COPYRIGHT® INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC

THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)

FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAZI ON TIME

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC

THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION (ISTAC)

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

BY

ADNIN ARMAS

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

MAY 2003
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS li

ABBREVIATIONS iii

ABSTRACT iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE

THE EXISTENCE OF TIME

1. Time Does not Exist 4

The Existence of Time is Self-Evident 13

The Existence of Time is not Self-Evident 21

CHAPTER TWO

THE QUIDDITY OF TIME

1. Various Definitions of Time 36

Time is not a Measure of Motion 43

puu

Time is Discrete Quantity 53

4^

The Now 57

CHAPTER THREE

GOD’S PRIORITY TO THE WORLD

1. The Eternity of T ime 62

Ibn Sina on God’s Essential (Causal) Priority to the World 70

3. God’s Priority to the World is Unknown 73

4. Eternity, Perpetuity and Time 82

CONCLUSION 88

BIBLIOGRAPHY 91

i
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Dr. Syed Muhammad

Naquib al-Attas, Founder-Director of ISTAC. His works and lectures enlightened my

appreciation of the significance of Islamic Thought and Civilization.

Professor Dr. Paul Lettinck, who supervised this dissertation, must be given a special

acknowledgment. I am, indeed, very grateful to him for his constructive criticism. He

guided me through every stage of its writing and saved me from more than one error.

I am also very grateful to Professor Dr. Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud, Deputy Director

of ISTAC and Professor Dr. Karim Crow for their advice during my studies at

ISTAC. Many friends of mine, especially Moh. Adi Setia, Wan Suhaimi Wan

Abdullah and Dr. Ugi Suharto, were helpful to me in many ways. Last but not the

least, I have to thank my wife, Irma Draviyanti, whose patience and constant

encouragement have contributed a lot to the present thesis.

ii
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MA Al-Razi, al-Matalib al-6Aliyah min al-6llm al-llatii, ed. Ahmad Hijazi al-Saqa,

9 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1987.

MM Al-Razl, al-Mabahith al-Mashriqlyyah fiIlm al-Ilahiyyat wa al-TabFiyyat, 2

vols. Qum: Maktabah Bldar, 1966.

SUH Al-Razl, Sharh 6Uyun al-Hikmah, ed. Ahmad Hijaz'! Ahmad al-Saqa, 3 vols.

Tehran: Manshurat Mu’assasah al-Sadiq, 1994.

Tafslr Al-Razl, al-Tafslr al-Kablr Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi, 32 vols.

1999.

iii
 ABSTRACT

Based mainly on the Matalib, the present study discusses al-Razi’s views on time by

elaborating on the arguments for and against the existence of time, its essence and

God’s priority to the world. After all of the above-mentioned points have been

clarified, the thesis concludes that al-Razi’s view of self-evident time is as central to

his physics and metaphysics as absolute time is to Newton’s philosophy. I believe

that this thesis will provide a solid investigation of al-Razi’s own idea of time, which

can hopefully enlighten further research leading to an assessment of his idea of

physics and metaphysics.

iv
 Introduction

Although Abu al-Fadl, Muhammad ibn ‘Umar al-Razi (d. 606/1209) extensively

discusses time in several of his works, his discussion of time has never been studied

in detail. Al-Zarkan briefly discussed al-Razi’s view on the existence of time.

However, he did not elucidate the arguments for and against the existence of time,

let alone elaborate on the divergent views concerning the essence of time, the

existence of the now, God’s priority to the world and the levels of time, namely

eternity (sarmad), perpetuity (dahr), time (al-zamari).x

Besides al-Zarkan, Ceylan also discussed al-Razl’s idea of time, but he did

not rely on the Matalib. As result, his presentation leads to a certain

CO

misunderstanding of al-Razi’s view on time. He holds that al-Razl denied the

existence of time before the point of creation and did not produce a solution to the

problem (existence) of time, and then he quoted the Mabahith to support his idea.1
2

As the present thesis will show, it is obvious that in the Matalib, al-Razl holds that

time is pre-etemal and believes that he produces a solution to the problem of time.

Although in the Mabahith, al-Razl candidly admits that he is agnostic concerning the

existence of time, he candidly admits that he follows Platonian time in his later

works. Perhaps the reason why Ceylan did not rely on to the Matalib when he

discussed time is that at the time of his writing, the Matalib was still in the form of

manuscript.

1 Muhammad Salih al-Zarkan, Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl wa Ara1uhu al-Kalamiyyah wa al-Falsafiyyah

(Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 1963), 450-62, hereinafter cited as Kalam.
2 Yasin Ceylan, Theology and Tafslr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl (Kuala Lumpur:
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996), 60, henceforth cited as
Theology.

1
 The present thesis will study al-Razi’s view on time as has been stated

mainly in the Matalib, the Mabahith and the Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah. As we shall

see, al-Razi’s idea of time in the Mabahith is different from that found in Sharh

‘Uyun al-Hikmah and the Matalib. This fact requires us to know his works

chronologically. As far as the Matalib, the Mabahith and the Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah

are concerned, the Mabahith was written most probably before he was thirty-six.

This view is based on the date of his journey to Transoxiana thought most likely to

have been 580 A.H/1184 C.E. Al-Razl himself states that the ninth debate of his

Controversies in Transoxiana was held in 582 A.H./1186 C.E. He reports in one of

his debates that the Mabahith along with the Mulakhas and the Sharh al-Isharatviexe

read by al-Farld al-Ghailam.3

Unlike the Mabahith, the Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah should be considered as

being from the later period. Al-Razl himself states that he wrote many books for

thirty years before the Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah. If he had started to write when he

was around 20 years old, then he would most probably have written it around 1198

C.E.

The Matalib is the latest philosophical work written by al-Razl. He himself

mentions that this book [time and space] was completed in 605 A.H./1208 C.E.4

Comparing these works, we find out that the Matalib is the most systematic

exposition of al-Razi’s ideas on time. The major arguments for time mentioned in

the Mabahith and Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah were incorporated in the Matalib. This

does not necessarily mean the first two works were insignificant. They still remain

significant because they provide us an insight into how al-Razl conceived time

3 Fath all a Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-D7n al-Razi and His Controversies in Transoxiana (Beirut:
Dar al-Mashriq, 1966),J2.
4 Al-Razl, al-Matalib al-‘Aliyyah min al-Tlm aldlatii, ed. Ahmad Hijazl al-Saqa, 9 vols. (Beirut: Dar
al-Kitab al-‘ Arabi), 5: 185, henceforth cited as M4.

2
differently. We know that his views on time developed gradually. The final position,

however, is found in the because it is the latest work. Thus, al-Razl’s views

on time that are not in line with the Mabahith should be considered as abrogated.

In his discussion of time, al-Razl mentions Plato (d. 348 B.C.E.), Aristotle (d.

322 B.C.E.), Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Razl (d. 311 A.H. /923 C.E. or

320 A.H./932 C.E.), al-Farabl, Ibn Sina (d. 428 A.H./1037 C.E.) and Abu al-Barakat

al-Bagdadi (d. 560 A.H./1165 C.E.) by name. Apart from these names, al-Razl

mentions some arguments, which it can be assumed refer to al-Kindi, al-Ghazali (d.

505 A.H./llll C.E.), and al-Shahrastarii (d. 548 A.H./1153 C.E). Thus, when we

present al-Razl’s view, we also consult their original works to have a comprehensive

outlook on his arguments. These include: the Physics of Aristotle, the Timaeus of

Plato, Al-Shifa’, al-Najat, ‘Uyun al-Hikmah, of Ibn Sina, Tahafut al-Falasifah of al-

Ghazali, Nihayat al-Iqdam fi Tim al-Kalam of al-Shahrastanl and Kitab al-Mu’tabar

of Abu al-Barakat al-Bagdadi.. Abu Bakr al-Razl’s al-71m al-Ilahihas been lost.

The present thesis is mainly based on the Matalib because it is the latest

philosophical work of al-Razl and the most systematic elaboration of his

philosophical ideas, including those on time. Other works, such as the Mabahith, the

Sharh cUyun al-Hikmah and the Tafslraxe used as supplementary texts. The different

views of al-Razl concerning time in several of his works will be highlighted. Since

the most important thinker that al-Razl invokes and critiques on this issue was Ibn

Sina, the present thesis will focus on al-Razl’s refutation of Ibn Sina’s ideas.

The thesis analyzes closely, translates, paraphrases, clarifies and comments

on the Matalib, which contains several passages which are problematic and

ambiguous. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to a better understanding of al-

Razl’s physics and metaphysics.

3
 Chapter One

The Existence of Time

1. Time Does not Exist

Al-RazTs predecessors like al-Kindi,5 al-Ghazafi,6 and al-Shahrastarii have argued

that time has no objective existence because it is a concept formed in the estimative

faculty (wahm). In al-Razi’s exposition on the arguments against the existence of

time in several of his works, the holders of this view are not specifically mentioned.7 8

Al-Razi summarizes and systematizes these arguments, though they are not

systematically elaborated in the works of these proponents. Al-RazTs exposition on

their arguments in al-Mabahith al-Mashriqiyyal? is less comprehensive than in al-

Matalib al-‘Aliyyah because the former belongs to an earlier period, while the latter

belongs to a later period. Precisely and briefly stated, they argue that existents may

be divided into two classes, (a) those (existents) whose persistence is due to the fact

that each individual is successive to another one. This concept does not require an

affirmation of something [sc. time] that is additional to them, and (b) those whose

, persistence is due to the fact that they permanently exist in the same way; this

5 In al-Kindi* s view, infinite time is based upon the imagination. Alfred L. Ivry, al-Kincfi’s
Metaphysics (New York: State University of New York, 1974), 59-70.
6 Al-Ghazafi repeatedly states in Tahafut al-Falasifah that time is the work of the imagination. For a
detailed view of Al-Ghazali, see Tahafut al-Falasifah, trans. Michael E. Marmura, The Incoherence
of the Philosophers, (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), 31-38 passim. This work is
hereinafter cited as Tahafut.
7 Al-Razi, Sharh *Uyun al-Hikmah, ed. Ahmad Hijaz'! Ahmad al-Saqa, 3 vols. (Tehran: Mu’assasah al-
Sadiq, 1415 H), 2: 120, henceforth cited as 5Z#/;and MA, 5: 9-19.
8 Al-Razl cites 5 arguments against the existence of time in the al-Mabahith, whereas he mentions 12
arguments in the Matalib. See Al-Razl, al-Mabahith al-Mashriqiyyah fial- Tim al-Ilahiyyat, 2 vols,
2nd ed. (Qum: Maktabah Bldar, 1966) 1: 642-47, hereinafter abbreviated as MM, and MA, 5: 9-19.

4
 concept also does not require the affirmation of something that is additional. This

argument is further elaborated as follows:9

(1) If time were existent, it would either be or not be permanently existent

(mustamirr al-wujud). If it were permanently existent, then today would be

exactly the same as the day of the Great Flood (al-tufari). On this

supposition, today’s event would be an event at the time of the Great Flood,

even before it, even an infinite time before it, and this is an absurd

contradiction. Moreover, by supposing that it always exists in the same way,

it must be true that it existed before (it existed) and will exist after it has

existed. If this concept required the affirmation of time (duration) for it, then

time (duration) must require another time (duration), so an infinite regression

would result, and this is impossible. If it were not permanently existent, then

it would imply that the supposed parts of time are subsequent and successive

(muta‘aqibah wa-mutawaliyaliy, then it is right to say that each part of time

is happening now, not before, nor after. If the judgment on each part of time

that it is happening now, or that it happened before now, or that it will

happen after now, required something else as a receptacle for each part, and if

it is due to its occurrence in this receptacle that it is true that it happens now,

or that it has happened in the past, or that it will happen in the future, then it

would be necessary for time to require another time ad infinitum, and that is

absurd.10

(2) It is self-evident that the parts of time do not occur simultaneously but

subsequently. Thus, either each part of time has or has no occurrence

9 MA, 5: 9-19.
10 Ibid., 5: 9; and MM, i : 642.

5
 (presence). As for the first alternative, if it had presence, then at the

occasion of its presence, it would be indivisible; for otherwise it would

consist of two parts in which the first part is prior to the second one, so that

the present would not be present, and this is a contradiction. Thus, each part

of time is indivisible, so time is composed of indivisible parts. It follows that

body would also be composed of indivisible parts, because if the extent of

03

the distance along which something is moving in an indivisible now were

divisible, then motion along one half of that distance would occur in one half

of that now, and then the now would be divisible, whereas it was assumed as

being indivisible, and this is a contradiction. Thus, if time were indivisible, it

would lead to the affirmation of an individual substance (jawhar fard))1 and

this is wrong. As a result, time has no existence. As for the second

alternative, if each part of time has no occurrence (presence) at all, time will

have no existence. Each part of time has no occurrence because the past has

been present and then disappeared and the future is not yet present. Thus,

past and future are dependent on the present. When it is impossible for the

present to exist, it is also impossible for the past and future to exist. Since the

existence of time is neither in the present, nor in the past, nor in the future,

its existence is impossible.13

11 12

(3) Either time is originated or pre-etemal. If it were originated, then its non­

existence would be before its existence. This before-ness is not in time

because this occurs in the non-existence of time, which is prior to the

existence of all time, and when this non-existence occurs, time does not exist.

11 Either each part of time is or is not, i.e., occurring now.

12 jawhar fardxs used to refer to atoms (indivisible parts)
13 Cf. MM, 1: 644-45.

6
 Thus, priority has occurred without the occurrence of time and its occurrence

does not depend on the existence of time. If time were pre-etemal, then this

would be wrong because the existence of time is only established due to the

subsequent priorities and posteriorities. This subsequence is change and it is

the essence of time, hence, its essence is preceded by the existence of

something else. Eternity, however, is not compatible with something else

preceding. The combination of the essence of time and the essence of pre­

eternity is impossible.

(4) It is self-evident that yesterday’s event is prior to today’s event and

yesterday is prior to today. What is prior and what is posterior cannot exist

together. If this kind of priority required the existence of a receptacle in

which this priority and posteriority occur, this receptacle would require the

existence of another receptacle ad infinitum. If this kind of priority did not

require a receptacle at all, then this would be the case also in all temporal

events. It is impossible to affirm an infinite number of times, one

encompassed within another, because on this supposition, today is not one

day, but an infinite number of days, one encompassed in another, while their

totality is present today. Also, yesterday is not one yesterday, but an infinite

number of days, one encompassed in another, whereas their totality was

present yesterday. Thus, the sum total of infinite yesterdays precedes the

totality of infinite todays, and this precedence must be due to another time,

which is a receptacle and a container for the other. A receptacle for the sum

total of yesterdays must be outside time, due to the fact that the receptacle is

different from what is being received. However, this totality of yesterdays is

one of the yesterdays and therefore, it must be at the same time inside the

7
 sum total of yesterdays. Thus, one thing in relation to this totality is both

outside and inside this totality, and this is absurd.14

(5) God must precede today’s events and it is impossible for His essence to be

separated (Jnfikak) from this priority. The occurrence of this priority is either

dependent on or independent of the occurrence of time. If this priority were

dependent on time, then the necessarily existent-in itself would require time.

As a result, the necessarily-existent-in-itself would be the contingently-

existent-in-itself, and this is a contradiction. Moreover, if the necessarily-

existent-in-itself required the existence of time for its existence, then it

would be self-evident that it is time which is rather the necessarily-existent-

in-itself, although it is composed of successive and subsequent temporal

events, and all that is impossible. Thus, God’s priority over today’s events is

not dependent on time, but His priority over today’s events is the same as the

priority of any temporal precedent (mutaqaddim zamanT), to any temporal

posterity (mutakhkhir zamanT) and there is no difference between the two,

and so the existence of duration (time) is not taken into consideration even

though these priorities (al-taqaddumaf) occur.

(6) There is no doubt that God is an enduring existent. In the same way as

origination can only be conceived with an imagination of duration (time),

endurance (al-dawam) can only be conceived also with the imagination of an

enduring duration (time), because what endures (al-da’im) has no beginning

for its existence. If this imaginative proposition were true, God’s endurance

would require the existence of time, and what depends on something else is

contingent-in-itself, and hence, the necessarily-existent-in-itself is

14 Ibid., 1: 643-44.

8
 contingent-in-itself, and this is a contradiction. If this imaginative

proposition were false, and the truth would be that the enduring of a thing is

not dependent on the existence of duration (time), and this should be the case

with regard to origination and change, then a thing’s being before, or after, or

simultaneous with something else does not depend on the existence of

something else that is a receptacle or a container for what is prior and for

what is posterior, and that is what is meant by the denial of time.

(7) Duration is contingent-in-itself because its parts are successive and

originated. Thus, if time were an existent, it would be contingent-in-itself for

the supposition of its non-existence after its existence does not entail

absurdity (fa-innahu la yalzam min fard ‘adamihl ba‘da wujudihl muhal). If

this posteriority could only be determined by time, then time would exist at

the occasion that it was supposed to be non-existent, because its non­

existence after its existence could be only determined by time. So if we

suppose that time does not exist after its existence, then it would follow from

its non-existence occurring after its existence, that it is existent, at the

occasion of its supposed non-existence, and this is impossible. Thus, if time

were an existent, the very supposition of its non-existence would necessitate

its existence. Thus, the supposition of the non-existence of time necessitates

an impossibility-in-itself, and hence, time is necessary-in-itself. Thus, if time

existed, it would be contingent-in-itself according to the first consideration

and would be necessary-in itself according to the second consideration, and

this is impossible. Thus, the occurrence of priorities and posteriorities is not

dependent on the existence of time.

9
 (8) The philosophers say that the existence of an originated thing occurs after its

non-existence, so it has preceding non-existence and subsequent

existence. It is impossible for the existence of an originated thing, after

having been non-existent to be acquired from a separate cause because the

precedence of its non-existence to its existence is a necessary fact in itself It

is impossible to suppose this existence unless it is preceded by non-existence.

