Journal of Business Ethics (2010) 91:3–16
DOI 10.1007/s10551-010-0564-4
Virtuous Decision Making for Business
Ethics
ABSTRACT. In recent years, increasing attention has
been given to virtue ethics in business. Aristotle’s thought
is often seen as the basis of the virtue ethics tradition. For
Aristotle, the idea of phronēsis, or ‘practical wisdom’, lies
at the foundation of ethics. Confucian ethics has notable
similarities to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and may embody
some similar ideas of practical wisdom. This article con-
siders how ideas of moral judgment in these traditions are
consistent with modern ideas about intuition in man-
agement decision making. A hypothetical case is consid-
ered where the complexity of ethical decision making in a
group context illustrates the importance of intuitive,
phronēsis-like judgment. It is then noted that both Aris-
totelian and Confucian virtue ethics include suggestions
about support for moral decision making that are also
consistent with modern theory.
KEY WORDS: intuition, management decision making,
phronēsis, practical wisdom, virtue ethics, yı̀
This article aims to draw together three strands of
thought, and thereby to suggest some ideas for fur-
ther development about ethical decision making in
business. The first strand of thought is about Aris-
totelian virtue ethics and Aristotle’s idea of phronēsis.
The second strand of thought is about Confucian
virtue ethics. The third line of thought is about
intuition in management decision making. The
exposition does not claim to be especially novel in
any of these areas, but to suggest that it may be
worthwhile to bring them together. In particular, if
our ultimate aim is to foster ethical action in busi-
ness, then we need to notice modern work about the
Chris Provis studied and taught philosophy, then worked for
some years in industrial relations and now is Associate Pro-
fessor in the School of Management at the University of South
Australia, where he teaches business ethics.
© Springer 2010
Chris Provis
importance of intuition in management decision
making. Bearing that in mind, we may see new force
in some quite old ideas in both Aristotelian and
Confucian virtue ethics traditions, ideas about the
close relationship of character and judgment, and
about ways to enhance individuals’ capacities and
dispositions for making good decisions.
In this opening section, I note the development of
literature about Aristotelian and Confucian virtue
ethics, both generally and in business ethics. The next
section then turns to ‘phronēsis’, a prominent notion
in Aristotelian virtue ethics. I suggest that the idea
can be illustrated by the sort of judgment a sporting
referee sometimes has to exercise, spanning both
evaluative and factual elements in a single act of
judgment. The next section suggests that such
judgment seems very much like some of the sorts of
intuitive judgment discussed by modern cognitive
psychologists. In the next section, I therefore explore
this suggestion in a hypothetical case similar to the
situation that confronted Roger Boisjoly before the
tragic Challenger launch decision. The complexity of
such a situation seems to require the sort of holistic
decision making that draws intuitively on an agent’s
experience and character, along the lines that are very
much in keeping with ideas of virtue ethics.
If that is correct, then it is worth noting also that
virtue ethics traditions may have worthwhile points
to make about the moral judgment in many such
complex management situations. In getting us to
focus on development of decision makers’ experi-
ence and character, these traditions may lead us
toward enhanced decision making more effectively
than approaches that focus on the details of specific
decisions. The final section, therefore, notes some of
the ideas that are prominent in virtue ethics about
ways to develop and support individuals’ decision
making, ideas that seem to be equally plausible
4 Chris Provis
suggestions about ways to foster good intuitive
decision making by managers.
The suggestions in this article are triggered by the
expanding literature about virtue ethics in business
(e.g. Koehn, 1995, 1998; Moore, 2002, 2005a, b;
Solomon, 1992a, 1999). The focus is on the notion
that is sometimes referred to as ‘practical wisdom’ in
translation of Aristotle’s term phronēsis. The idea is
prominent in Aristotle’s work, and lies at the core of
his idea of virtue:
‘Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice,
lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relatively to us, this
being determined by a rational principle, i.e. by that
principle by which the man of practical wisdom would
determine it.’ That is Aristotle’s definition of virtue.
(Ross, 1980, ix, quoting from The Nicomachean Ethics
II. vi. 15)
This is therefore a natural area to focus on in
thinking about the extent to which virtue ethics is
applicable to business, since Western virtue ethics
often looks back to Aristotle as its founder (e.g.
MacIntyre, 1985).
At the same time, as well as the growing aware-
ness of the applicability of virtue ethics to business,
there is also a developing literature about Confu-
cianism and the ethics of business (e.g. Chan, 2008;
Lam, 2003). Unsurprisingly, this area of discussion
overlaps with discussion of virtue ethics (e.g. Romar,
2002). Various writers have noted that Confucian
ethics has some important similarities to Aristotelian
virtue ethics (Sim, 2001, 2003, 2007; Slingerland,
2001; Yu, 1998, 2006).1 In considering the role of
judgment in virtue ethics and business, it is natural to
look at the Confucian tradition as well as at the
Aristotelian virtue ethics tradition. Yu has argued
that Confucius’ idea of yı̀ (義[义]) has important
similarities to Aristotle’s notion of phronēsis: “appro-
priateness is the rational aspect of Confucius’s con-
ception of virtue, and it corresponds in many aspects
to Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom (phronēsis)”
(Yu, 2006, p. 335).
There are some issues of translation, both of
phronēsis and of yı̀. Yu here translates yı̀ as ‘appro-
priateness’, but it is often translated as ‘rightness’.
