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Part VI: Chapter 17: Warfare in India

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 Chapter 17
Warfare in India

(10th Century AD Relief of Dancing Siva. Photo taken at the Museum of Cham Sculpture, Da Nang,
Vietnam, 10 January 2020.)

310
Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022
 Chapter 17
Warfare in India
THE BATTLE IN CONTEXT
Before considering the course of the actual fighting during the Battle of the Hydaspes, we
need to consider the battle in context. This is important. This was not a battle, or battles, of
like vs like. Porus’ army was quite different to anything Alexander had encountered before,
because the conduct of warfare in India was very different to the way war was fought outside
the subcontinent. To properly understand what happened at the Hydaspes, we must first
understand the nature of Indian armies at this time, and their limitations.
Prior to looking at the components of Porus’ army in more detail, it is important to stress
that Porus’ army was a very different kind of army to the Persian armies Alexander had
previously faced. The Persian armies up to the time of the time of Alexander, consisted of
three key elements:
• A core of professional soldiers and cavalry, including the Cardaces, The Immortals
or ‘Apple-Bearers’, the Royal Squadron and the King’s Kinsmen cavalry;
• A large contingent of Greek Mercenaries; and
• Regional contingents from all the satrapies under the King’s dominion, including
specific contingents of specialist units such as horse archers and the heavily
armoured Massagetae.1
Strategically, the Persians sought to intimidate and overwhelm their enemies by sheer
weight of numbers.
By contrast, as Kaushik Roy has explained, warfare in India followed a much more
archaic structure. Indian armies were modelled according to a structure designated the
Chaturanga Sena (four-limbed), referring to the traditional army divisions of infantry,
cavalry, chariots and elephants.2
That said, it is important to bear in mind that, as Chakravarti explains, in his 1941 thesis,
“ancient India … produced no historical literature worth the name”. In particular, for the
period from the 6th/5th century BC to the Islamic conquests of the 11th/12th century AD, most
of what we know about war in India comes from “foreign historians … and a few epigraphic
records”. But what we do know is, during that time, the military structures of the ancient
Epics, including four-fold army divisions, remained virtually unchanged for more than a
thousand years.3 And the most valuable of the foreign sources for the period currently under
consideration, Chakravarti admits, are the Greco-Roman historians. This is because we know
their “chronological framework”, unlike major “indigenous literary works” like the
Ramayana and the Mahabharata. This is because these works, like the Iliad and the

1
See in particular Chapters 5 and 6 of this study.
2
Roy, Kaushik, India’s Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil. Delhi, Permanent Black,
2004, pp. 11 – 16. Roy, Kaushik, Warfare in Pre-British India – 1500 BCE to 1740 CE. New York,
Routledge, 2015, pp. 15 - 33. Hereafter cited as Roy, Warfare in Pre-British India. Kaushik Roy is a
Professor in the Department of History at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He specialises in Military History and
Counter Insurgency, but has also taught Greek and Roman History. Welcome to Jadavpur University website
(jaduniv.edu.in)
3
Chakravarti, P. C., The Art of War in Ancient India. Dacca, University of Dacca, 1941, pp. i – ii. Hereafter
cited as Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India.
311
Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022
Odyssey, “represent a confused assortment of relics, myths and legends from a range of
different ages.4
Now, as Chakravarti explains, elements of this four-limbed division were further
subdivided into six troop classes:
1. The hereditary troops (maula);
2. Mercenaries (bhrta));
3. ‘ levies’ (sreni);
4. Soldiers provided by subordinate lords or allies (suhrdbalam);
5. Captured enemy troops and deserters (dvisadbalam); and
6. ‘forest tribes’ (atavi-balam).5
The most loyal were maula, the king/lord’s household guard. The sreni refer to troops
levied from the country’s trade and industry guilds. And the atavi-balam, the forest tribes,
the least trusted; ‘primitive’ tribemen drawn from the neighbouring forests and mountains on
promises of pay and plunder. Chakravarti compares them to the native Americans used by
the British and French in the early years of European settlement.6 And the complexities of all
this were further overlayed by the Indian caste system as described by Strabo citing
Megasthenes, which ranks warriors in the fifth caste.7
Now, in all this, it is important to note that service in the four-limbed division was also
determined by social rank rather than military prowess. In older times the chariot was seen as
the most important unit of the army. The chariots were the preserve of “knights and nobles”
who would lead the attack in an exchange of missiles with the enemy chariots and their
followers. From the 4th century BC, the elephants had superseded the chariots, while the
infantry and cavalry remained subordinate, including in Indian battle lines, to both the
elephants and chariots.8
Considering this, we could expect that the elephants and chariots were largely manned by
the maula, with perhaps mercenaries engaged as cavalry, while the infantry was drawn from
the lower classes listed above. Interestingly, Chakravarti later goes on to suggest that it may
have been Porus who first raised elephants to the preeminent position, noting that they
continued to retain that position after that time despite their ineffectiveness against
Alexander’s army.9
THE MILITARY UNITS
ELEPHANTS
Aelian reports that the Indian War Elephants were able to carry up to three armed men on
their back, either bareback or in a box-like structure described as a tower. The armed men
are arranged so that two can “hurl their weapons to left and right”, while the third throws his

