COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, and LIBERATION A Study of Society and Education in Leyte, The Philippines, Under Japanese Occupation.

Copyright by
Elmer N. Lear
1952
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, AND LIBERATION
A Study of Society and Education

in Leyte, The Philippines,
Under Japanese Occupation.
by
Elmer N. Lear
This dissertation has been approved for final

examination by the s t u d e n t ’s Dissertation
Committee whose w r i t t e n approval is on file
in the Advanced School*
Dissertation Committee:
Donald G. Tewksbury., Chairman

R. Freeman-Butts, M e m b e r of Committee
Oliver Lissitzyn, Member of Committee
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University
2->51
R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- I ■ • ■ . ;
Page
PREFACE.......... . . . . ......................... i
x v ii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. .................................................
Chapter
I. IEYTE BEFORE THE JAPANESE INVASION ................... ’ 1

The Island, Its People and Resources........................ 1
A Rapid Survey of Modern Leybean History.................... 4
Some General Information on Philippine Government .......... 7
The Struoture of Philippine Education— An Illustration of
Governmental Centralization ............................ 11
A Critioal Interlude: Defense and Surrender................ 14
II. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF LEYTE . . . .................... 29

The Occupation of L e y t e ..................................... 29
The Surrender of Leyte.................................. 29
The Japanese Garrison ................................... 31
Popular Reaction to the Surrender.................. . . 31
Rise of Opposition to the Japanese.................. 34
Provincial Administration.............................. 41
Law and the Courts...................................... 45
Financial Stringency in Leyte .......................... 49
The Status of the Occupation R e g i m e .................... 52
Economic Affairs ...................................... 59
Agriculture . ......................................... 60
Commerce ............................................. 61
The Populace Suffers.......................... 67
Augmenting Food Production.............................. 70
Control of Profiteering ................................ 74
Poor R e l i e f ............................................. 82.
Control of Distribution ............................... . ' 8 2
Japanese Intervention in Economic Affairs .............. ' 8 8
Confiscations and Priorities............ • * 89
Abaca and Copra Production ................ 90
Utilities............................ 93
Monetary Policy.......... 96
Banking................................................ 100
Labor Control.......................................... 101
Thought C o n t r o l.............................................. 105
Varieties of Propaganda . . . . . . . . 106
The Neighborhood Associations .......................... 106
The Kalibapi........• ................................... -|jp
Radio 121
Appealing for Mass Support.............................. ..
The Leyte S h i m b u n .......... 125
The Cinema................ 123
Miscellaneous Devices ................................... Igg
Setback . . ............................................ ^gg
Independenc e for the Philippines................ 130
"Pacification" Program.................................... 1 3 4
Leyte-Samar Bulletin..................................... . 13g
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Education in Occupied Leyte. . . .......... 143
Educational Philosophy................. ? ...............
Reopening the Public S o h o o l s .................. ..
Poor Attendance ................................ ^4®
The Sohools and the Japanese Regime. . . . . . . . . . • . 151
Organized-Religion During the Occupation................ .16 1
Public Health. ..................
Collaborationists . . . . . . . ............. ................ q
Guerrilla Counter-Action.................................... '•
The Sabotage of Tacloban's Pacification Program.........1 ^
Thwarting Food Production and Labor P r o g r a m s ............
Failure of Collaboration ...............................
Japan’s Last Days on L e y t e ...................................
S u m m a r y ...................................................... -’210
III. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN LEYTE................................ 2 1 3

Development of the Resistance Movement......................
Evacuation............ 214
The Rise of Guerrilla Groups............................ 216
Early Guerrilla Functioning . . . . . • 223
The Problem of Guerrilla Unification........................ 226
Captain Erfe. . . . . ................ 227
Alejandro Bal d e r i a n ..................................... ' 228
Bias E. Miranda .................... 230
The Miranda-Balderian Alliance and Ruperto K.Kangleon. . ' 2&L
A Study of the Miranua-Kangleon Feud......... .. . . . . . . . 235
The Miranda Version . ................................. 236
The Kangleon Version. . . . . . . . .................... 260
Evaluation............................................. 268
Guerrilla Society.......... 273
The Political Struoture of Resistance...................... 274
he Guerrilla War Council.............................. 277
^he Politioo-Military Government....................... 279
The TWLGWF.............................................. 284
USAFFE All ............................... . . . . . . 292
The Provincial Government of "FreeLeyte". . ........ 301
Guerrilla Combat Activities . ................. ........... 312
Law and Order................ 327
The Municipalities and the Guerilla........................ 3 4 3
Abuyog............................................... 348
Baybay............................................... 355
Merida. ........................................... 355
,-v Capoocan. ............................. 373
Villaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
D a g a m i ............................................. 377
Maasin.............. 333
S o g o d .................................. ............ 386
Ormoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Political Factionalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ggg
The Economics of Guerrilla Control....................... 404
Guerrilla Subsistence and Procurement . 404
Property and Its Control. ..................... 407
Regulation of Commerce............................... 423
Control of P r i c e s ................................... r 4 3 5
The Problem of C u r renoy............................. 445
Circulation of Guerrilla CurrencyfromOutside Leyte. 459
Small Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .463
. -r~' J
"'t ■ . - '
Social Service Functions. ........... „ . 471
; AgriculturalP o l i c y . ................. 478
Poor Relief ............. ................ 4 7 9
Education for Resistance................................. . 483
Guerrilla Propaganda. . ...................... . 484
Guerrilla Officership Training. ................. 498
Training of the Guerrilla Auxiliaries...................501
Public Health ............................ 503
Religion. . . . . . . . . . . .......................... 509
Educating the Y o u n g ................................... 512
Summary............................................. . 531
V. LEYTE HIRING THE LIBERATION PERIOD.............................. 537

The Expulsion of the Japanese from Leyte.................... 537
The American Landings . .............................. 537
The Combat Role of the Guerrilla. . ................... 541
The Post-Combat Career of the Guerrilla................. 551
The Civilians Under Fire............. .................. 556
The Fate of the Collaborationists......... . 560
Rehabilitation........................ .................... 575
Extent of War Damage................................... 575
Restoration of Local Government ........................ 576
Agriculture and Food.................................... 580
Trade vith American Troops . ................. 581
Inflation and the ECA ....... ................ 5 3 4
Abaca and Coprax Revival and the USCC . ................586
Some Other Industries in Leyte........................... 591
Nev Corporations in Leyte .............................. 5 9 3
Tacloban's Ascendancy.................................. 5 9 6
Economic Trends in the Liberation Period. . 599
Leytean Society in the Liberation Period..................... 601
Post-War Crime.......................................... 602
Some Special Legal Problems............................. 608
Public H e alth .......................................... 612
Labor Relations........................................ 616
Religion During the Liberation Period .................... 619
Education.............................................. 622
Resumption of Public Education........................622
Improving Instruction................ 626
Higher Education............................... 630
Vocational Education.............. ................. 633
Adult Education............ 639
Centralization in Educational Administration.......... 643
American Influence on Philippine Education............ 646
Summary............. 648
Amity in the Liberation Period...................... . . 6 5 0
Summary of Trends................................... . 663
APPENDIX........... ................ ......... ......... ............... 6 7 4
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . ...................................................... 669
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i
PREFACE
I remember how closely my companions and I followed the military bulletins

released at the close of 1944• These bulletins reported the bitterly contested
advance of the American Liberation forces across a remote Philippine province
towards an unknown port called Ovmoc. We were particularly interested in that
campaign as we watched our acquaintances in adjacent company areas hurriedly
gather their gear, assemble for final inspection, and embark from our South
Pacific replacement depot. Rumors concerning their destination were legion, but
the obvious objective was Leyte.
We had been alerted for some time. But we were already into 1945 before our
travel orders were cut, and our cautiously moving convoy headed north. Some weeks
later, towards evening, we clambered down the sides of our transport, boarded lan
ding craft, raced towards shore and effected what to us seemed a very dramatic
arrival. We hurriedly pitched tents in a battered coconut grove a short distance
beyond the beach, snatched a hasty repast from our packaged rations, and then took
our bearings.
We learned that we were encamped on the east coast of Leyte near the small
village of Tolosa. Our tension was quite superfluous. Peace had been restored
to this portion of the Island, save for the occasional enemy air raid. Whatever
action we were destined for would await our next assignment - Luzon, or perhaps
the Japanese home territories. Thus reassured, we suddenly became conscious of
thesweltering heat and our own physical discomfort. The waters of the Leyte Gulf
beckoned invitingly, their iridescence magnified by the brilliance of a full trop
ical moon. Not long afterward, a dozen bodies were diving and splashing about like
porpoises, enjoying the care-free luxuriance of cool water and warm breezes. That
refreshing swim, interrupted from time to time by emergence and a dash across the
crunchy, moon-lit sands, was my first and never-to-be forgotten introduction to
Leyte.
As the months passed by, my knowledge of the Islands and its people increased.
With my own eyes, I saw the devastation wrought by the Japanese invader. And from
the lips of the Filipinos working within the camp area, from the laundiy-girls
and shop-keepers in the village, and from the Philippine Array soldiers visiting
our outdoor theatre at niît, I heard harrowing narratives of Japanese sadism and
Filipino suffering. My ears were also filled with tales of the local resistance
movement, of the bravery of some guerrilleros and the ruthless brigandage of others,
and of the tortured life confronting the ordinary people caught between the opposing
fires of collaboration and resistance. I developed a profound sympathy for this
people, so harassed and destitute, and withal, so cheerful, friendly, and hospitable.
Some three months went by and I had not as yet conceived of the project that
forms the subject matter of this study. And then one evening, on the invitation of
a fellow-GI, I found myself in the recreation hall of a U.S. Army field hospital,
mingling with Filipino civilians and army officers. (I must confess, the inducement
to come was the promise that an almost forgotten delicacy, ice-cream, was to be
served.) I subsequently learned that my GI friend, other American personnel, and
many of the Filipinos in attendance were members of the Masonic Order and were
engaged in a fund-raising drive to restore Taclcban1s demoliiied Masonic Hall.
In the course of conversation, I was introduced to two prominent Leytenos,

Lt. (later Congeessman) Atilano Cinco and Maj • Fidel Fernandez. Lt. Cinco had been
actively associated with the guerrilla organization of north-east Leyte. Since the
Liberation, he had been an active member of the Filipino speaker's bureau, mak-ing the
rounds of American military installations on Leyte and interpreting Filipino customs
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ii
and problems to fascinated GI audiences. Maj. Fernandez had served as Judge

Advocate General on the staff of the guerrilla leader, Col. Ruperto Kangleon,
and since the liberation had occupied the important post of the deputy governor
ship of Leyte. I plied both these gentlemen with questions concerning life in
the Province during the period of enemy occupation, and listened with enthrallment
to -their replies. And what was especially pleasing and exciting to me, both
gentlemen invited me to call upon them for further information.
At my first free moment, I paid my respects to Atilano Cinco in his "home

town" of Dagami, finding him both exceedingly gracious and remarkably lucid in his
descriptions of Filipino life under Japanese rule. He paved the way for my meeting
the mayor of Dagami as well as the principal of the local school, both of Thom
added many interesting details to the picture I had been piecing together. But
my most valuable Dagami contact, aside from Atilano Cinco himself, was Major
Alejandro Balderian.
Balderian, a stocky person of grim visage, was then on terminal leave frcm
the Philippine Aimy. He had received his law degree shortly before the outbreak
of the war. and was planning to resume private practice — with a possible venture
into politics. But what was of particular interest to me, Balderian had been
guerrilla leader of north-east Leyte. I put my questions to Balderian bearing upon
guerilla organization, relations with the civilian population, combat activities,
etc. And each answer touched off a chain of related questions. I left Dagami
that day -with an invitation to return whenever I cared to do so (I visited with
Atilano Cinco and Balderian several more times), and with a very good "tip" —
a reference to several officers in the process of mustering out of the service
at the 1st Replacement Battalion, PA.
I reflected upon the information supplied to me while returning to camp. !.ly

camp was located fairly close to the Filipino replacement center. Inspiration
struck. Could I but find opportunity to interview these ex-guerrilleros before
their dispersal, I would come into possession of a rich fund of information. And
possibly I would discover that some of my informants had preserved papers per
taining to the resistance movement guerrilla documents or their own private
memoirs. This would constitute a most precious find. Yes, I already began to
see the makings of a full and absorbing study of Leyte's guerrilla movement during
the war.
My free evenings and week-ends during the next two months were reserved for
visits to the Filipino replacement center and the tracking down of unknown quarry.
First of all, I sought out the officers recommended as sources of information ty
Balderian. Each of these, after having been wrung dry as a sponge, obligingly
directed my steps to seme one else — a brother officer or non-commissioned officer.
I remember those sessions — the interviewees and myself leaning informally on an
array cot, the light for ray note-taking provided by a kerosene-filled beer can con
verted into a smoky lamp. Often, ex-guerrilleros from other provinces, sharing
the same tent with the interviewees, would listen, breaking in from time to time
to point out similarities and differences in their own experiences.
It woulu be impossible to acknowledge at this point all of the Filipino

soldiers who granted me full interviews, much less those bystanders who contri
buted to my'fuller understanding. But I must single out for special mention a
young lieutenant, Primo Talacay, (lately adjutant to the notorious guerrilla chief,
Antonio Cinco) who went out of his way not only in recounting his own experiences
but in introducing me to several particularly valuable informants. Of these in
formants, the most helpful were Lt. Domingo Radaza (for a time member of the
ill
“puppet" Leyte Special Force, and afterwards a member of Col. Kangleon's staff),
Lt. Arturo Nierras (active in the Biliran sector), Lt. Pascual Blancaflor (Barugo),
Sgt. Leon M. Ensoy (Villaba), S/Sgt. Epifanio Baduya (serving under guerrillero
Intoy Diaz — Babatngon), Pvt. Jose P. Martinez (key officer under the later
assassin of the guerrilla pirate Marcial Santos).
Surprisingly enough, the 1st Replacement Battalion, in its capacity of catch

all for the Philippine Army in the Visayas (central Islands), also received sol
diers -who had served in the Japanese-sponsored Bureau of Constabulary (BCs) diring
the occupation. From three top sergeants, Bibiano Mesias, Martiniano Bao, and
Gualberto B, Gariando, I received a complete report of the make-up and functioning
of the BC in Leyte, as well as an explanation of the circumstances motivating them
to join this organization. This set of interviews constituted my first direct
confrontation with so-called "Collaborationists", and provided me with facts and
organizing concepts for further investigation in the same subject area.
In the course of my inquiries, I learned that there had been two other
guerrilla organizations in Leyte in addition to the one officially recognized by
the United States Army. And through a chance contact, I met the leader of the
principal un recognized group, Lt. Bias E. Miranda. Miranda (a man with an engin
eering background) was officially on the roster of the Replacement Center, but had
been placed on temporary duty with the American troops. At the time I met him, he
was engaged in supervising the erection of a Red Cross recreation building* I was
invited to a dingy house he and his family were temporarily occupying (perhaps in
concealment from personal enemies) and there, over the course of several visits,
was given a thorough briefing on the nature and activities of his organization
(the WLGWF) and an adequate explanation of the disunity within Leyte's resistance
movement. I also learned the whereabouts of Sgt. Francisco Rodriguez, once a
regimental commander within Miranda's organization, now living with his wife in
a little shack hard by the replacement center. Both men referred me to former
officers of their organization located in Ormoc. and in Manila who would add to my
stock of facts, if I could but reach them.
Now I commenced to systematize the congeries of facts I had been collecting.

A pattern began to emerge of significant relationships that provided a framework
for further accessions of information and a tool of inquiry when carrying on my
interviews. I knew what to ask, what to look for. I had worked out a time se
quence of significant temporal intervals during the Occupation: the pre-surrender
period, the initial Japanese landings and the reconstituting of provincial and
municipal administrations, the Japanese efforts towards "pacification", the be
ginnings of guerrilla organization, the rivalries and consolidations among the
guerrilla, the extension of guerrilla,influence over municipalities, the Japanese
"reinvasion" and "mopping-up" campaign, the period of all-out Japanese control,
the reactivation of the guerrilla during the pre-Liberation months, and the
American landings.
With this understanding, I was better able to evaluate the material supplied
me, recognizing when my informant was garbling facts for reasons of self-glorifi
cation or defamation of his opponents. And now, in the privacy of my own thought,
I was able to put certain questions to the data I had amassed, intended as hypo
theses to explain wartime developments on the Island. These hypotheses were never
permitted to become blinders. They underwent an incessant modification as further
interviews and the gradual accumulation of written materials supplied by my in
formants punctured some of the notions I had been entertaining.
By now, I was adequately prepared to look up a temporarily "shelved" contact,

Maj. Fernandez. I found him at his office in the Provincial Capitol, an extremely
iv
busy and energetic man. He supplied me with many facts concerning the wartime
puppet administration of the Province. In addition, he placed in my hands a
letter addressed to the commanding officer of the Ijlst Infantry Regiment, the
reorganized guerrilla outfit of Col. Kangleon that had been incorporated into
the Philippine Army. The letter commended me to those concerned requesting them
to grant every courtesy in providing me with information and introducing me to
the officers and enlisted men, of the command.
I made two trips to Ormoc, the first was a short week-end jaunt, on special
pass from camp. YJhat stands out most vividly in my minu, as I relive the visit,
was the trip itself: a ride in a huge but rickety civilian truck converted into
a public carrier, transporting both passengers and commodities. I recall having
been jostled by a motley cargo — sacks of grain and sugar, sliding with every
lurch of the vehicle, bunches of bananas and bundles of unwrapped fish dangling
in my face, a menagerie of cackling chickens and chattering monkeys, crying
children and cigar-smoking old -women. From time to time, the truck came to a
standstill, allowing the passengers to attend to their needs along the roadside—
the wom'en retiring discreetly behind vegetation. At Carigara market-place, the
major stop en route, many passengers alighted to purchase fish, vegetables, and
assorted commodities. Soon we resumed, passing along the margin of picturesque
Carigara Bay, then climbing into a more rugged terrain (our viscera scrambled
by the roughness of the going over that rutted and rock-encumbered road) past
the shell-scarred trees and the final entrenchments of the Japanese at Barrio
Limon, and finally arriving at the wreckage of the once thriving Ormoc. The
trip was fatiguing to all, but spent in an atmosphere of jollity and good-feeling.
On alighting, I mused what a Charles Dickens, whose stagecoach sketches of life’s
drollities make such wonderful reading, would have done with the same scenes.
Some five months elapsed before I had an opportunity to follow up this

initial visit. On this second occasion, (after accumulated service points had
established my eligibility for discharge from the army), my request for assign
ment on temporary duty to the ifLst Infantry, was granted. These two weeks were
perhaps the most fruitful of my entire undertaking. The fact that I was living
with Filipino military personnel, sharing their meals of rice, dried fish and
gulay (in addition to American C and K rations), and swapping anecdotes with
them at night enabled me to build up an excellent rapport. And my interview time
was systematically apportioned, with sessions spaced all through the day and
evening.
The guerrilleros I interviewed were from all over Leyte, and vrere thus able
to give detailed descriptions of events in the respective sectors where they had
functioned during the war. I asked about the local problems of organization,
relations with the municipal officials, means of subsistence, character of the
Japanese garrison, nature of collaboration, and many related matters. And the
replies were always cross-checked for accuracy by comparison with statements
made by other interviewees from the same locality.
Again, I would be hard put to in attempting to give an exhaustive listing

of all my informants. All I can do is to cite the names of those interviewees
whose statements were of greatest value in the rounding out of my study.
First, I must express my gratitude to Lt. CoL Mortera who, as commandant

of the ifLst Infantry, did everything t o make my stay comfortable. In addition,
he added greatly to my knowledge about the resistance movement in Mindanao, in
which he had taken an active part. Secondly, I wish to indicate my thankfulness
to three officers Tor the good fellowship they provided (regaling me with stories
V
of humorous situations and hair^-breadth escapes during the Occupation and the
period of the American Liberation campaign) in addition to a thorough briefing
on events and personalities within their respective sectors: Lt» Esclepiades
"Perling" Quizon (radio technician associated with the American guerrilleros
Joseph St. John-Leyte Calling — and I.D.Richardson — American Guerrilla in
The Philippines). Lt. Jose Concepion (Malitbog), and Lt. Salvador Tan (North
Leyte). Aid finally, I must declare my indebtedness to three other officers
whose reports proved most clarifying: Maj. Porfirio Jain, lately commanding
officer of the 9l+th guerrilla regiment of south Leyte and organizer of Pintuyan
(who generously gave me of his time on the eve of his departure for a new
assignment); Capt. Abarientos, Executive Officer to Lt. Col. Mortera, and pre
viously active in both the 9Uth and 95th guerrilla regiments; and Lt. Domingo
Veloso (Chief Propaganda Officer for Col. Kangleon and elected Congressman in
19U6).
What proved most embarrassing to me duiing my investigations in the can?)

of the hist Infantry was the plethora of material available. Every man was a
storehouse of information, and every minute lost represented forfeiture of so
many additional facts. I decided to concentrate upon interviewing the troops
who had seen service in south Leyte, a region less known to me. And of these,
I attempted to get a sampling from each district. I sought out the appropriate
officer whose guerrilla camp had been located in a given sector for a full-length
interview, and then conversed with enlisted men of the same sector to fill in
gaps and amend errors of individual judgment.
Among the most valuable of the interviews were those with Capt. Campos
(Malitbog), Lt. Jose Escano (Malitbog), Lt. Floro Kangleon (tlacrohon), Lt. Cadelina
(ilacrohon— formerly in charge of a guerrilla prison camp), Capt. Celestino C.
Espina (Maasin— formerly executive officer to the American guerrillero, Gordon
Lang), Lt. Francisco Fernandez (Maasin), Lt. Juan Baybay (Maasin), Lt. Rufino
Villa (Bato), Lt. Filemon Pajares (Bato), Lt. Leandro P. Asinas (Inopacan, formerly
under the command of the American blackguard, Chester Peters), Lt. Lapulapu Mon-
dragon (Sogod), Lt. Maamo (Liloan), Lt. Graciano Capili (Cabalian), 1st. Sgt. Bias
Drama (Hinundayan), Cpt. Ireneo B. Salinas (Hinunangan), S/Sgt. Gregorio Gabe,
(South Leyte), Sgt. Teofisto Tan (Macrohon), S/Sgt. Bondoc (Bato), S/Sgt.Segundino
Caval (Hinaang), S/Sgt. Jesus B. Albarillo (Hindang),
While a considerable part of my time was thus given over to interrogation of

the troops who had been operating as guerrilla in south Leyte, I managed to locate
certain personnel from elsewhere on the Island who were of particular interest to
my study. Among these were: Capt. Felix Pamanian, quartermaster of the IpLst Inf.,
pioneer organizer in Capoocan and subsequently guerrilla chieftain of north-east
Leyte; Lt. Felipe Moralita (who came to Leyte from Mindanao with the "Expedition
ary Force" of Capt. Luis Morgan), Pamanian1s successor as battalion commander of
the 1st Battalion, 95th Regiment; Lt. Bonaparte K. Omega (Villaba and later with
the 96th guerrilla Inf. Regt.), Lt. Ismael Pastor (San Isidro), and Capt.Crescencio
Corpin (pioneer organizer for Biliran Island and later with the 96th Regt.), Capt.
Felix Pabilona (former commander of the 2nd Bn. 95th Regt.), and 1st Sgt. Saavedra
(Alangalang).
Proximity to the t o m center of Ormoc gave me the opportunity to follow

Lt. Miranda’s advice and hunt for some of his former followers reverted to civilian
status. I had little trouble in finding Lt. Bonifacio Capuyan, then on terminal
leave from the army, and in the midst of a political campaign as a candidate from
west Leyte for a seat in Congress. Capuyan had served as Miranda's regimental
vi
commander in Merida, and as the last chief of staff of the WLGWF. Through
Capuyan, I also met Atty. Victorino Tele ron (Judge Advocate General and Civil
Affairs officer of the WLGWF), Atty* Gleto Evangelista and Mamerto Palancos, .
members of the Judge Advocate Staff), Satumino R. Villoria (municipal coun
cillor of Ormoc, WLGWF Intelligence operative), Camillo Rosello (Assistant
Adjutant General) and Elias Cury (a fascinating Syrian, long resident of the
Philippines, -who had once been imprisoned by Col* Kangleon for serving as
member of a WLGWF propaganda team in south Leyte), and two motorship captains,
Esperidion Espejo and Apolonio Sevilla (former guerrilleros in the WLGWF).
I learned that some of the former officers of the WLGWF had joined the
organization of Col. Kangleon and might be presently found in the camp of the
Ip-st Infantry. On returning to the can?) area next day, I found and interviewed
Lt. Moncada (early organizer for the WLGWF in Ormoc), T/Sgt. Esmeraldo V. Galenzoga
(one of the guerrilla "fathers"-, in Baybay), Sgt. Delfin Obugan (Ormoc), and Cpl.
Juanito San Jose (Ormoc), Lt. Eusebio V. Aguilar (Ormoc), arid Lt. Agustin G* Flandez
(Baybay), It was quite obvious that these men were t o m in their loyalties be
tween their present organization and their original guerrilla outfit, the WLGWF.
Residual feelings of nostalgia were also found among another group of inter
viewed officers -- men from east-central Leyte who had served under the command
of Capt. Glicerio I. Erfe (executed by the Japanese). The statements made by
Lt. Sinforoso Ruales (Abuyog), Lt. Marcelo Lee (Abuyog), Lt. Francisco Malate
(La Paz), Lt. Eleuterio Trinchera (La Paz), Lt. Cesario Coral (Burauen), and
Lt. Antonio Mercado (originally Dulag, and later Pintuyan), threw new light on
many of the events occurring in that district of Leyte.
Aside from the tiro army camps, the most concentrated yield of information
that I unearthed in all my ramblings was found in the capitol building of Leyte
Province. Every office housed personnel who had directly experienced the effects
of the Japanese Occupation and who, from their particular vantage point, contri
buted vital information on either the resistance movement or the puppet adminis
tration. The man who was most lavish in placing his time at my disposal was a
clerk in the Provincial Auditor's Office, Enrique Potente. Potente had been
guerrilla auditor in Col. Kangleon's government of "Free Leyte” . He turned out
to be a keen observer, and what was most pleasant, a very self-effacing man.
Through Potente, I also met Ramon Mercado (guerrilla auditor for Capt. Erfe),
and the Provincial Auditor, Santa Cruz (who had served as puppet auditor). In a
nearby office, I met the Provincial Treasurer, Jimenez (incumbent during the
puppet regime), and Eustaquio Ligutan (treasurer in Maj. Balderian's "Politico-
Military" government). Needless to say, these men were able to supply consid
erable data on the economic status of Leyte, during both the war and post-war
periods.
The office of the provincial Fiscal, headed by Juan C. Pajo, furnished me

with knowledge concerning criminality in Post-Occupation Leyte. Fiscal Pajo also
did me a great service by arranging for me to meet Col. Kangleon, official leader
of Leyte's resistance movement, at the home of a mutual friend. (I discovered
Col. Kangleon to be a very forceful personality and a most prolific source of
information — - except in the area of the more delicate issues involving a criti
cism of his own leadership.
Pajo's assistant, Conrado Abiera, was of especial interest to me inasmuch

as he had served as provincial secretary of the guerrilla movement of "Free Leyte".
The clerk of court, Vicente Mate, had occupied the same post for the puppet govern-
vii
ment, and told me much about the functioning of the Court of First Instance
during the Occupation,
For a delineation of provincial affairs, a very valuable source was Pro

vincial Board Member Angel Espina, Espina had served in the same capacity in
the guerrilla provincial government prior to his capture by the Japanese, Pro
vincial Secretary, Federico P. Gaviola, added materially to my fund of informa
tion, And with the aid of an interpreter, I succeeded i n gleaning additional
information from Governor Demeterio, Col. Kangleon*s appointee to the chief
executive post of "Free Leyte”, and interim post-war incumbent.
Of course, I was most anxious to interview the members of the puppet regime,
serving under Japanese control. My major "find” was Bernardo Torres. Soon
after his release from the collaborationist internment camp, the former governor
granted me a lengthy interview. Torres, an educator before his entry into poli
tics, was an intelligent man. He was anxious to exonerate himself, and went to
great lengths to discuss all aspects of the Occupation regime — relations with
the Japanese Military Administration, ties with the central government in Manila
and with the Commissioner For the Visayas, food scarcity and economic controls,
contact with the outlying municipalities, and "independence” campaign, and the
"pacification” program. All in all, this interview was a very rewarding exper
ience.
Torres' provincial secretary, Atty. Antonio Benedicto, supplemented the

information I had thus obtained. Another valuable source consulted vras Vicente
de la Cruz, Judge of the Court of 1st Instance during the Occupation. The Div
ision Superintendent of Schools for Leyte during the Occupation, Florentino
Kapili, still further enriched my understanding. Having already interviewed the
war-time provincial treasurer and auditor, I rounded out my interviewing of pro
vincial officialdom with a visit to the office of a still incumbent Provincial
Agronomist, Victorino Berdan.
Most sensitive to the issue of collaborationism, and in certain respects the

best informed on activities within the provincial capital during the Occupation
were four people who had been active in pro-Japanese publicity work: Amador Daguio,
Ramon Esperas, Atty. Leon Rojas, Jr., and Julie Bayona. "While seeking to mini
mize their own roles in the collaborationist program, they were well equipped to
discuss all phases of that program: the newspapers, the public rallies, the
Neighborhood Associations, the Kalibapi, the food production campaigns, the copra
and abaca purchasing program, compulsory labor, etc.
For information about the governmental activities of Tacloban Municipality,

I found the wartime mayor, Quintero, and the Justice of the Peace for Tacloban,
Eugenio Brillo, very helpful. The prominent attorney, Julio Siayngco, Congressman
Mateo Canonoy (Maripipi), Congressman Filomeno Llontejo, and Senator Martinez sup
plied me with much information about Tacloban, about post-war politics, and about
the Japanese occupation.
A different order of informant was the Tacloban businessman. He viewed both

the Occupation regime and the resistance movement largely from the standpoint of
property relations, vfhen responding to certain questions in the course of inter
view, the businessman showed hard-headed realism and objectivity. Where his pri
vate interests were hit, however, he squealed with amazing tenderness. Many of
the businessmen were active in the Neighborhood Associations, and in the various
merchandising organizations established under Japanese sponsorship.
viii
Chief among my business interviewees in Tacloban were: Gerardo Villasin

(Eureka Saw Mill), Margarito Redona (M.A.Redona & Sons, Inc.), Marcelo Abesamis
(Visayan Saw Mill, Mercedes Theater), Federico V. Larraga (Manager of the Leyte
Land Transportation trucking dompany during the Occupation), Ramon Gatchalian
(Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant), and Cipriano de Luna (boat owner and speculator).
I also wanted information about post-war business from some of the smaller
firms and therefore sought out: C.L.Amba (Amba Studios: photography), Florencio
de la Cruz (de la Cruz Advertising Agency), Pelagio T. Tayao (Central Hotel), and
others.
The struggle to wrest control of merchandising from the grip of the Chinese
population of Leyte reached its crest of intensity in the Liberation period.
Judge de la Cruz, headed the local Chamber of Commerce, its activities dedicated
primarily to that purpose. Interestingly, Judge de la Cruz, Atilano Cinco,
Domingo Veloso and other political leaders had a major interest in several new
business firms opened up in the post-war period, and they discussed with me the
various facets of their plans for expansion. To get the local Chinese viewpoint
on this mercantile rivalry, I interviewed the leading representative of Chinese
business in the Province, T. Suya (with the aid of an interpreter), and in addi
tion, the manager of a smaller establishment, Wong On (Far Eastern Hotel &
Restaurant)•
The policies of the ECA and USCC were the objects of heated controversy
among Filipino businessmen and politicians during the period of early reconstruc
tion. For direct information on these matters, I contacted Provincial ECA Direc
tor P. Larrazabal (an Ormoc haciendero) and Assistant Director Jose S. Brillo.
Two non-Filipinos serving as Procurement Agents for the USCC, A.M.Selg (a Swiss
citizen, purchasing copra) and H.C.Derham (a Britisher, purchasing abaca), offered
their views on Leytean economic life, backed up by facts and figures.
To complete the picture of provincial economic affairs, I called upon the

Assistant Agent of the Philippine National Bank (Leyte Agency), Ruperto R. Visaya,
for a statement on post-war business trends, as well as for information regarding
the Bank’s activities during the Occupation. A.G.Castillo, cashier at the bank,
supplemented this report. Evaristo Tabonas, Vehicle Registration Clerk in the
office of the District Engineer, supplied a further index on post-war business
activity, and R. kesurreccion, Acting District Land Officer (Office No. 12, Bureau
of Lands) threw light upon another facet of the provincial economy. But to
Vicente Jaca, Provincial Commercial Agent for the Bureau of Commerce, I am in
debted for the most comprehensive discuss 'u of Leyte's affairs (as also for an
analysis of economic life in guerrilla North Leyte). Finally, I must mention an
interesting interview with Espiridion 1,1. Brillo, president of the Leyte United
Workers, from whom I learned much about Leyte's embryonic trade union movement.
Like the prospector for ores who struck a rich deposit at the surface, I had
been having little trouble in my diggings for information. But once I had left
Tacloban and directed my attention to other municipalities, the deposits grew
more scattered and more meager, while requiring proportionately greater effort
at excavation. For if, after locating the residence of a potential informant,
I found him to be out, I was compelled to leave with nothing accomplished.
Whereas, in the army camps and in Tacloban, I had always been able to make a
substitute call of equal value to my project. Moreover, the very task of locating
the residence of an informant, particularly if he dwelt outside the village center,
was time-consu ing. Hence, I made fewer complete interviews, using instead the
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.
iz
method of impromptu conversation with random contacts: farmers, fishermen, and

shopkeepers.
Travel throughout east Leyte as /ar south as Abuyog was simple so long as
one could “hitch” a ride with a fellow GI. I used this method of getting about
evenings and week-ends, and I devoted a few days (a week where necessary) to
each municipality. In each community, I sought out for full interview the muni
cipal mayor, sometimes the municipal treasurer, a person who had been connected
with the puppet administration, a personal who had been identified with the
local resistance movement, a businessman, a school teacher, and anybody who might
have special knowledge of a particular phase of his community^ wartime history,
hherever possible, I stalked persons fitting into several of these categories,
thus enabling me to conserve my time. Each of the personalities interviewed
is worthy of description, in terms of his special penchants and unique perspec
tives.
A flood of memories fills my mind as I look back upon those sessions but I
must hold in rein the temptation to give way to anecdotage. All I shall say is
that I am eternally obliged to the Filipinos of Leyte for the many kindnesses and
the hospitality heaped upon me.
Some of the puppet officials I had hoped to interview were still looked up
in the “Stockade" at the time I was on circuit. However, I did succeed in inter
viewing the following mayors: Gualberto Lastrilla (one of Jaro's puppet mayors),
Felix Anover (another puppet mayor of Jaro), Homobono Bardillon (Dagami), S.Generoso
Alvarado (Palo), Vicente de Veyra (Municipal Secretary of Tanauan), Rafael Avila
(son of the puppet mayor, Of Tanauan), Eugenio Ramos (Vice-mayor, Tolosa), F.
Candilla (Barrio Julita of Burauen, reconstituted as a municipality during the
Occupation).
The following mayors of the Liberation period granted me full-length inter

views: Pedro Gallego, mayor of Abuyog (he had been a leader of the guerrilla
militia under Capt. Erfe and a Deputy Governor of "Free Leyte" under Col. Kangleon^
Benito Prejula, (Burauen), Julia Lumen — La Paz; Cesario Colasito — Tolosaj
Dionisio Boco — Tanauan; Pablo Ontimare — Dagami; Simeon Militante — Palo;
Ezekiel Macanip — Jaro; Francisco Aurillo (municipal secretary, Abuyog), and
M. R. Manzanares (Municipal Secretary of Tacloban).
Special reports about criminality in post-war Leyte in addition to general

information about the home community was furnished by: Ciriaco U. Tupaz (Justice
of the Peace, Abuyog), Paulino Sillesca (chief of police, Abuyog); Enrique Tisado
(Sgt. of Police, Abuyog), Epifanio Villablanca (Justice of the Peace, Burauen);
Anastacio G. Azcarraga (Justice of the Peace, Dagami); Toribio P. Pedrosa (Justice
of the Peace, Tanauan); Miguel Bonaglia (police investigator, Tanuan); Perfecto
Perez (chief of police, Tolosa).
On the fiscal condition of the municipalities, and also on matters of local

commerce, the following municipal treasurers were of much assistance: Emeterio
Palana (Abuyog); Antonio Lagaspi (Dulag) — puppet treasurer in Inopacan during
the Occupation); Valentin Raz (Tolosa); Cirilo Morante (Tanauan); Juan C. Lajara
(Dagami); Felipe M. Quinia (principal clerk, Dagami).
I was never able to find time for a personal tour of south-east or south
Leyte. But on tiro occasions, I received a week-end pass to what the American
z
troops regarded as a recreation center — Baybay, on the west-central coast of

Leyte. On the second of the two visits, I took an over-night jaunt along the
south-west coast, passing through Incopacan, Hjndang, Hilongos, Bato, and Matalom.
(I cannot contain my feelings of awe at the recalled splendor of those sunsets.
Through a curtain of palm branches, one gazed at ahLoated red orb dropping into
the ultra-marine of the Camotes Sea while the sky remained painted in the
brilliance of the afterglow.)
I was fortunate in having been able to interview Mayor Gofredo Modina of

Baybay, Mayor Eutiquio Suarez of Inopacan, and Mayor Melquiades Flores of Hilongos.
In addition, I was able to reach the former puppet mayor of Baybay, Patemo Tan
(proprietor of the Farolita cafe), Msnandro L. Tavera, municipal treasurer of
Inopacan; and Salvador Ocampo, chief of police in Hilongos.
The Leyte mayoralty convention of January 10, 191+5 (convened at the capitol
to discuss the fixing of the 191+6 election date for Leyte, as well as to draft a
program for the equitable distribution of ECA supplies) provided me with an
opportunity to interview some of the municipal officials I had been unable to
visit, in their home communities: Mayor Felix C. Coraza (Malitbog); Mayor
Escolastico Cabrera (Maasin), Mayor C-regorio Edillo (Libagon), Vice-mayor Marto
Rubio (Libagon), Mayor Sotero Bulacan (Cabalian — Arsenio Cenizo, interpreter),
Chief of Police Jose Barte (Albuera), and Chief of Police Margarito Sanchez (Merida).
Of the other puppet mayors I had hoped to interview, I was able to contact
Florentino Zara of Maasin (on a visit to Tacloban to clear himself of. embezzlement
charges), and Vicente M. Veloso of Villaba, temporarily residing in Tacloban. I
had failed to mention earlier that I had conducted a lengthy interview of Catalino
Hermosillo, the first puppet mayor of Ormoc (favorite of the poorer class), and of
Jose Codilla, second puppet mayor of Ormoc (choice of the haciendero element),
while I was on leave at Ormoc.
I must note two other categories of informants who provided me with a some
what different approach to the subject-matter of my study. The first of these
were the physicians, men who because of their relative freedom from politics,
military intrigue and business preoccupations were on the whole more objective.
It must be stated, however, that only one or two carried over into their analysis
of events the same scientific acumen that they employed in investigations into
human pathology. These informants included: Dr. Adolfo Aldaba, (District Health
Officer, Tacloban); Dr. Enage (Tacloban); Dr. Felicismo V. Benedicto (Tacloban),
Dr. Virginio V. Fuentes, (Palo), Dr. Manuel V. Fuentes (Dulag), Dr. Cesario B.
Sudario (dentist, Damagmi), Dr. Goaofredo V. Benedicto (dentist, Tacloban), and
Querubin M. Liwanag (pharmacist, Tacloban).
At the regimental hospital of the Ulst Infantry, I had the opportunity to

consult with other physicians who had been drafted into the guerrilla: Lt. Julio
Dolorico (regimental surgeon, and fonnerly on the base hospital staff of the
WLGWF), Lt. Jose Gaviola (from south Leyte), Lt. Jose Lucinario (from Dagami),
previously chief medical officer for Maj. Balderian), Lt. Lao (south Leyte) and
Lt. Concordia Posoncuy (nurse, Carigara, and widow of the Japanese-executed
guerrilla intelligence chief, Dr. Ralph Posoncuy).
The second category of interviewees of special interest to me were the

parish priests, the spiritual leaders of this Catholic province. I was anxious
zi
to learn from the priests themselves what adjustment they had been compelled
to make to the Japanese rule, whether they had been able to minister to guerrilla
sacramental needs, and what their attitudes had been to various phases of war
time existence. The head of the Leyte diocese, the Rt. Rev. Manuel Mascarinas,
Bishop of Palo, presented me with a comprehensive account. Amplification to
clarify details in their respective local communities was provided by Padre Julio
Rosales (Tacloban), Padre Lino Gonzaga (Palo), Padre Pedro Morfe (Tolosa), and
Padre Pascual Quimbo, (Burauen). The Rev. Juan I. Pia, minister of the United
Evangelical Church (Tacloban), outlined for me the status of Leyte’s Protestant
community during the war and Liberation periods.
Finally, I wish to mention a few of the business people outside of Tacloban

whose sketches of their communities and its problems, in addition to specific
comments on local trade, were very enlightening} Jesus & Francisco Sanz (Abuyog)}
Philippine Lumber Co.), Nicasio & Antonio Vivero (Tanauan), Mrs. Jorge (President
of the Tanauan Retailers Assn.), Vicente Redona (Tanauan— purchasing agent during
the Occupation for the Leyte Prime Foodstuffs Assoc.), Doroteo Cinco (Tanauan—
pottery-maker), Luis Trinchera (Tolosa- whiskey dealer and merchant,, member of
the politically active Trinchera family), Gaudencio Pundavelo (Tolosa - liquor
store, member of an important family).
I have not referred to the teachers I had interviewed in the various com
munities I had been visiting because they constituted a distinctive group from
my standpoint. Not only did I wish to obtain their personal story and their
general reflections} I was interested in their metier, as actually practiced.
Again, I must say that the school administrators and teachers were most cordial
in opening their doors and allowing me to sit in and observe, and I must add that
I was greatly impressed by the zeal for their work displayed by the Filipino pupils,
despite the makeshift classrooms and study materials they were compelled to use.
Let me add I visited some of the private schools as well as the public schools.
From the educator group, my main informants were the following people: Vicente
Villegas (Academic Supervisor, west coast of Leyte), also supervisor of schools of
the guerrilla of the WLGWF), Benito Saavedra (Academic Supervisor of schools, east
coast of Leyte), Raymundo Aldana (district supervisor of schools, Palo), Pedro
Daantos (district supervisor, Dulag and LaPaz), Donato Pesado (Dulag, principal of
elementary school), Teofilo Acober (Burauen, principal), Maria Cinco (Dagami,
principal), Pedro Anloague (Barrio, San Jose-Dulag — head teacher of elementary
school), Pablo Pesado (Tolosa, principal), Candida Raz (Tolosa, teacher), Dalmacio
Colasito (Villaba, principal), Enrique Verzosa (Tanauan, principal), Cipriano
Aiguelles (Jaro, teacher and guerrillero), Margarita L. Gaviola (Maasin, principal),
Pio N. Montenegro (Tacloban, principal of Leyte High School), Emilio Rebana
(Tacloban, director, Leyte Business School), Dominaaor Honaragon (Tacloban, direc
tor Tacloban Vocational Institute — also guerrilla officer under Capt. Erfe),
Gerardo Jorge (Tanauan, principal, Asuncion Academy), Mrs. Bibi Tan (in charge of
English Division, Tacloban Chinese School), Agapito Mendoza (principal, Tolosa
High School, privately owned), Eugenio Villegas (principal, Dulag Academy, pri
vately owned} also guerrilla leader under Capt. Erfe), Atty. Francisco Astilla
(Tacloban & Barugo, Director, Leyte Institute).
Some of the interviewees previously mentioned in other contexts also contri

buted to my knowledge of the schools of Leyte in their capacity as educators:
Camillo Rosello (Ormoc, district supervisor), Provincial Board Member Angel Espina
(director of the Protestant school, the Maasin Institute), Ramon Esperas (Tacloban,
instructor in English, St. Paul's College), Amador Daguio (Tacloban, instructor
in English, Leyte Institute).
all
In the final period of my investigations in Leyte, I became extremely selec

tive, . singling out specific individuals whose oral testimony was necessary to
fill in the lacunae of my study. That is not to say that I rejected casual con
tacts who were informed and were representative of a certain grouping in a par
ticular community, but I devoted a proportionately greater period of time to
tracking down certain individuals I had vainly sought to reach previously.
As already mentioned, I had interviewed Ramon Mercado, Dominador Hondiagon,

Eugenio Villegas, Mayor Pedro Gallego, and a group of officers of the IfLst Regiment
who at one time had had a connection with Capt. Erfe's organization. There were
others I also sought and found: Mrs. Kathryn Erfe (widow of Capt. Erfe, Burauen),
Atty. Galiciano Enerlan (Burauen, politician, chairman of Erfe’s Guerrilla War
Tribunal), Eduardo Bugho (Burauen mayor under Erfe), Manuel Mondejar (Tacloban
businessman, formerly on Erfe’s staff), Silverior Paza (Tacloban, business school
instructor, formerly Erfe's adjutant), and Gaudencio Almindra (former Philippine
Scout, and member of Erfe's staff).
There were also certain people, formerly members of the Maj. Balderian's
organization, who could supply me 'with information about the guerrilla; Damian
Dadula (pioneer organizer under Balderian; I found him lying in a sick-bed in a
Tolosa barrio); Mrs. Ceferina Centino (Tacloban, storekeeper, wife of ex-guerrilla
chief, Centino), Artemio Mate (Tacloban, formerly guerrilla intelligence opera
tive), Francisco Sosing (Dagami, former guerrilla intelligence operative), Alfredo
M. Murrillo (Tacloban, working as investigator for the Provost Marshal; formerly
guerrilla intelligence operative), Maj. Martin Javelosa (Tacloban, U.S.Army Port
Command; guerrilla commander on Biliran I.; renowned for honesty in returning
£ 10,000 of Philippine Army money left in his custody before the Japanese invas
ion), Lt. Col. Quintero, (Tacloban, retired, in charge of north Leyte guerrilla
prison camp), Mrs. Nieves Fernandez (Tanauan, storekeeper, vrar-time guerrilla
leader)•
I -was also able to trace the whereabouts of a few former guerrilleros with
additional information about the south Leyte resistance movement: Pvt. Alfonso
Borromeo (Dulag, 2nd MP Co.; his sister, Paz Borromeo, had married American
guerrillero, Gordon Lang); Abraham Gabiola, (Tacloban, U.S.Army civilian employee,
war-time leader of the Bolo Battalion Reserve of Cabalian); and Macario A. Mariano
(Tacloban, District Forester for "Free Leyte1’).
And then, there were important unfinished leads to former members of the
WLGWF: Capt. Aristoteles Olayvar (Tacloban, on terminal leave from the army, WLGWF
regimental Commander in Palompon): Lt. Galo S. Maglasang (3rd Ordinance Co., PA;
WLGWF intelligence chief in Ormoc; well-remembered as my host at the New Year's
Eve party of 19h$, tendered by his Company); Lt. Conrado Sabelino (1st M.P.Co.;
WLGWF deputy chief of staff; interviewed either in Tacloban or Ormoc); Francisco
Corres (Burauen, appraiser for Base "Ii”, Y/LGWF guerrilla leader in Baybay).
In winding up my interviewing, I visited a few of the local men of influence

I had previously missed: Atty. Mamerto Ribo (Jaro; guerrilla fiscal for north
Leyte; Governor of Leyte, 19U6); Atty. Eliseo De Veyra (Alangalang), Atty. Floro
Cordero (Burauen), Rufo Raga (Burauen, first mayor during the Liberation period,
guerrilla liaison officer): Pablo Durana (Tolosa).
I had wanted to interview the few Americans who were in a position to pro
vide me with information about war-time Leyte. Unfortunately, almost all had de
parted for Manila or the United States. I had been fortunate in my previous con
tacts in having traced Filipinos who had served under I.D.Richardson, Gordon. Lang,
xiii
and Chester Peters, and who suppliedme with full information ahout the leader
ship policies of these American guerrilleros. And I was even more fortunate in
having located two Americans. The first was an American mestizo, Robert M. Price
(son of Walter Price, owner of the Leyte Land Transportation Co.) who had lived
in Tacloban during the Occupation under constant Japanese surveillance. At the
house of "Bob" Price, as the people of Tacloban knew him, I met one of the
American educators who had taken shelter with the guerrilla of south Leyte during
the Occupation, Fred Earl Warner (superintendent of the Baybay National Agricul
tural School). Warner's report on guerrilla society was one of the most useful
I obtained.
Two other Americans contributed to my knowledge of post-war Leyte. The

division superintendent of schools, Albert Haynes (interned by the Japanese in
191*2) discussed theeducational problems of the Province. And Lt. Col. Charles
W. Hall, Civil Affairs Officer, Base "K", gave me a full account of Leyte's
economic status in terms of trade and employment.
Before leaving for Manila on February of 19U6, I managed to find time for a
brief visit to Samar (a short ferry ride from Tacloban across theSan Juanico
Sts.). At the camp of the 1st Filipino Regiment, U.S.Army, I found the American
mestizo, Capt. Luis Morgan, the pioneer guerrilla organizer in Mindanao. Morgan,
who had led an "Expeditionary Force" to Leyte in 191*3, provided very valuable
comments on the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the various guerrilla
units in Leyte, in addition to information on the inter-island liaison.
I had also wished to interview Lt. Col. Juan Causing, commandant of the l*2nd
Infantry Regiment, PA. However, I learned that he was in Manila,having business
with Philippine Army Headquarters. I thereupon listed him as my initial inter
viewee as soon as I should arrive at the Philippine capital.
My voyage to Manila in a flat-bottomed boat (LSM)over the choppy inter-island

waters was for me an experience of severe sea-sickness such as I never hope to
duplicate. The craft rolled, pitched, shimmied, and slapped the waters, causing
me to stretch out on deck, absolutely motionless, as the sole means of cbtaining
relief. In my misery, I completely forgot the beautiful scenes of the fishing
villages.that had held my interest on the first lap of the trip as the craft
passed through the beautiful San Juanico Straits. Only when I entered the calm,
recess of Manila Bay did I feel secure again.
As soon as I had reported to my new outfit and completed the job of pro
cessing in, I asked to be directed to Philippine Army Headquarters. There, inquiry
concerning the whereabouts of Lt. C<1. Causing elicited directiorBto proceed to
a private residence in another part of town. After some delay in threading my way
through unfamiliar streets, I found the designated address and the Colonel within.
The search was crowned with a lengthy interview on a variety of important matters:
the pre-invasion period in Leyte, the Leyte Special Force, Maj. Balderian's organ
ization, Col. Kangleon's headquarters, the clash at Baybay between the guerrilla
troops of Kangleon and Miranda, and the guerrilla rivalries on the island of Samar.
Cn subsequent visits to Philippine Army Headquarters, I interview ;d a number

of the personnel who had been guerril.leros in Leyte. Invaluable was my interview
with Maj. Marcos G. Soliman, Secretary to the General Staff. Soliman had been
chief of staff in the 7/LGWF. He threw considerable light on the organization of
the WLGWF, (particularly the General Service School for Officers), and on the
nature of the power rivalry between Kangleon and Miranda, and on the liaison be
tween Panay and Leyte. Two other members of the headquarters personnel had
formerly belonged to the WLGWF: Lt* Pedro Abrenica (Palompon) and T/Sgt. Jabillo.
I encountered other former members of the \YLGWF in the ensuing weeks. At the
Recovered Personnel Office, Guerrilla Affairs Division, AEWESPAC, I met Lt.Florencio
B. Coloma, chief engineer of the WLGWF. A former officer of the Merida regimental
staff, Gemelo Pastor,was now a practicing attorney handling the legal affairs of
an American business firm* And unexpectedly, a person I had been wanting to inter
view, and whom I had contacted by mail, found me at my army address. This was
Conrado Daffon, regimental commander of the WLGWF in Albuera, who was one of the
best informed men in that organization. Daffon was on a mission that proved
bootless, a mission to secure official recognition of the WLGWF. Accompanying
him was Bienvenido P. Seno, another former member of the WLGWF, and presently
studying mechanical engineering at the Mapua Institute of Technology.
Some weeks after my arrival in Manila, I received a pass to spend a few days
at the army rest camp at Baguio.I shall forbear from describing the winding ride
up the ruggest slopes (affording magnificent vistas at every turn in the road) to
the summer capital of the Philippines — a district of invigorating climate and
marvelous sights. And in the midst of my daily sight-seeing tours (the terraced
rice paddies, the Dog Market, the gold mines, the stone quarry, the Igorot weavers,
etc.), I found time to interview two officers with whom I had made prior arrange
ments by mail. The first, Lt. Luciano Bonicillo, was attached to the Filipino MPs
of the Mountain Province. He described his guerrilla activities in the Alangalang
sector of Leyte as the chief adviser of guerrilla c' ief Pabilona. The other
officer, Lt. Apolinar B. Quetulio (2nd Combat Engineer Bn*) had been one of
Miranda's chief assistants in the early days of the Ormoc guerrilla, and later had
charge of ordnance work. Both men were clear thinkers and their penetrating com
ments on the difficulties of guerrilla organization were very welcome.
Back in Manila, I found several people who had been active in the guerrilla
of north-west Leyte, once headed by Felix. Pamanian. a follow-up visit to Philippine
Army Headquarters turned up Lt. Armando Guevara, chief adviser to Pamanian at
Capoocan. And then, at the billets of the Presidential Guards, I found Lt. Filemon
Corton, former guerrilla sector commander of Leyte municipality. Further inquiry
enabled me to reach the guerrilla organizer of the Villaba sector, Higino Cabiling,
preparing to join up with the merchant marine. Finally, I learned that Judge
Cabahug, evacuating in San Isidro during the Occupation, was the new Secretary of
Public Works. Secretary Cabahug told me much about noi*th-west Leyte under enemy
rule, and then introduced me to his private secretary, Pedo lap. Yap had been a
guerrilla intelligence operative in Carigara (under Dr. Posoncuy), as well as the
editor of a guerrilla newspaper. He in turn directed me to the Office of the
Budget Commissioner, where I was able to interview another former guerrilla opera
tive, Francisco Monge.
There were three Americans I sought out in Manila who provided me with inter
view material of great worth. At the Veterans Administration Office in Mianila, I
met Orville A. Babcock. Babcock, an educator long with the Philippine School
System, had been stranded in Leyte, and had served as supervisor of schools for
guerrilla "Free Leyte". He was very well versed in the guerrilla activities and
the politics of Free Leyte.
My second informant, Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons, I buttcn-holed while

he was serving as naval attache to President Osmena at the Malacanan. Some months
later, I succeeded in securing a long session with him at his business address,
the Luzon Stevedoring Company, and learned a great deal about the liaison between
Col. Fertig's headquarters in Mindanao and the headquarters of Col. Kangleon in
Leyte. Parsons also evaluated the work and personality of I.D.Richardson (American
XV
Guerrilla in The Philippines).
My third informant was Parsons* brother-in-law, Tom Jurika. Jurika had been
associated with Gordon Lang in the Commissary Department of Col. Kangleon, and was
thus in a position to discuss many phases of guerrilla activities in South Leyte.
Through Parsons, I also was able to trace the residence of Rosario Escano,
sweetheart of I.D.Richardson, (referred to as "Curly** in Ira Wolfert's book,
recently produced as a Hollywood photoplay), Miss Escano described the occupation
of south Leyte and guerrilla activities there, referring discreetly to the role
of her lover, Richardson.
Of my many interviews in Manila, only two proved disappointing. In both

cases, the persons concerned were largely non-committal in response to my ques
tions — presumably, because they knew too much. Senator Jose Veloso, arch
collaborationist of Leyte, had temporarily withdrawn from political life. I
found him bn the outskirts of Manila, (the proprietor of the Florian Club -- a
swimming pool and night club), evidently far from destitute. He received me
politely but coldly. He promised to send me a written statement, but he failed
to keep his promise.
My other disappointing interview was with the young and dapper General
Peralta. I had hopes that he would give me much information about the guerrilla
rivalries on the island of Leyte, since he had directed the intelligence network
of the Visayas. But aside from a few generalities that were common knowledge,
Peralta had little to say.
I turned to the Philippine legislature for my final interviews. I renewed

my acquaintance with Atilano Cinco and Domingo Veloso, sent to Congress by their
Leyte constituencies at the 19 U6 general elections. Two other members of the
new Leyte deputation I interviewed at their Manila residences: Congressman Juan
R. Perez (Tanauan) and Francisco Pajao (Maasin). They told me much about post
war politics in Leyte, as also about war-time conditions in their respective
communities. They also introduced me to an American mestiza, Mary Quaile, who
had lived in Leyte during the Occupation, and whose brother had served with the
outfit of guerrilla chief Antonio Cinco.
Another valuable informant, Senator Carlos Garcia, came from Bohol. However,
he had been evacuating in Hilongos during much of the Japanese occupation, and
knew a great deal about conditions in South Leyte.
My final congressional interviewee was a Moro leader elected from Lanao,

Mindanao — Congressman Manalao Liindalano. The Congressman had been commanding
officer of the Maranao Militia Force of the 108th Guerrilla Infantry Regt., and
supplied me with many new facts about the guerrilla of Mindanao.
In my reference to the many Filipinos interviewed, I made no mention of the

documents I had been collecting. The bibliography at the end of this study carries
a select listing of the materials I have drawn upon, both published and unpub
lished. It is my intention to deposit with the library of Columbia University the
bulk of the miscellaneous papers I have gathered in the Philippines, treating with
subject-matter here discussed. Some of these materials are extremely brittle,
for they have been interred during the Occupation period. Their general availa
bility will rest with the judgement of the library staff.
It is important that, a research worker should recognize the limitations of
xvi
his own study. In this case, there are gaps in the material bearing upon the
different topics re n e w e d in these papers. There is little that can be done to
bridge the hiatus resulting from lo^t«---deca.Yed^---burned«--^d--captured-gUwrriIla
documents. Similarly, many of the reports prepared by the provincial capitol
were lost or destroyed during the hurly-burly of the Liberation. I had hoped
to find copies of provincial records coursed on to Manila. But again, in this
case, the gutting of the public building during the retaking of Manila from its
entrenched Japanese occupiers meant the destruction of all contents. I know I
tried in vain to get a complete'statement of. the wartime finances of Leyte
both from the provincial treasurer and the Provincial Auditor in Tacloban, and
from the offices of their chiefs in Ormoc. As for the picture of guerrilla
finances, it is equally muddled. Looting of municipal treasuries by bandits
as well as confiscation by guerrilla groups threw out the municipalities as a
source of information. And so it went with wartime reports of litigation, tax
payments, etc. Nonetheless, it is certain that there are scattered documents
and private papers still extant, and unknown to me. However, it is extremely
doubtful, in view of elaborate pains taken by myself to interview as many people
as possible, whether any new finds would materially alter the picture of the
Occupation period. Perhaps possessors of pertinent materials will be willing
to contribute them to the Columbia University depository.
It is possible that the Military Intelligence division of the Department

of Defense will some day throw open its secret files covering the Japanese occu
pation and the resistance movement in Leyte. And while this additional data may
provide amplification of certain topics discussed in these pages, I suspect that
it will in no way disconfirm the conclusions advanced.
One final word in these preliminaries. My sincere apologies to any purist

who may take offense at violations of accepted word usage and grammatical form.
I thought it best to retain unedited and intact all quoted matter, thereby pre
serving the flavor of the Filipino source consulted. I refrained from placing
the corrected form in brackets out of deference to those of my readers who might
object to such supererogatory instruction on my part.
May I take this opportunity of thanking former army Chaplains Samuel Silver
and Abraham Fedder for the encouragement they gave to me while I was carrying out
my field work in Leyte -- sometimes under very disheartening circumstances. And
here, at Columbia University, I stand much in the debt of my chief adviser,
Professor Donald G. Tewksbury, and of Professors R. Freeman Butts, George S.Counts,
Clarence Linton, Oliver Lissitzyn, and Arthur Hacmahon for their counsel while
the organization and writing of the dissertation -were in progress. Finally, I
wish to thank the staffs of the Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C. and the
Philippine Consulate in New York City for courtesies rendered and information
supplied to me on several occasions.
MAPS AMD ILLUSTRATIONS
L e y t e ............................................... i
A Japanese Anti-Guerrilla Handb i l l ...... 106
The Guerrilla Staff Officers of the 2nd Battalion,

95th Regiment, 92nd Division....................... 213
The Battle of L e y t e ............................... 537
A Sign that Generated F r i c t i o n .................... 650
1
CHAPTER I
LEYTE BEFORE THE JAPANESE INVASION
To most Americans, Leyte is no more than a name on a Philippine map,
though a name made famous during World War II. For that matter, many Filipinos
living in Luzon or Mindanao know comparatively little more about it. It is
therefore appropriate that we prefix to this record of Leyte1s experiences dur
ing the war years a brief account of this Island’s looation and resources, its
people and history, and its plaoe in the over-all Philippine system of govern
ment and education. Having sketched in this background, we shall- proceed in
the remainder of the chapter to a launching of our otudy— a description of
conditions in Leyte in the interval between the outbreak of World War II and
the Japanese occupation of the Island.
The Island, Its People and Resources
It is not often that one turns to an arid collection of statistics for
an appreciational account of a region and its inhabitants. But the 1918 Census
of the Philippine Islands deserves a place alongside the most readable travelogue
for its vivid description of Leyte— its setting, resources, and people. In
introducing Leyte to the general reader, we shall transcribe this section of the
1918 Census verbatim, indicating where certain data require revision to be
brought up to date:
Leyte is one of the largest and most fertile islands in the eastern
Visayas group. The province of that name embraces the Islands of Leyte,
Maripipi, Biliran, Guiguintangan, Panaon, Limasawa, and several other
adjacent ones. The Island of Leyte is situated southwest of Samar and
is separated from it by the San Juanico Strait, whioh is said to be one
of the most beautiful waterways in the world, but dangerous because of
its swift current. The province covers an area of 7,783 square kilo
meters, but only a small portion of the land available for cultivation
is as yet under tillage, beoause of the unfavorable topography of the
country, the scarcity of labor, and the lack of capital necessary for
the development of idle lands and for the opening of roads through the
forests and remote valleys. The ooast is much indented, especially at
Carigara Bay on the north, Sogod Bay on the south, Leyte Gulf on the
east and Ormoo Bay on the west.
Taol ban, the oapltol, is the most important seaport on the eastern
coast, while Ormoo is the outlet on the western part.
Like Samar and other Visayan islands, Leyte is traversed by many
low mountain ranges. The ridge which extends from the northwestern part
of the provinoe to its southeastern extremity is very rugged and almost
impassable. There are also many extinct volcanoes of which Mahagnao is
the most important.
The olimate is agreeable and healthful. Due to its geographical
position, the island is favored with rainfall continuously throughout
the year. The northern part of the province is often visited by typhoons
during the period of the northeast monsoon, whereas the southern and
central parts are seldom affected by them. Oftentimes the high winds
which pass over the northern part of Leyte are so violent as to blow down
large buildings, uproot big trees, and damage the entire orops planted
on this portion of the island.
The coastal plains and the interior valleys are fertile and produc
tive. Hemp and copra are the most important products exported. Although
rioe is grown in all the towns of Leyte, oorn is the principal food of
the people. Other products raised in the plains are tobacco, bananas,
papayas, and pineapples. The swamps are wooded with nipa and mangroves,
while the mountains yield rattan and timber for various purposes. At
present there are thousands of hectares of virgin forests which await
the enterprising Filipino capitalist to convert them into actual souroes
of wealth.
Among the domestio animals are cattle, carabaos, hogs, horses, and
goats. There was abundance of cattle and carabaos in Leyte before the
Insurrection, but the ravages of war and animal diseases have greatly
reduced their number.
Yfhile the rivers, lakes and seaooasts abound in fish, the mountains
are well timbered. Coal is found in the towns of Leyte, Ormoo and Jaro.
Petroleum and asphalt are also found in the town of Leyte, the latter
being mined for street paving purposes. Gold is found in Pintuyan and
San Isidro; sulphur around Mahagnao; mineral springs in the crater of
Mahagnao, Ormoo, San Isidro, Caibiran, Mainit, Burawen, and Carigara.
The healthful climate and productive soil of Leyte attract many im
migrants from Bohol, Cebu, Masbate, and Samar. The people are indus
trious and friendly, their most important pursuits being farming and
fishing. Lumbering is neglected because of the lack of good roads, and
because nearly all the inhabitants live near the coast away from the
sources of supply.
This province has 46 municipalities and 969 barrios. The capital '
is Taoloban, with 15,478 inhabitants. It is located in the northeastern
parts of the province.^
In the two decades after 1918, Leyte developed considerably. We oan
form some notion of its growth by oiting certain figures characterizing its
status in 1918:
^Census of the Philippine Islands-1918. Manila: Bureau of Printing,

pp. 183-184.
,Cultivated lands hectares 105,715
Population 597,995
Hate of mortality per 1,000 inhabitants 38*2
Humber of establishments of household industries 5,638
Produotion in 1918 1,605,117.29
Number of manufacturing establishments 84
Production in 1918 31,670,213.10
Number of schools
Primary 279
Intermediate 31
High sbhool 1
Vocational 1
Enrolment for 1918 40,813
(males: 22,549; females: 18,264).
By way of contrast, we extract from the Eoonomio Survey of the Provinoe
of Leyte, prepared by the Provincial Commercial Agent, the following data:
As per records of the District Health Officer of this provinoe, the

population of the Province of Leyte as of December, 1940 is around
939,695, and distributed according to their nationality as follows:
Filipinos 936,313
Americans 49
Chinese 3,211
Asiatics 28
Europeans 81
All others 13
The following facts and figures will show the steady increase in
enrolment in all public schools in Leyte before the outbreak of the war::
Total enrolment, elementary schools - 1940 99,320
Total enrolment, elementary schools - 1941 127,349
Total enrolment, secondary schools - 1940 2,945
Total enrolment, secondary schools - 1941 3,726
Before the war, there were eight private institutions established in
the provinoe of Leyte giving primary, intermediate and secondary courses.
....There was also established in Tacloban a Chinese sohool, exclusively
financed by the Chinese oommunity. • • ................................
Of the total area of the provinoe of Leyte of about 778,295 Ha., about
60$ are so far cultivated....In the 40$ uncultivated area are included
oommeroial forests of about 961,600 acres, non-oommeroial forests of
about 58,240 aores and oogonal areas of about 378,600 acres, whioh are
mostly converted into grazing lands for cattle....
As inhabitants of an island forming part of the Visayas cluster, the
Leytenos speak a Visayan dialect. In fact, they speak two dialects--those of
the East Coast a speeoh akin to that of Samar, those of the VJest Coast, a
1 Ibid.t
p. 185.
Vicente P. Jaca, "Extracts From the Report of the Provincial
Commercial Aeent on the Eoonomio Survey of the Province of Leyte", 1945
(typewritten). Pp. 1-3, 21.
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.
- ••••\.yariaiit-.:of -thef Cebu, speech. Looal pride and in-breeding have, developed a speci
l-r\, ".• ■* ,.■'»;•: •' -.-'-t-,..-,-;, : > ■ ■»■' .• ■ •• •• ' .- V - ' •/•:, .' • ■• • ,' ':'V ■ ■' • "•
v ..-t ■_ '/■';■■■-- '■ ■'. ■ ■'■ ■ . ■ ■ ■ - V ; , ■?' ■ ' t.i
of narrow parochialism among some of the Leytenos.' Those so affected hare enters
tained a traditional coolness towards Filipinos coming from Luton, a"feeling '
■rl . ' ■; ' v V - ’
- • ■ -• " ' •• . -• '
heightened to positive ill-will toward the Ilooanos. Government administrators
sent to Leyte from outside the Visayas have not always received full co-operation
from the local population* And this, dispite the Leytean reputation for hospitality
to fellow-Visayans and to Americans. However, the rise of Filipino nationalism in
the pre-war period was beginning to break down this clannishness.
To complete the picture of pre-war Leyte, one very important detail must be
added. Leyte’s population was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic in religious affilia^
tion* The Commercial Agent placed the number of Roman Catholics at 883,962. The
next largest group, the Aglipayans, totaled only 23,678* and the Protestants numbered
a bare 5,181.^-
There is no need to pass upon the piety of the Roman Catholics, judged by
ecolesiastioal standards. The inhabitants of Tanauan, Palo, and Taoloban enjoyed a
reputation of devoutness, while their co-religionists of the West Coast were somewhat
more lex. But the important thing to note is that the population of the entire
provinoe in their daily living, on the oocasion of critioal personal events (baptism,
marriage, death), at the public celebration of fiestas, and to an indefinable measure
in their civic thinking were influenced by the Church. 1 Separation of church and
state precluded direct eoolesiastical meddling with public education. But the
omnipresent influence of religion insured a not unfriendly working relationship be
tween the public sohools and the religious authorities.
A Rapid Survey of Modern Leytean History
The inhabitants of Leyte have traditionally felt a strong emotional attach-

" * -■ -- -■ '•$■"- ■ V-. t.'-.,,: ..: . *■
ment for their Island. Its history is long and qolorful. Parents pass on to their
children stirring tales from this past. And the sohools add daub* of. color to the
3-Jaoa, op. oit., p. 1.
5
legendry. It is fitting that we present a synopsis of Leyte's history during the
pre-American era. The 1918 Census reported:
Limasawa, an outlet south of Leyte has the unique distinction of being

the place where mass was first celebrated in the Philippines. Toward the
end of March, 1521, Magellan discovered uhis little island, which then
appeared to be a prosperous community. It was here that Magellan met Rajas
Calambu and Ciagu, who feasted the Spaniards and exchanged presents with them.
Leyte, which was generally called Tandaya in the early days, was the
first Island of the Philippine Archipelago to reoeive the name of 'Felipina'.
On the occasion of Villalobos' expedition in 1545, a party visited this
island in search of food, and gave the place the neme that, in a modified
form, the whole Philippines now bears.1
The Filipino historian, Conrado Benitez, notes the visit of the conquistador
Legazpi to Leyte:
Sailing further, the expedition reached the island of Albuyo (or Leyte)
and anchored in front of the large town of Cabalian, but found the people
hostile. However, a chief named Canutuan, who came to the Spanish fleet,
was detained; from him much information about the country was obtained, and
it was he who guided Legazpi to Limasawa.^
At the first Philippine census of 1591, the Spanish found: "Of all this
part of the Visayas the island of Leyte was most thickly inhabited and reported no
less than ten important encomiendas...
Leyte passed under the jurisdiction of Hispanic Cebu in close association
with the neighboring island of Samar. At first, its population appeared traotable,
if not docile, accepting Catholicism from Spanish missionaries along with military
suzerainty. But resentments accumulated, finding expression in reversion to
paganism:
In 1622, a religious revolt broke out in Leyte, the leaders of which

were Bancao, chief of Limasawa, and his high priest, Pagali. The center
of the uprising was the town of Carigara, on the northern ooast, where
Bancao had erected a temple sacred to the diwatas. The rebellion spread
to several neighboring towns. Bancao, the leader, was an old friend of
^Census of 1918, op. cit., p. 184.
^Conrado Benitez, History of the Philippines (Boston: Ginn & Co.,

1940), p. 46. --------------------------
3Ibid., p. 178.
the Spaniards, haying received Legazpi in a friendly fashion in 1565.
It appears, however, that the old chief gave up Catholicism in his last
days and went baok to the praotioes of his former religion.^-
Less than three decades after the revolt of Bancao was quelled, another up
rising decidedly economic in origin, broke forth. Benitez thus desoribes it:
Thi6 was another revolt which showed the general feeling of dis
satisfaction among the Filipinos and their readiness to make common cause
for the purpose of throwing off the Spanish yoke. The oause of this up
rising is told by Father Diaz:
*Governor Don Diego Fajardo— with the intention of relieving the nearby
provinces. « • .from the burden of working at the harbor of Cavite. . . .
had ordered the alcaldes of Leite and other provinoes to send men thence to
Cavite for tha„ employment. That was a difficult undertaking, because of
the distance. . . .and the troubles and wrongs. . . .that would result. . . .’
The people of Palapag2, Leyte, initiated the revolutionary movement under
the leadership of Juan Ponoe Sumoroy, ’a very influential man and a bad
Christian*, and Pedro Caamug. June 1, 1649, marked th9 beginning of the
revolt with the killing of the curate of Palapag. Soon other villages
followed; then other islands and provinoes joined the movement. . . .
. . . .the rebel fort was taken by assault,and another rebellion put down.3
During these years of anti-Spanish ferment, the Visayas were convulsed with
dread of the predatory Moros. From their home bases in Mindanao, the Filipino
corsairs of the Islamio faith swarmed forth to attack after the fashion of their
Moorish namesakes of the Mediterranean. Benitez relates::
. . . .In the year 1634 the Moros were especially aggressive. • . .In
Leyte they raided and burned the towns of Sogod, Cabalian, Canemucan, Ormoc
and Baybay, killing many inhabitants. There were 18 boats and more than
1,500 Moros in these attacks. . • .4
No doubt, Vlsayan dissatisfaction with the ineffective Spanish protection
afforded against the Moros was a contributory cause of the seventeenth century up
risings. Both Leyte and Samar were hard hit by these Moro incursions, as Benitez
records in citing an earlier authority:
^Census, op. cit., p. 184.

2
Zaide locates the site of Palapag in Samar rather than in Leyte.
(Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine History and Government, (Manila: S. S. Macaraig
Co., 1938), p. 419.
Perhaps Zaide was relying upon the 1918 Census for this interpretation:
"Twenty-seven years sifter the revolt of Boncao, another uprising took place in Leyte.
This was merely an echo of the Sumoroy rebellion then in progress in Samar. The
center of disturbances in Leyte was a village called Bacor, where the churoh and
the convent were burned by the rebels." (Census, op. cit., p. 184.)
^Benitez, op. oit., pp. 268-9. Îbld., p. 285.
7
•In the year 1735 these two islands (of Leyte and Samar) made one
provinoe and had 11,331 tributes, from which can be seen that the people
of these islands in place of increasing have diminished. No other reason
need be sought for this than the incursions of the Moros, who, concealed
in the many little bays, have made many ravages upon all the pueblos.'1
From this time until the end of the nineteenth century, Leyte's oareer was
reasonably plaoid. The Philippine Census limits its narrative to these facts:
In 1768, Leyte and Samar were separated, each constituting a politico-

military province by itself. From time to time the capital of the province
of Leyte was changed from one town to another. The first capital was
Carigara; it was transferred to Palo, then to Tanawan, and finally, to
Taoloban.2
During the Spanish-American "vYar, Leyte joined her sister provinces in the
gallant fight against foreign oppression. The unhappy conversion of the struggle
for Filipino independence into the "Insurrection" against the United States event
uated in guerrilla fighting. And in April of 1902, on the terrain of Leyte's
neighbor, the "insurrectionists" made their final stand: "Samar was the last island
in the Visayas to submit because of the able resistance of General Lukban."^
Under American rule, Leyte advanced both economically and culturally, contri
buting her quota of leaders to the national political life of the Philippines. And
while it is true that she lagged behind some of her sister provinces in modernization,
it is also true that she escaped the bitterness and turbulence of peasant revolt.
Thus in 1940, on the eve of the promised Philippine independence, Leyte stood, rich
in tradition and resources, reasonably optimistic of what the future held in store.
Some General Information on Philippine Government
ConcerningLeyte in its own right, we have said all that need be said by
way of introduction. Yet, inasmuch as Leyte constitutes a province of the
Philippines, we must add certain data applicable to all the Philippine provinoes.
Primarily, we must emphas5 se the Philippines are not a federal union of sovereign
states enjoying residuary powers. Unlike the American states, the Philippine pro-
3-Ibid., p. 221. Census, op. pit., p. 185.

'“’Zaide, o^*ôii»., p. 487.
8
vinces are administrative subdivisions of a national unitary government centered in
Manila— albeit, historic entities with local traditions and considerable oohesive-
ness. As suoh, the provinces exercise a limited autonomy, hemmed in by a network
of national administrative offices functioning in the field according to the require
ments of governing executive regulations “2
A typical province, pre-war Leyte was governed by an elective Governor,
assisted by two other elective members functioning with him as a Provincial Board,2
The Provincial Board implemented orders promulgated by the Department of the Interior,
prepared the provincial budget, supervised the construction of public works, and pro
moted the public weal. From time to time, the Provincial Treasurer, Provincial
Auditor, Provincial Fiscal, and the Division Superintendent of Education would be
summoned to participate (separately or collectively) in a consultative capacity at
sessions of the Provincial Board,
The officials mentioned, together with the District Engineer, the District
Health Officer, the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the Provincial Commercial Agent and other functionaries representing the
Bureau of Forests, the Post Office, etc., were all answerable to their respective
bureau chiefs in Manila. But as representatives of the national administration,
these field officials were expected to furnish advice and co-operate with the Gover
nor in every way possible within their respective terms of reference.
The material on Philippine government in this section is drawn prin

cipally from Hayden’s treatment of the subject and the personal observation of
this writer.
p
Joseph R. Hayden was much impressed by the influence of the provincial
governor. He wrote: "The provincial governor is, of course, the great looal
official. . . .His political position as the titular, and frequently the actual,
head of the party in the province gives him additional power at home and, if his
party be in control at Manila, increased weight with the executive departments
and the legislature. . . .
In addition to these advantages, the governor is almost invariably a man
of substance with influential family and business connections. . . .He probably is
is also a man with a political future. . . ." (Joseph R. Hayden, The Philippines:
A Study in National Development ^New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 9 4 2 p. 284.)
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.
9
On inspectional trips through the Provinoe, the Governor attended complaints
against local officials, exercising his suspensory power when required. Similarly,
the Provincial Treasurer conducted inquests into fiscal malfeasance in the municipal
ities, And the Provincial Board scrutinized municipal ordinances and orders, dis
allowing those deemed in contravention of national law.
The judicial system of the province formed an element of the central ad
ministration, The highest provincial court was the Court of First Instance (two
chapters in Leyte— one at Tacloban and one at Maasin), possessing general criminal
and civil jurisdiction, and with its judge a presidential appointee. Below this court
were the justice of the peace courts, servicing one or more municipalities. The
justices, appointed by the President, disposed of petty litigation, referring the
graver cases to the Court of First Instance.
The public prosecutor of the province was the Provincial Fiscal, appointed
by the President but paid by the provinoe. The Fiscal also served as legal advisor
to the provinoe and its subdivisions, and exercised investigatory power on behalf of
the central and local governments, A provincial jail under a warden and a network
of municipal jails assumed custody over such of the convicted as were not committed
to national penitentiaries.
It is to the municipalities that one must look in any genuine assessment of
self-government. In the Philippines, one found a Municipal Mayor and a non-salaried
Municipal Council elected biennially, and responsible for adopting local ordinances.
The Municipal Mayor, assisted by a Municipal Treasurer, a Chief of Police, a Sanitary
President, and other local administrators had oversight of local affairs within the
legal boundaries determined by the Department of Interior in Manila and the
Provincial Board.
The municipalities themselves were divided into a poblacion and surrounding
barrios. The poblacion or town center contained the municipal administrative of
fices, the local jail, the central elementary school (with an intermediate division
of grades V and VI), the church, the market place and the larger business
10
establishments. The outlying rural districts or barrios were administered by
tenientes del barrio or barrio lieutenants (appointed by the mayor), assisted by
rural police, and contained the bulk of the farming population.
The disfranchisement of the illiterate hacked away at the size of the voting
population. But even this restricted electorate saw its self-determination curtailed
by the action of the Provincial Board in loosely construing its power to review and
annul local enactments. Furthermore, the Provincial Treasurer's surveillance of
local finances sometimes seriously shaokled municipal initiative in undertaking
permissible projects. To be sure, such checks guarded against abuses resulting from
local corruption and ignorance. Notwithstanding, unless both the municipalities and
the provinces were to be vouchsafed greater latitude for experimentation and, if need
be, for the making of mistakes, democracy would wither at the "rice roots".
And now, a final comment on the linkage of local with national politics. In
addition to voting for the elective municipal and provincial officials, the provincial
population oast votes for members of the lower house of the Philippine Congress. Leyte,
for instance, was divided into five Congressional districts, each of which chose a
Congressional representative. Members of the Philippine Senate were chosen at large
by the entire Filipino constituency, with Leyteno candidates sometimes elected.
Of the pre-war national political parties, only the Nacionalista party of
Quezon and Osmena enjoyed any importance in Leyte. But fractional strife had long
been keen in Leyte's party politics. The leading contenders for plaoe in Leyte had
been the Enage and Veloso factions— >with their candidates and henchmen vying for
provincial and municipal office and also for membership in Leyte's Congressional
deputation. As for the issues separating the rivals, there were none; only lust
for power and gain.
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.
XI
The Structure of Philippine Education—

An Illustration of Governmental Centralization
7fe have already mentioned that the Philippine administration is unitary in
struoture, the chain of command extending downward from the national offices in
Manila. This organizational pattern is clearly illustrated in the case of Philippine
eduoation. "We shall introduce at this point a "brief outline of the educational
struoture, because it exemplifies the general conformation of government in the
Philippines, and further, because we shall be concerning ourselves with aspects of
eduoation in this study.
Antonio Isidro, professor of education at the University of the Philippines,
has prepared the most authoritative and comprehensive study of Philippine education
to date. We shall take the liberty of culling from Professor Isidro’s text selected
excerpts bearing most directly upon the subject-matter of this present undertaking.
The administrative organization of the public school system during the

American regime was provided in Act. No. 74 of the Philippine Commission.
The entire school system was placed under the executive supervision of the
Department of Public Instruction. The system was headed by the General
Superintendent. The General Superintendent was vested with broad powers
over the establishment of schools, appointment of teachers, preparation of
the curriculum, and other matters relating to the extension of publio eduoation
Upon a subsequent reorganization of the government the title of General

Superintendent was ohanged to Director of Education, which was used until
1947 when it was changed to Director of Public Schools. The Director of
Eduoation performed his duties under the supervision of the Vice Governor-
General of the Philippines, who acted concurrently as the Secretary of Publio
Instruction. All the Vice Governors-General from the inception of the
American regime until the inauguration of the Commonwealth government and all
Direotors of Education from the passage of Act No. 74 until 1937 were
Americans. It was they who formulated the broad policies of the Philippine
school system........................................................ ..
All educational activities and school interests of the Republic are under
the administrative control and executive supervision of the Department of
Eduoation. At its head is a Secretary who is a member of the Cabinet appointed
by the President of the Philippines. . • .Under the Department are bureaus and
offices. . . .They are the Bureau of Public Schools including the division of
adult eduoation, the Bureau of Private Schools, the Bureau of Publio Libraries,
the Board on Textbooks, the Institute of National Language, and the Philip
pine Historical Committee.......... .......................... ...............
At the head of the Bureau of Public Schools is the Director, who is appointed
by the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Eduoation and with the Consent of the Commission on Appointments.of the Congress
. . . .The Director has several powers and duties fixed by law. He established
elementary and secondary schools wherever desirable and practicable; organises
night schools and fixes the salaries of teachers within the limits established by
law; prepares the curricula for all publio sohools under his jurisdiction and pre
scribes the authority to be exeroised by the principal teaoher of each school over
other teachers; approves the building plans for schoolhouses to be built by the
municipalities or provinces and fixes the area of the site required in each case;
promulgates the rules of hygiene for the schools; determines the assignments of
the provinoes; adopts the hours of regular daily school session with the approval
of the Secretary of Education; and serves as an ex-officio member of the Board of
Regents of the University of the Philippines. . . .
Since all schools are under the supervision of and subject to regulation by
the state, the government created the Bureau of Private Schools. This is the
government agenoy directly charged with the supervision of all: private schools,
colleges and universities. . . .Within the limits set by the government rules and
regulations, however, a private school corporation enjoys ample freedom of action.
The school system is divided for administrative purposes, into school divisions
A school division generally corresponds to the territorial limits of a provinoe
and is established by the Director of Public Schools subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Eduoation. . . .
The Division Superintendent is the chief administrator of the sohools in the
province. . . .The duties and powers of the Superintendent as provided by law are
as follows: (a) To exercise general superintendence over the schools and school
interests in his division; (b) to examine the school houses occupied for public
instruction within his division and to determine their suitability and hygienic
conditions; (c) to appoint by authority of the Secretary of Education municipal
teachers within his division and to fix their salaries within the limits of the
funds authorized by law; (d) to familiarize himself with the supplies and textbooks
needed in his division and to report the same to the Direotor; (e) to see that the
requirements of the curricula for primary and secondary sohools are complied with;
and (f) to oontrol the use of municipal and provincial school buildings.
In practice the duties of the Superintendent may be grouped into three kinds:
(a) supervisory, (b) administrative, and (o) publio relations. The supervisory
functions are oonoerned with the improvement of instruction. He may personally
supervise classroom instruction but he generally delegates this task to the divi
sion and district supervisors under him. The academic supervisor, who ranks next
to the superintendent in the division, is specifically charged with the duties
pertaining to the improvement of academic instruction in the elementary schools
of the division, while the industrial arts supervisor is responsible for the im
provement of vocational instruction. In many divisions, there are subject super
visors. . . .Most of the subject supervisors are those of home economics, national
language, and health. . . .
Tlihile the division supervisors assist the Superintendent in the general super
vision of the schools in the entire division, the district supervisors, supervis
ing principals and the elementary school principals help him in their respective
stations. The district supervisor or the supervising principal supervises the
schools of the district and the elementary school principal aids him in the super
vision of the schools in the town. All of them see to it that the policies of the
bureau are properly executed.
The administrative functions of the Superintendent deal with such matters as
the school budget, building construction, acquisition and registration of school
13
sites, and appointment, transfer, promotion and discipline of teachers. He has

control over the use of school buildings. . . .
His public relations duties are concerned with his relations with the commu
nity and the people. As a leader in the community, he participates in the various
community movements. He sees to it that wholesome relations exist between the
school and the community. Since the politicians have something to do with the
school budget, he establishes satisfactory relations with them. He uses tact and
otherwise deals with them so as to get their full support of his school program. . .
The business aspect of school administration involves the preparation of the
budget and the accounting of school property and services. The public school
system as a whole regularly receives from Congress annual appropriations for
regular maintenance and special appropriations for speoific purposes.
The Superintendent of schools is responsible for the financial administration
of the sohools in his division. . . .
The principal of an elementary school is the representative of the Bureau of

Public Schools in the administration and supervision of the school. He is in
charge of a complete elementary school with six grades having seven or more
teachers including himself. Some principals are called supervising principals.
In addition to his administrative duties in the central elementary school, a
supervising principal acts as supervisor of the branches of his school, each of
which is under a head teacher. . . .
Scattered all over the country are the barrio schools. For most of the
masses, the barrio school offers the only opportunity to learn the elements of
citizenship. . . .
A barrio school is generally under a head teacher, but some barrio schools
with complete elementary grades are under a principal. Under the head teacher
are several teachers, the number depending upon the number of classes. In the
case of the one-class barrio school he is both thehead teacher and the classroom
teacher. Head teachers are under the direct supervision of the district super
visor or supervising principal. Besides teaching, they perform multifarious
duties such as rehabilitating the school buildings, improving and cleaning the
grounds, taking charge of the gardening, conducting school celebrations, leading
in ground beautification, attending athletic meets, performing patent-teacher
association activities, and keeping the school property. He assumes leadership
in civic movements in the barrio and exerts efforts toward the intellectual and
social improvement of the community and its people.
It is claimed that the head teacher has responsibility without authority.
While he is responsible for the efficient management of the school, he has no
authority to supervise and rate the teaching efficiency of the teachers under him.
The teachers look upon the district supervisor, and not upon the head teacher,
as their superior. For this reason it has been suggested that the head teacher
should be given authority to manage the barrio school commensurate with his
responsibility.1
7/e shall reserve comment upon the baneful effects of excessive centralization
in Philippine eduoation for the closing portion of this study. Here, we wish to
Ântonio Isidro, The Philippine Educational System (Manila: Bookman, Inc.,

1949), pp. 10-12, 66, 74, 87, 110-112, 166-168, 185.
14
emphasize that the situation in eduoation typifies the general centripetal tendency
in the administration of Philippine affairs. It is most important that the relation
ship between central and local governments he fully appreciated because of its direct
relevanoe to the subject-matter of this inquiry. For when it is borne in mind that a
province under ordinary circumstances is held to a large extent upon the leading
strings of the administrators in Manila, the degree of self-reliance evidenced by
Leyte during the war years is quite remarkable. Indeed, it is upon this manifested
local self-reliance that the present writer grounds his advocacy of a greater libera
lization of home rule for the provinces. The extension of popular control over local
affairs is one of the most effective guarantees that the legacy of American tutelage
in democraoy shall not be squandered.
The preceding pages have sought to highlight the background of Leyte’s history
and resources, and the place of this province in the larger Philippine setting. And
now we are prepared to follow her career during the brief but painful interlude of
Japanese occupation.
A Critical Interval: Defense and Surrender
The Japanese invasion of the Philippines preceded Vforld Vvar II by some three
decades. It took the form of a business infiltration that dovetailed nicely with the
grandiose master-plan of the imperialist schemers. Carlos Romulo has recapitulated
the sequenoe of stages in words expressing a simultaneous loathing and admiration:
The first Japanese to invade the Philippines were the apa vendors who sold
rice-flour cakes for ice cream in the streets and were generally ridiculed.
Then, about 1916, we noticed for the first time in the Walled City small Japanese
shops that specialized in a sweet mixture of seeds or fruits mixed with shaved
ice, sugar, and cream, mongo con hielo. These shops multiplied until they were
on every corner of Calle Real.
Japanese barbershops began making their appearance in the capital. Japanese
massage parlors opened. These spread through other sections. . . .
Slowly an entire section of Manila filled with Japanese bazaars. A district
of Japanese shops developed and grew rich in Baguio. Japanese fisheries with
fleets of well-equipped boats gradually took over the fishing industry on our
coasts. 7/hile doing this, they accomplished a thorough job of sounding Philippine
waters— an invaluable aid to the Japanese invaders who were to land on our shores.
Meanwhile vast hemp plantations were being acquired by Japanese. Japanese
textiles undermined our textile trade. Immense forest concessions in the Philip
pines poured wealth into Japanese hands. . . .
By 1930 it was apparent that the Philippines were being bled to death from
within by Japan. . . .
In Manila the Japanese chamber of oommeroe, the Japanese tourist bureau, and
leading Japanese carried out a program of social aotivity subsidized and direoted
by Tokyo. They gave parties, made lavish gifts, stressed constantly their ad
miration for Filipino customs and ways. . . .Their conversations with Filipinos
invariably held hints calculated to turn them from the American point of view.
These were part of long-planned propaganda.
In this way, as early as 1928, we learned of Japanese plans for a federation
of Far Eastern countries. This had been brutally implanted on the Philippines
since the invasion as the ’Co-Prosperity Sphere of East Asia1.
The Japanese persistently stressed in many subtle ways the fact that the Fili
pinos and the Japanese should stand together as ’fellow Orientals'. But the
Filipino had no sympathy with the Japanese ideology and the Japanese point of
view.*
The sapping operation desoribed above by-passed Leyte completely. Only a
handful of Japanese actually settled in Leyte, and they played a negligible part in
the provincial economy. Nonetheless, the Leytenos who paid heed to world affairs
were clearly disturbed by the Japanese menace. They were among those inolined to
wonder whether their American guardian fully appreciated the nature of the threat.
But their fears were allayed by the conviction that Japan would not dare directly
challenge the colossus of' the West.
Into this atmosphere of outer calm and underlying disquietude burst the bomb-
o
shells of December, 1941. In rapid sequence the people of Leyte learned that the
bomber and fighter squadrons at Clark and Nichols fields had been destroyed, the naval
base at Cavite had been wrecked, and that Japanese troops were pouring ashore at
Aparri and Vigan on the northern coast of Luzon. And though Leyte itself went physi
cally unscathed in this initial assault, its people were left stunned and bewildered.
Yet the people of Leyte displayed a remarkable resiliency of character in
their quick recovery from the first shock of war. Though not without fear, the great
majority did not succumb to a defeatist paralysis. Obstinately, they brushed aside
the direful reports of an American debacle at Pearl Harbor, insisting that these were
monstrous lies cunningly planted by the enemy. Were not American soldieis fighting on
^Carlos P. Romulo, Mother America, A Living Story of Democracy (Hew York,

