READING PLATO

Tak�ng the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus as a start�ng po�nt—where Socrates argues
that a book cannot choose �ts reader nor can �t defend �tself aga�nst m�s�nterpretat�on—
Read�ng Plato offers solut�ons to the problems of �nterpret�ng the Platon�c d�alogues.
• What was Plato’s �ntent�on �n wr�t�ng d�alogues, not treat�ses?
• D�d he choose the d�alogue-form �n order to h�de h�s own v�ews and so preserve what
modern �nterpreters have called ‘Platon�c anonym�ty’?
• What d�d he mean by h�s severe cr�t�c�sm of wr�t�ng?
• D�d he have an oral ph�losophy, as reported by Ar�stotle?
Thomas A.Szlezák persuas�vely and erud�tely argues that the d�alogues are des�gned to
st�mulate ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry by turn�ng readers’ souls, as far as wr�t�ng can ach�eve
th�s, to the love of w�sdom (ph�lo-soph�a). The d�alogues �ntroduce them to the art of
argu�ng ph�losoph�cally wh�le show�ng that oral d�alect�c w�ll necessar�ly go beyond what
the d�alogues themselves can offer. Read�ng Plato offers a conc�se and �llum�nat�ng
�ns�ght �nto the complex�t�es and d�ff�cult�es of the Platon�c d�alogues wh�ch w�ll be
�nvaluable to any student of Plato’s ph�losophy. S�nce publ�cat�on of the German or�g�nal
(1993) Read�ng Plato has been translated �nto several European languages.
 READING PLATO
Thomas A.Szlezák

Translated by Graham Zanker

London and New York

 F�rst publ�shed 1993 as Platon lesen by Verlag frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart
Th�s ed�t�on publ�shed �n the Taylor & Franc�s e-L�brary, 2005.
“ To purchase your own copy of th�s or any of Taylor & Franc�s or Routledge’s collect�on of
thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.”
F�rst publ�shed �n Engl�sh 1999 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
S�multaneously publ�shed �n the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York,
NY 10001
© 1993 Fr�edr�ch Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog Translat�on © 1999
Routledge
The r�ght of Thomas A.Szlezák to be �dent�f�ed as the Author of th�s Work has been asserted by
h�m �n accordance w�th the Copyr�ght, Des�gns and Patents Act 1988
All r�ghts reserved. No part of th�s book may be repr�nted or reproduced or ut�l�zed �n any form or
by any electron�c, mechan�cal, or other means, now known or hereafter �nvented, �nclud�ng
photocopy�ng and record�ng, or �n any �nformat�on storage or retr�eval system, w�thout perm�ss�on
�n wr�t�ng from the publ�shers.
Br�t�sh L�brary Catalogu�ng �n Publ�cat�on Data A catalogue record for th�s book �s ava�lable from
the Br�t�sh L�brary
L�brary of Congress Catalog�ng �n Publ�cat�on Data Szlezák, Thomas Alexander. [Platon lesen.
Engl�sh] Read�ng Plato/Thomas A.Szlezák; translated by Graham Zanker. p. cm. Or�g�nally
publ�shed: Platon lesen. Stuttgart: Verlag frommann-holzboog, 1993. Includes b�bl�ograph�cal
references and �ndex of passages. 1. Plato. D�alogues. B395.S96913 1999 184–dc21 98–34035
CIP

ISBN 0-203-98100-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-18983-7 (hbk)

ISBN 0-415-18984-5 (pbk)

For Ol�ver Tapl�n and Chr�stopher Rowe, remember�ng our t�me together at the
Un�vers�ty of Br�stol �n 1972.

Th. A.Sz.
 CONTENTS

Preface v�

1 The joy of read�ng Plato 1

2 The reader part�c�pates 3
3 An example of �nd�v�dual recept�on 5
4 Poss�ble m�staken att�tudes on the part of the reader 7
5 One does not see what one does not know 9
6 Character�st�cs of the Platon�c d�alogues 14
7 Quest�ons about the character�st�cs 16
8 For whom �s Plato wr�t�ng? 19
9 Does a Platon�c d�alogue speak w�th several vo�ces? The modern theory of 21
the d�alogues
10 An anc�ent theory of �nterpretat�on 25
11 The �nterpretat�on of S�mon�des �n the Protagoras 28
12 The cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus 30
13 The def�n�t�on of the ph�losopher based on h�s relat�onsh�p to h�s wr�t�ngs 36
14 The mean�ng of τιµιώτερα 39
15 ‘Support for the Logos’ �n the d�alogues 42
16 The ascent to the pr�nc�ples and the l�m�ts of ph�losoph�cal commun�cat�on 47
17 Some ‘gaps’ 51
18 The doctr�ne of anamnes�s and d�alect�c �n the Euthydemus 58
19 The �mportance of the allus�ons for read�ng Plato 61
20 Plato’s dramat�c techn�que: Some examples 65
21 Irony 71
22 Myth 73
23 Monologue and d�alogue w�th �mag�nary partners 76
24 The character�st�cs of the d�alogues: What they really mean 78
25 How and why the d�alogue-form has been m�sunderstood 82
26 The d�fference between esoter�c�sm and secrecy 85
27 Plato’s concept of ph�losophy and the object�ves of the d�alogues 87

Notes 90
B�bl�ography 97
Index of passages c�ted 99
B�ograph�cal note 109
 PREFACE

Plato has never lacked readers, and we need not fear that he w�ll lack them �n the future.
Certa�nly, he does not need to be ‘d�scovered’ these days. But there �s a spec�al feature
about read�ng h�m. Perhaps no other ph�losoph�cal author has had such a m�xed att�tude
to wr�t�ng as a means of d�ssem�nat�ng knowledge as Plato. The d�alogue-form �s r�ghtly
cons�dered to be an extraord�nar�ly reflect�ve manner of deal�ng w�th the wr�tten word.
But what Plato wanted to ach�eve w�th �t �s someth�ng wh�ch �s d�sputed as few other
th�ngs are. Thus what Ar�stotle once sa�d about cons�der�ng the truth �n general �s �n some
measure true of read�ng the works of Plato: �t �s partly easy, because no one ent�rely
m�sses the mark, and partly d�ff�cult, because no one ach�eves the necessary prec�s�on.
The present volume a�ms to develop �ts theme by start�ng from the ‘easy’ mater�al, �.e.
from mater�al �n Plato wh�ch �s d�rectly access�ble to us moderns and not �n d�spute, �n
order to work forward from there to the ‘d�ff�cult’ mater�al, �.e. to those tra�ts of Plato’s
wr�t�ng of d�alogues wh�ch do not correspond w�th our modern v�ews of the use of
wr�t�ng �n ph�losophy, and wh�ch as a consequence are most often m�s�nterpreted or even
�gnored, but wh�ch nevertheless reach �nto the heart of Plato’s concept�on of ph�losophy.
Read�ng Plato f�rst appeared �n an Ital�an translat�on under the t�tle Come leggere
Platone (Ruscon�, M�lan 1991, 2nd ed�t�on 1992). Or�g�nally conce�ved as a volume to
accompany the new translat�on of all Plato’s d�alogues by G�ovann� Reale and h�s
collaborators, the book �s d�rected not only to the Plato-spec�al�st—though naturally to
h�m as well—but at the same t�me to the non-spec�al�st �ns�de and outs�de the ‘d�sc�pl�ne’
of ph�losophy. It does not a�m to s�mpl�fy or popular�se, but certa�nly attempts to br�ng
the complex problems of �nterpret�ng the Platon�c d�alogues to Plato’s grow�ng
readersh�p �n a form wh�ch �s not only access�ble to the spec�al�st who has spent years on
the task.
The a�m of th�s work �s not a deta�led engagement w�th the Romant�c parad�gm of
�nterpret�ng Plato, wh�ch was founded by Fr�edr�ch Schle�ermacher and from wh�ch the
p�cture sketched here of Plato’s a�ms, methods and techn�ques d�ffers �n essent�al po�nts:
for that, the reader �s referred to Platon und d�e Schr�ftl�chke�t der Ph�losoph�e (Berl�n
and New York 1985) and there �n part�cular to the append�x on method (‘D�e moderne
Theor�e der D�alogform’, pp. 331–375). At the w�sh of the Ruscon� Press references are
made to th�s book from the start, but no knowledge of �t at all �s assumed for read�ng the
present work.
The a�m �s to reach an �nterpretat�on of Plato’s ph�losoph�cal wr�t�ng wh�ch can endure
�n the face of Plato’s cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus. To want to devalue Plato’s own
devaluat�on of wr�t�ng or turn �t �nto �ts oppos�te, as has been standard pract�ce s�nce the
Romant�c per�od and �s frequently st�ll to th�s day, cannot open any path towards
understand�ng Plato as a wr�ter. Only �f Plato’s evaluat�on of wr�tten and spoken
ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry �s taken ser�ously can the d�alogues’ techn�que and �ntent�on be
adequately understood. Today’s reader must adapt h�mself to the perspect�ve of the
author, aga�nst all k�nds of prejud�ces and res�stance wh�ch are spec�f�c to modern t�mes.
 It �s only �n th�s way, I bel�eve, that we can exper�ence the joy of read�ng wh�ch, for
the author’s part—accord�ng to a remarkable test�mony of Plato about h�mself—�s
m�rrored by the joy at the success of the th�nker’s wr�tten ‘gardens of Adon�s’ (Phaedrus
276d).
Thomas Alexander Szlezák
 1
THE JOY OF READING PLATO

Above everyth�ng else, read�ng Plato enta�ls a un�que �ntellectual pleasure. The joy of
engag�ng w�th h�s thought comes not only from exper�enc�ng the art�st�c perfect�on of h�s
ph�losoph�cal dramas. There �s also the sense that as a reader one �s not only a w�tness but
somehow a part of the l�vely d�scuss�on wh�ch Plato presents �n masterly strokes as �f �t
were a natural �nteract�on between characters who seem to be taken from l�fe �tself.
D�rectness and freshness, wh�ch have been adm�red throughout the ages as a
character�st�c of Greek art and culture �n general, are qual�t�es wh�ch few, even w�th�n
that culture, ach�eved to the degree that Plato d�d. Although he was the sp�r�tual he�r of
the �mmensely creat�ve lyr�c and class�cal ages and was able to ass�m�late the exper�ence
of generat�ons of poets and th�nkers �n a h�ghly reflect�ve way, he can at the same t�me
create the �mpress�on that ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry began, as �f w�thout any presuppos�t�ons,
from zero, �n the br�ll�ant world of Athens he portrays.
A second, equally �mportant character�st�c of h�s l�terary world �s �ts var�ety and �ts
far-reach�ng �ntellectual r�chness. For the d�rectness and authent�c�ty of h�s presentat�on
of the Athen�an amb�ence �n no way mean that as a wr�ter Plato was completely
dom�nated by the h�stor�cal events and soc�al l�m�ts of that world alone. W�th the
sovere�gn sweep of a poet, Plato connects h�s nat�ve Athens w�th everyth�ng that Greek
�ntellectual h�story had produced. Certa�nly, �n undertak�ng th�s he was able to refer to
h�stor�cal events, for example when he makes the great �ntellectuals of the f�fth century
BC, who �ndeed l�ked com�ng to Athens, appear �n the early d�alogues �n front of an
Athen�an publ�c and advert�se the�r new systems of educat�on. But �n the later works,
when he makes a ‘Stranger from Elea’ who rema�ns anonymous or even Parmen�des
h�mself (�n the d�alogue named after h�m) come to Athens and talk ph�losophy w�th the
young Socrates, all b�ograph�cal and h�stor�cal plaus�b�l�ty �s thrown as�de. In the
d�alogue on the ph�losophy of nature, the T�maeus, a non-Athen�an statesman and
scholar, whom we are to �mag�ne as a Pythagorean even �f he �s not expl�c�tly descr�bed
as such, speaks before a small group, of wh�ch only half are Athen�ans, on the top�c of the
structur�ng of the cosmos by means of the d�v�ne reason of the Dem�urge; �n Plato’s last
work, the Laws, by contrast, an Athen�an, who on th�s occas�on rema�ns anonymous and
thereby reflects the culture of h�s c�ty all the more, �s on fore�gn ground, namely on Crete,
�n the company of two representat�ves of the conservat�ve culture of the Dor�ans, when he
drafts a comprehens�ve p�cture of a well-ordered future soc�ety and �ts �ntellectual
foundat�ons.
Apparently, then, Plato �ntended not only to broaden the �ntellectual hor�zon from t�me
to t�me by the l�terary dev�ce of the cho�ce of d�alogue-partner, but �n general also to
reflect a complex h�stor�cal process: f�rst, the new sc�ent�f�c and soc�al educat�onal
systems developed outs�de of Athens entered the pol�t�cally powerful c�ty; here, by
engag�ng w�th the �ntellectual wealth �mported from outs�de, Athen�an conceptual
 Read�ng Plato 2

ph�losophy was developed wh�ch, as soon as �t was sure of �ts methods, shaped �ts
responses more rad�cally and ass�m�lated the foundat�ons of the f�fth century, the
ph�losoph�es of the Eleat�cs, Heracl�tus and the Pythagoreans; f�nally, such an
exam�nat�on of the foundat�ons resulted, as the Laws symbol�se, �n the transm�ss�on of a
pol�t�co-moral system, wh�ch had evolved from the most r�gorous, method�cal school�ng,
to the whole Hellen�c world through ‘the Athen�an’. Thus, through the med�um of the
Platon�c d�alogue-partners from the early to the late d�alogues, we pass through the
h�stor�cal development of Athens from �ntellectual recept�v�ty to cr�t�cal deepen�ng and
f�nally to normat�ve creat�v�ty.
So the d�alogues’ d�rectness, the�r var�ety and the�r capac�ty to serve as a symbol, of
wh�ch we have already rece�ved a f�rst �mpress�on, have establ�shed Plato as the author
who �s regarded everywhere today, regardless of the d�fferences between nat�onal
cultures, as the author who �s most effect�ve at awaken�ng an �nterest �n ph�losophy.
Whoever beg�ns to conduct ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry w�th Plato can be sure that he or she �s
on the r�ght path.
At the same t�me, h�s powers of st�mulat�on are by no means l�m�ted to the
ph�losopher’s �n�t�al stages. The truly aston�sh�ng th�ng �s rather that Plato not only
def�ned the standard of what could from then on �n Europe be called ph�losophy, but also
elaborated a number of essent�al quest�ons of metaphys�cs, ep�stemology, eth�cs and
pol�t�cal ph�losophy �n so fundamental a way that, �n sp�te of such an �mmensely fru�tful
development of two and a half thousand years, �t �s �mposs�ble not to take account of h�s
approaches to solut�ons, or at least h�s statement of problems.
These should therefore be the most �mportant factors for the modern publ�c’s
exper�ence of read�ng Plato. The sense that we can take part �n ph�losophy at �ts f�rst and
st�ll unadulterated or�g�ns, bound together w�th the conv�ct�on that we are be�ng
confronted w�th quest�ons of a relevance wh�ch rema�ns und�m�n�shed, and susta�ned by
our exper�enc�ng v�rtuos�ty �n language and compos�t�on, produces for the recept�ve
reader the sense of �ntellectual joy w�th wh�ch we began.
 2
THE READER PARTICIPATES

Taken on �ts own, however, th�s exper�ence st�ll does not expla�n why the quest�on of
how one should read the text �s debated w�th spec�al pass�on and controversy prec�sely �n
the case of Plato. Even non-spec�al�sts have come to know that th�s �s the case. W�th no
other th�nker does the quest�on of the l�terary form �n wh�ch the ph�losoph�cal subject-
matter �s cast and, as a consequence, the quest�on of the manner �n wh�ch the reader must
approach th�s part�cular form, ga�n so much �mportance as w�th Plato. For w�th no other
th�nker �s the form of the representat�on so d�rectly relevant to the subject-matter as w�th
h�m; the correct understand�ng of the d�alogue-form and the correct understand�ng of the
Platon�c concept�on of ph�losophy are �nterdependent. It �s a paradox�cal s�tuat�on: th�s
author, who �s unr�valled �n h�s ab�l�ty to fac�l�tate the exper�ence of enter�ng
ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry, appears to need h�s own spec�f�c system of hermeneut�cs for be�ng
understood.
It �s certa�nly no co�nc�dence that the �nterpretat�on of the works of Plato and the
�ndependent d�sc�pl�ne of ph�losoph�cal hermeneut�cs have come �nto very close contact
w�th one another at two �mportant po�nts �n the�r development. It was the �mportant
Romant�c ph�losopher and theolog�an Fr�edr�ch Schle�ermacher (1768–1834) who was
the f�rst to reflect on the act�ve role of the reader and from th�s developed a method of
�nterpret�ng the d�alogues, the fundamentals of wh�ch many even today st�ll regard as
val�d. It was also Schle�ermacher who re-thought the old problem of theology concern�ng
correct exeges�s and thus advanced to a un�versal hermeneut�cs wh�ch can be regarded as
the actual beg�nn�ng of modern hermeneut�c ph�losophy. And, �n our own century,
HansGeorg Gadamer took h�s ph�losoph�cal start�ng-po�nt prec�sely from Plato and �n h�s
f�rst work, Platons d�alekt�sche Eth�k (1931), thereby deepened and put �n concrete form
Schle�ermacher’s p�oneer�ng �ns�ghts on the mean�ng of form for content. Gadamer also
produced, �n h�s ma�n work, Wahrhe�t und Methode (1960), a new foundat�on for
ph�losoph�cal hermeneut�cs.
The quest�on of the correct way of read�ng Plato �s ult�mately a quest�on of the ways �n
wh�ch the reader plays a part �n what he or she �s read�ng. That we cannot, when read�ng,
abstract ourselves from our own ego, that we cannot annul our man�fold l�m�tat�ons and
that as a consequence we ourselves form a v�tal factor �n the process of read�ng �s a
datum wh�ch �s val�d for every k�nd of read�ng and �s accepted by everyone. W�th Plato,
however, there �s the add�t�onal fact that, as we not�ced at the outset, the reader almost
�nev�tably gets the feel�ng not only of be�ng a w�tness but �n some scarcely def�nable way
also of be�ng part of the argument wh�ch he �s follow�ng—wh�ch must also have
consequences for the way �n wh�ch he responds to the content. And, �nasmuch as the
deep-seated, personal part�c�pat�on �n the d�alogue �s obv�ously not an effect wh�ch �s
merely acc�dental �n the works of Plato or �n any way aga�nst the author’s �ntent�on, the
problem w�th wh�ch we are confronted here cannot s�mply be one of el�m�nat�ng as
 Read�ng Plato 4

extens�vely as poss�ble all subject�ve elements �n our recept�on of the texts. Certa�nly, the
a�m �s to be able to or�entate oneself by the subject �tself alone (see Phaedo 91c); but as
long as one �s st�ll only on the way toward th�s a�m, �t would not be helpful to act as �f �t
were already ach�eved and on that bas�s to el�m�nate the poss�b�l�ty that dec�s�ve
h�ndrances (but �n favourable cases a�ds as well) may ex�st w�th�n ourselves for
approach�ng the a�m. Obv�ously, we should react to Plato’s dramas w�th our ent�re be�ng
and not only w�th our analyt�cal reason�ng. The quest�on �s therefore what form the act�ve
part�c�pat�on of the reader should take and what part h�s spontaneous contr�but�on may
have �n the construct�on of mean�ng.
 3
AN EXAMPLE OF INDIVIDUAL
RECEPTION

Nobody was more consc�ous than Plato that the recept�on of ph�losophy �s cond�t�oned by
each �nd�v�dual’s l�m�tat�ons. Aga�n and aga�n he makes us exper�ence how an
�nterlocutor �s h�ndered by h�s own part�cular m�nd-set from grasp�ng what �s meant.
One of the most famous examples �s Call�cles �n the d�alogue, the Gorg�as. Call�cles
represents the thes�s of the so-called natural r�ght of the stronger. Accord�ng to th�s �t �s
r�ght and proper that the man who �s super�or to the others �n strength and power
subjugate them and ruthlessly use them for the furtherance of h�s own �nterests. The
thes�s goes that nature �tself des�res the dom�nance of the stronger; the trad�t�onal v�ew of
just�ce, wh�ch l�m�ts the fulf�lment of one’s own des�res �n terms of the r�ghts of others, �s
noth�ng other than an �deolog�cal construct of the weak by means of wh�ch, for the�r self-
protect�on, they w�sh to d�scred�t the strong man’s healthy str�v�ng after the un�nh�b�ted
fulf�lment of h�s �nst�ncts and w�shes (see Gorg�as 482c–486d).
Plato could have had th�s thes�s debated �n a calm and d�sassoc�ated manner as a
s�mply theoret�cal contr�but�on towards a bas�c foundat�on of eth�cs. Instead, he makes
Call�cles express �t as h�s own peronal bel�ef. It �s not just an �ntellectual ‘pos�t�on’ but
the d�rect express�on of h�s patholog�cal amb�t�on and h�s boundless egocentr�sm. When
Socrates demonstrates to h�m w�th compell�ng reasons that the convent�onal concept of
just�ce makes sense wh�le the so-called r�ght of the stronger �s self-contrad�ctory,
Call�cles can no longer follow Socrates’ reason�ng—certa�nly not, however, out of a lack
of �ntell�gence, because he obv�ously has no l�ttle of that, but because of the l�m�tat�ons of
h�s character. It �s stated qu�te openly that �t �s h�s unbr�dled dr�ves wh�ch h�nder h�m
from understand�ng and accept�ng Socrates’ theoret�cally well founded and morally
wholesome v�ew (see Gorg�as 513c).
In part�cular, Call�cles has a perverted v�ew of h�mself: he �dent�f�es h�mself w�th h�s
des�res and �nst�ncts (Gorg�as 491e–492c). He does not know and does not want to know
that human be�ngs are more than the�r �nst�ncts and that reason does not ex�st �n them to
be deployed purely �nstrumentally �n the serv�ce of the�r �nst�ncts, but �s a d�v�ne force
wh�ch exerc�ses control over the lower parts of the soul. Socrates obv�ously has a
correspond�ng theory of the �nner structure of man ava�lable as a reply (see Gorg�as
493aff.), but when he sees that Call�cles would not be able to know what to make of �t, he
does not even beg�n to expla�n �t w�th arguments, but �s content to g�ve a few h�nts wh�ch
are only understandable �n the�r full range from the fully developed doctr�ne of the soul �n
the Republ�c. Call�cles �s, however, made aware that he st�ll does not know even the
‘Lesser Myster�es’; but �n�t�at�on �nto the ‘Greater Myster�es’ �s not perm�ss�ble w�thout a
knowledge of the lower step (497c). Put another way, the real solut�on of the problem,
wh�ch for Plato can be produced only by recourse to the �nner structure of man, does not
 Read�ng Plato 6

need to be �mparted to a character l�ke Call�cles, s�nce he lacks the personal qual�f�cat�ons
for accept�ng such truths adequately.1 Thus Call�cles rece�ves only an ad hom�nem
refutat�on as Socrates demonstrates the contrad�ctory nature of h�s pos�t�on, on Call�cles’
own level of argumentat�on (494bff).
W�th th�s br�ll�ant example of l�terary character�sat�on Plato tells us w�th all clar�ty that
h�s ph�losophy demands the whole human be�ng. Intellectual capab�l�ty alone �s
�nsuff�c�ent; what �s requ�red �s an �nner relat�onsh�p between the th�ng wh�ch �s to be
conveyed and the soul to wh�ch �t �s to be conveyed. Anybody who �s not prepared to
enter upon a process of �nner transformat�on �s not ent�tled to know the full solut�on
e�ther.
But a pos�t�ve att�tude �s needed not only towards the case wh�ch the ph�losopher
presents. Because ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry �s a process wh�ch goes on between �nd�v�dual
human be�ngs, good w�ll toward one’s partner �s also necessary. Plato shows
�n a very str�k�ng way that the conversat�on between Socrates and Call�cles ceases to be
real commun�cat�on because Call�cles cannot meet h�s partner w�th good w�ll.2 In fact �t �s
Plato’s conv�ct�on that real ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry �s only poss�ble among fr�ends, and that
ph�losoph�cal argumentat�on, �f �t �s to be product�ve �n real terms, can be conducted only
�n ‘well-�ntent�oned refutat�ons’ ( , Letter 7, 344b5). Th�s
conv�ct�on, wh�ch determ�nes Plato’s character-dep�ct�on �n all d�alogues, �s d�scern�ble
w�th part�cular clar�ty—apart from the Gorg�as—�n for example the Lys�s, the
Sympos�um, the Phaedrus and the Republ�c. Indeed, ‘fr�endsh�p’ �s not to be understood
�n th�s connect�on as subject�ve, random �ncl�nat�on, and thus as a mere emot�on, but
follows from the shared or�entat�on towards the ‘d�v�ne’ and the ‘erernally ex�stent’, and
�n the f�nal analys�s towards the �dea of the Good �tself.
Call�cles �s certa�nly an extreme character. Plato has drawn h�m, �n all h�s ruthlessly
open profess�on of �mmoral�ty, w�th �ntent�onal provocat�veness—as a provocat�on
d�rected at ph�losoph�cal opponents who d�sapprove of h�s foundat�on of eth�cs �n a
metaphys�cal doctr�ne of the soul and the Ideas, but also as a provocat�on d�rected at the
future reader—to us, then, who all have �n ourselves a Call�cles, at least potent�ally. The
challeng�ngly true-to-l�fe portra�t of a bas�c host�l�ty to eth�cs compels us to clar�fy our
att�tude to the ‘r�ght of the stronger’—our consc�ous att�tude and even more our
unconsc�ous one.
 4
POSSIBLE MISTAKEN ATTITUDES ON
THE PART OF THE READER

Wh�le good w�ll towards one’s d�scuss�on-partner �s necessary for any genu�ne
understand�ng, for us as readers the l�ve oppos�te number �s replaced by wr�tten dep�ct�on.
Reach�ng a correct att�tude �s undoubtedly made d�ff�cult by th�s, �nasmuch as any wrong
att�tudes wh�ch may crop up cannot be corrected by the book, �n contrast w�th when one
�s deal�ng w�th a personal partner. It �s thus of dec�s�ve �mportance that certa�n �rr�tat�ons
wh�ch m�ght be exper�enced when read�ng Plato should be recogn�sed as such and
counteracted. It should be remembered that here we are deal�ng w�th �rr�tat�ons wh�ch we
know by exper�ence may be felt by a reader who �s bas�cally open-m�nded and �nterested
�n ph�losophy, who �n add�t�on has taste and educat�on. It has to be real�sed that these are
a consequence of Plato’s concept�on of the correct manner of ph�losoph�cal
commun�cat�on, and are thus �n the f�nal analys�s a consequence of h�s concept of
ph�losophy; only �n th�s way can we avo�d lett�ng pass�ng �rr�tat�ons become a last�ng
obstacle to ass�m�lat�ng Plato’s thought.
(a) In the aporet�c d�alogues, whenever a solut�on �s not reached after a long, va�n
search even at the last attempt, the reader, for whom the po�nt of the strange, a�mless
journey rema�ns concealed, eas�ly gets the �mpress�on that the whole process has been
just an �dle exerc�se, or at any rate �s a prelude far too extended for fru�tful ph�losoph�cal
�nqu�ry, wh�ch meanwh�le has not yet eventuated.
(b) In the construct�ve d�alogues, whenever �t �s sa�d of the most essent�al problems
that they cannot be d�scussed ‘now’ or that they must be tackled on another occas�on, one
�mpat�ently asks oneself why such reward�ng themes are, as �t were, only paraded before
us and �mmed�ately removed aga�n, and whether there was anyth�ng at all �n Plato’s
thought wh�ch corresponded w�th th�s cont�nual foreshadow�ng of even more essent�al
mater�al, or whether the reader �s turned �nto a Tantalus who �s merely made to bel�eve
that real fru�t �s present.
(c) F�nally, common to the early and later d�alogues �s the unshakable super�or�ty of
the leader of the d�scuss�on over any g�ven partner. One m�ght accept that the Athen�an �n
the Laws �s �nstruct�ng h�s �nexper�enced Dor�an fr�ends unrelent�ngly from an
�nexhaust�ble supply of super�or knowledge, or that the Stranger from Elea has a
cons�derable advantage over the young people w�th whom he �s convers�ng; but �n the
d�alogues of an agon�st�c type the d�ctates of fa�rness seem v�olated when the
�nterlocutors are all too unequal and Socrates apparently never has any trouble �n
tr�umph�ng over h�s opponents. One asks �n d�sbel�ef whether such a tower�ng champ�on
�n verbal debate could ex�st who could throw everyone w�th the same ease, whether �t �s
the all-rounder H�pp�as, the rad�cal Call�cles, the �rr�table Thrasymachus or even the
celebrated Protagoras and the h�ghly respected Gorg�as. Somehow that seems unl�kely,
 Read�ng Plato 8

scarcely even cred�ble; �nst�nct�vely one w�shes for a greater balance, a greater equal�ty,
and �ndeed many an annoyed reader m�ght �nwardly start oppos�ng the �nv�nc�ble
Socrates.
Such react�ons are completely understandable. But they only have to be seen �n the�r
context for �t to become clear that they are a matter of our typ�cally modern des�re for
equal�ty and unrestr�cted exposure of suspected h�dden agendas. As people of the
democrat�c, plural�st and ant�-author�tar�an twent�eth century we are, whether we know �t
or not, emot�onally so attuned to the prevalent relat�v�sm that, confronted w�th a
monumentally super�or Socrates or Athen�an who �s so bold as to descr�be the or�entat�on
he represents as the only correct one, we meet them w�th scept�c�sm or �nner res�stance,
and feel the�r play w�th apor�a to be a lack of openness, and the�r reference to �ns�ghts to
be won �n the future to be an avo�dance of the demands of the moment. Instead, we
should be ask�ng ourselves whether Plato does not want to commun�cate someth�ng
spec�al, someth�ng no longer d�rectly understandable to us by conce�v�ng h�s characters �n
such a way, and whether th�s does not perhaps refer to a concept of ph�losophy wh�ch �s
fundamentally d�fferent from twent�eth-century values, but for that very reason capable of
complement�ng and enr�ch�ng them.
From th�s we see that, by the same token, the reader’s total and not only �ntellectual
react�on to the events of the d�alogues, wh�ch �s provoked by the text �tself, conceals a
danger. Anybody who fa�ls to detect the d�stort�ng factor wh�ch he h�mself represents
runs the danger of gett�ng stuck �n a read�ng wh�ch �s superf�c�al. The d�stort�ng element
does not have to be of a purely �nd�v�dual or subject�ve k�nd. It �s not only �nd�v�duals
who play a part �n what they are read�ng but whole epochs. That can lead to a s�tuat�on
where th�ngs �n the text are not seen or not�ced for generat�ons, s�mply because they do
not f�t �nto the thought of the per�od. The example wh�ch follows w�ll �llustrate th�s.
 5
ONE DOES NOT SEE WHAT ONE DOES
NOT KNOW

(a) The mot�f of ‘concealment’ �n the d�alogues

S�nce Schle�ermacher’s d�scovery that for Plato form �s not �nessent�al for content, the
�nterpretat�on of Plato has been faced w�th the task of exam�n�ng the d�alogues’ dramat�c
techn�que both as a whole and �n �nd�v�dual deta�l. Unfortunately, �t cannot be sa�d that
research has made much progress �n complet�ng th�s task. Nevertheless, part�cular
dramaturg�cal techn�ques, l�ke the change of �nterlocutor, and part�cular recurrent mot�fs,
l�ke the appeal to say�ngs of poets, have been descr�bed repeatedly. But one mot�f has
rema�ned as good as d�sregarded, although �t should have warranted prec�se descr�pt�on
and �nterpretat�on on the grounds of �ts pecul�ar�ty and �ts need of explanat�on, but above
all on the grounds of �ts prom�nence �n Plato’s works. I mean the mot�f of concealment
and the �ntent�onal w�thhold�ng of knowledge.
To us, th�s mot�f �s pecul�ar because �n the West the postulate that the fru�ts of
ph�losoph�cal and scholarly labour be accorded unrestr�cted publ�cat�on has preva�led for
a long t�me, and consequently no one even countenances the poss�b�l�ty that anyone could
consc�ously w�thhold a conclus�on worthy of ment�on. (Let us however bear �n m�nd that
�t was only �n the seventeenth century, and w�th cons�derable d�ff�culty, that the �dea of
the bas�c openness of �ntellectual work was accepted, as the Amer�can soc�olog�st Robert
K.Merton has proved;3 to ascr�be th�s att�tude, as �f �t were a natural one, to earl�er epochs
would thus be na�ve, because �t �s ah�stor�cal.)
As for the frequency of the mot�f of concealment, �t �s truly aston�sh�ng to see how
regularly Plato has recourse to �t. Aga�n and aga�n, Socrates’ d�scuss�on-partners fall
under susp�c�on of not want�ng to reveal the�r knowledge or not completely, whether �t �s
s�mply to keep �t for themselves, as appears to be the case w�th the Heracl�tean Cratylus
and the eccentr�c, would-be theolog�an Euthyphro, or also to test the others, as �s �mputed
to the soph�st Prod�cus, or even to cheat them, as �s regarded as poss�ble for Cr�t�as,
Call�cles, H�pp�as and Ion the rhapsode.4 In these cases �t m�ght to some extent be
excusable that the mot�f wh�ch �s obv�ously �mportant to Plato has not rece�ved
appropr�ate attent�on. But �t seems truly unbel�evable that no one has not�ced that �n one
of the formally most perfect d�alogues, the Euthydemus, w�thhold�ng knowledge shapes
the structure and also extens�vely def�nes the mean�ng, as a mot�f w�thout an
understand�ng of wh�ch the mean�ng of the whole d�alogue can be grasped only
�ncompletely. The ‘plot’ of the Euthydemus cons�sts of Socrates’ attempt to �nduce the
soph�sts Euthydemus and D�onysodorus to drop the�r fr�volous ant�cs and conundrums for
once, and to d�splay what they can contr�bute �n terms of ser�ous ph�losophy. So Socrates
�mpl�es that they have �mportant �ns�ghts at the�r d�sposal, but have been �ntent�onally
 Read�ng Plato 10

w�thhold�ng them up t�ll now. When he has no success �n teas�ng out the ser�ous s�de of
the soph�sts, he recommends to them that they should not deal w�th the�r w�sdom too
lav�shly �n the future e�ther, but to rema�n as spar�ng w�th �t as they have been up t�ll now,
for, as he puts �t, ‘What �s rare has value’ (Euthydemus 304b: how to �nterpret Socrates’
conduct �s someth�ng wh�ch w�ll concern us d�rectly).
Consc�ous w�thhold�ng of ph�losoph�cal knowledge �s someth�ng wh�ch Plato
env�sages not only as a poss�ble dec�s�on of �nd�v�dual people but also as a measure by
the state for organ�z�ng educat�on. Even �n the relat�vely early Protagoras a f�ct�t�ous
p�cture �s sketched, not w�thout humorous touches, of the ‘real’ Sparta, whose actual
strength was not wag�ng war but ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry. Unfortunately, the f�ct�on
cont�nues, the rest of the Greeks knew noth�ng about th�s oldest and most �mportant
source of ph�losophy �n Greece because the Spartans d�d not let them part�c�pate, but
e�ther assoc�ated w�th the�r lead�ng th�nkers �n secret or staged the well-known expuls�ons
of fore�gners, the real a�m of wh�ch was to enable them to conduct ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry
w�thout w�tnesses (Protagoras 342a-e).
More �mportant than th�s com�c f�ct�on �s the p�cture offered by the two pol�t�cal
utop�as. In the Republ�c the prec�se programme for the tra�n�ng of the ph�losoph�cal rul�ng
él�te presupposes that the content of the�r educat�on �s not freely ava�lable. For example,
there would s�mply be no sense to the regulat�on that only the most capable be led to the
contemplat�on of the h�ghest pr�nc�ple, the Idea of the Good, and even these only after
the�r f�ft�eth year (Republ�c 540a), �f the twenty-year-olds, and among them the average
and weaker talents, who are to be excluded from the ‘most prec�se educat�on’ (503d),
were able to access �nformat�on, for �nstance �n wr�tten form, about the ph�losoph�cal
act�v�t�es of the last phase. The long, arduous per�od of preparatory d�sc�pl�nes and the
systemat�c trans�t�on, not ant�c�pat�ng anyth�ng, to each next h�gher phase �s only
conce�vable �f those who have the h�gher forms of knowledge at the�r d�sposal deal w�th
�t respons�bly, and that means that they make �t access�ble only to those who are
adequately equ�pped for �t. (We shall see that Socrates h�mself also behaves �n th�s sp�r�t
�n the Republ�c.) In Plato’s later plan of the �deal state, the Laws, the h�ghest leadersh�p of
the state, the so-called ‘nocturnal counc�l’, �s surrounded by an aura of secrecy from the
outset—the ord�nary c�t�zen of the Cretan �deal state has no access e�ther to the dec�s�ons
or to the �nformat�on and the educat�on on the bas�s of wh�ch the members make the�r
dec�s�ons (Laws 951d–952b, 961a–b; cf. 968d–e).

(b) Socrates h�mself w�thholds knowledge

On the bas�s of our f�nd�ngs so far �t can already be sa�d w�th certa�nty that for Plato—
unl�ke the twent�eth century—the w�thhold�ng of knowledge was a central �dea of
obv�ously great relevance. That becomes even clearer �f we exam�ne Socrates’ conduct �n
the Euthydemus. We have just not�ced that he �mpl�es that the soph�sts Euthydemus and
D�onysodorus were �ntent�onally offer�ng mere ‘play’, beh�nd wh�ch, however, a
ph�losoph�cal ‘ser�ousness’ ex�sts, wh�ch for the t�me be�ng �s be�ng concealed. H�s
s�ngle-m�nded attempt, pursued through the whole d�alogue, to el�c�t the ‘ser�ous’ v�ews
of h�s partners shows none the less w�th �ncreas�ng clar�ty that �n real�ty they have
noth�ng apart from the s�lly, fraudulent conclus�ons w�th wh�ch they cheat young people.
 One does not see what one does not know 11

Socrates sees through th�s from the beg�nn�ng—h�s �ns�stence on an �ntent�onally

concealed ‘ser�ousness’ beh�nd the ‘play’ of the soph�sts �s noth�ng other than naked
�rony.
But why does Socrates choose prec�sely th�s form of mockery of h�s opponents? A
look at the ph�losoph�cal theor�es wh�ch he h�mself alludes to �n th�s d�alogue, though
w�thout develop�ng them w�th argumentat�on, can expla�n h�s behav�our: th�s Socrates
obv�ously knows the Platon�c doctr�ne of anamnes�s and Ideas, �nclud�ng the theory of
d�alect�c. Adm�ttedly, the modern reader can accept th�s as a certa�nty only after a careful
compar�son of Socrates’ statements �n the Euthydemus w�th the correspond�ng arguments
�n other d�alogues, part�cularly �n the Meno, the Phaedo and the Republ�c. Only the
reader who �s �n possess�on of th�s extended ph�losoph�cal background can comb�ne the
fragmentary and abruptly �nterspersed allus�ons �nto a mean�ngful whole. The upshot for
us �s that, �f the d�alogue Euthydemus were the sole extant work of Plato, we would not
be able to understand the ph�losoph�cal po�nt of v�ew of the pr�nc�pal character �n the
d�alogue—just as Socrates’ �nterlocutors �n the d�alogue ev�dently cannot understand
h�m. In other words, Socrates acts ‘esoter�cally’ �n the Euthydemus; he possesses a
deeper, reasoned knowledge, but sees no obl�gat�on to d�sclose th�s knowledge before
part�c�pants �n the conversat�on who are e�ther �nadequately tra�ned or who are bas�cally
not su�ted for ph�losophy. The ab�l�ty to w�thhold ph�losoph�cal knowledge �f necessary,
when c�rcumstances demand �t, �s someth�ng wh�ch Plato thus presents as a pos�t�ve
qual�ty of the true ph�losopher. It �s a b�t�ng p�ece of sarcasm that Socrates ascr�bes th�s
pos�t�ve qual�ty, w�th scornful pra�se, to the pseudo-ph�losophers Euthydemus and
D�onysodorus, a qual�ty to wh�ch they ev�dently have absolutely no cla�m.5
Accord�ngly, anyone who has understood the subtle �rony at play �n the Euthydemus
w�ll not m�s�nterpret Socrates’ r�d�cule of concealment here and �n other d�alogues as an
express�on of an ant�esoter�c v�ew on Plato’s part, but as a suggest�on that only the true
ph�losopher �s capable of mean�ngful ret�cence, or of a mode of commun�cat�on wh�ch
takes �nto account the l�m�ts of the rec�p�ent.
The opposed pos�t�on, that one d�splays one’s knowledge, w�thout cons�der�ng the
needs and degree of educat�on of one’s aud�ence, and br�ngs �t to market, l�ke a
storekeeper who loudly pushes h�s wares and tr�es to sell them to as many as poss�ble, �s,
�n Plato’s op�n�on, the pos�t�on of the soph�st. The soph�st, �n h�s very essence, �s
ant�esoter�c. It �s no surpr�se that Plato makes none other than Protagoras, the most
�mportant leader of the f�fth-century soph�st�c movement, express a plea for bas�c
openness �n the commun�cat�on of knowledge (Protagoras 317b–c).

