which exists, hence, the non-
existents are not objects of knowledge. The Ashairah, therefore, confined their classification of
existents only to objects which exist (mawjudat) and these comprise objects which have some first
initial moment of existence, namely created things, and that which does not have an initial moment
of existence, namely God who is Eternal. Created objects are either objects which require a
substratum in which they inhere, namely accident (arad), or objects which occupy space
(muta/iayyiz) and do not need a substratum, namely substance (jawhar), sometimes referred to as
body (jism). Accidents are incorporeal while substances are corporeal. The smallest unit that
constitutes substance is atom (jawhar al-fard). Atoms, according to the mutakallimun, are
homo eneous and when they are combined, they will form bodies. The mutakallimun held that the
tn
created worlds consist of corporeal substances and incorporeal accidents which inhere in
substances, and that the properties of objects arise both from the intrinsic nature of atoms which
constitute them and from the accidents which inhere in them and also the combination of these
114
To the Karramiyyah, this classification is applicable to God in the sense
that the essence of God is the substance (jawhar), a place or locus in which the
attributes inhere, while the attributes, since they cannot exist by themselves, are
accidents, and therefore are in need of the essence as a substratum for them to
subsist. The Karramiyyah, as put by al-Shahrastani, explained their argument as
follows:
We agree that God has essence and attributes. The attributes do not
at all stand in the same place (lyayth) as each other nor are they
spatially related, because that which subsists in another is not
susceptible of space, but they all subsist in His essence, i.e. in the
place where His essence is. The distinction between the essence and
qualities [attributes] is that the essence has a place of its own so that
the qualities are in reference to it while the qualities have not. The
word place (Jyayth) cannot be used of the qualities...thus direction by
which the Deity can be located can be asserted.* 29
To relate the above view with the principle held by the Karramiyyah we
mentioned earlier (that for every two existents, one of them must either be
dependent on the other or be distinct and free from the other in terms of
direction), it is apparent that the Karramiyyah considered this principle as the
most universal principle which is applicable even to God. Since the essence of
God is analogous substance which functions as a substratum for the

O
cu
attributes that do not possess real existence, God can, therefore, be regarded as a
substance or a body. This is basically the line of argument of the Karramiyyah
which supports their view of an anthropomorphic God.
The Karramiyyah also substantiated their view using the ‘argument based
on existence’ which, ironically, was also used by the mutakallimun, especially the
atoms with their inherent accidents to form larger units. For example, their combination to form a
living composite which is the human body. Ibid. 5,17. Cf. Al-Attas, A Commentary, 30-31; Shlomo
Pines, Studies in Islamic Atomism (Jurusalem: The Magnes Press The Hebrew University, 1997),
1-31. On the classification of existent things see Muhassal, 52-144.
29 Nihayat, 45.
115
Ashairah, in their argument for the Vision of God.3 They argued that since the
things that have directions in this visible world are substance and accident, there
must be a common cause to these two to be in such a condition. Analysis shows
that there is nothing common to all these substances and accidents except two
things: existence and origination (al-wujud wa al-huduth). Origination (hudutb)
cannot be the true cause of this principle since origination, similar to contingency,
is not a positive judgment or an existential attribute (sifah mawjudab). This is
due to the fact that origination is regarded as an existence that is preceded by
non-existence and non-existence cannot be the basis of a judgment.30

31 Hence, only
existence (yvujud) remains as the cause of this principle (that substance and
accidents have direction). Further, existence is common to both worlds, the
perceptible and imperceptible (al-sbabid wa al-ghalb). Since God, who is
imperceptible, exists, therefore He is also included in this principle. To put this
argument in another way, since existence is the basis of the condition of
substance and accidents being within a certain direction, and since God also exists,
He is also in a direction. In Asas, al-Razi summarized one of the proponents of
the Karr amiyyah, Ibn Haysam’s view on this principle:
It is indubitable that for every two existents in the visible world, one
of them must either be dependent on the other or it is distinct and
free from the other in terms of direction. The nature of every two
existents is also in the manner that either it is specifically being
substance or an accident32 or that which has a commonality between
substance and accident (amr mushtarak bayrta al-jawhar wa al
arad). And the common aspect between the two is either
origination (al-hudutb) or existence (al-wujud). All are false except
30 Controversies, 112-113. See further discussion on Ru yatullab in Chapter Five p.186-192.

3iArbam, 192.
32 This view means that bein a substance or accident in themselves cannot be the cause for them
tn
being in a direction, for the absurdity of the same thing having two different causes is entailed.
We must, therefore, find a common quality which is shared by these two.
116
existence. Hence, it is necessary that the cause of this judgment is
existence. [Since] God is an existent, it is necessary that He, the
Exalted, is either attached to [resides in] the world or distinct from it

in a direction.33
Moving from this conclusion, the Karramiyyah further argued that since
God is not residing within the world, this would lead to incarnation (al-hciliT)
which is rejected in Islam, God, therefore, must be distinct from the world in a
direction:
The anthropomorphists (ahi al-tashbih) maintain that the world and
the Creator are two existents. Every two existents, either one of
them resides (hal) in the other or is distinct from it...they state that
incarnation is impossible. Hence, it is affirmed that God is distinct
(mubayinan) from the world through a direction (bi al-jihah). In

this way they argue that God is qualified by space and direction.34
To summarize the arguments of the Karramiyyah, their arrival at the idea
of an anthropomorphic God is based on four major premises:
i) That for every two existents in this visible world, it is necessary
that either one of them subsists in the other (as in the case of
accidents) or that it is distinct from the other in a direction (as in
the case of substance).
ii) Since this principle embraces both substance and accidents, it
cannot be based simply on the fact that substance is a substance
or accident is an accident. There must be something that is shared
by both of them.
33 Asas, 70.
34 Ibid., 21.
117
iii) This principle is also not based on origination since origination is
an ‘imperfect’ cause. This is due to the fact that it is re arded as
CfQ
an existent which is preceded by non-existence.
iv) The only basis of this judgment is existence. Since God exists
and since existence is similar both in the visible and invisible
worlds, God is therefore applicable to this principle.
To put the view on a stronger footing, the Karramiyyab also claimed that
this principle is something known by reason necessarily (ma lum bi al-darurab).
In other words, it is impossible for an existent to exist without direction. The
existence of two existents (mawj udayn) beyond the seven directions is, according
to them, false because it is in opposition to the necessary knowledge (al- ilm al-
or _
chruri). They argued further that when something is affirmed by reason
necessarily, it cannot be refuted by any rational argument (nazariyy at) since the
status of self-evident knowledge (badibiyyat) is higher than rational knowled
and an objection of the former by the proof from the latter amounts to an
objection against the fundamental (al-‘a si) by the secondary (al-far ).35
36
AL-RAZl’S counter arguments
In response to the views mentioned above, al-Razi focused his attack on two
important points. First, to destroy the rational principle held by the Karramiyyah
by challenging the basic premises underlying this principle. In so doing, al-Razi
advanced two premises which ran contrary to the principle held by the
Karramiyyah. First, that it is rationally possible that there is an existent beyond
the grasp of the human external senses. Second, that it is not necessary for an
existent to have a resemblance or a likeness (nazir wa shabih) in order for it to
exist. Al-Razi’s second focus was to advance a series of rational proofs on the
35 Ibid., 16.
36 Ibid., 17. This is because in terms of the degree of knowledge, necessary statement is higher than
the statement through deductive arguments in the sense that it gives a priori kind of knowledge.
118
impossibility of ascribing the notion of space to God which serves as the basis of
denying God as a body and substance. In what follows, we will deliberate upon
these points in detail.
GOD AS AN EXISTENT BEYOND SENSE PERCEPTION
Following his unwavering insistence on the priority of divine transcendence, al-
Razi contended, against the position of the anthropomorphists, that the existence
of being that is beyond place and direction is possible and is not contrary to
reason or common-sense. Following the majority of mutakallimun, al-Razi
affirmed that as a Necessary Being, God is exalted from the physical world and
therefore cannot be characterized by the attributes similar to the things in the
physical world. This will entail that God also cannot be placed in any direction
>
and therefore cannot be indicated by the senses (yusbaru ilayhi bi al-/iiss).
matter of fact, this transcendent aspect of God was already affirmed by the
mutakallimun as an important aspect of the knowledge of God in kalam.
In relation to this world, God is neither residing in this world nor is He
separated from it through any spatial distance or specific direction as claimed by
the Karramiyyah. Al-Razi asserted:
Verily, we affirm the existence of an existent that cannot be

indicated by the senses (la yumkirt an yushar ilayhi bi al-Hss), be
He here or there, or we affirm the existence of an existent which
cannot be specified to be in space or direction, or we affirm the
existence of something which does not inhere in the world, neither is
He distinct from it through any of the directions...all these
expressions are different yet the meaning is one.37
This view, according to al-Razi, is a well-established position since it is
affirmed by the majority of scholars and authoritative men of reason (al-uqala’
al-mu tabirm). It, therefore, invalidates the principle of the Karramiyyah that
37 Ibid, 16.
119
God is in a direction is a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge, according to al-
Razi, will not be dissented by so many people particularly the intelligent ones:
The majority of the authoritative men of reason (al-uqala’ al-

mu tabirm) concur that God is exalted, He does not occupy space
(mutahayyiz\ nor is He specified in any direction. He neither
resides in the world nor is He separated from the world through any
sense of direction. If this view is necessarily known to be false, then
the majority of the reasonable people will be against necessary
knowledge.38 39 *
Al-Razi further attacked the view of the Karramiyyah that this principle is
self- evident, through the following arguments:
i) the knowledge of the principle is arrived at through detailed
proof (dalil munfasil) and this is not the nature of self-evident
knowledge whose conclusion is known at once.
ii) the conclusion of the principle is not as certain as the other self-
evident knowledge such as the formulation ‘one plus one equals
to two’ or the statement that affirmation and negation do not co-
exist (al-nafy wa al-itbbat la yajtami an).
iii) the principle is rationally incomplete since it only includes two
possibilities, namely that either one of the existents subsists in
the other or it is distinct from the other in a direction. There is
another possibility that is an existent that neither subsists in the
other nor is it distinct from the other in a direction. This is an
existent which is beyond the grasp of the senses.
By proving the possibility of an existent that is beyond the grasp of the
senses, al-Razi had weakened the principle of the Karramiyyah and disproved its
universality and its applicability to all existents. Al-Razi concluded that this
38 Ibid., 17.
39 Ibid., 18. This means that with regard to the principle, reason cannot immediately and necessarily
affirm that when we think of God and the world, it must be either God subsist in the world or He
is distinct with the world in a direction.
120
principle was therefore erroneous and rather based on their wild ima ination and
CfQ
fancies that could not be accepted in the description of divine realities.40
GOD AS AN EXISTENT WITHOUT ANY RESEMBLANCE
Contrary to the view of the Karr amiyyah, Al-Razi also affirmed that reason can
accept an existent, that is God, which does not have any resemblance in this
world. In other words, it is reasonable that there is an existent that possesses
certain attributes yet all existents other than He are different from Him in every
respect:
it is self-evident that reason does not reject the existence of an

existent which is characterized by some specific attributes such that
all thin other than it are different with it in these specificities.
CZ)
CrQ
Since this fact is not rejected by reason, we, therefore, know that the
non-existence of a likeness of something does not necessary lead to
its non-existence (la yalzam min adami nazir al-sbay’ adam
dbalika al-shay*).41
In this statement, al-Razi explicitly rejected the anthropomorphists’ view
that reason cannot begin to think of an existent that is neither connected
(muttasilan) to the world nor separated (munfasilan) from it, unless there is a
resemblance to it. For al-Razi, the recognition by the intellect of an existent does
not necessarily depend on the prior recognition of something similar to it.
Similarly, the non-existence of a resemblance of something does not lead to the
non-existence of that thing (adam al-nazir wa al- musawf la yujab al-qawl bi
adam al-shay "j.42 Here, al-Razi was trying to solve an important epistemological
question raised by the anthropomorphists, whether the human mind is able to
comprehend something that is totally different from whatever his mind had
experienced. The principle that something must have likeness in order to be
known might be true in regard to empirical, sensible things. For, there must be
40
Ibid.
41 Ibid., 26.
42 Ibid., 27.
121
some similarity for something to be known or defined, at least in terms of genus.
However, this principle certainly cannot be applied to the divine existence since
God, being unique in Himself, possesses attributes which are also unique to
Himself and these attributes do not resemble any of the attributes possessed by
other than Him. He is in His own category which is above and beyond the
categories of the substance and accident:
There is no doubt that God is different from these two divisions

(substance and accident) in His Unique Reality (bi haqfqatibf al-
makhsusab). If He were not distinct in His unique reality, He will be
either similar to the substances or the accidents. This would
necessitate Him to be originated like substances and accidents, which
is impossible.43
CLASSIFICATION OF EXISTENTS
The weakness of this principle is also apparent when it can be falsified through
number of counter-examples. There are some existents, as affirmed by the
philosophers, which neither occupy space nor do they reside on something that
occupies space such as intellects (al-uqul\ souls (al-nufus), the heavenly souls
(al-nufus al-falakiyyah) and prime matter (al-bay da). The Mutazilab, for
example, affirm that will (iradat), aversion (karahat), instinctive desire (sbabwab),
conviction (itiqad) and reason (nazar) also do not exist in a location.44 Al-Razi
also brought up many other cases in which even in this world, many things
alluded to human beings are free from the notion of ‘direction and space’ such as
the human self that is referred to by the term ‘I’. The existence of relations
(idafat) such as ‘father-ness’ and ‘son-ness’ also do not inhere in any space and
direction, neither do they subsist in any substance. For many things in this world,
43 Ibid., 76.
44 Ibid., 72; Dhanani, The Physical Theory, p. 16. In this book, Ibn Muttawayh, an early Mu tazili
is quoted enumerating those which are affirmed through proofs as accidents which includes among
others colors, tastes, odors, location, adhesion (ta ’Iff), force (i timad), life and annihilation (fana).
122
when they are regarded strictly in their quiddities and essences, they are
comprehended in a manner that is free from any notion of space and direction.45
Evidently, the main error of the Karr amiyyah lies in their confused
classification of existents (aqsam al-mawj udat). Following the classification of
substance and accidents, they reduced existents to that which occupies space and
that which resides in something that occupies space; but they missed the third
category, namely, that which is neither of the two.46 In fact, their classification,
as we have mentioned before, is only applicable to originated things (muJydathat).
The mutakallimun, al-Razi affirmed, maintained that originated things fall either
into something that occupies space or something that resides (qalrri) in something
that occupies space.47 As mentioned earlier, the first class refers to substance (al-
Jawhar), which can further be subdivided into that which is divisible, namely
body (al-jism) and that which cannot be further subdivided (al-jawhar al-fard)
which is the atom. The second namely that which resides in something
that occupies space refers to the accident (al-arad) such as colours and shapes.
There is in fact third class, namely, that which neither occupies space nor
resides in something that occupies space. To this category belong the existents
such as hay Ha and the intellects (uqul). Nevertheless, the basis of this third
classification with reference to originated things was disputed by the majority of
mutakallimun since it leads to the concept of something similar to God in its

quiddity.48 This is the reason why the mutakallimun. affirmed that all existents
other than God consist of either substance or accidents. Hence al-Ghazali, for
example, maintained that the soul is a substance (jawhar) which is applicable to

the above principle.49 Al-Razi, in his classification, disagreed with the view of the
45 Asas, 19.
46 Ibid., 18
47 Muhassal, 92.
48 Ibid., 92.
49 Al-Ghazali, Ma ary al-Quds fi Madarij Marifat al-Nafs (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah,
1988), 45. In al-Risalah al-Luduniyyah he referred to the soul as a perfect simple substance (al-
123
majority of the mutakallimun. Admitting that the existence of this class might
cause a commonality with God in terms of the ne ation of being in a direction and
CfQ
space, he nevertheless affirmed that this does not necessarily imply that those
under this class are similar to God, since the commonality in negation does not
necessitate resemblance (al-istbtirak fi al-sulfb la yaqtadi al-tamatbul).5Q Al-
Razi, therefore, maintained the existence of another class other than substance
and accidents among originated things, which does not conform to the principle of
the Karramiyyab. Despite this disagreement, both al-Razi and the majority of the
mutakallimun, nonetheless, reed that in the case of God, He is above and
beyond all these categories. Hence, although the third category is similar to God
in that it neither occupies space nor resides in something that occupies space, it is
still something different in reality from God.
The point that should be emphasized here is that in response to the
Musbabbibab’s view, al-Razi stressed the fact that if among originated beings
there is such an existent which is neither contained in space nor positioned in any
direction, what more of God who is the Creator of all these things. To say that
God is neither inside nor outside the world is not a contradiction since God is in a
category by itself which is above and beyond the category and genus of originated
beings. This fact reminds us of the philosophers’ view that since God is simple
(ba sit) and He is not a genus under which different species are classified, He
cannot, therefore, be defined.50

51
THE CAUSE OF THE PRINCIPLE (ILLAT AL-HUKM)
Among the problems raised by al-Razi amid his polemics with the
anthropomorphists is the confusion regarding the cause of the principle held by
them: Is it origination or existence that makes substance and accidents as they
jawhar al-kamil al-fard). Al-Ghazali, al-Risalah al-Laduniyyah, trans. Margaret Smith, Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society (JRAS), part 2 (April, 1938): 194.
50 Muhassal, 92.
51 Tahafiit, 125.
124
are? As mentioned before, the anthropomorphists were of the view that the cause
of the principle is existence. Hence, since God is an existent, He is also applicable
under this principle. Al-Razi noticed that the Karramiyyah confused the problem
of the cause of the principle when they assumed that substance and accidents are
brought into being by a sin cause while both of them, to say the least, are
different categories caused by different causes.52 53
The fact that substance is
described as that which is distinct from each other in a direction while accident is
defined as that which subsists in the other, shows that both of them are different
and they were brought into being by different causes. Hence, it is true to say that
substance is described as such because of its specific nature as substance and,
similarly, accident is described as such because of its specific nature as accident.
Even if we accept that they cannot be caused by their specific nature of
being substance and accident, al-Razi maintained that we still cannot say for
certain that they must be caused either by existence or origination. There mi
be other causes apart from these two which must be further investigated. “Not
finding something” argued al-Razi, “that does not mean that it does not exist”
(irma adama al-wijdan layadullu ala adam al-wujud) ,54
Although substance and accident are different from each other through
their specific nature, they are nevertheless similar in terms of their bein
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originated. God, on the other hand, is different from both of them through the
fact that He is eternal, not originated. This is, according to al-Razi, a strong basis
for saying that the cause of this principle is origination rather than existence and
that God, due to His difference from originated beings, is not included in this
principle.55
Among the reasons given by the Karramiyyah as to why they preferred
existence (al-wujud) over origination (al-huduth) is that the principle may be
52 Asas, 75.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 75.
55 Ibid., 76.
125
difficult to be established since we may not know whether in totality something is
originated or not and the ignorance of the originated things will lead to the
ignorance of the principle itself:
If the basis of the principle is the origination, then the ignorance of

the origination of something will necessitate the ignorance of the
principle.56
Nevertheless, to al-Razi, this argument is unacceptable since not knowing
whether something is originated or not will not necessarily lead to the ignorance
of the principle. We would still know the occurrence of the symptoms of some
diseases, for example, although we do not know their causes. Hence, the
ignorance of the cause does not necessarily lead to the ignorance of the effect.
Furthermore, if the ignorance of the cause leads to the ignorance of the effect, it
follows logically that the knowledge of the cause necessitates the knowledge of
the effect. In this case, if existence (al-wujutT) is the cause of things in the visible
world being in a direction, then it is known that everything that exists must be in
direction. However, the majority of the People of Unity (ahi al-tawhia) know
that God exists, yet it does not logically follow that they do know that God is in a
This shows that origination is still the cause and basis of the
specific direction.57 58
principle since it is the only aspect that is shared by jawhar and a rad yet is not
shared by God. Origination, in other words, becomes the differentia between the
co
existence of these two divisions and the existence of God.
Supposing that we agree with the Karramiyyah that existence is the basis
of the principle, al-Razi stressed the fact that existence is not equivocal. There is
still a difference between the existence of corporeal things and the existence of
God. The similarity is only in terms of words (ishtirak lafzi). Al-Razi clarified
further:
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 77.
58 Ibid., 76.
126
The Karramiyyah cannot say that the existence of the hidden
(gha’ib) and the perceptible (shahid) is one. If that is the case, it will
lead to the fact that the nature of God is similar with the originated
things from all aspects, or the fact that His existence is additional to
His essence, and they [Karramiyyah] do not agree with these two
points. 59
Furthermore, if existence becomes the cause of this principle of direction,
it follows that even substance, or accident, since they exist, can be further divided
into that which subsists in the other or is distinct from it in a direction which is
clearly impossible. If the Karrarniyyah replied that it is due to the specific nature
of substance and accident that prevents them from being further divided, al-Razi
would have responded by saying that the same is the case with God that it is due
to the specific nature of God that prevents Him from falling into this principle.59
60
Through this rigorous dialectical argumentation, al-Razi gave no possible
room for the Karramiyyah to extend their arguments in defending this principle.
NEGATION OF THE SPATIAL AND BODILY ASPECTS WITH REGARD