Doubleday j: Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 66-68.
fcFor the reaction of Filipino officialdom to the Japanese attack, see Presi
dent Quezon’s autobiography: Manuel Luis Quezon, The Good Fight, (New York, D. Apple-
ton-Century Co., 1946), pp. 181-207.
16
in Luzon? Would the United States government supinely permit the enemy to wipe out
its fighting men? Obviously, it was only a matter of Time— 90 days or perhaps six
months— before a massive Amerioan armada would arrive by sea and air to hurl baok
the treacherous invader. Meanwhile, all patriotic Filipinos must gird themselves for
hardships ahead, exerting their utmost staying power until the hour of relief and
revenge should arrive.
Leyte's provincial government assiduously set about cultivating a high morale
among the people. Governor Torres organized a propaganda committee, consisting of
himself and leading citizens of forensic ability. Collectively or as individuals
they toured the Island, convoking public rallies under the chairmanship of the munici
pal mayors, and exhorting the public to hold firm in its resolve to carry on. A
writer of looal reputation, Amador Daguio, undertook the setting up and editing of a
small newspaper, The Voice of Victory, dedioated to fostering Leyte's will to resist.
And in every community, the mayor, assisted by the principal of the central school
and his corps of teachers, constituted themselves a committee of public information,
purveying whatever cheerful tidings they chanced upon and organizing patriotio
assemblies.
But emotional outpourings and fervent pledges of faith did not suffice. Un
less opposition to the enemy was to remain mere verbiage, certain urgent preparatory
measures must be pushed. First and foremost, a system of air-raid precautions must
be instituted. In keeping with a bulletin on the subject sent down from Manila, air
raid shelters must be constructed and air-raid drills put into effect. Secondly, the
citizenry must be organized into home guard units. And finally, the general populace
must acquire some degree of adeptness in the essentials of first aid.
As things worked out, Leyte's air-raid defense measures remained embryonic.
A few shelters of very limited capacity were built as adjuncts to larger structures,
such as school or municipal buildings. And some of the municipalities organized drills
against bombing attaok, albeit with inadequate systems of ’’alert", and with insuffi
cient practice. In part, this negligence was explainable by the belief that the enemy
17 !
I
I
\
air force would find very few targets on Leyte worth bombing. And in part, knowledge
that the Island laoked effeotive military anti-aircraft defenses discouraged elaborate
civilian measures. Fortunately, when the Japanese invasion of Leyte did come, enemy
aircraft played only a minor role, so that Filipino unpreparedness did not result in
a heavy oasualty toll.
In other respeots, Leyte’s preparedness-was far more thorough. Proceeding
in accordance with national orders, the d-nspeator of Leyte's Philippine Constabulary,
Major Arturo Reyes, organized the male citizenry into a Volunteer Guard. Each muni
cipality had its own VG unit, drawn up according to Reyes' specifications, and placed
under mayoralty supervision. Many of the barrios also had their units, directed by
the resident barrio lieutenant. The municipal police, assimilated into the Constabu
lary by national directive for the duration of the emergency, served as a kind of
cadre in the organization of the local units. Around each municipality, a defensive
perimeter was staked out, and VG patrols were assigned to nocturnal sentry duty. In
addition, some of the municipalities held weekly or bi-weekly musters of their VG
units on Saturday or Sunday afternoons, scheduling a training program of close-order
drill (without arms), instruction in military courtesy and first aid, and a publio
parade for popular inspiration. Where possible, Philippine Army soldiers were detailed
to assist the munioipal police in the execution of the training program. Of all the
municipalities, Ormoc had the best-trained VG unit.
As a companion organization to the Volunteer Guard, a Women’s Auxiliary Ser
vice unit came into being in each community. Generally, a well-respected public
school teacher or a socialite with qualities of leadership assumed direction of the
WAS unit. Perhaps the primary mission of the WAS at this time was the training of its
membership in the rudiments of first-aid. The provincial first-aid program had been
organized by Dr. Aldaba, head of Leyte Provincial Hospital, and carried out by the
limited number of registered nurses and the teacher-nurses of the publio school.
These nurses, sometimes supervised by a local physician, served as instructresses in
18
the training of the WAS. The WAS also took over a very important social service
function, the distribution of community relief to the local indigents. It might be
added that the female publio school teachers of each community "worked "with devotion
and energy in the service of the WAS.
Compared with the American and British home defense, networks, the VG and WAS
organizations in Leyte seemed rudimentary— almost laughable. But this training re
ceived by Leyte's citizenry was to prove its worth during the Japanese occupation when
similar organizations sprung up— this time affiliated with the guerrilla. For the
lesson learned by these Leytenos, men and women both, was the paramount claim of the
community upon the service of the individual— a service that must be disciplined and
ennobled by faith in the righteousness of the democratic Filipino cause. It was the
esprit de corps developed by these citizen units, together with a bit of organizational
know-how, that allowed a decentralized resistance movement to come into being and
continue to function despite the unremitting pressure of hostile forces. Indeed, it
is no exaggeration to assert that without the psychological conditioning undergone by
the men and women of Leyte in this fashion, the unsurrendered Filipino soldiers who
were to form the guerrilla nuclei would have found their objectives impossible of
realization.
One other aspect of Leyte* s preparedness program must be considered here—
that of civilian evacuation from the centers of population. The question of an or
ganized evacuation of the population from the town centers and the principal barrios
to the hilly and less accessible interior of the Island would be settled by the mili
tary and civilian leaders. However, the imminent possibility of an official order
spurred many Leytenos to take preparatory measures on their own initiative. Dwellers
along the coastal area having farm property in the interior, or relatives and friends
owning such property, made arrangements to transfer reserves of food and clothing to
emergency refuges removed from probable sites of enemy invasion and occupation. And
many of these people took up steady residence in the interior, coming to town solely
19
to prooure necessities, visit relatives, and learn the latest news. Again, these
rehearsals of populational transfer served the resistance movement in good stead.
It familiarized the evaouees with the difficulties to be encountered in changed sur
roundings, and allowed a breathing spell ror making basic adjustments to a harsher
regimen. Moreover, it encouraged the propertyless to survey the publio forest areas,
considering them as possible sanctuaries in case of necessity. When the time oame
of choosing between submission to a despised regime and taking up resistance, those
who had already been initiated into the fraternity of the evacuee found the second
alternative less formidable.
Integral to a system of defense preparations was the procural of foodstuffs
and other basic commodities for the resisting population. From the outset, this
problem eluded the grasp of the provincial administration. Merchants, anticipating
scarcity, withdrew commodity supplies from their shelves. At once prices shot upward.
The populace, frightened by the spectre of starvation, stampeded into panic buying
beyond immediate consumptional need, being skinned by conscienceless merchants in the
process. Hoarding had begun.
Feebly attempting to halt run-away prices and restore public confidence, the
government addressed an appeal to sellers and buyers alike. Merchants were adjured
to roll back prices, consumers to abstain from inordinate buying. And as the wardens
of the civic conscience, the public school teachers were mobilized to check profiteer
ing. Under the direction of the principal of Leyte’s normal school, the principal in
every municipality organized the teachers into one or more Anti-Profiteering Commit
tees, and charged them to oversee transactions. The merchants were handed price
schedules drawn up in Tacloban and were expected to conform. And the merchants did
pledge compliance. Unfortunately, opportunities for evasion were manifold and enforce1
ment remained the futile procedure of moral suasion. The plague of the black market
settled over the land, persisting unexoroisable during the weary war years and the
trying reconstruction period. Nevertheless, the teachers held fast to their anti-
20
profiteering assignment, knowing that they had the good wishes of the people in hack
of them, and gratified by the slightest suooess.
Meanwhile, business in general was stagnating. The Japanese invasion had
virtual^ brought the inter-island trade of the Philippines to a standstill. Only
a few speculators were willing to risk the uncertainties of transacting business
deals away from home. The Chinese jobbers of Leyte ceased their purchases of abaca
and copra. The rock asphalt mine at Villaba shut down. The lumbering mills sus
pended operation. Everywhere, the businessman was waiting anxiously for the situation
to clarify, unwilling to put out capital that might never be recovered.
The Provincial Revenue Agent noted at the end of March, 1942:
Business is near collapse. No merchandise is coming to replenish the limited

stock of the merchants. Prices are sky high. The people are always on the rush
to buy for present and future needs. . . .Emergency bills drove away good bills
and coins for safe-keeping. . . .During the quarter, the great shortage of manufac
tured tobacco products from registered factories of Manila and America were
keenly felt. Many persons are manufacturing illicit oigars and cigarettes. To
minimize this trade, the undersigned deemed it wise to induce these people to
open cigar and cigarette factories under emergency permits which may be approved
by this office in order that tobacco dealers in Leyte would find a supply of
tobacco products to continue business as retailers. . . .•*-
A period of extreme financial stringency set in. The collapse of business
meant the withdrawal of ready cash from general circulation. To tone up the sluggish
circulation of money, Governor Torres authorized the municipal treasurers to apply
government funds in the purchase of these two raw materials, so important in the pro
vincial economy. The treasurers established stockpiles of abaca and copra, (soon to
be seized by the invader), thus placing cash in the hands of the farmers. But this
had small effect. Fortunately, in accordance with a national executive order promul
gated at the outbreak of the emergency, government employees in the provinces,
finanoed by national funds, (including the public school teachers), had received an
advance payment of three months’ salary. Expenditures by these salary recipients
helped prevent the stream of money from drying up completely. And, of course, the
1 »
Ceferino E. Sevilla, Prov. Rev. Agent. -Report on Economic & Internal
Revenue Conditions in Leyte for the Period Ending March 31, 1942". (Typewritten)
21
army finance department continued to disburse to the .troops stationed in Leyte.
An even more serious financial crisis threatened to develop as provincial
funds approached exhaustion. After the national Quezon government had evacuated
Corregidor,1 it authorized the printing of emergency currency from its temporary
Visayan headquarters for release to the provinoes. Leyte received some of these
emergency notes; they scarcely sufficed. Finally, in April, 1942, authorization
from Mindanao reached Leyte for the printing of 2,000,000 in emergency money.^ A
provincial Currency Board was to be constituted (consisting of Provincial Auditor
Santa Cruz, Provincial Treasurer Jimenez, and Fiscal Parades), under supervision of
the Provincial Auditor, which was to undertake at once the printing of the allotted
sum. The Currency Board was promptly constituted, and a printery set up at the small
town of San Miguel. By the time of the Japanese arrival in Leyte, over one-fourth
of the monies allocated to the Province had been emitted. This emergency currenoy
was to become a chronic bone of contention between the Japanese Military Administration
and the Filipino population of Leyte under its oontrol.
All this time, despite the gradual strangulation ofLeyte* s economic life
and the mounting hardships entailed for the people, the general morale remained buoy
ant. But in April, 1942, came tidings of twin disasters: the cave-in of the Bataan
defense and the overrunning of Cebu. Nov/ faint murmurings, compounded of dejection
and reproachfulness towards the United States, might occasionally be heard. It was
^See: Quezon,(op. cit., pp. 255-278) for an intimate account of the Presi
dent’s mental anguish in the dark days before he had charted his line of aotion.
Ân employee of the Auditor's office reoalled: ;'. . . .we were printing the
emergency currency money authorized by the President of the Commonwealth of the Philip
pines to finance resistance against the invaders. The printing. . . .was necessary
because no money from Manila was forthcoming, as the capital was already occupied by
the Japanese; and a shipment of money whioh was supposed to be destined to us had gone
to the bottom of the sea with the sinking of the S. S. Corregidor. On May 23, 1942,
in compliance with definite orders, we stopped the printing of the money, and we
burned the unissued notes and those partly printed notes on the plaza (or town square)
of San Miguel. Our chief in the printing shop, Mr. Alberto Santa Cruz,. . . .told us 1
that there had been issued over six hundred thousand pesos to the military and civil
government of the notes we had printed. . . ." (Enrique Potente, "A Letter to His
Friend, Mr. E. Lear”, /Teyte, 194ly?‘, p. 1.
22
to cultivate these popular misgivings through the counsel of despair that Congressman
Jose Ma. Veloso came to Leyte.
Jose Veloso had been in Manila at the outbreak of the war. Regarded in na
tional circles as Leyte1s leading politician, he could be very useful as an instru
ment of central policy in his home provinoe. So it came to pass that with the sur
render of Manila to the Japanese, and the establishment of a puppet government,
Veloso (together with politicians from other provinoes then in the capital) was
thoroughly briefed on the role of the "New Philippines", and dispatched to Leyte.
On arrival in Leyte, Veloso set about launching a whispering campaign of de
featism. Slyly at first, then with increasing audacity, he gave warning against fool
hardy resistance to the invincible Japanese. Why bring rack and ruin upon their be
loved Provinoe? The Japanese would prove to be lenient conquerors if only the local
population was disposed to cooperate.
Filipino ears were now somewhat more receptive to this propaganda line. But
to the great majority of the people, the Japanese were even more abhorrent than before.
Soldier escapees from the front were trickling back to Leyte, their lips reciting
terrible tales of Japanese atrocities. How could Veloso's lulling advice square with
the painful truth of these first-hand reports? Thus it happened that at one of
Veloso1s public harangues, his words so infuriated an anti-Japanese audience that they
literally mobbed him, and would have killed him but for timely police intervention.
Shortly thereafter, Veloso was arrested by the army for treasonable utterances, and
interned.
As the noose of Japanese encirclement drew steadily tighter, the economic
situation of the people grew progressively worse. The food shortage had become criti
cal. By provincial executive order, an embargo was declared on export of foodstuffs
from Leyte. This measure was necessary because grain speculators were callously
seeking more lucrative markets elsewhere for their hoardings. To avert famine in
Leyte, President Quezon's refugee government had dispatched an emergency shipment of
23
rice to the Island. Sacks of this relief rice were allotted to the muni
cipalities for sale at nominal charge hy the municipal treasurers or distri
bution gratis to indigents. But this was no solution.
To make matters worse, there were already some symptoms of mass hy
steria. Excited reports came through of enemy vessels sighted off the Samar
coast. These alarms were soon proven false, hut the tense atmosphere per
sisted . The public schools were closed, and the schoolchildren, confined to
the vicinity of the household, tended to increase adult anxiety. And now
people began to wonder whether the armed forces would contest a Japanese
invasion.
The military defense of Leyte was entrusted to the Leyte Provinsional
Begiment, United States Armed Forces of the Far East (USAFFE). The Regiment
was organized in December, 1941, after the 91st Infantry Begiment had moved
up to the front in Luzon. The Regimental personnel consisted of trained re
servists— 1,968 enlisted men and 98 officers. The 1st Battalion was located
at Burauen, under the command of Captain Sevilla, with Captain Erfe as Execu
tive Officer. The 2nd Battalion, under Captain Pachico, was centered at Jaro.
And the 3rd Battalion led by Captain Kolasco, had its headquarters at Ormoc.
Lieutenant Colonel Causing commanded the Begiment. He and the Samar commander
together came under the direction of the "Sector Commander", Colonel Theodore
Cornell.
Major Abay headed the Leyte Provincial Battalion of the Philippine
Constabulary, with Major Arturo Reyes as Provincial Inspector. The Battalion
bad three companies, located in Tacloban (under Captain Kolasco), Ormoc (under
Lieutenant Miranda), and Malitbog (under Lieutenant Alejandro) . After the
Japanese had overrun Masbate, Leyte's P.C. was cut off from its regular source
24
of supplies, and turned to army depots to fill its requisitions. The integra
tion of the Constabulary vith the army was a function of the Sector Command,
USAFFE.1
That the Leyte Provisional Begiment would resist the Japanese was a
foregone conclusion— at least by its own men. Troop morale was high, the men
inspired by the gallant combat performance of Leyte's 91st Infantry Begiment.
One of Leyte's civil servants wrote:
It may be remembered that during the early part of the Japs’ in
vasion in Luzon, soldiers from Leyte and Samar fought brilliantly against
the hordes of invaders, particularly in Neuva Ecija, Aparri and Lingayen.
They belonged to the 91st Infantry Begiment. President Boosevelt congrat
ulated the provinces of Leyte and Samar and commended their sons for their
courageous stand against the enemy.®
After the fall of Bataan, the Begiment prepared an interior defense
position at Burauen, to which it was prepared to retreat for last-ditch defense.
In April, the Regimental headquarters transferred to Jaro. The quartermaster
depots were also established in Jaro, concentrating stocks of foodstuffs and
weapons.
The army borrowed some P 300,000 in emergency currency from the pro
vincial government to finance its coomissary and carry on its defense opera
tions. To Pedro Gonvalvez, manager of Ormoc's sugar central, the army had
awarded the contract for construction work on Ormoc's landing field. An Ameri
can mining engineer, Chester Peters (who was to gain notoriety as a grasping,
self-appointed guerrilla chief during the Japanese occupation), worked along
with Gonzalvez. And since January, from 1,000 to 2,000 Filipinos were labor
ing on the landing field— many being volunteers receiving nothing but rice
^■Interview, Col. Juan Causing, Feb., 1946, Manila, during Causing's visit
to GSQ, Philippine Army.
®Eamon Mercado, Through Blood and Fire, (Taclcban, Leyte, 1945), p. 1.
(Unpub. M3) .
rations as compensation. Thus, though the odds weighted heavily against this small
USAFEE force, it vas determined to give an heroic account of itself in the best
tradition of Leyte.
And the army could apparently count on the provincial authorities for stal
wart support. A gathering of the municipal, mayors at the provincial capitol decided
overwhelmingly in favor of armed resistance. Governor Torres himself decided to ad
here to the instructions of Vice-President Osmena, given in conference at Cebu back
in March. The Governor would place the civilian population completely at the disposal
of the army, and would evacuate the provincial government from Tacloban in the event
of an invasion. Should the military decide on surrender, the Governor would take
orders from the military. This was the situation at the beginniig of May, 1942.
Then on May 6th came stunning news— the fall of Corregidor, after a magnifi
cent defense by the ragged forces of Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright. A
few days later, on May 10th, Brigadier General William F. Sharp, commanding the
Visayas-Mindanao Force, acceded to an appeal from Wainwright and surrendered. But
the surrender order issued by General Sharp was ambiguous insofar as it affected the
American outposts as yet unreaehed by the Japanese. Was Colonel Cornell, at his head
quarters in Tacloban, Leyte, also committed to surrender; or, was he thrown completely
on his own, with discretionary power either to continue the fight or give up?-*-
To understand Leyte’s predicament at this Juncture, we must briefly review
developments at General Sharp's headquarters. We are indebted for our information to
a Filipino ex-guerrillero, then serving as Junior officer in General Sharp's GHQ at
Bel Monte, Mindanao. A keen observer, Lieutenant Sabelino had been Dean of the
College of Liberal Arts in the Cebu Southern College before his military activation.
Âccording to Col. Causlig (in Interview) General Sharp had sent a radiogram
to Col. Cornell declaring that he had relinquished command. The following day, be
wired that he had resumed comnand, and issued instructions for surrender. On May 21st
MaJ. Philips arrived as emissary from Gen. Sharp. Col. Cornell sumaoned Causing and
his staff for a conference at Jaro. Before a rapt audience, MaJ. Philips explained
the plight of the USAFFE prisoners-of-war in Corregidor, held as hostages pending
surrender of the Visayan Forces. Philips also gave assurance that the Japanese had
not been mistreating those who had already surrendered.
26
TV© shall quota excerpts from an unpublished article in which Lieutenant Sabelino
wrote up an important episode:
Much has been said of the glorious surrender of Bataan and Corregidor but
little has been known or heard of the last stand of the southern forces of the
United States Armed Forces in the Far East. This southern segment of what was
supposed to be the Philippine defense was the Visayas-Mindanao Force consisting
of whatever remaining troops were left after the great bulk of the Filipino
manpower was massed in the gigantic and magnificent stand at Bataan and Corregi
dor. Over this force intended to reoeive the shock of the Japanese southward
and central offensive of the Philippines was tall and gaunt Major General
William F. Sharp.
From the beginning of the war, the inadequacy of arms and insufficiency of
equipment was very apparent. . . .On rare occasions supply ships could penetrate
the Jap blockade but they carried equipment and food supplies but not ordnance
equipment vital for defense. . . .Life in Sharp's headquarters was a long-drawn
anxious and nerve-racking experience of compiling disasters and defeats of the
Pacific and Far Eastern bulwarks of Allied defense. The feeling is that of a
condemned man at the end of a line of unfortunates ready for the gallows and
waiting for his turn. . . .
The departure of Quezon, Osmena, Roraulo and the earlier exodus of General
MacArthur, Sutherland and top ranking officers of the U. S. Army. . . .were not
news in inner circles. To those in the know, these rapid departures from the
beleaguered Philippines meant only one thing: imminent capitulation. . . .Just
as expected, Corregidor, the mighty symbol of Uncle Sam's sovereignty in the
Philippines surrendered unconditionally on May 7, 1942, by command of the gal
lant but ill-starred Lieut.-General Jonathan Wainwright. . . .General Sharp read
the radio message of General Wainwright to surrender unconditionally. With his
characteristic firmness of conviction and high sense of honor, 'Bill' Sharp re
garded the demand 1‘or surrender with the brief remark: 'We do not take orders
from a prisoner of war.'
Relentlessly, the Japs launched their big and savage offensive on Mindanao.
.. . .Supply depots were destroyed by air activities and transportation was a
mass of wreckage in the motor pools bombed to smithereens. Troops could not re
organize and reform their lines lest their slightest move would be noticed by
the ever-vigilant enemy observation planes. . . .With all fronts cracked, pene
trated and overrun by the enemy there was no way left for General Sharp but to
accept the inevitable demand 1'or unconditional surrender. . . .In short, concise
language, the Japs. . . .demanded the unconditional surrender of General Sharp
and his forces or else the American soldiers who surrendered at Corregidor would
■ be massacred. . . .
Bowed but not ashamed, General Sharp acceded to the appeal. Dictating the
order he loathed to make, he ordered his forces throughout the Visayas and Min
danao to lay down their arms at 8:00 a.m., May 10, 1942.^
It would appear from this that Colonel Theodore Cornell, heading the Leyte-
Samar seotor of GeneralSharp's command, was automatically implicated in the terms of
surrender. In point of fact, the issue was not at all clear-cut. Lieutenant Sabelino
^Lt. Comrado S. Sabelino, PA. "The Surrender of General Sharp", pp. 1, 4, 5,

7-9. (Typewritten).
points out that-General Sharp transmitted another order "on the eve before the sur
render day releasing his forces from his command effective May 10, 1945. That was
1-2
a good and well-timed start for a resistance movement. . . . "
What was Colonel Cornell to do? Should he court the slaughter of his troops
and perhaps of the oivilians as well in a heroic flouting of the surrender order?
Or should he allow discretion to counsel his valor, realistically acknowledge the
disparity of the contending forces, and accept a by no means dishonorable fate? The
Colonel pondered hard. On I'.ay 20, 1942, he addressed the following message to
Governor Bernardo Torres:
It is with the deepest regret that I must inform you that conditions over
which I have no control have necessitated the surrender of the troops under my
command. Acting on instructions from General Wainwright, through General Sharp,
I have this date issued orders for initiating the surrender. I am a soldier and
have received an order— ther is no question about it being obeyed.
I am sending a representative to Cebu on May 22, 1942, who m i l guide a de
tachment of the Japanese Forces to Samar and Leyte. All conflict with the Japan
ese Forces must be avoided. The destruction or hiding of any property is strictly
prohibited. Prompt obedience to the Japanese Army and their orders is absolutely
necessary.
In spite of prevalent rumors to the contrary, I assure you that I and all my
fellow Americans. . . .are acting in good faith for what we believe to be the
best interests of the Filipino people.
I realize only too well the difficulties with which you will be faced and
take this opportunity to suggest that you exert every effort to insure a peaceful
occupation of your Province. I am convinced that such a procedure is the only
sensible one, and any other will result in unnecessary hardship on your people.
With deepest personal regards, I remain
Very sincerely yours
T. E, Cornell, Col. Inf., USA, Commanding
The young American who was destined to play an active role in the guerrilla,
I. D. Richardson, recollected:
By the time I got back to Colonel Cornell’s headquarters at Tacloban, he had

received a dispatch from General Sharpe ^nisspelled^. It was something to the
effect that you are hereby released from my command, surrender is imminent.
’Boy,’ he told me, ’if you stay with us, I’ll have to surrender you -with
everybody else. That will be my orders, and where I fall down in the surrender
agreement, the Japs will fall down in their treatment of our fellows that they
already have.’^
^Tbid., p. 9.
^For further information on the surrender of Gen. Sharp, see: Edward Haggerty
Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao, (Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., N. Y., 1946), pp. 18-20.
Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York, Bantam Eooks),
p • 33 •
If Colonel Cornell believed that his Filipino troops would docilely adhere
to his capitulation order, he was much mistaken. The Regiment was racked with muti
nous dissension. The crux of the argument centered in a disagreement over the valid
ity of General Wainwright1s surrender order. As one Filipino soldier put it:
The order did not satisfy the Filipino fighting instinct as real fighters
for it was believed that such an order was not,a genuine wholehearted one be
cause the said General was at the point of the bayonet. With the rapid spread
ing of Japanese propaganda however, out of fear from the supposed might of the
Nippon Army, and thinking they could protect their families in an easier way,
a few Army officers and enlisted men surrendered to the enemy. But those who
have tougher and stouter hearts. . . .braved all possible dangers and fled to
the mountains to escape from the enemy. They preferred to die rather than to
surrender. There was a general feeling of hatred for the Japs, and the strong
faith that America will come back sooner or later to give the promised aid.^-
In less flamboyant language, another observer wrote:
Among the soldiers themselves there arose serious trouble between those
obeying the order for surrender and those soldiers not inclined to obey the
order of surrender. I might cite that incident in Barrio Tingib, Pastranna,
where in the school building which was used as temporary garrison of the Philip
pine Army, an altercation among the opposing soldiers developed into a riot,
resulting in a shooting affray and a partial destruction of the school building.
The schism that developed within the Leyte command as a result of the surrender
order was of paramount significance in its bearing upon Japanese occupation of Leyte.
On the one hand, it demonstrated that the Filipino will to resist would not be stilled
by decisions of a top command; it declared that a policy of state running contrary to
the deep convictions of the masses would not be abided. From the ranks of those whose
loyalties and convictions had thus been breached would shortly evolve the nucleus of
a guerrilla movement. Cn the other hand, this rift, emphasizing as it did the of
ficial character of the surrender proclamation, deprived the resistance forces of
legal sanction and rendered them outlaws. For the ordinary Leyteno henceforth, his
path of duty was obscure, his line of direction an affair of inner illumination.
^Felix Sotto, Brief History, 6th Infantry, WLGWF, (1945), p. 1. (Unpub. MS)
2
Potente, op. cit., p. 3.
29
CHAPTER II
THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF IEYTE
The Occupation of Leyte
The Surrender of Leyte.— As Leyte braced itself for subjugation, it took
glum comfort in one reflection— that it was to be spared the swath of ruin cut by the
invading Japanese across other regions of'their advance. A few days before their
landings on Leyte, the Japanese strafed the Ormoc airfield, setting fire to instal
lations and riddling what few planes were on the ground. Japanese aerial reconnais
sance was satisfied that this was the full extent of the pre-invasion softening-up
process required.
In the pre-dawn hours of May 25, 1942, the Japanese Imperial Forces landed
at Barrio Pinamopo-an, Capoocan and then proceeded on to the provincial capital to
receive the surrendering forces. An official report summed up:
Imperial Japanese forces peacefully occupied Leyte on May 25, 1942. Fol
lowing orders of the high command, USAFFE forces in Leyte formally surrendered
upon arrival of the Japanese, although only about 300 actually presented them
selves but of a total contingent of 1,800. Later about 300 more surrendered,
but the rest, together with their arms, went back to their homes or hid in the
mountains. A b there was absolutely no fighting nor any destruction of property
whatsoever, there followed a short period of comparative peace and order. . . .1
The surrendered Filipino soldiers were interned, and placed under investiga
tion. Most of them escaped physical torture, so long as they complied with regula
tions. But their rations were scanty, and their dormitories dirty and overcrowded.
O
As for the American officers, they were shipped out of Leyte as prisoners of war.
The indecision of the military was shared by Letye’s political leaders.
Governor Torres was reluctant to receive the Japanese invaders openly, and place his
■43. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration
for the District of the Yisayas.
2lst Sgt. Martiniano Bao recalled that the surrendered troops were quartered
in the 2nd Cadre Barracks, the officers occupying the upper story. The enlisted men
ate USAFFE rice, and Bao became the mess sergeant. The officers contributed money to
Bao, who was permitted to go to the market place and make purchasee of viands.
Towards the end of July, the surrendered troops were transferred to new make'
shift quarters in the Leyte Provincial High School. The Japanese employed the pri
soners to groom their horses, clean the stables, cut grass as horse feed. The pri
soner compound was administered along the lines of a military camp, with "taps" at
10:00 p.m.
30
administration at Japanese disposal. Perhaps also, he vas uncertain ahout his per
sonal safety should he fall into Japanese hands. At a meeting of the Provincial
Board, Governor Torres and Board Member Angel Espina concurred in delegating interim
posers to Board Member Pastor Salazar, a man already suspected of pro-Japanese lean
ings. Thereupon, Torres and most of the other provincial officials departed from
Taclohan to their evacuation places, standing by for nevs of developments.
It vas Salazar, the rabidly pro-Japanese Senator Jose Ma. Yeloso, and certain
lesser public figures uho received the Japanese invasion force and entered into nego
tiations vith the Japanese Military Administration. The Japanese made it plain that
they expected full Pillpino cooperation, in viev of the capitulation, and that they
required the prompt resumption of posts by all provincial and municipal officials
under the aegis of Manila's "Philippine Executive Commission".'1' Only in this way
could they hasten the stabilization of social and economic life, these prerequisites
of an efficient Japanese administration.
Tinder such pressure, Governor Torres and his administrative staff straggled
back to the provincial capital, and awaited Japanese orders. The Japanese Military
Administration, the governing occupation agency (backed by the might of its troops and
the Kem-pei-tai, its military intelligence corps), instructed the Governor to order
the return of all evacuated civilians to Tacloban and the other towns of Leyte, rtriir;
quire that all unsurrendered soldiers report and turn in their aims, reopen the
^■In his' study of wartime Manila, David Bernstein wrote: "On January 23, 1942,
the Japanese appointed Vargas /Jorge Vargas, lately Secretary to President Quezon^
Chairman of the Executive Cosmission, vith power to govern 'under the commands and
orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces*. Six executive de
partments were created, headed by Filipino Commissioners, but vith Japanese 'advisers'.
Every one of the collaborating Filipino Conmissioners appointed by Vargas. . . .vas
an experienced and respected Filipino. . . .The lesser personnel consisted chiefly
of holdovers from the Comnonvealth Government.
"The Executive Comoissicn lasted until October, 1943. It was extremely use
ful to the Japanese as the chief means of carrying out their will in the Philippines.
It tried to conduct the normal functions of government, to provide food and relief to
the thousands of destitute and hungry, to reconstruct public works destroyed in the
fightiig, and to induce Filipino and American guerrillas to surrender. In most of
these endeavors it vas not overly successful." (David Bernstein, The Philippine
Story (Farrar, Straus & Co., Hew York, 194"Q , pp. 162-3.)
31
public schools, and bring about the prompt resumption of normal agricultural and
business pursuits.
The Japanese Garrison:-" Japanese troops, estimated at 2,000-5,000 in number,
were centered in Tacloban and Ormoc during the first phase of the occupation of
Leyte. From time to time they despatched patrols to check up on the behavior of the
Filipinos and to look into the compliance with Japanese regulations on the part of
municipal officials. From these two principal bases, the Japanese also established
eight smaller garrisons, distributed over the Island at towns such as Malitbog on the
South Coast, Baybay on the west, Carigare in the north-center, Dulag and Palo on the
east. The complement of these detachments fluctuated in size, with personnel with
drawn from one point and transferred to augment their forces elsewhere. By retaining
mobility, the Japanese felt confident of their ability to police the Island, despite
the relative paucity of their members during this first phase.
As they appeared to one observer in Tacloban, the majority of the invaders
were veterans of Bataan and Corregidor campaigns and were shabby and fierce look
ing, big and muscular, especially the Koreans and those coming from the warring
tribes of northern Japan. Any mistake made by civilians, no matter how trifling
it was, which was mostly due to misunderstandings caused by language problem,
oftentimes resulted in slappings of the Filipinos by the Japs. It became the
basis of the bitter resentment of the former against the latter. . . .Conse
quently, the people, cognizant of the tyrannies of the invaders, as much as
possible kept away from the *superior' Japs.
Popular Reaction to the Surrender:— It is an impossible task to attempt to
resurrect the mood of the general population. All extant accounts are colored by the
subsequent activities of the narrators, by their orientation towards or away from
the Japanese regime. Nevertheless, we can discern strands of dismay and of terror,
of curiosity and of hope, of pugnacity and of submissiveness, sometimes peculiarly
intertwined in the same person.
A clerk of the provincial auditor's office aptly expressed the attitude of
many Leyte nos:
When the Japs actually landed on our shores on May 25, 1942, people came to
town watch Just what the newcomers were coming to do. It was observed that
^Mercado, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
32
seme days from their arrival they did not yet show to us their wares. There
vere already some abuses they call slight, like for instance the catchirg of
pigs and chickens without giving compensation to the owners, the carrying of
personal and household belongings whenever they seek quarters in private houses
dorii« the night, to let loose their mules to grace on growing fields of corn.
. . . .People tolerated these, on the belief that it is natural that some sol
diers of an invading and conquering force are prone to commit some petty
excesses. . .
In the same office, the Cash Examiner and Property Inspector set down under
the lurid title, Through Blood and Eire. a dramatic memoir of confused emotions:
. . . .The decision to surrender was the least expected. The people had
undergone the rigors of evacuation; entrenching themselves in the distant hills
and mountains which they believed a safe place from the bullets, molestations
and tortures of the invaders. . . .They were apprehensive thinking that at any
moment they would be pitted in between the hordes of advancing forces. This
decision to surrender giving as its main reason 'for the welfare and safety Of
the civilians' the people could sigh with relief. However, a question was
raised in the minds of everybody as to what would be the- outcome of this peaceful
surrender. . . .'Shall we be able to enjoy the freedom we used to have or shall
we be vassals or slaves devoid of any liberty? What dangers lurk beyond?' Those
were the prevailing questions of the day.
But the officer who had commanded the Ormoc detachment of the Philippine Con
stabulary at the hour of surrender had no doubts. For him, the turn of events was
deplorable:
The JIF arrived at Ormoc on 25th Hay 1942, occupying Camp Downes and Ormoc
proper on the earns date. . . .there was confusion and panic among the civilian
population. The morale of the people in the town as well as in the mountain at
that time was very low. . . .3
Filipinos who had stood shoulder to shoulder in indissoluble fraternity were
transformed. The surrender order had the effect of volatilising their solidarity.
Each man eyed his neighbor nervously, patting to confide his troubled thoughts, but
strangely toiûe-tied. An employee of the provincial auditor's office turned to his
chief:
I conferred with Mr. Santa Cruz and tried to sound his opinion. I asked him
as to what advice he could give. He coolly and hesitantly told me that be
could not give any advice and that everyone must decide for himself. . . .
Bturors of all kinds began to circulate. The people told of Japanese soldiers
round!rg up dll the Chinese inhabitants of Tacloban. It turned out that
^Potente, op. cit., p. 5.

2Mercado, op. d t .. pp. 1-2.
^Blas E. Miranda. 23 Oct. 1944. "Eeport on the Western Leyte Guerrilla
Warfare Forces."
^Mercado, op. olt.« p. 10.
these Chinese weremembers of the Chinese Nationalist Party and that their pie*
tores taken during one of their gatherings vas taken by a Hip photographer and
vas in the hands of the Japanese Military Police. Everybody seeaed to he jit
tery. . . .one cannot help to he distrustful.
By no means objective, the recollections of several amateur chroniclers as
sociated vith the guerrilla deserve quotation as testimony to public feeli 1*5 contem
poraneous vith the Japanese landings:
From Abuyog in the east central sector, this hate-seared narrative ceases dovn:
Then the puppets came over and took the reins. Fired hy the principles of
Nippon, most of them were, of course, volves in sheep's clothing. They voci
ferated loudly and much, hut accomplished little, if at all, in the interest of
public welfare. . . .As long as they could profit much from the Japanese occu
pation, all that they could probably think of vas. . . .have the Japs comb the
fields, capture 'misguided elements', and bov them beneath a blood-dripping
Jap sword.**
Here is the reaction of Dulag, a neighboring municipality j as recalled by
one of its guerrilla leaders:
When Leyte vas placed in the crossroad after the surrender of Corregidor,
Dulag waited for decision of the Provincial Board. The decision of the Munici
pal Council then vas to abide vith the decision of the Provincial Board. Indeed
the government officials of Dulag did follow, when it vas decided by the Provin
cial Board of Leyte (vith some officials attending the conference) to lay dovn
the arms even if at heait the municipal officials of Dulag did not have an iota
of sympathy. . . .
In the poblacion. . . .the people did not show excitement. The Municipal
Officials remained thereat in order not to Invite attention and suspicion, but
had to get out one by one except the Municipal Secretary, Mr. Marcial Lagunzad,
vho, under pressure of the responsible citizens of the town, vas forced to ac
cept the post of Puppet Mayor for the sake of the safety of the civilian
population. . . ,3
Albuera , on the West Coast, found voice in this diatribe:
. . . .That vas a period of doom for the civilian populace. Killing of

civilians regardless of age, sex, rank, and education; looting of properties
and abusing the women were rampant in the Japanese administration. With the
enemy constantly at our heels, Democracy seemed a mere shadow. . . .*
A provincial employee, shortly before abandoning his Job, described the
people of Tacloban:
3-Ibld.. p. 11.
^Francisco Aurillo, Municipal Secty., Abuyog, leyte,'The Philippine Resistance
Movement: Abuyog Version; 1945. pp. 1-2.
Êugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt. Inf., Actg. Mun. Secty.,Dulag. Sept. 10, 1943.
To: The Provincial Governor in the field, pp. 2-3.
*Felix Sot to, Brief History. 6th Inf.. WLGWF. 1945. p. 1.(typewritten)
... — - -• -- -• -- — j
A
34
Although the people seemed to be contented and happy, yet It vas but super
ficial, as I could read from their faces that in the very core of their hearts
the seed of hatred had already germinated. People moved mechanically. There
vas a prevailing tension.1
Summing up, another provincial employee vho became a guerrilla official wrote:
I found that the country around us vas filled vith the atmosphere of dis
satisfaction over the decision of the military authorities to surrender. People
everywhere I found were complaining of the cowardice of our officials.
. . . .It vas already evident however, at least in this part of the province,
that the people who feel in themselves that they can endure to undergo the hard
ships vere inclined to fight, while those vho preferred easier life decided to
surrender. Most of our so-called intelligentsia and the moneyed classes also
preferred to surrender. . . .
Else of Opposition to the Japanese:— In the face of expressions of defiance,
dejection and dread, we find official reports quite buoyant. Governor Torres, equat
ing obedience to Japanese orders vith maes endorsement of the changes that had oc
curred, issued a statement drenched vith satisfaction:
. . . .Provincial and municipal governments, by order of the Japanese Mili

tary High Conmand, vere Immediately organized. 90$ of the former officials and
employees returned to their old positions. The people vere seemingly satisfied
vith the new order. . . .3
But Tacloban officialdom vas soon disabused of its fancies. Opposition to
Japanese rule, inchoate at first, began to crystallize: "... .business was stag
gering to reach its bottom of collapse. . . .," the Provincial Eevenue Agent recorded.
"The public vas finding it harder and harder to buy things for its needs. . . ."4
To the pinch of economic privation vas added the spur of patriotism. Armed
groups formed in the districts outside the reach of the Japanese garrisons. They
pledged themselves to a renewal of the fight against Japan, a fight conducted along
guerrilla lines, consisting of sniping against Japanese patrols, liquidation of out
spoken protagonists of Japan, destruction of materiel of military value to the Japan
ese, and an inflaming of the civilians against the pro-Japanese provincial government.
To support these activities, they turned to municipal and barrio officials for help,
^ r c a d o , op. cit.. p. 13.

^Potente, op. cit.. pp. 2-3.
®B. Torres, Troy. Governor. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Adminis
tration for District of Yisayas.
^Prov. Bevenue Agent Sevilla. Eeport for quarter ending June 30, 1942.
35
requiring that these representatires of the people undertake, to provision them and.
promote the cause of resistance by appropriate local activities. The guerrilla
groups also turned directly to the people, soliciting contributions for their sus
tenance. And now, vith savageness and cunning, they launched their program of
ambuscades and assassinations.
Governor Torres thus accounted for the rise of opposition to the Japanese
regime:
Then came an influx of discontented elements and ex-USAFFE soldiers from

neighboring provinces, vho, because of lack of food in those places, vere now
seeking refuge in Leyte where food vas easier to procure. . . .Upon arrival in
Leyte, they began to preach false propaganda. To a certain extent, the ground
vas fertile, and vith not much difficulty, they succeeded in organizing bands
and guerrilla. About the beginning of August, when we had almost everything
normally functioning. . . .troubles began. They began to cut telegraph and
telephone lines, destroy bridges, threaten and intimidate the peace-loving in
habitants and officials cooperating vith the Japanese, and sometimes kidnapping
and killing them. Seme began to loot stores and bodegas in remote places,
stopped passenger trucks and extracted money from conductors and passengers.
In some municipalities, the treasurery and post office vere robbed and stores
were looted. . . .^
There is an inconsistency, no doubt motivated by fear, running through this
account. Torres does admit that "the ground was fertile" for guerrilla propaganda.
Soma months later, he dared put his fingers on two factors:
To a certain extent, uneasiness on the part of some of those vho vent to

the mountains vas caused by fear of the Japanese due to drastic measures, such
as punishing and killing done during the first months of occupation. Another
remote cause is lack of money, because of the prohibition of use of emergency
notes. When they found that they could not spend their money in the towns, they
vere forced to stay in barrios and in the mountains where the money was still
in use.
Once the stage of conflict had been reached, what followed might be char
acterized as the "logic of events". The Japanese, incensed at this balking of their
policy, threatened harsh reprisal, and backed up their threats with maltreatment or
execution of suspected pro-guerrilla families. Some of the pro-Japanese leaders
% . Torres, Governor. Dec. 21, 1942, To: Japanese Military Administration

for District of Yisayas.
2B. Torres, Governor. March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of ViBayas,
Japanese Imperial Forces.
36
vere themselves appalled by the brutal treatment meted out to civilian evacuees
by Japanese search patrols. At the Inter-Visayan Convention, It vas resolved that
civilians found or captured in the mountains should be turned over to the

authorities of the Bepublic of the Philippines for such action as say be legal
and necessary.
The same resolution also stipulated that the "Constitutional provision guaranteeing
that no property rightfully belonging to the citizens of the Bepublic be taken with
out due process of lav and Just compensation should be rigidly respected.
For the safety of patrols, the Japanese Military Administration insisted
that the area bordering both sides of the Provincial Boad and other principal
thoroughfares of each municipality be cleared of all obstructions to visibility. With
good cause, they determined to prevent the conditions that would, facilitate the lay
ing of ambuscades. This posed a serious problem in a tropical region, where grasses
and shrubbery grow rank unless constantly pruned, uprooted or scorched. And the
evacuation of large portions of the town populations in advance of the Japanese inva
sion had deprived the local authorities of manpower for clearance work.
On orders of the Japanese, the Governor proceeded to despatch messages to the
various mayors urging the exigency of clearance. To the Spanish-speaking mayor of
Jaro vho hastened to comply, Acting Governor Salazar sent a warm letter:
El esfuerzo que usted ha desplagado para limpiar los arboles de ambos lados
de la Carretera Provincial en tan poco tiempo merece nuestre encooio. Espero
que su actividad sirvira de ejemplo de los otros Alcaldes de la provincia.
Other reports of compliance reached the Governor:
San Miguel: "... .This municipality has cleared at least two thirds of
3
whole length on both sides of the road. However, we are doing the work every day."
Merida: "... .1 inform you that the order has been complied with by re
quiring all males from 18-60 under voluntary labor.”4
^First Annual Vi sayan Convention, held in Cebu City April 14-16, 1944. Beso-
lution Ho. 6 , Beconmendations 5b and 5e.
2P. Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov. Aug. 7, 1942. To: Clemente Lastrilla, Man.
Mayer, Jaro.
^Fortunato Logarde, Mun. Mayor, San Miguel. July 29, 1942. To: The Gov.
^Custodio Mendola, Man. Mayor, Merida. July 28, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
37
Hllopgoet "Clearing of bushes of road aides in provincial and municipal
vecioals are being started. There is not much shrubbery of road-sides vithin Juris
diction of this municipality. "•*-
Palo: "... .clearing of road sides and tall grasses and shrubbery vithin
this municipality has been carried out by the people. I assure^your office that pos-
O
sibly be the end of the week everything vill be in ship-shape condition."
Baybayt " . . . .poblacion, barrios and sides of the provincial road vithin
my Jurisdiction are cleared by voluntary labor."3
Eventually, most of the municipalities announced the Job completed. But this
matter vas one requiring constant attention. Repeatedly, as Japanese patrols vere
ambushed in the course of the occupation, Tacloban had to despatch notes of reprimand
and warning to the various municipalities.
By August, the Japanese Military Administration vas sufficiently perturbed by
the insidious non-cooperation of the people to attempt a nev approach. Turning to the
interned Filipino USAFFE soldiers, the Japanese directed the highest ranking officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing, to organize the Leyte Special Force.4 Some 180 men
vere released (vith stern warning that they vere still under surveillance), commis
sioned to help maintain lav and order in the occupied areas, apprehend all suspected
of opposing Japanese rule, and put dovn any possible anti-Japanese demonstrations.
By this move, the Japanese vere saying: "Behold, your late heroes are now on our
side. We are not really bad fellows. Work vith us for the good of your beloved
Province."
Supplementing the activities of this special constabulary, the municipalities,
on orders from Tacloban, organized Home Guard units. They vere patterned after local
^Melquiades Flores, Man. Mayor, Hllongos. July 28, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
^Simeon Militants, Mun. Mayor, Palo. July 28, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.
% . C. Modina, Mun. Mayor, Baybay. Aug. 3, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.
^Causing stated that he declined appointment as chief of the Cebu Constabulary,
In Leyte the special force had detachments at Tacloban, Alangalang, Sta. Fe, and
Karugo. (Interview, Feb., 1946, Manila, during Causing’s visit to GHQ, Philippine
Army.)
civil defense organ!rations formed before the Japanese invasion, hut now oriented in
support of the Invader.
Burauen reported:
I have the honor to inform that office that the Home Guards of Burauenvas
reorganized on Aug. 16, 1942 vith 2nd Lt. Eriberto Alibadbad as the leader and
sixteen active members. . . .The present vork of the members is purely detect
ing and spying suspicious persons in the Poblacion due to the fact that they
are out of arms. . . .However it is expected that after a fev days from nov on
the same will have thirty members as soon as more male persons vill come to town.
And Caibiran transmitted "to that Office the attached complete list of the
names of the member's of the Home Guard inthe poblacion of the municipality of
Caibiran."2
Neither the Special Force nor the Home Guard units materially strengthened
the position of the Japanese in Leyte. They succeeded only in making the guerrilleros
and their supporters more cautious. Save for the fev opportunists vho, seeking to
stand in good vith the Japanese, trapped some of their countrymen, most of these
auxiliaries vent about their assignments in purely perfunctory fashion.3
An entirely different matter vas the efficient counter-intelligence netvork
built up by the Japanese. Procuring the services of venal Filipinos, the Japanese
sent shivers of fright up the spines of the people. Lid anyone give shelter to an
Êriberto Alibadbad, 2nd Lt. Aug. 17, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov.
% . G. Maderazo. Aug. 21, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov.
^Staff Sgt. Gregorio Gabe had been a member of the Special Force before Join
ing the guerrilla. He stated that the Japanese had no confidence in the loyalty of
these auxiliaries. (Interview— 41st Inf. Begt., Ormoc, Leyte. January, 1946)
1st Sgt. Martiniano Bao, also served in the Special Force under Captain
Sevilla in the Alangalang sector. He stated that MaJ. Beyes had organized this out
fit in September 1942, and that Causing only succeeded to the top command in October.
As for the Japanese, they looked upon the Special Force contemptuously. Col. Omori
often brandished his saber menacingly when addressing the Force. The members re
ceived neither pay nor clothing--although they did receive 50 centavos apiece frcm
a visiting Japanese general after a special inspectional reviev. The guerrilla, ac
cording to Bao (and this may very veil be a prejudiced statement) got along amicably
vith the men under Captain Sevilla, maintaining close liaison. (Interview— lit
Be placement Battalion, PA, December, 1945.)
Sgt. Bibiano Mesias declared that the Leyte Special Force consisted of
three 30-men platoons, two armed vith rifles. After the unexpected Joining of the
guerrillas by Causing and his party and Sevilla's flight to Samar in early 1943.
the Force vas disarmed by the Japanese and confined to barracks. It vas disbanded
soon after. (Interview— 1st Bep lacement Battalion, PA, December, 1945.)
39
unsnrrendered soldier escapee? Was anyone concealing a rifle or pistol? Let him
beware, for his life vas endangered. Sometimes, a "stoolie" for the Japanese would
intimidate the offender into paying a bribe, promising non-betrayal— only later to
violate his oath, and inform. These hirelings also spied on the local officials,
t
reporting to the Japanese anyone suspected of disloyalty.
In turn, the guerrilla units tightened their security controls, making short
shrift of suspected informers and swearing a vendetta against collaborationists.
The upshot of all this wets that residents in Japanese garrisoned districts,
particularly the poblacion or town center, and the local officials came to be branded
as ipso facto pro-Japanese. The burden of proof rested upon the townspeople in their
demurral against such accusation. They must somehow, without detection by professed
collaborationists, establish contact with the resisters, and demonstrate their
loyalty to the cause of the resistance struggle. Similarly, evacuees from the pob
lacion, when investigated by Japanese patrols, must clear themselves of their pre
sumed pro-guerrilla tainture to escape molestation. And the municipal officials in
Japanese policed sectors must show their zeal in anticipating Japanese wishes to be
regarded as fully satisfactory servants of the new regime.
With the exception of those adroit enough to straddle the fence, families,
in fact whole areas, came to be marked out as either pro- or anti-Japanese.
St. John's observations are particularly apt:
But in the North, particularly around Tacloban, where the Japs had a lot of
men and full control, the people did not like guerrillas. They were afraid of
guerrillas, and they had reason. Lots of guerrillas told me: 'Tacloban people
pro-Jap. They do not fight Jap, they live in Jap town, therefore they pro-Jap.
If I catch Tacloban man, I kill him.'
All that the people in the South knew was they hated Japs.
When war came, and when the Japs took over the northern part of the Island,
the southern people naturally got mad at the northern people. There were old
feelings against the Tacloban people anyway. There probably was Jealousy because
the Tacloban people lived better .•*•
% t . John, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
40
In the districts firmly vithin Japanese grasp, the puppet officials began
to vork out certain forme of control that soon crystallized into definite procedures.
Or more correctly, as the central government In Manila elaborated its system of
controls, it sent directives to the provincial authorities for local application.
The Japanese Military Administration of the Province continued as an authority
plenipotentiary, handing dovn special directives and tempering vith this or that
mechanism as it sav fit.
The first fev months of the Japanese occupation vere months of turbulence
and dread for the average Filipino of Leyte. The mayor of Abuyog did not exaggerate
•when he said:
The living condition of the people in this locality during the veek was
punctuated vith fears and jitters. . . .The tenseness felt during the veek vas
heightened by rumors to the effect that the outlavs would come over to tovn
and make an all-out reprisal against the residents in the poblacion. . . .
Information reaching this Office from time to time all brings sad news con
cerning some barrio lieutenants and peaceful citizens in the barrios being kid
napped and killed by outlaws. Bloodshed is the clamor of these maniacs and
everywhere in the locality it is appallingly reaping a heavy toll in the lives
of the innocent citizens. . . .All these casualties could not be verified as
no policeman could be assigned for this purpose without endangering his own
life. . . .This Office staggers to imagine how the people would live— especially
those in poblacion— if and when the Japanese Military Detachment in this locality
is withdrawn without a subsequent relief.1
The unwillingness of the policemen to serve, much less to actively carry on
their duties, vas notorious during this period. The mayor of Barugo wrote:
The police are afraid. You know very well the present condition of many
municipalities regarding the maintenance of Peace and Order. Because, if not
for my courageous inducement to my policemen, no one would be willing to render
service to the Police Department of my municipality at this time .2
The police vere handicapped for lack of arms. They depended upon the Home
Guard to back up their efforts. The mayor of Biliran seemed to have brought affairs
under control:
The peace and order of this municipality is still being controlled by the
local authorities in spite of the fact that my police force are having no arms
but only regulation stick. And with the organization of my Home Guards which
lEicardo Collantes, Mun. Treas., Abuyog. Sept. 7, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov.
%!ayor Arpon, Barugo. Oct. 27, 1942. To: Prov. Police Inspector.
I
41
Is a great help to the maintenance of peace and order cf the locality, the
police force is becoming strong and may be able toecope vith any accident
that may occur vithin the municipality.
The Home Guards vith 20 members have been increased to 40 members to be
divided into 4 groups vith 10 members each group. Each group has its ovn
leader vho is taking charge of the patrulla every night in the poblacion while
the members of the police force is making patrulla in the day time vith the
help, of course, of the Home Guards. . . .*
Tacloban underwent a severe and prolonged siege of trepidation. She vas in
vested by guerrilla groups on all sides, her water artery was choked off by the
piracy of Marcial Santos and his brigands, and rumors were abroad that she would be
razed to the ground. But the guerrillas never effected a penetration of the provin
cial capital.
Herein lay the pathos of a people, crushed by an enemy invader, riven by
fratricidal strife, and paralyzed by a morbid anxiety about the morrow. Short of
administering an elixir in the form of a vastly changed occupation policy, the new
rulers would learn that their Imperialistic venture had yielded them— a corpse.
Having reviewed the course of events in Leyte at the time of its capitulation
to the Japanese, and having attempted to sketch its vicissitudes during the traumatic
days of transition, we must nov consider the administration of the "puppet" provin
cial government. We vill say something of its relations with the municipalities,
of its ties with the central government in Manila, and of the financial straits in
which it floundered.
Provincial Administration:— In the reorganization of Leyte's municipalities,
the governing administrative procedures were set forth in Executive Ordinance No. 43
of the Philippine Executive Comaission (May 18, 1942), approved by the Director
General of the Japanese Military Administration (August 4, 1942). The relevant Sec
tion 23 of Article IT provided: "A municipal government shall be deemed to be organ
ized under this Ordinance upon the assumption of office by the mayor and municipal
treasurer, by virtue of appointment extended to them by the Coamissioner of the
Interior. . . . "
Âlberto Enage, Mun. Mayor, Biliran. Sept. 15, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
Weekly Beport.
42
The Provincial Fiscal, in an opinion to the Governor, gave further clari
fications
Since the provisions of Executive Ordinance Ho. 43 are In suspenso until the
required conditions are complied vith, the old Municipal Code, as incorporated
in Title IX of the Eevised Administrative Code. . . .should govern the activities
of municipalities vithout receiving organization under Ordinance No. 43. The
provisions of the former Municipal Code may he applied, subject to the policy
intended to he pursued hy the Imperial Japanese Military Administration. . . .
Henceforth, in keepirg vith Section 6 of Executive Ordinance No. 43, a muni
cipal ordinance vas to he enacted hy the mayor in consultation vith the Municipal
Board, and certified hy the municipal secretary. The Municipal Board, made up of
the mayor, vice-mayor, municipal treasurer, and municipal councillors replaced the
former Municipal Council. Whatever local ordinances vere in contravention of exist
ing order’s, proclamations, lavs and the more nebulous "governmental policy" fell to
the ground, "axed" hy the reviewing authorities at the provincial capital.
The Tacloban administration had great difficulty in acquainting the interior
municipalities vith its adopted policies, and even more difficulty in supervising
implementation. From time to time, conferences of mayors and other municipal offi
cials vere convoked at the provincial capital. The Governor vas avare of the diffi
culties standirg in the way of attendance, hut nonetheless expected compliance as a
sign of loyalty. "On October 12-13, a convention of all mayors. . . .at Tacloban.
In viev of inadequate transportation facilities and the hazard of traveling, it is
requested that each take care of himself in the manner he sees fit. . . ., if neces-
O
sary on foot or hy bancas. . . . "
At the sessions, one or more prominent officials of the Japanese Military Ad
ministration vould he present to extend greetings, eulogize Japanese intentions re
garding the Nev Order in general and the Philippines in particular, set forth the
latest Japanese plans for the Province, and give testimonial of Japan's formidable
Iprov. Fiscal, Sept. 7, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov.

^B. Torres, Prov. Gov., Sept. 25, 1942. To: All Mayors.
military array. The mayors might next he asked to report on local conditions. Then
the Governor and other provincial officials would expound their program for applyicg
the general policy in Leyte and for dealing vith tbs difficulties expected to arise.
Finally, the municipal officials would he exhorted to return to their localities and
carry out with, vigor the many resolutions adopted during the session.
These conferences were not to he the easy-going gatherings with which Fili
pino officials had long been familiar. The announcement stipulated: "Attend
promptly; no smoking during sessions; bring paper and pencil." Non-attendance and
lateness were very serious breaches. On one occasion, the Provincial Secretary ad
dressed gravely-worded notes to absentees from a morning session: "Beport to the
Governor and show cause why you should not he punished."^ He also noted that the
following mayors arrived late: Clemente Lastrilla (Jaro), Eduardo Bugho (Burauen) ,
Fortunato Candila (Julita), Marcial Lagunzad (Dulag).
However, outside of the business sessions, opportunity would be provided for
the visitors to fraternize, to become acquainted with Japanese dignitaries and see
their "human" side, and sometimes to attend special demonstrations of Japanese
prowess. Thus, the Governor invited the mayors
to an informal Sumsuman party tomorrow noon, given by the Governor at his resi
dence. . . .in honor of the mayors. Tomorrow afternoon, a Warfare Demonstration
by the Japanese. We will gather at the Capitol at 1:50. Trucks to carry the
guests. Wear work or picnic clothes. . . .Invited to party given by Japanese
Military Authorities and Military Administration in honor of Mayors at 7PM at
the old Price Besidenee. . . ,2
But the distance which separated Tacloban from the outlying municipalities
was a measure of its remoteness from controlling them. By October of 1942, local
guerrilla offensives had succeeded in dislodging the Japanese garrisons from all of
the towns of South and West, save Ormoc, and pushed them into the confines of a strip
along the North-East Coast. Apologetically, Governor Torres presented the facts to
the Japanese command:
^Benedicto, Prov. Secty. October 13, 1943. To: Absentee Mayors.

% . Torres, Prov. Governor. October 12, 1942. To: All Mayors.
present adarinistrationj 21'are under .control' of ex^JEAFFE-'baiaia
:orl^^ ;:
«advFiiip;iiin*&^
tactwlt h th em a na there are;no J&panesedetaohaents in those annieipalitii^'y.
while the local officials Appointed ^ their
theycan maintain only a very passite administration tery .aoBxdli
the mercy and caprice ocf gnerrilla hands and handlts. When vieitedby 'them*"/
they have to maintain an attitude of toleration and compromise.“ We can'tbut ‘ •?
countenance this state of affairs,as, defenseless as they are, they hare no
other alternative, if they have to save their lives. . . .
' By>the tente of Executive Order Wo. 1 of the/Ctedrman of the Philippine
Executive Commission, Jorge B. Yargas, administrative supervision of the provinces

'V-;/, ; ,..i. ■ • ;^ ■. . /■ V ^ / :/ .
vested in the Comaissioner of the Interior. But difficulties of transportation and
communication between Tacloban and Manila prevented regular and effective contact
between the central and provincial goveranente. This meant that Leyte vas left to
itself, or more correctly to the local Japanese coanand and its Filipino henchmen,
in the administration of its Internal affairs.
national officials, working in the field, were able to contact Manila for
instructions infrequently, and therefore took the initiative in making their own
decisions. Thus, the District Forester in Leyte informed the Governor: .
In viev of great difficulty of contacting the Director of Forestry, the

undersigned in admlnlsterl^ the public forest of the district has used his
discretion so that the interest and welfare of the public as veil as tha;b of
the government are not prejudiced. The undersigned has had to act beyond the
limit of authority as permitted by the Director of Forestry. As an example, he'
has been issuing gratuitous and ordinary licenses, falliig vithin the power of
the Director.3
With the proliferation of Japanese agencies of control, the Manila government
deemed it expedient to bring the outlying provinces under closer supervision. This; /
led to the grouping together of the central islands of the Archipelago and placing
them under a Commissioner for the Yisayas, Paulino Gal las.
Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese. Military Administration
for District of Yisayas. /j
.2“A bureau of local governments was created under the department
to take direct supervision over the affairs of the provincial,
■Dr.BnflnoLuna, f onaezdy underseoretary of interior and member of tte Eteetbral Cam«
mission vaa.maae airecwor or vne oureau." vtfuxronio «. axip, rnu.nrpine aisxorr
Hanlapaz Publishing Co., Manila, 1946. pp. 306-7.) *!
Z^cehclo BaadLrez. Aug. 2, 1942. To:
Resolution Ho. 2 of the "First Annual Visayan Conference" reads in part:
"Whereas, His Excellency the President. . . .has vith rare good judgment and
vision created the position of Commissioner for the Yisayas, a position most
necessary for proper coordination and efficiency in the administration of
government in this region, "because of the abnormal conditions existii^ and the
paucity of communications. . . .
The Commissioner was to
exercise such powers as are granted to his Office by Presidential Ordinance No.
3, creating the Office of the Comnissioner for the Visayas, and as direct re
presentative of the Central Government, such other powers as may be warranted
by the exigencies of the present emergency. . .
Perhaps the insertion of this new level in the hierarchy of command might have
led to a devolution on a regional basis of the national administrative functions and
ultimately to the creation of a legislative body of limited jurisdiction. In all
livelihood, the change merely reflected the set-up in the Japanese military command
which provided for a Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Vi sayas--Genera] Kono.^ Crystal 3ization of such administrative changes came to an
untimely end with the arrival of the American liberation forces.
Law and the Courts:— Under Japanese rule, two systems of "law" functioned
concurrently in occupied Leyte. Paramount was the law of the Occupation Power, a set
of edictB promulgated by the Japanese Military Administration, summarily enforced by
the Kem-pei-tai or Japanese Military Police. Within those areas of civil affairs not
staked out by the Japanese as subject to special decree, the pre-war Commonwealth law
(as modified by new legislation emanating from Manila) governed.
Kem-pei-tai headquarters in Tacloban (originally the Chinese Club, and later
the xoDre isolated former office of the District Engineer) was fitted out with deten
tion chambers on the ground floor and torture chambers upstairs. To this terrifying
center were brought principally those suspected of espionage, violators of the Japan
ese currency regulations, and all accused of obstructing the smooth operation of the
Occupation regime. The detainees might be held indefinitely, subsisting on scanty
rations and suffering all the discomforts bred by congestion and filth. On release,
■'"Visayan Confeirtion, op. cit., Resolution No. 5.

?See Visayan Conference Resolutions, op. cit.. Resolution No. 4.
46
sonetines after having endured excruciating torture at the hands of their captors,
they presented a spectacle of sickliness and emaciation. Some never emerged. . . .
The Japanese did not interfere directly vith legal adminiatration by the
courts, though sitting in from time to time as spectators. However, the mere pre
sence of the Japanese ho verity in the background frightened the populace avay from
the courts and materially reduced the ordinary volume of litigation.
The Justice of the peace courts took cognizance of offenses arising under
the anti-profiteering lavs. However, the municipal chiefs of police and the mayors
vere lax in prosecution, so that very fev cases were actually decided by the JPs.
The same held true for violations of the many municipal ordinances banning black-
marketeering. For the most part then, the JPs concerned themselves vith petty crimes
and breaches of the peace.
Vicente Mate, pre-war clerk of the Court of First Instance at Tacloban, vho
continued at his post during the Occupation declared (in interview) that the Court
did not sit for an entire year following the Japanese invasion of Leyte. Of the 25
civil cases filed during the second half of 1943, the greater part dealt vith di
vorce proceedings. This unexpected development came about through a liberalization
of the divorce lavs effected in Manila, modifying the long-established virtual in
dissolubility of marriages. Nov, in addition to adultery, desertion, cruelty, non
support, contagious disease, and incompatibility became acceptable legal grounds
for granting a divorce.
Divorce cases bulked large in the 52 cases heard by the Court dnrirg 1944
(until October, date of the American counter-invasion). Had this permissive lav
remained on the statute books another fev years, it might have transformed the
traditional Filipino Catholic conception of matrimony and family relations. As
things vere, however, there vas sharp controversy following the Occupation regard!eg
the annulment or validation of var-tlme divorce decrees.
47
Cleric of Court Mate stated that the docket of criminal eases disappeared
during the American landings, when the Court offices and files vere looted. Of
Japanese interference in criminal proceedings, Mate could cite hut one Instance.
Judge Eugenio Brillo,1 JP of Taclohan, supplied the details of this case, for it
gave rise to a controversy hetveen himself and Fiscal Umali over court jurisdiction.
The Japanese vere an interested party to the case because one of the princi
pals had been serving as a Japanese espionage agent. The spy had detected a merchant
discriminating against Japanese currency, and threatened to report the offense unless
bribed to remain silent. The merchant appeared before the Fiscal as complainant,
but vas jailed by the Japanese for violation of currency regulations before the
Fiscal had granted a hearing. The Fiscal sought to delay proceedings, urging upon
the Japanese that their present intervention vas repugnant to the announced Japanese
policy of vouchsafing the Filipinos "independence". At the time of the Liberation,
no final action had yet been taken.
Judge Hernandez, pre-var incumbent Judge of Tacloban's Court of First In
stance, presided during the Occupation. In 1944, Hernandez vas promoted to the
Court of Appeals in Cebu, but held sessions in Tacloban and Maasin. Vicente de la
Cruz filled the Leyte vacancy, vith jurisdiction extended over neighboring Samar
2
province. An evacuee from Mindanao, Judge Bayona, vas appointed to preside over
the other chapter of Leyte's Court of First Instance.
It might be appropos to mention at this point that the Japanese deprived
the custodial force of the Leyte Provincial Jail of their usual quota of firearms.
^Judge Brillo vas intervieved in Tacloban in 1945. The Judge explained that
a Justice of the Peace had Jurisdiction over criminal cases in vbich the penalty for
conviction did not exceed 6 months imprisonment or P200 fine. He and the Fiscal
vere in disagreement regarding the seriousness of the case under consideration, the
Fiscal contending that it fell vithin the Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
^Judge Be la Cruz stated in interview that he was not eager to accept the
judicial post tendered him. However, this vas the time that Governor Torres had
made known his desire to resign from office and become food administrator. Pressure
vas being exerted upon De la Cruz to fill the vacancy. Esther than occupy a poli
tical office entailing responsibility for making many ticklish decisions, Be la Cruz
decided in favor of the lover-salaried Judgeship.
48
The consequence of this action was set forth "by the Provincial Warden in a letter
to the Governor:
Anticipating things, that if you had received. . . .any complaint against

the undersigned by several departments of the government that have solicited
prisoners from the provincial jail for some kind, of works that the undersigned
had denied to give, in view that the members of the provincial guard now do
not possess adequate arms to be used in the proper guarding when they are sent
out from the jail. ...■*•
The Warden also experienced difficulty in messing the prisoners:
I have to inform your honor that in spite of my best efforts to secure rice
yesterday for the subsistence of the prisoners, I vas able to get only one
sack of rice. . . .
It seems that the profiteering business is still in operation as the price
of rice in the market is ranging from P8.90 to P9.00 per sack.2
No mass outbreaks from the Provincial Jail occurred, although there were
several individual escapes. Fear of the Japanese acted as a restraining influence.
Summarizing, we may say that the concept of law and the actual functioning
of legal institutions underwent no marked change during the Occupation. What did
change, at least temporarily, vas the attitude of the populace towards the courts.
Whereas they had traditionally looked upon the courts as the solid buttress of their
recognized rights, they now regarded the courts as the instrument of the Japanese,
no longer to be relied upon as a dispenser of justice. Above all, the ordinary
Filipino wanted anonymity during the Occupation. If he could avoid entanglement in
legal process, he felt that his chances of escaping Japanese notice vere so much the
better. As for the Japanese, their general policy of non-intervention in judicial
affairs could best be explained by the conviction that they could accomplish their
objectives without the employment of the ordinary judicial machinery. After all,
in the event of a showdovn, they could always dictate the choice of personnel to
occupy judicial posts.
•4?. Reyes Diaz, Provincial Warden. May 4, 1943. To: The Hon. Prov. Gov.
^F. Reyes Diaz, Provincial Warden. Nov. 7, 1942. To: The Hon. Prov. Gov.
49
Financial Stringency in Leyte:— The war situation greatly increased Leyte's
need for funds. Writes Provincial Treasurer Jimenez:
The provincial and municipal treasurers were ordered to wage an intensive and
extensive campaign for the collection of taxes, with the understanding that the
local governments will he financed from the local treasuries. The procedure in
the collection of taxes and other government dues were based on the laws and
regulations existing during the first Commonwealth of the Philippines. However,
internal revenue taxes on articles which originated from the United States and
other allied nations, so-called by the administration as luxury articles, weri
so exorbitantly imposed as high as 35$ per month based on the gross sales.^
Provincial salaries were to continue, with certain adjustments made. The
Treasurer explains:
In accordance with Provincial Circular No. 49, dated November 27, 1942, of
the Director of the Bureau of Local Governments, the positions and the respective
salaries of the officials and employees before the Japanese occupation were main
tained. Not so much change in the salaries apportionment took place during that
period except that the big-salaried officials were given slight reduction in
their compensations. However, the low-salaried ones and those having big families
were supposedly benefited by the salary differentials and the cost-of-liviig
bonus, respectively, the latter consisting of an additional remuneration of P20
(Japanese peso, at that) per child below 18 years of age .2
The administration suffered extreme financial stringency. Lamented the
Governor at the end of 1942:
Aside from Tacloban, only in three other municipalities are taxes actually
being collected, and very little at that. At least in eight municipalities the
people are made to pay their taxes to controlling USAFFE or bandit administra
tions. Collections are slow because people do not have good money; because
disturbing elements campaign against payment of taxes by the people; some people
feel they should not pay taxes because they do not receive the benefits of
government administration.3
The Governor might have added that fear or indifference on the part of the
municipal treasurers and their clerks also militated against ample collections.
Thus, the Provincial Treasurer-soundly berated the treasurer of Dulag:
On verifying your report. . . .it is noted that you have not collected a
single centavo from land taxes during that week and that, in general, the col
lection from all sources is very poor. We have also noted that according to
your Daily Time Eecord. . . .you have not gone out of your office, even in the
poblacion, to collect taxes. As your municipality is also in great difficulty in
funds, you should redouble your efforts. . .utilizing every conceivable means...4
^Jimenez, o p . cit. . p. 1. 2I . D. Jimenez, "Brief Summary, etc.", p. 2.

3B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Jap. Mil. Adm. for Dist. of
Visayas.
T ’rov. Treas. Jimenez. Sept. 10, 1943. To: Balbino Lagunzad, Mun. Treas.
50
Dulag's treasurer advised the Provincial Treasurer that many taxpayers could
not meet their obligations "because certain lawless individuals have instructed them
not to prepare copra and abaca, aside from not permitting them to transport corn,
palay and other farm products in big quantities to the poblacion, under penalty 6f
losirg their lives should the order be violated."
As to the expedient of distraint for delinquency in tax-payment, the same
mayor commented:
Embargo of properties from delinquent taxpayers is not advisable because a

tax collector's life is not safe at present, as evidenced by the fact that
several taxpayers are aggressive even in the poblacion. They vigorously main
tain that under the present circumstances, taxes of whatever sort should not be
collected. On the face of this, we are incapable of thwarting their menace due
to an inadequate police force. . . .1
The results were unfortunate: "Provincial officials have not been receiving
salaries from the month of August. In many municipalities, officials and employees
have not received any salary from the very beginning."
Retrenchment by the elimination or curtailment of governmental services was
rigorously practiced. The District Post-Office Inspector wrote:
Drastic reduction of personnel has been effected in all post offices, inas
much as I have only retained the services of the postmasters, except at Tacloban
and Palo. . . .At the Tacloban Post-Telegraph-Radio Office, out of the forty-
five employees, only thirteen are actually working. . .
To alleviate the situation, the Governor had two suggestions. Firstly:
When the change of administration took place, the Provincial Treasury found
itself with about 5250,000 left over from the old administration, but all were
in emergency notes. If this money were to be made valid, the Province would be
in a very sound financial condition. The same. . . .of the municipalities. . . .
The reference to emergency money is explained by a guerrilla auditor who had
been employed in the office of the Provincial Auditor at the time of the surrender:
We were printing the pre-invasion issue of the Leyte Emergency Currency

notes at the small town of San Miguel when news came to us that the. . . .
authorities of Leyte decided to surrender. . . .We were shocked at hearing
the news as precisely as we were printing the. . . .currency authorized by the
^Balbino Lagunzad, Mun. Treas., Dulag. Sept. 18, 1943. 2nd Indorsement.
2B. Cunanan, Dist. P0 Inspector. Sept. 5, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov.
51
President of the Commonwealth. of the Philippines to finance the resistance

against the Invaders. The printing of money. . . .vas necessary "because no
money from Manila vas forthcoming, as the capital vas already occupied "by the
Japanese; and a shipment of money vhich vas supposed to he destined to us has
gone to the bottom of the sea with the sinkiig of the S. S. Corregldor. On
May 23, 1942, in compliance with definite orders, ve stopped the printing of
the money, and ve burned the unissued notes and those partly printed notes on
the plaza or tovn square of San Miguel. Our chief in the printiig shop, Mr.
Alberto Santa Cruz, Provincial Auditor, vho vas taking charge of the accounting
matters, told us that there have been issued over six hundred thousand pesos to
the military and civil government of the notes ve have printed. . . .
The Governor had a second proposal:
Leyte has alvaye been financially stable. Our funds and deposits in the Na
tional Treasury and the Philippine National Bank bear this out. We cannot vith-
drav any of these funds vhich amount to more than PI ,000,000. Neither can ve col
lect taxes. . . .It is suggested that Leyte be given P75,000 as a loan. . . .If
ve are not given help. . . .ve shall be entirely helpless, and conditions of peace
and order will never be reestablished.
The Province did receive some help from Manila in 1943, but it vas insuffi
cient. In October, 1943, the Provincial Treasurer announced income from real estate
taxes for the period from April to be belov P 4 ,000 and the internal revenue yield to
be slightly over P18,000. The receipt of P23,365 in aid from Manila provided the
item bulking largest in the total provincial income of P66,537.38. With operating
expenses pared to the bone, the provincial government could not hold its deficit belov
P2,595.62.3
The Governor continually pleaded for a larger national aid. He couched his
appeal in terms of the one argument that carried veight:
The intention of this administration is to render immediate aid to stricken

victims of abnormal conditions; entails substantial amountcf money. Pacification
funds made possible for Leyte. . . .exhausted. . . .Prom this fund of P10,000.00,
ten municipalities vere benefited. . . .Give more funds for reopening of municipal
ities in the interior, for rehabilitation, for pacification. The coming of order
vill necessitate the opening of more offices in the provinoe. Must depend on the
central govt.
The coming of the Philippine Republic in October of 1943 failed to bring vith
it an overhauling of provincial finances. In the vords of Treasurer Jimenez, only
■^Potente, op. cit.. p. 1.

% o v . Torres. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration
Sprov. Treas. Jimenez. Financial Statement from April 1 - October 31, 1943.
4Actg. Gov. Salazar. Report of Activities: April 1 - October 31, 1943.
To: Coamissioner of Interior through Director of Local Governments.
52“
"a limited portion of the taxes /were7. . . .accessible to the collecting officers.
. . . Ji. great portion of the local revenues accrued to the treasuries of the. ...
guerrilla civil government. . . ."*■
The Status of the Occupation Regime (1943-44):— Ve have taken up certain
phases of public administration in Leyte, discovering the Province to have been finan-;
cially tottering, its outlying municipalities tied to the provincial capital by ten
uous threads, and with only limited assistance rendered to it by the Manila government.
Ve shall now. resume the account of Leyte's fortunes under Japanese control during
the period 1943-44.
The "puppet" regime was at its weakest at the outset of 1943. Guerrilla or
ganizations were consolidating, had expelled Japanese garrisons from most municipali
ties, and threatened the two main bases of Tacloban and Ormoc. The Governor reported
gloomily in May, 1943: "... .The end of the month saw only seven towns in Leyte
with more or less nom a l situation. . . .BC patrols were kidnapped, guns taken. . ."2
The BC, or Bureau of Constabulary, had superseded the Leyte Special Force.
Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing, escaping the clutches of the Japanese, joined up with
the guerrilla. (There is some evidence to suggest that Causing had been kidnapped
by the guerrilla against his own wishes.) Major Arturo Beyes, who had headed Leyte's
constabulary prior to its incorporation into the Leyte Provincial Eegiment, USAfFE,
and who was regarded in bode quarters as anti-American even before the Japanese inva- :
sion, directed the provincial BC. Eeyes promised that his organization would produce ;
results. ;
At its inception, Leyte's BC had only 50 men, comparing poorly with the pre
war organization, 500 strong. The Japanese were distrustful of their loyalty and
were unwilling to furnish adequate arms. The gubernatorial report to Manila for
April, 1943, noted:
*1.D.Jimenez, Prov. Treas., "Brief Summary of the Conditions During the Jan
Period Insofar As This Came Under the Jurisdiction of the Treasury of Leyte", p. 2".
2Actg. Gov. Salazar, "Report of Activities: April 1-October 31, 1943". To:
Coirniissioner of Interior through Director of Local Governments.
53
. . . .Lack of numbers, arms and anmunitions told on the morale of the BC

contingents in Tanauan and Tacloban who evinced reluctance to patrol. . . .
And in May: "BC contingents voiced need for acre strength, aims, anmunitions
and other supplies. Tanauan had only seven men, insufficient to protect the town..."
Finally in June, after Balderian's guerrillas had brazenly defied the Japanese
comnand by burning a number of towns, the Governor noted: "BC detachment on increase
in strength, but still insufficient. . . . "
But by November, 1943, the constabulary had expanded to over 200 men.^
Of the 11 occupied towns of Leyte, Tacloban and Ormoc retained their police
forces under the old system. . . .The police force of Tacloban has been placed
under the command and supervision of the Senior Inspector, Bureau of Constabulary.
. . . .The police force in Ormoc is under the control and supervision of the
local Japanese Commander. Their pay is being paid out of funds of the munici
palities concerned. . . .
In the Ormoc sector, according to Lieutenant Maglasang (local intelligence
officer of the guerrilla), the constabulary detachment was an important adjunct to
the Japanese garrison. Under Lieutenant Vicente Orgilas, the constabularymen relent
lessly tracked down the guerrilla sympathizers. One of their favorite ruses in cap
turing the Volunteer Guards who still maintained guerrilla ties was to counterfeit
guerrilla membership and get "an inside track" on secret developments.
In some districts, the constabulary was thoroughly detested by the civilians,
and the chronicler of Abuyog wrote:
The civilians in Abuyog suffered much. . . .For instance, their personal pro
perties like rice, palay, root croops, livestock, eggs— even their houses, were
looted, confiscated, or burned— directly or indirectly— by the Japanese and the
Filipino constabulary. And the worst part is that these puppet peace officers
were even more notorious than the Japs themselves. They were good hands at
scaring the poor civilians, and when the latter scampered for safety, the 'con
stabulary men' would laugh to themselves and chuckling at their prize-gaining
overture, would bring all catch to town at their headquarters, or simply divide
their booty among themselves for each of their families. I guess that was their
main source for a living.
-*ist Sgt. Martiniano Bao, a professional soldier, Joined the BC in 1944 in

order to support his many dependents. In addition to his regular pay, Bao received
a rice ration. Be averred that the greater number did not betray their fellow Fili
pinos to the Japanese. But all of the BC men stood in terror of Col. Kato, one of the
most fierce of the Japanese officers stationed in Tacloban during the Occupation.
^"Distribution of Constabulary Officers and Men", Oct. 31, 1943.
I
54
At least sone of these 'peace officers' were adept at girir^ blows even to
innocent people in town. There was one Engracio Gaca whom Abuyognons hated most
and whom they would like, if he is still all we, to see in Abuyog again. He had
a list of the names of Filipinos the Japs had very much wanted to behead.1
Similar man-hunting went on in other municipalities. However, it must be
said that some of the constabularymen were very uneasy in their assignments, did not
carry out their orders conscientiously, and deserted over to the guerrilla whenever
they had the chance.
Governor Torres had been importunirg Manila for some time to arrange for the
allotment of a larger force of Japanese troops in Tacloban. Without them, he argued,
his administration would continue feeble, subject to the disruptive tactics of the
guerrilla.
At mid-year, the Japanese contingent in Leyte was somewhat augmented, and a
promise was made of substantial reinforcements to come. The puppet administration
took heart and again seized the initiative. Contact with interior municipalities,
cut off from the provincial capital, was made. In June, 1943, the Governor wrote:
"The Japanese and the BC detachment opened Carigara to communication with Tacloban,
and made possible the reorganization of the municipal government there." Other
municipalities were returned to the fold.
In October, the Governor reported cheerfully:
. . . .More Japanese troops by mid-October. Promises well for complete

pacification in Leyte; looking forward to better days. . . .Information from in
terior creeping into intelligence reports revealed weakening of guerrilla forces
. . . .More leaders reported surrendering. . . .
Sunxning up, the Governor said: ". . . .Many people from barrios descended
into the towns, the influx being helped by the presence of more Japanese troops, dis-
Integration of guerrilla elements, and the peace offensive."
Thus far, force. The Governor also Used another language:
•Âurillo, op. clt. t p. 10.

Bernardo Torres, Prov. Gov., "Beport of Activities: April 1 - October 31,
1943".
55
"No stone unturned to encourage people to follow former pursuits," the
Governor put it succinctly. And the provincial government sought to help recreate an
atmosphere of normalcy by restoring as many public services as its straitened budget
permitted. Thus, the Bureau of Public Welfare opened branches in Tacloban and
Tanauan. And— "Passenger buses of the Leyte Land Transportation Company have started
regular trips into the interior. Sight of those filled to capacity reassuring to
the people. . . ."'L
To hasten the restoration of its control over the Island, the Tacloban govern
ment adopted the expedient of granting municipal status to certain key barrios where
the rest of the municipality was still threatened by the guerrilla. The Governor
announced: "The organization of two new municipalities, Julita and Sta. Fe, is con
templated. Conditions in these places warrant their formation as independent muni
cipalities. Julita has been given representation by this office in past conventions
of Mayors. . . . j
Julita, a constituent of Burauen municipality, Santa Fe belonging to Palo,
and Tarragona of Abuyog were the main candidates for this special status. Same of
their leading politicians, landholders, and businessmen had been agitating for "home
rule" for years, and the war conditions provided the pretext for realization of
their ambitions.
As the year drew to a close, the puppet administration felt certain that
guerrilla resistance would soon be completely dissolved. The Governor accounted for
this development:
Inspections in the interior show desire of the people to return to normalcy.

Seasons: Disintegration of guerrilla, helped by fighting among themselves;. . . .
hostile attitude of people in the interior. . . .due to misery and sufferirg
inflicted upon them by lawlessness; arrival of strong Japanese contingents from
^ctg. Gov. P. Salazar, Nov. 20, 1943, To: Commissioner of Interior through
Director of local Governments.
2Salazar, Nov. 20, 1943, To: Commissioner of Interior through Director of
Local Governments.
56
sopping up in Cebu and Fanay;. . . .incessant offers of amnesty to guerrilla

elements aided by appeal to racial pride and patriotism, and necessity of
standirg behind the Bepubllc. . . A
In late December, the Japanese launched their all-out offensive to the
guerrilla units on the Island. Describing their activities as "mopping-up operations"
Japanese troops swarmed over the areas abandoned for over a year, reclaim!eg them for
the Tacloban administration. The guerrilla units were dispersed, with their manpower
surrender!eg or forced underground.
Dev municipalities vere opened up. The Tacloban administration proceeded to
install sets of municipal officials. These officials vere given only temporary ap
pointments until such time as they gave convincing proof of their undivided loyalty
to the new regime. Governor Torres noted: "In La Paz, Abuyog, and Dagami, the
municipal officials are still all acting officials. Observe work closely. If you
desire to make permanent, notify me. . . ,"2
■What the Governor did not knew vas that many of the appointees carried the
secret blessing of the guerrilla, and vere sworn to abet the cause of resistance as
well as they might without giving away their mission to the ubiquitous informer.
The Japanese pushed their campaign of rooting out the pockets of resistance
through the first part of 1944, and the Governor goaded the municipal officials into’
lending full aid.
The mayors must cooperate with the Japanese Forces, and any plan or movement
should be comaunicated to the Garrison Commander.
Mayors shall record the following:
a. Persons who are cooperating with the Administration and the Japanese Forces,
b. Persons who are against the administration and the Japanese Forces,
c. Persons vho are indifferent; d.) Suspects of support or sympathy to the guer
rilla; e.) Persons vho spread news; f.) Newcomers to the poblacion or the barrios;
g.) Persons living in the poblacion vho frequently go to the barrios or farms,
whose purpose is unknown.3
Extensive use was also made of paid "pacification" officials, instructed to
convoke mass meetings to harangue the people and also to keep check on subversive
^Prov. Gov. Torres, Nov. 20, 1943. To: Commissioner of Interior.

^B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Memorandum to P. Salazar.
^Benedicto, Prov. Secty., March 27, 1944. Instructions to the Mayors.
57
elements. "In viev of special conditions obtaining in Dag ami, four pacification
agents have teen appointed at P30 each. . . .If necessary, pacification agentc can
he appointed for Abuyog and La Paz. . .
Government acquisition and operation of the privately-owned Leyte Land Trans
portation Company, and restoration of service to the interior municipalities also
contributed to a strengthening of Tacloban's control over the Island. The Governor
requested the mayors to "cooperate with the Leyte Transportation Co. or with the
government to acquire by purchase all tires and accessories that can be secured from
any sources within the jurisdiction of your municipality. . . ."2
Some of the municipalities took forward strides in settling down to what
they^called "normal".
Villaba noted that "the pacification campaign is being pushed now with much
vigor, using the policy of attraction. . . .More than 300 have already surrendered."^
In Eilongos, the mayor "waged a relentless campaign for food production.
Everyone planting short-live crops as camotes, gabi, obi and bananas. . . .1 have con
tact with the army Garrison Commander. I was beginning to organize the HA., . . ."*
Merida's "Food production campaign has made headway inducing the people to
till idle lands. . . .Soap-making has helped in decreasing unemployment. . . ,"5
A representative of the Governor's office, on an inspectional tour of Blliran
Island, observed general implementation of Tacloban's reorganizational program. In
Naval, Kawayan, and Biliran municipality, the inspector reported noteworthy numbers
of guerrilleros surrenderirg, the food production campaign carried out, an effective
system of rice and corn control in operation, collection of local revenues picking
up, and BA and Kalibapi chapters organized. Only in Calubian was it found that
"the Mayor's administration is not efficient".®
IB. Torres, Prov. Gov., Memorandum to Pastor Salazar.