(c) The d�alogues po�nt beyond themselves

How l�ttle �t would su�t Socrates as the l�terary �deal ph�losopher-f�gure to d�spense h�s
knowledge �nd�scr�m�nately �s also demonstrated by the d�alogues Charm�des and the
Republ�c, along w�th many other examples.6 In the extended fram�ng act�on of the
Charm�des, the subject of d�scuss�on �s, �n a transparent metaphor, a med�cat�on
�mported from Thrace wh�ch Socrates could g�ve to the young
Charm�des to heal h�s headache—but he does not g�ve �t to h�m s�nce �t would only be of
use to someone who, Socrates adds, f�rst exposed h�s soul to the charm (Charm�des
 Read�ng Plato 12

155e). The med�cat�on, therefore, �s ready for use here too, but �s del�berately not appl�ed,
because the rec�p�ent �s ph�losoph�cally not yet advanced enough to rece�ve �t to any good
effect.
In the Republ�c the cont�nuous ‘plot’ cons�sts of the attempt of the brothers Glaucon
and Ade�mantus to �nduce Socrates to �mpart h�s v�ews on just�ce. Desp�te h�s esteem for
the brothers, th�s �s not a foregone conclus�on for h�m; �nstead, aga�n and aga�n a new
‘coerc�on’ �s needed to get Socrates to reveal more of h�s v�ews. Now �t �s cruc�al that the
‘coerc�on’ wh�ch Glaucon and Ade�mantus exert �s successful only up to a certa�n po�nt:
�ndeed, Socrates sketches the p�cture of an �deal state �n the course of wh�ch he also says
what just�ce cons�sts of; but, when he �s pressed to expla�n h�s v�ews on the Idea of the
Good as the pr�nc�ple of all th�ngs more prec�sely, he declares that he �s d�sregard�ng a
great deal, and �n part�cular what �s most essent�al, namely the d�scuss�on of the ‘nature’
(the ) of the Good (509c w�th 506d-e). And when Glaucon �ns�sts aga�n at a
later juncture and wants to know someth�ng more prec�se about the ph�losoph�cal
d�alect�c wh�ch Socrates has only sketched �n outl�ne, Socrates even �nforms h�m of the
reason why he �ntent�onally l�m�ts h�s commun�cat�on of ph�losophy: he h�mself,
Glaucon, �s the reason, �nasmuch as he �s �ntellectually not equal to the more prec�se
arguments for wh�ch Socrates �s capable and ready (Republ�c 533a). W�th th�s example
we have already touched a central structural character�st�c of the Platon�c d�alogues: �t �s
not only the Republ�c wh�ch uses passages l�ke the ones descr�bed, but almost all
d�alogues present, at some structurally emphat�c po�nt, one or more statements �n wh�ch
the d�scuss�on-leader makes �t unm�stakably clear that he has other more �mportant th�ngs
to say about prec�sely the most essent�al aspects of the subject be�ng treated, but w�ll not
do �t there and then. These passages, wh�ch are of the greatest �mportance for the correct
understand�ng of Plato and wh�ch w�ll repeatedly cont�nue to occupy our attent�on, we
shall des�gnate �n what follows as ‘del�berate gaps’, to be ‘f�lled �n’, e�ther �n another
d�alogue or by further oral d�scuss�on, on some other occas�on.
Modern �nterpretat�ons of Plato dur�ng the most recent generat�ons have pa�d scarcely
any attent�on to the features that I have descr�bed �n the preced�ng pages—the recurrent
�ns�nuat�on that the �nterlocutors w�ll w�thhold knowledge; Plato’s eluc�dat�on of the
mean�ng of th�s mot�f by means of the ‘plot’ of the Euthydemus; the l�m�ted access to
ph�losophy �n the outl�nes of the �deal state; the plot of all the d�alogues wh�ch exh�b�t,
through Socrates h�mself, a str�ctly addressee-d�rected, �.e. ‘esoter�c’, handl�ng of
ph�losoph�cal commun�cat�on; and, f�nally, even the expl�c�t ev�dence of the ‘gaps’. They
have e�ther not even been not�ced, as w�th Socrates’ subtle play w�th the reproach of
‘esoter�c�sm’, or they have been, as w�th the ‘del�berate gaps’, only part�ally understood
and systemat�cally m�s�nterpreted as the consequence of such a narrow�ng of v�s�on.7
The reason for th�s �s, as has already been h�nted, that our whole epoch, ‘modern�ty’
s�nce the Enl�ghtenment as well as so-called post-modern�ty, has no use for the consc�ous
l�m�tat�on of ph�losoph�cal commun�cat�on and consequently has no comprehens�on of �t.
One sees only what one knows.
Plato d�d not wr�te for the book-culture of the n�neteenth and twent�eth centur�es. If we
do not start tak�ng th�s s�mple but fundamental �ns�ght ser�ously, we cut ourselves off
from access to h�s ph�losoph�cal �ntent�on.
The cons�derat�on of Plato’s cr�t�c�sm of l�teracy �n the Phaedrus w�ll make h�s
att�tude to the problem of commun�cat�ng ph�losoph�cal knowledge comprehens�ble
 One does not see what one does not know 13

(below, Ch. 12). Before we come to that we must attempt a stock-tak�ng of the Platon�c
d�alogues’ essent�al formal character�st�cs (wh�ch are, however, at the same t�me relevant
to content) (Chs 6 and 7), and ask ourselves whether we can ascerta�n what aud�ence
Plato was actually wr�t�ng for (Ch. 8) and whether he �s comm�tted to a part�cular theory
of �nterpret�ng texts and wr�tes w�th �t �n v�ew (Chs 9 and 10).
 6
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PLATONIC
DIALOGUES

The follow�ng observat�ons are an attempt to understand the essent�al character�st�cs

wh�ch together prov�de the bas�c outl�nes of a morphology of Plato’s d�alogues. Taken
together, these character�st�cs are the express�on of a part�cular approach to
commun�cat�ng ph�losoph�cal knowledge, and thus also �nd�rectly of a part�cular concept
of ph�losophy.
Only those character�st�cs are cons�dered to wh�ch there �s no except�on, or almost
none, and wh�ch are to be found �n all phases of Plato’s œuvre (wh�ch �s why, for
example, the aporet�c end�ng, wh�ch �s typ�cal of some of the earl�er works, has not been
�ncluded). Every theory of Plato’s d�alogues should be able to expla�n such fundamental
character�st�cs; surpr�s�ngly, however, as must now be emphas�sed, the ant�esoter�c theory
of the d�alogues wh�ch has preva�led �n the n�neteenth and twent�eth centur�es can offer
only a part�al explanat�on for these character�st�cs—a clear �nd�cat�on that �t must be
replaced by a new parad�gm wh�ch comes closer to Plato’s conv�ct�ons.
1 The ph�losoph�cal works of Plato dep�ct, w�thout except�on, conversat�ons. However,
w�th�n the framework of the conversat�on long monologues are also poss�ble.
2 The conversat�on takes place �n a part�cular place and at a part�cular t�me. The
part�c�pants are personages who are character�sed �n a way wh�ch �s true to l�fe,
persons who are w�th few except�ons h�stor�cally ver�f�able.
3 Each d�alogue has a f�gure who clearly takes over the leadersh�p �n the conversat�on.
The name of the leader �n the conversat�on �s pre-em�nently Socrates; he �s
�nd�v�dually character�sed l�ke the other part�c�pants, though adm�ttedly from the very
beg�nn�ng w�th a certa�n �deal�s�ng tendency. In the later d�alogues the d�scuss�on-
leader can have other names as well; �n these cases he rema�ns less clear as a person
than the other �nterlocutors.
4 The d�scuss�on-leader speaks �n each case only w�th one partner. Conversat�ons w�th
more than two part�c�pants fall �nto sect�ons of conversat�on wh�ch show the leader �n
d�scuss�on w�th chang�ng partners. Three-party conversat�ons on a larger scale do not
ex�st. The leader can suspend the conversat�on w�th h�s real partner and replace �t by a
model d�alogue w�th an �mag�nary partner.
5 The d�scuss�on-leader can answer all object�ons. In conversat�ons of an agon�st�c
character he can refute all part�c�pants; he h�mself never �s refuted. All elements of the
conversat�on wh�ch are really helpful ones are �ntroduced by h�m (somet�mes, �ndeed,
�n a’ma�eut�c’ manner: he br�ngs to l�ght ‘somebody else’s’ thoughts).
6 The conversat�on does not grow more �ntense �n a cont�nuous thoughts fash�on but �s
ra�sed almost jerk�ly on to a qual�tat�vely h�gher stage, most often �n the course of
ward�ng off an attack.
 Character�st�cs of the Platon�c d�alogues 15

7 The d�scuss�on-leader does not br�ng the argumentat�on to an organ�c conclus�on, but
refers to future themes, top�cs requ�r�ng proof, areas for further work, a d�scuss�on of
wh�ch would be necessary �n the l�ght of the part�cular subject �tself, but wh�ch he
descr�bes as ly�ng outs�de the range of the present �nvest�gat�on. Every Platon�c
d�alogue has �ts ‘del�berate gap’ or ‘gaps’.
 7
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
CHARACTERISTICS

The most obv�ous of these character�st�cs of Plato’s works have generally been
�nterpreted too read�ly �n the sp�r�t of our age’s current thought-patterns. Because scholars
have thought that �n th�s way they already have the correct answers, they have aga�n and
aga�n fa�led to ask the really essent�al quest�ons of the ev�dence of the d�alogues
themselves. In what follows, let me enumerate some of the usual m�sunderstand�ngs,
wh�ch we must avo�d, together w�th the most �mportant quest�ons that emerge when we
cons�der the l�st of character�st�cs.
On (1): Is ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry poss�ble for Plato only �n d�alogue-form? Is �t bound
to ‘ex�stent�al commun�cat�on’ (�n the sense of twent�eth-century ex�stent�al�sm), and �s
the d�alogue-form the only conce�vable leg�t�mate mode of dep�ct�ng ph�losophy?
Care �s needed here. We should not forget that, �n the very d�alogue �n wh�ch Plato
makes Socrates plead w�th part�cular v�gour aga�nst the soph�sts’ ‘long speech’
( , makros logos) and on behalf of the quest�on-and-answer process,
namely �n the Protagoras, Plato s�multaneously d�splays a Socrates who h�mself g�ves a
long d�scourse �n cont�nuous speech (342a–347a) and, furthermore, defers the l�ve
argument w�th Protagoras for the t�me be�ng �n favour of an �mag�nary d�scuss�on (on th�s
art�st�c techn�que of Plato’s see below, on po�nt 4). In terms of content, therefore, the
result that Socrates reaches �s not dependent on Protagoras’ answer to h�m.8 That �s also
conf�rmed by Plato’s occas�onal dep�ct�on of h�m as the lonely med�tator, or by Plato’s
mak�ng h�m refer back to alleged earl�er agreements and d�scuss�ons or to p�eces of
�nstruct�on wh�ch he cla�ms to have rece�ved from th�rd part�es:9 all of th�s clearly shows
that �t �s far from the d�scuss�on-leader’s �ntent�ons to work out everyth�ng here and now;
rather, he br�ngs essent�al modes of thought and conclus�ons ready-made �nto the
d�scuss�on. That should warn us aga�nst na�ve hymns to ‘the d�alog�cal’ and the ‘l�ve
process of d�scuss�on’. The �mportance of the d�alog�cal nature of th�nk�ng �s not thereby
den�ed. But the real po�nt at �ssue �s the process of d�alogue �n thought �nasmuch as
thought �s, accord�ng to Plato, a conversat�on of the soul w�th �tself.10 Whatever �s
d�scovered through th�nk�ng on one’s own must be ver�f�able �n conversat�on w�th others;
Socrates descr�bes �t as a general necess�ty to subm�t one’s d�scovery to others and
conf�rm �t w�th them.11 Yet what matters pr�mar�ly �s bas�c ver�f�ab�l�ty, and when
Socrates attaches �mportance to check�ng everyth�ng w�th the best quest�oner and
answerer, as he asserts �n the Protagoras, he �s none the less forced to resort to h�s own
th�nk�ng rather than Protagoras’. But an account wh�ch �s not d�alog�cal �n terms of form
can also sat�sfy the bas�c d�alog�cal nature of th�nk�ng. Th�s �s shown w�th adequate
clar�ty by the sect�ons �n the œuvre of Plato wh�ch are not turned �nto d�alogue-form,
among wh�ch we can count the f�fth book and large parts of the s�xth book of the Laws,
 Quest�ons about the character�st�cs 17

the Eros-speech �n the Phaedrus and above all the magn�f�cent monologue of the t�tle-
f�gure �n the T�maeus: all that �s as much a genu�ne express�on of Platon�c ph�losophy as
progress�ng �n short quest�ons and even shorter answers.
Nor should Plato’s use of the d�alogue-form m�slead us �nto bel�ev�ng that he wanted
to rema�n ‘anonymous’, to h�de beh�nd the v�ews of h�s f�ct�t�ous characters. However
w�despread the bel�ef �n Plato’s ‘anonym�ty’ may be and however respected the scholars
who represent �t,12 �t �s noth�ng more than a rather na�ve m�sunderstand�ng. At f�rst �t
m�ght �ndeed seem qu�te a subtle cons�derat�on to not�ce that Plato nowhere speaks �n h�s
own name but merely dramat�ses the confl�ct of the op�n�ons of others. However, from
here to �ntent�onal anonym�ty �s a large step. A ph�losopher who really rema�ned
anonymous for some t�me was Søren K�erkegaard, who represented opposed v�ews under
var�ous pseudonyms l�ke Cl�macus and Ant�cl�macus; anybody who at all real�sed that
one anonymous author alone stood beh�nd these v�ews could �ndeed ask h�mself �n
confus�on what the real v�ew of the author was. Noth�ng of the k�nd happens �n the case
of Plato: nowhere �s �t recorded that at any t�me he had any of h�s works c�rculated under
a false name, and �t was at most �n the aporet�c d�alogues that �t rema�ned part�ally
unclear what he really thought (though these d�alogues also are often very clear �n the�r
negat�ve results). For example, that Plato h�mself also bel�eved �n the �mmortal�ty of the
soul even when he makes ‘only’ Socrates, T�maeus and the Athen�an argue for th�s v�ew
�s someth�ng wh�ch no reader �n ant�qu�ty doubted, and we too would be d�splay�ng pretty
unsubtle powers of judgment �f we wanted to doubt �t today.
On (2): P�nn�ng down the frame of the d�alogues to a def�n�te place and a def�n�te t�me,
as well as �ntroduc�ng �nd�v�dual, h�stor�cal characters, �s a strong �nd�cat�on that enter�ng
ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry can only succeed at any t�me w�th personal effort. One could
m�s�nterpret all th�s as emphas�s�ng that the results arr�ved at are cond�t�oned by Plato’s
t�mes—certa�nly, there �s the v�ew that Plato bel�eved that the ph�losopher has ‘noth�ng to
express that he would not �mmed�ately quest�on.’ To put th�s bel�ef �nto effect Plato could
�ndeed have rad�cally relat�v�sed the truth wh�ch was be�ng sought after prec�sely through
�nd�v�dual�s�ng and personal�s�ng the course of the conversat�on.
F�rst, however, Plato never held th�s v�ew, and, second, �t should be stressed that the
‘h�stor�c�ty’ of the s�tuat�ons and f�gures of the d�alogues �s a h�stor�c�ty wh�ch �s
tempered w�th the greatest poet�c l�cence. For the partners �n the d�alogues as well as for
the reader, the a�m �s to shake off the cha�ns of the�r �nd�v�dual�ty and to advance to
ab�d�ng truths. The dependence of the d�alogues on a part�cular s�tuat�on and t�me �s thus
an ‘�deal’ or exemplary one. It �s only for th�s reason that we can recogn�se our own
cond�t�on�ng �n �t. If Plato’s f�gures were only h�stor�cal f�gures, they would not be able to
touch us as closely as they �n fact do. Fortunately, they are not �nd�v�dual �n a merely
h�stor�cal or random way, but—�f I may put �t thus—�nd�v�dual �n a generally val�d way.
On (3): Doubtless �t would have been a real poss�b�l�ty for Plato to confront Socrates
or any other d�scuss�on-leader w�th partners who were the�r equals �n �ntellect and
character or conversely to dep�ct Socrates and the other d�alect�c�ans as less super�or.
Strangely, the lack of a conversat�on among equals has rarely even been not�ced, and
even more rarely perce�ved as a problem. We shall not be able to �gnore th�s quest�on: �t
�s �ntegrally related to the quest�on of why the d�scuss�on-leader �s e�ther �deal�sed or
character�sed only �n a vague way, and both quest�ons relate �n turn to Plato’s concept�on
of commun�cat�ng ph�losoph�cal knowledge. W�th partners of equal strength Plato could
 Read�ng Plato 18

have left fundamental quest�ons unsolved �n a def�n�t�ve way; such rad�cally aporet�c
conclus�ons do not ex�st �n Plato, as �s well known (the aporet�c conclus�ons of the early
d�alogues are on the other hand never the product of pos�t�ons of equal strength and, over
and above th�s, are resolved �n the Republ�c). We shall have to ask what concept of
ph�losophy �s presupposed by the concept�on of unequal partners.
On (4): The avo�dance of three-party conversat�ons means that each part�c�pant stays
focused exclus�vely on the d�scuss�on-leader and �s corrected by h�m—other po�nts of
v�ew cannot become fru�tful through contact w�th one another. If the argument over a
po�nt of v�ew cannot be cont�nued w�th suff�c�ent prof�t through the partner concerned,
the d�scuss�on-leader can pass over the pract�cal l�m�t of the poss�ble w�th sovere�gn style
and cont�nue the argumentat�on w�th �mag�nary partners. Such �mag�nary partners are, for
�nstance, the athe�sts �n the tenth book of the Laws, D�ot�ma �n the Sympos�um, or
Socrates’ anonymous house-mate �n the H�pp�as Ma�or. The last two examples show �n
add�t�on how the ‘h�stor�cal’ character of the d�scuss�on-leader can be extended qu�te
arb�trar�ly.
On (5): Plato’s dec�s�on to leave the lead�ng role �n a conversat�on to only one f�gure
would st�ll not make �t �mperat�ve also to equ�p th�s f�gure w�th such an advantage over
the others that he �s super�or to them �n every s�tuat�on. That �s so d�ff�cult to reconc�le
w�th modern not�ons of equal�ty that �t has s�mply been den�ed that Plato w�shes to
present Socrates as �nv�nc�ble �n argumentat�on. It �s, once aga�n, more prof�table to ask
what concept�on of ph�losophy �s expressed by th�s dramaturg�cal dec�s�on than to deny
the facts.
On (6) and (7): The s�gn�f�cance of an attack on a result that has been arr�ved at, wh�ch
�s followed by a spec�f�cally d�rected means of ‘support’ wh�ch conf�rms th�s result on a
h�gher level by means of more advanced conceptual tools and more penetrat�ng proofs, �s
made clear only when we cons�der the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng at the end of the Phaedrus.
S�nce th�s essent�al text has so far not been made the key to descr�b�ng the structure of the
Platon�c d�alogues,13 the abrupt elevat�on of the level of argumentat�on, wh�ch a few
commentators have at least not�ced, has l�kew�se never been correctly �nterpreted as an
express�on of Plato’s demand that the ph�losopher must be one step ahead of h�s logos.
The Platon�c d�scuss�on-leader can on purpose conduct ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry on
d�fferent levels—�t depends on the partner, h�s needs and capac�ty for comprehend�ng
what level Socrates chooses. He does not pass over to a h�gher level w�thout reason: true
ph�losophy does not offer �tself to �nterested part�es of �ts own accord, but w�shes to be
sought out. S�nce th�s has not been understood (�nstead, there has been a tendency to
�mag�ne an allegedly pushy Socrates who ph�losoph�sed w�th everybody on the street), �t
has consequently not been understood e�ther why the author consc�ously l�m�ts the
ascent—the ‘gaps’, as ment�oned above, have ne�ther been descr�bed correctly nor has
anyone recogn�sed the�r funct�on, wh�ch �n the f�nal analys�s cons�sts of referr�ng beyond
what �s wr�tten to Plato’s oral ph�losophy.
 8
FOR WHOM IS PLATO WRITING?

It would be of the greatest value for our cr�t�cal exam�nat�on of the l�st of character�st�cs
�f we could say for certa�n what publ�c Plato was wr�t�ng for. In address�ng th�s quest�on
we are not merely follow�ng the appeal of the trend �n l�terary scholarsh�p wh�ch calls
�tself ‘recept�on-aesthet�cs’ (and wh�ch s�mply cont�nues Class�cal Stud�es’ old a�m to
show the needs and expectat�ons of the or�g�nal aud�ence as a format�ve factor �n the
development and shap�ng of l�terature). Rather, the observat�ons we have made so far
have already repeatedly led us to the fact that Plato was qu�te aware of the s�gn�f�cance of
the d�ffer�ng ways ph�losoph�cal subject-matter m�ght be rece�ved. D�d th�s awareness
lead h�m to dec�de upon a spec�f�c readersh�p?
There �s no b�nd�ng statement of Plato’s on th�s quest�on, and none was to be expected
�n v�ew of h�s dec�s�on to g�ve h�s portrayal the form of cont�nuous dramat�sat�on. Thus
we are dependent upon �nferences from the d�alogues’ content and tone.
Yet the p�cture offered by the d�alogues �s not at all un�form �n th�s respect. At one end
of the broad spectrum of poss�b�l�t�es stands the l�ttle d�alogue, the Cr�to: w�th �ts mov�ng
person�f�cat�on of the laws wh�ch urge Socrates to rema�n obed�ent to h�s mother-c�ty and
w�th �ts lack of soph�st�cated argumentat�on, �t seems wr�tten pr�mar�ly for the
ph�losoph�cal layman who �s pred�sposed to loyalty. The T�maeus could be placed at the
other end: �t offers not only a profound doctr�ne of the pr�nc�ples of nature, but also, �n �ts
second part, h�ghly spec�al�sed f�nd�ngs from var�ous sc�ent�f�c d�sc�pl�nes; �t �s ev�dent
that such a work �s based on systemat�c prel�m�nary stud�es and a thorough knowledge of
the l�terature on the subjects and �s most l�kely to have been accorded an appropr�ate
recept�on by the spec�al�st or by �nterested people tra�ned �n the subject. The
abandonment of the d�alogue-format and the �n part �ntent�onally obscure style of
express�on demand of the reader cons�derable stam�na. Perseverance and the greatest
acumen are also demanded by the second part of the Parmen�des, wh�ch �s �ndeed played
out �n quest�ons and answers but, as a consequence of �ts r�gorous concentrat�on on the
log�c of the abstract concepts ‘One’ and ‘Many’, del�berately forfe�ts the charm and
l�vel�ness wh�ch are otherw�se character�st�c of Plato.
Th�s second part of the Parmen�des can be understood as an ‘exerc�se’ ( ,
Parmen�des 135d7), for wh�ch the youngest and most uncompl�cated person among the
people present �s chosen as a partner of the d�scuss�on-leader (137b–c). Young adepts of
ph�losophy are also the d�scuss�on-partners �n the late d�alogues Theaetetus, Soph�st,
Pol�t�cus and Ph�lebus whose d�scuss�ons have, �n compar�son w�th the earl�er d�alogues,
someth�ng profess�onally d�dact�c about them. The element of the method�cal exerc�se �s
also emphas�sed �n these works (see e.g. Pol�t�cus 285c–287a, ‘exerc�se’,
286b1).
 Read�ng Plato 20

From the addressees of the quest�ons w�th�n the d�alogues one could �nfer the
addressees of the d�alogues themselves; �n that case, the d�alogues would have been
wr�tten pr�mar�ly for students of the Academy as exerc�se-textbooks or as the bas�s of
the�r d�scuss�ons. Because of the�r tra�n�ng �n Platon�c ph�losophy the students were
certa�nly �n the pos�t�on to solve the text’s puzzles and apor�as and to supplement the
m�ss�ng proofs. The d�alogues’ references beyond themselves would �n th�s way be
brought �nto l�ne w�th an assumed procedure �n the Academy’s teach�ng of ph�losophy, or
even be expla�ned by �t. There �s no room for doubt that on th�s assumpt�on we would
have a mean�ngful read�ng of at least the early aporet�c d�alogues.14
So far �t seems as �f we have three groups of addressees to reckon w�th: laymen,
people w�th scholarly tra�n�ng, and Plato’s students �n the Academy. At the same t�me �t
would be rather arb�trary to want to separate these groups str�ctly from one another.
Anyone who had just entered the Academy w�ll hardly have been d�fferent from the
ph�losoph�cally �nterested layman �n terms of the state of h�s educat�on; on the other
hand, �n v�ew of the �ntens�ty w�th wh�ch sc�ent�f�c stud�es were pursued �n the Academy,
we can �mag�ne a g�fted ‘student’ be�ng a ‘spec�al�st’ �n one f�eld or another after only a
relat�vely short per�od. And let us not forget: no d�alogue �s w�thout �nterest for the reader
who �s ph�losoph�cally advanced, just as, conversely, none �s so �naccess�ble15 that �t
could not be read w�th prof�t even by a beg�nner.
In the Phaedrus Plato expla�ns that the value of the best wr�tten works (wh�ch on the
whole do not ‘mer�t much ser�ous attent�on’ (Hackforth)) l�es �n the�r funct�on as a
mnemon�c for the knowledgeable man (Phaedrus 278a1); the ph�losopher wr�tes as a
game and to set up an a�de-mémo�re for h�s old age—for h�mself and for everyone who
follows the same path (276d1–4). Who are these people who follow the same tra�l as
Plato? Can they be narrowed down to the students �n the Academy? Let us assume for the
moment that the d�alogues were �ndeed pr�mar�ly ‘exerc�se-books for use �n teach�ng’—
would �t follow from th�s that they were ‘not �ntended as l�terature for a w�de publ�c’?16
But Plato of all people knew that, once wr�tten, a book can be c�rculated �nd�scr�m�nately
among the most d�verse readers (Phaedrus 275e)—he would have had to take measures
to stop h�s wr�t�ngs be�ng c�rculated �f he had wanted to avo�d a w�de readersh�p. In the
wr�t�ngs of Isocrates, however, we have contemporary ev�dence that Plato’s works were
read outs�de the Academy as well, and the amb�t�ous l�terary form of masterp�eces l�ke
the Phaedo and the Sympos�um, the Euthydemus and the Phaedrus make �t as good as
certa�n that they were wr�tten for a publ�c educated �n l�terature also. On the other hand,
the pol�t�cal aspects of works l�ke the Apology, the Meno, the Gorg�as and the Republ�c
can hardly be adequately expla�ned on the assumpt�on that they were exclus�vely
�ntended for the younger people �n the commun�ty of l�ke-m�nded sp�r�ts. F�nally, we
should remember the strong proselyt�s�ng (‘protrept�c’) effect wh�ch �s felt �n Plato’s
early and m�ddle work and can st�ll be perce�ved �n many passages �n the late work: �t �s
a�med above all at the outs�der who has yet to turn to ph�losophy.
Thus, desp�te the w�dely d�verse �ntellectual demands wh�ch the �nd�v�dual d�alogues
present, the educated publ�c turns out to be the pr�mary aud�ence at wh�ch Plato a�ms. No
group from th�s publ�c can be excluded w�th certa�nty. To put �t more s�mply, Plato wr�tes
for everyone.
 9
DOES A PLATONIC DIALOGUE SPEAK
WITH SEVERAL VOICES?
The modern theory of the d�alogues

Thus, as we have seen, Plato knew that a book once publ�shed can reach readers of every
k�nd. And he knew, to judge from the ev�dence of the d�scuss�on of a poem of S�mon�des
�n the Protagoras (wh�ch we shall exam�ne �n further deta�l below) that d�fferent types of
readers tend to take away d�fferent th�ngs from the same text. And he �ntent�onally wrote,
�n any case �n the major�ty of h�s œuvre, for everybody.
Does �t follow that h�s a�m was spec�f�cally to address each of the var�ous types of
reader w�th the same text at the same t�me? D�d he have at h�s d�sposal a l�terary
techn�que wh�ch allows a wr�ter to make one th�ng clear to the one set of readers and
another to the others at the same t�me and by means of the same word�ng? And, �f he
knew of such a techn�que, d�d he �ntent�onally use �t to commun�cate the most essent�al
th�ng that he had to say �n such a way that only one part�cular type of reader can
understand �t?
The quest�on we are deal�ng w�th �s �llum�nated w�th unexpected clar�ty by
cons�derat�ons wh�ch Ludw�g W�ttgenste�n vo�ced �n an earl�er vers�on of the preface to
h�s Ph�losoph�cal Notes:17

If a book �s wr�tten for only a few, that w�ll become clear by �ts be�ng
understood only by a few. The book must automat�cally separate out those
who understand �t and those who do not…. If you don’t want certa�n
people to go �nto a room, hang a lock �n front of �t to wh�ch they have no
key. But �t’s po�ntless to talk w�th them about the room unless you want
them to adm�re �t from outs�de! For decency’s sake, put on the door a lock
wh�ch catches the eye only of those who can open �t, and doesn’t do so to
the others.

W�ttgenste�n thus cons�ders �t poss�ble and at the same t�me obl�gatory for the author to
supply h�s text w�th a ‘lock’ wh�ch from the outset �s seen only by certa�n readers and
then can also be opened by them. By means of th�s ‘lock’ W�ttgenste�n expects an
‘automat�c separat�on’ of readers �nto those who understand the book and those who do
not.
W�ttgenste�n was not at all th�nk�ng of Plato �n these cons�derat�ons. But more than
100 years before he wrote them a theory of the Platon�c d�alogue had ex�sted wh�ch
ascr�bed to Plato the �ntent�on of an ‘automat�c separat�on’ of readers by means of the
book, and prom�sed to make the lock he had hung �n front of h�s d�alogues consp�cuous
 Read�ng Plato 22

and to open �t. I mean the theory, already ment�oned several t�mes, wh�ch had been
propounded by Fr�edr�ch Schle�ermacher, and wh�ch we can also call the ‘modern theory
of the Platon�c d�alogues’, s�nce, �n �ts ma�n �deas, �t has rece�ved the w�dest currency �n
the n�neteenth and twent�eth centur�es.
Accord�ng to th�s theory the d�alogues can seek out the�r readers by themselves, s�nce
they can automat�cally hold off �nappropr�ate readers. They do not say the same th�ng all
the t�me, s�nce they reveal new levels of mean�ng w�th each re-read�ng and �n th�s way
answer the appropr�ate reader’s quest�ons. In th�s sense the Platon�c d�alogues can also
defend themselves on the�r own aga�nst attacks, s�nce the attacks of the non-
comprehend�ng do not reach the�r deeper level of mean�ng at all, but the doubts of the
reader who can understand are d�spelled by means of the more recent ‘answers’.
Accord�ng to th�s theory, these capab�l�t�es make a Platon�c d�alogue an ‘act�ve’ text, a
‘partner’ w�th whom the reader must seek out the ‘conversat�on’.
Let us recall to beg�n w�th that the pos�t�ve capac�t�es thus found �n the ‘act�ve’
d�alogue-book are ga�ned by deny�ng the fa�l�ngs wh�ch Plato �n the Phaedrus ascr�bes to
wr�t�ng �n general. Wr�t�ng, says Plato, always says the same th�ng, cannot
answer quest�ons, cannot choose �ts readers by �tself and cannot defend �tself aga�nst
attacks (Phaedrus 275d–e). Nowhere does Plato say that a type of wr�tten presentat�on
ex�sts or could ex�st �n the future by means of wh�ch these bas�c fa�l�ngs of wr�t�ng m�ght
be overcome. Only oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry �s unaffected by these fa�l�ngs: �n l�ve
conversat�on the ‘person w�th knowledge’ can seek out the appropr�ate partner by
h�mself; he w�ll be able to g�ve to quest�ons answers wh�ch are not always the same
word-for-word and he can defend h�mself aga�nst object�ons (276a, e).
The modern theory’s bel�ef that the wr�tten Platon�c d�alogues can ach�eve bas�cally
the same as ‘the l�v�ng and an�mate [�.e. oral] speech of the person w�th knowledge’
(Phaedrus 276a8), and are therefore des�gned by Plato also to cover the same range as h�s
oral ph�losoph�cal d�scuss�on cannot be supported by proof �n the text of Plato, e�ther �n
the Phaedrus or anywhere else. The v�ew that the d�alogue �s the only form of wr�t�ng
wh�ch overcomes �ts character as a book18 �s a rad�cal step beyond Plato, and we must
exam�ne �ts just�f�cat�on �n what follows.
Before we beg�n the exam�nat�on, two observat�ons must be made to g�ve a general
descr�pt�on of th�s theory.
(1) From the beg�nn�ng, the modern theory of the d�alogue-form has always had an
ant�-esoter�c object�ve, wh�ch �t has preserved t�ll today. Before Schle�ermacher,
W.G.Tennenmann had, �n h�s System der platon�schen Ph�losoph�e (2 vols (Le�pz�g
1792–95)), propounded the v�ew that �t was never Plato’s �ntent�on to dep�ct h�s
ph�losophy ent�rely �n wr�tten form. Aga�nst th�s v�ew, Schle�ermacher19 developed the
concept�on of the d�alogue as a means of dep�ct�on wh�ch �n the f�nal analys�s was equal
to oral conversat�on and thus had the �ntent�on of represent�ng Plato’s ph�losophy
completely, �f not through d�rect, then through �nd�rect, commun�cat�on. S�nce
Schle�ermacher ‘�nd�rect commun�cat�on’ has generally been regarded as a l�terary
techn�que wh�ch excludes esoter�c�sm. Th�s cla�m �s someth�ng else for us to exam�ne
separately.
(2) In v�ew of th�s approach, the modern theory of the d�alogues can be descr�bed as
the ‘ant�-esoter�c �nterpretat�on of Plato’ and �n th�s regard �t can be opposed to the
‘esoter�c �nterpretat�on’ wh�ch �n our century has been represented by Léon Rob�n, Paul
 Does a Platon�c d�alogue speak w�th several vo�ces? 23

W�lpert, Hans Krämer and Konrad Ga�ser. Unfortunately, th�s oppos�t�on �s l�kew�se
m�slead�ng. For Schle�ermacher d�d not do away w�th and overcome Platon�c esoter�c�sm
at all, but only—�n accord w�th a general trend of German Romant�c�sm—�nternal�sed �t,
transferr�ng �t to w�th�n the rec�p�ent, or, �n h�s own words, made �t �nto a ‘property of the
reader’. Even Schle�ermacher and h�s successors share w�th the ‘esoter�c�sts’ the v�ew
that �t was far from Plato’s purpose to offer everyth�ng wh�ch mattered to h�m to
everyone, und�sgu�sed. They merely d�spute that Plato �ntent�onally l�m�ted h�s
commun�cat�on of ph�losophy, and aff�rm that all that �s essent�al �s present �n the wr�tten
works, only ve�led by the techn�ques of �nd�rect commun�cat�on. It �s left to the reader to
become a ‘true hearer of what l�es w�th�n’ (Schle�ermacher), or, to use the �mage of
W�ttgenste�n, to see the ‘lock’ and to open �t. The result �s a po�nt of v�ew wh�ch can
correctly be descr�bed only as ‘esoter�c�sm �nherent �n the d�alogue’. It �s also def�n�t�ve
for th�s pos�t�on that ‘appropr�ate’ and ‘�nappropr�ate’ rec�p�ents are separated to the
exclus�on of the latter, except that accord�ng to th�s pos�t�on the separat�on, wh�ch
const�tutes ‘esoter�c�sm’, occurs ‘automat�cally’ through the book �tself.
Accord�ngly, we do not have to choose between ‘ant�-esoter�c’ and ‘esoter�c’
�nterpretat�ons of Plato, but between two forms of esoter�c�sm: �n oppos�t�on to
esoter�c�sm �nherent w�th�n the text—�t could also be called ‘hermeneut�c’ esoter�c�sm—
we have the esoter�c�sm wh�ch po�nts beyond the d�alogue, or the ‘h�stor�cal’ esoter�c�sm:
�t �s based on the h�stor�cal real�ty of a doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples wh�ch was never set down �n
wr�t�ng—the doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples wh�ch Ar�stotle prefers to c�te �n h�s cr�t�c�sm of Plato
�n the Metaphys�cs.
In order to make a well-�nformed dec�s�on between these two pos�t�ons �t w�ll be
necessary to cover anc�ent theor�es of mult�ple levels of mean�ng conveyed �n wr�t�ng, to
rev�ew Plato’s att�tude to them and �n part�cular to cons�der h�s cr�t�que of wr�t�ng more
closely (below, Chs 10 and 12). But our observat�ons so far do not leave us completely
w�thout cr�ter�a �n th�s quest�on.
It �s str�k�ng that the modern Schle�ermacher�an theory of the d�alogues �gnores the
‘gaps’. It must �gnore them or play them down, because they bas�cally do not f�t �nto �ts
scheme. To cont�nue w�th W�ttgenste�n’s metaphor of the ‘room’ and the ‘lock’ on �ts
‘door’,20 �t �s not the reference to the presence of a ‘lock’ wh�ch many cannot see that
would f�t �n w�th the ‘gaps’ (that �s, not the approach wh�ch W�ttgenste�n expl�c�tly den�es
�n h�s own case), but rather the statement that there are other ‘rooms’, wh�ch the reader �s
not yet stand�ng �n front of. Presumably W�ttgenste�n would have rejected such a
statement too, for he appears to bel�eve that the only mot�ve for d�scuss�ng the l�m�ts of
commun�cat�on �s the author’s w�sh that the readers ‘adm�re the room from outs�de’; thus
he cons�ders that �t would be ‘more decent’ to �ntroduce a less obv�ous ‘lock’. Out of the
same conv�ct�on, some readers also regard any esoter�c�sm as �n some way offens�ve.
However, �t �s very easy to see that other mot�ves can ex�st than those named by
W�ttgenste�n: Plato, for example, certa�nly wanted as many people as poss�ble to enter h�s
‘rooms’, even the �nnermost ones, though of course not w�thout appropr�ate tra�n�ng. On
the other hand, adm�r�ng them from outs�de was a matter of complete �nd�fference to h�m.
W�th th�s att�tude he could openly refer to the ex�stence of further ‘rooms’ w�thout �n the
least offend�ng aga�nst W�ttgenste�n’s ‘decency’.
Second, the modern theory of the d�alogues makes the commun�cat�on (the �nd�rect
commun�cat�on) of dec�s�ve �ns�ghts depend exclus�vely on the �ntellectual qual�t�es of
 Read�ng Plato 24

the reader. For the d�scovery of a deeper, ‘actual’ mean�ng beh�nd word�ng or tra�ns of
thought wh�ch seem superf�c�al and unproblemat�cal to others �s an ach�evement of
attent�on to language, log�cal analys�s, memory and the g�ft of synthes�s, �n short an
ach�evement of the �ntellect. However, �n our br�ef glance at the fram�ng plot of the
Charm�des (above, p. 15ff.), we have already seen that the appl�cat�on of the med�cat�on
wh�ch Socrates possesses �s made dependent on Charm�des’ lett�ng h�s soul be exposed to
a charm f�rst, wh�ch means at th�s po�nt that he �s ready to acqu�re the v�rtue of ‘self-
restra�nt’ . L�kew�se, we have seen that Call�cles �n the Gorg�as �s not
excluded from the ‘Greater Myster�es’ because of any lack of �ntell�gence but because of
the moral d�spos�t�on of h�s character. And, f�nally, �n the Republ�c, where Plato
expresses h�mself qu�te bas�cally about the requ�red qual�t�es of the ‘ph�losoph�cal
natures’, he stresses the eth�cal advantages no less than the �ntellectual ones (Republ�c
485b–487a). A theory of the commun�cat�on of the ‘actual’ wh�ch leaves th�s cond�t�on
completely out of account deserves to be handled w�th some scept�c�sm.
 10
AN ANCIENT THEORY OF
INTERPRETATION