Since precedence (al-masbuqiyyah) is a necessary fact in the very essence of

an originated thing, its existence cannot be acquired from a separate cause. I

say: if this existence after its non-existence cannot be caused by something

else, how could they say that this priority and this posteriority can only be

determined by something else, which is called duration and time? A thing,

being judged as before something else, can exist only with this priority and

thing, being judged as after something else, can exist only with this

posteriority. Thus, the occurrence of priorities and posteriorities is something

that takes place by itself. Since the necessary existent-in-itself is not the

necessary-by-the other, one concludes that the occurrence of these priorities

and posteriorities is not dependent on the existence of something else.

(9) The essence of time (duration) must be quantity because it is receptive of

being equal and different. This quantity is neither continuous, nor discrete. As

result, time has no existence. It cannot be a continuous quantity because

continuous quantity is divisible into two parts that share a common single

boundary. Time is divided into past and future, and both of them share a

single boundary, i.e., the now, which is the end of the past and beginning of

the future. However, past and future are non-existents and the now is

existent. Thus, one of the two non-existents, namely the past, is connected to

10
 the second non-existent, namely the future with a boundary that links both of

them, namely the now. This cannot be accepted, because it cannot be

accepted that two non-existents are connected to one another. Furthermore, it

cannot be conceived either that a non-existent is described as having

3}
boundary that exists. It cannot discrete quantity either, because

O"
o
otherwise it would follow that bodies are composed of indivisible parts, and

that has been refuted.

(10) If time were an existent, it would either be or not be an attribute of motion.

However, both are false, so time is not an existent. As for the second

alternative, time cannot be an attribute of motion for two reasons; (a) God

“was” occurring in the pre-etemity and the non-existence of what now exists

occurred in the pre-etemity. “Was” signifies time, and it has occurred even

though motion and change have not, because the existence of God was devoid

of motion and change. Similarly, the non-existence of today’s originated

thing was also devoid of change in the pre-etemity. (b) The argument would

become circular because motion requires time, and vice versa. As for the first

alternative, it is impossible for time not to be an attribute of motion because

time can only be determined by the occurrence of successive priorities and

posteriorities. The occurrence of priority after posteriority and vice versa is

change or motion. This implies that the essence of time can only be

determined by the occurrence of motion. Thus, if time were existent, it would

be or not be an attribute of motion. However, both are false, so time is not an

existent.15

15 Ibid., 1:643.

11
 (11) If time were an existent, it would either be or not be a measure of motion.

However, both are wrong, so time is not an existent. Time is not a measure of

motion because otherwise it would mean that it were a measure of the

extension of motion, and the extension of motion has no existence in the

external reality (a‘yari). The subsequent occurrences of a certain substance in

subsequent spaces do not occur in the external reality; what only occurs is

that a certain substance occurs in a certain space. Since the extension

05
o
motion’s existence does not occur in the external reality, its measure, which

is an attribute of this extension, does not exist either.16 This extension is non­

existent in the external reality, so it is impossible for the measure of this

extension to exist in the external reality because an attribute of a non­

existent can never be an existent. Al-Razi does not reject the view that time

exists, but is not a measure of motion, because the discussion is focusing on

the idea that time is a measure of motion, as maintained by Aristotle and his

companions.

(12) The existence of any originated thing is preceded by its non-existence. The

precedence is an aspect (sifah) of the non-existent, and hence, this aspect is

non-existent. Thus, priority and posteriority do not exist at all in the external

reality while pure non-existence does not require an existent substrate

(mahall mawjud). Thus, priority and posteriority do not require something

existing to which they are attributed. Time has no real existence except as

something to which this priority and posteriority are attributed. As a result,

time (duration) cannot be an existent thing.17

16 Ibid., 1: 646-47.
"MA, 5: 19.

12
 According to these 12 arguments, time does not indicate anything more than

that the existence of some existents is enduring, while others are successive and

subsequent.

Commenting on the arguments against the existence of time, al-Razi

admitted that he has no clear views in his early work, al-Mabahith al-

Mashriqiyyah. However, as we shall see, al-Razi‘s views in this early work were

modified in his later works such as in Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah and in al-Matalib al-

‘Aliyyah.

2. The Existence of Time is Self-Evident

Having systematically exposed the arguments against the existence of time, al-Razi

proceeds to discuss the arguments for the existence of time. He holds that those who

argue that time exists differ on whether it is a substance or an accident. Those who

believe that it is a substance disagree as to whether it is an immaterial substance or a

body. Those who regard time as an accident agree that it is a non-permanent

accident that flows; however, they disagree as to whether it is motion or another

accident, which is not motion.18

19 Al-RazTs position on this issue is that time is

neither an accident, nor a body, but an abstract substance (jawhar mujarrad). In

maintaining this view, al-Razi claims that he systematizes the arguments of Abu

Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya al-Razi and others20 who state that time is a self-

evident substance, and hence, proofs of its existence are not required. This can be

18 MM, 1:647
19MM, 1:651.
20Although al-Razi did not mention them by name, it can be rightly assumed that Abu al-Barakat al-
Bagdadi is one of them because he maintains that time is like an existence, which can never be
removed from the human mind. See further Abu al-Barakat al-Bagdadi, al-Mu’tabar, 3: 39. The
section on Metaphysics (al-IIahiyyaf) in the Mu'tabar has been edited by Wan Suhaimi Wan
Abdullah, (M.A. thesis, University of al-Azhar, 1998), 263, henceforth cited as al-Ilahiyyat.

13
 shown in various ways; however, as can be seen, these arguments are not devoid of

repetition.21

1. Imagine someone who is blind sitting in a darkened house and unaware of the

existence of the celestial spheres and stars. He still finds out necessarily that

duration flows ceaselessly, even if he intends to bring all motions, including

even those of his eye and soul to a state of rest. When he considers this

circumstance from the early morning (bukrah) to morning (dahwah) and then

from morning to the time of noon {waqt al-zuhi), then even if he is unaware

of the motions of all the celestial spheres, he knows all by himself as a self-

evident matter that what has passed from early morning to morning is a half

of what has passed from the early morning to midday, and this spontaneous

knowledge does not depend on his knowledge of the moving celestial spheres

and stars. These considerations show that the knowledge of the existence of

duration (time) is primarily self-evident and does not need any proof or

explanation.

2. The human mind judges that a thing, whether existent or non-existent, is

either in a state of origination and change or in a state of endurance and

permanence. If we consider it in the state of its origination, then the mind

affirms space and time and makes them a receptacle for the origination
o

thing. The mind has to say that a thing has occurred at such and such a time.

If we consider it in the state of its endurance, this endurance is only

conceivable if it has existed in previous times as much as it now exists in the

present time. Thus, the meaning of origination and endurance can never be

conceived if time is removed from the human mind.

21 MA, 5: 21-32.

14
 The prophet Adam’s priority to the prophet Muhammad means that there is a

specific duration between them and the simultaneous existence of twin

brothers means that they exist at the same time. Thus, the knowledge of the

existence of duration is very obvious in the human mind. The meaning of

simultaneity and priority are not essences in themselves because their

essences and their existences are the locus of division (mawrid li al-taqsini)

for this simultaneity and this priority. The locus of division is known

necessarily.

Whether a body is moving or at rest, the concept of motion presupposes time.

The moving body occurs in a place, after having occurred in another place.

This posteriority signifies that the body had occurred in another place, and

then occurred at another time in another place. This shows that motion can

only be understood after admitting the existence of duration (time). Also, a

body, which is at rest, remains in one place for a long time. This also signifies

that duration (time) exists. Thus, the knowledge of the essences of motion

and rest occurs only after admitting the existence of duration (time), and as

the knowledge of motion and rest is evident and primary, it follows that the

knowledge of them can only be determined by accepting the existence of

duration (time). Thus, something that is based on the evident assent (al-

tasdiq al-badlhT) is more appropriate to be primary. Thus, the knowledge of

the existence of duration (time) is self-evident knowledge.

Every human mind knows self-evidently that what exists is either pre-etemal,
yi

i.e., that its existence has no beginning, or originated, i.e., that its existence

has a beginning. That something exists without a beginning means that, if we

consider a situation in former times (al-azminah al-salifati), we can only

15
 imagine that time already existed before that. Concerning the meaning of

origination, it is that the existence of something has a beginning; in this case

the human mind arrives at a moment in which it deems that the thing has

been originated. Thus, the meanings of pre-etemity and origination can only

be conceived by taking the existence of time into consideration.

It is obvious to the human mind that time can be divided into years, months,

days, and hours, and it is known necessarily that an hour is a part of a day,

which is a part of a month, which is a part of a year, which is a part of

duration. The knowledge of these divisions and the knowledge that some

parts are shorter or longer than others is necessary knowledge ilm al-daruri).

Time must be realized (mutahaqqiq) in the external reality, otherwise it could

never be a locus of these divisions in the external reality.

7. Everyone knows that duration is either short or long and this is not merely

mental pure supposition because it is in conformity with an external

thing.
oo

Years are successive and the past, present and future are different from each

other. If these attributes of duration can be known self-evidently, then that

to which they are attributed is even more suitably known as self-evident.

We may say that two motions start simultaneously and stop simultaneously

and that of two other motions one starts before or stops before or after the

other. Our knowledge of this simultaneity in starting and stopping, and in

this priority and posteriority, is a necessary knowledge. The meaning of

simultaneity is that the two motions occur at the same time, and the meaning

of priority and posteriority is that what is prior occurs before the occurrence

16
 of what is posterior. All this shows that the knowledge of the existence of

duration (time) is self-evident knowledge.22

10. It is self-evident that the motion of creeping ant is slower than that of

as

Bi
flying bird. The meaning of slow motion and fast motion is that the fast one

covers the same distance as the slow one in a shorter time, or it covers a

longer distance than the distance of the slow one in the same time. Thus, the

knowledge of slow and fast motions is self-evident and the essences of the

fast and the slow motions can only be conceived by taking the existence of

duration (time) into consideration.23

Having shown that the existence of time is self-evident, al-Razi then

proceeds to show that time is not a motion of the celestial spheres, nor an attribute

of that motion due to the following reasons:24

1. Suppose a blind man is sitting in a darkened house and is observing the way

duration (time) passes. He knows more or less how much duration passes,

even without referring to the state of the celestial spheres. He finds out

necessarily that duration passes persistently and endures ceaselessly, except if

he is sleeping or if his thought is occupied with something different. Even if

he imagines that all the celestial spheres are non-existent, or all moving

things are at rest, or he is not aware of any of them, his mind is still

convinced that something is passing, which is called duration. Even if he has

been deaf and blind since the beginning of his creation, such that he has never

seen the celestial spheres and never heard at all that God created these things,

and even if he would force himself to bring his soul, his eyes, and the pupils

22 The ninth argument is a repetition of the third one.

23 The tenth argument is a repetition of the seventh one.
24 MA, 5: 26-32.

17
 of his eyes to rest, then in these situations he would still find duration

steadfastly in the mind. This shows that the knowledge of the existence of

time is necessary and that time is not the motion of the celestial spheres.

2. It is possible for the mind to imagine that the prior part of the motion of the

celestial sphere can be changed into the posterior part, and vice versa. When

the celestial sphere moves from the East to the West, its motion in the

Eastern region is prior to its motion in the Western region. If we imagine that

the celestial sphere moved from the West to the East, then its motion in the

Western region would be prior to its motion in the Eastern region. However,

it is impossible for the mind to imagine that the prior part of time can be

changed into the posterior part, and vice versa. Thus, duration is neither

motion, nor its attributes, nor its adjuncts (Jawahiq).

3. It is possible to question whether the motion of this sphere had occurred

before this moment during a period of 100, 000 years, or shorter, or longer.

However, it is not possible to question whether the previous duration that

occurred before this present hour has occurred during a period of 100, 000

years.

4. The biggest celestial circle is the equator (mintaqati). The parallel circles

which are closer to the equator are faster and those which are farther from it

are slower. Thus, the daily motions, which occur in the parallel celestial

circles, vary in speed. If time were equivalent to the celestial motion, then its

being equivalent to some of those circular motions would not be more

primary than its being equivalent to the motions of the other circles. If it

were equivalent to all of them, then this one day would not be one day but

many days that occur simultaneously, in accordance with those parallel

18
 circles, and this is absurd. If it is said that none of these is the very duration

(time), but that time is something different, namely that it measures all of

them, then this is what we were looking for. This view can be strengthened

by saying that each of those circular motions occurs in one time. The mind

judges that time is a receptacle for all those motions.

LA

Motion is fast and slow, but time cannot be described like that. Time is

neither slower than another, nor faster than another time. Moreover, the

speed of motion is conceived because of time, for a slow motion covers a

distance in a longer time, or it covers a shorter distance than a faster one in

the same time, and a fast motion is what behaves in just the opposite way.

It is possible to conceive many celestial spheres in an infinite void, in which

each of them is outside the other and is not connected with the other. On this

supposition, it is possible to conceive many simultaneous motions, such that

they will not follow one another, but it is impossible to conceive the

occurrence of two simultaneous times.

We may say that a motion with all its attributes occurs in a certain time, but

we cannot say that a motion occurs in itself, or in one of its attributes, or in

another motion.
OO

Time can be perceived without motion. Imagine that God makes all the

celestial spheres non-existent at the occurrence of the resurrection and He

leaves them to pure non-existence for a very long time until He creates them

again at the resurrection. Then there is a specific duration, namely the

intermediate duration between the beginning of the time of their non­

existence and the beginning of the time of their remaking. The human mind is

25 The text seems to be a repetition. MA, 5: 29.

19
 capable of conceiving that duration as less or more, although all motions are

non-existent. Thus, it is not impossible to remove every motion from the

human mind.

9. The essence of motion can be conceived only if we conceive that what is

moving occurs in one space, after having occurred in the other space. Thus,

motion is a transition from one space to another and its occurrence in the

second space happens after having occurred in the first space. Thus, the

essence of motion can only be conceived after conceiving the essence of

duration (time), The essence of duration may be conceived independently of

the essence of motion, because if God makes all motions of the celestial

spheres non-existent, then in such circumstance the human mind is

incapable of rejecting duration, because it considers that the moment of its

non-existence is different from the moment of its existence. Even if the

human mind is unaware of all the celestial spheres, it still finds out that there

is something that is extended permanently, the parts of which occur one after

another, like flowing water.

10. All bodies, including the celestial spheres, are originated. Before their

origination, their origination was possible. This shows that the origination of

thing must be in duration (time). Those who say that the world is originated
ca

differ as to whether the world before its origination was possibly existent, or

impossibly existent, but on both suppositions, they have thought that there is

priority and posteriority before the originated things.

11. If motion has a beginning, it will not be necessary for another motion to

occur before it, because one may conceive that something is at rest and then

moves. Similarly, if motion has an ending, it will not be necessary for another

20
 motion to occur after it, because after something has moved, it may be at

rest. Contrary to motion, if duration had a beginning, another duration must

exist before it, because it has a beginning only if its non-existence is before

its existence, and that ‘before’ occurs and can be conceived only because of

duration. Thus, if it had a beginning, then it would follow that it existed

before it began. Similarly, if it had an ending, another duration must exist

after its cessation, because the cessation occurs only if its non-existence is

after its existence. However, ‘after’ can be conceived only because of the

occurrence of time. Thus, the very beginning and the very ending of a motion

do not necessitate the affirmation of another motion before and after it, and

this shows that duration is not motion, nor any of its aspects.

All these arguments show that time is not motion, nor any of its accidents,

nor its conditions, but it is independent of all of them.

For all these reasons, those who hold that the knowledge of time is self-

evident affirm that duration is a self-subsistent existent that is autonomous in its

essence (al-muddah mawjud qa’im bi-nafsihi mustaqill bi-dhatihl). The motion

o
celestial sphere does not have any influence on the existence of duration, but motion

measures its parts. Day and night, for instance, are measured by a basin (/Z/7/'iz7),26likc

dial-watch (sanduq al-sa‘ah). These tools have no influence on making time

(duration), but they divide day and night into hours. Similarly, the celestial spheres

do not have an influence on making duration, but they divide duration into months,

days, and hours.27

1(iFinjan is derived from the Persian, bingan. It is a basin with a hole bored in the bottom which is
placed in water suffered to fill, and thus serves to measure the time that each cultivator is allowed
to have water turned upon his land from a canal for the purpose of irrigation.
27 M4,5: 32.

21
 Having elaborated on those arguments, it is worth commenting that al-Razi

agrees with Abu Bakr al-Razl, who maintains that the existence of time is self-

evident. Even in his early work of al-Mabahith, he had already stated that the

29 and refuted Ibn Sina’s attempt to prove its

existence of time is self-evident28

existence.30 31 we33shall see, however, this does not necessarily mean that al-Razi
As32

agrees with the idea of time as necessary-in-itself, as maintained by Abu Bakr al-

Razi. At this moment, it is worthwhile to proceed to al-RazTs refutation of the

argument that the existence of time is not self-evident.

3. The Existence of Time is not Self-Evident

Having affirmed that time is an immaterial substance and its existence is self-

evident, al-Razi refutes the argument that its existence depends on certain proofs,

and hence, that its existence is not self-evident, as maintained by Ibn Sina and the

people who rely on common knowledge {ahi ‘urf). As for Ibn Sina, he refutes the

idea that time is a beginningless substance (jawhar al-azafi?2 because the proofs of

capacities, priorities, posteriorities, and divisions of time show that it is not

necessary-in-itself, and that time is an accident. Refuting this view, al-Razi

disproves Ibn Sina’s arguments.

1. Al-Razi calls Ibn Sma‘s first argument the proof of capacities {daHl al-
_ _ __
imkanat). Ibn Sina states:

28 Ibid., 5: 22.
29 MM, 1:655.
30 Ibid., 1: 654.
31 M4, 5:48, line 20.
32 Ibn Sina, al-Shifa9\ al-Tabl‘iyyat: al-Sama* al-TabVi, eds. Said Zayed and Ibrahim Madkur (Qum:
1405 A.H.), 151. Further reference to this work will be abbreviated as Shifa’: Tabl'iyyat.
33 Ibn Sina, al-Shifa’\ al-Tabl(iyyat, 155; and Ibn Sina, Najat> ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq
al-Jadidah, 1985), 152-53, henceforth cited as Najat. The term imkan, which is translated here as a
capacity, denotes something similar to a parameter.