% . Torres, Gov., March 3, 1944. Memo Order No. 3. To: All Mun. Mayors.
Vicente Veloso, Mun. Mayor, Villaba. Feb. 8 , 1944. To; The Prov. Gov.
^Romanico Buiz, Actg. Mun. Mayort Hilongos. Feb. 8 , 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
Federico Boholst, Mun. Mayor, Merida. Feb. 23, 1944. To; Prov. Gov.
^Ricardo Mendiola, Representative, Office of Gov. Feb. 12, 1944. To;
________ The Prov. Gov._____
And so tbe trumpetings of gains registered continued. Yet the more sober
and objective investigators paused to mull over the trustworthiness of these reports.
Perhaps, the field man in Biliran vas misrepresenting the situation, telling
the Governor what he thought the latter would like to hear. For at this very time,
the mayor of Naval nervously advised the Governor that "the people do not have the
right attitude to the new governmental set-up" and that the "town’s discontented
elements were organizir^ a bolo battalion".1
As a matter of fact, the guerrilla outfits were already regrouping by the
end of January, 1944. But they adopted a lie-low policy for the time being. As one
of their civilian officials explained: "It was believed then not expedient to in
sist in the manifestation of activities in the municipal government. . . .in the in
terest of the inhabitants therein vho vere under continuous viligence by the Japanese
What the guerrilla chronicler of Abuyog said of his own municipality might
be extended to cover the state of affairs throughout the Province:
Most of the civilians acted a double play by allowing themselves to be

governed by the Japs but actually serving as sources of information regarding
enemy strength, movement and disposition, and sending rice or corn to the hill-
flghters when circumstances permitted. This was successfully maintained until
the time of liberation.5-4
If we are to believe that the Governor and his entourage were taken in by
the glowing reports received, it can only be on the hypothesis of stupidity or blind
fanaticism, and neither alternative squares with available information. We therefore
conclude that the Tacloban officials vere play-actors in a drama allowing no escape.
^Bestituto B. Copuaco, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Naval. Feb. 10, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^Potente, op. cit.. p. 28.
3Aurillo, op. cit.. p. 11.
^For Albuera, ve have this testimony: "It vas really wonderful how well the
people played hypocrite with the Japs, making them believe ours was a whole coopera
tion with them, when in fact ve vere at the same time shielding our soldiers from
h a m . . . ." (Felix Sotto, Brief History of the 6th Infantry, WLSHF. (1945),
p. 6 .)
59
Economic Affaire
From an analysis of the political situation in Leyte during the Occupation,
we now move on to a consideration of Leyte's economy. Ve shall have some things to
say about the Island's agriculture and its trade, and also about the efforts of the
provincial administration to cope with the emergency problems arising out of wartime
conditions. And, to be sure, we will attempt to indicate the specific ways in which
the Japanese Military Administration influenced the course of Leytean economic life.
The Japanese occupation, with the controls introduced, followed by the irrup
tion of the guerrillas, brought disequilibrium and partial paralysis to the economy
of Leyte. First of all, the over-crowding of centers like Tacloban and Ormoc and
the evacuation of other towns upset the internal balance of these communities.
\
Secondly, guerrilla blockading of the occupied towns, cutting off the source of food
supply normally coming in from the farms of the barrios, threatened the town popula
tions with famine. Thirdly, areas normally producing a surplus of cereal crops, such
as San Isidro, and depending upon outside markets, found their trade freighted with
encumbrances. Fourthly, other areas that had concentrated in past years upon the
growing of cash crops— abaca, coconuts for copra, etc., found themselves faced with
starvation as on the one hand the Japanese confiscated their supplies and on the
other the guerrilla forbade further production. Fifthly, the disruption of intra
provincial transportation, serviced by the produce and passenger trucks of the Leyte
Land Transportation Company seriously hampered the conduct of commercial relations—
especially in view of Japanese seizure of privately owned automobiles and motor
launches. Finally, the Japanese ban on the circulation of the emergency currency
released by the Commonwealth Government made worthless the money in the hands of
the people and dammed up the channels of trade.
•'\
60 I
|
Agriculture:— When the Province of Leyte was taken over, wrote the Provin- ?
ciai Agricultural Supervisor:
. . . .all the agricultural activities performed hy the civilians ceased auto

matically due to innumerable troubles caused by the invaders, and also due to
guerrillas and bandits prevailing in several places. Most of the inhabitants
of the Island evacuated to distant, secluded places. They left their farms,
animals and many of their belongings on their farms. They have gone to places
far from civilization and cultivated thereat unnoticeable small patches of
rootcrops. Their harvests and granaries left behind vere either taken or burned
by the Japanese soldiers who were constantly patrolling every place. Guerrillas
or bandits may have seized such properties that may be useful to them.1
We can best understand what was taking place by quoting some of the reports
submitted by the mayors to the provincial capital during the first months of the
Japanese occupation. Many of the local officials noted a general anxiety psychology
pervading the farm populations, interfering with the planting schedule, and thus
threatening the food supply of the towns. The Acting Mayor of Abuyog commented on
a "slackening" of agricultural activities due to "the nervousness of the people in
the rural communities arising from the current complex situation."11
A fortnight later, the same official reported: "As it is now, barrio resi
dents have come over to the poblacion for safety sake. Food shortage may become a
certainty during the ensuing season (rainy season).
In Burauen, the Mayor "issued a bandillo suggesting the people that the head
of the family may go to their farm to get their subsistence but their young ones
remain in homes in the Poblacion.
Carigara also suffered the same ills:
Agriculture suffers adversely due to the general evacuation of the people in

different farms and barrios. Farms are practically neglected. . . .Locusts are
still with us and they cannot be controlled due to the unfavorable conditions. . ?
Conditions in the municipality continued to deteriorate:
^Vitoriano B. Berdan, Actg. Prov. Agri. Sup. "Summary— Fcr My American

Friend" (1945) .
%leuterio A. Cana, Actg. Mayor, Abuyog. Aug. 31, 1942. Beport to: Prov.Gov.
^Sleuterio A. Cana, Actg. Mayor, Abuyog. Sept. 15, 1942. Beport to: Prov.Gov.
Êduardo E. Eugho, Mayor, Burauen. Oct. 11, 1942. Beport to: Prov. Gov.
^Mariano P. Salvacion, Mun. Secty. Sept. 22, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
61
. . . .The people from our farms keepon ccming to town daily. Their f a m e
are entirely neglected.. They cannot be persuaded, to return to their homes on
the farms as they fear many things like bombing,, bur niig of their homes, Japanese
patrols, mountains soldiers, and especially from the leaflets which were dropped
recently speaking of future bombings, poisoning and shootiig. . . .They are not
willing to return to their farms or places of abode unless they are given secu
rities and assurances that they will not be harmed. . . .
Likewise Tolosa:
. . . .But sometimes people in the interior barrios, when scared by the

approaching 'patrolla* of the Japanese Imperial Forces, as well as when they
heard the roaring sounds of machine guns and bombs from the adjacent barrios,
evacuated to barrios nearing the Poblacion of this municipality. They just as
well feared from being killed as taken as guide. Thus they abandoned work on
their farm, and consequently, it is predicted that there will be shortage of
foods if the people will neglect to prepare the rice fields for the- coming plant
ing season.2
And Babatngon weakly commented: "Agriculture--poor, but I am exerting efforts
to make my campaign effective so as that the people will not neglect his duties to
eradicate famine."^
Here then was an Island, accustomed to sustain itself from its own produce,
suddenly without food--its reserves gone and its farmers benumbed in the grip of an
anxiety neurosis. It would be up to the government to act decisively if confidence
was to be restored and famine averted.
Commerce:-- If the agricultural picture was glum, that of conanerce was total
bleakness. "Generally speaking, commerce has been hit hard by the current situation
in the community," commented Abuyog's Acting Mayor. "Chinese merchants constituting
one of the arms of local business have retired from the field either for lack of goods
or none at all on account of the present complexion of the situation. . . ."*
The following week the mayor groaned as another blow was delivered to the
local economy: "... .comnerce has slackened during the week. This was due to the
^M. P. Salavacion, Mun. Secy., Cerigara. Oct. 5, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov. j
2C. Colasito, Mayor, Tolosa. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Beport.
^Mayor, Babatngon. Aug. 31, 1942. Weekly Beport To: The Prov. Gov.
Êleuterio A. Cana, Acting Mayor. Aug. 31, 1942. Weekly Beport To: The
Gov.
62
order of the Japanese Military Detachment closing Abnycg from V prHngw of sailboats.
The present difficulty of transportation made articles of prime necessity hardly
obtainable. . .
Toloea suffered equally: "Since the outbreak of the present conditions or
emergency, commerce and industry have been diminishing, and till date, it remains
dormant. Local and retail merchants of both Chinese and Filipinos have closed their
business for lack and high prices of articles. . . ."2
In Carigara: ’Ve are not enjoying commerce as we ought to, because of this
present emergency. We have no transportation facilities on land and sea. . . ,"3
Tanauan particularized: "Commerce in the municipality is abnormal due to
the fact that all Chinese goods are now exhausted. . . .
Kawayan succinctly reported "no conmerce within the municipality, due to
non-purchasing. A very few engaged in weaving mats and making salt Just for their
own demand and not even sufficient for their need. . . ,"5
And Burauen: "Commerce in this town is movirg very slowly, if at all, due
to the absence of markets where to sell and buy articles or commodities. Retail mer
chandising is very much affected by the complete lack of small loose change."®
Fortunately for the population of occupied Leyte, vessels from neighboring
provisoes, and from unoccupied municipalities on the Island laden with basic commodi
ties , touched at the waterfront of seme of its municipalities.
The Mayor of Tanauan reported that traders "for and from the southern and
western towns of this province and to and from the neighboring provinces carry away
rice, palay, and corn. They bring in various goods of prime necessities. . . ."7
^Ricardo Collantes, Mun. Treas. &Actg. Mayor. Sept. 7, 1942. Weekly Report
to: The Governor.
2
C. Colasito, Mayor, Tolosa. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Report.
^Santiago Tonolete, Mayor, Carigara. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Report.
4
Januario Perez, Mun. Mayor, Tanauan. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Report.
®Dionisio B. De La Pen, Mun. Secty., Kawayan. Oct. 12, 1942. Weekly Report.
%duardo R. Bugho, Mun. Mayor, Burauen. Sept. 8 , 1942. Weekly Report To Gov.
7J. Perez, Mayor, Tanauan. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Report To: Prov. Gov.
63
Abuyog, too: "Sailboats mostly from Bohol oftentimes visit this ccanonnity
fop business purposes bringiig soap, salt, etc. On their return trip, they load corn,
palay, etc. While transactions in public markets are no longer as brisk as before
But these Imports could not be depended upon to replace the comaodities nor
mally required by Letye's consumers. Moreover, the scarcity in available supply vas
accompanied by a sharp rise in prices, thus having the effect of placiig these items
outside the reach of mass purchasing power. The resultant dissatisfaction soon
asserted itself.
The dislocation of commerce, even its temporary stoppage, was expected by the
people as a concomitant of war. What they complained about was a Japanese occupation
policy that exercised an unnecessarily inhibitory effect upon the revival of trade.
And to the Tacloban administration, this vas most embarrassing, for it thwarted the
announced objective of effecting the "normalization" of business.
Two particular features of Japanese practice cramped business activity in
Leyte. First, the invading Japanese army had commandeered all motor transport, both
land and marine. Secondly, the Japanese Military Administration placed a ban upon
the circulation of emergency currency, the currency issued in the interim period be
fore their arrival in Leyte, and possessed by the bulk of the population. In vain,
the Governor argued reconsideration.
The comnandeering of these motor vehicles seriously interfered with the
functioning of the economy. The District Forester, for instance, noted: "Leyte
sawmill operators. . . .willing to operate. They couldn’t because their launches
and auto trucks used for towing or haulir% logs and lumber were conmandeeredby the
Japanese. . . ."2
*E. Cana, Mun. Mayor, Abuyog. August 31, 1942. To: The Provincial
Governor.
district Forester Inocencio Bamirez. August 2, 1942. To: Provincial
Governor.
64
At the close of the year, the Governor pleaded for the restitution of these
motor vehicles: "When taken over, it vas the impression. . . .that they vere only
for purposes of registration. . . .Caused slow restoration to normalcy of commerce
and industry, and created had impression.
In 1943, the Leyte Land Transportation Company, operating under a government
receivership, functioned sporadically, moving both passengers and produce. Continual
guerrilla sniping, resulting in deaths and destruction of vehicles, barred any im
provement in service. Only in 1944, vhen the Japanese dominated the Island, could
local marketers begin to use these trucks with greater regularity— albeit, not vith-
out the risk of ambuscade.
The Impoverishment of the population, crippling local industry and commerce,
and vlthholding funds from the municipal treasury vas largely the consequence of
Japanese monetary policy. Kawayan deplored "the monetary crisis".^
Carigara noted that the "emergency notes are not circulating as they should
be in view of the Japanese Military instructions that they should not be received
by the government authorities. . . .And the merchants and other people have diffi
culties in paying their obligations to our local government. . . ."3
Babatngon--". . . .within the Jurisdiction of this municipality there is no
other money in circulation but only Leyte and Cebu Emergency Notes. Due to this
fact, the municipality could not make any collection due to lack of genuine money.
And Maasin— "Collections of the municipality is very low due to the non-
acceptance of the emergency notes.
*Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration.

^Dionisio B. De La Pena, Mun. Secty. Oct. 12, 1942. Weekly Beport To:
The Prov. Gov.
% . Tonolete. Aug. 29, 1942.
^Babatngon Mayor. Aug. 31, 1942. To: The Gov. (Weekly Beport).
Êscolastico Cabrera, Mun. Mayor, Maasin. Aug. 1, 1942. Weekly Beport To:
The Prov. Gov.
65
la Tolosa--11. . . .due to scarcity of money, and the refusal of the govern
ment to receive emergency notes, there vas no collection made hy the local government.
The people seemed to neglect their obligation to the government, in paying their
taxes, for they do not have the genuine money.
The situation continued unchanged through 1942 and 1943. In December of

i
1943, many municipalities vere urging the Governor to redeem the emergency notes as
the only realistic solution to the general problem. The Municipal Board of Abuyog
petitioned:
Whereas, ever since the withdrawal of the Japanese from this town. . . .the
people therein have been using emergency notes. . . .as medium of exchange for
local transactions;
Whereas during the period from October 13, 1942 to November 26, 1943. . . .
practically no Japanese money or old Philippine money entered the municipality.
Whereas the only kind of money kept or circulated by the people are emer
gency notes; and if ve have Japanese money or old money. . . .the amount is too
small for circulation in Abuyog with 40,000 population, and business practically
paralyzed;. . . .
Eesolved to request the Provincial Governor to authorize the Provincial
Treasurer to redeem the emergency notes circulating in Abuyog.2
We have said that Japanese policy hampered business activity. Indeed, by
1943, business in the northern portion of the Island had come to an end. Writing in
1945, Leyte's Conmercial Agent declared:
Big as veil as small commercial establishments had been closed during the
Japanese occupation. Comnercial establishments in Dulag, Dagami, Ormoc, Palcmpon,
San Isidro, Jaro and Villaba had all been wiped out. The Japanese took and
commandeered merchandise of all kinds and quantities they liked for their own,
to use and consume. They even purposely destroyed beautiful and costly buildings
from vhich to derive pieces of vood and lumber for fuel purposes. . . .3
This situation had not taken place at once. The first varehouses and shops
to be gutted by the invader vere those of Chinese proprietorship. The Japanese had
been accustomed to looting Chinese properties on the Asiatic mainland, and this
action in Leyte vas simply a continuation of time-honored practice. Many Filipino
establishments, however, had been temporarily abandoned by their owners, on their
"^C. Colasito, Mun.Mayor, Tolosa. Sept. 14,1942. Weekly Beport To: The I
Prov. Gov. ■
Actg. Mun. Secty.Adolfo, Abuyog Mun.Board. Dec. 6 , 1943.Be solution No. 2l

3Jaca, op. cit.. p. 25. I
66
evacuation to the hills. Failure of the ovner to return to the poblacion vas in
terpreted by the Japanese as forfeiture of title to properties. From seizure under
these circumstances to arbitrary confiscations vas an easy step. Problems of cur
rency and replenishment of inventories finished off the remaining businesses.
The towns in the southern part of the Island vere able to maintain business
activity somewhat longer, although in greatly reduced volume. This vas due to the
fact that initially, the Japanese did not come to the South in force, and that their
garrisons vithdrew by October, 1942. For about a year, the towns vere able to trade
with one another and with the neighboring islands. The reestablishment of Japanese
domination at the end of 1943 meant the benumbing of business in the South— the
spreading of a uniform pall over the entire Island.
The paralysis of ordinary business did not mean the complete elimination of
trade. The Conmercial Agent explained:
In the realm of commerce, two ways of trade vere born during the Japanese
occupation, the 'buy and sell' and the 'barter method'. Same wealthy and un
scrupulous businessmen took advantage of the effects of the war, and engaged
themselves in the 'buy and sell' business which was lucrative and mostly con
fined to the buying and selling of foodstuffs and war materials. The poor
people, who had only in their minds to live and exist, engaged themselves in the
'barter method' from which to derive their humble income with vhich to maintain
their humble 'modus vivendi'. The 'barter method' vas confined to the bartering
of cloth, old dresses, soap, salt and the like with fruits, vegetables, palay,
rice and corn from the farmers .■*■
The barter method of exchange is self-evident, and requires little comment.
Farmers, fishezmen, and weavers engaged in barter extensively— though there was a
tendency towards a norm of self-sufficiency. Occasionally, residents of Tacloban,
having secured their basic commodities shipped from Manila or Cebu and distributed
by the government, would travel to the interior and exchange them for foodstuffs.
And the DA.33)0, the Japanese agency, sought its entire producers of abaca and copra
to sell these valued products by offering cloth, soap, cigarettes and other basic
consnodities in exchange.
^■Jaca, op. d t ., p. 25.
"Buy and sell", as might he gathered from the caustic conment cited, vas a
popular term for speculative trading. The enterpriser would study consumer demand—
a simple procedure, since the town dwellers lacked all the basic commodities. Thee,
he would buy up foodstuffs from the farmers (either for cash or for cloth, soap,
etc. he had already acquired) and hold them back from the market until he could rea
lise a good price. Many of these dealers had amassed thousands of pesos by the time
of the Liberation.
The Populace Suffers:— Widespread suffering and general demoralization over
took the Province. Governor Torres sent a plaintive memorandum to the Japanese
Military Administration:
In many towns there is scarcity of food, especially of rice, because of the

fact that while in Leyte there is plenty of food in farms and barrios, the moun
tain soldiers and bandits stop the flow of food from these places to the town or
poblacion. The people in the poblacion. . . .are the ones that suffer. . . .In
efforts to reestablish normalcy, we are faced with the problem of lack of income
on the part of the people. Unable to produce agricultural and manufactured pro
ducts. Pay high prices for goods they have to bpy. . . .
Only fear of capture and execution by Japanese patrols prevented a general
exodus of the populace to the hills.
Somewhat of an upturn in the living conditions of the people of occupied
Leyte took place after mid-1943. The increased strength of the Japanese aimed forces
in the Island, at least in the north-eastern section, made it possible for farmers
and merchants to conduct their activities with less fear of guerrilla molestation.
In the latter part of November, 1943, the Governor wrote:
In twelve towns now enjoying more or less tranquility, the people are showing
growing faith in the new government and gratitude at the expulsion of the guer
rillas. . . .Other towns are fast becoming settled and people are busy planting
rice, corn, root crops and other food. . . .The presence of more Japanese here
is giving not only life but employment to people, the usual demand for food,
manual labor in landing fields and other miscellaneous tasks being met by them
with increasing willingness. Cordial relations between Japanese and Filipino
officials and civilians. Militaristic air eased somewhat. . . .
Torres, Prov. Gov. March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of Yisayas,

Japanese Imperial Forces.
^Bernardo Torres, Prov. Gov. Nov. 20, 1943. To: Commissioner of Interior.
But unrest continued, to prevail in the mountainous interior. The inhabitants
of these sections mere not directly affected by stabilization within the town centers.
The Governor begged:
Office needs funds to help people in interior settle to normalcy. Share of

rehabilitation and pacification funds needed, especially in burned and deserted
towns. Nipa, rattan, food, and local employment will be greatly needed. Bo
way to assure masses of strength and goodness of the Bepublic better than to
give tangible proof of governmental care. . . ,1
Problems multiplied at the close of the year when the Japanese, by "liberat
ing" the western and southern portions of the Island and clearing out the remaining
guerrilla pockets in the East, brought additional municipalities within the purview
of Tacloban's ministrations.
Mayor Cordero sketched conditions in Burauen as he found them when appointed
by the Governor to reorganize the municipality:
I discovered private houses looted; also the schools, the municipal buildiig
and its offices. . . .The steel safes and concrete vaults of the municipal
treasury had been forcibly opened;. . . .contents stolen. Government funds,
rural credit funds and accountable forms were gone ,2
Inopacan gave notice that
seventy-five per cent of the civilian population from the different barrios. . . .
have come down to the town to permanently reside, without a place to shelter in,
and without food to eat. . . .due to their fear of the constant bombing made by
Japanese airplanes in the barrios. . , .The present food situation of this
Municipality is somewhat tense. . . .
Many of these areas were threatened with widespread famine. Prompt shipment
of emergency rations, to be distributed among the general population at cost prices,
was needed to avert the danger.
The following messages are but samplings of the many petitions from the out
lying districts to the capital, urging succor:
Caibiran: "Allow me to inform you that the prime conmodities allotted for
the municipality of Caibiran for special distribution have not as yet been
received here. . . .It behooves me to remind you without reserve that. . . .
Caibiran needs the necessary succor in this unstable economic situation. . .*
1B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Nov. 20, 1943. To: Commissioner of Interior.
2Affidavlt of Jose S. Cordero, Mayor of Burauen, Feb. 10, 1944.
Îsabelo A. Lloren, Mun. Mayor, Inopacan. Feb. 21, 1944. To: The Prov, Gov.
% . G. Navarro, Mun. Mayor, Caibiran. Feb. 10, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
Kawayan: I have the honor to report. . . .that the municipality Is short
of 600 cavanes of rice or 10,100 cavanes of palay for the next six months. . . .
The little stock of palay vhich the Individual ovners have received for their
home consumption will not be enough to cope with the alarming food crisis
throughout the municipality. . . .in view of the fact that our young plants of
corn and secondary crops. . . .were completely destroyed by the last three
typhoons. . .
Albuera: Bequest: (l) That this municipality be given some more goods of
prime coamodities, especially clothing or dry goods. _
(2) Aid of rice or corn, even only 200 cavanes, to be sold to the public. .
The Provincial Government had only a limited supply of emergency rations, and
sought a full accounting from the municipalities before it doled out anything. From
the Mayor of Tolose, who had besought aid, the Governor requested:
an official detailed report of the result of your canvassing in that municipality

with respect to stocks of rice and corn, and showing exactly how much. . . .you
need weekly to supply your municipality at a maximum rate of 1 ganta rice or
milled corn per person per week.^
The Mayor of Palo complied with these instructions, but received no satis
faction:
. . . .1 wrote a letter to you informitg that at present there are 691

families with a total of 3,439 members in the poblacion of Palo vho are in direct
need of Bice for their personal consumption, and that according to my computation
each one of them will consume one ganta every week. . . .1 earnestly request to
please send it at once. . . .to prevent a possible famine in this locality.^
Among the other correspondence with the provincial office for aid, we may
note the messages of Mayor Yilleramos of San Miguel on January 18, 1943; Mayor Arpon
of Barugo on January 19thj Mayor Dalmacin of Babatngon on January 19th; Mayor Avila
of Tanauan on January 25th; Mayor G. Yeloso of Hinundayan on January 25th; Mayor
Palana of La Paz on February 1st; Mayor Zara of Maasin on February 2nd; Mayor Vano of
Malitbog on February 2nd; Mayor Evaretta of Yillaba on February 25th; etc.
Many of these local officials were compelled to importune the Governor again
and again, either because premised relief shipments were not forthcoming or because
^T. M. Sierra, Mun* Mayor, Kawayan. Feb. 20, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
Ê. B. Barte, Mun. Mayor, Albuera. Feb. 25, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
%ernardo Torres, Prov. Gov. Jan. 22, 1944. To: Mun. Mayor, Tolosa.
*S. Generoso Alvarado, Mayor. Jan. 27, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
70
they proved insufficient to alleviate public need.
That conditions persisted nay be gathered from the resolution adopted in June,
1944, by a special committee studying "ways and means to solve the food shortage" in
Naval:
Whereas, the people of Naval. . . .have no way of securing these cereals from
the neighboring towns on account of the very high prices charged in the black
market and because of the scarcity of same. . . .
Be It Resolved to request the Hon Frovincial Governor, Pastor Salazar. . . .
to send to this municipality as soon as possible the needed palay, corn and
other foodstuffs to be sold to the public at reasonable prices.
Augmenting Food Production:"- In attempting to mitigate the food crisis, the
provincial, authorities had recourse to two methods. One might be described as tech
nological. This method sought to raise the aggregate crop yield of the Island. The
second method was that of social control. It looked to a more equitable allocation
of the limited quantities available.
The method of increasirg the acreage under cultivation and diversification of
crops readily commended itself.
Following the advice of the Governor, many of the municipalities gave encour
agement to the planting of short-period crops in lieu of the traditional staples,
rice and corn. Tolosa reported the "cultivation of root crops, as cemote, gabi,
cassava, vegetables, and other period crops is undertaken by the people of this town,
but to a limited area, due to the present emergency or situation in the neighborhood.^
Similarly in Carigara: "... .Vfe have also endeavored to have our farmers
. . . .plant short time crops like maiz, different tubers, as gabi and talyan, and
root crops like camote and also balangjoy, and also all kinds of vegetables."3
Of all the crops sown, the cemote was the most practical.
Camote, the most popular root crop substitute among inhabitants, planted in
more extensive areas because farmers have acquired experience that it is the food
^Gabino Velasquez, Chairman; L. M. Limpiado, Mayer, Naval. June 2, 1944.

Resolution No. 1.
^Colaaito. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Report.
3
Santiago Tonolete, Mun. Mayor, Carigara. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Report To:
The Prov. Gov.
71
crop best suited under present circumstances, and could be left -with least
molestation by guerrilla. It is a crop that needs no granary or bodega, for
it could be used and preserved vith ease by the civilians and farmers vho would
prefer to stsy in an isolated place, free from effects and clutches of present
imbroglio.*
The provincial authorities also exhorted Leyte's population to sow all cul
tivable land. Not until 1944, vben guerrilla influence vas at its nadir, vas a
systematic program evolved to realize agricultural objectives. Then, under the im
petus of an Executive Order, bached by the Neighborhood Associations and the Kali-
bapi, the Filipinos of Leyte hitched themselves behind their carabaos to plant
their fields while their children planted vegetables in the gardens.
The Executive Officer of the Leyte Kalibapi chapter advised the Governor:
This office has reached an accord with the Provincial Agronomist to organize
the Kalibapi GardenerS* Association and the Kalibapi Farmers' Association. It
should be organized in all municipalities in the province to coordinate and
hasten the Food Production Campaign for the entire province. . . .No one can be
a member of the Associations if he doesn't belong to the Kalibapi.
The Provincial Agronomist summarized:
The food production campaign carried out in the 15 Eastern towns from Abuyog
to Carigara, within inspection range occupied by four District Agricultural In
spectors or Assistants, in agronomy. Campaign initiated primarily in organiza
tion of Vegetable Gardeners' Association and Bice Growers' Association. Fruitful
results in enforcement of Provincial Executive Order No. 6 , whereby every family
in town proper and barrios were required to cultivate home gardens. Mayors,
barrio tenientes, and NA very cooperative. . . .4"5
The municipalities also showed considerable inventiveness in working out their
own food production programs.
■4*. Salazar, Prov. Gov. May 20, 1944. Agricultural Beport.

‘Hfe cannot work out any quantitative estimates of occupied Leyte’s crop yield.
Suggestive, however, are certain statements made by the Provincial Agronomist:
"The food production campaign activities in the whole province of Leyte has
been very, limited. . . has been carried out in the fifteen Eastern towns from
Abuyog up to Carigara. . . .In the 1943-44 palay crop. . . .there have been distribu
ted. . . .68 cavans of Elon-elon seed palay variety. . . .during normal times this
office used to distribute from 300 to 400 cavans of seed corn throughout the whole
province. From January until now there have been distributed 18 kilos of different
kinds of vegetable seeds. There have been benefited many gardeners in several muni
cipalities of whom most are in Tacloban." (Victoriano E. Berdan, Prov. Agronomist,
March, 1944, "A Brief Report on Food Production Campaign Activities in the Whole Pro
vince of Leyte")
^Saturnine Gonzalea, Exec. Off., Leyte Chapter. Jan. 18, 1944. To: Prov.Gov.
V . Berdan, Prov. Agronomist, April 20, 1944. Beport.
72
"Pursuant to Circular No. 6 of the Governor," began Villaba’s Ordinance,
(1) All fanners should turn into productivity all areas that each had cultivated
during the years 1942-43 by p l a n t ! r i c e , corn, camotes, etc.
(2 ) All persons not engaged in farming should cultivate vegetable gardens. . . .
(3 ) Persons vho have no lands may apply to the Mayor or Barrio Tenientes for lots
vacant. . . .•*•
Merida had its method:
(1) All able-bodied males ordered to plant j corn not less than 1 ganta, or rice
not less than 5 gantas
(2 ) All able-bodied females ordered to manage vegetable gardens
(3 ) All Barrio Tenientes appointed as ‘Increased Food Production Leaders' in
their respective localities and the Chief of Police in the poblacion.
The leaders must see to it that the campaign be successfully carried out.
San Miguel vent about the task of raising its food production totals in
/
systematic fashion:
For purpose of Food Campaign, San Miguel divided into 25 agricultural dis
tricts, equal to number of barrios in Jurisdiction. It shall have a 'Full-Time
Staff1 vith 11 members, and 25 ’Increased Food Production Leaders’, vho are duly
appointed barrio lieutenants.
Full-time staff members shall have residence in Poblacion, vhile increased
food production leaders shall stay in respective districts, so as to closely
supervise plan of work, as outlined by respective full-time staff leaders. Plan
of vork should cover each planticg season. Increased food production leaders
should submit to respective Staff Members monthly reports of vork accomplished
in their respective districts, shoving area planted to each crop during month
to vhich report pertains. Staff members shall submit report to undersigned,
to be submitted later to Governor. . . .
Full-time staff members should attend regular meetings of barrio lieutenants
on every 15th and end of month, in order to receive proper instructions in in
creased food production plan as embodied in Circular No. 6 of Governor.*
But planting vas only one phase of the agricultural cycle. The reaping
still remained. To assure success in that enterprise, the Provincial Agronomist
called upon the executive for assistance.
This office needs the cooperation of the military authorities in order that
the farmers can harvest their palay since they are being constantly molested
. . . .Farmers1 failure to accomplish their harvest means famine and no seed
procurement, vhich will ultimately decide our future existence for lack of future
crops for harvest. . . .The rural districts of great rice regions like Abuyog,
^Vicente M, Veloso, Mun. Mayor, Villaba. Dec. 24, 1943. Villaba Ordinance
‘ No. 1.
^Federico Boholst, Mun. Mayor, Merida. Jan. 25, 1944. Merida Ordinance No.l.
3A. Valieramos, Mun. Mayor, San Miguel. April 30, 1944. To: Gov., Par.
1, 2, 5.
73
Tarragona, La Paz, Dulag, Burauen, Dag ami, Tanauan-, Palo, Pastrana, Alangalang,
Jaro, San Miguel and Carigara should he patrolled incessantly until the end
of the month of May.^
Becognizing that "lawlessness” might continue, the Agronomist suggested a
new scheme that might offset some of its had effects.
. . . .This Office, therefore, suggests that there should he created a com

munal or Progress Faim in every non-pacified municipality, amply protected hy
military force and Neighborhood Associations. . . .so that the law-ahiding
population, especially the farmers, could proceed with their agricultural
activities unmenaced; and, in this manner, such farm will automatically he en
larged from time to time as solicitous parties increase until finally the whole
agricultural area of the municipality is ahsorhed, and, at the same time becomes
wholly pacified.
. . . .If this project is applied or acted upon, selection of men should he
made, sc that only civilians of good repute, probity and integrity may he ad
mitted to own a lot in the communal or Progress Farm. . . .If an applicant is
doubted for his integrity, he should not he allowed to own a lot in the Progress
Farm, thus forcing him to mend his attitude or forget his evil thought. If, in
this manner, protective and helpful preferences are given to the peaceful and
cooperative civilians, therefore, food shortage will only he felt hy, and always
he the problem among, the had people. . . . 1 believe that the time is now pro
pitious to consider this project so as to avert future famine among the peaceful
citizens who had cooperated. . . .with the present government and the military
authorities, while the general pacification of the whole province is not yet
fully accomplished. . . .
While fulminating against the guerrilla, the Provincial Agronomist, we have
sei'ious reason to believe, was influenced hy them (as we shall see later on) in
working out his scheme for cooperative farming. As he pointed out, the lot on the
communal farm was to he individually owned. In reality, what was to he "communal"
was the system of defense.

3
The scheme met the approval of the then Governor, Pastor Salazar. He in
stituted a "pilot project" in the municipality of Tolosa, observed its workings, and
was pleased with the outcome. Then, he turned to the other municipalities:
^-Berdan, op. cit.

O
cVictoriano B. Berdan, Prov. Agronomist. June 16, 1944. To: The Commanding
Genera■>, Imperial Japanese Forces for Leyte and Samar, through the Prov. Gov., Leyte.
•Z
"It might he appropriate to indicate that Bernardo TorreB relinquished the
Governorship of Leyte in ]944 to Board Member Salazar in order that he might became
full-time "Food Production Manager, District of Visayas". His explanation (after the !
Liberation) of this shift of assignment was that the food production Job gave him an i
opportunity he had long been scheming fcr--to slip out of a repugnant political Jot |
into a neutral" technological one that was patently (he said) ^ or the benefit of the
masses. (Interview, Tacloban, January, 1946)
;
r-f- '
74
The municipality of Tolosa has now established Progress Farms. Every district
of the HA has one. Each member of every district is given an area in the farm.
It is also suggested that big families within your jurisdiction should be com
pelled to own a farm of any sort in order to maintain their livelihood. Other
wise, their share in the progress farm should be increased reasonably in order
that they can raise their necessary amount of food. Such farms should be pat
rolled often to protect the laboring elements. Make arrangements with the Japan
ese detachment or the Commander of the Constabulary. The Office of the Provincial
Agronomist is prepared to meet necessities in vegetable seed and seed corn.^-
Had a production scheme of this nature been worked out sooner, it might have
brought palpable results. As it was, the farmers were by then distracted. . . .Their
minds were turned to the Liberation forces, drawing steadily closer. All they wished
for was the opportunity to scrounge enough food to keep alive, while avoiding the
Japanese execution squads and the guerrilla black-list.
Control of Profiteering:— Inadequate as was the total supply of basic com
modities on the Island, this quantity was further reduced, as far as effective con
sumption went, by the voracious practices of the middlemen. Produce that slipped into
the Japanese garrison towns through the guerrilla blockade did not always reach the
public market. As often as not, it found its way into the channels of the black mar
ket where dealers could squeeze exorbitant profits from the necessitous.
In his report to the Director of Local Governments for May, 1943, Salazar
wrote: "Local profiteers attempted to take advantage of the situation by cornering
the market, raising prices to new heights, and forestalling price control attempts."^
The Province sought to deal with this situation by forbidding hoarding and
insisting that all transactions take place in the public market, where they were sub
ject to control.
<*Ho individual or concern may stock, hoard, corner the market on any article
for profiteering."3
lp. Salazar, Prov. Gov. July 11, 1944. To: All Mayors.
Âctg. Gov. Salazar. Beport of Activities: April 1-October 31, 1943. To:
Coumissioner of Interior through Director of Local Governments.
•%. Torres, Prov. Gov., Jan. 10, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 10.
75
Grains required special attention:
Ho person shall he allowed to have in stock acre than 3 cavans of palay or

1^ sacks of rice or 2 cavans of c o m for each member of his family for their
consumption during 6 months. . . .The storing and hoarding or cornering the
market of any cereals prohibited. . . .Persons or entities found guilty of
storing etc. punished by P200 fine and 6 months Imprisonment. . . .Such grains
found in possession of convicted shall be confiscated.^-
The shortage of carabaos, many having been slaughtered by the Japanese,
created a serious situation for a fanning population dependent upon this draft animal
The Governor also sought to limit the amount of meat consumed:
On Monday and Friday of each week, no livestock slaughtered for public or

private consumption. No meat served or consumed in eating places or private
homes. Food places prohibited service more than 2 courses in a meal, regardless
of number of eaters. . .
A restriction was placed on the number of carabaos permitted for weekly
slaughter: w. . . .In first class municipalities, not more than 2 carabaos may be
slaughtered; not more than 1 in all other municipalities
Cornering the meat market was also forbidden by provincial decree.^
And to cap this regulatory structure: "Buying and selling of fresh fish
outside of public market prohibited."^
The efficacy of these measures was vitiated by the export from the Province
of foodstuffs and other commodities seeking a more remunerative market elsewhere.
The Governor determined to adopt drastic measures in dealing with the situation. He
issued an executive order:
Exportation from Leyte of the following prohibited: Eice, corn, livestock,

leather materials, medicine, clothing materials and dry goods, hardware, and
shoes. Others may be prohibited from timeto time. Violatorpunished with
not less than 20 days imprisonment, or fine not less than P30, or both at dis
cretion of the Court. . . .6
^P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. March 28, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 21.
2B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Jan. 7, 1944.Prov. Ord. No. 11.
Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 4, 1944.Prov. Ord. No. 12.
*P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. May 27, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 23.
^P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. June 20, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 25.
Torres, Prov. Gov. Nov. 19, 1943. Prov. Ord. No. 2.
76
It need not be added that all contraband goods were to be confiscated. Not
long afterwards, the Governor decided on widening the scope of control. Not only
were enumerated articles banned from the inter-provincial trade. Henceforth: "No
person shall transport any articles without previous written permission of the Pro
vincial Governor or his representatives who shall be the Mayors. . . .
As a check on public adherence to these regulations, the Governor put all
sailing craft under close scrutiny. This system also provided an additional source
of revenue:
All parao or watercraft engaging in transportation of passengers and goods

for commercial purposes from any port of Leyte to outside shall pay fees to the
Provincial Treasurer or his Deputies. . . .Owner of sailboat leaving any other
port of Leyte without prior permit. . . .fined not less than P100, and license
cancelled.*
Supplementing this measure was another designed to trap violators:
For identification and more effective supervision and direction of sailboats

in the waters of Leyte and nearby provinces, registration of all kinds of craft
belotging to residents of Leyte and those that call in her ports. . . .All mayors
are authorized representatives of the Governor in their municipalities. . . .
Persons failing to comply shall be prohibited from sailing on any waters within
Jurisdiction of Leyte or call on any of its ports. . . .
In addition, the Governor directed the mayors to keep close tabs on the sup
plies in their respective localities to forestall unjustified shipments by local
producers and merchants.
Bevelatory of the difficulties involved in controlling the operations of the
merchants is the cry from the Mayor'of ^Tillaba: "Yillaba is in acute crisis of the
shortage of food because durihg- the time when I was in Tacloban for the Conference,
not less than 3,000 sacks of rice were sold by merchants to Cebu."^
No doubt, these merchants disregarded the embargo on grain shipnents because
they anticipated relatively modest profits in the local mart.
■*33. Torres,Prov. Gov. Jan. 10, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 10.
%. Torres,Prov. Gov. Nov. 19, 1943. Prov. Ord. No. 3.
^B. Torres,Prov. Gov. Feb. 11, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 15.
^Vicente M. Celoso, Mun. Mayor, Yillaba. Feb. 8 , 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
Baybay, too, suffered from the undercover selling operations of its mer
chants. The mayor wrote: "There is here a leakage of foodstuffs to outside places.
The police force is insufficient to take care of the situation. . . ."*
The food situation in Leyte was affected, to he sure, hy conditions in the
neighboring Visayan provinces, where "profiteers and racketeers bring food from
controlled provinces to uncontrolled provinces, to traffic in food commodities at
exhorbitant and unconscionable prices." To control this situation, the Inter-Visayan
Convention of 1944 called upon the Commissioner for the Visayas "to supervise and
coordinate the production, distribution and control of food in the various provinces
in the Visayas by means of whatever orders, rules or regulations he may deem proper
p
to issue."--The results were negligible.
To cope with the food shortage, the Governor attempted to gather data on
supply of cereals in the various communities. On the basis of figures regarding the
surplus or deficiency in the various communities, he would be able to direct the
distributive agencies along the proper channels.
Most of the mayors favored the idea of regulation. The Mayor of Naval wrote
to the Governor:
In compliance with your Memorandum to all Municipal Mayors, dated January 14,
1944, regarding the control of cereals in the municipalities, and to determine
whether there may be surplus or shortage of same, I have the honor to inform
that my survey. . . .disclosed. . . .that palay may not be enough to supply the
local need. . . . 1 am also doing my best to control the going out of palayfrom
this municipality including barrios to prevent serious shortages of same. . .
Hilongos flatly "prohibited producers and merchants to sell more than the
stated number of gantas of rice and corn or both to persons or families. " 4
Underlying this type of regulation was the suspicion that individuals pur
chasing more than they could reasonable consume were engaged in hoardirg, in order
Ipaterno Tan, Mun. Mayor, Baybay. March 8 , 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^Visayan Resolutions, op. cit., Resolution No. 5.
% . D. Copuaco, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Naval. Feb. 5, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^Rcmanico Ruiz, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Hilongos. Feb. 14, 1944. Hilongos Ordi
nance No. 1.
to "bid up prices and dump on a boom market. . ___
In addition to cereals, fish was another staple of the Filipino diet that
had gone way up in price. Villaba attempted to deal with the situation hy "prescrib
ing rules for disposing of fresh fish and controlling prices hereof .in answer to the
clamor of the people about the high prices of fish in this municipality. "•*■
Palompon went further. Its mayor decreed:
Whereas, in order to maintain self-sufficiency in fiBh for the people of

the municipality;
Whereas, exportation of fish has sent prices high and caused scarcity,
Therefore, exportation is prohibited.2
Several municipalities sought to conserve the remaining head of carabao by
forbidding their removal from the locality. Thus, Calubian "prohibited people to
transport carabaos outside of this municipality.
Unexpectedly, regulation of the movement of commodities backfired. The
Provincial Agronomist protested:
It has been noted by this office that the rigorous control of foodstuffs
movement from one municipality to another has in a way favored the bandits since
the producers are afraid to bring their stuffs to the town to their own homes
and to their relatives. The flow of cereals in the Eastern towns from Abuyog..
up to Carigara and Tacloban, but not going outside the province. . . ., should
at this time be liberated and fast propagated to the people in order to save the
most that we could from the clutches of the lawless elements who, as I presume,
are at present in the Eastern towns in dire need of food.^
The Governor was persuaded to accept this advice as sound. He circularized
the mayors to permit transfer of local commodities to neighboring municipalities
while continuing to stop the outflow from the Province. However, according to the
best information obtainable, the slippery "buy-and-sell" men wriggled through the
network of regulations, and the plight of the populace persisted, scarcely relieved.
In the whole scheme of regulation for the purpose of placing a greater quan
tity of basic conmodities within reach of the masses, the crowning structure was one
^Vicente M. Yeloso, Mun. Mayor, Yillaba. Jan. 27, 1944. Ord. No. 7.
2Alfredo Parrilla, Mun. Mayor, Palompon. March 14, 1944. Ex. Ord. No. 2.
^Lorenzo Mendoza, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Calubian. March 10, 1944. Ord. No. 1.
Berdan, op. cit., p. 2 .
of price control. One of the firet categories of ecmnodities to be so regulated,
was that of buildii% materials, nipa and rattan. The schedule of permitted, prices,
concluded, with the characteristic warning: "Buying or selling or offering at higher
prices punished by imprisonment of 1 to 6 months, fine not less than P 200."^
The published schedule of maximum prices of meats carried this stipulation
for the municipalities: "All ordinances fixing prices above these are ineffective."^
9
This schedule was revised upward a few months later.*3
The schedule of prices for cereals gave notice: "The procurement, purchase,
sale, distribution, and transportation of palay, rice and c o m shall be under the
supervision, direction, and control of the Governor. . . .
When the price schedule for vegetables appeared, it was specified that re
fusal to sell at the published prices was a violation. The Neighborhood Association
officers were designated as supervisors, charged with reporting violations.^
Finally, an administrative innovation appeared in the price schedule per
taining to fish. As an inducement to potential informers against violators, the
decree promised: "Special distribution of prime commodities may be given to those
who report any violator of this Ordinance."0
In conformity with gubernatorial directions, all of the municipalities
adopted some species of price-fixing ordinances, governing either the entire range
of commodities or a more limited schedule.
The Hindang ordinance is typical. Beginning with a preamble declaratory of
purpose, it proceeds to announce the posting of price quotations on a list of
cosmodities:
To maintain tvt™™ prices of prime commodities in Hindang, it is ordered

that. . . .all owners, dealers, middlemen of prime commodities must observe as
it is here listed, classified with their respective priceB. . . .'
1B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 18, 1943.Prov. Ord. No. 8 .

*B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 5, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 13.
^P. Salazar, Prov. Gov., May 27, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 23.
^P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. March 28, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 21.
5P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. May 27, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 22.
6p. Salazar, Prov. Gov. Prov. Ord. No. 25.
Tlsaias Milian, Mun. Mayor, Hindang. Jan. 31, 1944. Ord. Ho. l.
80
Palompon published an;ordinance "fixing the maximum selling price of food
stuffs and other prime commodities."1
And Albuera ordered the "controlling and fixing a tariff of conmodities of
prime necessity and other articles or materials."2
Naval*s ordinance was one "imposing a required price list for Prime Articles
and Commodities sold in the Municipality of Naval, and the penalties for violations
thereof
Babatngon enacted the regulation of the "price of fresh meat and fish sold
for consumption or any other p u r p o s e 4
And in two ordinances, Tacloban published the maximum prices of meat, fish
(fresh, salted, and dried), shellfish, palay, rice, corn grain, corn meal. Violators
were subject to imprisonment up to three months and/or fine not to exceed P100.6
With all these desperate measures of control, the bubble of inflation was not
pricked. In the words of the Provincial Treasurer:
With so much money in circulation, (it was Just a matter of the printing
machine and printing materials) and food and other personal necessities so scarce,:
naturally, following the law of economics, prices had to rise high.
J\ie won't inquire here whether economic "law" is descriptive or causative of j
phenomena^
. . ."".In Tacloban where in normal times rice could be bought at P6.25 (genu- .
ine money) a cavan, during the Japanese occupation the same kind of conmodity
was sold at PI,200 a cavan (Japanese peso) l . . . .However, in spite of the pre
vailing prices, the B & S (buy and sell) people never hesitated a bit to pursue
their nefarious trade. They paid taxes allright and they even went to the extent
of willingly and heartily paying for government-imposed fings fully knowingthat
the loss can be recovered in a wink of an eye, so to speak.6
The unworkability of the system within occupied Leyte was acknowledged by the
provincial authorities on the eve of the American landings: "After consultation with
the Provincial Board, Provincial Ordinances Nos. 21, 22, 25 repealed."7
Alfredo Parrilla, Mun. Mayor, Palompon. March 6, 1944. Mun. Ord. No. 1.
Êpitacio B. Barte, Mun. Mayor, Albuera. Feb. 1, 1944. Mun. Ord. No. 1.
~R. J>. Cqpuaco, Mun. Mayor, Naval. March 10, 1944. Ord. No. 2.
^Damasc Almacin, Mun. Mayor, Babatngon. Peb. 14, 1944. Mun. Ord. No. 2.
5V. A. Quintero, Mun. Mayor, Tacloban. Jan., 1944. Mun. Ord. Nos. 9 & lo.
6Jimenez, op. clt.. p. 3.
7Pastor Salazar, Prov. Gov. Sept. 19, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 27.
David Bernstein's investigation of war-time Manila indicates that its
economy vas no re stable than that of Leyte at the outset of the Occupation, hut de-
:
teriorated sharply in the final phase:
Economically, the country went from had to worse. . . .Prices were kept down ,
during 1942 and the first half of 1943, and a measure of control over the cost
of living, adequate for Japanese purposes, was maintained until well into 1944....
Severe shortages hegan to develop, especially in food and clothing. . . .In
late 1944, with the American landirgs in Leyte, all semblance of order in the
economy disappeared.
From December, 1941, to January, 1945, the cost of living increased 650 times
. . . .The price of a sack of rice Jumped as much as a hundred pesos a day.
Poor Belief:— To alleviate the widespread distress, the Japanese Military
Administration, the Manila government, and Visayan headquarters in Cehu made cloth
available, along with relief supplies of soap, cloth, sugar, salt and rice, to he
distributed at minimum prices.
The agency handling these relief consignments was the PRIMCO, the Leyte branch j
I
of the Prime Commodities Corporation. The PRIMCO apportioned its merchandise among
the Neighborhood Associations. It also supplied goods to special business associa
tions, such as the Leyte Federation of Betailers, and to the Prime Foodstuffs Asso
ciation. Such consignments were insufficient to allay the hunger pangs of the towns
people. Moreover, it was the general complaint that the mayors, municipal treasurers
and NA officers received a lion's share of these relief rations, which they hoarded
for personal use or disposed of secretly at black market prices.
Lieutenant Maglasarg, intelligence officer of the guerrilla in the Oimoc
sector, alleged it was common knowledge among the people of Ormoc that the puppet
mayor, Codilla, the puppet municipal treasurer, and the NA presidents hadconverted
to their private enjoyment the emergency rations intended forthepopulation at large..
A provincial Kalibapi officer returned from a visit to Cehu where he had ob
served the function! rg of the puppet government. He recommended to the Governor that
"arrangements he with PRIMCO officials so that government officials and employee*
receive the benefit of the ration of prime commodities."2 I
^Bernstein, op. cit. . pp. 160-1. 1

2Saturnino R. Gonzalez, Ex. Off. of Leyte Prov. Chap. of Kalibapi. March SO fl
1944. To: Prov. Gov. >M ,
82
The re comaendation made good sense to the Governor. Thus it was that PRIMCO
commodities rarely got beyond Tacloban— and in Tacloban beyond the favored officials
of the administration, and the local merchants.^
Control of Distribution:— If these several methods of placing more food in
the rice-bowls of the Filipino populace were unavailing, the Governor would try one
other. He would set up quasi-governmental corporations, vested with exclusive
authorization to purchase basic commodities frcm the producers, and place them on
the market at government prices. The other existing regulations regarding shipment
of commodities outside the Province, confining sales to the public markets, and for
bidding hoarding would act as a protective umbrella insuring the successful operation
of this semi-public corporation.
The Governor undertook the organization of retailers associations in the
municipalities under Tacloban's control as a means of regulating the marketing of
basic commodities. In May of 1943, he reported to the Japanese Administration:
In Leyte, we have now under our administration and control eight municipali
ties. . . .We have organized five retailers associations in Tacloban, Palo,
Tanauan, Ormoc and Dulsg. Soon, in others. It is requested that we be given a
constant supply of commodities in order that we can distribute to these munici
palities already under our administration and control.2
In the latter part of 1943, the merchants of the Province organized The Leyte
Federation of Betailers under the one Central association, and municipal branches.
The Central association received consignments of goods from the PRIMCO and other
sources, and distributed them at a 2$ mark-up of invoice value to the local associa
tions. In turn, the branch associations allotted their goods to their members at a
5$ gain. The retailers themselves were permitted a 20$ profit. In short, retail
prices to the consumer fluctuated within roughly a 27$ range of the basic PRIMCO
schedule as pegged by the Governor. The branch association had oversight of the
^Berdan, Prov. Agronomist. Interview in Tacloban, 1945.

*3. Torres, Prov. Gov. May 11, 1943. To: Director, Japanese Military Ad
ministration.
83
distribution of comnodities vithin a municipality. Goods -were rationed through a
coupon system— the customer purchasing coupons from the local association, redeemable
by the retailer.
The local associations were formed by groups of local merchants meeting to
gether , electir^ officers and choosing managers. The officers of the local associa
tions met and selected the officers of the Central association. As its principal
advantage, membership carried acoess to comnodities in the main unavailable to non
members. To be sure, the retailers also dealt in local goods bought through ordinary
channels. The Federation continued until mid-1944, when PRIMCO allotments ceased.
The local associations of dealers in particular commodities continued through
1944. Thus, the Governor directed the mayors: "Organize the butchers in your mun
icipality into an association to supervise effectively. This office will promulgate
rules from time to time. Butchers not members prohibited after association is
functioning.1,1
This plan was given teeth by the adoption of a provincial ordinance:
In municipalities where Butchers' or Meat Association has been organized,

under control of the government, no person except the association may slaughter
and sell to public. . . .Any person desiring to slaughter livestock for his
own consumption must apply to the Mayor for a license. . . .^
The Governor also encouraged the municipalities to organize their fish
dealers:
In those municipalities where the Fishery Cooperative Associations have been

duly organized, they and their agents alone are authorized to sell fresh fish
to the public, and all municipal licenses issued to individuals by said muni
cipalities to sell fresh fish are cancelled. Also illegal to act as labasero
(middleman) between fisherman and fish vendor.^
Governor Torres, in no sense hostile to business interests, had cause to
suspect the predatory character of local business dealings, with consequences
1B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 5, 1944. To: All Mun. Mayors.
^P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. May 27, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 23.
^P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. June 20, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 25.
84
prejudicial to the general pacification program. He instructed bis administrative
assistant: "Investigate activities of the Retailers Association in Tacloban, Palo,
Tanauan, Tolosa and Du lag. Report from time to time."
His colleague, Pastor Salazar, recognized the same vultures. He directed his
assistant: "Look into activities of Retailers Association in Carigara, Jaro, and
Alangalang."1
Nonetheless, these associations continued their operations vithout abatement.
Their directors •sere generally the NA district presidents, and hence felt invulner
able. What was needed was an agency empowered to buy up foodstuffs at fixed prices
in districts producing a surplus and distribute these foodstuffs in districts suffer
ing from famine— vithout permitting the racketeering elements to fasten their talons
on the limited supplies.
About the middle of 1943, the Governor organized the Leyte Corn and Rice
Dealers Association as an agency to purchase foodstuffs and allot them where needed
at controlled prices. Its Board of Control consisted of Governor Torres, Major
Reyes of the Constabulary, and a representative of the Japanese Military Administra
tion, with another Japanese serving as economic consultant. The Board of Control
designated the municipal mayors as local agents for purposes of purchase and distri
bution of rice. The mayors were expected to exhort the fanners directly and through
barrio lieutenants to sell their produce— at government prices.
The governmental rice purchases were financed through funds made available
by the Provincial Treasurer, credited to the municipal treasurers, and advanced by
the latter to the mayor and barrio lieutenants, functioning as agents. Rice so pur
chased was to be shipped to Tacloban for milling. Then, it was to be apportioned
among the NA units for sale at published prices. The Board of Control supplied
pick-up trucks, under convoy of Filipino constabularymen or Japanese MPs.
^Pastor Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov. December 10, 1943. To: Attorney Paulo
Jaro.
i
I
85 1
V.
i
il
The Leyte Corn and Bice Dealers Association did not prosper in its opera
tions. The fanners preferred to conceal their harvestings for domestic consumption
or sale on the "black market. In some areas, the guerrilla seized local stocks or
intimidated the fanners from selling to Tacloban's agents. The Board of Control
decided to reorganize the association, putting it on a firmer "business footing.

|
In February, 1944, the association metamorphosed into the Leyte Prime Food- i
|
stuffs Association, continuing under the Board of Control, "but now managed (at a j
I.
salary of P400 per month) by the Tacloban entrepreneur, Gerardo Villas in. The PBIMFA J
was capitalized at P100,000, with shares in P100 units on which dividends were to be
declared. The major shareholders were Margarito Bedona (P30,000) becoming president
i.
I
of the board of directors, the Chinese merchant T. Suya (P10,000), Villasin (P5,000) |
j
and the Tacloban businessmen Abesamis and Enriquez. Chinese dealers subscribed about
20$ of the capital in toto, and Japanese civilians about 5$. Shares in smaller lots
were purchased by subscribers outside of Tacloban.
The capital of the PBIMFA was employed as a revolving fund. Credits were
advanced to the municipalities for disbursement by the agents. After the agent had
completed his purchase, a checker sent by the manager, Villasin, came down to weigh
the palay or corn, go over the records, and then forward the grain by truck to
Tacloban.1
Provincial Ordinance No. 9 made known its powers (as further elaborated by
Ordinance Bo. 21): "The Leyte Prime Foodstuffs Association is the only entity autho
rized to procure, purchase, sell, exchange and distribute palay, rice, and corn. . . 7
Private individuals were notified that in reference to their private holdings of
grain: "All stocks of palay, rice and corn in excess of. . . .allowance must be sold
„2
to the Leyte Prime Foodstuffs Association or its agency. . . .
Âtty. Leon Bojas, Jr. served as checker. (Interview, Tacloban, 1945). I

2 f
P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. March 28, 1944. Prov. Ord. Bo. 21. I
i
86
The Governor intended to enforce recognition of the PRIMFA’s monopoly
privileges. He struck dovn Ordinance Ho. 1 of Hilongos: "Contradicts Provincial
Ordinance Ho. 9; no person or entity allowed to sell rice or corn to private person.
Sell through Prime Foodstuffs Association."'1'
He also conferred powers of domiciliary search upon the PRIMFA. To the
manager, he wrote:
. . . .You or your agents empowered to enforce provisions of Provincial

Ordinance Ho. 9. In exercise thereof, you or agents authorized to search any
dwelling, store, warehouse, or place suspected as depository of rice and corn
. . . .with right to confiscate same if it is found that they are in excess of
nseds of family of person storing same. . . .Search should he made in presence
of a peace officer. Should not he made unless strong evidence. . . .Personnel
must not ahuse power or annoy.
i-
It is worth noting that Governor Torres was still sensitive to the traditions j :
i
of domestic inviolability. j
The municipalities proceeded to establish branches of the PRIMFA to serve
their inhabitants. Thus, Yillaba notified the Governor: "I have appointed M r .
Flaviano Dornael as Agent of Leyte Prime Foodstuffs Association and at the same time
as Agricultural Inspector for the municipality, at rate of P40 per month, as per [
j
agreement we made during the conference in your office."3 If
And Biliran reported its contribution to the stocks of the PRIMFA: "Tengo
I
|
el gusto de dar conocimiento a Ud. que por mis gestiones a los vecinos de este Mun. I
de Biliran, he consiguido comprar 142 cavanes de palay, que se cargaron en varias I
embarcaciones para Tacloban, consignadoa LeytePrime Foodstuffs Association."^ j
Vicente Re dona, appointed by Mayor Avila of Tanauan as a purchasingagent in I
his municipality, called attention to an innovation. Aware that the farmers were
sorely in need of various conmodities unobtainable on the regular market, the PRIMFA
placed a limited supply of commodities (allocated by the PRIMCO) in the hands of the
1P. Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov. March 7, 1944. 1st Indorsement.

% . Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 19, 1944. To: Manager, Leyte Prime Foodstuffs
Association.
Vicente M. Veloso, Mun. Mayor, Yillaba. Feb. 8 , 1944. To: Prov. Gov.,
Item #7.
Êugenio Hierras, Mun. Mayor, Biliran. Feb. 9, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
87
agents. The agent -would then attempt to entice the fazmers to dispose of their
much-valued grain "by offering payment in hind up to 10# of the transaction's value.
Upon exhausting his stock of goods, the agent notified the mayor, who applied to
Tacloban for replenishment.
The ERIMFA succeeded in buyir^ but skimpy lots of grain during the months of
February, March and April, 1944. The coming of the new harvest in May was expected
to bring a decided upswing. And then an outrage was perpetrated. As the agents made
the rounds of their purchase territories, Japanese patrols appeared. With fixed
bayonets, the Japanese compelled the farmers to deliver over the bulk of their pro
duce . A large part of these seizures were confiscated outright, and the balance paid
for by the PBIMFA agents.
Completely discredited by these malpractices, the PRIMFA was shunned by the
people. Villasin resigned his managership in July, allegedly because he did not
wish to exploit his fellow Filipinos. The board of directors dissolved the corpora
tion soon after, realizing they had alienated the people. According to Margarito
Redona, the shareholders recovered 80# of the value of their investment— the balance
remaining on deposit with the Province.
In the minds of a great many people was the conviction that the ERIMFA and
its agents were in connivance with the Japanese, bent on spoliation. And the guer-.
rillas could say, "We told you so."
Successor to the PBIMFA was the BIBA (Bigasang Bayan or "Bice Mill of the
Town"), a governmental food purchasing and selling agency with headquarters in Manila.
At the Inter-Visayan Convention of 1944, it was resolved "to request the BIBA to
establish purchasing stations in every important area of food production and to cause
the Constabulary to take active part in making such purchases of foodstuffs."1
Its limitations were set forth in a note to the Governor: "... .Governors
who have informed the Office of critical food situation were advised not to depend on
îsayan Resolutions, op. clt.. Resolution No. 8 .
88
any possible assistance that BIBA can give them vith regard to furnishing their
shortage in rice. BIBA cannot give financial assistance to provinces requesting. " 1
The BIBA Agency in Leyte, capitalized at P50,000, commenced business on

2
August 1 , 1944. Municipal mayors, treasurers, barrio lieutenants and presidents and
leaders of the district and Neighborhood Associations -were designated as buyers of
the Agency. The palay was to be distributed only on authorization of Governor
Salazar, some going through NA channels.
The designation of Margarito Bedona as Manager of the Leyte branch of the
BIBA, along with the empowering of the NA officers, in many cases local business
people interested in their private gain, may account for the fact that the general
population did not materially benefit from the operations of this new agency.^
Japanese Intervention in Economic Affairs:— We have seen how the Japanese
showed some concern to alleviate the dire want of Leyte's population by assigning
emergency consignments of merchandise to the PBIMCO. It would be inaccurate to leave
the impression that they were consistent in this policy. In truth, whatever good
they conferred was decidedly cancelled out by their other carryings-on.
^ . Morelos, Chief Cleric for Commissioner of Yisayas. May 10, 1944. To:
Prov. Gov., Leyte.
2
Special Session of the Prov. B d ., Tacloban. July 31, 1944. Besolution No. 7,
3
The true character of the BIBA appeared in the functioning of its Manila
headquarters, as described by a Filipino Journalist:
"Thefirst months of 1944 saw Laurel wrestling with the problem of food. On
January 2 , he summoned absentee landowners of Central Luzon to Malacanan and told
them: 'We have got to get rice. If necessary, we must compel the planters to sell
to the BIBA. . . .We will strengthen the constabulary to keep peace and order and if
the constabulary can't do it, I will ask the Japanese Army to help me.'
"The people planted, but it was the Nips who reaped the harvest. The BIBA
was acreation of Laurel to use the Filipinos to corner the rice supply for the Japs.
"The first thing Boxas did on taking over the BIBA as EPB j/^conomic Planning
Boardy chairman was to allow the partial 'free entry' of rice into Manila with
license. The Japs then held all the supply in Manila but needed more. By means of
the license requirement, they were able to keep track of the rice entering from the
provinces.
" . . . .It vas at this time that hundred peso 'Mickey Mouse' notes vere •'e- *
sued. Stocked with bundles of this worthless currency, the Japs went on a buying
spree." (Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal in The Philippines, New York, A. A. Wyn, Inc.
1946, pp. 39, 63-4)
89
Confiscations and Priorities^.-- There was good reason to suspect that their
interest in increasing the crop yield of the Island was motivated "by a desire to
appropriate this increment for themselves. As the Provincial Agronomist testified,
the Japanese did provide troops at harvest time to protect the crop against guerrilla
raiders and "brigands. But— they seized about two-thirds of what they had been
guarding. Wrote a guerrilla official:
When the patrols of the Japanese became more intense, the stocks of food
suffered much. The Japanese were hauling them by the truck load without a
centavo of compensation to their owners, and what could not be hauled by them
was mostly set on fire.i
St. John accounted for Japanese confiscations:
Down along the coast and in the valley there was rice, and people got salt by
boiling sea water. But in the valley and along the coast the Japs could come,
and they took away rice and chickens and carabao— anything they wanted. The Japs
had to do that because they were not getting many supply ships in from Japan. . .
The Japs took cloth, too, to make uniforms and shirts and even to patch their
pants, yes, for a long time Jap soldiers on Leyte had to put patches in their
pants. . . .
The self-restraint shown at the outset by the couqueror all but vanished in
the closing portion of the Occupation. Personal stocks of rice, eggs, poultry and
pigs were grabbed and fish corrals plundered in an orgy of self-indulgence. And what
proved of more permanent damage to the Filipino population, the herds of carabao,
the indispensable draught animal in the native rice economy, were decimated to pro
vide meat for the Japanese fare, how futile were all the provincial administration’s
efforts to conserve and apportion more equitably when the Japanese were bent on
depredation.
Moreover, the Japanese asserted their priority rights to whatever produce
reached the public market . 3 And the Japanese commissary made certain that provisions
were sold to it at regulated prices, regardless of prevailing open market prices.
An official of the Bureau of Commerce, filled with sympathy for his indigent fellow-
Filipincs, indignantly advised the Governor:
1 2
Potente, o p . cit., p. 14 St. John, op. cit., pp. 121-2.
^Gunnison, op. cit., p. 74.
My observation on the vater front (muelle) in front of the public market
this mornlr^: There vas a baroto loaded with cassava (balanghuy) arrived to
the nmelle for sale. It vas purchased for P.35.a petroleum can by those whole
sale merchants from the market. Then they sold it to the public consumer for
P.00 a can. I further observed that contractors for the food of the Japanese
Army. . . .bought for. . . .P.42 a can. . . .There vas a poor woman as I know
because she vas poorly clad and pale and very thin vho vas trying to buy, ask
ing the same price given to the contractors. . . .These merchants did not yield
and even boasted that she can Just report the matter to the Governor or the
Japanese MP. I was moved to pity to this old woman and the buying public in •
general. . . .1
To be sure, the Japanese Administration could hardly be censured for protect
ing its commissary against mercantile extortionism. The wrath of the populace was
directed as much against the gougers amor® their fellow-countrymen, as against their
foreign military masters.
Abaca and Cojara Production^-- We have said that the Japanese were interested
in enlarging the gross output of Leyte's farmlands. Above all other crops, however,
they were anxious to restore the coconut and abaca plantations to their pre-war
productivity. Copra:and Manila hemp, the end-products of the harvestings, were of
prime value to the Japanese war machine. And Leyte's potential contribution to mili
tary requirements was considerable.
But the harvesting of abaca and coconuts for coprax, as well as their dis
posal on the regular market, were gravely deranged by the war. The acting mayor of
Abuyog, a center of abaca growing, pointed out that "abaca plantations may yet be
seen standing unharvested. The present disturbances in the barrios are the reasons
for this. . . ."2
Carigara noted that its abaca and copra also suffer "because until now they
are not bought and naturally the people do not enjoy the money coming from these
products."3
^L. M. Padaya. Jan. 18, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.

^leuterio Cana, Mayor, Abuyog. Sept. 22, 1942. Weekly Beport To: The
Prov. Gov.
3
Santiago Tonolete, Mayor, Carigara. Aug. 29, 1942. Weekly Beport To:
The Prov. Gov.
91
And Tolosa noted that:
Copra making, the gainful occupation by coconut landovners, la greatly

paralyzed. They abandoned the Industry for there is no buying and selling of
such products. . . .Hope making a nevly born industry. . . .But due to lack
of abaca fiber industry becomes negligible .•*•
Kawayan, in desperate plight, requested:
that the proper authorities concerned should set aside sufficient amount
from the relief fund for the purchase of copra and abaca so that the living
conditions of the people vill return to its normal condition.
Leyte’s branch of the NAFCO (National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation)
was closed by its manager, Gerardo Villasin, on orders of the Provincial Auditor be
fore the Japanese invasion of Leyte. The Corporation was a purely purchasing agency,
doing no processing work. The Japanese conmander in Tacloban ordered its reopening,
and Villasin complied. But the corporation failed to function as the people sold no
abaca to its representatives. The Japanese were reduced to rifling warehouses to
get what supplies were already on hand.
The Japanese were most intent on buying up all stocks of abaca and coprax
available in Leyte. They authorized a special corporation, the Daido Boeki Kaisha,
to handle these cozmodities in the Philippines. It established agencies in many of
Leyte’s municipalities. Quite often, a prominent local Filipino acted as branch
manager of the Daido. But the Japanese were too impatient to await the outcome of
their agents’ solicitations. They sent troops to seize large stocks of abaca and
coprax held in warehouses (often owned by Chinese middlemen) or cached.
Manila instructed Leyte's agronomist that " . . . .the present culture of
abaca. . . .will be maintained. . .
The provincial administration did all it could to further the efforts of the
Daido. The Provincial Treasurer conceived a scheme that promised success:
I was discussing with Mr. Sakay about gathering coconuts along the roadside
from Palo to Dulag, especially in places entirely abandoned by their owners.
1C. Colasito, Mayor, Tolosa. Aug. 2 9 , 1942. To: The Prov. Gov. (Weekly
Beport).
^Dionisio B. De La Pen, Mun. Secty. Oct. 1 2 , 1942. Weekly Beport To:
The Prov. Gov.
V f o ^ g° ^ goSaôêuBtin, Dir. plant & Animal Ind. Jan. 2 8 , 1943. To: Leandro
92
The idea is to employ laborers on a daily basis with a responsible capitaz

^/foreman/ to gather all the coconuts and when they are ready and placed along
the roadside, the Daido truck would haul them to Tacloban where the Daido will
take care of converting the coconuts into copra. . .
The guerrilla forbade all delivery of these products to the Daido, for they
were regarded as contraband of war. In general, they succeeded in frustrating the
Daido during 1942-43.
With the consolidation of its control, in 1944, the Tacloban administration
encouraged a maximum effort in the preparation of abaca and copra for marketing.
A municipal ordinance of Macrohon "prohibited the picking up of fallen nuts
from any coconut plantation by non-owners.
This type of regulation was designed to insure that the coconut meat would
be prepared for commercial uses and not to satisfy the hunger and thirst of the poor.
The Mayor of Malitbog informed the governor that under "instructions of the
agent of Daido, local business men under the leadership of Don Lorenzo Escano, for a
period of one week, have purchased: copra: 2,300 kilos; abaca: 1,000 kilos."^
In Villaba:
The Daido Office or agency was opened. . . .with Mr. Mulet and Mr. Esmas
as Agents. At present, the agency has purchased more than 5,000 kilos of
copra and about 100 kilos of abaca. The latter is rather slow because of the
difficulty of our propaganda to reach the mountains. . . .4
And the mayor of Ormoc advised the Governor that the "local branch of the
Company is taking charge of buying of copra and abaca in this municipality."5
Sogod promised recovery in these commodities, insofar as the guerrilla did
not hamper:
In the central, the making of coprax is going on; abaca stripping is not
yet done in full scale as plantations are mostly located in the mountains. . . .
^Prov. Treasurer Jiminez. May 12, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.

^Vicente D. Evarretta, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Macrohon. Jan. 30, 1944. Ord. Ho.3.
Sp.amon Yano, Mayor, Malitbog. Feb. 3, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^Yicente M. Yeloso, Mun. Mayor, Yillaba. Feb. 8 , 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
5Jose Codilla, Mun. Mayor, Ormoc. Feb. 21, 1944. To: Prov. Gov. |
93
I am positive that all people in Sogod can fully meet their obligations to
the government as this town is a coconut and abaca producir^ region. . .
The campaign for the production of abaca and copra vas intensified as the
plight of the Japanese war machine grew more desperate. In addition, the Japanese
distributed castor bean seeds through the Office of the Provincial Agronomist. It
was their intention to extract castor oil from the seeds for use as a dilute in avia
tion fuel, thereby "stretching" their limited supplies of this essential. But, if
we attach credence to the testimony of the Provincial Agronomist (of course, he in
tended to show after the war that his contribution to the enemy's war effort was
nil), the entire Japanese program of stimulating the production of plants suitable
for conversion to war materiel failed. Patriotism and fear of guerrilla reprisal
were sufficiently powerful negative incentives to overcome the money-making drive.
UtjL13.tie£: — Copra and abaca production were but the leading examples of
Leytean industries abandoned during the war, despite Japanese efforts to revive them.
Economic stagnation vas the general rule. Up and down the Island, from the sugar
centrals in the Ormoc district to the quarries near Villaba, from the lumbering and
saw-milling plantB in the Hinunangan-Abuyog district to the Jaro tobacco plantations,
all was forsaken. Even the fiBh corrals, source of a dietary staple for an insular
people, were in good part neglected, owing to the Japanese policy of confiscatinns. j
I
Only, here and there, a bit of fiber-weaving and pottery-making, insignificant in j
I
quantity, survived. j
In Tacloban itself, the Occupation authorities strove desperately to restore j
the utilities to operation. They ordered Gerardo Villasin, manager of the Eureka
Saw Mill, to reopen the plant, shut down in advance of the invasion. Villasin
asserted (in interview) that he was unwilling to operate the mill, knowing full well
that the Japanese would utilize the lumber for military purposes. He secretly
corsaitted sabotage (so he claimed), piercing the tubing of the steam boilers, causing
XMun. Mayor Labasta, Sogod. March 31, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
94
a steam leakage. Until the Japanese replaced the tubing, the mill could not operate.
And it vas not until considerable time had elapsed, specifically in August, 1944,
that the Japanese could procure nev tubing. The mill finally went into service in
September. But its dayB were numbered— the American bombings of Tacloban putting
a quietus on operations.
Ramon Gatchalian, managing the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant (owned by an
American partnership, louse and Chapman), discovered that there vas no resigning from
his Job. The Japanese army demanded resumption of operations. For Gatchalian,
service under the Japanese was distasteful enough. To make matters worse, the plant
was placed under the supervision of several officers, none of whom were engineers.
Contradictory orders and considerable confusion followed.
After a time, the plant was permitted to pass under the superintendence of
the Ieyte provincial government. But in 1943, all electric plants in the Philippines
were placed by the Japanese under the Taiwan Denroku Kaisa company, with central of
fice in Formosa. The Tacloban plant was administered by the company's Visayan branch,
located in Cebu City. Gatchalian received instructions to modify his bookkeeping
procedures to make them uniform with those of the company.
Shortage of fuel curtailed output of electricity and held down ice manufac
ture to token quantity. Most of the electricity generated was consumed by the Japan
ese army. However, a limited amount of wattage was permitted to privileged private
consumers.
Road transportation played an essential role in linking the provincial capi
tal with the interior towns and with those of the 'West Coast. The Leyte Land Trans
portation. owned by a Filipinized veteran of the Spanish-American War, Walter Price,
had been operating some 00 passenger and produce trucks at the outbreak of World War
II. Some had been commandeered by the USAFFE before the Japanese invasion of Leyte.
j
The remainder were seized by the Japanese Army, and Impounded. !
Federico V. Larraga, manager of the LLT, was called back to his post in June, l!
The Japanese turned over 17 trucks to him for operation on a limited schedule. The ;<
I
authorized routes were three: along the eastern coastal road south to Abuyog; alocg
the road, south-west to Burauen; and along the Alargalang-Jaro road to Carigara.
A trip entailed risk for the passengers almost from the time that service was rein
stituted, since guerrilla riflemen might shoot at them from behind cover. Accord
ingly, the Japanese generally provided troop protection.
In October, 1942, the Japanese handed over the management of the shrunken
LLT to the provincial government, with the Governor directly in charge. A Japanese
civilian, Nakamura, was appointed liaison between the Japanese army and Larraga’s
office. Whenever the Japanese requisitioned some trucks for transportation (in addi
tion to those from the LLT fleet permanently retained) they made payment in oil and
alcohol.
The trucks were overhauled in 1943, and the engine motors converted to burn
ing alcohol as fuel. Fuel shortage, in addition to increased guerrilla shootii^s
and ambuscades, threw the transportation schedule completely out of kilter. Trucks
ran intermittently, their loads often limited to high-priority goods and passengers.
In 1944, the Japanese need for transport was partially met by a shipment of
some 100 disassembled trucks. When pieced together, the trucks were reserved for
exclusive military use. For a while, the LLT was enabled to offer steadier service
to the civilians. Then, 6 of the LLT trucks were requisitioned for shuttling Fili
pino laborers to Japanese airstrips and other military installations, and for hauling
produce purchased by the Leyte Prime Foodstuffs Association. Sometime later, civi
lian service on LLT trucks was suspended completely.^
For overland traffic, only foot carriage remained. The Japanese had con
fiscated the horses that drew the traditional tartanillas. Filipinos desiring to
travel about the Island had recourse to small rowing and sailing craft— at the risk,
to be sure, of capture and investigation by Japanese or guerrilla water patrols.
Înterview— Federico V. Larraga, Tacloban.
96
MorataxyJPolicy: — Ho discussion of Japanese Influence upon the economy of
Leyte would he complete vithout a consideration of Japanese monetary policy. We had
occasion to point out that the Japanese-sponsored currency seriously hampered Fili
pino trade, and had a derivatively adverse effect upon governmental finances. Ve
direct attention to this matter again at this point in the interest of fuller under
standing.
The Provincial Treasurer of the Occupation period stated:
Various kinds of currencies were then in circulation in this province, es

pecially in the central and northern portions where the Japanese Army central
ized their forces. There were the genuine Philippine peso, the circulating
notes of the "banks--especially the Philippine National Bank, the emergency notes
printed in Taclohan to meet the cash shortage shortly "before the occupation of
the province, the emergency notes printed "by the guerrilla provincial govern
ment in the southern part of Leyte, those printed in Cehu and other provinces
before the occupation of the Visayas and Mindanao, and lastly, the Japanese oc
cupation peso which, in spite of the presence of the enemy, had hardly fallen
into the hands of most of the people.
While practically the first five kinds were the ones used by the business
people, the last or the Japanese Philippine peso rested in the pockets of the
government employees under the services of the Puppet Republic, their salaries
having been paid in that kind of 'money' which later turned out to be but sou
venirs. And considering the trend of the program of General MacArthur's Army |
in the liberation of the Philippines, the proportion of exchange reached as high !
as 1 to 15.1 |
The occupation peso was a fiat currency, backed only by the conmand that it
be received by the Filipinos in all their transactions, on pain of severe punishment. 1
In respect to the pre-war treasury notes in circulation, Japanese policy wavered from
permitting their acceptance on a par with Japanese notes to outright prohibition. The
policy not only varied in-lime, but also from municipality to municipality in accord
ance with the local Japanese commander's interpretation of his instructions. Towards
"emergency" currency, the Japanese attitude was clear and unmistakable. Circulation
t
of emergency currency, was banned, and possession of the same constituted prima !'
facie evidence of disloyalty towards the regime. J

I.
t
Prior to the Japanese invasion, wrote the Governor, f
I
most of the inhabitants had only emergency notes, for since January 1942, the I:
old government issued emergency notes. Upon arrival of the Japanese, circulation!*
Jimenez, op. cit.. p. 2 .
of these notes vas prohibited. This caused considerable difficulty and misery
among the people, especially the poorer classes vho had nothing else but emer
gency money. . . .1
Despite Japanese efforts to establish the acceptance of their currency, they
could not succeed in inspiring Filipinos to receive it. A Filipino merchant had no
choice but to make his reckoning in terms of Japanese pesos vhen he sold commodities
to the local garrison or to individual Japanese soldiers. But to a Filipino customer,
the merchant vould expect to be paid either in pre-var currency or at an enhanced
market price if the deal vas to be consummated in Japanese pesos. The Japanese sought
to stamp out this depreciation of their currency by punishing offenders, but the
O
practice of discriminating against Japanese pesos vas too universal to be prevented.
The Japanese also tried to wipe out currency speculation that developed vith
the adoption of the Japanese peso. They found themselves investigating cases of tri
angular currency deals, where speculators bought Japanese currency at a discount in
exchange for pre-war currency, and then resold it in neighborirg islands whenever the
black market in currency gave Japanese pesos a higher exchange ratio in terms of pre
war notes. Sometimes this trafficking became more intricate in its convolutions.
Perhaps the speculator might exchange his Japanese pesos for guerrilla currency on
favorable terms, dumping the guerrilla currency in areas where the Japanese patrols
did not penetrate. A variant procedure would be the barter of currency for rice or *
corn somewhere alorg this chain of clandestine transaction; with the subsequent sale
of the grain at handsome profit in the black market. The currency speculators sold
to the Filipinos of the interior vho required this money for payment of residence
and other taxes, and vho wished to have some of this tender on hand to present to
investigating Japanese patrols.
^•B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration
for the District of the Visayas.
o
In Manila, in January, 1945, ". . . .a single Philippine Treasury Certificat.
(one peso) vould bring eighty-five Japanese peBos in the open market. Filipino banks
were forced to remain open, and to use the worthless ’Mickey Mouse’ currency. Many
debtors gleefully paid off their debts during this period, and creditors were left
vith large sums of money which, vhen liberation came, had only a souvenir value.
98
Cipriano de Luna, a prosperous butcher in Tacloban before the war, saw the
Japanese occupation offering a golden opportunity for quick riches. He decided to
enter the money traffic as a speculator. He learned that the exchangeratio of pre
war Philippine treasury notes to Japanese money vas about twice as high inCebu City
as it was in Tacloban. So he sailed to Cebu City with a supply of pre-war money,
converted it into Japanese money, and returned to Tacloban. At hone, he converted
the Japanese money back into pre-war money and realized a tidy profit. An informer
finally reported him to the Japanese MPs.The MPs broke in, ransacked his house, and
seized P13,000 in Japanese money and P3,000 in "genuine" money. De Luna was also
Jailed for 3^ months, where he had time to brood over the’hasty”Japanese. His main
grievance against the Japanese, he admitted, was with their policy of holding every- j
One down to the same level; their unwillingness "to see people buy good food". j
Francisco Sanz, part owner of a sawmill in Abuyog, whose operations were in-
.i
terrupted, also tried his hand at speculation. He sought to take advantage of the
enhanced value of "genuine" money in the black market of Cebu. At the beginning of
1944, the exchange rate was P3.15 in Japanese money to PI in pre-war notes in Taclo-
i
ban, but P5.50 in Cebu. To cloak his operations, he became a dealer in mats, and
also realized quite handsomely on the turnover. In time, he thought up a new twist—
the purchase of rice in Cebu with the proceeds from the sale of mats. His dreams
for riches were dissipated by Japanese detection, the seizure of P5,000 in Japanese
currency and P2,000 in pre-war notes, and his incarceration.
Some of the municipal mayors, treasurers and other local officials seized
the opportunities presented by public office to traffic in Japanese currency. Ac-

:|
cording to Attorney Hibo, the Japanese-appointed mayor of Jaro (Gualberto Lastrilla)
was removed from his post at the close of 1943 because suspected (without confirm!Eg jf
fi'i\
, , , - - - — . - - - .. - ■ ,- - - - - . . . — ,_ _ _ _ _ _ — i i ij
-
For lending institutions this was to mean near-disaster after victory; for usurers l|
it vas a well-earned setback." ]j!
(Bernstein, op. cit. . pp. 160-1)
is:
H
j!i
ill
99
evidence) of having secretly engaged in exchange of Japanese currency for pre-war
currency— on a profitable "basis.
Nicasio Vivero of La Paz, another would-be currency trafficker, vas also
seized. He stated that the Japanese rounded up about 200 suspects in a grand catch
early in 1944, vith about 50 placed under detention. Among these were the Provincial
Treasurer himself, Jlmdnez, and Cashier A. 0. Castillo of Leyte's bank agency, vho
enjoyed unique opportunities for carrying on this enterprise.

vS
Governor Torres himself vas obliged to intercede in behalf of the arrested
speculators. To the Chief of the Japanese Military Police he dispatched a plea,
mingling candor vith cajolery:
In regard to the persons nov under your custody for exchanging Japanese
notes for Philippine notes not at par value. . . .permit me to say:
I am sure their act. . . .vas in no way inspired by any anti-Japanese
motive. They were led solely by the desire for gain to reap whatever profit
they could under the circumstances. . . .Our tolerance in the part of the cir
culation of emergency notes, old Philippine notes, and more recently circulating
notes. . . .opened the way to a natural vorking of lav of supply and demand the
moment Japanese military notes increased disproportionately in number vhen the
landing fields vork and the buying of military necessities vent under vay. . . .
Most. . . .of those under your custody had never. . . .acted in any vay
contrary to Japanese policies. . . .Many of them have had their houses offered
to Japanese officers, not to say their having helped gather to sell military
and other supplies for the Anny and Navy from the interior to the town. If
they erred, they erred in good faith. . . .to take advantage of a little profit,
they being businessmen or persons at present vithout employment. . . .The people
have an ever present fear of the military police, and if they notice that these
Filipinos are released after a good stiff and stern warning, the people will
certainly be reassured of Japanese good will, magnanimity and benevolence. .. .
. . . .We can make use of these people more so nov as instruments of unifi
cation and pacification. I am sure they are so frightened nov and vill be more
than villirg to heighten their efforts in explaining the sincerity of Japanese
intentions. . . .
. . . .1 give my personal assurance that they will from nov on take the good,
straight and narrow path. . . ,1
The Japanese MP conmand acceded, though not vithout detaining some of the ac
cused over 90 days. It is highly doubtful whether the incarcerated developed any
deep appreciation of Japanese "magnanimity*'. But it is certain that this punishment
served as an effective deterrent to the "big-time operators". Henceforth, only the
. Torres, Prov. Gov. Jan. 27, 1944. To: The Chief, Military Police,
JIF, Tacloban.
petty exchangers vho could more easily avoid detection dared to "err in good faith"
and "take advantage of a little profit".
Banking:— Leyte's chief financial institution, the provincial agency of the
Philippine National Bank, followed the course of the..business houses in closing dovn
before Japanese troops arrived. Ruperto R. Visaya, Assistant Agent of the Leyte
branch, vas ordered to return to his post by the Japanese conmand. According to
Visaya, the Japanese took this step as a propaganda move. As the symbol of economic
stability, a functioning bank vould act as a magnet, drawing the business elements
back to tovn, and diffusing a general feeling of confidence, and recreating the all-
important "normalcy".
Visaya recalled some 15 or 20 people depositing about P10,000 vithin a fort
night, and about 5 depositors withdrawing an aggregate of PI,000 vithin that same
period. Then, suddenly, the Japanese command reversed itself. It ordered the clos
ing of the bank, and the restoration of the books to their status before the Occupa
tion. The money just deposited vas returned to the depositors, vhile those vho had
•withdrawn sums were ordered to redeposit whatever vas not already spent. Behind this j
reversal was the Japanese determination to outlaw all transactions not conducted in [
l
the newly introducted Occupation peso. i
i
The bank remained closed through 1942 and the first half of 1943.
At the edd ;
i J;
of June, Governor Torres received notice from Manila: "We are pleased to inform you j
i
that we are nov ready to re-open our Leyte Agency.Weshallappreciate ifyou will j
i !
act as our representative in officially reopening the Agency. . .
The bank reopened in July, but adopting a very stringent policy vith respect
to withdrawals. The Leyte Provincial Hospital carried on a protracted correspondence
vith the Manila office before it vas advised: I

I
ama ■ 1 I I I I ■ — I ■ I.— ™ . . -I. — I II » I I I I »
i
j
^V. Carmona, PreB. of Philippine NationalBank. June 25, 1943. To: Prov. j
Gov. Torres. ij
!
•<
ij
21
ij
ii
El
101
Withdrawals can be made from the deposits of charitable institutions,

such as hospitals, with the limitation of P300 monthly. If amount is more
than P300, a license is necessary which should be forwarded through the
Philippine National Bank to the Bureau of Financing, Manila. 1
A. G. Castillo, cashier at the Leyte Agency, found deposits to be infrequent.
This was understandable, business having slumped. Some increase in the rate and size
of deposits occurred in 1944. The great expansion in the use of Filipino laborers
in Japanese military installations increased -the volume of currency in circulation.
The slight pick-up in business activity was reflected in an increase of banking
operations.
For the bulk of the population, the Leyte bank had no utility. The residents
of the interior dealt in occupation pesos as little as possible. Only in Tacloban,
center of the Japanese Military Administration, could the bank provide an occasional
service.
Labor Contjrol: We shall now briefly dwell upon one final aspect of Japanese
influence upon Leyte’s economy. And in this instance our subject extends beyond the
domain of production and exchange and trenches upon -the area of basic human rights.
For we have in mind the Japanese call upon Filipino manpower.
Labor gangs for carrying out heavy, unskilled jobs about the garrisons and
in other military installations remained a constant need for the Japanese from the
very inception of their occupation. In fulfilling their requirements, they turned
to the Governor and to the mayors of the towns where they had established garrisons.
At first, most Filipinos were reluctant to volunteer work. They dreaded unnecessary
contact with Japanese taskmasters. Moreover, the purchasing power of the Japanese
peso given them in remuneration was too limited to supply incentive. Only through
the employment of coercion, applied directly by the municipal officials at first,
and indirectly later through the leaders of the Neighborhood Associations, did the
Filipinos meet their quotas.
1 D. Pekson, Exec. Vice-Pres., Phil. Natl. Bank. Oct. 25, 1943. To:
Prov. Gov.
102
As the standard of living for the inhabitants Of Leyte slumped, the Filipino
became more amenable to the appeal for laborers. It was not the direct wage, even
then. The bait consisted of a small portion of rice, served gratis to the laborers.
And for the starved residents of inflation-afflicted Tacloban, membership in a labor
squad at a Japanese installation in the interior sometimes offered a chance to buy
rice from the local farmers at a better price.
In harmony with the Japanese injunction against sloth, and. also to maximize
output, the Province required full employment of Filipinos. It adopted an ordinance
whose preamble read: "To inculcate in the people of Leyte labor and industry and to
do away with indolence. . . ." <
Then it proceeded to order:
All persons, male and female above 15, during working hours of from 6 to 12
A.M. and 2 to 5 P.M., except Sundays and holidays, must work in and out of home.
Leafing, idling, gambling, gallivanting around the streets of the town or else
where between these hours by any person with no visible means of support and
for no other purpose but to pass time idly is prohibited.
What was to be construed as work: "Work shall include any kind of manual or
mental work or labor either at home and its premises, in farms, industrial plants,
public work projects or employ in government offices."
For females "household work" came within the purview of the permissible.
Somewhat wryly, the ordinance-makers saw fit to add: "Mahjong and such games are
not work."
"Persons physically unfit, temporarily sick or suffering" were exempted from
the strictures of the law. Detection of violators was committed to the Presidents
and Leaders of the Neighborhood Associations. And violators were promised a term at
hard labor, running from 1 to 6 months, or a fine of P20 to P60 at the Court's dis
cretion. In the event of penury, the convicted were liable to a subsidiary term of
imprisonment
~B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 21, 1944. Prov. Ord. No. 17.
The purpose underlying the ordinance vas the procural of laborers for public
projects. Administration classification of a person as "idle” rendered, him liable
for service on these projects, on pain of detention in the local Jail.
The Japanese worked feverishly in 1944 to build up their defenses. Accord
ing to Attorney Antonio Benedicto,^ Provincial Secretary under Governor Torres, the
Labor Conmission in Manila sent down field men to help recruit Filipino laborers
for work on landing-strips, roads, barracks, and docks. These laborers received
Pl.50-P2.00 per diem, plus a small rice ration. The NA districts applied pressure
on their members to "volunteer". To set the proper example, the provincial officials
themselves volunteered service.
Tacloban reported:
On the 17th and 24th of last month, June, government officials and em
ployees, national, provincial and municipal, rendered voluntary labor at the
San Pablo, Burauen, airplane landing field, headed by the Hon. Pastor Salazar,
Prov. Governor and the Hon. Bernardo Torres, Director, Bureau of Agricultural
Development. . . .2
Subsequently, the provincial officials and employees in Tacloban set aside
Saturdays of each week as the occasion for rendering voluntary labor on the landing
fields. When Salazar became Governor in March, 1944, he increased the tempo of HA
labor recruitment.
The Provincial Board took cognizance of the services rendered by the NA.
Governor Salazar informed the Board that it is his desire to give a sort
of a bonus to the Presidents of District Heighborhood Associations for their
services in helping the Government in its various activities, particularly in
the recruiting of laborers. It was moved and seconded that each District
Neighborhood President should be given P25.00 bonus. . . .and that the said
amount shall be taken from the proceeds of the Leyte Agricultural and Indus
trial Fair.3 “4
Grudgingly, the Filipino masses came to accept this requisitioning of labor
as an incident of the Occupation— while noting that their wealthier countrymen often
Înterview: Tacloban, November, 1945.