The �dea that a text m�ght be able to speak w�th several or at least two vo�ces �s by no
means of only modern or�g�n. Even �n Plato’s t�me �t was no longer new: at least the
ar�stocrat�c publ�c of a Theogn�s (681f.) or P�ndar (Olymp�an Odes 2.83–86) had been
acqua�nted w�th �t for a long t�me.21 But from the s�xth century �t had been of part�cular
�mportance for the �nterpretat�on of Homer. In the course of the archa�c per�od the ep�cs
of Homer had ach�eved author�tat�ve val�d�ty not only as aesthet�c models but as a
comprehens�ve �nterpretat�on of the human and d�v�ne world. The ph�losopher-poet
Xenophanes made �t a byword that everybody had ‘from the beg�nn�ng learned from
Homer’.22 Th�s Xenophanes was one of the most �nfluent�al of those who objected to the
anthropomorph�c �mage of the d�v�ne world �n Homer. Cattle would make �mages of the
gods �n the shape of cattle �f they were able, he scoffed, and horses �n the shape of horses.
And as far as the behav�our of these gods was concerned, Xenophanes concluded that
Homer and Hes�od had ascr�bed to them everyth�ng wh�ch brought outrage and d�sgrace
among humans.23 Heracl�tus, another sharp cr�t�c of the trad�t�onal theology of the poets,
went so far as to say that Homer should be banned from the fest�vals.24
But the strength of the trad�t�on was far too great for any attempt to get r�d of �t; on the
other hand, the new ph�losoph�cal cr�t�c�sm was too plaus�ble for the trad�t�on to be left
unaltered. The conv�ct�on preva�led—our f�rst ev�dence for �t �s Theagenes of Rheg�um25
�n the late s�xth century—that �n h�s apparently crude stor�es of betrayal, battle, jealousy
and love �n the world of the gods Homer was �mpart�ng w�sdom wh�ch was not access�ble
to superf�c�al understand�ng. The allegor�cal �nterpretat�on of Homer soon became a
regular component of Greek educat�on and made a substant�al contr�but�on to the fact that
Homer’s pos�t�on as teacher of the Greeks d�d not wane for a moment after the cr�t�c�sm
of the early ph�losophers but, on the contrary, grew further entrenched. In later centur�es
not only the Stoa but also Neoplaton�sm contr�buted to the development of th�s method of
poet�c exeges�s. And, because �t was not a matter of �nd�v�dual �nterpretat�ons but of a
whole method, �ts appl�cat�on to other ‘theolog�cal’ texts could not fa�l to follow.
Eur�p�des g�ves us an �mpress�ve example of the �nterpretat�on of the ‘deeper mean�ng’ of
a myth by a pr�est: �n the Bacchae, Te�res�as expla�ns to the unbel�ev�ng Pentheus what �t
‘actually’ means that D�onysus was born from the th�gh of Zeus (Eur�p�des, Bacchae
272ff). A s�m�lar exeges�s, by an unknown author, of an Orph�c text has been preserved
on a papyrus wh�ch was found �n a fourth-century BC grave.26
Isocrates prov�des ev�dence that th�s method, wh�ch was pr�mar�ly a method for the
exeges�s of poets, was appl�ed to prose-texts too. In the second part of the Panathena�cus
(12.240ff.) he descr�bes how the compar�son he makes �n the f�rst part between Athens
and Sparta, wh�ch turns out dec�s�vely �n favour of Athens, �s construed by one of h�s
 Read�ng Plato 26

students as �f the pra�se of Athens were only the surface mean�ng for the superf�c�al
reader, wh�le the attent�ve reader would d�scover beh�nd �t, as Isocrates’ real �ntent�on, a
covert b�as towards Sparta. The pra�se of Athens �s supposed to be meant ‘not on one
level’ but w�th the ulter�or mot�ve of test�ng whether the
students have remembered the v�ews that the�r teacher had expressed before and have
absorbed the speech �n a sp�r�t of ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry.27 To be able to wr�te �n such a
way, namely �n ‘speeches w�th double mean�ngs’ wh�ch can be
�nterpreted �n one way or the other and offer occas�on for controvers�es, �s sa�d to be
‘beaut�ful and ph�losoph�cal’ ( , 12.240). The str�k�ng
th�ng �s that Isocrates does not state h�s pos�t�on e�ther on th�s theory of wr�t�ng w�th
ulter�or purpose or on the �nterpretat�on that h�s cr�t�c�sm of Sparta actually meant the
oppos�te.28
So what d�d Plato th�nk of th�s theory of �nterpretat�on and of ‘speak�ng �n r�ddles’
, �n wh�ch the reader has to keep hold of a secret ‘covert mean�ng’
( )?
Naturally he knows that a ph�losoph�cal �dea can be understood on a h�gher or lower
level. In the Charm�des he makes Socrates expla�n the concept of ‘do�ng one’s own
bus�ness’ ( ) w�th �ntent�onal superf�c�al�ty and perversely, not
�n order to refute the def�n�t�on ‘self-control �s do�ng one’s own bus�ness’ but to establ�sh
f�nally that self-control cannot be ‘do�ng one’s own bus�ness’ �n the sense �n wh�ch he has
just tr�ed to understand �t; the or�g�nator of the def�n�t�on expressed a ‘puzzle’ and d�d not
say what he meant (Charm�des l6lc–d, 162a). But Socrates does not say �n what other
sense th�s concept m�ght be used �n any reasonable way, and we may understand th�s as
Plato’s challenge to the reader to search after that sense for h�mself.
On the other hand, �n contrast w�th Isocrates’ student �n the Panathena�cus, Plato
nowhere descr�bes wr�t�ng �n logo� w�th double mean�ngs as ‘good and ph�losoph�cal.’
The a�m of �mpart�ng knowledge �s ‘clar�ty and certa�nty (or stab�l�ty)’ of knowledge
(Phaedrus 275c6 , 277b8–9
, cf. 278a4–5 . Th�s a�m can only be
ach�eved by means of the l�ve logos of oral�ty; but s�nce Plato understands the wr�tten
logos as an �mage of the spoken one (Phaedrus 276a8–9), even wr�t�ng
must rema�n d�rected to the same a�m, even �f �t can never ach�eve �t (just as the repl�ca-
objects of the sensory world str�ve after the perfect�on of the�r or�g�nal models, the Ideas,
wh�ch, however, they never reach: Phaedo 75a–b). The v�ew that �ntent�onal amb�gu�ty
m�ght be able to he�ghten the clar�ty and certa�nty of the knowledge �ntended �s qu�te
def�n�tely not Platon�c. ‘Covertly’ �mpart�ng deeper truths about the gods �n a poet�c or
mytholog�cal form �s someth�ng wh�ch Plato rules out for the future �deal state, because
the l�stener cannot d�st�ngu�sh w�th certa�nty between ‘covert mean�ng’ and what �s
asserted d�rectly (Republ�c 2.378d). Although th�s �s sa�d there about the young rec�p�ent
�n part�cular, the problem rema�ns the same �f correspond�ngly more d�ff�cult ‘puzzles’
are placed before the advanced hearer or reader. Thus, r�ght at the beg�nn�ng of the
Republ�c, Plato makes a d�scuss�on of a say�ng by S�mon�des, �n wh�ch Socrates suspects
a ‘puzzle’,29 end w�th an absurd conclus�on and the confus�on of the �nterlocutor
 An anc�ent theory of �nterpretat�on 27

(Republ�c 1.331d—336a). Further, we must remember Plato’s heav�ly �ron�cal use of the
method of �nterpret�ng the names of the gods by covert �nterpretat�on and etymology �n
the Cratylus (400dff.), as well as h�s general d�sm�ssal of allegor�cal �nterpretat�ons of
myth �n the Phaedrus (229c–230a), as unnecessary �ntellectual pos�ng.
Plato’s obv�ous contempt for an �nterpretat�on of the poets wh�ch �s d�rected towards
deeper mean�ngs and h�s refusal to transfer th�s method expl�c�tly to ph�losoph�cal prose-
texts or even declare h�mself �n favour of wr�t�ng �n double mean�ngs as ph�losoph�cally
v�able make �t add�t�onally (see above, p.31f.) qu�te unl�kely that a correspond�ng l�terary
techn�que could have played a central role for h�m.
 11
THE INTERPRETATION OF SIMONIDES
IN THE PROTAGORAS

Plato’s artful and �ntent�onally bas�c dramat�sat�on of the attempt to make progress �n a
ph�losoph�cal quest�on by �nterpret�ng a text, wh�ch occurs �n the m�ddle sect�on of the
Protagoras (338e–347a), �s also very �mportant for our theme. It �s shown how two
extraord�nar�ly competent �nterpreters, namely Protagoras and Socrates, arr�ve at oppos�te
conclus�ons �n the �nterpretat�on of the same poem.
Protagoras cons�ders the ab�l�ty to �nterpret l�terature appropr�ately to be the most
�mportant part of educat�on �n general (338e), so he would l�ke to �nterrogate Socrates
spec�f�cally on th�s f�eld. He refers to a poem of S�mon�des wh�ch Socrates, too, as he
assures Protagoras, knows very well and th�nks h�ghly of. But, �n Protagoras’ op�n�on,
S�mon�des contrad�cts h�mself �n the space of a few l�nes by say�ng f�rst that �t �s d�ff�cult
to become a v�rtuous man and then by f�nd�ng fault w�th P�ttacus for h�s statement that �t
�s d�ff�cult to be noble—how can a poem be ‘good’ �f �t exh�b�ts such a contrad�ct�on
(339b–d)?
By h�s �n�t�al pos�t�ve appra�sal of the poem, Socrates �s comm�tted to ‘help’ the poet
and thereby h�mself as well ( 340a1; cf. 341c8–9), that �s, to
just�fy the poem and h�s judgment of �t. Plato makes h�m summon up for the purpose an
astound�ngly advanced method of �nterpretat�on: he makes comments on the l�ngu�st�c
usage of S�mon�des, he makes use of Prod�cus’ synonym�c approach, wh�ch was the most
modern theory of semant�cs of the t�me; he more or less reconstructs the poem’s
�ntellectual hor�zon by �dent�fy�ng �ts h�dden presuppos�t�ons; he shows that S�mon�des’
actual �ntent�on was to correct P�ttacus.
However, desp�te all Socrates’ methodolog�cal preparat�on and reflect�veness, h�s
�nterpretat�on �s hardly correct �n all po�nts. In two essent�al po�nts Socrates �ntroduces
h�s, or rather Plato’s, expert�se �nto the �nterpretat�on and thus goes substant�ally beyond
or past S�mon�des’ �ntent�on: f�rst, he removes the contrad�ct�on wh�ch Protagoras sees by
d�st�ngu�sh�ng between becom�ng good, wh�ch he cla�ms �s poss�ble for a short t�me, and
be�ng good, wh�ch he says �s not poss�ble for humans for any length of t�me—by wh�ch
S�mon�des, a non-metaphys�cal poet of the late archa�c per�od, �s saddled w�th Plato’s
ontolog�cal separat�on of becom�ng and be�ng and, s�multaneously, w�th Plato’s
concept�on of ph�losophy wh�ch says �t �s poss�ble for a human be�ng to reach the goal
br�efly under the st�mulus of th�nk�ng, wh�le �t �s �mposs�ble to stay at the goal on a
last�ng bas�s;30 second, Socrates d�scovers the bas�c foundat�on of h�s eth�cs, that v�rtue �s
w�sdom, foreshadowed �n S�mon�des. In �mplement�ng both defences, a l�ttle v�olence to
the text �s necessary, and Plato h�mself seems to be aware of �t.
It �s as �f Plato, by means of th�s f�rst deta�led l�terary �nterpretat�on �n European
�ntellectual h�story, w�shed to say that �nterpretat�on �s necessar�ly m�s�nterpretat�on, at
 The �nterpretat�on of S�mon�des 29

least part�ally. Ne�ther advanced methods nor out-of-the-ord�nary �ntellectual ab�l�ty on

the part of the �nterpreter can alter the s�tuat�on as long as the cause cannot be el�m�nated.
But the cause cons�sts of the fact that the �nterpreter necessar�ly �mports h�s own po�nt of
v�ew.
Consequently, Socrates subsequently rad�cally devalues the whole attempt to ach�eve
an assured �nterpretat�on of the mean�ng of the poem. He compares deal�ng w�th ‘other
people’s’ v�ews w�th the behav�our of uneducated sympos�asts who enterta�n themselves
by means of the vo�ce of a h�red woman flute-player. Just as selfrespect�ng sympos�asts
have no need of female flute-players and dancers but enterta�n themselves w�th the�r own
contr�but�ons, so the part�c�pants assembled for the present conversat�on should leave the
v�ews of the poets as�de and address matters d�rectly (347c–348a). Bes�des, the poets
cannot be asked what they are talk�ng about and the contrad�ctory analyses of the
�ntended mean�ng are not ver�f�able.31
Thus Plato br�ngs the �nterpretat�on of a text �nto sharp contrast w�th speak�ng and
th�nk�ng wh�ch are one’s own and wh�ch are or�ented towards the objects themselves
(towards the ‘truth’; 348a5). Th�s contrast between speak�ng w�th ‘other people’s’ or w�th
‘one’s own’ vo�ce �s naturally not dependent on the fact that the text wh�ch �s under
d�scuss�on here comes from a poet (and not from a ph�losopher). That means that for
Plato all ‘speak�ng w�th other people’s vo�ces’, that �s, all �nterpretat�on, �s of subord�nate
�mportance. And a second fa�l�ng �s not pecul�ar only to a poet�c text: th�s �s the fa�l�ng
that the author of the text cannot be quest�oned �n person, s�nce he �s not on the spot, and
the assumpt�ons about h�s mean�ng consequently rema�n uncheckable.
Both po�nts of cr�t�c�sm lead away from the use of texts and towards oral ph�losoph�cal
�nqu�ry wh�ch exam�nes the matters themselves and �nduces the part�c�pants’ own vo�ces
to speak. In a fundamental way Plato makes the contrast between the �ntermed�ary nature
of all wr�t�ng and the d�rectness of oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry the subject of the end of the
d�alogue, the Phaedrus.
 12
THE CRITIQUE OF WRITING IN THE
PHAEDRUS

In the f�nal pages of the Phaedrus (274b–278e) Plato d�scusses, �n a sect�on wh�ch has
become famous as the ‘cr�t�que of wr�t�ng’, the value of wr�t�ng �n general and the
ph�losopher’s att�tude to h�s wr�t�ngs �n part�cular. S�nce the un�ty of thought �n the
Phaedrus �s not very easy to understand, th�s sect�on has all too often been treated �n
�solat�on from the overall context of the d�alogue, and there has not even been any �nqu�ry
�nto whether there �s a concrete relat�onsh�p between �ts assert�ons and the structure of the
other d�alogues. It �s, however, of dec�s�ve �mportance to understand the cr�t�que of
wr�t�ng as the culm�nat�on of the Phaedrus, for �t �s only by understand�ng th�s that the
cr�t�que also becomes a key to understand�ng the structure of the Platon�c d�alogues �n
general.
The Phaedrus beg�ns w�th a compar�son between ‘speeches’ : the young
Phaedrus reads out an elaborate speech by Lys�as, whom he adm�res (230e–234c), and
Socrates sets aga�nst �t two �mprov�sed speeches (237b–241d, 243e–257b) on the same
theme, namely the theme of Eros. In th�s compar�son the ma�n �ssue �s not only perfect�on
of form but from the beg�nn�ng and above all the quest�on of who has a better �ns�ght �nto
the nature of the subject under d�scuss�on. W�th�n the speeches the ma�n concern �s the
quest�on of who �s the proper lover for a young man, the man who has fallen �n love or
the adm�rer who has not; s�nce Socrates presents Eros �n h�s second speech as the actual
dr�v�ng force of ph�losophy, the �nqu�ry about the true lover turns �nto the �nqu�ry about
the true ph�losopher.
These l�nes of argument are �n�t�ated �n the f�rst part, but are now brought together �n
the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n such a way that the cond�t�ons wh�ch must be fulf�lled �f one
speech �s to be super�or to the other are named �n general terms, w�th the result that w�th
the descr�pt�on of these cond�t�ons the knowledge that �s necessary for the ph�losopher
and h�s relat�ons w�th h�s wr�t�ngs are clar�f�ed at the same t�me.
By ‘speech’, (logos), Plato means not only spoken, �mprov�sed or prepared,
monolog�cal or d�alog�cal speech but also �ts wr�tten ‘�mage’. Thus he �s �n search of
cr�ter�a wh�ch are val�d for both, for what �s spoken as well as what �s wr�tten. But there �s
no room for doubt that �n h�s op�n�on l�ve, oral commun�cat�on has precedence, that
spoken commun�cat�on �s the doma�n by wh�ch wr�tten commun�cat�on must be
measured.
The qual�ty of a logos depends on whether �t �s made ‘�n accordance w�th art’. A
ph�losoph�cal art of speech-mak�ng presupposes not only the mastery of the prescr�pt�ons
of current rhetor�c for formal structur�ng (these have, �n real�ty, �mportance merely as
prel�m�nar�es; 266d–269c), but �s based on two far more amb�t�ous and comprehens�ve
ab�l�t�es: these are the knowledge of the nature of the �ssues dealt w�th by the speech and
 The cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus 31

the knowledge of the nature of the souls wh�ch the speech �s meant to address (277b–c).
Ne�ther the ph�losoph�cal knowledge of the �ssues themselves nor the knowledge of the
souls addressed can be ach�eved e�ther by emp�r�c�sm or by the w�sdom wh�ch goes w�th
sound common sense, but only through the strenuous research of the ph�losophy of the
Ideas wh�ch Plato def�nes as ‘d�alect�c’32 and understands as a ‘long c�rcu�tous route’
wh�ch can only be h�nted at here �n the d�alogue, not embarked upon.33
Aga�nst the backdrop of th�s def�n�t�on of an art of rhetor�c wh�ch �s ‘true’, �.e. based
on ph�losophy, �n the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng Plato develops the part�cular quest�on of the
‘propr�ety’ 274b6) of the use of wr�t�ng. Thus the pr�mary �ssue �s not the quest�on of
what wr�t�ng ‘can’ or ‘cannot’ do; �nstead, th�s quest�on �s d�scussed only w�th�n the
framework of the major quest�on of how a person who wants to ‘please God’ (see 274b9),
namely the ph�losopher, should use wr�t�ng. (‘D�v�ne’ �s for Plato the realm of the Ideas:
see e.g. Republ�c 61 1c2, Phaedo 80a3; speech and act�on wh�ch �s ‘pleas�ng to God’ �s
thus the a�m of the ph�losopher of the Ideas: Phaedrus 273e.)
Socrates f�rst �ntroduces a myth of the Egypt�an god Theuth, who accord�ng to the
�nterpretat�o Graeca was �dent�f�ed w�th Hermes and was regarded as the d�scoverer of
wr�t�ng. The fact that Plato has recourse to the mode of mytholog�cal thought about the
‘f�rst d�scoverer’ (the) shows that he �s survey�ng wr�t�ng �n �ts most fundamental aspect,
for �n mytholog�cal th�nk�ng the �nal�enable nature of th�ngs was establ�shed at the�r
or�g�nal creat�on. So the god Theuth brought wr�t�ng w�th other d�scover�es before K�ng
Thamus and pra�sed �t as a means of mak�ng the Egypt�ans ‘w�ser and stronger �n
memory’ ( , 274e5).
Thus Theuth represents the �llus�on that w�sdom and �ns�ght can be won by wr�t�ng,
that �s, ‘externally, by means of s�gns wh�ch are fore�gn (to the soul)’. Theuth’s �llus�on �s
utterly shattered by Thamus. Wr�t�ng does not nour�sh but harms the memory, �.e. the
soul’s ab�l�ty to fetch th�ngs up from w�th�n �tself; �t �s merely a mnemon�c. One does not
grow w�se by means of wr�t�ng but �s subject to the �llus�on that one �s w�se by repeated
read�ng ‘w�thout �nstruct�on’ ( , 275a7). Only , �nstruct�on
through personal �ntercourse, can �mpart clear and dependable knowledge (274e–275c).
If Plato had shared the bel�ef of the modern theory of the d�alogues (and that of
Isocrates’ student �n the Panathena�cus) that desp�te everyth�ng wr�t�ng �s able to �mpart
clear and ab�d�ng knowledge, even �f only to a chosen few who are capable of
understand�ng the subtle h�nts of a mode of expos�t�on wh�ch uses double mean�ngs, th�s
would have been the place for Plato to have declared �t. Instead, �n the follow�ng pages he
emphas�ses the bas�c fa�l�ngs of wr�t�ng, wh�ch are �nherent �n �ts nature. But whatever �s
�nherent �n a th�ng’s nature cannot be el�m�nated by a more or less sk�lful use of the th�ng.
It �s psycholog�cally understandable that s�nce Schle�ermacher the modern devotees of
the god Theuth w�th h�s fa�th �n wr�t�ng have sensed the need to reverse Plato’s judgment
by aff�rm�ng that wr�t�ng �n puzzles and allus�ons w�ll �ndeed have the des�red effect of
clar�ty and dependab�l�ty of knowledge �n the case of the d�scern�ng reader. However, we
must assert, calmly and w�thout any polem�c, that we are here deal�ng w�th a
methodolog�cally �nadm�ss�ble supplementat�on of the text’s ev�dence, and �ndeed a
supplementat�on wh�ch leads to the oppos�te of what Plato �ntended.
Plato arr�ves at the systemat�c del�m�tat�on of the oral from the wr�tten on the one hand
by a l�st of the character�st�cs of the oral logos wh�ch are lack�ng from the wr�tten, and on
the other hand by an �mpress�ve compar�son. Let us beg�n w�th the latter.
 Read�ng Plato 32

In order to understand the compar�son between the behav�our of a sens�ble farmer and
that of a ph�losopher or d�alect�c�an (Phaedrus 276b–277a) one must know the mean�ng
of the ‘gardens of Adon�s’, for wh�ch our passage �s the f�rst ev�dence. After the end of
the harvest �n summer a small amount of seed was earmarked for sow�ng �n shallow
bowls or baskets, for keep�ng �n dark cond�t�ons and for water�ng �n such a way that the
gra�ns sprouted luxur�antly after a very short t�me, �n the dog-days. The green bowls or
baskets were then exposed to the heat of the sun, where the plants qu�ckly w�lted,
naturally w�thout hav�ng produced a y�eld of gra�n. The w�thered gardens of Adon�s were
thrown by women am�dst r�tual laments �nto the sea or spr�ngs.
The mean�ng of th�s strange custom has only recently been uncovered, by Gerhard
J.Baudy. It �nvolves an agrar�an custom, a test-crop, known �n other forms as well, a�med
at test�ng the v�gour of the new seed.34 But we need not concern ourselves w�th th�s
aspect of the r�tual any more than w�th �ts connect�on w�th the myth of Adon�s, s�nce
Plato, who presupposes the reader’s knowledge of the matter, d�d not choose these facets
of the r�tual for the po�nt of h�s compar�son.
Instead, he argues that a sens�ble farmer w�ll not ser�ously choose gardens of Adon�s
�n wh�ch to sow the gra�ns of seed from wh�ch he wants a y�eld, just to enjoy the beaut�ful
growth of the plants w�th�n e�ght days; he w�ll �ndeed do such a th�ng �n a playful manner
�n honour of the Adon�s-fest�val, but, on the strength of h�s knowledge of the art of
agr�culture, he w�ll sow the seed about wh�ch he �s ser�ous �n appropr�ate so�l (not, that �s,
�n clay bowls) and w�ll be content �f the seed r�pens after e�ght months (276b). The
d�alect�c�an w�ll behave equally sens�bly w�th h�s seed: he w�ll not ser�ously plant �t �n the
Adon�s-gardens of wr�t�ng w�th logo� wh�ch cannot br�ng support to themselves and teach
the truth adequately. He w�ll sow the gardens of wr�t�ng only �n play, for example when
he ‘tells stor�es’ 276e3; see below, p. 45f. for an explanat�on of the
express�on) about just�ce and related themes. What he does take ser�ously �s the
deployment of the ‘art of d�alect�c’ wh�ch he ach�eves by tak�ng an ‘appropr�ate soul’ and
plant�ng logo� �n �t wh�ch can br�ng support to themselves and to the planter and not
rema�n w�thout y�eld (276c–277a).
The aspects of the r�tual of the gardens of Adon�s wh�ch Plato adduces for h�s
compar�son are therefore as follows:
(1) The aspect of the y�eld. (a) Just as there can never be a ‘y�eld’ of
35
‘gra�ns of seed’ �n the gardens of Adon�s, so, for Plato, wr�t�ng �s
necessar�ly w�thout fru�t, w�thout y�eld: knowledge and enthus�asm wh�ch can be
commun�cated by wr�t�ngs are to be compared w�th the br�ef, �llusory growth �n the
Adon�sgarden, wh�ch �s followed by a speedy w�lt�ng. (b) Because the ‘y�eld’ wh�ch the
farmer a�ms for cons�sts of gra�n (and not of the ‘art of t�llage’, wh�ch �nstead gu�des the
act�v�ty of plant�ng; 276B6), the ‘y�eld’ of the d�alect�c�an
( , 277a1) must also be understood �n terms of �ts
content, �.e. cons�st of ph�losoph�cal content (and not, for example, only of the
transm�ss�on of the ‘art of d�alect�c’ as a faculty w�thout a def�n�te content).
(2) The aspect of durat�on. The l�ttle garden of Adon�s grows �n e�ght days, wh�le
ser�ous farm�ng takes e�ght months to ach�eve �ts goal. Now we can understand why the
‘wr�t�ng-gardens’ of the d�alogues always emphas�se that d�alect�c �s a ‘long road’ wh�ch
many t�mes exceeds the s�ze of what �s offered there �n wr�t�ng.36 For Plato, the speedy
 The cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus 33

process of �nstruct�on through wr�t�ng wh�ch �s bas�cally �nsuff�c�ent (276c9) can never
adequately replace oral d�alect�c.
(3) The aspect of cho�ce. (a) Just as the clever farmer sows on ‘su�table so�l’ (276b7),
so the d�alect�c�an must by h�mself seek out a ‘su�table soul’ (276e6) for h�s ph�losoph�cal
sow�ng. S�nce wr�t�ng can never choose �ts reader by �tself, there �s no quest�on that �t can
be used for ph�losoph�cal sow�ng ‘by means of the art of d�alect�c’ (e5). (b) There �s no
way that the sens�ble farmer w�ll sow h�s ent�re seed-stock �n Adon�s-gardens: he would
thereby make any y�eld �mposs�ble, and he would no longer qual�fy as a sens�ble farmer.
The d�alect�c�an w�ll l�kew�se sow only a part of h�s ‘gra�n-seed’ �n the gardens of
wr�t�ng, and he w�ll hold back prec�sely those from wh�ch he hopes for a y�eld (276c3–9,
w�th b2–3). At th�s po�nt the compar�son between the procedure of the farmer and that of
the d�alect�c�an �s overla�d by the contrast between ‘play’ and ‘ser�ousness’ so that many
an �nterpreter has erroneously assumed that Plato �s a�m�ng at the contrast between an
author who sows h�s ent�re seed �n wr�t�ng ser�ously, and an author who s�m�larly sows
h�s ent�re seed �n wr�t�ng, but only �n play. Such an �nterpretat�on, however, enta�ls
neglect�ng the fundamental compar�son: for the Greeks, plant�ng �n the Adon�s-garden
always meant br�ng�ng out only a part of the seed. It �s only because the r�tual �s no
longer fam�l�ar to us and because we, as ch�ldren of the book�sh twent�eth century, have
�rrat�onal prejud�ces aga�nst Plato’s esoter�c pos�t�on, that we get on the wrong path of
�nterpretat�on. Plato never thought of entrust�ng h�s ent�re ph�losophy to wr�t�ng.
Why the d�alect�c�an exerc�ses restra�nt �n h�s deal�ngs w�th wr�t�ng emerges from �ts
bas�c fa�l�ngs wh�ch Plato enumerates before the compar�son:
(1) A book speaks to everyone, to people w�th ph�losoph�cal �ns�ght, and l�kew�se to
those who have noth�ng to do w�th �ts contents; �t cannot choose �ts reader, and cannot
refuse to speak to certa�n readers (275e2–3). For Plato, personal select�on of the partner
�n accordance w�th h�s su�tab�l�ty and the poss�b�l�ty of also rema�n�ng s�lent �f necessary
are dec�s�ve advantages of oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry (276a6–7, e6).
(2) A book always says the same th�ng. Th�s �s apparent when the l�stener or reader
has a quest�on about what �s sa�d �n a book: the only ‘answer’ �s the repet�t�on of word�ng
wh�ch �s already known. That seems to Plato to be so far removed from real
commun�cat�on that he puts wr�t�ng �n th�s connect�on on a par w�th the l�feless f�gures of
pa�nt�ng (275d4–9).
(3) A book cannot defend �tself �f �t �s wrongly cr�t�c�sed; �t cont�nuously needs the
support of �ts author (275e3–5). The l�ve oral logos of the person w�th real knowledge,
�.e. the d�alect�c�an, can do prec�sely that—support �tself. The d�alect�c�an can pass on to
the ‘su�table soul’, �.e. the student who �s amenable to ph�losophy, the ab�l�ty to support
the logos and �ts creator (276e5–277a3).
Here as well we must repeat categor�cally what we observed �n connect�on w�th the
sect�on on Theuth (above, p. 40f.): �f, �n the sp�r�t of modern theory about the d�alogues,
Plato had bel�eved that the wr�tten logos of the d�alogues �n fact does not speak to
everyone �nasmuch as �t knows how to address su�table people �n a spec�f�cally d�rected
manner, and that the logos does not merely repeat �tself, �nasmuch as �t g�ves d�fferent
answers to d�fferent readers �n accordance w�th the�r stage of development, and that the
logos does �ndeed �n some way know how to support �tself, th�s would have been the
place to state �t unequ�vocally. As th�ngs stand, however, there �s no suggest�on
whatsoever that any type of the use of wr�t�ng, whether one wh�ch �s already known of or
 Read�ng Plato 34

one wh�ch st�ll l�es �n the future,37 could ever adequately perform the tasks of the oral
logos. Indeed, we do not need to conclude from th�s that Plato d�d not know of ‘�nd�rect
commun�cat�on’ by means of �nt�mat�ons and allus�ons wh�ch the reader h�mself must
supply w�th mean�ng;38 but �t does follow that ‘�nd�rect commun�cat�on’ cannot have
played the dec�s�ve role �n h�s v�ew of the funct�on and value of wr�t�ng wh�ch
Schle�ermacher and h�s countless successors �n the n�neteenth and twent�eth centur�es
have ascr�bed to �t. It �s also easy to see why th�s could not have been the case: the art of
the allus�ve ‘speeches w�th double mean�ngs’ can perform the
tasks of an oral speech only �n a metaphor�cal sense, as I shall expla�n �n greater deta�l
below (p. 109f.). But cho�ce of partner, s�lence when confronted w�th unsu�table people,
support�ng by new arguments, are not metaphors �n Plato’s way of th�nk�ng, but have to
be understood as the bas�c cond�t�ons for the ph�losoph�cal commun�cat�on of knowledge.
S�nce wr�tten logo� cannot produce the effects we have been d�scuss�ng, the value of
the best of them �s l�m�ted �n Plato’s th�nk�ng to that of a�des-mémo�re for the person who
possesses knowledge ( 278a1; cf.
276d3). Wr�t�ng can �ndeed be an a�de-mémo�re �n many ways,
and unfortunately Plato does not spec�fy wh�ch part�cular way he had �n m�nd. Thus �t has
recently been suggested that the aporet�c d�alogues be understood as such a�des-mémo�re:
�n that case, Plato’s students �n the Academy would be the ‘people who possess
knowledge’, who on the bas�s of certa�n pr�or knowledge were able to solve the problems
wh�ch the aporet�c d�alogues presented.39 It �s poss�ble that Plato had such a th�ng �n m�nd
too. But one must remember that the construct�ve d�alogues, wh�ch are more l�kely to be
regarded as Plato’s ‘best wr�t�ngs’, cannot be a�des-mémo�re, �n any case not �n th�s
sense. Moreover, �t �s doubtful whether Plato would have classed students who must be
tested by means of such exerc�ses as ‘people who possess knowledge’ (�n the other
passages of the Phaedrus the express�on unequ�vocally means the d�alect�c�an). Indeed, �t
m�ght even be asked whether a student who for example knew the doctr�ne of anamnes�s
�n the form �n wh�ch �t ex�sts �n the Meno really needed the apor�as of the Euthydemus as
an exerc�se.
However that may be, at 276d3 Plato ment�ons that the ph�losopher sets up a�des-
mémo�re not only for people of l�ke m�nd but also for h�mself, for the t�me when he
reaches forgetful old age. The aporet�c d�alogues can certa�nly be el�m�nated for th�s
purpose. The emphas�s la�d on the funct�on of rem�nd�ng makes us moderns th�nk perhaps
pr�mar�ly of works l�ke the T�maeus and the Laws, wh�ch are r�ch respect�vely �n
sc�ent�f�c or jur�d�cal and h�stor�cal deta�ls. We cannot tell for sure to what extent
‘hypomnemat�c’ wr�t�ngs �n the narrower sense were also �ntended—for example,
collect�ons of deta�ls related to the most var�ed f�elds of knowledge, �nclud�ng the genre
of ‘D�v�s�ons’ and ‘Def�n�t�ons’.40
However, let us not forget that sett�ng up a�des-mémo�re �s not the only reason for the
wr�t�ngs of the ph�losopher to ex�st—Plato also ment�ons the ‘game’ whose success g�ves
pleasure to the author (276d4–8). There �s no reason not to apply th�s word to Plato
personally, espec�ally s�nce shortly after th�s he weaves �n a pretty clear allus�on to h�s
own ‘myth�cal’, �.e. story-tell�ng, ‘game’ w�th the concept of just�ce �n the Republ�c.41
Plato found the charm�ng and enterta�n�ng dramat�sat�on of ph�losoph�cal conversat�ons a
 The cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus 35

w�tty game wh�ch gave h�m great pleasure. The d�alogues owe the�r ex�stence not least to
th�s br�ll�ant wr�ter’s art�st�c �nst�nct for play.
 13
THE DEFINITION OF THE PHILOSOPHER
BASED ON HIS RELATIONSHIP TO HIS
WRITINGS

Plato’s cons�derat�ons on the relat�ve value of oral and wr�tten logo� lead up to a message
wh�ch Socrates g�ves to Phaedrus for h�m to del�ver to Lys�as—but apart from Lys�as the
message �s d�rected to Homer and Solon as well. None of the three names stands for
�nd�v�duals but representat�vely for whole areas of l�terature: Homer for the whole of
poetry (278c2–3), Lys�as for non-ph�losoph�cal prose, Solon for ph�losophy, espec�ally
for eth�cal and leg�slatory ph�losophy. At the same t�me, the three names stand for three
epochs of Greek �ntellectual h�story and w�thout doubt are meant to represent the ent�rety
of the Greeks’ l�terary trad�t�on symbol�cally. Thus Socrates says to Phaedrus to go and
tell th�s ent�re trad�t�on that, �f an author composed h�s works

know�ng the facts about truth, and capable of support�ng [them] �f he

engages �n an analyt�cal d�scuss�on about what he has wr�tten, and capable
of prov�ng what he has wr�tten to be tr�v�al by means of h�s
oral op�n�on [‘by speak�ng h�mself, ], such an author
must not be descr�bed by a term taken from these [sc. h�s works], but from
what he d�rects h�s ser�ous attent�on to.

Phaedrus: So what k�nd of names would you ass�gn to h�m?

Socrates: Call�ng h�m ‘w�se’, Phaedrus, seems to me to be go�ng a l�ttle too far, and to be
appropr�ate only to a god; but ‘fr�end of w�sdom’ or someth�ng of
that k�nd m�ght be more f�tt�ng and also be more proper for h�m.
Phaedrus: And qu�te appropr�ate.
Socrates: On the other hand, anyone who does not have anyth�ng more valuable
( ) than what he has composed and wr�tten,
turn�ng �t over th�s way and that for a long t�me, st�ck�ng th�ngs together and tak�ng
them apart, you would, presumably r�ghtly, address as ‘poet’ or ‘speech-wr�ter’ or
‘law-wr�ter’?
Phaedrus: What else? (Phaedrus 278c4–e3).