22
 Suppose a motion takes place over a certain distance with a certain
rate of speed, and another motion, at the same rate of speed, is together
with the first. Suppose they start simultaneously and stop
simultaneously, so that they cover the distance simultaneously. If one
of them started and the other did not start at the same time, one of
them would cover a distance smaller than the other. If a slow motion
started simultaneously with the first one, and if they coincided in
starting and stopping, it would be found that the slow motion would
have covered a smaller distance, while the fast one would have covered
a greater one. Thus, between the beginning and ending of the first fast
one, there is a capacity (jmkari) of covering a certain distance with
certain quickness, or a smaller distance with certain slowness. And
between the beginning and stopping of the second fast one, there is a
capacity of a smaller distance with that certain speed such that this
capacity is a part of the first capacity. If such is the case, then this
capacity admits of increase and decrease, and therefore, it must be
something existing certainly.”34 35

Commenting on Ibn Sina’s arguments, al-Razi holds that these three

suppositions have certain purposes, (a) The first supposition is that two motions,

which have the same speed and coincide in starting and stopping, cover the same

measure of distance. It aims at showing that there is a capacity of covering such a

distance with such a speed between the beginning and stopping of the motion and

that it is not possible for this distance to be increased or decreased in this extent of

capacity with this particular speed. Thus, this capacity is specified in itself, and

motion with a certain rate of speed is possible in it, only along a particular distance,

not a greater nor a smaller one. So, this capacity is specified in itself and has a real

essence insofar as distinction {imtiyaZ) and specification (ikhtisas) occur.

(b) The second supposition is that of two motions, having the same speed,

differing in starting, but coinciding in stopping, the second one must cover a shorter

distance. It has two purposes: (a) the capacity, in which the second motion occurs, is

part of the first capacity, in which the first motion occurs. Thus, this capacity

34 Translation is mine. MA, 5: 33-34; SUH, 2: 128-29; and Najat, 152-53. For a detailed view of Ibn
Slnaon this issue see Shifa': Tabl'iyyat, 155-59.
35 MA 5: 34-35; and SUH, 2: 129.

23
admits of increase and decrease, so that it must be something existent that admits

equality and inequality, (b) The motion that covers a smaller distance has in common

with the motion that covers a bigger one that it is a motion, has the same speed and

that what is moving has the same size, but it differs in the extent of this capacity.

And that by which similarity is, is not that by which dissimilarity is (wa ma bihl al-

musharakah ghayr ma bihl al-mumayazati). Thus, this capacity must be different

from the very essence of motion, and its speed, and from the substance of what is

moving.36 37 38

(c) The third supposition is that of two motions, which start simultaneously

and stop simultaneously, but are different in speed, the slow one covers less distance

than the first one. This aims at showing that this capacity is neither a measure of

what is moving nor a measure of the distance because if the slow motion and the fast

one cover the same extent of distance, then they are different in the extent of this

capacity. Likewise, if they have the same extent of this capacity, they are different

in the extent of the distance. Thus, the extent of capacity is not the extent of the

distance.

These three suppositions show that this capacity is something existent that is

a measure, but it is neither a measure of what is moving, nor a measure of the

distance, nor motion itself, nor the speed of a motion.

Having exposed Ibn Sina’s intention, al-Razl raises certain objections:

(A) Ibn Sina’s arguments presuppose the existence of time. These arguments, which

are based on three things, namely, the fact that motion may be fast or slow, that two

motions may start simultaneously and stop simultaneously, and that one of them

36 M4, 5: 34, line 13 shows that the text mentions musawi and it should be mughayir, which is
mentioned in another manuscript.
37 Ibid., 5: 36.
38 Ibid., 5: 36-38; and MM, 1: 654.

24
starts after the other, can only be brought forward after having affirmed the

existence of time. Firstly, a fast motion is a motion that covers a distance in a

shorter time than a slow motion, or it covers a longer distance than the slow one in

the same time. The slow motion is contrary to what has just been stated. Thus, these

conditions can only be established after having accepted the existence of time.

Secondly, if we say that two motions start simultaneously and stop simultaneously,

this means that the beginning and stopping of their existences are at the same

instant, but an instant can only be conceived after having conceived time. Thirdly, if

we say that one of them starts after the other, it is well known that the meaning of

priority and posteriority can only be conceived after the existence of time has been

affirmed.

Having stated this, al-Razi affirms that the existence of time is self-evident,

so that proof for its existence is not required. If the existence of time required an

explanation, its existence would be based on the premises mentioned before, but

those premises could only be established after having conceived the existence of

time, and hence, the argument becomes circular, and this is wrong.

(B) Ibn Sina’s view is that a thing of which one can say that it may increase and

decrease must be an existent. This view is an answer to those who argue that

motions have a beginning39 because they admit of increase and decrease. There is no

doubt that the parts of passing things have no enduring existence. If such is the case,

then one cannot predicate the increase and decrease of such things in themselves. It

is possible for an extended thing represented in the imagination to predicate the

increase and decrease of it. However, the extension of time has no actual or real

existence at all. Thus, Ibn Sina’s purpose to establish the real existence of time fails,

39 This is a translation of the Arabic text, but the sense is not clear. The context suggests that we
should read “existence’ instead of “beginning.”

25
because it does not really admit of increase and decrease. The supposition of a thing

in the mind does not prove that time exists in actuality. Thus, this argument is false.

(C) The proof of capacities has certain objections:

(i) Between the beginning and stopping of any time, there is a capacity that may

hold just that extent (of time), not more nor less; there is another capacity with

smaller extent, which cannot hold that time, nor a larger amount, but which is filled

with a part of it. If such were the case, time would have another time ad infinitum.

This is not merely imagination; because the same thing must be also said about

motion, because there is no difference.

(ii) The proof is refuted by (a consideration of the) future, because there is a capacity

that occurs from this present hour to tomorrow. This capacity can hold an amount of

motion characterized by a certain rate of speed, and it is not filled with a smaller, nor

larger motion, and there is another smaller capacity. This implies that the time,

which will come tomorrow, is occurring now and is present in this moment, and this

is wrong. If they said that what is present in this case is a capacity for the existence

of those future motions, not the existence of something else that becomes

container for those future motions, then we would say, why is the case of the past

not allowed to be like what you have said about the future?

(iii) Between the two borders of a vessel, there is a capacity that can hold a certain

extension of bodies and it is not filled with a smaller extent, nor can it hold a bigger

one. This would imply that that capacity which can hold that extension of bodies is

something that exists. This means that you must admit the existence of dimensions

that exist by their own essences, which are the capacities for these bodies. If they

said that this capacity is a capacity just for the very existence of those bodies, not a

capacity for the existence of a thing that becomes a container of those bodies, then

26
we would say that the same situation should also be allowed in the situation

mentioned before, that the capacity that you have mentioned signifies the capacity

of the very existence of those different motions, but that the affirmation of another

thing, which is a container of those motions, is not allowed.

2. Al-Razi systematizes and clarifies the argument from priority and

posteriority, which is not well elaborated by the holders of this view.

Explaining this argument, al-Razi states that father exists before the

as
existence of the son. This priority is either constituted by the existence of the

father and the non-existence of the son or by something that is additional.

This priority is not constituted by the existence of the father and the non­

existence of the son, but a thing, that is additional because of the following

reasons: 40

(a) The essence of each of them can be rightly conceived, although priority­

posteriority-simultaneity is neglected, and what is known is different from what

is not known.

(b) This priority and posteriority form a specific relation between these two

essences and, therefore, this relation is different from them.

(c) What is prior exists before what is posterior. What is prior insofar as it is

prior, does not continue to exist a/terwhat is posterior, insofar as it is posterior.

(d) Things that are different in essence may have their priority in common. The

fathers of a horse, a donkey and a man, for instance, come before their offspring.

Although a horse, donkey, and a man have different essences, they have
co

something in common, namely that each of them comes before their offspring.

Thus, their difference in essence, along with their common priority, signifies that

MA, 5: 38-41; and SUH, 119-22.

27
what is prior and what is posterior are different from those specific essences.

Moreover, things that have a common sense may differ in priority and

posteriority. Father and son, for example, have a common perfection of essence

(tamam al-mahlyyah), but they are different in respect of priority and

posteriority.

(e) What is prior, insofar as it is prior, is related to what is posterior, insofar as it

is posterior. A thing of which priority is predicated, is an independent substance,

and its essence is not understood in relation with something else, and such

thing is different from a thing of which the essence can only be understood in

relation with something else. This implies that priority and posteriority are not

those essences.

(f) God existed before today’s event and exists also when this originated thing

comes into existence today, and will exist after it has passed. Thus, the essence

of what exists necessarily by itself is subject to priorities, posteriorities and

simultaneities. If these concepts were the essence itself, then shifts would occur

in His essence and this is impossible.

Having shown that what is understood by the meaning of priority,

posteriority and simultaneity is different from the essence itself, they further

state that these additional concepts are either pure non-existence or are existent.

The former is false because its being before something else is contrary to our

saying that it has nothing preceding it. The non-existence of priority is pure non­

existence, whereas the opposite of privation is an affirmation (of existence).

Thus, priority and posteriority are two things that are additional to the essence

and they are two positive attributes that exist (wasfanlthabitariimawjudani).

28
 Having established this, they further argue that these positive attributes

exist in reality, not in the mind only because something that exists in the mind

only, like five is even, may not exist at all in the external reality. Thus, priority,

posteriority and simultaneity are concepts that are added to the essences and

they refer to things that really exist in the reality, such as they exist in the mind.

Having affirmed this, they proceed to show that these priorities and posteriorities

are accidents because they cannot independently exist as substances, for they are

relations. Thus, there is a thing to which these priorities and posteriorities

essentially attach, and this is not motion, due to the various arguments that have

been mentioned in the previous discussion.

Furthermore, one may argue that unlike the previous parts of time, which

can be conceived as posterior and vice versa, the previous parts of time cannot be

conceived as posterior and vice versa41 Thus, there exists a thing, to which these

priorities and posteriorities are attributed, which is essentially flowing and

differs from motion; this thing must be time.42

Having exposed Ibn Sina’s arguments, al-Razi refutes the idea that priority

and posteriority are (positive) attributes that exist, and he presents the following

reasons:

(A) Ibn Sina holds that priority is opposite to non-priority, which is a privation

and the negation of privation is affirmation (of existence). This view is

problematic, for possibility (al-imkari) is the negation of impossibility and

necessity. While impossibility is a privation, necessity is an affirmation. Thus, it

must be said about possibility that because it is the negation of impossibility,

which is a privation, it will be an existent and because it is the negation of

41 This means: motion may be reversed, whereas time cannot be reversed.

42M4, 5: 41; and MM, 1: 657-58.

29
 necessity, which is an existent, it will be a non-existent. Thus, it would follow

that a thing is both non-existent and existent, and that is impossible.

Al-Razi further argues that it is impossible for priority and posteriority to

be among the positive existents because of the following arguments:43

(a) Each originated thing is preceded by its non-existence and its non-existence is

prior to its existence. This implies that the precedence is an attribute of non­

existence. This attribute cannot be an existent attribute, because an existent

attribute never depends on a pure non-existent.

(b) If priority were an existent attribute (sifah mawjudah), it would exist in

relation with something else, and it would be either before, or simultaneous with,

or after it; then an infinite regression would follow. One cannot say that priority

in relation to something else is indeed before, but this being before is just its

essence, not a property added to its essence. For if we say priority is before

something else, then we have here the essence of priority, which is the subject.

Then we say about it that it is before something else, which is the predicate. The

subject and predicate of a proposition are certainly different. Thus, if priority

were some existent attribute, then its being before in relation to something else

makes it possible that this is just its essence; in fact, it must be something

different from its essence.

(c) Priority and posteriority are relations, which are related to each other. These

relations occur together in the external reality and in the mind. If both of them

were existents, they would exist together. If they existed together, that between

which the relation occurs, i.e., the subject of the relations (al-ma‘rud), would

occur together necessarily because a relation never occurs alone, but only if the

43 MA, 5: 41-43.

30
 subject of the relation occurs. In that case, one should say that what is posterior

necessitates that the two things44 exist together and then something, insofar as it

is before something else, must be existent together with it, and this is impossible,

(d) The two relations occur simultaneously. If this simultaneity were an attribute

additional to the two relations, then this addition would also be simultaneous

with them; then this second simultaneity would be additional, so an infinite

regression would follow. If it were not an attribute additional to them, then the

same would be the case for all other simultaneities and priorities. One cannot say

the fact that the two relations are simultaneous is just their essence, because if

we say: “ Two relations occur simultaneously, ’’then two relations is the subject

and occur simultaneously is the predicate. The predicate in every proposition is

not the subject because it is impossible to predicate a thing of itself. Thus,

priority and posteriority cannot be the positive attributes in the external reality.

(B) Ibn Sina’s proof implies the establishment of time for time. Parts of time are

prior to others. This priority is neither causal nor essential because what is prior

causally or essentially may exist simultaneously with what is posterior. It is

impossible for a prior part of time to occur with a posterior part. If this priority

can only be determined by time, then it follows that time has another time.45

3. It is known necessarily that there is a thing that can be divided into years,

months, days and hours. It is also obvious that that thing is counted by years,

which are counted by months, which are counted by days, which are counted

by hours. That to which these divisions apply is not pure non-existence, but

an existent, because pure non-existence cannot be divided into parts, nor can

it have more or fewer parts than another (non-existence). It is obvious to the

44 Sc: the subject of the relation.

45 M4, 5: 43.

31
 human mind that year is longer than a month, which is longer than a day,

which is longer than an hour. Moreover, the human mind judges that this

thing has a part that is past and a part that is future. The past is what has

been present, and then has passed. The future is what will be present, but it is

not yet present. If this thing had no presence and occurrence at all, it would

be impossible for the human mind to predicate it as being past and future.

Thus, this thing cannot be a pure non-existent, but an existent.

This existent is either permanent or non-permanent. Permanent existence

means that its parts are simultaneous, whereas non-permanent existence means that

when one part occurs, another part does not. This thing that may be divided into

years, months, days, and hours is not among the permanent existents because the

human mind knows spontaneously that two parts of it cannot exist simultaneously. It

is impossible for two years, two months, two days, and two hours to occur

simultaneously. Furthermore, two parts of it can never be brought together in

existence, even if they were the smallest parts, but each of them is prior to another.

Thus, unlike a body and all its categories, which are permanent existents, duration

(time) is a non-permanent existent. Thus, that which is called duration (time) is

different from anything else. This thing is either motion, or an aspect of motion, or it

is different from all of them. Time is not motion, which may be shown by various

arguments, which have been mentioned.46

Having elaborated on Ibn Sina’s argument, al-Razi holds that motion is

nothing but successive occurrences in successive spaces, and succession of

occurrence means that things occur after one another in subsequent times, but their

subsequence in those times is a relation between the subsequent things and those

46 MA, 5: 43-45; and Najat, 153.

32
times, and the relation between them and the times is established after the

occurrence of those times has been established. Thus, the essence of motion requires

time, not vice versa, because duration can be perceived even if it is without any

motions or changes.

Having refuted the idea that time is motion, al-Razi further refutes the view

that it is an aspect of motion because the existence of an aspect of motion requires

the occurrence of motion. Thus, if time were an aspect of motion, it would require

motion. In fact, the contrary is the case: motion requires time because it is like a

receptacle for motions.

4. The argument from determining given times (al-tawqlf). One person may say

to another: “I’ll come to you when the sun rises”. This statement denotes that

his coming is unknown (majhul) whereas the rising sun is known (ma‘ium).

What is unknown is connected to what is known, so that what is unknown

becomes known due to this connection. Thus, determining given times is

connecting the renewed imagined with the renewed known, what was

imagined vanishes (al-tawqit ‘ibarah ‘an qam mutajaddid mawhum bi

mutajaddid ma‘lum, izalah lial-lham).

“I’ll come to you when the sun rises” means that a speaker says that he will

come at the moment (al-waqt) of the rising sun. Thus, his coming and the rising

sun occur at one and the same time; this moment, which is a receptacle for his

coming and the rising of the sun does not persist, but flows; otherwise, it would

occur in the present, and it would not be something expected, occurring in the

future. Furthermore, the thing that flows is not something like the motion of the

celestial spheres because it is a receptacle of the celestial motion and the

receptacle of a thing is not the same as that thing. It is also not an aspect of the

33
celestial motion, because that thing is a receptacle of the celestial motion, and

the motion of the celestial sphere and all its attributes follow the same way as

the receptacle. If a receptacle were an aspect of that motion, it would follow that

the same thing would be both a receptacle and what is being received, which is

absurd. Furthermore, if someone said that God acts such and such when He stops

the motion of the celestial spheres and stars, then this statement is not evidently

false. However, it is evidently false, if this receptacle is an aspect of the motion

of the celestial spheres, because the occurrence of an event not in a certain

moment is evidently impossible. Moreover, no condition of the celestial spheres

can be said to occur, unless it occurs at a certain moment in the past or will occur

at a certain moment in the future. Thus, this receptacle is not the motion of the

celestial spheres nor one of its attributes. Thus, there is something that exists and

flows, and this must be time.

Having elaborated on this, al-Razi anticipates certain possible objections. If

someone has another interpretation of the statement “I’ll come to you when the

sun rises,” namely “I’ll come to you,” means that my coming is connected with

or is with the rising of the sun, and then this supposition disproves what has been

said. Moreover, the argument from determining given times is based on what the

people rely on as common knowledge, and such an argument should not be taken

into consideration.