^Prov. Auditor Sta. Cruz. July 6 , 1944. To: Auditor General, Manila.
^Special Session of the Prov. Board at Tacloban. Sept. 15, 1944. Resolu
tion No. 9.
4Shaplen, op. cit. , pp. 50-52.
104
hired substitutes, ■•with the connivanceof the Be igKborhood Association leaders. But
their attitude of resignation was not carried to the point of overlooking a certain
shocking incident.
In February, 1944, the puppet Governor received a memorandum from Commis
sioner for the Yisayas, Gullas:
. . . .Cooperation requested for raising manpower. . . .in Leyte. . . .where

persons furnished with certificates issued by the Japanese Army are and will be
engaged in raising laborers to be employed for abaca plantations and construc
tion of military facilities in Mindanao. . . .the conditions of employment beitg
daily pay of about B2 .20, free board and lodging, and the supply of daily ne
cessities at moderate prices. . . .
The terms of employment as set forth do not appear especially onerous.
However, this modest statement concealed the fact that the laborers recruited would
be separated from their families, and that the purchasing power of the Japanese cur
rency was very limited. The collaborationist mayors and BA officials of Carigara
and Capoocan undertook to recruit some 500 laborers as a first installment. A mass
meeting of the towns populations was called, at which time Japanese soldiers and their
Filipino agents surrounded them and "shanghied" their quota aboard vessels lying off 1
5
Carigara Bay. Some of the Filipino captives Jumped overboard and were drowned. The )
affair was an extremely heinous one, and went far to poison Leyte's population
against the Japanese.
With an economy normally diversified, self-sufficient, and prosperous, its
wealth extracted from the bounty of land and sea, Leyte might have been a most
valuable accession to the Japanese Empire. Had the conqueror displayed sagacity in
his occupation policy, truly pacifying the people and inspiring confidence, perhaps
a majority of the Island's population would have speedily returned to pre-war occupa
tions . Harvests of plenty would have been reaped, corrals teaming with fish would
have been scooped up, timber would have been cut, and quarried worked. The Filipino
inhabitants would have met their own requirements and had an ample surplus to satisfy
^Commissioner for the Yisayas, Paulino Gullas. Feb. 10, 1944. To: The
Governor, Tacloban, Leyte.
I
i
105
^radTtt^LTy, the derangemetts^r<^^ of war would hare been adjusted.
’^V;- But the;Japai»se ôTOîoj^',^ their new possessions, "killed

g - i: ' 'f\..''"' -' ; > . ' v 5 . ^ 1? i c . ' : . :-' ^ i: / ' ‘ ;V :' ■ ■•'.'■ ' ■” •
the goose that vlay ^tbe g o l d e n V l ^ i t U t p i r i n g ; and then
hatred, the Japanese^ deterred the inhabitants of Leyte from returning to their homes
and occupations and;aettllhg; :dbvh to a "noxmal" routine. Instead, they,, listened to
the vords of the guerrilla and remained in their evacuation places. Agriculture and
industry languished despite-all the synthetic schemes to revive them.
Bnder such‘
;conditiohs,'only the leeches, the unscrupulous profiteers on the
misery of their countrymen, could benefit. All government efforts to regulate pro
duction and distribution in the interests of the many failed. Japanese monetary
policy, coupled vith the practice of wholesale confiscations, reduced the life of
the population to wretchedness. And the final upshot vas one foreseeable and pre
ventable: hunger for the Filipino and nothing but unrest for the imperial ruler.
Thought Control
We have studied the ramifications of Japanese sovereign control over Leyte
in their effect upon the government and economics of the Island. We are now pre
pared to appreciate the Japanese program to win over the minds of the population.
To succeed in their objective, the Japanese were forced to take account of
several unfavorable factors. First. there vas a stubborn Filipino pride, rooted in
a long history of revolt against would-be conquerors, and nurtured by the increasing
measure of self-government granted by the United States administration, that resented
subjugation to Japan. Second, there was the tradition of democracy, of mixed Malayan
and American parentage, gravely threatened b y the Japanese authoritarian; spirit.
Thirdly, a feeling of revulsion against terroristic methods/ implanted in the Fili
pinos during the thirties as they followed the gory course of Japanese imperialism 1
in newspaper accounts, preceding the coming of the Japanese to the Philippines.
And fourthly. the starvation and disease that stalked the land in the wake of the
Guerrilla Resistance Against The M ighty im perial Nippon
Forces Is Just As Futile And Foolish As—
**Barking A t The Moon.”
var were attributed "by the people to Japanese rule.
It vas up to tiie Japanese Military Administration to counteract these un
friendly notions. Hatred against Japan must he displaced hy aggression manifested
towards the United States. And through a we 11-functioning thought-control machine,
warm, feelings towards Japan and loyalty to the new regime must be generated.
The Japanese realized that they must enlist the Filipino leadership of
Leyte in support of their program. For obviously, if the admired men of the Province
were disposed to go along in amity with the new rulers, the masses might be induced
to do likewise. We shall turn to an examination of the instruments fashioned under
the Japanese direction for this purpose; the "patriotic" organizations, the propa
ganda comaittees, and the press. We shall direct special attention to the "Philip
pine Independence" campaign waged by the Japanese and their particular efforts to
"attract" the guerrilla. Very important, also, in this context, we shall look into
the indoctrination carried on in the public schools. We shall round out this sec
tion by considering the status of the Church under Japanese domination. In passing,
we shall take note of the state of public health in occupied Leyte, a matter which
has considerable bearing upon the subject under review.
Varieties of Propaganda: ~
WeighborhoodJl£sociations: — The goal of Japanese policy in the Philippines
was the restoration of tranquillity so that Filipino resources and manpower might be
harnessed to the imperial machine. The high command understood that without the
active cooperation of the Filipino people, its program was destined to founder. It,
therefore, called upon the Manila government to underwrite the formation of people’s
front organizations that would initiate, oversee, and energize the execution of
Japanese-desired projects. j
One of the chief organizations established by the central government to
promote the Japanese Hew Order was the Neighborhood Association. TheExecutive Order
creatir^; it declared:
w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission. ^
There shall he created a system of district and neighborhood associations
. . . .for the purpose of providing means for mutual cooperation and self-
protection and thus insuring the stability of the life of the people, through
the maintenance of peace and order in area or areas under the Jurisdiction of
such district or neighborhood associations .V
Each municipality had its own Association, divided into "districts”, "neigh
borhoods", and "families", with their respective presidents and officers appointed
by the mayor. The NA worked to identify Filipino patriotism and civic spirit with
the support of the regime. "Neighborhood" meetirgB were run as morale-building af
fairs, proclaiming the latest Japanese military victories and the general triumphs
of the fascist Axis, distributing propaganda materials, and adopting local projects
for the furtherance of .the over-all program.^
Foremost on the NA program was the cultivation of vacant lands and the in-
3
crease of production generally. The provincial administration stood solidly behind
the NA in this part of his program, spurred on by higher authority.
The Director of Local Governments notified the Governor of Leyte:
Under Section 2(c) of Ordinance No. 1 on the control and distribution of

rice and corn, promulgated by the President of the Republic ofthe Philippines
on November 20, 1943, provincial governors. . . .are 'directedto organize or
complete the organization of district and neighborhood associations. . . .'
The organization. . . .becomes Imperatively necessary in view of Section 13
which provides 'that, whatever other intermediaries may be employed, the of
ficial district and neighborhood associations shall be utilized in the distri
bution of cereals among the ultimate consumers. ' . . . .
Leyte’s'Home Guard" militia, charged with guarding the town centers against
guerrilla midnight forays, detecting anti-Japanese espionage, and helping the police
■*-J. B. Vargas. Sec. 1 of Executive Order No. 77, dated Aug. 7, 1942, amended \
March 17, 1943.
Congressman Filomeno Montejo (serving as president of HA district No, 6 , in
Tacloban) stated that Tacloban's district presidents were assembled at a closed ses
sion whenever an official of the central government or a visiting Japanese officer of
rank arrived in Leyte. There, they were briefed on latest policy, and invariably
lectured on the futility of Filipinos' expecting an American return to the Islands.
Â number of municipalities adopted ordinances resembling that of Albuera:
". . . .in view of the scarcity of dry goods due to the present war situation. . .
every Neighborhood Association is compelled to engage in weaving industry within the'
Jurisdiction of this municipality under the following provisions:
"1. That every NA is compelled to make at least one loom or hablanan for
weaving cloth, baling, etc. out of any local material. . . .
"2. That said loom shall be used by the members of the NA by rotation. . , *
(Epitacio B. Barte, Man. Mayor, Albuera. March 9, 1944. Mun. Ord. Ho. 2.)
I
protect life and property against criminals, vas assimilated into the HA structure.
Schedules of night vatohes and patrol "beats" with HA male householders assigned to
duty roster? became standard operating procedure in every municipality, boasting an
HA organization.
"The people in the towns of the interior," wrote the Governor in April,
1943, "especially in Tanauan, Dulag, and Tolosa organized themselves into vigilantes
. . . .Home Guards of Ormoc Joined forces with the Japanese to protect the town.
And in Tacloban,2 by direction of the Governor, "all members of the HA. . , .
on duty as guard or on patrol can search, Investigate, detain, and arrest any sus
picious character, and should immediately report to the Japanese MP, the Constabulary
. . . .for action."3
The Mayor of Tacloban, constantly under the direct scrutiny of the Governor
and the functionaries of the Japanese Military Administration, strove to outdo all
others in making his municipal NA an elite organization. He directed his district
presidents:
Upon request of Capt. Nankashima, Adjutant to Col. Kavazoe, instruct your

leaders to be present at the athletic grounds this afternoon, as there will
be roll call, and failure to attend may warrant such action as imposition of
fatigue, etc. Those leaders who are too old for training in the use of bamboo
spears would be required to name substitutes for them who are younger and
strorger, but must be no less than 16 years. Besides leaders, you are re
quested to send to the athletic field this afternoon your bamboo brigade con
sisting of 16 members, the organization of which has been the suggestion of the
Governor. Leaders and 16 more from each district are being trained in order
that they may in turn become trainers of the other members of the district, in
order that in the celebration of Bizal Day, you will have available men who can
compete in the bamboo’ spear contest and in the parade to be held that day.
From now on, the neighborhood patrols should carry bamboo spears together
with wooden clappers and the identification number of the district instead of
night stickB. A sufficient number of bamboo spears shall also be kept in the
district guardhouse for use in case of emergency.
Capt. Nakashima requests that you require 20 of your members, men or women
to attend Badio Taiso (mass calisthenics) every morning at 7 at the wharf. . . .
On December 30, there will be an inter-district competition of Badio Taiso. . . f
Âctg. Gov. Salazar. Eeport of Activities: April l-0ctober 31, 1943. To:
Commissioner of Interior through Director of Local Goveriraents.
^Valuable information on subject supplied by Atty. Emilio Benitez, Pres, of
HA Dist. #4, Tacloban.
Îsyor Quintero, Tacloban. Aug. 12, 1943. To: All Dist. & HA Pres.,Tacloban
^Mayor Quintero, Tacloban. Dec. 17, 1943. To: All Dist. NA Pres. 1
109
On Japanese orders, "the HA. undertook the sponsorship of a compulsory program
of mass calisthenics, known as Radio Taiso. The Japanese hoped to instil an alert
ness and agility into the general population, perhaps with the intention of utiliz
ing it as a supplementary defensive force in the event of invasion. Psychologically,
such mass activity might also serve to build up an esprit de corps, enabling the
Filipino better to withstand privation and identify the corporate interest with the
ruling regime.
The regulations promulgated by Palompon are typical:
Badio Taiso exercises must be executed daily at the most convenient period
of the day for at least 15 minutes under the auspices of each District HA.
The District Presidents and Leaders are held responsible for the execution.
Each able-bodied member of the family shall take exercises by rotation in !
accordance with a schedule which should be adopted by the Leader of each Asso
ciation consistent with the general plan prescribed by the District NA Presi
dent. A minimum of 10 persons a day is required for each HA. Each head family
member must be represented.
Disciplinary measures may be taken against any District HA President or
Leader who disobeys the orders in connections with execution.
Any member of the NA who fails to comply with Badio Taiso rules shall be
punished by Imprisonment of not less than 3 hours nor more than 48 for every
offense committed, as may be reported by the District NA President concerned
to the Office of the Mayor
Those Filipinos who were indolent by temperament chafed under this Spartan
training course.
While exemptions were not permitted, a numbe-*' of the wealthier families were
able to hire substitutes to replace them at this annoying activity— of course, with
the connivance of the NA Leaders. The substitutes, generally paupers, were glad to
earn a bit of pocket money, while the wealthy might indulge their morning drowsiness
unmolested.2
In the course of time, the Japanese Military Administration assigned special
duties to the NA— in particular rendering assistance to the Japanese garrison as i
laborers and clearing the vicinity of the main roads of vegetation that might furnish 1
Âlfredo Parrilla, Mun. Mayor, Palompon. March 9, 1944. Exec. Ord. Ho. 1.
information given by Bamon Esperas, NA Supervisor February-October, 1944,
Interview— Tacloban— 1945.
shelter for guerrilla sharp-shooters. Occasionally, msmbers of the NA might accom
pany collaborationist officials on Japanese raids against guerrilla hide-outs in the
hills. In any given municipality, the character of the NA, the enthusiasm with which
it carried out its assigned mission, vas largely determined by the attitude of the
mayor and his principal officials. To galvanize the NA outside of Tacloban and
coordinate activities throughout Leyte, the Governor appointed Ramon Esperas NA
Supervisor in February, 1944. Esperas stated (in interview) that the burden of his
duties allowed no time for field work.
Membership in the NA was more than a matter of unrequited civic obligation.
Tangible advantages redounded to members in good standing. Chief among these ad
vantages was a position of privileged priority as recipient in the distribution of
basic commodities, particularly rice, sugar, salt, and Japanese cigarettes.
In this connection, we note a complaint from the mayor of Palo:
In order that the NA of Palo enjoy the same privilege granted to those of
other- municipalities, furnish the undersigned sufficient sacks of rice to be
distributed among members of the NA as follows:
46 to Poblacion associations; 12 to San Joaquin; 6 to Tibak; 10 to Guinda-
puaan; 8 to Pawing.
We have already intimated that serious abuses as well as petty fraud accom
panied NA administration of rationed commodities. Illustrating the meanness of NA
cozenage is the following warning issued by Tacloban*a mayor:
This office has been informed. . . .that some presidents charged 30^ for
a kLl>of sugar in the last distribution instead of 25^ as agreed upon previously
. .. .If such amount is to be considered a contribution of said members to the
district funds, consent of members is first needed.2
Ostensibly a mutual aid organization, a banding together of the citizenry
in democratic fashion for self-defense against dangerous elements and for enlarging
its food supply, the NA was potentially an instrument for bringing the entire popu
lation under the immediate control of the Japanese Military Administration. Its
■kj. Alvarado, Mayor, Palo. Jan. 18, 1944. To: G. Villasin, Mgr. Leyte Fed.
of Retailers.
2Mayor Quintero, Tacloban. Dec. 17, 1943. To: All Dist.NA Presidents.
officers, the "neighborhoo&'U leaders <and the "district4* presidents vere the selectees
of the mayor, men upon vhom he could count to do the bidding of the administration.
Through this organization, the governor and the Japanese could briig pressure to
hear on the masses and ferret out the uncooperative.
Hierarchical in structure, the authoritarian tendencies of the HA vere made
more apparent in. 1943 as a result of amendments to the fundamental Executive Order
establishing it. Henceforth, leaders of the "neighborhood" unit vere to "report im
mediately to the president of the district association the transfer of residence of
a family in the area or areas under his Jurisdiction or the arrival of a nev family. '}■
It vas incumbent upon the "district" president to notify the mayor as it vas
upon the head of a household to report in the first instance to the neighborhood
leader. Moreover, the presidents of the district associations vere charged vith
responsibility for taking a semi-annual census of the inhabitants every June and
December. On the basis of such precise information, the mayors vould be able to
advise the Japanese commanders on the exact manpover available for labor and defense
duties and eventually, perhaps, for conscription.
The principle of leadership responsibility for violations of regulations vas
also established by the proviso:
In case any resident vithin an area. . . .established connection vith... .

or conceals or assists. . . .a bandit, the said resident shall be punished
in accordance vith existing lavs or orders; and the leader of the neighborhood
association as veil as the president of the district association shall be
punished. . . .if notvithstanding knowledge of said fact, they failed or re
fused to take the measures necessary for the apprehension of such criminal
element.2
As might be expected, most Filipinos vho served as district presidents, as
veil as the municipal mayors, denied (in post-war intervievs) that the HA ever
e t
Jorge B. Vargas, Chairman of Exec. Commission. March 17, 1943. Exec. Ord. j
Ho. 137, Sec. 5
2^., .,
Ibid., Sec. 4, 6, 7, 11
amounted tb more than a paper organization. Such protestations of innocence former
guerrilla leaders vehemently rehut, though concedicg that the earnestness and effi
ciency of the BA varied from one municipality to the next. The best opinion seems
to he that the BA stepped up its activities in 1944, carrying out the census of
householders in the tovns, drawing upon its rosters to recruit laborers for service
in Japanese installations, attempting to intimidate those on guard duty into report
ing the presence of disguised guerrillas and their sympathizers, and using the oc
casional distribution of commodity rations as an additional coercive lever.
The Ealihapi£-- Closely associated with the Neighborhood Associations, and
in a certain sense superseding it, was the Kapisanan sa Faglilingkod sa Bagong
Pilipinas or " K a l i b a p i O f the Kalibapi, one student of wartime Manila has written
In December of 1942 the Japanese sponsored a new political party. . . .The

Kalibapi was designed to be the sole political party in the country. Benigno
Aquino was Director-General Succeeded by Dr. Camilo 0sias7 an^ the notorious
Pio Duran Secretary-General; one of the other top leaders-was Benigno Bamos,
the erstwhile Sakdalista. . . .It absorbed the previously established Neigh
borhood Associations. . . .
The Kalibapi soon claimed a membership running into hundreds of thousands.
To the extent that this may have been true, it is likely that most of its mem
bers hoped to obtain from their support a larger share of the meager food and
clothing supply in the Philippines. But it vas useful to the Japanese as a
propaganda vehicle and an effective means of political control. . .
The Kalibapi was introduced to Leyte from Manila in 1943. Branding it fas
cist in tendency, though demurring against similar indictments of the NA, Governor
Torres, (in private interview— Tacloban, January, 1946) declared that the Kalibapi
aspired to integrate the life of the Filipino people completely into the economic
and cultural program of the Japanese New Order. It would have emulated the Nazi
culture-front organizations foisted upon the subjugated French, Belgians, Dutch,
Danes, and Norwegians of Europe.
^Bernstein, op. cit.. pp. 162-3.
The purposes of the Kalibapi (in English, the "National Service Association
of the New Philippines") were briefly set forth in the course of a resolution adopted
by prominent Vis ayan officials, as including "the duty to help the Administration in
the gigantic tasks of pacification and food production and conservation, the propa
gation of Tagalog as the National Language of the Philippines, and the rehabilitation
of our people.,,^“^
Significantly, a further resolution requested:
. . . .the Honorable Director-General of the Kalibapi, Dr. Camilo Osias, to

give preference to the execution of ail possible ways and means for the immediate
restoration and maintenance of peace and order, over and above all other various
projects of the National Service Association. . . .3
And in the language of the Kalibapi Worker's Handbook— "To the KALIBAPI re
mains the great responsibility of adberirg strictly to the policies of the Adminis
tration and bringing about a true understanding of the Co-Prosperity Sphere to all
Filipinos."4
The Governor served as ex officio Chairman of the Provincial chapter, with
the esteemed Judge Vicente de la Cruz as Vice-Chairman. The actual direction of af
fairs was entrusted to a paid executive staff: two men competent for their jobs,
but not bracketed with Leyte's top politicians, and a female public school principal:
Atty. Saturnino Gonzalez, Executive Officer and Supervisor of the Leyte

Provincial Chapter, at a salary of PI,200.
Emilio Benitez, Jr., Jr. Kalibapi Leader, paid P960.
Mrs. Paz A. Abosolo, Leader of the Women’s Auxiliary Service of the Leyte
Provincial Chapter, receiving P960.
The two male executives had been "delegates representing Leyte at the Kalibapi
1Visayan Convention, op. cit.t Besoltion No. 16.

Attending the Convention were: " . . . .the Provincial Governors, City
Mayors, Provincial and City Treasurers, Senior Inspectors, and Kalibapi Executive
Officers of the various Visayan Provinces. . . . " (Ibid.. Eesolution No. 2.)
Îbld., Eesolution No. 15.
^ h e Kalibapi Worker's Handbook (Manila, 1943) Bureau of Printing, p. 50.
Leaders’ Institute. ... . .completed prescribed training and courses of instruction
and awarded certificates of proficiency. . .
Kalibapi chapters vere organized in Tacloban and a few other municipalities
amidst much fanfare. Provincial and municipal officials, school teachers, and
prominent civilians vere dragooned into Joining.
The Governor and the provincial executive of the Kalibapi vere sensitive
to criticism of slim membership lists. Thus, the Director-General had written:
From reports of February 29, 1944, I learn that Leyte has only 3,052 regis
tered members. I appreciate the difficulties hitherto encountered in the mem
bership drive. . . .1 should like to see the membership drive stepped up so
that your chapter will approximate the goal set; for adults— 20$ of the total
population, l/3 of whom should be male; for the Jr. Kalibapi, total membership
equal to twice the number of boys and girls enrolled in the public and primary
schools. . .
By August, 1944, the Executive Officer of Leyte's Kalibapi could report
substantial growth, bringing membership totals up to 40,387. Nonetheless, the bulk
of the adult populations remained outside the organization.^
The scope of Kalibapi interests was wide, its activities diversified. Pro
minent on its agenda was food production. As the NA had already made a start, it
undertook to step up the tempo of the NA program, and improve coordination. The
Leyte executive directed:
a. Every home yard and vacant lot is to be put under cultivation.

b. Enlist the names of persons without lots in each NA. Apportion vacant
lots according to their working capacity.
c. Assign representatives from the Junior and Senior Kalibapi in each NA
to make a house-to-house campaign. Make reports. . . .
d.........submit reports of persons who are unwillirg to cooperate. . . .
so that proper action may be taken by the authorities. . . .4
But the field of "patrioteering" was the preserve par excellence of the
Kalibapi. Fervent addresses were delivered, at meetings , and pledges taken to work
for a rejuvenated Philippines and the strengthening of the Japanese Co-Prosperity
lc. Osias, Actg. Dir.-Gen., Kalibapi. Dec. 13, 1943. To: Prov. Gov. Leyte.
^Camilo Osias, Actg. Dir.-Gen., Kalibapi. Mar. 10, 1944. To: Bmilio Benitea,
Jr.
^Saturnino B. Gonzalez, Exec. Off. Aug. 11, 1944. To: Hon. Jose Delgado,
Director-at-large for the Visayas. p. 5.
^Food Production Campaign Program, submitted by Emilio Benitez, Jr., Leader
of the Leyte Prov. Chapt., based on Circular Ho. 12-2 of Kalibapi Central Orfice.
Sphere. Kalibapi pins vere worn b y the membership as badges of loyalty; inoi-
dentally serving as a "visa" for the traveler from one municipality to another.
(The guerrilla sought to get pins illicitly to expedite the work of their spies.) '
The Importance of the salute in the mystique of totalitarianism’is too widely
known to require special comment. At the Inter-Visayan Convention, it was resolved
to adopt and popularize the Kalibapi salute in all formal activities and cere
monies. . . ., as well as in formal and informal greeting among friends, ac
quaintances, and officials on whatever occasion. Training in the Filipino
way of salute and greeting, as adopted by Kalibapi, should begin immediately
in schools and other agencies. . . .
The advent of officials of Kalibapi’s national office was occasion for dress
parades in Leyte. The provincial executive advised the mayor of Tacloban to create
a good impression:
We have .Just received advice that Director Osias is coming to visit the
province soon. We want to show him that Kalibapi is in operation in your
municipality. . . .It is imperative that everybody should know the National
Anthem and Kalibapi March by heart and salute in the Filipino way--bowing
with the right hand above the heart. These may be practiced during Badio
Taiso every morning, and should be use in all your programs and ceremonies. . . p-
Imitating its counterparts abroad, the Kalibapi launched a youth movement
with great enthusiasm, a movement designed to mould a new generation in the "true"
Filipino cast. Jr. Kalibapi chapters were formed, dedicated to the new Filipino
youth, virile, patriotic, self-disciplined. The youth was pledged to volunteer for
agricultural productivity and public service programs. Various patriotic rallies
and athletic meets were sponsored by or participated in by the Junior Kalibapi.
From a report submitted to the Governor of Leyte, we can get a good idea of
the breadth of the Junior Kalibapi program. It set for itself a grand project:
To effect and initiate a campaign to be called ’Patriotic Philippines’ for

the purpose of securing the unification of the Filipino people of all classes
through the development in them greater love for things Philippines, to develop
among them a deeper interest in the study of the oriental and truly Filipino
Culture, History and Tradition, and to develop in them such qualities as are
worthy of a true Filipino.
1E. Benitez, Leyte Provincial Chapter, Kalibapi. March 20, 1944. To:
Mayor Quintero, Tacloban.
The nebulous qualities of.,the."true Filipino " vere to be corporealized by
activities manifold in nature:
(1). To encourage vocational pursuits like coconutshell-craft, shell-craft,

weaving, bamboo and rattan-craft/toy-making, gardening, cooking and food pre
servation, and any form of handicraft, hy conducting Agricultural and Indus
trial Expositions and Fairs for the display of these products, and possibly
raise funds and give prizes to the best products registered in a contest for
the same, requiring an entrance fee from each contestant.
(2). To sponsor and present a series of patriotic and historic plays on
the Philippines, and plays on Filipino life, and encourage native folk dances,
primarily to foster the cultural, moral and spiritual advancement of the
people, providing them vith wholesome recreation; secondly, to raise funds for
the Kalibapi; and thirdly, to assist other local chapters of the Junior Kalibapi
interested in the same line of activity.
(3). To sponsor a series of athletic games and tournaments, and encourage
native Filipino games, in order to develop such qualities of character as moral
discipline, sportsmanship, and moral and physical robustness.
(4). To conduct a monthly or bimonthly Convocation Program, whereby special
lectures on varied subjects of interest and of great importance to the youth
will be presented, by such lecturers as may be chosen upon request of the Ad
visory Board of the Tacloban Junior Kalibapi, encouraging Intelligent discussions
and open forums.1
Athletic meets were particularly favored by the provincial administration
because they diverted the attention of the youth from the vision of their people
prostrate while demonstrating to the Japanese that the Filipino youth was thoroughly
behind the new program of "national rejuvenation". An official of Leyte’s Kalibapi,
after conference with Commissioner for the Visayas, Gullas, reported to the Governor:
The Commissioner is much interested in having us promote a tournament be

tween Cebu and Leyte under Kalibapi auspices. Leyte is requested to prepare
grounds where games will be played. . . .1 recommend that you call a meeting
of the members of the Kalibapi and all prominent citizens of this community to
lay out plans regarding this matter. . .
And the Governor notified the Provincial Secretary: "For obvious reasons,
you are ordered to establish, maintain, manage and operate the boxing stadium in
Tacloban. . . .Use your discretion to finance. . . .
The Tacloban branch of the Junior Kalibapi vas well on the way to reachixg
its target.
^Saturnine p. Gonzalez, Exec. Officer, Leyte Prov. Chapter. March 29, 1944.
To: Pastor Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov.
**S. E. Gonzalez. March 30, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
3Actg. Gov. Salazar. August 7, 1944. To: Prov. Secty. Benedicto.
117
In' conjunction vith the Women's Auxiliary Service, the Juniors helped to
make the Leyte Agricultural and Industrial Pair of 1944 a noteworthy event.1
They also "conducted a house to house campaign for food production and home
gardens making a report on the number of gardens and lots cultivated." In the phil
anthropic field, they "conducted a relief drive for the typhoon victims in Taclohan
. . . .providing them with housing and subsistence expenses. . . . " As recruiting
sergeants for the Kalibapi, the Juniors were also effective, with spokesmen from
among them selected "to conduct a house to house campaign, including the schools,
corporations," etc.2
The adult organization had far-reaching plans for their youth movement. To
realize these plans, it was proposed that a "Junior Kalibapi Training Center" be
founded in Tacloban "with the aid of the Provincial Government and the Governor as
head of the Provincial Chapter. . . .This Training Center will be open to the youth
from the ages of 9 to 18 to train leaders who will take charge of the other members."
The program for trainees was to be a daily affair, from 9:00 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. In
cluded in the curriculum were the following subjects: Badio Taiso, Disciplinary
Drill, Mass Singing, Language Instruction in Tagalog and Kippongo, Philippine and
Oriental Culture and History, Folk Dancing, Vocational Activities, Scouting and First
Aia.3
The training program was well-rounded in conception, and admirably designed
for its indoctrinations! function. It would provide the trainees with a theoretical
grounding in the background of the movement, and offer concrete activities for direct
participation.
Was this Training Center to be the germ of an "elite" ruling group within
the youth movement? We cannot say, for the regime was overthrown with the arrival
% . B. Gonzalez, Exec. Off., Kalibapi. July 20, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
2Emilio Benitez, Leader, Leyte Prov. Chapter, Kalibapi. April, 1944. To:
Executive Officer.
Ê. Benitez, Jr., Leader, Leyte Prov. Chapter, Kalibapi. Eeport— April,
1944. To: Executive Officer.
U81S
of the Liberation forces. nonetheless, the,question becomes pertinent if ve juxta
pose the Idea of the Training Center vith certain developments in the adult movement.
Ve note the formation of a Kalibapi Women's Auxiliary Service,
with local chapters being organized in the municipalities as subsidiary

units of the Kalibapi, vhich will take over all activities of the Women's
Club and other associations having to do vith home and community activi
ties . . .
From this statement, we are Justified in inferring that the KWAS was to ab
sorb all other women's organizations, thus placing the female'population of the Pro
vince under the direction of a single controlling body. The tendency becomes all
the more marked and indubitable when we consider the parent organization.
When Imperial Japan decided to grant "independence" to the Philippines, the
responsibility of preparing the new constitution devolved upon the Kalibapi. There
vas nothing in the entire procedure to suggest a sounding out of public opinion.
As David Bernstein has written:
In June Premier ToJo informed the Diet that the Philippines would now re
ceive its independence. Two days later the High Command of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines ordered the Kalibapi to set up a preparatory commission
for Philippine independence. Its members included Jose Laurel (chairman),
Benigno Aquino (assistant chairman), Jorge "Vargas,. . . .and Manuel Eoxas. In
September the Constitution was written, and every member of the commission signed
it. Three days later, a Kalibapi convention summarily ratified it. There vas
no attempt to submit it to the Filipino people, forobvious reasons. But com
mission members and Kalibapi leaders toured the country, speaking in behalf of
the new Constitution and pleading for public support
In Leyte, as in the other provinces, the proceedings were otiose:
At a recent meeting of the Provincial Chapter of the Kalibapi, Hon. Pastor

Salazar and Hon. Vicente de la Cruz have been chosen to represent the Provinoe
of Leyte in the Constitutional Convention which will be held in Manila on
September 6, 1943 to ratify the Constitution of the future Philippine Bepublic. .5
Following the ratification of the new constitution, the Kalibapi assumed a
further civic responsibility. Declared Governor Torres:
Pursuant to authority conferred upon me by Executive Order Ho. 42, by the

chairman of the Executive Conmission, it is ordered that all members of the
% . Benitez, Jr., Leader, Leyte Prov. Chap., Kalibapi. April, 1944. Report
to: Executive Officer.
“Bernstein, op. cit.. pp. 163-4.
^Bernard© Torres, Prov. Gov. August 30, 1943. To: (a select list of gentle
men.)
Kalibapi in Leyte, who are duly qualified electors, must convene at 9 AM,
September 20th, at the Capitol to cast votes to elect a delegate of the Pro
vince to the national Assembly of the Be public of the Philippines. Any
Kalibapi member qualified who fails for no good reason to comply will be ex
pelled as a member of the Kalibapi and forfeit nil his rights and privileges.^
With the inauguration of the puppet Philippine Bepublic, President Laurel
proclaimed the dissolution of political parties, and the Kalibapi fell heir to the
now vacant political field. The provinces were expected to follow this lead. Leyte
was quite complaisant, the provincial administration urging the municipalities to
adopt declarations to this effect.
Wherever a Kalibapi chapter existed, the membership called upon the munici
pality to so resolve. Manila congratulated Governor Torres on the resolution of
La Paz:
It has been highly gratifying to read the resolution approved by the offi
cials and prominent citizens and leaders of La Paz, whereby they agreed to dis
solve political parties and work in unison for the best interest and welfare of
the people. . . .so that all FilipinoB may live happily together under one
Constitution, one Flag, one President, and Bepublic. . . .
The "political parties" here indicated are merely political cliques— clusters
of men follow!eg a local politician largely for the favors he might dispense. The
resolution of La Paz and of other municipalities did not mean the end of local boss-
ism. What it suggested was that the local boss might conclude a temporary pact with
his chief rival whereby both would enter the fold of the Kalibapi and work out a mu
tually satisfactory deal under Kalibapi auspices.
^Bernardo Torres, Prov. Gov. Sept. 16, 1943. To: All Kalibapi Member's.
The confining of the vote to the Kalibapi membership meant a decidedly
limited electorate. But even within the Kalibapi, the electoral procedure vas
shackled. A message sent by the Governor is most illuminating on this matter. Ad
dressing a group of Kalibapi members who had constituted themselves a nomination com
mittee , the Governor said: "I am informed that you are contemplating to launch the
candidacy of Judge de la Cruz for the National Assembly. Permit me to quote a tele
gram from Commissioner Laurel, received yesterday: ’To the Governor: At convention
recently held in this city (Manila), Jose Veloso was chosen official candidate for
delegate to National Assembly from that Province. Beirg official candidate, see that
he is elected in elections of 20th.*. . . (Bernardo Torres, Prov. Gov. Sept. 17,
1943. To: 7 citizens of a nomination committee.)
2Camilo Osias, Actg. Dir .-Gen., Kalibapi. Feb. 24, 1944. To: Gov. Torres.
120"
nonetheless, the significance of such happenings lays in their high-lightii*5,
a trend towards a monolithic state. Granted a youth movement and a women*s. auxiliary
giving similar indications, the matter could not he flippantly dismissed (as some
were wont to do) by asserting the incompatibility of Filipino temperament and totali
tarian regimentation. When we bear in mind that the franchise under the Philippine
Bepublic was restricted to Kalibapi members in good standing, and that Kalibapi
propagandists were spearheading the campaign among the people to discredit the re
sistance movement, we begin to sense the magnitude of its influence. Let us mention
but one more factor, a decisive factor— behind the Kalibapi lay the Imperial Japanese
Army.
Suggestive of the Kalibapi's possible developments was the inquiry of the
Director-General to the Leyte chapter:
. . . .We have opened the first Kalibapi Producers' Camp at Diliman, Manila,
with emphasis on actual production and spiritual training. If it succeeds, we
shall establish similar camps elsewhere. Let us know if the same can be done
under the auspices of your chapter. . .
Heedless to say, the feasibility of such schemes was contingent upon the
durability of the regime. As things worked out, the Kalibapi’s period of expansion
coincided with the decline of Japanese power. Talk of the coming American counter
invasion had undermined belief in the permanence of the Occupation regime. And thus
it came about that while Leyte’s Kalibapi directorship continued to submit reports
of humming activity, the organization was withering. Founded upon faith in a "new”
Philippines, integrated with a pan-Orientalism, the Kalibapi could not survive the
crumbling of the faith itself. Hever a mass movement in Leyte, the Kalibapi saw
Invasion Day approach with its leadership demoralized, severally scheming the rescue
of their individual necks.2
^Camilo Osias, Actg. Dir-Gen., Kalibapi. March 10, 1944. To: Emilio
Benitez, Jr. 1
^The Chinese inhabitants of Leyte were not overlooked by the Japanese. Be- I
fore the war, some 900 of them resided in Tacloban. Many had been active in the AntiJ
Japanese Association, under the presidency of the merchant T. Suya. The Japanese 1
imprisoned Suya for a week, threatening to execute him unless he agreed to collaborate!
V*
Badio: - Much of the efforts of the Japanese Military Administration vere
directed to convincing the Filipinos that the "New Order" vas destined to last for
a long time. To create this impression, they harangued the Filipinos incessently
about the invincibility of the Imperial armies, playing up every gain made by their
forces as proof of this central contention. They also stressed the momentous con
sequences of Axis victories in the grand strategy of global domination by the
"vigorous" nations of the "New Order".
In actuality, things did not invariably take a favorable turn for Japanese
arms even in the first flush of their triumph. But the Japanese were determined
that cold fact should not upset the grandiose illusions they were propagating. This
meant imposing a rigorous censorship on incoming news from the outside world.
When the Japanese Invaded Leyte, they proceeded to seize whatever radio sets
they could lay hands upon. Subsequently, they issued instructions to the mayors of
the Province:
1. The public is allowed to listen to radio broadcasts operated and con

trolled by the Japanese forces in the Philippines (EffiE only, for the present),,
and only to overseas broadcasts from Japan.
2. The use of antennas is prohibited irrespective of whether or not broad
casts can be heard.
3. Every Mayor shall prepare list of the owners or users of radio sets,
and have them prepare said list for registration to the Japanese Military Ad
ministration in Tacloban not later than August 20. . . .
4. All radio sets previously surrendered to the mayors shall be returned
immediately after registration.
5. The mayors are responsible for the execution of this notification.
6. Violations will be severely punished in accordance with Japanese Mili
tary Law.1
Most of the municipalities hastened to comply with the regulations.
in their program. Suya acquiesced, was appointed President of a "Chinese Association"

and directed to organize his fellow townsmen into a "home guard". The Chinese were
amerced B100,000, which Suya had the unpleasant responsibility of pro-rating. Addi
tional levies vere made upon the Chinese Association from time to time. The Chinese
had no choice but to comply, hoping that they would not be considered enemies by the
guerrilla. Those who remained outside of the town in their evacuation places had the
unhappy experience of being molested both by Japanese patrols and by Filipino free
booters pretending to be guerrillas.
■^By order of Commander-in-chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines
through Actg. Gov. Salazar. Aug. 12, 1942. To: All Mayors. *
The mayor of Babatngon wrote: "In compliance of your notification of
August 12th, I submit the attached list of ovners or users of radio sets previously
surrendered to the undersigned."^-
And Carigara gave notice: "In reply to your letter of the 12th, I state that
there is not a single radio in town, at least for the present. The sets we used to
O
have vere all commandeered by the Japanese Forces detailed in Jaro last June."
Further instructions were issued from time to time. Those municipalities
under guerrilla control at the beginniig of 1943 were obliged to comply with the new
instructions as soon as they were retrieved by the Tacloban administration. Thus,
notice was given to Abuyog:
Immediately upon receipt hereof, require all radio ovners in your municipal
ity who are in possession of their receiving sets to deliver them to the munici
pal building. As soon as all sets in your Jurisdiction are gathered, please
notify this office immediately in order that all of them will be brought to
Tacloban for reconditioning, as required by Executive Ordinance No. 166 of the
defunct Executive Commission and the unnumbered Provincial Circular of the Di
rector of Local Governments of June 7, 1943. Representatives of the Ministry
of the Interior who recently arrived in Leyte for this particular work will
issue receipts and certificates for all sets reconditioned.^
The purpose behind requiring the registration and reconditioning of all
radio sets, explained a bulletin of the central authorities, was "to prevent unneces
sary anxiety and unrest which may result from hostile propaganda activities among the
people of the Philippines."
And teeth were put into the order:
Any owner, manufacturer, dealer, possessor, repairer, or lessee of radio re

ceiving sets who neglects. . . .to have the. . . .sets in his possession recon
ditioned in accordance with the provisions of this Order shall be punished by
imprisonment of not more than six months or a fine of not more than six hundred
pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court. . . .The penalty herein provided
shall be without prejudice to any penalty which may be imposed by the military
authorities for violation of military laws. . . .
% . Canete, Mayor, Babatngon. Aug. 19, 1942. To: The Japanese Military
Administration through Prov. Gov.
Mariano P. Salvacion, Actg. Mayor, Carigara. Aug. 22, 1942. To: Actg.
Gov. Salazar.
^Prov. Secty. Benedicto. Nov. 27, 1943. To: Mun. Mayor, Abuyog.
^Rufino Luna, Dir. of Local Govts. June 17, 1943. Unnumbered Circular.
It was the fear of running afoul of5Japanese regulations which served, as
effective deterrent to Leytenos outside the guerrilla zores. But despite all
governmental efforts, the occupied area could not be kept hermetically sealed.
Transcripts from guerrilla short-wave receivers infiltrated by word of mouth, under
mining faith in Japanese invincibility, and restoring hope in .America's return to
redeem her Filipino wards.
Appealing for Ma£s_Supp°rt2_— In the program of converting Leyte an resistance
to loyal support of the Japanese regime the Tacloban administration relied upon two
engines— the word and the sword. Sometimes employed alternatively, they might be
used conjointly to reinforce one another. A mixed entourage of Filipino and Japanese
notables would assemble the townspeople of a certain locality to evoke their support
of the "Hew Order". Simultaneously, a punitive patrol of Japanese soldiers and
Filipino constabularymen might put to the torch a cluster of dwellings occupied by
the alleged intransigeant supporters of the guerrilla.
The tone of this propaganda drive was set by the mayors in convention as
sembled early in the course of the Occupation:
Whereas. . . .realizing as we. .. .do the unselfish, untiring and uncease-

less efforts exerted by the Imperial Japanese Forces in Leyte. . . .towardsthe
pacification and ultimate reconstruction of Leyte;
Whereas, We are aware of the generous and sympathetic treatment which the
Military Authorities have consistently shown to the Mayors and the people in
general. . . .
Therefore, In token of our deep appreciation. . . .we hereby solemnly reit
erate our pledge of loyalty and cooperation to the Imperial Japanese Government
and to the Imperial Japanese Forces in Leyte. . . .1
The Job of the mayor and municipal officials at these rallies was to turn out
the local population en masse, assembling them either at an outdoor plaza or inside
the central meeting hall. The mayor, the parish priest and other leading townspeople
would be called upon to pledge municipal support to the program of the Province and
of the Japanese administration. Whether the mayor's remarks were temperate or
whether they exceeded all bounds in protesting loyalty to the Japanese regime and
Resolution of Loyalty and Gratitude to the Imperial Japanese Forces in Leyte

of the Municipal Mayors Assembled in Convention at Tacloban, Leyte, on October 12
and 13, 1942. .
;1S4
promising an active campaignâgainst the guerrilleros larking in the vicinity de
pended upon his own beliefs, his personality, and his opportunistic appraisal of
the total situation, (including the knowledge that guerrilla espionage agents would,
report to their chiefs his public utterances).
let us see how the mayors set about implementing their resolution. According
to his own account, the mayor of Burauen was among the most zealous of the local
officials in fostering the collaborationist programs
. . . .1 held public meetings in the different barrios to infoim the people

of the workings of the government; told them to stay their proper places and
work. . . .Told them further that the Imperial Forces are here, not to fight
us, but to liberate us from the yoke of Anglo-American imperialism. To vindi
cate us orientals where rights and liberties has been denied us by occidental
domination. Furthermore, told them to cooperate with the government, for only
in cooperation can our reconstruction of our new Philippines be achieved. As
a result of my endlee? sacrifices which has been haunting me night and day, at
last my dreams has been fulfilled. The people has returned to our former places
and work is now in full swing. . . .So at last on Sept. 25, 1942 a public meeting
in the poblacion was held, sponsored by the Japanese Officer, Burauen Detachment,
which was witnessed by plenty of people, whereon a letter entitled Praise And
Merit was issued to me by Captain Watanabe.
u
The most apt comment that can be made on the report of this mayor, in his
bombastic toadyism, is that some months later, when Burauen came temporarily under
guerrilla control, he professed with equal ardor his staunch support of resistance.
In fact, after the war'B end, he addressed a petition.to the American military
authorities seeking recognition and emoluments for services rendered as a guerrilla.
A Provincial Propaganda Corps, sparked by Pastor Salazar, prodded the muni
cipalities. Abuyog’s program got started under the impetus of the provincial auth
orities.
The Propaganda Corps headed by Member Pastor Salazar held a meeting on the
premises of the municipal building on September 12, 1942. The meeting was well
attended. A local chapter of the corps headed by Mayor Eleuterio A. Cana as
Chairman with Municipal Treasurer Ricardo Collante 8 as Vice-Chairman. . . .was
organized. It held its first meeting on September 13, 1942, at Bito market on
the occasion of the cockfight. . . .Many people attended the meeting which was
successful, as the speakers were reemphasizing the points brought about by the
Eduardo B. Bugho, Mun. Mayor, Burauen. Oct. 1, 1942. To: The Governor-
Weekly Report.
members of the Provincial Propaganda Corps. . . .Inasmuch as the. . . .Corps
plans to hold meetings in the "barrios. . . .it is respectfully requested that
the Assemblyman Jose Ma. Veloso he reminded. , . .to detail a PC detachment
to. . . .accompany the local committee.
The provincial propagandists reached Carigara, and a public meeting was
convoked:
On the 19th instant, the town of Carigara was honored by the visit of the
Tacloban Propaganda Corps. . . .They informed the public about the troubles the
mountain people are giving to the people living in different places in the pro
vince. They requested the people to give full cooperation in the peaceful ad
ministration of the new Japanese government in the Philippines, particularly in
the Province of Leyte. . . .There was a big crowd that attended and listened
earnestly to the different speeches. . .
It was inevitable that the Japanese Military Administration should require
the Governor to preach the gospel of the "New Order” . For his part--so Torres de
clared in interview after the war— he sought to hammer away at a single theme, a
plea to the guerrillas to avoid needless provocation as prejudicial to the welfare
of the Filipino people. Whenever he departed from this refrain, and took an out
spokenly pro-Japanese line, it was only because his Japanese masters had prepared
•2
his speech in advance.
The Ls^te Shimbun: — Besides haranguing the population at open-air meetings,
the Administration sought to reach the people through the press. Tacloban was
destitute of a local newspaper during the first months of the Japanese Occupation,
the pre-invasion Voice of Victory having met its demise. Copies of the controlled
Manila newspapers had a limited circulation within the provincial capital.
But the local Japanese Military Administration was eager to have the Province
publish a paper with "home flavor". Their propaganda section conferred with Governor
Torres and Jose Ma. Veloso, requesting the nomination of same prominent Leyteno to
assume the editorship of a projected 4-page semi-weekly, to be called the "Leyte
Collantes, Actg. Mayor, Abuyog. Sept. 15, 1942. To: The Prov. Gov.
Mariano P. Salvacion, Mun. Secty. Carigara. Sept. 22, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
Înterview— Tacloban, January, 1946.
126
Shimbun" and to sell at 10^ per copy. The choice fell upon Judge Vicente de la Cruz.
Judge de la Cruz had passed most of the month of June in prison, under in
vestigation by the Japanese for alleged unfriendliness to the new regime. He was
released only after the personal intercession of Torres and Veloso, but a cloud of
suspicion still hurg over him. It was to help deflect suspicion from himself that
he consented to accept the editorship when the Governor confidentially approached him.
The Judge was no newspaperman, and his title was so much window-dressiig.
Most of his contributions to the Shimbun were transcripts of articles published in
the Manila and Cebu press. From time to time his signature was penned to an edi
torial prepared by others. Under the circumstances, however, he had no alternative
but to remain with the publication.^-
The active members of the editorial staff were a group of Leyte High School
teachers, recruited by tie Japanese. Because of hiB previous experience with the
defunct 'Voice of Victory", English teacher Bamon Esperas became the driving force
on the paper. Court Interpreter Eduardo Makaventa was added to the staff to handle
the Visayan-language section.
As Esperas recollected the set-up, when interviewed,^ the Japanese supplied
paper and ink and censored news copy— the news items being either "canoed" hand-outs
by the Japanese Military Administration or stories culled from the Manila Tribune
and the Visayan Shimbun of Cebu. Speeches and releases by prominent Leytenos such
as the Governor, Board Member Salazar, or Attorney Fidel Fernandez (before he Joined
the guerrilla) were played up prominently.
In addition to news information, the Shimbun served to promote Japanese social
and cultural policy in the Philippines, stressing all that Japan was doing for its
Filipino wards. Space, of course, was allotted for local tidbits, featuring the
political and cultural rallies convoked at Japanese behest, callingattention to
gains in Leyte’s food production campaign, appealing to the people to cooperate
Înterview at his home: Tacloban, September, 1945.

Înterview at his home: Tacloban, October, 1945.
whole-heartedly in the administration*s programs, and alternately pleading with the
resisters to lay down their arms in what was necessarily a hopeless struggle and
threatening a drive of extermination against the "outlaws” who refused to comply*
Esperas and his associates were on the provincial pay-roll, drawing P60
monthly checks as propagandists. But their supervisors came not from the Governor's
office hut from the military. English-speaking Japanese officers could always he
found snooping ahout the editorial room, while their spies shadowed the staff during
after-work hours.
The Shimbun began publication in August, 1942, and continued until March,
1943. Its circulation never exceeded 300, few people willing to expend 10 centavos
per issue. Advertising revenue was very small. Lack of funds and shortage of paper
brought about the suspension of publication. For the public, the loss was no blow,
because few people were sufficiently credulous to accept what purported to be news
reporting.
During the ensuing months, the readers of the controlled press had to turn
to Manila again. The General Manager of the Manila Siribun-Syn sent Mayor Quintero
of Tacloban some sample copies of his newspaper, adding " . . .We hope you will help
us establish an agency by recommending someone in your town who can represent us
there... . ."‘L
The Mayor replied:
The copies are now beir^ placed in my reading rocm. for the general public.
I will support any measure in disseminating of reliable news inculcating the
people with the right attitude towards the Japanese Military Administration.
I recommend Mr. Vicente Tuazon, who can help establish an agency and secure
subscribers. . . .2
"Srukuichi Fukomoto. March 11, 1943. To: Mayor of Tacloban.

âyor Quintero, Tacloban. April 16, 1943. To: The Manager, Sinbun-ajm.
'4
Eie:Cineaa^— Supplementing radio, press, and soap-boat oratory, the admin- j
istration made liberal use of Japanese war-films for propaganda purposes. |
The only motion picture house in Tacloban, the Mercedes Theater, vas owned \
by Marcelo Abesamis. When the Japanese arrived, they at once sized up the utility <
of the theater for propaganda purposes, and took over control. Abesamis was per
mitted to serve as manager (at P 120 monthly salary), but a co-manager was Installed
to check up on thirgs.
A government employee, describing the Japanese occupation of Tacloban,
testified:
In the afternoon of the fourth day the people who were seen in the streets
and nearby houses were rounded up and penned at the Mercedes showhouse. . . .
After the speeches, Jap news film was shown, picturing the might of the Japanese
Navy with the caption 'the greatest Navy in the world' to protect the shores
of Great East Asia from the invaders; the industries of Japan; and the life of
the laborers in Japan.
The message of such films was always the same:
It would be futile to resist the Japs. . . .that there was no more aid.,
American or otherwise, coming to the Philippines; that the Japanese were good
people; that they are Orientals like ourselves;. . . .and that it would be
better for us to accept the government which was genuinely ours and cooperate
with the Japanese Administration for the success of the 'Greater East Asia Co
prosperity Sphere'.-*•
All films shown were provided by the Japanese Military Administration. Care
ful censorship eliminated "dangerous" passages in the case of American made movies.
Abesamis recalled that the theater had been playing "Anchors Aweigh" as intermission
music for about a month, before it was identified by the Japanese as an American
military piece and banned.
The Japanese made full use of newsreels to put across their propaganda mes
sages. Some of the cinema audience were, no doubt, influenced by the more skillful
portrayals of events. One of the most powerful of the anti-American movie drams,
a full-length picture entitled "Dawn of Freedom", dealt with the downfall of Bataan.
Using a Filipino cast, the film sought to represent the Americans as hideously cruel
Mercado, op. cit.. pp. 11-12.
free. Japanese MPa vere on band to cope vith anyi.-uimpected-.deinron&itft^^
unexpected.demon^retibris
f''' ':•'•
L l k L . * ■, - a' . ■ a — „ ’- j a _ ' a
Wot infrequently, movie audiences vere gathered underdnress,folloving
precedent of the first "show";. As ifor the entertainment-starred element .vrho attended’1
out of curiosity, it is ûestipn^le vhether they conformed to the old sav, '"seeing'-,.*
is believing". But the Japanese vere satisfied vith appearances, and did .not inter-
■ . V .• - -■-.'.Vi-.
rogate a man's soul. V 1’
M£cellaneou£ Dejice£S -- The Japanese resorted to a variety of lesser devices f
for influencing public opinion. . ; ■)'■[;'y-V’: .
They opened a public readily room in Tacloban. Japanese magazines and pro?’
Japanese Filipino topical literature inade its appearance*. Objectionable pre-war

r - '.
books vere not available. Very fey ►Filipinos made use of these, facilities,for they'
vere housed in the building occupied by the Japanese A m y ’s propaganda section.
The ineptitude of Japanese propaganda sojjetiines proved amnsing. The army ' S> f,- <■
"fyf
placed a large bulletin board in a prominent position at the Tacloban market place;,yjj •.
and posted daily records of alleged American losses in ships and planes. Quite ..
V.
often, they also tacked up announcements of Japanese losses— generally a small
fraction of the American. But this turned out to be a clumsy manoeurer. Most •
Filipinos sav through the hoax. In fact, many drev an opposite conclusion from that?vj
intended, the conclusion that American material resources must be Inexhaustible to
sustain such constant depletions and continue to carry on on the same tremendous s<
Vrb\H
Setback: — That collaborationist propaganda fell short of its mark, titt:- ^
■* * ^ ‘ r -". . ..v’ Ji'i .-i-i
■ •"j,' - •'-■~'\ * i•... '5'i~’ '*'' ^
Goremor himself attested: T4ost of the„ people hare no vork and don’t earn.
swayed by propaganda. Many believe that the Asierican regime? vas better, because;.pf ;
. - •- V . ’
n»re vork and more money." r > .-vv..
v-■ /‘J v r . T - >•'
V 'iV .- ' - • !. ' - . ' ^ V- ' V
‘. - ' • j . . . •: . - - . . . . , . .V _■j - . ■■■ ~ ’v 7 1
130
And then the Governor added, vhether vith naivete or irony ve cannot say: i
"Even among the intellectual class, there are still some vho have not been able to |
i
fully realize the good and honest intentions of Japan in this war."
As for the guerrilla— "When we tell them that nothing will happen to them if
they surrender, they still doubt because they say that even those vho have surrendered
at the beginning still are prisoners in the concentration camp."1
In the light of the situation then existing, the recommendations made by ]
the Governor made sense:
1. That a much bigger force be stationed in Leyte and if possible, a de- |

tachmerrt of at least 30 soldiers be placed in more towns than at present.
2. That prisoners of war still in concentration camp of Leyte be released
as soon as possible.
3. That the people be given vork in government projects such as repair of
roads and bridges.
4. Bice and corn, for sale in towns where there is scarcity, be sent.
5. That our Constabulary unit in Leyte be increased, if possible to 500 men.
6 . Transportation facilities should be increased. There should be a regular
boat line between Cebu and Tacloban, and between Tacloban and Manila via Cat-
balogan and Masbate. The telegraph should be reestablished in Tacloban.
Torres went to Manila to intercede personally for the adoption of his program.
In the ensuing months, he had the satisfaction of seeing its gradual adoption. i
Indej^ndence_for_the_Phililupinesj_- - But the Japanese had new plans afoot
calling for a "policy of attraction" towards the Filipino. The piece de resistance
was to be the conferral of independence upon the Philippines. Toprepare the minds
of Leyte's provincials for this momentous event, Governor Torres and his staff vere
directed to swing all of their agencies of propaganda into play.
Jose Ma. Veloso returned to Leyte in 1943 to play a leading role as propa
gandist and "ace trouble-Bhooter". He left his Manila abode vith reluctance, and
only because so ordered by the central government. Begarding all guerrillas as out
laws and the Japanese as benevolent seekers of "lav and order", he felt no compunc
tions whatever in undertaking a whirlwind speaking tour. His favorite theme: "I am
4 o : Commander, District of Visayas, Japanese Imperial Forces. Mar. 1, 1943,

2B. Torres, Prov. Gov. March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of Visayas
Japanese Imperial Forces. ’ :
not pro-Japanese; I am not pro-American— I am p r o - F i l i p i n o V e l o s o rs presence in
a given municipality always drew a good-sized throng. However, there is no way of

/
judging how effective his speeches were, for the accompanying volume of applause may
have "been simply the measure of popular fear in the presence of Japanese troops.**"
The Governor's report to Manila for August stated:
. . . .Intensive speaking campaign informing inhabitants of coming inde

pendence. Tacloban chose delegates to the Constitutional Convention. . . .
To effect success in election of a representative for Leyte, trucks were sent
* to the interior, bribing voters into Tacloban. The capital experienced the
first gala atmosphere in years. Elected Jose Veloso for Leyte. . . .
After the Japanese had worked out the details of "independence”, all Filipino
officials were instructed to carry out an energetic campaign of indoctrination,
whipping up enthusiastic support for the new dispensation. In Leyte, the collabora
tionists worked through the instrument of press and public platform pressing heme
the point that Japan, and not the United States, had satisfied cherished aspiration
for independent statehood, and that it behooved the Filipino people to demonstrate
their gratitude by collaborating enthusiastically in all measures promulgated by
the Japanese. Filipino response would be rewarded by the generous Japanese, but
spitefulness or indifference would be treated accordingly.
A speech delivered by the Provincial Secretary, Benedicto, set the tone for !
the fulsome expressions of gratitude to Japan:
Only one year from Pearl Harbor, the Great and Magnanimous Empire of Japan
offers us independence. But it behooves on us, My Countrymen, to give and of
fer in return for our political emancipation unconditional and unqualified
cooperation and collaboration with Japan in her gigantic struggles. It behooves
on us to be worthy to accept from Japan our age-long aspiration to be free. . . ,
Let us therefore cooperate actively and fully with the great Nippon Empire in
ereati1^5 a new hemispheric foundation, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
for only in this way can we rest assured that the future of the Philippines shall
be one of hope and not of despair. . . .
The Governor received a full set of instructions from Manila regarding the
proper way of celebrating "independence” in. the province. He hastened to comply.
Înterview— Florian ciub, owned by Jose Ma. Veloso— Manila, June, 1946.
158
To make the celehratlon a gala event, the Governor called upon the KA to
raise funds among the people.
The Finance Committee of the Celebration of Philippine Independence have

agreed to collect voluntary contributions from the people of Tacloban. .
It is requested that you appeal to all members. . . .Pleaqe* don't collect from
members who are government employees and members of the Chinese comnunity,
since they pay to their respective heads.^
The celebration was not to be confined to the provincial capital. The mayors
were instructed: "You are requested to convene the Kalibapi municipal chapter to
treat on the proper celebration of Independence Day. For guidance, I quote from
instructions sent from Manila. . . ."2
As the day of the inaugural approached, the Governor grew apprehensive.
Perhaps, as rumor had it, the guerrilla would hurl defiance by widespread acts
of sabotage. "The Japanese garrison and all BC detachments in the province were or
dered to be on the alert. . . .to assure the peaceful inauguration of the Bepublic."
But no incident occurred to mar the holiday atmosphere. The explanation, no doubt,
lay in the fact that on "October 14, several transports of Japanese soldiers arrived
with complete arms and equipment."3
The Governor announced with effusiveness:
. . . .Peace offensive of the government by means of proclamations, speeches,

and news about coming of independence seemed to have borne fruit. Happiest day
in October came with the hoisting of the Filipino flag. All Tacloban flocked
to the occasion; every house was decorated with a banner. Hoisting a thrilling
and tearful scene. . . A
Independence also provided the season for resounding reaffirmations of
friendship between the Japanese authorities in Leyte and Filipino officialdom. Harad
Shogun, Director of the Japanese Military Administration, Tacloban Branch, "in token
of my sincere gratitude to all of you for such cooperation you have shown me during
Âctg. Gov. Salazar. Oct. 5, 1943. To: All District HA Presidents.

2Actg. Gov. Salazar. Oct. 1, 1943. To: The Municipal Mayors.
Âctg. Gov. Salazar. Nov. 20, 1943. To: Commissioner of the Interior
through the Director of Local Governments.
*Actg. Gov. Salazar. Beport of Activities: April l-0ctober 31, 1943. To:
Commissioner of Interior through the Director of Local Governnents.
133
my administration", invited the Governor and others to a "simple banquet"
And so it went throughout the Province, Japanese garrison commanders and
municipal officials exchanging courtesies. And for a brief interlude, the Japanese
troops put on pleasant faces and behaved with Impeccable civility towards the Fili
pino civilians they encountered in the course of their activities.
On the occasion of the "Independence Day" celebration, propaganda materials
of every description, sent from Manila, rained down upon Leyte's population. Among
the many broadsides widely circulated was one entitled "President Laurel's Address
to Filipinos", beginning: "Today we have proclaimed our independence," and conclud
ing: "For my part, I solemnly pledge to you all the strength of which I am capable,
my whole heart, even to the last drop of my blood, to serve you always, to foster and
protect your interests and to uphold the honor and freedom of our Fatherland."^
A special issue of The Tribune1 newspaper, sent down from Manila, also en
joyed wide circulation. Over a picture of President Laurel being sworn in by Chief
Justice Yulo, the caption was emblazoned, "P. I. Independence Achieved". The issue
featured Laurel's inaugural address, whose high points stressed the need for peace
3
and order, economic self-sufficiency, and gratitude to Japan.
In this setting of cheery handclaspings and the gladsome pealing of church
bells, a discordant note broke through. An "Open Letter" addressed to Governor
Torres, drawn up by some of his former colleagues and students in the teaching pro
fession, and despatched from the guerrilla area, was surreptitiously circulated.
It declared in part:
. . . .We rejoiced when you were appointed Governor because you represented
the young generation in the government. But when crisis came to test one's
character and patriotism, you were among the first to leave us in favor of the
^Reported by Pastor Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov. Oct. 23, 1943.

^Jose P. Laurel, Pres., Bepublic of the Philippines. Oct. 14, 1943. Mala-
cana Palace.
^The Tribune. Oct. 23, 1943, Manila, P. I., pp. 1, 3, 4.
: enemy. . . .Until now, we cannot reconcile Mr. Torres, Eep. Torres and Dean
Torres of the past and the Governor Torres of the present. After teachirg us
ideal traits of a Filipino citizen which have penetrated into our very system,
must you undertake to correct those teachings. . . .must you carry us with empty
and hollow promises to follow you and offer us to your Japanese masters whom
you have already learned to love?
We can only conjecture vith what inner disquietude the Governor mulled over
this denunciation. We can only wonder how many Filipinos reproached themselves as
hypocrites while rendering outward obeisance and pouring out thanks to their con
querors .
"Pacification^ Program:-- In her sovereign graciousness of "nobleBse oblige",
Japan, through President Laurel, proclaimed a decree of amnesty to all guerrilleros
if they but reported to the constituted authorities, surrendering their weapons as
they registered and swore allegiance. Evacuees were invited to return from the moun
tains and take an oath, without fear of reprised. The procedure adopted in Leyte was
for those surrendering to report to the nearest Japanese garrison, or to the office
of a municipeil mayor, and make deposition on prescribed forms. The mayors were to
forward a list of those surrendering along with their depositions to the Provincial
Governor, for transmittal to the Amnesty Board, Manila.
The Governor of Leyte advocated a special indulgence to guerrilleros as a
premium on the policy of surrender. The Minister of the Interior addressed the Min
ister of Finance:
Vfe are in receipt of a telegram of the 11th from the Governor of Leyte,
recommend! rg redemption of emergency notes without limitation as effectively
helping the pacification campaign. . . .As redemption is one of the attractions
being offered by the government to the guerrilla to surrender, it will be ap
preciated if favorable action can be taken.-1-
The Tacloban Administration engaged the services of peace agents to tour the
barrios and spread the evangel of the Amnesty. The agents were sometimes municipal
employees who were given an opportunity to add to their skimpy incomes by going out
on this "peace offensive". As the Provincial Treasurer put it, there was an "unaer-
■Âctg. Minister of Interior A. Bonifacio. Nov. 13, 1943. To: Minister of

Finance, A. de 1m Alas.
standing “between the Provincial Treasurer and the mayors to employ men doing the
work of police, guide, and laborer only when their services are needed— not
continuously. . . ,"1
Whenever the Japanese Military Administration of agents of the Manila govern
ment distributed relief supplies among the provincials, they expected the occasion
to be used for spreading propaganda. Thus, a bulletin sent out by the Ministry of
Health announcing the distribution of cloth, specified:
A program shall be held on the day of distribution featuring speeches by

. . . .the Provincial Health Officer. . , .the Provincial Governor, the Super
intendent of Schools. . . .the Municipal Mayor, and a member of the community.
The theme of the speeches shall be the interest that the President is taking
the we11-being of the masses and on the emphasis that he is laying for the
building up of a strong nation with peace and order and food production as the
immediate problems on hand. . . .
Filipino nationalism was encouraged, but coupled with allegiance to Japan in
a way to imply that Japan was the true and mighty backer of the Filipino nation.
Thus a Kalibapi official advised the Governor that the "Kalfbapi intends to show a
patriotic play, 'Filipinas', written by Amador Dsguio, taking the Filipino flag as a
symbol of the attempt to unite themselves. We should like permission to present
this play on April 24-26th.”3
Filipinos bent on demonstrating their loyalty to the Japanese regime found
a convenient way to do so. Whenever and wherever possible, they declared, with much
noisiness, their hatred and scorn for the United States and its culture. A favorite
way was the renaming of public streets bearing American names.
Palompon's mayor suggested how this might be done in sweeping fashion. He
issued an executive order ’’changing the names of all barrios, streets, plazas, public
buildings, parks, and bridges bearing American names to Filipino or Japanese names.”
■*Prov. Treas. Jiminex. April 19, 1944. To: The Prov. Auditor.
2Emiliano T. Tirona, Minister of Health. May 4, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.,
Tacloban, Leyte.
Êmilio Benitez, Jr. March 24, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
136
In the poblacion, the chief streets vere to bear revised names: Washirgton Street
becoming Bonifacio Street, Lincoln Street becoming Lapu-Lapa Street, Taft Street
becoming Plaridel Street
In 1944, there vere some indications that the regional authorities, specifi
cally the Commissioner of the Visayas, was keeping watch on the progress of Leyte's
propaganda drive. A Kalibapi official of Leyte was interrogated by Commissioner
Gu]las:
The Commissioner asked who are the prominent government officials and citi
zens of Leyte taking an active part in Pacification work. I did not want to
answer, fearing that I would not be accurate. I was prevailed to mention
Assemblyman Veloso, Gov. Torres, Hon. Salazar, the Provincial Secretary, the
Municipal Mayors, Constabulary Inspectors, and persons employed in Pacification
work. I mentioned that Kalibapi members and members of the HA. helped me in
pacification work. . . .
r
Lack of funds hampered the pacification program. The Mayor of Babatngon
advised the Governor: "I have the honor to inform you that the amount of P200,
pacification fund, which I received was already expended. . . .Hope more will be
available. . . ,"3
nonetheless, so long as the Japanese troops were present in formidable num
ber, the surrender campaign made headway. Macrohon announced:
The work of pacification in this town haB been going satisfactorily. From
the time of our arrival (January 18, 1944) up to the time of this writing,
about 800 persons have presented themselves to the garrison commander of the
town and took the oath. Former municipal officials have surrendered. . . A
The mayor of Baybay announced Jubilantly: "Since the time you left for Tac
loban until the present, we have adopted the mass surrender of all volunteers and
soldiers who desired to do so. We are having an average of 500 to 600 a day." Op
timistically, he added: "Send us Forn Ho. 2 prescribed by the Amnesty Proclamation
--not less than 3,000 as I expect to have 10,000 to surrender before the date of
Âlfredo Parilla, Mun. Mayor, Palompon. March 25, 1944. Sxec. Ord. No. 3.
^Saturnine B. Gonzalez, Exec. Off. of Leyte Prov. Chapt. of Kalibapi. March
30, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
^Damaso Almacin, Mun. Mayor, Babatngon. Feb. 17, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
Vicente D. Evarretta, Actg. Mayor, Macrohon. Jan. 30, 1944. To: Prov.Gov.
137
expiration of the Amnesty.
And Merida reported that the "Municipal officials are doing propaganda work
in advising the people in general and guerrilla elements to avail themselves of the
henefits of Amnesty.
The Mayor of Hilongos wrote;
I hold community meetings to inform the people of the establishment of the

new government And inculcate upon them the spirit of loyalty to support the
Republic of the Philippines. The people were all responsive to the call and I
found them to be cooperative. There was general enthusiasm. . . .especially
the policy of the government to rehabilitate the war-torn condition of the
mass. . . .3
The people of Sogod allegedly understood "the might and good intentions of
the Japanese. . . .The people have realized that their hardships are caused by the
notorious activities of the guerrilla. They are only waiting for the time to open
their mouths. . . ."4
In their, appeal to the guerrilla chieftains, the Japanese-sponsored officials
did not rely upon mere hirelings. Jose Ma. Veloso, Salazar, and Torres themselves
undertook to induce surrender. Messages artfully blended of reassurance, threats,
and sometimes enticingly vague promises found their waycircuitously to the lairs of
the hunted guerrilla leaders. Typical in its silkiness is the letter of Veloso to
Agapito Villasin, one of chieftain Bias E. Miranda's trusted lieutenants;
Ormoc, January 6 , 1944

Mr. Agapito Villasin
My dear friend;
I take this chance of writing you now that I am in the town or Ormoc advising
you to present as soon as possible to Mr. Jose Codilla/the puppet mayor/ so
that no harm will happen to you.
Arrangement has already been made with the Japanese Military Police about
you. They promised me that as long as you present to them you will not be
•^Paterno Tan, Mun. Mayor, Baybay. Feb. 16, 1944. To; The Prov. Gov.
% . Boholst, Mun. Mayor, Merida. March 11, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
^Romanico Ruiz, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Hilongos. Feb. 8 , 1944. To: The Prov.
Gov.
^Hospicio M. Labata, Mun. Mayor, Sogod. March 4, 1944. To: The Prov. Gov.
138
punished nor concentrated. In the other coast of Leyte the guerrilleros vho
presented vere released immediately.
Do not be afraid to present because there is already a proclamation of
amnesty issued by the President of the Philippine Republic approved by the
National Assembly sanctioned by the Japanese Military police to pardon all
guerrilleros no matter what crimes h<?,ve been committed by them. This amnesty
will last up to January 31st only so that you and your friends should now take
the chance.
Just notify Jose Codilla of the place where I can meet you and I will come
immediately.
Don't think of hiding because there are 30,000 Japanese soldiers in Leyte
who will mop the province and am sure you cannot escape.
Within this month I will be in Leyta going around b o you better get the
chance now that I am still here. ,
(Sgd) Joê Veloso
This particular solicitation left the address*.? unmoved. But other coaxings
2
brought results. Among the surrenders that most delighted tuc Tacloban administra
tion was that of Eleuterio Tomas, Jr. of Carigara. He had been a member of the Pro
vincial Board of Colonel Kangleon’s government of Free Leyte, though for the most
part inactive. Governor Torres wrote to the Mayor of Carigara: "Convey my warmest
congratulations to Mr. Eleuterio Tomas, Jr. for his wise step in surrendering. Hope
he will cooperate in the reconstruction of the municipality. . . .Request that he
visit me in Tacloban."^
And then the Japanese drove a spike into the very center of the resistance
movement. In a terse statement covering up what must have been a mood of black des
pair, the guerrilla auditor of "Free Leyte" reported
that our Provincial Governor S . K . Demeterio was captured by the Japanese at

the evacuation place in Macrohon at two o'clock at night. And two days after
. . . ., another report came to us to the effect that Member Angel S. Espina
of the Provincial Board has surrendered to the Japanese at Maasin. . . .*
The Tacloban propagandists gave wide publicity to these triumphs, using them
to weaken the morale of the guerrilla elements doggedly holding out. Officers of
%ote: The following statement is affixed to this copy of the Veloso letter:
"The above is a translation from the letter in Visayan-Cebuan. (Sgd) Usualdo F.
Laguitan, 1" Lt. Inf., Asst., The Adj. Gen. (WIGWF) 4-26-45."
^Ve have placed in the Appendix a copy of a surrender appeal addressed by the
Japanese commandant of the Ormoc garrison to three guerrilla officers of the WEBHF.
We may add that this particular appeal failed in its mission.
^B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 11, 1944. To: Mun. Mayor, Carigara.
TPotente, op. cit.. p. 22.
the Japanese-sponsored constabulary vere employed to disseminate this propaganda
among the people of the municipalities recently opened up, particularly in the
southern and western parts of the Island. They also distributed the latest "infor
mation releases" prepared in Manila.
One of them wrote:
. . . .The people in the barrios and sitios are thirsty for what is going
on in Manila and Greater East Asia. They were especially Impressed by pictorial
display of ceremonies in Manila during Independence. . . .The Constabulary
detachment commanders reported lack of copies to satisfy the populace. . . .1
suggest giving copies to local Japanese headquarters, with advice for proper
distribution through the sector commanders at Ormoc, Baybay, Maasin, Malitbog,
Sogod and other strategic places. . . .They haven't heard news ever since the
destruction of communications and transportation shortly after the Japanese
occupation. Papers are a means towards early restoration of peace and order
in the Province.^
Ieê-Samar Bulletin^— Influenced by such encouraging reports, the provin
cial authorities thought the time appropriate for reviving the local press. They
discussed the situation with the Japanese and in March, 1944, called upon Amador
Daguio to edit a new paper, to be called the Leyte-Samar Bulletin. Baguio, who had
been with the Voice of Victory' and had been doing publicity work for Governor
Torres, was amenable.
Attorney Leon Rojas, Jr. was invited by Daguio to become associate editor at
P75 monthly salary, described the newspaper office as occupying two rooms of the
Japanese propaganda building. The building also housed a small library of American
and Filipino literature, and had a radio scrupulously watched by a Japanese officer.
Julie Bayona, a young lady who was the daughter of a Judge, Joined the staff
as special features and "gossip" writer. According to her written account, the
Japanese
heard from some people that I was practically the only girl in the town who had
taken a university course in writing— so that they thought that I might be able
Â. N. Ayaay, 2nd It. BC, in absence of Sr. Inspector. Dec. 15, 1943.
To: Executive Officer, Bureau of Constabulary.
2
Interview— Tacloban, Dec., 1945.
to do the paper a certain amount of good,. X tried: to make him_/a Japanese
messenger/ understand that I vas not yet through vith my course and that my
only experience at newswriting vas on the College paper. . . .After a demand
for a definite 'yes' or 'no' answer. . . .1 hegan to realize that a 'yes'
vas definitely safer than a 'no1. . . .
My position as 'Associate Editor* vas merely to write a column— 'Our Social
Whirl', it vas called--a gossipy column vith attempts to touch on the fashion
trends of the moment, society doings (of vhich there vas practically none) and
society's personalities. Once in a while, I vas to vrite editorials that ap
pealed to the uomen. In short, I vas to be the 'feminine touch' of the paper.
Julie Bayona's breezy summary of the Bulletin's sfcyle and content help to
explain vhy this paper received a cold reception by the public in its semi-veekly
appearances:
The news that we printed was invariably taken from the DOMEI news agency.
These were received in Japanese but were translated into English by a Jap vho
took everything literally— his knowledge of English being meager. . . .It vas
not surprising for one to read in this particular paper a whole paragraph full
of high-sounding words, the tenses going haywire, and the whole thing sounding
like a riddle. Of course it was our duty to proof-read everything and improve
the headlines, but we didn't care much for the paper. What's more, we were
afraid to offend the translator. Consequently, the news was printed almost
always in its original translated form. Announcements from the Japanese High
Command, excerpts from the Manila dailies and comments from Jap officials filled
up almost the entire paper. Almost invariably, the important 'newsettes' would
have the 'Japanese airmen make a daring day-time raid' on some American base
'destroying all the enemy planes on the ground', 'leaving the place in flames'
and 'every one' of their planes returning to their bases.
Mr. Daguio took his 'Editorials' from various sources, but his favorite source
was from a small book written by the puppet president of our puppet Republic.
This saved him a lot of inconveniences— and gave him more time to play his
favorite game— mahjong £
Daguio amplified in writing:
A Japanese newspaperman, Takano, saw to it that the organ was in conformity

vith the Japanese policies in the country. . . .A study of the editorial space
devoted to these pro-Japanese dictations will show how in spite of the danger of
our position we were able to keep to the barest minimum of pro-Japanese views.
Japanese news was mostly quotes from old newspapers in Manila.
My position was a fine vantage ground for the dissemination of information
among Filipinos. While outwardly printing a pro-Jap newspaper, we twisted phrases
here and there to insinuate opposite meanings, which people in our confidence
understood. We had a chance to listen to allied radio news on the excuse that
we vere listening to Tokyo. We imparted Allied news within an hour after we heard
it. Information told us by the Japanese officers which we realized was of value
to the guerrillas was relayed to the people, ultimately reaching the guerrillas.
Julie Bayona, "Recollections of a Newspaper", (Tacloban, 1945), pp. 4-5.

2Ibid., pp. 6-7.
141 ;i j
i
■V
Observations, unguarded intimate "views or information we received were all
relayed. . . . "I
*
Let ua scan one issue of the Bulletin. That of May 9th featured an editorial \ '
(
declaring Leyte’s three foremost objectives; the achievement of peace and order, I
the control of foodstuffs, and the increase of food production. Pages 1 and 2 were
!!
devoted primarily to news of international and national import:
(a) Announcement of the Japanese Emperor’s birthday.

(b) The death of U. S. Secretary Knox— blamed for aggression in the Pacific,
and attributing his death to remorse over failure.
(c) Japanese Army advances in North China.
(d) British kill Indian soldiers to prevent their Joining up withChandra
Bose.
(e) 700,000 of those conscripted in the United States military forces are
mentally ill.
(f) An Allied submarine sinks a Japanese hospital ship.
(g) The Pope protests against the bombing and machine-gunning of Vatican City.
(h) Germans shoot down 129 bombers over Berlin.
(i) Filipino newsmen meet at Domei News Agency to observe the 2nd anniversary
of the fall of Corregidor— an event marking the beginning of Asia for the Asiatics.
(j) Cebuanos offer labor to construct an airfield for the Japanese forces.
All of the news items published were designed to hold the Allied forces in
contempt, to magnify the strength of the Japanese, and to extol Japanese graciousness.
News about Filipino activities in Manila and outside of Leyte were intended to show
that the Filipino people by and large were cooperating with the "New Order”.
News about Leyte appeared principally on pages 3 and 4, but with write-ups
of one or two outstanding provincial events on the first two pages;
(a) Mayoralty convention at Tacloban.

(b) Posthumous honorirg of constabulary heroes who died in line of duty.
(c) A feature article on the Kalibapi and civic service.
(d) Amador T. Daguio to present the play "Filipinas”, inspiring the people
to return to their own Oriental ways.
(e) Delegates to the Cultural Institute in Manila.
(f) Ex-Governor Jaro advises the guerrillas to seek peace.
(g) General Kawazoe is back— let the guerrillas beware.
Local items fluctuated between denunciation of the guerrillas and appeals to
them to accept Japanese magnanimity and cooperate in the building of trie New Order.
Local problems were dealt with in a way to suggest that effort was needed but that
Hfritten reply to a series of questions put to Amador Daguio by Elmer N.

Lear in Tacloban, Leyte, January, 1946. j
1
143,
the outlook vas not unfavorable. Subtle Indoctrination of the Filipino mind to
accept Japanese culture as kindred vith his own vas very pervasive.
Sober confrontation vith this edition and similar ones vould incline the
pro-guerrilla reader to classify Daguio and his Bulletin staff as inescapably pro-
Japanese. Daguio himself vould concede that he vrote under danger of assassination
by enemies of the regime. But on the central issue, the issue vhether the Bulletin
exerted enough influence to sving public opinion over to the support of Japanese,
Daguio voUld argue in the negative. And our ovn conclusions, based upon an informal
cross-sectional survey of Leytean opinion on this matter, inclines us to hold vith
Daguio. As to the ethical issue bound up vith Baguio's assumption of the editorship,
we remain reticent, referring the interested to the subsequent discussion of
"collaborationism".
Thus far, we have been studying the activities of the Occupation regime to
mobilize adult opinion in Leyte and marshal popular support of the "pacification"
program. But the Japanese had visions of a long rule. They must reach the youthful
minds, the plastic minds, and impress upon them the doctrines and attitudes that
vould guarantee their maturing loyalty. For this task, the most appropriate agency
vas the public school.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, the system of public education in Leyte, as
elsewhere in the Archipelago, vas thoroughly saturated vith the spirit of American
mentorship. The Japanese could not raze the structure, at least at the beginning.
What they vould attempt vas a Job of decontamination. In the following pages, we
shall examine the public schools of Leyte, noting the changes brought about by the
provincial authorities in conformity vith Japanese purposes.
Education In Occupied Leyte;
Educational Phj.loBophyj_— What conception of the function of education in
formed educational practice in Leyte under Japanese tutelage? To answer this query,
we must first differentiate between the views of the Filipino administrative person-
nel--the division superintendent, the field supervisors, the principals— on the one
hand, and the bulk of the classroom teachers on the other. Perhaps a majority of the
humble teachers held to the same viewpoint that had motivated their teaching during
the Commonwealth regime. During the Occupation, they would perform their duties as
inconspicuously as possible, comply with administrative directives as much as neces
sary to avoid entanglement in the coils of the counter-intelligence, and earn their
skimpy rice-tickets. To be sure, the same brief commentary could be affixed to the
personnel records of some of the administrative force. But the others took seriously
the program handed down from Manila. To this we turn.
President Laurel of the puppet republic, in his inaugural address, expounded
as cogently as anyone the educational philosophy of the Occupation period. He
declared:
Character-foxmation shall be the mainspring of all educational enterprise born

of a telling realization that scholarship destitute of character is worthless.
. . . .We can combat the virtue of excessive materialism which we have inherited
from the West only by a return to the spiritual ways of the East where we right
fully belor^.
Re-definition of purpose and reorientation of curricula would be futile if
they were not brought to bear upon the great mass of our population. While the
Constitution provides for citizenship training to adult citizens which should not
be neglected by all means, more decisive results would be accomplished if we
concentrate on the plastic minds of our youth and revolutionize a whole genera
tion. Elementary instruction must not only be free and public as required by the
Constitution, but attendance at least in primary grades must eventually and as
resources permit be made compulsory for all children of school age. It is the
constitutional duty of every citizen to render personal military and civil ser
vice as may be required by law. . . .To insure this, the State may furnish the
necessary preparatory training dove-tailed to its requirements, and the indivi
dual is duty-bound to submit to the instruction so prescribed.
All the students in our schools, colleges, and universities must be subjected ■
to the rigid discipline of a well-regulated daily schedule. In general. . . . j
they must wear a prescribed uniform not only to inculcate in them the habits of !
thrift but to pexmit closer supervision over their activities. . . .Only by j
strengthening the moral fibre of our youth and casting them into the heroic j
14
mould shall the soft metal of their miDds harden into maturity. . . .^
"Scholarship destitute of character is worthless." This is an apothegm to
•which the educators of the Commonwealth regime would readily subscribe. Why did
Laurel single out the idea of character-buildi 1*5 as diacritical of the "new*' regime?
We can best answer the question if we realize that the term "character", as employed
by Laurel, had primarily an emotive, an evocative function. Its designatory value
was vague— a beautiful piece of obfuscation. It could signify whatever the autho
rities intended to implement their other purposes.
However, we can unravel a few clues if we look closely at Laurel's exposi
tion."It is the duty of every citizen to render personal military and civil ser
vice", etc. coupled with "the State may furnish the necessary prepafatpry training",
etc. can be construed to support the conclusion that education is to be primarily
indoctrination for integration of the individual into a comprehensive, statist pro
gram. This conclusion is bolstered by the further statement: "All the students in
our schools. . . .must be subjected to a rigid discipline" looking toward a "closer
supervision over their activities."
The "return to the spiritual ways of the East" is to be interpreted as a re
jection of the scientific method in the analysis of social problems. By concentrat
ing on "the plastic minds of our youth", tb£ new leadership could shape a generation
prepared to respond to a "spiritual" call— Verbalism translatable into prompt, un-
hesitatir® obedience to command.
Reopening the Public_S£hoola2.— In line with its intent of restoring order
and tranquillity to the Philippines, the Manila government anxiously pressed for the
reopening of the public schools. Youngsters, cowering in their households or prowl
ing about the streets, were a disquieting influence. "Open the schools wherever
feasible and let the parents send off their children in regular attendance"--thiB
was decreed. Directives reached the educational officials, who at once handed down
supplementary instructions to the division superintendents in the field.
lThe Tribune, Manila, Oct. 23, 1943, p. 3.
145
At the apex of the educational structure was a new bureaucracy, described
by Isidro:
When the Japanese Imperial Forces created early in 1942 the Philippine
Executive Commission, one of the executive departments organized was the De
partment of Education, Health, and Public Welfare. This new department like
the others was placed under a Commissioner, not a Secretary. . . .It was vested
with executive supervision and administrative control over all educational in
stitutions and this was exercised through the Bureau of Public Instruction,
Bureau of Private Education, Bureau of Physical Education. . . .
While the Commission of Education, Health, and Public Welfare and the bureaus
under it, like other offices, -were nominally headed by Filipinos, each office
had a Japanese adviser who practically dictated its policies and activities.
Upon the inauguration of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Eepublic, the
executive departments were once more renamed and the Commission. . . .became the
Ministry of Education. The chief of each Department was given the title of
Minister.1
In Leyte, the man charged with overseeing this program was Division Super
intendent Kapili. Florentino Kapili came to his position with comparatively good
professional equipment. He had attended the Trenton Normal School in the United
States in 1918, taking some coursework under Professor Bagley. The insular govern
ment, recognizing his potentialities for professional growth, awarded him a scholar
ship for advanced sttidy in the United States. After his return, he held various
posts in the Visayas as elementary school principal and district supervisor, also
serving for a period as critic teacher in the Philippine Normal School. When the war
broke out, he occupied the principalship of the Cebu Normal School.
Kapili came to Leyte in February, 1942, proceeding to his wife’s home town
of Dag ami. Leyte was by no means unknown to him. Some years before, he had resided
in Barugo, for he was principal of its elementary school. The arrival of the Japan
ese invasion troops brought him his big opportunity. Governor Torres offered him
the division superintendency of schools. Kapili was the most available man, and
he accepted.
By June, some of Leyte’s schools were in operation. Kapili reports that
"many schoole were already functioning as this was in accordance with the order of
^"Isidro, op. cit.t pp. 12-13.
the Provincial Governor, vho vas instructed by the Commander of the Japanese Imperial \
Forces in Leyte.
The Japanese knew of no single agency more potent than the public schools,
(vith the reassurance they gave of the continuity of generations), in lulling Jangled j
nerves and in inspiring a cooperative attitude. Only start classes afresh, and the
Filipino vould docilely succumb to the conqueror's yoke.
On June 29, 1942, as many of the district supervisors and principals as ■were
2
able to attend trooped to Tacloban for a two-day conference on educational policy.
Contact between the divisional office and the field had not been as close as in
peacetime. In some isolated municipalities, the local school authorities had been
thrown virtually on their own, resortirg to practices of their own improvisation.
At this gathering, the veil covering the educational program of the new regime would
be lifted, and many administrative questions disposed of. Let it not be supposed
that the supervisors and principals in conference assembled set about democratically
to thrash out their difficulties under the parlous conditions of enemy rule. This
vas a unilateral declaration by the superintendent of aims and basic procedures, as
laid dovn by the political authorities. Reserved to the local officials vas the
raising of questions in seeking clarification of vague matters.
Among the points taken up at the conference, the following had to do vith
the conmencement of enrolment, the sina qua non of any school system:
1. Upon their return to their respective stations, enrollment should com

mence by listing all the pupils who apply for admission. In this connection,
the Mayors are requested to help in the campaign for enrollment.
2. Teachers vho are natives of the municipalities will be used for this
enrollment, and in the barrios where there are no teachers available, the Mayors
will be requested to assign the teniente del barrio or any other responsible
person.
3. Teachers vho are not natives of the towns should be notified to be ready
when their services are needed vhen classes begin.
■Âctg. Supt. Kapili. July 1, 1943. Report to the Director of Public In
struction, Manila.
% rs. Margarita Gaviola, then principal of the Tacloban Elementary School
stated in interview that the attendance was well-nigh perfect. ’
1«
4. A preliminary report on this enrollment will be submitted as of July 1C

and a final report as of July 15.
5. Definite opening of classes will "be announced later.1
The conferees returned to their respective localities to carry out the in
structions . But Superintendent Kapili did not abate his efforts:
You are strongly urged to intensify the campaign for enrollment. Teachers
should go to the homes of parents whose children have not yet reported for en
rollment , and persuade them to ccsnpel their children to attend classes. The
cooperation of the municipal mayors and other influential members of the com
munity should be secured.
The intimation that compulsion might be inevitable in effectuating an ample
turnout of pupils suggests that the superintendent was not entirely sarguine. But
with the prestige of the municipal officials backing his efforts, Kapili hoped to
make some kind of a showing. Meanwhile, he would proceed to set the date for the
official commencement of sessions:
Classes in all public elementary schools in the Province of Leyte will begin
on Monday, July 20, 1942. However, enrolment should continue until Friday, July
31, 1942. Only those classes whose enrollment is no less than 20 should be al
lowed to function. In schools where this number does not reach in each grade,
pupils in different grades should be combined until one teacher has no less than
20 pupils. The possible combinations are as follows: Grades I-II, Grades I-II-
III, Grades I-III, Grades I-II-III-IV, Grades I-IV, Grades II-III, Grades II-IV,
Grades V-VI.3
Realizing that his instructions were ambiguous, the Division Superintendent
circulated addenda:
Maximum enrolment for each grade: 80 in primary grades (using the two-single
session plan) and 55 in intermediate grades (using the one-teacher-one-class
plan). You should not be confused with the contents of the circular letter. . .
which states that 'only those classes whose enrollment is no less than 20 should
be allowed to function'. This does not mean that you can organize four sections
of 20 pupils of one grade, say Grade I , in one school. In this case, when there
are 80 pupils, only one teacher should be used, even if there were four teachers
in grade I when schools were closed in December, 1941. ^
•^Points taken up with District Supervisors and Principals by the Actg. Div.
Supt. of Schools during the Conference on June 29 and 30, 1942, at Tacloban, Leyte.
2Actg. Supt. F. Kapili. July 15, 1942. To: District Supervisors end Prin
cipals .
3Tbid.
Âctg. Supt. Kapili. July 25, 1942. To: District Supervisors and Principal
14)
The possible grade combinations envisioned in these instructions, as
also the registration totals allowed for each class, were but the corollary of
the reduced teaching staffs. That the quality of instruction would deteriorate
went without saying. Yet, what else could be done, considering the financial
uncertainty?
Kapili kept the central office posted on conditions within his division:
Since the last letter of this Office, dated July 3, 1942, which was brought
to your office through the courtesy of Senator Yeloso, the following were the
activities undertaken:
Soon after the return of Governor Torres from Cebu, where he had a conferen
with the Japanese administration, an"order was issued by him to open classes in
all public elementary schools in the province of Leyte. In connection with the
opening of classes, circular letters were issued to the field, dated July 15
and July 25. . . .
The enrollment in the different municipalities, as per report on July 15,
is as follows:
Primary: 12,763 Intermediate: 4,372
This report is not complete due to lack of communication and transportation.
Twenty municipalities and 118 barrios were not able to report their enrollment.
It is believed, however, that this enrollment will increase.
The classes were ordered to begin on July 20, and enrollment to continue
until July 31. As soon as the final reports of all municipalities and barrios
are received in this office, same will be forwarded. . . .i
Meantime, the central government had taken stock of its resources and brougb
to light its inability to finance the reopening of all the schools. Hence, availabl
monies would be allocated among the provinces, with only a fraction of the divisions
schools eligible for reopening.
On August 24, 1942, Governor Torres arrived in Tacloban. With him were two
letters from Manila, bearing the signature of the Director of Public Instruction,
dated July 30th and August 15th, 1942, authorizing the school division of Leyte to
organize but 10 elementary schools.2 Soon after, it was made known that a total of '
teaching positions had been granted the Province, including the 10 principalships.
The Superintendent transmitted the details of the central office instruction!
to his district supervisors:
•^F. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt. Aug. 1, 1942. To: Dir. of Pub. Inst., Manila
2Actg. Supt. Kapili. July 1, 1943. Report To: Dir. of Pub. Inst., Manila.
Eaclx municipality: will have. 6 classroom teachers for complete elementary
classes and one principal. Other positions are abolished effective today. . .
Maximum enrolment in all grades, including the intermediate, for each teacher
will be 120, 60 in the mornir^ and 60 in the afternoon. . * .Report by. wire
actual enrolment by grades and names of teachers recommended to handle them,
and whether class rooms can continue the entire school year.-1-
How determine in which municipalities schools would be established? The
superintendent sought a solution that would be both equitable and effective in goad
ing the localities to speed up their enrolment machinery. "The order authorizing
the continuance of classes will give preference to municipalities in accordance wit!
actual enrolment and regular daily attendance.” The superintendent thus served
notice that only the first ten municipalities to comply with the governing regula
tions would be authorized to recommence classes.
Poor_Attendance:— Low enrolment and chronic absenteeism plagued the school
authorities. This state of affairs was attributeble to multiple factors: hunger,
lack of clothing, illness, obligation on the part of school children to assist their
parents in the all-er^rossing care of making a living, etc. But indubitably, the
minatory influence of the guerrilla organizations upon parents, teachers, and school
children constituted an invisible barricade about the deserted school buildings.
Superintendent Kapili sought to counteract this influence. He ordered the
teachers to undertake a. house-to-house canvass of the parents in their individual
comnunities:
You are strongly urged to intensify the campaign for enrollment. Teachers
should go to the homes of parents whose children have not yet reported for en
rollment, and persuade them to compel their children to attend classes.
To reinforce these efforts, the teachers were advised that the "cooperation
of the municipal mayors and other influential members of the community should be
secured" .2
All these efforts notwithstanding, the public school enrolment under the
Tacloban provincial administration was pitiably skimpy. In May, 1943, the division
1Actg. Supt. F. Kapili. Aug. 25, 1942. To: List. Supervisors.

Înstructions, July 15, 1942, op. clt.
superintendent submitted a dreary report: o. i
Of the 47 municipalities in this division, only 10 submitted their reports

in answers to a circular telegram dated August 25, 1942, sent by this Office.
. . . .The schools that held classes regularly during the school year are from
the municipalities of Dulag, Ormoc, Tacloban, and Tanauan.^
Alarmed over this dismal showing, the superintendent conferred with puppet
Governor Torres. The upshot was a gubernatorial Proclamation, addressed to the
people of Leyte:
Whereas, it is the duty and policy of the present Administration to provide

elementary education to children of elementary ages, and
Whereas, it is the principal and sacred duty of every parent to send chLldrer
to school:
Now Therefore, pursuant to the authority conferred upon me as Provincial
Governor of Leyte by Executive Order No. 42 of the Chairman of the Executive
Commission, I hereby call upon all parents with children of elementary school
age (7 to 15 years, and who are in grades 1-6) to send them to school in munici
palities where schools are established by the government or in private schools
recognized by the government.
In drawing up his proclamation, the Governor was aware that there was consid
erable malingering on the part of children nominally enrolled. He therefore added
the provision: "Once a child is sent to the school, he should be kept in school for
the entire school season, unless there is a justification for the child to quit schoo:
during the period."
The Proclamation did not content itself with an exhortation on civic duty:
Any parent who fails to send his children to school for no Justifiable and
valid reasons. . . .shall be punished by a fine of not less than P20, and not
exceeding P50, or by imprisonment in case of insolvency. All municipal mayors
in the province of Leyte are hereby instructed to proceed immediately to the
enforcement of the provisions of this proclamation.2
Attempts were made to implement this Proclamation. Once again, "with the
help of the town mayors, the teachers campaigned for enrolment." The results were
dispiriting, for the same deterrents were still at work. "After one week of intensive
work, very few pupils reported. . . . " In Tacloban alone was some improvement
registered.
Pctg. Div. Supt. Eapili. "Annual Report for the School Year 1942-1943."
Proclamation No. 1, s 1943. May 29, 1943.
Enrollment in the-Japanese controlled portions of Leyte did perk up towards
the close of 1943. And the trend continued into 1944. Superintendent Eapili's
Annual Beport for the school year 1943-1944 recorded the organization of schools in
s
13 municipalities, with a staff of 120 teachers.and a pupil population of 8,572.
Taclohan, Ormoc, and Dulag underwent the greatest expansion in enrollment.
This upward trend paralleled the retrogression of guerrilla fortunes. This
was the period when the Japanese were on the offensive, engaged in a Province-wide
campaign to smoke out the combat units of the resistance. And with all that, the
division superintendent noted in August, 1944: "Practically in all schools, attend
ance of pupils was very irregular," Bo doubt, many children willing to attend
classes remained at home, famished and ill-clad. But others, in sympathy with the
resistance movement, expressed their convictions by malingering.
The Schools and the Jajmne£e_Reg jjne:-- In the eyes of some Filipinos, it was
preferable that the young should attend to their studies rather than remain idle.
Attendance at school by the pupils, they said, did not imply assent by the parents tc
the program of the Japanese. But the guerrilla leaders were more skeptical. They
pointed to the active role played by the division superintendent of schools, and by
some of the principals and classroom teachers in Japanese propaganda work. Thus,
on March 25, 1943:
Col. Voshi, In Charge of Internal Affairs, Japanese Military Administration

for the Visayas and Mindanao, and his staff visited the public and private school
in Tacloban. He was accompanied by the Governor and the Division Superintendent
of Schools.
And some months later: "General Ushijima of the Japanese Military Adminis
tration came to the office on a courtesy call. The next day, we visited the Tacloban
Elementary School and the Leyte Boys’ and Girls’ High Schools."
It was the guerrilla conviction that these inspections! visits by high-ranking
Japanese officers marked the occasion of solemn pledges to inculcate into the Filipim
children acceptance of Japanese cultural goals. However, the guerrilla found even
more distasteful Superintendent Kapili's inclusion in the propaganda entourages of
15
the Japanese officers, travelin outside of Tacloban. These parties would, convoke
public assemblies of the townspeople along their course, roundly denounce the guer
rilla as bandits, and exhort the people to hasten the return of "normalcy" by co
operating with the Japanese administration and by sending their children to school.
Superintendent Kapili recorded:
On Sunday, January 24th JlSAZj with the Provincial Governor, Provincial

Treasurer, and other provincial officials, I visited the schools in Dulag and
Tanauan. Speeches were delivered by some of us advising the people to lead
normal lives and to continue their normal activities.
On August 6 ^L9437, I visited Palo with the Provincial Governor, Col.
Omori, local commanders of the Japanese Imperial Forces, Capt. Tohei the local
chief of the MP, and other government officials. A meeting was held. The
speakers spoke about the coming of Philippine Independence, the necessity of
sending the children to schools, the need of Intensive food production, and to
encourage the people who are still in their evacuation places to return to
the Poblacion.
On the 19th of November, 1943, "with the Governor and Col. Omori and several
other Japanese officers, the undersigned inspected the schools in Dulag and Tanauan.
And rounding out the year’s activities— "With Governor Torres, Major Kitagavi
and other provincial officials and Japanese officers, I inspected the towns of Dagam:
Burauen, and Dulag and the barrio of Tarragona, Abuyog."'1'
Perhaps the division superintendent of schools did collaborate actively with
the Japanese administration. Would this in itself substantiate the allegation that
the ordinaryclassroom teacher was abetting Japanese purposes? Conceivably, this was
but so much window dressing to dupe the conqueror. He would not suspect that the
classroom continued to serve as the shrine of sacred Filipino beliefs and loyalties.
This line of Justification the guerrilla authorities rejected as utterly spe
cious. They called attention to Superintendent Eapili’s circular (implementing
Executive Order No. 10) distributed among the principals when the schools of tbs divi
sion were reopened, underscoring that teachers in the reconstructed staffs must be
"in perfect sympathy with the accomplishment of the objective of the Greater East
^F. Eapili, Div. Supt. of Schools, Leyte. Beport of December, 1943.
c
IE
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with Japan as the centripetal power.
Moreover, the Division Superintendent was vigilant in eliminating objectioi
able study materials from the classrooms. In his Initial conference with his dis
trict supervisors and principals, where he enunciated the cardinal regulations to
he followed, he made clear:
A circular letter was given to district supervisors and principals, giving

a list of text hooks to he used in the elementary schools in the Philippines an
parts in the text hooks which should he eliminated, as given in Instruction No.
18 found in Volume-Ill, pages 1 to 9 inclusive, of the official Journal of the
Japanese Military Administration.
Text hooks will not he shown to pupils unless all parts to he eliminated ar
properly eliminated.
Books that are prohibited to he used in our schoolB should he kept in "boxes
properly closed and labeled. In the absence of boxes, these hooks. . . .should
he placed either in aparados or storerooms properly locked. Care should he take
that none of these hooks are shown or handed either to teachers or pupils. For
the final disposition of these prohibited hooks, you will he notified later.
Library hooks should not he issued nor allowed to circulate until further
notice. Strict compliance is expected in this matter. No hooks should he
loaned to anybody including pupils, teachers, and outsiders. ^
These Instructions plainly show that the Division Superintendent distrusted
at least seme of his teachers. He intended to frustrate in advance any ruse by
which anti-Japanese classroom teachers might circumvent regulations. Willy-nilly,
the teachers were committed to presenting to their pupils a garbled version of pre
war instruction.
To he sure, it must he remembered that the Division Superintendent did not
•make policy. It was his responsibility to fulfill the objectives of the Manila cen
tral office. Isidro has condensed into their essentials the changes in elementary
education propagated by Manila:
^-Instructions, July 15, 1942, op. clt.