The translation of phronēsis as ‘practical wisdom’ may
have a connotation of instrumentalism or practical
efficacy which is absent in Aristotle, and the close
relationship between phronēsis and yı̀ may better be
brought out by translating phronēsis as ‘moral wis-
dom’ rather than ‘practical wisdom’ (see e.g. Byrne,
1997; Hursthouse, 1999, p. 59). In addition, of
course, the term phronēsis refers to an activity of
judging, whereas yı̀ refers to what is judged. This
partly reflects the fact that as a general matter Con-
fucianism does not place so much emphasis as
Western tradition on issues of individual judgement
and knowledge (Hansen, 2004, p. 85).2 However, I
shall contend later that the Confucian tradition
equally with the Western virtue ethics tradition has
important ideas about ways to support ethical deci-
sion making.
Translation aside, in what follows I shall suggest
that phronēsis and judgments of yı̀ can be usefully
aligned with modern views of management decision
making. The idea of ‘appropriateness’, or ‘moral
wisdom’ is one that may build a bridge between
general accounts of management decision making
and specific discussions about ethical decision mak-
ing in business. In doing so, they can add weight to
the idea that virtue ethics provides a viable basis for
ethical decision and action in business. The intention
is therefore not primarily to argue in detail for a
specific interpretation of Aristotle’s idea of phronēsis
or of the idea of yı̀, but to suggest an account that
seems to me to be consistent with these ideas and is
worthwhile in itself.
Phronēsis
Phronēsis has been discussed as a significant idea within
virtue ethics by a number of recent writers (see, e.g.
Fowers, 2003; Holt, 2006; Homiak, 1997; Hurst-
house, 1999; MacIntyre, 2007, p. 154; McDowell,
1979; Nussbaum, 1985; Sherman, 1989; Sorabji,
1980; Swanton, 2003). However, there has been only
a little discussion of it in a management context, even
amongst writers who have explored virtue ethics as an
important approach to business ethics. While it is
touched on (see, e.g. Koehn, 1995, pp. 534–535;
1998; Moore, 2005b, p. 250; Solomon, 1992b,
pp. 62–63), the implications have not been fully
examined.
One key idea is that phronēsis should be contrasted
with mechanical calculation and with routine rule-
based decision. In addition, however, phronēsis
embodies an element of evaluation. This is brought
 Virtuous Decision Making for Business Ethics
out in the difference between phronēsis and
Aristotle’s contrasted notion of technē, the sort of
technical judgment exercised in an art or craft (see
Aristotle, 1934, VI, iii, 1, pp. 331–333). I believe
that the core idea is embodied in the difference
between umpiring in cricket and refereeing in soc-
cer. For a little while, I want to concentrate on this
example. Not everyone will be familiar with the
details of both these sports, but they are widely
played all over the world, and the distinction
emerges reasonably well from a description of what
is involved. Other sports could also be used to make
the same distinction.
In cricket, a batter is out whenever a fielder catches
the ball after it has been hit, before it touches the
ground.3 This is true even if the bat has only made
slight contact with the ball, and the ball has continued
on with only a slight deflection. Members of the
fielding team may then appeal to the umpire to
determine that the batter has been ‘caught behind’.
Because the contact between bat and ball is often very
slight, the umpire sometimes has to make a quite
difficult decision in judging whether to uphold the
appeal. The decision relies on perceptions of various
factual matters, such as whether the bat touched the
ball and whether the wicketkeeper took the ball
cleanly before it hit the ground. If the answer to such
questions is yes, then the required decision is clear: the
batter is out. The umpire’s decision does not require a
value-based judgment. Provided certain matters of
fact are clear, that is all there is to it.
Contrast this with a soccer referee’s decision
whether to award a free kick or a penalty. In the
rules (or ‘laws’) of soccer, Law 12 states that a free
kick is to be given if a player performs any of several
actions, such as pushing, charging or jumping at an
opponent “in a manner considered by the referee to
be careless, reckless or using excessive force”. Thus,
at least part of what is required of the referee is to
make a judgment about what is “careless, reckless or
using excessive force”. This is to a significant extent
a value-based judgment. This idea of ‘value-based
judgment’ is undefined and imprecise, of course, but
crucially here it requires certain experience and
virtues of character from the agent. It requires the
referee to have an understanding of what is poten-
tially injurious, of what a player can reasonably be
expected to do in various circumstances, and so on,
5
and to identify an act as careless or using excessive
force on that basis.
At least so far as determining an appeal for caught
behind, the job of the cricket umpire could be lar-
gely performed by a machine, in the same way that,
in recent years in major tennis tournaments, a
machine has been used to determine whether the
tennis ball is ‘out’.4 The task of the soccer referee
could not be, because judgments of what is careless
or reckless require some general understanding of
values like human well-being or responsibility. I
suggest that one way of putting this point is to say
that the soccer referee must display phronēsis in
deciding whether to award a free kick, whereas at
least in deciding an appeal for caught behind, the
task of the cricket umpire seems more akin to technē.
In a business context, a similar distinction can be
applied to decisions required of managers. There are
certainly decisions like those required from the
cricket umpire. We might refer to these quite nat-
urally as technical decisions. But many management
decisions will be value-based decisions that involve
phronēsis-like judgment, a judgment about what is
appropriate, or right, that is not a purely technical
matter.