TO GOD
Apart from invalidating the principle of the Karramiyyah, al-Razi put forward
strong rational proofs for denying the claim that God is a body and that He resides
in a space, two presuppositions that underlie the views of the Karramiyyah and
the Hanabilah. In order to refute the notion of body in regard to God, al-Razi
examined the notion of occupying space (al-hayyiz) as the fundamental principle
of the existence of body (al-jism) and atom (al-jawhar). Body, as an extension of
atoms, must be in a space in order for it to exist. Therefore, if the notion of space
can be invalidated with application to God, so also will the notion of body:
If we have proved that God the Most Exalted does not occupy space
(laysa bi mutahayyiz}, we have actually proved that He is neither
59 Ibid., 77.
60 Ibid, 77-78.
127
body nor an atom (jawbar fara). For, that which occupies space, if
it is divisible, it is a body, while if it is indivisible it is an atom.61
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPATIAL BODIES
In his refutation of this notion of space, al-Razi argued that since the nature of
spatial bodies (mutahayyizat) is absolutely different from that of God, it is
impossible for all of them to be ascribed to God. He enumerated few basic
characteristics of spatial bodies and subsequently argued that these characteristics
are impossible to be applied to God. The first characteristic of spatial bodies is that
they are essentially homogeneous in their quiddity as a whole (mutamathilayn fi
tamam al-mahiyyahf By asserting that they are similar in quiddity as a whole,
al-Razi was implying that ‘occupying space’ is not an accidental attribute of atoms
and bodies, but rather an essential one, the absence of which will lead to the denial
of both. In other words, it constitutes the very nature of body. If God occupies
space, His quiddity will definitely be similar to them as a whole (fi tamam al-
mahiyyabf
occupying space (mutahayyiziyyah) is not an attribute (sifab) of

something [body]. It is [indeed] the essence itself (nafs al-zat).
Therefore, it is necessary that things which are similar in terms of
occupying space, are also similar in their essences.62
This position also serves as a rejection to an argument by the Karr amiyyah
that God might be similar with other bodies in the attribute of occupying space
but differs with them in other essential attributes. For the Karramiyyah,
occupying space was only an accidental attribute of God, which is also shared by
other bodies and there are still many essential attributes of God that do not
occupy space which differentiate God from bodies. For al-Razi, this view was
untenable since it is not possible for two things to be similar in terms of
occupying space yet different in other specific attributes that have nothing to do
61 Ibid., 45.
62 Ibid., 46.
128
with occupying space. It is also implausible to say, as claimed by the
Karramiyyah, that it is the specific attribute which is essential compared to
occupying space, for it is impossible for these essential attributes to be associated
with occupying space without leading it also to becoming something that occupies
space. In other words, if God is characterized by an essential attribute which does
not occupy space, He cannot be characterized with the attribute of occupying
space without this essential attribute also being ‘infected’ by the attribute of
occupying space:
[as to] the specific [essential] attribute which is not [supposed] to be

bound by space and direction, we will say that it is impossible for
‘occupying space’ to be its attribute by which it subsists (qalmah
biha) because this essential attribute is not specified in space and
directions. Occupying space [on the other hand] cannot be conceived
unless through the notion of direction. Hence, that which
necessarily occurs in direction cannot take place on something whose
occurrence in a direction is impossible.63
Through this refutation, al-Razi has forcibly asserted that occupying space
(mutaJiayyiziyyah) is an essential attribute of bodies and atoms and consequently
denied the possibility of God being attributed by it due to the fact that it will lead
to the conclusion that God is a body. Having affirmed this, al-Razi further
advanced the implications of God being homogeneous in His quiddity as a whole
with bodies:
i) that among the nature of two homogeneous entities is that they
will also be similar in their concomitant attributes (lawazim). It
follows that if God is eternal, bodies are also eternal, while if
bodies are originated, God is also originated.
ii) If God is homo eneous with bodies, some attributes such as

CfQ
Knowledge, Power and Life are possible to be deprived from Him
and they are only possibilities in regard to His essence as in the
63 Ibid, 46.
129
case with bodies. This will imply that God needs determinant
(mukhassis) in order to bring these attributes into existence
which is impossible.
iii) If God’s essence is homo eneous to bodies, then, like bodies, God
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will be subject to movement and rest. Being receptive to
movement and rest (qabilah li al-harakah wa al-sukuri) is the
attribute of originated things. Since God is eternal, He cannot be
attributed with this attribute.
iv) Being similar to bodies implies that God is composed of units and
every unit will be similar to each other, whereas composition is

impossible to God.64
The second characteristic of things that occupy space is that they are finite
(mutanahiyah). They are so because all things that occupy space have an extent
in space and time which increases and decreases.65 66An atom, for example, is a
finite, indivisible entity which when attached to another will constitute a body.
The body, likewise, is characterized essentially by its extension which also has
capacity to increase and decrease. Al-Razi further argued that every finite thing
is, in turn, possible (mumkiiT) because their nature to increase and decrease is a
possibility. Finally, al-Razi argued that every possible thing is originated because
they are equally predisposed to the possibility of increasing and decreasing, hence
they are in need of a determinant (al-mu’thir) or an originator which is God.67
64 Ibid., 47.
65 Ibid.
66 The majority of the mutakallimun held that a body is composed of a finite number of indivisible
parts that are called atoms (jawhar fard). The number of atoms to constitute a body is, however, a
point of contention among them. To the Ashairah, for, example, it consists of a minimum of two
atoms. Apart from this view of the majority, there were also other theories on the composition of
bodies; a) bodies are composed of an actually infinite number of parts, as held by al-Nazzam; b)
bodies are not composite but they are infinitely divisible; c) bodies are composite but their division
never reaches an utmost limit beyond which no further division is possible. Dhanani, Physical
Theory, 122, 152 n.34.
67 Asas, 48.
130
This line of argument is used by other mutakallimun, especially the Ashairah to
prove that body is by nature originated.
Havin argued that bodies are by nature originated, it is therefore,
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according to al-Razi, impossible to ascribe God as occupying space since this will
lead to the conclusion that He is finite, possible and originated. This clearly
contradicts the nature of God, who is the originator and eternal.
The third characteristic of things that occupy space is that they are
logically composite hence their constituents are in need of each other. The
explanation is as follows: Bodies are similar to each other in terms of occupying
space but they are different in their individuality (tashakhkbuf). In this case
(different in individuality), occupying space becomes genus under which the
species come. If God is a body, His essence, as one of the species, will therefore
be composed of genus and differentia which is impossible. If, on the other hand,
there is no difference in their individuality, then the occupying space becomes
species under which are individuals and God, in this case, will be one of the
individuals. In both cases, there is an element of dependency, which is improper
to God. For every composition will be in need of others (kullu murakkab fa buwa
muftaqir ila ghairihf).6 This is contrary to God’s nature of being simple (basif).
If the third characteristic refers to logical composition, the fourth
characteristic of spatial bodies is that they are physically composites. For a thing
that occupies space, one side of it will be different from the other side, and all
things with this nature are divisible, and every divisible thing is composite. Since
God’s essence is simple, divisibility will be in contradiction with His nature. Even
if there is such a thin as the unitary atom (al-jawhar al-farcT) as claimed by the
CfQ
atomists, it still cannot be ascribed to God since this will relegate God to being
very small thing in size, and this is a humiliation (al-faqarah). In other words,
the notion of simplicity referred to God is not physical, like the atom. Hence,
69 Ibid.
131
composition, both in terms of logical and physical, is impossible with regards to
God.
The view that God can be specified in space and direction will lead to the
same conclusion of the philosophers, namely, the eternity of the world. This is so
because if God is specified by these two aspects, He must be so specified a parte
ante and parte post (azalan wa abadan) parallel with the eternity of His essence.
However, this will assume that space and direction are equally eternal, which is
impossible. In this case, al-Razi observed some similarity between this position of
the mushabbihab with the views of the believers in the eternity of time
(dabriyyun) who viewed that God is prior to the world in infinite time (muddab
gbayr mutanabiyab) which consequently led to their erroneous view that time is
eternal and hence God is in time and space.70 71 72
In sum, by holding the view that God must be bound to a particular
direction in relation to the world, the musbabbibab reduced the divine reality to
the sensible world, which is conceived through their fancy and imagination, not
through reason:
The judgment which is based on fancy and imagination is

unacceptable with regard to God’s essence and His attributes...This is
our position, the People of Divine Unity and Transcendence (abl al-
Tawhfd wa al-Tanzih) who reject the judgment based on fancy and
imagination with re ard to the essence of God and His attributes.
CfQ
And this is the correct method and the straight way.
Al-Razi concluded his rational argument by quoting Aristotle that whoever
wishes to venture into the knowledge of the divine should prepare himself with
new nature (fitratan ukbra). By a new nature he meant a new kind of thinking
different from that which he used in discussing knowledge regarding physical
70 Ibid., 22.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 24.
132
things. We cannot therefore employ the same reasoning that is used in
understanding the empirical world in understanding the metaphysical realm.
TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS ON THE TRANSCENDENCE OF GOD
Based on numerous verses of the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions that lay
stress on Divine transcendence, al-Razi expounded various arguments in his
response to the views of the musbabbibab. Since the notion of God upheld by the
musbabbibab, as we have alluded to before, centered around the notion of the
body, al-Razi, in enumerating these Qur’anic verses, intended to show that the
conception of God as expounded in the Qur’an runs counter to the idea of ‘body’
as understood in the science of physics (tabiiyyat), a discipline in which he was
also well-versed. Among the aspects emphasized by the Qur’an that run contrary
to the notion of the body are as follows:
i) The Qur’an upholds the unity and oneness of God while the notion of
body implies multiplicity.
ii) The Qur’an insists on the difference between God and other beings
while the mujassimab’s conception of God leads to a similarity between
them.
iii) God, in the Qur’an, is described as the source of need and dependence
while the notion of body implies dependency.
iv) The Qur an infers that there is no chan in God’s essence whereas
body implies change.
v) God as described in the Qur’an is eternal while bodies will perish.
Surat al-Ikhlas
Al-Razi identified Surat al-Ikblas as the strongest proof of the Qur’an in negating
the idea of corporeality and spatiality of the deity. He maintained that this verse is
among the verses with well-established meanings (jnuhkamat} and whose
133
argument is demonstrative, since it is an answer revealed by God to a specific
question posed by the unbelievers to the Prophet concerning the nature of God.73
The strong affirmation in the form of a command to the Prophet, “Qul huwa
Allabu a had” (Say, He is Allah the One and Only!) at the outset of this chapter
proves the total negation of attributes contradictory to divine unity.
The term ahad, according to al-Razi, denies three things: bodily aspect
(jismiyyah), space (al-hayyiz) and direction (al-jibab). It negates the notion of
body since a body, as construed in the field of physics, is composed, at least, of
two atoms (jawbarayn). Every body possesses at least two different sides which
are distinct to each other, e.g., left and right, up and down, front and back. This
will mean that it is divisible while something divisible is not one and it is against
the principle of divine unity. To the question whether God can be said to be
similar to an atom (Jawbar al-fard) which is also one and cannot be further
divided (al-juz’alladbi la yatajazza9), al-Razi replied that it is still impossible. For
the One (a had) does not only mean indivisible but also something without an
opposite (ddd) and equal (nzdd).74 If God is one like an atom, He can still be
similar to other atoms since every atom is homogeneous and this will violate the
principle of divine unity. It is to this fact, according to al-Razi, that the last verse
of this chapter, “There is none like unto Him” (wa lam yakun labukufuan ahad.)
refers.75 Elsewhere, al-Razi ridiculed the idea of the atomistic nature of the God of
the Karramiyyab who implied God as small and paltry (haqarab).76 As to the
denial of space and direction, al-Razi maintained that the notion of space and
direction is a direct concomitant of the notion of body and atom. For every thing
that is attributed by space and direction, if it is divisible, it is a body, otherwise it
73 Ibid, 30.
74 Ibid, 31.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, 20.
134
is an atom. Since the notion of body has earlier been disproved through the
explanation of a had, both space and direction, as concomitants, are false.77
The principle that God is exalted and free from any need or reliance upon
any other than Him is inherent in the notion of al-Samad in the second verse of
the chapter (Allah al-Samad). Al-Samad, according to al-Razi, conveys two basic
meanings. First, as iven by Ibn Abbas, it means a master on whom all things
CfQ
depend in their needs (al-sayyid al-masmud ilaybi fi al-mwatj). Second, it
denotes something compact and not hollow (jawf), or a solid stone out of which
nothin can emerge nor enter.78 The first meaning, according to al-Razi, refers to
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relative attributes (al-sifat al-idafiyyah), that God is a Lord who is being sought in
every need and every need is not accomplished except through Him, while the
second indicates the negative attribute (sifat salbiyyab), that, as the Necessary
Existent, changes will not occur in the essence and attributes of God.79 80
In relation
to that, al-Razi enumerates various attributes given by the mufassirun which
subsumed under both generic meanings. For example, the meanings which come
under the first one (a Master) are: that God is All-Knowing, the Most Forbearing,
the Creator of all thin the Object of wishes (ragba’ib) and help-seeking, the
CTQ
One and All-Glorious. As to the second meaning, the attributes included that He
is Self-sufficient (Ghani), One who does not eat and drink, and One who endures
when all creatures perish. 80
Resorting to the discussion of the mushabbihah, al-Razi maintained that
with the attribute of al-Samad, it is impossible for God to be a body since a body
will imply dependency on the atoms in the body, while al-Samad is free from any
need. Further, if God has organs as claimed by the musbabbihab, He will
definitely be in need of these organs. Neither can al-Samad run parallel with the
notion of space or direction since He will be in need of space and direction for His
77 Ibid., 31.
78 Tafsir, vol. 11, 362.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid, 362-363.
135
existence. In fact, the condition of ‘in need of something else’ which is embedded
in the notion of body will run contrary to other divine attributes mentioned in the
verses of the Qur’an such as al-Gbanf (the Rich or the ‘Free of all wants’) in the
verse “But Allah is free of all wants, and it is you that are needy”81 and the
attribute of al-Qayyum (self-subsisting) as in the verse “Allah, there is no God
but He, the Living, the Self-subsisting.”82
The foliowin verse in the same chapter which reads “There is none like
CfQ
unto Him” (lam yakun labu kufuwan a had) is another decisive proof which can
disqualify the musbabbibab's idea of an anthropomorphic God. The denial of the
idea of kufu’ (likeness), or mitbl as mentioned in another famous verse, “laysa ka
mitblibf sbay” or nidd as in the verse “Then set not up rivals (andad) unto Allah
when you know”83 is incongruent with the notion of body. If God is a body,
stated al-Razi, He will then resemble other bodies in their characteristics:
If God Almighty is a substance (jawbar), He will resemble other

substances, and similarly all substances will become duplicates of
Him. If He [on the other hand] is a body, He will become
composition of atoms...Then it is affirmed that this chapter (Surat
al-Ikhlas) is an obvious proof that God is not a body nor a substance,
neither does He reside in a place or direction.84
This textual refutation is based on the principles of physics, which we have
discussed, that all bodies resemble each other (al-ajsam mutamdtbilab) in their
essence, a point which al-Razi continually emphasized in his attack on the
anthropomorphists. This resemblance will mean that whatever major differences
we may observe in terms of the attributes or accidents among bodies (ajsarri),

>
their essences are still the same. man and a horse may look very different in
81 Al-Qur’an, Muhammad 47:38.

83 Al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah, 2:22.
Asas, 33.
136
their appearance and accidental characteristics, yet in terms of their essence, as
or
bodies, they are similar.
Based on the above premise, al-Razi affirmed that the difference between
God and man is an essential difference, or to use his terms, difference in
quiddity as a whole (fftamam al-mabiyyab). This affirmation also serves as an
answer to the doubt raised by the musbabbibab as to why it is impossible for God
to be similar to human bein as a body but different in other major attributes,
CrQ
CZ)
just like a man is the same as a horse in terms of their ‘animality’ but different in
some basic attributes. By this, the mushabbihah attempted to show that the
difference between God and man is only in degree but not in kind. A somewhat
similar view was propounded by Abu Hashim, Mu tazili, who regarded the
essence of God as being similar to other essences in their essential nature but only
differ in terms of mode (A^/).87 Ibn Sina, one of the most important philosophers
85 86
of Islam, was recorded by al-Razi as holding the view that the essence of God is
similar to the essence of other than He. This follows from his view that God’s
essence is identical with His existence and existence is something that is shared by
all existents (al-mawj udat). The difference between them is that God’s existence
is essential while that of others are accidental.88 To all the above views, al-Razi
replied that God cannot be said to be similar with other than He in terms of
essences and different with them only through their specific attributes because it
implies that there is a composition in God since those things which are similar are
from those which are different.89 Furthermore, the status of these specific
attributes in God will become possible not essential, while possible things need
determiner to be actualized:
85 Ibid., 35.
86 Ibid.
87 Mu ha sal, 154. Four modes, according to Abu Hashim, that make God different from others, are
the modes of Living (al-Hayyah), Knowing (al- Alimiyyah), Existent (al-Mawj udiyyah) and
Powerful (al-Qadiriyyab).
88 Ibid.
89 Asas, 36.
137
Two essences (al-dbatari), if they are similar, their specific attributes
will be among the possible things (al-j a*iz at), not necessary (al-
wajibat), since things which are similar in essence and quiddity as a
whole (mutamatbilab ft tamam al-dbat wa al-mabiyab) will not
[necessarily] differ in concomitants (al-lawazim). If the Creator is a
body, His specific attributes [which He differs from other than Him]
will be among possible things. If this is the case, it follows that He
is in need of a governor or a determiner. This will falsify His nature
of being God of the world.90
The strong disavowal of any resemblance between God and anything other
than He stressed by the verses discussed earlier signifies the pertinent fact that
not only can God be ascribed to any notion of body, but also the knowledge of the
essence and quiddity (mahiyyab) of God is beyond the reach of human
comprehension. To this point also, al-Razi related the story of Prophet Moses
and Abraham who were posed with the same questions regarding the nature of
God. Prophet Moses, for example, was asked by Firaun on the quiddity of his
Lord through the question “what is your Lord (ma rabbuka)?"91 92

to which, he
answered by explaining the attributes of God, “that He is the Creator of human
beings and their administrator, that He is the Creator of both the heavens and the
earth and all between them (gala rabb al-samawat wa al-ard wa ma bayna
huma).99 This proves that there is no answer to the question of the divine
essence since it is only known to God. As in the case of Prophet Abraham whose
questions rather came introspectively through his skepticism—in his inquisition
of the nature of God—on the changes that occur in the rising and setting of the
stars and the moon, he came to the conclusion that those in which changes occur,
as that which occur in the case of the body, are not fit to be attributed to God.93
The failure of humankind to know the essence of God is also upheld by a number
of Prophetic traditions such as the one which says, “I cannot enumerate your
90 Asas, 36.
91 Al-Qur’an, al-Shu ara’ 26:23.
92 Al-Qur’an, al-Shu'ara’ 26:24.
93 Asas, 33-35. It refers to the story of Prophet Ibrahim in the Qur’an, al-An am 6:75-79.
138
Praise, You are as You praise yourself” (la \ihsi thana’an alayka anta kama
athnayta ala nafsika).94 Another Hadith from Ibn 'Abbas, “Think about the
creation of Allah but do not indulge in speculating on the Nature of God”
(tafakkaruffkhalq Allah wala tatafakkaruft Allah)95
The notion of the body also contradicts other scriptural proofs, namely, the
description of God in the verse, “He is Allah, the Creator (al-Khaliq), The Maker
(al-Barf), The Bestower of forms (al-Musawwir), to Him belong the Most
Beautiful Names.”96 The attribute al-Khaliq connotes the meaning of Estimator
(al-Muqaddir), the One who sets limits to something. If God is a body, He will
be finite and every finite thing will have a limit. Thus, it is impossible for God to
set a limit to Himself. Every finite thing also possesses different aspects of
limitation. It is therefore impossible for God, who describes Himself as the

Q7
Bestower of forms, to limit himself in a form.
Another direct scriptural argument used by al-Razi in attacking the
anthropomorphists is the verse “But they shall not encompass Him with their
knowledg ” 8 and the verse “No vision can grasp Him”99 both of which clearly
prove that God is beyond any measurement (miqdar), shape (shakl) and form
(surah). The mushabbihah may argue usin the first verse, that since God’s body
CfQ
is great in size, their knowledge could not therefore encompass Him. To this
assumption, al-Razi replied that the same may apply to the heavens and the
mountains and oceans, whose size cannot be encompassed by human
knowledge.100
94 Muslim, “Solat” Sahih, no. 1090, vol. 4, 426.