^Conference of June 29, 1942, op. clt., Points 8, 11, 19, 20.
^Kapili, when interviewed in 1945 in Tacloban, sought to give theimpression
that he obviated Japanese censorship by coverity those portions of text-hooks ordere<
expunged with transparent paper. But he himself admitted, if he he taken at his own
word, that his trick came to nought. He stated that the affair came to the^notice ci
the Japanese MPs, who demanded an explanation. Kapili exculpated himself by pleading
that this paper was the only kind available at the time, and promised to replace it
at once with a heavier grade of paper.
15
During the Japanese occupation, the curriculum vas again chained to meet th
new ob jectives. While the sub jects in the elementary school curriculum remains
practically the same as those offered before the war, the contents were so
chosen as to retain only those elements consistent with Japanese aims. Beading
phonics, arithmetic, language, spelling, music, writing, character educationy
health education, physical education— subjects which were traditional in the
elementary schools before the war— were retained, but the contents of the text
books were examined and censored to retain only those portions which, although
they might not contribute effectively to the execution of the Japanese plan,
would not be prejudiced to the new alms. First grade children continued to reac
Pepe and Pilar, but without the symbolism and illustrations of the previous re
gime; they solved arithmetic problems, but only those not involving the mention
of dollars and shillings; they sang songs, but not the Star-Spangled Banner, not
the Philippine Hymn, nor America. In their place the children were taught to
sing the .Aikuko. Koshin Kyoku, Singun K a . and Hinomaru.
To eradicate Arglo-American ideas in textbooks, a Textbook Examining Commit
tee composed of Japanese and Filipinos was created. Its primary function, as
the name implies, was to examine all textbooks in the schools and to determine
which books were to be entirely eliminated and which portions were to be deleted
from the others. As a result of the examination, certain textbooks were strictl
banned from the schools and the rest were approved only after portions, which wer
inimical to Japanese aims had been deleted. A few of the textbooks which were
banned from the elementary schools were the following: (1) Correct English, for
Grades III and 1 7 . (2) Essentials of English for Grade V . (5) Intermediate Geog
raphy, (4) A Brief History of the Philippines, (5) Elementary Civics for Grades
V and V I . and (6) Philippine Civics.
Most of the textbooks which the Comnittee approved were 'retouched'. Each
word or phrase that was frowned upon was covered with a piece of paper or crosse
out with black ink, and the approved expression was written in its place. No
textbook was issued to pupils until the prohibited parts had been fully elimin
ated or changed. Among the stories that were eliminated were the following:
'The First Thanksgiving', 'Materials on Pilgrims and Thanksgiving', 'Saluting
the Flag*, 'Story of Lady Claire', 'King Arthur and the Pound Table', 'The Pass
ing of Arthur*, 'John Maynard, Pilot', in Grade V; 'Hail Philippines', The Boy
hood of Benjamin West', 'Henry Wadsworth Longfellow', 'A Letter from Thomas Jef
ferson to His Daughter', 'Abraham Lincoln', 'Thomas Edison', and 'Leonard Wood',
all in Grade VI.*
The Japanese determination to discourage critical thinking and at the same
time increase agricultural and industrial productivity was most clearly revealed in
the underscorieg of vocational education. In the words of Isidro:
The emphasis on vocational education during the Japanese occupation was mani
fested not only in the granting of authority to reopen only strictly vocational
schools and technical colleges, but also in the revision of the primary and
secondary curricula to give these a greater vocational slant. In the elementary
school curriculum, Heme and Community Membership was introduced in lieu of the
social sciences. The new subject was pre-vocational in nature, aiming to dis
cover the vocational interests of the child through industrial arts and home
economics. The course attempted to train boys in the manufacture of ordinary
*Isidro, op. cit.. pp. 8-9.
15.
articles such as rakes, trowels, shovels, and chisels and encouraged the girls
to devote more time to the making of cookies from rice flour andcassava. In
the field of secondary education the purely academic high schools were abolishe<
and only the modified general curriculum which was vocational in nature was
authorized to continue. By a system of electives the new high school curriculur
aimed to prepare the students for some vocation or a college course. As a pre
paratory course for college, it gave greater emphasis to natural sciences than
did the old curriculum. The science subjects consisted of General Science in tl
First Year, Biolcgy in the Second Year, Elementary Chemistry in the Third, and
Physics in the Fourth Year. These had a total time allotment of 23.33 hours a
week as against 16.67 hours in the 1940 curriculum. The vocational course for
hoys and home economics for girls was emphasized, each being given nine periods
a week. The vocational course offerings were similar to those of the general
curriculum and consisted of agronomy, horticulture, poultry and swine, auto
mechanics, electricity, and others, although in the First Year the orientation
subjects were grouped into larger headings of agriculture, trade, commerce, and
household industries.^-
The most direct manifestation of Japanese influence in education was found
in the propagation of the Japanese language: ". . . .The curriculum of the public
schools," Isidro wrote, "was overhauled particularly to have Nippongo supplant Eng
lish. Every child from the first grade up was required to learn the Hanasl Kotoba,
a Nippongo primer. . . . 1,2
In Leyte, Superintendent Kapili hoped to ingratiate himself with the puppet
administration by notifying his field force:
At least 40 minutes should be devoted daily to the teaching of the Japanese

language in every grade. For your source of material for thiB subject, use the
pamphlet handed to you during the conference of District Supervisors and Prin
cipal Teachers at Tacloban on June 29 and 30, 1942
Along with the teaching of Nippongo, Superintendent Kapili introduced certain
ritual into the classroom, symbolic of the close ties between Japan and the Philip
pines. With great exactitude, Superintendent Kapili ordained: "The correct dimen
sions of the official Japanese flag to be used is 100 inches by 70 inches. The
central red circle must be 42 inches in diameter.
Also specified was the prescribed manner of rendering the salute to the
colors:
Îbid., pp. 21-22. 2 Ibid.. p. 5.

Înstructions, July 15, 1942, op. cit.
^Conference of June 29, 1942, op. cit., Point #2.
The Japanese flag should he hoisted; daily before classes begin and It should
he lowered after classes with proper ceremony. Pupils should line in front of
the school buildings facing the flagpole,-while the Japanese flag is being
hoisted, with bowed heads. The same procedure should be repeated at the close of
the school session in the afternoon. This practice should be observed daily.
Copies of the Japanese patriotic songs will be sent later. As soon as you
receive them same should be sung during the hoisting and lowerings of the Japanese
flag.
Superintendent Kapili hoped that by means of these ceremonies in the class
room, the teachers would succeed in instilling in their charges a warm and friendly
disposition towards their foreign overlords. It was the expected thing for a Japan
ese to officiate at the school commencement exercises, while the teachers and pupils
paid proper deference to Japanese culture.
In Tacloban, the Leyte Boys' and Girls' High School and the Tacloban Elemen
tary School held Joint commencement exercises on May 26. . . .Numbers in the
program, speeches and songs were given in Nippongo, Tagalog, local dialect and
English. . . .General Kawasoe was one of the speakers."
The Japanese promoted the cult of the physical and called upon the schools
to Join in. In keeping with this tone, the division superintendent arranged several
public athletic functions:
An athletic meet managed by the undersigned was celebrated on March 10

as a part of the celebration of the anniversary of Japanese Army Day. The mili
tary authorities requested the Division Office to undertake this work. The
school children and members of the District Neighborhood Association participated.
Along the same lines, the Japanese sponsored a physical fitness program in
the schools, including the mass performance of calisthenics. This was known as Badio
Taiso. Superintendent Kapili used to send out supervisors to check up on the faith
ful adherence by the teachers to this program. Kapili noted that Mr. Paulino, on his
trip in June, 1943, "also taught teachers. . . .how to execute properly Badio Taiso.*•
In his June, 1944, Beport, Kapili stated that 70 teachers had enroled in the Badio
Taiso course, offered by the Teachers Institute held at Tacloban.
-Înstructions, July 15, 1942, op. cit.

^Beport of Actg. Div. Supt. F. Kapili: Jure 5, 1944.
Presupposed in this elaborate program of classroom, indoctrination vas the
reorientation of the teachers' viewpoints, and their acquisition of. new skills.
Special institutes vere set up in Manila to further this goal. Isidro thus outlined
the program:
When the Japanese came, the task they considered paramount vas not to train
additional teachers. They set out to re-educate the Filipino teachers with a
view to making them accept the tenets and principles of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
As a first step in this re-education, they organized institutes for teachers
■which aimed to give them orientation in the philosophy of the new order. In
these institutes teachers frcm both the private and public schools vere given a
short period of training for fifteen veeks, and vere taught Nippongo, the basic
principles of education, Japanese and Philippine songs, and physical education.
They studied the geography and history of the yaricus nations composing the
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and vere taught that Japan vas the undis
puted leader of the Orient. Groups of teachers vere selected from various parts
of the Philippines to attend the institutes. Practically all the teachers thus
trained vere turnedlately given appointment s.
To increase the number of competent Nippongo teachers in the division of
Leyte, as veil as to intensify their loyalty to the Nev Order, Superintendent Kapili j
took advantage of the arrangements made by the general office to send some of his
teachers to Manila for intensified Btudy. They vere known as "pensionados", or
scholarship recipients. They vere expected to soak up as much subject-matter as the
retentivity of their minds would allow during their stay. On their return, they
would be scattered throughout the division, instructing in Nippongo and Tagalog, and
organizing classes in Nippongo for their fellow teachers in their respective locali
ties. Thus, Kapili noted:
Of the sixteen pensionados from Leyte who graduated on December 23, 1943 in
the Normal Institute, fourteen arrived this month. . . .These pensionados are
now distributed in all the schools in the Division as follows: Barugo: 1;
Burauen: 1; Carlgara: 2; Dulag: 2; Jaro: 1; Ormoc: 1; Palo: 1; Tacloban: 2;
Tanauan: 1; Tolosa: 2.
But only a limited number of teachers could be sent on scholarship to Manila.
To cope vith the shortage of teachers able to give instruction in basic Nippongo,
Superintendent Kapili organized special training classes in the Province. For Taclo- !
ban, it vas fairly simple.

M ."
Îsidro, op. clt.. pp. 18-19.
158
A class in Nipporô began on December 15, 1942, under a Japanese civilian,

Mr. Sakay. All teachers and division office personnel, including the under
signed, are attending this class. Instruction is given three times a week, for
one hour.
Not until 1944 did Superintendent Kapili extend this instruction to the teach
ers outside of Tacloban. In a circular letter to the principals, he announced the
setting up of a teachers' institute at Tacloban during the vacation period, providing
instruction in Nippongo:
The teachers attending classes will be paid their regular monthly salaries
without per diem, and they have to pay their own transportation to Tacloban and
return to their stations. In case in your municipality there is a Nippongo class
regularly conducted by a competent teacher, the teachers may attend this class.
The Institute remained in session from June 15th to July 15th, 1944. Kapili
reported the registration for Nippongo as 52 for the beginners class, and 20 in the
advanced class.
All schools in the Division are represented in this Institute. Teachers

who are not in attendance are. . . .attending classes in Nippongo under a Jap
anese connected with the local Japanese army garrisons. . . .
When the regime of the Philippine Executive Commission was replaced by the
so-called Philippine Republic, the authorities rescinded the ban on the teaching of i
social studies. Lest anyone should conclude that this marked the return of unfettered
teaching, the Provincial officials emphasized that the schools must continue to show
the relationship between Filipino nationalism and the New Order for East Asia:
"This office and the schools," Kapili reported, "took a very active part in
the preparations for the celebration of the inauguration of the Republic of the Philip
pines on October 14, 1943."^
With similar enthusiasm, "the schools participated in the program for the
celebration of Constitution Day on September 7th.
"Home and Community Membership" became one of the most important subjects of
the curriculum, built around the concept of integrating individual and State. Just
IF. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt. May 25, 1944. To: Principal Teachers.
2peport for June, 1944. July 5, 1944.
3 F. Kapili. Report of October, 1943. To: Governor.
% . Kapili. Report of September, 1944. To: Governor.
159
as theadult Filipino must respond to a governmental summons to serve wherever di
rected,so the children must learn to place themselves at theservice of thecom
munity— chiefly aiding in the food production campaign. School gardens were planted
with vegetable seeds, and the pupils, under teacher direction, devoted part of their
time to cultivating vacant lots. Superintendent Kapili inventoried the results of
the campaign for the academic year of 1943-1944:
6,363 engaged in cultivating 480,975 sq. met., producing a value of

PS5,322.27.
Livestock and products to the value of P13,439.40.
Trees planted to the value of P 8 ,916.10.
124 teachers produced field and garden products to the value of P35,74l.
livestock and its products to the value of P794.55.
This was no mean accomplishment. It meant prodigious effort by the teachers
and full cooperation by the pupils.
On August 19, 1944, the first batch of high school students joined a labor
brigade:
. . . .headed by Governor Salazar and Lt. Kojima. . . .in twenty Army and Leyte
Land cars for Burauen, arriving at the landing field about 9 o'clock. They were
immediately assigned to different tasks awaiting them. . . .The girls cheered up
the party by their singing of Japanese and Filipino songs, and the boys, by
their stunts. Arriving in Tacloban at about 6 o'clock P.M. the party broke up,
each went his way with a feeling of satisfaction for having done his duty for
his country and for the opportunity to render personal service for the mighty
Empire of Japan.^
That there were subdued protests might be inferred from the remarks of the
defenders of the project:
. . . .Many democratic-minded citizens among us may decry the idea as totali

tarian, but nobody can deny the good result of making all young people render
free "abor service for the State. . . .In the end, they shall become trained in _
body, spirit and mind, ready tc take up greater task before them for their land."
The teachers, of course, were expected to play their role in the civic or
ganizations of their communities, especially insofar as the promotion of law and
order was concerned. In April, 1943, the Division Superintendent stated:
1 F. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt., August 1, 1944. "Annual Deport for Academic
Year 1943-1944” .
2 Leyte-Samar Bulletin, Aug. 25, 1944, pp. 1-2.
Îbid., Editorial Comments, p. 2.
160
All teachers and other employees of the Bureau of Public Instruction in

this province are now members of Kalibapi. Our membership cards, properly
accomplished, were forwarded to the office of the Provincial Governor on
April 15, 1943.1
"Off-hours" for the teachers was a chimera. Teachers must ever enrol in
coursework to better adapt themselves for the new regime and master their responsi
bilities therein, Join the general labor contingents in the war effort, visit homes
to buoy up flagging morale and assure regular attendance at school by the children.
Thus, Superintendent Kapili:
In compliance with the instructions of the undersigned, the teachers with

their principals visited the homes of pupils during Saturdays in connection
with the Home Membership activities, and to campaign for better attendance.
On all holidays and extraordinary occasions, the teachers were expected to
help in the preparations for the celebrations and in getting the population to turn
out. They also rendered yeoman’s service on the anti-profiteeriig committees, striv
ing to curb the greed of the black marketeers and the heartless get-rich-quick mer
chants. But their major extra-curricular activity in 1944 was in the food production
campaign. In some cases, teachers were appointed to position in the Province, with
their primary function to assist in directing the local food production campaign.
Where schools operated sporadically, for one reason or another, the teacher might
‘Z
devote practically all his time to the food-raising endeavor.
In May, 1944, the division office received an important directive from Manila:
". . . .Although schools close this month, teachers remain on duty and should be as
signed food production work, including care and cultivation of -school gardens. . . ."^
Proceeding to implement this directive, Kapili despatched a circular letter
to the principals of the division, directirg them among other things: "You should
also have teachers attend to the food production campaign in your municipality.
ip. Kapili, April 2, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.

2 P. Kaniii, Actg. Div. Supt. , Leyte. Beport, December, 1942.
Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt., Leyte. Beport, April, 1944.
^Director of Education, Manila. May, 1944. To: Div. Supt. of Schools,
Leyte.
161
Teachers assigned to this campaign should render at least seven hours of service
each day on regular days and five on Saturdays.
The guerrilleros regarded all these activities as anathema. And the teacher
was thoroughly distraught. Aside from his unshakable material cares (for his salary
fell below the mark of bare subsistence needs) and the harassing conditions of over
crowdedness and lack of instructional materials under which he taught, he also faced
an inner moral struggle. Vas he serving his country and acquitting himself of his
professional obligations by retaining his post? Was he selling the souls of his
children to the enemy as the resisters contended? Was he helping to create the con
ditions of stability, when he should be stoking the fires of revolt? Or, as he tried
to tell himself in soothing his conscience, was he keeping alive the traditions of
Filipino nationhood under the flimsy cover of pretending to integrate his people with
the Japanese "Hew Order"? To the extent that he succeeded in convincing himself that
the latter was the case, to that extent could he go more serenely about his appointed
tasks.
Organized Beligion During the Occupation:-- In the remarkable composite that
is the Filipino version of Malayan culture, the Spanish religious ingredient ranks
alongside the American political factor as a major force in the life of the people.
American influence, the Japanese sought to eradicate by force of arms. Beligion,
however, was not regarded as a threat to Japanese sway. In fact, if possible, it was
to be ranged on the side of the Empire.
The Japanese Military Administration realized that the population was over
whelmingly Boman Catholic, and fairly devout, at that. From the very beginning, they
made it clear that they did not intend to interfere directly with the people's wor
ship. On the contrary, they adopted a policy of religious toleration, a policy to
which they faithfully adhered (with but a few minor and unofficial lapses) . By this
policy, they hoped to convince the population of their friendliness, and thus have
another talking point in their general "pacification" campaign.
■*'F. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt. of Schools, Leyte. May 25, 1944. To: All Prin.
■ '’ • H ^ r
‘
‘162
Wiile abstaining from interference with the devotional side of religion,
they expected the Church, in return, to assume an attitude of neutrality in things
political. Bishop Mascarinas of Palo^ primate of Leyte, instructed the parish priests
to'confine their ministrations to ritual, and to avoid words vith political over
tones in their sermons. This was the tactic of prudenoe, and needed little urging.
Individual priests may have felt unccmfortably choiked up as they surveyed the tribu
lations of their flocks and felt an upsurge of indignation and hatred against the
conqueror. But the unobtrusive entrance of English-speaking Japanese soldiers at
their service muted their outcries. Even allusion to political conditions spoken
in the vernacular entailed risk, for a sprinkling of Filipino espionage agents might
be found in any congregation. The priests must content themselves with whatever
spiritual balm they could proffer to soothe the hurt of their faithful.
But the neutrality exacted of the Church was to bea benevolent neutrality.
If the priests were to restrict their function to administering thesacraments, the
Church as an institution— if only by implication— was expected to align itself on
the side of "pacification".
This was a coin of two faces. On the negative face, the priest must refuse
to officiate within the resistance area, if summoned by the guerrillas. Furthermore,
he must hasten to inform against any guerrilla personnel entering a church for com-
I
zounion or seeking an ecclesiastical wedding. On the positive face, the parish priest
must be present with the municipal dignitaries at all public rallies convened for
pacification purposes. Only in this way would the masses of Leyte know that the
Church could not be used as a focal point of infection forthe germ of revolt.
As an added precaution, the Japanese also required that the parish priest
apply in advance to the local garrison commander for permission to conduct an outdoor
religious processional or organize a public fiesta. The military authorities did not
intend to provide the guerrilla with a ready-made opportunity to disguise themselves
•^■Interviewed at Palo, October, 1945.
163
and infiltrate for purposes of terrorism and sabotage. If forewarned of such events,
the Japanese believed they could adequately cope with any surprise move.
In the main, the Church conformed. Parish priests generally took their
places alongside the mayors. How the priest actually conducted himself on such oc
casions was largely up to him. The majority limited themselves to a few words of
invocation or benediction. A small fraction, however, openly and blatantly espoused
the Japanese cause, enraging the guerrilla, and in some cases marking themselves for
assassination at the hands of guerrilla "flying squads".
Ho evidence is available to the author to show that any priest ever betrayed
to the Japanese the presence in church of disguised guerrilla personnel. In the in
stances where outspokenly anti-guerrilla priests might have done so, the guerrilla
knew very well of their identity, and carefully avoided their precincts. On the
other hand, some priests regarded their ordination obligations as transcending the
conflict, and risked their lives to administer the sacraments to guerrilla personnel.
Padre Lino Gonzaga of Palo^- asserted that he had secretly married several
guerrilla couples. Moreover, he had stealthily transmitted badly needed office sup-
2
plies to a guerrilla outfit on several occasions. And Padre Pedro Morfe of Tolosa
recalled a tense few hours when he cooperated with a guerrilla unit desire to use
church premises for a special meeting. He knew the Japanese would grow suspicious
if church attendance exceeded the usual count. Cannily, he applied to the Japanese
garrison for permission to hold a fiesta on a stipulated date. . . .The meeting was
held without incident.
The Churchcould not eschew supplying its good offices to the celebration of
the Japanese-given Philippine Independence. Tacloban called upon Bishop Mascarinas
to add a religious touch to the ceremonies:
October 2, 1943
My dear Mons. Mascarinas:
In accordance with tte program prepared by the local Independence Day commit
tee for the celebration of Independence Day on October 15, 1943, one of the
1 2
Interview, October, 1945, Palo. Interview, October, 1945, Tolosa.
164
principal parte of the program is the mass which will be said by you at the
Plaza. . . .After the mass, at a program which will be held at the Provincial
Capitol, one of the parts of the program is an invocation by you. I hope you
will be prepared for this part of the program and may I suggest that on this
day you instruct all the priests under you or under your jurisdiction to par
ticipate in the celebration of Independence Pay in Tacloban.
Thanking you again for this favor.
Respectfully yours,
Pastor Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov.
And the Governor directed the mayors of 11 municipalities then under his
control to carry out the terms of telegraphic instructions from Manila, point No. 2
of which ordered "town residents to attend mass or services of their respective
churches".^
Alangalang's inaugural program mentioned "ringing of the Church bells (3
times) announcing the eve of the inauguration" at 12:00 noon on October 14, 1943.
The following morning, at 7:00 a.m., a "solemn mass and Te Deum at the Roman Catholic
Church" was held. At 9:30 a.m., there took place the "ringing of the Church bells
announcing the Flag ceremony at the Municipal Plaza. . . ." An invocation by "Rev.
F. Mateo Avila, Parish Priest", constituted part of the flag ceremony. 2
At Pulag, where the Kalibapi chapter conducted the program, provision was
made for a "special mass at the Church, 8:00 a.m. (attendance of the people requested),
followed by the ringing of church bells and an assembling of the people at the plaza
where the Reverend F. Acebedo pronounced the invocation. 0
Some priests were not content with this meagre contribution to the cause.
They traveled about haranguing large audiences, urging their listeners to express ap
preciation to the Japanese by collaborating in building up the Province and giving
no quarter to the guerrilla.
No serious friction developed between the Church and the Japanese Military
Administration in occupied Leyte. On one occasion, because of a misunderstanding
^Pastor Salazar, Actg. Prov. Gov. Oct. 1, 1943. To: 9 Mun. Mayors ^ n u m
erated/ .
^Municipality of Alangalang--PROGRAM in Connection with the Inauguration.
^Mun. of Pulag— Official Program for the Inauguration of the Republic of the
Philippines.
165
inverting a breach of security regulations, the Japanese closed the church in Taclo
ban. Fortunately, a Japanese Catholic priest, a member of the Japanese propaganda
section, was serving as liaison in religious affairs. To him the Bishop appealed,
clearing up the mi sunder standing, and accomplishing reopening of the church within
a week.
Until the Japanese "mopping-up" campaign of December, 1943-January, 1944,
the bishopric had little contact with any of the interior parishes. But within oc
cupied Leyte, Filipinos flocked to worship, finding in the warm ritual and the spirit
of repose a true escape from tie outer turbulence and a nourishment providing tem
porary forgetfulness for gnawing hunger. In several towns, in the course of guerrilla
attacks upon the Japanese garrison, the population evacuated en masse to the local
church and its parish buildings. Here was sanctuary from bullets and bolos, a place
of inviolability. For these and other reasons, Catholicism flourished during the war.
The great majority of parochial schools suspended instruction during the war.
According to Padre Julio Rosales of Tacloban1 the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban re
opened in 1943, with a registration of about 250 pupils. Both boys and girls were
permitted to enrol in what before the war had been an all-girls' school. Tuition
fees were assessed at the rate of P3 monthly. In June, 1943, the diocesan seminary
opened in Tacloban with some 25 enrolees. Classes remained in session until the
first American bombings.
Financially, the churches of occupied Leyte did not fare too badly, according
to Bishop Mascarinas. Collections were good, for the people appreciated what religion
had to offer them. The contributions were necessarily in Japanese pesos, increasing
in amount with the rise of inflation.
How shall we sum up the role of the Church in occupied Leyte? For one thing,
it failed to furnish a coherent moral leadership within Filipino society. By trying
to avoid temporal issues at a time when the Province was torn with civil strife, it
interview, October, 1945, Tacloban.
left the population demoralized. In fact, the ambivalence of its position, wherein
it both elected political "neutrality" and at the same time submitted to incorpora
tion into the "pacification" program, only intensified confusion.
Furthermore, the Church took no active part in denouncing the war-tine hoard
ing and profiteering that brought wealth to the few and suffering to the many. It
restricted its social concern to alms-giving.
On the other hand, the Church served as an abode of serenity for the devout,
to which Catholics might retreat from the oppressiveness of a war-torn world. By
offering an "eternity perspective" in a spiritual realm, it allayed the pangs of im
mediacy and materiality. But beyond that, it provided a zone of relaxation where
(barring the danger of Japanese espionage agents) plain folk might gather and enjoy
a bit of compassionate neighbor!iness.^
Public Health;— We have now completed our survey (within the limits set by
fragmentary data, supplemented by selected interviewing) of opinion formation within
occupied Leyte. Before we move on, it might be advantageous to consider a matter, if
not strictly germane at least overlapping the general theme we have been treating.
The matter referred to is that of public health.
The Japanese were necessarily concerned with the stamina of Leyte's popula
tion. Not humanitarianism but farsighted self-interest motivated Japanese care.
They sought to restore the productivity of the population so that they might thor
oughly exploit the Island's natural resources and, in an emergency, have a reserve of
combat manpower to draw upon. We saw this interest exemplified in Japanese sponsor
ship of mass calisthenics (Badio Taiso), in the encouragement given to the Junior
Kalibapi and its athletic program, and in the constant Japanese exhortation to the
Filipinos to build up their virility in a rejuvenated Philippines. In short, the
■’-Tacloban's small Protestant congregation, attending the United Evangelical

Church, was not molested by the Japanese. The active membership, however, dropped
from over 100 adults to fewer than 15. Services were conducted exclusively in the
Yisayan dialect during the war, English temporarily dropped.
(interview— Rev. Juan I. Pia--Tacloban, October, 1945)
167
Japanese acknowledged the intimate relationship between physical vitality and morale.
Threatening to vitiate this program were two inexorcisable evils: famine and
epidemic. Despite the strenuous efforts made by Tacloban to increase food production,
scarcity persisted. The warm tropical climate permitted a low-caloric diet. None
theless, if gross starvation was averted, malnutrition, the consequence of dietary
inadequacies and imbalances, resulted. This was both a substantive evil, inducing
lethargy and reduced efficiency, and a contributory evil, lowering resistance and
increasing the incidence of disease.
Against the twin foes of hunger and disease, the Japanese were forced to con
tend . And they must cope with this situation within the framework set by a resist
ance movement, on the one hand, and their own interference with the economic mechan
ism on the other. Hence, they could do little more than offer palliatives.
In one respect, the Japanese occupation policy favored the Filipinos of
Leyte. The Japanese Military Administration did its best to enforce sanitary regula
tions within the occupied area. Fear of dysentery epidemics in addition to tradi
tional Japanese neatness motivated this strictnees. The Governor, under Japanese
pressure, notified the mayors to clean up the area of their jurisdiction;
The mayor of La Paz cited one of the difficulties:
La Paz is not in a position to finance for proper cleaning of our grassy

public streets, caused by the total evacuation of the inhabitants of the pobla-
cion some months ago. People have returned to their houses, but they are not
interested in cleaning the street in front and behind them, because they are
still accustomed of waiting from the government's aid. . .
The Governor was furious: "You have authority to compel the people of your
municipality to clean the premises of their houses. Persons who do not comply with
p
your order should be reported to the Japanese MP."
Abuyog went about its work conscientiously:
As last week, activities on sanitation were regularly pursued during the

week. House surroundings as well as part of the streets in front of houses were
cleaned. Efforts along this line could not be done in the barrios in view of
the disturbed conditions thereat. . . . 3
1La Paz Mayor Molon. July 3, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.

|B. Torres. Prov. Gov. July 14, 1942. To: Mayor Molon, La Paz.
°R. Collantes, Mun. Treas., Abuyog. Sept. 7, 1942. Report To: Prov. Gov.
168
Some of the mayors were a bit peeved that their diligence had been ques
tioned. The Mayor of Hilongos wrote: "All streets in the poblacion already cleaned
previous to my receipt of your instructions. Also surroundir^s of every house . " 1
And the Mayor of Matalom: "The poblacion is always cleaned, and the barrios
too . " 2
Waste disposal was another serious matter for the provincial administration.
Many of the local sanitation officers were no longer on duty, and the influence of
the public schools in this regard was absent. Nonetheless, a few of the municipali
ties strove to maintain pre-war conditions. Biliran municipality boasted of its
strict observance of the
rules and regulations of sanitation, especially in matters of constructing the

Antipolo System which is the best place for depositing waste matter avoiding
therefore any sickness or epidemic that may occur in the near future. . . ^
The Japanese authorities notified the Governor:
The Military Administration is making an investigation concerning health

and sanitary organization within your jurisdiction in order that the adminis
tration can give full aid and cooperation necessary to attain its ends.4
Whenever, for one reason or another, a portion of the population abandoned
the poblacion, problems of sanitation recurred. The Mayor of Palo deplored condi
tions in his municipality in mid-1943:
Because of the absence of. . . .families in the town, many streets are
becoming grassy, dirty and uncleaned, thus destroying the esthetic view of the
town, contrary to the rules and regulations of the Bureau of Health. In view
of the above circumstances, and because of the present depleted revenues of
this municipality, I respectfully request to please, give us aid, so as to enable
the undersigned to employ necessary laborers for clearing up the streets. . . .It
will be highly appreciate also if you could expedite this matter in view of the
approach of the coming town fiesta. . . , 5
•^Melquiades Flores, Mun. Mayor, Hilongos. July 28, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
^Jeremias Pal, Mun. Mayor, Matalom. Aug. 1, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
Âlberto Enage, Mun. Mayor, Biliran. Sept. 15, 1942. Weekly Beport To:
Prov. Gov.
^Director of Yisayan Branch, Jap. Mil. Admin. Jan. 21, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.
S. Generoso Alvarado, Mun. Mayor, Palo. July 17, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.
169
It was impossible to maintain pre-war sanitary standards. Dr. Virginio
Fuentes, serving as head of Tacloban's Sanitary Division during 1944,^ pointed to
lack of disinfectants and equipment as only one of the difficulties. Even more
significant, the preoccupation of the people with questions of bare survival made
them indifferent to the amenities of life. Small wonder that there were 33 deaths
from dysentery in January and 21 in February . 2
Concerned with public health, the Japanese were nevertheless partly respon
sible for the spread of one type of disease in Leyte— venereal disease. The pre
sence of a sizable body of Japanese troops in Leyte, with some money to spend and
some benefits to bestow, particularly during the lean years, attracted prostitutes
in droves, especially to Tacloban. This raised serious problems of control for the
Filipino authorities of the Province. But in matters of this kind, their hands were
tied, and responsibility was shifted to the Japanese Administration.
Thus, we have a night club proprietor writing to the Governor for a permit to
open a night club:
Undersigned requests to operate a night club in this municipality. Entrance

fee of 20 centavos will be collected from patrons. There will be dancing.
Hostesses will be hired, who will be subjected to periodical physical examina
tion. Drinks and food will be served at reasonable prices. Hours from 5-i0 PM
daily. ^
The application was turned over to the Japanese authorities. 4
The growth of prostitution in Tacloban finally led to the promulgation of
Executive Order Ho. 196, creating a zone of segregation and providing for auxiliary
controls. But the Executive Order remained a dead letter, and the Governor wished to
know why:
Bequest information regarding action in enforcing Executive Order No. 196.

Prostitution houses can be found in almost every corner of Tacloban. For safety,
•Înterview, Tacloban, January, 1946.

SLeyte Dist. Health Officer Aldaba. May 9, 1944. To Exec. Off., Kalibapi,
Leyte Chapter.
^Susanto Cormero. June 18, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.
^Prov. Secty. Benedicto. June 21, 1943. To: Director, Japanese Military
Administration.
health and precaution of the civilian population, preservation of good morals of
our women, this office requests immediate action he made as compliance of above
Executive Order , 1
The Mayor of Tacloban called the Constabulary's attention to the existence

I
of Municipal Ordinance No. 11:
I suggest that care be taken to execute the Ordinance in determining each

individual case for purposes of segregating the prostitutes in the district of
Anibong. As the time comes when the general public learn the provisions of this
ordinance, neighbors may be of great help to locate them and report the fact to
the authorities. Your soldiers and policemen of Tacloban, I believe, can well
check these prostitutes at their leisure times in advising the unfortunates to
live at the 'red light' district of Anibong. The place is healthful and beauti
ful. As to the permit and municipal tax, this can be done later, when they
settle down in that district. It is essential, however, that they should submit
to the supervision of the health authorities. In no way, I shall allow any woman
to practice her vocation unless she provides herself with the medical certificate
as required. This is the cardinal objective of the law for the protection of
public health . 2
Segregation of prostitutes was never carried out in Tacloban. In the other
municipalities, the problem did not reach the same proportions, and such schemes were
not advised. Meanwhile, the incidence of VI) grew higher, persisting into the post
war period to plague United States Army medical personnel as well as the provincial
authorities.
Japanese seizure of drugs and surgical instruments for use of their own medi
cal corps worked to the detriment of Leyte’s health status. Private hoardings of
hidden Bupplies and suspension of shipments from Manila further complicated the prob
lems of public health. Abuyog sketched the situation in all its gravity:
Concerning our operations on health, nothing could be done in behalf of the

people in view of the fact that our Public Dispensary Office has no stock of
medicine with which to cope emergency cases. Wounds even slight in character
could not be given treatment for lack of medicines. The commodity (medicine)
could nowhere be found in the community and if at all any is on the market it
would be sold at sky-high prices.
Further complications supervened:
Going hand in hand with this problem is the difficulty of transportation.

This will certainly entail hardship on the part of those who would like to send
their patients to the nearest hospital for treatment. This Office, therefore,
*B. Torres, Gov. Dec. 21, 1943. To: Lt. Z. Bonan, Actg. CO, Tacloban
Constabulary Co.
^fayor Quintero, Tacloban. Dec. 24, 1943. To: CO of BC, Bonan.
171
respectfully requests that adequate facilities of medicine "be made available

so that they would, be on hand, whenever the Sanitary Inspector needs them for
emergency cases or otherwise. 1
The Japanese occupied Leyte Provincial Hospital in July, 1942, seizing its
medical supplies and appropriating its facilities. The dispossessed hospital staff,
after preliminary negotiations, moved to Bethany Hospital, a private institution,
and took over the administration. At the close of 1943, the staff of the provincial
hospital was again evicted, this time to accommodate headquarters of the enlarged
Japanese Medical Corps. This shift took the staff to the remaining hospital, the
smaller San Diego Hospital (under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Leyte) . With
greatly depleted staff, and in insufficiency of drugB and surgical instruments, the
provincial hospital struggled on in cramped quarters. Finally, at the end of August,
1944, authorization was granted for reoccupancy of the Bethany Hospital quarters
Even on a greatly contracted scale, it was questionable whether the Province
would have the funds to support public medical services. Discussing puericulture
centers, the Provincial Treasurer advised:
To relieve the municipalities of additional expenses, the activities of the

Center should be suspended. Presence of presidents of sanitary divisions and
sanitary inspectors and nurses in the different municipalities makes a center
in each municipality unnecessary unless self-supporting.^
The Provincial Treasurer also gave warning that the Provincial Hospital "may
close for lack of funds, without help from the Central Government.
By 1943, the Governor had decided that the Tuberculosis Dispensary could no
longer be maintained. However, he did not act on his opinion:
I authorized continuance of the work of the Tuberculosis Dispensary because

the Japanese so commanded and because I saw the need of its work. . . .As is
shown by Dr. Gaerlan, up to the end of this year, we will need about P3,060.75,
after deducting P539 .29 income of the hospital.
^Ricardo Collantes, Mun. Treas., Abuyog. Sept. 7, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
2
Dr. Adolnho Aldaba, Interview, Tacloban, January, 1946.
Sprov. Treas. Jiminez. Aug. 4, 1942. To: Gov. Torres.
^Prov. Treas. Jiminez. Aug. 4, 1942. To: Gov. Torres.
172
The Governor appealed to Manila to "send this sum through the National
disbursing funds.
Only a fraction of Leyte's tiny contingent of medical personnel (physicians,
dentists, pharmacists, nurses, and maternity nurses) continued to practice privately
during the Japanese occupation. The others had Joined with the guerrillas, retired
to their farms, or left the Province. The practitioner's medical fee was uncertain,
and often collected in kind. He or his wife might be compelled to engage in "buy
and sell" on the side in order to meet basic subsistence requirements.
The net result of the Occupation, then, was to depress Leyte's standard of
health considerably below the pre-war level. Faulty diet, often sheer lack of food,
had a debilitating effect upon the population, tearing down its ability to withstand
the impact of disease. Deficient medical supplies and absence of medical personnel
rendered more difficult the treatment of ordinary organic disorders. Over and above
this, USAFFE "stragglers" from the campaigns of Luzon reached Leyte not infrequently
afflicted with malaria or amebiasis, and acted as sources of infection for the neigh
boring people. As for the mental health of the population, one can only conjecture
that anxiety neurosis and its various complications must have been quite widespread
under the prevailing general tension.
We have been considering the all-out campaign instituted under the "Philip
pine Republic" to mobilize the resources and thinking of Leyte's population as if it
were the outcome of a single line of force. In actuality, the guerrilla sallied fort'
from their temporary lie-low to effectively challenge the realization of tie Japanese
program. We shall attempt to indicate what steps the guerrilla took in their counter
action, and. to suggest some reasons why Tacloban failed to consolidate popular suppor
behind the Japanese regime.
Before proceeding, however, we shall undertake a somewhat extended excursus.
Thus far, we have been skirting the domain of ethical evaluation, forbearing from
employing the designation "collaborationist". At this point, we shall attempt an
1B . Torres, Prov. Gov. July 31, 1943. To: Director of Health.
173
analysis of the term '’collaborationism", realizing full well the many pitfalls be
setting all efforts at clarification.
Collaborationism:— The word " collaboration", itself neutral, has undergone
the same career as has "appeasement” . It has become a highly-toned emotional term.
Its derivative, "collaborator", when attached to some person as a descriptive, in
dicates far more than that the person in question had lent his support to a certain
program or cause. Perhaps the rendering of the term most adequately explaining its
popular connotation is that of "selling out"--the surrendering of some self-evident
"good" in return for advantages of intrinsically inferior worth, shorter durability
or more limited scope.
Let the term "collaborator" or "collaborationist" (a stronger form) be at
tached to a person, and he becomes, by virtue of that label, a moral degenerate.
In short, an abstraction is indiscriminately applied to all who associate themselves
with the regime established in a conquered nation by an enemy invader. The condi
tions that give rise to such association, the nature of the association, and the
consequences of such a relationship do not constitute criteria for the application
or withholding of the designation "collaborationist" in a given instance. From this
it follows that all collaborationists are of the same stripe, alike infected by the
Game degeneracy.
However, the historian who would investigate empirically the characteristics
of "collaborationism" at a given time and place, (in this instance, Leyte) , will not
be satisfied with such cavalier treatment of a subtle and complex matter. By the
fitting of all individuals under consideration in the single Procrustean bed provided
by the above categorical definition, certain significant distinctions are amputated.
All those to whom the category apnlies then become wicked. Conversely, those to whom
it is inapplicable are self-evidently patriots of sterling excellence, stalwartly
resisting blandishments and intimidation that would seduce them from their unques
tionably proper course.
174
That such assumptions would distort the narrative of what actually occurred
in Leyte we here contend. This is not to argue that the term "collahorationism"
should he dropped, as empty of content. But it must be employed circumspectly, and
only after the criteria for its employment have been fully specified.
We should not hesitate to consider as Filipino collaborationists those who
gave public expression to their pro-Japanese orientation even prior to the arrival
of the Japanese in Leyte, and who worked consistently with the Japanese towards the
realization of their objectives after their arrival. In Leyte, Pastor Salazar of
the Provincial Board (subsequently Governor Salazar) and Senator Jose Yeloso were
the leading protagonists of a pro-Japanese orientation. Does this attitude in itself
Justify their damnation? Wot until we have examined the nature of Filipino-Japanese
relations.
It is here proposed that the only valid test for pronouncing judgment upon
the political relationship between two peoples, one powerful and the other dependent,
is the test of the people's welfare. During the pre-war Commonwealth regime, the
Philippines were under American sovereignty, while enjoying a substantial measure of
autonomy. In Leyte, the bulk of the population experienced little direct contact
with the United States, or with Americans. The few American businessmen and military
officers in Tacloban or the handful of Americans in the interior who had intermarried
and "gone native" scarcely caused a ripple in the lives of the people. The United
States affected Leyte economically in providing a market for its important abaca and
copra output. However, agriculture bad been sufficiently diversified on this Island,
so that the imbalance of one- or two-crop economies did not disturb the population.
Culturally, the United States had influenced Leyte primarily through the
public school system. But here again, the high mortality in public school education
meant that very few youngsters reached the high school level. Hence, their knowledge
of the English language and of American ideas was rather patchy. On the other hand,
the literates who went on for a high school and occasionally a college education, and
became Leyte's school teachers, professionals, municipal officials, and provincial
175
■bureaucrats and political leaders -were considerably influenced by American ideas.
And through this educated leadership, the American influence was kept alive among
the masses.
Politically, Leyte was a Province of the Philippines, and therefore under the
United States Constitution. As component of a democracy, she enjoyed the advantages
of representative government, and of free expression of opinion. While popular il
literacy and bureaucratic corruption to some extent vitiated the practical operation
of democracy, this form of government was generally accepted by the bulk of the
people as the most desirable and the most promising for Leyte's future.
As discussed elsewhere, Leyte had no organized labor and peasants' movement,
much less a left wing organization expressing cynicism over a political democracy
lacking popular control in the economic sphere. Yet, the wealthier landed and
business groups of the Province demonstrated no group preference for right wing
totalitarianism. They seemed quite convinced that the existing state of affairs af
forded them all the requisites for continued enjoyment of their privileged position.
And although grumbling against Chinese economic influence in merchandising was b e
coming more audible, the Filipino business class of the Province felt that they were
quite competent to handle the situation locally, once popular support had been en
listed .
The issue of immediate independence from the United States was not of burning
concern in Leyte, as in some of the other Philippina provinces. Most of the politi
cally interested people were content in the knowledge that independence was close at
hand. Apprehension over the economic terms of the independence agreement with the
United States was not acutely felt in Leyte, as in other provinces with radical move
ments that had devoted special research to the question, and had conducted popular
campaigns casting suspicion upon American economic motivation. The politicians,
lawyers, and businessmen of Leyte who had gone to Manila to practice, as also some
of the officers and soldiers who had served in that area, had in some cases a
different sort of grievance. Sooner or later they had encountered instances of
social die.crimination on the part of the Manila American colony. Their Malayan and
Spanish heritages made them extremely sensitive to such slights. Moreover, they
perceived the inconsistency between American democratic preachments and the social
snobbery of Americans. Contact with other Filipinos who had sojourned in California
or elsewhere, and had experienced more sharply the cutting edge of American racial
inequality, intensified their pique. These were the people who, on returning to
leyte, were prone to carp at American policy in the political and economic fields—
their criticism being in essence a projection of their outraged feelings of fair play.
What had Japan to offer that might appeal to the Filipino? The Filipino
could only Judge on the basis of Japan's previous action, as disclosed in China.
Japan's defiance of the Western Powers had elicited the admiration of the Oriental
who resented white supremacy. But was this negative attitude enough to make Japan
a desirable ally for the colonial colored races in their campaign for freedom? Japan
had posed as the champion of the subjugated Orientals, but her policy in China belied
her pretenses. In the walce of her conquering armies, massacre, pillage, and desola
tion remained. And the integration of such of the Manchurian and Chinese economies
that fell under her rule plainly showed that Japan, and not the native population,
was to benefit from any change. Moreover, the Japanese did not treat the conquered
populations as social equals, but unmistakably pushed them down to a lower level.
The governments set up by the Japanese were transparently of the puppet variety,
beneficial to the small privileged cliques prepared to do the bidding of their
imperial masters.
In Leyte, at any rate, the Filipino population had disclosed no inclination
to throw off its American allegiance for Japanese rule. Even those who bore no love
for the United States were terrified by the stories of unspeekable Japanese barbarism.
What then can we say of those few, typified by Jose Ma. Yslosc and Pastor Salazar,
who openly voiced their preference for Japanese rule? Simply that they were
177
opportunists, awed "by Japanese might, convinced that Japan was destined to seize the
Philippines and successfully retain them, and therefore determined to Jump on the
"band wagon and "become the local gauleiters, regardless of the consequences for their
countrymen.
In the case of Leyte, therefore, we are prepared to say that Japanese rule
promised a definite sinking of the fortunes of the people. Bold support of the Jap
anese meant a deliberate disregard of popular interests for selfish purposes. Under
these circumstances, collaboration with Japan was a censurable course of conduct, not
because it was ''collaboration” , not because it meant repudiation of political obliga
tion to the United States, but because pragmatically it meant possibly irreparable
damage to the Philippines in general and to the Province of Leyte in particular.
■ Howbeit, if outright, deliberate collaboration with the Japanese invaders was
morally blameworthy, it did not necessarily follow that support of the United States
in the war against Japan was the course open to the people of Leyte. To understand
the position of the average Leyteno, we must bear in mind a rounded picture of the
situation by May of 1942, when the Japanese invaders reached the shores of Leyte.
First, we must note that Leyte as a province made its due contribution to
the defense of the Islands by mustering combat troops who saw action in Luzon.It
had, in addition, a regiment entrusted with the defense of home soil. It also pre
pared, within limits set by its resources, a network of civilian defense agencies.
At the outbreak of the war, despite the bombing of Manila and the subsequent news of
the Pearl Harbor debacle, the population of Leyte believed with complete faith that
America would promptly avenge this blow and stave off complete disaster. But as the
months went by, and Filipino blood was shed, it became painfully clear that the
mother country was sending neither an air force nor a navy to their rescue. Inevit
ably, doubts began to well up in the minds of some concerning America ' 3 capacity or
even her willingness to come to defense of the Filipino. That being the case,many
wondered whether the Filipino should continue to resist. Thedoubts were intensified
hy news of Japanese successes in other military theaters of South East Asia.
178
Meanwhile, the Japanese had overrun Luzon, Cebu and others of the Visayas
group, and were pushing ahead in Mindanao. The provincial government and the Leyte
Provincial Begiment continued to speak of resistance. But when following General
Sharp’s capitulation order in Mindanao, Colonel Cornell ordered the termination of
resistance preparations in Leyte, what were the Filipinos to do?
That Filipino soldiers and patriotic civilians disregarded the surrender order
and subsequently organized for guerrilla warfare against the invader did not alter
the fact that the constituted American authorities of Leyte had ordered surrender.
Technically, those soldiers who failed to report and surrender their arms were muti
neers, and their civilian supporters were outlaws. Under these circumstances, the
Filipino officials of Leyte who reported for duty and were subsequently organized
into a collaborationist government were hardly guilty of criminal parricide.
It is beside the point to argue that the officials in question, had they been
men of clear vision and sterling character, would have seen that Japanese rule was
antithetical to Filipino interests. The fact of the matter is that most politicians
are ordinary men, with some capacity for altruistic action, but also prone to make
decisions on the basis of proximate forces and not remote abstractions. For them,
there was the actuality of irresistible Japanese military power, and the order that
normal governmental functioning be resumed without delay. Someone had to serve. Why
not those already incumbent who presumably had popular support, who were experienced,
and who would undertake the moral obligation to protect Filipino interestsagainst
the conqueror as far as would be possible.
The decision to collaborate with the Japanese carried certain implications.
Primarily these Filipino administrators were pledged to make their officesoperate as
efficiently as possible. And they realized that the Japanese would hold them strictly
answerable for non-feasance. Hence, they were forced into the position of opposing
non-cooperation as obstructing the success of their administrations, and fighting the
guerrilla who threatened their lives and work. Such is the irony of enemy rule that
it tends to incite civil conflict.
179
For the ordinary Filipino, Japanese rule was a fait accompli. That meant
that he must comply with all regulations of the collaborationist government: resump
tion of his normal occupation, acceptance of Japanese currency, sending his children
to school, complying with Japanese security regulations— and avoiding involvement in
the guerrilla movement. Had the Japanese shown a true interest in Filipino well-
being, and had they dealt wisely and considerately towards the conquered, respecting
the Filipino's sense of dignity,.they might have won over the preponderance of the
population towards their regime.
For, consider these facts. The Japanese did rule through the officials
elected by the Filipino people. Moreover, they soon granted independence, whose sham
nature was not apparent to the poor peasant. Under these circumstances, Filipino
self-rude seemed to be protected. Why then should they prefer the rule of the United
States, who, when all was said and done, had abandoned them to foreign conquest.
Moreover, Japanese propaganda about "Asia for the Asiatics" had some appeal to the
literates, led to believe that the Filipino would share in the wealth of the Orient
— an Orient no longer to be exploited by Western capitalists for their private bene
fit. For the poor peasant of Leyte, who had never enjoyed abundance, the substitution
of a set of Japanese political leaders for the American set did not promise to disturb
his material circumstances one way or the other.
Furthermore, stories about the conduct of the guerrilla groups in the early
period of organization did little to Jar acquiescence in Japanese rule. Many of the
so-called guerrillas were little better than roaming bands of brigands, shaking down
the people with promises of furnishing protection, while actually doing nothing.
They seemed to direct their wrath not against the well-armed Japanese, but against
such of their own countrymen who dared denounce their rapacity.
When these pseudo-guerrillas occasionally fired upon a Japanese patrol, they
needlessly Jeopardized the life of civilians by carrying out their ambuscade in the
vicinity of a cluster of habitations. The Japanese would subsequently dispatch a
punitive patrol, believing that the civilians were harboring guerrilla fighters, and
180
sometimes wiping out vhole groups of families. Moreover, individual guerrilleros,
harboring a grudge against some individual, would charge him with actively abetting
I
the Japanese, and thereupon proceed to liquidate him. Finally, many of the town
dwellers, as those in Tacloban and Ormoc, felt that the guerrilleros were unneces
sarily heartless in imposing a blockade on foodstuffs from the surrounding country
side and inflicting starvation upon them.
Governor Bernardo Torres reached the heart of the issue in his address to
his fellow Leytenos on the occasion of the announcement of Philippine "independence":
I have been accused of being a Japanese agent, a Japanese slave. I am not

either. I am a Filipino agent, working to the best of my ability to serve my
unfortunate country at an unfortunate time in her history. I am doing what I am
doing because my sincere belief is that it is for the good of our people and
country under the present circumstances. I am a civilian, a government offi
cial. I am entrusted with the administration of government which means peace,
order, and security in my beloved province which however, has not as yet come to
know these things. If I had been a military man, I might have fought in the
battlefield and after the surrender of the Filipino troops, I might have chosen
either of these two: to surrender to the Japanese as ordered by Gen. Wainwright
or to take the risk and fight in a guerrilla warfare. Any of these two choices
I might have chosen because in choosing one I would have been led by principles
dear to m e , even as those soldiers of ours who have chosen, chose their decision
because by doing so, they knew they were doing Justice to themselves and were
being loyal to their principles. Who is wrong and who is right, who is a traitor
and who is not, is not the question--for that can never be decided— Just as well
say that the thousands of Filipino soldiers who fought in Bataan, Corregidor,
and Mindanao but who surrendered are all traitors and a few guerrillas are all
patriots, or vice versa. The question of whether in making our choice we are in
the right is not within our power to know, but what is important, what should
guide us is the question: Are we choosing a decision which will benefit in the
lorg run, under our present plight, the great interests of the country?
Many soldiers have chosen to surrender. Are they then traitors? Some sol
diers have chosen not to surrender. Are they then patriots? Who will decide?
And who will say that I am a traitor to my country becuase I happen to have been
called to make government--peace, order, security--function in our province? I
was not privileged to fight in the battlefield and make a military choice. I was
fated by circumstances to be the governor of our province before and during this
war. I could only make a civilian choice--I made it in good faith, and with no
selfish or unpatriotic thought. . . .1 am receiving no advantages from the Jap
anese for this choice. . . .} on the contrary, I have invited the threat of some
of my brother Filipinos to welcome me with bullets if I should speak of peace
and order and the dignity and honor of independence to our people. . . .
And even now, if I were to choose between loyalty to America, loyalty to

Jaoan, or loyalty to our beloved country the Philippines, I prefer a thousand
timss to be loyal to our country if in being disloyal to the other nations I
can prove my love and offer my services to the Philippines and serve her best
181
interests and work for the happiness of her own people. . . .
I wish only for the unity of our people, I wish for peace and order, first,
as a preparation and foundation for that unity. . . .But I can do credit to my
self and he faithful to the memory of our heroes by doing my best to help unite
all Filipinos not for any nation or race but for themselves, for the ideal that
all the Filipinos should stand together, as one, in victory and defeat, in
happiness or sufferirg. . .
Whether on grounds of logic or morals, there would appear to be nothing un
tenable about the position adopted by Torres. He asserts that while his choice of
action was uncoerced, at the same time it was not undetermined. His decision to
serve under the new regime was contingent upon the circumstance that he was holding
office, the supreme executive office of his province, when the enemy invasion occurred.
Weighed down by responsibilities not to be lightly discarded, he reflected upon a
situation murky with perplexities.
The situation was not of his making. It was brought about by the defeat of
the sovereign power, epitomized in the surrender of General Wainwright. Obligations
of fealty were at that moment dissolved. What remained was the overarching obliga
tion to so act that his country and his people might best prosper.
There was also a matter of guesswork, of faith, involved. If Torres was
reasonably certain of Japanese success on the basis of the best information available;
and if his basic postulate was that a small nation will only destroy itself if it
does battle against a victorious empire; and if his unquestioned axiom was that a na
tion must not condemn itself to annihilation if it can possibly prevent that fate--
then, the course of collaboration he embarked upon was the only course open for him.
No light shone indicating the path to be trod unfalteringly by the true
patriot. Torres looked within himself and saw the path of collaboration with the
conqueror as the only means of salvaging the destiny of his people from the calamity
that had befallen them. Perhaps he was in error, he conceded, insofar as his know
ledge of the material circumstances was concerned. Conceivably, his analysis was
faulty, his understanding lame. But from the standpoint of subjective intent, of
^Bernardo Torres, Prov. Gov., "Proclamation on Philippine Independence",

pp. 4, 5.
purity of motive, he insists that his action was unimpeachable ^
What, then, is the upshot of this disquisition? A protest is here made
against the snap judgment holding all collaborators to be wicked men on the basis of
a prior classification. For in truth, collaboration can only be equated with wick
edness if we can demonstrate empirically that all who collaborate thus act on the
prompting of wicked motives, and also, that the outcome of their action involves
wickedness. Thus we are appealing to a principle to establish that individual col
laborators are wicked, which principle itself must be confirmed by the exhaustive
examination of individual instances. And in Leyte, at any rate, blind adherence to
a formula will lead to a serious mis Judgment.
In truth, the social complex called collaborationism that we are attempting
to assess proves recalcitrant to simple moral analysis. For the individual Filipino
of Leyte, the situation at the time of the Japanese invasion was blurred, ambiguous,
highly plastic— in a word, what the social psychologist would call an unstructured
situation. The convergence upon the individual of a host of inconsistent elements
and conflicting claims: an official surrender order, an attachment to democratic
patterns of living identified with loyalty to the United States of America, a revul
sion against Japanese totalitarianism and brutality, a sensitivity to assertions of
white racism, aspirations for an independent Philippines, a localistic attachment to
the home Province and a desire to preserve it from devastation, a sense of responsi
bility for family welfare, and a desire to survive the war— all these deprived the
individual of a frame of reference, of norms for Judging right from wrong.
The course of conduct finally evolved, therefore, was a function of the in
dividual's perception of a very muddled situation. Those attitudes previously domi
nant in the individual's make-up, those aversions which were strongest, those impulse
operating most powerfully, in addition to the unique play of chance factors in each
case together wrought the individual's role. If auch characterization appear
^For comnent by an American correspondent on Torres, see: Robert Shaplen,

"Lovely Americans", The Hew Yorker, Vol. 20, No. 40, p. 50.
183
unsatisfactory to the mind seeking simple polarization of right and wrong, let it
he said in Justification that the process of life does not abide tte convenience of
the classifiers.
Now that we have said this much, some further remarks are necessary. It
may have been true that at the outeet of the Japanese occupation of Leyte, many of
the Filipinos decided to reserve Judgment, forbearing from resistance for reasons
already reviewed. With the passage of time, however, Japanese occupation policy had
a chance to unfold, and the ruthlessness and cruelty of the conqueror became clear.
It was also very patent that self-rule was a hollow affair— a papier-mache setting
for the imposition of a Japanese program. Sanctity neither of Filipino person nor
property was observed by the Japanese. It was then that the full significance of
American democracy came to be appreciated, and the faults of the American rule ap
peared venial alongside the reality of Japanese tyranny.
As Japanese rule came to revolt the spirit of the Filipino, the conduct of
his puppet countrymen also became more insufferable. Men like Salazar and Jose Ma.
Veloso acted not at all like the guardians of Filipino interest, but pursued with
fanatic zea1 the wishes of their Japanese masters. And such who complained when
struck with whins were promised scorpions. Those of the municipal mayors and other
local functionaries who never wearied of service in the interests of the Japanese--
raising more than the quota of men needed for compulsory labor in Japanese installa
tions, informing the Japanese against those Filipinos who were lax in meeting certain
of their obligations, leading Japanese patrols to hunt down alleged guerrilla sym
pathizers in the town— these were the true collaborators, for they were betraying the
interests of the Filipino people in order to elevate their own position in the eyes
of the powers that be. Likewise detestable were the local officials who kept Japan
ese emergency rations for their own private hoard. And along with them, the ravenous
,fbuy and sell" merchants preying upon the needs of the people for private gain.
When Japanese occupation policy in Leyte had matured to the point where its
heinous character was generally acknowledged, the Filipinos who had evacuated to the
184;
hills and thrown in their lot with resistance were hound to feel that the town-
dvellers were their enemy. Those who were unahle to evacuate through force of cir
cumstances were duty-bound to mitigate their collaboration by scrupulously avoiding
involvement in the anti-resistance movement, and by holding down to an absolute
minimum their public acts of compliance with Japanese mandate. Those who failed to
moderate their collaborationism thereby forfeited special consideration; objectively
speaking, they were working against the interests of their people.
Insofar as the issue of collaboration raises ethical questions, we may pro
fitably reconsider the case of Governor Torres. In judging whether his actions were
formally right, we need only ask whether he acted as he believed he should act in the
light of circumstances as he understood them. Vfe are debarred from probing the
soul of the man, Torres, and are willing to accepthis words at face value. But the
material rightness of his action is another thing, again.
Torres asserted that the only loyalty of moment to him was a loyalty to the
Philippines. Completely irrelevant and therefore a pseudo-problem was the issue of
taking a stand on loyalty either to Japan or America. The sole imperative on which
he chose to act was that of loyalty to his own land and people.
But this is taking a superficial approach. In point offact, the Philippines
were prostrate, under the boot of Japan.Despite bombast onthe diplomatic level,
it was apparent that Japanese rule was despotic and not benevolent. To speak of na
tional welfare intelligently was to take into account the realities of subjection to
Japanese rule.
It was all very well to call for unity among the Filipino people, as Torres
did. But he must raise the question, "unity for what?". Merely to stand together
was not enough. The Filipinos also held ideals of liberty and democratic government.
If these were nere abstractions, verbalisms, there still remained the negative ideal
of freedom from exploitation. The Filipinos of the resistance raised doubts at pre
cisely these points. They too wanted unity. But they sought to prevent the unity
185
of bondage, which was an external unity only. They would fight to recover what
they believed their country had lost when it was overrun by the Japanese.
For a straightforward rebuttal of Governor Torres' line of reasoning, the
guerrilleros turned to an open letter prepared by Governor Tomas Confesor of Iloilo
and widely circulated in Leyte. Reprinted in a small mimeographed guerrilla paper
entitled News, it was prefaced by the following editorial comment:
We take pleasure in publishing a letter of Governor Confesor to puppet

Governor Caram of Iloilo when the latter, together with Col. Furukawa, went
around that province 'on a mission of peace' . Nothing can be a better expres
sion of the genuine sentiments of a true Filipino. . . .
In the last part of the letter, the governor could not as yet mention the
fall of Italy and her declaration of war against Germany, the plight of the
Jamnese in the Solomons and New Britain, the bombing of Java, Borneo and
Celebes, and the devastating raids over Europe, because the letter was written
only at the early stage of the general Allied offensive. With firmer conviction
and greater enthusiasm, Governor Confesor can write this letter NOW when Japanese
defeat is evident and sure.
Bated February 20, 1943, Confesor's temperately defiant message read, in part:
. . . .1 entirely disagree with Mr. Vargas when he stated that the Japanese
independence proposition is definite and clear while that of America is ambiguous.
On the contrary, it is that of the Japanese which is nebulous, vague and indefi
nite . The terms and conditions in this regard are phrased in such manner that
only puppets could understand them clearly, people who have no freedom to use
their will and other mental faculties.
I agree with you when you say that our people are 'experiencing unspeakable
hardships and sufferings' because of these hostilities; but you should realize
that our people are bearing these burdens cheerfully because they are doing it
for the good and noble cause. . . .Now that Japan is attempting to destroy our
liberties, should we not exert any effort to defend them? Should we not be will
ing to suffer for their defense?. . . .
I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders in these
their darkest hours to teach our people to avoid suffering and hardship at the
sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life.
. . . .You puppets love ease and comforts so much as to compel you to barter the
liberties of our people for anything. . . .You are besmirching to the maximum
degree the character of our people.
It is therefore evidently fallacious and insincere on your part to state that

you are not pro-Japanese nor pro-American but a pro-Filipino. What do you mean
by a pro-Filipino? If you have any ob,5ectives and ideals at all, do you believe
in realizing them more effectively under a totalitarian and absolute system of
government or under a democracy?. . . .In other words, on what concrete grounds
dees your pro-Filipinism rest?
186
You were decidedly wrong when you told me that tbs re is no ignominy in
surrender. That may he true in the case of soldiers who were corralled hy the
enemy consisting of superior forces with no way of escape whatsoever. For when
they gave themselves up they did not repudiate any principle of good government
and the philosophy of life which inspires them to fight heroically and valiantly.
You also brought the point that the Japanese are generous because they freed
the Filipino soldiers wham they captured. In this connection, let me ask you
this question: Is it not a fact that the former USAFFE men are now working as
PC under the Japanese Army and are compelled to fight and kill their own people
who are still resisting. . . .?
. . . .If Lincoln revised his convictions (during the Civil War) and sacri
ficed them for the sake of peace and tranquility as you did, a fatal catastrophe
would have befallen the people of America. . . .1 prefer to follow Lincoln's
example than yours and your fellow puppets.
. . . .You people who have surrendered to the Japanese do not know of any
news but those given by them to you. It shows again that you are ignorant of
what is going on. For your information and guidance, let me tell you that Japan
is digging her grave deeper and deeper every day. . . .In Europe, Germany is in
flight pursued by the Russians. In Africa, Tripoli and Tunisia have fallen into
the hands of the Allies. . . .The Italians will soon demand for separate peace.
. . . .What are you going to do next, revise your convictions again?. . .
And should Torres have pleaded, in extenuation, that his presence protected
the populace from Japanese excesses, the guerrilleros would have answered along the
lines of an American investigator: "... .And there has been no proof that, on any
important matter, the Filipino puppets prevented the Japanese from doing what they
9 X
wanted to do." ~
It does not follow from this that all who espoused the cause of resistance
were selfless men of high resolve. Just as we must look into the circumstances that
brought about collaboration in individual cases, so we must consider cases of re
sistance on their own merit. First, we must note that the municipal officials who
sided with resistance did not necessarily so act because of principle. Merely to deny
that a man was implicated in collaboration does not suffice to affirm the contrary—
that he acted boldly in behalf of resistance.
In some instances, the Japanese did not penetrate a given sector. Or if
their patrols did pass through, they failed to establish a garrison. Thus, the local
1 TTEWS, Vol. I, No. 6 , (October 28, 1943), pp. 2, 2A, 2B.

^Bernstein, o p . cit. , p. 159.
3N0TE: We have placed in the Appendix the full text of An Open Letter ad
dressed to Gov. Torres by 'Your Former Pupils", inveighing against his program of
collaboration.
187
government did not fall under Japanese control. When the guerrilla troops developed
in these sectors, they hastened to make contact with the municipal administration,
"bringing it into line with the program of the guerrilleros. In such cases, the
municipal officials became "patriots" without benefit of their own conscious election.
In other areas where the Japanese had brought the municipal government under
control of the Tacloban regime, the guerrillas sometimes felt powerful enough to
establish rival administrations in the interior barrios. The personnel of these ad
ministrations were often recruited from the rival political faction that had failed
to win out at the previous election. Neither side necessarily acted on principle.
It was the old case of tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee— naked rivalry for the spoils of
local office. Between factions in some municipalities, a long-time enmity hp<j exis
ted. It was only to be expected that if the faction in office found itself ranged
on the side of collaboration, the faction out of office would loudly condemn its
adversary and proclaim its devotion to resistance.
In point of fact, many municipalities were exposed to vindictive action by
the Japanese and the guerrilleros alike. They therefore determined upon a course of
expediency. While seemingly paying close heed to Japanese regulations and delivering
public addresses in behalf of the "New Order", they surreptitiously furnished sup
plies to the guerrilleros and attempted to stay the hand of the Japanese whenever
they contemplated punitive raids against guerrilla hide-outs.
At the end of 1943, when the Japanese received considerable reinforcements
and launched their monping-up camnaign to thoroughly root out the guerrillas , the
latter realized that they were destined to lose control of the municipalities under
their sway. In both the zones of Kangleon’s "Free Leyte” and Miranda's WLGWF, the
guerrilla sector commanders authorized the appointment of sets of municipal officials
to return to the town and serve under Japanese direction. But they were pledged to
protect Filipino interests as best as they could. In some cases, these men had been
active supporters of the guerrilla. But in the changed circumstances of complete
138
Japanese control, they found themselves implicated in a network of activities that
were contrary to the interests of the Filipino people.
Thus, Attorney Bibo of Jaro, a prominent supporter of Major Balderian's
Politico-Military Government, found himself compelled to remain in town after the
Japanese returned in force. Soon he was heading the local Neighborhood Association
and in other ways suggesting that he had completely recanted of his late guerrilla
associations. Similarly, some of the leading attorneys in Western Leyte who had been
active in Miranda's organization found themselves tied in with the NAs of their
municipalities and a host of other collaborationist activities. Indeed, it would
appear that some of the charges of collaborationism leveled against municipal offi
cials formerly with the WLGWF may have been simply another expression of the invet
erate antagonism between Kangleon and Miranda. Let us examine the situation more
closely.
When the Japanese unleashed the deadly offensive against the WIGWF in Decem
ber of 1943, they all but wrecked the regime so slowly built up in West Leyte over
a year and a half. As was indicated, the ranks of the resisters were utterly deci
mated. The people returned to the towns in droves, apparently prepared to cooperate
with the Japanese order.
Not only Ormoc town but all of the five municipal centers were not directly
under the heel of the enemy. Obviously, the guerrilla could no longer have direct
contact with the mayors and municipal councils. But in actuality, the WLGWF had
planned for such a contingency. It had been apparent in November that the increased
enemy activity in Ormoc Bay and elsewhere had only one connotation— a renewal of the
offensive. The guerrilla GHQ did not know exactly when the invaders planned to
strike, but they realized very well that they could not withstand a large-scale at
tack. This was precisely why Miranda had always demurred to the suggestion that he
occuny Ormoc. He knew that M s forces would be sent scuttling as soon as the enemy
brought up sizable reinforcements, equipped with all the latest weapons, and, if
189
necessary, given aerial support. But what would be the policy of the guerrilla
when the Japanese, with their Filipino puppets, undertook to wipe out their guerrilla
administration?
Recognizing their own powerlessness before the massed superiority of the
enemy, the GHQ decided to authorize the municipal governments to put up a nominal
front of cooperation with the enemy. Mayor, treasurer, chief of police and all the
others vould accept the authority of the Japanese Military Administration. But as
far as humanly possible, they must sabotage the substance of the Japanese war effort.
Moreover, they must not betray the presence in town of guerrilla operatives who would
continue to keep the unsurrendered resisters apprised of Japanese activities and
intentions.
In keeping with this resolve, the guerrilla authorized the appointment of
municipal officials ostensibly aligned with the Japanese regime. There was no problem
in Ormoc. The guerrilla had never controlled the town center, where the Japanese had
maintained a continuous garrison. But in the other towns, the Jepanese control had
been intermittent. In Baybay, Mayor Paterno Tan, originally appointed under Japanese
aegis, stayed on during the re-occupation. The mayor of Palompon, Perilla, was in
structed by Chief of Staff Soliman (prior to the latter's departure to the Camotes
Islands) to return to the town from his mountain hide-away and pretend to serve the
Japanese. Soliman's purpose in so ordering was to spare the interior barrios of
Palou^jon the destruction that would certainly descend upon them if the Japanese would
be obliged to send out "pacification" detachments. As to the character of Pari 11a's
tenure, there are Bome who accuse him to having exceeded the bounds of necessity in
Ms zealousness to serve his new master. But others spring to his defense and attest
that he only coliaborated as far as he had to to avoid stirring up the delicate
Japanese suspicions.
Guerriila mayor Serafin 2-tenssis a] so took to the hills during the Japanese
re-occupation. But he was inducted into the guerrilla, becoming G-4 when the general
staff was reorganized under Capuyan. In his stead, Frederico Boholst was authorized
to go to Merida center, and form a new administration under Japanese rule. Guerrilla
Capuyan declares that Boholst did as well as lie could under the circumstances.
Mayor Epitacio Barte received a vote of confidence to serve on at Albuera
under the Japanese. Some of the other municipal officials left office, and the va
cancies created were filled hy new appointees. Conrado Daffon, guerrilla organizer
in Albuera and long its regimental commander, is of the opinion that the municipal
officials only went through the motions of cooperating with the Japanese.
When Major Nazareno, as commanding officer of Kangleon's 96th Infantry Regi
ment, moved into the zone of the WIGWF, he regarded all of the functioning municipal
governments as ipso facto collaborationist. Since he had no dealings with the WIGWF
as such, and did not consult with those former members of the WLGWF who had been in
ducted into his regiment in regard to the character of these local governments, he
was disposed to deal with them in a summary fashion. This attitude hardly comported
with that of his fellow officers of the 94th Regiment (his former outfit) who, under
similar circumstances, had authorized trustworthy civilian officials to return to
their respective municipal buildings and make a pretense at collaborating with the
Japanese.
Mayor Epitacio Barte of Albuera met a harsh fate. According to testimony,•*-
Barte was invited by Camacho, Nazareno's sector commander, to a conference. Barte
accepted, and was slain. Arcadio Menesis, first concillor of Albuera, replaced him
as mayor.
Mayor Federico Boholst of Merida met a similar fate at the hands of Nazareno’s
forces. Nazareno's new appointee was Ruflnc Mendiola, who held office till the pre
war mayor returned from his wartime place of evacuation.
Mayor Parilla of Palampon was more fortunate. Evidently, he managed to avoid
antagonizing the new leaders. Hazareno confirmed his tenure, and he continued to
serve until February, 1945. Oddly enough, he was belatedly denounced, and interned in
^Daffon. supported by his adjutant Jabillo, so testified.
M
191
the Tael oban stockade in February as a collaborator. But he was released some months
later.
In Baybay, Paterno Tan was appointed mayor by the Japarese. During 1944,
Tan had no further contact with the rump WIGWF. But as Kangleon's forces began to
emerge from their hibernation, they sent Lieutenant Filemon Pajares into tie Baybay
sector. Tan claims that he established successful contact with Pajares, so that his
name was not entered upon the guerrilla blacklist.
And now, consider some of the military leaders of the resistance. Colonel
Kangleon commenced his career during the Occupation as a surrendered officer. Accord
ing to many reports, Kangleon, who had been associated with Major Soliman in Mindanao,
prior to General Sharp's surrender order, had made a private compact with Soliman not
to surrender. But he changed his mind at the last moment, gave himself up, and was
interned in a Japanese camp at Butuan, Agusan, Mindanao. Whether he escaped from this
camp as some contend or was released by the Japanese is a matter of dispute. But the
point remains that the leader of Leyte's resistance movement began as a surrendered
officer.
On the other hand, Major Soliman, who did not surrender, and who came to
Leyte and Joined Miranda as chief of staff of the WLGWF, ended up as a surrendered
officer. This came about after the smash assault in December of 1943 by a Japanese
force against Miranda's headquarters— an assault that almost shattered the organiza
tion. Soliman felt constrained to give up under the circumstances, lest his family's
safety be endangered.
Let us attend one more instance--a dramatic one involving four officers of
Kangleon's s t a f f T w o of them, Lieutenant Colonel Causing and Major Abay, had been
. . .Kangleon's deputy, Fidel Fernandez, a promiment pre-war attorney, had

been ordered by the puppet governor, Salazar /Torres was then governor/, to go out to
the hills to arrange for Kangleou's Marcial Santos/7 surrender. Fernandez and an
other leading citizen named /Colonel/ Causing said they would be delighted to try to
arrange something. They made a splendid arrangement--to Join ângleon's /Balderian's/
guerrillas themselves. Now they are both active in the new Philippine government..."7'
(Gunnison, op. cit., p. 77)
192
coerced into joining the Japanese-organized Leyte Home Force constabulary, at the
beginning of Japanese rule in Leyte. The third, Attorney Fidel Fernandez, was a
member of the editorial staff of the Leyte Shixribun, thus lendiig his talents to the
cause of collaborationism. These three, along with Causing's son, a Lieutenant
Eadaza and a Sergeant Gabe (also of the Home Force) were sent on a pacification mis
sion to persuade a guerrilla leader, Marcial Santos, to surrender. The three prin
cipals assert that they accepted the assignment in that it offered them an oppor
tunity to escape without suspicion from the work they really detested (and without
exposing their families to Japanese torture), and that they had been secretly nego
tiating with the guerrilla to effect their escape. At any rate, they were ambushed
by Captain Pabilona and Major Balderian, taken prisoner, and placed under investiga
tion. They were subsequently transferred to Colonel Kangleon's command as valuable
increments to his inadequate guerrilla staff. Colonel Causing became Kangleon's
chief of staff, and subsequently a guerrilla leader on nearby Samar Island; Major
Abay became Finance Officer of the division; and Attorney Fernandez was commissioned,
became Judge Advocate General, and in time was promoted to a majority. Eadaza and
Gabe were also assimilated into the guerrilla.
What we are trying to point out by these and other possible examples is that
to a large extent chance decreed what motives would be victorious in the inner strug
gle of competing motives determining whether an individual in Leyte was to be guer
rilla or collaborationist. Many Filipinos who were mustered into the puppet constab
ulary hated their work. Some deserted when they had the chance. No doubt, some re
galed themselves with the authority and security they fancied they had gained for
themselves through their association with the victorious Japanese. These were crude
opportunists. But can we condemn all the constabularymen as traitors, and praise all
the guerrilleros as natriots?
Peccgniticn that a man’s behavior is conditioned by antecedent events, that
it is in that measure determined., is not to destroy the significance of ethical
193
choice, or to undermine the foundations of juridical personal responsibility. So
long as a person is not physically constrained, so long as he can deliberate within
himself and exercise conscious choice, we regard him as a free agent, and thus re
sponsible for his own decisions. But we must pay scrupulous attention to the con
ditioning circumstances affecting his motivation, we must pay some regard to that
motivation as -Hell as to the long-term character set of the man, before we presume
to form an ethical judgment. Short of this, we are left with no alternative but to
brush aside the entire ethical problem as irrelevant, and proceed by some arbitrary
dictum: viz, that all who are, by objective criteria, ranged on the side of an
enemy invader, are by definition "collaborationists", and hence deserving of any
treatment mechanically annexed to this classification,
* If the reader will go along with the argument advanced thus far (which in
essence asks that we avoid the indiscriminate usage of catchwords), then we are pre
pared to make an important concession--a concession comporting with popular feeling.
We aver that the true resister, the Filipino animated by a positive love for his
native land and a deep belief in the democratic way of life, acted with nobility and
courage in spurning collaboration with the enemy-instituted regime. And as a corol
lary, we hold that the Filipino who knowingly bartered personal honor and national
welfare in collaborating with the enemy, and further sacrificed the well-being and
very lives of the resisters for the sake of personal ease, such an individual is
deserving of the bitterest calumny and the severest punishment that an outraged
society can apply.
Guerrilla Counter-Action
It is hoped that the preceding discourse on collaborationism, if not en
lightening, will at least have the effect of causing the reader to be more circum
spect in his judgment of the issue. And now, let us resume discussion of guerrilla
reaction to the ’’collaborationist" program in Leyte.
The Sabotage of Taeloban’s Pacification Program:— The guerrilla resolved
that things should not go smoothly for the collaborationist regime. In every way
possible, they carried out a policy of sabotage and terrorization. What they lacked
in weapons, they sought to compensate for in determination and cunning. First of
all, they tried as long as possible to delay the return of the evacuees to the pobla-
cion. As the mayor of Alangalang described the situation:
. . . .At present there are only 30 families in the poblacion and our ef
forts to increase the number of returning families meet with little success be
cause guerrilla elements controlling the barrios outside the poblacion are
prohibiting or preventing the people to come in, or have contact with the
authorities. They threaten to kill, kidnap, punish, or inflict injuries to
those who are attached to, and cooperate with, the present regime.
The authorities were likewise unable to collect taxes. Dulag's mayor pru
dently advised: "Under present circumstances, collections of taxes through embargo
of properties is not reccmmendable, as lives are dangerous on the part of the col
lection employees. . . .
The Provincial Treasurer pompously opined: "It is propitious to make every

•Z
citizen conscious of his duties and obligations."
But the matter was not helped by verbal wisdom. ,j
Violence was the general pattern. Abuyog's treasurer informed his chief in
Tacloban:
Market collector Justo Bayot together with Policeman Fulgencic Chaves, in the
course of duties, were kidnapped by bandit or guerrilla elements when they
■^Nicolas Salazar, Mun. Mayor, Alangalang. Oct. 1, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.
^Marcial K. Lagunzad, Mun. Mayor, Dulag. Sept. 18, 1943. 3rd Indorsement.
^Prov. Treas. Jiminez. Jan. 27, 1943. 5th Indorsement.
195
happened to be out of the poblacion. . . .It is the consensus that they have
already been murdered. It is a known fact that bandit elements are persecuting
those attached to or cooperating with the present government.
Carigara enjoyed not the semblance of tranquility:
On March 4, 1944, at 4 PM, Filiciano Riveral, municipal chief of police,

was kidnapped by guerrillas. . . .The same day, noon, T. Brazil, Barrio Teniente
of Naugisan, was kidnapped by an unknown. . . .
About 700 guerrillas now roam the fields of Carigara— led by Balderian,
Pabilona, Cinco, Centino— looting innocent civilians of their food and clothing,
forcing them to stay in the mountains despite their willingness to stay in the
poblacion. . . . 2
Where a town was beginning to settle down, the guerrillas were sedulous in
recreating pandemonium. The mayor of Cabalian wrote in consternation:
On February 3, at 2 AM, the Japanese garrison of this municipality was at

tacked by guerrillas. . . .Prior to the attack, everything in the town was
normal. . . .Now everything is in turmoil again. The people have fled to the
mountains for fear there wili be another attack on the garrison. . . .Advise
what I shall d o . 3
Before the Governor could reply, the Mayor reported:
another encounter between the Japanese garrison and the guerrillas last Sunday,
February 6 th, in Barrio Pong-oy, 2 km from the poblacion. . . .1 have found it
very difficult to make civilians come to town and their homes in the barrios.
I am keeping intact all municipal employees as they are made to report to their
respective Jobs daily. . . .As it is, everybody is in hiding. I beg that the
Municipal Treasurer, through your office, be authorized to pay employees from
any fund available.
And the Mayor of Hilongos, while reporting "general enthusiasm", also noted:
On the night of February 3, 1944, the garrison was attacked. The populace
was frightened; it began to evacuate. I have tried to maintain morale. A
patrol encountered the guerrilla 3 km. from town. . . . 3
The Mayor of Sogod expressed disappointment with the results of his reorgani
zation tactics:
. . . .The far-off barrios are deserted by civilians who hide in. the mountains
on account of the propaganda and threat of guerrillas. Almost all of this people
are employed as "VG to serve as watchers while they are hiding and at the same
1Bicardo Collantes, Mun. Treas., Abuyog. April 15, 1944. To: Prov. Treas.
2Prudencio Borgueta, Mun. Mayor, Carigara. March 7, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
3 S. Bulacan, Mun. Mayor, Cabalian. Feb. 4, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
4 S. Bulacan, Mun. Mayor, Cabalian. Feb. 10, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^Romanic Ruiz, Mun. Mayor, Hilongos. Feb. 8 , 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
196
time they are bread-earners. Government activities cannot be extended to these

places. . . .No active members of the guerrilla surrendered to take advantage
of Amnesty. . . .In the barrios, few lots under cultivation due to unsettled
conditions. Acute scarcity of food in the central. . . .Trading very slow be
cause there is no article for commerce. . . .Need food and clothing badly.
Collections of government slow. . . .Eeal property tax poorly collected because*
we cannot locate whereabouts of owners as our activity is limited to central.
' Suggest detachment of Japanese in most important barrios for ample protection
of civilians returning to their homes, and to cut propaganda from the wild sourced
And the Mayor of Naval spoke of sinister broodings:
Until now, the local guerrilla chieftain is still in hiding. . . .The other
day, I was reliably informed that the town's discontented elements were organiz
ing a bolo battalion to strike at their pet enemies when the garrison is with
drawn. If this is not stopped with drastic measures, you know what this will
lead to with seme mutineers still at large. . . .The people do not have the right
attitude to the new governmental set-up. Blame age-long politics. Besides, the
Republic came in so suddenly in this part of Leyte that the people do not know
yet the Government and officials they should be loyal to. . . .
Villaba's mayor, categorically declaring his municipality to be "completely
normal" went on to qualify—
except in Barrio Kahigan, where people seem restless because of the influence
of Mercoleta and Pamanian, who are still keeping a part of their organization
intact near or around the forest of Matoloto. . . .1 have been writing letters
to Capt. Mercoleta and one to MaJ. Pamanian. I hope they would understand the
purpose of our government. . . .
These guerrilleros understood only too well. . . .
A pathetic misunderstanding of the concept of "normalcy" marked the report of
the Mayor of Malitbog. His cringing anxiety to please distorted his perspective:
. . . .On February 1, 1944, I left for barrio San Isidro with members of the
Propaganda Corps of the Japanese Imperial Forces. . . .After the truck went as
far as 5 km from the poblacion, we were treacherously attacked by guerrillas. . .
I cried over the incident before a Japanese officer, becuase it would stamp a
bad impression upon my administration. . . .Since my return from Tacloban, I
have been working hard and cooperating with the Commanding Officer of the local
Japanese Garrison, with a view of obtaining peace in the municipality. . . .A
record crowd greeted Col. Yosiaka and Assemblyman Veloso and party last January
25th. In other words, there was already a state of normalcy in the municipality.
How the good mayor came to infer from the turning out of the populace in
goodly throng— obviously, for some, a matter of prudential consideration to avoid bad
odor with the Japanese— that all was well with the municipality escapes understanding.
%un. Mayor Labata, Sogod. March 31, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
êstituto E. Copuaco, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Naval. Feb. 10, 1944. To: Prov.Gov.
^Vicente M. Veloso, Mun. Mayor, Villaba. Feb. 8, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
197
It took but little to upset these tranquil relations. As the Mayor proceeded to
relate:
After that sad incident, the civilians, due to fear, returned again to the
mountains, especially in places near the scene of the happening. I have to
campaign again for their coming down in order to snare their lives. What the
administration has accomplished has been set back.-^
Thwarting the Food Production and Labor Programs:— The guerrillas also sought
to nullify the effects of the food production program. The Governor reprimanded the
mayor of Tarragona:
The Food Campaign in your municipality is very slow. Enforcement of the

Provincial Executive Order No. 6 for establishment of home gardens by every
family is practically neglected. . . .
San Miguel's results were negligible: "Guerrilla activities handicap the
food production campaign. Only yesterday, C. Diola was killed by a guerrilla."^
And Matalom: "The Food Production Campaign is not active due to guerrilla
activities. People in the poblacion and in all barrios content themselves to work
little and stay in hiding places, because of frequent sounds of guns and bombs."4
The Provincial Agronomist attested to the success of guerrilla sabotage in
hampering production:
Because of periodic outbreak of guerrillas and bandits in La Paz, Tarragona,

and mainly Abuyog, the great source of corn seeds, no more seed corn at present
procurable. . . .
. . . .This Office needs cooperation of the military authorities in order
that farmers can harvest palay. Failure means famine and no seed procurement.
The rigorous control of foodstuffs movement from one municipality to another has
in a way favored the bandits, since the producers are afraid to bring their
stuffs to the town to their own houses and to their relatives. Flow of cereals
in Eastern towns up to Carigara and Tacloban should be liberated to fast spread
to the people in order to save most from the clutches of the hands of lawless
elements, who are in Eastern districts and need food. Rural districts of great
rice requirements should be patrolled incessantly. . . .^
And in mid-May, 1944, the Governor seconded this unfavorable report: ". . De
spite pacification campaign, situation not greatly improved. . . .
^ E . Vano, Mun. Mayor, Malitbog. Feb. 2, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

% . Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 24, 1944. To: A. Matoza, Mun. Mayor, Tarragona.
% a y o r Villeramus, San Miguel. April 8 , 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
Â. Olo, Mun. Mayor, Matalom. March 24, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
5v. Berdan, Prov. Agronomist. April 20, 1944. Agricultural Report.
. Salazar, Prov. Gov. May 20, 1944. Agricultural Report.
198
The guerrilla were particularly incensed against those Filipinos who con
sented to serve as laborers on Japanese military installations. Many incidents
occurred, arising out of this matter. Thus, the 24ayor of Carigara reported:
Last Friday, about 8:15 A.M., three Japanese Army cars came to Carigara to
get the 206 civilians to work in Jaro, Leyte, in the construction of Japanese
Army nipa houses and digging fox holes. At Bn. 49, we were ambushed by guer
rilleros and a rain of bullets came from both sides of the Provincial Road.
Seven civilians were instantly killed, and one died in Jaro Japanese hospital.
Seventeen were wounded and among them, three are still expected not to survive.
That was the 10th day of the work of the Carigara civilians since August 15. . .
Failure of Collaboration:-- Mute but eloquent was the testimony declaring the
failure of the collaborationist program of winning over the Province. It took the
form of a wave of resignations from municipal office. The governing motivation, of
course, was carefully cloaked behind seemingly valid reasons: ill-health, the need
for greater income, family obligations outside the municipality, etc. Nonetheless,
the excuses offered, plausible individually, were less tenable in the mass, suggest
ing some common underlying malaise,--fear of retribution at the hands of the guerrilla.
The Acting Mayor of Carigara, humbly urged that "the work of the mayor is
too big for his head and ability. . . .It is earnestly requested that be relieved
2
of his work as Acting Mayor. . . . " Such modesty bespoke true regard for the welfare
of the municipality.
Another confession of inadequacy is a self-administered municipal purge.
Wrote the treasurer of the same Carigara municipality:
. . . . 1 have the honor to state further that the above resignation is based
on the belief and understanding of the undersigned. . . .that Mr. Eugenio
Domingo is not. . . .fit to hold the above position. Hence, for the good of
the service. . . .^
The Mayor of Biliran simply tendered his resignation, "effective on receipt".^
The Mayor of Dulag pleaded 1{oor health— return to plantation" as ground for
his resignation.^
1 PrudencioBorgueta, Mun. Mayor, Carigara. Aug. 28, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^Guillerno V. Babagay, Actg. Mayor, Carigara. May 19, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
Êugenio Domingo, Actg. Mun. Treas., Carigara. May 19, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
Âlberto Enage , Mun. Mayor, Biliran. May 20, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^1. Lagunzad, Mun. Mayor, Dulag. March 3, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
199
So, too, did Macrohon's chief executive.
And Paulo Jaro informed the Governor: "I resign as your confidential
assistant.
As the months wore on, there took place an acceleration of the tempo of
resignations. Seme of those resigning were outspoken in accounting for their action.
The Acting Mayor of Jaro wrote in desperation: "Six months of loyal and strenuous
service has eaten my vitality. Bandits and guerrillas have twice made attempts on
my life. Wife and children worried. . . ."3
And the Mayor of Calutian: ". . . .Wo peace and order. We are wanted by the
guerrillas. Family staying in Tacloban. Turning over the pistol given by garrison, f
And the Labor Agent, responsible for recruiting Filipinos to work for the
Japanese, in asking to resign, remarked: "Last month, I asked for 50 days leave for
my health. It didn't do any good. . . .
Bitterly, the Mayor of La Paz wrote: "I have worked with the Japanese in
order that the Government we are enjoying under their protection will be welcomed
all citizens. My labors in vain."6
Less conspicuous, but more numerous, were the school teachers, policemen,
clerks and various functionaries who resigned in swarms.
The resignations from provincial and municipal posts were but the surface
dimensions of something deeper. Fear of guerrilla reprisal was not potent enough to
bring about this general malingering. Below the surface, a ferment of hatred against
the Japanese invader, the wanton plundering invader, the cruel despotic invader, was
seething in a million breasts.^ The legend of a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" survived only
-'■Vicente D. Evarretta, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Macrohon. Feb. 15, 1944. To:
Prov. Gov.
^Paulo Jaro. Feb. 27, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
•^Joaquin Anover, Actg. Mayor of Jaro. Aug. 10, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
Enrique Q. Enaje, Mun. Mayor, Calubian. Aug. 23, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
Ântonio M. Brillo. Sept. 2, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
6Pedro K. Palana, Mun. Mayor, La Paz. May 12, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
^See: Marc T. Greene, "The Filipinos Are Beady", Asia and the Americas.
Vol. 44, No. 9, pp. 399-402.
200
as the butt of sardonic quips. And awe of Japanese might was beginning to evaporate.
Sven those who cherished no special love for the Americans were estranged . Under
conditions of such pervasive disaffection, Filipino officials and public servants
saw release from office as the sole way of deflecting popular malice from themselves
onto their Japanese overlords.
Those who would speak of the Japanese as the "fellow-Oriental" were uncon
vincing.
Visions of Japanese sadism could not be erased from the mind's eye. The
Provincial Agronomist gave warning to the Governor:
I have seen with my own eyes this morning our poor Municipal Agricultural
Inspector. . . .Fornillos with a bleeding head as he came out of the Japanese
military barracks. After a short interview with him of what had happened, I
found out that he was beaten by a Japanese soldier and that most probably he
was suspected a bad person. The scandalous torture aroused the interest of a
big crowd at the municipal building and I am afraid the news may be spread to
all nooks of the municipality and create hatred. . . .^-
Many Filipinos shuddered and froze at the mere sight of Japanese soldiers,
for their behavior was utterly unpredictable. One could never know when a spasm of
sadism might move a unit of soldiers or a single private to commit some atrocity.
The people remembered the ruthlessness of the Japanese, whose reconnaissance
patrols killed peremptorily. The Mayor of Abuyogreported that "during the recent
patrol tour of the local Japanese military detachment to Barrio Comatin, oos person
said to be affiliated with a guerrilla band was shot and killed.
It was enough that a person's guerrilla affiliations should be only a matter
of conjecture to jeopardize that person's life. As for a cluster of dwellings or a
whole barrio suspected of disaffection, it might be blotted out from the sky, or razed
to the ground by flame. Carigara reported:
. . . .However, on the 4th instant the people were nervous due to the Imperial
Japanese soldiers burning of about 27 houses big and small in the barrio of
Caghalo and a house in the barrio of Sogod. At about noon of the same day, 3
Âgronomist Berdan. Nov. 10, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.