It is important that this is not a straightforward
distinction, because it often requires value-based
judgment to see that an issue is not a matter for
purely technical decision. In business, unlike cricket,
whether a matter requires a purely technical decision
or some value-based judgment often will be unclear
or contestable. This is an important aspect of
phronēsis, and a significant point about the role of
judgment in virtue ethics. Phronēsis revolves around
the perception of particular cases as falling under a
general heading which has some evaluative or ethical
dimension. The understanding involved in such
perception requires the agent to possess such virtues
of character as compassion, forbearance and courage:
“character is revealed as much in what an agent
perceives as in what is done” (Fowers, 2003, p. 417).
In a management context, this is a first point to note
about phronēsis: it seems to be involved at the very
outset of any decision-making process, in recognis-
ing that there is a decision to be made, or the
salience of certain possibilities and choices. This is
why judgment plays such a central role in Aristotle’s
virtue ethics:
6 Chris Provis
On Aristotle’s view, an ethical theory that begins with
the justification of a decision to act begins too far
down the road. Preliminary to deciding how to act, one
must acknowledge that the situation requires action.
The decision must arise from a reading of the cir-
cumstances. This reading, or reaction, is informed by
ethical considerations expressive of the agent’s virtue.
Perception is thus informed by the virtues. (Sherman,
1989, p. 29)
Similarly, for Confucians like Mencius, judgment of
what is appropriate emerges from human develop-
ment and the growth of character (Van Norden,
2004; see also Confucius, 1971, Book XV, Chap.
xxxii, p. 303). Virtue is in part an inclination to act
well, but in part also an ability developed from
experience, to judge what is right.
This understanding of ethical decision making is
at odds with many traditional accounts that that lay
emphasis on decisions in well-defined and clearly
structured situations where the fact that a decision is
necessary is apparent. Typically, such accounts posit
a clearly defined set of objectives and a well-defined
set of alternative courses of action, with outcomes
that can be attributed some definite value (e.g.
Thomas, 1972, pp. 31–32). There are at least two
ways in which such an approach to management
decision making is at odds with an approach that
emphasises phronēsis. One is the implication that
decision situations present themselves in clear,
structured ways. That approach can suggest that we
first identify some decisions but not others as
requiring consideration of ethics, in the way that
some decisions but not others may require consid-
eration of industrial awards, or engineering prob-
lems. On the contrary, emphasis on the importance
of phronēsis implies that
Such decision making is not limited to the emergence
of an occasional ‘ethical issue’. Rather, deliberation
about how best to act is part of the warp and woof of
everyday life. (Fowers, 2003, p. 417)
The second way is the idea that we can separately
identify goals and values and make decisions aimed at
maximising those values. This approach is of course
characteristic of modern consequentialism, and has
been criticised from various directions, not only
from the point of view of virtue ethics, but the
importance of phronēsis in virtue ethics may be one
of the most important ways in which virtue ethics
differs from consequentialism. Once again, this is a
point of similarity between Western and Confucian
virtue ethics. In assessing yı̀, what is appropriate,
Mencius quite explicitly differed from the Mohist
opponents of Confucianism: “the Mohists, defend-
ing a form of universalistic consequentialism, argued
that what is righteous is what benefits everyone as a
whole. Mencius, in contrast, argues against using
benefit or utility as a metric for choosing appropriate
action” (Van Norden, 2004, p. 150).
Intuition, management and value
Recently, a good deal of work has been done on
management decision making, and it is nowadays
widely accepted that good decisions do not neces-
sarily require a well-defined decision problem
addressed through a process of conscious, deliberate
ratiocination. Sadler-Smith and Sparrow note that
“the decisions which managers are faced with in
workplace settings are often characterized by prob-
lem structures which are ambiguous, dynamic, data
poor, and time pressured” (2008, p. 315). It is
therefore no surprise that attention has been given to
the idea of ‘intuition’ in management decision
making. Although this idea is not new (see e.g.
Barnard, 1938, p. 302), it has been taken forward by
recent work in modern cognitive science, which has
drawn together ideas from psychology, biology,
computing and elsewhere to advance our under-
standing of decision making (see e.g. Clark, 2000
and references therein). Here, the salient point is that
“research suggests that intuition may be integral to
successfully completing tasks that involve high
complexity and short time horizons” (Dane and
Pratt, 2007, p. 33).
Dane and Pratt note that the term ‘intuition’ can
be used to refer to different things. The nature of
intuition is still a matter of discussion and debate
within modern cognitive psychology. There has
been debate, which still continues, about how best
to model the processes underlying cognition (e.g.
Evans, 2008; Sloman, 2002). However, it seems
possible to distinguish between ‘intuition’ and the
sorts of cognitive ‘heuristics’ that we may use to
reach decisions quickly or with little information
 Virtuous Decision Making for Business Ethics
(Betsch, 2008, p. 8; Glöckner, 2008). Betsch gives
this definition:
Intuition is a process of thinking. The input to this
process is mostly provided by knowledge stored in
long-term memory that has been primarily acquired
via associative learning. The input is processed auto-
matically and without conscious awareness. The out-
put of the process is a feeling that can serve as a basis
for judgments and decisions. (Betsch, 2008, p. 4)
It is compatible with this that such intuition can be
complemented by conscious, deliberate reflection
(Betsch, 2008, p. 7).
The role of experience is crucial. Betsch suggests
that “intuition can yield highly accurate judgments
and decisions if the prior sample of experiences is
representative for the current task” (2008, p. 6),
while Epstein comments that although intuition is
often a form of pattern recognition, “the defining
attribute of intuition is the tacit information that is
acquired by automatically learning from experience”
(Epstein, 2008, p. 31; see also Hogarth, 2008, p. 95).