4
Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, p. iii. With regard to indigenous sources, as I understand it, much
of what we know has been stitched together by modern scholars from snippets and passing comments in a range
of texts where matters of war are simply mentioned in passing. In will not attempt to address the complexities
of these problems here, but would highly recommend the works of Chakravarti and other authors I cite or
mention in my Bibliography.
5
Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, p. 3. See also Dikshitar, V. R. Ramachandra, War in Ancient
India, Madras, Macmillan & Co., 1944, pp. 180, 191. Hereafter cited as Dikshitar, War in Ancient India.
6
This is just the merest summary of a highly complex hierarchy. For more details, see Chakravarti, Art of War
in Ancient India, pp. 3 – 10.
7
Strabo 15.1. 39 – 49.
8
Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, p. 2.
9
Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, pp. 47 – 48.
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to the back. A fourth man, the mahout or driver, guides the elephant with a goad.10 The
reference to the hurling of weapons suggests that the warriors atop the elephant were armed
with javelins rather than bows.11
Chakravarti attributes the source of Aelian’s account to Megasthenes,12 which is not
unreasonable. Aelian does not name his source for this passage, though he does cite
Megasthenes at three other points.13
None of the accounts of the Hydaspes in our primary sources offers any details regarding
how the elephants were manned for battle. Arrian’s Indica and Strabo’s Geography do
provide do provide detailed accounts of how the elephants of India were captured, trained and
otherwise used. But these also reveal nothing of how they were used in warfare.14
According to Roy it was the introduction of elephants into the army that allowed warfare
in India to be extended into the rainy season. This was because unlike chariots, elephants
could be used in “rocky and swampy areas”.15
CHARIOTS
Despite their prominence in the Indian forces, our accounts of the Hydaspes battles offer
few details on what the chariots looked like, or how they were meant to be used.
Curtius paints the most dramatic picture. In his account, the chariots carried six men; two
drivers, two archers and two shield-bearers. The archers were stationed on either side behind
the shield-bearers. The drivers are reported to have multiple javelins close at hand should
they find it necessary to drop their reins and engage in hand to hand fighting.16 If this
account is accurate; and Bosworth seems happy to accept it;17 this implies that the Indian
chariots were quite large – carts serving as fighting platforms. The reference to two drivers
suggests they were drawn by four horses. A larger vehicle would also be needed for the
archers, given the cumbersome size of the Indian bows.18 And the shields carried by the