Replying to these two objections, al-Razi states that (1) the connection and

the simultaneity do not occur in the essence nor in something else, but the

meaning of this connection and simultaneity can only be that these events occur

in the same moment. (2) The controversies should be conceived as structuring

necessary knowledge, which can only be attained by admitting self-evident

34
 propositions, and the truth of this tawqlt is admitted by all sound intelligences,

and the truth of these premises is, in turn, based upon the existence of time.47

Having mentioned the arguments from determining given times, it is worth

discussing al-Razi’s own view on al-tawqit. He refutes this argument, in his al-

Mabahith. He holds that this view is based on two simultaneous events. This

simultaneity is not time itself, because of the following arguments: (1) many

simultaneities may occur in one time, whereas many times do not occur in one

time. (2) Simultaneity is not a very essence of what is designated (as being

simultaneous), (a) because simultaneity does not differ by the different positions,

whereas things to which the simultaneity is an accident are different (in

position), (b) Simultaneity is a relation and hence, it is not independent in itself,

but it is an accident of something else and the subject of the relation is different

from the relation itself. It is not possible for simultaneity to be a necessary

accident for a thing because the thing, of which simultaneity is an accident, may

also be said to be prior or posterior because the thing of which the simultaneity is

an accident does not remain with posteriority.48 Thus, simultaneity is not a

necessary attribute for the essence of what is designated, and hence, the

simultaneity is among the accidents due to the fact that two things occur in one

time. If that simultaneity is an effect of time, it is impossible for that

simultaneity to be time itself. (3) If the time of the occurrence of an event, that

occurred simultaneously with it (sc. that time) were an expression of the

moment, which determined the given times, then tomorrow would be an

expression of a certain thing together with which it would occur with another

47 MA, 5: 46-49. In maintaining this, al-Razl replies to someone who criticizes the argument from the
determining given times (al-tawq7t) because this argument is held by the people who rely on
common knowledge.
48 The text has posteriority, but the context shows that simultaneity is meant.

35
 event. Imagine the occurrence of that thing was today, and then tomorrow would

occur today. Thus, it is wrong for anyone to regard the determining given times

as time itself.49

Having stated this, we may conclude that al-Razi disagrees with the idea of

tawqlt. He discusses tawqlt under the general heading that the existence of time

does not need any proof, including the proof adduced by tawqlt. Furthermore, the

essence of time, as conceived by the proponents of this view, is not in line with

al-Razi’s idea of the essence of time, as stated in the al-Matalib. They hold that

time is something that flows, whereas for al-Razi this flowing is because of the

relationship of time to something, which is external, not in the very essence of

time. Further discussion on the essence of time will be presented in the next

chapter.

49 MM, 1:650-51.

36
 Chapter Two

The Quiddity of Time (mahiyyat al-zamaiif*

1. Various Definitions of Time

Having discussed the arguments for and against the existence of time, al-Razi moves

on to discuss the essence of time. Before we present al-RazTs treatment of the

various views concerning the essence of time, that lead to the different definitions of

time, it is worth noting that al-Razi’s predecessors, especially Ibn Slna and Abu al-

51 Ibn Slna
Barakat al-Baghdadi have discussed those definitions in their works.50

insists that time is a measure of motion and refutes the idea that it is a motion or a

motion of the celestial sphere, with the exclusion of other motions, or a recurring of

the celestial sphere, that is one revolution, or the celestial sphere itself, or a

determining given times52 or a beginningless substance, that is necessary-existent-in-

itself.53

Al-Baghdadi refutes Ibn Sina’s view that time is a measure of motion

because it may exist without motion. AI-BaghdadTs idea that time is not inherently

linked to motion was already formulated by Abu Bakr al-Razi before. Thus, al-Razi

appropriates al-Baghdadi’s and Abu Bakr al-RazTs view to refute the Aristotelian

concept of time. As we shall see, al-RazTs presentation of the various essences of

time mainly focus on the idea that the essence of time is not a measure of motion.

He systematically presents and criticizes the following definitions of time.

50 The terms essence and quiddity are used synonymously in al-RazTs philosophy.
51 See Ibn Slna, Shifa: al-TabTiyyat, 151-54. Cf. Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, al~Mu‘tabar, 2: 69-77,
passim.
52 Ibn Slna, Shifa’: al-Tabl'iyyat, 152-54.
53 Ibid., 159.

37
 Firstly, time may be defined as a measure of the motion of the greatest

celestial sphere (miqdar harakat al-falak al-a'zam), as defined by Aristotle and his

followers like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Aristotle defines time as a number of change

in respect of before and after.54 He also holds that time is in particular measured by

the revolution of the fixed stars, since this alone is a change that is never failing and

uniform. All other changes are measured by the change of the revolution of the

celestial sphere.55 Reaffirming Aristotle’s view, Ibn Sina holds that time has neither

beginning nor an end. Time is a measure of motion; therefore the pre-etemity of

time entails the pre-etemity of motion. The only eternal motion is the circular

motion. Thus, ultimately time is a measure of the motion of celestial spheres, by

which all other motions are measured.56

Al-Razi raises various objections to Ibn Sina’s view and these objections will

be dealt with after elaborating on his views of other definitions of time.

Secondly, time may be defined as a measure of existence (miqdar al-wujud),

as maintained by Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi.57 Al-Razi’s considers this view as

vague and general (mubham mujmal). It would had been better for al-Baghdadi, says

al-Razi, to regard it as a measure of the extension of existence (miqdar imtidad al-

wujud). If he means so, then this meaning is false because the extension of existence

is its persistence and this persistence is either additional or not additional to the

essence of the persistent. However, the persistence of every thing is a dependent

attribute. Moreover, its persistence is not the other persistence. If the meaning of

time were so, then the number of the collected times in this one hour would be

54 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 106, line a
37, henceforth cited as Physics.
55 Ibid., 117.
56 Ibn Sina, Najaf, 155; and SUH, 2: 135-38.
57 Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, al-Ilahiyyat, 262; and Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, al-Mu‘tabar, 3: 40.

38
 according to the number of the persistent things in this hour. However, it is

impossible for the collection of many times to occur all at once.58

It is unfortunate that al-Razi did not clarify extensively al-Baghdadi’s views

in the same way that he extensively exposed Ibn Sina and Abu Bakr al-Razi’s views

on time. Al-RazTs critique on the concept of ‘measure’ may open a further

discussion because a ‘measure’ in al-Baghdadi’s view has a different concept from

the Arisotetelian measure.59 Furthermore, al-Razi’s views on the essence of time has

something in common with him, namely that time is not inherently linked to

motion.60

Thirdly, time may be defined as the motion of the greatest celestial sphere

itself (nafs harakat al-falak al-a(zam). Al-Razi did not specifically name the holders

of this view.61 His refutation of this definition is included in his refutation of the

idea of time as a measure of motion.62

Fourthly, time may be described as merely determining given times (mujairad

al-taqklt\ as has been mentioned.63

Fifthly, the motion of now that is in time follows in a way the motion
o
cc

point that is on a line. The motion of a point connects one part (the end of a stretch)

of a line to a second one (the beginning of another stretch). However, if the point

stops, it separates (the end of a stretch of) that line (from the beginning of another

58 MA, 5: 75.
59 Ahmad Muhammad Tayyib, Mawqif Abl al-Barakat al-Baghdadimin al-Falsafah al-Masya’iyyah
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cairo: University of al-Azhar, n.d), 220-223.
60 Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, al-Mu‘tabar, 3: 39; and Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, al-Ilahiyyat, 261.
61 M4, 5: 51. According to Abu al-Hasan al-*Ash‘an (d. 935 A. C), his teacher al-Jubba’I maintains
this view. See Abu al-Hasan al-’Ash* an, Maqalat al-Islamiyyln wa ikhtilaf al-musaliln, ed.
Muhammad Muhy al-Din ‘Abd al-Hamld, 2nd ed, 2 vols. (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Misriyyah,
1969), 2: 130.
62 MA, 5: 52-65.
63 Refer to previous page, namely pp. 32-35.

39
 stretch). Similarly, the motion of now that is in time, connects the past to the future.

However, if its origination in a continuous time is taken, the now is a divider.64

In al-Razi‘s view, this difficult comparison is inconceivable because the

senses can pinpoint the motion of a point on a line, whereas they cannot pinpoint the

motion of the present. Thus, how can time be conceived to move? Suppose it moves,

and then on what thing does it move? Whether on the celestial spheres or on the

elements? This thing is not known conceptually.65

Sixthly, time is pre-etemal substance, necessary existent-in-itself (al-zaman

jawhar azafi wajib al-wujud li-dhatitii). as maintained by the ancient philosophers

(qudama’ al-hukama9).66 67 68 its essence, nor its existence is dependent on the

Neither

celestial sphere, nor on motion. This view had been propagated by Abu Bakr al-

Razl The ancient philosophers argue that time is necessary-in-itself because of the

following reasons: (1) necessary-in-itself means that it must be impossible to

suppose its non-existence though this necessity is either self-evident or theoretical in

the mind. However, if this necessary impossibility were known to be self-evident,

then it must be admitted that the necessary-in-itself is primary, and the meaning of

this most primary thing is time because it is necessarily self-evident that the

supposition of its non-existence is its existence. If such is the case, the most evident

and the most perfect attribute of the necessary existent-in-itself is that it exists in

64 Ibid., 5: 51.
65 MA. 5: 106.
66 Ancient philosophers hold that there are five necessary existents, namely: the Creator of the world,
which affects but is not affected (muaththir la yata ’aththar). prime matter (hayula). which receives
effects but does not affect (muta’aththir la yu’aththir). soul (al-nafs), which affects and is affected
(yu’aththir wa yata''aththar), perpetuity and space (al-dahr wa al-fada*). which neither affect, nor
are affected. See MA. 5: 80. For a further discussion of the five necessary existents, refer to Paul
Krauss, Rasa’il Falsafiyyah li Abl Bakr Muhammad bin Zakariyya al-Razl (Tehran: al-Maktabah al-
Murtashunah, n.d.), 191-216.
67 MA. 5: 51-52.
68 The source of Abu Bakr al-RazTs view can be traced back to his teacher Abu al-‘Abbas al-
Iranshahri. See Shlomo Pines, Studies in Islamic Atomism, trans. Michael Schawz and ed. Tzvi
Langermann (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1997), 60.

40
 time. Thus, it is the necessary existent-in-itself. (2) Whenever the human mind

attempts to remove time, it must assert its existence because the human mind

removes time either before something, or with something, or after something. The

occurrence of that priority, simultaneity and posteriority is obvious and hence, its

existence cannot be denied. Thus, time is all the time and its non-existence is never

absent. This is the fundamental attribute of the necessary-in-itself. (3) The necessary

existent-in-itself is everlasting, beginningless and endless. Thus, something is

unthinkable to be the necessary-in-itself except by time (duration). Thus, it is a

cause for the necessity of existence of everything beside itself, and hence, it is the

foremost necessity in itself. (4) The endurance of anything, except duration can only

be conceived by duration. However, the endurance of duration is independent of the

endurance of something else as a container for duration. Thus, the existence of

duration is independent of everything else, but the existence of everything else,

except duration, is dependent on the existence of duration. This implies that only

time (duration) is necessarily existent. If it is not the case, at least duration is

necessary-in-itself.69

The extremists among the ancient philosophers regard time as God of the

world. They argue that the persistence of everything else is only established by

duration (time), whereas the persistence of time is independent of the persistence of

everything else. Everything else, as a matter of fact, must require duration; therefore,

it must be true that it is necessary-existent-in-itself. Moreover, the human mind

witnesses that duration (time) is only one. This hour is only one hour, not many

hours. Based on this supposition, the one-ness of the necessary existent-in-itself is

established. Both reason and revelation affirm that God is the First and Last, the

69 M4, 5: 77-78.
41
 Evident and Hidden. These attributes are only suitable for duration because

everything else always presupposes it. The first and last are the states of duration.

The knowledge of its existence is the most evident knowledge, but the knowledge of

its specific quiddity is the most hidden knowledge due to the fact that its very

quiddity cannot be comprehended. The evident and hidden are only suitable for

duration because it is the most evident thing for everybody to exist in this duration

and the most difficult thing for everybody to find its specific quiddity. It is self-

evident that duration is necessary-existent-in-itself because its existence can never

be removed from the human mind. Furthermore, it has its influence on the

origination of contingents. In relation to the changeless things and the changeable

things, the states of God are called perpetuity, beginninglessness, endlessness and

eternity. Moreover, the existence of time does not occur inside, nor outside the

world, but it is beyond the world. It is said in some of the prophetic traditions: don’t

vilify perpetuity because God is the perpetuity (Ja tasubbu al-dahra fa inna Allaha

huwa al-dahr). It is also said in the sublime words (al-kalimat al-'aliyaliy. He, no one

but He, no one knows except He, there is no God except He, O Beginningless, O

Endless, O Perpetuity, O Eternity, 0 Perpetuity (dahr), O Perpetually (cfihar), O

Perpetualitiness (dihuf), He who lives and does not die (Ya huwa. Ya man la huwa

ilia huwa. Ya man la yadri ahad kaifa huwa ilia huwa. Ya man la ilah ilia huwa. Ya

azal. Ya abad. Ya dahr. Ya sarmad. Ya dahr. Ya dihar. Ya dihur. Ya man huwa al-

hayy al-ladhl la yamut)?®

Having elaborated on their arguments, al-Razl asserts his own view. He

replies that time is still contingent-in-itself, necessary by the existence of something

else even though it is self-subsistent substance, an independent in itself. It is not*

70 Ibid., 5: 78-80.

42
 necessary-in-itself because the necessary-in-itself must be one from all aspects.

Unlike God, who is sanctified above attachment of any potentiality and hence not

subject to changes, time is still subject to changes because of the successive

priorities and posteriorities.71 Thus, al-RazTs view on time does no go hand in hand

with the necessary five-eternal principles as maintained by the ancient philosophers.

Al-Razi’s refutation of this argument has been consistently maintained since in the

Mabahith.

Having elaborated on various definitions in the Matalib, it is worth noting

that in his al-Mabahith, al-Razi disproves some other definitions. He rebuts the

essence of time as a body such as a celestial sphere; this idea is based upon two

premises; every body is in time and every body is in a celestial sphere. The major

premise is false because the celestial sphere itself is a body. Thus, the true major

premise should be: every body, which is not a celestial sphere, is contained in a

celestial sphere.72 Given the fact that the celestial sphere is a body, it is in time since

all bodies are in time. Thus, if time were the celestial sphere, it would be something,

which is in itself, and this is false.

Having refuted this, al-Razl holds that those who argue that time is motion

base their argument on two grounds (1) time is composed of past and future, so is

motion, and (2) if anyone does not feel motion, he will not perceive time either, like

in the stoiy of the companions of the cave. Furthermore, time seems long for the

blissful person because motions are erased in his mind and on the contrary, time

seems long for an afflicted person because motions persist in his mind. Thus, time is

motion.

71 Ibid., 5: 81; and MM 1: 652.

72 MM, 1: 652-53; and I bn SIna, Shifa’: al-Tab7‘iyyat, 154.

43
 Having elaborated on this, al-Razl rebuts this view by arguing that (a) one

motion is faster and slower than another motion, but time cannot be faster and

slower than another time, and (b) two motions can be simultaneous, but two times

cannot be simultaneous, and (c) two different motions concur in time and that by

which dissimilarity is, is not that by which similarity is, and (d) the parts of motion

occur in time, not in motion. The meaning of a faster motion is that it covers

distance in a shorter time, not in a shorter motion.73 74

2. Time is not a Measure of Motion

After presenting all these diversified descriptions of time, al-Razi mainly criticizes

the Aristotelian conception of time. In his view, time is neither a measure of motion

nor its attribute, or a measure of the celestial spheres. This may be shown in various

ways: 74

1. When the motion of the celestial sphere requires time, this requirement is

either not or is due to its being a motion. Both are false, so time is not a

measure of motion. The first possibility is false because motion, insofar as it

is motion, is transference from one state to another. If such is the case, the

quiddity of motion, insofar as it is motion, can only be determined by the

occurrence of the consecutive priorities (al-qabliyyaf) and posteriorities (al­

ba*diyyat), and this meaning occurs only by time. Thus, motion, insofar as it

is motion, requires time. If the requirement were due to motion, the aspect of

requirement in each motion should be the same due to the fact that the aspect

of requirement happens simply by its being motion. If this were the case,

time would not occur for one motion in the first place and for the others

73 MM, 1: 653; and Ibn Slna, Shifa’: al-TabTiyyat, 152-53.

74 MA, 5: 52-65.

44
subsequently. Based on this supposition, it would be impossible to

distinguish one motion from another by it, namely time, in which case, either

time must occur for each motion individually, or one time and the same

occurs for all, or time does not occur for motion.

As for the first alternative, al-Razi holds that time does not occur for each

motion individually for two reasons: (a) it would be necessary for one hour to

be not one hour, but many hours according to the number of existent motions

in the heavenly world (al-‘alam al-a‘la) and in the sublunar world (al-‘alam

al-asfal). This is wrong for there is no doubt that one hour should be only one

hour, (b) When these times (al-azminah) exist simultaneously, then their

simultaneity must be due to another time that encompasses them, and this is

impossible because it leads to an infinite regression. It is impossible to accept

the infinite regression because a thing by which the totality of times occurs

must encompass this totality, and what encompasses the totality of times

must not be time because all times have been gathered in that totality. What

encompasses the times is outside of them and must be time because it entails

simultaneity, before and after. Thus, what is outside the times must and must

not be time, which is contradictory, and hence it is impossible.

As for the second alternative, al-Razi maintains that time does not occur for

all motions because of the following arguments: (a) it is impossible for one

accident to subsist in many varying substrata, (b) If a motion does not exist,

its measure will not exist either. If a second motion persistently exists, its

measure will persistently exist too. If the measure of all motions were one in

number, it would follow that one thing would be both existent and non­

existent simultaneously, and this is impossible, (c) The different motions

45
 have different measures. If the measure of all motions were one thing,

whereas the different motions had different measures, it would follow that

one thing in accordance with itself would have different realities, and that is

impossible.