He goes onto contend that “in problems that are too
complex or that are structured in a manner that
makes it impossible to objectively analyze their
components, holistic, experiential judgments may
provide the only possible approach” (Epstein, 2008,
p. 33).
Dane and Pratt reserve the term ‘intuition’ for
“affectively charged judgments that arise through
rapid, nonconscious, and holistic associations”
(2007, p. 40). If we accept that characterisation, then
it seems plausible to suggest that phronēsis may be
considered as a form of intuitive decision making,
which incorporates general, value-related consider-
ations in judgments about specific circumstances. It
is plausible to suggest that phronēsis is ‘holistic’, in the
sense that it maps stimuli onto complex cognitive
structures, “recognising features or patterns … rather
than making connections through logical consider-
ations” (Dane and Pratt, 2007, p. 37), and the fact
that such judgments are “affectively charged” is also
significant. The affective charge can be associated
with value-based considerations. In the analogous
case of the soccer referee, the referee’s judgment is
one that embodies an appreciation of bodily harm
that a player is likely to suffer. In a business situation,
the affective base for managers’ judgment may be the
harm that is liable to be suffered by employees,
7
customers or others, or equally some benefit or other
consideration, including quite general perceptions of
what is ‘appropriate’ or ‘right’.
The significance of affect in such cognitive pro-
cesses has itself been an area of exploration. Haidt
emphasises that “the contrast of intuition and rea-
soning is not the contrast of emotion and cognition”
(2001, p. 818). Emotions can play a significant
positive role in intuitive cognitive processes, for
example by directing attention one way rather than
another (Epstein, 2008, p. 33; Sadler-Smith and
Sparrow, 2008, p. 313; Slovic et al., 2002). One
implication may be to reinforce the suggestion that
in many decision-making situations it is unrealistic to
draw a line between facts and values for separate
treatment. Emotions and values are not the same,
but they are closely linked. It is somehow odd to
experience emotional responses to things that one
does not value, either positively or negatively, and
odd not to experience some affective response to
things that one does value (Provis, 1981).
Many management decisions are not best achieved
or modelled by separating facts and values as part of
the decision-making process. Often we can best refer
to the correct decision by using the English term,
‘appropriate’, the term that Yu uses when translating
yı̀ in the Analects. The term ‘appropriate’ is one of
those terms that spans the distinction between fact
and value. To say that it would be appropriate to take
an umbrella on my walk is partly to say that I have
some beliefs about the possibility of rain, and partly to
say that I do not wish to get wet. There, we might
identify a relatively well-defined set of factual state-
ments and another relatively well-defined set of value
statements that we can see together go together with
the judgment of appropriateness. However, there
does not seem to be any general presumption that
every judgment of appropriateness has to be based on
two complementary well-defined sets of statements,
one set about values and another about facts. When a
manager correctly judges that a particular course of
action is appropriate, that does not necessarily mean
that it is possible to separately identify well-defined
sets of values and facts that are the basis for the
judgment. It is partly because the decisions faced by
managers often do not have the clear structure that
would be required for separation of factual and
evaluative elements, that they may best be modelled
by using ideas like intuition or phronēsis, rather than
8 Chris Provis
by referring only to a process of following rules or
calculating outcomes.
The fact that intuitive judgments sometimes allow
rapid decisions to be made under conditions of time
pressure has made them of special interest to scholars
of management. However, as noted by Dane and
Pratt, it is not only time pressure but also complexity
that can make it important to call on intuition. So far
as ethics is concerned, it may be the complexity of
judgments that is more salient than time pressure.
That complexity is partly the intermingling of factual
and evaluative elements. To explore this point, it
will be useful to consider an example of a kind of
situation that a manager may confront, where deci-
sion making would be hard to model in some
orthodox terms, and then go further in considering
the applicability of a notion like phronēsis.
Jean and the new product
To explore how phronēsis-like intuition may figure in
everyday management decision making, consider a
hypothetical case in which one individual’s decision
is the focus, but the individual’s decision revolves
around communication in a group situation. Such
cases are very important in modern organisations,
although not much discussed in traditional virtue
ethics.
Imagine that Jean is a middle-ranking project
officer and team leader in the fictional Endeavour
Organisation. Sometimes, Jean has to attend meet-
ings where she and other members of Endeavour
have to determine organisational policy on a par-
ticular issue. She sometimes goes into those meetings
with a point of view, but finds it difficult to maintain
her initial stance as she hears others with different
ideas. On occasion, she finds herself influenced by
the course of the discussion and is convinced by the
ideas others are putting forward, without being quite
sure why. On other occasions, she assents to the
general opinion, even though she has private reser-
vations. Sometimes, one or two others at such a
meeting will join with her, and together they will
maintain a minority viewpoint, and sometimes even
convince the majority to change their own view.
This morning, Jean had to attend a meeting about
production strategies. There is a proposal being
considered for a new product, which most people at
the meeting are supporting, but she is concerned
about a potential weakness that may pose a danger to
users. She can point to some general data about
strength of materials, which support her misgivings.
However, most people at the meeting seemed to
think that she is being alarmist, and point to the
extensive history of the use of similar materials
that has not seen any problems. The meeting was
adjourned, and will continue tomorrow. Jean has to
consider how firmly to press her opposition to the
proposal. What should she do tomorrow, when the
discussion continues about the proposal for the new
product? This morning, she had a distinct feeling
that she was on the outer, and that if she persists in
opposition to the project she will harm her reputa-
tion, while the project will go ahead anyway.