Here Plato separates all authors �nto two very unequal groups. The one group,
undoubtedly the major�ty, can be called poets, speech-wr�ters or law-wr�ters �n
accordance w�th the�r respect�ve l�terary product�ons. The other group rece�ves a name
wh�ch not only separates them from God but also assoc�ates them w�th h�m—for only �n
 The def�n�t�on of the ph�losopher 37

the name of the ph�losophos �s there an echo of the d�st�ngu�sh�ng qual�ty of God, be�ng
w�se (sophos). The ph�losophos owes h�s greater nearness to God to h�s ‘know�ng’: the
person ‘who knows the facts about truth’ (who �s ,
278c4–5) �s no other than the d�alect�c�an who possesses knowledge of the Just, Beaut�ful
and Good (276c3) and who makes use of the art of d�alect�c, �n other words the th�nker
who recogn�ses the truth of th�ngs �n accordance w�th the doctr�ne of the Ideas (cf. also
277b, as well as 273d–274a).
It �s to th�s knowledge of the Ideas that the ph�losophos owes a super�or�ty over h�s
wr�t�ngs wh�ch d�st�ngu�shes h�m alone: he �s �n the pos�t�on to support h�s wr�t�ngs
whenever he embarks upon the process of exam�nat�on and ‘refutat�on’ ,
and can at the same t�me prove through oral demonstrat�on that what he has wr�tten �s
tr�v�al ( , 278c6–7).
Anyone ‘who possesses noth�ng more worthwh�le than what he has composed or wr�tten,
turn�ng �t over th�s way and that over a long per�od of t�me, st�ck�ng th�ngs together and
tak�ng them apart’ (278d8–e1) belongs to the other group of non-ph�losoph�cal authors.
The ph�losopher can thus support h�s wr�t�ngs orally, through better argumentat�on—
how else could he prove h�s wr�t�ngs to be of negl�g�ble value? Someth�ng wh�ch �s
correct �n terms of �ts content can for all that be ‘badly’ sa�d —namely at the
moment when adequate substant�at�on �s lack�ng (see Republ�c 449c4–8). Plato now
def�nes these better arguments as ‘more valuable’ by summar�s�ng w�th the express�on
(278d8) what the non-ph�losopher lacks: knowledge
of the Ideas, and as a consequence the ab�l�ty to ‘support’ and to show up the lesser value
of what �s wr�tten. From th�s negat�ve express�on, wh�ch forms the ant�thes�s to ‘the
person w�th knowledge’ (278c4), we can conclude that for Plato ,
that �s, the possess�on of someth�ng of greater value than h�s wr�t�ngs, �s a pos�t�ve
character�st�c of the d�alect�c�an.
Def�n�ng the ph�losopher �n the l�ght of h�s relat�onsh�p to h�s wr�t�ngs has
�mpl�cat�ons wh�ch we must th�nk through.
One poss�b�l�ty �s that an author only somet�mes has at h�s d�sposal ‘th�ngs wh�ch are
more valuable’ than h�s wr�t�ngs, but somet�mes he does not. Then he w�ll somet�mes be
able to ‘support’ h�s wr�t�ngs and prove them tr�v�al, but, once aga�n, somet�mes he w�ll
not. Consequently, somet�mes he w�ll deserve the name ph�losophos, somet�mes he w�ll
not. But �t tells aga�nst th�s poss�b�l�ty that the d�fference between the ph�losopher and the
non-ph�losopher �s an absolutely fundamental one for Plato. Becom�ng a ph�losopher
enta�ls exper�enc�ng a ‘turn�ng of the soul’ ( , Republ�c 521c6;
cf. 518d4) wh�ch alters one’s whole l�fe. What marks out the ph�losopher �s a completely
altered att�tude to real�ty—only he �s capable of a knowledge of the Ideas. Everywhere
that Plato adduces the concept of the ph�losophos he refers to th�s ontolog�cal
reor�entat�on (see Phaedo 101e, Sympos�um 204bff. [Eros as ph�losopbos], Republ�c
474bff., Phaedrus 249c, Theaetetus 172c–177c, T�maeus 53d). Thus noth�ng �s more
�mprobable than that Plato could, here �n the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng, make the name
ph�losophos dependent on a chang�ng d�spos�t�on.42 In fact, noth�ng �n the text suggests
that an author who �s worthy of the name ph�losophos today could be relegated to the
category of the poets or speech-wr�ters tomorrow.
 Read�ng Plato 38

Thus �t follows that the ph�losophos �n Plato’s sense always has t�m�ôtera at h�s
d�sposal. Here aga�n two poss�b�l�t�es present themselves: the one �s that he has set down
everyth�ng that he has to say, and can advance unl�m�tedly w�th further arguments. But �n
that case the upshot would be that for Plato argumentat�on was an �nf�n�te regress wh�ch
never reaches an end. As �s well known, however, the contrary v�ew l�es at the bas�s of
the Platon�c concept�on of ph�losophy: d�alect�c leads to , an to a non-
hypothet�cal pr�nc�ple of everyth�ng, or, to put �t �n other words, there �s an ‘end of the
journey’ ( , Republ�c 532e3) for the d�alect�c�an. And
someth�ng else tells aga�nst the poss�b�l�ty: the d�alect�c�an would not be behav�ng l�ke
the clever farmer who would never sow h�s ent�re seed �n h�s Adon�s-gardens.
The only rema�n�ng poss�b�l�ty �s the one wh�ch the compar�son w�th the farmer
(276b–c) was work�ng up to, along w�th the emphas�s placed on the ab�l�ty to rema�n
s�lent �f necessary (276a7). Only �f we accept that Plato’s author must �ndeed behave l�ke
the sens�ble farmer can we �nterpret the def�n�t�on of the ph�losopher �n the cr�t�que of
wr�t�ng �n a way wh�ch �s free of contrad�ct�on: only �f the ph�losopher consc�ously keeps
h�s last arguments out of the Adon�s-gardens of wr�t�ng can we be sure that he really �s �n
the pos�t�on to leave h�s own wr�t�ngs beh�nd h�m through ‘more valuable th�ngs’; �t �s
only on th�s cond�t�on that we can d�sm�ss the def�n�tely unPlaton�c v�ew that the qual�ty
of be�ng a ph�losopher w�ll one moment be ascr�bed to an author and the next moment be
den�ed h�m accord�ng to the uncerta�n success of support wh�ch he �mprov�ses ad hoc;
and �t �s only on th�s cond�t�on that support wh�ch �s always ava�lable w�ll not have to end
�n an unPlaton�c regressus �n �nf�n�tum.
 14
THE MEANING OF TIMIΩTEPA

In our �nterpretat�on of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng we appl�ed the word

(t�m�ôtera) to ph�losoph�cal subject-matter: by the ‘more valuable th�ngs’ Plato means
concepts and theor�es, propos�t�ons and arguments �n the�r favour to wh�ch a greater
ph�losoph�cal �mportance can be attached �n compar�son w�th other propos�t�ons and
arguments. S�nce the express�on t�m�ôtera has, however, often been m�sunderstood (see
below, p. 53f.) we would do well to def�ne �ts mean�ng d�rectly from �ts context �n the
Phaedrus and related passages �n Plato.
In the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng the po�nt �s that the ph�losopher’s spoken logos must as a
general pr�nc�ple be able to surpass h�s own wr�tten logos by com�ng to �ts support w�th
better conceptual tools. But surpass�ng one logos by another �s a theme wh�ch �s already
dealt w�th—as we saw br�efly above, p. 39f.—�n the f�rst part of the d�alogue: after
Phaedrus reads out a speech of Lys�as wh�ch �s set �n wr�t�ng (230e–234c), �n the course
of conversat�on w�th Socrates �t �s made clear how one speech must be const�tuted �f �t �s
to surpass the one wh�ch �s offered f�rst (234e–236b). The new speech must offer more �n
terms of �ts content, and not merely quant�tat�vely but also �n terms of �ts ph�losoph�cal
�mportance: what �s requ�red �s not merely ‘more’ but ‘add�t�onal’ and ‘better’ subject-
matter, of ‘h�gher value’.43 Thus the reader knows from the beg�nn�ng what cond�t�ons a
super�or logos must fulf�l. Indeed, Socrates’ speeches about Eros ent�rely fulf�l these
cond�t�ons. Thus the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng bas�cally only expresses �n a general form what
Plato demonstrates �n the course of the d�alogue. Accord�ngly, the �nterpretat�on wh�ch
chooses not to understand the t�m�ôtera on the bas�s of ph�losoph�cal content breaks an
�mportant connect�on of thought wh�ch �s clearly marked out by Plato h�mself. Moreover,
�n order not to let any obscur�ty ar�se, Plato cont�nues th�s connect�on beyond the cr�t�que
of wr�t�ng through to the ep�logue of the Phaedrus: there, �n an obv�ous pred�ct�on based
on h�nds�ght, �t �s sa�d of Isocrates (who l�ke Lys�as composed court-speeches for others,
but then changed h�s profess�on and became a respected teacher of rhetor�c and the author
of wr�t�ngs on pol�t�cs and educat�onal theory) that he would surpass Lys�as and devote
h�mself to ‘greater th�ngs’ (279a8). Th�s express�on too �s �mmed�ately understandable as
yet another synonym for the ‘more valuable th�ngs’. In the whole d�alogue we are thus
always deal�ng w�th the same thought: the ph�losoph�cal rank�ng of the content of a logos
dec�des the rank�ng of the logos. Consequently, the fact that t�m�ôtera appear �n the
spoken support of the ph�losopher means that he w�ll expla�n more �mportant th�ngs by
the spoken word than �n wr�t�ng.
A mean�ng other than one relat�ng to content was not at all to be expected of Plato’s
l�ngu�st�c usage. The ‘most �mportant and h�ghest-rank�ng (most valuable) th�ngs’
( ) are, accord�ng to the Pol�t�cus (285e4), the
�ncorporeal ent�t�es of the world of the Ideas; �n the Phaedrus the Ideas are l�kew�se �n
 Read�ng Plato 40

the�r ent�rety , �.e. ‘of (h�gh) rank�ng or value’ (250b2). At one po�nt �n the
Republ�c a d�st�nct�on �s drawn between h�gh-rank�ng and low-rank�ng ‘parts’
( , 485b6) w�th�n the world of the Ideas.
For Plato the ult�mate source of ‘rank�ng’ and ‘value’ �s the Idea of the Good �tself45 as
the pr�nc�ple of everyth�ng. But knowledge part�c�pates �n the rank of the Good too,46
naturally to the extent that �t d�rects �tself to the or�g�n. But the logo� wh�ch express
knowledge partake �n �ts rank�ng, for they are, accord�ng to T�maeus 29b, related to the
th�ng wh�ch they deal w�th. In general, knowledge �s of h�gher rank�ng than r�ght op�n�on
( , Meno 98a7) because �t ‘b�nds fast’
w�th arguments what �s correct about the op�n�on. The f�nal substant�at�on must come
from the ‘pr�nc�ple of everyth�ng’ (from the ); the ascent to the
pr�nc�ple �s by steps, from hypothes�s to ‘h�gher hypothes�s’ r�ght to the
‘non-hypothet�cal’ ( see Phaedo 101d–e, Republ�c 511b). For �ts part,
the generally ‘h�gh-rank�ng’ or ‘valuable’ argument must grow step by step �n �ts rank�ng,
when �t succeeds �n connect�ng the �ns�ghts ga�ned to concepts wh�ch are closer to the
pr�nc�ple, closer �n the sense of ‘the th�ngs wh�ch are l�nked w�th the pr�nc�ple’ (Republ�c
511b8). ‘Possess�ng someth�ng of greater value’ thus means for
the d�alect�c�an the same as be�ng �n the pos�t�on to substant�ate an explanat�on he has
g�ven �n such a way that the process of ‘b�nd�ng fast’ by means of arguments takes a
start�ng-po�nt wh�ch �s ‘h�gher’ �n the scale of hypotheses.
Another result of what has been sa�d �s that the ‘more valuable’ or ‘h�gher-rank�ng’
logos must also be the more sc�ent�f�c, the more str�ct one. It �s clear from th�s why the
d�alect�c�an sees h�s ‘ser�ous act�v�ty’ �n h�s oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry and h�s ‘play’ �n
wr�t�ng for a necessar�ly m�xed and sc�ent�f�cally untutored aud�ence. In compar�son w�th
the spoken word, the wr�tten word �s (Phaedrus 278c7), wh�ch �s to be
understood here �n the well-attested mean�ng of ‘unspec�al�sed, untechn�cal’.
We should note �n pass�ng that the use of t�m�on by Ar�stotle and Theophrastus
suggests that the word became a techn�cal term �n the Early Academy for descr�b�ng the
ontolog�cal status of the f�rst pr�nc�ple .47 The Platon�c �dea that the
status of knowledge �s determ�ned by the status of �ts object, an �dea wh�ch, as �s well
known, forms the bas�s of the doctr�ne of the Ideas (see Republ�c 474b–480a), �s
preserved by Ar�stotle, as �s shown for example by the beg�nn�ng of the De An�ma:48

If we proceed from the assumpt�on that knowledge belongs to noble and

valuable th�ngs , and one form of
knowledge more than the other, e�ther on the bas�s of �ts exactness or
because �t addresses better and more �mpress�ve objects
( ), we
shall on both counts w�th good reason cons�der study�ng the soul as one of
the most �mportant forms of knowledge.
(402a1–4)
 The mean�ng 41

The upshot of all th�s �s that no member of the Early Academy or the Per�patos would
have had any doubt that the Platon�c ‘th�ngs of h�gher value’ are to be
related to ph�losoph�cal subjectmatter and that they owe the�r status to the way the
arguments for them are traced back to the archê, the source of all status and value.
A common m�sunderstand�ng of the ‘more valuable th�ngs’ ar�ses from not
recogn�s�ng the overarch�ng connect�ons w�th�n the Phaedrus, �gnor�ng Plato’s l�ngu�st�c
usage and then, w�th the hor�zon thus narrowed, attempt�ng to deny the reference to
ph�losoph�cal subject-matter by stat�ng that what �s meant �s the act�v�ty of spoken
d�scuss�on wh�ch of �tself should be preferred to wr�t�ng. The real mot�ve beh�nd deny�ng
the obv�ously correct �nterpretat�on �n terms of subject-matter �s of course the ant�-
esoter�c prejud�ce of the twent�eth century: �t �s not w�ll�ngly adm�tted that the Platon�c
d�alect�c�an could �ntent�onally leave fundamental subject-matter as�de. (The same
�nterpreters then do not w�sh e�ther to adm�t that �n the Phaedrus there are two clear
references to leav�ng �mportant areas blank: 246a and 274a.)
Let us br�efly cons�der the consequences wh�ch would result �f th�s �nterpretat�on were
correct. If �t �s �rrelevant to requ�re arguments of greater mean�ng �n terms of subject-
matter, the ph�losopher’s oral defence of the wr�tten word would end up the way we are
fam�l�ar w�th from every poss�ble f�eld and from our everyday exper�ence, namely
cont�nu�ng to speak �n a sooth�ng and conc�l�atory manner on the same level of
reflect�veness as wr�t�ng �tself, wh�ch �s to be ‘supported’. However, such support w�ll as
usual be more concerned w�th prov�ng one’s own wr�t�ngs to be correct and val�d, wh�le
Plato’s d�alect�c�an w�ll prove h�s wr�t�ng as noth�ng less than ‘of negl�g�ble value’ by the
support wh�ch he br�ngs �t orally. Furthermore, any more or less �ntell�gent author �s
capable of g�v�ng the usual support w�thout arguments of h�gher standard �n terms of
subject-matter; but that would mean that anybody who �s not completely lack�ng �n talent
would be worthy of the name of ph�losophos, even �f he had never stud�ed the Platon�c
d�alect�c of the Ideas. Indeed there have been recent commentators who have bel�eved
that Plato �s ‘offer�ng’ th�s t�tle to all sorts of authors �nasmuch as they put on only a
‘qual�f�ed att�tude’ towards the�r own wr�t�ng. But we have already seen that the ‘man
w�th knowledge’ who �s the subject of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng (276a8, c3–4, 278a1, c4)
can only be the man who knows the Platon�c ph�losophy of the Ideas and d�alect�c (see
276e5–6, 277b5–8). And �n v�ew of the �mportance wh�ch the des�gnat�on ph�losophos
had for Plato (see above, p. 47f.), we can have l�ttle fa�th �n a solut�on wh�ch can cons�der
�t conce�vable that th�s t�tle should all of a sudden be easy for anyone to have. Moreover,
th�s solut�on was formulated �n obv�ous �gnorance of the fact that the d�alogues show
clearly enough �n numerous passages how the spoken ‘support’ of the d�alect�c�an
proceeds, and �n �gnorance of the fact that they thereby fully and completely conf�rm the
�nterpretat�on of the ‘th�ngs of greater value’ �n terms of subject-matter.
 15
‘SUPPORT FOR THE LOGOS’ IN THE
DIALOGUES

S�nce the d�alogues are ‘�mages’ of the l�ve speech of the man w�th knowledge (see
Phaedrus 276a), they can also g�ve an �mage of the character�st�c oral procedure of the
d�alect�c�an, namely the ‘support’ he g�ves to h�s logos. It m�ght at f�rst s�ght appear a
contrad�ct�on that oral support �s represented �n wr�tten works. But there would only be a
contrad�ct�on �f a wr�tten d�alogue cla�med to conta�n the ‘support’ wh�ch �t stands �n
need of �tself. But, as �s well known, the oppos�te �s the case: �n the ‘gaps’ the d�alogues
refer to theor�es wh�ch are not �mparted on the spot but wh�ch would be necessary for
the�r own substant�at�on, or ‘support’ them. The fact that �n Platon�c d�alogues one
wr�tten logos supports another wh�ch �s l�kew�se wr�tten �s �n �tself free of contrad�ct�on
and totally unproblemat�cal, prov�ded that the reader knows unamb�guously that the
d�alogue br�ng�ng support, as a wr�tten d�alogue, naturally also needs support wh�ch �t
cannot g�ve �tself. To put �t another way, �t �s only the h�gher stages of support lead�ng to
the recogn�t�on of the fundamental pr�nc�ple (the archê) wh�ch Plato could not have
entrusted to wr�t�ng w�thout self-contrad�ct�on. But the Platon�c d�alogues qu�te obv�ously
do not contravene th�s cond�t�on.
The s�tuat�on �nvolv�ng , that �s, the s�tuat�on �n wh�ch a logos �s exposed
to an attack and �ts author �s requ�red to support �t, �s the central structural pr�nc�ple of the
Platon�c d�alogues. There are cases where the word ‘support�ng’ �s used
expl�c�tly, and others where �t �s replaced by a synonymous expres s�on, but the bas�c
s�tuat�on always rema�ns the same. The quest�on �s always the same, namely whether the
author of the logos �s capable of br�ng�ng support by means of new and more we�ghty
modes of thought and arguments, �.e. w�th t�m�ôtera; �f he can, he �s the ph�losophos. The
d�scuss�on-leader, who represents the f�gure of the d�alect�c�an, always stands the test
when confronted w�th th�s task: everyone else fa�ls, for only the man capable of
contemplat�ng the Ideas �s �ndeed a ph�losophos. Let us now turn to the ev�dence.49

(a) Three examples of Platon�c ‘support’

(1) In the Phaedo, �mmed�ately after S�mm�as’ and Cebes’ object�ons to the �mmortal�ty
of the soul (84c—88b), there follows an �nterrupt�on �n the narrated d�alogue. In Plato’s
works th�s procedure always has the funct�on of prov�d�ng what follows w�th a strong
emphas�s. The l�stener of the fram�ng d�alogue, Echecrates, w�shes to know from Phaedo,
the narrator, how Socrates reacted to the cr�s�s �n the d�scuss�on wh�ch the Theban fr�ends
tr�ggered, whether he was angry or ‘d�d he calmly try to support h�s logos? And d�d he
 ‘Support for the Logos’ 43

support �t adequately or unsat�sfactor�ly?’ (

, 88d9–e3). Thus Echecrates asks
how Socrates reacted �n human terms and �n terms of h�s arguments. Phaedo then goes on
to report how adm�rably Socrates acqu�tted h�mself �n both respects. H�s
was capable of sat�sfy�ng h�s cr�t�cs, a fact wh�ch �s commented
on �nc�dentally �n a second �nterrupt�on of the narrat�ve of the d�alogue, wh�ch of course
�s des�gned to add emphas�s to the f�rst one (102a). In order to refute the object�on of
Cebes, Socrates temporar�ly leaves the theme of the ‘soul’ (from 96a) �n order to propose
a comprehens�ve theory of the cause of com�ng �nto ex�stence and pass�ng out of �t (‘for
we must �n general terms exam�ne the cause of com�ng �nto ex�stence and pass�ng out of
�t’,
, 95e9–96a1); th�s theory leads, as we know, to the
expos�t�on of the hypothes�s of the Ideas (99dff.), on the bas�s of wh�ch the problem of
the soul can be d�scussed as a subord�nate spec�al case, so to speak (105bff.).
We may summar�se the character�st�cs of th�s sect�on of the d�scuss�on as follows:

1 The person who carr�es out the successful �s the d�scuss�on-

leader (naturally not S�mm�as or Cebes).
2 In order to help h�s f�rst logos (on the soul), Socrates f�rst talks about other matters (the
Ideas etc.). He temporar�ly changes the theme (w�thout �n the meant�me los�ng s�ght of
the general theme of ‘�mmortal�ty’).
3 Th�s add�t�onal theme relates to a theory of greater scope wh�ch leads closer to a
knowledge of the f�rst causes. Proceed�ng by hypotheses �nvolves a success�ve ascent
to a wh�ch �s obv�ously to be v�ewed as the archê (101d–e; cf. 107b). In that
the support�ng logos opens the way to knowledge wh�ch �s more comprehens�ve and
better based, �t �s, �n terms of the facts, just�f�ed to talk of a theory wh�ch �s ‘of h�gher
value’.
(2) At the beg�nn�ng of the second book of the Republ�c we hear an attack by Glaucon
and Ade�mantus on just�ce, wh�ch Socrates had successfully defended aga�nst
Thrasymachus �n the f�rst book. Socrates �s challenged to support just�ce (and therefore
naturally support h�s f�rst logos �n favour of just�ce), and he h�mself recogn�ses th�s as h�s
duty. The express�o appears no less than f�ve t�mes �n th�s connect�on.50 The
‘support’ wh�ch Socrates br�ngs just�ce encompasses the whole l�ne of argumentat�on
r�ght up to Book 10. In order to acqu�re a theory of just�ce, he changes the �mmed�ate
subject of d�scuss�on and talks about the best state and about the soul; �n order to defend
h�s concept of the state further, he talks about the d�fference between Idea and part�cular,
about the nature and the educat�on of the ph�losopher, and, w�th�n the framework of the
last theme, about the ‘greatest object of �nstruct�on’ of all, the
Idea of the Good, wh�ch �s the ‘pr�nc�ple of all th�ngs’. ‘Support�ng’ just�ce �s therefore a
scaled ascent,51 �f not r�ght to the knowledge of the archê (whose �s left out of
cons�derat�on, 506d–e), then �nto �ts �mmed�ate v�c�n�ty. The Good �tself �s �n absolute
terms the th�ng of h�ghest value (
 Read�ng Plato 44

, 509a4–5; cf. b9), so that explanat�ons wh�ch

are a�med at �t are correctly to be descr�bed as t�m�ôtera �n compar�son w�th theor�es and
arguments wh�ch a�m at anyth�ng less.
(3) The support wh�ch the Athen�an br�ngs the law of �mp�ety �n the Laws bears great
s�m�lar�ty to the support wh�ch Socrates br�ngs just�ce �n the Republ�c. The almost
�dent�cal reference to a duty to support,52 understood �n rel�g�ous terms, by �tself
demonstrates suff�c�ently that the two operat�ons have the same �ntent�on. The Athen�an
�s ant�c�pat�ng an attack by athe�sts on the law he has just formulated. Th�s law w�ll, l�ke
all laws, be promulgated �n wr�t�ng to the c�t�zens of the new Cretan state that �s to be
founded (89 la); however, even �n th�s oral conversat�on w�th Cl�n�as and Meg�llus, the
author has the arguments ready by wh�ch wr�t�ng w�ll have to be defended at that
juncture. What �s meant �s not a jur�d�cal and pol�t�cal defence, wh�ch of course every
lawg�ver should have ready, no matter how untra�ned he m�ght be as a ph�losopher.
Rather, the d�scuss�on-leader hes�tates to beg�n w�th the ,53 for
these would make �t an unavo�dable necess�ty to ‘step outs�de the lawg�v�ng process’
( , 891d7). In the course of h�s help the Athen�an
does �ndeed abandon the usual level and the top�c up to th�s po�nt and d�scusses, �n order
to secure the foundat�ons for the law aga�nst �mp�ety, the concept of movement, the self-
movement of the soul, the pr�or�ty of the soul over the body, the role of the Good and the
Bad �n the cosmos, and the d�rect�on of the un�verse by the gods (891b–899c). Thus the
Laws (l�ke the Republ�c) upholds all the character�st�c qual�t�es of support as we def�ned
them �n the case of the Phaedo. Furthermore, th�s text demonstrates w�th exemplary
clar�ty that one cannot atta�n to Platon�c support ‘�n any other way’
than by means of that �s, through chang�ng
the top�c (891d7–e1), and that th�s procedure leads closer to the
(891c2–3, w�th e5–6).
Thus Platon�c ‘support’ �s the method of the d�scuss�on-leader (the
representat�ve of the ‘d�alect�c�an’-type) for defend�ng h�s logos when �t has come under
attack, by leav�ng the theme beh�nd for the moment and advanc�ng on the path to
know�ng the archa� �n order to present a sound foundat�on for h�s or�g�nal logos by means
of theor�es of ‘h�gher stand�ng’.

(b) The unchang�ng s�tuat�ons where occurs

Apart from , we hear

(cf. ) and or
as Plato’s express�ons of support�ng. Plato’s well-known
d�staste for f�xed term�nolog�es54 makes �t no surpr�se that he var�ed th�s key-term of h�s
cr�t�c�sm of wr�t�ng further. In order to d�scover synonyms one must start from the bas�c
and unchang�ng s�tuat�ons: a logos �s formulated (‘the soul �s �mmortal’; ‘just�ce �s better
 ‘Support for the Logos’ 45

than �njust�ce’), �n�t�al arguments are proposed—but the

undergoes the elenchus, �.e. he �s challenged to show that he �s a ph�losophos, by trac�ng
h�s logos back to deeper fundamentals.
It �s �mportant that, accord�ng to the ev�dence of Phaedrus 278c–d, both the
ph�losopher and the non-ph�losopher are to be measured aga�nst th�s k�nd of elenchus. It
�s therefore only to be expected that �n the d�alogues qu�te d�fferent types of human
be�ngs are subjected to the elenchus, but only one type, the ph�losopher, passes �ts test. It
�s of �mportance, furthermore, that the d�alect�c�an can �mpart the capac�ty to support
(Phaedrus 276ef.); prec�sely for that reason we shall recogn�se the teacher who cannot do
that as a non-ph�losopher.
Th�s �s the case w�th Gorg�as, whose pup�l Polus would l�ke to ‘reconstruct’ the logos
of h�s teacher after Socrates’ cr�t�c�sms (Gorg�as 462a2). He fa�ls, l�ke Call�cles after h�m,
because h�s teacher �s not a ph�losophos �n Plato’s sense, and consequently was not able
to teach how to .55
The s�tuat�on �n the H�pp�as Ma�or �s rather less obv�ous because �t �s overla�d by
gross �rony. Socrates wants to make H�pp�as �nto the super�or teacher from whom he
would l�ke to learn �n order to ‘f�ght h�s way through the conversat�on aga�n’ (286d7
) after h�s alleged defeat �n d�scuss�on w�th an
anonymous th�rd person. What H�pp�as offers as a means for resum�ng the conversat�on �s
�ndeed (�ron�cally) assessed by Socrates as h�s support
, 291e5). In real�ty the anonymous th�rd person
�s only a transparent mask for the �nner vo�ce of Socrates (see esp. 304d), who �s thus the
person who rema�ns v�ctor�ous �n th�s conversat�on as well, not least because of the way
he reaches for more comprehens�ve themes �n the excursus after H�pp�as’ attack (300b
ff.).
Sharpest �rony �s what also typ�f�es the shorter conversat�on w�th H�pp�as. In a ‘f�t’
( , H�pp�as M�nor 372e1) Socrates upholds a morally �ndefens�ble
propos�t�on from wh�ch he would l�ke H�pp�as to ‘heal’ h�m. The request ‘Don’t refuse to
heal my soul’ ( , 372e6–7)
means �n the context of the s�tuat�on �n the d�alogue noth�ng other than ‘support your
logos’ , for H�pp�as has represented the
eth�cally correct v�ew—�f he could only substant�ate �t more deeply he m�ght be able to
heal Socrates’ ‘f�t’; but H�pp�as �s not a ph�losophos and the ‘heal�ng-process’, l�ke all h�s
other attempts to support h�s logos, fa�ls to eventuate.
The �ron�cal elevat�on of the opponent �s dr�ven to extremes �n the Euthydemus. Both
students of er�st�cs are called on for help ‘l�ke the D�oscur�’ (293a2). The�r benef�c�al
�ntervent�on would be �ndeed comparable w�th the ‘heal�ng of the soul’ expected of
H�pp�as. S�nce Socrates has sarcast�cally ra�sed h�s opponents to the level of the helpers-
�n-need Castor and Polydeuces, he does not talk �n terms of ‘support’ anymore but of
‘rescue’ from the start:
, (293a1–3;
56
). The students of er�st�cs are thus
 Read�ng Plato 46

asked to support someone else’s logos: that too �s part of the sk�ll of a d�alect�c�an (to the
extent that the logos �n need of support allows �t), as the d�alogues Cratylus and
Theaetetus show. Here Socrates defends Cratylus’ pos�t�on up to a po�nt (Cratylus
h�mself �s present) or that of Protagoras (who �s represented by h�s pup�l Theodorus); but,
character�st�cally, he h�mself must take over the task of support�ng for the others, and �n
the last analys�s th�s does not lead very far: only the pos�t�on based on the ph�losophy of
the Ideas can stand up to every elenchus. In Plato’s sense, support�ng �s not a quest�on of
�ntellectual versat�l�ty but of the correct ontolog�cal po�nt of v�ew.
The �dea, turned �nto comedy �n the H�pp�as Ma�or, that Socrates when defeated �n
conversat�on seeks ph�losoph�cal �nstruct�on from a person who �s ‘more w�se’ �s
someth�ng wh�ch Plato formulates aga�n, and th�s t�me w�thout any com�c �ntent�on, �n
the Sympos�um. Socrates, who allegedly labours under the same �llus�ons as Agathon
(Sympos�um 201e), quest�oned the w�se D�ot�ma, �n order to learn someth�ng about Eros.
Th�s t�me h�s expectat�ons d�d not dece�ve h�m. But the prophetess of Mant�nea, D�ot�ma,
�s as much a f�ct�t�ous character as the anonymous th�rd person �n the H�pp�as Ma�or. It �s
therefore aga�n Socrates who cont�nues the d�scuss�on. And �t �s obv�ous how he reaches
far beyond the framework of h�s conversat�on w�th Agathon about Eros �n the speech he
attr�butes to D�ot�ma and deals w�th th�ngs of greater ph�losoph�cal �mportance wh�ch
lead closer to a knowledge of the archê.
So much for parallel s�tuat�ons and synonyms. It should have become clear that the
concept of character�ses the structural pr�nc�ple of the Platon�c
d�alogue; �t cons�sts of �ntent�onally elevat�ng the level of argumentat�on towards an
ult�mate argument based on the archê.
 16
THE ASCENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL
COMMUNICATION

Plato states more than once that the a�m of the man of knowledge �s to ascend to a f�nal,
transcendental pr�nc�ple. He may talk about an ascent from hypothes�s to hypothes�s to
reach someth�ng wh�ch �s ‘suff�c�ent’ ( Phaedo 99d–107b), or about an
ascend�ng recogn�t�on of the Beaut�ful from observ�ng beaut�ful bod�es, past the
recogn�t�on of the morally beaut�ful up to the contemplat�on of the Beaut�ful �tself
(Sympos�um 210aff.), or about the gradat�on of the modes of percept�on, the h�ghest of
wh�ch, , recogn�ses the pr�nc�ple of all th�ngs (Republ�c 509d–511e).57 At any
rate the mean�ng of these passages has not been m�sunderstood by prev�ous generat�ons,
who regarded the des�re for ‘ascent’ and ‘cl�mb�ng over’ as the essence of Platon�sm.
But �t has been recogn�sed much less often that ascent �s the actual theme of the
d�alogues’ dramat�c representat�on. Whenever scholars have not�ced th�s,58 the�r emphas�s
has been on the ascent as such, and �t has been forgotten that the d�alogues always
�llustrate only one sect�on of the ascent and make the �ntent�onal l�m�tat�ons of the
process perfectly clear. It �s only when we understand the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng correctly
that we can understand why the two th�ngs hang together—the ascent and the l�m�tat�ons
of �ts presentat�on �n wr�t�ng, ‘support�ng’ through ‘more valuable th�ngs’ and ‘rema�n�ng
s�lent’ when �t �s necessary . The examples adduced above
for Platon�c ‘support’ (pp. 55–58) are examples not only of resort�ng to t�m�ôtera but also
of clear cases of ‘gaps’.
It �s s�gn�f�cant that Plato’s t�m�ôtera po�nt �n the f�nal analys�s to the recogn�t�on of
the pr�me pr�nc�ples �n v�ew of the fact that
Ar�stotle �n h�s Metaphys�cs and other works refers to a doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples not
found �n th�s form �n the d�alogues. Th�s d�screpancy has led to a qu�te unnecessary
confus�on �n Platon�c stud�es. The vast major�ty of scholars has not been ready to accept
that Ar�stotle, who spent twenty years �n Plato’s Academy, could know more prec�se
deta�ls of Plato’s doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples than �s poss�ble for the modern student of Plato as
long as he st�cks to the d�alogues alone. In consequence, the attempt has been made to
play down Ar�stotle’s statements: some scholars have wanted to l�m�t the doctr�ne of
pr�nc�ples, wh�ch grew more and more ev�dent �n outl�ne, to a part�cular phase �n Plato’s
l�fe, namely to h�s very last years—the old Plato, they say, s�mply d�d not have the t�me
to wr�te yet another d�alogue on the subject; others have thought that they could
understand the Ar�stotel�an statements as mere �nterpretat�ons. The Platon�c scholars’
ab�d�ng �ncapab�l�ty to recogn�se a real Platon�c doctr�ne of pr�me pr�nc�ples was caused
 Read�ng Plato 48

among other th�ngs by the fact that no one had a clear concept of the poss�ble reasons
why Plato m�ght reserve op�n�on �n wr�t�ng.
Why must �t be prec�sely the sect�on of Plato’s ph�losophy that deals w�th pr�me
pr�nc�ples wh�ch has to be defended aga�nst wr�tten d�ssem�nat�on? Aga�nst the
background of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng the answer �s s�mple: the more complex the subject,
the greater the probab�l�ty that uncomprehend�ng people w�ll unjust�f�ably d�sm�ss �t, a
s�tuat�on wh�ch the author cannot ward off �n h�s absence (see Phaedrus 275d–e). Plato
clearly d�d not th�nk such d�sm�ssal a matter of �nd�fference—wh�ch �s perfectly
comprehens�ble �f one cons�ders that for h�m the world of the Ideas had a ‘d�v�ne’ status
‘beyond the heavens’.59 It �s perhaps more �mportant that Plato thought �t mean�ngless to
pass on to anyone th�ngs for wh�ch he �s not su�ted, or not yet suff�c�ently tra�ned. He
calls such th�ngs (aprorrhêta)—‘th�ngs wh�ch must not be passed on prematurely’,
because, �f they are passed on prematurely, �.e. before the rec�p�ent �s ready for them, they
‘expla�n noth�ng’ (Laws 968e4–5). S�nce the theory of pr�nc�ples �s the area of ph�losophy
wh�ch generally makes the greatest demands, any adequate preparat�on for �t by means of
wr�t�ng, wh�ch �s, however, ‘�ncapable of teach�ng the truth adequately’ (Phaedrus
276c9), �s ruled out, and as a consequence even f�x�ng �t �n wr�t�ng would also be only
counterproduct�ve.
Instead of extract�ng these s�mple but fundamental �ns�ghts from the d�alogues and
apply�ng them to the d�alogues themselves,. scholars have sh�ed away from the �dea that a
‘secret doctr�ne’ m�ght be ascr�bed to Plato60 and have thought that they would be able to
exonerate h�m from that charge only by deny�ng h�m a theory of pr�nc�ples. Other
scholars have constructed the unnecessary object�on that, �f we accept an unwr�tten
theory of pr�nc�ples, we must also accept that Plato had two d�st�nct spheres for h�s
ph�losophy, one for wr�tten ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry, another for oral.61 The object�on
m�sunderstands the relat�onsh�p of oral�ty and l�teracy �n Plato; we are not deal�ng w�th
two d�st�nct spheres of subject-matter but w�th a cont�nu�ng ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry �nto the
same problems, ra�s�ng the level of argumentat�on step by step.
Both attempts to get r�d of Ar�stotle’s ev�dence on Plato’s ‘unwr�tten teach�ngs’ are
doomed to fa�lure. There �s ne�ther any means of show�ng that these statements are mere
�nterpretat�ons62 (on the contrary, for here as elsewhere Ar�stotle d�st�ngu�shes very
clearly between what h�s opponents sa�d and what he th�nks follows from the�r
hypotheses),63 nor �s �t acceptable to narrow the doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples down
chronolog�cally to Plato’s later per�od. It �s not only �n the Republ�c that the educat�on of
the ph�losopher-k�ngs culm�nates �n the d�alect�c understand�ng of the Idea of the Good as
the archê of everyth�ng (504aff., 532eff., 540a); the relat�vely early d�alogues the
Charm�des and the Lys�s d�splay the �dea of the ascent wh�ch cannot be broken off unt�l a
f�rst pr�nc�ple, an archê, has been reached: �f we want to explore φιλíα we must go back
to a ‘f�rst dear th�ng’, a (Lys�s 219c–d); �f we w�sh to understand self-
restra�nt, the ‘knowledge of the Good and the Bad’ appears on the hor�zon of the
d�scuss�on (Charm�des 174b–c).64 It �s prec�sely �n th�s d�alogue on self-restra�nt �n the
Charm�des that, as was ment�oned br�efly above, p. 15f., we f�nd a transparent
metaphor�cal usage of the concepts of ‘med�cal remedy’ ( pharmakon) and
‘�ncantat�on’ ( , epôdê) wh�ch can make us understand Plato’s att�tude to wr�t�ng
about the archa�: Socrates cla�ms to have a pharmakon for the �llness of the young
 The ascent to the pr�nc�ples 49

Charm�des: but the pharmakon �s not handed over on the grounds that �t �s effect�ve only
w�th an �ncantat�on, and useless w�thout �t (155e8) and because Socrates had g�ven an
oath to the Thrac�an pr�est who had g�ven h�m the �ncantat�on and the pharmakon never
to allow h�mself to be persuaded to hand on the pharmakon w�thout the �ncantat�on of the
rec�p�ent’s soul (157b1–c6). There can be no doubt that the �magery of the pharmakon
carr�es a statement about the correct manner of commun�cat�ng ph�losoph�cal
knowledge.65 Plato g�ves us to understand that Socrates as the d�alect�c�an has �ns�ghts at
h�s d�sposal wh�ch would �ndeed be d�rectly commun�cable, but wh�ch he del�berately
does not commun�cate because they would be useless for Charm�des as long as he has not
obta�ned the correct preparat�on for understand�ng the ‘remedy’ �n the form of
prel�m�nary ‘�ncantat�ons’. The pharmakon thus stands for central pr�nc�ples of d�alect�c
knowledge of the Good and the Bad; these pr�nc�ples can be formulated (there �s no
quest�on here whatsoever about the �nexpress�ble �n ph�losophy), and they could
consequently be formulated and d�ssem�nated �n wr�t�ng as well. What stops Socrates
from pass�ng on the pharmakon �s an oath wh�ch he had g�ven h�s Thrac�an teacher—thus
the d�alect�c�an also has the respons�b�l�ty, wh�ch he feels just as strongly as a sworn
rel�g�ous obl�gat�on, to hand down h�s ‘th�ngs of greater value’ only when the cogn�t�ve
and eth�cal cond�t�ons are present wh�ch w�ll ensure that they w�ll be rece�ved
appropr�ately. But, as we know full well, wr�t�ng can never produce these cond�t�ons.
What the early Charm�des tells us by means of metaphors �s expl�c�tly expressed by
the late T�maeus, namely that �t �s the pr�nc�ples �n part�cular wh�ch cannot be
commun�cated to everyone. The myth�cal f�gure of the Dem�urge �s doubtless the name
for a pr�nc�ple of the world-order w�th�n the framework of the T�maeus. It �s d�ff�cult,
Plato says, to f�nd th�s creator and father of the cosmos, but to commun�cate h�m to
everyone once he has been found �s �mposs�ble (T�maeus 28c3–5). Accord�ng to another
passage �t �s the ‘even h�gher pr�nc�ples’
wh�ch are known (only) to God and,
among humans, to the one who �s a fr�end of God, and for that reason are not g�ven
dep�ct�on (53d6–7).
Th�s statement follows upon the T�maeus’s �ntroduct�on of elementary tr�angles as
elements or ‘pr�nc�ples’ of percept�ble bod�es (52c–d). What pr�nc�ples can be
commun�cated ‘to everyone’, �.e. through wr�t�ng, and who are the people for whom that
�s �nappropr�ate cannot be spec�f�ed for us as readers of the d�alogues accord�ng to any
general rule. The example just g�ven prov�des us w�th a small �ns�ght �nto the way Plato
leads the world of the senses back to �ntell�g�ble pr�nc�ples; here he sets the l�m�t to what
can be commun�cated after the f�rst step of the reduct�on wh�ch led to the f�eld of
geometry (that the ‘even h�gher pr�nc�ples’ denote, beyond elementary tr�angles, numbers
�s someth�ng wh�ch we can state w�th certa�nty thanks to Ar�stotle).66 We cannot say
whether Plato set down th�s l�m�t once and for all; �t �s more probable that �t was a
quest�on of d�scret�on how much of h�s ‘seed’ he wanted to sow �n an ‘Adon�s garden’
and that he set the l�m�t for each d�alogue as he wrote �t. Plutarch remarked that Plato was
more �ncl�ned �n h�s old age to state the pr�nc�ples he had �n m�nd w�thout concealment
(De Is�de et Os�r�de 48, 370F), but we should add that the bas�c thought—that there are
th�ngs wh�ch �t �s better not to reveal �n wr�t�ng, because �f they are commun�cated
prematurely they do not expla�n anyth�ng and are thus ‘useless’—rema�ns �ntact and
unchanged from the metaphor�cal �mage of med�cal remed�es �n the Charm�des through
 Read�ng Plato 50

to the twelfth book of the Laws, where the s�gn�f�cant concept of (aprorrhêta) �s f�nally
co�ned (968e).
 17
SOME ‘GAPS’

Another th�ng wh�ch rema�ns unchanged �s that one can never learn from the allus�ons to
m�ss�ng mater�al w�th suff�c�ent clar�ty what the content of the m�ss�ng mater�al cons�sts
of. We would never be able to d�scover what the ‘even h�gher pr�nc�ples’ beyond the
elementary tr�angles are supposed to be �f we were l�m�ted to th�s allus�on alone �n
T�maeus 53d. In th�s case, as has been remarked, �t �s only the Ar�stotel�an ev�dence on
Plato’s unwr�tten teach�ngs wh�ch sheds the necessary l�ght.67 The same �s true of the
famous ‘gap’ at Republ�c 506d–e, where Socrates makes �t unm�stakably clear to h�s
d�scuss�on-partner, Glaucon, that the nature (the ) of the Good �s not to be
d�scussed because �t �s a top�c wh�ch goes beyond the framework of the present
conversat�on. Indeed, no less a scholar than Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued that the
�nformat�on meant here about the nature of the Good, namely that the Good �s the One,
l�es ‘�mpl�c�tly �n the structure of the Republ�c as well’;68 but �f anyone w�shed to
conclude that �t �s suff�c�ent to analyse the structure of the Republ�c �n order to see what
Plato meant by the undef�ned of the Good, he would be the v�ct�m of a
c�rcular argument: for actually the only reason why we can extrapolate the equat�on
One=Good even from the structure of the Republ�c ‘�nd�rectly’ �s because we have the
d�rect �nformat�on �n Ar�stotle that the Academy equated the One �tself w�th the Good
�tself, but thought that �ts nature ( ) lay ma�nly �n �ts be�ng one (Metaphys�cs N4,
1091b13–15).
In the case of the ‘gaps’ wh�ch refer to the theory of pr�nc�ples �n Plato’s oral
ph�losophy we can thus understand the mean�ng of the cross-reference only �f the
trad�t�on outs�de Plato prov�des us w�th a key to �t.
Fortunately, there �s another type of ‘gap’. In common w�th the f�rst, �t does not
present a puzzle wh�ch m�ght be solved from the text �tself by acute analys�s and prec�se
observat�on of the word�ng, but once aga�n �s a case where the content of the m�ss�ng
mater�al cannot be reconstructed w�thout add�t�onal �nformat�on prov�ded by an author�ty
outs�de the work �n quest�on. But, unl�ke the f�rst type, here the �nformat�on necessary for
supplement�ng the sense can be found �n other works by Plato h�mself. The value of these
passages cons�sts of the fact that they g�ve us an authent�cally Platon�c conf�rmat�on of
our �nterpretat�on of the ‘gaps’: by means of them, and from w�th�n the Platon�c œuvre
�tself and w�thout recourse to the ‘unwr�tten teach�ngs’ (wh�ch are attested only
�nd�rectly), we can ver�fy and establ�sh that Plato’s ‘gaps’ are not vague prom�ses but
refer �n a concrete way to sharply def�ned theor�es and that they are not essent�ally
puzzles to be solved from w�th�n the text, but refer d�rectly to ph�losoph�cal conclus�ons
presented elsewhere.
Several of these ‘gaps’ relate to the doctr�ne of the soul. Aga�n, that �s no surpr�se
when one cons�ders how �mportant the theory of the soul �s for Plato’s ontology,
 Read�ng Plato 52

ep�stemology, cosmology and eth�cs. In the Phaedrus Plato even states l�terally that a
knowledge of the nature of the soul �s not poss�ble w�thout the knowledge of the nature of
the un�verse (270c). Correspond�ngly, the f�gure �n the d�alogues who makes the clearest
statements on the nature of the soul, T�maeus of Locr�, �s descr�bed as the most expert
man �n matters of the nature of the un�verse (T�maeus 27a), and �n fact �n the course of
h�s lecture he br�ngs cosmology and the doctr�ne of the soul �nto the closest contact.
Because the r�ch ph�losoph�cal background of the theory of the soul could not be
developed each t�me and because the f�nal arguments would �n any case �nvolve the
archa� (wh�ch cannot be commun�cated to everybody), the relat�vely h�gh number of
‘gaps’ �n th�s context can be expla�ned eas�ly.
In the great myth about Eros �n the Phaedrus, after prov�ng the �mmortal�ty of the soul
on the bas�s that �t �s self-mov�ng Plato comes to speak about �ts form (�dea 246a). He
says that to show what k�nd of th�ng �t �s would properly enta�l an ‘ent�rely d�v�ne’ and
long explanat�on, and thus �t w�ll only be stated here �n a br�efer and ‘human’ explanat�on
whom �t resembles (246a4–6).
Scholars have bel�eved that they had to conclude from the oppos�t�on of ‘d�v�ne’ and
‘human’ explanat�ons that the shorter human one �s all that �s actually atta�nable by
humans. But Plato nowhere cons�ders the knowledge wh�ch �s typ�cal of gods to be
closed to humans on a pr�or� grounds—on the contrary, �f a human real�ses the h�ghest of
h�s capab�l�t�es he becomes ph�losophos, because through h�s knowledge of the Ideas he
comes near to God, who �s sophos. Therefore �t �s also stated �n the T�maeus that the
knowledge of the archa�, wh�ch �s a d�st�nct�ve feature of God, �s access�ble to those
among mortals whom God loves (53d), and s�m�larly �n the Phaedrus that through
anamnes�s the soul of the ph�losopher �s always as close as �t can be to the world of the
Ideas, ‘h�s closeness to wh�ch g�ves a god h�s d�v�n�ty’ (249c, trans. Rowe), and that the
ph�losopher thereby becomes ‘perfect’.
In fact, we can d�scover from the Phaedrus �tself what an analys�s of the nature of the
soul would have to ach�eve �f �t were to offer more than the v�v�d compar�son w�th a
w�nged char�ot descr�bed as a ‘human’ explanat�on at 246aff. Such an analys�s would
have to ask whether the soul �s composed of one or several parts, and, �f �t cons�sts of
more than one part, what �ts capab�l�ty (�ts dynam�s) cons�sts of �n terms of act�on and
pass�ve suffer�ng (270d1–7). It �s clear that the myth d�d not confront these quest�ons
cr�t�cally but answered them w�thout formal argumentat�on but w�th the �nsp�red verve of
the poet�c compar�son. But �t �s equally clear that these quest�ons can be tackled �n a
cr�t�cal and reasoned way w�th�n the framework of the Platon�c d�alogues and that they
were �ndeed so tackled, namely �n the fourth book of the Republ�c. At 435eff. we f�nd a
carefully argued explanat�on why the soul �s not to be cons�dered as cons�st�ng of one
part, why a d�st�nct�on has to be made between prec�sely three ‘parts’ of the soul and
where each of the�r capab�l�t�es l�es.
Do we therefore have before us, �n wr�t�ng, the ‘d�v�ne’ explanat�on of the nature of
the soul �n the fourth book of the Republ�c? That would be too great a cla�m, s�nce the
theory of the soul offered there �s �tself heav�ly qual�f�ed (�n a way that we shall cons�der
�n greater deta�l d�rectly); but no jud�c�ous reader w�ll be able to deny that the arguments
of the fourth book of the Republ�c comply far better w�th the agenda of a ph�losoph�cal
psychology drawn from Phaedrus 270d (see also 27 1d), and �n any case come closer to
the ‘d�v�ne’ explanat�on than the beaut�ful �mage of the char�ot of the soul.
 Some ‘gaps’ 53

