TC 610 (P)

TC- 610
6TH KIIT NATIONAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2023
MAY 5, 2023 TO MAY 7, 2023
IN THE HON’BLE COURT LEARNED SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BHUBANESHWAR
C.C. 23 OF 2017
In the matter of
State of Odisha
(Prosecution)
v.
Dharmesh Pradhan
(Defence)
For the offences charged under:
SECTIONS 376, 370, 371, 406, 498-A & 419 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
&
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005 & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
Upon Submission to the
Hon’ble Sessions Court, Bhubaneshwar, India
Memorandum on Behalf of the Prosecution

6TH KIIT NATIONAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS______________________________________________V-VII
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES__________________________________________VIII-XIII
A. BOOKS viii
B. LEXICONS ix
C. LEGISLATIONS / CODES / STATUTES ix
D. LEGAL DATABASE ix
E. CASES_____________________________________________________________X- XIII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION________________________________________XIV
STATEMENT OF FACTS_________________________________________________XV
STATEMENT OF CHARGES_____________________________________________XVI
STATEMENT OF ISSUES________________________________________________XVII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS_______________________________________XVIII-XX
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED________________________________________________1-15
ii
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PROSECUTION
[1.] WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE U/S
376 OF THE TPC, 1860?_______________________________________________________________1
[1.1] An act of sexual intercourse was committed by the accused with the prosecutrix.___________1
[1.1.1] Statements of the witnesses____________________________________________2
[1.1.2] Documentary Evidence._______________________________________________2
[1.2] The act must fall under any of the seven circumstances of §375.______________________3
[1.3] Accused is not covered under exception 2.________________________________________4
[2.] WHETHER THE ACCUSED DARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY UNDER § 498-A OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005?________________________5
[2.1] Will the Living relationship between the accused and informant come under the ambit of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?________________________________5
[2.2] Is the informant an Aggrieved Person and subjected to Domestic violence?_____________6
[3.] WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE

UNDER §370 & §371 OF IPC?__________________________________________________________8
[3.1] The accused received a person by practicing fraud, or deception, or by using threats, or using
force, or any other form of coercion.________________________________________________8
[3.1.1] Practicing fraud, or deception.__________________________________9
[3.1.2] by using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion._________9
[3.2] Accused need to be dealt with, slaves.__________________________________________10
[3.3] The said exploitation has been done habitually.__________________________________10
[4] WHETHER THE DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER § 406 OF
INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?__________________________________________________________11
[4.1] The Property was entrusted to the Accused.______________________________________11

[4.2] The accused dishonestly used the said property.__________________________________12
iii
[5.] WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER §419 OF
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?_____________________________________________________12
[5.1] The acts of the accused satisfy all the pre-requisites of the said section._______________13
[5.1.1] Pretention to be some other person.______________________________13
[5.1.2] Resulting in cheating._________________________________________13
[5.1.2.1] Intentional Deception._________________________________14
[6.] WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER §66 OF
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000?_______________________________________14
[6.1] Securing and denying access of the computer.____________________________________15

[6.2] Dishonest Intention.________________________________________________________15
PRAYER__________________________________________________________________________XXI
iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SL. NO. ROOT WORD ABBREVIATION
1. Allahabad All.
2. All India Reporter AIR
3. And &
4. Andhra Pradesh A.P.
5. Another Anr.
6. Article Art.
7. Bombay Bom.
8. Chief Justice C.J.
9. Code of Criminal Procedure Cr.P.C.
10. Convention on Rights of the Child C.R.C.
11. Criminal Law Journal Cri. L.J.
12. Cuttack Cut.
13. Daughter of d/o
14. Delhi Del.
15. Deputy Commissioner of Police D.C.P.
16. Edition Ed.
17. Excise Law Times E.L.T.
18. Exhibit Ex.
19. First Information Report F.I.R.
20. Gauhati Gau.
21. High Court H.C.
22. Himachal Pradesh H.P.
v
23. Hours hrs
24. Indian Law Reporter I.L.R.
25. Justice J.
26. Karnataka Kant.
27. Kerala Ker.
28. Madras Mad.
29. Mister Mr.
30. Number No.
31. Orissa Ori.
32. Others Ors.
33. Page Pg.
34. Paragraph ¶
35. Paragraphs ¶¶
36. Patna Pat.
37. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences POCSO
38. Punjab and Haryana P&H
39. Read with r/w
40. Regina R.
41. Section §
42. Sections §§
43. Son of s/o
44. Supplementary Suppl.
45. Supreme Court S.C.
46. Supreme Court Cases S.C.C.
vi
47. Indian Evidence Act I.E.A.
48. Indian Penal Code I.P.C.
49. Under Section u/s
50. Union of India U.O.I.
51. Union Territory U.T.
52. Uttar Pradesh U.P.
53. Versus v.
vii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
A. BOOKS
1. Gaur K.D., Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. Glaister, J., Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 1957.
3. I, Basu D.D. Cr.P.C. 1973, (5th Ed. Lexis Nexis).

4. II, Basu D.D. Cr.P.C. 1973, (5th Ed. Lexis Nexis).
5. II, Sarvaria, S.K, Indian Penal Code, (10th Ed. 2008).
6. III, Sarvaria, S.K, Indian Penal Code, (10th Ed. 2008).

7. IV, Sarvaria, S.K, Indian Penal Code, (10th Ed. 2008).
8. Kataria, R.P., Commentary on ‘The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences’ Act,
2012 (1st Ed. 2014).
9. Kataria, R.P., Commentary on ‘The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences’ Act,
2012 (2nd Ed. 2016).
10. Kelkar, R.V., Criminal Procedure, (5th Ed. 2009).

11. Lal, Batuk, Law of Evidence, (5th Ed. 2011).
12. Malik, Shailender, The Code of Criminal Procedure, (8th Ed. 2011).
13. MODI, Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, (24th Ed. 2018).
14. Monir, M., Law of Evidence, (10th Ed 2017).
15. Monir, M., Law of Evidence, (5th Ed. 2010).

16. Ramasubramaniyam P., Criminal Major Act 2013.
17. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure, (17th Ed. 2010).
18. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, (31st Enlarged Ed. 2006).
19. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence, (23rd Enlarged Ed. 2011).
20. Sarkar, Law of Evidence, (17th Ed. 2011).
21. Williams & Glanville, Criminal Law, (2nd Ed. 2011).
viii
B. LEXICONS
1. Catherine Soanes, Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus, 40th Ed., 2006, Oxford University Press.
2. Collin’s Gem English Thesaurus, 8th Ed, 2016. Collins.
3. Garner Bryana, Black’s law Dictionary, 7th Ed. 1981, West Group.
4. W B Saunders, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 32nd Ed. 2018, Dorland.
C. LEGISLATIONS / CODES / STATUTES
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).

2. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act No. 1 of 1872).
3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860).
4. The Information Technology Act, 2000.
5. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
6. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
D. LEGAL DATABASE
1. www.heinonline.com
2. www.lexisnexis.com
3. www.manupatra.com
4. www.scconline.com
ix
4. CASES
1. A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak 1988 2 SCC 602

2. Abdul Majid v. Emperor AIR 1927 Lah 735 2
3. Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648
4. Aman Kuman v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1497
5. Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana 2004 4 SCC 379
6. Anil Kumar Sharma v. State of H.P., 2015 SCC OnLine H.P. 3758
7. Baboo Khan v. State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 759
8. Babulnath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 6 SCC 29
9. Bakshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 840
10. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State Of Gujarat 1983 3 SCC 217
11. Bhoora Yadav alia Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 93 ACC 597
12. Crown v. Mohabat 1889 PR 20
13. Velusamy vs D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469
14. Das Bernard v. State 1974 Cri LJ 1098
15. Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263
16. Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2005 SC 203
17. Devaki Amma v State, 1981 Ker LT 475
18. Dinesh Chandra Jamuna Das Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC 420
19. Dr. Vimla, AIR 1963 SC 1572
20. Emperor v. Bholasingh Amersingh, AIR 1924 Bom 303
21. Emperor v. Bishan Das, 1 Cr LJ 218
22. Emperor v. Muhammad Shah, 20 Cr LL 77
23. Empress of India v Ram Kaur, ILR (1880) 2 All 723 (FB) per Qldfield J
24. Fateh Chand v. State of Haryana, (2009) 15 SCC 543
25. Gendan Lal v. Abdul Aziz Khan, 1 Cr LJ 1044
x
26. Ghanashyam Misra v. State 1957 Cri LJ 469

27. Gopalakrihnan v State of Kerela, 2009 (4) KLT 525 (Ker)
28. Guddu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 14 SCC 454
29. Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165
30. In Kamaljit Singh v. State Of Punjab, (2003) 12 SCC 155
31. Independent Thought vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, MANU/SC/1298/2017
32. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
33. Iridium Indian Telecom Ltd v. Motorola Incorporated, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201
34. Jaharlal Das v. State Of Orissa. (1991) 3 SCC 27
35. Jai Narain Chandra Dutt v. Mohammad Abdul Kuddus, 1972 All Cr R 23
36. Jayant Kumar Jaiswal v Bihar State Financial Corp, 2006 Cr LJ 3972 (Pat)
37. Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113
38. Karachi Municipality v. Bhojraj, 16 Cr LJ 706
39. Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) Cri. L.J. 889
40. Koppula Venkar Rao v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 602
41. Koroth Mammad v Emperor, AIR 1918 Mad 647, per Abdur Rahim J.
42. Krishan Kumar v. Union of India, (1960) 1 SCR 452
43. Krishan Lal v. State Of Haryana. 1980 3 SCC 159
44. Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705
45. Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey (1992) 3 SCC 204
46. Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval, 1992 SCC 3 204
47. Mangeram v. Chhatramohan Singh, AIR 1951 Nag 315
48. Mata Prasad v. Emperor, 21 Cr LJ 362
49. Meghmala v G Narasimha Reddy, 2010 (8) SCC 383
50. ML Goel v. Mukhtar Singh, 1980 Chand LR 262 (Punj)
51. Mst. Jantan v. Emperor 1934 36 Punj LR 35
52. Mukesh and Ors. vs. State for NCT of Delhi and Ors, MANU/SC/0575/2017
53. Natha v. Emperor 1925 26 Cri LJ 1185
54. Nikhil Soni v. State of H.P., 2015 Cri. L.J. 889
55. Nnad Lal v. Empress, 36 PR 1888
xi
56. Om Prakash Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 458, p 461
57. Parminder Singh @ Ladka Pola v. State of Delhi, AIR 2014 SC 1034
58. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 2274
59. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, 2013 CriLJ 4448 (SC)
60. Pradeep Kumar Mahopatra v. State, III (2013) DMC 620 (Delhi)
61. Pradeep Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059
62. Prag Boobha v. State of Jharkhand, 2012 (116) AIC 733 (Jhar)
63. Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa [1977 3 SCC 41
64. Prithi Chand v. State of H.P 1989 1 SCC 432
65. R. v. Wood Cock (1789) 1 Leach 500
66. Rabindranarayan Das v. State of Orissa, (1992) Cr. L.J. 269 (Ori.)
67. Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State Of Andhra Pradesh 2013 SCC 11 688
68. Rajendra Datta Zarekar v. State of Goa, AIR 2008 SC 572
69. Rajesh Namdeo Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 4 LJ. 266
70. Ram Narain Poply v Central Bureau of Investigation, 2003 Cr LJ 4801 (SC)
71. Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 927
72. Rameshwar v. State of Haryana 1984 Cri LJ 786 P&H
73. Rameshwar v. The State Of Rajasthan. 1952 SCR 377
74. Reema Agarwal v. Anupam 2004 (2) KLT 822 SC
75. Robert John D’Souza v. Stephen V Gomes, (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 724
76. Rupabati v Shyama, (1958) Cut 710
77. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248
78. Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State Of Maharashtra And Another 2006 SCC 10 92
79. Sakshi v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 3566
80. Sansae Singh v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 711
81. Santosh Bakshi v. State of Punjab, (2014) 13 SCC 25
82. Santosh Kumar Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh MCRC/4279/2017
83. Satish Jain v. State of Uttaranchal, 2006 Cr LJ 1172 (Uttr)
84. Shakar Kishanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546
85. Shankarlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 35
86. Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
xii
87. Shyam Narain v. The State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 77