This case resembles the Challenger disaster. That
case has been discussed and analysed at great length
(see e.g. Allinson, 1998; Elliot et al., 1993; Vaughan,
1996). The issues are to do with estimates of risk,
organisational communication, care for danger, and
the like. Some of the issues are difficult: When does
failure to recognise the danger become reckless, and
immoral? For Jean, the issue is immediately practical,
even though it still has difficult theoretical elements.
There are intertwined issues of risk assessment and
how firmly to maintain her position. She has to
evaluate risk, both with regard to the probabilities of
events occurring, and the significance of the harm
they would involve, and at the same time she has to
work out ways of approaching the forthcoming
discussions, with possibilities of carrying the day, and
implications if she does not.
In many social situations, we are confronted with
a similar interplay, where we have to make some
estimate about the facts of the situation, at the same
time as we have to work out how to communicate
our estimate and its implications, bearing in mind
not only the probabilistic assessment we have made
of the facts but the ethical concerns that are tied to it,
and the attitudes and positions of others in the sit-
uation.
If we were to reason about things in a step-
by-step way, then we might try to separate out those
different sorts of considerations, and deal with them
one by one. First, what are the probabilities that x, y
and z will be the case? Second, what are the ethical
issues tied to x, y, and z? To what extent does x
 Virtuous Decision Making for Business Ethics
involve harm to others? To what extent does y
involve keeping a promise? To what extent is z
unfair to others? Third, even when I have then come
to a view about what it will be best for us to do, how
do I approach others? In fact, though, we often do
not reason in that step-by-step way. We make a
single, unitary judgment which integrates an
understanding of the facts with some evaluative
stance: in short, we display phronēsis. Our judgment
involves an inextricably evaluative element. Our
situation is similar to that of the soccer referee, who
has to come to a conclusion about what probably
occurred, but in addition, simultaneously, has to
judge whether the conduct was careless, and so on.
We have a situation that illustrates the point made by
Sadler-Smith and Sparrow that:
While models and computers may be good at aggre-
gating and analyzing data, intuition (since it derives
from integrative pattern recognition and holistic
judgments) may be the only avenue open to managers
to weigh, aggregate, and make sense of intangibles
involved in judgments where there are ‘deeper core
values that underlie a decision’. (Sadler-Smith and
Sparrow, 2008, p. 317; quoting Schoemaker and
Russo, 1993, p. 28)
Do we need to accept that a manager’s intuitive
judgment in this kind of situation is best modelled as
a single unitary act, which combines both a per-
ceptual and an evaluative dimension? The onus of
proof at least seems to be on a theorist who wishes to
champion separate acts of factual perception and
moral evaluation. Such an approach seems likely to
be motivated by a particular understanding about
ethics and decision-making. It seems to rest on a
positivist, Hume-type view that fact and value are
distinct, and must be dealt with independently. That
general view has been widely criticised (see, e.g.
Anscombe, 1958).
It is both the decision time-frame and its com-
plexity that suggest that a soccer referee’s judgment
is likely to be a single act of intuition. In Jean’s case,
it is more especially the deep complexity of her
situation that suggests that her eventual judgment
about what to do will be a single act of intuition.
Given the complexity and multi-layered nature of
group decision making and organisational commu-
nication, it seems plausible to suggest that Jean, in
her meeting, will have to make a single, unitary
9
judgment, one which combines general ethical
considerations with an assessment of what, probably,
the effects will be of the new product. For the sake
of analysis, it may be possible to separate some
assessment of facts from ethical implications, but the
judgment she eventually has to make is like the
soccer referee’s, combining factual and evaluative
elements.
For example, the layers of complexity include the
fact that Jean has to decide how far to press her view.
In this respect, her situation is very much like Roger
Boisjoly, the engineer at Morton Thiokol who has
become the most well-known for voicing concerns
about the Challenger launch, and who had specific
fears about the effect of low temperature on the
O-ring seals, which in the event did fail, causing the
disaster. Boisjoly tried hard to persuade others, but
was not heeded (Elliot et al., 1993, pp. 96–97).
Perhaps there is some requirement on Jean to act as
Boisjoly did. Assuming that her judgment is unal-
tered about the risk, then it seems that she has an
obligation to try to convince others of it. The
problem will be how to deal with the group pres-
sures that dispose others to agree with the majority.
There are limits to what she can do, and perhaps
how far she should press her concern depends on the
details of her assessment. But is it just a matter of Jean
weighing up consequences, considering her estimate
of the likely harm if the new product goes ahead, her
judgment of how likely she is to get the proposal
abandoned, against the harm to her reputation and
career if she maintains her opposition?
This might be one sense of the English phrase
‘practical wisdom’, and it even figures in some
translations of phronēsis as ‘prudence’.5 However,
that does not seem to be what we would expect of a
person who is virtuous in the sense espoused by
virtue ethics, if we are imagining a person who puts
reputation and career ahead of other considerations.
In English, ‘practical’ can have the connotation of
subordinating ethical concerns to others of more
pressing importance, but that would be problematic
as an approach to advocate from an ethical point of
view, and may not be a reasonable translation of
Aristotle.