95 Al-Zabidi, Ithaf al-Sadat al-Muttaqih bi Sbarh Ihya’ Ulum al-Dfn (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, n.d.), vol. 13, 307.
96 Al-Qur’an, al-Hashar 59:24.
91 Asas, 38.
98 Al-Qur’an, Taha 20:110.
100 Asas, 39,
139
CHAPTER FOUR
MUHKAMAT, MUTASHABIHAT, AND THE ROLE OF

TA WIL IN RAZT’S THOUGHT
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter, we have examined how al-Razi established strong
foundation for the divine transcendence in Islam through both rational and
traditional proofs. This foundation serves as a substantial ground for rejecting
any kind of anthropomorphic implication in the understanding of Qur’anic verses
and Prophetic traditions which bear anthropomorphic expressions. The next
question, which is the subject of this chapter, is the implication of this rejection
in al-Razi’s treatment of the anthropomorphic verses. How does al-Razi deal
with the meaning of the mutashabihdt verses? If the Qur’an is described as
being a clear message to humankind, what is the position of those ambiguous
verses in contributing to the clarity of the message of the Qur’an? How should
the descriptions of God, which appear contradictory to rational principles, be
comprehended? What is al-Razi’s position on ta \vil which is commonly viewed as
an alternative way of explaining the meaning of anthropomorphic verses?
THE MUHKAMAT AND MUTASHABIHAT IN THE QUR’AN
The term muhkam is derived from the past participle noun ‘abkama’, which
means to prevent something from corruption (mariabu min al-fasad).1 It implies
something that is made or rendered firm, stable and strong or held secured from
falling to pieces.2 3 According to al-Razi, if one says in Arabic, ‘bakamtu’ or
‘abkamtu,’ he means ‘I resist’ (radadtu) or ‘I prevent’ (manatu). Hence,
1 Ibn Manzur, vol. 12, 143.

2 Edward William Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon (Bayrut: Librarie Du Liban, 1980), vol. 2, 618.
3 Asas , 203.
140
judge (hakim) is the one who prevents injustice from the hands of the unjust,
while a firm building (bind’ muhkam) is a strong structure that withstands the
forces of nature.4 In the Qur’anic context, dydtun muhkamdtun refer to those
verses whose lexical meaning is secured, fixed from further change and
alteration. This means that their meanings are clear and obvious not only in
terms of their linguistic and literal implications but also in terms of the
commands and directions these verses convey such that they neither need further
interpretation in order to be understood nor any proof to be ascertained.
Mutashabih, on the other hand, comes from the root tashabaha which
denotes likeness (al-mithl), similarity and conformity of something to another.5
It means something is similar or resembles another thing to such a manner that it
is difficult to differentiate between the two. It also means something
‘ambiguous’ which is a result of something being similar to another thing.6
According to Ibn Manzur, mutashabih means something whose meaning cannot
be obtained from its word (ma yutalaqqa manahu min lafzihi). This meaning,
added Ibn Manzur, carries two implications: first, that the meaning can only be
known with reference to those verses with established meaning (idha rudda ila
al-muhkam); second, that the meaning cannot be known completely.7 According
to al-Razi, when the Qur’an refers to the Jews’ excuse upon being ordered by
Prophet Moses to sacrifice a specific kind of heifer that “all heifers are alike to
4 Ibid.
5 Ibn Manzur, vol. 13, 504; Lane, vol. 4, 1500. In the Qur’an, it refers to those verses that are
equivocal or ambiguous; i.e., susceptible to different interpretations, or verses unintelligible such
as the commencements of many of the chapters. Mutashabih also means that of which the
meaning is not to be learned from its words; and this is of two sorts: i) one is that of which the
meaning is known by referring it to what is termed muhkam; ii) that of which the knowledge of
its real meaning is not attainable in any way. Ibid.
6 See Leah Kinberg, “Muhkamat and Mutashabihat (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic Pair of
Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” ARABICA, no. XXXV (1988):144. In this article, the author
analyses the definitions given by traditional Muslim scholars and mufassirun and concludes that
both ‘similar’ and ‘ambiguous’ are two basic meanings given by scholars to the mutashabih.
7 Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab, vol. 13, 505.
141
us” (inna al-baqara tasbabaha calayna), 8 this would mean that to the Jews, the
heifers looked the same so that they could not differentiate between them.9 10
The
same ambiguity is meant in the Hadith which says that ambiguous matters
(mutasbabibat) are between two clear positions: the permissible (al-halal) and
the prohibited (al-baram)^
QUR’ANIC ORIGIN: SURAH AL IMRAN, VERSE 7
The root from which the whole discussion regarding the mubkamat and
mutasbabibat verses of the Qur’an sprang, is the verse in Surat Al 'Imran, which
clearly delineates these two kinds of Qur’anic verses:
He it is Who has sent down to you the Book; In it are verses basic
or fundamental (of established meaning i.e., mubkamat); They are
the foundation of the Book; Others are not of well established
meaning (mutasbabibat). But those in whose hearts is perversity
follow the part thereof that is not well- established meanin
Seeking discord, and searching for its hidden meanings, but no one
knows its true meanings except Allah. And those who are firmly
grounded in knowledge say: ‘We believe in the Book; the whole of it
is from our Lord;” and none will grasp the Message except men of
understanding.11

9 Al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah 2:118. It also refers to the ambiguity in the hearts of the Jews due to
their doubt and inclination towards uncertainty to which the verse in Surah Al-'Imran refers.
According to Ibn 'Abbas, the Jews were those inclined towards the mutashabihat as they tried to
give metaphorical interpretations to the alphabets that occur in the beginning of certain verses in
the Qur’an. Tafsir, vol.3, 140.
10 Asas, 203. The Hadith that was reported by Nu'man bin Bashir goes: “I heard Allah’s
Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying this: What is lawful is evident and what is
unlawful is evident, and in between them are the things doubtful which many people do not
know. So he who guards against doubtful things keeps his religion and honor blameless, and he
who indulges in doubtful things indulges, in fact, in unlawful things, just as a shepherd who
pastures his animals round a preserve will soon pasture them in it. Beware, every king has a
preserve, and the things Allah has declared unlawful are His preserves. Beware, in the body there
is a piece of flesh; if it is sound, the whole body is sound, and if it is corrupt the whole body is
corrupt, and hearken it is the heart.” Bukhari, “Kitab al-Buyu ”, no.2, vol.5, 11.
11 Al-Qur’an, Al 'Imran 3:7.
142
According the above verse, the first kind of Qur’anic verses are the well-
established ones (muhkamdt) whose meanings are stable and fixed, and the
second are the mutasbabibdt which are, on the contrary, not clear in meaning.
Apart from this classification, the verse also gives further explanation concerning
the nature of these two kinds of verses. The mubkamat are called the Principle
of the Book (Umm al-Kitab) which, according to al-Razi, means the root of the
Book (asl al-kitab) upon which the content of the whole book depends.12
13 The
Arabs used to call whatever takes similar course with the root as mother (umm)
just like they called the brain as the “mother of the head” (umm al-ra’s) and
Makkah as the “mother of villages” (Umm al-Qura).14 Al-Razi further
mentioned that there are two general views on the meaning of Umm al-Kitab.
First, it is the Preserved Tablet (Lawb Mahfuz) together with all the creations of
the celestial and lower spheres (al-alam al (ulwi wa al-alam al-sufli). This is
based on the Hadith, “There was a time when God existed and nothing was with
Him and He created tablets and wrote on it the states (ahwal) of all the creations
until the Day of Judgment.”15 Second, it refers to God’s knowledge, that God
knows everything existent and non-existent.16 Ibn Kathir, the famous
fourteenth century mufassir, interpreted the term Umm al-Kitab as being the
verses whose meanings are evident and clear in indication and which do not lead
to confusion. They are also the root (asl) from which inferences are drawn when
there are ambiguities in understanding other verses of the Qur’an.17 Other
mufassirurt maintained that these verses are called Umm al-Kitab since they lay
down the principles of Islam and contain the basis of the creed and law, the
12 The name Umm al-Kitab is also ascribed to the first chapter of the Qur’an, al-Fdtibah, mainly
due to the importance of its content.
13 Tafsir, vol. 7, 52.
14 Ibid.
15 Bukhari, 4:169
16 Tafsir, vol. 7, 52.
17 Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur’an al-'Azim (Bayrut:Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-'Arabiy, 2000), vol.l,
354.
143
positive and prohibitory law, the basic duties, or the Islamic do ma.18 Based on
CfQ
these descriptions, they identified the muhkamat mainly with those verses which
contain God’s commands such as the performance of prayer, fasting and
pilgrimage. Ibn ‘Abbas, for example, indicated that the muhkamat are those
verses which abrogate other verses; verses which describe what are permissible
and forbidden, laws (hudud), judgments (ahkdrri) and obligations (fara’id).1
Another report also from Ibn ‘Abbas says that the muhkamat are the basic
principles of the Islamic way of life as contained in verses 151-153 of the Surat al-
Anam20 and the verses 23-2521 in Surat al-Isra’.22
As to the mutashabihdt, while their indication is in line with the

muhkamat, they also refer to other meanings.23 It is due to the multiple
meanings implied by these verses that the derivation of their meanings becomes
ambiguous. They are open to more than one way of interpretation. While one
interpretation may lead a believer to the meaning that suits him best and answers
his doubts, he, on the other hand, may be misled. Thus, the above verse in Surah
Al ‘Imran, in light of the two classifications, also indicates that those who are
18 Kinberg, “Muhkamat and Mutashabihat,” 151.

19 Ibn Kathir, vol.l., 354.
20 These verses, which are related to the basic principle of the Islamic way of life, reads as
follows: “Say: ‘Come, I will rehearse what Allah has really prohibited you from: join not anything
as equal with Him; be good to your parents; kill not your children on a plea of want. We provide
sustenance for you and for them; and come not near to shameful deeds whether open or secret.
Take not life which Allah has made sacred except by way of justice and law. This has He
commanded you that you may learn wisdom. Come not near to the orphan’s property except to
improve it, until he attains the age of full strength. Give measure and weight with full justice.
No burden do We place on any soul but that which it can bear. Whenever you speak, speak
justly even if a near relative is concerned; and fulfill the Covenant of Allah. Thus has He
commanded you that you may remember.”
21 The verses are: “Your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him, and that you be kind
to parents. Whether one or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of
contempt, nor repel them but address them in terms of honour. [24] And out of kindness, lower
to them the wing of humility and say, ‘My Lord! Bestow on them your mercy even as they
cherished me in childhood’. [25] Your Lord knows best what is in your hearts; If you do deeds of
righteousness. Verily, He is Most forgiving to those who turn to Him again and again.”
22 Ibn Kathir, Tafstr al-Qur’an al-Azim, vol.l, 354.
144
inclined to follow the mutashdbihdt are blameworthy since vagaries in doubt will
lead them to uncertainty and a shaky foundation of belief and practice.
The mufassirurt identified the mutashdbihdt mainly with those
anthropomorphic verses whose meanings are ambiguous due to their resemblance
with human characteristics. Nevertheless, there were also others who associated
the mutashdbihdt with some equivocal words bearing legal implication, such us
the word lams al-nisa’ which can mean either to merely touch one’s wife or to
have sexual intercourse.24 Also linked to the mutashdbihdt are the alphabets
which occur at the outset of some chapters (fawdtih) in which a Muslim should
believe but not to act accordingly.25 Some others viewed mutashdbihdt as matters
whose realities cannot be grasped by people such as the appearance of the Day of
Resurrection, the condition in the Afterworld, rewards and punishment in the
Afterworld, the number of angels in Hell, the appearance of Dajjal before the
End of Days, the rising of the sun from the West, and the duration of the world
and its end.26 According to Kinberg, among all these mutashdbihdt matters, two
of the most crucial and controversial in Islam are the opening letters (fawdtih)
and the anthropomorphic attributes of God.27 28Despite these ambiguous and
controversial implications given by the mufassirun in discussing the meaning of
the mutashabihat, in a more extensive discussion, the inherent meanin of the

CfQ
term mutashdbihdt also conveys some positive meanings, that the verses
resemble one another in eloquence and they confirm each other in the message
they bear. They also resemble each other in beauty and truthfulness. All these
characteristics are ultimately the signs of the miraculous nature of the Qur’an. 28
While there seems to be some general agreement in identifying which
verses constitute the muhkamdt and mutashdbihdt in the field of law and
24 Hamka, Tafsir al-Azhar (Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1982), vol. 3, 710.

25 Kinberg, 150.
26 Ibid., 156.
27 Ibid, 156-157.
28 Ibid, 146.
145
jurisprudence, it is not so in the field of theology, particularly when it relates to
some controversial issues such as the issues of freedom and predetermination, the
createdness of the Qur’an and the Vision of God. Different schools have ascribed
verses which incline to their theological positions as muhkamdt, while for others,
these verses are mutashabihdt. “The Mutazilah," al-Razi related, “due to their
rational inclination, viewed the verse, fa man sba’a falyu’min wa man sha’a
falyakfur’ (let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject)29 as muhkam,
while the verse lwa ma tasha’un ilia an yasha’ Allah’ (but you will not, except as
Allah wills) 30 as mutashabih while the Ashairah viewed the opposite.”31 32

Al-*
Ghazali, in his al-Mankhul min Taliqdt al-Usul listed six different schools
(madhahib) in the identification of muhkamdt and mutashabihdt:

c 32, c < 33
1) Wasil ibn 'Ata’ and 'Amru ibn 'Ubayd who viewed that
muhkam are the warnings of punishment (al-waid) that is
mentioned regarding immoral activities (al-jaralm) and major
sins (kabalr) while the mutashabih are verses about that
warning regarding minor sins (al-saghartr).
ii) Al- Asamm Mutazili jud who flourished under al-
Mu'tasim34 who said that the muhkam are the attributes of the
Prophet in the Taurdt and previous books, while the mutashabih
are his [anthropomorphic] attributes in the Qur’an.
iii) The views of some of the salaf who said that the mutashabih are
the alphabets, while the muhkam are the non-alphabets.
iv) The view of those who said that the mutashabih are verses
identified as abrogated and others are muhkam.
29 Al-Qur’an, al-Kahf, 18:29.

30 Al-Qur’an, al-Insan, 76:30.
31 Asas, 205.
32 His full name is Abu Huzayfah Wasil bin ‘Ata’ al-Ghazzali. He was a pupil of Hasan al-Basri
under whom he studied history and various branches of learning during the reigns of 'Abd al-
Malik b. Marwan and Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik. He was highly esteemed amon the Mu'tazilah
tn
for his learning and culture. The Mutazilah were known to uphold the warnin of reward and
punishment as one of their main theological principles. Milal, 43-45.
3 He was a follower of Wasil bin 'Ata’ in the circle of the Mutazilah. A transmitter of Hadith
and well-known for his asceticism. He was an emissary of Yazid during the Ummayyad period
but afterwards he became a friend of Mansur whose imamate he accepted. Mansur once praised
him saying, ‘I threw grain out to the people and all gathered it up except 'Amr., Milal, 24,45.
34 Tritton, 126.
146
v) The views of another group of which Ibn Abbas was one who
said that the mutashabih are those verses which are difficult to
be understood by their literal meaning such as the verse
mentioning God being established on the throne (al-istiwa9).
vi) The view of al-Zujjaj who said that all the verses of the Qur’an
are muhkam except the verse of the Day of Resurrection (al-
-
Qiyamah).
LEGITIMACY OF INTERPRETING THE MUTASHABIHAT
The verse 7, Al cImran also becomes the point of contention and continuing
debate among scholars as to who really had the correct understanding of the
meaning of the ambiguous verses (dydt mutashabihat). The contention resulted
from the discord over the punctuation of the phrase in the previous verse of
Surah Al ‘Imran, the verse which says, “no one knows its true meanings except
Allah and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge...” (wa ma ya lam
ta \vtlahu ilia Allah wa al-rasikhun fi al-ilm). The contention is whether there is
punctuation between the word Allah and the phrase wa al-rasikhun fi al-‘ilm.
Those who maintained that the true meaning of the ambiguous verses is known
only to God would read the verse with punctuation separating the word ‘Allah’
and the phrase “those are firmly grounded in knowledge” as the ones who know
the meanin of the mutashabihat. Others took the particle waw as a

CfQ
conjunctive thereby ascribing the capacity of understanding and the right of
interpreting such a text not merely to God but also to those who are firmly
rooted in knowledge.
This debate concerning punctuation, as we shall see later, has deeper
implications for another discussion namely whether or not the meanin of the
CfQ
Qur’an is totally established and clear. Those who are of the view that there are
verses whose meanings are beyond the grasp of the human intellect agree with* *
35 Al-Ghazali, al-Mankbul min Taliqdt al-Usul, ed. Muhammad Hassan Haitu, (Dimashq: Dar
al-Fikr, 2nd edn, 1980), 170-172
36 This was the view of some important companions and linguists such as Ibn 'Abbas, 'A’ishah,
Malik b. Anas, al-Kisa’i and al-Farra’. Tafslr, vol. 3, 145.
147
the position that there is a punctuation in the middle of the sentence which, in
turn, means that even those who are deeply rooted in knowledge will not know
the true import of these verses. Therefore, we should leave the meanings of
these verses to God. While those who regard the whole content of the Qur’an as
established and clear, deny any punctuation in the sentence, thus affirming the
authority of those who are deeply rooted in knowledge to interpret the
mutashabihat verses. Al-Razi himself defended the view that the punctuation
should be after the phrase wa al-rasikhun fi al-(ilm, hence he agreed that not
only does God know the meaning of the mutashabihat, but so also do those who
are deeply rooted in knowledge. This is because it is improper for God to say
something he does not mean or only known to Him. Furthermore, God has
described the Qur’an as being a guidance (hudan) and clear illustration (bayari)
which presupposes that the meaning of the Qur’an can be understood.37
Nevertheless, in Asas, al-Razi elaborated upon the salaf position and their
reasons in restricting the knowledge of the meaning of the mutashabihat only to
God. The core argument of the salaf, according to al-Razi, was to affirm that the
true meaning of mutashabihat is not its apparent meaning and that we must
leave the meanings to God and not indulge in futile interpretations.38 Among
their reasons for leaving the meaning to God are:
i) that the inquiry into the meanings of the mutashabihat is

blameworthy as alluded to by verse seven in Surah Al-'Imran
mentioned before.
ii) those who are deeply rooted in knowledge are praised by God
due to their unshakeable belief in God’s knowledge (yaqulun
amanna billah).
iii) the view that the waw is conjunctive is not in line with the
Arabic science of eloquence (fasahah).
iv) if the knowledge of the meanings of the mutashabihat are also
known by those who were deeply rooted in knowledge, the
37 Al-Razi, al-Mahsul fi 'Ilm al-Usul, ed. Taha Jabir al-'Alwani (Bayrut: Mu’assasah al-Risalah,
1992), vol.l, 386.
38 Asus, 207.
148
Companions and the earlier generations who are nearer to the
Prophet would have narrated the meanings of these
anthropomorphic verses while this was not the case.
CAN THERE BE ANYTHING IN THE QUR’AN THAT IS BEYOND OUR

KNOWLEDGE?
The contention re arding mubkamat and mutashabibat also stems from
discourse regarding the clarity of the Qur’an, that is, the meaning of the Qur’an
wholly established and clear? Is it possible that there are verses or words in the
Quran whose meanin are beyond the knowledge of human beings and only
known to God? In answering these questions, Muslim scholars from the past,
according to al-Razi, were divided into two main groups: first, the mutakallimun
who agreed that all the contents of the Qur’an are established and understood,
and second, most of the jurists, traditionists (ahi al-hadith) and the sufis, who
disagreed with this view. The mutakallimun argued that if there is something in
the Qur’an which is beyond the comprehension of human beings, then the
Qur’an is, therefore, using a language that is not clear, thus contradicting the
very claim of the Qur’an that it is revealed in clear Arabic tongue (bi lisanin
39 Ibid., 211-213. In Tafsir, al-Razi elaborated further the arguments supporting the view of the
salaf that when a word yields a literal meaning and there is a stronger proof that the literal
meaning is not intended by God, what is left are various metaphorical meanings (majazat) of this
word. The selection of one meaning over the others can only be done based on linguistic
preference (tarjib at al-lughawiyyab), yet linguistic preference is conjectural and not
recommendable since the matter has to do with fundamental, specific issues and is not
conjectural. “It is unanimous among the Muslim scholars that conjectural sayings with regard to
God’s essence and attributes is not possible. Second, this verse is preceded by the condemnation of
God of those who seek interpretation (talab al-ta\vll al-mutasbabihat). Third, God’s praise of
those who are deeply rooted in knowledge and who put their faith in God on matters regarding
mutashabibat. Fourth, if there is a punctuation after the phrase al-rasikbun fi al-'ilm and the
next verse starts from the phrase yaqulun amanna bibi, it sounds strange linguistically especially
in terms of its eloquence (fasahah). Al-Razi also quoted the saying of Ibn 'Abbas that there are
four kinds of tafsir of the Qur’an: first, that which everyone knows; second, that which is known
only by the Arabs; third, that which is known by scholars; fourth, that which is known only by
God. The tafsir of the mutashabibat, according to al-Razi, is the fourth. Tafsir, vol. 3, 146.
149
‘arabiyyin mubin). Furthermore, since the Qur’an is a speech (kalam) whose
very meaning presupposes understanding (ifham), the absence of understanding
with re ard to some of the verses will therefore render the speech useless
CfQ
(‘abathari). 1 It is also unacceptable that the Prophet is commanded by God to
warn the people (li takun min al-mundharin), yet in doing so he was given
book with incomprehensible verses.43 42 there are numerous verses in the
40 41Since
Qur’an which urge humankind to contemplate the meaning of the Qur’an (e.g.,
afala yatadabbarun al-Qur’an),44 it is highly incongruous that they are asked to
contemplate verses which are not comprehensible to them. There are several
other phrases and terms which imply that the whole content of the Qur’an is
(clear book), tibyanan li

comprehensible, such as the phrase kitabun mubin45 46
kulli sbay ^(explaining all things), balagbun li al-nas47 (message for mankind)
and ma farratna fl al-kitab min sbay48 (nothing have We omitted from the
Book).
The second group, however, contested the view by saying that not all of
the verses of the Qur’an are meant to be understood by mankind. There are
some verses which are beyond comprehension. They substantiated their view by
drawing an analogy with the act of worship (flbadat). Just as in worshipping
God, there are some acts whose meaning and wisdom can be comprehended by
mankind such as prayer, fasting and almsgiving, while the wisdom of some
others cannot be comprehended such as pilgrimage, so also is the case with the
40 Al-Qur’an, al-Shu ara’ 26:195; Asas, 200.