Apart from possess�ng a deep knowledge of the nature of the soul, the d�alect�c�an, as
the advocate of a rhetor�c wh�ch �s based on ph�losoph�cal pr�nc�ples, part�cularly needs
to know the nature of the th�ngs about wh�ch he w�shes to �mpart the truth (Phaedrus
273d–274a; see also 277b–c). Here aga�n there �s a reference to a ‘long detour’ wh�ch has
‘much effort’ �n store, but wh�ch �n the end leads to our be�ng able to speak and act �n a
way wh�ch �s ‘grat�fy�ng to the gods’ (Phaedrus 273e4–5, e7–8, 274a2; trans. Rowe). The
‘path’ wh�ch Plato means here �s the path or ‘journey’ ( , Republ�c 532e3) of
d�alect�c; as always, Plato represents �t as a path wh�ch we can really tread, �.e. he
presents a real poss�b�l�ty for mank�nd, and wh�ch leads to a str�ctly c�rcumscr�bed goal
wh�ch humans must reach �n order to atta�n to the�r happ�ness. There �s no room for doubt
that th�s �s the path of oral d�alect�c to wh�ch the d�alogue makes reference, but �t cannot
be trodden �n the med�um of wr�t�ng.
In the Gorg�as Plato refers to h�s theory of the soul �n a form wh�ch reveals far less of
the ‘form’ ( , �dea) of the soul than the �mage of the tr�part�te char�ot of the soul.
Socrates’ d�scuss�on-partner Call�cles �s, as we have already seen (p. 6f.), h�ndered by h�s
bl�nd egocentr�c�ty and compuls�veness from understand�ng the core pr�nc�ples of
Socrat�c eth�cs: h�s b�ggest hand�cap �s h�s pr�m�t�ve self-�dent�f�cat�on w�th h�s des�res
(49e–492c). Socrates confronts �t w�th a totally d�fferent p�cture of mank�nd wh�ch he
represents as the v�ew of other anonymous ‘w�se men’ , �n order to underl�ne
�ts d�stance from Call�cles’ �ntellectual world. Accord�ng to th�s v�ew, the �rrat�onal
people are those who are un�n�t�ated (493a7): they do not know that l�fe �n the body
�s l�ke l�fe �n a grave and that the cont�nual sat�sfact�on of the �nst�ncts
and des�res �s noth�ng other than what the myth of the Dana�ds v�v�dly expresses, namely
an attempt to f�ll a leaky barrel w�th a s�eve (492e8–493c3). In Socrates’ understand�ng of
the �mage the ‘barrel’ corresponds w�th a part of the soul: �t �s ‘the part of the soul �n
wh�ch des�res are located’ (493a3, b1). The soul �s thus a structured whole �n wh�ch the
‘s�eve’ serves the needs of the ‘barrel’; but obv�ously th�s �s true only of the way of l�fe of
�rrat�onal people and those who are controlled by the�r �nst�ncts, just as Call�cles th�nks
that the only funct�on of �ns�ght ( , 492a2) �s to serve the �nst�ncts. Taken
together w�th Socrates’ suggest�on that Call�cles choose the l�fe of self-control �nstead of
the l�fe of the unbr�dled and bas�cally unfulf�llable sat�sfact�on of the �nst�ncts (493c–d),
Socrates’ recourse to the myth of the Dana�ds means that the pass�ons and �nst�ncts are
not the ent�re soul but only one part, to wh�ch only �rrat�onal people subord�nate �ns�ght,
for they do not know that the soul knows of yet another l�fe—the l�fe of the rat�onal soul
�n a state wh�ch �s free of the body. Furthermore, s�nce Call�cles’ �deal of excellence �s
measured aga�nst the system of the Platon�c card�nal v�rtues (489e, 491c–e), wh�ch �s, for
�ts part, connected to the theory of the tr�part�te soul �n the Republ�c, �t �s obv�ous that
Call�cles would above all else need enl�ghtenment concern�ng the structure of the soul �n
order for h�m to be totally freed from h�s errors about h�mself and consequently about the
type of l�fe most worth str�v�ng for. Only �n th�s way could he understand the mean�ng of
‘hav�ng control over oneself ( , 491d8). But Call�cles does
not rece�ve th�s enl�ghtenment, obv�ously because h�s moral state precludes any cogn�t�ve
progress. That essent�al th�ngs are �ntent�onally kept out of the d�scuss�on here even
though they are �n fact essent�al for a val�d analys�s of the problems �s �nd�cated to
 Read�ng Plato 54

Call�cles (and the reader of the d�alogue) by means of the �mage of the Myster�es:
Socrates says scornfully that Call�cles should be del�ghted to be �n�t�ated �nto the ‘Greater
Myster�es’ before he has become acqua�nted w�th the ‘Lesser Myster�es’ (497c)—every
reader of the t�me knew that that was �nadm�ss�ble �n the Eleus�n�an Myster�es, and yet
Plato makes Socrates express the fact h�mself. Readers are meant to understand that they
are not to expect an �n�t�at�on �nto Plato’s ‘Greater Myster�es’ here �n the Gorg�as.69
For Call�cles, an �ntroduct�on �nto the Platon�c doctr�ne of the parts of the soul �n the
form �t takes �n Republ�c Book Four would �tself have enta�led a dec�s�ve step forwards.
But for the character who represents the ‘d�alect�c�an’, Socrates, even th�s vers�on �s not
at all the same as reveal�ng the ‘Greater Myster�es’. Abandon�ng the �mage of the
Myster�es and revert�ng �nstead to prosa�c clar�ty, he states, before he develops h�s theory
w�th arguments, that the procedure that he has been follow�ng �n h�s conversat�on w�th
Glaucon and Ade�mantus �s �nsuff�c�ent for a ‘prec�se’ answer to the quest�on of the parts
of the soul: ‘Be assured, Glaucon; �n my op�n�on we shall never understand th�s prec�sely
w�th the methods wh�ch we are now us�ng �n our d�scuss�ons—for there �s another path,
one wh�ch �s longer and more extens�ve, that leads to �t.’ (Republ�c 4, 435c9–d3).
In th�s way Plato l�m�ts the ph�losoph�cal range of the reason�ng beh�nd the theory
wh�ch �s the bas�s of the doctr�ne of v�rtue and the des�gn of the State.
But Plato does not leave th�ngs at th�s one reference. He refers back emphat�cally to
the passage �n Book Four when he prepares to �ntroduce another bas�c theory. In the s�xth
book, when Socrates beg�ns to expla�n why the ph�losoph�cal rulers �n the �deal State of
the future w�ll have to have a sound knowledge of the Good, he stra�ght away recalls the
dec�s�on, made �n the fourth book, to treat the theory of the soul on a del�berately reduced
level of argumentat�on (504a). Character�st�cally, the conversat�on-partner at f�rst has no
memory of �t—one almost gets the �mpress�on here that Plato, on the bas�s of a super�or
psycholog�cal knowledge, wanted to car�cature the �nab�l�ty to real�se h�s d�alogues’
obv�ous self-l�m�tat�ons.
But Socrates rema�ns �ns�stent, and f�nally the same l�m�tat�on �s approved for the new
theme of the Idea of the Good as well. The ‘longer’ way cannot be entered on at th�s
prec�se po�nt. Cons�dered w�th�n the dramat�c sett�ng, th�s �s because of the lack of
tra�n�ng on the part of the conversat�on-partners (see 533a); seen from the perspect�ve of
the Republ�c as a book, �t �s because of the l�m�ts wh�ch wr�t�ng �mposes on ph�losoph�cal
commun�cat�on. It �s notable that, at the po�nt where Socrates approaches the d�scuss�on
of the ‘h�ghest object of learn�ng’ (the µέγιστoν µάθηµα, 503e, 504d-e, 505a), he stresses
(504b—d) how �nadequate �t �s to avo�d the ‘longer way’ far more emphat�cally than �n
the fourth book. In the end he expla�ns that he does not want to deal w�th the quest�on of
the nature of the Idea of the Good (506d—e), that even the �mage of the sun, g�ven as a
subst�tute, �s �ncomplete �n many ways and that �n what follows he only wants to expla�n
what �s ‘poss�ble at the present moment’ ( ,
509c9–10); both passages make �t perfectly clear that explanat�ons are not l�m�ted
because the subject �s �ncapable of be�ng expressed, as has occas�onally been ma�nta�ned,
but that Socrates does possess a ‘v�ew’ on the Good, wh�ch, however, he w�ll del�berately
not d�sclose:
 Some ‘gaps’ 55

But, my dear fr�ends, let us leave as�de for now the top�c of what the Good
�n fact �s; for I th�nk that even my v�ew on �t �s beyond our reach �n our
present attempt. (506d8–e3)
…—Don’t stop at all, he sa�d, but once aga�n expla�n the �mage of the
sun, �f you have (up t�ll now) been leav�ng anyth�ng out.
—Well, I sa�d, I have been leav�ng out a great deal.
—You shouldn’t pass over even the least deta�l, he sa�d.
—I th�nk [sc. that I’ll pass over] a lot, I sa�d; all the same, I shall not
w�lfully leave out whatever �s feas�ble at th�s po�nt. (509c5–10)

The mean�ng of Socrates’ �ntent�on to expla�n only what �s ‘feas�ble at th�s po�nt’ �s made
clear from h�s refusal �n the seventh book to expla�n the content and methods of d�alect�c
�n a br�ef sketch: ‘You won’t be able to follow me any further, my dear Glaucon—for my
part, there won’t be any lack of w�ll�ngness’ (533a1–2).
In Plato’s major work, therefore, abandon�ng the ‘longer way’, wh�ch the Phaedrus
knows of also (274a; see above, p. 68f.), has a bear�ng on the doctr�ne of the soul on the
one hand and, on the other, on the ph�losophy of the Good and consequently the whole
f�eld of Platon�c d�alect�c, wh�ch leads to the recogn�t�on of the f�nal archê. As ment�oned
above (p. 66), supplement�ng the contents of th�s f�eld can only be ach�eved �n part from
the �nd�rect trad�t�on. As far as the theme of the ‘longer way’, the doctr�ne of the soul, �s
concerned, however, Plato beg�ns, �n the Republ�c �tself, to descr�be what �s m�ss�ng at
least �n outl�ne, and thanks to a couple of statements �n the T�maeus we can reach a clear
and certa�n op�n�on on at least one central matter.
In the tenth book of the Republ�c Plato �ntroduces �n two steps a v�tally �mportant
supplement to the psycholog�cal theory of h�s major work: f�rst he proves the �mmortal�ty
of the soul, wh�ch has played no part up to th�s po�nt (608c–611a); then he cont�nues (I
paraphrase 611a–612a): We must not th�nk that the soul �s const�tuted ‘by �ts truest
nature’ (Bloom) as �t has appeared to us up t�ll now, as full of var�ety, �rregular�ty and
str�fe. Whatever �s composed of many th�ngs and does not possess the best means of
comb�n�ng them can hardly be everlast�ng. One has to v�ew the soul �n �ts pure form, �.e.
free of all the secondary accret�on wh�ch �t has ga�ned from assoc�at�on w�th the body.
One can recogn�se �ts ‘old nature’ ( , 611d2) by look�ng at �ts love
of w�sdom, �ts ph�losoph�a: one can then see what �t �s �n contact w�th and what �t longs
to assoc�ate w�th �n v�ew of �ts relat�onsh�p to the d�v�ne and ever-ex�stent. Observ�ng �t �n
such a way would reveal �ts ‘true nature’, whether �t �s mult�form or un�form: as �t �s,
however, we have observed the th�ngs wh�ch �t exper�ences and the forms
�t takes �n human l�fe.
Here, then, Plato places a future �nvest�gat�on of the soul �n sharp contrast w�th the
�nvest�gat�on wh�ch has so far been carr�ed out �n the d�alogue. Both types of
�nvest�gat�on are d�rected to the same quest�on, namely whether the soul has parts and �f
so wh�ch: for the quest�on of the soul’s be�ng mult�form or un�form (612a4) means the
same as the quest�on �n the fourth book, whether or not the soul exh�b�ts the ‘parts’ wh�ch
could be observed �n the State as an enlarged model (435c4–6). But only the future
exam�nat�on w�ll reveal the ‘old’ or ‘true’ nature of the soul and be able to say of that
whether �t has more parts or only one.
 Read�ng Plato 56

The psychology of the Republ�c �s thus emphat�cally one wh�ch �s of the here and now
and, so to speak, ‘emp�r�cal’. Its results are thoroughly val�d for the realm �n wh�ch they
were ach�eved, as �s spec�f�cally emphas�sed (611c6, 612a5–6). But �t has no access to the
most �mportant th�ng: to the ‘true nature’ of �ts object.
If we look at the word�ng alone, we must say that the quest�on of the mult�form�ty or
un�form�ty of the true soul �s left open (612a4); only the complete and f�nal exam�nat�on
of the soul, wh�ch �s m�ss�ng �n the d�alogue, w�ll g�ve a dec�s�ve answer. Th�s apparent
openness has led scholars e�ther to attr�bute the wrong answer to Plato or even to expla�n
that he h�mself st�ll d�d not know what the solut�on would look l�ke.
In real�ty, Plato’s v�ew of the true nature of the soul can be learnt not only from th�s
passage but also from others �n the Republ�c, but unfortunately not w�th the expl�c�tness
needed to command general assent. That the ‘true nature of the soul’ could be mult�form
�n the same sense as the soul �n th�s corporeal l�fe �s someth�ng wh�ch �s already excluded
by the sharp contrast between the two ways of descr�b�ng the soul. In part�cular, the
statement that the true soul �s related to the d�v�ne and the eternally ex�stent shows clearly
that only the (log�st�kon), or the h�ghest part of the tr�part�te soul, can be
meant by �t. The not�on that �t could ‘ent�rely follow’ the eternally ex�stent, �.e. the world
of Ideas (611e4), po�nts �n the same d�rect�on—espec�ally �f one �ncludes what �s sa�d
about the ‘relat�onsh�p’ and the �ncl�nat�ons of the three parts of the soul �n the n�nth book
(see 585bff.): s�nce the log�st�kon alone �s d�rected towards ‘what �s eternally the same,
the �mmortal and the truth’ and consequently �t alone ass�m�lates �tself to th�s realm (see
500c), only �t �s called ‘the d�v�ne’ �n the human make-up (589d1, e4, 590d1). It �s
thereby actually �mpl�ed that only the log�st�kon can be �mmortal, s�nce the other two
parts of the soul are d�rected towards mortal th�ngs and ‘follow’ them. A passage �n the
seventh book �s even clearer; there �t �s sa�d that the v�rtue of ‘be�ng rat�onal’ (of
) �s—�n contrast w�th the other v�rtues wh�ch are almost l�ke bod�ly
v�rtues—the funct�on ‘of someth�ng more d�v�ne’, ‘wh�ch never loses �ts strength’ (518d–
e).
The mod�f�cat�on of the doctr�ne of the soul wh�ch �s the outcome of these passages �s
therefore as follows: the only �mmortal part of the tr�part�te soul �s the rat�onal soul, the
log�st�kon; thus �t alone reveals the �ndestruct�ble ‘old’ or ‘true’ nature of the soul, wh�le
the two other parts of the soul �n the fourth book were �ndeed correctly separated from
one another and from the log�st�kon, but by the�r very nature are noth�ng other than a
trans�tory accret�on wh�ch �s caused by the ‘true’ soul’s assoc�at�on w�th the body.
But prec�sely th�s p�cture of the human soul can be formed from the d�alogue the
T�maeus. Only the rat�onal soul �s created by the Dem�urge, or ‘m�xed together’, as Plato
puts �t (35a, 41d): �t alone �s therefore �ndestruct�ble. The two other parts of the soul are
‘bu�lt on’ by subord�nate de�t�es as mortal add�t�ons (69c–d); �n accordance w�th the�r
nature they are d�rected at mortal th�ngs, namely pass�ons and amb�t�on (90b), wh�le the
log�st�kon has the task of becom�ng l�ke the order and harmony of the heavens by a
rat�onal comprehens�on of the revolut�ons of the un�verse, ‘�n accord w�th �ts old nature’
(90c–d, , d5; cf. Republ�c 611d2).
Th�s d�chotomous structure of the soul, w�th �ts ontolog�cal d�v�s�on between the
�mmortal and the two mortal parts, �s also clearly ment�oned by Plato �n the Pol�t�cus
(309c) and �n the Laws (713c), and �s obv�ously assumed �n the Phaedo. But here, at the
 Some ‘gaps’ 57

conclus�on of the Republ�c, we d�scover no expl�c�t descr�pt�on of th�s structure, and st�ll
less any explanat�on of the nature of the soul from �ts connect�on w�th the �ntell�g�ble—
presumably because such an explanat�on would not have been poss�ble w�thout further
statements on the world of the Ideas, wh�le the d�scuss�on-partners would not have been
able to cope w�th the ‘longer way’. Even the clearer passages wh�ch I have c�ted do not
let us understand w�th complete clar�ty what the result of such a revelat�on of the ‘true
nature’ of the soul m�ght cons�st of. (To be sure, the rema�n�ng uncerta�nty relates only to
the nature and const�tut�on of the rat�onal soul; there �s no further room for doubt that the
‘true nature’ denotes the log�st�kon and that only th�s can be �mmortal.) When Plato talks
of ‘becom�ng l�ke’ and ‘relat�onsh�p’, he presumably does not s�mply mean �dent�ty;
perhaps he was th�nk�ng of a def�n�t�on by means of wh�ch the rat�onal soul would be
ass�gned to the m�ddle ontolog�cal realm, ment�oned by Ar�stotle, between the Ideas and
the world of the senses to wh�ch mathemat�cal objects belong as well.70 The famous
‘m�xture’ of the world soul (wh�ch �s pure rat�onal soul) accord�ng to mathemat�cal rat�os
�n the T�maeus (35a–36d) �n any case suggests th�s poss�b�l�ty.71
The T�maeus perhaps also clar�f�es the formulat�on, wh�ch m�ght momentar�ly seem
d�sconcert�ng, that future exam�nat�on would show the true nature of the soul, ‘whether �t
�s mult�form or un�form, or whatever �ts compos�t�on m�ght be’
( , 612a4). It
�s unl�kely that Plato was uncerta�n of what the result would be. If one proceeds on the
bas�s of the doctr�ne of the part�t�on of the soul �n the fourth book of the Republ�c �t �s
unamb�guous that the answer w�ll be that the true old nature of the soul �s un�form,
, because the two other ‘parts’ are or�ented towards mortal th�ngs
and as a consequence are themselves mortal. The fact that Plato leaves �t at an ‘open’
formulat�on could be prec�sely because he �s no longer th�nk�ng of the part�t�on of the
soul �n the sense of the fourth book, but already of the ‘m�xture’ of the rat�onal soul out
of d�fferent ‘parts’—even �f these ‘parts’ f�nally prove themselves �n the T�maeus to be
someth�ng qu�te d�fferent from the ‘parts’ of the tr�part�te soul.
We should not doubt the �mportance of the qual�f�cat�on to wh�ch Plato subjects h�s
theory of the soul �n Republ�c 611a–612a. Inasmuch as the content of furure, more
prec�se exam�nat�on can, at least �n �ts central po�nt, be supplemented w�th total certa�nty
from other d�alogues, we have a guarantee that by the ‘longer way’ Plato �s referr�ng to
concrete results of h�s ph�losoph�cal act�v�ty, as well as �n those passages where he has
not made such a means of check�ng poss�ble for us.
Republ�c 611a–612a �s remarkable �n yet another respect: we have establ�shed that th�s
text, by referr�ng to a more prec�se psychology wh�ch �s not yet ava�lable, ant�c�pates the
contents of that exam�nat�on by allus�ons. Th�s br�ngs us back to the quest�on wh�ch �s so
�mportant for the �nterpretat�on of Plato, the quest�on of the role of the allus�ons and the
h�nts for wh�ch the reader must supply a content. Must we value the �mportance of the
allus�ons more h�ghly than we have done so far? Before we attempt an answer to th�s
quest�on (see below, Chapter 19), let us turn to a further text of Plato’s wh�ch by means
of allus�ons refers to d�fferent results wh�ch are of more bas�c �mportance than those
present �n the text �tself.
 18
THE DOCTRINE OF ANAMNESIS AND
DIALECTIC IN THE EUTHYDEMUS

In the Euthydemus the reader �s confronted aga�n and aga�n w�th apparently po�ntless,
decept�ve conclus�ons w�th wh�ch D�onysodorus and Euthydemus would l�ke to confuse
the�r partners. Several of these decept�ve conclus�ons make good sense, however, �f they
are �nterpreted aga�nst the background of Plato’s v�ew of learn�ng and the doctr�ne of
anamnes�s.72
F�rst of all, the quest�on �s put to the young Cl�n�as: who learns, the w�se or the
�gnorant ( , 275d4)? The answer ‘the w�se’ �s refuted,
whereupon Cl�n�as opts for the �gnorant, wh�ch �s however l�kew�se refuted (275d3–
276c7). So far, all th�s feels l�ke a soph�st�c game, and for the characters �n the drama,
Euthydemus and D�onysodorus, th�s �s prec�sely the purpose. But one real�ses
�mmed�ately that more �s �nvolved for the author Plato as soon as one br�ngs Sympos�um
203eff. and Lys�s 218a to bear: accord�ng to these passages the learner �s ne�ther someone
who has knowledge nor someone who does not. But th�s ne�ther—nor pos�t�on, the only
way the two refutat�ons would make sense, does not appear �n the Euthydemus, as l�ttle as
the related concepts of Eros and ph�losophy.
In the case of the second quest�on, too—does one learn what one knows or what one
does not know?—both poss�ble answers are refuted (276d7–277c7). In the Meno
prec�sely th�s conclus�on—that one can learn ne�ther what one knows nor what one does
not know—occurs as an ‘er�st�c argument’, wh�ch Socrates destroys there by expound�ng
the theory of anamnes�s (80df.). But th�s solut�on does not occur �n the Euthydemus.
None the less, �t sh�nes through clearly �n a later passage: the er�st�c�ans prove that
whoever knows someth�ng knows everyth�ng (293b–e), that everyone knows everyth�ng
(294a–e) and that every-one always knew everyth�ng (294e–296d). What m�ght sound
here l�ke arrant nonsense �s transparent and mean�ngful aga�nst the background of the
Meno: from one ‘recollect�on’ the person w�th understand�ng can seek after everyth�ng,
s�nce all th�ngs are bound together by one relat�onsh�p: further, s�nce every soul has seen
the Ideas before enter�ng the body, every human be�ng potent�ally knows everyth�ng; and
�n v�ew of the knowledge of geometry wh�ch Socrates el�c�ts from the uneducated slave
of Meno one can see that �ndeed everyone has potent�ally known everyth�ng (Meno 81c–
d, 85d–86b; see Phaedrus 249b on the v�ew�ng of the Ideas before b�rth).
The two er�st�c�ans prove, further, that the�r own father �s at the same t�me the father
of the�r d�scuss�on-partner, but beyond that the father of all human be�ngs, �ndeed of all
l�v�ng creatures, �nclud�ng all sea-urch�ns, p�gs and dogs (298b–e). Th�s strange
‘relat�onsh�p’ between humans and an�mals of all k�nds �s however presumably meant as
a car�catur�ng var�at�on on the tenet wh�ch conta�ns the ontolog�cal bas�s of the doctr�ne
 The doctr�ne of anamnes�s 59

of anamnes�s: ‘s�nce the whole of nature �s related’

( , Meno 81c9).
It �s therefore pla�n that several of the decept�ve conclus�ons �n the Euthydemus are
conce�ved w�th the theory of anamnes�s �n m�nd. But th�s theory �s not d�scussed there, or
even ment�oned. The word ‘soul’ (295b4) m�ght perhaps rem�nd us that the Platon�c
doctr�ne of the soul �s the background wh�ch could g�ve sense and mean�ng to the s�lly
games of the er�st�c�ans. But th�s allus�on—�f �t �s one—can only be understood by people
who already know someth�ng about the Platon�c doctr�ne of anamnes�s and the soul.
There �s even an allus�on to the doctr�ne of the Ideas (wh�ch was almost to be expected
�n v�ew of the fundamental connectedness of the theory of anamnes�s and the Ideas). The
problem of the relat�onsh�p between part�cular and Idea �s obv�ously one w�th wh�ch
Socrates �s fam�l�ar (301a2–4); for h�m, ‘the Beaut�ful �tself �s separate from the beaut�ful
part�cular �nstance, but the latter �s beaut�ful because of the ‘presence’ of the Beaut�ful
(note , 301a4). On the level represented by the er�st�c�an D�onysodorus, the
conclus�on reached from all th�s �s that Socrates would become an ox through the
presence of an ox (301a5).
S�nce the theory of the Ideas �n the Republ�c �s connected w�th a deta�led concept�on of
the relat�onsh�p of the branches of knowledge to one another, �t �s no surpr�se that th�s
theme also �s ment�oned. Mathemat�cs, as we are told at 290c–d, cannot be the sought-
after h�ghest branch, s�nce product�on (or acqu�s�t�on) and use must co�nc�de �n the latter,
wh�le mathemat�cs leaves what �t ach�eves to d�alect�c just as a general hands over a
conquered c�ty to pol�t�cs. Th�s v�ew of the relat�onsh�p of mathemat�cs and ph�losophy �s
not prepared for by anyth�ng �n the Euthydemus and rema�ns �ncomprehens�ble even �n
the framework of the d�alogue; �t �s only when one ventures beyond the d�alogue and
�ncludes Republ�c 510cff., 531cff. that the mean�ng �s made clear. Thus Plato presupposes
more than he expresses.
In the search for the dec�s�ve h�ghest ‘branch of knowledge’ or ‘art’, the art of speech-
wr�t�ng ( , 289c7) �s also cons�dered and rejected. The
reason for �ts reject�on �s the reference to ‘certa�n speech-wr�ters’ (289d2), �n whose case
the product�on and use of the�r products �s separated; they wr�te speeches but do not
del�ver them, wh�le the�r cl�ents �ndeed use these speeches but could not compose them
themselves. It �s accepted that �t �s not th�s art of rhetor�c wh�ch can be the h�ghest art for
bestow�ng happ�ness—and yet Socrates had thought that he would f�nd �t ‘somewhere’ �n
th�s area (289d8–e1). One can, however, take �t from these str�k�ng formulat�ons that
there m�ght be another ‘art of rhetor�c’ wh�ch would fulf�l the cr�ter�a for the ‘branch of
knowledge sought after’ (el). What �s meant �s obv�ously the aspect of d�alect�c wh�ch �s
developed �n the Phaedrus, namely d�alect�c as an �deal art of rhetor�c. D�alect�c �s there
understood as oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry, �n the case of wh�ch the d�alect�c�an �ndeed f�rst
produces the ‘speeches’ �n conversat�on w�th the appropr�ate addressee but
s�multaneously uses them �n accordance w�th h�s knowledge of the soul and of the
subject.73 In the Phaedrus we also read that the logo� of d�alect�c engender the happ�ness,
euda�mon�a, wh�ch humans are capable of (277a3).
In general, one gets the �mpress�on that �n the Euthydemus a r�ch ph�losoph�cal
background �s present, wh�ch however shapes the tra�n of thought only �n a covert way,
w�thout dom�nat�ng �t. Such �mportant components of Plato’s ph�losophy as the doctr�ne
 Read�ng Plato 60

of anamnes�s and the Ideas and the theory of d�alect�c are present �n substance, but they
are nowhere named clearly, let alone rev�ewed �n a coherent manner or even argued for.
They are thus not not�ced by the d�alogue’s d�scuss�on-partners, and m�ght never have
been not�ced by us as readers e�ther �f we were not expl�c�tly �nstructed by other
d�alogues about the theor�es concerned.
 19
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLUSIONS
FOR READING PLATO

We now have suff�c�ent examples at hand to enable us to treat the quest�on of the
allus�ons �n Plato afresh.74 The quest�on �s of course not whether there are allus�ons and
references wh�ch are left to the act�vely engaged reader to express—�t �s obv�ous that
there are such th�ngs �n Plato; but, s�nce there are such th�ngs �n other authors too, as we
shall see, we must, �n order to f�nd what �s spec�f�cally Platon�c about Plato’s
ph�losoph�cal wr�t�ng, �nqu�re more closely what status he ass�gned to wr�t�ng allus�vely.
Up t�ll now we have found no ev�dence that Plato bel�eved that he m�ght come close to
oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry �n wr�t�ng by a soph�st�cated use of subtle allus�ons, �nd�rect
references and coded clues. That was the na�ve bel�ef of Fr�edr�ch Schle�ermacher, who
comb�ned �t w�th the ant�esoter�c conv�ct�on that, through the art of ‘�nd�rect’
commun�cat�on, reserv�ng essent�al parts of h�s ph�losophy for the realm of oral�ty was
unnecessary for Plato. Yet wr�t�ng rema�ns bas�cally rel�ant on oral supplementat�on by
‘th�ngs of greater value’ (t�m�ôtera). It �s a modern m�sapprehens�on that wr�tten allus�ons
can fulf�l the funct�on of th�s oral supplementat�on; we shall have more to say about �t
later. But f�rst let me demonstrate by means of d�fferent types of allus�ons and references
that they do not at all funct�on �n Plato as r�vals of d�rect commun�cat�on, whether �t be
wr�tten or spoken.
(a) The most s�mple form of allus�on �s po�nt�ng out what �s meant by means of a
reference �n the form of a quotat�on. We f�nd th�s type at Phaedrus 276e2–3, where Plato
names ‘story-tell�ng’ about just�ce and related themes as an example of
the ph�losopher’s ‘play’ �n wr�t�ng. S�nce the Republ�c deals w�th just�ce and the other
v�rtues and s�nce �t descr�bes �tself as a (�n two places (376d, 501e), there can be no doubt
that Plato here refers to h�s own major work as a case of wr�tten ph�losoph�cal ‘play’. But
�t �s left to the reader’s resources to recogn�se the allus�on for what �t �s and to draw the
correct conclus�on from �t, namely that Plato’s own works are �ncluded �n the cr�t�que of
everyth�ng that �s wr�tten.
So �sn’t the most �mportant quest�on of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng answered by a mere
allus�on? Not at all. For the quest�on whether or not Plato’s d�alogues are subject to the
cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �s one wh�ch �s relevant only to the modern theory of the d�alogues
wh�ch �s v�tally �nterested �n exempt�ng the d�alogues from the cr�t�que on the grounds of
�ts ant�esoter�c presuppos�t�ons. For Plato, that was not a quest�on: he d�rected h�s cr�t�que
aga�nst wr�t�ng �n general. And for the reader who �s not �ncl�ned to tw�st the
clear �mpl�cat�on of the text because of modern prejud�ces, �t �s stated d�rectly, not only �n
allus�ve terms, that the cr�t�que refers to the d�alogues as well, when �t refers to
everyth�ng that has been wr�tten down. A reader who has grasped th�s has grasped the
 Read�ng Plato 62

essent�al po�nt—whether or not he recogn�ses the unobtrus�ve reference to the Republ�c �s

pretty �mmater�al �n compar�son.
It �s ent�rely understandable that the unobtrus�ve reference should have been
d�scovered qu�te late—�n fact only �n 1961, by W.Luther.75 What �s really amaz�ng �s the
fact that the completely unamb�guous reference cont�nues to be neglected or treated as
uncerta�n by most commentators even after �t has been d�scovered. It only goes to show
how r�ght Plato was: noth�ng ‘clear and permanent’ can be expressed by means of
wr�t�ng; even �n the case of evaluat�ng such a s�mple and ‘certa�n’ allus�on cons�derable
room rema�ns for subject�ve judgment. Why should we accept that Plato of all people
staked so much on the unamb�gu�ty of allus�ons? The cr�t�que of wr�t�ng shows clearly
enough that he had long s�nce shed the na�vety necessary for that.
(b) In connect�on w�th the ‘even h�gher archa�’ wh�ch are referred to at T�maeus 53d
but are not expla�ned there, we had the opportun�ty to recall a passage �n the Laws �n
wh�ch the or�g�n (γένεσις, genes�s) of all th�ngs �s ment�oned (above, n. 67). The text
reads as follows:

What process must occur for th�ngs to come �nto be�ng �n each case? It �s
clearly poss�ble only when a beg�nn�ng (archê) �s present and takes on an
accret�on and so reaches a second stage of development ,
and from th�s reaches the next unt�l �t arr�ves at the th�rd, when �t can
prov�de some percept�on of �tself for creatures capable of percept�on.
Everyth�ng or�g�nates by means of such change and transference;
everyth�ng has true ex�stence as long as �t endures �n th�s way, but as soon
as �t changes �nto another state �t �s ent�rely destroyed.
(Laws 10, 894a1–8)

No one w�ll be able to deny that the passage ‘must at f�rst be regarded as puzzl�ng’, as
Konrad Ga�ser put �t.76 That �s also the case when the context of the passage �n the tenth
book of the Laws �s exam�ned carefully. As Konrad Ga�ser has shown, true clar�ty �s only
ach�eved when the ev�dence for the unwr�tten theory of pr�nc�ples �s taken �nto
cons�derat�on; the passage then proves �tself as an �ntent�onally crypt�c representat�on of a
mathemat�cal theory concern�ng the trans�t�on from the f�rst to the second to the th�rd
d�mens�on wh�ch Plato used as a model for expla�n�ng ontolog�cal facts.77
Can one say here that the essent�al po�nts are conveyed allus�vely? No, because
bas�cally noth�ng �s ‘conveyed’ here, at least not to the reader who has not been g�ven
pr�or �nformat�on from another source; w�thout the sources wh�ch Ga�ser br�ngs �nto
d�scuss�on our passage would rema�n �ndef�n�te to the po�nt of obscur�ty and would be at
the mercy of subject�ve �nterpretat�ons. And the explanat�on of genes�s by means of the
three d�mens�ons �s not ‘the essent�al po�nt’ for what the tenth book of the Laws �s
actually �ntended to show, namely that a reason�ng world-soul re�gns �n the un�verse.
However, the fact that the contents of the ph�losoph�cal educat�on of the State’s d�rectors
belongs to the aprorrhêta wh�ch �t would be po�ntless to convey prematurely �s
someth�ng wh�ch the reader learns not through crypt�c allus�on but through d�rect
statement at the end of the work (968e; see above, p. 62).
(c) When we expla�ned the ph�losoph�cal �ns�ghts wh�ch appear from ‘beh�nd’ the
confus�ng and apparently absurd tra�ns of thought �n the Euthydemus (Chapter 18 above),
 The �mportance of the allus�ons for read�ng Plato 63