88. Som Nath Puri v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 1490
89. State of Karnataka v. F. Nataraj, (2015) 9 SCC 91
90. State of M.P v. Dayal Sahu (2005) 8 SCC 122
91. State of M.P v. Promod Mategaonkar, 1964 M.P.L.J. 750 at p. 753
92. State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658
93. State of Orissa v. Kruihna Chandra Sahu, 1987 SCC OnLine Ori 101
94. State Of Orissa v. Simanchal Gouda And Others 1996 SCC ONLINE ORI 324
95. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & ors, AIR 1996 SC 1393
96. State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 2235
97. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ravi alias Nehru, (2006) 10 SCC (Cri.) 133
98. State of U.P v. Krishna Gopal (1988) 4 SCC 302
99. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840
100. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chhoteylal, (2011) 2 SCC 550
101. State v. Ramadas Naidu, 1977 Cr LJ 2048 (Mad)
102. Suleman & Anr. v. State of Delhi, (1999) 4 SCC 146
103. Supra Note Ram Narain Poply v Central Bureau of Investigation, 2003 Cr LJ 4801 (SC).
104. Suresh v. State Of Haryana, 2007 SCC OnLine P&H 358
105. Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 560
106. Tarkeshwar Sahu vs. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/4421/2006
107. Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 5 SCC 254
108. Umar Shankar v. State of Chattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 642
109. Varun Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Crim. Appeal No. 364 of 2014
110. Vijay v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191
111. Vinay Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, 2013 (127) AIC 502 (Jhar)
112. Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 3566.
xiii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The prosecution has approached the Hon’ble Sessions Court at Bhuvbaneshwar under § 376,
§371, §370, §406, §498-A, §419 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 along with Domestic Violence Act,
2005 & Information Technology, Act, 2000.
§ 177 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Ordinary place of inquiry and trial
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction
it was committed.
§209 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Commitment of case to Court of Session when
offence is triable exclusively by it.
When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before
the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court
of Session, he shall-
a) Commit the case to the Court of Session.
b) Subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and
until the conclusion of, the trial;
c) Send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be
produced in evidence;
d) Notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.
xiv
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Ms Juhi Das met Mr Dharmesh Pradhan alias Neeraj Modi in 2006 in Mumbai stating that he was an Event
Manager of one of India's leading event management companies. At the time, she was a third-year student at
Mumbai University, living in a girl’s hostel.
FAMILY & FRIENDS
Dharmesh Pradhan told her stories about his family businesses and the inter-family enmity, due to which his
brother-in-law and sister had filed a false case against him in Gujarat to take over the family business. He
also introduced her to his friend Rohan Narula, who also lived in Mumbai and had financially helped him a
lot in his hard days.
MARRIAGE & PREGANCY
She was pregnant after a few months of courtship, she informed Dharmesh about the same, he took her to a
temple and informally married her following Hindu rites and customs.
CREDITORS, DELIVERY, THREATS FROM CREDITORS, & SHIFTING TO

BHUBANESHWAR
She found out that he had no work and had taken a loan of about Rs. 50 lakhs from different creditors
including Rohan Narula, who were threatening him with dire consequences for default. Dharmesh begin to
physically assault her. Rohan financed the delivery process after which Dharmesh, sent her daughter to live
with informant’s parents in Noida as they had to continuously change location due to the increasing threats
from the creditors, after which they shifted to Bhubaneswar, where she started teaching in schools. In 2016,
he bought his daughter back to threaten the informant to not tell anyone about his physical and mental abuse
regularly.
F.I.R & FINAL REPORT
In 2016, he asked his friend Rohan Narula to move in with him so that they could pursue a business
opportunity. On 24.17, Informant and Rohan confronted the accused with a picture on the internet of a wanted
criminal for financial fraud with the name of Neeraj Modi. He violently assaulted the informant and
threatened to kill Rohan. On 23.02.17 threatened the informant to leak private pictures and took away her
belongings, also brutally assaulted her, choked her with a piece of cloth, and had forceful sexual intercourse
with her. An F.I.R was registered on 24.02.17 by Informant and subsequently, a Final Report was Filed on
26.05.17.
xv

STATEMENT OF CHARGES
ACCORDING TO THE SUBMITTED FINAL FORM REPORT OF F.I.R. NO. 24/2013

DATED 27/02/2013 THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN CHARGED U/S.
376 (45 of
1860)1 Punishment for Rape
370 (45 of Trafficking of person

1860)2
371 (45 of Habitual dealing in slaves

1860)3
419 (45 of Punishment for cheating by personation.

1860)4
498-A (45 of Cruelty

1860)5
406 (45 of Punishment for criminal breach of trust

1860)6
IT Act 2000 Section 43 r.w 66
Domestic
Violence Act. Section 3
2005
1
Punishment for rape. —Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished
with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which 3 [shall not be less than ten years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine].
2
Trafficking of person. —Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
3
Habitual dealing in slaves. —Whoever habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, traffics or deals in slaves,
shall be punished with 1 [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
4
Punishment for cheating by personation. —Whoever cheats by personation shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
5
Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. —Whoever, being the husband or the relative
of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
6
Punishment for criminal breach of trust. —Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
xvi

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE U/S 376

OF THE TPC, 1860?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE ACCUSED DARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY UNDER § 498-A OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE, 1860 & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE

UNDER §370 & §371 OF IPC?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER THE DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER § 406 OF

INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?
ISSUE 5
WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER §419 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?
ISSUE 6
WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER §66 OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000?
xvii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF RAPE

U/S 376 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court of Sessions, Bhubaneshwar, that there are prolific
developments and evidence that corroborate the fact that the accused Mr. Dharmesh Pradhan is
guilty of the offence of rape under §376. On a harmonious reading of §376 and Babulnath v. State
of Uttar Pradesh,7 we see, two important ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of rape
beyond a reasonable doubt: [1] an act of sexual intercourse by a man with a woman,8 [2] the act
must fall under any of the seven clauses of §375,9 and also to strengthen the prosecution case [3]
conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY UNDER THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN

FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005 & 498-A of IPC, 1860?
developments and evidence that corroborate the fact that the accused Mr Dharmesh Pradhan is guilty
of the offence under §498-A beyond a reasonable doubt. The essentials ingredients to constitute the
of cruelty by husband is getting satisfied. The way she has been treated and tortured, as per the
testimonies of her and medical of the victim, that would definitely make the accused liable for
‘Domestic Violence’.
3. WHETHER MR DHARMESH PRADHAN (ACCUSED) IS GUILTY OF OFFENCES U/S

370 & 371?
7
Babulnath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 6 SCC 29.
8
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648; Rameshwar v. State of Haryana 1984 Cri LJ 786
P&H; Rameshwar v. State of Haryana 1984 Cri LJ 786 P&H; Santosh Kumar Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh
MCRC/4279/2017; Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State Of Andhra Pradesh 2013 SCC 11 688.
9
Independent Thought vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, MANU/SC/1298/2017.
xviii

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Sessions Court of Bhubaneshwar, that there are
multitudinous incidents and shreds of evidence that corroborate the fact that the accused is guilty of
the offence of Trafficking of person and habitual dealing in slaves under section 370 and 371 I.P.C.,
1860, respectively. In order to bring affluent conviction under this charge it is pertinent to refer to
the essential ingredients of offence. Further, there are multifarious episodes that put the guilt of
Dharmesh Pradhan (accused) into the picture. The accused received a person by practising fraud, or
deception, or by using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion. Accused need to be
dealt with, slaves and the said exploitation has been done habitually.
4. WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF OFFENCES u/s 406 OF

INDIAN PENAL CODE 1860?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Session’s Court of Bhubaneswar, that there are sufficient
shreds of evidence that corroborates the fact that the accused, Mr Dharmesh is liable for the offence
of Criminal Breach of Trust under Section 40610 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
5. WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN (ACCUSED) IS GUILTY OF OFFENCES