41 Asas, 200.
42 “Verily this is a revelation from the Lord of the worlds. With it came down the spirit of faith
and truth. To your heart and mind, that you may admonish, in the perspicuous Arabic tongue,”
Al-Qur’an, al-Shu'ara’ 26:195.
43 Asas, 197.
44 Al-Qur’an, Muhammad 47:24; Al-Qur’an, al-Nisa’ 4;82.
45 Al-Qur’an, al-Ma’idah 5:15.
46 Al-Qur’an, al-Nahl 16:89.
47 Al-Qur’an, Ibrahim 14:52.
150
verses in the Qur’an. There are kinds of speech whose meanings are known
while there are others which are not. The only wisdom for the latter, as in the
case of ‘ibadaf is for the glorification (tazim) and total submission to God
(kamal al-inqiyadf49 Thus, the Juqnbd’and the muhaddithun believed that the
content of the Qur’an, in this case, is divided into two: those whose meanings are
known by human beings and those which are not and whose meaning can only
be known to God. The most obvious proof according to them for this view is the
abbreviated alphabets at the beginnin of some chapters of the Qur an (al-huruf
CfQ
al-muqattaah) whose ultimate meanings are not known.50 Regarding these
alphabets, the fuqaha’ and the muhaddithun maintained that their meaning is
secret, concealed and hidden by God, based among others on the saying of Abu
Bakr that “in every book of God there is a secret and His secret in the Qur’an is
the letters at the beginning of the chapters,” and the saying of ‘All that “to every
book there is a safwah (quintessence) and the safwah of the Qur’an is the
alphabets (tafrdyf).”51 52
Al-Razi himself attempted his own discerning reconciliation with regard
to these two contending views by explaining the context in which both views can
be understood. Maintaining that while there are indications in the Qur’an that
the meaning of the Qur’an is in its entirety established (muhkam) such as “tilka
ayat al-kitab al-hakim” (These are the verses of the Clear Book), and “kitabun
49 Asas, 201.
50 As we may see later, the above position of both the mutakallimun, on the one hand, and the
fuqaha’ and the muhaddithun, on the other, left some impact on their view on taXvil. The
former, parallel with their view that the totality of the Qur’an is established in meaning, pushed
for an allegorical interpretation of those verses dealing with anthropomorphism, while the latter
were satisfied with the position of tafwid, that is, to leave the meaning to God.
51 Tafsir, vol.l, 250. As to the first group, they tried to interpret the meaning of these alphabets.
Al-Razi enumerated 21 different views of the mutakallimun in describing the meaning of these
alphabets, for example, that these alphabets are the name of the verses, the Name of God, part of
the divine names of God, name of the Qur’an, the divine attributes, divine acts.
52 Al-Qur’an, Yunus 10:1.
151
uhkimat aydtuhu” (This is a book with verses of established meanings), 3 there
are also verses which allude to the fact that the Qur’an as a whole, is ambiguous,
such as the verse “Allah has revealed the most beautiful Message in the form of
book, ambiguous and repeating (Allah rtazzala ahsana al-baditb kitaban
mutashabihan matbaniya}” 4 and “Had it been from other than Allah, they
would surely have found therein much discrepancy (yva law kana min ‘indi gbayr
53 Both
Allah lawajadu fihi ikhtilafan kathirany’55 54 assertions, al-Razi maintained,
must be understood from their contextual meanings. The first, namely that the
Qur’an is on the whole established in meaning would indicate that the words and
meanings of the Qur’an are true and established in terms of expression and
meanin compared to other speech. There is no other speech that

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commensurates to the Speech of God. To say that the Qur’an is in its totality
mutashdbih would mean that some of the verses resemble (yashbah) the other in
their merit (al-busn) and eloquence (fasahah) thus affirming instead of
contradicting each other.56 Al-Razi elsewhere agreed that the miracle of the
Qur’an basically related to its eloquence and not to other aspects such as its
method (uslub) or its account of unseen matters.57 Based on this accommodative
view, it seems that al-Razi was with the view that, as a whole, the meaning of
the Qur’an can be understood since its ambiguity refers to the resemblance in
terms of merit and eloquence.
53 Al-Qur’an, Hud 11:1.

54 Al-Qur’an, al-Zumar 39:23.
56 Asas, 202; Tafsir , vol. 3, 137-138.
57 Al-Razi, Nihayat al-Ijaz ft Dirayat al-Fjaz, ed. Bakri Sheikh Amin (Bayrut: Dar al-'Ilm li al-
Malayin, 1985), 78-82.
152
LINGUISTIC AND TECHNICAL MEANING OF MUHKAM AND
MUTASHABIH
Linguistically, al-Razi explained that a word (lafz) which is the locus (mawduj
co
of a meaning can either have one or many meanings. If it has one meaning, it
is referred to as the explicit (nass). If, on the other hand, it contains more than
one meaning, it may fall into one of the following categories: i) if the first
meaning is the preponderating one (rajih) compared to the second, the first
meamn is called the manifest (zahir) while the second, the interpreted
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(mu’awwal). If it has two meanings that are equal and one of them does not
preponderate over the other, both of the meanings are called the equivocation
(mushtarak), and each meaning, when it refers to the individual meaning, is

called generality (mujmal).58
59
Based on this classification, in general, there are four kinds of words that
imply meanings: nass, zahir, muhwwal and mujmal. The first two, namely,
nass and zahir, share the quality of clarity and preponderance in meanin over
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the other two. The only difference is that a nass is free from contradiction
(manian min al-naqtd) in the sense that it will not go against another nass,
while zahir is open to contradiction as in the case of the mutashabihat verses. As
for mu ’awwal and mujmal, both share the lack of clarity in meaning, and in the
case of mujmal, both meanings are of equal status with one meaning not
preponderating over the other. While in the case of mu’awwal, there is
preponderance with regards to the shared meaning. Now, both nass and zahir are
considered muhkam since they carry a clear meaning (haml al-lafz ‘ala manahu
58 Asas, 203; Tafsir, vol. 3, 138; al-Razi, al-Mahsul, vol.l, 228. Cf. Al-Ghazali’s discussion on the
similar issue in Iysa A. Bello, The Medieval Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy:
ma and Ta ’wil in the Conflict between al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 52-
65.
59 Asas, 203.
153
al-rajih). Muhwwal and mujmal, due to their lack of clarity, are regarded as
mutashdbih.60
TERMS/VERSES IN THE QUR’AN
Muhkam Mutashabih
(clarity) (ambiguity)
nass - single meaning mu’awwal - less clearer in

(beyond contradiction) meaning
mujmal - similar meaning
zahir - preponderant meaning
(open to contradiction)
TA W IL AS A METHOD FOR UNDERSTANDING THE

MUTASHABIHAT
Since the mutashabihat verses carry an inherent ambiguity in their meanings,
their understandin is more problematic compared to the muhkamat. Their

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interpretation becomes more disputable as the Qur’an, the verse seven in Al
'Imran which we have consulted before, warns against preponderating on the
meaning of the mutashabihat.61 Yet, as we have alluded to before, for those who
are of the view that the meanin of these verses is known to those who are
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deeply rooted in knowledge, the arrival at their meanings can be attained through
the right interpretation by these people. Since the mutashabihat are mainly
identified with the anthropomorphic verses, whose literal understanding can lead
to meanings antithetical to divine transcendence, the need for their proper
assignment of meaning becomes more pressing. Hence, ta \vll, an allegorical and
60 Ibid., 204.
61 “Those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part thereof that is not well-established
meaning.” Al-Qur’an, Al 'Imran 3:7.
154
deeper interpretation of these verses, have become the most appropriate method
upheld by the majority of the later mutakallimun and mufassirun in solving this
problem.
Linguistically, ta’wil is derived from the verb awwala which means to
return. It refers to an effort to understand the meaning by referring back to the
origin. Al-Razi asserted that linguistically ta’wil refers to the tracing of the
meaning of a word to its origin and result (al-marjac wa al-masirf62 When
explaining verses in which the term ta’wil occurs such as the phrase wa ibtigba’a
ta'wilibi63 and the verse regarding Prophet Moses and Prophet Khidr “sa
’unabbi’uka bi ta’wil ma lam tastati ‘alaybi sabran (I will tell you the
interpretation of those things over which you were unable to hold patience),64 al-
Razi clarified that ta’wil in these two phrases means the inclination to inquire
into the explanation of the very intent of a term (ikbbar ‘arnma yarjiu ilaybi al-
lafz min al-mana).6 In this regard, ta’wil bears the same meanin as tafsir.
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This view is in line with the beginning of the development of tafsir where both
the terms tafsir and ta’wil were used interchangeably.66 67

However, both terms
later gained more intensive meaning, with the first referring to the intensive,
esoteric meaning of a verse, while the second to the exoteric and direct
67
meamn
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How, then, did al-Razi explain the method of ta’wil with regard to
deriving the meaning of the mutasbabibdt? The first is by underlining the need
for a clear method of classifying the muhkamat and mutasbabibdt. A word said
al-Razi:
62 Tafsir, vol.3, 145.

63 Al-Qur’an, Al ‘Imran 3:7.
64 Al-Qur’an, al-Kahf 18:78.
65 Tafsir, vol. 3, 145.
66 See Shalahudin Kafrawi, “Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s Sources of Ta’wil: Between Revelation and
Reason,” Islamic Quarterly, vol. XLIII, no. 3 (1999):187.
67 A.J. Arberry, Revelation and Reason in Islam (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1957), 16;
Kafrawi, 187.
155
if it implies two meanings, one meaning is preponderating (rajih)
and the other is preponderated (marjuh). If we take the rajih and
leave the marjub, this situation is called muhkam. If, on the other
hand, we take the marjub and leave the rajih, we arrived at the
mutashabih.63
It is in the second one where the preponderated meaning is preferred that
ta \vil is done. But when do we re ard certain verses as mutashabihat in which
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ta \vil is needed? What are the situations in which the preponderated meaning
(marjub) should be preferred over the preponderating one (rajih)? Al-Razi
admitted the difficulty in identifiying the mutashabihat for it has been disputed
by many scholars from many schools of thought.69 Nevertheless, what he was
suggesting is that there is a need for a basic rule (al-qanun al-‘asli) that can be
referred to in identifying the muhkamdt and mutashabihat.70 It is apparent from
his explanation that when the preponderating meaning (rajih) of the word is clear
and does not involve any contradiction with any other proofs, then this verse is
called muhkamdt; hence no ta\vll is required. Nevertheless, when there is
another proof which contradicts the rajih to the extent that we have to move to
the meaning that is marjub, this verse is called the mutashabihat, and ta\vil, in
this case, is necessary. This would mean that ta\vil or the preference of the
second meaning of the word is only applicable when there is another proof that
clearly contradicts the literal or predominant meanin of the word.

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The next question is: what kind of proof can contradict the
preponderating meaning of the word? To al-Razi, not any proof can invalidate
the preponderating meaning of the term. This proof, maintained al-Razi, must
be an external and independent proof (dalil munfasiT). In other words, we

69 Asas, 205.
156
cannot use the preponderated meaning without the existence of the external
evidence:
[In the case of contradiction,] if the word of the verse or report is

predominant in meaning (zahiranfi al-mana), we have to leave this
predominant meaning through an external evidence (dalil
munfasil)”. Otherwise the speech of God will be meaningless and
the Qur’an will not be a proof (hujjah). 71
Al-Razi went on to explain the nature of this external proof. This proof
must be rational in nature, for if it is textual, than there will be two
contradictory textual proofs where neither the selection of one proof will be prior
to the other:
This external proof is either textual or rational. If it is the first, we

affirm that if this happened, there will be two contradictory textual
proofs. If there is contradiction between the two, neither the
exclusion of one of them in replacement of the other is prior (laysa
tark ahadahuma li ibqa’ al-akhar awla min al-aks), except to say
that one of the two proofs is decisive (qdti) while the other is zahir,
and qdti is preponderant over the zahir, or to say that each of the
two are zahir, only that one of them is stronger than the other...71 72
Nevertheless, al-Razi did not agree with the view that one textual proof
can be more decisive in terms of its indication (daldlah) compared to another
textual proof due to the fact that all textual proofs are conjectural (maznun)
since they are based on a number of conditions which must be met before they
can be considered as certain.73 “Conjecture (al-zunun),99 affirmed al-Razi, “must
not be relied upon in arriving at conclusions on matters that are established
rationally (al-masall al-‘aqliyyah al-qat'iyyah)”74 Based on the same principle,
he did not accept that one textual proof is clearer than the other. For him, to
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 For the detail of these conditions, see 164-165 of this chapter (Discussion on rational and
traditional proofs).
74 Asas, 206.
157
move from one textual meaning which is clear to another textual meaning can
only be done with problems dealing with legal matters (masa’il fiqhiyyah) but
not with problems relating to theological matters (masa’il usuliyyahf75 Hence,
for al-Razi, we can only turn away from the literal meaning of a textual proof
once a decisive rational proof has been attained that the literal meanin is
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unacceptable:
From what we have mentioned, it is established that the movin
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from the preponderating meaning (zahir) to the preponderated one
(mu ’awwal) is not possible unless there is a decisive [rational] proof
that the preponderating meaning is impossible and rejected.76
Although ta\vil is necessary, al-Razi assigned the role of ta’wil only to
those who are able to do it, and he advised those who are not able to do so to
leave the meaning to God:
When [the impossibility of the literal] meaning take place, it is

necessary for a Muslim to affirm that the intended meaning of this
word is not what is imparted through its apparent meanin Then
at this stage, those who are capable to do ta\vil, should go for it
while those who don’t, should leave the knowledge [of its meaning]
to God.77
Since al-Razi’s main emphasis is divine transcendence, what is important
for him is the insistence on avoiding the literal meaning apparent in these verses.
For that matter, al-Razi did not object the method of the salaf who entrust the
knowledge of the meaning of the mutashdbihdt to God. In fact, to him, to opt
for the salafi position was safe for it is far from the risk of being incorrect in
assigning the true meaning of the anthropomorphic expressions.78 But this does

76 Asas. 206.
77 Ibid.
78 For al-Razi, the method of the salaf is different from those of the Hanabilah and the
Karramiyyah who he criticized in Asas al-Taqdis. The salaf rejected the literal meaning of the
verses before assigning the meaning to God, while the Hanabilah, due to their strict affirmation
of the mutashdbihdt as the ‘so-called’ words of God, affirmed their literal meanings.
158
not invalidate the necessity of ta ’wil since ta ’wil is a rational implication of the
rejection of the apparent meaning of the anthropomorphic verses. Once we reject
the apparent meaning, it is either we leave the meaning to God like the salaf or
we assign an alternative meanin in order to make the verses comprehensible.
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Furthermore, al-Razi seems to conform to the prescriptions of the Qur an that to
arrive at the meaning of the mutashabihdt is possible and can be appropriately
carried out by those who are deeply rooted in knowledge. As a theologian who
continuously emphasized the understandability of the Qur’an, al-Razi inevitably
had to explain the meanin CfQ

of these verses as what he had done in Asas al-
Taqdis.
Al-Razi maintained that most of the groups in Islam affirmed that ta ’wil
is necessary with regard to some of the Qur’anic verses.79 After putting forward
arguments on the impossibility of understanding the verses and the Hadiths in
their literal sense, al-Razi asserted that “ta’wil is something necessary for every
reasonable person (‘aqU)... when it is affirmed based on strong proofs that God
the exalted is pure from any notion of direction and body, it is necessary for us
to assign those verses their proper meanings.”80
THE IMPORTANCE OF REASON AS THE SOURCE OF TA WlL: AN

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
As we have seen before, al-Razi’s position regarding muhkamdt, mutashabihdt
and ta’wil is influenced by his view on the priority of reason. This priority is
more apparent in his discussion on proof (dalil) where he regarded rational proof
as a foundation in apprehending the meaning of the revelation. In this remaining
analysis, we will look at his view on the rational and traditional proofs and the
epistemological solution when contradiction between the two occurs.
79 Ibid., 91.
159
As a mutakallim and a logician, the consistency between the meanings of
the verses of the Qur’an is, for al-Razi’s, the highest priority in understanding
the revelation. This priority can be discerned, for example, in the way he
organized his great Qur’anic commentary, al-Tafstr al-Kabir.sl Throughout this
voluminous and encyclopedic tafsir which embraces extensive discussions on
various fields such as kalam, philosophy, fiqb, usul, physics, logic and
grammar,82 al-Razi consistently explained the connection of one verse to another
and provided reasonable explication on the relationship between all the
chapters. As remarked by Hussayn al-Dhahabi, it is not sufficient for al-Razi to
only mention one relation, but in most cases, he will mention more than one
relation and this systematic approach has been a distinctive mark of this tafsir to
such an extant that it is considered the most important commentary with
rational-intellectual justifications (al-tafsir bi al-ra ’y).
Not only did he emphasize a systematic explanation amon the verses, al-
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Razi also stressed the requirement that all these verses must be consistent with
the rational principle. For him, inconsistency between the Qur’anic verses and the
principle of reason will imply that the whole message of the revelation is not
understandable, which is incongruous with the fact that the Qur’an was revealed
to humankind whose essential quality is his reason. Al-Razi maintained that it is
impossible for God to reveal something that has no meaning, for that will render
God as revealing something senseless (budhyan) which implies His81
81 Also known as Mafdtlh al-Ghayb, this Qur’anic commentary (32 vols, Al-Qahirah edition) is
re arded as the most extensive tafsir. It was described by Ibn Khallikan as one that
tn
‘encompassed all remarkable and strange things’ (jamaa fihi kullu gharib wa gbaribah). It
contains vast discussion on various kinds of knowledge, views of different sects such as the
Mutazilah, the philosophers, the Karramiyyah and other Muslim sects. Its extensive nature can
also be seen among others, in his discussion of surah al-Fatibab, in which he says that from this
surah alone, 10,000 problems can be extracted. As reported by al-Dhahabi, Abu Hayyan in his
work Bahr al-Muhit remarked that “it has everything in it except ta/sir”(This statement is also
attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah). Al-Husayn al-Dhahabi, vol.l, 289-296.
82 Ibid, 293.
83 Ibid, 294.
160
Further,
imperfection.84 85 86 87 it is impossible for God to reveal the message of the
religion using language which cannot be comprehended and that is

contradictory.8 Since the Qur’an was revealed to humankind as a clear
explication (bayan) in the Arabic language that is clear (mubin), far from any
crookedness,88 its meaning must, first and foremost, be understandable and
consistent.
RATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL PROOFS
under the topic ‘whether traditional

In his kalam and usul al-fiqh works, 89 90
proofs yield certainty or not,’ al-Razi underlined the priority of reason; that
rational proofs are necessary in any argument to such an extent that they must
be the basis of the traditional (transmitted) proofs (al-adillab al-naqliyyah)99
“Reason,” says al-Razi, “is the foundation for understandin revealed text (‘asl
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20
al-naql)...if we disprove reason, we have disproved the very tool in understanding
of a revealed text, and once we have disproved it, we have also disproved the
revealed text.”91 Likewise, reason is necessary since it is the source of reflection
(nazar), which is a way to understanding divine matters. Al-Razi maintained
that nazr (reasoning) which he defined as ‘ordering of assents in order to arrive at
other assents’ (tartib tasdlqat li yatawassal biba tasdlqat akbar)92 is necessary in
reli ion since it is the only way for man to arrive at the knowledge of the
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existence of God. He argued that since the knowledge of the Absolute is
necessary, nazr, as the only way to the knowledge of the Absolute, is also
necessary. This is based on the famous maxim known in usul al-fiqb, namely,
84 Mahsul, vol.l, 385.