�t was necessary to emphas�se that none of th�s d�alogue’s ‘r�ddles’ would be solvable
w�thout our know�ng the uncoded expos�t�on of the doctr�ne of anamnes�s and of the
concept of d�alect�c �n the Meno, the Phaedo and the Republ�c. The ‘r�ddles’ of the
Euthydemus are thus not at all puzzles �n the sense of the archa�c l�terary genre of the
a�nos, the ch�ef charm of wh�ch res�des �n the fact that the aud�ence deduces the mean�ng
from the text �tself w�thout external help. For Oed�pus, the puzzle of the sph�nx had to be
solvable w�thout spec�f�c �nformat�on wh�ch only he had at h�s d�sposal: h�s ent�re fame
as a puzzle-solver would have been forfe�ted �f he had approached the task under spec�al
cond�t�ons. On the other hand, the ‘puzzle’ that everybody knows everyth�ng and has
already always known everyth�ng (Euthydemus 294a–e, 294e–296d) �s solvable only �f
we possess pr�or �nformat�on wh�ch �s spec�f�cally Platon�c; but w�thout th�s �t would be
what the unpr�med reader takes �t to be, namely arrant nonsense.
It �s not by means of �ndef�n�te allus�ons that Plato s�gnals here that part�cular and
�mportant mater�al l�es �n the background, but by means of the dramaturg�cal dev�ce of
�nterrupt�ng the narrat�on of the d�alogue; we shall deal w�th th�s subject �n Chapter 20.
(d) When we d�scussed the ‘gap’ at Republ�c 611/12, we �ncl�ned to the v�ew that the
result of the more prec�se analys�s of the soul wh�ch �s not conducted �n the d�alogue can
nonetheless be gleaned from a few h�nts �n the text (above, pp. 72–75). Does the allus�on
here accord�ngly have the funct�on of commun�cat�ng the essent�al po�nt �n a ve�led way?
Indeed, Plato does not say ‘The “true nature” of the soul �s un�form, for �n �ts
“pur�f�ed” form the soul �s �dent�cal w�th the h�ghest of �ts three “parts”, the log�st�kon.’
However, �f one cons�ders that th�s conclus�on results very s�mply from the statement that
the true nature of the soul can be d�scovered from �ts ph�losoph�a, �ts assoc�at�on and
relat�onsh�p w�th the d�v�ne and eternally ex�stent (611e), one asks oneself �n what sense
we can talk about a ‘coded’ commun�cat�on. It �s, rather, a matter of s�mply remember�ng
earl�er conclus�ons �n the d�alogue (see above, p. 72f.). S�gn�f�cantly, the reader’s s�mple
‘task’ of comb�n�ng earl�er mater�al w�th the present top�c has not led to the necessary
‘clar�ty and certa�nty’ of knowledge; �nstead, �t has been d�sputed that Plato here w�shes
to l�m�t �mmortal�ty to the log�st�kon.78
It �s dec�s�ve for the evaluat�on of the passage that the quest�on left open at 611/12 can
only be answered from the Republ�c �tself �n so far as the ‘true nature’ of the soul �s to be
equated w�th one of the three parts of the soul. On the other hand, what m�ght be meant
by the mult�form�ty of the true soul �tself cannot even be guessed from the Republ�c; �t �s
only the d�rect �nformat�on about the �ngred�ents of the ‘m�xture of the soul’ (T�maeus
35a–36d) wh�ch can g�ve us an �dea of the more advanced ontolog�cal analys�s of the
soul. In summary, we can state that Plato makes use of the most d�vergent types of
allus�ons, suggest�ons and references, but that he nowhere reveals any �ntent�on to ass�gn
a central role to the l�terary dev�ce of allus�on �n ph�losoph�cal commun�cat�on.79
Heracl�tus’ famous comment that the god of the Delph�c oracle ‘ne�ther states nor
conceals but g�ves s�gns’80 �s an outstand�ng descr�pt�on of the way that oracles and
en�gmat�c speech ( , ) commun�cated. But Plato had far outgrown the
archa�c l�terary m�nor forms of oracle and ; he can use them on occas�on, and he
uses them �n a masterly way, but always to subserv�ent and supplementary purposes. If
one wants to understand h�s actual �ntent�on as a ph�losoph�cal wr�ter, one must f�rst and
foremost cons�der why he adopted the new major l�terary form of prose-drama, and ask
 Read�ng Plato 64

w�th what dramaturg�cal means he makes �t clear what matters to h�m. But the cr�ter�on
for judg�ng all �nterpretat�ons �s and rema�ns the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng.
But the sp�r�t of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �s contravened �n two ways by the modern
theory of the d�alogues, wh�ch ascr�bes the dec�s�ve funct�on of ph�losoph�cal educat�on
to the wr�tten allus�ons—�n such a way as to make any esoter�c oral ph�losophy of
pr�nc�ples unnecessary through them. F�rst, the modern theory forgets that accord�ng to
Plato ‘clar�ty and certa�nty (permanence)’ of knowledge cannot be ensured by wr�t�ng
(Phaedrus 275c6–7, 277d7–8); �ts v�ew that necessar�ly �ndef�n�te allus�ons can surmount
th�s obstacle, wh�ch �s �nherent �n the nature of wr�t�ng, �s based on a na�ve opt�m�sm
wh�ch Plato never shared and wh�ch has been completely refuted by the h�story of the
recept�on of Plato’s works. Second, �t overlooks the fact that select�ng the ‘appropr�ate
soul’, wh�ch for Plato �s the prerequ�s�te of s�gn�f�cant ph�losoph�cal �nstruct�on—�n any
other c�rcumstance the ph�losopher w�ll rema�n s�lent—�s fundamentally �mposs�ble when
wr�t�ng �s used. The coded allus�on can be decoded by any reader who has the necessary
�ntell�gence. An example of th�s �s Alc�b�ades, who has long been lost to the cause of
ph�losophy, and who announces �n the Sympos�um that one only has to ‘open’ the
Socrat�c logo� to have everyth�ng one needs to become good and v�rtuous (Sympos�um
221d–222a).81 But Plato does not just demand �ntellectual capab�l�ty from the
‘appropr�ate soul’; he also demands an �nner aff�n�ty to the cause of ph�losophy, an
aff�n�ty wh�ch also �ncludes the presence �n the soul of the card�nal v�rtues �n the full
ph�losoph�cal sense (Republ�c 487a; see also the Seventh Letter 344a). One must ask
oneself �n amazement how th�s enormous gap, wh�ch separates modern conf�dence �n the
educat�onal funct�on of the allus�ons and the ‘�nd�rect mode of commun�cat�on’ from
Plato’s v�ew of a ph�losoph�cal use of wr�t�ng, could have been overlooked for so long. It
was perhaps only poss�ble because from the very beg�nn�ng, that �s, s�nce Fr�edr�ch
Schle�ermacher, cons�derat�on of the Platon�c d�alogues has been gu�ded by ant�esoter�c
w�shful th�nk�ng. Schle�ermacher, �n fact, bel�eved that �t was Plato’s a�m to organ�se the
use of wr�t�ng �n such a way that �t m�ght ach�eve almost the same as oral commun�cat�on
for �mpart�ng knowledge. In the Phaedrus, wh�ch Schle�ermacher cons�dered an early
work, Plato �s not yet supposed to have had any hope of ach�ev�ng that, but later
succeeded �n do�ng so,82 so that he ‘d�d not end up bel�ev�ng that ph�losophy was so
comprehens�vely �ncapable of be�ng �mparted’.83 For Schle�ermacher, then, Plato adopted
a po�nt of v�ew �n the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng wh�ch he later overcame. Th�s was the bel�ef on
wh�ch Schle�ermacher based h�s theory of the d�alogues, wh�ch st�ll �s cred�ted today by
many people. In the meant�me, �t �s now known that the Phaedrus �s a relat�vely late
work, not wr�tten before 370 BC, and that �t conta�ns Plato’s well-cons�dered, f�nal v�ew
of the proper use of wr�t�ng for ph�losophy. Thus we can also d�sm�ss as un-Platon�c the
modern theory of the Platon�c d�alogues, wh�ch �s based on false presuppos�t�ons and
wh�ch w�shes to load on to the allus�ons and references �n the text the task wh�ch only
oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry can fulf�l.84
 20
PLATO’S DRAMATIC TECHNIQUE
Some examples

As ment�oned above, understand�ng the d�alogues does not have to be d�rected by the
hermeneut�cs of the archa�c l�terary m�n�ature forms of the oracle and
r�ddle ( , ), but must start from the more developed large-scale form of
drama. In fact, Plato has all the techn�ques of developed dramaturgy at h�s d�sposal, and
he knows how to deploy them jud�c�ously �n order to present h�s concept of ph�losophy.
A complete descr�pt�on of Plato’s dramat�c techn�ques �s not my �ntent�on here: any such
attempt would requ�re a second book of at least the length of th�s one. All that can be
offered here are a few examples wh�ch can demonstrate the old �ns�ght that the form of
the Platon�c d�alogues �s not a superf�c�al th�ng, but �s essent�al to the�r content. Indeed,
many �nterpreters of recent generat�ons have declared the�r support for th�s �ns�ght, but
that has rema�ned ma�nly l�p-serv�ce; the un�ty of content and form, announced so
programmat�cally, has rarely had any concrete consequences for �nterpret�ng Plato. Many
an aston�sh�ng �ns�ght can be won here by an accurate observat�on of Plato’s l�terary
methods and an exam�nat�on of them �n the l�ght of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng.85

(a) The cont�nuous ‘plot’

In general, the fact that the Platon�c d�alogues as a rule have a cont�nuous ‘plot’ �s seldom
recogn�sed. One method by wh�ch Plato keeps th�s plot �n the reader’s m�nd �s the
repet�t�on of mot�fs.
In the Euthydemus, as has already been ment�oned (p. 13f.), the cont�nuous plot
cons�sts of the exposure of the er�st�c�ans Euthydemus and D�onysodorus as non-
esoter�c�sts, and for Plato that means as non-ph�losophers. Step by step �t �s shown that
they are not stor�ng up any ‘th�ngs of greater value’ w�th wh�ch they m�ght be able to
support the�r logos when challenged. The mot�f by means of wh�ch th�s plot �s furthered
and d�v�ded �nto stages �s that of ‘concealment’ on the one hand and the oppos�t�on of
‘play’ and ‘ser�ousness’ on the other. Socrates’ tact�c cons�sts of v�ew�ng the er�st�c
nonsense w�th wh�ch Euthydemus and D�onysodorus want to show off the�r br�ll�ance as
the�r ‘play’, and of challeng�ng them aga�n and aga�n to come out w�th the�r ‘ser�ousness’,
wh�ch they must st�ll be keep�ng h�dden. When �t �s establ�shed once and for all that they
have noth�ng more valuable than the�r cheap fallac�es, Socrates sarcast�cally adv�ses them
to keep on w�thhold�ng the�r knowledge �n such a f�ne esoter�c manner.
Interpreters have not fa�led to not�ce that �n th�s d�alogue ‘Socrates’ has at h�s d�sposal
the doctr�nes of the Ideas and anamnes�s as well as the Platon�c concept of d�alect�c.86 Yet
 Read�ng Plato 66

�t has not been understood what th�s fact means �n the context of the d�alogue, because
cr�t�cs have not thought to br�ng Socrates’ percept�ble background knowledge �nto
relat�on w�th the cont�nuous plot. But �f one assesses Socrates’ head-start from the
perspect�ve of the plot, and he does �ndeed �ron�cally conceal �t �n the d�alogue, �t all at
once becomes clear that he �s h�mself prec�sely what he categor�ses the er�st�c�ans as
be�ng: a person w�th knowledge who consc�ously w�thholds h�s ‘ser�ousness’. The plot of
the d�alogue can now be formulated as follows: the true esoter�c�st, Socrates, exposes two
charlatans by prov�ng that they do not have any w�thheld ‘ser�ousness’ at the�r command
at all; �n an �ron�cal reversal of real�ty he dep�cts them as esoter�c�sts. What �s scorned �s
thus not the esoter�c w�thhold�ng of knowledge, but prec�sely the �nab�l�ty to exerc�se �t.
In pos�t�ve terms, that means that the message of the Euthydemus, wh�ch �s d�scern�ble
only �f one takes the le�tmot�f and the cont�nuous plot �nto cons�derat�on, �s that the true
ph�losopher must be an esoter�c�st.
In the Charm�des the cont�nuous plot cons�sts of a k�nd of ‘convers�on’ of the young
Charm�des, or of h�s sudden and uncond�t�onal devot�on to Socrates, the �deal teacher.
The mot�f that �s comb�ned w�th th�s plot �s that of the ‘med�cat�on’ and the ‘charm’
wh�ch must be performed before the med�cat�on �s appl�ed.87 The theme of the d�alogue �s
the v�rtue of self-control.
The connect�on between plot, le�tmot�f and theme �s, �n br�ef, as follows. At the end of
the d�alogue Charm�des dec�des �n favour of Socrates as h�s teacher, wh�ch �s doubtless a
s�gn of the self-control wh�ch �s already present �n h�s soul as a natural tendency. But the
actual dec�s�on rests w�th Socrates: he h�mself po�nts out that �t �s up to h�m whether to
release the ‘�ncantat�on’ or not (Charm�des 156a). He could even apply the ‘med�cat�on’
d�rectly, but the warn�ng of h�s Thrac�an teacher d�scourages h�m from be�ng seduced �n
any way �nto pass�ng on the ‘med�cat�on’ w�thout a pr�or ‘�ncantat�on’ (157b–c). As a
teacher, then, Socrates needs the v�rtue of self-control on h�s own account, and he proves
that he possesses �t by w�thhold�ng h�s deeper ph�losoph�cal knowledge (h�s pharmakon)
�n the �nterests of proper �nstruct�on, for as long as �t takes the preparatory conversat�ons
(the epôdê) to make the student ready for �t. The weav�ng of le�tmot�f, plot and theme
aga�n shows that the true ph�losopher must be capable of esoter�c ret�cence.
Th�rd, we must analyse the cont�nuous plot �n the Republ�c more closely.88 It cons�sts
of the attempt by a few fr�ends to ‘compel’ Socrates to �mpart h�s v�ews on just�ce, the
best State, and f�nally on the Good and on d�alect�c as the way to the Idea of the Good.
The mot�f wh�ch art�culates the plot and wh�ch �s var�ed aga�n and aga�n throughout the
whole d�alogue can be found on the f�rst page of the work: the fr�ends w�sh to ‘keep hold
of Socrates and not to ‘let h�m go‘under any c�rcumstances; he on the other hand th�nks
that he can qu�etly conv�nce the fr�ends to let h�m be (Republ�c 327a–c). R�ght at the
beg�nn�ng, therefore, the s�tuat�on makes �t clear that the others need the w�sdom of
Socrates, wh�le he h�mself can even �mag�ne w�thdraw�ng from the conversat�on.
However, he g�ves �n for the moment and the fr�ends succeed �n �nduc�ng h�m to expound
on �mportant matters: he �s prepared, from Book Two onwards, ‘to come to the a�d’ of
just�ce (and thereby of h�s own logos �n support of just�ce �n Book One as well). He �s not
only prepared but also br�ll�antly competent; he �ntroduces truly ‘more valuable th�ngs’
�nto the d�scuss�on, th�ngs wh�ch far transcend the �ntellectual framework of Book One
and lead to more and more fundamental quest�ons. But, as the d�scuss�on comes step by
step closer to the pr�nc�ples (archa�), there �s a decrease �n Socrates’ �ncl�nat�on to open
 Plato’s dramat�c techn�que 67

up to the others, unt�l he can at last calmly conv�nce them to ‘let h�m go‘�n expound�ng
h�s v�ews on the Good and the methods and content of d�alect�c: h�s statement that
Glaucon would not be able to follow h�m any more �n that f�eld (533a) �s accepted by
Glaucon w�thout protest.
Thus the plot of the Republ�c began as a symbol�c tr�al of strength: Socrates’ fr�ends
threatened �n jest to drag h�m �nto conversat�on even aga�nst h�s w�ll (327c). But �n the
end the d�alect�c�an �s revealed as the w�nner �n the tr�al of strength. The others have to
accept that �t has to be left to Socrates to dec�de freely how much he �mparts of h�s
ph�losoph�cal knowledge. Socrates makes �t unm�stakably clear that �mpart�ng h�s v�ews
�s determ�ned by whether or not the partner fulf�ls certa�n requ�rements, or, to put �t
another way, that h�s method �s to proceed w�th ph�losoph�cal knowledge on a bas�s
wh�ch �s str�ctly related to the addressee, or �s ‘esoter�c’. Anyone who understands the
plot of the Republ�c also understands that Plato had more to say about the Good as the
h�ghest pr�nc�ple than he wrote down �n the book. Even w�thout Ar�stotle’s �nformat�on
we may know for certa�n, on the bas�s of Plato’s major work alone, that there was an oral
Platon�c theory of pr�nc�ples.

(b) Interrupt�ons �n the narrat�ve of the d�alogues

Interrupt�ng the narrat�ve of the d�alogue by means of the fram�ng d�alogue �s a spec�al
dramaturg�cal dev�ce wh�ch Plato uses on occas�on. Thus, �n terms of form, the
Euthydemus �s a report by Socrates to Cr�to of a conversat�on wh�ch he had the day
before w�th two er�st�c�ans �n the Lyceum. In the course of the report we learn that the
young Cl�n�as had sa�d of the art of d�alect�c that �t was tak�ng over the ‘booty’ of
mathemat�cs �n the same way that pol�t�cs takes over the booty of m�l�tary strategy, for
example a conquered c�ty (290c–d).89 In th�s assessment a certa�n relat�onsh�p between
mathemat�cs and d�alect�c �s �mpl�ed wh�ch can only be understood �n the l�ght of the
ep�stemology of the Republ�c (510cff., 531cff.), and seems l�ke a fore�gn body w�th�n the
Euthydemus, where the reader �s not g�ven any preparat�on for the conclus�on.
In order to h�ghl�ght the �mportance of recogn�s�ng that mathemat�cs �s subord�nate to
d�alect�c, Plato �nterrupts the narrat�ve of the d�alogue and makes Cr�to ask whether the
young Cl�n�as sa�d such a clever th�ng—�f �t was he, he needs no further human
�nstruct�on (290e). To our amazement, Socrates �s not w�ll�ng to guarantee that �t was
Cl�n�as; �t m�ght also have been Ctes�ppus. But when Cr�to �s not prepared to accept that
from h�m e�ther, Socrates expresses the assumpt�on that perhaps ‘one of the h�gher
be�ngs’ who happened to be present at just that moment had �ntroduced the �ns�ght
(291a4). We do not have to puzzle for long over whose vo�ce the unrecogn�sed god used.
What �s certa�n �s that w�th d�alect�c the realm of what �s ‘h�gher’, of the ‘d�v�ne’
ph�losophy, �s reached. Thus Plato places no trust �n the comprehens�b�l�ty of h�s br�ef
allus�on to h�s ep�stemology, but deploys the much clearer dramat�c dev�ce of �nterrupt�ng
the narrat�ve of the d�alogue �n order to make �t clear to the reader that beh�nd the
d�alogue ph�losoph�cal r�ches ex�st wh�ch are not made expl�c�t but wh�ch are related to
the matters d�scussed expl�c�tly �n such a way as the realm of the d�v�ne �s related to that
of the human.
 Read�ng Plato 68

The narrat�on of the d�alogue �s �nterrupted �n the Phaedo as well, tw�ce �n fact (as we
saw above, p. 56f.). The reader’s attent�on �s thereby drawn to the �mportance of the
‘support’ wh�ch the ph�losopher must be capable of br�ng�ng to h�s own logos. The
support that Socrates �s �n fact able to br�ng shows �n an exemplary way that the
ph�losopher cannot, as �s often assumed, rema�n at the level of the logos wh�ch �s to be
defended. The two �nterrupt�ons underl�ne th�s state of affa�rs and thus, �n comb�nat�on
w�th the theme of ascent from hypothes�s to hypothes�s, make �t comprehens�ble why the
support wh�ch transcends the case �n po�nt must be the central structural pr�nc�ple of the
Platon�c d�alogues �n general.

(c) Change of d�scuss�on-partner

In several d�alogues Socrates’ f�rst d�scuss�on-partner �s replaced �n the course of the

conversat�on, mostly, but not always, by a person of l�ke m�nd. The change of persons
often betokens a change �n the level of argumentat�on and �s standardly assoc�ated w�th a
case of ‘support�ng the logos’.
In the Gorg�as, the great soph�st after whom the d�alogue �s named �s quest�oned by
Socrates �n connect�on w�th the object and a�ms of h�s art . Socrates treats h�m
pol�tely; �t �s only h�s student Polus whom he presses w�th harder and more bas�c
quest�ons: when Polus shows that he �s not up to the d�scuss�on, Call�cles enters the
conversat�on as a representat�ve of pol�t�cal rhetor�c.
The sequence of the d�scuss�on-partners can be expla�ned �n the l�ght of the cr�t�que of
wr�t�ng. The d�alect�c�an can pass on to the appropr�ate student the capab�l�ty to support
the logos and thereby the or�g�nator of the logos (Phaedrus 276e–277a). If Gorg�as and
two of h�s followers are quest�oned, �t means that Gorg�as �s be�ng tested to see whether
he �s the true teacher of ph�losophy. It becomes ev�dent that ne�ther the teacher nor the
students are capable of br�ng�ng ph�losoph�cally well-founded support to the�r logos. The
exam�nat�on of Gorg�as’ pos�t�on �ndeed reveals �ts deeper bases; �t �s just that these bases
do not cons�st of ‘th�ngs of greater value’ (t�m�ôtera). What becomes clear �n the case of
Call�cles �s the brutal negat�on of all eth�cs �n the name of the so-called ‘r�ght of the
stronger’. Thus the twofold change of persons �n the Gorg�as �n one sense results �n an
ascend�ng l�ne, �nasmuch as the d�scuss�on leads to more and more fundamental
quest�ons, and the dramat�c tens�on of the argument cont�nuously r�ses. In a charm�ng
way th�s ascend�ng l�ne �ntersects w�th a counter-movement �n so far as the oppos�ng
pos�t�on becomes less and less respectable �n terms of �ts content, and s�nks deeper and
deeper.
Plato uses the same dramaturg�cal techn�que �n the f�rst book of the Republ�c w�th the
sequence Cephalus, Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, just as the two f�gures
Thrasymachus and Call�cles appear to be two attempts at g�v�ng the same mater�al
dramat�c shape. In the case of the Republ�c the d�scuss�on does not stop w�th the
refutat�on of the negat�vely character�sed opponent. After Thrasymachus’ def�n�t�on of
just�ce as the ‘advantage of the stronger’ has been rejected w�thout �ts real nature (�ts
) hav�ng been d�scussed, the conversat�on could have come to �ts end; and �n
fact �t �s ended as far as the d�scuss�on-partner Thrasymachus �s concerned.
 Plato’s dramat�c techn�que 69

But at the beg�nn�ng of the second book the brothers Glaucon and Ade�mantus make
the�r appearance. In long speeches (358b– 362c, 362e–367e) they renew Thrasymachus’
attack on just�ce. Nevertheless, the d�scuss�on w�th them, wh�ch f�lls Books Two to Ten
of the Republ�c, has no s�m�lar�ty to the d�scuss�on of Thrasymachus. The d�fference l�es
�n the characters of the d�scuss�onpartners: wh�le Thrasymachus attacks the trad�t�onal
concept of just�ce out of �nner conv�ct�on, Glaucon and Ade�mantus want merely to
provoke a thoroughgo�ng refutat�on by means of the�r arguments for �njust�ce. They are
personally conv�nced of the super�or�ty of just�ce but do not possess the arguments
necessary for defend�ng �t; th�s �s someth�ng they would rather hear from Socrates.
Socrates, who had already thought that he had f�n�shed w�th the conversat�on (357a),
now embarks on a d�scuss�on of qu�te another k�nd, for the sake of the brothers Glaucon
and Ade�mantus: �n the place of the aporet�c d�scuss�on, wh�ch consc�ously left open the
of the matter d�scussed (347e, 354b) and was unamb�guous only �n refut�ng the
�ncorrect v�ew of just�ce, we now have the construct�ve conversat�on wh�ch sets forth an
unexpected wealth of pos�t�ve statements and arguments and f�nally, �n the excursus on
the doctr�ne of the soul, even reaches a def�n�t�on of just�ce (443c–e). Yet both
conversat�ons—and th�s �s of extreme �mportance—are held on the same day before the
same c�rcle of people, the one d�rectly after the other. What �s clearly expressed by th�s
dramaturg�cal order�ng �s th�s: Plato g�ves us to understand that, �n real�ty, beh�nd the
apor�as of the d�alogues on the v�rtues, wh�ch ostens�bly cannot def�ne the v�rtues of
bravery, p�ety, self-control and just�ce, there stands the Republ�c’s system of the doctr�ne
of the soul, the State and the v�rtues; and at the same t�me he shows that expound�ng such
t�m�ôtera can only succeed �f �t �s des�red by d�scuss�on-partners who br�ng w�th them the
character-tra�ts requ�red for such �nstruct�on. Exclud�ng �nappropr�ate partners, however,
has noth�ng to do w�th secrecy: Thrasymachus can attend the ensu�ng d�scuss�on, but �s
no longer the addressee. The d�scuss�on w�th h�m got stuck �n the aporet�c front courtyard
of ph�losophy, whereas, for Glaucon and Ade�mantus, Socrates �s prepared to reveal the
τί of just�ce. But the type of ph�losoph�cal commun�cat�on wh�ch �s str�ctly
addressee-related or esoter�c �s preserved even �n the�r case, as we have already seen (see
above, p. 87): they are not equ�pped for the τί of the Good and thus are not told
Socrates’ v�ew of �t (506e).
The use of the dramaturg�cal dev�ce of chang�ng the d�scuss�on-partner �n the
Sympos�um �s clearly d�fferent from these two cases. Whereas Polus and Call�cles �n the
Gorg�as and Glaucon and Ade�mantus �n the Republ�c are present from the beg�nn�ng,
Alc�b�ades breaks �nto the company of the sympos�asts after the speeches on Eros have
already reached the�r peak �n Socrates’ speech on D�ot�ma (Sympos�um 212c). Indeed, the
p�cture wh�ch the drunken Alc�b�ades draws of Socrates’ character �tself br�ngs a second
peak �n the d�alogue, but �n the meant�me the theme has sh�fted from the nature of Eros to
the real�sat�on of the ph�losoph�cal Eros �n the person of Socrates.
Alc�b�ades’ report �s totally shaped by personal exper�ence. It becomes clear that
Alc�b�ades was a person who had had the talent for ph�losophy and thus had been
‘erot�cally’ courted by Socrates for a wh�le. But h�s unstable character made �t �mposs�ble
for h�m to hand h�mself over totally to Socrates’ ph�losoph�cal gu�dance; f�nally, he
dr�fted away ent�rely from h�s �nfluence. Thus Alc�b�ades g�ves fragments of a
ph�losoph�cal autob�ography wh�ch show h�m as one called to ph�losophy but �n the end
 Read�ng Plato 70

not up to th�s call�ng. Alc�b�ades �s the young ph�losopher who has not fulf�lled the
expectat�ons held of h�m.
H�s role �n the frame of the Sympos�um’s plot corresponds w�th th�s status. He �s the
man who has come too late, the man who has not been present from the start and who has
not heard the most beaut�ful and the most elevated top�c �n the conversat�on, D�ot�ma’s
‘�n�t�at�on’ �nto the nature of Eros. Even �n real l�fe th�s man had m�sunderstood Socrates’
‘erot�c�sm’ and �nterpreted �t as sexual �nterest (Sympos�um 217c–219d, esp. 218c).
It �s an example of Plato’s subtle dramat�c �rony when he selects none other than
Alc�b�ades, who had once been tested by Socrates and was found to be too l�ghtwe�ght,
and makes h�m character�se Socrates’ nature. Certa�nly, he says much that �s correct and
�mportant about h�m—th�ngs wh�ch are the result of h�s accurate recollect�on of what he
had exper�enced. But when he tr�es to descr�be Socrates’ logo�, �t becomes ev�dent how
far off the mark he �s from the true Socrates. For Alc�b�ades expresses the op�n�on that
these logo� looked laughable at f�rst s�ght, w�th the�r analog�es to blacksm�ths,
shoemakers and tanners, except that one has to ‘open’ them to real�se that only these
logo� conta�n reason and the most d�v�ne �mages of v�rtue (Sympos�um 221d–222a).
It �s obv�ous what type of Socrat�c logo� Alc�b�ades �s referr�ng to: the occas�onal
conversat�ons dep�cted �n the early d�alogues, wh�ch cont�nually work w�th the analogy
from technê and a�m at draw�ng conclus�ons from the ‘knowledge’ of the ‘art�st’ (the
techn�tês) for the knowledge of the moral agent. The short exchange �n the Sympos�um
between Socrates and Agathon, wh�ch follows after Agathon’s speech (199c–201c), also
belongs to th�s type of elenct�c and aporet�c d�scuss�on. Alc�b�ades appears to know
noth�ng else. But �n the Sympos�um the elenct�c d�scuss�on w�th Agathon �s only the
prelude for a résumé of qu�te d�fferent d�scuss�ons, namely the repeated d�dact�c
ph�losoph�cal d�scuss�ons wh�ch Socrates had w�th D�ot�ma and by means of wh�ch he
rece�ved pos�t�ve, uncoded �nstruct�on concern�ng Eros. Alc�b�ades, the man who has
come too late, has no knowledge of d�scuss�ons of such a k�nd. Hence the emphas�s he
lays on the shoemaker and tanner analog�es and on the necess�ty to ‘open’ such
d�alogues. At the dec�s�ve moment Alc�b�ades h�mself was obv�ously not capable of
‘open�ng’ Socrates’ words, wh�ch were �mparted to h�m pr�vately �n an ‘erot�c’ s�tuat�on
and wh�ch conta�n clear resonances of the �dea of the gradat�on of the Beaut�ful �n the
speech of D�ot�ma (Sympos�um 218d–219a); otherw�se he would no longer have hoped
for phys�cal love (219b–c), nor would he have later dr�fted away from the un�que teacher
of ‘v�rtue’ .
If we thus are correct �n understand�ng Alc�b�ades’ late arr�val as a consc�ous and
express�ve dramaturg�cal dec�s�on of Plato’s, we shall �ndeed see a correct and �mportant
�nterpretat�onal max�m �n the ‘open�ng’ of the d�alogues (�.e. �n the dec�pherment of
h�dden allus�ons). But we shall not overlook the fact that Plato �ntroduces ‘open�ng’ very
clearly as the �nterpretat�onal method of those who know noth�ng of the more
construct�ve ph�losoph�cal logo� wh�ch lead h�gher up on the way to the archa�.
Alc�b�ades �s not only our Platon�c guarantor for ‘open�ng’; he �s also Plato’s example for
show�ng that ‘open�ng’ cannot be successful w�thout expl�c�t �nstruct�on on the dec�s�ve
ph�losoph�cal �ssues.
 21
IRONY

Irony �s perhaps Plato’s most famous styl�st�c techn�que. The urbane l�ghtness, elegance
and nuanc�ng of h�s �ron�c tone are w�thout equal �n the whole of world-l�terature, wh�ch
�s �tself not lack�ng �n �rony, and are an �nexhaust�ble source of del�ght for the educated
reader.
There are many ways �n wh�ch �t can be appl�ed: a whole d�rect�on of plot can be
shaped by �rony (as �n the Euthydemus), a whole character can be revealed �n the l�ght of
�rony (l�ke Euthyphro or H�pp�as); or the entrance of a character can be �ron�cally
qual�f�ed by the dramat�c context (as we have just seen �n the case of Alc�b�ades �n the
Sympos�um), or perhaps even only one s�ngle react�on of a character who �s not otherw�se
subjected to �rony (we may note for example Ade�mantus’ forgetfulness concern�ng the
cond�t�ons wh�ch the d�scuss�on �s subject to; Republ�c 504a–c).90
As versat�le as Plato’s use of �rony may be,91 �t �s none the less a method of
presentat�on wh�ch �s of l�m�ted range for h�m. It �s of dec�s�ve �mportance that we do not
confuse Platon�c �rony w�th the all-pervas�ve Romant�c �rony, wh�ch �s a spec�f�cally
modern phenomenon. Romant�c �rony �s not d�rected towards a spec�f�c opponent, but
aga�nst everyth�ng and anyth�ng; �t penetrates the po�nt of v�ew of the �ron�st h�mself, �n
fact the �ron�st �n part�cular; �n essence, �t �s self-�rony, and �ts most �mportant funct�on �s
to leave noth�ng, absolutely noth�ng, untouched wh�ch m�ght escape �ron�c treatment. For
the Romant�c th�nker there can be noth�ng absolute wh�ch m�ght be �mmune from be�ng
relat�v�sed by �rony. In the case of Plato, on the other hand, �t �s ev�dent that �rony stops
short of what he calls the ‘d�v�ne’ realm of the eternally ex�stent, and of the ‘d�v�ne’
ph�losoph�a as the attempt to grasp the realm of the eternally ex�stent noet�cally. It �s
often remarked that the att�tude �n wh�ch Plato speaks of the realm of the Ideas has a
clearly rel�g�ous element.92 For Plato, �rony �s only a means for produc�ng th�s att�tude �n
the reader as well, by reveal�ng the fals�ty and r�s�b�l�ty of oppos�ng pos�t�ons.
A sense of �rony �s thus w�thout doubt �mportant for read�ng Plato. At the same t�me
we must guard aga�nst the error of mak�ng �rony a central—and not merely a
subs�d�ary—means of �nstruct�on �n Plato. Th�s v�ew �s found �n the �nterpreters who on
the one hand have seen that the aporet�c d�alogues on the v�rtues do not conta�n apor�as
about whose solut�on Plato could have been �n any doubt, but who on the other hand have
not been able to accept that Plato produces ‘puzzles’ wh�ch are unsolvable w�thout
recourse to other �nformat�on—whether �t be to h�s oral ph�losophy or to the doctr�ne of
the v�rtues �n the Republ�c; accord�ngly, �t has been concluded, the �ron�c presentat�on
must be suff�c�ent unto �tself for clar�fy�ng Plato’s actual mean�ng. As prom�s�ng as th�s
thought m�ght appear, when such �nterpretat�ons are carr�ed out �t has been shown aga�n
and aga�n that more �s necessary for answer�ng the open quest�ons of the early works than
merely the correct�on of the �ron�cally sketched m�staken att�tudes and m�staken
judgments. One s�ngle example may suff�ce. In the H�pp�as M�nor the thes�s �s ‘proven’
 Read�ng Plato 72

that the man who does wrong of h�s own free w�ll �s ‘better’ �n compar�son w�th the man
who does so w�thout free w�ll. Socrates’ d�scuss�on-partner, H�pp�as, who �s treated w�th
a great deal of b�t�ng �rony, �ndeed d�sputes th�s false thes�s but cannot counter Socrates’
del�berately false argumentat�on w�th anyth�ng. But �t would be qu�te po�ntless here to
turn everyth�ng about H�pp�as that �s presented �ron�cally �nto �ts oppos�te �f we do not
know Socrates’ thes�s ‘No one errs w�ll�ngly’. If one has th�s thes�s all the paradoxes of
the H�pp�as M�nor are resolved w�thout d�ff�culty. But �n no passage of the d�alogue can
th�s thes�s be recovered by s�mply cancell�ng out the �rony. The reader must already be
equ�pped w�th �t �f he wants to read w�th prof�t, or otherw�se the d�alogue w�ll mean
noth�ng to h�m. The ‘�ron�c’ �nterpreters of our t�mes are equ�pped from the very
beg�nn�ng w�th the necessary knowledge by means of our cultural trad�t�on; that �s the
only reason why they can �mag�ne that they have extracted �t from the d�alogue ‘w�thout
presuppos�t�ons’.93
It should have been real�sed all along that for Plato �rony �s a dev�ce of l�m�ted
�mportance and funct�on. The s�mple fact that �t beg�ns to recede markedly �n �mportant
works of the m�ddle per�od, makes only a marg�nal appearance �n the major work, the
Republ�c, and �s almost ent�rely lack�ng �n works l�ke the T�maeus and the Laws should
have safeguarded aga�nst the Romant�c overest�mat�on of �rony’s �mportance for Plato.
 22
MYTH

In more than one respect, Plato’s use of the ‘myth�cal’ style �nv�tes compar�son w�th h�s
use of �rony: h�s myths are as famous as h�s uses of �rony; they are l�kew�se a source of
ever new l�terary pleasure for the recept�ve reader; they are s�m�larly versat�le �n terms of
form and funct�on; and, fourth, they have somet�mes been just as overest�mated.
On the one hand, Plato puts h�s myths �n clear oppos�t�on to logos. On the other, �t
cannot be den�ed that, desp�te the clar�ty of the semant�c oppos�t�on, he del�berately blurs
the border between myth and logos �n part�cular cases. We can see th�s even �n the
presentat�on of a myth told by someone other than Socrates: Protagoras, �n the d�alogue
named after h�m, makes h�s aud�ence choose between h�s present�ng h�s po�nt of v�ew �n
the form of a myth or of a logos (Protagoras 320c); the cho�ce �s g�ven back to h�m, at
wh�ch he beg�ns w�th the ‘more pleasant’ form, a myth. After speak�ng for some t�me he
declares that he now no longer wants to offer myth but logos (324d6)—but at th�s po�nt
the alert reader has long s�nce real�sed that the myth has turned �nto a logos cons�derably
earl�er (namely at 323a5, or, perhaps better, even earl�er, at 322d5), w�thout any sharp
demarcat�on.
Plato does the same w�th h�s own myths. The story of the d�scovery of wr�t�ng by
Theuth (Phaedrus 274c–275b) has all the character�st�cs of a Platon�c mythos: �t takes
place �n d�stant pr�meval t�mes, the agents are gods, and they are �ntroduced w�th
speak�ng roles; the subject of the story �s a pr�meval d�v�ne ‘d�scovery’, �.e. the moment
when the natural character�st�cs of a th�ng were determ�ned once and for all. But Socrates
has scarcely concluded h�s l�ttle story when Phaedrus remonstrates w�th h�m for �nvent�ng
th�s Egypt�an logos; so Phaedrus has w�ped away the myth�cal elements of the story, and
has recogn�sed the logos �n the myth �n v�ew of �ts transparent message—a procedure
wh�ch Socrates �mpl�c�tly approves of by emphas�s�ng for h�s part that the only matter of
�mportance �s whether the facts referred to are presented accurately or not (275b–c).
In the same d�alogue there �s Socrates’ great Eros-speech, whose core—the story of
the ascent of the d�v�ne and human char�ots of souls to the place beyond the heavens
(246aff.)—dep�cts a story wh�ch �s unamb�guously myth�cal. The speech def�nes �tself as
‘proof’ of the thes�s that Eros �s g�ven by the gods for the greatest
happ�ness of the lover and the beloved—except that th�s proof would be �ncred�ble to the
over-clever, but cred�ble to the w�se (245c1–2). Th�s reference to the var�ed assessment
and recept�on of what follows �s not d�ff�cult to �nterpret: on the one hand, Plato reckons
w�th readers who see only the myth�cal element of the story and thus decl�ne to bel�eve �t,
and at the same t�me he hopes for readers of the k�nd who understand that what �s
unproven by the myth not only needs proof but �s also capable of be�ng g�ven �t—a fact to
wh�ch Plato �n fact spec�f�cally refers94—and therefore accept the myth’s message �n
v�ew of the logos conta�ned �n �t. The ‘proof’ of the thes�s �n any case beg�ns w�th the
 Read�ng Plato 74

proof of the �mmortal�ty of the soul (245c5–246a2), wh�ch does not at all proceed by
myth�cal narrat�ve but �n a str�ctly conceptual manner.
I have already remarked (pp. 68f.) that the myth�cal p�cture of the tr�part�te char�ot of
the soul �s g�ven just�f�cat�on �n arguments of the fourth book of the Republ�c. Seen from
the perspect�ve of the myth �n the Phaedrus, the Republ�c would thus have to be
descr�bed as a logos; but we have already seen (p. 79) that Plato alludes to h�s major work
w�th prec�sely the words ‘�n that he [sc. the ph�losopher] tells stor�es about just�ce’
( Phaedrus 276e3). Of course, the
Republ�c, as a utop�an des�gn wh�ch awa�ts real�sat�on, also has a strongly myth�cal
element: much �s left to the creat�ve �mag�nat�on of �ts author and �s unable to be
measured aga�nst exper�ence so far; but, above all, the ‘myth�cal’ character of the major
work could be based on the fact that essent�al po�nts, although �n pr�nc�ple capable of
substant�at�on, are not substant�ated �n fact.95
In th�s sense the whole essay of natural ph�losophy �n the T�maeus �s descr�bed as a
‘probable myth’ (29d, 68d, 69b), because here the ontolog�cal status of the subject rules
out total substant�at�on or total certa�nty of substant�at�on.
In the greatest conce�vable contrast w�th the T�maeus’ ph�losophy of nature, wh�ch
somet�mes operates w�th new, extremely d�ff�cult concepts, there are the myths of the
other world, wh�ch, �n the manner of trad�t�onal rel�g�ous stor�es, dep�ct the lot of the just
and the unjust after death. Even here Plato plays w�th the oppos�t�on between myth and
logos, as when he makes Socrates say when �ntroduc�ng the myth �n the Gorg�as that
what he �s about to produce w�ll be someth�ng wh�ch Call�cles �ndeed w�ll regard as a
myth, but for h�mself �t �s a logos, because �t �s true (Gorg�as 523a). Certa�nly we must
not understand th�s as �f Plato were declar�ng the truth of the story that under Cronos and
at the beg�nn�ng of the supremacy of Zeus judgment was passed on a mortal’s l�fe on h�s
last day on th�s s�de of the grave, and, what �s more, by judges who for the�r part st�ll
l�ved �n th�s l�fe (523b–524a). None the less, for Plato the truth of bel�ef �n �mmortal�ty
and the conv�ct�on that our future fate �n the afterl�fe depends on our eth�cal conduct �n
th�s l�fe rema�ns an unshakeable real�ty. But because Call�cles knows noth�ng of the
�nternal structure of the soul (see above, p. 69f.) and consequently does not know the
ph�losoph�cal concept of just�ce e�ther (alluded to by Socrates at 526c3–4), wh�ch �s
der�ved from the structure of the soul, he cannot understand the logos �n the myth, for
wh�ch reason he w�ll d�scard �t as a ‘mere’ myth. The vary�ng assessments of the myth of
the hereafter as a logos by Socrates and as a myth by Call�cles are �n perfect accord w�th
the expected double evaluat�on of the Eros-speech �n the Phaedrus, about wh�ch we have
just spoken (above, p. 97).96
It �s aga�nst th�s background that we should cons�der the much-d�scussed quest�on of
whether myth �n Plato �s subord�nate to logos or whether �t �mparts a h�gher truth wh�ch
cannot be reached by logos.
The second assumpt�on, that the myths have a greater capac�ty for truth, der�ves from
the percept�on of modern �rrat�onal�st trends and cannot be supported by any arguments
of Plato’s. On the other hand, subord�nat�ng myth under logos cannot be accepted e�ther,
�f by that one means that myth �s a more or less d�spensable decorat�on, a merely
�llustrat�ve way of putt�ng �ns�ghts wh�ch can be ach�eved �n other ways. Had th�s been
Plato’s v�ew of the role of myth, he would hardly have been able to devote such space to
�t �n h�s wr�t�ngs. To be sure, the d�alect�c explorat�on of real�ty, wh�ch �s ach�eved �n
 Myth 75

argumentat�onal logos, �s the ult�mate a�m of the ph�losopher. By the same token, he
cannot d�spense w�th the enterta�nment-value of myth; moreover, the ab�l�ty of p�ctures
and stor�es to dep�ct a fact �n �ts ent�rety and �ntu�t�vely �s an �nd�spensable supplement to
conceptual analys�s. Looked at �n th�s way, myth proves �tself to be a second approach to
real�ty wh�ch �ndeed cannot be �ndependent of logos �n terms of content, but represents an
advantage compared w�th �t wh�ch cannot be replaced by anyth�ng else.97
 23
MONOLOGUE AND DIALOGUE WITH
IMAGINARY PARTNERS