U/S 419?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Sessions Court11, that there are numerous pieces of
evidences12 and instances which corroborate the fact that the Accused is guilty of personating a
person with the intent to commit an offence u/s. 419.13 In order to bring affluent conviction under
this charge it is pertinent to refer to the essentials of cheating by personating. The acts of the Accused
satisfy all the pre-requisites of cheating by personating and there are witness statements u/s 16114 to
prove the guilt of the accused u/s 419 of I.P.C., 1860.
10
Indian Penal Code, 1860 § 406.
11
Trial Proposition.
12
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §3.
13
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §419.
14
xix

6. WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER §66

OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court15 that there are numerous shreds of evidence that
corroborate the fact that the accused Mr. Dharmesh Pradhan is guilty of committing computer related
offences under §6616 read with §4317 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. On a harmonious
reading of these sections, it is evident that to constitute an offence under these sections, these
essentials have to be met, namely [I.] accesses or secures access to such computers [ii.] denies access
of such computer to any person authorized and [iii.] does the above act dishonestly or fraudulently.
15
Trial Proposition.
16
The Information Technology Act, 2000, §66.
17
The Information Technology At, 2000 §43.
xx

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1
[1.] WHETHER MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS LIABLE FOR THE OFFENCE OF RAPE

U/S 376 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?
guilty of the offence of rape under §376. On a harmonious reading of §376 and Babulnath v. State
of Uttar Pradesh,18 we see, two important ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of rape19
beyond a reasonable doubt: [1] an act of sexual intercourse by a man with a woman, 20 [2] the act
must fall under any of the seven clauses of §375,21 and also to strengthen the prosecution case [3]
[1.1] An act of sexual intercourse was committed by the accused with the prosecutrix.
The prosecution most reverently submits before this Hon'ble court that the facts and the circumstance
of the case clearly show that there was sexual intercourse22 by the accused with the prosecutrix
without her consent.23 The essence lies in the ‘penetration'24, however slight, of the penis25, or
'insertion of any object or part of body (other than penis),26 or manipulation of any part of the body
of a woman for penetration27 into the vagina,28 urethra, or anus of a woman. It is not necessary that
there should be injuries on her private parts29 or her hymen should rupture,30 or should ejaculate.31
In the present case this can be established with the evidence [1.1.1] Statements of the witnesses and
18
Babulnath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) 6 SCC 29.
19
Tarkeshwar Sahu vs. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/4421/2006
20
Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648; Rameshwar v. State of Haryana 1984 Cri LJ 786
P&H; Rameshwar v. State of Haryana 1984 Cri LJ 786 P&H; Santosh Kumar Yadav v. State Of Chhattisgarh
MCRC/4279/2017; Radhakrishna Nagesh v. State Of Andhra Pradesh 2013 SCC 11 688.
21
Independent Thought vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, MANU/SC/1298/2017.
22
Sakshi v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 3566.
23
Shyam Narain v. The State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 77.
24
Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 3566.
25
State of Tamil Nadu v. Ravi alias Nehru, (2006) 10 SCC (Cri.) 133
26
Parminder Singh @ Ladka Pola v. State of Delhi, AIR 2014 SC 1034.
27
Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana 2004 4 SCC 379; Natha v. Emperor 1925 26 Cri LJ 1185; Abdul Majid v. Emperor
AIR 1927 Lah 735 2; Mst. Jantan v. Emperor 1934 36 Punj LR 35; Ghanashyam Misra v. State 1957 Cri LJ 469; Das
Bernard v. State 1974 Cri LJ 1098; Prithi Chand v. State of H.P 1989 1 SCC 432.
28
Anil Kumar Sharma v. State of H.P., 2015 SCC OnLine H.P. 3758.
29
Fateh Chand v. State of Haryana, (2009) 15 SCC 543.
30
Guddu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 14 SCC 454; Rajendra Datta Zarekar v. State of Goa, AIR 2008 SC 572;
State of Karnataka v. F. Nataraj, (2015) 9 SCC 91.
31
Aman Kuman v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1497; Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 560.
1

[1.1.2] documentary evidences.
[1.1.1] Statements of the witnesses
Keeping in mind that it is not for the prosecution to meet any and every hypothesis suggested by the
accused,32 howsoever extravagant33 and fanciful it might be,34 It is humbly submitted before this
Hon'ble court that the circumstantial evidence in the instant matter shows that within all human
possibilities, the act is done by the accused.35
It is a well-known maxim that 'Evidence has to be weighed and not counted36 and it has been given
statutory placement u/s 13437 of the Evidence Act which states that no particular number of witnesses
is required.38 Also on a congenial reading of §114A39 of the Evidence Act and Rajesh Namdeo
Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra,40 it is evident that the accused has to prove that the woman
consented to sexual intercourse.
The prosecutrix had signified to the accused her reluctance, the accused took her consent for their
marriage, thereby obtaining her assent thereto by fraud. Also, the prosecutrix has given a statement
that forms the basis for the conviction of the accused.41 Sole reliance on single-witness testimony
was upheld in various cases.42 Therefore, the accused had committed an act of sexual intercourse
with the prosecutrix.43
[1.1.2] Documentary Evidence.
A well-known dictum states that ‘a man may lie, but a document will not’44 Documentary evidence
prevails over oral evidence, and this case has unimpeachable documentary evidence 45 which
32
State Of Orissa v. Simanchal Gouda And Others 1996 SCC ONLINE ORI 324; State of U.P v. Krishna Gopal (1988)
4 SCC 302; Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Shankarlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 35;
Jaharlal Das v. State Of Orissa. (1991) 3 SCC 27; R. v. Wood Cock (1789) 1 Leach 500.
33
Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263; In Kamaljit Singh v. State Of Punjab, (2003) 12 SCC 155.
34
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840.
35
Bakshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 840.
36
Nikhil Soni v. State of H.P., 2015 Cri. L.J. 889.
37
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §134.
38
Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) Cri. L.J. 889.
39
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §114A.
40
Rajesh Namdeo Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 4 LJ. 266.
41
Bhoora Yadav alia Rahul v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 93 ACC 597.
42
Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 927.
43
Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State Of Maharashtra And Another 2006 SCC 10 92.
44
Uka Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 5 SCC 254.
45
Piara Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1977 SC 2274; Rameshwar v. The State Of Rajasthan. 1952 SCR 377, Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State Of Gujarat 1983 3 SCC 217, Krishan Lal v. State Of Haryana. 1980 3 SCC 159.
2

corroborates with the statement of the witnesses such as the Medico-legal Report of the
prosecutrix.46When we combine the documentary and the oral evidence all the essentials of crime-
(i) mens rea,47(ii) actus reus,48 (iii) planning,49 (iv) preparation50 of the accused was essentially
involved in sexual intercourse with the accused and hence guilty of the offence of rape.51
[1.2] The act must fall under any of the seven circumstances of §375
On a harmonious reading of S.375 and Shakar Kishanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra,52 It is