85 Ibid., 385-386.
86 Al-Qur’an, Al ‘Imran 3:138.
87 Al-Qur’an, al-Hijr 15:1.
89 See Ma'alim, 21-22; Mahsul, vol.l, 385-318; Muhassal, 51-52; Arba'in, 423-426.
90 Ma'alim, 25; Mahsul, vol., 390-391.
91 Mahsul, vol. 1, 406.
92 Muhassal, 40.
161
“that without which the necessary thing does not complete, is itself necessary”
(ma la yatimm al-wajib ilia bihifa huwa wajib).
Compared to traditional proofs, al-Razi viewed the role of rational proofs
as foundational. Traditional proofs, due to their dependent nature on rational
proofs in that they need to be intellectually processed, cannot stand by
themselves. They also cannot be substantiated by other traditional proofs since
this will lead to circularity. In point of fact, the knowledge of the veracity of the
Prophet, which is the basis of the traditional proofs, is acquired through rational
proof:
A proof based on the Qur’an and the tradition (al-Sunnab) depends

on the knowled of the veracity of the Prophet, and this
knowledge [of the truth of the Prophet] is not attained (la
yustafad) by traditional proof, for that will lead to circularity;
rather it is based on the rational proofs. And it is beyond doubt that
this [preliminary] premise [which is based on the rational proof] is
one of the important parts in the validity of the traditional proof.
Hence, it is affirmed that a proof that is traditional in its entire
premise is impossible and false.93
94
Due to its foundational nature, rational proof is a necessary element in any
form of argument. Al-Razi maintained that proofs can either consist of premises
that are entirely traditional, or entirely rational, or composed of the two. The latter
two are possible while the first, namely, that proofs with entirely traditional
premises, due to the reason explained above, is impossible.95 By advancing the above
argument, al-Razi seemed to stress the importance of rational proofs in internalizing
traditional ones in terms of its logical priority. In other words, traditional proofs
must be preceded logically by rational proofs. Any Qur’anic text or Hadith must
first depend on the veracity of the Prophet as the conveyer of the message, and the
93 Ibid., 44. Cf. Irshad, 7.

94 Arbain, 424.
95 Muhassal, 51.
162
Hence, the
truthfulness of a Prophet, in turn, is justified through rational proofs.96 97
traditional proofs, in its final analysis, cannot continuously base themselves on
similar traditional proofs, but must somehow be founded on rational proofs. This is
also based on the logical principle that a branch cannot be stronger than the root.
Since the rational substantiation in this case is prior and is considered the principle
compared to the traditional proofs, its position is more fundamental in determining
the strength of the argument.
Another argument given by al-Razi supporting the priority of reason is that
which is related to the certainty of the traditional proofs. Rational proofs are prior to
traditional proofs because the latter in themselves do not yield certainty (la tufidu
al-yaqin). This is because traditional proofs by their very nature undergo the
process of transmission and this process is based on some contextual conditions that
need to be verified before they can be regarded as certain. The obscurity of these
conditions, according to al-Razi, will lead to a difficulty in understanding a given
traditional proof:
Traditional proofs do not yield certainty [italics mine] since they are
based on the transmission of language (naql al-lughat), grammar
(al-nahw wa tasrify equivocation (al-ishtiraky metaphor (al-
mojaz\ conveyance (al-naql), concealment (al-idmar), priority and
posteriority (taqdim wa takbir), specification (takbsis), abrogation
(ndsikb), and [rational] contradiction (mu arid). All these are
Q7
conjectural (zanniyyab).
These conditions, which are called ‘the ten rational criteria’, were further
elaborated by al-Razi as the followings:
i) The knowledge of language (marifat al-lugbat) which is based

mostly on the solitary narrations (riwdydt al-abad) from the
96 Nibayat, 133-142. The mutakallimun, according to al-Shahrastani, argued that it is possible for God
to send a Prophet because he has the power to choose a man to communicate His will to mankind so
that there is no impossibility in His doing so. They also argued for the possibility of miracles
through rational arguments.
97 Mahsul, vol. 1, 390-391. See also Mnn/zm, 22; Arbatn, 423-426.
163
linguists who are not free from error and disa ree among each
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other.
n) The correctness of the grammar and syntax (sihhat al-nahw wa
tasrif) with various expressions (i robot) and various meanings
which were also disputed among the grammarians.
iii) Equivocation in the meaning of words (al-ishtirak fi al-lafz) - If
there is equivocation in meaning, the words intended by God
may mean differently from what we understand.
iv) That it is necessary to bear the meaning of a certain word to its
literal (baqiqab) meaning rather than its metaphorical (majaz)
since the latter is numerous.
V) There should be no omissions and concealments or ellipsis (badhf
wa idmar) in the verses, for if it so, denial will become
affirmation and vice versa.
vi) There is no prior and posterior (taqdim wa takbir) with regard
to a narration or verse that will confuse the meanin
vii) There are no general statements (umumdt) without any specific
meanings.
viii) There are no abrogations of verses (nasikh wa mansukh).

ix) There are no contradictions in narrations (mu arid sanii) which
will confuse the true meaning.
x) There are no rational contradictions (mu arid ‘aqlf) whose
existence will lead to metaphorical interpretation of the
98
meanm of the verse.
CfQ
Linguistically, all these conditions are pertinent in determining the
meanm of words. Al-Razi called them “the ten premises” (muqaddamat

CfQ
cashar) which surround the derived meaning of any given textual proof.1 Since
the meanings of traditional proofs are based on language and language is
conditional by the ten contextual matters, the meanings of traditional proofs are
regarded as conjectural (mafnun). Whatever depends on something conjectural is
itself conjectural (al-mawquf bld mafnun mafnun). 1 Hence arguments
98 Arba'in, 424-426
99 For a lengthy linguistic discussions by al-Razi on words and meaning, and their related
problems, see Tafslr, vol.l, 29-50.
100 Arba'in, 424.
101 Ma'alim, 22; Mabsul, vol.l, 407; Tafsir, vol.l, 41-42.
164
(dilalat) which are based solely on traditional arguments, for al-Razi, do not yield
certainty.
Al-Razi, however, made some qualification on this general principle by
allowing the employment of traditional proofs if they are supported by the
mutawdtir reports:
these discussions [on the conjectural nature of the traditional

proofs] in its absolute sense is not true since perhaps the traditional
proof is joined (iqtarana) with matters that are known through
true reports (al-akhbar al-mutawdtirab). These matters will deny
all these possibilities and in this case the traditional proofs, which
are joined with other proofs (al-qaraln), which are affirmed
through true reports will yield certainty.102
The discussion on the priority of reason in any justification is not new in
Ashairah theological thought. Prior to al-Razi, a few other Ashari theologians had
already stressed the importance of reason in understanding revelation. Al-Juwayni,
for example, asserted that what can be proved by revelation must first be accepted
by reason or rendered possible by reason:
If the spirit of the law that has come to us is contrary to the

judgment of reason, on the basis that the law is not contrary to the
judgments of reason, it should be rejected decisively. In this
category, there is no way to formulate a decisive rule on the basis of
tradition.103
102 Arba in , 426; Mahsul, vol.l, 408.

103 Irshad, 196. According to al-Juwayni, what can only be perceived by revelation is the
judgment that affirms the realization of what is possible according to reason but cannot be
decided upon without revelation. This includes the whole body of duties and related matters such
as determining the bad and the good (taqbih wa tab sin), obligatory and forbidden (ijab wa bazr)
and recommended and permitted (badb wa ibahah). Ibid., 195; Muhammad Moslem Adel Saflo,
Al-Juwayni’s Thought and Methodology (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2000), 96-99. In Irshad
also, al-Juwayni explained that the principles of belief are divided into: i) what can be proved by
reason alone, ii) what can be proved by revelation alone iii) what could be proved by both reason
and revelation. In Burhan, he added another principle namely proof based on miracle (mujizat).
Reason, however, plays an important role for it precedes, in principle, revelation in acquiring
knowledge of religion. Ibid; al-Burhan, ed. 'Abd ‘Azim Mahmud Dayb (Doha: Dar al-Wafa’,
1992), vol.l, 116.
165
Al-Juwayni also affirmed that any question of belief that comes prior to the
belief in the speech of God, the Qur’an, can only be understood or known by reason.
This is because revelation (sam'iyydt) is based on the speech of God, so anything
regarding God’s attributes whose proof is preceded by the proof of the Speech (such
as the attributes of Existence, Knowledge, Life) can only be proven by reason, for
the attribute of Speech can only be given to the One who has such attributes:
As for what cannot be perceived except by reason, all elements of

faith depend originally on knowing the Word of God, the Exalted
and on the necessity of its having the quality of being true. The
evidence supplied by tradition is grounded in the speech of God.
Thus, prior to the affirmation of the speech, what one must
acknowledge cannot possibly be grasped through tradition.104
The position is further strengthened by a-Ghazali who viewed that there are
three categories of theological propositions from which knowledge can be derived: (i)
the propositions which can be known by reason without the need of the evidence
from the Shar; (ii) propositions which can be known by the evidence of the Shar
without the need of reason; (iii) propositions which can be known by both these
means. The examples of the first category are the origination of the world, the
existence of the Originator and His Power, Knowledge and Will. All these, according
to al-Ghazali, are important matters that precede the knowledge of internal speech
(kalam al-nafs) which refers to the Qur’an and they cannot be substantiated by the
same kalam, but through reason. An example of the second category are those
matters that reason can only conceive as possible, such as the Resurrection, the Day
of Judgment, reward and punishment. The truth of these propositions cannot be
known except through revelation. The example of the third category is that which
can take place according to reason and is affirmed by revelation, such as the Vision
104 Irshad, 195; Saflo, 96.
166
of God and that God alone is the Creator of all movements and accidents.105 As to
how reason should react on what comes from revelation, al-Ghazali explained that
there are three attitudes of reason toward traditional proofs: (i) reason can state the
possibility of believing in what is provided by the traditional proofs, as in the case
when traditional proofs are conclusive and positive in their transmission (sanad) and
text (jnatrif (ii) reason may state the impossibility of believing in what is provided
by the traditional proofs, as in the case where the wording of the traditional proofs
must be interpreted because what is brought by the traditional proof is opposed to
the verdict of reason; (iii) reason may take passive attitude and refrain from
making any statement upon either the possibility or the impossibility of believing in
what is provided by the traditional proofs.106
What is clear from the view given by al-Razi’s predecessors regarding the
role of reason is that they generally agreed that reason plays an important role in
substantiating some major foundational aspects of religious doctrines. The
doctrines that come from the traditional proofs must also not be in contradiction
with the principle of reason. What al-Razi did was to pursue further this
position by putting forward the condition in detail. As a matter of fact, al-Razi’s
new way of putting forward the elaboration regarding the status of rational and
traditional proofs influenced many mutakallimun after him in their treatment of
the topic of proofs. For example, in both al-Taftazani’s Sharh al-Maqasid and
al-Jurjani’s Sharh al-Mawaqif, two important works of later Ash'arite kalarn, the
ten conditions discussed above were elaborated as being necessary conditions that
must be satisfied before any scriptural text can yield certain knowledge.107 As
recorded by Heer, al-Taftazani and al-Jurjani classified these ten conditions into
105 Al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad, 132. See also M.A.R. Bisar, Al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali as Theologians:
with special reference to al-Irshad and al-Ttiqad, (Ph.D. dissertation, Edinburgh University,
1953), 40-41.
106 Al-Ghazali, al-Iqtisad , 133; Bisar, 41-42.
107 Nicholas Heer, “The Priority of Reason in the Interpretation of Scripture: Ibn Taymiyah and
the Mutakallimun”, Literary Heritage of Classical Islam, ed. Mustansir Mir (Princeton: The
Darwin Press, Inc., 1993), 181-183.
167
three general headings: first, that the language of the text must be known for
certain. This includes its vocabulary (lugbah), syntax (rtabw) accidence (sarf);
second, the intent (iradah) of the speaker must be verified which is known if the
text is devoid of changes in the meanings of words (naql), ambiguity (ishtirak),
metaphor (majaz), ellipsis or omission (idmar), limitation (takhsis), and irre ular
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ordering of words (taqdim wa ta kbir); third, there must be no rational counter
argument (mu‘arid aqli) that conflicts with the meaning of the scriptural text. If
such conflicts exist, the scriptural text must be interpreted allegorically.108
Concerning the last condition, which is pertinent to our discussion, namely that
there will be no rational contradiction within traditional proofs, al-Taftazzani
said:
Among the necessary [conditions], but with respect to which there

can be no certain knowledge (al-jazm), is the absence of a rational
counter-argument (al-muarid al-aqli), since should such
counter-argument exist, scripture (al-naql) would have to be
interpreted allegorically (ta’wil) and shifted from its literal meaning
(zahirihi). The reason for this is that it is impossible to affirm
(tasdiq) both [scripture and reason], because of the impossibility of
believing two contradictory propositions (al-naqidayri) to be true,
or to deny (takdhib) both, because it is also impossible to believe
two contradictory propositions to be false. It is also impossible to
affirm scripture while denying reason, because reason is the root
(asl) to understanding scripture and scripture stands in need of it
and ultimately terminates with it, for, as has been mentioned
previously, the truth of the scripture can be known only through
rational evidence (dalil ‘aqli), and to deny the source in order to
affirm its derivative (al-far) is to deny both the source and its
derivative. The existence of that which implies its [own]
nonexistence is certainly absurd (batil).109
Jurjani’s in his Sbarb al-Mawaqif also commented on the same matter:
8 Heer, “The Priority of Reason,” 182.

109 Al-Taftazzani, Sharh al-Maqasid, ed. 'Abd Rahman 'Umayrah, (Bayrut: 'Alam al-Kutub,
1989), vol.l, 283.
168
The reason the rational counter-argument must be given priority
over scriptural evidence is because they cannot both be operative (la
yumkin al-camal bihima) in the sense that one cannot judge the
implications of both to be false either, because that would violate
the principle of excluded middle (irtifa al-naqidayn).no
SOLUTION TO THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN RATIONAL AND

TRADITIONAL PROOFS
In Asas particularly, al-Razi laid down the principle that should be upheld when
dealing with any contradiction between a literal understanding of textual proofs
from the Qur’an or Hadith and rational proofs such as in the case of the
anthropomorphic verses.110 How do we, for example, account for the meaning of
111 112
the ‘hand of God’ (yadd Allah) whose literal meaning contradicts the rational
principle that God cannot be ascribed with corporeal and physical attributes. If
such contradictions occur, there are four possibilities that may happen: (i) either
we approve both the rational and textual proofs. This is impossible since
logically, we cannot affirm two contradictories (tasdiq al-naqidayn); (ii) to
disprove both of them which is also impossible, for it denies two contradictories;
(iii) to affirm the apparent meaning of the textual proof and disprove the rational
principle that is contrary to the literal meaning. This option was also, to al-Razi,
unacceptable based on the reason that we mentioned before that the preference of
the traditional proofs at the expense of the rational proofs is undesirable as it will
impin upon the traditional proofs themselves. Since all these three
possibilities are rejected, the only way out, for al-Razi, is the fourth, namely, to
hold to the principle of reason which necessitates that the meanin of these
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111 Asos, 193-194.
112 If these matters are proved by textual proofs namely the Qur’an or Hadith, it will lead to
circularity (dawr), since God, whose existence is the object of proof, Himself brings down the
Qur’an.
169
traditional proofs are true yet the meanings are not literal. In this case, if the
traditional proofs can be interpreted via ta\vil, they must be so done. In the case
of the word ‘the hand of God,’ since it is not parallel with God’s divine
transcendence, it can be allegorically interpreted as meaning the omnipotence and
power of God. But if the allegorical interpretation (ta\vil) cannot be done in
such way, the knowledge of the meanin of the verses must be entrusted
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(fawwada) to God.1 This is, according to al-Razi, the general methodology (al-
qanun al-kulliy) that should be followed in dealing with the anthropomorphic
verses.
IBN TAYMIYYAH’S RESPONSE
Al-Razi’s principle that rational proofs form the basis of traditional proofs was
challenged by a Hanbalite scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328). Since this challen
is very much relevant to our discussion, we will discuss in brief the ar uments of
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Ibn Taymiyyah. In his work, Dar’ Taarud al-Aql wa al-Naql, Ibn Taymiyyah
made clear at the very outset of the work, where he repeated al-Razi’s view:
If there is a conflict between scriptural and rational evidence

(adillah al-sarniyyab wa al-aqliyyab), or scripture and reason (al-
sam‘ wa al-aql), or tradition and reason (al-naql wa al-aql), or
traditional text (al-zawahir al-naqliyyab) and rational certainties
(al-qawati al-aqliyyab), or what is expressed in similar terms,
then either [1] both may be accepted as true (yujma baynabuma),
but that is impossible because it violates the principle of
contradiction (jam' bayn naqidayn), or [2] both may be rejected as
false, [and that is impossible because it violates the principle of
excluded middle], or [3] scripture may be given priority [over
reason]. That, however, is also impossible because reason is the
source of scripture (asl al-naql), and if we give priority to scripture
over reason, we should thereby impugn reason, which is the source
of scripture. Furthermore, to impugn the source of a thing is also
to impugn the thing itself. Therefore, to give priority to scripture is*
113 Asas, 194. In this case, perhaps al-Razi was referring to those alphabets that occur at the
outset of some verses in the Qur’an from which no other allegorical meanings can be derived.
170
not only to impugn reason but to impugn scripture as well. It is,
therefore necessary [4] to give priority to reason and either to
interpret scripture allegorically (yuta ’awwal), or to entrust its
meaning to God (yu/hwwud).114
Ascribing the origin of this principle to al-Razi and his followers, Ibn
Taymiyyah claimed that the former has put this principle as a universal law
(qanurt kulliy) in giving proof from the Book of God and the sayings of the
Prophets.115 Ibn Taymiyyah rejected this principle on the basis that it is based on
three false premises: (i) that there exists a conflict between reason and scripture;
(ii) that the alternatives mentioned are limited to four, and (iii) that the three
alternatives rejected are, in fact, impossible.116 In refuting these premises, he
presented forty-four arguments attacking primarily the notion of reason
understood by the mutakallimun.117 The basic outline of Ibn Taymiyyah’s
refutation, as summarized by Abrahamov, is as follows:
I. Reason is not the basis of tradition
II. Arguments against the rational arguments:
1. They are various and sometimes self-contradictory.
2. They contain doubts.
3. They are a mixture of truth and falsehood.
4. They do not coincide with linguistic use.
5. They are not always rational.
III. The arguments of kalam and philosophy are false.

IV. The result of the preference of reason.118
114 Ibn Taymiyyah, Muwafaqdt, 31.

115 Ibid., 32.
117 See further Abrahamov, Binyamin, “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with
Tradition,” The Muslim World, vol. LXXXII, No. 3-4 (July-October 1992), 257-258; Heer, “The
Priority of Reason”, 181-192.
118 Abrahamov, “Ibn Taymiyyah,” 258.
171
Traditional proofs, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, do not need reason as
their basis since they can stand by themselves. They exist on account of
Prophetic report or other devices whether we know their existence or not.
Furthermore, the content brought by the traditional proofs such as God’s unity,
His names and attributes, His Messenger’s veracity exist whether we know them
or not.119 They do not, in other words, need the justification from reason.
Ibn Taymiyyah also attacked the integrity of reason by saying that
rational principles are relative and sometimes contradictory. It can be seen in the
case of the philosophers who had the highest number of divergence in their
views. Rational proofs also, to Ibn Taymiyyah, combined in themselves truth

and falsities.120 On the other hand, traditional proofs, namely, the revelation, are
greed upon by wise people. It cannot be said that the matters brought by the
traditional proofs contradict reason since they are known through necessary
knowledge which ensues from uninterrupted narrations (tawdtur).
Holding mainly on the method of interpretation of the Qur’an by the
Qur’an, Ibn Taymiyyah disapproved taXvil by saying that everything is already
explained by the Qur’an and the Prophet. He viewed that there is no need to
move from the literal meaning to an alternative meanin of word since

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whatever alternative meaning that exists must already have been explained by
the Prophet since he is the best qualified person to elucidate the truth.121 In
other words, if there is another meaning intended by the anthropomorphic verses,
the Prophet would have explained it through the traditions. Furthermore, as far
as the essence and attributes of God are concerned, Ibn Taymiyyah is in the
position that we have to affirm of Him whatever He affirmed of Himself in the
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., 259.
121 Ibid., 264.
172
Qur’an and in the authentic Hadiths.122 Ibn Taymiyyah’s attack on ta’wil was
also based on the claim that there are no standard rule in employing this method.
Since ta \vil is based on reason and reason has already been condemned by him as
subjective and inconsistence, ta’wil is also uncertain. He also questioned the
basis for choosing which verses required ta \vil and which do not.
In sum, Ibn Taymiyyah was of the view that since revelation also contains
the rational principle and it also enjoins the usage of reason, there is in principle
no contradiction between reason and revelation. The content of the revelation
must also be accepted as a whole. The deviation from revelation in one item
leads to the total deviation of the understanding of revelation.123 However, this
leaves an important question unanswered: did he believe that the
anthropomorphic verses really convey the literal meanings to mankind, the
positive answer of which will mean that he is upholding the position tajsim and
tashbih? This explanation becomes more crucial since Ibn Taymiyyah also
rejected the method of tafwid, to entrust the knowledge of the anthropomorphic

verses to God alone.124 To him, since God has ordered man to reflect on the
Qur’an and induced him to understand it, it is therefore inadmissible that He
should have wanted man to deviate from its understanding and knowledge by
conveying a message that is not understood by man. To put it plainly, if he
viewed that there should be no alternative meanings to the anthropomorphic
verses, at the same time we do not accept the fact that these meanings are only
known to by God, what other meanings are left to these verses other than their
literal and anthropomorphic meanings?
122 Ssekamanya Siraje Abdallah, “Ibn Taymiyyah’s Thological Apparoach Illustrated: On the
Essence (Dhat) and Attributes (Sifat) of Allah,” ShajarahJournal of the International Institute of
Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), vol.9, no.1(2004), 45.
123 Ibid, 270.
173
CHAPTER FIVE
AL-RAZI’S TREATMENT OF THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC

VERSES
INTRODUCTION
In the foregoing chapter, we have analyzed al-Razi’s view on muhkamdt and
mutashdbihdt as well as his methodology of ta’wil as an appropriate modus operandi
in arriving at the meaning of the mutashdbihdt. Also examined is his view on the
epistemological principle regarding reason and revelation particularly concerning the
knowledge of the divine. Having established this epistemological basis in arriving at
the knowledge of God and a clear conception of ta’wil, it is for us now to show how
al-Razi applied this method in his explanation and commentary regarding the
meaning of anthropomorphic verses in the Qur’an which appear to be in conflict
with the epistemological basis that he had laid down. In doing this, our reference
will be mainly his Kitab Asas al-Taqdls in which al-Razi explained in detail the
appropriate meaning of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an. His al-
Tafslr al-Kabtr is also used as a cross reference for some of his explanations
regarding these expressions.
There are several anthropomorphic attributes mentioned in the Qur’an and
Prophetic traditions. Among them are: words implying organs such as hand,1 eyes,2
face,3 thigh (sdg);4 words which refer to directions, such as above (fawq);5 words
designating actions such as to ascend (nazala, nuzul),6
1 Al-Qur’an Sad 38:75, al-Ma’idah 5:64, al-Fath 48:10.