The myths are presented �n cont�nuous speech. They prov�de the most v�s�ble ev�dence
that the d�scuss�on-leader can leave d�alogue beh�nd and use a makros logos. The longest
and ph�losoph�cally most �mportant two of these myth�cal monologues, the lecture of
T�maeus and Socrates’ great speech on Eros �n the Phaedrus, mostly conta�n th�ngs
wh�ch �n trad�t�onal th�nk�ng would no longer be categor�sed as ‘myth�cal’—the
conversat�on-leader has thus g�ven up the commun�cat�onal mode of d�alogue under the
name of myth, and has made the trans�t�on to �nstruct�ng �n monologue-form.
Another means of leav�ng d�alogue beh�nd �s d�alogue w�th�n the d�alogue. Here I am
not th�nk�ng of the l�terary techn�que of the framework-d�alogue, as �t can be seen used �n
the Phaedo and the Euthydemus among other d�alogues, but of the way �n wh�ch the
conversat�on wh�ch has been held t�ll now �s temporar�ly �nterrupted by the conversat�on-
leader and by the �ntroduct�on of an �mag�nary person, whether as an �mag�ned poss�b�l�ty
or as a report of a conversat�on wh�ch has allegedly been held �n the past. Indeed,
formally �t m�ght look merely as �f another conversat�on-partner �s be�ng �ncluded, as
happens repeatedly �n the Platon�c d�alogues. But because the new ‘person’ �s clearly
d�fferent�ated from the persons present at the conversat�on �n that he does not have any
�nd�v�dual�ty of h�s own but �s s�mply representat�ve of a certa�n pos�t�on or a certa�n
mental�ty, he can eas�ly be recogn�sed as a construct�on of the conversat�on-leader, who
thus preserves the d�alogue-form by means of the dev�ce wh�le �n real�ty suspend�ng the
conversat�on actually held up to th�s po�nt �n order to be able to g�ve �t the d�rect�on he
des�res.
To th�s day, th�s l�terary dev�ce of Plato’s has nowhere been descr�bed, although Plato
frequently has recourse to �t and although �ts s�gn�f�cance for understand�ng the d�alogue-
form �s cons�derable. D�ot�ma �s the most famous of the �mag�nary partner-subst�tutes. Of
course, there may have once been a seeress �n Mant�nea (several archaeolog�sts even
�dent�fy a marble head of the fourth century as a portra�t of D�ot�ma); but Socrates’
conversat�ons w�th D�ot�ma are clearly conce�ved as a cont�nuat�on of the conversat�on
wh�ch Socrates has been hold�ng w�th h�s real partner, Agathon (see Sympos�um 201e). In
that Socrates now takes over the role held t�ll now by Agathon, the conversat�on can be
ra�sed to he�ghts wh�ch would have been �ncred�ble w�th Agathon as partner. Socrates
�ndeed del�vers h�s contr�but�on to the pra�se of Eros �n terms of a d�alogue (though only
unt�l 208b—from there on D�ot�ma speaks �n monologue), but �n real�ty on h�s own, as
other part�c�pants �n the group have done.
Important po�nts of v�ew and conclus�ons are arr�ved at by means of an anonymous
th�rd party �n the tenth book of the Laws where the Athen�an ant�c�pates the answers and
react�ons of athe�sts �n the future �n order to prov�de pre-empt�ve ph�losoph�cal defence
 Monologue and d�alogue w�th �mag�nary partners 77

for the law aga�nst �mp�ety (893aff.), or �n the Protagoras, where Socrates �nforms
anonymous representat�ves of the actual mean�ng of the�r hedon�sm (Protagoras 353aff.).
Most clearly conce�ved as a mask of the d�alect�c�an, however, �s the anonymous th�rd
person �n the H�pp�as Ma�or, who even l�ves �n Socrates’ house and shows h�m, after h�s
return ‘home’ (H�pp�as Ma�or 304d4), the way to a more adequate treatment of the
problems than �s poss�ble w�th H�pp�as. F�nally, �n the Phaedo Socrates �nforms us �n a
long ‘quotat�on’ (66b3–67b2) what the ‘people who truly conduct ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry’
would say to one another about the search for truth and about the
relat�onsh�p between body and soul.
The ph�losoph�cal mean�ng of the l�terary techn�que of the �mag�nary d�alogue w�th�n a
d�alogue appears to be a double one. The fact that even what the d�alect�c�an offers from
the wealth of h�s own �ns�ghts w�thout the part�c�pat�on of the real conversat�onpartner �s
presented �n the form of a d�alogue means that th�nk�ng, as a conversat�on of the soul
w�th �tself, �s �n a fundamental sense d�alog�cal. Th�nk�ng wh�ch a�ms for a val�d�ty wh�ch
�s recogn�sed �nterpersonally must �n pr�nc�ple sat�sfy the requ�rement that �t expose �tself
to cr�t�c�sm by �ts opponent and stand up to �t. Thus Plato shows that even the
d�alect�c�an’s conclus�ons, wh�ch have been ach�eved �n lonely cog�tat�on ‘at home’, are
conclus�ons result�ng from communal �nvest�gat�on. Second, we can also gather from th�s
that the Platon�c d�alect�c�an, even though h�s th�nk�ng necessar�ly does sat�sfy the a
pr�or� requ�rement of �nterpersonal (d�alog�cal) exam�nab�l�ty, �s �n fact at no t�me
requ�red to depend on a part�cular partner and a part�cular s�tuat�on �n order to come to a
part�cular conclus�on. Rather, he br�ngs the dec�s�ve �ns�ghts ready-made to the
d�scuss�on; at h�s d�scret�on, he can develop them even w�thout the real partner by
br�ng�ng them forth as the result of earl�er agreements reached w�th an �mag�nary partner.
But he can also, �f �t seems r�ght to h�m, rema�n s�lent about them (see Phaedrus 276a6–
7).
 24
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
DIALOGUES
What they really mean

We have now collected suff�c�ent examples for us to return to our l�st of the essent�al
character�st�cs of the Platon�c d�alogues and to be able to �nqu�re �nto the�r or�g�nal
mean�ng. The cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �n the Phaedrus prov�des the essent�al po�nts of v�ew for
�nterpret�ng the form of the d�alogues. Only th�s clue of Plato’s own can g�ve us the
guarantee that we are not pr�v�leg�ng modern hab�ts of thought and prejud�ces over
Plato’s own �ntent�ons.
We shall now cons�der, �n reverse order, the character�st�cs enumerared above (p.
18f.).
(7) We must start from the bas�c �ns�ght that no wr�t�ng, and therefore no Platon�c
d�alogue, �s �n the pos�t�on to br�ng �tself the necessary support �n the case of attack. The
d�alect�c�an or ph�losophos �s, on the other hand, d�st�ngu�shed prec�sely by h�s ab�l�ty to
support h�s wr�t�ngs orally; �n th�s way he w�ll reveal ‘th�ngs of greater value’ (t�m�ôtera)
and thereby prove h�s wr�t�ngs to be (comparat�vely) negl�g�ble. Now �f Plato’s d�alogues
are the wr�t�ngs of a ph�losophos (and th�s suppos�t�on can scarcely be doubted), a fund of
ph�losoph�cal t�m�ôtera must ex�st beh�nd them wh�ch could �n pr�nc�ple be
commun�cated �n wr�t�ng but wh�ch the author del�berately does not comm�t to wr�t�ng.
The ex�stence of an oral ph�losophy beh�nd the d�alogues �s thus above all a deduct�on
wh�ch results conclus�vely from the appl�cat�on of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng to Plato’s own
wr�tten works. But �t �s secondar�ly d�rectly conf�rmed �n a str�k�ng way by the ‘gaps’.
Interpreted �n the l�ght of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng, the ‘gaps’ convey a very clear message;
through them Plato says noth�ng other than ‘Th�s wr�tten work �s the wr�t�ng of a
ph�losophos who can substant�ate what he has expla�ned here more prec�sely by means of
the spoken word w�th �ns�ghts and theor�es, �n compar�son w�th wh�ch the present wr�tten
work would appear less �mportant.’
(6) The bas�c s�tuat�on dep�cted �n the d�alogues �s always the . It �s a
method of test�ng whether someone �s a ph�losophos or not. Whenever a thes�s �s
expressed �t �s attacked: �ts or�g�nator must show that he can defend �t w�th arguments
wh�ch reach more deeply. Only one f�gure �s ever capable of th�s qual�tat�ve ra�s�ng of the
level of argumentat�on, wh�ch �s so typ�cal of the structure of the d�alogues: the f�gure,
always the same, of the Platon�c d�alect�c�an. Pass�ng the ph�losopher’s test �s not s�mply
a quest�on of �ntell�gence (otherw�se Protagoras and Gorg�as would be able to support
the�r logos), but �s bound up w�th the knowledge of the Ideas and Platon�c d�alect�c.
(5) Now �t also becomes comprehens�ble why the d�alect�c�an always proves h�mself
to be �nv�nc�ble and �s not reduced to the level of the lesser stature of the conversat�on-
 The character�st�cs of the d�alogues 79

partners even by m�nor defeats or occas�onal m�stakes. He tests the others �n front of the
background of h�s t�m�ôtera; he �s the ‘man w�th knowledge’ (the , Phaedrus
276a, 278c) who has atta�ned the knowledge of the Ideas; oppos�te h�m the others,
�nasmuch as they lack the ph�losophy of Ideas, are bas�cally ‘learners’ (
, see Phaedrus 276a5). The d�alogues aga�n and aga�n show the same s�tuat�on: the
d�alect�c�an’s search for the ‘appropr�ate soul’ (see Phaedrus 276e6).
The d�alect�c�an’s �nv�nc�b�l�ty, wh�ch has �rr�tated many readers, �s �n any case not
only to be seen �n the actual progress of the conversat�ons but �s also expressed d�rectly:
Socrates, says Alc�b�ades, would conquer everyone, and �ndeed always (Sympos�um
214e3–4); and for the recogn�t�on of the Good, says Socrates �n the Republ�c, the
d�alect�c�an must have passed all attempts at refutat�on w�thout be�ng harmed (534c1–3).
Thus here too we see that Plato’s theoret�cal p�cture of the ph�losopher �s �n full
agreement w�th the l�terary portra�t of the d�alect�c�an �n the d�alogues.
(4) The d�alect�c�an’s bas�c super�or�ty �s also the cause of h�s always be�ng shown �n
conversat�on w�th only one partner.98 The d�scuss�on-leader has the author�ty to enforce
concentrat�on on one theme w�th one partner. Cons�der�ng several po�nts of v�ew
s�multaneously and on a par would only d�stract from the fundamental d�fference between
the person who already has the ‘turn�ng of the soul’ ( ,
Republ�c 521c6; cf. 518c8–d4) by means of the ph�losophy of the Ideas beh�nd h�m and
the person who st�ll has �t �n front of h�m. The ph�losoph�cal d�stance from the
d�alect�c�an must become repeatedly clear step by step, w�th each partner, not to
hum�l�ate h�m but to prepare h�m for the poss�ble trans�t�on. Other po�nts of v�ew than
that of the ph�losophy of Ideas cannot be made fru�tful even �n debate w�th one another;
thus there are no moments �n the conversat�on �n wh�ch the d�alect�c�an would w�thdraw
and temporar�ly leave the d�scuss�on to others (H�pp�as’ attempt at Protagoras 347a–b to
�ntroduce h�s own logos �nto the d�scuss�on as a th�rd alongs�de those of Protagoras and
Socrates shows clearly that Plato d�d not avo�d th�s poss�b�l�ty by chance but on purpose:
H�pp�as �s rejected).
If the d�alect�c�an enters a d�scuss�on wh�ch has been started by others, as Socrates
does �n the Cratylus, �t �s he (not the opponents up to th�s po�nt) who br�ngs the v�ews of
both s�des �nto relat�on w�th one another, �n order, f�nally, to measure them both aga�nst
h�s own pos�t�on. One must not measure fals�ty aga�nst fals�ty; rather, ‘true ph�losophy’ �s
the measure for all d�ffer�ng op�n�ons. But s�nce all humans have a vague memory of
what the�r soul once saw �n �ts �ncorporeal state and of wh�ch only the ph�losopher of the
Ideas possesses a clearer memory, they are dr�ven by a long�ng, however unconsc�ous, for
the knowledge of the d�alect�c�an. In the f�nal analys�s, therefore, �t �s the partner who
needs conversat�on w�th the d�alect�c�an and not the reverse. The plot of the d�alogues
shows th�s aga�n and aga�n, even �f w�th vary�ng degrees of clar�ty. I refer to the Laches
and Charm�des, where the appropr�ate teacher �s sought for; or the Sympos�um, where
Socrates changes from be�ng the court�ng lover �nto the courted beloved; but part�cularly
the plot of the Republ�c wh�ch revolves solely around the others’ not want�ng to let the
d�alect�c�an ‘get away’,99 because they could not make any progress w�th the quest�ons
wh�ch concern them w�thout h�s �ns�ghts. For h�s part, the d�alect�c�an �s never dependent
on a part�cular partner, and he even clearly demonstrates th�s: he can suspend the
conversat�on and d�rect �t wherever he wants w�th the help of an �mag�nary ‘partner’.
 Read�ng Plato 80

(3) Thus the d�alogues have a sovere�gn d�scuss�on-leader. Indeed, Plato’s masterly art
of presentat�on can often create the �mpress�on that Socrates subord�nates h�mself w�th
perfect pol�teness to the �deas wh�ch the partner has of the conversat�on. But that �s
clearly only an appearance preserved for the sake of urban�ty; more prec�se observat�on
can always show that the d�alect�c�an has the str�ngs of the conversat�on �n h�s hands. In
the Protagoras he subjects the famous soph�st to h�s method of short quest�ons and
answers (�n the d�spute over methods; 334c–338e); �n the Republ�c he h�mself def�nes
how far h�s fr�ends may press and ‘compel’ h�m. F�nally, the quest�on of ‘command’ �n
the conversat�on �s also openly expressed: when Socrates reproaches Meno for
‘command�ng’, the obv�ous �rony there �s a clear h�nt that th�s pr�v�lege can only be
bestowed on h�m.100
There �s no conversat�on among equals �n Plato. The only t�me that he makes men of
equal �ntellectual capac�ty come together,101 �n the T�maeus, he avo�ds d�alogue: T�maeus
del�vers a monologue of several hours’ durat�on before Socrates, Cr�t�as and
Hermogenes. Descr�b�ng a conversat�on among several perfect d�alect�c�ans would
actually have to have been the most reward�ng task of all for an author w�th Plato’s
l�terary talent. The lack of such a conversat�on �s a puzzle for those �nterpreters who
assume that Plato wanted to entrust h�s th�nk�ng �n �ts full range to wr�t�ng and to th�s end
created the d�alogue as a self-suff�c�ent form of wr�t�ng. But the puzzle �s solved w�thout
d�ff�culty �f we take the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng as our measure: a d�scuss�on among
�ntellectually equal d�alect�c�ans would �mmed�ately have to r�se �nto those reg�ons of the
theory of pr�nc�ples wh�ch the ph�losopher del�berately reserves for oral defence. For
example, �f T�maeus had to support h�s ‘myth’ under the cr�t�cal quest�on�ng of Socrates,
he would have to reveal those ‘even h�gher pr�nc�ples’ wh�ch he so carefully keeps out of
h�s d�scourse (53d), or he would have to expose the nature of the Dem�urge wh�ch
however, accord�ng to T�maeus 28c, cannot be �mparted ‘to everyone’, �.e. �n wr�t�ng.
That �s why the T�maeus �s the only d�alogue w�thout a d�scuss�on-leader: these l�steners
do not need any ‘lead�ng’. But �t �s also the only d�alogue w�thout d�scuss�on: the
d�alect�c exchange of such part�c�pants �n the conversat�on would no longer be ‘for
everyone’.
(2) If we compare the except�onal d�alogue, the T�maeus, w�th the rema�n�ng works �t
becomes ev�dent that �t also lacks the usual l�vely descr�pt�on of the place and the t�me of
the encounter and of the �nd�v�dual character of the part�c�pants. Th�s cannot be by
chance: �n the Phaedo Socrates, as �s well known, says that one should leave one’s person
out of account and pay artent�on to the truth only (91c). The ab�l�ty to do that �s �ndeed
someth�ng wh�ch can only be ach�eved by long pract�ce; the way the Phaedo cont�nues
shows clearly enough that the l�steners present were not �n a pos�t�on to do that. The
aud�ence of T�maeus’ lecture are �n that respect on a h�gher level: Plato lets us know
scarcely anyth�ng about the�r �nd�v�dual personal�t�es, and what he does �mpart has no
�nfluence on the progress of the d�scuss�on.
Leav�ng one’s �nd�v�dual�ty out of account �s thus a task for the ‘learner’. The task for
the d�alect�c�an l�es elsewhere: �n h�s search for appropr�ate partners he could hardly
leave out of account the�r �nd�v�dual requ�rements and pecul�ar�t�es, wh�ch make �t
d�ff�cult for them—and for each of them �n d�fferent ways—to enter �nto ph�losoph�cal
�nqu�ry �n any other manner. The a�m of a ph�losoph�cally based ‘rhetor�c’ �s to offer each
 The character�st�cs of the d�alogues 81

soul the ‘speeches’ wh�ch su�t �t (Phaedrus 277b–c). The d�alogues �llustrate the
d�alect�c�an’s ab�l�ty �n th�s.
The characters �ntroduced are w�thout except�on ‘colourful’ souls (see Phaedrus
277c2), �.e. unstable souls, not yet suff�c�ently pur�f�ed �n ph�losoph�cal terms. If the
d�alect�c�an seeks the r�ght logo� for each of them, th�s means that he �s not operat�ng �n
the reg�on wh�ch �s h�s a�m—�n the reg�on of purely conceptual knowledge (see Republ�c
511b–c) wh�ch leads upwards to the pr�nc�ple and back from �t to the mult�pl�c�ty of the
Ideas.
The strong emphas�s on the un�que and the �nd�v�dual �n the d�alogues thus rem�nds us
not only that we must each devote ourselves to the ‘true ph�losophy’ personally, as
characters w�th some l�m�tat�on or other, but also that exclus�vely �nd�v�dual
character�st�cs are someth�ng wh�ch ph�losophy w�ll help to overcome �n favour of a
depersonal�sed, object�ve search after the truth wh�ch �s or�entated purely by the
(by real�ty), and th�rd that �n h�s wr�t�ngs Plato wanted to dep�ct only those phases wh�ch
precede th�s str�ct d�alect�cal search for the truth, wh�le the d�alect�cal search for truth
�tself necessar�ly rema�ns reserved for oral ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry.
(1) In the l�ght of all th�s, the fact that Plato dep�cts conversat�ons does not mean e�ther
that ph�losoph�cal �ns�ghts are to be won only �n the company of others (the d�alect�c�an
can often make greater progress �n company w�th �mag�nary f�gures, �.e. �n h�s own
company, than w�th the real partner)102 or that d�alogue �s the only leg�t�mate form of
�mpart�ng ph�losoph�cal knowledge and �ns�ghts (T�maeus can help h�mself to a
cont�nu�ng sequence of arguments). Be�ng �n d�alogue, as a way of l�v�ng, �s not dec�s�ve
e�ther, for meet�ng over ph�losophy over a long per�od, �ndeed l�v�ng together, wh�ch the
Seventh Letter speaks about ( , , 341c6, 7), �s prec�sely what cannot
be dep�cted �n the d�alogues. In contrast w�th modern v�ews wh�ch emphas�se only the
process of hold�ng d�alogue as such, Plato was concerned w�th dep�ct�ng the agreement
(homology) wh�ch �s reached �n d�alogue. The presence of the super�or f�gure of the
d�alect�c�an, who knows the ‘truth’ about h�s subject, lends �ts we�ght to the homology
wh�ch �s acqu�red �n company. Even �f the f�nal proof �s lack�ng, whatever agreement �s
reached under the leadersh�p of Socrates, the Stranger from Elea or the Athen�an �s not
the empty chatter of people who comm�t themselves today to th�s and tomorrow to that,
w�thout respons�b�l�ty w�th regard to the truth. What Plato wants to create �s a homology
wh�ch can be accounted for. The result wh�ch the d�alect�c�an atta�ns w�th h�s partners �s a
result wh�ch rat�onal human be�ngs should agree upon. Plato �s so far removed from
h�d�ng beh�nd the v�ews and op�n�ons of h�s f�gures, and from thus be�ng ‘anonymous’,
that he unt�r�ngly dep�cts the correct homology, by wh�ch the reader should or�ent
h�mself. The way Plato marks what �s correct as correct by d�rect�ng plot and
man�pulat�ng sympathy can, as �n the Gorg�as or the Phaedo for example, reach a degree
of unamb�gu�ty wh�ch leaves noth�ng to be des�red. Cont�nu�ng to speak here of ‘�nd�rect
commun�cat�on’ could st�ll formally be defens�ble, but �n fact �t would be s�ngularly
m�slead�ng. Plato does not use the poss�b�l�t�es of the genre of drama to produce max�mal
amb�valence,103 but as a rule he leads the reader by means of frequently amb�valent steps
to a clear f�nal result104 and to the equally clear assurance that further substant�at�on and
trac�ng back to ‘even h�gher pr�nc�ples’ �s as yet forthcom�ng, but �s necessary and
poss�ble.
 25
HOW AND WHY THE DIALOGUE-FORM
HAS BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD

We can now say, when we look back at the modern theory of the Platon�c d�alogues (see
pp. 28–32 esp. 29) wh�ch ascr�bes to the wr�tten d�alogues the task wh�ch Plato reserves
for spoken ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry, that th�s theory �s not only unPlaton�c �n the sense that �t
has no Platon�c text to support �t (see above, p. 30), but also ant�-Platon�c �n the sense that
�t contravenes the sp�r�t and letter of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng and del�berately turns a deaf
ear to Plato’s cont�nual and clear references to h�s oral doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples.
The modern theory of the d�alogues attempts a rehab�l�tat�on of wr�t�ng �n the face of
Plato’s own cr�t�que of �t, and �n the f�nal analys�s �t attempts an equat�on of wr�t�ng and
oral�ty �n the dec�s�ve matter of how the ph�losopher’s ‘more valuable th�ngs’ (t�m�ôtera)
are �mparted.
But the rehab�l�tat�on of the wr�tten d�alogues �s only ach�eved by a ser�es of
metaphors. The fact that a d�alogue m�ght �tself ‘select’ �ts reader does not mean the same
as when Plato says of the d�alect�c�an that he selects for h�mself an ‘appropr�ate soul’
( , Phaedrus 276e6): th�s certa�nly means an
act�ve cho�ce, but �n the case of the d�alogue-book ‘select�ng’ only means that many a
reader puts �t as�de �n boredom wh�le many another does not. But that does not make for a
spec�al case of the d�alogues (�t �s also true of stock market reports). Or, �f an
�nappropr�ate person st�ll reads the d�alogue, the d�alogue ‘�s s�lent’ by ‘h�d�ng’ �ts deeper
level—a mere metaphor for the s�mple fact that not every reader understands all the
references of the mean�ng; consequently, the d�alogue’s ‘answer�ng’ and the ‘support’
wh�ch �t �s supposed to be able to br�ng �tself �s only a metaphor for the ab�l�ty of the
reader’s comprehens�on to grow w�th t�me. But that too �s perfectly true of other forms of
the use of wr�t�ng.
By the select�on of a partner, by the poss�b�l�ty of paus�ng and be�ng s�lent, by
‘support’, Plato does not mean th�ngs wh�ch pass�vely happen to the ph�losopher’s logos
when �t �s cons�dered by �ts readersh�p, but modes of behav�our by wh�ch the d�alect�c�an
act�vely d�rects the conversat�on. Thus we can rule out the poss�b�l�ty that what Plato had
�n m�nd was a metaphor�cal re�nterpretat�on when appl�ed to the wr�tten d�alogue. For
Plato, �t would not have been sens�ble to attempt to rehab�l�tate any spec�f�c type of the
use of wr�t�ng (e.g. h�s own d�alogues), �n v�ew of the general a�m of the cr�t�que of
wr�t�ng. In oppos�t�on to wr�t�ng, wh�ch he confronts �n qu�te general terms, he places oral
ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry, but not d�alogue �n book-form, wh�ch �s alleged to have a
pr�v�leged pos�t�on: no book can store new answers to new quest�ons s�nce the text �s now
f�rmly establ�shed and ‘always says one and the same th�ng only’ (Phaedrus 275d9).
The spec�al status ass�gned to the d�alogues does not merely lack any support �n
Plato’s reflect�ons on putt�ng wr�t�ng to ph�losoph�cal use, but over and above that �s also
 How and why the d�alogue-form has been m�sunderstood 83

extremely dub�ous when looked at object�vely. Accord�ng to the modern theory, the
d�alogues alone should be exempted from the verd�ct of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng. But, once
the metaphor�cal �nterpretat�on �s adm�tted, �t soon becomes apparent that many other
forms of wr�tten expos�t�on ‘by themselves choose the�r readers for themselves’, because
they ‘are s�lent’ to �nappropr�ate readers, and that they ‘do not always say the same th�ng’
�n answer to quest�ons. Who would want to deny these (metaphor�cal) capab�l�t�es to the
lyr�c poetry of Hölderl�n, the novels of Dostoevsky or Umberto Eco, the pastoral novel of
Longus, the dramas of Eur�p�des or even the profound h�stor�cal work of Herodotus?105
We should ment�on Theogn�s and P�ndar here as well, for they clearly state that the�r
verse conta�ns the r�ght message only for those who are qual�f�ed for �t.106 All authors
who produce such ‘act�ve’ wr�t�ngs would suddenly have to become ph�losophers, �f the
metaphor�cal re�nterpretat�on were leg�t�mate, and the whole cr�t�que of wr�t�ng would
lose �ts cr�t�cal mean�ng, s�nce there would be more except�ons than cases wh�ch f�t the
rule.
W�thout doubt Plato too hoped for the ‘r�ght’ reader—but that �s someth�ng that other
poets and wr�ters, whom Plato would not have regarded as worthy of the name of
ph�losophos, d�d as well. And Plato also unquest�onably made use of ‘�nd�rect
commun�cat�on’ and gave much �nformat�on only by means of allus�ons; but by do�ng so
he also took h�s place �n the c�rcle of the non-ph�losoph�cal authors. But the cr�t�que of
wr�t�ng says unm�stakably that the ph�losophos �s d�st�ngu�shed from other authors
prec�sely by means of h�s relat�onsh�p to wr�t�ng. As a ph�losophos, Plato departs from
usual pract�ce by consc�ously not entrust�ng everyth�ng to wr�t�ng, not even �n a coded
form, but reserves for oral expos�t�on the ‘th�ngs of greater value’ �n h�s theory of
pr�nc�ples as a support for h�s works. However, the techn�ques of ‘�nd�rect
commun�cat�on’ rema�n for h�m merely a subs�d�ary means of ph�losoph�cal
commun�cat�on, wh�ch �s bas�cally not su�ted to replace oral esoter�c�sm s�nce by means
of �t the ‘clar�ty and certa�nty’ of knowledge wh�ch the ph�losopher atta�ns �n d�alect�cal
d�scuss�on �s not atta�nable.
To return to Ludw�g W�ttgenste�n’s express�ve metaphor �n the Verm�schte
Bemerkungen (see p. 28f.): Plato d�d not reject hang�ng �n front of the ‘doors’ of h�s
‘rooms’ ‘locks’ wh�ch were to catch the eye of certa�n readers only and could be opened
by them alone. But th�s form of protect�on, wh�ch was and �s standard from Theogn�s to
W�ttgenste�n and beyond, was not suff�c�ent for h�m: bes�des the ‘locks’ he put up s�gns,
eas�ly v�s�ble for all, wh�ch say w�thout secret�veness and ‘deeper mean�ng’ that apart
from the ‘rooms’ of the d�alogues there are further rooms wh�ch w�ll be reached only by
those who are prepared to subm�t themselves to the effort of the ‘longer way’ of oral
d�alect�c.
One must f�nally ask how these m�s�nterpretat�ons, wh�ch are now gradually g�v�ng
way to a new �mage of Plato, ever came �nto be�ng.
One conduc�ve factor was the understandable and w�despread, but ult�mately na�ve,
tendency to al�gn the great th�nkers of the past w�th the att�tudes of one’s own t�mes.
Because the v�ctory of unrestr�cted openness �n the �mpart�ng of knowledge has become
�rrevers�ble for the modern per�od s�nce the Enl�ghtenment and because esoter�c�sm �s
thus no longer a poss�ble opt�on, readers have wanted to red�scover the new att�tude �n
Plato as well. Aga�nst th�s background we have an explanat�on for the un�versal �nab�l�ty
 Read�ng Plato 84

of the n�neteenth and twent�eth centur�es to take the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng ser�ously and to
apply �t to the d�alogues themselves.
More part�cularly, the m�sunderstand�ngs have been nour�shed by long-l�ved
prejud�ces about the oppos�ng pos�t�on: tak�ng Plato’s doctr�ne of pr�nc�ples �nto account
would lead, people have thought, to a ‘devaluat�on’ of the d�alogues or to a ‘dogmat�c’
Plato or to ‘secret teach�ngs’. But the ‘devaluat�on’, as we have seen, comes from Plato
h�mself and cannot be shared by us anyway, s�nce we cannot possess the oral ph�losophy
�n �ts or�g�nal form. Why Plato �s supposed to have been more dogmat�c �n h�s oral
d�scuss�on of the pr�nc�ples than for example �n h�s doctr�ne of the soul, as we possess �t
�n the d�alogues, �s �ncomprehens�b�e. We need not fear any secret teach�ngs: Plato d�d
not cons�der h�s th�nk�ng on the pr�nc�ples as secret , but as ‘not
prematurely commun�cable’ ( ; see p. 62). S�nce the usual prejud�ces have
h�ndered the understand�ng of th�s Platon�c d�st�nct�on, I shall attempt to clar�fy them here
�n a l�ttle more deta�l.
 26
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ESOTERICISM AND SECRECY

Plato’s act�v�ty as a ph�losoph�cal wr�ter cannot be fully understood as long as the

d�st�nct�on between esoter�c�sm and secrecy �s not understood. The d�st�nct�on becomes
clear by means of a compar�son between the Seventh Letter, handed down to us under
Plato’s name, and the Pythagorean trad�t�on on the profan�sat�on of certa�n doctr�nes of
the commun�ty.
Ar�stotle and Ar�stoxenus attest to the fact that secrecy was typ�cal of the early
Pythagoreans.107 The story was later told that a member of the commun�ty, H�ppasus (or
H�pparchus) by name, was the f�rst to break the s�lence and make a mathemat�cal
d�scovery of Pythagoras’ access�ble to all. The react�on of the commun�ty was to ban�sh
H�ppasus and to erect a grave for h�m: for the other Pythagoreans he was henceforth
‘dead’. But as a pun�shment for h�s cr�me a de�ty had h�m drowned �n the sea.108
Whether or not the story has a core of truth, �t shows �n any case what secrecy means.
The de�ty, �t says, �mposed a just pun�shment: that can only mean that the Pythagoreans
bound themselves by an oath not to make the�r communal knowledge publ�c (w�thout a
rel�g�ous t�e the gods need not have �ntervened). The ban�shment of the rebel by declar�ng
h�m dead must have been an effect�ve sanct�on as long as the pol�t�cal strength of the
commun�ty was unbroken. The mot�ve for the ban�shment was scarcely concern about the
appropr�ate recept�on of the mater�al to be w�thheld: �t was a matter of a mathemat�cal
theorem, and thus of a type of mater�al wh�ch can most read�ly be passed on w�thout
tak�ng account of the �nner makeup of the rec�p�ent. Obv�ously, the real �ssue was the
pr�v�lege of knowledge. It �s therefore not surpr�s�ng that H�ppasus was later ascr�bed
democrat�c sympath�es:109 anyone who makes any knowledge publ�c wh�ch pr�v�leges a
commun�ty �s obv�ously regarded as the subverter of the strength of the commun�ty �n
other respects as well.
Let us compare th�s w�th the att�tude wh�ch can be observed �n the Seventh Letter.
(Whether th�s letter �s genu�ne or not �s of as l�ttle consequence �n th�s context as the
poss�ble h�stor�cal kernel of the story of H�ppasus: what matters here �s only the
d�fference between two bas�c att�tudes wh�ch are often wrongly confused.)
D�onys�us �s not reproached for break�ng any oath. Nor does Plato call down the gods’
pun�shment on h�m; �ndeed, he does not even th�nk of outlaw�ng any memory of h�m �n
the c�rcle of h�s ph�losoph�cal and pol�t�cal fr�ends �n the Academy and �n Syracuse;
�nstead, he even has pos�t�ve th�ngs to say about D�onys�us and refuses to support the war
aga�nst h�m (338d6, 340a, 350c–d). One repr�mand rema�ns, however, and �t �s a we�ghty
one: D�onys�us has brought h�mself to c�rculate �n book-form what he had heard from
Plato dur�ng pr�vate �nstruct�on about the ult�mate a�ms of h�s ph�losoph�cal �nqu�ry. H�s
mot�ve can only have been ‘ugly amb�t�on’ (344e2). In contrast w�th Plato h�mself
 Read�ng Plato 86

(344d7) D�onys�us felt no respect for the matters d�scussed and d�d not stop at
d�ssem�nat�ng th�ngs wh�ch can only be successfully understood after a long
ph�losoph�cal preparat�on and wh�ch once formulated are exposed �n the h�ghest degree to
the danger of m�sunderstand�ng and d�stort�on by unph�losoph�cal or even �ll-d�sposed
rec�p�ents. Thus Plato �s not concerned about the strength and �nfluence of the Academy;
however, what hurts h�m �s the m�sjudgment of what matters to h�m ph�losoph�cally, and
the poss�b�l�ty that th�ngs m�ght be debased whose object�ve value he �s deeply conv�nced
of. H�s react�on to D�onys�us’ publ�sh�ng fragments of h�s oral ph�losophy �s not moral
outrage but unutterable human d�sappo�ntment.
The contrast between the two bas�c att�tudes now becomes clearly comprehens�ble:
secrecy �s based on compuls�on. Anyone who breaks �t breaks h�s oath and exposes
h�mself to the sanct�ons of h�s former group. Secrecy means keep�ng any knowledge
wh�ch pr�v�leges the group �n the group’s possess�on �n order to ma�nta�n �ts strength:
knowledge kept �n secret �s thus a means to an end.
Esoter�c�sm �s a requ�rement of reason, not the result of compuls�on by a group.
Anyone who trespasses aga�nst esoter�c reserve �s not expos�ng h�mself to any sanct�ons
at all; he �s thereby not harm�ng the commun�ty but the cause �n quest�on: th�nk�ng about
the pr�nc�ples, a process r�ch �n precond�t�ons, cannot develop �ts pos�t�ve effect �f �t �s
rece�ved �n the wrong way through lack of adequate preparat�on. Ph�losoph�cal
knowledge �s not a means to an end but an end �n �tself, and should therefore be passed
on properly, w�th necessary c�rcumspect�on, not promulgated mechan�cally. In short,
esoter�c�sm �s d�rected to a cause, secrecy to power.
Seen from the perspect�ve of the twent�eth century, th�s d�st�nct�on m�ght �n sp�te of
everyth�ng seem un�mportant: one could �ns�st that the only relevant th�ng �s that �n the
case of both bas�c att�tudes knowledge �s st�ll �mparted restr�ct�vely. The answer to that �s
that the one-s�ded po�nt of v�ew of the twent�eth century cannot be b�nd�ng for the
evaluat�on of Plato. Our modern conv�ct�on that �t �s des�rable that all research and all
knowledge meet w�th unrestr�cted c�rculat�on �s a h�stor�cally recent phenomenon: �t
f�nally preva�led only �n the seventeenth century and �n the subsequent per�od of the
Enl�ghtenment and bel�ef �n progress. The Seventh Letter, however, cons�ders that �t �s
�nappropr�ate to d�ssem�nate Plato’s oral ph�losophy to everybody �nd�scr�m�nately
(341el–2). The agreement w�th the v�ew of the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng (Phaedrus 275e1–3) �s
clear. It would be qu�te unh�stor�cal to �ns�nuate that Plato would accept the modern
preference for d�ssem�nat�ng knowledge on pr�nc�ple. If th�s v�ew �s ruled out, however,
the d�fference between the two types of ‘restr�ct�ve’ knowledged�ssem�nat�on becomes all
the more �mportant. Moreover, �f one cons�ders the �mportance wh�ch free and rat�onal
dec�s�ons have �n Plato’s thought, one w�ll not hes�tate to attach fundamental �mportance
to the d�fference between esoter�c�sm and secrecy as well.
 27
PLATO’S CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY
AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
DIALOGUES

The trend to ass�m�late Plato to modern hab�ts of thought at any pr�ce has not stopped at
h�s concept of ph�losophy. Not a few �nterpreters have wanted to red�scover �n h�s
wr�t�ngs the �nf�n�t�v�sm of German Romant�c�sm. Accord�ng to th�s �nterpretat�on, Plato
thought that ph�losophy was a journey of thought w�thout end, a perpetual str�v�ng and
search�ng wh�ch �ndeed never reaches a f�nal goal; the ph�losopher has noth�ng to present
that he would not �mmed�ately quest�on; ph�losoph�cal propos�t�ons are consequently
always temporary propos�t�ons, ph�losoph�cal truth always truth to be retr�eved.
Today we know, espec�ally as a result of the systemat�c and h�stor�cal works of Hans
Krämer and Karl Albert, that th�s �dea �n no way corresponds w�th Plato’s concept of
ph�losophy.110
Throughout h�s work, Plato presents d�alect�c not as a utop�an, unreal v�s�on of
another, superhuman mode of ga�n�ng knowledge, but as a real poss�b�l�ty, a walkable
path wh�ch leads to an atta�nable goal. Once the soul has arr�ved at th�s goal and the ‘end
of �ts wander�ng’, �t f�nds rest from the effort of the search (see Republ�c 532e). Th�s goal
�s the Idea of the Good, wh�ch �s knowable for the human nous, just as �ts analogue �n the
realm of the senses, the sun, can be seen by the human eye (Republ�c 5l6b, 517b–c). God
can recogn�se the pr�nc�ples, as can the human be�ng who stands near h�m, �.e. the
ph�losopher (T�maeus 53d). Thus �t �s �n the recogn�t�on of the pr�nc�ples and the Ideas
that the ‘approx�mat�on to God’ occurs wh�ch �s at the same t�me the ontolog�cal and
eth�cal a�m of human be�ngs (see Republ�c 500c, 613b, Theaetetus 176b, Phaedrus 253b,
T�maeus 90d, Laws 716c). The knowledge of the Ideas �s an endur�ng knowledge,
, and ‘b�nds t�ght’ what �s correct w�th reasons, makes �t
last�ng (Meno 98d), and thus preserves �t from be�ng cont�nuously quest�oned and
formulated anew. However, approx�mat�on to God does not d�ssolve the ontolog�cal
d�fference between God and human. The d�fference does not cons�st of man’s not
atta�n�ng the def�n�t�ve knowledge of the Ideas and the pr�nc�ple—Sympos�um 210e,
Phaedrus 249c and Phaedo 107b also talk of reach�ng the goal—but of man’s ab�l�ty to
rema�n only temporar�ly �n the knowledge wh�ch def�nes the nature of God, and �n h�s
repeated s�nk�ng back �nto a preoccupat�on w�th �nessent�als. For that reason, Eros
embod�es the essence of ph�losophy: Eros �ndeed reaches what he str�ves for, but what he
reaches escapes h�m aga�n (Sympos�um 203e).111
Ph�losoph�cal talk �s always exposed to the danger of m�sunderstand�ng; the d�alogues
g�ve examples of that aga�n and aga�n. As a matter of fact, the knowledge of the Ideas
cannot be enforced. The objects of knowledge are very d�ss�m�lar: the �ncorporeal as the
 Read�ng Plato 88

