The Indian Constitution is fundamentally a social document, with provisions aimed at advancing

the goals of the social revolution by establishing conditions for its achievement. The core
commitment to this revolution lies in Parts III and IV, encompassing Fundamental Rights and
Directive Principles of State Policy, often regarded as the conscience of the Constitution. These
rights and principles have deep roots in India's struggle for independence and connect its past,
present, and future, adding significant meaning to their inclusion. The Fundamental Rights in
the Indian Constitution are divided into seven parts: the Right to Equality, the Right to Freedom,
the Right Against Exploitation, the Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and Educational Rights,
the Right to Property, and the Right to Constitutional Remedies. These rights protect individuals
and minority groups from arbitrary state action and encroachment by society, fostering an
egalitarian society where liberty is not limited to a privileged few. In the Directive Principles,
however, one finds an even clearer statement of the social revolution. These aim to make Indian
masses positively free from centuries of coercion and abject conditions, guiding the state in
governance despite not being enforceable by courts.
The demand for fundamental rights in India traces back to the Constitution of India Bill, of 1895,
which included rights such as free speech, protection against arbitrary imprisonment, and free
state education. Congress resolutions from 1917 to 1919 reiterated the call for civil rights and
equality of status with Englishmen, advocating for equal terms in bearing arms and a wider
application of trial by jury. This demand exemplified both the desire for negative freedom and
positive freedom. By the mid-1920s, Indian leaders shifted focus from establishing rights vis-a-
vis Englishmen to ensuring liberty within India, reflecting a growing consciousness of their
identity and the needs of the people.
The next significant development in the demand for fundamental rights in India occurred with
the drafting of the seven fundamental rights provisions in Mrs. Besant's Commonwealth of India
Bill of 1925. These provisions ensured individual liberty, freedom of conscience, free expression
of opinion, free assembly, equality before the law, and no disqualification based on sex.
Additionally, free elementary education was guaranteed for all persons in the Commonwealth of
India. The Forty-Third Annual Session of the Congress in Madras in 1927 empowered the
Working Committee to draft a Swaraj Constitution for India based on a declaration of rights,
recognizing the importance of written rights to safeguard against oppression. The committee,
chaired by Motilal Nehru, emphasized securing fundamental rights denied to Indians and
providing protection to minorities, explicitly including rights related to freedom of conscience
and religion to prevent domination of one community over another. These rights evolved into
Minority Rights and are enshrined in the Indian Constitution under Religion, Cultural, and
Educational Rights, as well as in Part XVII on Language.
The Congress Session in Karachi in March 1931 adopted the Resolution on Fundamental Rights
and Economic and Social Change, serving as both a declaration of rights and a socialist
manifesto. This resolution emphasized the importance of economic freedom alongside political
freedom to end the exploitation of the masses. It called for the state to safeguard the interests
of industrial workers by ensuring legislation for a living wage, healthy conditions, limited
working hours, and protection from economic hardships. Special protections were also
proposed for women and children. Additionally, the state was tasked with owning or controlling
key industries and services, and reforming systems of land tenure, revenue, and rent. This
resolution laid the groundwork for the Directive Principles in India's future constitution.
The Sapru Report, published at the end of 1945, further discussed fundamental rights and
highlighted the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable rights. This distinction served
as a significant aspect of the report's treatment of rights.
By 1947 it was a commonly accepted belief that the state bore a major responsibility for the
welfare of its citizens. it was clear that ‘the utility of a state has to be judged from its effect on
the common man’s welfare’, and that the Constitution must establish the state’s obligations
beyond doubt. This was the purpose of the Directive Principles of State Policy.
The Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee, formed in 1947, drew on various drafts and
memoranda to draft fundamental rights over ten meetings in March and April. While there was
some disagreement on techniques, there was little on principles. It became evident that
fundamental rights were not meant to prevent state intervention in social revolution. For
example, there was debate over the freedom to practice religion, with concerns raised about
practices like temple prostitution and sati. Ayyar and Amrit Kaur opposed allowing the free
practice of religion without limitations. This led to a provision in the Constitution allowing state
laws for social welfare and reform. Similarly, there was discussion about equality before the law,
with Ayyar arguing that it could hinder reform efforts, suggesting instead that "no person should
be denied the equal protection of the law." This phrase was adopted in the Constitution,
reflecting the committee's consideration of social welfare alongside individual rights.
The demand for positive liberty, such as independence, led to the acknowledgment of adult
suffrage, or universal franchise. The Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee unanimously
supported the inclusion of universal suffrage along with secret and periodic elections. Although
ordinary remedies existed for protecting rights, the decision to include prerogative writs in the
Constitution was made to strengthen Fundamental Rights provisions. These writs became
popular and were considered crucial for upholding freedom and liberty.
it was recognized that while the rights included in the Constitution were fundamental and
enforceable by the courts, they could not be absolute. Therefore, limitations were proposed,
such as attaching provisos to specific rights and providing for their suspension in certain
circumstances. This approach was exemplified in the Karachi Resolution, where rights like free
speech were to be exercised without contravening law or morality. The sub-committee, led by
advocates like A. K. Ayyar and K. M. Munshi, drafted the 'rights to freedom' with provisions
subjecting their exercise to public order and morality. However, these provisos faced mixed
reception in the Assembly. Despite initial reservations, the Drafting Committee further
elaborated on these limitations, subjecting rights like free speech, assembly, and association to
various conditions, including public order, morality, health, decency, and public interest.
Moreover, mechanisms for suspending fundamental rights during emergencies were expanded,
allowing executive action even in contravention of certain rights to freedom.