2 Al-Qur’an, Hud 11:37, Taha 20:39, al-Tur 52:48.
3 Al-Qur’an al-Baqarah 2:115, al-Qasas 28:88, al-Rahman 55:26-27, al-Kahf 18:28, al-An am 6:52, al-
Rum 30:38, al-Insan 76:9, al-Layl 92:20.
4 Al-Qur’an, al-Qalam 68:42.
5 Al-Qur’an, al-An'am 6:18, 61; al-Nahl 16:50.
6 Hadith which says: “God descends every night to the lower heaven and says, “Is there any who has
a request? And I will grant it him. Is there any who asks forgiveness? And I will forgive him - until
dawn arrives.” Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawbid, 126.
174
to come (ja’a, al-majij,' to meet (Uqaj, to grasp (qabd); words that denote self
and individuality such as self (nu/s )10 8 9 soul (ruh);11 words that are similar to
7 and
physical matters such as light (nur);12 indications of spatial meaning such as in the
veil (hijab),13 near (qarb),14 beside (janb)'15 words which refer to feeling such as
laughing (dahk)16 and shy (haya j.17 18
In Asas, al-Razi dealt with all the above expressions, but since our concern is
more towards examining al-Razi’s general approach in arriving at the meaning of
these expressions, we, therefore, do not wish to go into detail as to how al-Razi
employed ta \vil in all the expressions. On the other hand, we will select from them
few examples which are representative of the categories mentioned above and
explain how al-Razi dealt with them. Five examples that we will discuss are those
on God’s image and the form of Adam, God’s face, the Vision of God in the
Hereafter, the notion of direction, and God’s hand.
GOD’S IMAGE AND THE FORM OF ADAM
The controversy surrounding this term lies in the use of the personal pronoun "ha"
(his) in the Hadith of the Prophet, which runs, “Verily God has created Adam
according to His form” (inna Allah khalaqa Adam cala suratihV). There is also
another Hadith in which the Prophet warns a man not to disgrace (taqbahu) the
7 Al-Qur’an al-Fajr 89:22.

8 Al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah 2:46, al-Kahf 18:110, al-Sajdah 32:10.
10 Al-Qur’an, Ta ha 20:41, al-Ma’idah 5:116, al-An am 6:54, Al 'Imran 3:30.
11 Al-Qur’an, al-Hajr 15:29.
12 Al-Qur’an, al-Nur 24:35.
13 Al-Qur’an, al-Mutaffifin 83:15.
14 Al-Qur’an, Qaf 50:16.
16 Al-Qur’an, al-Najm 53:43.
18 Muslim, Sahih, no. 7092, vol. 17, 175-176.
175
face of another since God has created Adam in his form.19 Another Hadith which
comes with a different ending, relates that God has created Adam in the form of ‘the
Most Merciful’ (h/d surat al-RahmdiT). In Asas, apart from the abovementioned
Hadiths, al-Razi enumerated several other Hadiths which convey similar
anthropomorphic meanings: first, a Hadith regarding the last group of people who
God will remove from Hell and to whom God appears twice, first, in the image that
they do not recognize (la ydriftin') to the effect that they reject Him, and then, in
the image which they are able to recognize Him.20 Another Hadith relates that the
Prophet himself had seen God in the best form (/T ahsarti surah) and that God put
His ‘hand’ on the Prophet’s shoulder to the effect that the Prophet felt the coldness
of the touch. Most of these Hadiths mentioned above are also among those quoted
by Ibn Khuzaymah, in his Kitab al-Tawhid, in affirming the literal understanding
of the anthropomorphic expressions of God’s qualities against which al-Razi
attacked.21
As we have mentioned, the controversy of these Hadiths lies in the question
of who the pronoun ‘his’ refers to. A common grammatical analysis of the Hadith
suggests that the pronoun would refer to God, which leads to an anthropomorphic
implication of the similarity between the form of God and humans. Most of the
traditional scholars rejected this meaning not only due to its anthropomorphic
implication of the similarity between God’s form and the human form,22 but also
because of its Judeo-Christian origin. A similar saying appears in the Bible, which
alludes to the fact that God created man in His form in order for man to have control
over the world and its content. The Book of Genesis says:
19 The Hadith goes, “ One of should not say to another that God condemned your face and the face
similar to your face, since God has created Adam in ‘his’ form.” Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawbid,
36.
20 Asas, 101.
21 Ibn Khuzaymah, Kitab al-Tawbid, 36-41.
22 Nevertheless, it was accepted by later Muslim scholars such as Ibn Qutaybah (d.885) which
appears in his work, TaXvil Mukhtalif al-Haditb. It was also brought out by al-Qastallani’s
(Isti’dban, [79]) commentary on al-Bukhari and al-Nawawi’s commentary on Sahih Muslim (al-Birr
[45]); W. Montgomery Watt, “Some Muslim Discussions,” 95.
176
Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image after our likeness; and
let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of
the air, and over the cattle and over all the earth and over every
creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.” So God created man in his
own image, in the image of God He created him: male and female He
created them.23
In regard to the controversy of the pronoun, al-Razi’s viewed that the
pronoun ‘his’ at the end of the word surah could indicate three possible meanings: (i)
either it means the form of somebody other than the forms of God and Adam; (ii) or
it indicates the form of Adam; (iii) or it refers to the form of God. In the first case,
the contextual meaning of the Hadith, according to al-Razi, is that the Prophet,
when uttering this Hadith, could have referred the pronoun to mean the face of
particular person that has been denigrated by another person. This is further
supported by a Hadith that cites an incident when the Prophet once passed a man
who was beating his servant on the face, and said to him, “Do not beat his face, for
God created Adam in his form.”24 By reminding the man that God created Adam
with the face as that in the form of the man whom he was beating, the Prophet was
implying that to denigrate the ‘face’ of that man was equivalent to denigrating the
face of Prophet Adam as well as other prophets. The reason why the name of
Adam, not men in general, is mentioned in the Hadith, according to al-Razi, is
because Prophet Adam was the first creation who was created with this (human)
form of face.25 In addition to this specific reason, this Hadith also serves as a denial
of stories of what were said regarding the feature of Adam through the Isradiyydt
sources that he was huge in size and that his head nearly touched the sky. This
explanation of the Hadith, on the contrary, affirms that the fomi of Adam
corresponds to the form of a normal human being.26 Provided that the chain of
narrators of this Hadith is sound, it seems to us that this line of interpretation (that
23 The Bible, Revised Standard Version (The British & Foreign Bible Society, 1952), 2.
24 Ta \vil, 148; Watt, “Some Muslim Discussions,” 96.
25 Asas, 97.
26 Ibid., 98.
177
the pronoun refers to other than God and Adam) is the least controversial due to the
fact that it does not involve any form of anthropomorphism.27 28
As to the second meaning namely that the pronoun refers to Adam, al-Razi
believed that this is the most appropriate meaning of this Hadith despite the
rejection of this view by others due to its redundancy in meanin Al-Razi,
however, had his own justification in preferring this interpretation. The first is that
this meaning is in agreement with the grammar of the Arabic language that suggests
the assignment of pronoun to the nearest word mentioned prior to the pronoun:
This is the most prior meaning of the three, since the assignment
O
pronoun (damir) to the nearest words is necessary. In this Hadith, the
nearest word mentioned is Adam (peace be upon him). Hence, the
assignment of the pronoun to it (the word Adam) is prior.29
Second, al-Razi maintained that this second meaning has its moral
justification. For, when Adam was taken out from the heaven due to his
wrongdoing, unlike other creatures, whose forms were transformed by God,30 the
form of Adam was maintained by God as a sign of respect and nobility. Hence,
when the Hadith says that God created Adam in his form, it means that God
maintained Adam in his own original form without any transformation.31 Third, al-
Razi also pointed out that this second meaning implies that Adam was created
without undergoing the natural embriological process, such as through sperm
27 However, we do not concur with Watt’s view that this version of interpretation is an ‘ingenious
way’ of reinterpreting the words put forward by the traditionists (mubadditbiuT) in order to escape
from the controversial implication of anthropomorphism. Watt, “Some Muslim Discussions,” 96. For
this interpretation is duly taken in accordance with the context of the utterance (asbab al-wurud) of
the Hadith as mentioned earlier by Ibn Qutaybah. As a matter of fact, the problem of
anthropomorphism still persist, if other versions of the Hadith such as that with the ending ‘in the
form of the Most Merciful’ (’ala surat al-Rahman ) are taken into consideration.
28 Ibn Qutaybah, for example, disagreed with this interpretation since it will make the saying
superfluous and does not yield any benefit (ma kana ft al-kalam faldatan). “Nobody doubt,” he
argued, “that God will create human beings according to their nature and create other creatures
according to their own respective natures.” Ta *wil, 147.
29 Asas, 98.
30Al-Razi related that when God removed Adam from heaven, together with him being removed were
the serpent and the peacock whose forms were changed by God. Asas, 99.
31 Ibid, 98-99.
178
(nutfah), blood clot (‘alaqah), a morsel of flesh (mudghah) and other process of
biological birth affirmed by the naturalists (al-dahriyyah) and biologists as
something necessary for the formation of a human being. Neither was Adam
created through a long period of time and through the medium of celestial bodies
(al-aflak) as maintained by the philosophers. Fourth, al-Razi alluded to the fact that
the term surah can also convey the meaning of attribute (sifab). Hence, when the
Hadith says that God created Adam in his form, it means that God created him in a
form already perfected with the attributes of a man, such as being knowledgeable,
happy and the like.32
As to the third meaning, namely, that the pronoun ‘his’ refers to the form of
God,33 al-Razi observed that this meaning is possible through the following line of
understanding: first, Adam is imbued with attributes similar to those of God.
According to this interpretation, Adam is distinct from other creatures in terms of
his knowledge which is universal in nature as well as in his capacity of knowing
language. Both of these qualities, according to al-Razi, resemble in some respects
the attributes of God:
Adam is indeed distinguished from other persons and bodies in the

fact that he knows the intelligibles. He is able to derive words and
knowledge (al-hurf wa al-sinaah). These are the noble qualities which
befit the attributes of Allah in some aspects. Hence, the saying of the
prophet ‘Allah has created Adam in His image’ is true according to
this line of interpretation. 34
Al-Razi nevertheless made an important note that this similarity does not
lead to the similarity in terms of divinity (ilahiyyah) between Adam and God. Being
32 Ibid., 100.
33 Although al-Razi prefers the view that the pronoun ‘his’ in the Hadith “God created Adam in his
form refers to Adam, yet in the Hadith in which the addition “surah al-Rahman” (the form of the
Merciful) occurs, the implication of the pronoun ‘his’ must be to God, since it cannot be otherwise.
In other words, any of the versions with the words (the Merciful) made it clear that the form is
God’s.
34 Asas, 100.
179
similar in some remote concomitants (lawazim al-ba(idah) yet different in many
others does not necessitate similarity in terms of divinity:
If it is said that the commonality (musharakah) in the attributes of

perfection (sifdt al-kamal) necessitates the commonality in divinity (al-
ilabiyyah), we say that commonality in some remote concomitants (al-
lawazim al-baldab) with differences in many other aspects, does not
necessitate similarity in divinity.35
Second, as an extension of the first, the ‘form of God’ could also be
interpreted as Adam being created with the attributes of generosity and majesty, the
perfect manifestation of which belong to God. It is also an indication that man is
created fundamentally distinct from other creatures in terms of his attributes. He is
created in the best form, nearer to his Creator. By this, al-Razi was suggesting that
there is a possibility that man, in varying degrees, though not completely, can
imitate God in terms of His attributes as Ion as it does not negate the divine
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transcendence. To support this view, he quoted the Qur’anic verse, “for Him
belongs the loftiest similitude” (wa lahu al-matbal al-ald) and the Hadith of the
Prophet “adorn your conduct with the decorum that is Godly” (takballaqu bi akblaq
Allah). In his other work, Lawami al-Bayyindt, al-Razi further explained how
this imitation of every name of God can take place in re ardi to man. 38
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From the above two interpretations, the Hadith which indicates that the
Prophet was displeased with the man who denigrated the face of another man can be
incorporated into this meanin Since Adam is created ‘similar’ to the attributes of
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God, the denigration of the man’s face which is the place where many of the36 37 38
36 Al-Qur’an, al-Rum 30:27.

37 Asas, 100.
38 Lawami', passim. In this work, following in some respects the work of al-Ghazali, Maqsad al-
Asna fi Sharh Asma’ Allah al-Husna, al-Razi explicates each and every one of the Ninety Nine
Beautiful Names of God followed by the way how the servant of Allah can imitate at his own level
that particular divine Name. For example, the way a servant can be characterized with the Name al-
Quddus (The Holy) is through purifying their soul from the inclination towards the matters related
to bodies (al-jasmaniyyahf and busying himself in acquiring eternal knowledge and a praiseworthy
character (al-akhlaq al-hamidah). While to be characterized with the attribute of al-Malik, a servant
should detach all his needs from other than Allah. Lawami, 182-186.
180
manifestation of his attributes such as seeing, thinking, hearing, should be avoided.
We will further elaborate upon the position of the face in our next sub-topic.
The third interpretation which is based on the view of al-Ghazali is that just
as God is beyond any corporeal implication, Adam is created similar to this ‘form’ in
the sense that his essence, which is his soul, neither inheres in nor connected with
any physical and corporeal being. Its connection with the body is only in terms of
regulation (al-tadbir) or administration (al-tasarruf ).39
It becomes clear from the foregoing explanations regarding the issue of the
‘image of God’ that for al-Razi, to whatever the pronoun ‘his’ in the Hadlth refers,
the principle maintained by him is that it must not, as much as possible, impinge
upon the divine transcendence.
GOD’S FACE
Another anthropomorphic attribute often mentioned by the Qur’an is the Face of
God (Wajh Allah). Among the verses in which this word occur are “But forever
will abide the Face of your Lord,”40 “Everything will perish except His own Face,”41
“...who seek the Face of God,”42 “To Allah belong the East and the West, wherever
you turn, there is Allah’s Face.”43 In a number of Hadiths, the word Face of God
mostly takes place when it refers to the ultimate objective of a Muslim in his acts of
submission towards his Lord, that he submits and strives in God’s path in order to
39 Asas, 100-101. Al-Ghazali mentioned this in his Kitab 'AJaib al-Qalb one of the chapters in his
Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din. He explained that the heart and the body are analogous to a king and a kingdom
or a city. As a king, the heart has its army including the physical organs such as the hands and legs,
as well as the spiritual ones such as anger, intellect and desire. Al-Ghazali, Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din
(Bayrut: Dar al-Fikr,1991), vol. 3, 6-8.
40 Al-Qur’an, al-Rahman, 55:27.
42 Al-Qur’an, al-Rum 30:38-39. The word ‘face’ also occurs in the form “who seek His face” (yuridu
wajhahu) as in al-Kahf 18:28, al-An am 6:52; and in the form “the desire to seek the Face of their
Lord Most High” (ibtigha’ wajh rabbihi) as in al-Layl 92:20.
181
seek His Face (ibtigha’ wajh Allah). Al-Razi adduced the Hadith which was
mentioned by Ibn Khuzaymah in commenting the verse of the Qur’an, “Say: ‘He has
power to send calamities on you from above, and from beneath your feet, or to cover
you with confusion in party strife giving you a taste of mutual vengeance each from
the other,’”44 following which, the Prophet repeatedly (three times) said, “I seek
45 46
refuge by Your Face” (audhu bi wajhika).
Al-Razi, first and foremost, denied any possibility that the term 'wajh Allah"
could be understood in the literal sense. It is impossible to comprehend ‘the Face of
God’ as a physical face, as an organ and limb (al-udw wa al-jarihah) as claimed by
the anthropomorphists. Al-Razi put forward a simple, foolproof argument more
towards discrediting the argument of the anthropomorphists. If the Face of God is
to be understood in the physical sense, then when God says elsewhere in the Qur’an
that “everything will perish except His own Face” (kullu shay7 halik ilia wajhabu),
all other limbs will perish including the eyes which is on the face!47 It also implies
that the verse “Wherever you turn, there is Allah’s Face” will mean that the physical
face of God will appear in every section of the world, which is absurd. In addition,
al-Razi challenged the consistency of the anthropomorphists by questioning how
they would construe the meaning of “seeking the Face of God” if the meaning of
face is physical, since they themselves re arded the Face of God as eternal.48
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44 Such as the Hadith mentioned by al-Razi which says, “Whoever fasts a day for the cause of Allah
in order to seek the Face of God, Allah will keep away his face from Hell for seventy years (kharif -
literally autumn).” Another Hadith, “Those of you who take refuge with Allah, He will protect him,
whosoever among you who seek the Face of God, He will grant him with greatness.” Asas, 131.
46 As to the last part of the Surah (to cover you with confusion in party strife giving you a taste of
mutual vengeance each from the other), the Prophet says, “these two are more easier and lighter.”
Asas, p. 131; Ibn Khuzaymah, 11. This Hadith was narrated by ‘Amru bin Dinar from Jabir. Ibn
Khuzaymah asserted after quoting the above verse that God has affirmed to Himself a face and
attributes to it the attribute of Majesty, Bounty and Honour (dbu al-Jalal wa al-Ikram) and He
affirms (hakama) His face with eternity and denies it from annihilation (halak). Ibid., 10.
47 Al-Razi is here referring to the view of Ibn Saman of the Rafidah who held this view, that it is
only God’s face (as a limb) that will persists. Tafsir, vol. 9, 22.
48 Asus, 133
182
Something eternal, according to al-Razi, cannot be sought especially when the act of
seeking implies that the object that they seek will take place in existence.49
...the Face of Allah according to their view is eternal and everlasting