As for the third alternative, which is the true one, time for all motions is not

an accident of any of those motions, but it is distinct from all of them, except

that those motions occur in time and are measured by it. Thus, time is

independent of any motion.

Al-Razl simplifies Ibn Sina’s exhaustive descriptions in the Shifa’15 into one

sentence: “time is a measure of a certain motion, and then that motion is

measured by that measure in the first place then, by means of that measure,

all other motions are also measured.”75

76

Having simplified Ibn Sina’s view, al-Razi affirms that motion that requires

time is not due to its being a specific motion, but due to its being a motion

only, and this concept is common in all motions. It follows that the aspect of

requirement that occurs in all motions should be the same. Thus, time does

not occur for some of those motions only. Furthermore, Ibn Sina’s view is

also wrong from another perspective. The meaning of time as a measure of

motion is that it is a measure of the extension of motion. This means that the

extension of a thing’s existence is its persistence, which can occur only in the

thing itself, not in another thing, irrespective of the disagreement on its

persistence, whether it is or is not an attribute additional to its existence.

Thus, the measure of its persistence is nothing but quality of this

persistence and this quality is primary, as it cannot be separated from it.

75 Ibn Sina, Shifa': Tabi'iyyat, 167-69.

76 MA, 5: 55.

46
 Thus, the meaning of time as a measure of motion is that the measure of each

motion must depend on that motion and it is impossible for the occurrence of

one measure to be dependent on one motion, so that all motions in

themselves are devoid of their measures.77 Al-Razi disproves Ibn Sma’s view

that “the measure which exists in the body, measures the body, then by

means of this measure, all other bodies are measured”78 because whenever

there is a measure (miqdar ‘ala liidah) for each of those bodies individually,

there must be measure for each of these motions individually. On this

supposition, if time were a measure of motion, it would follow that many

times would occur all at once, then the cited impossibilities would be

repeated again.79

If, then, someone maintains that time is not the very measure of motion, but

that there is a specific measure for each motion individually and there is

another thing, which is distinct from all, namely what is required for the

occurrence of those measures (al-muqtada lihusul tilka al-maqadir), and that

is time, then we say that this view is wrong because (a) there is a different

meaning between a measure of motion and what is required for a measure of

motion. The view that what is required for a measure of motion (al-muqtada

limiqdar al-harakah) is an abandonment of the view that time is a measure of

motion and (b) the measure of the motion of a celestial sphere means the

extension of its persistence. As contingent-in-itself, its persistence occurs

only due to the persistence of its cause. Thus, it would be necessary for him

77 Ibid., 5: 56. Cf. SUH, 128.

78 MA, 5: 56, lines 21-22; and Ibn Slna, Shifa\ Tabl‘iyyat, 169 line 1.
79 MA, 5: 56-57.

47
 to regard time as the necessary-existent-in-itself, the first cause, and this is

false. 0
Ol

The meaning of time measure of motion is that it is a measure of the

C/5
03

03
extension of motion. However, the extension of motion has no existence in

the external reality because motion is the successive occurrences in the

successive spaces. The totality of these occurrences has no existence in the

external reality because from those occurrences only one occurrence in one

instant exists, then it disappears and after its disappearance, a similar

occurrence occurs. Thus, it is impossible for the measure of that extension to

exist in the external reality. Thus, if time exists actually, it cannot be

03
measure of motion.

If time were a measure of motion, it would be an attribute of motion. Since

each attribute requires what is being attributed, it will be necessary for time

to require motion. However, motion requires time because each motion is a

transition from one state to another. Thus, the time of a state from which it

moves must be different from the time of a state into which it moves. Thus,

the reality of motion can only be determined by the successive parts of time.

Since time is a necessary condition for the existence of motion, time as a

measure of motion is a vicious circularity.

No matter whether the daily motion is a heavenly motion or a terrestrial one,

they occur today by their own essences and with all their attributes. If today

were an attribute of some of these motions, then that attribute would occur in

the very same attribute and, therefore, it would occur in itself, and this is

absurd.

80 Ibid.

48
If time were a measure of motion, the non-existence of motion would signify

the non-existence of time. However, the consequent is false and, therefore,

the antecedent is also false. The consequent is false because (a) if the

celestial spheres, the sun, the moon and all the stars, came to rest and

likewise all motions, including the soul and so forth, it would be self-evident

that time would still pass like flowing water, (b) If the celestial spheres and

their motions were non-existent, then their non-existence would occur after

their existence, and this posteriority would be time. Thus, it is possible to

suppose the non-existence of all motions, but it is not possible to suppose the

non-existence of time.

Time is a necessary existent-in-itself, otherwise its non-existence may come

after its existence. This posteriority is a temporal posteriority. Thus, the

supposition of the non-existence of time entails the existence of time, and

that is impossible. Thus, time is a necessary existent-in-itself. If this has been

established, then time is not an aspect of motion nor its measure because then

it would require motion, so that it will be contingent-in-itself. As a result, the

necessary-in-itself must be the contingent-in-itself, which is wrong.

Moreover, if time required motion, then motion would become the foremost

necessary-in-itself. As a result, motion would never depend on substrate and

location, and this is impossible.

Since the relation between time and both motion and rest is the same, time is

not a measure of motion. Their view is that time measures the rest by

supposition (‘ala sabll al-fard), for if one imagines that a thing which is now

at rest moves, changing from its being at rest, then that motion occurs in that

portion of time. However, this is wrong because (a) if somebody were not

49
 aware of any motion that occurs either in the heavenly world or in the

sublunary world, he would find duration permanently present. This shows

that regardless of the occurrence of motion and rest, duration is always

permanent, (b) The quiddity of motion in its reality requires the occurrence of

time. If time in its reality required the occurrence of time, a vicious circle

would follow, (c) Time is a container for both motion and rest because there

is no difference between the two and this judgment does not depend on the

awareness of motion. Thus, if one says that time is a measure of rest,

following from the view that it is a measure of motion, then this is an empty

opinion.

8. The measure of the extension of motion has no existence in the external

reality at all because its occurrence is neither in the present, in the past, nor

in the future. It cannot be in the present because a divisible measure of

extended motion cannot occur in the indivisible present. Neither can it be in

the past, nor in the future because of the non-existence of past and future.

9. The statement that a certain motion occurs in this time is like the statement

that a certain body occurs in this time. If such is the case, the relationship of

time to motion is like the relationship of time to body. If time were a

measure of motion, it would be an accident that exists in motion, while

motion is an accident that exists in a body. This would imply that time exists

in a body, not vice versa, and this is wrong. Thus, it is impossible for time to

be a measure of motion.

10. God’s essence is exempt from motion and change. We know necessarily that

God existed before today and is existing now and will exist after today has

passed. Since it must be true that He existed before and exists now and will

50
 exist, these concepts are not attached at all to motion or change. Intellectual

substances are also devoid of motion and its attributes. As philosophers have

proved, they exist simultaneously with God because a cause must exist with

the effect. Thus, the concept of simultaneity occurs, whereas it is impossible

for motion and change to occur here. This shows that priority, posteriority

and simultaneity are not dependent on motion.

11. It is obvious to the human mind that time is a receptacle for motion and it

witnesses that an attribute of a thing cannot be described as a receptacle.

This necessitates that time is not an attribute of motion.

12. We can imagine that the motion of the celestial sphere were non-existent

before this moment during a period of one million years. In other words, there

was a time in which the non-existence of the celestial sphere during a period

one million years occurred before this moment. This implies the non­

existence of the celestial sphere and its motion to a certain moment. If time

were the motion of the celestial sphere, then the meaning of this statement

would be that the motion of the celestial sphere was non-existent, when it

was existent, and this is a contradiction.

13. The followers of Plato81 show that time is pre-etemal, but motion is not. This

signifies that time is different from motion and all its attributes. Time is pre-

etemal because if it were preceded by non-existence, its non-existence would

be prior to its existence, and this priority occurs due to time. Thus, at the

occasion of its non-existence, time was existent, and this is impossible.

Motion is not eternal because its quiddity requires that it is preceded by

something else. This is incompatible with the quiddity of eternity, which

81 AI-Razi does not mention them by name, but it can be rightly assumed that they are Muhammad
ibn Zakariyya al-Razi and Abu al-Barakat al-Bagdadi.

51
 does not require the precedence of something else. So, time is eternal, but

motion is not. It follows that time is neither motion nor a measure of motion.

14. A measure of any thing is either itself or an attribute that occurs in the thing

itself. It is impossible for something to occur in itself, likewise it is

impossible for something to occur in what is occurring in it because of

oa
vicious circularity, which is absurd. If such is the case, it is impossible for

ds
motion to occur in itself and in its measure. If any motion occurs in time, and

no motion occurs in itself and in its measure, then time is neither motion nor

the measure of motion.

15. By removing motion, the measure of motion will be removed, but time will

not be removed although motion is removed.

Having rejected the idea that time is a measure of motion due to the various

cited arguments, al-Razi further rejects 3 arguments of Aristotle’s followers.

1. Time is the successive occurrence of priorities and posteriorities, so change is

necessary. Change is movement; therefore, time depends on movement. Al-

Razi replies that the dependence of time on motion is simply deceitful

estimation and wrong imagination because: (a) God existed before the world,

and exists now existent with it, and will exist after it. Although our saying

that God existed and exists now and will exist, refers to a change of states,

this change of states does not occur in God’s essence. It follows that it is not

necessary for time to imply change, (b) These events were non-existents in

the pre-etemity. The pre-eternal non-existence is predicated by temporal

judgments, whereas it is impossible for change to occur in pure non­

existence. (c) Priority, simultaneity and posteriority have no existence in

52
 actuality and they are simply relations conceived and expressed by the human

mind.82 83

2. The proof of capacities shows that time is a quantity because of its

receptivity to equality and inequality (musawah wa mufawatali). This

quantity is not stable; otherwise the present moment will be the same as the

past and the future, and this is contradiction. Thus, time is not stable in its

essence. Thus, the parts of time must elapse (murui) and, therefore,

O
□-
G

P
matter and becomes one of its attributes, based upon the idea that it is

necessary for any originated thing to have matter. Time must have matter

and its matter is not the matter of a body but an attribute of a body. Its

matter is not the matter of a body because it is impossible for time to be the

measure of the matter of distance. This impossibility is due to the fact that

sometimes what is different in measure is equal in distance. It is also

impossible for time to be a measure of the matter of a moving thing,

otherwise with the greater time, the moving body would be greater

correspondingly, and this is a contradiction. Thus, time is a measure of

ca

disposition and a disposition is not permanent; otherwise its measure must be

permanent. Thus, time is a measure of a non-permanent disposition, which is

in fact, motion. As a result, time is a measure of motion.

Al-Razi maintains that time is not a quantity per sc because its receptivity to

equality and inequality is not due to its own essence, which has an

autonomous reality subsisting by its own essence (al-zaman lahu fi-dhatihl

82 Ibid., 5: 65-66.
83 Ibid., 5: 66-67; MM, I: 656; Ibn Sina, ShifaK. Tab7‘iyyat, 156; and Najaf. 153-54.

53
 haqiqah mustaqillah bi-nafsiha qa’imah bi-dhatiha), but due to its relations to

motions, which are accidental to its essence/4

3. They argue that time is an aspect of motion because time is realized if and

only if motion is realized. The people of the cave do not feel time because

they do not feel motion either.* For al-Razl, the sleeping person does not feel
85 86

time not because he or she does not feel motion, rather due to the fact that

sleeping precludes the feeling absolutely. As a matter of fact, the inversion is

primary. If for instance, a blind man sitting in a darkened house does not feel
o/

any motion, he still feels the persistence of time.

Having shown that time is neither a measure of the motion of the celestial

sphere, nor a motion of the celestial sphere, nor the celestial sphere, nor motion, al-

Razl proceeds to refute the idea of the continuous quantity of time.

3. Time is a Discrete Quantity

Before presenting his own view, al-Razi elaborates on the view that time is
S3

continuous quantity. Those who assert that time is a continuous quantity (kam

muttasil), argue that time is a quantity because of its receptivity to equality and

inequality. This quantity is not discrete because any discrete quantity is composed of

units. If time were a discrete quantity (kam munfasil), it would .be composed of

successive instants (anat mutalasiqah) and consecutive jerks (dafa'at muta'aqibati).

If such were the case, it would follow that motion would be composed of subsequent

parts each of which is indivisible because the occurrence of motion is in a now. If

(those parts) of motion were divisible, the first part of it would be prior to the second

M MA, 5: 39.
85 Ibn Sina, Shifa’\ Tabi'iyyat, 152, lines 8-10.
86 MA, 5: 67. This argument has been used before by Al-Baghdadl. One who sleeps does not feel
motion and time. For a detailed explanation, see Al-Baghdadi, a!-Mu‘tabar, 2: 73.

54
 one, and then the now would be divisible, whereas it was assumed as being

indivisible, and this is a contradiction. Thus, the extent of motion occurring in one

now is indivisible. If time were composed of successive instants, a motion would be

composed of indivisible things. If such were the case, a body would also be

composed of parts which cannot be further parted (al-ajza9 al-lati la tatajazza*)

because if the extent of the distance along which something is moving in an

indivisible now with an indivisible motion were divisible, then motion along one half

of that distance would be prior to the motion along the second half, then motion

would be divisible, so would be the now, which is contrary to what we have

assumed. It follows that the extent of distance is indivisible. Thus, if time consisted

of successive instants, it would follow that a distance would also be composed of

indivisible parts. However, this view is false according to the philosophers. It follows

that time cannot be composed of subsequent instants and consecutive constants. If

this has been established, time must not be a discrete quantity, but a continuous
87
quantity.

Refuting this, al-Razi argues that it is impossible for time to be a continuous

quantity because of the following arguments:87

88

1. The present now, which is the end of past and beginning of future, can never

be divided into two parts, such that the first part is prior to the second one. If

such were the case, then when the first part was present, the second one was

not and when the second part was, the first one had disappeared. Thus, the

now would never be present because the first part of it must be prior to the

second one. Since it is not possible to have division of the now, it is

indivisible.

87 MA, 5: 69-70.
88 Ibid., 5: 70-74. Cf. also SUH, 2: 124-26.

55
 Al-Razi further argues that the ceasing of the now must occur at once. If its

ceasing occurred gradually, it would be divisible, but it was indivisible. If its

ceasing is at once, the now that is a beginning of its non-existence will be

connected to its existence {kana al-’an al-Iadhi huwa awwal ‘adamihiyakun

muttasiian bi wujudihi), so that these two instants are successive, and then

the discourse on the second now in the same way follows the first now, and

this entails that instants are successive.89

Al-Razl discusses a possible objection. Although he does not name the

objector, there is no doubt that he had Ibn Sina was in mind.90 Al-Razl states

that the objector may hold that the now ceases to exist neither at once nor

gradually, but in the whole of the time, which is after it. He may further

argue that the beginning of its ceasing is (the instants of) its existence

{awwal 'adamihi wujuduhii), so the occurrence of that now is exactly the

same as the beginning of the time of its non-existence. Based on this

supposition, the successive instants would not follow. The view that there is

beginning of the non-existence of an instant at which it is non-existent is

cd

based on the idea of successive instants, so there would be a vicious

circularity, and this is wrong.

Replying to this objection, al-Razi maintains that the non-existence of now

must have a beginning at which that now ceased. This can be proven in this

way. This now was an existent, and then non-existent. Its non-existence took

place after it was not non-existent. This non-existence had a beginning

certainly, and that non-existence occurred at that beginning certainly;

otherwise, it did not change from existence to non-existence, whereas the

89 MA, 5: 70-71. Cf. SUH, 2: 125.

90 Ibn Sina refutes that the now ceases at once or gradually, see Ibn Sina, Shifa*\ Tabl'iyyat, 161-63.

56
 occurrence of change has been assumed. Thus, if the existent now ceased,

there must be a beginning at which it would cease.91

Having stated this, al-Razi modified his previous view in his al-Mabahith, in

which he affirmed that the now ceases neither at once nor gradually, but in the whole

of time, which is after it.92 Thus, unlike in the al-Matalib and in the Sharh ‘Uyun al-

Hikmah, al-Razi in the al-Mabahith defended Ibn Slna’s idea that the now ceases in

the whole of time, which is after it.

2. The present now is indivisible. If the present now ceases, another present

instant, which is also indivisible, must occur after its non-existence, so that

the successive instant follows. If another instant does not occur at all after

the now that ceased, there would be a discontinuous time and it would end in

a non-existence, which is false. This argument is different from the first one,

which shows that the first ceasing now must occur at another instant, which

is subsequent to it. Unlike the first argument, the second one does not discuss

the first ceasing now, but it asserts that another instant must be present after

the first passing now, without the need to explain how the first (now) has

ceased.

3. Time is composed of past and future and both are non-existents. If the now

necessitated a connection of past to future, one of two non-existents would

be related to another non-existent with a border that exists, which is wrong.

However, if time consists of discrete instants, the problem could be resolved

because what occurs does not depend on what has ceased except in the sense

that it has occurred after the first has passed.

91 M4,5: 71-72.
92 MM. 1: 84.

57
 4. Of any two supposed parts of time one must be prior to the other. That the

prior part is prior to the posterior part is not due to something else; for

otherwise, an infinite regress or a vicious circularity would follow. Thus, the

prior part is prior to the posterior part by itself. If such is the case, each of the

two supposed parts of time is established and each one of them is a

concomitant, that is necessitated by itself (lazim yalzamuhu li-dhatihi), and

that necessity cannot occur in the reality of something else. However, the

different concomitants (al-lawazim) show that the essence of what is

connected (al-malzumat) is different. If such were the case, the supposed

parts of time would be different in the realities and essences. If so, their

connection is only conceivable as successive and subsequent, in such a way

that each one is discrete in itself from another, and this is the explanation of

the successive instants.