Êleuterio A. Cana, Mun. Mayor, Abuyog. Sept. 22, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.,
Weekly Peport.
201
Japanese airplanes dropped about 9 to 12 bombs in the neighborhood of the barrios

of Sogod and Canlampay. . . .The motive of the burning and bombing was due to
the alleged keeping or maintaining of mountain soldiers in these places . 1
In many cases, the Japanese caught sight of a group of timorous civilians
fleeing before them, and at once assumed that they were guerrilleros or auxiliary
bolomen. Many mayors found it necessary, as did the Mayor of Burauen, to warn the
people that "they could not hide in their evacuation places, as they are at the nercy
of the Japanese soldiers if found while on patrol duties.
Richardson gave vivid description to the plight of the refugees from Japanese
ferocity:
The people of the towns ran frightened into the hills. That made the Jap
food position in the towns serious. Their garrisons were living off the towns
people. They were forcing them to work. The Japs could not exist in deserted
barrios. They went into the hills with fifth columnists, hunting the evacuees,
those who had buqweed. When the fifth columnist identified a buqwee family as
townsfolk, it was compelled, to return home. The hill families were killed to
keep them from aiding the guerrillas. The hill barrios were burned to keep
guerrillas from living off them. . . .
I myself watched while the Japs in force burned four barrios. That was why
we fought close to the coastal towns rather than pick the more advantageous
ambush spots in the hills for our battlefields. We wanted to fight the Japs back
out of the hills to save the barrios and 3 ave the people there and keep the Japs
bottled up in the towns. We knew they wouldn't kill the people they were living
off . 3
Japanese patrols constantly harried the Filipino farmer, especially at har
vest time. The Mayor of Palo complained:
Permit me to inform your office that rice harvesting in Barrio Pitogo and
sitios nearby after a few days from now will be in full swing. . . .The Japanese
detachment in Sta. Fe, Pastrana and Palo which daily goes there on patrol when
ever they see persons harvesting rice along the way bring them to a certain
place or in the barrio proper for Pitogo for the alleged purpose of attending a
meeting, of which all of them are ordered to surrender their arms. . . . 1 am
also sure that if this practice of arresting innocent persons working in the
farms will not be stopped, the time will come when there will be no more harvest
ers in our rice fields. . . A
The Japanese also seized construction materials throughout the length of their|
stay. Thus, in Burauen, the "bodega of the Municipal Treasury, valued at P361.01
Mariano P. Salvacion, Mun. Secty. , Carigara. Sept. 8 , 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
%duarco B.Bugho, Mun. Mayor,Burauen. Oct. 1 , 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
also: Jeremias Pal, Mayor, Matalcm. Aug. 1, 1542.. To: Prov. Gov. (item 1 in the
Matalom report bears on the same matter.)
^Wolfert, op. cit. , pp. 180-1. See Ibid., pp. 164-5; Haggerty, op. cit. .
p p . 165-§0. *" “*
-Generoso Alvarado, Mun. Mayor, Palo. Feb. 19, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
--
202
was demolished, and materials consisting of galvanized iron sheets and lumber were
taken to the landing field under construction at barrio San Pablo by order of the
Japanese Forces."’
'
School buildings served as warehouses for construction supplies. The divi
sion superintendent was obliged to request the mayors to keep a record of confiscated
materials "like wood, galvanized iron, fence wire, etc."2
And the provincial property clerk advised the Provincial Treasurer:
. . . .1 think it would be better if we will write a letter to the Japanese

Military Authorities requesting. . . .that before a thing belonging to the
Provincial Government is removed from a certain place, permission must first be
obtained from the Provincial Treasurer. . .
--A vain illusion!
The sham of "independence" was apparent to most of Leyte's Filipino popula
tion, even to those who found it expedient to feign enthusiasm. The arrogant behavior
of the conqueror and the frequent violation of Philippine law by the Japanese sol
diery in their dealings with civilians made burningly clear what the true relation
ship was. The provincial officials appealed to the Commissioner for the Visayas for
advice and heln. They recognized the ridiculousness of their position in urging the
peoole to feel warmly disposed toward? Japan while they suffered indignities and
brutalities. The Commissioner could only offer promises:
. . . .The President himself says he is willing to Bhare the difficulties

and sufferings of his own people. . . .An understanding has been reached between
the General. Liaison Office of the _/japanese Visayan command/ and this Office
whereby illegal searches and lootings and other crimes. . . .may be reported to
the office of the former, giving names of culnrits, date of crime, and details
for action. . .
By the middle of 1944, disillusionment with the Japanese regime was complete.
Yet the people had nothing palpable to look forward to as a substitute. Despite
guerrilla reportB of Allied victories in the South-Pacific, the United States troops
were far away. Meanwhile, they continued to sustain the crushing burden of an army
(
-'Mayor Cordero, Burauen. March 13, 1944. To: Prov. Auditor.

2 F. Kapili, Div. Supt., Ee-oort of September, 1944.
3a. Sumayod, Actg. Property Clerk. May 6 , 1943. To: Prov. Treas.
^Commissioner for the Visayas, P. Gullas. Memo Order No. 23.
la
203
of occupation and all the miseries this entailed.
Then July--and news "broke (through the grapevine) of an American submarine
surfacing off Abuyog, defying Japanese supremacy in Philippine waters, and beaching
arms and essential supplies for use of Colonel Kangleon's guerrillas. More convinc
ing, American cigarette and chewing gum wrappers were circulated, together with copies
of the OVJT magazine, Free Philippines. The effect was electrifying--exhilarating to
guerrillas and their secret well-wishers, depressing to the remnant of pro-Japanese.
The haughty bravado of the victor had vanished. A whining self-righteousness,
rapidly becoming a self-pity, was henceforth the dominant motif. In place of carol
ing victories, Tacloban's propaganda was now deploring the "cruel inhumanity" of the
American armed forces.
It was obvious that as the year wore on and Axis fortunes wore thin, the
propagandists were reduced to squeezing the last drop of juice from the rind of a
lemon. An editorial of August 15th in the Leyte-Samar Bulletin read: "According to
geographic categorical imperative our national salvation lies with all other Asiatic
nations. To go against the logic of contemporary events would be to fly away from
the face of truth." (p. 2.)
On August 19th, as the American tide drew inexorably closer, the Bulletin
plastered across its banner-head: "P.I. Apostolic Delegate Desgusted With U.S.
Barbarism" and proceeded to expatiate in an article on the disgraceful "defilement
of Nippon soldiers' remains", (pp. 1 and 4.)
Significantly, by September 3rd, the editorial was discussing "Air Raid
Shelters and Drills" (p. 4), and the Sentember 6th issue went into "The Pointers of
Aerial Defense For The Public", (p. 2).
Anc while Tacloban continued to play the mummery down to the very end, pre
tending that Allied flights over Leyte were made by Japanese aircraft, the population;
was preparing for the Liberation, and the guerrilla leaders were drawing up their
prescription lists of "enemies of the nation".
M
204
Japan1b Last Days on Leyte:— September, 1944, ushered in the waning phase
of Japan's power in Leyte- Superficially, all was still the seme. Japan was well
entrenched in the Island, her hired Filipino minions continued to spy on enemies of
the regime, and helpless civilians labored in ever greater numbers in Japanese mili
tary installations. Provincial and municipal officials associated with the govern
ment continued to issue directives exhorting the people to more strenuous exertions
in behalf of the "Philippine Republic".
But conformity to regulations under the watchful eyes of the Kem-pei-tai no
longer meant awe of Japanese might. It meant cautious self-control, repression of
an almost irresistible urge to shout in stentorian voice, "The Yanks will soon be
here." Everyone had heard of the new guerrilla regiment organized by Colonel Kang-
leon, equipped with American arms, and sent to the Ormoc area to replace the disin
tegrated Western Leyte Guerrilla of Miranda. It was no secret that the Japanese de
tachments in the South and West were anxious. A guerrilla officer observed:
The enemy, feeling the pressure of Col. Kangleon's men, ceased to patrol
and confined themselves to their garrisons. Successful raids on enemy garrisons
were effected forcing the enemy to abandon isolated outposts.
And in the East and North, it was obvious that the guerrilla was becoming
increasingly defiant. On top of all this came rumors of guerrilla advice to civili
ans of coastal towns to prepare for evacuation. Clearly, the day of Liberation was
approaching. But that was all the more reason for the citizen in occupied Leyte
to tread softly, avoid giving offense to the touchy Japanese, save his neck from
beheading, and thus survive until the glorious day of redemption.
Yet, a strange disquietude disturbed what should have been a pure jubilation,
howbeit suppressed. This was the uneasiness of those reflecting upon the parts they
had been playing under the Occupation, and suddenly becoming contrite. How many
edicts of the guerrilla command had they violated, unmindful of grave warnings that
records of such misdeeds would be preserved? And now that the heavy paw of the in
vading beast would soon be removed, would the vengeful hand of the guerrilla strike?
^ e p . Domingo Veloso, "Brief History of the Leyte Guerrilla" (1945), p. 10.

(Typewritten).
Among the most apprehensive of those who had incurred guerrilla ill-will were
the Filipino constabularymen. Many had become thoroughly odious in the eyes of the
people for the ruthless opportunism they had shown on their patrols. Those with
fairly clean records were anxious to dissociate themselves from their comrades. If
they could sneak away and surrender to the guerrilla, offering to fight by way of
penance, perhaps their lives would be spared.
Singly, in pairs and trios, constabularymen began to vanish from their out
fits during September. The Japanese, at first tricked into believing they were
casualties of guerrilla kidnapping or shooting, soon realized that their auxiliaries
were deserting. Always suspicious of the constabulary, the Japanese now stripped
them of most of their weapons and maintained a careful vigilance. Henceforth, flight
would be more difficult. The constabularymen must now plan on escape to the safety
of American lines, should the expected invasion take place, before the double nemesis
of Japanese soldier or guerrilla avenger could pick him off.
Government officials, clerks, school teachers, merchants and farmers who had
dealt with the Japanese now engaged in a frantic last-minute effort to stave off
conceivable punishment. Had they ever given foodstuffs, clothing, or stationery sup
plies to the guerrilla? They must exhume the crumbled slip of mildewed paper that
was a guerrilla receipt. Had they passed on some scrap of intelligence to the dis
guised guerrilla operative in town? They must hasten to locate him and remind him of
this service. And if, though they ransacked their memories, they could think of no
"T?he American guerrillero, Hichardson, commented on this development:

"I don't know what effect the great September raid had on the other islands
of the Philippines, but where I was it had this effect: the commanding officers of
the BCs in the area /southern Samar/ came calling to see me. He walked directly up
to a volunteer guard. . . .and said, 'Please tell Major Richardson I would like to
talk to him. . . .1 have come to offer you my services and the services of my command.’
". . . .A day later a Jap patrol came down the road from Hiporlcs. Perhaps
all the 3Cs everywhere and all the fifth columnists and traitors and Jap spies and
rats everywhere were Jumping from the sinking ship. . . .Anyway this Jap patrol,
thirty of them, came to disarm the BCs, and the BCs laid an ambush for them."
(Vo]fert, op. cit., np. 224-29.)
i
206
positive deed rendered in behalf of the resistance movement, they must do two things:
(a) they must contrive in their minds for public presentation as convincing a case
as possible, demonstrating the extenuating character of the circumstances surrounding
their ostensibly pro-Japanese "actuations"; (b) they must locate a blood relative
active in the guerrilla, or some friendly neighbor on good terms with the guerrilla,
and entreat this person to intercede in their behalf.
Meanwhile, as if to buoy up their own courage, the Japanese proclaimed loudly
and insistently that the Americans would never return to Leyte. How could they?
Were not the Japanese sinking American ships and destroying American planes at a rate
faster than new ones could be constructed? But then, in October, American recon
naissance planes flew overhead. Even then, the Japanese naively hoped to hoodwink
the people .--These were Japanese planes, part of the aerial covering provided to pro
tect the Filipinos against the devastation the inhuman Americans would rain down if
they were only given the chance.
The residents of Tacloban were not provided with air raid shelters— even of
the flimsiest, make-shift sort. Neither were they alerted against possible air raids
by drill in scurrying to safety, in rescue work, and in debri3 clearance. And the
Japanese persisted in this headstrong insouciance even after American bombers began
to pock-mark Leyte's landing fields in mid-September
^Tacloban's newspaper, The Guardian, in a mood of reminiscence, observed in

1945: " . . . .One year ago last. . . .September 12, about nine o'clock in the morn
ing, the first pre-invasion bombing startled Tacloban. Taclobaners in the know that
the Americans were only after military objectives, did not go to their improvised
air-raid shelters, but enjoyed seeing the spectacular feats of the airmen in render
ing the Kataisan airstrip useless. Later, through the human grape-vine telegraphy,
we learned that the American forces were 300 miles away from Davao. . . . "
(The G-uardian, Vol. I, No. 6, September 22, 1945, p. 2.)
An American ex-guerrillero then stationed in sopthwest layte, sparkled as ;

he recalled the same memorable occasion:
"But on the morning of September 12 I saw hundreds of airplanes in the sky. •
At first I thought it was Just another bunch of Jap airplanes, but then I said to my ;
radio operator, 'My God, those must be United States airplanes. Look how many there
are 1'
207
Elsewhere on the Island, the Filipino civilians were making preparations for
the long-awaited American onslaught. Many municipalities had two local governments,
one in the poblacion answerable to the Tacloban administration, and one in the hills
under guerrilla auspices. The guerrilla instructed their civilian officials to give
notice that the poblacion-dvellers must evacuate. Thus, the chronicler of Abuyog
recorded:
September, 1944. Mayor Gallego passed the word to town warning everybody to
leave the place by all means before the end of the month. He repeated it for
days and he meant it. . . .The civilians in the poblacion. . . .gradually dimin
ished without the Japs' notice. By mid-October, 1944, the poblacion of Abuyog
was only a poblacion of Japs, except for some Chinese civilians who were also
prepared to slip away into the swamps. The people were scattered in the barrios
along the coast as well as inland. . . .1
October came, finding Leyte in a state of seige. Most of the towns along the
East coast had been evacuated. The last traces of commerce and fishing had disap
peared. Farmers had abandoned their fields. A tense expectancy hovered everywhere.
In the Horth, guerrilla units were poised not far from the town3 , ready to
storm in and take over. In the Ormoc sector, and the neighboring municipalities of
the West coast, where Japanese concentrations were strong, guerrilla reconnaissance
was intensified. Here toe, evacuation had been proceeding, but not as completely as
on the East coast.
It was in the South, however, where Kangleon had direct oversight of guerrilla
operations, that the guerrillas displayed the most aggressive spirit. The exploits
of Company "I" of the 94th Kegiment drew wide notice:
"Then they began to bomb Cebu City. Boy, we could hear those explosions all
the way over to Leyte. The people cheeredand hollered. . . .
"People dragged American flags out of mothballs andwaved themandhollered,
'Kill the Japs'. Kill the Japs'.. . . . '
"After while the airplanes came back. They got over the freighter again,
and two of them peeled off. . . .
" . . . .In Hilongos, where I was, everyone climbed to the top ofhouses or
into trees so they could see what happened to the freighter.
"That day was a holiday of course, and everyone Btayed out on the streets
talking and laughing and singing. It was the happiest day Hilongos had had in years,
the day of the beginning of the Liberation." (St. John, op. cit. , pp. 167-70.)
■Âurillo, o p . cit. , pp. 14-35.
The guerrillas, better armed and better manned than they had ever been, began
stronger raids on Jap garrisons. Captain Landia's company of 110 men raided the
garrison in the town of Abuyog, a garrison of about 80 men.
It was short and sweet. The guerrillas came in from several directions and
were swarming all over the town before the Japs knew what was happening.
The guerrillas fired from behind fences, from around the corners of houses,
from trees, from all over. Taken by surprise, the Japs did not do very well.
Thirty Japs were killed. . .
And Abuyog's chronicler boasted:
Almost immediately before the invasion of Leyte by MacArthur's retaking

forces, the Japs stationed at Einunaiân, a municipality south of Abuyog, and
numbering about a hundred, sneaked away northward via the Jungles. A unit of
the southern Leyte guerrillas followed them at once and requested the 'I' boys
to block the way. The 'I' men did. In the Jungle fight that ensued, the trail- {
ing unit sustained some casualties, the Japs. . . .most, but the unit in the
block suffered none.^
Yet, let it not be imagined that the Japanese were resting idly. On the
basis of intelligence reports gathered and sifted, the 95th Infantry of Major Balde-
rian pieced together the following picture of Japanese tactics, under way since July:
The enemy, about a division in strength, is massed in the northeastern part

of the province. They are preparing a coastal defense from Abuyog to Tacloban
with a strong support of artillery pieces. Aside from improvement of old roads
along the coast and across the province they are constructing a series of dust
roads between towns. Their present activities tend to show the following:
a. They expect American landing forces between Tacloban and Abuyog.
b. They will utilize the towns of Palompon, Ormoc and Baybay for landing
reinforcements and exit in case of retirement utilizing Ormoc-Tacloban road and
Baybay-Abuyog road.
c. They will utilize the dust roads they are constructing to repulse our
forces already in the province from disturbing their rear installations, and to
gether with lateral trails already in existence as a route of withdrawal or re
inforcements in the event that roads are rendered unserviceable.^
The Japanese were also very much aware of the guerrilla. They had enough re
spect for the guerrilla to organize a huge espionage program. Headquarters of the
95th Infantry sent out an urgent warning to its subsidiary units:
Reliable information has been received. . . .to the effect that there are
over 1,000 spies sent to this province by the Japanese. These spies who are
from Cebu and Bohol are trained for high class espionage work. . . .The enemy
through their agents will organize dances, gambling. . . .fiestas, tuba and wine
drinking parties. All these gatherings are designed to attract the attention of
^St. John, op. cit. , p. 178.

tAurillo, o p . cit. , pp. 12-13.
"Armandez Guevara, 1" L t ., Inf., Egtl. Plans and Training Officer, 95th Inf.
g2nd Div., LAC. August 22, 1944. Plans of Attack, Par. 1.
209
our soldiers vith the hope that they become careless. . . .Then the enemy will
be able to obtain information relatirg to our plans, intentions, and above all,
the movements and concentration of our troops. In order that the enemy's inten
tion will fail, it is directed that all the said dances. . . .be immediately
stopped. Any soldier or civilian who violates these limitations should be given
drastic action.
Warning was also relayed to the West coast district under command of the 94th
Regiment:
Report from my operatives: BC officers sent to Baybay for espionage work,

pretending to be merchants. . . .Riding in paraos. . . .Mopping operations be
ginning the first week of September from Abuyog to Baybay will employ 12,000
Japs.2
The outnumbered and outgunned guerrilla of the 94th and 96th Regiments avoided
for the most part direct skirmishing with the Japanese. The Japanese therefore turned
on the civilians, slaying many in these "mopping" operations for alleged sympathy
with the guerrilla.
Appropriation of foodstuffs was intensified, especially in rich cereal-
growing areas.
Enemy has reoccupied San Isidro for purposes of getting supply of corn.
Enemy set quota of 9,000 sacks for said town. Big hacienderos were given their
respective quota. Japs pay in textiles, cigarettes, soap, sugar, or B12 Philip
pine Treasury Notes per cavan. Enemy bluffs hacienderos that corn they got used
for feeding their 20,000 laborers in Eastern towns.5
As already mentioned, recruitment of Filipino laborers for work on landing
fields and military installations was greatly expanded. These laborers were brutally
treated after the first American bombings. "Japs directed fire at laborers working
in landing fields at Burauen to revenge. Many killed. According to laborers who
escaped when American planes strafed."^
Reports were widely bruited about that Filipino youth would soon be called up
for combat duty. "Laurel issued conscription of youth. Advise people in occupied
area to stay away from the enemy," Colonel Kangleon warned.5
3-B. V. Abarientos, Capt., Inf.. Ex. 0. Sc Adj., 95th Inf. 2e June 1944. Memo
randum: All Unit Commanders 95" Inf. Regt.
2A. Balderian, Maj., 95th Inf. Aug. 30, 1944. To: Kaj. Jain, CO, 94tli Inf.
5A. Balderian, 95th Inf. Sept. 10, 1944. To: Col. Kangleon, CO, LAC.
4A. Balderian, 95th Inf. Sept. 13, 1944. To: Col, Kangleon, CO, LAC.
^R. Kangleon, CO, LAC. Sept. 16, 1944. To: Maj. Balderian, CO, S5tli Inf.
In the provincial capital, some signs of crisis were beginning to appear,
Guerrilla intelligence learned:
All BCs in Tacloban disarmed by Japs. Maj. Reyes unmolested, but without
arms. Prominent residents and puppet government employees closely watched by
Japs. Salazar and Japs forbid evacuation of residents from Tacloban. Employment
of forced labor in landing fields and military installations continues regardless
of sex,1
The branch bank closed. So did the public schools and the two functioning
parochial institutions in Tacloban. The Japanese seized the Leyte Land Transportation
Company, confiscating the remaining trucks, garage equipment, and P27,000 in cash.
Yet, withal, the Japanese continued to maintain a fantastic fascade of self-
assurance. Indeed, on October 17, they convoked a monstrous parade, wryly named a
"Victory Parade", celebrating the destruction of the United States fleet— at the very
moment when a titanic armada was assembling for the big push towards Leyte's shores.
Summary
We have presented. the salient characteristics of the Japanese-sponsored
regime of Leyte, attempting to make clear its difficulties and its proposed lines of
solution. It is fitting that we make some evaluation of this regime.
First, we must note that the regime lacked effective leadership. Manila de
termined policy; Tacloban applied this policy with such emphasis as was exacted by
the local Japanese Military Administration. This meant considerable rigidity. We
saw this inflexibility illustrated in several important instances.
Governor Torres attempted to restore business stability. To do this, he
sought to validate the emergency currency that constituted the principal tender in
circulation among the masses. He pleaded his case as eloquently as he could but
found the Japanese adamant.
Secondly, the Governor sought the restoration of motor transport, to civilian
control as an indispensable adjunct to the functioning of commerce. Again, he was
thwarted.
1A. Balderian, MaJ., 95th Inf. Oct. 4, 1944, To: Col. F. Kangleon, CO,
LAC.
k
211
Finally, he hoped to establish an armed constabulary adequate in strength
to effectively support the execution of the provincial program. But the distrustful
Japanese held back the issuance of weapons. The gubernatorial arm remained withered,
too weak for the tremendous task of pacification.
These examples of the Japanese Military Administration working at cross
purposes with the Governor illumine the inner incoherence of the Leytean occupation
regime. The primary mission of the administration was the restoration of pre-war
"normalcy". By normalcy was meant the return of every family to its pre-war abode,
the resumption of peacetime vocations, and the ending of armed resistance to the
Japanese occupation. These conditions could be met if and only if the inhabitants of
the Province felt confidence in the benevolent intentions and strength of the regime.
We have already seen how Japanese policy militated against the economic re
covery of the Province and the effective implementation of the Governor's pacifica
tion program. This had a two-fold effect. On the one hand, Filipinos prepared to
abide by the conquest of Leyte as a given fact were unwilling to accept economic
adversity. On the other, families that had evacuated to the interior were not suf
ficiently impressed by the might of the Tacloban regime to dare defy the guerrilla
resistance edicts.
Overriding all these considerations was one indubitable fact. Philippine
officialdom was instructed to present the case for acquiescence to Japanese rule in
terms of the benevolence and Oriental kinship of the ruler. The regime was allegedly
founded upon the rule of law, and those resisting were in point of fact, outlaws.
But the humble Filipino, observirg Japanese decorum, could not but doubt whether the
sovereign occupation power actually regarded itself as bound by law. He saw a gulf
separating the conquered from the conqueror. His own interests were given no con
sideration. The conqueror behaved with a cruel arbitrariness, valuing only his
imperial advantages. This being the case, propaganda about Philippine independence
was a stinging mockery.
212
One more word. The inhabitant of leyte was told that in the new Philippines,
all true Filipinos must place the corporate interest above that of selfish individual
calculation. But while he suffered from malnutrition and his family wore tatters,
he observed privileged few looking sleek and contented. He sweated, earned a few
pesos, and was speedily plundered of his earnings by the hawks of the market-place.
All must suffer equally, he was told. But he knew that relief supplies were being
syphoned off into the maw of corrupt officials and their influential wealthy hangers-
on. . . .And now he was completely disfranchised.
Perhaps, if the Japanese had overrun the entire Province at the time of their
initial invasion, the Tacloban administration might have enjoyed a more successful
rule. As it was, the administration's control was confined to a small district on
the North-East coast until 1944. By then, the population had grown to hate the Jap
anese, while feigning compliance with their regulations. And in a few months, word
of an American counter-invasion was in the air. . . .
p/2/9
213
CHAPTER III
THE EESI STANCE MOVEMENT IN LEYTE
Development of the Resistance Movement
That the cast a particular society takes on is conditioned by the circum
stances of its formation may he asserted as almost self-evident. In studying the
make-up of Leytean society under guerrilla control, we must begin by paying some heed
to the setting— to the forces and personalities from whose concatenation emerged the
phenomena under review. We have surveyed the salient features of collaborationist
society in occupied Leyte as the axis along which resistance thrust out its lines of
opposition. But these oppositional thrustings did not reach their mature dimensions
at once, much less coalesce into recognizable patterns with a self-coherent indivi
duality of their own. We turn to an examination of this uneven development.
Again we throw back to the Japanese invasion of May, 1942. We must pursue
the career of that portion of the population electing to evacuate to the mountainous
interior of the Island rather than remain and accomodate itself to enemy rule. We
must examine the conditions under which this fugitive population dwelt, the adversi
ties faced the undertow inexorably dragging many back to the occupied areas. This
was the diema1 opening act of resistance.
But we are studying resistance as an organized phenomenon, not as a dis
jointed , flapping negativism. We move on to inquire into the rise of Leyte's guer
rilla groups, their generic traits, their organizational problems. We shall trace
the high points of the story of guerrilla unification in the Province, indicating why
full realization of unification did not come about. This historical narrative is the
necessary preclude to a more functional analysis of life within guerrilla domains.
We shall conclude this portion of the study by passing under our scrutiny the con
flict between the two principal loaders of resistance on Leyte. We do so not only
because the matter is of intense interest, but also because it shows how a narrow-
ranged motivation on the part of the resistance leaders could work to nullify the
attainment of cherished goals .
214
Evacuation
The coining of the Japanese to Leyte threv the civilian population into panic
and confusion. A large proportion abandoned their possessions and scuttled to the
hills. They acted vith a frenzied spontaneity. Some, of course, had already con
templated evacuation to mountain refuges, and had made advance preparations. Between
the time of the Japanese bombing of Manila in December, 1941, and the landing of
their expeditionaries (May 25, 1942) on the beaches of Leyte, the Province had under
gone a state of siege, allowing the inhabitants ample time to reflect upon their
course of action. Weird tales of Japanese sadism had cast a long shadow of terror
upon the minds of the credulous provincials, so that they scarcely knew what to ex
pect. For them, flight to an inaccessible interior seemed .to offer the sanest al
ternative. There, in concealment, they might pursue a policy of watchful waiting
and observe the deportment of the invaders.-1
Their stay in the mountains posed a number of grave problems for the Filipino
evacuees. First of all, they were threatened with banishment beyond the pale of law,
and treated accordingly, if captured. This outlawry would subject their town pro
perties to sequestration, their mountain goods to seizure, and their persons to de
tention and disposition by summary Justice. For no sooner had the Japanese entered
Tacloban, the capital, and there established a military administration than they re
constituted the pre-invasion Filipino civilian government. And among the first in
structions imparted to Filipino authorities was the order for the immediate return of
the evacuees.
^Tn his report to the Japanese administration, the puppet Governor took ac
count of these factors: "Due to very strong propaganda of the Americans, the minds
of the people were poisoned against the Japanese, and at trie beginning they simply
did not want to be under the Japanese. . . . " (B. Torres, Prov. Gov. March 1, 1943.
To: Commander, District of Visayas, Japanese Imperial Forces)
^"Due to the frequent forays of the Japanese, the people of the lower Philip,
pine Islands have added, with grim humor, an American word to their vocabularies.
This is the word 'evacuate'. Chick's young American guerrillas did not take long to
note the similarity between the Filipino pronunciation of this word--which they called;
'e-bac-whit'— and that of 'buckwheat'. The return is called balikuate, a Visayan
word." (Travis. Ingham. Rendezvous By Submarine, Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., ^FTev ]
York, 19457pp. 76-77.)' I
i
215
The Japanese were bent upon restoring law and order as early as possible.
Only under such conditions could the economy function properly. And a stable economy
in the conquered territories was essential for the fullest exploitation and integra
tion of the area into the master plan of the new economic order. Pelted with edicts
and regulations by their own officials now cooperating with the Japanese, and also
made fearful?.y aware of Japanese power as the latter dispatched patrols from their
garrisons, the simple Filipino farmers were utterly disoriented and demoralized.
Second, should the Filipino decide to remain in his hideout, all these con
siderations notwithstanding, he was confronted with an unexorcisable specter— hunger.
¥hether craftsman in Tacloban, Ormoc, or the smaller municipalities, or simply farmer
his withdrawal to the mountains entailed cutting off his regular source of income.
How was he to sustain himself end his family with no working capital? Even the more
far-sighted, who had provided for this contingency by preparing tiny subsistence
farms, would have great difficulty. For bereft of equipment, a single family might
succeed in eking out some of its food requirements; but whence would come the surplus
exchangeable for other commodities? And should prowling Japanese patrols uproot it
and compel it to seek a new place of concealment, how would it manage to eat, clothe
itself and tend the ill?
Third, a further complication, an almost inevitable incident of the disrup
tion of normal civil process made itself felt. As ordinary government collapsed,
the antisocial parasitical elements of the Province burgeoned, regarding the now un
protected peaceful elements as legitimate prey to fasten upon. Working individually
or in bands, these brigands began to exact tribute from the comnon people, and would
not stop at slaying those who balked. Sometimes, with greater cunning, these bat-
teners upon the misfortunes of their countrymen posed as patriots, pledged to a last-
ditch fight against the invader, but requiring assistance to prosecute their program.
Their "shakedowns" of the evacuees were thus defended as contributions which would
only be withheld by selfish, unpatriotic persons.
216
As a result of these adverse influences, many of the families originally set
to evacuate came to reconsider their decision. It was difficult enough to endure the
asperities of uprooted life under any conditions. If in addition, these families
were to he molested by the offscourings of society on the one hand, and a devilish
foreign invader on the other, the resulting anguish was more than could be stomached.
On top of this was the steady pull of the collaborationist appeal to return to a
normal mode of life, without penalty for previous dereliction. What wild impulse
moved them to evacuate in the first instance, they asked themselves. The Japanese
were not actually as oppressive as they had imagined. They would return to their
farm or their trade, obey regulations— and live. After all, what could they do to
change the situation? If America ever came back, it would be time enough to Join in
the fight.
So they reasoned, and so some of them, a little hesitantly, made their re
turn. They were not bad people, or a conscienceless lot. They were terribly muddled,
and let their reactions to immediate events direct their next steps. Some of them
had later occasion to repent of their return, and again evacuated to the hills.
Others remained, caught up in thevortex of events. . . .Significant choices are not
as reversible as one might desire.
The Rise of Guerrilla Groups
The resistance movement of Leyte did not come into being as a full-blown,
organized affair. Unlike the situation in other countries (where in anticipation of
enemy occupation of their land, carefully organized outfits, with recognized leader
ship, an adroit program of operations, and often a supporting ideology that provided
elan, went underground, resolved to foil enemy plans of consolidating the regime),
resistance in much of the Philippines, and particularly in Leyte, was a haphazard
affair. It expressed no single outlook and possessed no unified program. It repre
sented a form of adjustment on the part of sections of the population to a situation
not of their own devising, wherein they saw no possibility of cooperating with the
enemy and took to active opposition as the only alternative. Wo systematic plan for
217
carrying on this resistance, no social philosophy to clarify the meaning of this re
sistance , no program of reconstruction after the expulsion of the invader provided
a dynamic.
The brutal execution of an American prisoner of war by the Japanese conmand
in Tacloban provided a strong impetus to Filipino resistance in Leyte. A memberoof
the guerrilla government of Free Layet caught the mood of his countrymen:
Sometime in July, 1942, the Japs inaugurated their famous practices of bru
talities, tortures, bayoneting and killing people indiscriminately. People sus
pected of any crime by them were being herded like cattle, tied up by the neck
and killed in cold blood. /There may be some hyperbole in this lurid depiction,
for its suggestion of mass slaughter is midleading. But that there was a sadistic
bloodthirstiness already in evidence may be accepted as substantially correct^/
It was at this time that Capt. James Bullock, SC, USN Beserve, and his three
Filipino companions were taken from their concentration camp to the municipal
cemetery of Tacloban and killed there without any known guilt. There immediately
sprang up the public manifestation of the existence of the Leyte Guerrilla.
Hundreds of guerrilleros armed with rifles and bolos paraded the streets of Palo,
/neighboring municipality to Tacloban/ a block away from the Japanese garrison,
bearing the American and Filipino flags, headed by Sergeant Eusebio Teraza of the
Philippine Army . 1
The spontaneity of the guerrilla formation and upsurge again may not have oc
curred as suggested. That there was a spontaneity of revulsion against the Japanese
for the execution of Captain Bullock and his Filipino companions would be assented to
universally. The population felt that it was at the mercy of a sanguinary beast that
might tear apart its hapless victims on any occasion. No sooner had this thought
registered with the Filipino, who is not meek and does not quail before his oppressor,
than seditious talk began. And now, small groups of unsurrendered soldiers, fervent
in their hatred of the conqueror, began to gather in conspiratorial cells for pur
poses of direct action.
Generally, the resisters were clusters of Philippine Army and Constabulary
men (former],y attached to Leyte outfits and in large part natives of Leyte) , who dis
trusted Japanese pledges of no harm to all who would peacefully turn in their arms
and surrender. Atrocity stories made them unwilling to relinquish their only protec
tion— their weapons. They found refuge in the interior, remained isolated for some
ôtente, o p . cit. , p. 4.
218
weeks or months in temporary hibernation, eventually emerged cautiously to reconnoi
tre, learned of each other's existence, and banded together for mutual support. To
this original nucleus might be added survivors from Bataan and the other Luzon cam
paigns, who took a stand on non-surrender. These "stragglers", as they were called,
might have been Scouts or members of activated Leyte regiments. Now weary, dejected,
and in some cases ailing from the effects of malaria, dysentery or tropical ulcers,
they sought sanctuary in their own homesteads. Further increments came from yourger
and more vigorous civilians, never mobilized for military service, but impelled by
a variety of personal reasons to throw in their lot with resistance.
Governor Torres' report to the Japanese command on guerrilla activities gave
a fairly accurate analysis of how anti-Japanese developments began:
. . . .The USAFFS having surrendered by order of Gen. Wainwright, there was

no fighting, but less than one half of the USAFFS troops in Leyte formally sur
rendered. Many of the men, including many of the officers, went to the mountains
with their guns. It was at first believed that they were only afraid to be made
prisoners of war. For three months there was comparative peace and quiet. In
September, however, hostilities began. . . .
The causes for the disturbance of peace and order in Leyte are as follows:
1. Due to very strong propaganda of the Americans, the minds of the people
were poisoned against the Japanese, and at the beginning they simply did not want
to be under the Japanese.
2. The Filipino BOldiers and officers of the USAFFE were divided. Some
wanted to surrender, more did not want to. They took to the mountains and waited
for an opportunity.
3. Many of them still think that America can and will send aid to the Philip
pines. This they hear f"om radios which they were able to take with them to the
mountains.
4. There are many who have Joined the guerrillas for no other motive than to
take advantage of the situation. They rob, they plunder, they kill innocent and
defenseless civilians. These are the worst types.
5. To a certain extent, the uneasiness on the part of some of those who went
to the mountains was caused by fear of the Japanese due to drastic measures such
as punishment and killing done during the first months of the occupation.
6 . Another remote cause is the lack of money because of the prohibition of
the use of emergency notes which was the only money most of the people had at
that time. When they found out that they could not spend their money in the
towns, they were forced to stay in the barrios and mountains where the money was
still in use. . . . 1
These bands did not conform to any single pattern. In fact, they presented
the greatest diversity. At the outset, their numbers werenecessarily restricted.
JB . Torres, Prov. Gov. Mar. 1, 1943. To: The Comdr., Diet, of Visayas, Jap. jj
Imp. Forces, thru the Comdr.. Leyte and Samar Sector.
S:
iii
219
Firepower was of greater value than manpower. Since a goodly number of the potential
resisters were weaponless at the time they established contact with the early guer
rilla chiefs, they could not be immediately mustered into service. Afterwards, when
the bands had achieved some degree of adhesiveness, and actively launched a program
of canvassing for arms and ammunition among the civilian population, the small arse
nals that they succeeded in amassing made possible a further expansion.
At the close of 1942, Governor Torres wrote:
On the whole, our enemies are poorly armed and equipped. Except about three
or four bands which probably have about 1 0 0 rifles and several machine guns, re
volvers and automatic rifleB each, the rest have only bolos and about 1 rifle to
every 20 men. . . .Those bands operating in municipalities facing Cebu ^ S G W F J
and Mindanao JpGrlFj are constantly receiving aid in form of money, arms, and am
munitions, brought to Leyte on paraos and bancas. Groups operating in Samar go
back and forth between narrow San Juanico Sts. ûnits of SantoB and Pabilona/.^"
Torres grossly exaggerated the aid being received from outside the Province.
Most of the weapons mustered by the guerrilla came from scouring the countryside and
confiscating arms, or from improvising home-made shot-guns (latongs).
The problem of subsistence was another restrictive factor. In those parts of
Leyte where the Japanese patrols did not penetrate, it was possible for guerrilla
members to spend part of their time in gainful occupation, assembling periodically at
a stipulated place. This combination of working and fighting was ruled out in areas
where the Japanese troops effectively policed the civilian populations. Here, the
resistance bands were compelled to retire to hidden, relatively unpenetrated areas and
establish a kind of camp. By so doing, they cut themselves off from the possibility
of directly satisfying their own food requirements, and were obliged to seek other
methods (to be discussed below). Under these conditions, the size of their conmissary
was a limiting factor in their enlargement.
In the beginning, these guerrilla bands were uncertain of the scope of their
activities. In certain cases, they did not really understand their reason of being.
;j
As already explained, some of the Filipino soldiers, put on their own by the higher j
commands , refused to lay down their arms, largely out of fear of Japanese barbarism. :j
]B. Torres. Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration ;
for District of Visayas. £
f
I
220
For them, resistance was the only means of self-preservation. They would hang on,
prolonging the struggle after the official capitulation until the day (sometimes de
spaired of— never disbelieved) of the great American deliverance.
Others . and this is indeed an extremely slippery matter to establish quanti
tatively, were fired by an unquenchable nationalism. For them, prudential considera
tions were of secondary moment. All they knew was that their nation's honor had been
defiled, and upon them weighed the noble task of redeeming that honor. Since so
glorious a purpose could not be served individually, organization was the necessarily
inferred course. And as guidance and inspiration in this direction, the history of
the Philippines— nay, that of their own Province of Leyte— could be consulted.
The motivation of another guerrilla element, perhaps the largest at the outset,
was clearly put by war correspondent Gunnison:
At the start, a few Filipino roustabouts saw the advantage of making up small
gangs and preying on the public. They'd call themselves guerrillas but they
plundered and pillaged both the Japs and the Filipinos. If they had a grudge
against anyone, the word was passed and the man was killed. It grew on Leyte and
Samar and elsewhere into open terrorism.
With no over-all organization, the best comparison is that of gangland mobs
on each Island, with their territories marked off by gentleman's agreements be
tween the mob leaders. All this was done in the name of the guerrilla movement.
If the civilians in the barrios or towns refused to send food or information or
even their daughters into the hills, they were marked as fifth columnists or pro-
Japanese. Farmers were prevented from bringing food into towns. What did get in
went to the black market at prices that made it nearly impossible to purchase.
. . . .From late 1942 to late 1943 in Leyte and Samar, more civilians than
Japs were killed by the irregular guerrilla bandits. The Filipino citizen lived
in mortal fear of the Jap on the one hand and in apprehension of the bandits on
the other.-'
A perfect exemplification of this species of guerrillero were Marcial Santos
and his concubine Ceferina Estogera:
Kangleon wanted the support of Marcel /Marcial/ Santos, who was the only
savage guerrilla I've been able to turn up among my inside guerrilla contacts,
. . . .Santos had a small fleet of bancas which he stealthily operated between
dusk and dawn. When he could catch a few Jap supply barges starting out at night
to run between the islands or down the coast, he'd cut them off and take them
over. . . .He sold some of the captured Jap supplies to the black-market boys and
some to other bandits. But where he made his mistake was in boasting of all the
money he had— 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
^Boyal Arch Gunnison, "Filipino Firebrands", Colliers, Vol. 114, No. 25, 3
(Dec. 16, 1944) , p. 74.
i
2SL
With that much money, there is also the inevitable woman— a guerrilla "by the
name of Peserima Espojero ^Ceferina Estogera/. • • .She ordered executions and
was as brutal as Santos.
One night at a beach headquarters, two guards heard Santos plotting with
Peserima to bury their 100,000 pesos. Peserima insisted that the two guards who
went along to dig the hold should be killed, and they were. But they weren’t
the same two guards who had overheard the conversation. A few nights later, the
listeners came into the camp, shot Santos and captured Peserima, who had been hit
in the leg as she lay beside Santos. They blindfolded her and forced her to tell
where the money was, promising they'd take her to a cemetery— out of courtesy to
her former leadership— dig a grave, finished her off and buried her. Kangleon
got to the Santos camp Just too late, but he routed up the Santos unit and it is
still operating as a guerrilla army outfit A
And another desperado flying the guerrilla banner was Antonio Cinco:
In peacetime he was a cochero cairametta, driver of a little two-wheeled

horse-drawn vehicle. . . .When the Japs came in to Leyte in May of 1942, Cinco
killed one who tried to commandeer his cairametta and horse.
The Japs caught Cinco and threw him into Jail after a brutal beating. . . .
But by miraculous luck Cinco was able to wiggle his feet loose from the bonds. . .
Cinto hit for the hills where he gathered a gang around him and began pillag
ing the countryside. He sent his men into the villages for food, clothing, women,
money and ammunition, and his men insisted on taking more than they needed. If
a civilian refused, his house would be burned and his wife or daughter taken to
the hills. . . . 2
The guerrilla leader who respected lawful procedure was hard put to curb his
more truculent subordinates. Alluding to the same Antonio Cinco, Bichardson said:
. . . .a guerrilla leader's control over his men is 'elastic'. He can lead

them only where they want to go. I found this out in arguing with Captain Cinco,
who had been 'unified' by Kangleon. Cinco. . . .was about thirty years old,
with an appearance of being powerfully built. He had been a tartenela (driver
of a two-wheeled horse carriage) before the war, then had become a guerrilla
leader. He was enjoying himself very much. He had more women than any other
man I had ever known. But I have never seen him smile. . . .Cinco's face appears
frozen. . . .Leading a man like that is a matter of tying a rope around his neck,
unless you are leading him where he wants to go."'
One of the most searching critiques of guerrilla mentality was provided by an
American educator in the Philippine school system, a man who had found shelter among
the Leyte resisters during the Occupation and served as guerrilla school administrator
I have been especially interested in the psychological effects of the war

upon the so]diers and civilians. . . .Over-night the soldier was released from
1Ibid. . pp. 74, 76. (Note: It was MaJ. Balderian of the 95th F.egt., rather
than Kangleon--then in the South--who coped with Santos. Balderian assigned Santos'
unit to Capt. Pabilona's battalion.)
2Ibid. , p. 74. Seifert, op. cit. , pp. 116-17.
222
the discipline and the regimentation of the camp. At first he was shy, diffi
dent, frightened and homesick. . . .But as time went on he gained confidence and
became imbued with his own importance; he learned the power and prestige of the
rifle in dealing with the civilian population. His nomadic life, easy living,
freedom from responsibility made him self-important and less sensitive to the
rights and feelings of others. What he asked at first as a favor he now demanded
as a right. When the metamorphosis was conplete, the timid soldier. . . .came
to believe that anything which advanced his own self-interest was undoubtedly
for the good of all. He looted all the treasuries to secure funds for himself
and his dependents— and probably believed, with all sincerity, that he was per
forming a patriotic act; he didn't seek the poor and starving families of the un
employed. He levied taxes and solicited contributions in order that he and his
dependents might receive pay; he never saw the hundreds of teachers and other em
ployees who had received no pay for six months. When he wished to buy rice, corn,
or camotes, he fixed a low and arbitrary price; but he didn't remain at the mar
ket to see that the poor people might purchase as cheaply.
. . . .The guerrilla believes that his role is the only important one in the
community. . . .The civilian population have unwittingly helped to strengthen
. . . .this idea. Wherever the guerrilla goes, he is given dances and public en
tertainments; he is wined and dined; he is deferred to. The civilians do these
things largely because they fear to give offense; the guerrilla accepts it as
recognition of his worth and importance. . . .The average soldier is young, poor
and provincial; hs has little formal education, and has never before occupied a
position of authority. Although he can’t govern himself, he is suddenly placed
in a position where he makes laws and regulations for others. You can't expect
too much Justice without wisdom. . . .The 'under-dog' is now having his day, and
one shouldn't be surprised that it spoils him Just a little. . . .1
Despite its somewhat patronizing air, this commentary is remarkably perspi
cacious. In two respects, though, it needs correction. It does not advert to the
selfish avarice of many civilians, nominally resisters, who refused to do their share
save when coerced. And it fails to point out that even the under-dog-become-ruler is
capable of admirable self-restraint when brought to realize that he is part of a
movement engaged in transforming his society into a better place for all.
When all has been said, the final assessment can still be made by the same
writer quoted:
. . . . 1 know most of the guerrilla 'heads' on this coast— and they are, as
a group, nice fellows. . . .But everything considered, the guerrilla has shown
more restraint and common-sense than I expected.^
Ôrville Babcock, (Inchon, Leyte, November 20, 1942), Unposted letter to his
daughter.
2 Ibid.
223
Early Guerrilla Functioning
We have already alluded to the collapse of civil government, following in
the wake of the invader. And we have indicated that the lawless elements took ad
vantage of the anarchic conditions to molest and despoil the civilians . 1
Even the meekest of people will only submit to oppression for so long. Then
they wii 1 begin to murmur audibly and concert for mutual protection. According to
the natural rights echool of political historians, this situation of exposure to de
predation and the inadequacy of self-help give rise to organized government. In the
frontier zones of America, the formation of vigilante units became almost a regular
feature of social life. In Leyte, the guerrilla bands took over the functions of a
constabulary. They resolved to crush banditry with a summary justice, whose harsh
ness would act as a deterrent upon would-be plunderers. For, they reasoned, only if
the evacuee could feel a reasonable security in person and chattel would he continue
to ignore Japanese blandishments.
The greater number of Leyte's guerrilla organizations began their careers in
independence of one another. Whether they had a fixed camp, from which they sallied
2
forth on various missions, or whether completely mobile, they tended to confine
their operations to a few barrios, or at most, to the limits of a single municipality.
If the area within their circuit was unoccupied by the Japanese, and the municipal
government was functioning, they would enter into communication with the local offi
cials, enlisting support for their enterprise. They would throw their weight behind
the police of the poblacion (the administrative center) of the municipality and the
^ h e puppet Governor wrote: " . . . .There are numerous bands operating

throughout the whole province. Not all are ex-USAFFE. Many bandits also. . . .Most
of the groups operate simply for purposes of banditry and they are the ones that do
more harm to the people. It is also noticed that most of them try to evade encoun
ters or engagements with Japanese forces. They commit their depredations against de
fenseless inhabitants." (B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Jap, Mili. Adm.
for District of Visayas.)
Âmbushing of isolated Japanese patrols was the favorite occupation of these
early bands. Thus, "four men of the Leyte Constabulary were sent out to Barrio Paw
ing, Palo. . . .to verify newB that a truck load of Japanese was ambushed. . . .The
men returned. . . .and confirmed. . . ." (Jv.Causing, Sr. Insp. Leyte Constabulary,
Aug. 9, 1942. To: Japanese MP.)
i
224
rural police serving under the barrio lieutenants. In return, they vould expect that
the advice they gave to the local officials regarding public policy be accepted and
acted upon, and that the municipality or the barrio officials actively aid them in
meeting their subsistence problems.
Where the disorganization following the Japanese invasion was carried to the
point of municipal collapse, with the local officials themselves taking flight, the
guerrilla helped to constitute an interim government. In some instances, the guer
rilla exercised complete control over the civil government, allowing the latter only
a nominal existence. In fact, after the creation of a civilian militia, as auxiliary
to the guerrilla, the local officials might be inducted into this force and breveted
militia officers.
In the course of time, the various guerrilla units began to send out feelers
to the neighboring organizations. Japanese patrols and the far-flung espionage nets
of the Filipino collaborators made this necessary.-^ Since a strengthening of the
Japanese grip over any district meant further outposts for them, from which they
could advance to new absorptions, it was to the interest of all guerrilla units to
maintain close contact with each other. Every scrap of information concerning Japan
ese reinforcements, troop movements and campaign operations gleaned by the intelli
gence operatives of one unit would be passed on to the others. Moreover, when the
Japanese were preparing some sort of mopping-up activity in one sector, the defend
ing unit might appeal for assistance from its neighbors. In particular, these
^Puppet Governor Torres put guerrilla casualties at the end of 1942 at

1,000. "Only 100 Japanese casualties and 5 constabulary soldiers." (Gov. Torres.
December 21. 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for District of Visayss.)
The disparity in casualties suffered by the contending sides is, of course,

reversed in guerrilla accounts. There is no way of getting at an independent check
on figures submitted. Both sides undoubtedly exaggerated the list of enemies
smitten.
225
requests for aid took the form of borrowings of ammunition and other supplies.^"
In addition to such fraternal contacts brought about by the exigencies of the
moment, some of the stronger and more far-sighted guerrilla chieftains looked ahead.
As the American navy began to spearhead Allied efforts to wrest control of the South
Pacific from Japanese dominion, and military headquarters was established in Austra
lia, Filipinos envisioned the eventual liberation of their own Archipelago. For that
purpose, it would be necessary to assemble as much data as possible concerning Japan
ese troop concentrations and deployments, the type and location of enemy installa
tions, the type and quantity of Japanese resources, the routes of their supply con
voys, the nature of their hold over the local economy, the alternative sites of in
vasion beachheads, and the character of the support they might expect from the native
population. The gathering and transmitting of information, so varied and important,
presupposed if not unityat least close coordination of activities among the guerrilla
unit 8 of the Province.
Further, once this sort of thing should become feasible, shipments of arms,
medicines, uniforms, and other supplies by submarine or airplane would depend upon j
Filipino demonstration of effective operational capacity. Or, to put it differently, ■
official recognition of a guerrilla organization by Allied Headquarters, as the autho-'
rized representative of the Allied forces in a specified region, with all the rights i
appertaining to that status (such as promulgation of martial law effective over the
civilian population, receipt of supplies from Allied sources , and a likelihood of
the guerrilla troops being granted retroactive pay and various bonuses and veterans
^The organization of Marcel Santos may have been composed primarily of bri-
gands, but it did oppose the Japanese. Its plea for arms, addressed to a stronger
group, might have been formulated by any one of the small guerrilla units:
". . .Kemember when our hearts vrere so closely united in an iron of under- '
standing for the welfare of our respective organizations? When the least thing I i
could have, I always gladly share with you, and in return you share fifty-fifty with !
me your ammunition which is your life blood itself? When my Camp was burned, I in- j
stinctly turned to you. . . :
"But now that is past. You have already grown and expanded.................. :i
,TWe are now at a loss as to how we could hold any longer. I realized now 1
that it is futile. We now lack arms and ammunitions. Without your once undivided j
cooperation and helping hand, we will be forced to leave this Sector. . . (Ceferina
L. Fstogero. ?4 April , 1943'. Letter: "My dear Col. Pabilona") jjj
226
privileges, etc.), began to loom large in the minds of some of the leaders. On top
of this, add the personal ambitions for self-aggrandizement on the part of some chief
tains , and you have the centripetal forces at work.
It is a futile and foolish endeavor to determine which of the many groups
that sprang up in Leyte is entitled to the honor of chronological primacy. Esprit de
coprs, surviving among the remnants of these proto-organizations, even after their
membership had been absorbed into larger and more permanent, groups, impelled each to
press claim to the distinction. Moreover, the civilian population among whom these
early cells were born (provided relations between civilians and guerrilla were reason
ably amicable) . tend to corroborate the testimony of their own guerrilla fighters.
By early June of 1942, within less than a month of the Japanese occupation, guerrilla
groups were already functioning throughout the length and breadth of the Province.
And their activities were not confined to the merely passive phases of ferreting out
information and collecting arms. The more intrepid were already ambushing Japanese
patrols, stamping out banditry, executing a swift and ruthless vengeance upon Filipino
espionage agents of the enemy, and instructing the municipal officials in the proper :
conduct of their local administrations.
The Problem of Guerrilla Unification
It was only on the very eve of the American landings that the resistance
movement of Leyte achieved a semblance of unification. Full and complete unification
had yet not come into being. True enough, a single organization, the 92nd Infantry
Division, USFIP, of Colonel Kangleon had been recognized by GHQ. SFPA as the official
guerrilla outfit of Leyte. Furthermore, it might be conceded that there was no rival
organization active in the field. For although the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare
Forces (WIGWF) was now largely dispersed, and although elements had been absorbed
into the 96th Infantry Pegiment of the Kangleon command, it nonetheless succeeded in
"USFIP— United States Forces in the Philippines, the designation adopted by

Col. V. W. Fertig in Mindanao, and accepted by Col. Kangleon. The 92nd Div. Hq. also
referred to itself as IAC, or Leyte Area Command.
ik
227
maintaining a separate cadre, and petitioned the Guerrilla Affairs Division of the
United States Army's Philippine Headquarters for recognition soon after the expulsion
of the Japanese. In fact, officers and enlisted men of the WLGWF offered their ser
vice to the American landing forces as guides, technicians and labor squads. The
study of the organization and activities of the resistance movement on Leyte gives
U rise to the question— why was even partial unification so long delayed in this
Province?
Captain Srfe
Surprisingly enough, in the light of this failure, it should be noted that
mergers and consolidations of guerrilla bands had made considerable headway by the
autumn of 1942. Indeed, one group on the East Coast, centered in the Dulag-Abuyog-
Burauen-La Paz district, asserted by fiat a kind of jurisdiction over the other units
in north-east and north-west Leyte, themselves in various stages of fusion. Its
leader, Captain Glicerio I. Erfe , largely by virtue of his rank, tended to regard
these other units as parts of a province-wide confederation. And he attempted to
back up these claims by assigning station numbers to the different outposts, estab
lishing an intelligence liaison, and requiring the preparation of organizational re
ports and their submission to his headquarters. As a capstone to the structure of
activities he was building, he presumed in the latter part of 1942 to draw up opera
tional plans for the launching of a simultaneous assault by all the units against
the Japanese outposts, compelling their retreat to one corner of the Island, Tacloban.
Had the general attack gone off as planned, perhaps the prestige of Captain Erfe
would have been augmented, and he might have welded the resistance movement into a
unified whole.
Unfortunately, various wrinkles crept into the execution of this smoothly
conceived plan. Its success was limited. Thereafter, Captain Erfe's supremacy was
purely vestigial. His instructions were diluted to the impotence of mere suggestions.
Insofar as they were intended for units on the West Coast, Lieutenant Balderian was
beginning to make his influence felt. In South Leyte, Captain Erfe never had real
2 28
contact, except perhaps with the unit of Lieutenant TTuiaue at Sogod. The coining of
Colonel Kangleon to southern Leyte, his unification of the "bands in that district,
and then his northward penetration into the "bailiwick of Captain Erfe undermined the
structure that had been built up. Moreover, in establishing close contact with the
organization of Lieutenant Balderian, and nominally at any rate subjugating Balderian
to his command, Colonel Kangleon was in a position to crush Erfe. Disaffection crept
into the organization of Captain Erfe. One of his trusted subordinates, Captain
Landia, broke off and annexed his unit to the organization of Colonel Kangleon, while I
others remained only lukewarm in their allegiance. In mid-1943, Captain Erfe and
some of his faithful officers were arrested on charges of insubordination and illegal
issuance of currency. The organization came to an end.
For the more militant members of Balderian's command, Erfe was not suffici- f
ently active in combat activities. On the other hand, Erfe was generally liked by
the civilian population as a defender of law and order, and as a guerrilla leader
who did not exercise his authority to exploit the people under color of military
necessity. What damaged his chances of success as much as anything else was his
inability to establish successful liaison with the other guerrilla commands outside
of Leyte--much less with GHQ, SWPA.
Alejandro Balderian
The organizations of north and north-east Leyte were certainly among the
earliest to get under way. Here there was a multiplicity of groups, with some strug
gle for supremacy among them. As the fusional process began to reduce the number of
separate units in the-field. lieutenant Balderian emerged as the principal leader in
the north-east, and Sergeant Pamar.ian along the northern coast.
By December of 1942, the value of a closer integration of all the units in
this area had become apparent. An exploratory conference was held, which resulted
not only in a unified military organization, but in the setting up of an embryonic
nrovincial civil government to offset the propaganda of the collaborationist regime
in Tacloban. Balderian, breveted a colonel, became the "Politico-Military Governor",
il
229
and. the other sector chiefs became regimental conmanders and deputy military gover
nors . It might be remarked that the personnel of this district built up a strong
esprit de corps and continued to harbor a suppressed resentment against the Head
quarters of Colonel Kangleon for destroying its independence. (Parenthetically, we
might add that Sergeant ^brevet Lieutenant-Colonel7 Pamanian and his right-hand men
also nurtured a share of pique against Balderian and his close associates that became
manifest in the politics of Leyte after the Liberation.)
Even after his inclusion within Colonel Kangleon's table of organization,
Balderian continued to exercise a good deal of practical control within his district.
The commencement of the Japanese "mopping-up operations" in Leyte in December, 1943,
disrupted the functioning of Kangleon's GHQ, leaving each regimental command largely
on its own. Not until the summer of 1944, after Kangleon had received by submarine
his sorely needed consignment of military supplies, did he again presume to exercise
effective authority in northern Leyte. In actuality then, Balderian was on his own
throughout the greater part of the Japanese occupation, and even extended the area of
his jurisdiction to take in the former territory of Captain Erfe.
We might add that one of the factors making possible Colonel Kangleon's as
cendancy was the independent spirit of Balderian's chief intelligence officer, Dr.
Ealph Posoncuy. A very capable man, he had originally been with Pamanian, until a
rift had developed between them. Under Balderian, Posoncuy fretted over his status
of staff officer, entailing his subordination to the line. It was only after
Posoncuy's transfer to Kangleon's GHQ that he seemed to adjust. This meant the sever
ance of Balderian's source of contact with the other guerrilla leaders outside of
Leyte.
£30
Bias E . Miranda
The real stormy petrel of Leyte's resistance movement was Lieutenant Bias E.
Miranda. It vas the unreconcilsble rivalry between Miranda and Kangleon that was
largely responsible for the non-formation of a single, solid guerrilla organization
on Leyte.
By October of 1942, Miranda had succeeded in establishing his control (under
the name Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces) over the four west coast municipali
ties of Ormoc, Palompcn. Merida, and Albuera. and was consolidating his ground in
Baybay. The next town further to the south, Inopacan, was controlled by an American,
Chester Peters . Peters had his eye on absorbing the three coastal municipalities
below his stronghold of Inopacan. Both Peters and Miranda were ambitious men. Nei
ther would scruple to use the other for advancing his own interests. An amicable
contact had been established between the two, although not accompanied by a frank
avowal of mutual aims.
In November of 1942, Peters called a conference of guerrilla leaders from the
municipalities of Bato, Hilongos, and Hindang and from Sogod across the mountains.
Ee also invited Miranda's sector leaders from Baybay to attend. A misunderstanding
developed, and firing broke out between the Miranda and the "southern" elements.
The "southerners" withdrew in confusion, leaving some dead and wounded behind, and
losing a truck and valuable weapons.
Peters, wounded in the affray, put the blame entirely on the southerners, who
had allegedly omened fire. Miranda later contended that the blame must be shared by
Peters and the southerners, his own officers, being merely the victims of circum
stances, forced to fire in self-defense. On the other hand, the southerners counter
charged that the entire incident was cunning" y prearranged by Miranda, who was using
Peters to pu"" his chestnut-"1

, out of the fire. Whatever the motivation, the denoue
ment was a victory for Miranda. Disabled, Feters could no longer maintain effective
control over his guerrilla organization. He was suffered to retain nominal control,
acting through his lieutenant, but it was obvious that Miranda could seize Inopacan
i
il.
331
whenever he so chose.
Meanwhile, Miranda let no grass grow under his feet. He engaged in diplomacy,
sending one of his most reliable officers to the more southerly towns. The debacle
suffered by the guerrilla units of this district created a kind of military vacuum.
There could be no effective resistance to a southward thrust by Miranda legionnaires.
The townspeople accordingly, at least for public show, gave the Miranda delegation
a rousing •welcome. Encouraged by his apparent success, Miranda's plenipotentiary
was audacious enough to advance to Maasin, citadel of another American, Gordon Lang.
Lang had previously been in touch with Peters. In fact, in the summer of
1942 he himself had led a "flying squad" as far north as Baybay, dauntlessly striking
against the Japanese garrison. Lang had given Peters the impression that he was
favorably disposed to some sort of league that would give their united forces control
of the entire west coast. But Lang cooled off as he saw Peters slipping into the
orbit of Miranda. No doubt he reflected upon the meaning of the clash at Inopacan
and drew certain disturbing inferences. And so when the Miranda deputation entered
his domain. Lang put on a pheasant front, while inwardly determining to frustrate
what he considered, an encroachment.
The Miranda-Balderian Alliance and Buperto K . Kangleon
While the amalgamations just considered were separately taking place on both
the east and west coasts, certain more far-reaching developments were also maturing.
Shortly after the setting up of the "politico-Military" government in December of
1942, Balderian and his advisers began to formulate plans for a southward expansion
along the east coast. One of Balderian's deputy military governors was assigned a
new sector, taking in the Abuyog district of Captain Erfe's domain, and also stretch
ing out into the lower municipalities of Einunangan and ?inuncayan. This projected
annexation was not to remain long in the paper stage. It was to be implemented forth
with. As 1942 drew to a close, a heavily armed guerrilla force moved south beyond
Abuyog. cormandeering foodstuffs and supplies from terror-stricken civilians along
the way.
232
To the disunited and dismayed guerrilla leaders of the south. Lang, Francisco,
Jain,Nazareno, and Nuique. this expedition of Balderian could not be disjoined from
the advances and the most recent political manoeuverings of Miranda. This was a
single master plan,they concluded, on the part of both expansionists to launch a
concerted offensive and establish a condominium. And it looked very much as though
they might succeed. Whether in actuality these movements of Balderian and Miranda
were consciously synchronized is a moot matter. Rowbeit, the southern leaders re
solved that only prompt and decisive action could stop this Juggernaut.
It was at this Juncture that Colonel Kangleon stepped into the picture. Only
recently released from a Japanese concentration camp under obscure circumstances, he
had returned to his home in south Xeyte, in partial retirement.-"** Here he was sought
out by the excited guerrilla leaders and prevailed upon to assume command of a hastily
mobilized force. Accepting, he led this striking force against Balderian.^ Somewhat
ignominiously, the latter permitted himself to be disarmed without a show of resist
ance, pleading that he had no designs of aggression, that he had been utterly mis
understood, and that the idea of his acting in collusion with Miranda was preposter- ,
ous. As a token of good faith Balderian sent a detachment of his own troops to ac
company the main body of Kangleon's as the latter immediately turned to the Miranda
vanguard. Miranda's men were taken by surprise, disarmed, and the leaders thrown
^Kangleon said of himself: "Leyte is my home province. I was assigned by

MacArthur as commander of the 9th MD. I was in command of this district from July
1938 until August 26, 1941. Then I was assigned Commanding Office of the 81st In
fantry. My brigade commander was Col. Chastaine. We were fighting the enemy in
the east and north sections of Davao until order for the general surrender was given.
I refused to surrender and ordered my officers and men to escape. Chastaine and )
other Americans ordered, me to surrender. I became a prisoner of war on May 29,
1942. I suffered at the hands of the enemy. I returned to Leyte on December 26,
1942. I found many guerrilla leaders who did not understand each otter; they fought '!
among themselves. . . .The people of Leyte asked me to step in; I did. I have acted j
for the good of the people in general. . . . " (Ruperto K. Kangleon. Col. April 9 , j
1943. To: Col. Wendell W. Fertig.) ’ j
2"When Kangleon slipped back to his home. . . .he learned that a bandit garg I
was near by. He lay low for a while. . . .Then he decided it was time to organize I
the bandit gang and it was this organization that did the trick." (Gunnison, 1
op. cit., p. 74) |
233
into Jail for court martial .^

!
Thereafter follo-wed negotiations "between representatives of Kangleon and
Miranda. A convention was drafted, which had the effect of containing Miranda behind
a line running north of Inopacan. Yet this line was to cut two ways, for Kangleon
was pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Miranda's sphere of influence.
With the release of Miranda's deputation to the "south", a modus vivendi between the
two organizations was effected, and the situation became stabilized.
Beneath the placid surface, however, a fierce struggle for power between the |
two organizations was relentlessly waged. Each consolidated its own position and
i
strengthened its defenses. But the final resolution of the conflict would be deter
mined by forces outside of Leyte. The key to victory would be grasped by whomsoever
first established permanent contact with GHQ,, SWPA, and contrived to secure Allied
recognition of leadership over the entire Province. And the confusions in the inter
island intelligence network of the Philippines, and a degree of rivalry among the
principal guerrilla leaders of the Archipelago's southern islands had direct reper
cussions in Leyte.
!
Colonel Kangleon worked feverishly to contact Australia via Mindanao. He
was fortunate in early establishing contact with various American officers of the in-
^Cangleon's American admirer, Orville Babcock, recounted the episode:

" . . . .Then Kangleon got busy. H e , Captain Lang with 60 or 70 soldiers
started south (around Sogod Bay) to intercept him ^Balderian/j they added to their
forces as they went along and surprised the fake Colonel at Sogod, and he and all his
troops surrendered to Kangleon without firing a shot. Then Kangleon struck over the
mountains and surprised another detachment at Bato (on the west coast) which also
surrendered without resistance. Our 'God' ^Miranda/ has lost much 'face'. . . . "
(Babcock, op. cit. , Ilihan, Leyte, January, 28, 1943. Unposted letter to his daughter)
% n a spirit of amity, Gordon Lang wrote to the WLCWF officer at Baybay:
"Received your three tins of gasoline and thank you very much. Accordii» to i
information, I hear that you are worried about us coming up to Baybay. . . .We will j
go no further than Inopacan. If we ever do come up there it will be for the purpose
of fighting the Japs and then you will be duly informed of our coming. Please, be
lieve n e , we don’t want anything but to leave things the way they are. . . .From now
on let us cooperate. . . ." (Gordon A. Lang, Hilongos. Jan. 24, 1943. To: "Bear ;
Cant. Rodriguez") |
I
|
33
1
234
telligence network— Colonel Wendell W. Fertig,^ Lieutenant Commander Charles "Chick"
Parsons , 2 and the radio coamunications man, Lieutenant I. D. Richardson of the United
'States Navy.
^Father Edward Haggerty of the Ateneo de Cagayan in Mindanao has written from
first-hand experience a very absorbing account of the guerrilla movement on that is
land. At the outset, "Western Lanao and Misamis were taken almost bloodlessly by
Captain Morgan, an American mestizo. Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, with a
splendid record at Bataan, had assumed command there and people referred to him as
'the General'.
"Now in January 1943, his ^Fertig's7 organization was Just beginning to spread
out. Major McLish in Agusan and Surigao, Major Bowler in Bukidnon and Oriental
Misamis, Captain Hedges in Lanao— all had become part of his organization. I had
further brought letters concerning a Cotabato leader, Lieutenant Salipada Pendatun. . .
Although Pendatun had. . . .considered himself leader in Davao, Cotabato and parts of
Bukidnon, he would acknowledge Fertig as leader.
"That evening Fertig came in excitedly.

"'We've got it, Padre; we've got it--a message from MacArthur;. . . .'
"Far into the night the two of us worked on decoding that message. . . .At
last we read something like this:
"'Fertig. . . .You are named Guerrilla Chief. . . .Your men are not deserters
but fighters. . . .In some way I will get aid to you. . . .For the future I reiterate
my pledge. . . .1 shall return. . . .MacArthur.'" (Edward Haggerty, Guenrilla Padre
in Mindanao, Longmans. Green & Co., Inc., 1S46, New York, pp. 49,' 76-77.)
Fertig considered his guerrilla organization to be "a regular part of the
American Army--USFIP, United States Forces in the Philippines." (Lt. Joseph F. St.Johr
as told to Howard Handleman. Leyte Calling, The Vanguard Press, New York, 1945, p.
62); Also: Ingham, op. cit. , pp. 58-60.
2After the fall of Manila. Chick Parsons organized a group of undercover agents
to gather information of possible value to allied, military authorities. "Chick ar
rived in the United States in August 1942 and almost immediately was assigned as
naval liaison officer and aide to President _uezon. . . .Quezon felt very much con
cerned over the safety of Roxas and made known his sentiments to his life-long friend
General Douglas MacArthur. It became such an obsession with Quezon that MacArthur's
headquarters soon devised plans to get Eoxas out of the Philippines.
"For this purpose, Chick came in very handy. Because of his extensive know
ledge of the islands— having roamed the seas around the Visayas and Mindanao during
his early years in the Philippines— he was entrusted with the mission of contacting
Eoxas. . . .Where, when and how, Chick did not bother much at the moment but soon he
was in a submarine bound for Mindanao. . . .
"Meanwhile, Parsons had set up a radio station for the use of Col. Fertig in
making his reports to the Southwest Pacific headquarters. Chick likewise established
a chain of so-called coast watcher stations. . . . (The Sunday Times Magazine,
Manila, November 24, 1946, p. 6 .)
According to Parson's biographer, "MacArthur had given Commander Parsons full ;
authority to recognize the leader of a movement on any of the Islands, as soon as he *
could -produce proof that he was capable, sincere, loyal, willing to take orders, and
supported by a sufficient group of men sworn to submit to his direction and discip-
line." (Ingham, on. cit., p. 61) ?;
i
235 i
Kangleon vas eventually vested with supreme command in Leyte. The dubita-
tive issue concerns the assignment of a date when the investiture occurred. Kangleon
is disposed to set an early date to this event. He contends that he had received un
official notification of pending appointment early in 1943, with official unchal
lengeable confirmation coming about mid-1943. Equipped with this authority, he pro
ceeded to proclaim the fact of his elevation, and threatened Miranda with outlawry
if the latter continued to hold out. The destructiveness of the Japanese onslaught
against the headquarters of Miranda at the close of 1943, plus the shipment of Ameri
can arms to Kangleon, left Kangleon undisputed master of the field. To the Americans
of the Liberation, Kangleon was The Guerrilla Leader..
A Study of the Miranda-Kang?eon Feud
\Je n^v come t-'> the mo^-t problem in this study of the guerrilla movement of
Leyte--the refusal of Lieutenant E. Bias Miranda to acknowledge the supremacy of
Colonel Kangleon as guerrilla leader of Leyte.^ Was Miranda's intransigeance the
outcome of overweening ambition and avarice, as his antagonists allege, or was his
stand Justified by the character of Kangleon's leadership? Indeed, the way the ques
tion is generally framed indicates an implicit prejudgment adverse to Miranda. For
might one not legitimately interrogate vas Colonel Kangleon Justified, as a Filipino
patriot, in endeavoring to wrest the leadership of the resistance movement away from
Lieutenant Miranda? In approaching this issue, we have to explicate our criteria
of Judgment. First comes the admission, granted by all of Leyte's guerrilla leaders,
that the effectiveness of the resistance movement was vitiated by the prevailing
disunity. Adopting unity, then, as a desideratum, we may legitimately assert, that
whoever interfered with the process of unification did the cause of resistance a
disservice. If we attempt to apply this criterion in the premises , we are compelled
•*-The collaborationist officials were well aware of guerrilla disunity. Gov.

Salazar reported to Manila: "Dissension among guerrilla elements. Kangleon and
Miranda groups have fought. . . .with demoralizing effect upon themselves." (Actg,
Gov. Salazar. Nov. 20, 1943. To: CommisAioner of Interior thru Dir. of Local Govts.'
236
to ask whether it was Kangleon or Miranda who thwarted the achievement of unifica
tion. And. a posteriori Judgment would direct the shaft of criticism against Miranda, j
since it was the case that upon Kangleon was conferred the title of Island Commander.
Yet, at the time that the Kangleon-Miranda rivalry began, Kangleon had not yet been
vested with this authority. At that juncture, could Kangleon have legitimately ex
pected Miranda to abdicate from his command? Should Miranda, as a good Filipino
patriot, have done so anyhow, in the interests of a solidified resistance movement?
Or should Kangleon have accepted the command, all things considered?
So much for conjecture, involving the imponderables of personal motivation,
patriotic duty, and the like. Now further interpellation is in order. At what
stage in his career was Kangleon officially empowered to assume the status of Island
Commander? When did Miranda learn of Kangleon's elevation with the certitude of
finality? In the light of the events that poisoned relationships between the two
leaders, could Miranda have forfeited his command to Kangleon, even after he suspec
ted that the latter's official confirmation res in the offing? But any answers here
offered will be subject to the criticism of defectiveness. But since bo much of
discussion elsewhere has been mere partisan self-vindication, rife with invective,
any effort at objectivity which is at once sympathetic to the position of both men
and critical of both deserves an audience.

Tha Lliranda Vers ion
Let us attempt to recdnhtruct the" sequence of events, first as they appeared
1
from the vantage point of Miranda, and then from the standpoint of Kangleon. Having
done this, we shall undertake the risky business of passing judgment. At the time
of Kangleon's arrival on the scene, the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces was
a going ccncern--far and away the best organized and best disciplined of all the
guerrilla outfits on Leyte. If any organization could contest this claim of Miranda's:
to organizational superiority, Balderian's would be the one. In south Leyte, there

_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ H
^-"When Miranda got word that Kangleon was going to take over. . . ., he ,j
cried, 'Oh, no, he doesn't. I claim the true leadership because I never surrendered
Although Kangleon was my superior in the Constabulary, that is past. He surrendered, f
He's not fit to be the leader.' And in the minds of thousands of Filipinos, Miranda
had some thing-the re ." (Gunnison, op. cit., p. 74)
237
was nothing hut a collection of independent guerrilla hands, cooperatir^ to the ex
tent of exchanging intelligence information, and on rare occasions partially combining
for a limited Joint operation. What pushed Kangleon hy chance into leadership of the
southern sector was an emergency situation. The southern guerrilla leaders, vith
Gordon Lang in the forefront, suspected a pincers movement heing worked against them
hy Miranda and Balderian, acting in collusion. Finding Colonel Kangleon on hand, the
southern leaders pressed him into service, and then hastily whipped up a striking
force. They succeeded in disarming Balderian’s "expeditionary troops" in the south
east, and then took captive the small political deputation sent hy Miranda to cam
paign for annexation of the southern towns.
It is the claim of Conrado Daffon (in interview), commander of the WIGWF
Albuera sector and chief of the Miranda deputation to the south, that he was cordi
ally received hy the townspeople along his route— in fact, that it was a triumphal
procession . 1 Furthermore, Daffon alleges that he reached a fair understanding with
Gordon Lang, American sub-sector commander in Maasin. Finally, he points out that
Kangleon himself was in Maasin visiting friends on Daffon's arrival there, and that
he apparently was disinterested in what was taking place. Seeing that his mission
had heen successful, Daffon returned to Miranda's headquarters at Ormoc to report
what had happened and to apply for further instructions. What had caused Lang to
make this complete about face and Kangleon to develop a sudden active interest in
developments in the short interval between Daffon's departure and return remained a
1" . . . .Officers have been invited to come to General Headquarters for con
ference. All are willing to see the West Coast of Leyte united.
"Municipal officials and responsible citizens showed desire to Join the
WLGWUF by submitting a petition signed by them.
"General Fertig is not found on the South of Leyte. Hence meeting him could
not be gained by this patrol.
"An effort should immediately be exerted towards establishing Government in
all Municipalities in the South under the banner of the WIGWUF.
"Col. Kangleon a prisoner of war is trying to establish a military Group in
Leyte and Samar under him which does not look nice. I am of the opinion to regard
him as doing things against us." (C. Daffon, West. Ley. Guer. War. Unit in the Field.
"Patrol Report" To: Adj. Gen.. WIGWUF. Jan. 10, 1943.)
238
- profound mystery to Daffon. At any rate, Daffon and his followers were apprehended,
given a rough handling, and incarcerated.
Then followed negotiations between Miranda and Kangleon for release of the
deputation. 1 Miranda dispatched his chief of staff, Soliman, as special envoy. A
conference took place at Bitan-hu-an, on the outskirts of Baybay. An understanding
was concluded, whereby the southern leaders agreed to respect the southern boundary
of Baybay as constituting the line of demarcation between the WLGWF and the southern
sector. At the same time it was agreed that Daffon and his political deputation were
to be released. At this meeting, so Soliman reported (in interview, Manila, 1946)
Kangleon had made no pretensions to the guerrilla leadership of the Island. In fact,
he indicated that he was weary and old, and wished to retire from active service,
suggesting that perhaps Lang and Soliman could together bring about unification of the
resistance movement.
% g t . (Brevet Captain) Francisco Rodriguez, second in command, described the

episode: "Major Conrado Daffon with 12 of my enlisted men and myself under orders
from the VIGWF GHQ were sent on a mission to the Southern towns. . . .Our mission was
made and accomplished where every town official of each town was inducted to the WIGWE
Unknowingly at Hilongos we were disarmed by Kangleon who led almost 200 men (armed).
Major Daffon was held in confinement and brought to the Southern towns. . . .Inasmuch
as I was released by Kangleon, I returned to my sector and reported personally to
L t . Miranda the incident that happened. . . .Majors Olayvar, Ramirez and Col. Soliman i
went with me to the GHQ and then to Baybay where Col. Soliman and Kangleon made an ?
agreement at Bitanhu-an, Baybay. The conditions of the agreement made and signed by
both Colonels. . . .are as follows:
"(a) To release Daffon from confinement, (b) To return the arms and ammuni- j
tion confiscated. (c) To provide passes to E/M as well as civilians coming in and j
out of each Bector. (d) Not to encroach on any sector without previous knowledge of !
the Sector commander. . . ." (Francisco H. Rodriguez. "To Whom It May Concern,"
19 March 1945.)
This writer interviewed at Ormoc in January, 1946, a Syrian merchant, Elias
Cury (wed to a Filipina), who had belonged to the WIGVIF and had been a member of the
Rodriguez mission. Cury stated that Kangleon developed an intense enmity for him be
cause of his blazing eyes (natural expression), tall stature, and white race. He was
roughly handled and imprisoned along with Daffon. Daffon (interview, Ormoc, Jan.,
1946) confirmed this story. ?
M a J . Marcos Soliman outlined the terms of the Bitanhu-an agreement thusly: j
"a. That the Baybay-Abuyog Highway will form the boundary line. . . .b. That we send !
him ângleon/ foodstuffs of which they were short in Southern Leyte in exchange for
empty cartridge shells which we were to load with powder in our own Ordnance shopand |
send them back the ammunition, c. That he will release the officers. . . .provided^ .
Capt. Daffon would be court-martialled. d. That our organizations will. . . .coordin
ate our activities against the enemy. _ .
"Daffon was subsequently released and court-martialled by our organization.
As far as I can remember, he was acquitted. . . . " (Statement of MaJ. Marcos C.
Soliman, Former Exec. Off. of the 81st Inf. Regt., pp. 2-3) ,
239
This affair, from the standpoint of the WLGWF, had important consequences.
First, it established the fact that Kangleon had no claim to leadership at this time —
January. 194?— unless it was the questionable claim grounded upon rank. But the
prestige was offset by several factors: (a) that Kangleon admitted himself to be old,
and decr ined to regard himself as eligible for elevation to the chief guerrilla post;
(b) that Kangleon had been a surrendered officer, and that his getaway from Mindanao
occurred under questionable circumstances, thereby leaving hiB reputation tarnished,
and making him an object of suspicion outside of his own home area of the south;-^-
(c) that other leaders had already come to the fore as the men who had pioneered the
resistance movement in the dark dayB following the Japanese invasion. Second, the
compact signed at Bitanhu-an was a de facto recognition by Kangleon of the WLGWF, and
indicated a willingness to cooperate with it so long bb it remained within the con
fines agreed upon. Finally, the imprisonment of Daffon, and the harsh treatment-
meted out to him and his followers left a legacy of ill-will in the minds of the
p
WLGWF, which wae played up and. broadcast among the civilian population of this zone.
In the ensuing months Colonel Kangleon vas busily preparing the ground for
his own recognition as guerrilla commander of Leyte, (it is important to note that
Balderian who, when disarmed in the south, had acknowledged fealty to Kangleon,
■'"When Kangleon slipped back to his home. . . .he learned that a bandit- j
guerrilla gang was near by. H e lay low for a while, even doing some farming and j
manua1 labor for the Jans, to learnsomething about theirmethods. . . .,T
(Gunnison, ~p . c it. . p. 74) I
The moot question , of c urse. is whether Kangleon privately thought he was
lying low "for a while" only, or whether he had ad lusted himself to submission to
enemy rule.
p
The WIGWF protested that the southerners did not adhere to the agreement in
all particulars: i
"It has been over amonthsince we had the conference.. . .in which we ar- j
rived at an arrangement for the return of the firearms belonging to the Western |
Forces. Up to now. there seems to be no visible attempt on your part to carry out |
your part of the agreement. . . ." (Marcos G. Soliman, Lt. Col., Inf. 4 March 194o. ^
To: "My dear Captain Lang")
1
240
continued to carry on the status ante as "Politico-Military Governor" in North
Leyte) ,-L
But Miranda too vas "busy. Contrary to the assertion of the southern sector
leaders that Daffon vas acting in collusion vith Balderian, Miranda declared that
Daffon vas really on a mission of liaison. Miranda's account reads:
On Jan. 1943. Capt. C. Daffon, Inf. a guerrilla officer vas sent to Mindanao
to contact I.t. Col. V. W. Fertig. Said officer vas not successful because during
his stay in Southern Leyte, he vas imprisoned and handcuffed and sent to Sogod,
Leyte by order of It. Col. Kangleon. . . .
At approximately the same time. Mindanao vas in touch vith Miranda:
On January 1943 Capt. Iloyd Waters Inf., contact officer of L t . Col. McLish
of the 110 Division USFIP visited our headquarters. Fe vas accorded full respect
and courtesy due an officer. His mission according to him vas to inspect our
unit in order that same vLll be assimilated. He visited the units under my com
mand. and found them satisfactory. He visited our base shop, and our hospital
and vas convinced of the efficiency and orderly nanner J i n which/ ve vere running
the guerrilla. On Feb. 25, 1943, Capt. Waters brought my appointment as Command
ing Officer, Province of Leyte, together vith L t . Ismael Ingeniero, CO, Province
of Bohol4 This order vas signed by Lt. Col. McLish.^ This order vas never
revoked. 0
This testimony requires some elaboration. Captain Waters' visit to the
Miranda headquarters came after he had first inspected some of the southern units.
■^During this period, the WLGWF vas making a serious attempt to vin the adher
ence of Balderian and hie follovers:
" . . . .It is the desire of the Sector Commander for Leyte îranda/ to hold
aconference at Cananga, Ormoc, on April 18, 1943 at 2:00 P.M.
"It is suggested that pertinent facts regarding the organization of your re
spective commands vLll be brought to this conference.
"Lieut. Agapito Villasin, Inf.. Liaison Officer of this command is sent to
extend the personal invitation of the Commanding General." (C. S. Sabelino, Lt. Col,
Chief of Staff, WLGWF. March 31, 1943. Invitation To: The Comdg. Officers, North,
East and Northern Leyte Sectors)
The invitation vas accepted:
"In connection vith the request of the G-2. . . .dated 14 April 1943, asking
fromthis Command an officer vho vil1 represent the Division in the conference. . . .
called for by Brig. Gen. Bias Miranda, Actg. CO of I.eyte, this Headquarters is send
ing over to you Capt. Salvador F. Tan’ . Begimental Adjutant, this Begiment, for in
structions. . . .If that Headquarters ^Balderian"/ also vants to delegate the Division
representations to him, he may a ^ o perform the designation." (Felix M. Pamanian.
Bvt. It.-Col .. Pegtl . Cmdr. '5 April 1943. To: The Adj. Gen., North-East Leyte
Sectors)
The conference did take place in a friend.ly atmosphere, but no accord vas
reached.
^0n McLish (spelled MacLish by Parsons), see: Ingham, op. cit., p. 63.
'"’Miranda, op. cit. . pp. 5-6.
241
Evidently he vas considerably impressed by the contrast. Kangleon vould discount this
by representing Waters as a siurole-minded man, lacking in perspicacity, who vas taken
in by Miranda's big talk and favning velcome. Some hint darkly at bribery. Hovever 1
this may be, such innuendoes cannot be supported by documentation. And it is a fact
that Miranda did receive the McLish appointment.^
The next questions relate to the defectiveness of the appointment. Did
McLish as a divisional commander in Mindanao possess authority to dispatch liaison
missions, vhen he himself vas under the jurisdiction of Colonel Fertig? Was this in
the nature of a clandestine contact, designed to vin support for his ovn position
outside of Mindanao, so that he might vrest control from Fertig? There vere evidently
indications of insubordination, or at least of confusion in the relations subsisting
between McLish and Fertig.^
But in a sense, the unraveling of this tangle is irrelevant to our present
enterprise of clarifying Miranda's status. He was certainly not in a position to
understand the nature of the hierarchy of command outside of Leyte. As far as he vas
concerned, the dispatch of the Waters mission was prima facie evidence of McLish's
competency in the premises. Was McLish not an American? And vould not the authority ’
of General MacArthur devolve upon such Americans precisely in order to strengthen the
forces of resistance throughout the Philippines? Only by such decentralization could
the Job of expelling the enemy be accomplished. On the basis of such reasoning, it
^Maj. Balderian vas among those guerrilla leaders who received a copy of the
McLish appointment notice. (E. McLish, Lt. Col. Inf., Eq. 110th Div. Feb. 20, 1943.
Memo: All Unit Commanders, Bohol, Leyte, Samar, Par. 5.)
Miranda vould have enjoyed the support of Provincial Board Member Angel
Espina, whom McLish had been considering for governor on the same "ticket". A further
increment of strength might have come from Mayor Zara of Maasin vho, in early Febru
ary, vas busy contacting the political leaders of Macrohon, Malitbog, and other com
munities, exploring the possibilities of establishing a provincial government for
western Leyte.
^Morgan so stated in interviev, Samar, l 6 t Filipino Inf. Eegt. , Jan., 1946. ^
Tending to corroborate this testimony is Kangleon's ccnplaint to Fertig: ,
"Radio transmitter installed by your order at Pinotan fTj some time early in '
April has been removed and taken away to Mindanao June 9th by order of Colonel McLish, ;i
depriving us of contact vith your GHft. Our liaison officer, Lt, Richardson, left a ‘j
few days ago. . . . " (Ruperto K. Kangleon, Col. June 11, 1943. To: Commanding |
General, 10th MD.) M
242
is easy to see why Miranda vould cling to this appointment even if he had later
grounds for suspecting its validity. Vould this not suffice to build up a mind-set
of hostility to the notion of subordinating himself to the command of 3ome other guer
rilla leader on Leyte?
Some months later, Miranda's headquarters was again visited by an emissary
from Mindanao, this time Fertig's chief of staff:
On May 1943 a certain L t . Col. Luis Morgan visited our territory with the
same mission as (that of) Capt. Waters— Assimilation. In the operation room of
the Base Hospital, located at our headquarters, Col. Morgan and his staff met in
conference with my staff. M a j . Marcos G. Soliman was given a free hand and also
a blanket authority to transact business, with him and to represent the WLGWF,
as we believed his (Soliman's) words would bear more weight to Lt. Col. Moigan
in as much as they knew each other. Stenographic records were taken to whatever
transpired in the conference. The conference closed successfully. However early
in the morning before breakfast was served, MaJ. Soliman called my attention on
whether I came across the genuine signature of Gen. MacArthur in any of the
papers shown to us the night before. I answered him in the negative. MaJ.
Soliman on that occasion approached Col. Morgan and asked him in a chunmy way, to
quote, ’Say, Cavalier, I forgot to ask you about the Authority last night. Will
you please give me a copy of that authority. I want to see the genuine signature
of MacArthur. I know it begins with a big D 1. Lt. Col. Morgan answered him
smilingly saying, 'You constaboys are really good at secret service work. You
got me. You see, I made Lt. Col. W. W. Fertig a general.' With these words,
MaJ. Soliman patted Col. Morgan in a friendly way courteouslytelling him that
we will postpone Joining up with them until he can show the authority. Lt. Col.
Morgan and his party left that day for North Leyte, but everywhere he went about
in our sector, he was received courteously and kindly. I gave him hand grenades
for his expeditionary force . 1
This account is also of great significance in helping to illumine the story
of the guerrilla rivalry on Leyte. First, it should be mentioned that Morgan's party
was not received in a friendly fashion when it first crossed into the zone of Miranda.
The soldiers on detail at the outer guardposts regarded this incursion suspiciously,
as a kind of Trojan Horse possibly sent by Kangleon to take the headquarters by
guile. It was only after Morgan had been received by the headquarters staff that
clearance was effected, and he was feted as a friendly guest. This prelim inary dis
comfiture probably created an initial prejudice against the W1GWF. Then, when it ap
peared that Morgan's program of assimilating the WIGWF with the Mindanao command had ^
net with initial success, the subsequent repudiation of his mission provided a sharp
■^Miranda, o p . cit. , p. 6 .
I
J
j
243
Jolt. Although Morgan took the challenge to his authority graciously, an inner pique
stung the man over this imputation of spuriousness to his mission. Indeed, on return
ing to Mindanao, Morgan submitted an adverse report to Fertig respecting the WIGWF.-1-
If hy May of 1943, Kangleon was laying claim to the headship of the guerrilla
movement in Leyte, Miranda still had tenable grounds for rejecting that claim. 2
Miranda gave expression both to his confusion regarding the authenticity of Kangleon's
claims, and the psychological harriers that prevented an understanding between the
two leaders:
In connection with assumption of command hy Lt. Col. Kangleon as District