Without undue emphasis on self-interest, a con-
sequentialist view might also suggest that account of
Jean’s situation, seeing just the need to weigh pos-
sible outcomes. Such an account might require Jean
10 Chris Provis
to take into account the long-run effects of what she
does, the impact on such cases in the future, for
example, and other such factors, but ultimately it
will see the decision in terms of consequences. Is
there any other way of seeing it? Werhane (1999,
Chap. 3) has discussed the Challenger case in detail in
the context of ‘moral imagination’, commenting
especially on the way in which participants’ ‘mental
models’ may have limited the way in which they saw
the situation. One notable point brought out by her
discussion is the difference amongst different par-
ticipants in their various risk assessments. She
emphasises the general availability of different ways
of seeing things in such complex organisational sit-
uations, different ‘perspectives’, as she puts it. Here,
we can note that such perspectives might go beyond
different assessments of risk, not necessarily seeing it
in terms of consequences, at all.
Such a possibility is identified by Philip Pettit in
his prominent defences of consequentialism (Pettit,
1991, 1997, 2000). He notes that whatever moral
values we have, there are two approaches toward
them: an approach that considers that ethics requires
us to do just what will promote those values, and an
alternative approach that considers that it may be
appropriate to ‘honour’ such values, even if that may
contribute nothing toward promoting them. With-
out being able to look at details of Pettit’s arguments
here, we may take it that Jean could honour her
values by standing out against the proposal for the
new product, even if she had no assurance that doing
so would be of any use. Can we resolve the question
whether Jean ought to do that?
Such cases are not unreal. Pettit notes as an
example the tension between pacifists who adopt a
course in the belief that it will promote peace, and
others who eschew war whatever the outcome
(Pettit, 1997, p. 126). Another instance might be the
case in the news not so long ago of a climber
encountered by others on Mount Everest. The
climber was in difficulties. The others did not try to
assist, because, as one of them said, “there was
nothing they could do for him”.6 Subsequently, Sir
Edmund Hillary said “On our expedition 50 years
ago, [we] would have never considered leaving a
man like that”.7 The difference might reflect that
same question of whether to ‘honour’ values, even if
doing so has no effect on outcomes.
Here, the implication is that Jean might not only
have to weigh up consequences. At least in some
cases, she might have to ‘honour’ her values, rather
than basing her decision on an estimate of likely
outcomes. It may be that the exercise of phronēsis
does sometimes require ‘honouring’ values, rather
than maximising them. It may be that when we see
what is appropriate (yı̀), then we do not calculate
outcomes but see patterns in events, and intuitively
compare the pattern that will emerge if we act in one
way, with the pattern that will emerge if we act in
another. We are affected by such factors as our
intuitive forecast of what sort of person we will
subsequently seem to be in our own eyes, if we act
in one way rather than another. We have no firm
criterion to refer to. Calculating outcomes may be
impossible, in practice (Elster, 1989, Chap. 4). At
best, we can see a number of considerations. How
serious is the issue? In the issue, how prominent is
the value? How clear are the consequences? Whose
interests are at stake in the possible outcomes? These
all seem as though they may be relevant. It is pre-
cisely the fact that there is not a usable general rule
that makes necessary some intuitive, holistic, virtue-
based judgment.
In Jean’s case, it is the complexity of the cir-
cumstances and factors relevant to the decision that
make it plausible to suggest that it should be mod-
elled as an intuitive process. In the case of the soccer
referee, it is both the complexity and the time
involved that suggests the same conclusion. The
referee sees that a player has acted carelessly or used
excessive force, and that perception carries on its face
the implication that a free kick is appropriate. Both
complexity and time pressure create needs for rapid,
holistic judgment (cf. Cohen, 2004, p. 49). Such
judgment is discussed in modern literature under the
title of ‘intuition’, but it seems to be very similar to
Aristotelian phronēsis or Confucian judgment of yı̀.
From an ethical point of view, it can be set over
against judgments that are based on calculation of
outcomes or following clearly delineated moral
rules. The complexity of many real situations where
moral decisions are needed means that a holistic
judgment is required of the sort envisaged in these
virtue traditions. This is one major respect in which
virtue ethics differs from consequentialism and rule-
oriented deontology.
 Virtuous Decision Making for Business Ethics
Developing virtuous judgment
This leaves us with the question how Jean will view
her decision subsequently. Can she be sure that she
acted correctly? Was there a right decision in the
circumstances? We have now reached a point where
criticism is sometimes levelled at virtue ethics. It can
seem as though we are saying that virtuous intuition
is needed to make moral decisions, rather than cal-
culation or reference to clear rules, but not saying
any more about that virtuous intuition. It may seem
to be defined only by reference to what it is not,
without any substantial information about what it is,
how to attain it, or how to evaluate it.
In fact, however, there are positive directions to
pursue for substantive comment about such virtuous
intuition. We have already noted the substantial
literature that has grown up about phronēsis. Now-
adays, that is complemented by modern writing
about intuition in decision making. A number of
developments and conclusions in that area can have
specific application to intuition in moral decision
making (see in particular Haidt, 2001). Such study
further extends virtue traditions’ long-established
emphasis on development of good decision-making
powers in individuals. The Confucian focusses on
the jūnzı̆, and the Aristotelian focusses on the
phronimos, both orienting themselves toward the
decision-maker rather than the decision process. That
emphasis on individuals’ decision-making capacities
suggests that development of good decision making
involves development of individuals rather than
refinement of techniques of decision analysis.