5. Past and future are composed of indivisible presences (al-huduraf), which are

indivisible instances. So, time is composed of indivisible instances. Having

stated this, al-Razi maintains that motion is also composed of indivisible

parts. It also follows that a body is composed of indivisible parts as well.

Having presented al-RazTs views on the discrete quantity of time, one can

rightly assume that al-RazTs idea of the discrete quantity of time is rooted in the

view of the theologians who argue that time is composed of time-atoms.93

94

93 Cf. SUH, 2: 125.

94 Maimonides presented 12 propositions that show the universe is based on the idea of an atomic
system. See further Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1956), 120-133.

58
 4. The Now

Al-Razi briefly enumerates certain problems concerning the now.95

1. The existence of the now.

The now must exist because of the following arguments: (a) Past and future

are pure non-existence (‘adam mahd). If the present were also pure non­

existence, the occurrence and existence would not be determined at all. Thus,

nothing would exist, and this is wrong, (b) The human mind conceives the

occurrence of things as taking place in past and future. The past is what has

been present and then disappeared and the future is what will be present, but

it is not yet present. If the occurrence of now were impossible, both past and

future would also be impossible. Since that is not the case, the present now

must exist, (c) We do not observe things in the past because they have

disappeared nor in the future because they are not yet present, so observable

things occur in the present now, which is the direct source of our observation.

2. The now is indivisible.

Divisible things are of two kinds:

(a) Something is divided, such that all of the parts of an existent occur

simultaneously, such as a division of a body. Each part of it when it is

divided occurs simultaneously with another.

(b) Something is divided, such that one part does not occur when another

occurs, such as time. The divisible present, says al-Razi, falls under the

second division because one part of it does not exist, when another occurs. If

the present now were divisible in the second type of division, the totality of

time would never occur at all because when the first part was present, the

95 MA, 5: 83-88.

59
 second one was not and when the second part was, the first part had

disappeared. The divisible now means that the first part of it is prior to the

second one. Since it is not possible to have division of the now, it is

indivisible.

3. On the one hand, the now is a divider (fasil) and on the other hand,

connector (wasih.

According to the Aristotelian view of a continuous quantity, any continuous

quantity of time is receptive of division (al-fasl), that is the occurrence of an

actual border for that thing, and this implies that a single border in actuality

may occur in time, and then this border may separate and may connect, as a

point that occurs on a line. Any point that occurs on a line is a divider, then

after that it may be a connector or not. The first alternative is that if a point

occurred on a line, so that because of that point, one stretch of that line to the

second one is not separated, a point would occur in actuality. That point is

the end of a stretch of that line, and at the same time the beginning of

another stretch. Thus, on the one hand, this point is a divider, and on the

other hand, a connector. It is a divider because before the occurrence of this

point on that line, it was a single line; when this point occurred on that line it

divided that line into two. Similarly, it is a connector because that point

necessitates a connection of one stretch of that line to another stretch.

As for the second alternative, that a point is not a connector but only
o3

divider, this occurs when one half stretch of a line, for instance is suspended

from the other half. That point, which is the end of one stretch is not

necessarily a connection to another.

60
 Having presented this, it has been shown that the present now separates past

from future, because it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future,

so this now is a divider. This border that divides may or may not be

connector. It is necessary for the now that divides to be a connector for,

otherwise, time would be discontinuous and something else will not occur

after it, and that is impossible because if time were non-existent, its non­

existence would be after its existence: this temporal posteriority can only be

determined by time. If such is the case, it is obvious that any instant that

occurs is a divider, on the one hand, and a connector, on the other hand. It is a

divider because it separates past from future and a connector because it

necessitates a connection of past to future. Thus, any supposed instant in

time is a divider, on the one hand, and a connector, on the other hand.

Having presented the Aristotelian view on this, al-Razi does not comment on

it. If we would like to extract his views on this argument, we may hold that

al-Razi disagrees with an analogy of a motion of now in time with a motion

of a point on a line, as has been stated at the beginning of Chapter two.

4. The now that is existentially posterior to time is different from the now that

is existentially prior to time.

According to the Aristotelian view of continuous quantity, any continuous

quantity is receptive of infinite divisibility that does not occur in actuality

for, otherwise, it would follow that two borders which have actual infinite

parts would occur in a limited time, and that is impossible. Time is a single

continuous thing in itself. If a cause is attributable to it, necessitating its

separation, the actual separation occurred in it, and that separation is the

61
 now. This now occurs after the existence of time and it is existentially

posterior to time.

The now that is existentially prior to time is a flowing now that operates in

time in a way similar to a moving point that operates in a line. This now is

existentially prior to time. Commenting on this, al-Razi maintains the

Aristotelian view that the now is indivisible and its flowing makes time; this

view means an acceptance of time as something independent in itself that is

autonomous in its essence. The flowing of an indivisible now that makes time

is the same as the Platonian view that time is an independent substance, and

then the successive and subsequent relations occur to the events. As a result,

the true view on of duration (time) is not according to Aristotle, but to

Plato.96

It is difficult for us to trace the exact source of al-Razi when he quoted the

Platonic idea of time. Furthermore, Plato’s meaning in the Timaeus has been the

subject of dispute. There are three main interpretations of the Timaeus. Firstly, time

began together with the ordered kosmos, and there was nothing before that.

Secondly, there is one kind of time, which began, but it was preceded by another

kind of time. Thirdly, time and kosmos have no beginning.97

Al-Razl would interpret Plato in line with the second interpretation that there

would be two kinds of time. This idea had also been formulated by Abu Bakr al-Razi

in his kitab fi ‘ilm al-Ilahi, which is quoted several times by al-Razl Thus, it can be

assumed that Abu Bakr al-RazTs kitab fi ‘ilm al-Ilahl and al-Baghdadi’s al-

96 M4, 5: 88.
97 Richard Sorabji states that it was Velleius, spokesman for the Epicurians who held that there are
two kinds of time. See Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London: Gerald
Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1983), 268-71.

62
Mu'tabar, which go against the idea of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina on time, have

contributed to al-Razi’s thought to refute the Aristotelian idea of time.

63
 Chapter Three

GOD’S PRIORITY TO THE WORLD

1. The Eternity of Time

The previous two chapters have shown us, that in al-Razi’s view, time exists

necessarily and self-evidently. The essence of its existence is not dependent on

motion. The necessary existence of time and its essence, which is independent of

motion, does not imply the pre-etemal world. Al-Razi refutes Ibn Sina’s view that

the pre-etemal time implies the pre-etemal world. In Ibn Sina’s view, if time is pre-

etemal, motion will also be eternal; and if motion is eternal, that through which

motion subsists, i.e., the world will also be eternal. Thus, the world does not come

into existence in time, but with time. Thus, the world exists simultaneously with

time, which is infinite. In other words, the world exists in infinite time. The world

that exists in infinite time cannot be preceded by time because there is nothing

before the world that exists in infinite time. Thus, if God is prior to the world, which

is infinite in time, this priority will not be temporal, but essential.

As for al-Razi, the pre-etemal time does not necessitate the pre-etemal

motion that in turn, necessitates the pre-etemal world. This is due to the fact that

the essence of the existence of time is independent of motion. Thus, in al-Razi’s

view, the world does not come into existence with time, but in time. Thus, the world

comes into existence and its existence is preceded by its non-existence. The non­

existence of the world precedes its existence in time. Thus, the world is finite in

time. If God is prior to the world, this priority will be different from the five

64
conventional types of priority. 8 Before we elaborate on the sixth type of priority

that leads us to understand al-Razi’s view on God’s priority to the world, it is

worthwhile to discuss the arguments for the eternity of time because through the

argument on time the issue of God’s priority to the world can be better understood.

Al-Razl elaborates on the arguments for the pre-etemity of time (duration) as

follows:98
99

1. Either God and the world exist simultaneously, or the world is posterior to

God in infinite duration of time, or the world is posterior to Him in finite

duration of time. The first two alternatives are false, and hence, the third is

the true one. As for the first alternative, if God and the world existed

simultaneously, God and the world would be either two pre-etemities or two

originated things. As for the second alternative, if the world were posterior to

God in infinite duration of time, this would be wrong because what is prior to

an originated thing in finite duration, would be originated, and it would

follow that God would be originated. What remains is the third alternative,

that is God, is prior to the world in infinite duration of time. This

necessitates that time is the cause for God’s priority to the world. This

priority is infinite in time and pre-etemal. Thus, duration is pre-etemal.

It is possible to hold the view that the pre-etemal duration may exist without

the pre-etemity of the world. Someone might say that there is no doubt that

God is today’s originated events. God’s precedence to them is either

o

with finite time or with an infinite time. The first alternative would
05

necessitate the origination of God, whereas the second one necessitates the

98 See p. 65.
99 MA, 4: 197-210.

65
 pre-etemity of duration. If it were said that this is based upon God’s

precedence to the world or this certain event in time, so that then it were said

that that duration is either finite or infinite, then this is wrong because God is

not prior to the world by duration, as will be discussed later.

2. Duration (time) either has nothing before and after it, or has a beginning and

an end, or has one of them, without the other. The first alternative is true,

whereas the second one is false because if duration had a beginning, it would

have been preceded by a non-existent, which has nothing before it, and it

would be succeeded by a non-existent, which has nothing after it. These two

non-existents have in common that each of them is non-existent, but each of

them differs in its being prior and posterior to this existence. And that by

which similarity is, is not that by which dissimilarity is. This priority and

posteriority by which the first non-existence can be differentiated from the

second one, must be different from non-existence, which is common in these

two non-existents. The meaning of time (duration) is that two similar things

are different from one another with respect to a before and after. Since the

first non-existent is qualified by being ‘before,’ in such a way that there is

nothing before it, and the second non-existence is qualified by being ‘after,’

in such a way that there is nothing after it, one must conclude that time

(duration) has nothing before and after it. Thus, affirmation of a beginning

and an ending of duration would entail a denial of its beginning and its

ending, and that is impossible. Thus, it is impossible for duration to have

beginning and an end.

3. If the world were originated, then the moment of its non-existence would

either be or not be different from the moment of its existence. If the moment

66
 of its non-existence were different from the moment of its existence, then

dissimilar moments would occur before the origination of the world, so that

the moment of its non-existence could be distinguished from the moment of

its existence. This implies the pre-etemity of duration (time). If the moment

of non-existence were not be different from the moment of existence, then

the non-existent and existent could never be predicated. It is obvious that

what is originated came into existence after its non-existence, and this order

can only occur when the moment of non-existence is different from the

moment of existence.

4. If duration came into existence, its origination would only occur by an

efficient cause. Suppose that God intends to make duration come into

existence either with or without the condition to specify the origination in a

certain moment. As for the first alternative, if God intended to make duration

come into existence with a condition to specify the origination in a certain

moment, then this would be wrong because the discourse on this moment

would be like the discourse on the first one, and an infinite regress (aJ-

tasalsul) would follow. If the infinite regress occurred at once, that would be

impossible. However, if each part of the infinite regress occurred after having

been preceded by another, but this does not go back to a first one (la ila

awwal), then that is what we were trying to prove. As for the second

alternative, if God intended to make duration come into existence, without

condition to specify the occurrence at a certain moment, but if it were His

intention to make duration without this condition, then based on this

supposition, the occurrence of such an effect would not be posterior to this

67
 intention. Since it is God’s intention to make time (duration) exist eternally,

duration and time must be pre-etemal.

It is obvious to the human mind that an event only occurs after being

preceded either by non-existence or existence. Based on this ground, any

event is preceded by something else and this does not go on until a first one.

This is the meaning of time. Thus, time has nothing before it.

Any originated thing is preceded by its non-existence. Anything that is

preceded by its non-existence, its non-existence is prior to it. The non­

existent, which is prior to that non-existent, is not the same non-existent

because the previous non-existent and the successive non-existent have in

common that they are non-existents, but they differ in being prior and

posterior, and priority and posteriority are concepts that are added to pure

non-existence. Both are contrary positive attributes (wasfani thubutiyani

mutanafiyani)™ So, one must suppose something to which this priority and

posteriority are attached, as an infinite regress. That thing is time. Thus,

time, having no beginning, exists before any event.

7. God existed pre-eternally and will exist endlessly. These two statements

mean something different for, otherwise, these two statements would have

one meaning and the difference would be in the expression only. “He was pre-

eternally” signifies a past, whereas “He will exist endlessly ’ signifies

future. If we altered the expression and stated: “He was in the future and will

be in the past” the human mind considers this obviously false. Thus, there are

different meanings in those statements. If this is the case, then we say that

God is predicated by existence. The occurrence of each one of these two

100The arguments for and against the positive attributes have been discussed in Chapter one. See pp.
22-27.

68
 concepts cannot be predicated together with the occurrence of the other

concept, and this necessitates that each one is different from God’s essence.

Furthermore, both concepts are different from the concept of the world being

non-existent. The concept of non-existence may be conceived together with

cc
‘beginninglessness’ and an ‘endlessness. Thus, the concepts of

‘beginninglessness’ and ‘endlessness’ are different from God’s essence and

the non-existence of the world. The pre-etemity signifies an endurance that

has no beginning in the past, whereas the ‘endlessness’ signifies an endurance

that has no ending in the future, and these two things are different from

God’s essence and the non-existence of the world. This is what duration,

perpetuity and eternity mean, and so perpetuity and duration have no

beginning.

8. If the world were originated, it would be right to say: “God was with the non­

existence of the world.” The meaning of ‘was’ is either just God’s existence

and the non-existence of the world or God’s existence and the non-existence

of the world by a specific condition (bi shart khass) and in a specific way (bi

kaifiyyah khassah). The meaning of ‘was’ is not just God’s existence and the

non-existence of the world only, because “God, will exist with the non­

existence of the world,” signifies that God’s existence occurs with the non­

existence of the world, whereas “God was with the non-existence of the

world” did not. Thus, the true meaning of “God was with the non-existence

of the world is that God was with the non-existence of the world by

specific condition and in a specific way, and this condition is something that

persists since pre-etemity to the present, and this is the meaning of duration

(time).

69
9. That something is originated signifies that it did not exist in the previous

moment, and then it became an existent. If time were originated, it would

have not been existent in the previous time, and then it would become

existent. This implies that time existed before it existed, and this is

impossible because the supposition of anything being non-existent that leads

to the supposition of its existence is impossible. Thus, it is impossible to

suppose the non-existence of time, and hence, it has neither a beginning nor

an end.

10. If the world were originated, then it would be either possible or not possible

for another world to exist prior to this world, such that it comes to an end at

the beginning of this world, during a period of ten revolutions. If the

existence of another world, such that comes to an end at the beginning of this

world, during a period of ten revolutions were not possible, then it would

entail either the transference of the world from self-impossibility (al-imtina(

al-dhati) to self-possibility (al-imkan al-dhatl) or the transference of the

Creator from powerless to powerful. However, these two are impossible. If

the existence of another world, such that comes to an end at the beginning of

this world during a period of ten revolutions were possible, then it would

entail the occurrence of a possibility. It is also possible to suppose that God

could create another world prior to this world, such that it comes to an end at

the beginning of this world, while existing during a period of twenty

revolutions. If these two suppositions occurred, they either began

simultaneously and stopped simultaneously at the beginning of this world or

the beginning of one’s existence must be prior to the other’s existence. The

supposition of their simultaneous beginnings and simultaneous stoppings at

70
 the beginning at this world is wrong, for otherwise it would necessitate that

what is more (za’id) would be the same as what is less (naqis), and this is

impossible. Concerning the other supposition, this would necessitate the

existence of duration (time), because a possibility extended to ten revolutions

and not to twenty revolutions, and another possibility extended to twenty

revolutions, which is not filled by ten revolutions, occur before the existence

of the world. In this case, the second possibility has been determined to exist

(mutaqarrir al-wujud) before the first one. Duration is nothing but this, and

this implies that it has no beginning.

11. The pre-etemity to the beginning of the creation of the world is smaller than

the pre-etemity to the moment of the Great Flood. The pre-etemity to the

moment of the Great Flood is smaller than the pre-etemity to today.

Whenever the day and time pass, the pre-etemity to that moment is more

than the pre-etemity to the moment before it. Thus, the pre-etemity to the

present is something that admits of an increase and a decrease, and therefore

it is an existent, because pure non-existence can never be characterized by

increase and decrease. If this is the case, then a thing that admits of increase

and decrease is either God’s essence or non-existence, or a third thing. The

first is wrong because God’s essence is sanctified from admitting increase

and decrease. The second is also wrong because pure non-existence does not

admit of the characteristic of increase and decrease, as has been stated. Thus,

the third is right and it is time or something occurring in it because it admits

of increase and decrease.101

,0,This argument does not show that time is eternal, but that it is existent.

71
 12. The origination and endurance of a thing can only be conceived by taking

time into consideration. What is originated comes into existence in a moment

after being non-existent in the previous time, whereas what is pre-etemal and

enduring (al-da’im al-qadini) exists only after it existed before. Since the

concepts of origination (al-hudutti) and everlastingness (baqa>) always take

the moments into consideration, time can never come into existence.

Having stated the arguments for the eternity of time, it is again worthwhile

to elaborate on Ibn Sina’s view on God’s priority to the world because al-Razi’s

view can be regarded as a reaction to the former.

2. Ibn Sina on God’s Essential (Causal) Priority to the World

Using equivocal terms, Ibn Sina maintains that there are five types of priority.102 (1)

Natural priority (al-taqaddum bi al-tab*), like the number 1 always being prior to the

number 2. The number 2 cannot exist unless the number 1 exists. The natural priority

means that the ‘prior’ can exist without the ‘posterior,’ but the ‘posterior’ cannot

exist without the ‘prior.’ In his view, natural priority (al-taqaddum bi al-tab") is

synonymous with existential priority (taqaddum bi al~wujud).103 104

(2) Temporal

priority (al-taqaddum bi al-zamari). (3) Priority in rank (al-taqaddum bi al­

martabaH), which is equivalent to the term priority in place (taqaddum bi al-

makari).m (4) Priority in perfection (al-taqaddum fl al-kamal), like the priority of

Abu Bakr r.a. over ‘Umar r.a. This priority is equivalent to priority in nobility (al-

l02Ibn Sina, Najat, 257-58. Cf. Ibn Sina, Shifa9: Ilahiyyat, 2 vols. G. C. Anawati and S. Zayed. Eds
(vol. 1) and M. Y. Musa, S. Dunya, S. Zayid (vol. 2), 1: 163-66, henceforth abbreviated as Shifa9:
Ilahiyyat.
1031 bn Sina, Shifa9: Ilahiyyat, 164.
104Ibid., 163.