(qadim azaliy). Something eternal is not sought (la yurad), since that
which is sou ht will mean that what is sou ht is its occurrence in
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existence (yuradu busuluhu ft al-wujud) which is impossible in regard
to something eternal.50
Besides, if the face is considered physical, those who seek the Face of God
will also seek the wrath of God which also appears from the face, while certainly
what they are after is not the wrath of God but rather His pleasure (al-rida).51 52
Due to the above impossibilities and logical inconsistencies, the term ‘wajb’
according to al-Razi, can only be understood as referring to two allegorical meanings:
first as an indirect expression (kindyah) of the essence (al-dbdt) of God; second, as a
sign of God’s pleasure (al-rida). The explication of the former goes as follows: that
the face is the aspect through which the essence and reality of man can be
manifested (al-(adw alladhi bibi yatabaqqaq wujud dhalika al-insan). According to
the custom and tradition of the Arabs, the person who is responsible for social
52
organization is called the ‘the face of the community’ (wajb or wajib al-qawm).
The face, therefore, is the representation of the whole self of a man. Second, the
meaning of man is the manifestation of what transpires from his intellect, senses,
understanding and reflection. The source and substratum of all faculties and
activities is the head of a person, while the outward manifestation (mazhar) of these
faculties is represented by the face. Thus, the word face is the appropriate term for
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. This is a logical argument which follows from the premise that the face of God is the physical.
Al-Razi argued that since from the face not only the signs of pleasure will appear but also the signs
of wrath and anger, hence, to seek the face of God will imply not only seeking His pleasure but also
His anger and wrath.
52 Ibid., 134.
183
representing the essence of man.53 In addition, when the Arab says the face of the
matter (wajb badha al-amr), he means the essence of the matter.54
From the above nuances of meanings, the verses “but forever will abide the
face of your Lord” and “everything will perish except His own Face” are then
understood as indicating that which is the eternal essence of God which abides and
which will not perish.55 Everything other than Allah, since they are originated and
contingent, is receptive of non-existence and destruction. But God, as a Necessary
Existent, and the Creator and Determiner (Murajjib) of all originated things, is not
receptive of destruction and non-existence.56
As to the meaning of pleasure (rida), al-Razi explained that the face
represents the attitude of human being towards something, since when a man is
inclined towards something, he will direct his face towards it, and vice versa. This
indicates that the face is the manifestation of the inclination and hatred in man.57 It
is through this meaning that the verse “To Allah belong the East and the West,
wherever you turn, there is Allah’s face,” and the Hadith, “I seek refuge by the Face
of Allah (bi wajb Allah)” should be interpreted.58
The meanin of rida is supported by the fact that some of these verses refer
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specifically to man’s submission to God (‘ibadab). 9 For example, the phrase
“wherever you turn, there is Allah’s face” in Surat al-Baqarah (2:115) refers to
directions in prayer (so/dt), while the phrase “seeking the Face of Allah” in Surat al-
Rum refers to seeking the Pleasure of God by almsgiving (zakat).60 It goes without
saying that all these rituals are done in order to seek the pleasures of God.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. Al-Razi maintained that these verses are mentioned by God for the sake of affirmation (al-
ta kid) and exaggeration (mubalaghah).
56 Tafsir , vol.9, 20-21.
57 Asas, 134.
58 Ibid., 135; Tafsir, vol. 2, 21.
59 Tafsir, vol. 10, 356.
60 Before this phrase, in the same verse it goes, “So give what is due to the kindred, the needy and the
wayfarer”(Al-Qur’an al-Rum 30:38).
184
In al-Tafslr al-Kabir, al-Razi elaborated further the interpretations of the
term wajb in the Qur’an. First, the attachment of the term ‘wajb’ to God is similar
to other attachment of created things to the divine God such as God’s house (bayt
Allah) the purpose of which is to render nobility and honour to such created things
(h/d sabll al-tasbrif). In other words, a creation of God becomes noble when its
name is specifically attached to the name of God, although ultimately it means that
the thing indeed belongs to God. Since all directions including the east and the west
are under the dominion of God, the phrase fa thamma wajb Allah means that ‘the
direction to which you are made to face (aiblah) belongs to God.’ matter of
cz>
fact, this is what is meant by qiblah, namely ‘the direction which has been specified
by God for people to face.61 Second, the term wajb also means aim and intention (al-
qasd wa al-niyyab) as shown by the verse “For me, I have set my face, firmly and
truly towards Him who created the heavens and the earth.”62
In general, the allegorical meanings ascribed by al-Razi for the term “Face of
God” is far from any anthropomorphic implication. < matter of fact, in

co
contradistinction from the view that the verse leads to anthropomorphism,63 al-Razi
regards the phrase “to God belong the East and the West” as the strongest proof in
denying the bodily aspect of God and affirming His transcendence.64 This is due to
the fact that this phrase makes clear that these two directions as well as other
directions are parts of God’s creatures:
...It is clear that these two directions (the East and the West) are in the
dominion of God (mamlukatdn. lahu). This is so since ‘direction’
means something extended (mumtad) in length, width and depth and
everything with this nature is divisible. Every divisible is composite
and compound and everything with these characteristics necessarily
61 Tafsir, vol. 2, 21. Hence what is called qiblah is that direction which Allah has determined and
asked the Muslims to face to in their five daily prayers.
63 According to al-Razi, the anthropomorphists argued that this verse yields anthropomorphism in
two regards. First, that the verse clearly shows that God has a face and the existence of a face
presupposes the existence of a body. Second, God also attributes Himself as ‘He who possesses
width’ (al-wasi) which is one of the attributes of a body. Tafsir, vol. 2, 21.
185
needs a creator...it is affirmed from this that God is the Creator of all
directions. The Creator is no doubt prior in existence than the
creation. Since God, the Creator before the creation, is beyond any
direction, it is necessary that He remains as such even after the
creation...65
Moreover, if God’s face is corporeal as claimed by the anthropomorphists, His
face will be designated in a certain direction which will contradict the last phrase of
the verse, that “wherever you turn, there is Allah’s face.”66
THE VISION OF ALLAH (RUYAT ALLAH)
Another topic that has a direct implication for our present discussion is the Vision of
God (Ru’yat Allah). It is a theological position which stipulates that God can be
seen by human beings in the Hereafter. Rejected categorically by the Mutazilah
due to its absurdity and serious impingement upon the divine transcendence, it is
defended, however, by the Ashairah and the Maturidiyyah as something important

in the belief of a Muslim.67 While the arguments against this position hinge upon the
impossibility of the Vision of God due to its physical implication, those who support
it depend on the textual proofs from the Qur’an and Hadiths. The later Ashairah,
however, endeavored to describe the nature of this Vision by linking it to a special
kind of Vision granted by God only to select humankind.
What is interesting with regard to this topic is for us to know al-Razi’s
position on this issue. Al-Razi who was an Ash’ari, as we have maintained
throughout the previous chapters, was consistent in rejecting the notion of
physicality with regard to the nature of God. Since the attack leveled by the
65 Ibid.
66 Tafsir, vol. 2, 21. Al-Razi also provided another possible allegorical meaning for the word ‘wajb’ in
this verse namely it refers to intention and objective (al-qasd \va al-niyyab) as implied by another
verse regarding Prophet Ibrahim, “I have set my face, firmly and truly towards Him who created the
heavens and the earth, and never shall I give partners to Allah” (al-An am 6:79).
67 For further reference to the Ashairah and the Mutazilah view on this issue, see Ibanah, 56-65;
Nihayat, 115-118; Arbain, 189-218; Ma'alim, 53-57. A lucid summary on this issue was written by
Fathalla Kholeif in his commentary of al-Razi’s debate in Controversies, 118-130.
186
Mutazilab mostly alleged that the affirmation of the Vision will lead to
anthropomorphism, al-Razi’s position as an Asb‘ari was, therefore, in a dilemma.
How did al-Razi defend the Ashairab position which seems to contradict his very
own principle? Did al-Razi agree with this position and if yes, how did he reconcile
this position with his overall rejection of the notion that God is beyond the physical
and temporal realm?
As have been mentioned earlier, the position of affirming the Vision of God is
strongly based on the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic tradition. Among the Qur’anic
verses which affirm the Vision of God is the verse that describes the gleaming faces
of the believers in the Hereafter upon seein their Lord as their reward in Paradise
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“...and some faces, that Day will beam, looking towards their Lord.”6 Another verse
reads, “To those who do right is a goodly reward and even more (ziyddab).”*
69 When
commenting upon this verse, the Prophet in one Hadith said that ziyadah meant
“seeing God’s face.”70 Some other verses mention the meeting of the true believers
with their Lord (liqa9 rabbibimf which implies the prerequisite of seein Him.71 72
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The Mu tazilites maintaining that human physical structure is necessary for
sight, generally denied the Vision of God. They took up their position on Qur’anic
verses which appear to deny Vision such as “Eyes cannot reach Him,” His words
to Moses: “You will not see Me,”73 and “It is not fit for man that God should speak
to him except by revelation or from behind a veil...”74 Some Mu tazilites interpreted
the Vision as knowledge which is related to the human intellect or heart, hence we
can see God through our hearts (qulub) which is equated with our knowledge of
8 Al-Qur’an, al-Qiyamah 75:22-3.

69 Al-Qur’an, Yunus 10:27.
70 Ma'alim, 54; Yusof Ali The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, 487.
71 Maalim, 54-55.
72 Al-Qur’an, al-Anam, 6:103.
73 Al-Qur’an, al-Araf 7:143.
187
God.75 While others viewed that we will see God in the Hereafter, God will create for
man in the Hereafter the sixth sense through which we will see God.76
On the other hand, the Ashairah, being more faithful to scriptural authority,
affirmed the possibility of the Vision of God. Abu Hassan al-Ash'ari viewed that the
Vision of God, first and foremost, must be believed.77 In al-Ibanah, he said:
We hold that God will be seen in the next world by sight as the full
moon is seen in the night. So shall the faithful see Him, as we are told
in the traditions that come down on the authority of the Prophet of
God: and we believe that the infidels will be veiled from Him. When
the faithful see Him in Paradise as God said, “Yea, they shall be shut
out as by veil from their Lord on that Day”, [al-Qur’an, al-
Mutaffifin, 83:15] and that Moses asked God for the sight of Him in
this world and God manifested Himself to the mountain and turned it
to dust78 and taught Moses by it that He should not see Him in this
world.79
The story of Moses was an oft-quoted proof by the Ashairah in proving the
Vision of God. Al-Shahrastani argued that the fact that Prophet Moses asked to see
God shows that it is a possibility. Likewise, when God, in His reply, made the
condition for the Vision by asking Moses to observe the mountain, it also indicates
that the Vision is possible:
Now did Moses know that God could be seen? Or was he ignorant on
the subject? If he was ignorant, his knowledge of God ill-befitted the
dignity of a Prophet; if he did not know that it was a possibility, then
his knowledge agrees with the fact that his request was for the possible
not for the impossible. The reply, “You shall not see me” equally
points to the possibility, for God does not say “I’m not visible” but He
asserts impotence or lack of vision on the part of the seer...Thus the
75 Maqalat , vol.l, 238. This is the view of Abu al-Hudhayl.

76 Ibid., vol.l, 289. This is the view of Direr and Hafs. According to them, the sixth sense is
different from the senses we have now.
77 Nihdyat, 115-116. He, however, hesitated as to whether it was a special cognition, i.e., connected
only with an existing thing, or a perception virtually the same as knowledge in its connection, i.e. not
affecting, or being affected by, the object of Vision.
78 Al-Qur’an, al-A'raf, 7:139.
79 Ibanah, 51-52.
188
impediment is linked to a possibility and the impediment is referred to
the weakness of the instrument not to the impossibility itself.80
Later Ashairah had advanced more philosophical arguments in support of the
possibility of Vision of God. The common one, as pointed out by al-Razi, is the
argument based on existence that runs as follows: That the common reason of the
visibility of substance and accident, when analyzed, is either origination (al-huduth)
(which implies that both have point of beginning) or existence (al-wujud).
Origination cannot be the cause of visibility since it is regarded as an existence
preceded by non-existence, and non-existence (al-adam) cannot be part of the
principle. Therefore, the only cause of the visibility is existence. Existence is also
what is common to both the visible world (shahid) and the invisible world (gha’ib).
Extending this formula to the case of God, it follows that since God exists, He,
therefore, can be seen.81
Al-Razi, however, disagreed with this argument and regarded it as weak.
Using mostly the argument of the Mutazilah, he raised strong objections to the
rational proofs put forward by the Ashairah. His arguments, inter alia, attacked the
very notion of possibility. Since the arguments put forward by the Ashairah are
based on possibility (which he refers to with the terms imkan and sihhah), 82 it
cannot be a strong basis of argument in affirming the Vision of God. This is because
possibility is an ontological status that is preceded by non-being. The possibility of
Vision, therefore, is a judgment of privation or a non-existent quality (hukm
‘adamiy), not a positive judgment (sifah mawjudah), since it is based on something
absent, something absent cannot be the cause of something that exists. If
something possible can be the cause of something real, argued al-Razi, the world
so Nibayat, 118.
31 Arba'in, 191; Ma'alim, 54; Nibayat, 116.
82 It seems here that what al-Razi meant by sibbab here is equivalent to possible or contingent
(mumkin).
™Arbam, 192
189
would actually have existed when its existence was merely possible, and this entails
, -4- 84
eternity:
If possibility is a positive attribute (sifah mawjudah'y there is no

doubt that the world before its existence, existed in reality (sahib al-
wujud) and if possibility would be the existential attribute, it will
necessitate the eternity of the world.85
As to the argument by the Ashairah regarding the visible nature of
substance and accident, al-Razi viewed that substance and accident do not only share
in common the characteristics of visibility, but also other characteristics such as
being created (makhluqah). If ‘being created’ is re arded as the premise of the
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argument, it will lead to the conclusion that even God can therefore be created
(makhluqah). In other words, although God shares the attribute of existence
together with substance and accidents, His existence nevertheless cannot be
identified with the existence of the substance and accidents since His existence is
essentially distinct from the other two. This ar ument also reminds us of our
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previous discussion with regard to the position held by the Karramiyyah in proving
that Allah is in a direction and the counter-argument which al-Razi gave in

rebutting this argument.86 The Karramiyyah also argued based on the premise that
existence is the cause (eillah) of the principle which they held that for every two
existents, one of them must either subsist in the other (halan fi al-akhar) or be
distinct from the other in terms of direction.87 In the same vein, al-Razi refuted this
premise held by the Ashairah and affirmed that it is not existence but rather
origination (huduth) that is the cause of the principle.
The difficulty in employing rational proofs in substantiating the possibility of
the Vision of God led al-Razi to reject the possibility of arguing this position
through rational means. In Arbain, after putting forward a lengthy refutation on
See Chapter Three, 116.
190
the difficulty of the rational arguments supporting the possibility of the Vision of
God, al-Razi concluded, following the position of al-Maturidi,88 that we cannot
affirm the possibility of the Vision of God based on rational proofs.89 The
affirmation has to be based on scriptural authority:
What is preferred, according to us, is to say that it is the textual proofs

that indicate the Vision of God.90
Al-Razi’s disagreement with rational arguments for the possibility of the
Vision of God, nevertheless, does not lead him to the opposite position, namely, the
denial of the Vision of God, as done by the Mutazilah. As a matter of fact, he
disproved all the ar uments of the Mutazilah which are based on the Scripture
under the pretext of their misunderstanding the verses of the Qur’an.9
Al-Razi also maintained his stern position against anthropomorphism by
denying any physical implication of the Vision. For that matter, he employed ta\vil
by resorting to the view that the Vision is a spiritual Vision that God grants
specifically to those deserving the reward by God. He maintained that the Vision
which is alluded to in the verse, “and some faces, that Day will beam, looking
towards their Lord,” means the spiritual Vision (al-ru’yah) and not an ocular Vision
using the pupil of the eye but a special kind of Vision endowed by God to those
Q?
whom He wishes.
Based on the foregoing explanation, we can conclude that for al-Razi,
following the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions that clearly stipulate it, the
88 See Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, Kitab al-Tawbid, ed. Fathalla Kholeif (Bayrut: Dar al-Mahriq, 1970),
77-85
89 Arba'in, 198. It seems that this difficulty was also shared by other later Asbairab. We found, for
example, in Shahrastani’s Nihayat Iqdam the same complication was reported. After having a
lengthy explication of the issue, he concluded, “On the whole it is best to re ard the visio Dei as a
tn
matter of scriptural attestation, in which case the story of Moses is the locus classicus’, but God
knows best what is true.” Nihayat 118.
90 Ma'alim, 54. Al-Razi conceded that in this regard he follows the position of al-Maturidi, who was
also of the view that rational proofs cannot exhaust the possibility of Vision of God and its
occurrence must be based on the textual argument. Al-Razi, al-Arbatn ft Usui al-Din, 198.
91 Arbam, 210-218.
92 Arba'in, 208.
191
Vision of God will certainly take place among the believers in the Hereafter. As far
as the rational proofs are concerned, especially those put forward by the Ashairah,
he regarded them as insubstantial since they can only prove the Vision at the level of
possibility. Although he affirmed the actualization of Beatific Vision, al-Razi was
consistent with his principle that this Vision does not imply anthropomorphism.
The Vision must not be in any way physical in nature but spiritual or in a manner
that God will create in accordance to the suitability of the believers. In this way, he
still held to his principle of denying anthropomorphic implications in the meanin of
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the textual verses. His view also proves that as an Asbairah, he still put great
emphasis on textual proof.
THE AFFIRMATION OF DIRECTION (AL-JIHAH) WITH REGARD TO
GOD
Among the anthropomorphic aspects that compel the mind of the mushabbihab into
holding the corporeal view of God, is the notion of direction (jihab). By affirming
that God is within certain direction, they support their views with rational
principle that for every two existents, one of them must either subsist in the other
(hdlan fi al-akbar) or be distinct from the other. Al-Razi also, as we have dealt with
earlier, has pointed out in great length the weaknesses of this principle.
In the Qur’an, there are several verses that literally imply the notion of
direction and which led the anthropomorphists to ascribe direction to God. Al-Razi
categorized ten kinds of Qur’anic verses brought forward by the anthropomorphists
which, according to them, clearly imply the affirmation of direction with regard to
God:
i) Verses that relate the act of God sittin on the Throne.

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ii) Verses which contain the term ‘above’ (fawq).
iii) Verses with the term ‘to be high’ (al-uluw).95 93 94
93 Al-Qur’an, Taha.
94 Al-Qur’an, al-An am 6:18, 61; al-Nahl 16:50
192
iv) Verses which contain the term ‘ascend towards Him’ (al-uruj ilaybi)?
v) Verses with the words ‘lowering’ and ‘sending down’ (inzal wa al-
9598
tanzil) 97 9699
vi) Verses which contain the word ‘towards’ (ila) describing God as the
end point of destination (intiba’al-gbayab)9*
vii) Verses with the phrase ‘they are veiled (mabjubun) from God’ which
implies a physical connotation."
viii) Verses which infer that God is in heaven (ft al-sama9).1"
ix) Verses containing the word ‘elevation towards Him’ (al-raf ilaybi)
especially in the case of the Prophet ‘Isa.101 102 103 104
x) Verses which indicate nearness to God (cindiyyab)192
There are also several Hadi ths which indicate similar meanings. Among them
is one related by Abu Hurayrah in which the Prophet says, “Whenever God decrees
creation, He will write something (kitaban) and, it is with him above the Throne (fa
buwa ‘indahu fawq al-‘arsb). [God says] Verily My blessing precedes My wrath
(inna rabmati sabaqat gbadabi)”193 Another Hadlth mentions that the Prophet
affirmed the positive answer of a maid of companion when the latter asked her
whether or not God was in the sky (/z al-sama9). Another textual argument used
by the anthropomorphists is the story of the ascension of the Prophet to heaven
(mi raj) which implies that God is specifically in the direction of above referring to
the verse in the Qur’an “Then He approached and came closer, and was a distance of
95 Al-Qur’an, al-Baqarah 2:255; al-Saba’ 34:23; al-A‘la 87:1; al-Layl 92:20; al-Ma arij 70:4.
96 Al-Qur’an, al-Ma arij 70:4; al-Fatir 35:10.
97 These words occur more than 100 times in the Qur’an.
98 Al-Qur’an, al-Qiyamah 75:23; al-Sajadah 32:11; al-Hajj 22:48; al-Fajr 89:28.
99 Al-Qur’an, al-Mutaffifin 83:15.
100 Al-Qur’an, al-Mulk 67:17; Al-Qur’an, al-Naml 27:65.
101 Al-Qur’an, Ali ‘Imran 3:55; al-Nisa’ 4:157-8.
102 Al-Qur’an, al-Araf 7:206; al-Qamar 54:55; al-Tahrim 66:ll;Fussilat 41:37; al-Anbiya’ 21:19.
103 Bukhari, Sahib, vol. 7, 127.
104 Asas, 174.
193
but two bow-lengths (qaba qawsayri) or nearer. So did Allah convey the inspiration
to His servant what He meant to convey.”105
In Asas, al-Razi approached this issue from two aspects: first by reaffirming
the rational argument on the divine transcendence (of the direction and body)
against the anthropomorphists’ rational principle that God is localized in a direction.
From this affirmation, he moved on to assert that the rational proof that God is
beyond the notion of body and direction renders it necessary for us to interpret the
verses regarding the anthropomorphic nature of God to other than their literal
meaning. In other words, once the transcendence of God is affirmed through
strong rational principle and scriptural proofs, the meanin must not contradict this
CfQ
principle. For, this would render the Qur’an and the Hadi th contradictory to each
other as well as to reason.
Al-Razi also opined that the safest way for many people in dealing with this
issue was to deny the literal meanings of the verses as held by the early generation
(al-salaf) and refrain from looking for further meanings.106 Nevertheless, as a
mutakallimun who put very much emphasis on a systematic approach to kalam and
also on the consistent and comprehensive understanding of the meaning of the
Qur’an as well as holding to the view that the Qur’an is overall understandable, al-
Razi went on to explain the proper meaning of the anthropomorphic verses. He put
forward a few arguments in refuting the literal meanings of the verses held by the
anthropomorphists regarding direction. His method was to examine the context in
which the verses take place and to detect the contradiction between the literal
meanings with the whole context in which the verses occur. For example, with
regard to the phrase in the Qur’an which says that God is ‘sitting on the Throne,’
the physical sitting or settling on the Throne should be rejected since the contextual
meaning which can be understood from the verses prior and after this particular
>
verse, does not support the alleged meaning. The preceding verse that says,
105 Al-Qur’an, al-Najm 53:8-10.

106 Asas, p. 175.
194
revelation from Him who created the earth and the heavens on high,” 7 clearly
demonstrates that God is not specified by any notion of direction. While the verse
which follows verse 5, says, “To Him belongs what is in the Heavens and on the
earth and all between them, and all beneath the soil,” shows the impossibility of God
being physically settled on the throne, which is in the heavens. If al-sama9 which
literally means that which is in the direction of above (sumuw wa fawqiyyab), and
everything in it belong to God, it is, therefore, impossible for God to be in the same
direction as that which He has created. This situation, according to al-Razi, is

equivalent to saying that “God belongs to God” which is absurd.107 On the other
108 109
hand, the general meaning of both the two verses which precede and follow that
particular verse alludes to the perfection of God’s power and the apex of His
greatness in Divinity (ghdyat uzmatibV). Hence it is implausibe, as far as the overall
understanding of the Qur’an is concerned, that the verse which comes in the middle
conveys a contradictory meanin to the two other verses.