10
Aelian On the Characteristics of Animals XIII. 9, hereafter cited as Aelian, Animals. Chapters 7 – 9 make
it clear that the author is referring to Indian elephants.
11
Chakravarti goes on to note that “from the Gupta period onwards”, the main weapons used by those riding on
elephants was the bow and arrow. Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, p. 52. But the Gupta period
dates to well after the time of Alexander. Warfare in Pre-British India, p. 56.
12
Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, p. 52.
13
Aelian, Animals, Vol. III, Authors Cited index, p. 443.
14
Arrian Indica 13 – 14. Strabo 15. 1. 42 – 43.
15
Kaushik Roy, India’s Historic Battles: From Alexander the Great to Kargil, Delhi, Permanent Black,
2004, pp. 15 – 16. In this book Roy has intentionally eschewed the use of endnotes (and footnotes) for the sake
of readability, p. xi. Consequently, it is impossible to determine how accurate some of his claims are. While I
do not accept his assessment of the course of the battle, I am happy to cite his comments on ancient Indian
military practices given that he would have a better background in such matters. His work also provides a
different perspective on the battle to that provided by western scholars. Hereafter cited as Roy, India’s Historic
Battles.
16
Curtius VIII. 14. 3..
17
Bosworth, Commentary 2, p. 289, citing Singh, S. D, Ancient Indian Warfare with special reference to
the Vedic Period, Leiden, Brill, 1965, pp. 23 – 52. While I have not been able to cross-reference this work
directly, I have been able to download Singh’s original 1962 thesis through ProQuest. In that work the chapter
on chariots runs from pp. 43 – 99, hereafter cited as Singh Thesis. The first part of this chapter is given over to
a detailed account of the evolution of the chariot in the ancient world, generally. With regard to his discussion
of chariots in India, it is important to bear in mind that Singh’s focus is on the Vedic period, and that many of
the sources cited are religious texts rather than histories.
18
See below.
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Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022
shield bearers must also have been large, to protect the archers, and not the small bucklers
reported in Rolfe’s translation.19
Strabo paints a much simpler picture in his account of the Indian social structure, starting
with the caste system as described by Megasthenes.20 After the castes, Strabo goes on to
report on the various other kinds of sub-divisions in this apparently very hierarchical society,
including ‘city commissioners, and, below them, the administrators in charge of military
affairs, which is also subdivided.21 Included in these are “those in charge of the infantry; …
the horses; … the chariots; and … the elephants”. From this we learn that the Indian chariots
were drawn by oxen in transport, with horses in harness only replacing the oxen for battle.
According to this account the chariots carried “two combatants … in addition to the
charioteer”.22 Strabo elsewhere mentions four-horse chariots, but only in the context of
festival parades”.23
Interestingly, Indian chariots are not included in the description of “Indian war equipment”
in Arrian’s Indica.24 Four horse chariots are mentioned a little later, but only as a royal
mount, second only to the elephant.25
Taken together, the passages in Strabo and Arrian’s Indica suggest that four horse chariots
had an elite function in Indian society, reserved for royalty and special festivals. It seems
highly unlikely that such cumbersome transports would have been brought out for battle. In
which case, Strabo’s earlier account of three-man chariots, presumably drawn by just two
horses, would offer a more likely model of the kind of chariots used in the battles at the
Hydaspes.
Just how they were meant to be used is unclear. But if Curtius is correct in the inclusion
of archers and shield-bearers together with the charioteer, than we can speculate that they
were never meant as a frontal assault weapon. Rather, they were meant to ride past their
enemy firing arrows at them, in the same manner as the Scythian mounted archers. And this
idea helps to explain why in Aristobulus reports they ‘drove past’ the Macedonians and made
no effort to prevent Alexander’s men from crossing.26
As Singh notes, in the Epic tradition chariots were “the invincible instruments of battle”.27
According to that tradition, kings and nobles traditionally rode in chariots.28 By the time of
the Hydaspes battle, elephants had superseded chariots as the vehicles of kings such as Porus.