the sine qua non that an act of sexual penetration53 must fall under any of the seven circumstances
under S. 375 of IPC, 1860. The first two circumstances, sexual penetration without the consent of
the victim54 and against her will55 appear synonymous.56 But there is some distinction on the basis
of the element of active opposition.57
The first circumstance, the act being against her will, can be proved upon the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix and the same is enough for conviction is a well settled proposition58. As per the written
complaint59 at the time of filing of FIR under §15460 on 24.02.2017 at Khandagiri Police Station and
her statement61 under §161 of CrPC, the prosecutrix stated that on the intervening night of
23.02.2017, the accused after tearing her clothes, forced himself on her and upon resistance, choked
her with a piece of cloth and had forceful sexual intercourse with her which can be corroborated by
the medical report of the prosecutrix62 which expressly mention about the presence of semen in
vaginal extract, external injuries and the final opinion stating the possibility of rape.
The Hon’ble Court has held that no woman would make a humiliating statement against her honour
in cases such as rape63 and her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as
46
Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey (1992) 3 SCC 204; Pratap Misra v. State of Orissa [1977 3 SCC 41.
47
Umar Shankar v. State of Chattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 642.
48
Dinesh Chandra Jamuna Das Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC 420.
49
Suleman & Anr. v. State of Delhi, (1999) 4 SCC 146.
50
Koppula Venkar Rao v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 602.
51
Suresh v. State of Haryana, 2007 SCC OnLine P&H 358; A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak 1988 2 SCC 602.
52
Shakar Kishanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 546.
53
Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval, 1992 SCC 3 204.
54
Rabindranarayan Das v. State of Orissa, (1992) Cr. L.J. 269 (Ori.).
55
Pradeep Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059; Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113.
56
Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2005 SC 203.
57
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chhoteylal, (2011) 2 SCC 550.
58
State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 2235.
59
Trial Proposition, Pg. 5.
60
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, §154.
61
Trial Proposition.
62
63
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors, AIR 1996 SC 1393.
3

that of an accomplice64. It stands well established that if evidence of victim inspires confidence, it
must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement and minor contradictions and
insignificant discrepancies of non-fatal nature shall not be used to throw out an otherwise reliable
case.65 Thus, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that since the pre-requisites of rape
are fulfilled, the accused is liable under §376.
[1.3] Accused is not covered under exception 2
Invalid marriages are no marriage in the eyes of law.66 Mere cohabitation of a man and a woman at
any rate, does not give them the status of husband and wife even though the society has been treating
them the same way.67 Marriage, as a legal union of man and woman, cannot extend to a non-valid
marriage in the eyes of law68 and mere going through certain ceremonies with the intention, doesn’t
make them ceremonies prescribed or approved by an established custom69. Moreover, unless a
marriage is performed with proper ceremonies and due form, it can’t be said to be solemnized. The
§7(2)70 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the marriage becomes complete after following Saptapadi and
§1271 of the Act states that if the consent for marriage is taken by misconception of facts or fraud, it
is an invalid marriage.
In case, the consent of the prosecutrix for marriage and to have sexual relationship was acquired
under misconception of facts under §9072 of IPC and therefore the case of the prosecutrix feel under
clause secondly of §375 of IPC. It is evident from the written complaint and the statement of the
prosecutrix that the accused concealed the facts about him being unemployed and a debtor 73 by
telling her that he was an event manager at a big event managing company74 and that he was a wanted
criminal for financial frauds in Gujrat75. Thus, it can be concluded that the accused can’t be provided
with the immunity of Exception 2 and is guilty under §376 of IPC.
64
Vijay v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191.
65
State of M.P v. Dayal Sahu (2005) 8 SCC 122.
66
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1564.
67
Ibid.
68
Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and Ors, 2004 SCC OnLine SC 54.
69
Shiromani Jain v. Dr Ashok Kumar Jain & Anr, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1507.
70
The Hindu Marriage Act, §7(2), No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India).
71
The Hindu Marriage Act, §12, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India).
72
Indian Penal Code, §90.
73
74
75
4

ISSUE 2
[2.] WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY UNDER THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN

FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005 & 498-A of IPC, 1860?
guilty of the offence under §498-A beyond a reasonable doubt.
[2.1] Will the Living relationship between the accused and informant come under the
ambit of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
When unmarried couples live together to maintain a long-term connection in a manner akin to
marriage. It is a relationship whereby two individuals choose to live together for an extended period
of time or permanently in a close, intimate connection on a sexual and/or emotional level is called
live-in relationships. The phrase is used more frequently to describe unmarried couples who live
together. In India, the Court acknowledged a live-in partnership by interpreting the words
relationship just like marriage provided in Section 276 of the Act in light of shifting societal
conditions. Supreme Court has also laid down that women in live-in relationships can file a case for
domestic violence if the relationship is determined to be just like a marriage relationship 77 under
section 2 or more specifically S.2(f), S.2(s), S.2(a) and S.3(a) of Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The Court established the following standards for defining the abovementioned expression of
relationship just like marriage in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal78 that a) The couple must both
be of legal marriageable age, b) They must be single and satisfy all other requirements for a valid
marriage, c) They must present themselves to the public as being comparable to couples. d) For an
extended period of time, they must have lived together voluntarily and portrayed themselves to
society as being on an equal footing with couples. In Koppisetti Subbharao @ Subrahmaniam v.
State of Andhra Pradesh79, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the judgment that, there could be
no impediment in law to liberally construe the words or expressions relating to the persons
76
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. § 2
77
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.
78
D. Velusamy vs D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469.
79
2009 SCC OnLine SC 941
5

committing the offence so as to rope in not only those validly married, but also anyone who has
undergone some or other form of marriage, and thereby assume for himself the position of husband
to live, co-habitat and exercise authority as such husband over another woman.
All the above-mentioned standards are evident from the facts and circumstances80 of the instant case.
Both the accused and informant were of legal age during their inception and relationship, however,
their relationship continued for a period of more than eleven years, every condition for a valid
marriage under Section 581 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been fulfilled by both, the accused
can also be termed as a husband,82 from the statements of witnesses83 under section 161 of Cr.P.C,
1973, such as the informant, Rohan, Neha, Informant parent’s, and the landlord of the informant, it
can be established that both have been portrayed as a couple in the society for the whole extended
period of their relationship, who have been sharing the household, financial assistance, childcare,
and domestic tasks, from this it can be concluded the live-in relationship of the informant and the
accused is covered under the ambit of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
[2.2] Is the informant an Aggrieved Person and subjected to Domestic violence?
The pre-requisite of admitting a case under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 is that the Applicant should be an “Aggrieved Person”84 as per Section 2(a)85 of the Act. The
aggrieved person mentioned in Section 2(a) refers to any woman who either in the past or in the
present time is in a relationship which is domestic in nature86 with the respondent and who claims
that the respondent did spousal violence or domestic violence87 to her.
“Domestic violence” is a broad term that entails not only physical beating but also other forms of
violence such as emotional violence, mental violence, sexual violence, financial violence and other
forms of 88cruelty that may occur within a household. The definition provided in Section 389 of the
Domestic Violence Act includes the following as acts of domestic violence: “Any act, omission or
commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it—
80
Trial Proposition.
81
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
82
Reema Agarwal v. Anupam 2004 (2) KLT 822 SC
83
Trial Proposition Pg. 10.
84
Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705.
85
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. §2(a)
86
Supra note 77.
87
Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165
88
Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, 2013 CriLJ 4448 (SC)
89
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. § 3
6