Such an emphasis is consistent with research on
intuition to the extent that such research suggests
that successful intuition-based decision making is
developed through personal experience. We have
already noted comments by Betsch (2008) and
Epstein (2008), which illustrate the point: “For
many cognitive scientists, the most plausible source
of intuition is past experience… [T]his account
conceives intuition as knowledge accumulated
unconsciously through experience with numerous
cases” (Smith, 2008, p. 459). Modern accounts of
how learning may occur in neural networks,
through repeated synaptic adjustment, suggest that
repeated exposure to instances of one kind and an-
other allow such networks to recognise patterns in
phenomena (Churchland, 1995, Chap. 3). In that
11
way, we may develop ability to recognise patterns,
without necessarily learning a rule of any traditional
form, or acquiring any ability to measure and cal-
culate. When we are considering intuition-based
ethical judgments in business, an implication seems
to be that intuitive judgment may be developed by
getting individuals to consider cases and examples.
Taking the point further, we may accept that in
ethics as in other areas,
organizations that wish to facilitate effective intuiting
need to concentrate on promoting ongoing and
deliberate practice in kind learning environments.
They may also encourage managers to be mindful of
their environments in order to facilitate implicit
learning. By remaining alert and viewing problems
from multiple perspectives, ‘mindful’ managers may
form new cognitive categories and distinctions (Dane
and Pratt, 2007, p. 49).
Those comments not only are consistent with
Werhane’s emphasis on the importance of devel-
oping ‘moral imagination’ as a basis for decision
making, but they are also reminiscent of teaching in
major virtue ethics traditions. Both Aristotle and the
Confucian traditions give some emphasis to experi-
ence as a primary source of developing practical
wisdom. Aristotle suggests that
while young men become geometricians and mathe-
maticians and wise in matters like these, it is thought
that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found.
The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only
with universals but with particulars, which become
familiar from experience, but a young man has no
experience, for it is length of time that gives experi-
ence. (Aristotle, 1980, VI, viii, p. 148, and see also VI,
xi, p. 153; and see Hursthouse, 1999, pp. 59–60)
Without doubt, though, experience alone can be
over valued as a basis for developing good decision
making (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 306). Bazerman
notes the inadequacy of experience as a corrective
for certain kinds of shortcomings of judgment
(Bazerman, 2006, pp. 191–193). It may be that the
sort of intuition involved in moral judgments is best
developed through experience complemented by
other processes such as reflection (Clark, 2000;
Haidt, 2001, pp. 828–829) and coaching (Phillips et
al., 2004, pp. 308–309). The fact that experience
alone is not sufficient for development of moral
12 Chris Provis
wisdom is also to be found in virtue ethics traditions.
The point seems implicit in Aristotle (Nussbaum,
1986, pp. 306–308). Steinberger notes that for
Aristotle phronēsis seems to involve not only aretē –
which may be translated as ‘virtue’ – but also nous:
mind, or intelligence (Steinberger, 1993, p. 120).
The point is also quite clear in the Confucian tra-
dition. Lai notes “the centrality of practice” in the
Confucian tradition (Lai, 2006, p. 111), but also
points out that there is no suggestion that practice
alone is enough. She argues that “the significance of
Confucian ethical thought lies in its attention to the
cultivation of reasoning skills and sensitivity in moral
deliberation” (2006, p. 109), even though “in
Confucian thought, the primacy of practice con-
textualises the entire cultivation process” (2006,
p. 117). It is quite possible that in areas like moral
decision making our intuition and judgment may be
improved by reflection on experience, and it is this
combination of thought and experience that is called
for in the Confucian tradition: “Learning without
thought is labour lost; thought without learning is
perilous” (Confucius, 1971, Book II, Chap. xv,
p. 150). Although Confucian teaching sometimes
seems to emphasise the importance of practice over
theory, and even though Confucians like Mencius
stress “the context-sensitivity of virtuous actions”
(Van Norden, 2004, p. 172), they accept the
importance of deliberation and reflection that turn
on reasons and principles (Cua, 1989; Shun, 1989;
2004, p. 190). In Jean’s case, considered above, she
can take into account of general principles like moral
principles of beneficence and respect, not assuming
that they specify correct actions in a precise way, but
reflecting subsequently on the decision she made,
trying to see it from different points of view and
considering whether, with hindsight, she might have
chosen differently.
The general picture that emerges on this account
is that good ethical decision making is often intui-
tive, that such intuition is developed through
experience, but experience needs or benefits from
training and reflection (cf. also Smith, 2008, p. 461).
Overall, however, what is at the centre of the
picture is development of the individual decision-
maker rather than of superior decision-making
routines and processes that are generally applicable.
This is an idea that is consistent with modern
research in cognitive science (Gigerenzer, 2006,
p. 121), but it is also very much a picture within the
virtue ethics tradition.
At the same time, other related points to be found
in modern literature about intuition-based moral
decision making are redolent of virtue traditions. For
example, they note the importance of social inter-
action in developing intuition. Clark comments that
“even if it is true that individual moral understanding
typically far surpasses anything that a few words can
capture, it is also true that moral reasoning and
decision-making is quintessentially a communal and
collaborative affair” (2000, Clark’s emphasis). Haidt
suggests that aspects of intuitive moral decision
making can be enhanced by the involvement of
suitably-chosen others:
By seeking out discourse partners who are respected
for their wisdom and open-mindedness, and by talking
about the evidence, justifications, and mitigating fac-
tors involved in a potential moral violation, people can
help trigger a variety of conflicting intuitions in each
other. If more conflicting intuitions are triggered, the
final judgment is likely to be more nuanced and ulti-
mately more reasonable. (Haidt, 2001, p. 829)
If, on the one hand, this reminds us of Werhane’s
account of the importance of getting ourselves to see
things from different points of view, then on the
other hand, it also reminds us of both Confucian and
Aristotelian advice about the support of others: “The
superior man on grounds of culture meets with his
friends, and by their friendship helps his virtue”
(Confucius, 1971, Book XII, Chap. xxiv, p. 262),
and “those in the prime of life [friendship] stimulates
to noble actions – ‘two going together’ – for with
friends men are more able both to think and to act”
(Aristotle, 1980, VIII, i, p. 192). The general point
that development of individual decision-makers is
best enhanced in a social context is supported by
various pieces of research (see e.g. Garcı́a-Retamero
et al., 2006; Takezawa et al., 2006).