19
Latin Clipeatos – basically round shields as distinct from the tall scutum of the Roman legionnaires. Lewis &
Short, New Latin Dictionary, p. 354.
20
Strabo 15. 1. 39 – 49. That Megasthenes was the primary source for this discussion is affirmed at Strabo 15.
1. 45 – 46, where the author states “Let me now return to Megasthenes … where I left off” and then goes on to
describe the fourth caste”. This non-Indian discussion of the caste system, starting with the
philosophers/Brahmin who are held highest honour, offers an interesting perspective on Indian culture at the
time when there is little contemporary evidence from India until after the time of Alexander. See below.
21
Strabo 15. 1. 52.
22
Strabo 15. 1. 52.
23
Strabo 15. 1. 69.
24
Arrian Indica 16. 6 – 12.
25
Arrian Indica 17. 1 – 2. Later still, Arrian acknowledges that he drew his brief account of the Indian people
from Nearchus and Megasthenes.
26
In Aristobulus’ view they should have “leapt from their chariots and attacked the foremost of those coming to
land”. Arrian V.14. 3. In this case Aristobulus displays no understanding of how the charioteers were armed.
And, as I have argued the engagement must have happened at some distance from the crossing point. But
Aristobulus may have somewhere picked up some allusion to Indian chariots being used in drive-by attacks, but
failed to understand the nature of their use.
27
Singh Thesis, p. 8.
28
Singh Thesis, p. 90. Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient India, p. 23.
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Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022
But chariots still ranked higher in prestige to cavalry, and were probably the preferred vehicle
of the king’s kin and other nobles. However, as Singh notes, chariots had their limitations.
While they worked well “on even ground in ideal conditions” they could not handle “difficult
terrain and adverse weather,29 as we shall see.
CAVALRY
Arrian, in his Indica, offers a succinct account of the Indian cavalrymen that clearly spells
out their limitations. They are said to be armed with two javelins that can also be used as
lances. They have a small shield that is said to be smaller compared to those used by the
infantry (see below). The have no saddles for their horses, and control their mounts not
through the kind of bits the Greeks and Celts then used, but by a “band of stitched rawhide …
fitted round the muzzle” fitted with in-turned metal goads. There was also an iron spit fitted
inside the beasts mouth to which the reins were attached. These were used to steer the horse
together with the goads in the band.30 All this is presented in the context of Indian military
equipment. Shortly afterwards, Arrian shifts to a brief broader discussion of Indian culture,
in which he delineates the social status of different beasts of travel. The elephant is for
royalty, with 4-horse chariots next in rank followed by camels and finally, horses. And in
respect of the horse Arrian notes that “to ride on a single horse is low”;31 a comment fully in
keeping with the rigid hierarchical structure of this society already discussed.
For much of this Arrian was likely come following Megasthenes, though he does also
acknowledge Nearchus as his other principal source for his description of the Indians and
their culture.32
Interestingly, Strabo, following Nearchus, offers a detailed account of the Indian’s infantry
weapons. But there is only an oblique reference to Indian cavalry in a brief description of the
way Indians use nose-bands in place of muzzles. This correlates with Arrian’s account, and
Strabo also alludes to the goads mentioned by Arrian. However, as Strabo describes them,
the horses’ lips are said to have been “pierced through by spikes”.33
At this point it should be stressed that the writings of Megasthenes postdate the time of
Alexander by several years. Megasthenes was Seleucus’ ambassador to the throne of
Changragupta Maurya, the founder of the Maurya empire sometime after 305 BC.34
Changragupta is said to have risen to power by first attacking Alexander’s
outposts/settlements along the Indus River before usurping “the throne of Magadha in 320
BC”.35 Magadha had originally been a small state on the south of the Ganges, but by 326 BC
under the Nanda Dynasty its territory included much of northern India as far west as the
eastern side of the Indus.36
The rise of Changragupta also appears to have led to a dramatic military reformation both
during and after his reign. Much of these changes are generally attributed to Changragupta’s
chief advisor, Kautilya, elsewhere named as Chanakaya. Kautilya is the nominal author of an
Indian manual of statecraft and military affairs called the Arthasastra. Opinion in the past