72
 taqaddum ft al-sharaf). (5) Causal priority (al-taqaddum bi al-dlfiyaliy like the

priority of cause over its effect.

Ibn Sina holds that origination is either a temporal origination {huduth

zamarii) or an essential origination {huduth dhatl)™6 For Ibn Sina, a thing in itself

(in its essence), insofar as it is only in itself without its cause, does not come into

existence. It comes into existence only by a cause.107 *Thus, essential priority is the
* 106

same as causal priority, but not the same as natural priority because the number 1

does not cause the number 2, although the number 1 is prior to the number 2.10x

Both causal and natural priorities have a common meaning in one sense, and have

S3
different meaning in another sense. While the common meaning is that the number 1

is prior by reason of its essence to the number 2, the difference in meaning is that the

number 1 does not cause the number 2, and therefore, it is not a causal (essential)

priority but a natural priority {al-taqaddum bi al-tab*). Because Ibn Sina states:

“origination is either a temporal origination {huduth zamarii) or an essential

origination,”109 Marmura argues that God’s priority is limited to either essential

priority or temporal priority, and cannot be anything else.110 Unlike Ibn Sina, both

Shahrastarii and al-Razi explicitly state that God’s priority to the world is not

restricted to the temporal and the essential, nor any of the other 5 kinds mentioned

,05Ibid.» 164, Ibn Sina, Najaf 258.

106Ibn Sina, Najat. 259.
,07Ibid.
,08Michael E. Marmura is not right when he regards the essential priority and the natural priority as
equivalent terms in Ibn Slna’s view. See Michael E. Marmura, “The Conflict over the World’s Pre­
Eternity in the Tahafuts of al-Ghazall and Ibn Rushd” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,
1959), 103, hereafter designated as Conflict.
109Ibn Sina, Najat. 259.
1,0Michael E. Marmura, Conflict, 102. Cf. also “The Logical Role of the Argument from Time in the
Tahafuts Second Proof for the World’s Pre-Etemity,” The Muslim World, 49, no. 4 (1959), 309,
hereinafter cited as Pre-Etemity.

73
by Ibn Sina.111 2

In dividing origination into temporal and essential, Ibn Sina aims at

maintaining that essential origination, unlike temporal origination, is not always in

time. As far as the issue of God’s priority to the world is concerned, Ibn Sina

maintains that God’s priority to the world is not temporal but essential {bi al-

dhaf). In other words, essentially the world is a ‘non-temporal posterior’ to God.

The infinite world in time is ‘simultaneous with and posterior’ to God. God is

‘simultaneous with and prior’ to the world, which is infinite in time.

Ibn Sina proves that God’s priority to the world is necessarily essential by

proving that it cannot be temporal.113 He asserts that if God is eternal, and if God’s

priority to the world is taken to be temporal, then God must have preceded both the

world and time by an infinite time having no limit in the direction of its beginning.

Hence, before the existence of the world and time, infinite time existed. However, to

say that time existed before it existed, is contradictory. Since time is a measure of

motion, motion also has no beginning. If God is eternal, time must be eternal. If time

is eternal, motion is eternal as well; and if motion is eternal, that through which

motion subsists, i.e., the world, is eternal.114 Thus, God’s priority to the world is

essential.

Ibn Sina further argues that the world comes into existence not in time, but

with time, and time comes into existence essentially {huduth dhatl). Thus, for Ibn

Sina, time does not come into existence as a coming to be in time {huduthan

H1Shahrastanl mentions that God is not prior to or with the world in time, place, nobility, essence and
nature. See Shahrastanl, Kitab al-Musara‘a, trans. Wilfred Madelung and Toby Mayer, Struggling
with Philosopher: A Refutation ofAvicenna’s Metaphysics (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2001),
115-116, henceforth cited as Struggling. AI-Razl also holds the same view. See MA, 4: 15-18.
ll2Ibn Sina, Najat, 154, line 20.
,,3Ibn Sina, Najat, 154, lines 19-20.
114A1-Ghazafi, Tahafut,3\

74
zamaniyyarif but as an eternal creation (ibda*), in which its creator does not precede

it in time, but in essence. If time had a temporal beginning, it would come to be after

a before that did not exist. Thus time is a creation, which is only preceded by its

creator.115

Having briefly and precisely presented Ibn Sina’s view on temporal vs.

essential origination, which provides us a background to the issue of God’s priority

to the world, we shall now present al-Razi’s view.

3. God’s Priority to the World is Unknown

Al-Razi investigates the meaning of the originated thing (muhdath) before he

discusses the issue of God’s priority to the world. He states that the originated thing

must be preceded either by non-existence or by existence. If its precedence is non­

existence, then it exists after having been preceded by non-existence. If its

precedence was existence, then it will exist after being preceded by the existence of

something else. For al-Razi, that its precedence is non-existence is more appropriate

because the originated thing, insofar as it is originated, must exist after having been

preceded by its non-existence. Insofar as it is originated, it is not necessary that its

existence is preceded by the existence of something else, because the argument that

it is impossible for an originated thing to come into existence, except by an

originator and something existent, is not yet proven.116

Having stated this, al-Razi shows that these two possibilities, i.e., the

precedent of the originated-thing as non-existent and the precedent of the originated-

thing as something else existing both have a difficulty, as far as temporal priority is

concerned.

115 Ibn Sina, Najat, 154-55.

1,6 MA, 4: 13.

75
 On the one hand, if the existence of the originated thing were preceded by

non-existence, then the precedent itself would be non-existent, and its priority would

have no beginning, and this priority entails time. Temporal priority occurs only with

the occurrence of time, and this implies the pre-etemal time. Since it is affirmed in

physics that time is an aspect of motion, which is an aspect of a body, then the pre-

eternity of time must entail the pre-etemity of a body. Thus, the origination

O
CO
body must entail the pre-etemity of the body, which contradicts the view that the

originated thing must be preceded by non-existence.117

On the other hand, if the existence of the world were preceded by the

existence of something else, then the precedent of the world would be some other

existent; this priority has no beginning, and this priority must entail time. Temporal

priority occurs only with the occurrence of time, and this implies the pre-etemal

time. Since it is affirmed in physics that time is an aspect of motion, which is an

aspect of a body, then the pre-etemity of time must entail the pre-etemity of the

body.118 Thus, the origination of a body must entail the pre-etemity of the body. As

result, the pre-etemity of the world would have not been preceded by the existence
to

of something else, and this is a contradiction of the view that the existence of the

world was preceded by the existence of something else.

As an answer to this difficulty, al-Razi holds that the non-existence of the

world precedes the world in another type of priority, which does not belong to the

accepted five types of priority. Thus, using equivocal terms in his al-Tafsir and the

Matalib, al-Razi, holds that there are six types of priority and they are as follows: (1)

priority in causality (al-taqaddum bi al-ta’thh), which is synonymous with al-

taqaddum bi al- ‘aliyah. (2) Priority in necessity but not in causality (al-taqaddum bi

"’Ibid.
118 Ibid., 4: 14.

76
 al-hajah la bi al-ta’thuj, which is equivalent to the term priority in essence (al-

taqaddum bi al-dhat). Al-RazTs term for priority in essence is exactly the same as

natural priority in Ibn Sina’s view. (3) Priority in dignity (al-taqaddum bi al-sharaf}.

(4) Priority in hierarchy (al-taqaddum bi al-rutbah), which is equivalent to priority in

place (al-taqaddum bi al-makari). (5) Priority in time (al-taqaddum bi al-zamari). (6)

Priority like that of parts of time to other parts, which cannot be included in the

preceding types.119 120 * in al-RazTs view, God’s priority to the world is like the
Thus,

priority of parts of time to other parts.

Unlike the preceding five types of priority, each of which has a specific name,

al-Razl calls the priority of parts of time to other parts only the sixth type™

Perhaps he only calls God’s priority to the world the sixth type because its specified

quiddity (mahiyyatuhu al-makhsusah) is the most hidden knowledge. The human

mind is unable to comprehensively know its very quiddity (‘uqul al-khalq qasiratun

'an al-ihatah bi kunhl mahiyatihl)n{ Al-RazTs view on the sixth type should not be

regarded as synonymous with priority simply by existence, like the priority of the

existentialiser to the existentialised (al-taqaddum bi al-wujud faqat, kataqaddum al-

mujid 6ala al-mujad), which was considered by al-Shahrastanl as the sixth type of

priority 122because his concept of the sixth type has a different meaning.123 Al-

Shahrastanl maintains that this priority in existence is an absolute priority, whereas

for al-Razl, this priority signifies the existence of time, though it is not in time.

Furthermore, al-Shahrastanl calls the sixth type priority in existence (al-taqaddum bi

1I9A1-Razl, al-Tafslr al-Kablr, 32 vols. (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-‘Arabi, 1999), 10: 444,
henceforth cited as Tafslr. Cf. M4, 4: 15.
120MA, 4: 15, line 2; Tafslr, 10: 444-45.
,2,M4, 5: 79.
mNihayat t 10, line 11; Struggling. 96, line 5.
,23Yasin Ceylan is not right when he holds that al-Razl seems to have taken the basis of the argument
from al-Shahrastanl. See Yasin Ceylan, Theology, 59.

77
al-wujud), whereas al-Razi does not. Thus, al-Razi’s argument from the sixth type

might have not taken the basis of the argument from al-Shahrastarii because ai-

Razi’s view on the nature of time goes against al-Shahrastarii’s idea of time, which is

Aristotelian. There is no doubt that al-Razi’s argument on the sixth type is deeply

rooted in his concept of time. For this reason, al-Razi describes the sixth type as

being like parts of time. Thus, although al-Shahrastam mentioned the sixth type

perhaps for the first time, al-RazTs concept is different from that of al-Shahrastarii.

Furthermore, al-Shahrastarii seems to have taken the basis of the argument from al-

Ghazali. According to al-Ghazali, God’s priority means that His being was the only

being (fa na‘nl bial-taqaddum infiraduhu bi al-wujud faqaf).m

Al-Razl maintains that God’s priority to the world cannot be known in a

detailed way (‘ala sabll al-tafsll), but can be known only in a general way (‘ala sabll

al-ijmai). The human mind cannot know the primal-ness of God because the human

mind is capable of knowing a thing only if it can comprehend it and everything

comprehended that is present in the mind is finite, while God is infinite. Thus God,

being the very first, is the most evident of what is evident (azharmin kull zahlr), and

yet He is the Being who is most secret of what is secret (Ibtan mln kull batin')
1 ?s
because His se/£evident-ness is outside the human mind.
cr*

Al-Razi gives 6 arguments to show that there must sixth type of

CO
CB

priority.126
124 125

(1) Time is nothing but the successiveness (ta‘aquty and the subsequence

(talahuq) of its parts. If a part of time has ceased to exist, then the part

coming into existence after it, is contingent-in-itself (mumkin al-wujud li-

124 Tahafut, 31.

125 Tafsir, 10:446.
126 AM, 4: 15-18.

78
 dhatihl), not necessary-in-itself {wajib al-wujud li-dhatitii) because the

quiddity of necessary-in-itself does not accept non-existence, while the

present part, that comes into existence after its non-existence, accepts non­

existence. For this reason, the present part, coming into existence after being

non-existent is contingent-in-itself. Having proven this contingency of the

parts of time, al-Razi moves on to argue that supposing that the first part of

time has ceased to exist and after it, another part of time has not yet come

into existence, privation occurs after existence. Since an absolute privation of

time (‘adam al-zaman mutlaqari) has been presupposed, posteriority is not in

time. It follows that priority and posteriority occur without reference to time.

{fa hahuna qad hasalat al-qabliyyah wa al-ba‘diyyah min ghayr ftibar al-

zaman). If this can be understood, then, it can be also understood that the

occurrence of the priority of the non-existence before the existence of the

originated, and the occurrence of the posteriority of the existence of the

originated after its non-existence, is not in time either.

(2) The parts of time are successive. Each of these parts comes into existence

after its non-existence, so it is contingent-in-itself. Since each of them is

contingent-in-itself, the sum total of time is contingent-in-itself. Since each

contingent-in-itself has an agent or a cause {mu’aththif), the sum total of

time must have a cause.

This cause is either necessitating {mujib) or voluntary {mukhtar). The former

case is impossible for, otherwise, the effect would be perpetual with the

perpetually of the essential cause {dhat al-'illah), and then, time would be an

existent, everlasting in essence, devoid of change and successiveness-- this is

not time. Thus, if the cause of the existence of time were necessitating-in-

79
 itself, then it would be necessary that time is not time, and that is impossible.

(annahu law kana al-mu’aththir fl wujudal-zaman mujiban bi al-dhat, lazima

an la yakuna al-zaman zamanan, wa dhalika al-muhal).

By disproving a necessitating agent, al-Razi proves voluntary agent. Al-

Razi goes on to argue that a voluntary agent is the cause of time and He is

prior to His act. As a result, the voluntary agent {faeil mukhtar) is prior to the

existence of time. That precedence is not in time, otherwise time would exist,

at the occasion (event) of its non-existence, and that is impossible, {wa

dhalika al-taqaddum laysa bi al-zaman wa ilia lazima an yakuna al-zaman

mawjudan, hala adamihl, wa dhalika al-muhal). This kind of precedence is

not temporal priority, and it does not belong to the accepted five types of

priority either.

(3) Time is either originated {hadith) or pre-eternal {qadini). If time were

originated— its non-existence would precede its existence and that

precedence could only be with time, then the precedence of the non-existence

of time over its existence would occur without the occurrence of time. Al-

Razi’s argument shows that it is impossible for time to come into existence

because time is always presupposed before its origination. In short, time

comes to be afters before that does not exist!

If time were pre-etemal, then its persistence {istimraf) could not have been in

time; otherwise time would require another time. If it could be understood

that the persistence of something is not due to time, then it could also be

understood that its origination is not due to time either.

(4) Yesterday is prior to today and this priority is not a causal priority. This may

be shown in two ways; (a) the parts of time resemble one another

80
(mutashabihati). If one part of time is the cause of a second part, the second

part would be the cause of the first, and each of those parts would be the

cause of itself. When two things are the same in essence, what they entail

must be same as well, (b) The cause must occur when its effect occurs. If the

first part of time is the cause of a second part of time, then the cause and

effect would occur simultaneously. Thus, time would not be time, and this is

contradictory.

With this proof, al-Razi also claims to have shown that parts of time are prior

to one another not in essence, nor in dignity, or in place. Then what remains

is priority in time. This temporal priority means that what is prior occurs in a

time in which what is posterior has not occurred, then another time occurs in

which what is posterior occurs. If some parts of time were prior to other parts

in time, then it would be necessary for each of these temporal parts to occur

in another time, so that each of them would be a receptacle and a container

for the other. (Jazima an yakuna kull juz’in min ajza’i al-zaman hasilan fi

zaman akhar, bi haythu yakun ahaduhumazarfan lial-akhar wa wi'a’an lahu).

As a result, it would be necessary for each time to occur in another time ad

infinitum, and each of them would exist simultaneously at once, and this is

wrong because: (a) this hour would not be one hour but an infinite number of

hours, (b) the sum total of infinite yesterdays precedes the sum total of

present days. The priority of infinite yesterdays’ totality to the present days’

totality is in time and the receptacle is different from what is being received

(al-zarf mughayir li al-mazruff The receptacle and the container of this

totality must be outside the totality because the receptacle is different from

what is being received. At the same time, however, the receptacle of this

81
 totality must not be outside its totality because each individual thing must be

inside the totality of these individual things. As a result, one thing in relation

to its totality is both inside and outside its totality, and this is impossible.

For this reason, the priority of parts of time to another is not included in the

previous five types of priority, but it is the sixth type. If this can be

understood, then it can also be understood that the precedence of the non­

existence of what is originated over its existence is similar to the precedence

of parts of time, which are not in time.

(5) In terms of temporal relation, it is self-evident that two things may either be

prior, or simultaneous, or posterior to one another. God’s priority to the

world also falls into this relation. If priority, simultaneity and posteriority

occur only due to time, and if it is impossible for God to be free from this

relation, then God would require the existence of something else, namely;

time. As a result, the necessary-in-itself would become the contingent-in-

itself, which is impossible. Thus, the occurrence of priority, simultaneity and

posteriority do not require time at all.

(6) If the occurrence of priority, simultaneity and posteriority could be only due

to time, then there is no doubt that a thing that occurred in time occurs

together with time, and its occurring together with time is not due to another

time. Since the occurrence of simultaneity is not due to time [as shown in the

fourth argument], therefore, the occurrence of priority and posteriority is also

not due to time.

Having established that God’s priority to the world cannot be included in the

previous five types of priority, but in the sixth type, al-Razi maintains that the

difficulty that has been mentioned above emerged because time was defined as a

82
measure of motion and the successive instants which occurred in its flow. Thus, the

pre-etemity of time is derived from the pre-etemity of motion which, in turn, is

derived from the pre-etemity of the body. AI-Razl refutes this definition and asserts

that time is not an attribute of motion, but a self-subsistent substance (jawhar qa’im

bi nafsihi). Thus, it is neither derived from the pre-etemity of motion nor from the

pre-etemity of a body.127 *It is an endless substance (jawhar baqiri), not connected to

any event, so it is a single enduring (al-dawam al-wahid) and a single permanent (al-

istimrar al-wahid) thing that it is not supposed to change in its attributes, and this is

the meaning of perpetuity (ai-dahi), pre-etemity (al-azal) and eternity (al-sarmad). If

it is connected to the occurrence of the successive and consecutive events, then it

occurs due to the occurrence of those successive events, together with the changes in

the relations that are external to its essence. Nevertheless, the essence of duration

cannot be considered as something that is flowing and enduring because the flowing

and elapsing (al-taqaddi) occur in connection with its relations that are accidental to

its essence. Al-Razi believes that this view is a solution to the difficulty

mentioned.