CfQ
His second argument against the physical implication of istiwa’ is that the
implication of understanding ‘istawa as a physical sitting is that God will be
composed of parts:
the part of the one who sits on the Throne which takes place on the
right side of the Throne must be different from the part which takes
place on the left part of the Throne. This will necessarily lead to
compartment and composition in the essence of God, which is
impossible.10
Emphasizing again the purity and transcendence of God, al-Razi added that if
we accepted the physical sitting of God on the Throne, we will be forced to accept
the fact that God can reside physically in other places, which means that God will be
mingling with dirty and impure things (qadhurdt wa al-najasdt). Al-Razi also
argued based on the verse which says that “and the angels will be on its [the
107 Al-Qur’an, Ta ha 20:4.

108 Asos, 176.
109 Ibid., 177.
195
Throne] sides, and eight will that day bear the Throne of your Lord above them,”
saying that if the ‘arsh is the physical place of God, the angels then are construed as
carrying God while God, who preserves and maintains the creations, is not in need of
111 Scripturally, the notion of God sitting physically on a Throne also
them.110
contradicts many other verses which indicate that God is near to human beings and
that God is always with them, such as, “We are nearer to him than His jugular
“It is He who is God in heavens

vein,”112 “He is with you wherever you may be,”113 114
and God on earth.”
Hence, the appropriate meanin of the term ‘istawa cala al-arsh’ according to
CfQ
al-Razi, is the complete mastery, power and possession of God over the Throne.
This meaning, according to al-Razi, is established on the principle of the Arabic
language used by the expert of the language as shown, for example, by the
following poetry:
man has taken possession (istawa) over Iraq,

without the usage of any sword and the spill of any blood115
One may question that if it is the metaphorical meaning that is meant by God
in this verse, God is then ignorant of the proper word to be used in conveying the
message to human beings and this is an imperfection with regard to God. To this
view, al-Razi replied that God reveals the Qur’an based on the custom (urf) and
convention of the people, and the conveying message through allegorical

O
expressions is not something strange to the Arabs. Even in the Qur an there are
numerous verses that comes with such expressions as in the verses, “But it is Allah
who deceives them (khadiuhum) ”116 “The unbelievers plotted against God and Allah
110 Al-Qur’an, al-Haqqah 69:17.

111 Asos, 177.
112 Al-Qur’an, Qaf 50:16.
113 Al-Qur’an, al-Hadid 57:4.
114 Al-Qur’an, al-Zukhruf 43:84.
115 Asas, 178.
196
too plotted against them,” “Allah makes fun of them.” All these verses do not
convey their literal meaning since this would go against the divine transcendence.
As to the reason why it is the Throne which is specifically mentioned in the verse as
the object of divine possession and not other creations, al-Razi asserted that it is due
to the fact that among the originated existence (al-mawjuddt al-muhdathah\ the
Throne is the greatest creation, and God administers all matters in the world through
the Throne as He created all creation based on the creation in the Throne.119
117 118
With re ard to the verses which contain directional connotations such as

CfQ
“/hwq” and “mw,” al-Razi remarked that these terms do not refer to direction but
rather to the power and domination of God over His creation. This is apparent in the
case of the term ‘fawq' when in the same verse, it is also linked to other similar
attributes such as al-Qahhar which is evident in the verse “He is the Omnipotent
over His worshippers (fawqa ‘tbadih?).”120 In addition, if they refer to the direction,
it will not necessarily be a praiseworthy position for God since in this case, what
makes God praiseworthy is not His essence and attributes but his directional
position.121 122 123
GOD’S HAND
The term hand of God is used sometimes in its singular form, yad (one hand) as in
the verse “Say, all bounties are in the Hand of Allah, He granted them to whom He
pleases,” “The Hand of Allah is over their hands,” and in some other verses it is
mentioned with “two hands” such as “Allah said, “O Iblis! what prevents you from
prostrating yourself to one whom I have created with My [two] hands,”124 and “Nay,
117 Al-Qur’an, Ali ‘Imran 3:54.

119 Asas, 179.
121 Asas, 180-181.
122 Al-Qur’an, Al-‘Imran 3:73.
123 Al-Qur’an, al-Fath 57:29.
124 Al-Qur’an, al-Sad 38:75.
197
both His hands are widely outstretched, He gives and spends as He pleases.”125 This
different occurrence, nevertheless, is to al-Razi, does not make any change in his
interpretation of the verses. For both are not indicative of a physical organ of God.
Rather, they refer to other meanings, which are more appropriate to the divine
qualities of God.
Al-Razi assigned three meanings to the term hand: first, it refers to the
meaning of power (qudrab). Linguistically, when it is said that “the hand of the king
is over the hand of the people,” it means that his power is predominant over his
citizens. The meaning of ‘hand’ perfectly indicates the meanin of power and it is
CfQ
further supported by the expression that “this state is in the hand of this leader,”
which means that the leader has power over the state even if he himself does not
possess physical hand!1 Second, the term ‘hand’ conveys the meaning of bounty
(nimab) since hand is the efficient means by which bounties are granted. But in
this case, the semantic relation between the term ‘hand’ and the meaning of bounty,
to al-Razi, is in the form of a relation between the cause and the effect (al-sabab
'ala al-musabbab). In other words, the meaning of bounty, as something that is
granted by the hand is also inherent in the meaning of hand. The third meanin of
CfQ
hand is more mechanical and linguistic, namely, as a relation of words that function
as an affirmation in the Qur’anic verse “...spend something in charity before your

private consultation” (fa qaddimu bayna yaday naiwakum sadaqab).127 In this
verse, there is no indication of the meanin of hand involved since it only serves as a
CfQ
linguistic tool.
Based on the above linguistic preliminaries, al-Razi further assigned these
meanings to various verses in the Qur’an in which the term ‘hand’ occur. In the
verse “The Hand of Allah is over their hands,”128 the meaning of hand here is power,
that the omnipotence of God predominates over the power of His creatures. As for

126Asds, 141.
127 Al-Qur’an, al-Mujadalah 58:12.
128 Al-Qur’an, al-Fath 48:10.
198
the verse regarding the Jews who claim that the hand of God is tied up (yadullah
i 17Q
maghlulan), the meanin of hand in this verse refers to bounty while the whole
CfQ
verse means the Jews believed that the bounties of God are withheld from them.1
This is also congruent with the following phrase in the same verse which is
indicative of the granting of bounties to creatures, “Nay, both His hands are widely
outstretched, He gives and spends (of His bounty) as He pleases.”
Al-Razi also refuted the views of scholars who assigned the meaning of ‘two
hands’ as ‘two attributes which subsist in the divine essence from which a noble and
distinguished creation (referring to Adam) had been created.’131

129This
130 refers to the
verse “Allah said, ‘O Iblis! What prevents you from prostrating yourself to one
whom I have created with My [two] hands.”132 They based their argument on the
fact that it is due to the creation by the two attributes of God that has made Adam
noble person and become the reason for the angels to prostrate before him.
Disagreeing with al-Razi, they questioned that if the two hands were interpreted to
mean power, then why is it that other creations which were also created by God by
His power were similarly not commanded by God to be prostrated to by the
an els?133 Al-Razi replied that if it is because of being created by two hands that
CfQ
Adam had been conferred with more nobility, hence the creation of beasts (bahalm)
and cattle (an dm.) would be nobler than Adam since it is mentioned in the Qur’an
that they were created by many hands [of God]134 “See they that it is We who have
created for them - among other things which our hands have fashioned- cattle,
which is under their dominion?”135 The number of hands, according to al-Razi, is not
indicative of any numerical representation, rather it refers to the abundance of divine

130 Asas, 142.
131 Ibid.
132 Al-Qur’an, Sad 38:75.
133 They also questioned that the term “two hands” cannot mean power since the term has the
connotation of two things while power only means one. Asas, 143.
134 Ibid.
135 Al-Qur’an, Yasin 36:71.
199
providence which has been given to God’s creation. ‘Hand’ also is a metaphorical
expression of something that is done by someone or somebody.136
CONCLUSION: AL-RAZI’S GENERAL METHOD IN TREATING THE

ANTHROPOMORPHIC VERSES
From the foregoing discussion, we can observe some important methods employed
by al-Razi in dealing with anthropomorphic verses:
i) Since divine transcendence occupies an important place in al-Razi’s
interpretation of the anthropomorphic verses, al-Razi consistently applied
tawil with re ard to those expressions whose literal meanings appear to

CfQ
contradict the principle of divine transcendence which have already been
established based on reason and other clear verses of the Qur’an. Whatever
alternative meanin that he assigned to the anthropomorphic expressions

CfQ
must be in line with the denial of their apparent meaning which are contrary
to the divine transcendence. This is also in accordance to his systematic
approach in interpreting the Qur’an which emphasizes consistency and
coherence between the meaning of all the Qur’anic verses.
ii) As a linguist, al-Razi’s inclination to discuss the problem from the linguistic
point of view is apparent. For example, he manifested an independent mind
in exhausting each and every meaning of a word without necessarily being
confined to the classical interpretation of the word or a verse. By exhausting
both ordinary and terminological meanings word used in the Arabic

O
language, he widened the semantic field of a word before assigning proper
meaning to it.
His mastery of Arabic literature also assisted him in analyzing the proper
usage of given word, evidenced, among others, by the fact that many
136 Asas, 144.
200
time he cited pieces of evidence (shawahid) from pre-Islamic Arabic poetry
to corroborate his explanation of a word. For example, in affirming the
allegorical meaning of the word istiwa’ in the Qur’an as istila’ (complete
mastery and power) and to show that this meanin is an established one
CfQ
within the Arabic language, he cited classical Arabic poetry: “man has taken
possession (istiwaj over Iraq, without the usage of any sword and the spill of
any blood.”137
iv) Although al-Razi was not strict in assigning various meanings to certain
words, he nevertheless did not stretch the meanin to the extent it
CfQ
contradicted the normal usage of Arabic language. He often regarded the
‘normal usage of the word’ as something canonical in determining a certain
meaning of a word. For example, in the case of the temi ‘face of God’ (wajh
Allah), al-Razi chose the meaning ‘the essence of God’ based on the normal
usage of the Arabic language which usually used the term wajh to refer to
the most important aspect of a matter, such as wajh al-qawm, which refers
to the head of the community and wajh al-amr which refers to the essence
In another case which is not mentioned in this chapter,

of a matter.138 139
namely that regarding the verse ‘laysa ka mithlihi shay/ where al-Razi
rejected the interpretation of some mufassirun who viewed this verse as
having a double meaning due to the repetitious words ‘fcu’ and ‘mithlj hence
interpreted the phrase as “nothing likes unto His likeness,” as if it affirms
the existence of God’s resemblance (mithl). Al-Razi’s rejected this
interpretation based on the fact that it is not a common usage of the Arabic
language. This kind of linguistic structure is used as a kind of rhetoric
(mubalaghah), but the Arabs, according to al-Razi used this kind of phrase
to refer to the ‘person’ not the resemblance.
137 Asas, 178.

138 See page 184-185 in this chapter.
139 Ta fsir, vol.9, 584.
201
v) Al-Razi often used simple rational arguments in disproving the impossibility
and inconsistency of the anthropomorphists’ literal interpretations. This is
supported by the explanation of the context of the verses. Although this
method is also associated with the Mutazilah, a few exceptions in al-Razi’s
explanations such as in the case of the Vision of God where he aligned
himself to the scriptural authority although no rational evidence satisfied him
in affirming the actualization of the Vision, have rendered him different from
the method of the Mutazilah.
202
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing study of al-Razi’s view on divine transcendence and
anthropomorphism, it has become clear that al-Razi, like al-Ghazali before him,
believed that divine transcendence should be upheld in an absolute sense, as
established by the Qur’an and the principle of reason. For that matter the
understanding of the anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an and Hadiths
must be in accordance with this unswerving principle of divine transcendence.
Our examination of his refutation of the Musbabbihab’s views also demonstrates
that al-Razi extensively utilized the logical and philosophical method which
became one of the important hallmarks of the later Asharite mutakallimun. in
explicating the theological views as well as refuting the views of their adversaries.
This is in line with what has been observed by Ibn Khaldun who himself wrote
Lubab al-Muhassal, summary of al-Razi s theological masterpiece, Muljassal,
that al-Razi was the first among the later scholars (muta ’akhkbirm) who
successfully combined the problems of philosophy with those of kalam.1

2 3With
this new approach, al-Razi was also deemed as offering a more systematic
theology. It is also important to note that through al-Razi’s forceful refutations
of anthropomorphism, more elaborative arguments concerning the subject of
God’s otherness or differentness (mukhalafab) were included by later Ash'arite

mutakallimun in their expositions on the Islamic creed4 such as the detailed
discussion on the impossibility of divine essence being subjected to corporeal and
bodily qualities such as the characteristics of substance and accident (jawbar wa
arad): that God cannot be in a space and direction, and that God cannot be seen,
touched, smelled and so on. Al-Razi’s Kitab Asas al-Taqdis, in this case, which
1 Ed. Rafiq al-cAjam (Bayrut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1995).

2 Muqaddimah, 466.
3 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 96.
4 “Some Muslim Discussions”, 87.
203
was specifically written to refute the literalist position of the two main sects of
the musbabbibab, namely the Karramiyyab and the extreme Hartabilab, has
served as a repository of rational and textual arguments for the later Asharite
mutakallimun in expounding their arguments against the anthropomorphists.
This is evident from the writings of al-Razi’s Asb arf successors such as al-
Taftazani and al-Iji, who utilized several important principles that were
originated and formulated by al-Razi in their exposition of the principle of

kalam.5 We have also demonstrated in our study that al-Razi, through his Kitab
Asas al-Taqdfs, has identified and deliberated at length, as he always did in his
other works, all his adversaries’ arguments before putting forward his own
arguments. While this work benefited the later Asb arf mutakallimun, it also
invited criticism from their theological adversaries, notably by later Hanbalite
scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah in his work Ta’sis al-Radd ‘ ala Asas al-Taqdfs.
Our study also reveals that al-Razi’s priority in understanding the
scripture is on the internal consistency of the whole message of religion revealed
by God to humankind. There must not be any contradiction in God’s message
especially with those principle which were already established rationally and
scripturally. The Qur’an as a clear book (kitabun mubfri) which was revealed by
the Wise God (al-Hakim) must also be clear to human reason. In the case of the
ambiguous verses (mutasbabibat), they must be understood through the
guidance of the clear and established principles of reason and other verses with
established meanings (muhkamat). Hence, after having made clear the specific
criteria of mudkamat and mutasbabibat of the Qur’an, al-Razi maintained that if
there are any contradictions between the literal meaning of any verses of the
Qur’an or Hadith with established rational principles and other established
verses, the literal meanings must, first and foremost, be denied. More so when
5 Heer, “Priority of Reason”, 181-183.
204
the literal meaning is detrimental to the principle of divine transcendence. What
follows after that, according to al-Razi, is either that we leave the meanings to
God, as done by the salaf, or we interpret them to come to a more acceptable
meanin within the bounds of the established verses, linguistic applicability and
CfQ
sound reason. This is basically the principle underlying al-Razi’s treatment of
anthropomorphic verses.
Al-Razi was often judged by his critics as being influenced by the
Mu tazilah.6 This representation becomes clearer when he proposed ta \vil, the
allegorical interpretation, which has been the distinctive characteristic of the
Mu tazilah method in the interpretation of the Scripture, as being the proper
solution for dealing with anthropomorphic verses. Without denying the
parallelism of much of his arguments with those of the Mu tazilah, we, however,
have shown in our study that al-Razi was still an Ash arI and was consistent in
using the epistemological framework of Ash arI kalam in dealing with the
anthropomorphic issue. In Chapter Two, it has been established that al-Razi was
in disagreement with the Mu tazilah on the issue of the nature of the divine
attributes and their relation to the divine essence. While concurring with the
Mu tazilah on the necessity of ta \vH when dealing with those verses which
contradict rational principles, he outlined some exceptions to give greater room to
the priority of revelation as we have shown in the particular case of the Beatific
Vision in Chapter Five.
Throughout our study, the problem of the relation between reason and
revelation is also clarified. In contrast to the Western religious tradition in which
reason and revelation are on opposite sides, the Islamic tradition resolves the issue
by identifying the role of reason as the true interpreter of the scripture. The
exaltation of God’s Words and the understandability of the Scripture must not be
at the expense of reason. As shown by al-Razi, the consistency of the scriptural
6 Ignaz Goldziher, ‘Aus der Theologie das Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’, Der Islam, iii (1912) quoted in Watt,
Islamic Philosophy, 95; Theology, xv.
205
message can be established by adhering to established rational principles while
emphasizing the most important aspect of God, namely, His transcendence as an
important message of the Qur’an as the Word of God.
The method employed by al-Razi in dealing with anthropomorphic verses
can offer solutions for overcoming extremism in dealing with the Scripture,
problem which prevails even in our present day between two extreme positions:
strict adherence to the literal meaning of the text, on the one hand, and the
liberal method of interpreting the meaning of the text, on the other. The former
can be seen from the present-day emergence of the Wahhabf-Salaff group which
traces their origin to the Hanbalites, while the latter, indubitably, is gaining
momentum in the present age with the emergence of “post-modernist” Muslim
thinkers with their ‘deconstruction’ hermeneutical method employed in
interpreting the Qur’an, in emulation of the Biblical tradition of the Christian
West. We believe that al-Razi’s approach is a good antidote for both extremes.
206
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Divine Transcendence and The Problem of Anthropomorphism in Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi's Kalam

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INTKHNATIOKAL ISLAMIC UX1VLBSITY MKT KV<^tm

DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF

MOHD FARID MOHD SHAHRAN

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the

As a religion which upholds divine transcendence as its fundamental element in

characteristics of others particularly humans. The strong disavowal of

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JJ-I ^"^01 <J^ ‘ ’ ^OU (Z^l < JpOJI

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JJ^ JI IA^UpJIS JI J cZ^J jjJ jrji^j C?JII ^J>JI cX^JI •V

Mohamad Zaini Olhman

Ssekamanya Siraje Abdallah

submitted as a whole for any other degrees at HUM or other institutions.

Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran

DECLARATION OF COPYRIGHT AND AFFIRMATION OF

Copyright © 2000 by Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran. All rights reserved.

DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF

No part of this unpublished research may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

1. Any material contained in or derived from this unpublished research may

Allirmed by Mohd Farid Mohd Shahran.

“A ah wi l up to suitable ranks and degrees, those of you who believe and

My genuine indebtedness also goes to my parents for their enormous sacrifice

CHAPTER TWO: DIVINE ATTRIBUTES IN AL-RAzI’S KALAM 66

CHAPTER THREE: TEXTUAL AND RATIONAL BASIS OF THE

CHAPTER FOUR: MUHKAMAT, MUTASHABIHAT,

CHAPTER FIVE: AL-RAZI’S TREATMENT

Arbain Al-Razi, Kitab al-Arbain ft Usui al-Din

Asas Al-Razi, Asas al-Taqdls

Controversies Fathalla Kholeif, A Study on Fakbr al-Din al-Razi

El First Encyclopedia of Islam

EI2 Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition

Fakbr al-Din Salih Zarkan, Fakbr al-Din al-Razi wa Ara’ubu al-

Farq Al-Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayna al-Firaq

Fas I Ibn Hazm, al-Fasl ft al-Milal wa al-Abwa’ wa al-

Ibanah Al-Ash'ari, al-Ibanab ‘an Usui al-Diyanab

Irshad Al-Juwayni, al-Irsbad ila Qawdti al-Adillab ft Usui

Lawdmi Al-Razi, Lawdmi al-Bayyindt Sharh Asma’Allah

Maalim Al-Razi, Maalim ft Usui al-Din

Mabahitb Al-Razi, al-Mababith al-Mashriqiyyah ft ‘Ilm al-

Mabsul Al-Razi, al-Mabsul ft ‘Ilm al-Usul

Maqalat Al-Ash'ari, Maqalat al-Islamiyyin wa Ikhtilaf al-

Masail Al-Razi, al-Masall al-Khamsunft Usui al-Din

Milal Al-Shahrastani, Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal

Muhassal Al-Razi, Muhassal Afkar al-Mutaqaddimin wa al-

Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah

Nihayat Al-Shahrastani, Nihayat al-Iqddm fi Tim al-Kalam

Sharh al-Aqald Al-Taftazani, Sharh alAqarid al-Nasafiyyah

Tafsir Al-Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir

Tahafut Al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Faldsifah

Ta \vil Ibn Qutaybah, Ta \vil Mukhtalif al-Hadith

Theology Yasin Ceylan, Theology and Tafsir in the Major

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

(tanzih) is one of the underlying principles in arriving at the understanding of

anthropomorphic (tashbih) language in describing some of God’s qualities and

emphasize the absolute uniqueness of God. As far as the history of kalam is

mutashdbihat. They soon began attributing anthropomorphic qualities to God.

theology, began to be challenged by these anthropomorphic interpretations.

theology, it compelled the mutakallimun to provide a considerable amount of

substantial and systematic arguments in refuting these ideas.

Apparently, there were many modes of interpretations in dealing with the

anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur’an ranging from crude emphasis of the

gorically reject any anthropomorphic meanings regarding God’s attributes