29
Singh Thesis, p. 98. See also Dikshitar, War in Ancient India, p. 164. Chakravarti, Art of War in Ancient
India, p. 24.
30
Arrian Indica 16. 10 – 12.
31
Arrian Indica 17. 1 – 2.
32
Arrian Indica 17. 6.
33
Strabo 15. 1. 66.
34
Kulke, Hermann, and Rothermund, Dietmar, A History of India, 3rd Edition. London, Routledge, 1998, p.
59. Hereafter cited as Kulke & Rothermund, A History of India.
35
Kulke & Rothermund, A History of India, pp. 58 – 59.
36
Kulke & Rothermund, A History of India, pp. 55 – 56.
315
Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022
has been divided as to whether or not Kautilya was the author of the work, or whether it dates
to a later time. But, as Roy notes, it is now accepted that there are many layers to the work,
but the core of the work was probably composed around 300 AD, around the time
Megasthenes was in Changragupta’s empire.37
We know there is a significant gulf in information about military matters in this part of
India from after the Vedic period to the rise of the Maurya empire. It may be that
Megasthenes’ reports on military matters reflect the changes made after the death of
Alexander. If so, the best can say about the organisation of cavalry and infantry under Porus
is that those troops can have been no better armed and organised than they were as described
in the reports of Megasthenes.
INFANTRY
Arrian provides a detailed account of the arms of the Indian infantry, which he notes is
divided between archers and javelin-men. Strabo affirms this, suggesting both are here
following Nearchus, Strabo’s named source.
Both archers and javelin-men are said to also carry ‘small’ raw hide shields; just small
according to Strabo, though Arrian adds that they were narrower and shorter than the men
holding them. Both agree that all the infantry also carried a 3 cubit long broad sword, for
hand to hand combat when needed. Arrian goes on to make it clear that this was not part of
their natural style of fighting, and when they had to use the sword they wielded it two-handed
to deliver a ‘smiting’ blow.38 This suggests that the swords were used more for killing fallen
opponents than actual one on one fighting.
The accounts of the Indian archers are particularly interesting. Both Arrian and Strabo
claim that their arrows, like the swords, were 3 cubits long. Arrian adds that they were
capable of piercing any armour. They were fired from long bows as tall as the archer, that
needed to be set into the ground at the bow’s base, and secured in place with the archer’s left
foot.39
This is consistent with the subordinate roles of cavalry and infantry in particular, to
elephants and chariots as discussed above.
In neither account is there any suggestion that the Indians divided their archers and
javelin-men into separate units.
According to Roy, the Indian infantry was clearly light infantry since, as he is careful to
stress, European-style “disciplined armoured infantry … did not exist in ancient India” at this
time.40 He further notes that the effectiveness of the heavy, 5 foot long bows used by Indian
archers would have been hampered, like the chariots, by the aftereffects of the earlier heavy
rain.41
At the end of his discussion on the actual battle, Roy also makes some interesting general
comments that highlight the significant “technological and managerial gap (that) existed
between Hellenic Greece and ancient India”. These include:
• India had no capacity to “mass-produce sophisticated weapons”;
• Chariots were already obsolete at the time of the battle; and

37
Roy, Warfare in Pre-British India, pp. 8, 47 – 49.
38
Arrian Indica 16. 6 – 9. Strabo 15. 1. 66.
39
Arrian Indica 16. 6 – 7.
40
Roy, India’s Historic Battles, pp. 15 – 16.
41
Roy, India’s Historic Battles, p. 21, 23.
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Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022
 • Poros’ army was “not a standing army”, but depended on tribal armies who “brought
their own arms” and perhaps some mercenary contingents.42
THE INDIAN FORCES
On the face of it, the numbers for the Indian troops involved in this first engagement as
cited in four of the above sources appears irreconcilable. But there are some interesting
overlaps. And all the figures must be taken within the context of what we know about Porus’
main army.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the divisional numbers for Porus’ army provided by
Arrian and Curtius are remarkably similar. And Curtius’ numbers match the size of Porus’
army as reported to Alexander in the Metz Epitome while he was staying in Taxila.
Units\ Arrian43 Curtius44 Metz Epitome45
Before main battle As first encountered Alexander at Taxila
Chariots 300 300 300
Cavalry 4,000
Infantry 30,000 30,000 30,000
Elephants 200 85 85