Having presented al-RazTs refutation of al-Farabi’s and Ibn Sina’s views on

the pre-etemity of the world, this does not mean that he is in agreement with al-

Kindi, al-Ghazafi and al-Shahrastam who assert that time is finite because the world

is finite in time. Al-RazTs view, as a matter of fact, goes beyond them because

unlike al-Razl, they neither challenged the Aristotelian definition of time, nor did

they refute the idea that pre-etemal time can be derived from the pre-etemal motion.

On the contrary, they all admitted that time is inherently linked to motion. They

I27M4, 4: 200.
,28Ibid.

83
 affirmed that time and the world come into existence simultaneously.129 Thus, their

argument on time in the issue of the pre-etemity of the world is not an irreconcilable

conflict over the conception of time because they agreed with al-Farabl and Ibn Sina

that time is inseparable from motion. Their argument on time in the issue of God’s

priority to the world is, as a matter of fact, rooted in their incompatible conceptions

of God’s will, which is beyond the subject of our discussion.

Al-Kindi, al-Ghazafi and al-Shahrastarii insisted that time is originated and

created, and before it there was no time at all. That God is prior to the world and

time means that He was while there was no world and that then He was while the

world was with Him. {annahu kana wa la ‘alam thumma kana wa ma‘ahu (alani}. In

their view, ‘God was’ does not necessarily signify the existence of time because time

is a concept formed in the estimative faculty. Time is a relative relation. It is similar

to space.130 Al-Razi refutes their views on finite time and affirms that time is pre­

eternal. However, as has been stated, he does not agree with al-Farabl’s and Ibn Sina

when they argue that the world is pre-etemal. Thus, al-Razi‘s view that time is

infinite, but the world is not, can be considered as an attempt to solve the

contradicting views among al-Farabi and Ibn Sina on the one hand, and al-Kindi, al-

I29A1-Kindi holds that time is a duration, which is counted by motion, its parts are not fixed {al-zaman
muddah ta'udduha al-harakat, ghayru thabitah al-ajza*}. Al-Kindi also holds that duration is
counted by motion. If motion existed, time would have existed and if the former has not, the latter
would have not been {muddah ta ‘udduha al-harakah fain kanat harakah kana zaman wa in lam takun
harakah lam yakun zaman}. See: Muhammad ‘AH al-Jundl, Ishkaliyyat al-Zaman fi Falsafat al-
Kindt, Ru’yah Mu'asirah (Maktabah al-Zahra, n.d), 56-57. Al-Ghazafi also maintains that temporal
extension is a concomitant of motion, {fa al-bu‘du al-zamanl tabi* li al-harakah}. See Tahafut, 33.
Shahrastanl also holds that perpetuity and time only begin in view of the origination of motion
{yabtadi’u al-dahr wa al-zaman haithi: huduth al-harakah}. See Shahrastanl, Struggling, 118.
™ Tahafut, 31-39 passim. Shahrastanl likens time to space. Just as the existence of space between
God and the universe cannot be accepted, similarly the existence of time between God and the
creation of the world is not valid. The difficulty of comprehending this fact is due to the prejudiced
human thinking of God in terms of time and space, which is no more than illusion {wahm}. See
further al-Shahrastanl, Nihayat al-Iqdam fi ‘ilm al-kalam, ed. Alfred Guillaume (n.p. Maktabah al-
Thaqafah al-Dlniyyah, n.d.), 9-10, henceforth cited as Nihayat, Cf. Struggling, 101-02.

84
 Ghazal! and al-Shahrastarii, on the other hand. This solution is rooted in his views on

time.

4. Eternity, Perpetuity and Time

In fact, the issue of God’s priority to the world can be considered as a relation

between the non-temporal and the temporal. Ibn Sina distinguishes three kinds of

relations.

1) He holds that the relationship of the changing to the changing is in time (a/-

zamari). He maintains that a thing is in time if it entails the notion of prior-

and posterior. Thus, the parts of time, namely the past and the future, and its

extremities, namely the instants, exist primarily in time. The now is in time

as the one is in number, and the prior and the posterior are in time as the even

and the odd are in number. Besides, the parts of time, motion and the moving

thing are in time according to priority and posteriority; motion has priority

and posteriority in respect of its substratum, spatial magnitude, and the

moving thing has the prior-and-posterior in respect of motion. While motions

exist in time secondarily, moving things exist in it in a tertiary manner, for

they exist in motion and motion exists in time. The moving things exist in

time like the counted things exist in number. For him, a rest being the lack of

motion accidentally is in time. Thus, what does not belong to this group of

things does not exist in time.131

2) He also holds that not everything that exists together with time exists in

time. What has a permanence that corresponds to the permanence of time

itself is said to be in perpetuity (dahr). In other words, thing that

cd

131 Ibn Sina, Shifa’: TabiTiyyat, 170-71; Ibn Sina, Najat, 155.

85
 permanently exists with permanent time is not in time. 32 Although Ibn Sina

himself did not state what kind of existents exist in dahr. it can be rightly

assumed that Intelligences {al-(uqul}. the celestial spheres, and time itself

exist in dahr.

3) He maintains that perpetuity in itself is part of eternity and is called

perpetuity (only) when compared to time {al-dahr fi dhatihi min al-sarmad,

wa bi al-qiyas ila al-zaman dahr). Eternity means the relationship of the

unchanging to the unchanging {thabit).

Having mentioned Ibn Sina’s classification, al-Razi considers Ibn Sina’s

o'
3
of the relation between dahr and sarmad as vague because Ibn Sina did not explain

further the meaning of perpetuity {al-dahi) and eternity {al-sarmad} m Ibn Sina did

not clarify whether perpetuity {dahr} and eternity {sarmad} are the specified relation

itself or another thing requiring the occurrence of this relation. If they were the

specified relations {al-nisab al-makhsusah), then Ibn Sina should say the same about

time, namely that time is nothing but relation specified by before-after-

simultaneous without affirming another thing (motion). However, since Ibn Sina

states that time is existent, requiring the occurrence of this relation, and since he

does not state that perpetuity is existent, requiring the occurrence of this specified

relation, and since he does not differentiate between the two, therefore, his view is

oscillating.

Al-Razi goes on to question Ibn Sina, regarding whether he meant perpetuity

or eternity to be the specific existent requiring the occurrence of this relation.

According to al-Razi, Ibn Sina should have explained it either as a substance

{jawhai) or an accident (‘arad}. If it were a substance, is it then among the material* *

132 Ibn Sina, Shifa': Tabf'iyyat, 171-172.

133 MA, 5: 89.

86
substances (al-jawahir al-jismaniyyah) or among the immaterial substances (al-

jawahir al-ruhaniyyahy? If it were an accident, then what kind of accident? The issue

can only be understood in this way.134 135

Besides this, al-Razi also focuses his critique on the meaning of perpetuity

(dahf). Is perpetuity persistently unchanging in itself or continually changing in

itself? If it were persistently unchanging in itself, then could it be or could it

CT
□
o
O
cause for the occurrence of the relation of changing? If persistently unchanging in

itself could be the cause of the occurrence of the relation of changing, why could it

not be said, as Plato maintains, that the occurrence of the relation of some changing

things to another is unchanging in itself? If unchanging could not be a cause for the

occurrence of the relation of changing, how could Ibn Sina make perpetuity, being

persistently unchanging in itself, a cause for the occurrence of the relation occurring

between unchanging things and changing things? Al-Razi again asks if perpetuity

were changing in itself (al-mutaghayyir ft dhatitii), would it or would it not be

possible for perpetuity, being changing in itself, to be a cause for the relationship to

unchanged things? If it were possible, then why would time not be sufficient, so that

the affirmation of perpetuity is not required? If it were not possible, how could

perpetuity, being changing in itself, be a cause for the relation of unchanging things

to changing things?

Since Ibn Sina maintains in ‘Uyun al-Hikmah, that perpetuity in itself

belongs to eternity and is called perpetuity when compared to time, al-Razi explains

this by saying that perpetuity in itself is an unchanging thing, not a changing one,

and is called perpetuity ifand only ifrelated to time (al-zaman\ which is a changing

existent in itself. Perpetuity is unchanging in itself, nevertheless, it implies the

134 MA, 5: 89-90; and SUH, 2: 147-49.

135 MA, 5: 90. The text in line 13-18 show a repetition.

87
occurrence of the relations of changing things. Thus, something can be unchanging

in itself, though it entails the states of changing with the specified measures. Al-Razi

holds that Aristotle’s followers, who say that time is a measure of motion, in fact,

follow the Platonic conception of time in the idea of perpetuity and eternity.136

Having shown that Ibn Sina’s view is inconsistent because his view of the

nature of perpetuity and eternity is no longer Aristotelian but Plotinian,137 and

because his views on the nature of time (al-zamari) are inapplicable to the nature of

perpetuity and eternity, al-Razi, admitting himself to follow Plato,138 maintains that

time (al-zaman) is self-subsistent in itself, an independent existence in itself. It is

called sarmad if and only if its essence is related to the essence of existents

independent of change. In other words, it is the relationship of that which is not in

time to that which is not in time, insofar as it is not in time.

It is called perpetual perpetuity (al-dahr al-dahif) ifand only ifits essence is

related to what is before the occurrence of motion and change. In other words, it is

the relationship of that which is with time but not in time to that which is in time. It

is called time (al-zamari) if and only if its essence is related to change as

concomitant and realized with it.139 In other words, it is the relationship of that

which is in time to that which is in time.

Having presented al-RazTs view in the Matalib and the Sharh ‘Uyun al~

Hikmah, it is worth noting that in his al-Mabahith, al-RazTs views on things that are

in time are not in line with the Matalib and the Sharh ‘Uyun al-Hikmah. In the

136 Ibid., 5:91.

,37Proclus’ work on Elements of Theology was attributed to Aristotle’s work, while it belongs to
Plotinus’ work. Perhaps Ibn Slna took this idea from his teacher, al-Farabl, who attempted to
reconcile the ideas of Plato and Aristotle partly based on the pseudo work of Aristotle. Thus, in Ibn
Sina’s view the issue of dahr and sarmad has no basis in Aristotelian time, and it has basis in
pseudo-Aristotle works, which in fact, belong to Platonian tradition. Ibn Rushd, who is consistent
with Aristotelian time, has not mentioned the distinction between sarmad, dahr, and zaman.

88
Mabahith, he maintains that a thing is in time if it entails the notion of‘prior’ and

‘posterior.’ The now is in time as the one is in number and the prior and posterior are

in time as the even and the odd are in number.140 As has been mentioned before, al-

Razl called the priority of parts of time to other parts the sixth type, which is not in

time. Thus, in his later view, he maintains that the priority of parts of time is not in

time. Thus, it is a right assumption that al-Razl had changed his views in his later

works. With respect to motion and, moving things, they are in time. This view is

consistently maintained since his earlier work, sc. the Mabahith.

Apart from things that are in al-zaman, al-Razl did not specify existents that

are in sarmadand in dahr in his works. However, it can be assumed that, in his view,

time is in dahr because motion is not inherent in its essence, but related only to its

external essence. Thus, the existent that is time falls within dahr.

Concerning sarmad that is the relationship of that which is not in time to that

which is not in time, insofar as it is not in time, it can be assumed that only God falls

within this sarmad. God that is not in time is related to that which is not in time,

insofar as it is not in time.

Before we end our discussion of al-Razl’s views on time, it is worth noting

that although ancient philosophers mentioned that perpetuity and eternity belong to

the necessary pre-etemal principles,141 al-Razl’s view does not go hand in hand with

the necessary five-eternal principles. For al-Razl, the necessary existent must be one

from all aspects and, therefore, unlike duration and time, which are subject to change

140MM 1: 678.
l4lSee MA, 5: 80. There are various views concerning the initiation of the idea of five necessary
existents. See further Paul Krauss, Rasa’il Falsafiyyah li AblBakr Muhammad bin Zakariyya’ al-
Razl(Tehran: al-Maktabah al-Murtashunah, n.d.), 193.

89
due to the occurrence of before and after in them, God is not subject to change. If

God is subject to change, then He is no longer the necessary existent.142

i42M4, 5: 81.

90
 CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing chapters, we may hold that, in al-RazTs view, time is an

eternal substance and in its own nature, without relation to anything external,

remains always the same. It flows equally from ‘beginninglessness’ to ‘endlessness.’

It is prior to its conceptualization and its existence is prior to, and independent of,

the human mind. Its essence is neither derived from nor dependent on motion. The

perception of time is always possible even if it is not perceived together with

motion. Having stated this, we may conclude that in al-RazTs view, time is an actual

existence because ontologically it is absolute and cannot be thought of as non­

existent.

Having concluded that time is absolute in al-RazTs view, we shall briefly

present a parallel idea between al-RazI and Newton, concerning absolute time.

Alexandre Koyre states: “Newton’s physics, or, it would be better to say, Newton’s

natural philosophy, stands or falls with the concepts of absolute time and absolute

space”.143 It is not exaggerated to hold that al-RazI ’s views on self-evident time are

as central to his physics and metaphysics as absolute time is to Newton’s

philosophy. He holds that the indivisible time leads to an indivisible motion which,

in turn, leads to an indivisible body.144 Furthermore, parts of time are not in time and

God’s priority to the world is like the priority of parts of time to other parts.145 Thus,

time is a key idea in al-Razl’s physics and metaphysics.

143A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and The Scientific Revolution (Britain: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 219. Cf. Antonio Moreno, O. P., “Time and Relativity: Some Philosophical
Reconsiderations,” The Thomist^ (1981), 62.
I44M4, 5; 73.
"5Tafslr, 10: 444; and MA, 4: 15.

91
 Newton’s idea that time is no longer a discursive concept as understood

within the Aristotelian paradigm,146 has been also stated extensively by al-Razi.

Both al-Razi and Newton hold that experience presupposes time. They present

C
O
metaphysical conception of time.

Newton holds that absolute time and space are prior to, and independent of,

human cognition. They constitute the foundation for an intelligible order of existing

beyond the varieties of direct experience. Nevertheless, says Newton, the human

mind is an ‘asymptote’ of absolute space and time.147 *As was seen in Chapter One,

al-Razl repeatedly states that the existence of time is self-evident. Furthermore, al-

Razi also states that the human mind is incapable of comprehensively grasping the

very quiddity of time (‘uqul al-khalqi qasiratun ‘an al-ihatah bi-kunhi mahiyatihi)^

Commenting on the absolute, true, mathematical time, Burtt states that it is

an infinite, homogeneous, continuous entity, entirely independent of any sensible

object or motion that can be measured. Time flows equally from eternity to eternity

and space exists all at once in infinite immovability. 149A1-Razl

* maintains the same

view when he asserts that time a self-subsistent substance (Jawhar qa’im binafsihi).

It is an endless substance (Jawhar baqin), not connected to any event, so it is a single

enduring (al-dawam al-wahid) and a single permanent (al-istimrar al-wahid) thing

that is not supposed to change in its attributes, and this is the meaning of perpetuity

(al-dahf^ pre-etemity (al-azai) and eternity (al-sarmad).[SQ

l46G. Windred, “The History of Mathematical Time,” Isis 19 (1933), 139.

I47J. E. McGuire, “Existence, Actuality and Necessity: Newton on Space and Time,” Annals of
Science., 35 (1978), 507, henceforth cited as Space and Time. The term ‘asymptote’ is used by
Leibniz to signify that the human mind cannot completely grasp the intelligible nature of absolute
space and time, but it can only approach their infinite characteristics.
,48M4, 5: 79.
,49E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (New York: Humanities
Press Atlantic Highlands, 1932), 209-312.
,50M4, 4: 200.

92
 In Newton’s view, God’s eternal nature is that there is no time at which and

no place in which He can possibly fail to exist. In this sense, infinite time and place

are absolute affections of His unending existence. God’s existence refers to God’s

state of being actual with respect to infinite time and space. Thus, to be actual with

respect to infinite time and space is an inseparable fact about Divine existence. It is

an inseparable part of the fact that an eternal Omnipresent being exists. However,

Newton maintains that God is still a necessary being although He must exist with

time and space. The necessity does not derive from omnitemporality, which is a

consequence of His existence, rather from the virtue of His nature.151

Newton does not regard infinite space and the eternal time as God’s intrinsic

attributes because they are not parts of His nature and their natures are distinct from

His. Newton explicitly states: “God is not duration or space”.152 Being infinite does

not necessarily become self-evident. Furthermore, God’s infinity is different from

the infinity of space because God’s perfection is in an intrinsically highest degree

and His perfection possesses an intrinsically greater reality than the perfection of

other existing things. It follows that not everything eternal and infinite will be

God.153

Having a similar view, al-Razl states that time is still contingent-in-itself,

necessary by the existence of something else, even though it is a self-subsistent

substance, independent in itself. It is not necessary-in-itself because the necessary-

in-itself must be one from all aspects. Unlike God, who is sanctified above

15,J. E. McGuire, Space and Time, 499-503.

I52lsaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Chica&y. William Benton, 1934),
370.
,53J. E. McGuire, Space and Time, 483.

93
attachment of any potentiality and hence not subject to changes, time is still subject

to changes because of the successive priorities and posteriorities.154

Having stated the parallel ideas between Newton and al-Razi, it could be

concluded that the Newtonian concept of time had been preceded by al-Razi’s idea

of time. Furthermore, to work out the implications of time in al-RazTs philosophical

system, for instance, for space, motion, existence, causality, soul, and so forth could

be the subject of further investigation.

154 MA, 5: 81; and MM, I: 652.

94
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