a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or
physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse,
sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any
other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or
valuable security; or
c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct
mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
When one person in a relationship takes advantage of their strength to control the other, that is
considered domestic violence. It entails imposing authority and fear in a relationship through the use
of violence and other abusive tactics. Examples of this violence include physical, mental, social or
even financial. The violence may be constant, sporadic, or intermittent in nature. Generally, women
are seen as victims here. Domestic violence is any act that endangers or hurts the victim's life, safety,
health, or limb, whether physical or mental. This definition covers sexual, physical, emotional, and
verbal abuse as well as financial exploitation.
The definition of “domestic violence” in the 2005 Act contemplates harm or injuries that endanger
health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well as emotional abuse. Said
definition certainly has a close connection with Section 498-A90 Explanation. (a) & (b) IPC which
defines cruelty.91 According to the provisions of this Act, any aggrieved woman who is in a domestic
relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to the act of domestic
violence by the respondent can seek help. A woman can file a complaint against any adult male
perpetrator who commits an act of violence. She can also file a complaint against any male or female
relatives of the husband/ male partner (for example in a live-in relationship) who has perpetrated
violence.92
The Documentary evidence such as the medical report93 shows the physical injuries suffered by the
victim due to the physical and sexual assault committed by the accused against the informant. The
90
Indian Penal Code, 1860. § 498A
91
Supra note 76.
92
Santosh Bakshi v. State of Punjab, (2014) 13 SCC 25.
93
7

same can also be corroborated by the statements of witnesses94 under section 161 of Cr.P.C, 1973,
such as the informant, Rohan, Neha, the Informant’s parents, and the landlord of the information,
wherein they all in one or another way stated about the informant being subjected to the physical
and mental abuse by the accused frequently.
ISSUE 3
[3.] WHETHER MR DHARMESH PRADHAN (ACCUSED) IS GUILTY OF OFFENCES

U/S 370 & 371?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Sessions Court of Bhubaneshwar, that there are
multitudinous incidents and shreds of evidence that corroborate the fact that the accused is guilty of
the offence of Trafficking of person and habitual dealing in slaves under section 37095 and 37196
I.P.C., 1860, respectively. In order to bring affluent conviction under this charge it is pertinent to
refer to the essential ingredients of offence. Further, there are multifarious episodes that put the guilt
of Dharmesh Pradhan (accused) into the picture [3.1] The accused received a person by practising
fraud, or deception, or by using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion, [3.2] Accused
need to be dealt with, slaves and [3.3] The said exploitation has been done habitually.
[3.1] The accused received a person by practicing fraud, or deception, or by using

threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion.
Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states whoever for the purpose of exploitation receive
a person by [3.1.1] practicing fraud, or deception, or [3.1.2] by using threats, or using force, or any
other form of coercion commits the offence of Trafficking of person.
[3.1.1] Practicing fraud, or deception.
Section 25 of the Indian Penal Code explains the context of fraud97. Fraud is an act of deliberate
deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. Fraud and deception are
synonymous.98 The accused in 2006 in Mumbai deceived the informant by stating that he was an
Event Manager of one of India's leading event management companies.99 He offered informant to
94
95
The Indian Penal Code, 1860. §370.
96
The Indian Penal Code, 1860. §371.
97
The Indian Penal Code, 1860. §25
98
Meghmala v G Narasimha Reddy, 2010 (8) SCC 383.
99
Trial Preposition, Page 1, Para 1.
8

act as a moderator for various stage shows. According to the supreme court “The word “defraud”
includes an element of deceit. Deceit is not an ingredient of the definition of the word “dishonestly”
while it is an important ingredient of the definition of the word “fraudulently”.100
[3.1.2] by using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion.
At their initial meetings accused used to only deceive the informant by impersonating some other
person but as time passed accused also started using physical force to assault the informant. 101 On
congenial reading Section 350102 of the IPC, 1860, it is evident that the preceding Section 349103
IPC defines ‘force’. This section says that ‘force’ becomes criminal (1) when it is used without
consent and in order to the committing of an offence, or (2) when it is intentionally used to cause
injury, fear or annoyance to another to whom the force is used. To attract the definition of ‘criminal
force’ under section 350 IPC, 1860, there must be the intentional use of force on any person, without
that person’s consent.104 The accused used to mentally and physically assault the informant in a
brutal manner which can be corroborated by various witness statements105 under Section 161106
CrPC, 1973 namely as per the statement of the informant, Sushanta Das, Rohan Narula, Neha Narula,
and Debashis Panda, and also with the documentary evidence such as the observation of external
injuries in Medical Report107 The accused brought her daughter back in 2016 and kept her with him
to use her to threaten the informant so as to not tell anybody about the mental and physical
harassment.108 A threat Constitutes assault.109
3.2 Accused need to be dealt with, slaves.
Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states whoever for the purpose of exploitation receive
a person by practising fraud, or deception, or by using threats, or using force, or any other form of
coercion commits the offence of Trafficking of person.
100
Dr. Vimla, AIR 1963 SC 1572.
101
Trial Preposition Page 01 Para 03.
102
The Indian Penal Code, 1860. § 350
103
104
Devaki Amma v State, 1981 Ker LT 475.
105
Trial Preposition Page 10
106
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 161
107
Trial Preposition Page 09.
108
Trial Preposition Page 01 Para 05.
109
Rupabati v Shyama, (1958) Cut 710.
9