The units and numbers provided by Curtius and the Metz Epitome are identical. This
suggests both were drawing from the same source, though they chose for whatever reason to
quote these details at different points in their narratives.
That Arrian also matches the numbers for chariots and infantry in his account of Porus’
assembled army just prior to his account of the main battle, cannot be coincidence.
Especially when we consider that Curtius later lists the same number, 4,000, of cavalry as
Arrian does. In Curtius, however, this is the number of cavalry Porus sends off in response to
news Alexander had led a company across the river.46
All three lists read very much like a list of the notional or reported strength of Porus’
army; i.e. before any fighting began. This is how Curtius and the Epitome present them. And
although Arrian provides his list after the first engagement, his matching figures are too neat.
There is no reference to the troops, including elephants, left behind to deter Craterus from
crossing. And there is also no reference to any reduction to the troop strengths because of
casualties suffered earlier that day.
The most likely reason for this is that there were no records available of the actual size of
Porus’ army by the time the main battle of the Hydaspes took place. And because of that,
Arrian simply used the reported army size prior to the battle, baring the elephants, as the size
of the army Porus took to the field against Alexander.
From this, we can conclude that Porus assembled army prior to any fighting consisted of
30,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, 300 chariots and at least 87 elephants.
THE STRIKE FORCE

42
Roy, India’s Historic Battles, p. 24.
43
Arrian V. 15. 4.
44
Curtius VIII. 13. 6.
45
Metz Epitome 54.
46
Curtius VIII. 14. 2.
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 From the above figures, we can them attempt to estimate the likely size of the Indian
contingent sent out in response to reports that Alexander had crossed the river somewhere
upstream.
Plutarch claims that in the engagement 1,000 cavalry were routed together with 60
chariots. All the chariots were captured and 400 horsemen killed.47 This is the same number
of chariots as Arrian claims were present according to Aristobulus. Interestingly, Ptolemy’s
figures as cited by Arrian, are double those provided by Plutarch; 2,000 cavalry and 120
chariots, though the casualty figure of 400 cavalry slain remains the same. This cannot be a
coincidence, especially given that the number of chariots is not rounded down to a neat 100
as we might otherwise expect. This suggests both Plutarch and Ptolemy were drawing on the
same original source. And in saying this I acknowledge that Ptolemy is generally regarded as
one of our most reliable primary sources for Alexander’s campaigns. But, as I have argued,
Ptolemy was not involved in these battles. He was committed to subterfuge on the far side of
the river. So in his account he must have drawn from either another account or official
records for the number of troops engaged.
The question then becomes, which accounts should we regard as more reliable? The
answer lies not in the number of chariots, but in the cavalry numbers. Although the
references are confused it appears that there were only about 4,000 cavalry in Porus whole
army.48 And Porus must have been aware that his army was grossly under strength in cavalry
compared to Alexander’s forces.
This means we can dismiss Curtius’ claim that Porus’ initial response to word Alexander
had crossed the river was to send 100 chariots and 4,000 cavalry to “oppose the advancing
column”. That would have committed all, or perhaps almost all his cavalry to what could
only be a reconnaissance and delaying tactic. And for that reason we can also discount
Ptolemy’s claim that 120 chariots and 2,000 cavalry were sent, since that would have
required Porus to commit half his cavalry to that mission. We are then left with just
Plutarch’s figures of 1,000 cavalry and 60 chariots, as the most reliable guide to the size of
the Indian forces at the first engagement.
This begs the question, why would Ptolemy inflate the size of the Indian forces in clash in
which he had no part to play? Bosworth debates this at length, acknowledging that Ptolemy
“could well have inflated” the numbers, while conceding it may be impossible to ever
determine the truth.49 He may have inflated the numbers for dramatic effect, to turn a brief
skirmish into something more than it was. Or either he, or Arrian drawing on Ptolemy,
conflated two separate references to the same units, into a single force twice the size. Which
is true, is impossible to say.

47
Plutarch Alexander 60. 5.
48
Diodorus, who inflates the size of most of the other units – 50,000 infantry, 1,000 chariots and 130 elephants
– actually reduces Porus’ cavalry to just 3,000 men. Diodorus XVII. 87. 2.
49
Bosworth, Commentary 2, pp. 287 – 291. While many of the points raised her remained valid, Bosworth
arguments are themselves premised on the mistaken belief that Ptolemy was involved in the actual fighting.
318
Copyright © Kathleen Toohey 1/6/2022

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