‘most beaut�ful and most �mportant’ �s �ndeed of a h�gher ontolog�cal level, but harder to
know (Pol�t�cus 285d10–286b2). S�m�larly, w�th�n th�s realm there are d�fferences of
levels (Republ�c 485b6), wh�ch means, accord�ng to the s�m�le of the cave, that the
d�ff�culty of the knowledge reaches �ts extreme po�nt w�th ontolog�cal nearness to the
Idea of the Good (Republ�c 515c4–517b7). And the nearer th�nk�ng comes to the d�ff�cult
knowledge of the pr�nc�ples the less one can depend on �mpart�ng �t un�mpededly.
Wr�t�ng absolutely never reaches the degree of ‘clar�ty and certa�nty’ of knowledge wh�ch
�s �mperat�ve for the d�alect�c�an prec�sely �n the realm of the archa�.
The conclus�on wh�ch Plato drew from th�s �s that the ph�losopher does well not to
entrust h�s th�nk�ng �n all �ts range to wr�t�ng. H�s mot�ve for th�s reserve �s h�s
respons�b�l�ty for the cause of the ‘d�v�ne’ ph�losophy. S�nce Plato appeals to the reason
of the wr�ter (Phaedrus 276b–c; cf. Letter 7, 343a, 344c–d), he th�nks of a free dec�s�on:
thus �n pr�nc�ple what �s w�thheld �s commun�cable, even �n wr�t�ng. Looked at �n terms
of �ts content �t �s the ‘more worthwh�le th�ng’, �.e. substant�at�on from the ‘even h�gher
pr�nc�ples’.
Accord�ngly, the d�alogues are not go�ng to be the complete presentat�on of Plato’s
ent�re ph�losophy. They do not even reveal the latest state of h�s th�nk�ng at each po�nt.
But what they reveal �s someth�ng �nf�n�tely valuable: they reveal paths �nto ph�losophy
wh�ch can be sought out and and trodden by �nd�v�dual people, affl�cted w�th m�stakes
and l�m�tat�ons l�ke ours. By means of the�r v�v�d l�vel�ness the d�alogues reveal an
�ncomparable protrept�c power, �.e. a power wh�ch turns us to ph�losophy. But the
protrept�c element �s not all: we exper�ence not only a long�ng for and an embarcat�on
upon ph�losophy but also �mportant steps on the path of ph�losophy towards the
pr�nc�ples. The protrept�c element cannot be separated from the d�scuss�on of �mportant
th�ngs, s�nce �t �s prec�sely the very we�ght of the ‘more worthwh�le th�ngs’ wh�ch has the
strongest protrept�c effect. Thus they must be revealed somehow, even �f under the
l�m�tat�ons wh�ch the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng �mposes on the ph�losopher’s use of wr�t�ng.
Thus the d�alogues are to be read as fragments of Plato’s ph�losophy w�th a propens�ty
to encourage the reader and at the same t�me to po�nt beyond themselves. But the form
must be regarded as essent�al for the content. The d�alogues are thus to be read as
dramas: as plays w�th a cont�nuous plot and a carefully thought-out constellat�on of
characters. Aga�n and aga�n the plot shows that ph�losoph�cal �nstruct�on �s not randomly
ava�lable, ready l�ke wares for any purchaser, but �s �mparted only �n accordance w�th the
�ntellectual and moral matur�ty of the rec�p�ent; the plot shows, second, that, for ra�s�ng
the level of argumentat�on �n the sequence of ‘cases of support’, and thus for pass�ng the
ph�losophers’ test, only one f�gure �s competent, namely the representat�ve of the
ph�losophy of Ideas. The upshot of th�s �s the unchang�ng but never bor�ng constellat�on
of characters: the d�alect�c�an as a man w�th a ph�losoph�cal advantage wh�ch cannot be
caught up w�th stands �n oppos�t�on to people who can be very ung�fted or very g�fted,
but who �n every case are st�ll undeveloped, st�ll �nsuff�c�ently advanced. In v�ew of th�s
�nequal�ty the d�alect�c�an must make h�mself the leader �n the conversat�on; he leads the
partners to homolog�es (agreements) wh�ch are appropr�ate to the�r state of knowledge.
The unamb�gu�ty of the constellat�on of characters guarantees that the homolog�es arr�ved
at are not random and �rrelevant but exemplary—�.e. the best that can be atta�ned �n these
def�ned cond�t�ons. Thus what f�nally appears, after all k�nds of detours, to be
consol�dated by agreement must be taken ser�ously as �nformat�on wh�ch �s meant by the
 Plato’s concept of ph�losophy 89

author to be val�d. But the ‘gaps’ must also be taken ser�ously; they do not have the
stand�ng of as�des, but are �ntroduced �nto the development of the plot as def�n�ng �ts
structure: they draw attent�on to the fact that the d�scuss�on-leader could lead us to yet
other, more deeply founded homolog�es.
Thus, by means of the�r cons�stently susta�ned l�terary techn�que, the d�alogues refer to
Plato’s oral ph�losophy. In th�s way they prove themselves to be works of a ph�losophos
�n the sense def�ned �n the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng.
 NOTES
1 On th�s passage see further below, p. 69f.
2 See my �nterpretat�on of the d�alogue �n Platon und d�e Schr�ftl�chke�t der Ph�losoph�e.
Interpretat�onen zu den frühen und m�ttleren D�alogen (Berl�n and New York 1985) 191–
207, esp. 197f. (Th�s book w�ll be c�ted hereafter as PSP.)
3 R.K.Merton, The Soc�ology of Sc�ence (Ch�cago and London 1973) esp. 273ff.
4 See Cratylus 383b–384a, 427d–e; Euthyphro 3d, 11b, 14c, 15e; Protagoras 341d; Charm�des
174b; Gorg�as 499b–c; H�pp�as M�nor 370e, 373b; H�pp�as Ma�or 300c-d; Ion 541e.
5 For a more deta�led argument for th�s �nterpretat�on of the Euthydemus see my ‘Sokrates’
Spott über Gehe�mhaltung. Zum B�ld des (φιλóσoφoς �n Platons Euthydemos’, Ant�ke und
Abendland 26 (1980) 75–89, together w�th the chapter on Euthydemus �n PSP (above, n. 2)
49–65.
6 Almost every d�alogue conta�ns someth�ng relevant to th�s theme. I have tr�ed to g�ve a
comprehens�ve p�cture of the Socrat�c manner of �mpart�ng ph�losoph�cal �ns�ghts �n PSP.
7 For the treatment of the ‘gaps’ �n scholarsh�p see PSP 324f. w�th n. 144. The f�rst scholar to
have recogn�sed the s�gn�f�cance of these passages clearly was Hans Joach�m Krämer, Arete
be� Platon und Ar�stoteles (He�delberg 1959) 389ff.
8 It �s qu�te a separate matter that �t does �ndeed depend on the react�ons of each �nd�v�dual
partner how much of h�s v�ews and �ns�ghts Socrates �mparts to h�m: see p. 69ff.
9 Sympos�um 175b, 220c–d; Cr�to 49a; Meno 81a; Gorg�as 493a; H�pp�as Ma�or 304d; Republ�c
505a3, 611b9–10; Phaedo 100b5.
10 Theaetetus 189e, Soph�st 263e.
11 Protagoras 348d.
12 An early example �s He�nr�ch von Ste�n, S�eben Bücher zur Gesch�chte des Platon�smus
(Gött�ngen 1862) vol. 1, 11f.; more recently Ludw�g Edelste�n, ‘Platon�c Anonym�ty’,
Amer�can Journal of Ph�lology 83 (1962) 1–22 has been �nfluent�al.
13 In PSP I tr�ed to repa�r th�s om�ss�on �n research on Plato s�nce Schle�ermacher (who paved
the way for th�s mode of �nterpretat�on).
14 See Re�nhold Merkelbach, Platons Menon (Frankfurt a.M. 1988), Introduct�on 5–10;
M�chael Erler, Der S�nn der Apor�en �n den D�alogen Platons (Berl�n and New York 1987).
15 Perhaps w�th the sole except�on of the second part of the Parmen�des.
16 See Merkelbach, Platons Menon 6.
17 Ludw�g W�ttgenste�n, Verm�schte Bemerkungen: E�ne Auswahl aus dem Nachlaβ, ed�ted by
Georg Henr�k von Wr�ght, w�th the collaborat�on of He�kk� Nyman (Frankfurt a.M. 1977) 23.
18 In the formulat�on of Paul Fr�edländer, Platon I3 (1964) 177, The d�alogue �s the only book-
form wh�ch appears to overcome the book �tself.’
19 In the ‘Introduct�on’ to h�s translat�on of Plato (vol. I, 1 (Berl�n 1804) 5–36).
20 See the quotat�on, p. 28f.
21 See also p. 110 w�th n. 106.
22 Xenophanes DK 21 B 10 (DK=D�els-Kranz, D�e Fragmente der Vorsokrat�ker, I, 19526,
131).
23 Xenophanes DK 21 B 15 and 11.
24 Heracl�tus DK 22 B 42.
25 Test�mon�a �n DK 8 A 1–4; see G.Lanata, Poet�ca pre-Platon�ca (Florence 1963) 104ff.
26 The so-called Derven� papyrus; text �n Ze�tschr�ft für Papyrolog�e und Ep�graph�k 47 (1982)
after p. 300.
27 Isocrates 12.236:
 Notes 91

You do not appear to me to have summoned our c�rcle and pra�sed our
c�ty w�thout ulter�or purpose (‘not on one level’), and not as you sa�d to
us, but w�th the �ntent�on of test�ng whether we are concerned w�th our
educat�on (‘whether we ph�losoph�se’) and remember what has been
sa�d �n our d�scuss�ons, and whether we are capable of recogn�s�ng the
manner �n wh�ch the speech has been composed. (

.)

See further PSP 360 w�th n. 42; M. Erler, ‘H�lfe und H�nters�nn.
Isokrates’ Panathena�kos und d�e Schr�ftkr�t�k �m Pha�dros’, �n L.
Rossett� (ed.), Proceed�ngs of the 11 Sympos�um Platon�cum (St.
August�n 1992) 122–137.
28 Isocrates 12.265:

I sa�d noth�ng �n response to h�s further allegat�ons—ne�ther that he

had h�t on my �ntent�on w�th �ts covert mean�ngs, nor that he had
m�ssed �t, but left h�m �n the pos�t�on �n wh�ch he had brought h�mself.
(

, ,

).
29 Republ�c 1, 332b9 .
30 See Karl Albert, Über Platons Begr�ff der Ph�losoph�e (St August�n 1989). Albert develops
Plato’s concept of ph�losophy pr�mar�ly from the ev�dence of the Sympos�um and the
Phaedrus, w�thout address�ng the earl�er advance �nterpretat�on �n the Protagoras. See also
p. 116f.
31 Protagoras 347e3–7: [sc. ]
,

,
,
.
32 Phaedrus 276e5 , cf. 266c1 .
33 See Phaedrus 274a and 246a—two typ�cal ‘gaps’.
34 Gerhard J.Baudy, Adon�sgärten. Stud�en zur ant�ken Samensymbol�k (Frankfurt a.M. 1986).
 Notes 92

35 Cf. 276b2, 277a1; 277a1,

276b2, c5.
36 Cf. e.g. Republ�c 534a7 , 504b2
, 435d3 ; Phaedrus 274a2 , 246a
; Parmen�des 136d1–137a6, esp. a5
.
37 In �ntroduc�ng poss�b�l�t�es wh�ch w�ll be real�sed �n the future, Plato can refer to h�mself
w�thout mak�ng ‘Socrates’ comm�t an anachron�sm. Scholars have been r�ght to relate the
‘great man’ of the future �n Charm�des 169a �n th�s sense to Plato. Here �n the Phaedrus he
could just as eas�ly have outl�ned a ‘future’ use of wr�t�ng �n accordance w�th the modern
theory of the d�alogues. But th�s was prec�sely what he d�d not �ntend to do.
38 See p. 92 on the theme of ‘open�ng’ �n the Socrat�c d�alogues.
39 See above, n. 14.
40 and . The attempt has even been made to relate the a�des-mémo�re to
the theory of recollect�on, or anamnes�s (C.L.Gr�swold, Self-Knowledge �n Plato’s Phaedrus
(New Haven and London 1986)). If what �s meant by th�s �s the capac�ty of the s�gns of
wr�t�ng to �nduce the soul d�rectly to recollect the Ideas wh�ch have been seen �n the other
world, such an �nterpretat�on would of course scarcely f�t the �ntent�on of the cr�t�que of
wr�t�ng.
41 276e1–3: ‘It �s a wonderful game, Socrates, wh�ch you are oppos�ng to an �ns�gn�f�cant one:
the game of a person who knows how to play w�th speeches by tell�ng stor�es about just�ce
and the other matters you have ment�oned.’ S�nce the Republ�c �n fact descr�bes �tself as a
(mythologe�n; 376d, 501e), there can be no doubt that Plato �s referr�ng to
h�s major work (so already W. Luther, ‘D�e Schwäche des geschr�ebenen Logos’,
Gymnas�um 68 (1961) 536f.).
42 A passage �n Ar�stotle seems relevant here. The a�m of eth�cs �s happ�ness; but th�s must be
someth�ng last�ng, and thus must be based upon the most last�ng human qual�t�es and
ab�l�t�es, �.e. the possess�on of v�rtues and knowledge (EN 1100a32–b22). If one wanted to
make happ�ness dependent on the v�c�ss�tudes of fate one would make the happy man (the
) ‘�nto a k�nd of chameleon’ (1100b6). In Plato, however, the f�gure who
corresponds w�th the Ar�stotel�an and h�s �s the , for
whom the creates the wh�ch �s poss�ble for
humans (Phaedrus 276e5–277a4): he �s no chameleon e�ther.
43 Phaedrus 235b, 236b: , wh�ch �s clearly a
synonym for t�m�ôtera. For an �nterpretat�on of th�s passage see PSP 28–30.
44 Of course that does not mean that Isocrates �s thereby declared to be a ph�losopher �n the
Platon�c sense: �s a comparat�ve express�on, l�ke t�m�ôtera and :
what Isocrates d�d at the end of h�s career was �ndeed ‘more �mportant’ than what he had
begun w�th, but �t was st�ll far removed from the t�m�ôtera of the Platon�c ph�losopher.
45 Republ�c 509a4–5 , 509b9–10
(
means noth�ng other than ).
46 Republ�c 508e2–509a4.
 Notes 93

47 See for example Ar�stotle, EN 1101b11, 1102a4, a20, 1141a20, b3, 1178a1; Metaphys�cs
1026a21, 1074b21; De Part�bus An�mal�um 644b25; Theophrastus, Metaphys�cs 6b28, 7b14,
10b26, 11a23 (on Speus�ppus).
48 S�m�larly Metaphys�cs 983a5–7, 1026a21; De Part�bus An�mal�um 644b32.
49 On the outl�ne of s�tuat�ons �nvolv�ng ‘support’ �n sect�ons (a) and (b) see further the deta�led
�nterpretat�ons of the relevant d�alogues �n PSP.
50 Republ�c 2, 362d9, 368b4, b7, c1, c5.
51 See 445c5 .
52 Laws 10, 891a5–7 ~ Republ�c 2, 368b7c1:

‘It appears to me even to be �mp�ous (“not p�ous”) not to support these

logo�’ ~ ‘I fear �t m�ght even be �mp�ous (“not p�ous”) to stand by
whenever just�ce �s scorned and to be found want�ng and not to support
�t’ (

).
53 Just as �n the lead-�n to the ‘support’ �n the second book of the Republ�c (see above, n. 50),
express�ons denot�ng support are found �n abundance: 890d4
(cf. Republ�c 368c3 ), 891a5–7 (text above,
n. 52), 891b3–4 , b4–6 .
54 See Charm�des 163d, Menon 87b–c, Republ�c 533e, Pol�t�cus 261e.
55 L�kew�se Protagoras, whom we regard as an �mportant th�nker, �s not a ph�losophos
accord�ng to Platon�c th�nk�ng, wh�ch �s the reason why the overall thrust of the d�alogue
g�ves a negat�ve answer to the dec�s�ve quest�on put to h�m whether he w�ll be capable of
support�ng h�s logos ( , Protagoras
341d8).
56 In my ‘Sokrates’ Spott über Gehe�mhaltung. Zum B�ld des (φιλóσoφoς �n Platons
Euthydemus’, I have tr�ed to g�ve an explanat�on for the numerous and remarkably close
contacts between the Euthydemus’ car�cature of the ph�losopher and the p�cture of the
ph�losopher �n the cr�t�que of wr�t�ng. Hold�ng back knowledge, wh�ch Socrates �ron�cally
ascr�bes to Euthydemus, �s someth�ng wh�ch he pract�ses h�mself, as �s shown by allus�ons to
the doctr�ne of anamnes�s and the concept of d�alect�c. See pp. 76–78 and 86.
57 In th�s context we must naturally also recall the myth�cal p�cture of the ascent of the ‘char�ot
of souls’ to the ‘place beyond the heavens’ (Phaedrus 246aff.), even �f, among the objects
for contemplat�on �n the world beyond (247d–e), no one pr�nc�ple �s spec�f�ed there as the
pr�me pr�nc�ple of the others.
58 René Schaerer (La quest�on platon�c�enne (Par�s and Neuchâtel, 1938, 19692) and Paul
Fr�edländer (Platon, 1928, 19753) are among the scholars whose op�n�ons have been most
�nfluent�al.
59 One need only th�nk of the ‘place beyond the heavens’ as the local�ty of the Ideas (Phaedrus
247cff.), or even of the ‘approx�mat�on to God’, wh�ch �n �ts very nature �s an approx�mat�on
to the orderl�ness of the world of the Ideas (Republ�c 500b–d).
60 On the d�fference beween ‘esoter�c�sm’ on the one s�de and ‘secret doctr�ne’ on the other see
chapter 26.
61 So Gregory Vlastos �n Gnomon 35 (1963) 653f.
62 Demonstrat�ng th�s was the a�m of the arguments of Harold Chern�ss, Ar�stotle’s Cr�t�c�sm of
Plato and the Academy (Balt�more 1944, 19462). The great Ar�stotel�an W.D.Ross, �n
 Notes 94

Plato’s Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951) 143, made the follow�ng judgment on Chern�ss’s
attempt:

Ar�stotle was not the pure blunderer that Prof. Chern�ss makes h�m out
to have been… I do not th�nk for a moment that he [sc. Chern�ss] has
establ�shed h�s case that all that Ar�stotle says about Plato that cannot
be ver�f�ed from the d�alogues �s pure m�sunderstand�ng or
m�srepresentat�on.
63 See my art�cle ‘D�e Lückenhaft�gke�t der akadem�schen Pr�nz�p�entheor�en nach Ar�stoteles’
Darstellung �n Metaphys�k M und N’, �n A.Graeser (ed.), Mathemat�cs and Metaphys�cs �n
Ar�stotle. Mathemat�k und Metaphys�k be� Ar�stoteles (Bern and Stuttgart 1987) 45–67.
64 On the �dea of ascent and the concept of a dec�s�ve knowledge of the Good and the Bad see
PSP 127–150, esp. 145–148; on the �dea of the archê �n the Lys�s, PSP 122f.; see further
G.Reale, Per una nuova �nterpretaz�one d� Platone10 (M�lan 1991) 456–459.
65 See PSP 141–148.
66 Of spec�al �mportance among the numerous passages �n Ar�stotle wh�ch attest to the
ontolog�cal pr�or�ty of numbers over geometr�c shapes �s Fragment 2 Ross, from the
, wh�ch �s preserved by Alexander of Aphrod�s�as �n h�s commentary on the
Metaphys�cs (55.20–26 Hayduck). See also Konrad Ga�ser, Platons ungeschr�ebene Lehre2
(Stuttgart 1968) 148 w�th 372 n. 125.
67 See above, n. 66. Indeed, Laws 894a also seems to refer to the same theory, but th�s passage
�tself needs explanat�on from the �nd�rect trad�t�on. See also p. 80f.
68 Hans-Georg Gadamer, D�e Idee des Guten zw�schen Plato und Ar�stoteles, S�tzungsber�chte
der He�delberger Akadem�e der W�ssenschaften, Ph�los.-h�stor. Klasse 1978, 3 (He�delberg
1978) 82.
69 For a d�scuss�on of the l�m�tat�ons of the d�scourse �n the Gorg�as see PSP 191–207, esp,
199–204.
70 Ar�stotle, Metaphys�cs A6, 987b14–18 and Z1, 1028B19, accord�ng to wh�ch Plato gave the
objects of mathemat�cs an ontolog�cal m�ddle pos�t�on (see also W.D.Ross, Ar�stotle’s
Metaphys�cs (Oxford 1924) I, 166).
71 On the problem of psyche and mathêmat�ka �n Plato see Ph�l�p Merlan, From Platon�sm to
Neoplaton�sm3 (The Hague 1968) 13ff., 45ff.; Ga�ser, Platons ungeschr�ebene Lehre2 44ff.,
89ff.
72 Hermann Keulen, Untersuchungen zu Platons ‘Euthydem’ (W�esbaden 1971) 25–40 and 49–
56; see also Paul Fr�edländer, Platon II3 (Berl�n 1964) 171, 177f.
73 On the other hand, wr�t�ng necessar�ly �nvolves the separat�on of product�on and use: author
and reader generally do not even know one another. Th�s ‘al�enat�on’, wh�ch �s �nherent �n �ts
nature, makes wr�t�ng bas�cally �ncapable of fulf�ll�ng the requ�rements of true ‘rhetor�c’
.
74 Seepp. 28–35, 74f.
75 ‘D�e Schwäche des geschr�ebenen Logos’ 536f.
76 Ga�ser, Platons ungeschr�ebene Lehre2 187.
77 Ib�d. 173–189, esp. 175 and 187–189; see also Ga�ser, Platone come scr�ttore f�losof�co
(Naples 1984) 148f.
78 On the problems of the passage and �ts d�scuss�on �n the l�terature on Plato, see my art�cle
‘Unsterbl�chke�t und Tr�chotom�e der Seele �m zehnten Buch der Pol�te�a’, Phrones�s 21
(1976) 31–58.
79 On ‘open�ng’ the d�alogues (Sympos�um 221d–222a) see p. 92f.
80 Heracl�tus DK 22 B 93.
 Notes 95

81 On Alc�b�ades see further p. 91f.

82 Fr�edr�ch Schle�ermacher, Introduct�on to the translat�on of Plato, vol. 1.1 (Berl�n 1804) 15.
83 Ib�d., Introduct�on to the Phaedrus, 52.
84 For a deta�led cr�t�c�sm of the methodolog�cal def�c�enc�es and factual errors of
Schle�ermacher and h�s followers see PSP 331–375 (Append�x 1: D�e moderne Theor�e der
D�alogform).
85 One of my a�ms �n PSP was to demonstrate the congru�ty between Plato’s theory of the use
of wr�t�ng and the l�terary shap�ng of the d�alogues. On the observat�ons �n pp. 85–93 see the
more deta�led analyses to be found there.
86 See pp. 76–78.
87 Seepp. 15f. and 63f.
88 See the br�ef d�scuss�on on p. 16 as well as the chapter on the Republ�c �n PSP 271–326.
89 See p. 77f.
90 See p. 70 and PSP 307f. w�th n. 99.
91 Of course, �t �s not my object to attempt a comprehens�ve stock-tak�ng (let alone a f�nal
balance-sheet) of Platon�c �rony here.
92 Th�s �s accepted even among commentators of an unamb�guously ‘ant�metaphys�cal’
or�entat�on; see e.g. G.Vlastos, Platon�c Stud�es (Pr�nceton 1973) 397: ‘Could anyone say
that Plato felt anyth�ng less than venerat�on for the Ideas?’
93 See PSP 87f.; l�kew�se, I have demonstrated that �nterpretat�ons wh�ch deal solely w�th the
aspect of �rony are �nadequate for the other early works as well. See now also Erler, Der S�nn
der Apor�en �n den D�alogen Platons.
94 Phaedrus 246a. On the passage see p. 67f.
95 At Pol�t�cus 304c10–d2 there �s a d�scuss�on of a type of oratory wh�ch conv�nces the many
‘w�th knowledge’ (�.e. lege art�s) ‘Zby means of story-tell�ng, but not by �nstruct�ng’
( ). It m�ght be deduced from th�s that
for Plato �nfluenc�ng people verbally w�thout �nstruct�on (�.e. by means of personal
�nstruct�on: wr�t�ng stays , Phaedrus 275a7) falls under the category of
mytholog�a. Meanwh�le, �t rema�ns quest�onable whether the passage can be appl�ed to the
d�alogues: for they �ndeed reach the many (no author can avo�d that), but do not a�m to
conv�nce the many qua mult�tude .
96 The fact that Plato �s aware that one and the same text w�ll be �nterpreted d�fferently by
d�fferent l�steners or readers naturally does not mean that he l�ved �n the bel�ef that he was �n
possess�on of a l�terary techn�que wh�ch could rel�ably d�rect such d�fferent responses. On
these matters see Chapters 9–11 and 19.
97 In a very balanced d�scuss�on, Ga�ser, Platone come scr�ttore f�losof�co 125—152, esp. 134–
136, argued �n favour of myth’s equ�valence to logos. The approach wh�ch subord�nates
myth to logos has been represented by among others G. Müller, ‘D�e Mythen der
platon�schen D�aloge’, Nachr�chten der G�eβener Hochschulgesellschaft 32 (1963) 77–92
(also �n �d., Platon�sche Stud�en (He�delberg 1986) 110–125). The d�scuss�on of the theme
by G. Cerr�, Platone soc�olog�co della commun�caz�one (M�lan 1991) (17–74 M�to e poes�a)
�s full of excellent observat�ons.
98 To be sure, �t can happen that a po�nt of v�ew �s represented by two names: �n the Republ�c
Glaucon and Ade�mantus together demand a defence of just�ce by Socrates; S�mm�as and
Cebes together appear �n the Phaedo as people who doubt the �mmortal�ty of the soul;
Cl�n�as and Meg�llus together represent Dor�c culture, the pol�t�cal orderl�ness of wh�ch
the Athen�an �n the Laws w�shes to �m�tate and surpass. But such tw�n-f�gures
do not form two �ndependent po�nts of v�ew, and the arguments of the d�alect�c�an are mostly
d�rected at any one t�me only towards one of them, rarely to both at the same t�me. (Only
 Notes 96

Cl�n�as and Meg�llus, who resemble each other almost l�ke tw�ns, are frequently addressed
s�multaneously.)
99 See p. 87.
100 Meno 86d–e (see PSP 185f.), l�kew�se Euthydemus 287d6 (both t�mes means ‘to
command’); see also Protagoras 351e8–11, 353b4 ( means ‘to exerc�se
command’).
101 In the Parmen�des the young Socrates meets the old Eleat�c: the str�k�ng emphas�s on the
d�fference of ages (Parmen�des 127b–c) obl�ges us to see even �n th�s conversat�on a
conversat�on between unequals.
102 Of course there rema�ns the bas�c d�alog�cal nature of thought as a conversat�on of the soul
w�th �tself; see pp. 20f. and 100f.
103 It should be noted �n pass�ng that the aporet�c d�alogues do not s�mply revel �n
amb�valences but can be very unamb�guous �n the�r den�al of whatever �s wrong and
m�staken.
104 See G.W.F.Hegel, Vorlesungen über d�e Gesch�chte der Ph�losoph�e (Theor�e-
Werkausgabe ((Frankfurt a.M. 1971)) vol.19, p. 22): ‘from h�s [sc. Plato’s] d�alogues h�s
ph�losophy emerges w�th absolute clar�ty…. The d�fference of op�n�ons wh�ch emerges �s
exam�ned; a result ar�ses as the truth.’
105 L�terary scholars have been just�f�ed �n descr�b�ng a ser�es of authors �n concepts wh�ch
modern �nterpreters of Plato would l�ke to reserve for the Platon�c d�alogues. I have collected
some references at PSP 359 n. 40 (w�th supplementary mater�al �n Platone e la scr�ttura
della f�losof�a3 (M�lan 1992) 448 n. 40).
106 Theogn�s 681–682; P�ndar, Olymp�an Odes 2.83–86. On them see Gregory Nagy,
‘Homer�sche Ep�k und P�ndars Pre�sl�eder. Mündl�chke�t und Aktual�tätsbezug’, �n
Wolfgang Ra�ble (ed.), Zw�schen Festtag und Alltag. Zehn Be�träge zum Thema
‘Mündl�chke�t und Schr�ftl�chke�t’ (Tüb�ngen 1988) 51–64, esp. 52–53.
107 Ar�stotle fr. 192 Rose; Ar�stoxenus fr. 43 Wehrl�.
108 H�ppasus DK 18.4.
109 Iambl�chus, De V�ta Pythagor�ca 257 (=DK 18.5).
110 Hans Joach�m Krämer, Platone e � fondament� della metaf�s�ca (M�lan 1982, 19893); �d.,
‘F�chte, Schlegel und der Inf�n�t�smus �n der Platondeutung’, Deutsche V�erteljahrsschr�ft für
L�teraturw�ssenschaft und Ge�stesgesch�chte 62 (1988) 583–621; Albert, Über Platons
Begr�ff der Ph�losoph�e.
111 On th�s po�nt see Albert, Über Platons Begr�ff der Ph�losoph�e 20–30, esp. 27.
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 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED
Ar�stotle
Fragments (ed. Rose)
Fr.192 n. 107, p. 113
(Per� tagathou, �n Ar. fragm. sel. ed. Ross)
Fr.2 n. 66, p. 64
De An�ma
402a1–4 53
Metaphys�cs
983a5–7 n. 48, p. 53
987b14–18 n. 70, p. 74
1026a21 n. 47, p. 53, .n. 48 p.53
1028B19 n. 70, p. 74
1074B21 n. 47, p. 53
1091b13–15 66
N�comachean Eth�cs
1100a32–b22 n. 42, p. 49
1100b6 n. 42, p. 49
1101b11 n. 47, p. 53
1102a4 n. 47, p. 53
1102a20 n. 47, p. 53
1141a20 n. 47, p. 53
1141b3 n. 47, p. 53
1178a1 n. 47, p. 53
De Part�bus An�mal�um
664b25 n. 47, p. 53
644b32 n. 48, p. 53
Ar�stoxenus
Fragments (ed. Wehrl�)
Fr.43 n. 107, p. 113
‘Derven� Papyrus’ n. 26, p. 34
Eur�p�des
Bacchae 272ff. 34
Heracl�tus
Fragments (ed. D�els-Kranz)
22B42 n. 24, p. 33
22B93 n. 80, p. 82
H�ppasus
Fragments (ed. D�els-Kranz)
18.4 n. 108, p. 113
18.5 n. 109, p. 113
Isocrates
Panathena�cus (=12th Speech)
12.236 34
12.240 34
12.240ff. 34
 Index of passages c�ted 100

12.265 n. 28, p. 34
P�ndar
Olymp�c Odes
2.83–86 33; n. 106, p. 110
Plato
Charm�des
155e 16
155e8 63
156a 87
157b1–c6 63
157b–c 87
16lc–d 35
162a 51
163d n. 54, p. 58
169a n. 36, p. 43
174b n. 4, p. 13
174b–c 63
Cratylus
383b-384a n. 4, p. 13
400dff. 35
427d–e n. 4, p. 13
Cr�to
49a n. 9, p. 20
Euthydemus
275d3–276c7 76
275d4 76
276d7–277c7 76
287d6 n. 100, p. 106
289c7 78
289d2 78
289d8–e1 78
289e1 78
290c–d 78; 88
290e 88
291a4 88
293a1–3 59
293a2 59
293b–e 76
294a–e 76; 82
294e–296d 76; 82
295b4 77
298b–e 77
301a2–4 77
301a4 77
301a5 77
304b 13
Euthyphro
3d n. 4, p. 13
11b n. 4, p. 13
14c n. 4, p. 13
15e n. 4, p. 13
Gorg�as
 Index of passages c�ted 101

462a2 59
482c–486d 6
489e 69
491c–e 69
491d8 70
491e–492c 7; 69
492a2 69
492e8–493c3 69
493a n. 9, p. 20
493a3 69
493a7 69
493aff. 7
493b1 69
493c–d 69
494bff. 7
497c 7; 70
499b–c n. 4, p. 13
513c 6
523a 98
523b–524a 98
526c3–4 98
H�pp�as Ma�or
286d7 59
291e5 59
300bff. 59
300c–d n. 4, p. 13
304d n. 9, p. 20; 59
304d4 101
H�pp�as M�nor
307e n. 4, p. 13
372e1 59
372e6–7 59
373b n. 4, p. 13
Ion
541e n. 4, p. 13
Laws
713c 74
716c 116
890d4 n. 53, p. 58
891a 57
891a5–7 n. 52, p. 57; n. 53, p. 58
891b–899c 58
891b3–4 n. 53, p. 58
891b4–6 n. 53, p. 58
891c2–3 58
891d7 58
891d7–e1 58
891e5–6 58
893aff. 101
894a n. 67, p. 66
894al–8 80f.
951d–952b 14
 Index of passages c�ted 102

961a–b 14
968d–e 14
968e 65; 81
968e4–5 62
Letters
7, 338d6 114
7, 340a 114
7, 34lc6–7 107
7, 341e1–2 115
7, 343a 117
7, 344a 83
7, 344b5 7
7, 344c–d 117
7, 344d7 114
7, 344e2 114
7,350c–d 114
Lys�s
218a 76
219c–d 63
Meno
80df. 76
81a n. 9, p.20
81c9 77
81c–d 77
85d–86b 77
86d–e n. 100, p. 106
87b–c n. 54, p.58
98a7 52
98d 117
Parmen�des
127b–c n. 101, p. 106
135d7 26
136d1–137a6 n. 36, p. 43
137b–c 26
Phaedo
66b3–67b2 101
75a–b 35
80a3 40
84c–88b 56
88d9–e3 56
91c 5; 106
95e9–96a1 56
96aff. 56
99dff. 56
99d–107b 61
100b5 n. 9, p. 20
101d–e 52; 57
101e 49
102a 56
105bff. 56
107b 57; 117
Phaedrus
 Index of passages c�ted 103

229c–230a 35
230e–234c 39;51
234e–236b 51
235b n.43,p. 51
236b n. 43, p. 51
237b–241d 39
243e–257b 39
245c1–2 97
245c5–246a2 97
246a n. 33, p. 40; n. 36, p. 43; 54; 67; n. 94, p. 97
246a4–6 67
246aff. n. 57, p. 61; 68; 97
247cff. n. 59, p. 62
247d–e n. 57, p. 61
249b 77
249c 49; 68; 117
250b2 52
253b 116
266c1 n. 32, p. 40
266d–269c 40
270c 67
270d 68
270d1–7 68
271d 68
273d–274a 48; 68
273e 40
273e4–5 68
273e7–8 68
274a n. 33, p. 40; 54; 71
274a2 n. 36, p. 43; 68
274b–278e 39
274b6 40
274b9 40
274c–275b 96
274e–275c 41
274e5 41
275a7 41; n. 95, p. 97
275b–c 97
275c6 35
275c6–7 83
275d4–9 44
275d9 110
275d–e 29; 62
275e 27
275e1–3 115
275e2–3 44
275e3–5 44
276a 30; 55; 104
276a5 104
276a6–7 44; 102
276a7 50
276a8 30; 54
 Index of passages c�ted 104

276a8–9 35
276b 42
276b–277a 41
276b2 n. 35, p. 42
276B2–3 43
276b6 43
276B7 43
276b–c 50; 117
276c–277a 42
276c3 48
276c3–4 54
276c3–9 43
276c5 n. 35, p. 42
276c9 43; 62
276d x
276d1–4 27
276d3 45
276d4–8 45
276e 30
276e–277a 89
276e1–3 n. 41, p. 45
276e2–3 79
276e3 42; 97
276e5 n. 32, p. 40; 43
276e5–277a3 44
276e5–277a4 n. 42, p. 49
276e5–6 54
276e6 43; 44; 104; 109
276ef. 59
277a1 n. 35, p. 42; 43
277a3 78
277b 48
277b5–8 54
277B8–9 35
277b–c 40;68; 107
277c2 107
277d7–8 83
278a1 27; 45; 54
278a4–5 35
278c 104
278c2–3 47
278c4 49; 54
278c4–e3 48
278c4–5 48
278c6–7 48
278c7 53
278c–d 58
278d8 48
278d8–e1 48
2798a8 52
Pol�t�cus
261e n. 54, p. 58
 Index of passages c�ted 105

285c–287a 26
285d10–286b2 117
285e4 52
286b1 26
304c10–d2 n. 95,p. 97
309c 74
Protagoras
317b–c 15
320c 96
322d5 96
323a5 96
324d6 96
334c–338e 105
338e 36
338e–347a 36
339b–d 36
340a1 36
341c8–9 36
341d n. 4, p. 13
341d8 n. 55, p. 59
342a–347a 20
342a–e 13
347a–b 105
347c–348a 37
347e3–7 n. 31, p. 37
348a5 37
348d n. 10, p. 21
351e8–11 n. 100, p. 106
353aff. 101
353b4 n. 100, p. 106
Republ�c
327a–c 87
327c 87
331d–336a 35
332b9 n. 29, p.35
347e 90
354b 90
357a 90
358b–362c 90
362d9 n. 50, p. 57
362e–367e 90
368b4 n. 50, p. 57
368b7 n. 50, p. 57
368b7–c1 n. 52, p. 57
368c1 n. 50, p. 57
368c3 n. 53, p. 58
368c5 n. 50, p. 57
376d n. 41, p. 45; 79
378d 35
435c4–6 72
435c9–d3 70
435d3 n. 36, p. 43
 Index of passages c�ted 106

435eff. 68
443c–e 90
445c5 n. 81, p. 83
449c4–8 48
474b–480a 53
474bff. 49
485b–487a 32
485b6 52; 117
487a 83
494bff. 7
497c 7
500b–d n. 59, p. 62
500c 73; 116
501e n. 41, p. 45; 79
503d 14
503e 71
504a 70
504aff. 63
504a–c 94
504b2 n. 36, p. 43
504b–d 71
504d–e 71
505a 71
505a3 n. 9, p. 20
506d8–e3 71
506d–e 16; 57; 66; 71
509e2–509a4 n. 46, p. 52
509a4–5 n. 45, p. 52; 57
509b9 57
509b9–10 n. 45, p. 52
509c 16
509c5–10 71
509c9–10 71
509d–511e 61
510cff. 78; 88
511b 52
511b8 52
511b–c 107
515c4–517b7 117
516b 116
517b–c 116
518c8–d4 104
518d4 49
518d–e 73
521c6 49; 104
531cff. 78; 88
532e 116
532e3 49; 69
532eff. 63
533a 16; 71; 87
553a1–2 71
533e n. 54, p. 58
 Index of passages c�ted 107

534a7 n. 36, p. 43
534c1–3 104
540a 14; 63
585bff. 73
589d1 73
589e4 73
590d1 73
608c–611a 72
611a–612a 72; 75
611b9–10 n. 9, p. 20
611c6 72
611d2 72; 74
611e 82
611e2 40
611e4 73
611–612 82
612a4 72; 73; 74
612a5–6 72
613b 116
Soph�st
263e n. 10, p. 21
Sympos�um
175b n. 9, p. 20
199c–201c 92
201e 60; 101
203e 117
203eff. 76
204bff. 49
208b 101
210aff. 61
210e 117
212c 91
2l4e3–4 104
217c–219d 91
218c 91
218d–219a 92
219b–c 92
220c–d n. 9, p. 20
221d–222a n. 79, p. 82; 83; 92
Theaetetus
172c–177c 49
176b 116
189e n. 10, p. 21
T�maeus
27a 67
28c 106
28c3–5 64
29b 52
29d 97
35a 73
35a–36d 74; 82
41d 73
 Index of passages c�ted 108

52c–d 64
53d 49; 66; 68; 80; 106; 116
53d6–7 64
68d 97
69b 97
69c–d 74
90b 74
90c–d 74
90d 116
90d5 74
Plutarch
De Is�de et Os�r�de
48, 370F 64f.
Theagenes
Fragments (ed. D�els-Kranz)
8A1-4 n. 25, p. 33
Theogn�s
681f. 33; n. 106, p. 110
Theophrastus
Metaphys�cs
6b28 n. 47, p. 53
7b14 n. 47, p. 53
10b26 n. 47, p. 53
11a23 n. 47, p. 53
Xenophanes
Fragments (ed. D�els-Kranz)
21B10 n. 22, p. 33
21B11 n. 23, p. 33
21B15 n. 23, p. 33
 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Thomas Alexander Szlezák, born �n 1940, stud�ed Class�cs, Ph�losophy and H�story from
1959 to 1967 at the un�vers�t�es of Erlangen, Mun�ch and Tüb�ngen. He ga�ned h�s
doctorate at the Techn�sche Un�vers�tät �n Berl�n �n 1969, w�th a thes�s deal�ng w�th late-
ant�que �nterpretat�ons of Ar�stotle (Pseudo-Archytas über d�e Kategor�en. Texte zur
gr�ech�schen Ar�stoteles-Exegese, publ. 1972). He obta�ned h�s post-doctoral lectur�ng
qual�f�cat�on �n 1976 at Zur�ch Un�vers�ty w�th a thes�s ent�tled Platon und Ar�stoteles �n
der Nuslehre Plot�ns (publ. 1979), �n wh�ch Plot�nus’ methods of the ph�losoph�cal
�nterpretat�on of the ‘Class�cs’, Plato and Ar�stotle were for the f�rst t�me subjected to
systemat�c ph�losoph�cal analys�s. There followed several years of research and teach�ng
as a pr�vate lecturer �n Zur�ch, from where, �n 1983, he moved to the Cha�r of Class�cs at
Würzburg Un�vers�ty. Platon und d�e Schr�ftl�chke�t der Ph�losoph�e appeared �n 1985.
The �nterpretat�ons offered there of the early and m�ddle d�alogues of Plato demonstrate
that the prevalent v�ew of the d�alogues as self-suff�c�ent works (wh�ch thus do not need
any supplementat�on by means of Plato’s oral ph�losophy) �s contrad�cted by Plato’s text
�tself—a conclus�on wh�ch has rad�cally altered the controversy over the last decades
about Plato’s unwr�tten ph�losophy of pr�nc�ples. The book has also appeared �n Ital�an
(M�lan 1989, 19923). The f�rst ed�t�on of the present volume was also publ�shed �n Italy
(M�lan 1991, 19922). Translat�ons �nto other languages followed (French 1996, Span�sh
1997, Pol�sh 1998, Swed�sh 1999). Szlezák’s other ma�n research areas �nclude f�fth-
century Greek tragedy as well as Ar�stotle’s Metaphys�cs; a ser�es of essays and rev�ews
on these f�elds has appeared �n recent years. Szlezák has been teach�ng at the Un�vers�ty
of Tüb�ngen s�nce 1990.