Explanation 1 of the same section defines the expression “exploitation” shall include any act of
physical exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude, or the forced removal of organs. This section and the succeeding section 371, Indian Penal
Code, 1860 were enacted to suppress the practice of slavery.110 (pg 3160 RA Nelson IPC V3).
The word slave, as appearing in Section 370, IPC, has not been defined in the code. We have,
therefore, to look for its ordinary meaning. The Oxford Dictionary defines a slave as a human chattel,
a helpless victim to or of some dominating influence, a person having no leisure or a contemptible
person, captured by others and made to serve them. The minimum requirement of the status of
slavery is the absolute power asserted over the liberty of the slave on his personal services.111
From the abovementioned definitions and statutes, when the circumstances of the informant are
correlated it comes into the picture that the informant was also exploited by the accused in the same
manner as a slave being a helpless victim with dominating influence of the accused which made her
serve him as a slave against her will without any liberty to her own earning where every penny used
to be taken by accused by using fear of injury to her and her daughter. Which was stated by her in
her statement112 under Section 161113 CrPC, 1973.
3.3 The said exploitation has been done habitually.
Section 371114 of the IPC, 1860, makes Habitual dealing in slaves as a punishable offence.
115
According to this section a person, who habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, traffics
or deals in slaves shall be guilty and be punished for the offence. With the same line of understanding
from the statement of the informant under Section 161116 CrPC, 1973 accused used to treat the
informant against her will with no liberty to enjoy her own freedom as suppressed by the dominating
influence of the accused moreover like a slave. So it is evident that the accused dealt with the
informant as a slave which can be inferred through various definitions and statutes stated. It is also
perceptible to notice that the act of exploitation of the informant commenced long back and used to
continue till a day before registering an F.I.R. at Khandagiri Police Station117. It apparent from the
110
Empress of India v Ram Kaur, ILR (1880) 2 All 723 (FB) per Qldfield J.
111
Koroth Mammad v Emperor, AIR 1918 Mad 647, per Abdur Rahim J.
112
Trial Preposition Pg. 13.
113
114
115
Textbook On Indian Penal Code, 1860 by Shriniwas Gupta & Dr Preeti Mishra.
116
117
Trial Preposition Pg. 02 Para 02.
10

statement of witnesses under Section 161118 CrPC that the accused used to habitually treat the
informant like a slave while exploiting her, which makes the element ingredients of the offence get
satisfied and for the same accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE 4
[4.] WHETHER MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF OFFENCES u/s 406?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Session’s Court of Bhubaneswar, that there are sufficient
shreds of evidence that corroborates the fact that the accused, Mr Dharmesh is liable for the offence
of Criminal Breach of Trust under Section 406119 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, The following
essential ingredients120 are absolutely necessary to attract the operation of the section:
A. the accused must be entrusted with property or dominion over property; and
B. the person so entrusted (ie, the accused) must: a) dishonestly misappropriate, or convert to
his own use, that property, or b) dishonestly use or dispose of that property or wilfully suffer;
C. any other person to do so in violation of i) any direction of law, prescribing the mode, in
which such trust is to be discharged, or, ii) any legal contract made touching the discharge
of such trust.
The prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt submits that [4.1] The
Property was entrusted to the Accused, [4.2] the accused dishonestly used the said property.
[4.1] The Property was entrusted to the Accused
The term entrustment is not necessarily a term of law. In its most general signification, all it imports
are the handing over of possession for some for some purpose which does not imply the conferring
of any proprietary right at all.121 It must be taken in a wider sense of the ownership or beneficial
interest being in some person other than the accused122 and it can be expressed or implied123.
In the present case, as the husband, the accused was entrusted with the property of the prosecutrix124
which included laptop, mobile phone, voter ID, etc. As long as the accused had the possession with
118
119
Indian Penal Code, 1860 § 406.
120
Om Prakash Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 458, p 461.
121
Ram Narain Poply v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2003 Cr LJ 4801 (SC).
122
Jayant Kumar Jaiswal v. Bihar State Financial Corp, 2006 Cr LJ 3972 (Pat).
123
State of M.P. v. Promod Mategaonkar, 1946 M.P. LJ 750.
124
11

the owner being in a person other than the accused, he is said to be entrusted with the property125. In
casu, since the accused and the prosecutrix lived in the same house, so he was in one way, or another
entrusted with the property without the actual transfer of ownership.
[4.2] The accused dishonestly used the said property
In case, the accused was entrusted with the property of the prosecutrix as they reside in the same
house which included her laptop, mobile phone, voter ID, school certificates and a hard disk
containing her photos and videos126 which took away and refused y and refused to give back to the
prosecutrix with an dishonest intention of making her lose her identity give back to the prosecutrix
with an dishonest intention of making her lose her identity and this refusal to return the property to
the rightful owner also constitute dishonest use or disposal127
Moreover, the threatening by the accused using the private pictures of the prosecutrix to not let her
disclose about his criminal identity128 to anyone prove beyond reasonable doubt, the dishonest
intention of the accused. Since, in the present case, all the necessary conditions of the offence are
fulfilled, the accused should be held liable under §406 of the IPC.
ISSUE 5
[5.] WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN (ACCUSED) IS GUILTY OF OFFENCES

U/S 419?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Sessions Court, that there are numerous pieces of evidence
and instances which corroborate the fact that the Accused is guilty of personating a person with the
intent to commit an offence u/s. 419.129 In order to bring affluent conviction under this charge it is
pertinent to refer to the essentials of cheating by personating. The acts of the Accused satisfy all the
pre-requisites of cheating by personating and there are witness statements u/s 161130 to prove the
guilt of the accused u/s 419 of I.P.C., 1860.
125
Som Nath Puri v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 1940.
126
Trial Proposition.
127
Gopalakrihnan v. State of Kerela, 2009 (4) KLT 525 (Ker).
128
Trial Proposition.
129
130
12

[5.1] The acts of the accused satisfy all the pre-requisites of the said section.
In the case of State of M.P. v. Padam Singh,131 it was held that for an act to constitute an offence
u/s 416132, there must be cheating in addition to personation and the personation must be for the
purpose of cheating. The ingredients of this section are: [i.] pretention by a person to be some other
person133 and [ii.] such pretention should result in cheating134.
[5.1.1] Pretention to be some other person
To ‘personate’ means to pretend to be a particular person.135 The offence is committed whether the
individual personated is a real or imaginary person.136 Furthermore, in the present case, the accused
pretended to be an Event Manager at a leading event management company.137 Moreover, it is
corroborated from the statement of the victim138 that the accused introduced himself to her as
‘Dharmesh Pradhan’ on 03.12.2006, convinced her of his family issues and made her believe that
he would get his I-cards made. Therefore, the accused must be convicted u/s 419 of I.P.C., 1860.
[5.1.2] Resulting in cheating
To constitute an offence under §415, the following ingredients must exist, namely: [i.] the accused
must have deceived the complainant fraudulently139 or dishonestly140 or intentionally; and [ii.] by
means of such deceit, the complainant musty have been induced to change his position: (a) by
delivering any property to any person or by consenting that any person shall retain any property, or
(b) by doing or omitting141 to do, anything which he would not do, or omit, if he were not so
deceived, and such act or omission, causes, or is likely to cause, damage or harm to the complainant
in body, mind, reputation or property.
[5.1.2.1] Intentional Deception.
Deception is to lead into error by causing a person to believe what is false or to disbelieve what is
131
1972 SCC OnLine MP 87.
132
133
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 737, Lexis Nexis, 2019.
134
State of Orissa v. Kruihna Chandra Sahu, 1987 SCC OnLine Ori 101.
135
Hague, (1864) 4B & S 715, 720.
136
Supra note sec 416
137
138
Trail Proposition, Pg. 12.
139
140
141
13

true and is a necessary ingredient for the offence of cheating 142 but second part of the section does
not mention fraudulent or dishonest intention. It only requires that the inducement must be
intentional, doesn’t matter if the deceiver has not acted fraudulently. 143 The explanation refers to a
dishonest concealment of facts which it is the duty of the person concealing them to disclose to the
person with whom he is dealing.144
In case, the accused intentionally made the victim believe that he was an Event Manager by the way
of words145 and that he would get his I-cards made. Furthermore, he also deliberately concealed the
facts from the victim that he has taken up loans from various creditors including his friend Rohan
Narula and that he had no work which she later found out. Therefore, the accused must be convicted
u/s 419 of I.P.C., 1860.
ISSUE 6.
[6.] WHETHER MR. DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE UNDER