Certainly, there are differences between the
Western and Confucian virtue ethics traditions, and
the Confucian tradition lays more emphasis on
the importance of judgment as a social process
(Kupperman, 2004, pp. 113–114). That seems to be
the other side of the coin from the fact noted early in
this article that the Confucian tradition places less
emphasis on matters of individual judgment, and
associated with the Confucian emphasis on ideas of
 Virtuous Decision Making for Business Ethics
social harmony that are much less noticeable in
Western thought (Ihara, 2004; Kupperman, 2004;
Rosemont, 2004). A more detailed account could
explore these and other differences. Here, however,
the general point is that each tradition does
acknowledge the importance of social support for
good intuitive decision making.
From a management point of view, this confirms
the often-recognised importance of peer support and
organisational culture in supporting ethical action.
Again, a more detailed account could explore that
point in more detail, including close reference to the
types of social experience and example that can
improve intuitive ethical judgement, and the
organisational processes, structures and inititatives
that are implied, such as the importance of ‘com-
munities of practice’ for knowledge and under-
standing within organisations (see e.g. Wenger and
Snyder, 2000). There are other points also that may
be drawn from the literature on intuition-based
decision making. Thus, for example, Dane and Pratt
suggest that organisations “need to reduce the rate of
member turnover in order to foster the development
of more effective intuitive decision making among
members” (2007, p. 49), and that transfer of exper-
tise may best be effected by having experienced,
good decision-makers work together with novices.
Such points once again resonate with a virtue ethics
emphasis on decision-makers rather than abstract
decision processes.
Conclusion
The general picture presented here is that often
when we make decisions, we do not utilise an ability
to follow rules, or to calculate outcomes, but rec-
ognise a pattern in our circumstances, and see that
some action or other is ‘appropriate’ in such cir-
cumstances. On this view, ethical decision making
and management decision making are often matters
of pattern recognition, and the virtue ethics tradi-
tions born of Aristotle and Confucius give better
accounts of such decision making than some modern
analytical accounts that have their roots in the he-
donic calculus of Bentham and other consequen-
tialist approaches.
This picture is consistent with modern accounts
of management decision making which emphasise
13
the importance of intuitive judgment in situations of
high complexity. Management decisions are very
often made in situations of high complexity where
social and other factors are interwoven. Often it is
not practicable to separate out factual and evaluative
matters or weigh the consequences of different
alternatives. Sometimes, it will just be necessary to
make an intuitive judgment, and perhaps to honour
some values one is committed to.
The emphasis that this account puts on intuition
in ethical decision making leads to derivative
emphasis on development of capacity by individual
decision-makers, rather than analysis of decision
processes. Once again, traditional virtue ethics
accounts are consistent with some modern accounts
of how good intuitive decision making is developed.
In particular, they suggest the importance of expe-
rience coupled with reflection, and social support.
Modern research can extend and deepen our
understanding of managers’ ethical decision making,
but that understanding may have foundations in very
old virtue ethics traditions.
Notes
1
MacIntyre (1991) has argued against comparison of
the Confucian and Aristotelian traditions, but his view
has been widely questioned (see Sim, 2007).
2
The term zhı̀ (志) used in Confucian ethics (for
example, as one of Mencius’ four ‘sprouts of virtue’:
Van Norden, 2004, p. 149) is sometimes translated as
‘wisdom’, but seems to have more of a volitional sense
than the sort of cognitive sense that phronēsis has and
which figures in the discussion of this article (Shun,
2004, p. 186).
3
With a few qualifications that are not relevant here,
such as the ball having been properly delivered to the
batter and the fielder being within the field of play.
4
And indeed a ‘snickometer’ has started to figure in
cricket television replays as a way for the audience to
check the umpire’s judgment.
5
See, e.g. Rackham’s Loeb Library translation (Aris-
totle, 1934, II, vi, 15, p. 95). Perhaps this English con-
notation is the reason why Hursthouse (1999) tends to
use ‘moral wisdom’ more often than ‘practical wisdom’.
6
‘Climber’s Everest Decision Agony’, BBC News 23
May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/tees/
5010348.stm, accessed 2 September 2006.
7
‘Death on the Mountain’, ABC Radio National,
The Sports Factor, 2 June 2006, http://www.abc.net.au/
14 Chris Provis
rn/sportsfactor/stories/2006/1651512.htm#, accessed 2
September 2006.
Acknowledgments
This is a revised version of an article presented at the
2008 World Business Ethics Forum, which was itself a
much-revised version of a article presented at the 2008
conference of the Australian Association of Professional
and Applied Ethics. The author is grateful to partici-
pants in discussion on those occasions, and to Howard
Harris for many relevant conversations.
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School of Management,
University of South Australia,
North Terrace, Adelaide, SA 5000, Australia
E-mail: chris.provis@unisa.edu.au