§66 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there are numerous shreds of evidence that
corroborate the fact that the accused Mr. Dharmesh Pradhan is guilty of committing computer related
offences under §66146 read with §43147 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. On a harmonious
reading of these sections, it is evident that to constitute an offence under these sections, these
essentials have to be met, namely [i.] accesses or secures access to such computers [ii.] denies access
of such computer to any person authorised and [iii.] does the above act dishonestly or fraudulently.
6.1 Securing and denying access of the computer.
A bare perusal of §43(a) & of 43(f)148 reveals that it prescribes penalties and compensation149 for
142
Iridium Indian Telecom Ltd v. Motorola Incorporated, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201; Robert John D’Souza v. Stephen V
Gomes, (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 724.
143
Crown v. Mohabat 1889 PR 20; Nnad Lal v. Empress, 36 PR 1888; Mangeram v. Chhatramohan Singh, AIR 1951
Nag 315.
144
Emperor v. Bishan Das, 1 Cr LJ 218; Pradeep Kumar Mahopatra v. State, III (2013) DMC 620 (Delhi); Gendan Lal
v. Abdul Aziz Khan, 1 Cr LJ 1044; Karachi Municipality v. Bhojraj, 16 Cr LJ 706; Iridium Indian Telecom Ltd v.
Motorola Incorporated, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201.
145
Supra note 12
146
The Information Technology Act, 2000, §66.
147
The Information Technology At, 2000 §43.
148
The Information Technology Act, §43(f), No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
149
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248.
14

damage150 to the computer151 or computer system152 if any person accesses or secures access and
denies access of the computer to an authorised person respectively to a computer, computer system,
or computer database153 or any other programmes residing in such computers without the permission
of the owner or in charge of such computers.
In this case, according to the testimony of the victim,154 the accused took away her laptops and this
is further supported by the statement of the victim’s father, Sushanta Das who stated that the accused
stole his daughter’s laptops which were recovered by police after the F.I.R was filed.155
6.2 Dishonest Intention
On a harmonious reading of §66 of the I.T. Act, 2000, it is evident that to constitute an offence under
this section, the securing of access and the denial of access by the accused to the authorised person
must be done fraudulently156 Dishonetly157has to be a wrongful loss or a wrongful gain158 in order for
the act to be caused dishonestly. Moreover, wrongful loss includes being wrongfully deprived of
property.159
In the present case, the accused wrongfully deprived the victim of her laptops amongst other things
to keep her from getting any further information regarding his true identity160. Therefore, the accused
must be convicted u/s 66 of I.T., 2000.
150
Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000, India, Schedule 5.
151
The Information Technology Act, §2(1)(i), No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
152
The Information Technology Act, §2(1)(l), No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
153
Supra note 5.
154
Trail Proposition, Pg. 2.
155
156
157
158
Id. at 12.
159
Krishan Kumar v. Union of India, (1960) 1 SCR 452.
160
15

PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the questions raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Sessions Court, Bhubaneshwar
To acquit accused Mr. Dharmesh Pradhan
u/s.376, 370, 371, 406, 498-A, 419 of I.P.C., 1860 & §66 of
IT ACT., & Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
And
Pass any such order that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interests of justice, equity and
good conscience.
Place: Bhubanshewar All of which is respectfully submitted

Date: May 6th -7th, 2017 Counsels for the prosecution
xxi

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TC- 610

6TH KIIT NATIONAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2023

MAY 5, 2023 TO MAY 7, 2023

IN THE HON’BLE COURT LEARNED SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BHUBANESHWAR

For the offences charged under:

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2005 & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000

Upon Submission to the

Hon’ble Sessions Court, Bhubaneshwar, India

Memorandum on Behalf of the Prosecution

C. LEGISLATIONS / CODES / STATUTES ix

[3.] WHETHER THE ACCUSED MR DHARMESH PRADHAN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENCE

[4.1] The Property was entrusted to the Accused.______________________________________11

[6.1] Securing and denying access of the computer.____________________________________15

2. All India Reporter AIR

4. Andhra Pradesh A.P.

8. Chief Justice C.J.

9. Code of Criminal Procedure Cr.P.C.

10. Convention on Rights of the Child C.R.C.

11. Criminal Law Journal Cri. L.J.

12. Cuttack Cut.

13. Daughter of d/o

14. Delhi Del.

15. Deputy Commissioner of Police D.C.P.

16. Edition Ed.

17. Excise Law Times E.L.T.

18. Exhibit Ex.

19. First Information Report F.I.R.

20. Gauhati Gau.

21. High Court H.C.

22. Himachal Pradesh H.P.

23. Hours hrs

24. Indian Law Reporter I.L.R.

26. Karnataka Kant.

27. Kerala Ker.

28. Madras Mad.

29. Mister Mr.

30. Number No.

31. Orissa Ori.

32. Others Ors.

33. Page Pg.

36. Patna Pat.

37. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences POCSO

38. Punjab and Haryana P&H

39. Read with r/w

43. Son of s/o

44. Supplementary Suppl.

45. Supreme Court S.C.

46. Supreme Court Cases S.C.C.

47. Indian Evidence Act I.E.A.

48. Indian Penal Code I.P.C.

49. Under Section u/s

50. Union of India U.O.I.

51. Union Territory U.T.

52. Uttar Pradesh U.P.

1. Gaur K.D., Indian Penal Code, 1860.

3. I, Basu D.D. Cr.P.C. 1973, (5th Ed. Lexis Nexis).

6. III, Sarvaria, S.K, Indian Penal Code, (10th Ed. 2008).

10. Kelkar, R.V., Criminal Procedure, (5th Ed. 2009).

14. Monir, M., Law of Evidence, (10th Ed 2017).

15. Monir, M., Law of Evidence, (5th Ed. 2010).

2. Collin’s Gem English Thesaurus, 8th Ed, 2016. Collins.

4. W B Saunders, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 32nd Ed. 2018, Dorland.

C. LEGISLATIONS / CODES / STATUTES