Commander, 9 MD. May 1943, it was never the intention of the WLGWF to disobey the
orders of higher headquarters.
It is of common knowledge that Lt. Col. Ruperto Kangleon surrendered to the
Japanese. M a J . Soliman made it known to us that at one time while he was still
hiding in Agusan, Lt. Col. Kangleon brought Japanese soldiers to capture him.
If we doubted his appointment, it was because he came from the concentration camp.
Many high ranking officers were serving the Japanese: Lt. Col. Causing, Maj. E.
Abay, and Maj. Reyes and other officers. During those days many of our men died
fighting against the Japs and JCs (Japanese Constabulary, manned by Filipinos) .
Had Lt. Col. Kangleon visited our outfit then and praised our work even (if) he
would not have meant it, the officers and men would have accepted him as our
leader.
. . . .All these troubles would have been avoided if we had the necessary i
communication facilities to contact the SWPA. When we asked or inquired from
Lt. Col. Peralta as to who was District Commander for the 9th MD, he informed us
on August 7, 1943, that there was no District Conmander assigned. His assumption
of command on May 1943 would therefore be inconsistent with the information re
ceived from Panay Area Command on this matter.3-4
^ h i s writer interviewed Morgan in January, 1946, on Samar. (After many

vicissitudes of fortune, Morgan had become Commanding Officer of "C" Company, 1st
Filipino Infantry Regiment, United States Army.) Morgan declared at that time that
Miranda had an indisputably better organization. Nonetheless, Morgan preferred
Kangleon for the top command. On March 23, 1946, Morgan died "in an airplane crash
on southern Luzon". (Daily Pacifican, Vol. I, No. 293, April 4, 1946, pp. 1,3)
2 0n the strength of all available evidence, the WLGWF was the most powerful
guerrilla organization on Leyte at the mid-year of 1943. The puppet governor of
Leyte, in an indirect tribute, reported to Manila in his summary for May, 1943:
"Ormoc looked like an armed canq?, threatened by the boldest guerrilla groups, led by
ex-Lt. Bias Miranda. . . . " (Actg. Gov. Salazar. Report of Activities, April 1-
Octcber 3i . 1943. To: Commission cf Interior thru Director of Local Govts.)
When interviewed in 1945 (at his residence, Tacloban), the first puppet
governor, Bernardo Torres, did not hesitate to state that the WIGWF was the best or
ganized group on the Island. I
^Miranda, o p . cit. , p. 8 .
% t . John concedes that American support for Kangleon was the decisive factor
"Kangleon had every advantage, of course. He was getting arms andaimunitionfromthe
Americans. . . .But most important, probably, was the fact that peopleknew Kangleon:
was the man the Americans liked." (St. John, op. cit. , pp. 91-92;
244
That Miranda had no way of direct wireless contact with CHQ SWPA precluded
his obtaining unimpeachable information respecting the wishes of the high command in
the matter. There is no doubt that Kangleon put up a bold front in May and over
reached himself in laying claim to the command of the 9th Military District. Kangleon
no doubt felt sure of himself, felt that full investiture with authority was merely
a matter of time, and that delay was costly. As far as Miranda was concerned, there
were already dangerous ice floes visible, but the seas were still open.^
2
It was upon Panay that Miranda came to lean for furtherance of his cause.
His contact with Panay began shortly after the organization of the WIGVF. His account
noted:
The WLGWF received a letter of recommendation from Lt. Col. M. Peralta, CO,
PAC (Panay Area Comaand) on Feb., 1943, after the visit of his contact officer,
Lt. Hinolan on Jan. 1943.^ A contact officer of our force, Lt. Fernandez, was
In point of fact, Miranda had good reason to believe that much of Kangleon's
self-assuredness was only posturing. Kangleon was much shaken by news of the McLish
mission. To Parsons, he repined: "Lt. Miranda refused to Join us because he received;
assurance of an American Capt. Waters that American officers in Mindanao are backing j
up his stand." (E. K. Kangleon, Col. Apr. 30, 1943. To: Lt.-Com. Charles Parsons)
O
Macario Peralta--the leader on Panay who first acquainted the outside world
with the existence of a free movement in the Islands— Chick found to have a much
■larger force of men than anticipated, about twelve thousand. These men had been
solidly welded together into a fine fighting unit by Peralta with the assistance of
one of the outstanding national figures in Philippine affairs, Tomas Confesor."
(Ingham, op. cit.. p. 155; also, p. 99)
^Miranda claims the following letter to be authentic:
"My dear Miranda:
" . . . .If the report of L t . Hinolan dated 25 Jan. '43 is even only partjLy
correct, I think you have dene a great Job in Leyte. If I have anything to say about
it, I won't let anyone (no matter how high ranking) steal the credit from you and your
loyal officers.
"MacArthur is reorganizing the Philippines based on existing Military Dis
tricts. Thus, I have been placed in command of the Sixth Military District and Lt.
Col. Wendell W. Fertig in command of the 10th Military District. Whether these com
mands will be expanded, I do not know.
"I'm not placing you under my command. I think you are perfectly fit to
coianand your own unit. All that I ask you to do is: Keep up your good work. Smash
banditry............................................................................
"Major Marcos Soliman is an old friend of mine. He has a lot of ability and 1
training. , ........................................................................ *
"I do not have to tell you to maintain relations with other guerrilla lead
ers. You do not have to kowtow to them. Some people. . . .want to be boss Just be- ,
cause they have the rank. If they had the brains and had also done the dirty work, I
would not mind. . . ." (Macario Peralta, Jr., Lt. Col., Inf. 25 Feb. 1943. To:
"My dear Miranda")
245
sent to Panay on June 1943 to bring our letter to Col. Peralta vith the request
that he vill inform Gen. MacArthur of our activities. . . ^
This compressed statement conceals the aspirations and anxieties of Miranda
regarding the longed for recognition to be accorded his organization. As he cams to
realize that the hopes aroused by the Waters mission vere doomed to frustration, he
abandoned reliance upon McLish and the Mindanao route to recognition, and looked to
Peralta instead. Peralta, while making no definite commitments, was on the whole
encouraging, especially in his exchange of correspondence with Major Soliman.2 By
the end of 1943, it was on these tenuous threads that Miranda was fastening hie hopes
of recognition— or at least of co-recognition, along with Kangleon— as an independent
unit rendering a commendable performance.
The "Baybay Affair" rent assunder all talk of unification. This instance of
i
a pitched battle between the two principal guerrilla forces on Leyte is of sufficient !
importance to this analysis to deserve extended treatment. The prologue to the "Af
fair" was furnished by the so-called "Inopacan Incident" of November, 1942. This
began as a conference between the staff of Chester Peters and the sub-sector leaders
of south-west Leyte. Its conclusion was the routing of the southern forces by a
burst of fire from the riflemen of Miranda's detachment, visiting at Peters' head
quarters. And its repercussion was the planting of a deep hatred among elements of
these "southerners" against the organization of Miranda. One of the objectives of
the Daffon deputation to south-west Leyte (December, 1942-January, 1943) was to coun- !
teract the bad impression that had been implanted in civilian minds by the "Inopacan
^Miranda, o p . cit., p. 5.
2"I have been given blanket authority by Lt. Miranda to contact you and I am
enclosing herewith a letter for you in answer to your letter of February 25 /19437. .
"If you can do anything for us at all in the way of having our names recom
mended through your transmitter to General MacArthur's Eq . , you shall have done us a
favor which we shall never forget for the rest of our lives.
"A Mindanao delegation passed through here recently under Morgan. . . .We had*
a conference, but. . . .they do not have papers to present that they are in contact ;
with General MacArthur nor that they are well-organized. Besides, I would rather havei
our organization join under you. knowing you as I have all these years. . . . " -
(Marcos G. Soliman, Maj., 81st. Inf. June 5, 1943. To: "Dear Mac" _£Lt. Col. Macario !
Peralta, 3 r J . pp. 1-3) s
246
Incident". Daffon sought to demonstrate that the WLGWF was well organized, dis
ciplined, zealous in safeguarding law and order. To all appearances, Daffon had
succeeded, for he was given a rousing welcome all along the way. This may have been
but so much window-dressing on the part of a thoroughly affrightened population,
willing to do anything to forestall the much-dreaded wrath of Miranda. On the other
hand, Daffon had been stationed in this part of Leyte before the war, as a member of
the Philippine Constabulary, and was very popular with many of the local residents.
Be that as it may, after his arrest by Kangleon, and his forcible eviction from the
region, the southern guerrilla leaders set to work to blacken systematically the
name of the WLGWF.
Miranda regarded Attorney Domingo Veloso of Baybay (subsequently Congressman
from Leyte and chief public relations officer of Kangleon during the war period) as
chiefly responsible for this barrage of unfriendly propaganda. Miranda's account
summed up Veloso's influence:
Our relation with South Leyte was never cordial on account of political in
fluence. Attorney Domingo Yeloso, a defeated candidate during the last election,
a former justice of the peace during the occupation of the Japanese at Baybay,
Leyte; and who escaped his post when the guerrillas became actively engaged
with the Japanese Forces, was responsible of disseminating adverse and false
propaganda against the organization. This propaganda polluted the minds of the
people in the South and as far as the islands nearby. We never had the chance
of counteracting these propaganda because the Japanese Imperial Forces were ac
tive in our sector. . . .Atty. Veloso blamed us for the acts of Victorino when
in truth and in fact he was not a member of the organization. Conference called
for by a certain Chester Peters resulted in a clash with the Southern forces,
when they fired at him. . . .The claim of the southern forces is that the organi
zation or its leader is in league with Peters and is not only false, groundless
and preposterous but unfounded .-
According to Miranda, the source of this hatred by the Attorney was his long
standing family grudge with his cousin, Dr. Domingo Veloso, chief surgeon of the
WIGWF. This feud was so intense that neither man would stop at anything to bring
harm to his rival. When Miranda dispatched Francisco Corres to the Baybay area to
bring it into line, Attorney Veloso, then serving as local justice of the peace, inters
preted the action otherwise. According to Veloso, this was Miranda's famous "flying
^Miranda, op. cit. , pp. 6-7.
i
squad", the extermination force sent out to rid the organization of all who stood in
the way of its success. There would he no trial for the unfortunate when captured;
Just instant liquidation, Veloso was certain that his cousin had poisoned Miranda's
mind against him, representing him as an arch-collaborationist. What could Veloso do
then hut to escape into the southern sector and from there wage a relentless campaign
of vituperation against the organization of Miranda.
The municipality of Baybay remained the Achilles' heel in the organization of
Miranda. For Attorney Veloso was an influential man in this community, and he was
able to maintain clandestine contact with important elements of the local population.
Some of these elements were restive under the military administration of Francisco
Rodriguez, Miranda's regimental commander in Baybay. The grounds for this dissatis
faction will be considered elsewhere. These dissidents constituted a fifth column,
only too willing to be absorbed into the sector of Kangleon's organization.
The opportunity for slipping out of Miranda's control came unexpectedly. One
of the sub-sector commanders, Bagaslao by name, an early guerrilla organizer in the
Baybay area, was disgruntled with the corrmand of Rodriguez. He felt that Rodriguez
had dealt with him unfairly, and not put him in the post he deserved. Finally, when
he could no longer contain his rage, he deserted his post, and fled with his detach
ment to Abuyog to find sanctuary with Captain Landia.
Captain Catalino Landia. once the confidant of Captain Erfe and a former
chief of police of Abuyog, now headed a company of the 94th F.egiment of Colonel
Kangleon's 92nd Division.1 He waB overjoyed to receive thi3 unexpected incremento
manpower through the desertion of Bagaslao. Meanwhile, the battalion commander,
Major Degracia, arrived with a detail of men.^ Degracia had Just been subjected to
^"Captain Landia, a distinguished-looking, gray-haired man who had some kind

of office Job before the war, was in command of a company that had one of the beet
blacksmith arsenals on the island.” (St. John, o p . cit. . p. 118).
%here is some evidence that Capt. Landia had requested protection from. Col.
Kangleon against the incursions of Antonio Cinco in the Abuyog area. After the ar
rival of Degracia, Landia wrote to Kangleon: " . . . .Sir, 1 hope Cinco will not
bother us any more. . . ." (Catalino T. Landia, Capt. 14 Aug. 1943. To: Dist. Cndr.
92nd Div., Par. 6.)
248
the inconvenience of crossing the mountain range of central Leyte by means of a
rugged cross-country trail. The main east-west road was blocked to the forces of,
Kangleon, since it traversed the territory of Baybay. Indeed, Major Jain, regimental
comnander of the 94th Regiment, was treating with the WLGWF for sobe easement that
•would permit peaceful thoroughfare to eastern Leyte across the Miranda territory.
Degracia was an activist, favoring expansion into the territory of the WLGWF
at the first opportunity. Wo doubt Miranda was aware of the existence of such senti
ment among some of the southern leaders, despite the inhibitions placed upon them by
the pact of Bitanhu-an, signed in January of 1943. And he was inclined to believe
that Kangleon himself, while discreet in such matters, was enough of an opportunist
to violate his pledge, provided the prospects of success were good. In the opinion
of Miranda, the course of action undertaken by Degracia was prosecuted with the full
blessing of Kangleon. To this charge, Kangleon hotly demurred. Let us turn to
Miranda's account for a chronicling of events as he saw them. We must suppose that
Degracia and Landia, enheartened by the defection of Bagaalao (who may have reported
that the loyalty of the other sub-sector commanders was only lukewarm), decided that
the time was ripe to strike and strike swiftly.1 This they proceeded to do:
(1) At dawn on August 5, 1943, Maj. Degracia and other officers together wi
a platoon of riflemen and bolomen, treacherously attacked our detachment stationed
at Baybay, without provocation on our part. They shot the sentinel on post and
maltreated the corporal of the guard. They completely disarmed our unit thereat,
captured our officers and men, tied them and brought them to the South. Some of
these officers were: Dr. Bernardo, Atty. Russiana and Capt. Sevilla. Mayor
Paterno Tan was also concentrated. They destroyed the records of the 4th Infantry
and looted the office of the Commanding Officer. They took everything they could
find such as typewriters, stationeries and medicines. They upset and overturned
tables, break the glasses, destroyed chairs; destroyed the cooking vat in the
la n d i a advised Kangleon: " . . . .shortly after Major Degracia arrived here

he hinted me together with Lt. Asinias his intentions to tske Baybay after he finished
his mission in Abuyog. i
"True to his words, Major Degracia left the poblacion Abuyog at the head of \
his force which iniuded 22 of my riflemen, 2 officers. . . .and 30 bolomen on the 3rd j
of August. Ten o'clock P.M. of August 4, they left crossing with some 50 of Lt. t
Bagaslao’s men. Five o'clock P.M. of August 5, I met my boys at crossing where I was *
waiting for them, and they told me Baybay collapse. j
"One week after. . . .incident happening within Baybay were totally discour- .[
aging for Miranda. His soldiers and officers tried to disarm and arrest one another."
(Capt. C. T. Landia. 14 Aug. 1943. To: List. Cmdr., 92nd Div., Par. 2-5) j
249
kitchen, and looted the officers quarters of all clothings and other personal
effects left by the officers after the heavy fusilade from the southern forces
which was never answered. They maltreated civilians whom they believed sympath
ized with us.
(2) The conquering forces after their victorious march on treacherously cap
tured Baybay received heartfelt congratulations from members of their headquarters
in the South. Not contented with Baybay, they proceeded northward reaching as
far as Binolho, Albuera, to open their ground for an attack on our headquarters.
They wrote threatening letters and urging us to surrender. They propagated
(propagandized that) Merida and Palompon already fell into their hands. While on
their way to Albuera, they stopped at Caridad. They looted the house of Dr.
Domingo Veloso apd drained his house to the last tablespoon. It was in this
house where Maj. Degracia and his sex fiend officers raped our women prisoners.
When they reached Albuera proper, they looted the houses. They stole chickens,
carabaos, and bancas. They ripped canvas mats and cots, and opened safes. There
was panic and horror than in that town. These lascivious acts and wanton destruc
tion of properties caused public indignation. Any sensible person will condemn
this atrocious acts. No decent person would move his feces on cooking pots and
water containers. This act can be committed by the Japanese but never expected
it to be done by Maj. Degracia and his bunch of ruthless renegades. These acts,
I believe, can only be committed by bandits and beasts.
(3) On August 12, the general staff and the regimental staffs and commanding
officers available at that time met in conference at the General Headquarters,
to discuss the critical situation. It was a sorrowful and sentimental moment
for all of us knowing as we do the probable effects and the public ridicule that
will follow. It was a matter of survival of the fittest; a fight between Liberty
and Death. They started: This was a violation of the Bitanhuan Agreement. . . .
The decision was reached to drive the Southern Forces from Baybay.
(4 ) On August 13, 1943, Maj. Soliman wrote a letter to Col. Kangleon,request
ing him to withdraw their forces at Baybay, and to release all prisoners; and to
return all the area they confiscated from the 4th Infantry. This was acknowledged
by Lt. Col. Causing then commanding the Expeditionary Force that reinforced Maj.
Degracia. As per report of the Commanding Officer, Composite Expeditionary Force,
WLGWF, it stated that when they reached Kilim, Baybay, he together with his staff
were willing to confer with L t . Col. Causing, but did not prosper because a shot i
was fired at our forces.^
(5) On August 13, 1943, the WLGWF counterattacked at Caridad. The Southern
Forces lost. . . .
^Miranda claims his officers subsequently came into the possession of the !
following field order despatched by the commanding officer of Kangleon's 94th Eegi- j
msnt: "The following information have been received:
"1. Men of Miranda of 4th Inf. are massing at Tugod, Kilim (old camp of Lt.
Mane .la)
"2. Send your operative to verify and get them if you can.
"3. Let me know from time to time developments. Old man ^Kangleon/ is par
ticular in your operation." (Major Jain. 11 Aug. 1943. To: Maj. Degracia. /True
Copy— Bias E. Miranda, 1st Lt., 4 March, 1945/)
2Miranda!s Chief of Staff, Soliman, declared: ". . . .1 was in Palompon. . . j
at this time. A message was sent to me by Miranda on August 11, 1943 ordering me to j
come to the GHQ at once. Upon arrival. . . .we had a Staff conference. It was agreed;
that I send a letter addressed to Col. Kangleon urging him to withdraw from our terri
tory. . . .Lt. Col. Juan Causing who was commanding the 'Expeditionary Force' /of
Kangleon/ demanded conference. But when our officer courier approached their bivouac
area carrying letter from us, he was fired upon. As a result our men \rere provoked, 5
resulting in the sad 'Baybay Incident'." (Statement of Maj. Marcos G. Soliman, GSC, |
Former Executive Off. of 81st Inf. Begt., p. 3.) |
250
(6) A ■week later, after the refusal of the Southern Forces to withdraw from
Bajfoay proper, the composite expeditionary force, with the flags of the US and
the PI waving proudly that day and carried by two of our flag hearers, the
southern forces was forced to withdraw after every futile attempt to hold their
ground was made. Truth and Justice prevailed. We won.
(7) The Composite Expeditionary Force returned to its station after accom
plishing its mission. No step or no move was taken to beyond our borders. We
did not cross, absorb, or trespass their territory.^-
Two aspects of the Baybay Affair will be dwelt upon; one relateB to the role
of Colonel Kangleon in instigating the attack; the other concerns the relative
strength of the two organizations as revealed in this ordeal by battle. On the first
point, Colonel Kangleon denied categorically that the surprise attack on Baybay was of
his scheming. He pointed to the court-martial proceedings instituted against Major
Degracia for undertaking unauthorized operations. Moreover, he reminded his critics
of the amicable negotiations then taking place between spokesmen of the two organiza-
2
tions to arrange a peaceful passage across the territory of the WLGWF.
The leaders of the WIGWF regarded this line of reasoning as weak. First,
they regarded the parley on the matter of transit privileges as a ruse to distract
their attention from the intending attack. Second, they looked upon the court-
martial of Degracia a trumped-up affair to mask Kangleon's own guilty feelings. They
pointed out that Degracia was hailed as a conquering hero in the early stages of his
campaign. His trial was then nothing but a punishment for failure, and not a repudi
ation of tortious action. Moreover, Degracia's sentence in actual fact was extremely
light, and scarcely constituted a rebuke for this misadventure.
Secondly, in a well-disciplined organization, the leader must accept respon
sibility for the misdeeds of his subordinates. But the celerity with which Kangleon
proceeded to reorganize the municipal administration of Baybay, and the triumphal
public celebrations held in the poblacicn suggested that everything had been well
prepared in advance.
^Miranda, o p . cit. , pp. 7-8.

^ e t Kichardson wrote: "There was a Captain de Gracia working for Kangleon.
He went up to Baybay in Miranda's territory to see a girl and heard stories there
about Miranda's activities that made him decide to try to hold the barrio. Kangleon
agreed and sent troops to help him. On August 15, Miranda came out of the hills to
take back 'his' town." (Wolfert, o p . cit., pp. 112).
J
'I
251 |
Finally, there was a piece of circumstantial evidence which, while not pro-
!
bative, tended to undermine Kangleon's defense of innocence. At the time of the figbt>
ing in the Baybay-Albuera sector, a delegation of officers from Balderian's 95th
Regiment crossed into Miranda's zone and proceeded to the WLGWF headquarters for con
ference. There is evidence that Pamanian's battalion had been alerted for a possible
incursion into the Palompon sector. Had Balderian attacked at the time that Miranda's
"Composite Expeditionary Force" was engaged at the other extremity of the WLGWF zone,
the results might have been disastrous.
Miranda a]lege3 that he was prepared for this contingency: that he had a
rear-guard in reserve and alerted in the Palompon sector, while his headquarters was
heavily guarded with a special headquarters force. Nonetheless, the poor showing
put up by his 4th Infantry Regiment at Baybay makes his apparent confidence open to
question. Why Balderian's force did not attack at this Juncture remains a subject
for conjecture. Possibly he was holding off to swing his men into a rear attack after
Kangleon's "Expeditionary Force" (under Causing) had advanced on Ormoc and threatened
Miranda's headquarters with frontal assault.1 Balderian denies that his intention was
bellicose, and that his presence in Ormoc was pure coincidence. But Pamanian is
more ambivalent, and hints that he held off because he did not think it right for ' '
Filipinos to be fighting one another, dissipating their own strength while the enemy
stalked the land. However the case, the WIGWF was convinced that Kangleon had en
gineered the entire episode, and that only military weakness prevented him from re-
on
vealing his full hand.
This takes us to our next consideration. As the organization that received
recognition from GHQ SWPA, what kind of showing did the 92nd Division make in action i
I
against a dissident guerrilla group? There is no doubt that Miranda's 4th Regiment |
in Baybay was rife with internal dissension, and that nests of dissatisfied elements I
^That some careful thought had been given to the possibilities of armed con- ° 3
flict- with the WIGWF may be Judged from the drawing up of an "Emergency Flan" by a QE«
battalion of the 95th Regiment. (Ramon C. Eipe, 2nd Lt., Inf., F&T Off., 2nd Bn. *1
95th Inf. Regt. 7 August 1944. Emergency Plan. Camp Langit, J pIGWFj} No. 3.) *J «
252
existed among the civilian population. While the propaganda of Attorney Veloso may
he cited in partial explanation, the malâdministration of Rodriguez vas principally
to blame. Reports of Rodriguez' abuses had reached Miranda's headquarters. In that
he permitted Rodriguez to continue in comaand despite these warnings, Miranda must
share the blame.
But if Miranda's Baybay command was weak, he certainly showed himself to be at
least a match for Kangleon in general organizational power and in tactical skill in
combat. Richardson's account of the encounter at Baybay, and interpretation corro
borated by the southern leaders, would, have us understand that Kangleon's force with
drew largely to avoid the unnecessary shedding of Filipino blood. We are told that
Miranda's field command placed the bolomen reservists in the vanguard to draw
Kangleon's fire. Over the bodies of his fallen first line, Miranda's riflemen might
then advance. Miranda, then, was prepared to squander lives in order to obtain his
objective ."1 To this, the WLGWF rejoin that this is but lame extenuation for the ob
vious fact that Kangleon's forces were hopelessly outmanoeuvered, breaking like a
disorganized rabble on realizing that the advantage lay with the counter-attacking
Expeditionary Force of the WIGWF. As for Kangleon's humanitarian squeamishness, that
was not very much in evidence during the initial stages of the campaign when he eg- >
2
greased against the WIGWF positions.
The officers of the 92nd Division may retort that they were able to maintain
their cohesiveness even after the Japanese had mounted their offensive at the close
of 1943, whereas the WIGWF all but fell apart. And a rejoinder charging prevarication
is brought by the WIGWF. While conceding that some of their regiments disintegrated
and that the headquarters cauro was destroyed, they insist that the identity and mis
sion of the organization was preserved during this enforced period of hibernation.
^Miranda asserts that all his troops wielded bclos: "All enlisted men and
Force Reserves shall be armed with sharp bo]os aside from their regular arms. Offi
cers will also preferably provide themselves with bolos. Enlisted men and members of ’
the Force Reserve armed with spears and bow and arrow must keep such arms always sharp
ready for action especially in jungle fighting.” (Command of Brig. Gen. Briguez
^?ami]o Rosello, Capt. Inf., Asst, the Adj. Gen J Aug. 4, 1943. Memo. No. 56.) ;
?Wc!fert, op. cit. , pp. 112-13; a] so see: St. John, op. cit.. p. 91. |
253
Further, they allege that Kangleon's oorganization also was compelled to adopt a pas
sive lie-low policy during this period, of stress; in fact, that this policy was in
conformity with general instructions emanating from GHQ, SWPA. If only they had re
ceived recognition and an arms consignment, they insist, they could have functioned
openly and. effectively in the months preceding the American landings.
After the Baybay Affair, the possibilities of fusion of the two organizations
were dashed to pieces. There were elements in the WIGWF in the mood of pressing their
advantages and driving into the territory held by Kangleon's 94th Regiment. Portions
of the Baybay population, fearing reprisal for their disloyalty to the WIGWF, fled to
the south, circulating hostile storieB wherever they want. On the other hand, the
WIGWF remained on the alert, never knowing when Kangleon's force might issue forth
to recoup lost prestige.
Miranda's chief of staff, Major Marcos G. Soliman, had penned an astringent
letter to his former associate of the 81st Infantry Regiment, USAFFE, at the time of
the Baybay Affair:
My dear Col. Kangleon:

It is rather lamentable that in spite of our agreement not to cross each
other's border which was consummated. . . .at Barrio Bitanju-an, Baybay, you have,
without provocation on the part of our troops stationed in Baybay, invaded our
sector. This act. . . .does not constitute the real pronouncements of my own
brother officer, who, I am sorry to say, was formerly iny Commanding Officer.
As you very well know you have invited me so many times to Join you, but some
how. I am a man of only one word. . . .; hence after joining this organization to
which I now belong, I do not have that weakness of character to face about. . . .
In this instance it is needless for me to state that we are serving for the
same cause. . . .
For your information, cur contact officer has Just arrived from Panay and it
would be interesting for you to know that letters coming _/from7 L t . Col. Macario
Peralta, Jr., addressed to me, do not state as to who is the Commander for the 9th
Military District; also among other things this organization has been delegated
the mission of intelligence. ...•*■
After this rupture between Soliman and Kangleon, Miranda made a proposal— a
daring proposal--which appealed to hi 3 chief of staff. Soliman recollected:
There was also a move to have the 9th MD placed under my command and it was
^-Marcos G. Soliman, Maj., 81st Inf., Chief of Staff, WIGWF. 13 August 1943.
To: "My dear Col. Kangleon".
agreed by our staff that Miranda will turn over the conmand to me.^ Merritt of
Samar was also contacted and he offered no objection provided that I go over to j
Samar to look over the situation there myself. The conference with the North and
Eastern Guerrilla Forces did not materialize due to enemy activities. . . .2-3
This move by Miranda was extremely astute. It would blast the contention of
Kangleon that he, Miranda, was vaingloriously concerned only with himself. It would
indissolubly wed the fortune of Soliman's to his own, an insurance against the possi
bility of a fa n ing out between them. At the same time, it would give him an ally in
the neighboring province of Samar.
•*A.s a matter of fact, this step, while now seriously broached, had been pri
vately considered earlier. Soliman recollected: "About the middle part of December,
last year ^19427 I met one of your _êralta'£7 contact officers. At that time, I
was very sickly and everything here was knotty. Among the things he proposed to me
was for me to command the island of Leyte. I told him flatly that since there were
so many guerrilla leaders in this island who had started organizing guerrilla bands,
I did not want to assume command, just because I had the rank to back me up to the
prejudice of what those leaders had, at that time, accomplished. . . . " (Marcos G.
Soliman, Maj., 81st Inf. June 5, 1943. To: "Dear Mac" ^Lt. Col. Macario Peralta,Jr*7
p. 1 .)
Miranda, too, had taken some preliminary soundings: " . . . .When Capt.
Lloyd Waters visited our headquarters, I made mention of the name of Maj. Soliman as
the best qualified officer to be district commander. At that time, I have not yet
heard the presence of Lt. Col. Kangleon in Leyte. Capt. Waters was not yet able to
contact Samar then. . . ." (Miranda, op. cit., p. 8 )
^Statement of Maj. Marcos G. Soliman, GSC, Former Exec. Off.of 81st Inf.
Begt., pp. 3-4.
•’’Soliman's statement is of interest in that it shows the continuance of
friendly relations between Miranda and Balderian even after the unhappy episode of
Baybay. No doubt, the 95th Begiment was impressed by the good showing made by the
WLGWF against Kangleon's vaunted, troops, and saw in Soliman a possible substitute for
Kangleon.
Indeed, Capt. Landia in the Abuyog sector (94th Begt.) had addressed a very
conciliatory note to the new WIGWF commander at Baybay:
” . . . .1 am very happy to learn from the Major _^5alderian7 that no ill-
feeling existed between you and the men of Col. Kangleon in spite of the lamentable
incident at Baybay. . . .
"I hope from now on o\ir officers who are given that command will think twice
before they resort to doing things. I mentioned here Major de Gracia who acted with
out orders. let us hope for a solid unity for all of us and that Baybay willbe
opened for everybody." (Catal ino T. Landia. Capt. Inf., Cmdg.,Co. "G", 94th Inf.
12 Oct. 1943. To: 'Dear Capt. Conopio")
As a further sign of good will. Balderian notified Miranda that he would per
mit the WLGWF to station a detachment of troops within 95th Begimental territory to
guard the easterly approach to the WIGWF domain against the Japanese: "Gen., you
have written me. . . .whether it will be possible for you to keep an armed force to
be stationed in Burauen with the end in view of fighting against our enemy. I have
no objection as long as it is for good. . . . " (Alejandro Balderian, Maj. Nov. 10,
1943. To: "My dear Gen. Briguex")
255
And the extension of Soliman's control over Semar was "by no means far
fetched.^- Colonel Kangleon's selection for the post of regimental commander in Samar,
Lieutenant-Colonel Juan Causing (Kangleon's defeated field commander at Baybay) was
totally unacceptable to Captain fferritt. Merritt saw affiliation with Peraltacf
Panay. under the inmediate command of Soliman. as a means of circumventing Kangleon's
manoeuverings. Merritt's own chief of staff notified Miranda:
. . . .We are almost through cur work of unifying all the guerrilla forces
in Samar. We should have achieved this earlier were it not for the interference
of Col. Kangleon. . . .He wrote us threats to align with him or else face the
alternative of being outlawed. . . .You will understand in our letters to Col.
Macario Peralta, Jr. . . .that there is a slight misunderstanding between Col.
Kangleon and us here. I hope that the breach will not develop into worse propor
tions . . . .
We should like to establish a closer connection with you there in Leyte— you
who will probably understand us and our organization better. . ..
So long. My personal regards and best wishes to you. the family and friends.^
Word of this friction within the 9th Military District reached the headquart
ers of Fertig in Mindanao.3 After consultation with authorities at GHQ, SWPA. Fertig
ordered Kangleon to drop his title of District Commander, and confinehis activities
to the Province of Leyte alone— the Leyte Area Command (LAC).
If anything, Kangleon's antipathy towards Miranda and the WLGWF increased as
a result of the friction with Samar. Then followed an incident both alarming and
provocative to the WIGWF— the transit across WIGWF territory (Palompon) of an officer
of Balderian's command, Lieutenant Cabiling (Villaba sector) purportedly fleeing to
■'"There were at least four separate major guerrilla groups on the Island.
Two in the north led by former Governor Arteche. . . .and Captain Merritt, formerly
of the Phil lupine constabulary. From the south were Captains Abia and Valley. . . . "
(Ingham, on. cit.. p. 158)
-Eduardo P. Soliman, End Lt. Inf.. Chief cf Staff (for Cant.. Merritt). IS Oct.
1947. To: "Dear It. Miranda".
"’The guerrilla command in Panay seemed to be conniving at Miranda's defiance:
"Peralta is operating in the 9th MD through Miranda and Merritt who claim that they I
are attached to the 6th MD. We sent a radiogram to Peralta, suggesting that he re- ]
lease his command over them. . . ." (K. K. Kangleon, Col. Aug. 25, 1943. To: Com- j
manding General, 10th MD) ]
Parsons explained Peralta's support of Miranda as part ofthe Panay command's!
attempt to establish hegemony over the Yisayan guerrilla organizations. In turn, j
Parsons suggested to MacArthur that Peralta's command be confined to Panay. Evident-I
ly, Parsons' advice was adopted by GHQ, SWPA. (Interview with Chas. Parsons, Luzon 1
Stevedoring Co., Manila, Sept. 14, 1946, 3-4 p.m.) 1
256
the south after a falling out vith his ovn battalion, hotly pursued by Lieutenant
Pedro Kierulf (Carigara sector) at the head of an anted force. Miranda saw something
sinister in all this:
. . . .after the Baybay incident, the southern forces had been sending spies
in our territory. Informations received from reliable sources had it that they
wanted to get the Chief of Staff , 3 Maj. Soliman, at any cost. They wanted to get
me dead or alive. It. T. Regner and Lt. H. Kabiling were some of those spies
sent. A ] 1 efforts to capture Maj. Soliman were in vain. Dr. Juan Rosete Joined
our forces. He was accepted but (we) found him later to be a spy of the southern
forces .2
By the close of November, Kangleon's patience had been strained to the limit.
He saw no likelihood of the VLGNF voluntarily accepting assimilation into the Leyte
Area Command. He thereupon invoked his presumptive powers to reach out at the key
officers of the WIXJWF (as individuals) , ordering Major Soliman and Lieutenants
Miranda, Olayvar, Sabelino, Capuyan, Conopio, Cabatingan and Montua to "report to
this headquarters for assignment and duty."3
These orders served to effect no palpable change in the relationship of the
two organizations. Yet, it is quite conceivable that the dispatch never reached its
destination, for, soon after, the Miranda GHQ crumbled under a surprise Japanese
onslaught.
All through the lie-low period of 1944, when Japanese troops spread every
where, Miranda was anxiously awaiting word that Peralta had succeeded in obtaining
recognition for the W G W F . But rumors of Kangleon's appointment grew louder and more
3 So. too Soliman: "About November 194?, there were attempts on the part of
forces supposedly brought under the command, of Col. Kangleon to have me kidnapped and
brought to his headquarters in the south. These troops were directly under the com
mand of a certain L t . Kierulf and a certain Capt. Kabiling. They were, however, out-
bluffed and outmanoeuvered. hence, were unsuccessful." (Soliman, o p . cit. , p. 3.)
Balderian endeavored to assure Miranda that such a construction was totally
unfounded: "I am in receipt today of a copy of a memo dated Oct. 19. 1943 from your
Headquarters which was signed by your Asst, to the Adj. Gen., Capt. Camilo Rosillo,
to all Regimental Commanders to the effect that the Northern forces have been mobil
ized to kidnap the Chief of Staff V’.L.G.W.F. I wish to inform the Gen. that this is
a foolish notion and the one who informed your office is fabricating facta which tend
to destroy our connection. This act may be considered an activity of 5th columnist
. . . .Frankly speaking, I do not want the spirit of good neighborhood to be broken. V
(A. Balderian, Maj., Inf., Cmdg, Nov. 10, 1943. To: "My Dear Gen. Briguez")
2 Miranda,
op. cit., p. 5.
~By order of Col. R. K. Kangleon (U. C. Francisco, Maj., Chief of Staff) 28
Nov. 1943. Special Ord. No. 70, Par. 5.
257
persistent. In desperation, Miranda finally decided to try another outlet:
On May 1944, Dr. Domingo Veloso (chief medical officer) was sent to Cebu to
contact Lt. Col. Cushing. All adverse propaganda (disseminated by the enemies
of the WIGWF) was counteracted and explained. Col. Cushing, at our request was
kind enough to transmit our radiogram to Gen. MacArthur, although the picture was
already painted dark for us. Answer to the message was received on July 20,
1944, informing our headquarters of the appointment of Lt. Col. Kangleon as CO,
LAC (Leyte Area Command), (it) was acknowledged. This message was delayed on
account of the attack of the Japs on CAC f T J .
By this time the position of Miranda was hopeless. With the arms shipment
sent by submarine, Kangleon was able to organize a new regiment, the 96th, placed
under the conmand of Major Nazareno, and assigned to take over the district now only
nominally held by the WIGWF. Miranda's organization was not in a position to dissent.
And by holding out, Miranda had given legal force to Kangleon's position (as
the now undisputed commander of Leyte) in branding him (Miranda) a bandit, forfeiting
all protection and consideration. Miranda claims that the answer to his radiogram
was not received till July 29, 1944.2 Perhaps, he did receive an earlier reply, but
continued to clutch at straws like the proverbial drowning man. At any rate, he
eventually concluded that his cause was hopeless and decided to call a special meet
ing of his general staff.2
On July 30, 1944, I relinquished command of the WLGWF. Lt. Bonifacio Capuyan
(then chief of staff, and the officer who had directed the Composite Expeditionary
Force) was sent to the south to confer with the CO, LAC, relative to affiliation
and assimilation. Copies of this relinquishment of Command was furnished the
Coxnnanding Officer, IAC.
Lt. Capuyan was sent to the south on August 5, 1944. He did not return.
What transpired in the conference, I am at a loss to discuss the Bubject.
While I was waiting for the return of Lt. B. Capuyan, Lt. Teofilo Moncada
(former regimental commander of the WLGWF) , Felix Moralita (an officer who had
been a member of Col. Morgan's party, and had remained in Leyte and Joined up
with Balderian), Sgts. Boncilao and Bendalan, Lt. Pamanian and his Battalion of
^Miranda, op. cit. , p. 5.

20ne of Miranda's former officers pleaded with him to Join Kangleon: ". .Hav
ing been sent on missions by our GH^, to different area commands, and having been ap
prised of the authenticity of the leadership of Kangleon. . . .1 see a. . . .peaceful
solutibn^ Of-the problem at hand. . . .These pleadings were prompted by purely altru
istic motives in hopes to pave a way for a complete unification, . . .’’ (Francisco
Correa, Maj., CE. June 23. 1944. To: CO, WIGWF)
^Gunnison was wrongly informed when he wrote: ".. . .After some weeks,
Miranda cane into Kangleon's mountain camp and offered to serve with his former su
perior officer as a patriot in the same cause. The two men shook hands and went to
work together." (Gunnison, op. cit. . p. 74)
400 me a armed with carbines, tbonpsons, and automatic rifles, surrounded iiy > 5 ;
hideout and asked me to surrender.1 I refused. They fired. An exchange of shote
ensued. I was able to escape. I fired two bursts overhead with the machine
rifle to scare and delay them. . . .2
This sounds like a wild west story with the hero making his hairbreadth es
cape in the nick of time. No doubt there is exaggeration here in respect to the size
of the enveloping force. But that an attempt to capture Miranda in his hide-outwa
made and that he showed uncanny presence of mind and agility in making his get-away
is beyond dispute. The question could be raised concerning the necessity of this
attack. Was Kangleon Justified in that be did not know of Miranda's plan to relin
quish the comnand, and that in time of war insubordination is a capital offense?
Miranda thinks that Kangleon was motivated by mean considerations of ven
geance. Had Kangleon been a different sort of personality, Miranda might have been
able to swallow his pride and Join Kangleon. Asthings were, he felt that committing
his fate to Kangleon would be an act of personal suicide.
In his account, Miranda goes on to relate how the attacking force looted his
hide-out and then burned it. Hie wife, then pregnant, and his three small daughters
were allegedly given shabby treatment, and taken prisoner. And then, in an impas
sioned peroration, Miranda cries out:
I did not report (for duty) because I was positively sure that I will not
receive Justice from Lt. Col. Kangleon. He has instructions to either concen
trate me or kill me. I can substantiate these statements with proofs. . . .
Casting modesty aside, could there have been a guerrilla leader in Leyte, working
day and night, devoting all his time and energy since the Order of Surrender (who
did more than I)? Before the law of man and of God, I can say with calm deliber
ation that what I have done in the guerrilla was for the common good of all, and
not for personal profit, personal gain, or to build up my personal future in
politics, or a means to seek revenge. . . .If the US will not give me due credit
for my work, then let my accomplishments be past history and my makings a dream. ^
What did become of Lieutenant Capuyan's mission to parley with Kangleon for
assimilation of the WLGWF? Capuyan relates (in interview) that he was treated with
^Miranda claims that the arrest party acted on the following order: TTou
will upon receipt of this memorandum proceed to the hide-out of 1st Lt. Bias Miranda,
Inf., to arrest him together with his officers, let Lt. Teofilo Moncada, Inf., will
go with you as the guide. You will bring armed soldiers of 'A' and ’B T Conq>anies in
arresting those above mentioned officers. In case they resist, shoot to kill."
B. Y. Abarientos, Capt. Inf., Exec. 0. & Adj., 95th Inf. Begt. Aug. 3 ; 1944. To: CO,
1st Bn., 95th Inf. Begt.)
2Miranda, op. cit., pp. 8-9. ^ i d .. p. 9.
259
a brusque high-handedness by Kangleon, who completely ignored hie message. After
having been given the run-around for some time, Capuyan was informed that he and his
fellow officers would be treated on an individual basis and inducted into the armed
forces cf the Leyte Area Command.1 Not even indirect recognition of the integrity of
the WLGWF as a fighting organization was granted. With many misgivings, Capuyan,
Cataag and other officers and enlisted men enrolled in the 92nd Division, a large
proportion of them finding themselves in the 3rd battalion of the 96th Regiment,
under Major Nazareno's command. Of course, no consideration was given to their ranks
in the WIGWF, their status being determined by their pre-war positions. Capuyan main
tains that all of the former WIGWF personnel fought valiantly during the operations
under the American command. Grudgingly, he and some of the others were accorded
minor recognition. But on the whole, the 96th Begiment showed a disposition to dis
criminate against the ex-WIGWF personnel, officers and men alike, both in respect to
fraternizing with them and in assigning duties and recommending promotions.
Those members of the WIGWF who were not inducted into the 92nd Division, as
well as the reservists, reverted to simple civilian status. However, some of them
rendered assistance as volunteers to the men of Nazareno, and all served as scouts
or labor squads during the American campaign. The chronicler of the 6th Infantry,
WIGWF, relates:
In August. 1944, Kangleon's men had an encounter with the Japanese at Panila-
han; coincidentally. Major Daffon was in Albuera. He volunteered to help Lt.
^ h e unit of Lt. Moncada, one of the pioneer organizers for the WIGWF in the
Ormoc Bector, had joined Balderian's 95th Begiment in early 1943. Moncada and
Miranda had not been on good terms. Moncada &ay have been promised a conmand in the
former WIGWF territory. In May, the 95th sent Sgt. Juan D. Boncilao, a resident of
Ormoc (former CO of Hq. & Hq. Service Co., under Moncada) on a mission to contact
former soldiers: "Sgts. Juan Boncilao and N. Garcia, ’B ’ Co., 1st Bn. this Begt.
will upon receipt of this order proceed immediately to Ormoc to contact the former men
of WIGWF and induce them to join the Leyte Area Command. . . ." (B. V. Abarientos,
Capt. Inf., Ex. 0. & Adj. 19 May 1944. Special Order No. 55.)
2Claro C. Gofred.o, Adjutant to Rodriguez during the latter's command of the
Baybay regiment of the WIGWF, became a member of Hq. & Hq. Co. of Bn. 3, 96th Inf.
Begt. He states (in interview) that the former members of the WIGWF were mistreated,
being Jeered at incessantly, and held back when promotions were due. He alleges that
Capt. Inez of Miranda's combat troops was liquidated b y Nazareno's men. Indeed, he
goes on to charge that only the arrival of the Americans prevented the snuffing out j
of other loyal Miranda men. I1
iii
260
Hazareno and his boys fight the Japs. Nazareno highly appreciated Major Daffon’s
bravery as a warrior. Major Daffon soon left again after he knew the southern
boys were after his life. Much to our regret, the southerners were still employ
ing the 'hit and run' tactics, and at the same time hating the members of the
■WLGWF; and in August 25, 1944 the Japanese at Ormoc sent a whole battalion of
soldiers from different points centering at Albuera, having heard of fresh guer
rilla activities once more in this town.-*-
The Kangleon Version
There is another side to the story. We must retrace our steps to the early
period of guerrilla formation. Miranda has just brought the Baybay district under
control. He has reached an amicable understanding with Chester Peters who heads the
unit in the municipality of Inopacan, directly below Baybay. Peters, through his
wife Julia and other emissaries to the headquarters of Miranda, has discussed common
policy. And then Peters contacts the unit leaders of Eindang, Hilongos, and Matalom
inviting them to a conference at Inopacan to discuss coordination of activities.
At this tine, Hilongos is under the influence of one Saballones, who is from Bohol
and is considering the assimilation of south-west Leyte with Bohol. By chance, a
Lieutenant Mondragon of the Sogod area (under the conmand of Captain Nuique) is visit
ing in Hilongos, possibly feeling out the opportunities of expansion or of new con
tacts. These men, somewhat charily (for Attorney Veloso has already been warning the
inhabitants about Miranda's voraciousambitions) accept the invitation. They are not
apprised of the presence of a platoon of the WIGWF men from the Baybay district.
They arrive in a truck, are disturbed by the way the men of Peters are deployed about
them and are tightening the cordon, and grip their rifles. Suddenly Peters commands
them to abandon arms and dismount from the truck. Frightened, one of them opens fire
and Peters drons to the ground. Immediately, a return volley, this time from the
rifles of the WLGWF platoon. Panic, men wounded, prisoners taken— and the remnants
of the southern forces flee in wild confusion. The southerners are convinced that
PeterB' invitation is a hoax, prearranged under the direction of Miranda, and intended
to subdue the southerners into accepting the overlordship of the WIGWF. The fugitive
"southerners" return home, spreading stories about the villainous Miranda, and
^Sotto, o p . cit. , p. 7,
261
warning the people to avoid all dealings with the treacherous emissaries of the
WLGWF.
That the guerrilla leaders of the south early formed an implaccable hostility
towards Miranda is of more than passing interest. It means that the further exten
sion of his sway on Leyte would he extremely distasteful to them, and that he would
he utterly unacceptable to them as Island Commander. Consequently, when Miranda took
over Inopacan as a kind of protectorate, and through his agent Daffon seemed ready to
annex Eindang and Hilongos by default, and was on the verge of penetrating Bato and
Matalom, the southern leaders were evidently quite jumpy. The cordial reception
accorded Daffon's delegation may have been pure pretense to forestall the exercise
of violence. But even if we grant that the local residents were prepared to enter
the Miranda fold, the leaders of the more southerly towns regarded the balance of
power as gravely upset, and were intent on curbing any further expansion. The march
down the east coast of Balderian's expedition seemed to suggest collusion with
Miranda, and seemed to emphasize that no equilibrium could be established until
Miranda's legions were repulsed beyond Inopacan.
Then Kangleon stepped into the picture. And he would contend that he was
the savior of the resistance movement in Leyte. For if unification was the desidera
tum, he alone was cut out for the role of unifier. Miranda's non-acceptability to
the Southern leaders ruled him out. These chieftains would resist any attempt by
Miranda to subjugate them. And if by joint operations with Balderian, Miranda could
succeed in nominally making himself master, he would be faced with sabotage and even
with armed revolt. Certainly Belderian could not have become Island Commander, if
for no other reason than that Miranda would never have had it. And the remaining
organization, that of Captain Erfe, was a paper affair, except in a very limited
sector.
The warm reception accorded Kangleon in his own southern district, and the
zeal with which he was pressed into service by the southern leaders demonstrated his
■oopularity in the south. His peoule felt him to be a selfless patriot, alone capable
262
of ‘bringing order out of chaos. And as the highest ranking officer on Leyte, and
former Commanding Officer of the 9th MD of Leyte and Samar, he alone possessed the
experience and prestige to weld the disunited guerrilla hands together into one
mighty spear of resistance. His success against Balderian, by a mere threat of em
ploying force, drove home this lesson. And the subsequent disintegration of Captain
Erfe's unit, after Erfe had showed recalcitrance was another object lesson. That
Balderian maintained an autonomy until July of 1943 would not weaken the argument.
It would only suggest that Kangleon had to delay in capitalizing upon the victory he
had gained over Balderian at Sogod.
Kangleon would dismiss the Waters mission to Miranda as abortive. McLish
had overstepped his authority when he presumed to invest Miranda with the Island
command.1 As for Waters, he had been cajoled into sponsoring Miranda. At any rate,
2
these blunders had been erased. Kangleon's work could hardly be Judged at that time
since he had only just arrived. But the tremendous strides he had made by mid-1943,
not only in building up a guerrilla organization along truly military lines but in
establishing a regime of law and order among the civilians, with no trace of the ex
ploitation and violence allegedly rampant in the zone of Miranda, gave pragmatic
sanction to his comnand.
Nonetheless, Kangleon had been much shaken by news of the McLish mission:
"A week ago, I was informed that, by your orders, all units of Bohol, Leyte and Samar
were assimilated under your comnand, and that Miranda was temporarily assigned to
comnand Leyte units. I do not question your authority if you represent MacArthur in
the Philippines. I request you to send an honest man to find out for yourself the
condition in Leyte, because I believe you have been misinformed." (R. K. Kangleon,
Col. Apr. 9, 1943. To: Col. Wendell W. Fertig)
But Kangleon was shrewd enough not to communicate his apprehensions to his
own subordinates. He put on a bold front for Maj. Balderian. And the latter, in turn
informed his sector leaders: "Then came the problem of Miranda as it is well known
that Miranda was made by Col Llash ^ftEcLish/ as the C.O. of Leyte. Col. Kangleon said
that Captain Waters. . . .will go to jail~because he did not reveal the actual condi
tion of the guerrilla. . . .The Order making Lt. Miranda as Sector Commander of Leyte
is rebuked and Miranda will be made to Join the other guerrilla groups. . . . " (Col.
Alejandro Balderian. Apr. 28, 1943. To: "My dear Lt. Col. Felix Pamanian")
În May, 1943, Fertig had proclaimed: "The 9th MD will operate directly with
the General Headquarters; hence all orders emanating from the Headquarters, 110th
Division /McLish/ and from the IV Philippine Corps /Feralta/ are hereby recalled and
will, henceforth, have no effect in this district."" (WendellW. Fertig. Brig. Gen.
May 23, 1943. General Order No. 4, Par. 2.)
253
Kangleon's success in contacting Fertig, Parsons and the American high com
mand merely put the capstone on the structure he had built. Having once before servec
as District Commander of the Leyte-Samar 9th Military District, he deemed himself
qualified to revive that command. Fertig's action in proclaiming establishment of
the 10th Military District in Mindanao served to confirm Kangleon in his resolve.
In March, 1943, Commander Chick Parsons, "Spy Squadron" supremo, visited
Leyte"1 and extended the accolade to Kangleon. Thus encouraged, Kangleon sent a
special mission to Fertig:
The bearer, Captain Gordon A. Lang is CO of the South Leyte Guerrilla Units.
He is our contact man to inform you of our situation in Leyte and Samar and to
ask for ammunition. Mr. Orville Babcock, Division Superintendent of Schools,
accompanies Lang to inform you of the general opinion of the people of Leyte. . .
I went to Cebu and Bohol to ask for ammunition from Col. Cushing and Maj.
Ingeniero, but I only brought back promises. I wanted to inform MacArthur of
our situation from Cebu; but Australia couldn't understand because of our
changed code
Then, Kangleon acted swiftly. "On April 20," he notified Parsons, "I assumed
command of the 9th Military District,."'-’
Fertig quickly ratified this assumption of command:
Pursuant to the instruction in radiogram from General Douglas MacArthur dated

February 15, 1943, Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, who assumed command of the 9th MD
effective April 20, 1943, is confirmed by this Headquarters.4~5
^Fhis is how Parsons came to meet Kangleon: "In his business dealing with all
kinds of people in the Philippine Islands Chick had made a host of friends and ac
quaintances. Here on Leyte he encountered two of these, men of national prominence,
the Cuenco brothers. One was a former representative, the other an ex-cabinet secre
tary. In their eyes there was only one logical person to head the guerrilla movement
on Leyte— and accordingly Chick made his way to the farm of Colonel Kangleon at San
Roque, on the southern tip of the Island." (Ingham, op. cit. . p. 61)
. K. Kangleon, Col. Apr. 9, 1943. To: Col. "Wendell W. Fertig.
. K. Kangleon, Co]. Apr. 30, 1943. To: Lt. Cmdr. Charles Parsons, U.S.U.K.
^Wendell "W. Fertig, Brig. Gen. May 23, 1943. Genera] Order Ho. 4.
^Fertig also notified Captain Pedro Merritt on Samar: "The former military
districts are ordered restored by Genera] Douglas MacArthur and district commanders
wi]i be apoointed from time to time. Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon was appointed dis
trict conmander. 9th MD, composing Samar-Leyte on April 20. 1943.
"Please Join up your forces with the Hinth MD under Col. Kangleon. . .
("Wendell W. Fertig, Brig. Gen. May 22, 1943. Memorandum for: Captain Pedro V.
Merritt, P a r . 2. 3.)
264
Assured in his title to command, Kangleon advised Fertig of steps being
taken in implementation:
Complying with the instructions of MacArthur through Parsons, I have organ

ized the 92nd Division: 1 infantry Regiment on Samar; 2 Regiments in Leyte.
Units composing the Division are the guerrilla units. . . .
This communication was followed by the despatching of radio-communications
chief, I. D. Richardson,^ on a special mission:
I am sending It. I. D. Richardson to your GHQ to take up the following:

Immediate recognition of the 9th MD by MacArthur or his authorized repre
sentatives .
Aid in forms of ammunitions, arms and medicines.
Money to pay our officers and men.
Authority for the Commander of the 9th Military District to appoint civil
government officials for Ieyte and Samar because the provincial officials are
with the enemy. Once the 9th MD is recognized, a sound democratic government
will be restored. . .
While these exchanges were going on, Fertig’s guerrilla chief of staff,
''Lieutenant-Colonel" Luis Morgan^ and his "Expeditionary Force" were in north Leyte
conferring with Balderian and his sector commanders, urging that their looee affilia
tion with Kangleon be converted into a true unification, with their subordination
■*R. K. Kangleon, Col. May 24, 1945. To: Cmdg. Gen., 10th Military District.
O
Richardson recalled his meeting with Kangleon: "I introduced myself as an
officer in the United States Navy. He _/Kangleon7 said he had heard of me from other
Americans. Then we discussed for a long time the problems of guerrilla organization.
"I came away from there with a mission. He had sent two people to try to
contact Colonel Fertig. They both had disappeared without trace. I offered to be
the third to try.
"I delivered to Colonel Fertig a letter from Colonel Kangleon. We talked for
about half a day straight of the problems involved in putting a guerrilla organization
on a sound working basis in Leyte. There must be unification, he said. . . .
"At the headquarters I met Lieutenant Commander Chick Parsons, who had come
up as MacArthur's personal representative to the Philippines. Fertig and Parsons
were a wonderful team. . . . " (Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines ,
Bantam Books, /ifev Yorlr. 19507, pp. 100-109.)
"P.. K. Kangleon, Co] . May 50, 1945. To: Cmdg. Gen. , 10th Military District.
^"Lieut.-Col. Luis P. Morgan, Chief of Staff, U3FIP, will leave this Head
quarters on or before January 7. 1945, with such officers and men sis he may designate
to make an inspection of all subordinate units within the area occupied by the troops
of the USFIP." (Wendell V. Fertig, Brig. Gen. Jan. 5, 1945. Special Order No. 2,
Par. 4.)
Shere seems tc be some evidence that Fertig dispatched Morgan because he
found the latter too troublesome to endure at close range. During Morgan's absence,
Fertig succeeded in undermining Morgan's hold over some of the Mindanao sector com
manders .
265
distinctly acknowledged. Only in this way would the northern guerrilleros receive
the advantages of American recognition. On May 5, 1943, Morgan sent word to Kangleon
requesting him to come north to Carigara for a general conference:
You are requested to take with you other guerrilla leaders like Messrs.
Balderian, Pabilona, Cinco, Centino, Erfe and other officers you would like. . .
Officers from Samar. . . .are also requested to come over to Carigara. . . -1
Kangleon was not able to journey north, but Balderian was duly impressed and
swung his command fully into line. Thereafter, Balderian sought to assure Kangleon
of his ful] loyalty--short of openly clashing with Miranda.^
Now Kangleon was prepared to take the consummatory step. "By authority of
Oen. MacArthur," his guerrilla auditor recorded, '?a civil government was established
in the Province of Leyte in a proclamation issued by Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon
dated July 19, 1943.
A month later, Fertig's headquarters received a radio message from GHQ, SWPA,
intended for Colonel Kangleon:
Until the time that I shall return and require active support, you will
continue to quietly organize and give protection and encouragement to the
people. Maintain a mobile defense. . . ,4
And then, In September, there came the final blessing--a message from Presi
dent Quezon:
•^Luis P. Morgan, Lt. Col., USFIP. May 5, 1943. To: Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon,
Par. 2.
^Balderian's true mind vis-a-vis Kangleon and Miranda was candidly expressed
to his liaison officer, Attorney Rufo Eaga of Burauen:
"In connection with your mission. . . .you should bring into your conversa
tion with Gen. Briguez îrande.7 the following:
"(a) That I respect his honest opinion as to the status of Col. Kangleon,
who at the beginning surrendered to the enemy, but that, whether we like it or not,
we cannot but submit ourselves to his command, in view of his appointment by General
MacArthur. . . .The copies of documents I am sending as enclosures with the other
memoranda ere authentic. _^These allegedly authentic documents were the materials
left behind by Moran^/
"(b) That if only Gen. Briguez would subordinate his personal views to the
urgent need of a unified command, he would realize later that history willbring o
the truth as to who had really started and sacrifice. . . . " (Alejandro Balderian,
Col., Inf. June 10, 1943. Memorandum for: Atty. Rufo P.aga.)
ôtente, op. cit. , p. 15. (See also: Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., Actg.
Mun. Secty., Dulag. Sept. 10, 1943. "Report" To: Prov. Gov. in the Field, p. 1.)
^Gen. MacArthur. 28 Aug. 1943. Radio Message. To: Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon.
266
I have observed with great pride the steadfast and determined manner in which
so many of my people in the province of Leyte CMA under your splendid leadership
CMA remained faithful to our concept of human liberty and freedom ED This in
spite the ravages of war and the hazards arising from enemy occupation PD. . . .
My affectionate greetings and grateful acknowledgment for service of inestimable
value to our country PD. . . .Sgd. Quezon.1
On the strength of this formidable backing,2 Kangleon (so he alleged) re
peatedly notified Miranda of his appointment, but met with only a cold ignoral. As
a military commander, he could not permit any man to obstruct his work. He had no
alternative but to outlaw the WH3WF, and let all its responsible officers take the
consequences. Had Miranda shown himself to be cooperative, the 'WLGWF would have been
assimilated and constituted as a regiment of the 92nd Division, administering the
same zone subsequently assigned to Major Nazareno. And he certainly would have found
an important berth for Major Soliman, as his repeated invitations to the latter to
Join the 92nd Division testify.
Charges that Kangleon was motivated by selfish ambition were clearly of mali
cious inspiration. Worn and ill as he was, he would have much preferred the quiet
anonymity of his retreat in Macrohon. But he could not remain true to his military
calling and his patriotic obligations and spurn the invitation to unite the guerrilla
movement in his country's hour of peril. That a cloud rested upon his reputation
because of his internment by the Japanese was no arguing point. He was taken prisoner
by the Japanese, but showed his real allegiance when he made his escape back to Leyte.
Even if there had been a legitimate ground for suspecting him on his first return to
Leyte, those suspicions should have been quickly dispelled as soon as he had swung
into action against the Japanese. No, the selfishness and unbridled ambition rested
with his opponents, and not wi+h him.
transmitted by Wendell W. Fertig, Col, AUS, Cmdg. Sept. 28, 1943. To: Col.
K. K. Kangleon, Ninth Military District.
t h e persistent refusal of Capt. Merritt to place his Samar comnand under
Col. Kangleon’s appointed Col. Causing, and the apparent backing Merritt was receiv
ing from Peralta in Pansy, finally led to revocation of the order establishing the
9th Military District. GHQ, SWPA, advised Kangleon to limit his Jurisdiction to
Leyte. Henceforth, Kangleon referred to his command as the Leyte Area Command, (in
terview, Manila, Feb., 1946, during Causing's visit to GHQ, Philippine Army)
(See Appendix for letter from Capt. Merritt to Col. Peralta.)
267
The Baybay Affair was unfortunate. If he could in any way have anticipated
Degracia's action, he certainly would have restrained him. Once enscounced in Baybay,
however, he was convinced by the spontaneous demonstrations of Joy and relief that
Miranda's regime was cordially detested by the local population. The proof of this
opinion lies in the voluntary exodus to the south of a stream of Baybayanos in the
wake of Miranda’s retrieval of the municipality. Moreover, Miranda's shake-up of
his regimental command (4th Regiment) constitutes a left-handed acknowledgment that
relations with the local population were far from satisfactory. But Kangleon was
unwilling to shed Filipino blood, even to liberate his fellows in Baybay, and conse
quently abandoned the municipality— though he could have held it, had te been willing
to put up a determined resistance.
Even after all the provocations that he had endured, Kangleon would have made
use of the services of Miranda had the latter, deporting himself as a disciplined
soldier, reported for duty. Only when he was convinced that Miranda would never sub
mit did he order his officers to capture Miranda. And at that he had no intention
of killing Miranda. On the contrary, it was Miranda who had fired upon the delega
tion of officers that came to arrest him— an arrest in conformity with the proprieties
of military usage. The excesses committed against the properties of Miranda by the
arresting party were but the expressions of exasperation on the part of men who had
no use for Miranda, and who in their own persons or in the persons of their friends
had been maltreated at the hands of Miranda. The securing of Miranda's wife and
children as prisoners (and charges of mistreatment are falsifications) was not only
a device to immobilize Miranda against instigating further sabotage, but was a neces
sary precaution in view of the Japanese control of Leyte. In short then. Kangleon
had acted honorably but with firmness in all his relations with Miranda. And that a
number of former WIGWF officers and enlisted personnel decided to throw in their lot
with Kangleon in mid-1944 only shows how much more could have been accomplished had
Miranda not obstinately balked at cooperation.
268
Evaluation
To pass upon the meritB of these special pleadings is a hazardous undertaking.
Nevertheless, ■we do so, for the responsibilities of the task assumed so require. We
find ourselves unable to support the charge that Miranda was a scoundrel, prepared to
sacrifice the interests of the Filipino people on the altar of his own unquenchable
lust for power.•*■ Although his leadership reveals many shortcomings, it is nonethe
less true that in the situation in which he found himself, he did an admirable Job
in building up a well-organized resistance unit from practically nothing. His un
willingness to turn over his organization to the first person who came along and
claimed the cousnand as the lawful appanage of a field-grade officer's rank is quite
understandable. The newcomer, even conceding his qualifications, did not suffer the
tribulations cf fathering the organization. Moreover, might his qualifications not
be highly suspect to the pioneer organizer when he is known to have left a Japanese
internment camp under questionable circumstances? And is it correct to blame Miranda
alone for flouting the authority of a superior officer when his chief of staff,
Soliman, himself a field grade officer, has demurred against recognizing Kangleon?
^Thus Richardson wrote critically: "By August ^19437 he was the only guer
rilla leader in the Samar-Leyte area who had refused to Join Kangleon. Kangleon had
used threats on some, persuasion on others, but not threats nor persuasion had worked
on Miranda. He had his territory and nobody was going to be boss over him there."
(Wolfert, op. cit., p. 112)
As a matter of fact, Capt. Merritt of Samar had no intention of subordinating
himself to Kangleon's command, during the time that Kangleon had considered a reacti
vation of the 9th Military District (embracing Leyte and Samar). Moreover, it is not
true that Kangleon had attempted honest persuasion with Miranda.
În a prepared statement, Soliman had declared: "After this conference /with
Kangleon in Bitanjuan, Baybay, Feb. '437 I received two or three letters from Col.
Kangleon with the same tenor— inviting me to be his Chief of Staff and claiming that
he had already received recognition from S W A . This was sometime in May 1943. But
I was not convinced of his allegation until I could see the genuine orders from Head
quarters SWPA. For if I had been convinced, I would not have hesitated to affiliate
our organization with his.
"There were other officer emissaries from Mindanao who arrived in our area
at different times. . . .None of these emissaries could produce authentic credentials
that they were in contact with SWPA. . . .
"In the meantime around July 1943, contacts were made with the Eeadquarters
of O'-1 . Peralta in Panay. Col . Peralta sent us intelligence funds." (Statement of
Maj. Marcos G. Soliman, GSC, Former Exec. Off. of 81st Inf. Eegt., p. 3.)
269
And is it accurate to impute to Miranda alone all of the suspicions and hatreds
directed against this "upstart" after one of Miranda's respected subordinates (Daffon)
popular in his home community of Albuera, was brusquely slapped into Jail? And
were not tempers roiled some six months later after the territory of the WIGWF had
been invaded in violation of solemn compact, with the invading forces committing
various unseemly acts?
Finally, can we indict a leader for standing by what he considers his lawful
title to leadership, after the emissary of McLish (assertedly acting as a legate of
General MacArthur) officially confirms him in office? And after this paper of com
mission falls into desuetude, can we blame Miranda for persisting in pressing his
claims so long as he believes he has found a sponsor in the intelligence coordinator
of the Visayas, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Peralta?
The brother of one of the sector leaders of Merida questions the basis for
conferral of recognition upon Colonel Kai^leon'B outfit in words that reflect the
WIGWF's resentment:
Considering the fact that the Western Leyte Guerrilla Forces had better or
ganization, more men, and was organized long before Kangleon's guerrillas saw
the light of day, so-to-epeak. The reason advanced for this phenomenon is that
Kangleon's forces had its headquarters in Southern Leyte and was near the sub
marine base of the Americans and that contact was frequent because of proximity.-*-
Kangleon's strongest talking point is that he found disunity among the guer- 1
rilla leaders of Leyte and that he felt an obligation to rectify this condition.
But this argument is scarcely consonant with the allegation that he assumed command
with great reluctance as the only way of thwarting the conspiracy of Miranda and
Balderian to conquer the Island together. If the attribution of this strategy to
Miranda and Balderian is truly descriptive of what was occurring, then one may infer
that the two best organized outfits at the time found it possible to cooperate. Why,
then, should it be assumed that the disunited southern leaders would not have bowed
before this force majeure, perhaps with willingness when they stopped to reflect upon
^■Jose T . Pastor, The Critics K e v ie w , V o l . 1 , Ho. 1 , Oct., 1 9 4 5 , p . 2 5 .
270
the advantages of a Joint command? It is even conceivable that a sort of confedera
tion might have been established of Miranda, Balderian, and Gordon Lang as southern
spokesman, with possibly a man like Captain Erfe as chief of staff. And what ob
stacle would have blocked the acceptance of Major Soliman as Commanding Officer under
these circumstances, with the other leaders serving as sector conmanders? One might
reproach Miranda only for the tactical error of not having insisted upon Soliman's
assuming command, even if the latter had appeared unwilling.
As things developed, Kangleon did not remedy the disunity. In fact, he ac
centuated it by creating conditions through the "Baybay Affair" (and we cannot exempt
him of responsibility for this tragedy) that foreclosed any possibility of unity, ex
cept through direct fiat from GHQ,, SWPA. And Kangleon's proclamation of himself as
Commanding Officer of a recreated 9th Military District (replaced by the more re
stricted "Leyte Area Command") undermined confidence in the integrity of his proclam
ations. That he was subsequently able to set up and equip the 96th Begiment with
the arms delivered by American submarine, and assign it to operate in the territory
of the WIGWF cannot be adduced as proof of his having created a single unified com
mand. The fact is that he permitted the still functioning cadre of a well-knit or
ganization to lapse and go underground, with a wastage of manpower and impairment of
morale. We must inject at this point the charge that Colonel Kangleon also mishandled
the organization of Captain Erfe, permitting it to disintegrate in the interests of
establishing hiB own absolutism. He ignored the sensibilities of the early organizers
serving under Erfe. His abolition of the Guerrilla Warfare Brigades and his setting
up in their stead of simple VG organizations meant a psychological deflation for all
concerned. This was also a displacement of power relationships— even if largely of
a fictitious sort. For the municipal functionaries within Erfe's zone, accustomed
to leading relatively simple civilian lives, there was a sense of exhilaration in
playing at soldier— especially since there was a genuine element of danger under the
conditions of enemy occupation, ^rfe'e laissez-faire policy was preferred to the
expected autocracy of Kangleon's regime.
271
It is the absolutism, the rigidity of the man Kangleon that really deserves
censure. Had he shovn administrative flexibility, he could easily have brought
Miranda and Erfe into the fold. He -would have granted the Justification of these nen
and their followers in suspecting an escapee from a Japanese concentration camp, and
would have taken steps to rid himself of this taint. He would have recognized the
advisability of placating the men who endured the hardships of pioneering, and would
have behaved with humility. Perhaps, like Major Soliman, he might have served as
chief of staff, thus demonstrating a personal eminence high above considerations of
private prestige. Ee would have toured the units in the other sectors as an inspir
ational leader, not as a harsh generalissimo come to subdue refractory rivals. He
would, in suitable ceremony, have publicly acknowledged the contributions of both
leaders and followers in these other sectors, emphasized the residual autonomy that
would be vouchsafed them even after unification, and pointed up the advantages of a
unifier) comnand. In all these things Kangleon blundered egregiously. Even if we
credit him with unsullied patriotic motivation, even if we show that he led an ab
stemious life and was not interested in furthering his personal advantages, we can
not help but deplore his high-handed unconciliatory manner.
Kangleon in many ways was quite provincial minded. The followers of Miranda
and Erfe stress the fact that each of these two leaders was an Ilocano, and therefore
detested by the haughty type of Visayan. And Kangleon was haughty. This writer dis
covered that in his interview with Kangleon. In fact, his own personal impressions
of the man, admittedly non-objective, cause him to lend credence to those who main
tain that Kangleon voluntarily surrendered to the Japanese in Mindanao. In private
conversation, Kangleon showed himself to be a dogmatic racialist, the kind who Is
smarting under alleged hauteur of the whites. Evidently, Kangleon thought thdt his
American superiors had not done right by him. Arguing from this as a springboard,
he vent on to deprecate the racial psychology of the general run of Americans. Such
a state of mind, of course, would not constitute proof cf pro-Japanese feelings. But
272
it is the sort of mentality that would "be most disposed to absorb the arguments
about a "New Order” in Asia for the Asiatics.
How Kangleon got away will remain a secret. Perhaps, like Causing and
Abay, he made promises to the Japanese, while not regarding himself as morally
bound to observe them. His return home in itself would not constitute suffi
cient proof of this construction upon his earlier record.
When art is said and done, we can still concede that once having assumed
command Kang’eon proceeded upon his task of unification with unmatched vigor,
and that he did further the principle of law and order among his subordinates.
But while appreciating the constructive achievements of Kangleon, we need not
commit ourselves to the role of vilifying Miranda.
In the last analysis, this observer holds that Kangleon's recognition
came about largely because he commended himself to Commander Parsons. And
Parsons endorsed Kangleon not only because he was the highest ranking Filipino
officer on Leyte, and because his organization seemed to meet at least minimal
military specifications, but because Kangleon seemed to embody the forces of
stability. Miranda, tainted as he was with a seeming radical populism (although
Miranda was scarcely a doctrinaire social revolutionary of the Central Luzon
brand), offended the sober-mindedness of Parsons. a pre-war and post-war busi
nessman. Proximity to the American contact men would not have sufficed to
purify Miranda of this taint. This is the story of rivalry among the guer-
ri H a s .
\
273
Guerrilla Sooiety
Having pieoed together the history of Leyte’s resistance movement from its
beginnings to the arrival of the American liberation forces, and having accounted
for the failure to aohieve unification, we may now proceed to an examination of the
society ruled by the guerrilla organisations. We discover, before proceeding very
far, that the society we are dealing with is one and continuous with pre-war sooiety.
True, the jolt to the customary way of life, consequent upon enemy invasion and dis
ruption of normal activities, was severe, somewhat stupefying. Howbeit, once the
course of resistance was decided upon, what followed was primarily a series of
problems in the techniques of adaptation. There was no overturning of traditional
values, no erection of new goals. How to acquire the material means for carrying
on resistance, how to integrate civilian and military activities -- these were the
sort of exercises engaging the thought of the resistance leadership.
To facilitate treatment of this material, we shall divide our analysis into two
parts, a political and an economic. In the portion concerned with things political,
we shall endeavor to understand something of the structure of guerrilla administration*
We shall examine the pattern of relationships worked out in attempting to gear civil
administration with military rule, seeking to discover the principles of successful
adjustment. Vfe shall then have something to say concerning the relationships
between the central guerrilla authorities and the sector commanders, and the cross
currents flowing between the sector commanders and the municipal officials. We
shall round out this analysis by placing randomly selected municipalities under the
searchlight of closer investigation, in order to see how some of the generalities
we discuss took shape in particular instances. In concluding this portion, we shall
note how military and civil authorities worked together to maintain law and order
in the territory under their joint control.
Turning to the portion of this analysis dealing with economic affairs, we
shall oocupy ourselves with an important idea. We shall show how the resistance
movement of Leyte, concerned primarily with the restoration of the pre-war order,
274
was led to spin out a set of controls, oarrying with it the potential revamping of
that pre-war order. In separate sections, we shall look to guerrilla methods of
subsistence and procurement, the regulation of private property, the restriction of
commerce, the control of prioes, and the emission of currency. We shall also take
notice of certain public service functions of guerrilla government, the special
position of municipal finance in the guerrilla area, and the subject of poor relief.
The Political Structure of Resistance in Leyte
In Leyte, ve find a variety of organizational forms evolving to meet the
peculiar needs of resistance. In clarifying this situation, we must repeat what we
have already mentioned; Leyte lacked a pre-war political-social organization working
for revolutionary or even reformist objectives, and having a well-defined, disciplined
structure streamlined to implement policy. Thus Leytean resistance was deprived of
the know-how provided by a political party schooled in the techniques of organized
opposition, whether legal or underground. Under the circumstances, resistance had
to be organized from the ground up, under untutored leadership and scarcely
comprehending followership.
Y.'e must further bear in mind that no leader of stature, on the provincial
scene of Leytean political life, attempted rallying the people to resist. As
already pofntod cut, the surrender order in Leyte was made by the American commander,
Colonel Cornell. In the interim botvre-.r. the tombing of !.anile, and the Japanese
invasion of Leyte, the provincial officials had looked to the Quezon government to
give general directions from its evacuation place, and had depended upon the local
American commander for on-the-spot instructions. In the main, the incumbent
provincial and municipal office-holders were the politicians with the strongest
popular backing — or at any rate, the support of the most active of the local
agricultural and commercial interests. Their reinstallation by the Japanese, after
some days of confusion, meant that in effect, the leading local politicians were
with the invader.
275
In this situation, the only men available for organizing guerrilla warfare
were the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary officers and soldiers who had
gone into hiding, without turning in their arms, at the time of the surrender order.
To these men were later added sympathetic municipal officials, local politicians,
school teachers and others residing in sectors not penetrated in stren- th by the
Japanese military forces. Hence, it was to be expected that the military mind would
predominate in the actual operation of Leyte’s resistance movement. And it was the
attitude of the local military leader that determined the nature of civilian-military
relationships.
T<hat we shall do in xhis section is to describe some of the organizational
forms that developed within Leyte's resistance movement, attempting to locate the
center of power, and assigning some reasons for the particular contour of the
organizational structure in each case. Into this account, we shall weave brief
sketches of some of the leading guerrilla personalities, attempting to shed light
upon their motivation and evaluating their contributions. IVe shall offer some general
conclusions, and close the section with "case studies" of conditions in several
guerrilla municipalities.
Successful resistance in Leyte presupposed a close integration between the
guerrilla military leadership, and the civilian office-holders. This integration
could be brought aoout in several ways. The military leaders might govern entirely'
by decree, depending upon their subordinate sector commanders for implementation,
and prepared to coerce by force of arms where obedience was not forthcoming. Under
military aegis, some municipal civil functionaries might be permitted to continue in
office, (their discretionary authority’- extremely' circumscribed) , and liable to removal
if adjudged unsatisfactory. Or at the other extreme, the civil authorities of one
or more municipalities rr.irht call upon available soldiers in their district to
organize combat units for defensive purposes, subject to general supervision by the
civil government.
276
Between these two types, any number of intermediate forms might develop.
Thus some kind of joint war council of guerrilla military and civil authorities
might be organized responsible for the formulation of general policy of a total
natureo This council might then allocate duties on a purely functional basis,
with the military leaders directing the combat phase and the civilians in charge of
the politioal-economio-social phase. Decisions concerning the interrelation of
military strategy and supply with civil affairs would be worked out in keeping
with the total picture.
In another type of war council, the military component would prevail.
Under these circumstances the civil authorities might be called in for intelligence
regarding general conditions amoung the population (economic activity, health, morale,
etc). The civilian leaders would also be briefed on impending military decrees
so that they might aid in the execution, paving the way for prompt acceptance by
the mass of the population.
Resembling the aforementioned type, but somewhat more democratic, would
be the council summoning civilian leadership in a genuine consultative capacity.
Under this arrangement the military chieftains would sincerely endeavor to weigh
popular sentiment respecting general and specific issues. The military would
invite the civilian representatives to air popular desires and grievances, and
would then take these views into account before declaring policy and promulgating
orders affecting the civilian population.
Finally, we call attention to a hybrid military organization, with
first-line guerrilla troops under direct military leadership, and with auxiliaries
(drawn from the general male population) under civil leaders inducted into the
guerrilla organization. Under this plan, civil and military leadership would
together evolve an over-all program.
277
The Guerrilla War Counoil
One of the earliest guerrilla groupings was effectuated at Alangalang by
Filemon Pabilona, a Philippine Army sergeant, With Lieutenant Luciano Bonioillo
(former Commanding Officer of Company "L", Leyte Provisional Regiment) acting as
his adviser, Pabilona set out to enlist the good will and active support of the
civilian population. The two men worked out an ingenious, if somewhat cumbersome
arrangement, which they called the Guerrilla War Council. Its officers were drawn
from the educated elements in Alangalang. By associating the local luminaries with
their own efforts to stamp out lawlessness and subsist their guerrilla men,
pabilona and Bonicillo hoped to enhance the presitge of their organization. The
roster of officials (according to Bonicillo) listed Lodesto Gatela, a local
politician, as president; Vicente Ripalda, a prominent attorney, as vice-president;
Tomas Tobias, a school teacher, as secretary; and Juan Pla, another teacher, as
treasurer. The Guerrilla Y.'ar Council dedicated itself to prosecuting the struggle
against the enemy and suppressing banditry. This body remained largely conciliar,
and did not arrogate to itself legislative or executive functions. Treasurer Pla
and his assistants solicited voluntary contributions both in kind and in cash, in
behalf of the guerrilla. The War Council also took it upon itself to keep tabs on
the people dwelling in the poblacion (town center), and root out espionage in
support of the Tacloban government*
The towns of San Riguei, Babatngon and Barugo established like bodies, made
up of their prominent citizens, and carrying on similar functions. The Alangalang
Council, Bonicillo stated (in interview), sought to establish a hegemony over its
counterparts through a loose confederation called the Leyte Guerrilla Council*
However, the expansionism of Alangalang was resisted. We might add that the
general structure of the Alangalang Guerrilla War Council and its purposes and
functions were set forth in a constitution with preamble, framed largely by
278
Bonicillo, and used as a model by San Miguel and Babatngon and Barugo.^
Pabilona was hailed as guerrilla chieftain by these four towns. He
organized Volunteer Guards for each, regarding them as his auxiliaries. According
to the general run of testimony, he was favorably looked upon by the civilians as
both an intrepid fighter against the enemy, and a fair, law-abiding man in his dealings
with the general population. He affiliated with the tnen-Lieutenant Balderian, and
became Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 95th Infantry Regiment.
The influence of the Guerrilla War Councils was confined to a fairly small
district of four municipalities. As ad hoc bodies, they were useful in bringing
about a unified policy for the population of the area, in maintaining order, and
in demonstrating the possibilities of a happy working relationship between the
military and civilian leadership. ' The further development of this arrangement
was inhibited by the unwillingness of three of the municipalities to acknowledge
the headship of the fourth Alangalang. From this case, the lesson was drawn that
further unification would await the setting up of some structure permitting the
fuller participation of local politicians on a wider basis. It remained for
Alejandro Balderian to point the way.
Suggestive of the varied functions of the Guerrilla bar Council were the
instructions addressed to a civilian official:
"You are directed to audit'receipts and expenditures of public funds and to
examine all records of accountability in the custodies of the municipal treasuries
of Alangalang, Babtngon, Barugo, and San Liguel and report immediately to this office
statements of the financial status of each municipality. . ."
(Felimon Pabilona, kajor, Northern Sector, Leyte Guerrilla Forces 3 Nov. 42
kemo to: kr. Vicente Ripalda, Vice-President Leyte Guerrilla Council)
p
The story of how the guerrilla of Norther Leyte organized a government to
stamp out banditry during the early months of the Japanese occupation was revealed
in Tacloban by Pedro V. Calo, who was chief intelligence officer of the Hill
Fighters. . . To meet this problem, the guerrilla formed the Leyte Guerrilla bar
Council under the leadership of Modesto Cadela.
"The council decreed the death penalty for any bandit, and it only reouired
one execution to put an end to this lawlessness. The. • .council also refused to
recognize the imperial government of Japan and provided that anyone who gave such
recognition should answer with his life.. . •"
(Leyte-Samar Free Philippines, Tacloban, Leyte - Vol. I, No. 39, Far. 18, 1945, p.2)
279
The Politico-Military Government
Lieutenant Balderian, stocky of build, swarthy, and wearing a conspicuous
black handlebar moustache di-d not look like the typical Filipino.^- His portly and
somewhat fierce bearing at once singled him out, A novice in the field of lav;, he
found his career cut short by the outbreak of the war. He was recalled to duty as
a reservist, and became an officer in the Leyte Provisional Regiment. His fighting
spirit rebelled against surrender to the Japanese at the time of Colonel Cornell’s
capitulation order. He chose the course of resistance, organizing a small unit that
operated between his home tovm of Dagami and nearby Jaro. Y.'ith an old time soldier,
Damian Dadula, he busied himself gathering arms and ammunition, reoonnoitering, and
establishing contact with other guerrilla units of North and East Leyte. By the end
of November, 1942, Balderian was convinced that the time was ripe for convoking a
regional conference. Advising him in these moves were two local politicians of some
prominence, Attorney (and post-war Congressman) Atilxano Cinco of Dagami, and Attorney
(and post-war Governor) Hamerto Ribo of Jaro.
Balderian’s first step was to undertake an exploratory conference in Capoocan
on December 4, 1942, where he sounded out the attitudes of the principal leaders of
North West Leyte, Ser-eant Felix Pananian, Captain Corpin, and Dr. Posuncuy. The
meeting v.as successful. It was agreed unanimously that the resistance movement would
be immeasurably strengthened through the achievement of unification. It was further
felt that the fullest mobilization of civilian effort could be accomplished through
an over-all regional go ernment, which might expand into a government for -the entire
province. Reorganization of municipal governments would also be necessary. It was
resolved to hold a follow-up plenary conference, with delegations from all sectors
present in strength, at which time the instruments of government might be fashioned.
Înterview: Balderian’s residence in Dagami, Leyte, 1945, while the latter

was on terminal leave from the First Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army.
280
On December 14, 1942, some 60 delegates (interview: Attorney Ribo) gathered
together from the towns of north and east Leyte. Among those present were Attorney
Cinco, Dr. Jose Lucinario (physician), Dr. Cesario Sudario (dentist), all of Dagami;
Attorney Alberto Aguja, Attorney Santiago Tonelete, Dr. Posuncuy (physician), and
Mr. Rocha (formerly assistant clerk of the Court of 1st Instance) from Carigara;
Attorney Ribo, Councilman Eusebia Go, and Eustaquio Ligutan (of the Provincial
Auditor’s Office) from Jaro; Generoso Alvarado and Enrique Potente (of the Provincial
Auditor’s Office) from Palo; Mr. Boco of Tanauan; Mr. Barantes (former supervising
teacher) from Alangalang; Gregorio Suria (head of the local Volunteer Guards) from
Tolosa; and other local dignitaries, in addition to the military leaders and their
assistants.
A guerrilla division, the 92nd Infantry Division (not to be confused with the
division of the same designation subsequently created by Colonel Kangleon), was
launched, with Balderian as Commanding Officer, breveted a colonel. His staff was
drawn in good measure from the organization of Pamanian, North Leyte leader. Vfithin
the command were three regiments and a Headquarters Combat Detaohment.
The organization created at this convention was duplex. Besides being a
combat division, it constituted the germ of what was called the Politico-Military
Government of Leyte, with its capital at Carigara. Balderian became Politico-Military
Governor. His regimental commanders were the Deputy Governors of each of three
districts. A fourth district existed only in plan, and remained to be organized.
(it was to take in lov;er Abuyog and the municipalities on the south-east coast)
The responsibilities of the deputy governors i'cluded supervision of the municipal
governments within their respective jurisdictions, assistance to the police and other
law-enforcement agencies in the event of civil disorder, protection of the civilian
population against the enemy, and making provision for subsistence of the guerrilla
troops with the aid of the cooperating local authorities.
Of the civilian functionaries invested with "provincial" authority at this
281
time, we must note: Provincial Secretary - Attorney Ribo; Adviser on Justice (a
special post) - Attorney Cinco; Provincial Treasurer - E. Ligutan; Provincial Auditor -
E. Potente; Divisional Surgeon and Chief Health Officer - Dr, Yfalstrom; Chief of
Chaplaincy - Padre Dominador Sudario; Fiscal - Attorney Cononoy (who subsequently
declined to serve); Judge of the Court of 1st Instance - Attorney Floro Cordero of
Burauen (after the refusal of Judge Cabahug to accept).
Early in January, the convention reconvened, this time at Carigara. This
gathering dedicated itself to drafting a policy that would guide the new regional
government in its operations. First, the convention had to consider the recruitment
of personnel to staff the posts in the reorganized municipal G o v e r n m e n t s O n this
matter, it was decided to empower the old Commonwealth employees and functionaries
to resume their positions, but to perform in accordance with all regulations emanating
2
from the newly established central government. Another major problem was the com
batting of inflation, - an inflation which exercised an enervating influence upon
1
A guerrilla civilian functionary described the operation of local government
in three municipalities: "I have visited Tanauan, Dagami, and Pastrana, and there
I found out that they have loaned almost all the funds they oould collect to the Army.
In Dagami, the officials and employees -were being paid by the municipal treasurer at
a uniform rate of P5.00 per month. In Pastrana, when visited, the payments of
salaries were behind some eight months. It seemed however that the officers and em
ployees of the various municipal governments were willing to share their lot with the
volunteer guards who were serving the people without thought of compensation."
(Potente, op. oit., pp. 13-14)
'Balderian may have looked to an order emanating from the Headquarters of
McLish in Mindanao as sanction for the organizational wheels he had set in motion:
"Lt. Lloyd Y.'aters, Inf., U.S. Army, contact officer of this Division, is being
sent to your respective sectors by this Hq. to inform you of the assimilation of your
units into this Hq., under the command of Brig. Gen. YY. \Y, Fertig.
"Hereafter, you are all directly under this Hq....
"It is the policy of this Hq. to retain pioneers or organizers of each sector
in command of same. . • •
"Pursuant to the policies of the Commanding General, USFIP, Sector Commanders

are hereby instructed to help immediately reestablish the civil governments in their
respective sectors to function. . . .Provincial and municipal officials under the
Commonwealth government. . . .who have not manifested pro-Jap leanings will be called
to carry on the civil government wherever said civil officials are available. . . . "
(E. HcLish, Lt. Col. Inf., Hq. 110th Division. Memo to: All Unit Commanders: Bohol,
Leyte, Samar, Feb. 20, 1943, Par. 1-3,7.) *
282
governmental activities in undermining popular morale and increasing the burden of
governmental finanoing. It was decided to delegate responsibility for maintaining
prioe control to the separate municipalities, urging them to enact by local ordinanoe
a schedule of reasonable prioes, to which all businessmen must adhere on pain of legal
penalty. The scale of prices was to be rigged at a moderate advance over the pre-war
range. (Thus, rice that had been averaging P5 per cavan in pre-war times might now
go on sale at P7.) Finally, and perhaps most important, the government proposed to
deal with the problem of subsistence by embarking upon a full-fledged program of
maximum land utilization. Increased cultivation would mean more foodstuffs for all.
It was agreed that civilians in occupied towns would be permitted to go to the farms
to procure food supplies, with the tacit proviso that they pass on information respect
ing enemy troop strength and movements as well as information about the current
activities of the current government."'
Alluding to the activities of the new government, an active civilian guer-
rillero wrote:
The sanitary inspectors have been mobilized at that time to campaign for
the sanitation and improvement of living conditions of the evacuees. Agri
cultural inspectors were waging intensive campaigns for the production of
food. The teachers were assigned to canvass homes to take census of the
families, t^ teach home industries, and for the dissemination of information
on the Y.'ar.'J
Alejandro Balderian was a man of personal ambition. Young, intelligent,
and educated, he nourished secret thoughts of building up a political future in his
home province by vanning a reputation as an intrepid fighter and a capable adminis
trator. In ordinary times, men vrith established reputations, and greater political
talents, such as Attorney Atilano Cinco of Dagami, and Attorney ksmerto Ribo of Jaro
nalderian* s intelligence officer, Posuncuy, used to keep lists of his civilian

informants who spied upon the Japanese, in his G-2 office. During the mopping-up drive,
the Japanese raided this office, seizing the lists as well as a highly confidential
diary (kept by Krs. Briccio Aguilos, wife of Posuncuy*s assistant) as containing con
siderable data on guerrilla act-vities. Naturally, the seizure of these documents by
the Japanese exposed many Filipinos to the harsh punitive measures of the conqueror.
^Potente, op. cit., p. 13.
283
might have obstructed his political career. As it was, these two men, associated with
his organization, might actually help advance his future. Such considerations, set
against the background of his own legal training, disinclined Balderian to the employ
ment of unnecessary strong-arm tactics in his administrative procedures*
On the other hand, Balderian had within his command as unit leaders such ruth
less, law-defying men as the notorious Antonio Cinco, the brigand, I'.arcial Santos,1
and perhaps a shade more cautious, the Centinos. These men respected naught but
superior force, and responded primarily to incentives of personal gain. Balderian
was foroed by these truculent personalities into winking at certain abuses in order
to forestall mutiny. The civilians within Balderian1s jurisdiction were the sufferers
whenever such lapses occurred.
By investing military command with plenary powers, through the device of the
Politico-ldilitary Governor and his deputies, Balderian foreclosed the possibilities of
independent check in the event of abuse, and also sidestepped bringing in the people
in the business of policy planning and implementation. Theoretically, his advisers
on civil affairs, taken in conjunction with the apparatus of lav/ courts and municipal
governments, constituted an independent force. But the local governments were pre
served intact chiefly as instrumentalities to do the bidding of the military in levy
ing tames and subsisting the troops, (in fact, there is evidence of petty factionalism
j*
on the municipal level abetted by the military. That is to say, the local politicos
supported Balderian and in return expected his acquiesence and backing in their efforts
to dislodge and eliminate political rivals. There is evidence of such influences in
Dagami, Burauen, and some of the other towns.) And the advisers wore more concerned
with smoothing the going for Balderian than xn curbing the actions of uhe military
for the benefit of the populace.
*A fitting epitaph for Santos found its place in the report of the puppet
Governor of Leyte for June, 1943: "Tacloban. . . .thrilled at the news or t.'arcial
Santos’ death, bloodiest bandit of them all. . . ." (Actg. Gov. Salazar, Report of
Activities: April 1 - October 31, 1S43. To: Commissioner of Interior through Dir.
of Local Governments.)
284
Could Balderian's organization have Brought about the unification of the
guerrilla forces on Leyte under his command? Probably not."*” He was opposed by the
guerrilla leaders of South Leyte. But he did establish a friendly accord with the
West Coast of the Island, controlled by the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces.
A duumvirate kiranda, and Balderian enjoyed favorable omens at one time. We shall
therefore proceed to consider the WLGWF.
The W. L. G. Y,r. F.
Bias E. kiranda was either a mountebank or something of a genius. The present
writer met him during the early Liberation period, when kiranda was assigned on
temporary duty from the 1st Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army, to an American
installation, charged with putting up a Red Cross recreation hall for the troops,
kiranda had been trained before the war as an engineer, and vent about his work with
an air of surety. Small of stature and of boyish visage, kiranda did not immediately
impress one as the commander of a guerrilla division, much less the alleged exe
cutioner of many.
To engage kiranda in conversation for any length of time was to come under
the spell of a very magnetic personality. A fertile mind and articulate tongue held
their audience captive, relating, while eyes glistened nostalgically, the story of
One of Balderian's heretofore trusted subordinates voiced certain misgivings:

". . . .1 for one have taken the initiative in the creation and organization of the
Northern Levte sector. . . .but for the sake of unity. . , .1 submitted to you. . . .
Y,hen I did so, however, I did not have the intnetion cf completely obliterating the
distinct and separate personality of my sector. . . .Any meddling or interference. .
. .will be carefully scrutinized by me and I will act only if I am convinced that such
action will redound to the benefit. . . .of the people in my sector................
"Provincial officials have been appointed, who, by she very nature of their
positions, will naturally assume jurisdiction in my sector. You will easily under
stand how jealous and solicitous I am for my powers and prerogatives after all the
efforts that I have exerted towards the normalization cf conditions in my sector. . . .
I do not want it understood that i am antipathetic. . . .to the provincial government.
I will cooperate in every way. . . .but with this qualification; that I will always
have the power to overrule. . . .As I also stand ready to be accountable. . . .for
the civil administration. . . .of my sector, it is tut fair and just that. . . .1 also
possess the. . . .commensurate authority."
(Felix I... Pamanian, Bvt Lt.-Col., Inf., Regtl Cmdr. A Deputy Governor 15 April 1S45
kerne to: The CO b Lili. Prov. Gov., Northern-Eastern Leyte Sector, pp. 2,5,5)
285
one man’s efforts to "build a guerrilla organization out of nothing. His enemies
called him an empty braggart capitalizing upon a glib tongue to rook the credulous;
his friends swore by his superior ability and driving enthusiasm. This was the man
who had hoped to become chieftain of the Leytean guerrilla forces, and who held out
against fusion under other leadership when balked in his ambition.
Unlike Balderian, kiranda was not a native Leyteno. Indeed, he was of
Ilocano extraction, — the ethnic sub-group of mountainous northern Luzon, alike
despised and feared by the more "insular" of the Visayans. kiranda attributed
his unpopularity in certain quarters, and particularly Colonel Kangleon’s dislike
of him, to his place of origin. At any rate, he found himself a 1st lieutenant of
the Philippine Constabulary commanding the Crmoc detachment, before the outbreak of
the war. And he was among those who refused to lay down arms at the time of the
surrender order.
He is known to Americans principally through his two American detractors,
I.D. Richardson and Joseph St. John. Neither had come face-to-face with kiranda.
Thus St. John: "I never met him, nor any of his men, so I had to pick up the
story from the guerrillas who did not like him, and the people. None of the
people liked kiranda."-*-
St. John could find no good to say of kiranda:
In the first place, they knew he was a third lieutenant in the Philippine
Army before the war. That is about like a warrant officer in our Army.
Bingo, come the war, and he takes over in southern western Leyte. He
made himself a brigadier general, no less. Filipinos have a rood sense of humor,
and they laughed when none of his men was looking. But they could not laugh at
what he did.
He taxed the people heavily. . . .He took rice from the people, and chickens
and pigs and carabao and cloth................................................
But his main idea was to make himself rich and powerful. He wanted to come
out of the war as the strong man of Leyte, the big-shot, with too much money and
too many men for anybody to hurt him.^
"'"St. John, op. clt., p. 90
^Tbid., pp. 90-1
286
Richardson's account, while differing in detail, was equally vituperative:
. . . .This Miranda was what is called in mixed company a picturesque

character. His real name is supposed to have been Blasmeyer. He had been a
second lieutenant in the Philippine Army at the start of the war. After
the surrender he promoted himself to be general and started his own borobo --
guerrilla force. He is a quick boy with a bolo, and his borobo thrived.^-
Both St. John and Richardson, very reliable as sources of information on
so many subjects connected with Leyte's resistance movement, simply permitted their
O
loyalty to Colonel Kangleon’s organization to prejudice their judgment of Kiranda.
The formal organization of the Y.'LCnYF was the culmination of a unifying
process that began -when Lieutenant Miranda first sought out groups beyond his small
mountain camp. It represented both resoluteness and pliability — and ability to con
vince the other guerrilla leaders that their own contributions in furthering resistance
would be respected by their investment v/ith authority in their respective sectors,
while subtly warning them that refusal to join up might result in their deprivation
of leadership. Above all, though, this patient, sustained spadework sought to
demonstrate the advantages of a unified command for the vigorous prosecution of
a mission all were implicitly engaged in furthering. Through his liaison, kiranda
remained in constant touch with the sector commanders, promulgating common policy
vis-a-vis the invader and Filipino collabcrctionists, and advising on organizational
problems, meanwhile, each of the sectors had been materially strengthened by the
accession of USAFFE officers with practical experience in the problems of military
command. At first, they remained passive, merely observing the procedures adopted
by the guerrilla. Eventually, a sense of patriotic obligation impelled them to
"H'.'olfert, op. cit., p. 112
2
As for Iliranda's assumption of a "generalship", the same nay be said
of Fertig in Mindanao, moreover, Kangleon himself did not forbid the attribution
to himself of a brigadier's rank by some of his subordinates, as military orders
prepared by his adjutant attest. The long and short of the matter is that any
guerrilla officer, aspiring to command a guerrilla division, was obliged to
assume the corresponding rank.
237
report for duty, and place their capacities at the disposal of the local guerrilla.
To them must he added the continuous influx of enlisted men, stragglers from Luzon
and soldiers separated from their commands all over the Archipelago, determined to
resist the enemy from their new base of operations. The growing might of the
guerrilla made a profound impression upon the civilians, and induced the men of
combat age to apply for admission either as combatant or as reservist.
Miranda tested the sentiment of the various sub-sector commanders regarding
their willingness to attend a conference to explore the feasibility of setting up a
unified organization, operating on strict military lines. He found an overwhelming
sentiment in favor of unification. Thereupon he convoked a conference in December
of 1S42, attended by the principal guerrilla chieftains of '..'est Leyte. Among, those
present were two regular officers who outranked him, major Marcos Soliman and
Captain Aristoteles Olaybar. kiranda alleged (interview) that he proffered the
command to Soliman, but the latter declined, in recognition of Miranda’s pioneer
services. Both Soliman and Olaybar corroborate this assertion, but hedged on whether
Eiranaa made the offer in good faith or merely as a gallant gesture. (Olaybar, in
particular, hinted that there were times subseouently when both of them chafed under
the leadership of Miranda)
În a letter to Col. Peralta of Paray, Maj. Soliman explained how he came to
join the Y.XGVF:
"As for me, I believe I have done my part in the Davao front. I claim no
honors except that I was the only Filipino officer who was never relieved by an
American officer of my duties as executive of my regiment, I had been recommended
to Lt.-Colonelcy as early as January 15 / l 942/but I only got my Major’s rank about the
latter part of April. This, I attributed to the fact that T was unfortunate to be
assigned under an American Brigade Commander who was very much prejudiced against
Filipino officers. /T.agleon, also with the 81st Inf., similarly complained in the
course of an interview with this w r i t e ^ At any rate, I won a Silver Star in one of
our engagements. ...................................................................
"I am proud to tell you that only 10fc of the officers and enlisted personnel
of my regiment surrendered or were caught by the Japs. They refused to surrender upon
my orders. . . . "
" . . . .the old spirit of once a soldier always a soldier found me hitched to
the wagon again and I joined 1st Lt. Bias E. Miranda, formerly CO of the 2nd Leyte
Company, PC, in Crmoc. I told him frankly that in spite of my former rank, I was
288
Under the guerrilla rule, functions appertaining to the military in a
stricter sense were commingled with civil functions. This tended to blur the
separation of powers between the different branches of government, since an all-
powerful military executive could override obstacles interposed by the local
authorities. Practical expediency, the desire to retain the confidence of the
populace and to receive the utmost material support from the civilians, restrained the
military from usurping plenary powers and exercising them in tyrannical fashion. On
the other hand, to the extent that the civil authorities threw in their lot with the
cause of resistance, to that extent they exposed themselves to punitive action
from the occupying power, and of necessity leaned heavily upon the armed forces
of resistance for protection. This implied submission to such policies and controls
as were deemed necessary by the military in the working out of a unified plan of
resistanc o.
The Y.'LGV.F never set up a provincial civil government for the zone it
controlled.Instead, it encouraged the municipal authorities of the five sectors
in its zone to carry on their normal functions, while its own C-HO. would provide the
needed coordination.
As Adjutant-General and first Chief-of-Staff, Conrado Sabellino was invested
with blanket authority to act in the name of the Commanding General, kiranda.. Kot
only would Sabellino handle disputes among the officers and attempt to compose the
differences, he was also empowered to incr ire into disagreements between the sector
willing to serve under him, in any capacity. lie appointed me Chief-of-Staff and
at the same time, Commandant of a Service School for officers which we organized
and have been operating since January." (karcos G. Soliman, k.ajor, 81st Inf.
To: "Dear k.ac" /Peralta/ June 5, 1943 , pp. 3-4) (Also see: kiranda, op. cit.,
p. 2) “
^■A former officer of the YkLGbF engineer corps, Lt. Coloma, (directly
associated with kiranda in the ordinance shop), declared that in early 1943,
confidential conversations were taking place between the emissaries of Balderian
and kiranda regarding an organizational fusion, that might have placed Balderian
at the head of Leyte's civil administration.
(Interview: Florencio B. Coloma, 2nd Lt. - lianila, 1946)
289
military and civil authorities and attempt conciliation. Failing in that, he might
ordain his ovm arbitrament. Investigation into the activities of alleged collabo
rationists added a judicial character to his office. It 7/as hardly possible for a
man to 'wield such sv/eeping authority without creating personal enemies. This was
the fate of Sabellino. Reports began to drift into the headquarters of Miranda
that his Chief-of-Staff was subtly undermining the authority of the Commanding
General by taking personal credit for the accomplishments of the Y.XOMF. Miranda's
position was a very precarious one. Even if these rumors were unfounded, he could
not afford the risk. Accordingly, Sahellino was recalled, and placed under
investigation. T.'hen restored, it was in the capacity of Deputy Chief-of-Staff,
The second Chief-of-Staff, and the man who held this post until the Japanese
assault on the GTD was Major Marcos C-. Soliman, a soldier well-qualified for these
responsibilities. To him, Miranda delagated practically all administrative
responsibility, 'Whenever a question of top-level policy was at issue, kiranda
reposed full faith in the soundness of Soliman’s judgment. And Soliman1s policy
might be summed up as a two-fold proposition: a) good relations with the civil
authorities through a just administration; b) hewing to the line of military
correctness within the Y.LGY/F in order to qualify for recognition from GHQ, SY.T“A.
Perhaps Soliman inwardly resented Miranda’s failure to relinquish the commanding
generalship to horn. As to his loyalty, hov/ever, there could be no question. Despite
repeated attempts, Kangleon could not detach Soliman from the V.LGD?,
From an organizational standpoint, perhaps the greatest weakness of the
TLCa F arose from Miranda's refusal to 1eave his ovm strongly -uarded headquarters,
end undertake a tour of inspection throughout -he MX GY? zone. This in itself
would account for some of the abuses perpetrated b,r certain sub-sector and sector
commanders, who felt secure in their relative remoteness from Glih. It was this self-
imposed confinement that made Miranda unaware of certain developments, particularly
the unpopularity of the Rodriguez command in the Baybay sector. But Miranda was
290
convinced that the omnipresent agents of Kangleon would assassinate him at the
first unguarded appearance. Extradordinary precaution was his only safeguard.^"
Municipal ordinance in the IVLGW? zone did not take effect before
ratification by the GHQ. As liaison, a special Civil Affairs Office was created,
headed by Attorney Teleron, Judge Advocate General. The duties of the Civil
Affairs Officer were primarily the transmission of general instructions from the
GHQ, to the municipal mayors, and the screening of municipal ordinances. According
to Teleron, the YfLGMF issued a bulletin declaring that all municipal ordinances
not disallowed within 15 days after promulgation would be regarded as having full
force of law. And the grounds of disapproval might range from ultra-vires in the pre
war sense of the term to inexpediency. Teleron gives an example of the vacating
of a Merida ordinance proposing the dismantlement of an old public school building
in order to use the materials in the erection of a guerrilla building at Barrio
Katlang, Merida. Inasmuch as public school buildings were national property during
the Commonwealth regime, (and not provincial or municipal), the local authorities
were foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction over these buildings.
To what extent did the regimental commander interfere with the municipal
administration? Vicente Villegas, Academic Supervisor of Vest Leyte after the
war and Superintendent of schools for the VLG.'F would reject this question as calling
for too simple an answer. Actually, much depended upon the personality of the mayor
and the character of the sector commander. In Palompon, Mayor Pari11a was a weak
personality and the sector commander was the dominating figure."
^Miranda received an anonymous warning: "• . . .1 regret to respectully

inform. . . .that Lieut. CdL Ruperto Kangleon. . . .sent his henchman — Lieut.
Regner — to our Cebu Northern Sector and maliciously informed us that you and your
men are to be shot on sight if ever you care to come to Cebu with your men. . . .
"The undersigned is a mere corporal. . . .who sympathized with you. I know
that the accusations. . . .against you are absolutely false and unfounded. * . ."
(Juan De La Cruz, your former soldier and friend To: Brig. Gen. Miranda
June 9, 1943)
Interview: Capt. A. Olaybar, in command for the Y.XGYF at Palompon),
Tacloban, 1945)
In Merida, on the other hand, under the more forceful personality of Menesis, the
mayorality retained much of its normal power* In AlhuBra, the popular regimental
commander Ccnrado Daffon, "the local fair-haired boy", got along amicably with
mayor Barte, so that there was no conflict of wills. The Japanese occupation of
Ormoo put the poblaoion beyond the reaoh of the guerrilla. But the "military mayor",
administering the municipal "government in exile" in the mountain seat, was directly
under the thumb of Miranda1s GHQ. Baybay, further removed, was largely controlled
by Sergeant (guerrilla Major) Rodriguez.
Where a working relationship was established between the regimental commander
of the sector and the municipal mayor, the Municipal Council was content to let
things be. In general, the municipal council would function in a self-restraining
fashion, sensing the desires of the WLGWF, and not introducing measures calculated
to bring on a veto. The council of Palompon might be regarded as the norm in its
functioning. According to Vicente Villegas, it rarely met, allowing full initiative
to the regimental commander in the sponsoring of proposals. When it did convene, how
ever, the regimental commander scrupulously refrained from dictating an agenda. In
Merida, (according to the regimental S-3 Pastor), the Municipal Council on its own
initiative submitted pending measures to the guerrilla author! tics for approval.
This was also true of Albuera. In the Ormoc sector, the GHQ rather than the regi
mental commanders (2 regiments here) generally sponsored measures for action by
the guerrilla municipal government.
The combination of a Japanese offensive at the end of 1943 and American
recognition of Colonel Kangleon as official guerrilla leader of Leyte reduced the
WLGfVP to the status of a paper organization, but with an abiding esprit de corps
among its scattered remnants. Despite its defects and the abuses it may have
tolerated in its first period of expansion, the WLGiVF was sounder structurally than
any of its rivals. While integrating the municipal administrations into the general
military framework for purposes of taxation, troop subsistence, and general security,
292
the military GHQ continued to allow considerable home rule to each of its five
constituent municipalities# A Civil Affairs Officer associated with GHQ brought
about .the needed inter-municipal coordination of programming, and also acted as an
independent cheok on administration by the sector commanders. There is evidence
that kiranda would have set up a provincial government under a civilian governor
had he received American appointment as guerrilla commander of Leyte. Perhaps the
character of the TILG.'.T would have undergone complete remodeling under those
circumstances. But .judging by what was, we may say that the LLGJF showed the
possibilities of achieving a high degree of efficiency while not abolishing democratic
proc edure.
"TJSAFFE ALL"
As the menace of Japanese invasion drew nearer daily, the Leyte home force was
actively mapping out a defense. It was ap_;reed that the local forces would fall back
upon the mountainous sector of Burauen. Among the Filipino officers responsible for
action in this sector was one, Captain Glicerio Erfe. V/hen the majority of his fellow
officers surrendered to the Japanese, Erfe withdrew and went into hiding. Hot long
after, he was busy gathering all unsurrendered TJSAFFE soldiers who were prepared to
plunge into resistance against the enemy."'-
Tlrfe dilated upon the guerrilla mission in a letter to a brother guerrilla

leader: "The TJSAFFE is but only one organization. After the êneral order for
surrender those officers and soldiers who surrendered were called USAFFE but those
soldiers who aid not surrender are called USAFFE AT LARGE. . . .The group to
•which you and I belong, believing that it was due to a higher cause. . . .which is
much higher than discipline itself, which is the only purpose for which those that
are now in the coneentration camp have surrendered. . . .has prompted us not to
surrender........ Inthe very beginning after the general surrender I found that
I happen to be the most ranking officer in the line and I believe it is my moral
obligation not only to the organization to which we belong but also to the people
of the province of Leyte in particular and the people of the Philippines in
general to subordinate myself to its needs. In this time of crisis it is for the
sake of directing towards a single effort all our resources and energies, that I
have self-appointed myself at the helm of the government....! believe myself canable
both physically and mentally. . . .However, if there is any officer ranking higher
than me in the province of Leyte, I would gladly turnover the command of the
USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte, to him. . . . "
(kemo to: Lt. Balderian, CO, East Leyte Sector — 14 Dec. 42 - "9", Cant.,
Inf.), Cmdg.
293
Captain Erfe was the highest ranking unsurrendered USAFFE officer on Leyte.
He saw himself burdened with a grave moral responsibility - the responsibility of
assuring the close working together of all other officers and enlisted men who had
thrown in their lot with resistance. This was an assumption not readily conceded by
the others, nonetheless, when Erfe proceeded to work out an organizational plan and
issue directives to the others, his authority went unchallenged. At most, we can say
that some of them tacitly disregarded his orders.
Erfe looked upon his immediate followers and the other units he learned about
as "the USAFFE at large, fighting the enemy in Leyte after the general surrender."
His purpose wcs to weld into a coordinated combat organization the scattered bands of
the USAFFE at large. He regarded his own especial zone, the municipalities of Burauen
and La Paz, for this was the site of his initial organizational activity. But Dulag
and Abuyog came 'within the circumference of h: s organizational enterprise. He decided
that the soldiery was too weal: numerically to shoulder alone the burden of active de
fense. It would be necessary to eke out the scant numbers by the founding of auxiliary
guerrilla units drawn from the civilians of fighting age. For that purpose, he en
listed the active cooperation of the municipal governments. A plan emerged:
Each municipality will be organized into guerrilla brigades commanded by a

Brigadier General. Each brigade will be composed of so many Regiments, depend
ing upon the population of the municipality; each Regiment to be organized
into 3 Battalions. The Regiment will be commanded by a Colonel with a complement
of 990 men; each company to be organized into 110 men commanded by a captain.
Each company is organized into 3 platoons of 4 squads each.
The officers shall be appointed in their respective grades and given their
oath of office. They shall receive no pay and allowances but shall with the
enlisted men be subsisted in kind with taxes to be levied in accordance with
the resolution passed by municipal council of each municipality. . .
f~Erfe 'sj
It was under his , _ command that the four municipalities got the p
Lowing designate
following designations: La Paz, 1st Guerrilla Brigade; Abuyog, 2nd; Dulag, 3rd;
and Burauen, 4th.®
^"9", Capt. Inf., Cmdg. Lay 22, 1942. To: Cmdg. Gen., USAFFE.
?
Aurillo, op. cit., p. 3.
3
Dulag was placed under the La Paz command for a short period o f time, supposed
ly for reasons of administrative convenience. The move was resented by the Dulag uni't.
(Villegas, Exec. Off., 3rd. Guer. Brig., 2,9 Larch 1943. To: Col. 9.)
294
What were to he the relations of the guerrilla brigades and the municipal
administration? One of the sector leaders reported:^-
Here is a copy of the tentative layout of the organization which was fur
nished us by Captain 9. I believe it will serve as the pattern for other
organizations. As per his instructions, each municipality will be a Brigade
under the command of the Mayor.^ The brigade commander will have his brigade
staff composing of the members of the municipal government as follows: Vice-
Mayor - Executive Officer; Secretary - S-l (Adjutant); Justice of the Peace -
S-2 (Intelligence Officer); Chief of Police - 8-3 (Plans k Training Officer);
and Municipal Treasurer - S-4 (Supply Officer) . All the members of the brigade
staff shall be appointed as captains. Then the municipality will be divided
into districts and each district shall oomoose of three barrios. The commander
of each district is a captain and is a member of the municipal council. Each
barrio will be composed of 100 selected men commanded by a lieutenant, preferably
the barrio lieutenant. These 100 men shall be called company; and inasmuch as
there are 3 companies in each district, they shall be designated as Companies
A, B, C, 1st district. The company shall then be divided into 3 platoons, each
platoon to be divided into 4 squads for tactical purposes.
It may be noted that inasmuch as the captain of a district is at the same
time member of the municipal council, the municipal councilors are still function
ing in the municipality. In the deliberation of military matters the members of
the municipal council shall be converted into war cabinet. Each district
ilamon Mercado stated that his informant was "Victorio Tiozon of Terragona,
Abuyog, and a leader of the guerrilla. . . c* learned frcn M r tlx 1 M.cir erganizatio:
which was headed by Llayor Pedro Gallego, was already under the wing of Captain 9."
2
The guerrilla government of Dulag wcs organized in the barrios while Mayor
iiicoias Bautista was still unwillingly exercising office in the poblacion (town center'
under Japanese surveillance.-
"The executive power of the Municipal Mayor became evidently felt when a
delegate, in the person of Mr. Eugenic Villegas. . . .was sent to exercise the
executive power. . . .Stealthily, as father to his children, the mayor.. . .did not
relinquish his cares over his people. How the local officials (net of the puppet
government, though some of them are also members cf the guerrilla organization within
the poblacion) has imposed upon themselves cf their own volition, the paramount duty
to keep the morale of the people, to serve the army, to maintain peace and order. . . .
"The following men were the guerri? la functicnaires cf Dulag: in 1943:
1. Mr. Fedrc Tupaz, the Chief of Police, has been Chief of Police from 1932 up to the
time when war was declared and until after Leyte has d olared its surrender, serving
ir. different municipalities. He is the C— 2 of the Guerrilla Brigade.
2. Mr. Leovegilco Radaza is recommended Acting Justice of the Pee.ce. He is a holder
cf LI. B. degree and admitted to the bar, though he did not pass. He served as Court
Interpreter ir. the Court of First Instance at Tacloban ror a period cf about 1- years.
He is the G -2 of the G.B.
5. M r . Juan Gabriola is recommended Acting Municipal Treasurer. He is the G-4 of
the G.B. He has been a teacher with two years experience and when the war broke out
he was taking his post-graduate work in Leyte Normal School.
4. Mr. Eugenic Villegas is being assigned as Acting Municipal Secretary. He was the
Military Mayor and Chief of the Guerrilla Forces of Dulag since its organization. At
present he is the Procurement and Supply Officer for the "L" Co., 95th Inf. Keg. He
has been in the teaching profession for a period of 14 years, until the war broke cut.
. • ." (Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., Acts:. Mun. Secty., Dulag. Sent ember 10.
1943. To: The Prov. <5ov. in the field, pp. 1-2.) ' *
295
commander shall he awsisted hy a district staff composed of the following: S-l

Adjutant; S-2 - Intelligence Officer; S-3 - Plans and Training Officer; and S-4 -
Supply Officer.
V.rhat is the significance of this conjoining of military and civil functions?
Ramon kercado reflected upon this unique arrangement at the outset of his associations
with Erfe:.
So in that case the Mayor, who has the rank of Major — f ~he might have re
ferred to the etymological common ancestry of these designatTonsJT* will have a
dual personality. Could that be possible? I think there will be complications. .
• »
But the local organizer sets Mercando's doubts at rest:
There can never be complications. Ca tain 9's idea is to avoid any clash
between the civil and military leaders. That is the reason why hr is appointing
the Mayor as the Brigade Commander who shall be known as the .Military Mayor and
brigade commander. Besides, the mayor being the head of the town, he is respected
b t h e people. Furthermore, in the administration of his municipality, he will
be able to get the maximum cooperation from his subordinates, as: the;/ are the same
personnel who worked with him previous to the invasion. Moreover, it would lessen
the numoer of collaborationists among the government employees by making them in
terested in the opposition. . . .If there will be two chiefs, the people would be
at a loss vs to who would be followed.
Erfe summed up:
The mission of the USAFFE AT LARGE is just pure and simple. First, to crush
the enemy in the olace they have occupied; after which such nlaces as are in our
hands should be turned over to the municipal mayor with appropriate ceremony
with instructions to continue as usual the municipal government cf the Philippine
Commonwealth. His government shall be backed up by the guerrilla brigade to help
him protect the life and property of the municipality; to eliminate fifth column
ists; and the protection of the civilians from the invaders’ patrol. The USAFFE
after turning over the government to the mayor, will be used toother fronts where
their presence is more important. The USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte, is not in any way
influenced by politicians, for that is against statutes for military men to mix
up with politics.
As soon as ell the municipalities that are now occupied by the enemy would
have been cleared end r r-turned tc normal condition, then that is the time when
the provincial government shall be established, officials of which shall compose
of the same provincial officials provided they are hot pro-Japs or in any way
influenced by the enemy. They shall be directed by the highest USAFFE officer in
command. . . .
The present and the future activities of the USAFFE AT LARGE in its relation
to civil authorities has been the object of careful planning by this Headquarters
in order that the USAFFE AT LARGE here in Leyte will not be the recioient of
criticism, ridicule, or embarrassment from the civil components of the Philippine
Hiercado, op. cit., pp. 37-9.
296
Commonwealth during and after the war
Yvere all former occupants of public office to be automatically reinstated?
Erfe specified the conditions governing the return to office of the former incumbent,
and the obligations devolving upon him:
As a general rule, all those lawfully elected or appointed to the different i

offices of the civil government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. . . .and
have been and are actually. . . .loyal to the government. . . .should be allowed
and assisted or required to return to their respective offices and to regularly
perform their respective public duties as v:ell as to exercise their legal powers
and receive their regular salaries.
All officers so appointed and returned. . . .shall be commissioned in the
Guerrilla Y.'arfare Service with the United States Army Forces in the Philippines
and shall submit their oaths of office to this headquarters.^
Erfe differentiaited between the first-string soldiery of his mobile units and
the guerrilla reservists - (comparable to the American "State Guard" of World IVar II)•
The mission cf our mobile units will be as follows:

a. To reinforce guerrilla units threatened, upon request of the Brigade
Commander.
b. To protect farmers from ^whiley7tilling their lands.
c. To assist the military mayors in enforcing law and order in their res
pective spheres.
d. Apprehension of fifth columnists, saboteurs, and spies.
In November of 1942, an agent cf General Lacario Peralta, Lieutenant Jinolan,
gatherin intelligence data in Leyte, established contact with Erfe. Lieutenant
Jinolan declared that Peralta, had been in contact with GHQ, SY/'PA, had assumed
command of the resistance movement m the Visayas, and was designating his own command
in Panay as the 4th Philippine Corps. (panay had formerly been the 6th Military
District). Thereupon, he sugrested to Erfe that the latter organize along similar
lines, perhaps adopting the designation 9th l.ilitary Corps for Leyte, the former 9th
l.ilitary District. Finally, he advised Erfe to keep in touch with Peralta and thereby ,
"9" Cant., Inf., Cmdg., 14 December, 1942. l.emo to: Lt. Balderian, CO,
East Leyte Sector.
2
Col. 9 , Inf., GHQ USAFFE -LT LAKGE, Oct. 9, 1942, Unnumbered Circular, Par.
- .
1 2
^” 9" Col., Inf., Cmdg. Memo to: Major P. Gallego, Feb. 3, 1943.
4
One of Erfe’s key officers, C-audenciro Alrr.endra, was credited by St. John with
introducing the LAS to Leyte's guerrillas: "The LAS girls were organized in the south
ern towns. . . .A Lt. Guadincio Almendra of the guerrillas got theîdea first and sent
out announcements to all the towns." (St. John, op. cit., pp. 162-3.)
297
improve his chances for recognition.
Erfe1s adjutant recorded:
. . . .that on the 1st day of December, 1942, the guerrilla units v.'ere re
organized into the IX Philippine Corps, U. S. Army. . . .and that Colonel Erfe
and other officers and enlisted men performed the mission of l.ilitary Adviser ^
and Assistant Military Instructors respectively, as per General Orders No. 1. . . .
The internal structure of the guerrilla brigades underwent a relatively minor
change but the Abuyog organization moved into the ascendancy.
The twenty-four districts commanded by guerrilla captains rose to be twenty-

four battalions, each battalion no longer to be commanded by a captain but by a
major. Gallego flavor of Abuyog^became a major-general and Landia ^cThief of
polic^*brigadier general. They were no longer on top of only the Second Guer
rilla Brigade but of all brigades under Erfe. And as for Erfe, he made himself
known as Colonel of Infantry — Military Adviser. . . .The four municipalities
were therefore grouped together under Gallego and Landia* s command, and with
Erfe as Military Adviser, bore the name, 11th Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Division,
IX Philippine Corps, IJ. S. Army.
By styling himself "Military Adviser", Erfe made it clear that he had no
aspirations to political control of his zone. He was from Luzon, and looked to the
local politicans to provide the support needed for subsisting his troops and further
ing his security program. The real influences in his organization were men like
Mayor Gallego of Abuyog and Attorney Enerlan of Burauen. In point of fact, Erfe’s
organization was the only one where relationships were reversed, and the civilian
officials helped to determine military policy. The device of the guerrilla brigades
allowed the nunicipal officials to play at being soldiers and enjoy the pomp of
officership. This was a sure ray of retaining active civilian support. On the ether
hand, it oermitted the infiltration of petty local politics into what should have been
the exclusively non-partisan and technical aspects of military organization.
Y.'hat may we say re yarding the accomplishments of Erfe’s organization? This
is how Erfe saw himself:
Through my company commanders. . . .this Headquarters was able to eliminate

political supremacy among leaders in La Paz and Abuyog; sectionalism and tribal
^Silverio T. Paza, Affidavit, January 12, 1946, Tacloban.

2
Aurillo, op. cit., p. 4.
298
prejudices were put to an end; robbers, killers, and bandits were approached,
routed, killed, or disbanded; enemy patrols relaxed and confined only to barrios
bordering occupied towns; enemy air raids suspended, except the retaliation
after the day your men encountered the Japs’ patrol from Dulag: Peace and
order reigneth; farmers returned to their farms; civilians returned to their
household duties; merchants and businessmen ply their trade again; civil govern
ments function regularly as before the invasion; civil government officials were
re uired tc return to their legal powers; Guerrilla Brigades were organized,
commanded to L.ilitary Layersjmembers of which were tc render volunteer service
to "JSFIP, inducted properly into the service in accordance with military
regulations, officers given commission and an oath of office in accordance
with the oivil service law; a Guerrilla bar Tribunal was instituted for the
trial of fifth columnists, espoionare, sabotage, treason, etc., which cannot be
tried by lower courts and to insure justice to all persons that may be brought
before it before the law; government prices on commodities of prime importance
enforced; profiteering eliminated, except on occasional cases in places vety
remote from our control; hoarding of foodstuffs prohibited; strcno consciousness
of national soldiarity has already consolidated the people’o efforts and
resources into one solid front. The complete vithdraval of Japanese forces in
Sogod, Lalitbog, Laasin, Idatalon, baybay, all towns in the Forth and their
subsequent retreat to the towns of Dulag, Burauen, Tanauan, Palo, Sta. Fe and
Tacloban was attributable to the initiative of this headquarters when, on October
1, 1942, it issued Field Orders Ho.
These claims are somewhat pretentious, though true at their core. They
represent as much Erfe's aspirations as his genuine accomplishments. For instance,
he did strive to eliminate political factionalism from Abuyog and LaPaz, but his
success was only partial. The feud between Captain Landia and I.’
,ayor Gallego in
Abuyog was only allayed, and did erupt when these two local leaders split on the
ouestion of supporting Erfe after he had fallen under the ban cf Kangleon. Again
the inspectional procedures introduced to eliminate profiteering and hoarding were
effective only intermittently, and then against only the most glaring forms. And
See also, Erfe’s declaration of objectives, especially his determination

to fight for the restoration cf liberty and independence and his struggle to unify
the resistance movement in the Province of Leyte.
a) L'emorandum to Lt. Balderian, CO, East Leyte Sector, 14 Dec. 42, "9" Col.
Inf., Cmdg.
b) Open Letter to: "All the people of Leyte" - Subject "V.'hat the USAFFE AT
LARGE and Guerrilla "barfare Units, Leyte, are Fighting For". lT Jan., ’43, "9" Col.
Inf. Cmdg.
Erfe’s former adjutant declared "that this organization has checked banditrv
which before this organization was rampant in the different places in the orovince;*
that fifth column activity was also reduced to the minimum; that the morale of the
peo;le sprung up into a fighting spirit that never wavered to follow the oath of
patriotic duty. . . ." (Silverio T. Paza, Affidavit, Jan. 12, 1946, Tacloban)
r O '
CG. I. Erfe, Subject; Reply to Letter of Earning, June 9, 1945, To: Col.
Auperto Kangleon.)
299
finally, as previously noted, the general attaok, following the issuance of Field
Order No. 9, was poorly coordinated. Whatever success was realized ■was partially
the outcome of other factors operating at the time.
1"hy did Captain Erfe defy the authority of Colone}. Kfangleon? Had'he not
spoken on many occasions of this willingness to abdicate the supreme command should
an officer of superior rank appear? Perhaps there was an element of selfishness in
Erfe; perhaps he, like IViran da (whom Erfe had also condemned) , was unwilling simply
to hand over to another the organization he himself had fathered.^ But others in
the organization, such as hayor Gallego and the "Brigade" leaders, also enjoyed a
vested interest in the perpetuation of the organization under their own leadership.
i.Ioreover, they had won a large measure of good-will from the civilian population.
They hesitated risking the dissipation of this good-will by ueeding the organization
over to new leaders who might pursue other objectives and employ different procedures,
moreover, as m the case of Liranda, Kangleon had adopted unconciliatory tactics,
ignoring the human f eelings involved on the part of those ousted from command.
To understand Erfe’s character, one must bear in mind that he was possessed
by an indomitable sense of purpose, of mission. It is with complete sincerity that
he wrote; "... .In this time of crisis it is for the sake of directing towards
a single effort all our resources and energies. . . .that I have self-appointod myself
at the helm of the government now miserably left alone due to the collapse of our
p
national defense. . . ."
Part of Erfe's disgruntle;-ent lay in kanfelon's siding with Balderian in the

Balderian-Erfe rivalry for the command of forth Leyte. Balderian explained to a
subordinate: ". . . .Captain Erfe told the story that he was the first to organize.
. . .1 stood up and asked Capt. Erfe what kind of organization did he organize,
whether it was an organization of folunteer guards or of a guerrilla, . . ."
(Alejandro Balderian, Col. Ilemo to: "Ily dear Lt. Col. Felix Pamanian". April 28,1945)
One of Erfe’s pre-invasion associates, heading the Sogod guerrilla group, ad
vised: " . . . .This is the time we have to third: of others and not of ourselves. . .
•I do not want you, Balderian and other guerrilla leaders to misunderstand each other.
If you are not working. . . .under one Hors., be sure that you cooperate. . . .in the
fight against our enemy or in matters of food and other war materials. . . ."
("Eligible"ît. tiuiou^/ Col. Inf., Sogod. To: "My dear Capt. Erfe". 28 Jan. 1943)
^"9", Capt., Inf., Cmde. To: Lt. Balderian, CO, E. Ley. Sect. 14 Dec. ’42.
But Brfe was a God-fearing jnan, who prayed regularly. Whatever measure of
success he enjoyed he was inclined to attribute to the friendly disposition of God.
Unlike some men of his stamp, he did not develop a self-righteous arroganoe. Humbly—
MI never forget his Divine Guidance in solving perplexing problems. I never forget
1"
the delicate and heavy responsibilities entrusted to me by the people of East teyte...
Erfe was much more sensitive to the delioacies of interpersonal relations
than most of his fellow guerrilla officers. When he found fault with a guerrilla of
ficer, he did not u6e the bludgeoning method of rebuke, but tried to shame the of-
2
fender in terms of his own principles.
When. Falderian notified Erfe of plans to establish his own separatist govern
ment for Leyte, Erfe did not denomnce him directly*. "It is inconceivable to believe
that one of my ablest leaders in the firing line could be capable of sending such a
message to his superior. . . .Mo subordinate is willing to make this beautiful struc
ture collapse to pieces by demoralizing the whole oommand in his endeavor to get
•Z
over his superior. . .
Realizing that he had pricked the vanity of Balderian, he followed this criti
cal statement with a letter of commendations " . . . .Your industry, perseverance, de
votion to duty and that sense of stick-to-itiveness in the prompt- accomplishment of
your mission merits the praise and respect of this Headquarters. . . .1 trust that
. ^ 4" i
m the future you and your man will live up to the expectation of this command. . . .
After Balderian persisted in ereuctiny his scheme, Erfe contented himself
with this temperate comment in reporting to Kangleon of these activities; ...You
may inform the_ Colonel about the little trouble which Brevet Lt. Col. Balderian is
^Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt., Inf., June 9, 1943. To: Col. Ruperto Kangleon,
Cmag. Gen., 92r.d Div.
2
Mayor Gallego stated that when Miranda declared he would not despatch period
ic activity reports to Erfe, the latter replied with s t e m dignity: "I will hold you
responsible for everything that will happen in that sector." (interview; Kty or
Gallego of Abuyog. Abuyog, 1945.)
3"9", Capt. Inf. Cmdg. To; Lt. Balderian, CC,E. Ley. Sec. 14 Deo. ’42.
^"9" Col. 23 Dec. *42. To: Bvt. Lt. Col. Balderian,CO,E .Ley. Sec.
w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.
p
301
doing at preseiit in his endeavor to set up a Politico Military Government, . , ,with

i.1
himself e s the Military governor.. . .
On the other hand, when Erfe himself was on the defensive, trying to justify
his intransigoance, ho was both firm and tactful to Colonel Kangleon:
. , . .But whatever I have humbly done for the protection of the people, botl
from the enemy, bandits and murderers, I have done then honestly and above re
proach. . . .1 did not build a houst of cards, Yfhat I did for my soldiers and
thousands of peoole of East Leyte w i ;1 never be forgotten. . . .i vrish to repeat
here again my resignation as an Adjutant. . . .The next time you are in the
neighborhood, please visit me. . . .
Erfe abhorred unnecessary violence. His enemies allege that he was afraid
of personal danger. He wrote: "I wish to designate that such an honor Âdjutant^7 be
£)
designated from. . . .one whose family is not exposed to the enemy like mind.
He also says a bit self-consciously: "I have excellent disciplined fighting
men. . . .1 may not be with them most of the time, but I was not idle. . . •
The outstanding pol'tical leaders within the area formerly controlled by
Captain Erfe were lavish in praising his policy. Had the other guerrilla chieftains
followed his example - they said - Ley1o's Resistance movement would have been blessed
r;
with greater harmony and fewer hillings.’'
The Provincial Government of "Free Leyte11
"The first attempt to unify the guerrillas in Southern Leyte was made by
Colonel Hangloon early January ISMS.” This statement by Attorney (later, Congressman),
Domingo i/eloso is in error, and should be corrected to read, ’’successful attemrt”. As
a matter of fact, the American Gordon Lang, heeding a group based in Maasin, attempted
a partial unification. He succeeded in bringing the Macrohon sector under his wing.
He also established friendly contact with his fellow American, Chester Peters, at
^”9” Col. Inf., Cnd ;• 25 Jan *43. To: 3vt. Capt. G, Almendra, G-3.
2Glicerio I. Erfe, Grt. Inf. June C, 1943. To? Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon
Cmdg. Gen., 92nd Div. *
3-,.. A
ubic. Ibid.
Interviews: Leyte, 1945. a) Burauen - Mayor Prejula; former mayor Bumho•
o)Abuyog - Mayor Gallego, Hun. Seety. Aurrillo; c) Dulag - Ergenio Villegas (principal
Dulag Acadery); d) Taoloban - Atty. Enerlan (of Burauen).
302
Inopacan, with Lieutenants Julia and Napoli at Matalom, and with Lieutenant Saballones
at Bato.^- It was Lang who organized the attack against the Japanese garrison at
Baybay in September, 1942. The attack was tactically unsuccessful. But as the attack
ing Filipino force was drawn from all the guerrilla units mentioned, the action served
as an object lesson in the value of unified effort.
In October, 1942, Lang and Peters decide to convoke a gathering of all the
guerrilla leaders of the territory lying between Laasin and Inopaacan. The conference
was held in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality. Unfortunately, the machine-rifle
of Saballones* Bato unit served as the apple of discord. Peters instigated Lang to
demand its possession, on the ground that âng was the most active against the enemy.
Saballones refused to surrender this priceless weapon. And now provoked, Saballones
demurred in the proposal that a unified command be established, with Lang as supreme
commander. Saballones was overruled, and the conference broke up with Lang nominally
in control, but the general amity marred. Lang never followed up his powers, for
responsibilities in i'aasin took up nis full attention. Soon after, his cordiality
towards Peters underwent a decided freeze.
^Commander "Chick" Parsons held both Peters and Lang in disesteem:

"Lack of competition. . . .as much as personal jealousy doubtless caused the
rivalry between the two most prominent warring groups in the south. One was led by a
yeoman who had been attached to vhe Sixteenth Naval District at Cavite before the war;
the other by amining engineer who had lost one job after another in the Philippines.
Both these men were, in Parsons' opinion, the type to take advantage of a situation,
gather together a few rifles, and give their supporters poor leadership.
"Almost daily pitched battles occurred between the forces of 'Captain* Gordon
Lang and 'major X' as Chester Peters, the other leader, called himself. .
"Visiting 'Lajor X' first of all, Chick found him to be a boastful swashbuckler,
with a mestiza wife who called herself 'Joanne of Arc', completely intent on his sole
purpose of eliminating the immediate opposition of Lang............................
"Lang seemed to be slightl;/ more amenable to reason but told Chick: 'I've just
got to get Peters before he gets me. That's all.'" (Ingham, op. cit., pp. 71-2.)
St. John's estimate of Lang corroborated that of Parsons:
" . . . .Lang, who used to live in Linnesota, had quite a setup there, with
guerrillas and everything -- which included a frigidaire, a motorcycle, and a couple
of automobiles. Pe lived in a big house, had married a Spanish mestizonamedPasing,
and was doing all right."
(St. John, op. cit., p. 91)
303
In November, Peters convoked another gathering, this time with representatives
of Liranda's Y/LGWF in attendance. This conference turned into a shodting affray be
fore its deliberations were commenced, with Peters being wounded and several of the
other leaders killed. (Lnng had been absent, ill with dengue fever) . The I'fLCWF be
came the beneficiary of this fracas, making Inopacan a satellite, and using it as a
1
base for expansion southward to Kindang, hilongos, Bato, and IJatalom.
The American evacuee who was to become guerrilla school administrator pointed
out an important psychological by-product of this incident:
. . . .1 referred earlier in this letter to the recent skirmishes among the

guerrillas. Every man killed in that affray was murdered, and one wno fired
the shots are murderers. But no one with whom I have talked looked upon the
'killings’ as a crime. Cruelty is contagious during a war. . . .SeveraJ. persons
in telling me about the 'killings' at Inopacan laughed hilariously as if it
were a good joke on somebody or ether.“
meanwhile, Lieutenant Nuique of Sogod was sending out feelers to his fellow
officers in I alitbog and Fintuyan (Erancisco, Jain, Hazareno) on the subject of uni
fication. His effort came to nought. Blocked by the overweening personal ambition
of the other sector leaders, unification talks bogged down, liuinue concluded that he
must discover a leader who, by force of personality and recognized experience, towered
above the others. He found his candidate opportunely in the person of Colonel Ruperto
k. kangleon, recently returned from a Japanese prison camp, in Lindanao.
1
'^'Commander Parsons learned of the "Inopacan Incident" upon his arrival in
Leyte, but he was misinformed concerning the date and the principals involved:
" . . . .The day before Chick arrived ^Tarch, 194^Ta senseless encounter
between the two rivals had resulted in the death of forty-five fine young guerrilla
soldiers and the wounding of Peters. . . ." (Ingham, op. cit., p. 71)
Babcock's report of the episode differed somewhat:
"I had planned to go to Sogod yesterday with Lt. k. ^Tondragor^for a visit, 1
but the trip had to be postponed. A week or so ago, I.', received a note from the
guerrilla head at Inopacan, inviting him to attend a conference there. L., with a
handful of soldiers, crossed the mountain from Sogod to n ato, where he got a truck
for Inopacan. L t 7’in.hvuy. . . .the truck was surrounded by In&nacan guerrillas who,
without warning, opened fire. Several of U s soldiers were killed and others wounded,
and 1'. himself was slightly injured. His soldiers lest all their arms and ammunition.
. . .Cornered in a truck, there was nothing to do but flee. (Orville Babcock, Nov. 21,
1942. Unposted letter to his daughter.)
2
babcccx, November 20, 1942. Unposted letner to h s daughter.
304
unification conference was held in Sogod, in January, 1943, attended by all
of the Southern leaders, as well as by Balderian and other guerrilla chieftains of
Korth Leyte. Kangleon was chosen liilitary Adviser of the guerrilla of Leyte. Yfith
the consent of the other leaders, Kangleon appointed Gordon Lang, to command the
Southern Leyte Guerrilla Units which, in turn, Joined in confederation with
Balderian's or ganiz potion of East Leyte. The SLGU evolved into the S4th Infantry
Regiment under the over-all command of the 92nd Infantry Division, Leyte Area Command.
On the ISth of July, 1943, Kangleon proclaimed the establishment of the civil govern
ment of "Free Leyte", provincial representative of the Philippine Commonwealth
government-in-cxile.
Small of stature but of commanding presence, Colonel iangleon was regarded
by his troops as a man to be respected and avoided. He was a severe martinet, gener
ally sullen and often cantankerous. He is said to have slapped and kicked subordinate
officers and enlisted men under stress of anger. He had a reputation for valor,
willing to lead his men personally into combat, and deriding officers of the i'.iranda
■'"St. John wrote: "Kangleon had no trouble getting started. For one thihg,
Yeoman Gordon Lang had started an organization. . . .
Kangleon took over Lang's guerrillas. . . .(St. John, cp. cit., p. Si)
2
In April, Kangleon met with the principal leaders of northeast Leyte: "In
our military conference held at Abuyog on April IS, 19^3, at about 6:00 p.m., the
following were present: Col. Kangleon; Capt. Erfe; Lt. Hazareno; Lt. Arias; Lt.
Hapoli, Brovet Lt. Clnedo; Brevet Lt. Loreno; .Brevc-t Lay or Dadula: Brevet Lt. Telimhar
Brevet Lt. Trine her a; Cant. Landia, La j . /T.&yor/Gall ego; A tty. G. Enerlan; A tty. K.
Vertudazo; Atty. Closa; Atty. Santos; many others and I were present:-
"The subject of the conference was the revelation cf the Instruction of Gen.
L.acArthur to Col. Kangleon to take command cf the 9th military District. . .
(Alejandro Balderian, Col. April 2B, 1945. To: "Ly dear Lt. Col. Felix Pamanian)
Balderian followed no the decisions of this conference to recognize Kangleon
by convoking a gathering cf principal absentees - those from north and northwest Leyte
Pamanian of northwest Leyte was favorable: "Permission is hereby reouested to allow
Lt. Col. Cuintero to become my personal representative. . • .It is understood that he
is authorized to cast his vote in any decision toward unification. . . ." (Felix
Romanian, Bvt. Lt. Col. Inf. Cmdg. 27 April 45 To: CC, Uorthern-Eastern Ley. Sec.)
Balderian's adjutant further advised him: "Lt. Cels, "uintero ?■ Causing,
Lajors Posoncoy £• Centino are on the way. . . .Lt. Col. Pabilcnn nay join the nsrtv
at Jaro. Under rresent circumstances Lajor Estojero-Santcs cannot attend. . . .Cant,
/atty. Kamcrto/Eibo has asked this Headcuarters for permission to be present. . .
(Luciano Bcnicillo, Adj. Gen., 28 April 43. To: Cel. balderian.)
305
and Erfe type who issued field orders from the safety of their headquarters. His
honesty was unimpeachable, no scandals of confiscation for personal benefit or of

t
embezzlement of municipal funds ever having sulliechhis name. He lived abstemiously,
capable of enduring much privation, and encouraged his followers to adopt his example.
This writer interviewed Kangleon at the residence of the Provincial Fiscal
Tacloban, in 1945. Conversation revealed that Kangleon nourished a suppressed
hostility towards American racial arrogance. He charged the pre-war USAFFE with
having discriminated against Filipinos in its promotional policy, as well as with
having snubbed Filipino officers socially. Is it possible that he harbored some
sympathy for Japanese propaganda of "Asia for the Asiatics"? At any rate, he did
surrender to the Japanese in Mindanao, and his "escape" from a Japanese internment
camp is set in obscure circumstances.
An army careerist of the type favoring the hierarchical structure of social
organization where orders proceed down the chain of command, and where administrators
on each level obey with alacrity the orders of their superior, Colonel Kangleon had
scant patience for the deliberative process. He was determined that the provincial
government he was establishing would be a crecture of the guerrilla army.
Ho doubt, he could have governed the municipalities of his jurisdiction from
headnuarters and scrapped the machinery cf civil administration. Oddly enough, it
v/<-'s Kangleon’s almost relirious respect for form, the outcome cf his training, that
made him anxious to present the semblance of an independent civil administration.
He was thinking of American recognition, and of accounts to be reckoned in the post
war period. Above all, he wanted to be looked upon as the restorer of law and order.
From the reestablishment of a provincial government for Leyte, Kangleon be
lieved he could derive lawful authority for authorizing printing of the emervencv
currency, interrupted by the Japanese invasion. He knew full well that the army
1n _ _ . J. — — - 4
. . ^ (p p "*r\f\J~'• ’ "
O tf• h U i.i © l y up# u j. u • | p.'« O “ X
Also: Ingram:, op. cit'., pp. 7 2-5, 224-5.
tttw
306
would be the principal beneficiary of this currency. Therefore, he was anxious to
create the appearance of a civil government, independent of the military, voting of
its ovm will to orovide army appropriations. He was also anxious that any policies
of security, economic mobilization, and social control that he should find necessary
(as applicable to all the municipalities) would emanate from an over-all civilian
body. In this way, he felt that the people would be less recalcitrant towrards
accepting unpopular measures. Finally, he was entirely willing that purely local
affairs of no consequence should be handled by civilian officials, thereby lightening
the administrative load of the military.
But if the provincial administration was nominally under civilian control,
Kangleon made certain that his influence pervaded its activities. He made known his
wishes, and emphasized that his program was to be carried out as promptly as possible.
The acting governor was his personal appointee, not the choice of a plebiscite. And
the decision to include on the Provincial Board a member representing Horth Leyte,
who found it physically impossible to attend meetings, meant that the one remaining
Board member could be controlled so much more ea.sily. 1 In short, Colonel Kangleon
had the Provincial Executive safely tucked in his pocket.^
"Governor Demetrio who had presided over Leyte in 1924, was made leader of
2
our government by Kangleon and was installed in the municipal building at Haasin."
Serving with Demeterio as the Frov'ncial Board was the pre-war member, Angel
Espina, and the member representing north Leyte, Eleuterio Tomes. (Tomas returned
to Carigara after only one week of service because cf family preoccupations.)
Having recognized the command of Colonel Kangleon, Lajor Balderian had no

alternative but to dissolve his own Politico-1, military government.
"Inasmuch as Provincial Officials have already been appointed for the re
organized government, I hereby announce the termination of my incumbency. . . .
"I hereby direct that the following officials I have appointed by virtue of
the powers vested in me by proper resolutions. . . .terminate their incumbency. . , .
^/persons named~J "All other provincial officials and employees as well as municipal
officials and- employees. . . .are expected to extend the same cooperation. . . .to the
new rrovir.cial Governor, Hon. Salvador K. Demeterio and to the other officials arccir.t-
ed by the District Commander." (Col. Ale.iandro Balderian, CO, 95th Inf. Peg.,"Cir
cular Letter", July 29, 1945, To: All Provincial Officials and Employees, Province
of Leyte.^ Par. 2-4.)
«, 1 1 i'O . .., -W • Cl..., ilc.
307
Regular meetings of the Board, according to Attorney Abiera who had served as guer
rilla secretary of the Provincial Board (interviewed Tacloban, January, 1946),
occurred weekly, although special meetings might be called by the Governor at any
time. The provincial government would send out circulers embodying its policies
to the municipalities for incorporation in local ordinances. In turn, the munici
palities forwarded their ordinances to the Provincial Board for approval or dis-
allov.ance. The Board would disapprove local ordinances fixing commodity prices at
what was deemed improper levels. As Abiera pointed out, the orice-fixing pov.er was
reserved to the President by the terms of the Emergency Powers Act. Under the ex
traordinary circumstances of war, the provincial government authorized the munici
palities to embark upon price-fixing legislation.
"The legal hold Kangleon had over the governor", exulained Kangleon1s chief -
of-staff, Richardson,, "was his power to appoint an Army civil administration officer
for the region in case he deemed it necessary. The mere existence of this power made
it unnecessary ever actually to use it."^
Discussing finances, Richardson said:
There was a loyalty tax to be collected from the people. The rate was
originally 10 centavos a month for each male from eighteen to sixty, but I
ordered the governor to increase that to 25 centavos a month after fretting
hold of a Life magazine that told of the v:nr effort in America. The people
could be sold the idea by the story of the great job being done back home.
The tax would be collected by municipal officials whose treasurers would
turn it in to our provincial government.^
The provincial auditor, Enrique Potente, vras empowered to audit the books
of the municipal treasurers. However, the civil government was debarred from inauiry
into the propriety of military appropriations.
The Provincial Board undertook to print the balance of the authorized emer
gency money allocated to Leyte. This money was used to finance the provincial govern
ment and the guerrilla. Salaries v.-ere paid in emergency funds to orovir.cial officials !
|
Îbid., p. 118.
2Ibid., p. 118.
i
[
306
while special appropriations were granted to meet partial payment to necessitous
municipal officials.
Guerrilla Auditor Ennique Fotente provided an adequate fiscal statement:
There has been a very small collection from the regular source cf revenue
of the Government, since we are in war. The greater part of our revenue pro
ducing enterprises were at a standstill or have gone to the Japanese Puppet
Government, as they are located within the territory controlled by them. It
should also be taken into account that the greatest single item in our revenues
comes from the land taxes. Not much land taxes at that time could be collected,
as we had no right to do it, so long as the government could not guarantee to
the people that their lands, to be taxed, will not be trampled by the enemy
any time.
The inhabitants of the best coast of Leyte, especially in the towns of Bato
and Katalom, were engaged in an extensive weaving of abaca clothes; but the people
used to pay the licenses for their looms in kind (of abaca clothes), by special
arrangements at that time; and the municipal governments ga.ve these clothes as
voluntary contributions to the Army where they are used as uniforms of the sol
diers. Industries such as soap manufacturing, sandals, etc., vrere not duly taxed.
The so-called 'Loyalty Tax' which was levied from the people at the rate of
P.20 per capita wrs collected by order of Col. Ruperto K. 1.angleon, GO of the
Leyte Guerrilla, As this tax has been imposed without authority of Law, he
has repeatedly manifested that he assumes full responsibility of the same.
The amount of PIGO,207.09. . . .represents the total expenses of the Govern

ment for the oeneral operation of said government. . . .It also included the
following war-time expenses:
Salaries <5: traveling expenses cf FoodProcurementAgents for the Army P 5,004.21
Relief to Volunteer Guards killed, or vmose houses were burnt by
theenemy 18,540.00
Relief to evacuees 211.00
Printing of Emergency Currency Notes 12,108.28
Distilling alcohol for fuel of automobile 1,003.75
Total — P 137,46?. 24'
t lie exc ess (

a id from th
printing of the emergency money fo: fnat a id •
The following is a comparative :atem e n t of

Leyte during the guerrilla time (A' - 1, 194 5 t o
in) and that of its Pre-war times:
1945- 1544 1540-1941
Revenue
Taxation ni i.16
£-14,015.16 708,171.44
Incidental Revenue 25, 96 2.31
25,962.31 61,203.93
Loyalty Tax __ 650 .54
7,__________________________________
Total Revenue 37, 6 76
37,6 .01
26.01 76S,575.37
Expenses of the Provincial Government 150, 257 .09
150,257.09 636,123.99
| cJ
Balance 127, 611

127,611.08 135,251.38 1
^"Potente, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
309
Tilth these funds, many governmental functions were revised. The oourts were
reconstituted. Ordinary cases were handled by the local justice of the peace. Graver
oases came before the Court of First Instance at Haasin. Auditor Potente added:
The complete governmental agencies were made to function. All public works
were resumed. Bridges were repaired. The health service was also resumed and
postal service established. The public schools were opened in all the munici
palities not occupied by the Japanese. . . .The government transactions increased
greatly in a few months. In November, 1943, our vouchers were approaching in
volume the average of pre-war transactions of the Provincial Government of Leyte.
The inhabitants there were apparently contented; but oftentimes rumors were broad
cast of the imminent reinvasion of that region by the Japanese.'*'
Speaking of the municipalities, Richardson commented:
In the towns and barrios that the Japs had not garrisoned, municipal mayors
or tinentes /5enlentes/and officials in general functioned in complete autonomy,
visited now "and then by Japanese patrols but with decreasing regularity during
1943 as our strength increased and life for Japanese patrols became more hazardous
Each locality had its own police, but in most cases we disarmed then to equip the
army, and what they did was patrol around with homemade shotguns or just clubs. 9
. . . .The regular municipal functionaries were in most cases left untouched."'
The guerrilla government sought to expand. The Auditor noted:
Efforbs were made by the provincial government in the south to get in touch
with the rest of the municipalities of the Province. Letters were sent to the
mayors and treasurers of those municipalities which were known to have been es
tablished outside of the Japanese control. Some of the officials of said munici
palities have responded, but on account of the difficulties of communication,
there could not be established a continuous contact with them. 1,.^’or Pedro
Gallego of Abuyog has been designated as Deputy Governor and mas assigned to
undertake an inspection of the municipalities comprised in the northeastern por
tion of the Province. Layor Gallego could not complete his tour. . . .because of
Japanese interception. Ir. enito Salas of Laasin was also designated as Deputy
Governor, and was commissioned for an inspec bion trip to the Northwes t. He could
accomplish his mission uo to the tov:ns of Villaba and San Isidro only, establish
ing schools in Villaba. It was believed then not expedient to insist or. the
manifestation of activities in the municipal governments established outside of
the control of the Japs - in the interest of the inhabitants therein who were
under continuous vigilance by the Japanese controlling the area, and in keeping
also with the instructions of Gen. L'.acArthur to lie low in the meantime.0
In a moment of candor, Richardson declared;
The government proved very useful to us. It acted as the 'goat1on all guer
rilla actions disapproved of by the people. It bore the expense of all improve
ments mutually beneficial to our army and the population — road repairs, for
Potente, op. cit., pp. 17-16.

2.
woifert, op. cit., pp. 117-16.
Potente, op. cit., pp. 27-8.
310
example, and bridges, a telegraph system that I installed later. Kangleon had
an army mind. He didn’t care whose money was spent as long as it wasn’t the :
army’s. Because of the civil government, I was able to give our army a number
of advantages that Kangleon would have regarded as ’frills' if they had to be
paid for out of his funds.^
In November, 1943, the government transferred to Ichon, Lacrohon because
the Japanese were becoming more active:
The Governor has established his office in the school home economics building.
The offices cf the Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Auditor were housed. . . .
in the biggest ouilding in the Barrio. . . .in an ideal place near the seashore
and along the Provincial Road, surrounded by coconut trees. It was vacant
where we found it."'
The government so painstakingly built by the guerrillas disintegrated with
the Japanese "reinvasion" at the end of 1943. In describing the passing of tho
guerrilla regime in J-.indanao, Haggerty equally well epitomized the debacle in Leyte:
This invasion. . . .was the end of a guerrilla era that had lasted nearly a
year. Never again was there to be such a large thickly-populated area free from
the Japs. The coastal towns were occupied, people fled to the wooded mountain
slopes; the towns were deserted, the electric lights gone, the ports where hundreds
of bancas had gathered, empty. . . .
The civil government with its. . . .volunteer guards, school libraries, work
projects, was scattered. . .
In January, 1944, Governor Demeterio was captured by the Japanese; in February,
Provincial Board member Espina was caught. Colonel Kangleon thereafter assumed direct
control as military governor of Leyte.
Yet trie reverse suffered b" guerrilla fortunes was not irreversible. As
Haggerty so well put it:
But the Japs had waited too long, the taste of freedom had left too sweet a
flavor to be so soon forrrotton. The myth of tho Jap superman had been shattered.
Japanese weakness in manpower, shinein^ end wrar material was evident; our sub
marines were brin>-in~ us supplies and the guerrilla movement could never be
shattered by a few thousand mobile Jap troops.^
Realizing their own limitations, the guerrillas decided to play along with
the conqueror, but exploit the situation for their own advantage. The American
noliert, op. cit., p. 113.

Potente, op. cit., p. 19.
7 1
Haggerty, op. cit., p. 128.
'Ibid., p. 128.
311
guerrillero, St. John,explained the strategem adopted in southern Leyte:
Baok in the fall of 1943, when the colonel learned from guerrillas on other
islands that the Japs were going to reinvade Leyte, he contacted all the big-
shots in the towns of southern Leyte. He told them the Japs were coming and
then tested their sympathies.
The ones who were sympathetic were made what the people called puppet mayors.
They used the word puppet, differently than we would. The puppet mayors actually
were Colonel Kangleon*s spies. They played up to the Japs to hold their jobs
as mayor and even worked with the Japs a little bit. Not too much, though.
They they sent reports to Colonel Kangleon. They told him when a Jap garrison
was going to move, when a patrol was going to go out, what the Japs did to the
people, and all sorts of things like that. Then they did what they could to help
the people in their town. "They used to lie like hell to the Japs. The Japs
would catch a guerrilla and met ready to behead him, and the mayor would go to
the commanding officer of the garrison and say, •This man no guerrilla. He my
cousin. Pardon, sir, but I believe you make mistake.1
Lots of times it worked. At least it worked often enough to make it worth
whi 1e.
And this was the pattern of relations established throughout Leyte, except
where a "puppet mayor" broke faith with the guerrilla and actively collaborated with
O
the Japanese.^ In such cases, the guerrilla appointed "mountain mayors" to administer
affairs in the evacuation areas. Thus, at the time of the American landings, the
guerrillas were in a position to expedite the restoration of the Commonwealth govern
ment by designating sets of local officials to function in every municipality. Need
less to say, this procedure made it possible for the American forces to concentrate
upon military operations, assured that friendly Filipinos would take over the adminis
tration of civilian affairs.
St. John, op. cit., p. 155.

2
The man who accented a guerrilla mandate to serve as a puppet mayor did so
with much conpuction. This is apparent in the proceedings of a town meeting held
at Cabalian, south Leyte, as the Japanese re-occupation drew nigh. He here extract;
"The chairman informed the public that the object of the meeting was to select
a man who will remain in the town and act as a mayor of his municipality in case of
reinvasion by the enemy. This mayor will meet and entertain the enemy. . . .
"Mr. 3. Bscarilla stood up and said that if we are going to select. . . ,a
person other than the actual mayor. . . .we are just like pushing him to his grave be
cause when the Japanese came to this place the first time, Mayor Bulacan was alreadv
a mayor. . . .and he was appointed by them to continue his office. . ............ ,
"Mayor Bulacan stood up. . . .:

. . .You perhaps remember that in the early stages of the guerrilla.
312
Guerrilla Combat Activities
A study concerned with the resistance movement of an area would be manifestly
defective were it to pass over in silence the military phase of opposition to enemy
rule. In the given instance, however, it is more important that the reader appreciate
the combat mission of Leyte’s ûerrillas than that he have a complete narrative
specifying the site of every ambuscade laid and the number of casualties sustained by
the Japanese in every skirmish.
From the Japanese invasion of Leyte until the end of 1942, the guerrilla units
were preoccupied in collecting arms, gatherj ng foodstuffs and supplies, contacting
municipal officials, stamping out banditry and policing the districts under their
control. Luch of their attention was necessarily diverted to defending their organ
izational and territorial integrity against the incursions of rival bands foraging
for weapons and subsistence. Under these conditions, encounters with the Japanese
were almost entirely defensive in nature — intended to discourage Japanese patrols
from penetrating too deeply into the ungurrisoned portions of the island.
or'-anization, I was terribly manhandled and confined in Camp ’G ’ for an act that I
believed was for the good of the country I am serving. It is for this reason that
I do not like to remain in the town when the Japs come back for I might be again sus
pected of being a pro-Jap. But if the public so desires. . . .1 will be forced to
stay even at the sacrifice of my life, especially because I am of the opinion that
the Japs know that this town and its mayor are supporters of the USAFY’E.1............
"Lt. S. Remade, stood u" and said that he was with the opinion of the others
and in addition to that he su'west^d t at the public should write a petition to the
CC of the 9th I.D and the Provincial Governor through the CC of Gamp ’G’ that the
actual Municipal l.ayor be given authority tc remain in the town......................
• • ' • ♦ • ♦ • • • • • • ♦ • ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ • • • • • • • • • ♦ • ♦ • • • ♦ • • • • ♦ ♦ • I I
"Resolved: to petition to the GO of the 9th I'D and the lion. Provincial Gover
nor through the CC for Camp ’G! that the actual municipal kayor be given authority
to remain in the town in case of invasion by the enemy. . . .Unanimously approved.
"Present: Capt, C. L. Lialubay, Inf. — Pol. Force k Vol. Guards; Lt. Elpiab
Ramada, OR Depot Crndr.; S. Escarilla, Col. Himatagon Bolo Rgt; V. S. Veloso, Lt, Col,
Central Bolo Rgt.; Sotero Bulacan, Run. l.ayor; Rev. P. L. La. Ricalde, Parish Priest.
P. Santillano, Supervising Principal; ¥u Leong Suy, President, Chinese Community
/and about 3,000 peopl^7
(judge F. Nombrado, Chairman; S. F. Seg&dor, Run. Secty. liinutes of the
Lass Lieeting held at the Session Kali, Cabalian — kov. 17, 1945.)
313
Yet even in 1942, the bolder guerrilla chiefs realized that only a valiant
spirit could rally the dismayed civilian population to the standards of resistance.
Thus, very early in the Occupation, the guerrilla units operating in the northern
and eastern portions of the Island vied with one another in demonstrating their
prowess, sniping at Japanese reconnaissance squads and ambushing Japanese vehicles.
The ti en-Lieutenant Balderian, and the USAFiE soldiers who were in contact with him,
(leraza, Fabilona, Bonicillo, Pamanian, Corpin, Guevara, Diaz, the Centinos, Cinco,
Dadula, etc.) each won renown for himself and his little band by defying the
"Invincible" Japanese.
In the South, a stranded American sailor, Gordon Lanr, joined with Lieutenant
Uuinue to attack successfully a small Japanese detachment at Sogod. Lang subseouently
led a guerrilla band in a daring raid against a Japanese unit at Baybay. Although
the attack failed of its immediate objective, the Japanese garrison withdrew to Crmoo
shortly thereafter. By the end of October, L'uique, L.ondragon, Francisco, hazareno,
Jain and the other pioneer organizers of the south had cleared out the remaining
nests of Japanese.
In the west, the jurisdiction of the LXG.'.F was never an area of active fight
ing against the Japanese. Not that there were no encounters with Japanese patrols.
The combat narrative of the Gth Infantry recorded:
On September 8, 1942. . . .a Japanese patrol went as far as Damulaan 'where

it was ambushed successfully under the command of Capt. Daffon. After this
event, the firing line was established m the Ormoc-Albuera boundary at the
Panilahan River. From thence guard duties were strengthened on good observation
posts at the coast line and mountain passes which could possibly be used by the
enemy. By that time Capt. Conrado Daffon was commonly known under the guise
name of Robin Hood so his Headquarters was appropriately called the Sherwood
Forest. The site 'was 'well chosen for guerrilla purposes at Serab Hill, Binoljo,
where che soldiers going to and from the firing line could conveniently meet
and rest. . . .
^Jurir.g J!over.ber7*, the guerrillistas under Lt. Salve ’-mbushed a Japanese
patrol in Binoljo, Huring which a Japanese high officer was killed and seme Jan
soldiers. At the guard post the Japanese soldiers killed a volunteer guard and
a few soldiers were wounded.
lFelix Sotto, Brief History 6th infantry, 1945, p. 2 (typewritten)•
314
The main garrison of the Japanese in best Leyte was entrenched in Ormoc.
l.iranda wrote:
The primary mission of the YlLGYi'F was accomplished when the JlF (Japanese
Imperial Forces) were concentrated and pocketed m t h e potlacion cf Ormoc on
October 31, 1942, giving us the minimum loss and effect to civilian lives and
properties. Since that date until 5 December 1943, when the JIF staged their
colossal attack on our force thememy was never successful in breaking our line.
On the contrary heavy casualties were always inflicted on them.
From this statement, it can be seen that L.iranda regarded his mission pri
marily as one cf containing the Japanese within Ormoc, and cutting them down whenever
they attempted to venture forth. Thy did Firanda never attempt to take the poblacion
of Ormoc by storm? ".'hen interviewed, L.iranda stated that he believed his force
was s tronr. enough to launch a smashing attack that would have carried his men surging
into the center of the town. But such bravado v,rould have been costly, end utterly
futile. So long as the Japanese controlled the offshore waters, they could send a
task force steaming into Ormoc hay at any time. Furthermore, the skies overhead
were also under Japanese control, putting the town at the mercy cf Japanese bombs.
llajor karoos 0. So liman, G hi ef-of-S taf f of the T.LGbF described his organ
izational make-up;
Our organisation has been patterned after a re-ular division with modifications,
of course, to suit guerrilla purposes. Y.e have six infantry regiments operat
ing moreor less independently with their respective service elements. The C-HO
has a strong combat team which can be moved from one locality to another in case
a regiment is hard pressed. All of these units are responsible for their res
pective areas and the usual administrative and routine reports are sent to the
Division Fo.
V.'e have a corrnlete General Staff composed mostly of e::-reserve officers who
have sec-n action in different fronts.
. . . .be have jln this or "rnisatio: only one regular officer, /in addition
to Soliman, himselfT*? nrtai n Ar is to telco B. Claybar. Gloss 194C rFA, who was
a Battalion Comnanaer. . . .in Geku............................................
• • • • • • • • • • • • • « • • • • • • • • • • • • • » • • • • • • • * « • * •
I am presentin' to you our organization. . . .:

a. Organized originally by Lt. l.iranda. from among small and separate
Report of the h'estern Leyte Guerrilla barfare Forces end Various In
formations" . 23 October 1944. To: The Commanding General, United Staves Arm.v
Forces in the Philippines, p. S.
315
guerrilla bands. . .
b. Expanded to its present strength of 417 officers and about 12,000
rn^Qti * * h *5
c. IVe have a plant for the manufacture of ammunition, grenades and land
mines which is under the direct supervision of Lt. Liranda himself,
who is a civil engineer by profession and en inventor by avocation;
d. V<re have a base hospital under a former Chief of the Southern Hospital
in Cebu with several doctors, nurses, and attendants. In addition,
we have regimental and battalion aid stations. . .
e. V.'e have some engineers, some lawyers who compose the JAGS, and of
course, the AGS, the QJ.1S Corps, some signal men, Chaplains and a
General Service School for officers, and a Signal School for Signal
enlisted men.-1-
Gnly one major offensive vras attempted by the guerrilla during 1942. This
offensive, organized by the headquarters of Captain Glicerio I. Erfe (then laying
claim to the supreme command on the Island as the highest ranking officer), ordered
all unit commanders to launch a concerted attack against the Japanese garrisons in
their respective sectors. Erfe's public relations office announced the outcome of
the attack;
In accordance with the Field Orders Ho, 9, issued on October 1, 1942, by

the General Headquarters USAFFE AIL, located somewhere in Leyte, a reneral
offensive vras launched on October 9, which lasted up to Hovember 15, 1942.
Results: ................................................................
Towns retaken and restored to peace and order under the Commonwealth
Civil Government; Carigara, Barugo, Palo, Capoocan, L'aripipi, La Paz, Jaro,
Tolcsa, Abuyog, San 1 iguel, Danami, Baybay.
Remaining Jap- soldiers garrisoning the above towns withdrew to Tacloban,
Tanauan, Ste. Fe, ûlag, Burauen and Ormoc. . . .
All Japanese soldiers who were garrisoninr the northern, Y.’estern, and
Southern parts of Leyte were withdrawn, and sent tc the Eastern part to replace
their comrades w;ho rere casualties during the general offensive. . . .
It is interesting to note that the general offe. sive launched by the
USAFFE ALL and Guerrilla units in the Eastern part of Leyte on October 9,
1942, was followed by similar uprisings in practically all the Islands in
the Visayas. . . .^
ll.Iarccs G. Soliman, Ifuj. 81st Inf. Juno 5, 1945. To: "Dear Lac"
^/Peralta/^?. 2.
2
S. Paza, The Voice of the Polahans, A eeklv Release, February 28, 1943,
(mimeographed).
See also document; Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt. Inf., CO, 95th Regt. and Lili-
t&ry Advisor, 11th Div., GTS, "Reouest Recognition of the Guerrilla Forces in Leyte
Designated the ?11th Div., IX Phil. Corps, U.S. Army'", Far. 6. To: The Commanding
General, USFIP.
In point of fact, this publioity was largely bombast. Only the units
dlreotly under Erfe’s oonmand ("USAFFE ALL") and the troops of Balderian actually
oarried out the assault. And on this limited front, the plans to invest Burauen^"
and Dulag misoarried, due to faulty inter-unit liaison - something not at all appar
ent to the reader of the quoted release.
Erfe took credit unjustifiably for the expulsion of the Japanese from the
south, a result brought about through independent action on th® part of the southern
units. And it was most presumptuous to imply that guerrilla activity occurring on
Panay and elsewhere followed the inspiration of Erfe’s glorious deeds. Nonetheless,
the ’’Offensive" did "strengthen the morale of the people and encouraged them to offer
2
undoubted resistance."
Early in 1943, the guerrilla leaders of south Leyte called upon Colonel
Ruperto Kangleon (freshly arrived from a Japanese internment camp) to take over
command of their forces. Kangleon accepted, winning a rather lukewarm promise from
*
Major Baldei'ian to merge his north Leyte forces under the same command.
xhe puppet mayor of Burauen, Jose Cordero, deolared that "on October 31,
1942, thousands of guerrillas attaoked Burauen for one week. Some oivilians took
refuge in the barraoks of the Japanese. Most evaouatod to the mountain^. • • .The
constituted munioipal government ceased. Guerrilla guards blocked all the trails
baok to town. . . . " (Jose S. Cordero, Mayor of Burauen,Affidavit, Feb. 10, 1944.)
2
The American educator evacuating in the hills of Leyte observed! "During
the first few months of Japanese occupation, their soldiers moved about freely. As
the guerrillas' became stronger and better organized the Japanese either had to
increase their forces or else withdraw to a few oentralized and fortified points.
For the time being, at least, they have taken the latter course.. .«" (Baboook,
op. oit., Letter of November 19, 1942.)
g
Some months later, Balderian formally affiliated with Kangleon's 9th Mili
tary District, bringing about a "re-organization of the guerrilla forces in northern-
eastern Leyte sector." He proclaimed* "In pursuance to the order of organization,
I have temporarily assumed oonmand, effective May 1, 1943, of the 95th Infantry Regi
ment, 92nd Division. . . .
. .The following guerrilla leaders will organize. . . .
(a) Lt. Col. Felix Pamanian - 1st Battalion} Co's 'A', 'B*, ’C ’ k Machine Gun Seo-
tion; and Hq« & Hq. Co.
(b) Lt. Col. Felimon Pabilona -2nd Battalion} Co's fE ' G * , & Machine Gun Sec
tion; and Hq. & Hq. Co; 'G' Co. i6 hereby designated for the Tigbao Unit under the
oonmand of Major Estojero-Santos.
(c) Lt. Col. Antonio Cinoo - 3rd Battalion} Co’s 'I', 'K', *L'j and Hq. & Hq. Co.
(d) The guerrilla unit under Major Isabelo Centino will be absorbed into the
317
To win the respect of his north Leyte affiliates and also toughen civilian morale,
«
Kangleon organised a special combat troop and marched boldly into the Abuyog-Dulag
distriot where he had several brisk encounters with the Japanese. His reputation
assured, Kangleon returned to the south and proceeded to organise a regular division
al headquarters.
"At his peak1’, St. John observed, wKangleon never had more than 3,000 men, plus
1
maybe 500 women who did first aid, oooking, sewing, washing. . . . "
I. D, Richardson, Amerioan intelligence operative in Leyte, was called upon
by Kangleon to serve as his chief of staff. Riohardson wryly commenteds
As chief of staff, I naturally felt it necessary to have a staff to be

chief of. When I came into the picture the colonel and his eldest son, Loloy,
were all the staff there was. . . .
I found people to head up all these branches — Frederioo Coaeyes, former
pilot who knew regulations and knew people, he was Glj Dr. Posoncuoy, a Spanish
factually Chine seînest iso boy, was the Best G2 you can imagine until June,
1944, when he was killed by the Japsj G3, our operations, was headed by Capt.
Hq. Bn. thus t Combat Co.. Hq. ft Hq. Service Co.. and 12 men in the Medioal Co.
(e) Major Martin Javelosa — QMS, FS, ft Ord. Serv.
(f) M£jor Ralph Fosongcuy - Intelligence Seotion
(g) Lt. Col. Cresencio Corpin - Plans ft Training
(h) Regimental staff officers - offices in the Headquarters and other units.
( "Strengths of the oombatatant units have to be equalised by even distribution
of rifles and shot guns. . . .
"The best judgment. . . .shall be exercised as to inolude for assignments
in the Regiment the most deserving, judged from their qualifications and meritorious
servioes since the inception of guerrilla fighting. While preference will be given
to USAFFE officers and enlisted men who did not surrender. . . ., civilian pioneers
• . . .deserve as much right. . . . —
"After the selection. . • .has been completed, the rest who cannot be
possibly included in the regular Regiment for lack of arms will be kept organised. .
. .and oonsidered reverted into the United States Army Reserve. . . .When aids in
the form of arms and ammunitions will have come and the else of the oonmand will be
augmented. . • .enlisted will preferably be made from the. . . .Reserve." (Alejandro
Balderian, Col., Inf. - 15 June 1943 - Circular No. l)
The reversion of a portion of the guerrilla enlisted personnel to a reserve
status engendered bad feelings in some quarters. The Commanding Offieer of the Tig-
bao Sector, Santos, gave warning*
" . . . .To reduce a battalion into a company would compel me to discriminate
against two-thirds in behalf of one-third who will be incorporated into a regular
company. . . . . . ............................................... . . . . . . . . . .
"I have been sensing. . . .that incident to the reorganization there will be •
soldiers who will be discontented who will. . . .surely beoome fifth columnist against
us; besides that, they have already established their vested rights as Guerrilla fight
ers." (C. Estogero, E. Ley. Seo., Tigbao. 2 June 43 To* The CO, HE Ley. Seot.)
1st. John, op. oit., pp. 93-4.
318
Joe Kazareno, a fine guerrilla fighter. . . .; 34 v.ras Gordon Lang, an American

who had been yeoman second class in the Davy, stationed in Cebu............ ..
Propaganda was run by Gorden /Dominvo/Veloso, a former politician /post-war

Congressman from Leyte/. V.e p/ave him a radio as his news source, and he turned
the news into fiery words which were distributed by our transportation corps. .
I took the signal corps under my special supervision. I wanted cor. munica-
tions so that, wherever our radio station was, reports could come into it
cuickly......................................................................
Almost the first messages I sent out v.er- general orders to all unit
commanders: (l) no regular enrolled member of the ruerrilla army would be
regarded as a deserter by either the Filipino Army or the united States Amy;
(2) all guerrilla army men who had served previous to September 1, 1943, would
be paid from the time of the surrender to date of termination of their services;
(3) all men enlisting after September 1 would be paid from the date of enlist
ment, regardless of previous service in the regular A m y ; (4) monthly allowance
against full pay — which could not he paid over at once but must be carried on
the books until victory -- herewith increased from IP to 74 pesos a month; (p)
a pious hone that the substantial sum of money to be paid each man after victory
as salary due would be spent wisely for a farm or to start a small business.
'Jell then v.re had the makings of an Army, be had communications twenty-
four hours a day. It expedited intelligence reports enormously. Intelligence
was the primary mission of each unit in a Jap garrison area. . . .These men
were being drilled and taken through practice exercises in ambushes, night
maneuvers, forced marches, and target practice — without bullets. . . .
Companies were organized on a regular army basis — with a guardhouse,
barracks, mess hall, officers' quarters. These structures might be any houses
or huts they found around in the hills. There would be regular guard mount. . . .
And we had a medical corps. 1 made Doc Parado our chief surgeon because
he had been such a good fighter. I then enrolled all civilian doctors and den
tists in a reserve and concentrated all medicines and medical instruments in the
area in one place. In that way we had a genuinely mobile hospital unit. All
the instruments filled only two ordinary doctors' satchels. . . .
During 1 9 4 5 , the guerrillas ..set as their principal objective the con-

2 3
t&inment cf the Japanese wit;.in a few garrison towns along the eastern coast,and within
V.clfert, op. c i t . , pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 5 .

O "
’Parsons estimated t h a t t h e Japanese in earl 70 1 9 4 3 " h a d T a c t i c a l l y no
forces on Leyte at t h a t time, probably n o t over t h r e e h u n d r e d in all." (inrham,
on. c i t . , p. 71)
This would appear to be an extremely conservative estimate, probably based
uncn observations in southern Leyte.
3
Gf Balderian's military activities, the puppet Governor recorded:
"fanauan burned in April. Guerrilla forces reported busy around Juiita and
Gulag. . . . " find in June, he wrote deploringly: "Events reached blook-cur dling
climax. The bandits went on the warpath, inspired tv success in Tanuan. They burned
buildings in the towns of Alangalang (one block), Jaro (the main street, the convent,
schools) Carigara (the main street - five blocks, numbering 3CC houses), Earugo (two
319
Ormoc on tho western coast. So tightly drawn was tho cordon thrown around tho
remaining Japanese strongholds that tho puppet administrations in both Taoloban and
Ormoc trembled in apprehension of mass asBault. And such assault might very well
have succeeded. But, as Miranda explained, the overrunning of an important town
would bo a costly and futile enterprise. The Japanese would reduoo the guerrilla
prize to rubble by air bombardment, and retake it leicurly by landing sea-borne
reinfor cements•
Rather1
, than mount a foolhardy offensive, the guerrilla oontinued and in
tensified their harassing operations against the oautiously dispatched Japanese pat
rols, and attempted to throttle all shipment of foodstuffs and essential supplies to
sohoole), Pastrana (four sohool buildings, the municipal building). . • (Retg. Gov*
Salazar. Report of Activities: Apr. 1 - Oct. 31, 1943. To: Commissioner of In
terior thru Direotor of Local Govts.)
These buildings were burned, Balderian explained (interview, home in Dagami,
1945) in anticipation of Japanese reocoupation of the town centers of tho afore
mentioned municipalities. The sohool houses, municipal buildings, convents, and the
largest private residences were invariably selected by the Japanese comnand as the
sites of their local garrisons. In the case of Tanauan, however, what took place
was pure vengeful incendiarism on the part of guerrilla chief Antonio Cinco, who
believed the townspeople had betrayed the hiding-place of his wife to a Japanese
patrol.
Balderian’s top operation called for the wresting of the provincial capital
out of Japanese hande. The puppet governor reported in June 1943: ”Captured letters
revealed guerrilla intention to sack Taoloban and overthrow the constituted government.
Because of oonstant surveillance and armed readiness of the people, the Japanese
military, and the BC detachment, no further damage was done by the guerrilla.”
That Balderian persisted nonetheless was admitted by the governor in August:
” . . . • The guerrilla made a last attempt at Taoloban by an attack on Perikhon out
post, resulting in the death of one BC sentinel. . . . ” (Actg. Gov. Salazar. Report
of Activities: Apr. 1 - Oct. 31, 1943. To: Commissioner of Interior thru Direotor
of Local Govts.)
Colonel Kangleon felt obliged to dissuade 3alderian from continuing in his
campaign of arson: ”1 just reoeived your letter of July 21st last. I read and re
read it with profound interest. I admire your plan to deprive the enemy of shelters.
However, I cannot authorire you to destroy government or private buildings. • • .Who
will answer for the destruction of those buildings after the end of the war? Besides,
we shall always be the losers. For, if the enemey really intends to oocupy La Pat or
other towns, with or without buildings in that town. . . .he can put up. . . .tempor
ary shelters while we are weak to stop him. . . .But how long will he stay in the
Philippines?
”Col. Balderian, victory ia fast approaching. « . .Destruction or not de
struction of buildings. • . .we shall win the war. Besides, in the radio message,
Gen. MaoArthur prohibited the destruction of buildings and the declaration of martial
law even in towns occupied by the enemy. . . . ” (Col. Runerto K. Kangleon, Cradg.,
9MD. ”Dear Col. Balderian” 5 Aug. ’43).
320
tho Japanese-garrisoned towns, particularly Taoloban.*- Moreover, as they established
contact with the inter-island resistance movement, Leyte's guerrillas intensified
and perfected their intelligence activities, preparing aecurate and detailed reports
of enemy troop concentration and activities* And in the distriots they controlled,
the guerrillas provided military protection for the pro-resistance municipal ad
ministrations •
By mid-1943, the Japanese on Lyete began to receive reinforcements, and
were able to break loose from the guerrilla stranglehold. They advanced in sufficient
strength upon Carigara, Jaro.and Aiangalang to compel a guerrilla withdrawal. But in
December, the Japanese received large-scale increments of manpower, and now undertook
to break the baok of resistance on Leyte as they had long threatened. A powerful
assault against the headquarters of Miranda was followed by the retrieval of the
five west coast municipalities administered by the WLGWF. At the same time, they
swept southward along both coasts and northward to Biliran, retrieving oontrol for
2
the Tuoloban regime and establishing outposts at strategic points.
^Che guerrilla also sought to safeguard the crops of the resisters at har
vest time: w . . . .Enemy robbing people of their food. . . .Patrolled districts of
Dulag and Burauen, watohing the rice fields that will soon be harvested. . . .1 de
cided to engage our troops with enemy patrols.” (Ruperto K. Kangleon, Col. April
30, 1943. To: Lt. Comm. Charles Parsons.)
p
fT''&»^Richard son reoounted: "The next day, December 6, the typhoon came. •
•Coconuts and while tress were whirling through the air Hire armor-piercing shells.
This was the typhoon through which the Japs moved to wipe out Miranda, at 'Camp Heavenji
"When I woke up the next morning the guard told me a launch had passed by about
four o 'clook. . . .
"The *âps landed all over everywhere that day. They took every one of our
towns. • • .and Liloan and Pintuyan on Panoan Island aoross the bay.
"The southern Leyte guerrillas had begun to itoh the hide of them. They
reached out, fingers to s quash u s . . ................ ..
"The Japs Iandiiig' in southem Leyte found no arny to oppose them. They came
charging up the beach, threw their machine guns down, threw themselves down. . . . .
nThe Japs fanned out into the hills. We watched their columns walking along.
. . .Their columns eonverged on nothing. • • .Not a shot was fired at them. They
found nothing to shoot at. . . «" (Wolfert, op. oit., pp. 156-61)
(See also: St. John, op. cit., pp. 92-3.)
321
The guerrillas were too poorly armed to ohallenge this Japanese expansion.
In keeping with word from USFIF headquarters of Fertig in Mindanao, they adopted a
temporary lie-low policy. Father Haggeirty, in close touch with Fertig and Commander
Parsons, outlined the new policy*
'Commander Parsons gave us a new perspective on the global war. He told

guerrilla officers quite bluntly that S.W.P. was not interested in how many
Japs Company A had killed. He told us plainly, and bluntly, that even if
American prisoners cf war were slowly dying of malnutrition, and even i f all
guerrillas were about to be wiped out, no rash attempt would be made to save
them.................................................................... ..
So a new phase of guerrilla war began; orders were given to make no more
attacks on Japanese strong points, but to hold all territory now under guer
rilla control. The plan was to quiet Jap suspicion »nd give no provocation
for them to send more troops.
Former Amerioan Air Corps men, Filipino telegraph and radio operators,
radio meohanics, were placed at strategic watoher stations on every ooest.
Transmitters were built to supplement those brought in from Australia. . . .
Guerrilla organisations now becamd primarily protectors of these transmitting
stations. Thus all movements of enemy ships were followed and promptly re
ported to American submarines. • .
The guerrillas of Leyte no longer had a definite territorial base. But
from their mobile field headquarters, they maintained contqct with many of the puppet
municipal officials (some of whom they had themselves installed, thus outwitting
the Japanese), furnished armed protection for the isolated watcher stations set up
by American personnel on speoial assignment (Richardson, St. John, H©minway, etc.),
and continued an uninterrupted flow of intelligence reports. But Colonel Kangleon
was not content to remain militarily dormant*
. . . .He had seven hundred men in this sector ^south Leyte^, about half
of them with rifles. The Japs hunted them with more than five thousand heavily
armed troops, a completely equipped task foroe. . . .Kangleon knew eventually
the Japs would tire of sending their columns on long forced marohes through
thin air. . • .The Japs would start to withdraw it. Kangleon could not wait
until they withdrew it altogether. For political reasons, there must be a
fight. The people had supported a guerrilla army. It must fight for them.
Else, how would hope of liberation be kept alive until MaoArthur arrived. . . .
The guerrillas must strike at a time in between, when the Japs were not so weak
they were no longer sending out patrols but not so strong that their patrols
were columns. .......... .............................................
’Haggerty, op. cit., pp. 98-9. AJ.so j Ingham, op. pit., pp. 141-2.
322
By tho end of January, Kangleon deemed the time ripe for the guerrillas
to strike. He ordered his men to go over to the offensive at OOOOhours, mid
night February 1, 1944. . • •
The offensive was a guerrilla offensive. It didn’t consist of fellows going

over the top after en artillery barrage. Joe Nazareno had artillery, one .81-
millirneter mortar with five shells and one bazooka gun. He and his fellows
went over the top, but the rest didn’t even have a machine gun. • . .and so
they just hung near the towns waiting fbr the Jap patrols to come out. Except
at Anahawan. There was a garrison of twelve Japs there. They never went out
on patrol, just stayed in town, so the boys went in after them................
Joe Nazareno. . . .gried to take his boys into the town of Liloan. He had
a combat company with sixty automatic rifles. Kangleon had given him almost
every automatic rifle in the army. They came in on two sides. . . .
The battle started with a mortar shell that landed just outside the Liloan
school building where the Jap garrison was staying. The Japs came piling out
into foxholes. They had barbed wire entanglements, too. . . •
The Japs had fired star shells, and Joe reasoned that meant a plea for
reinforcements from Cabalian, across the Liloan Straits. He held the beaoh. . .
A banca full of Japs ceme sneak ng over the water at night. Joe and his boys.
. .waited until the banca grounded on the beach. Then they opened up with
everything they had. They had counted about eighty Japs in the banca, all
flocked together when the guerrillas opened fire. But Joe’s boys dove all
night for bodies and rifles and supplies. . . .
Joe fought a naval battle, too. Reinforcements came that day and drove them
off the beach. But Joe sneaked in the next morning. . . .Then the Japs sent
a patrol out in a benoa. They worked along close to shore, and Joe opened up
on them with an unnerving fire. They turned and tried to run. Joe and a
crowd of boys chased after them in a banca of their own. . . .Some of them
started jumping wildly over the side. . . .The guerrillas took every one of them
out of the water to get their shoes.
The bazooka had been set up to command Liloan Straits, connecting Cabalian
Bay and Sogod Bay. It had to wait until February 10 to get a shot in. . . .The
Japs were too busy fighting off attacks to move around. Then a launch came
along, making about eight knots. . • .They aimed for the engine. . . .
. . . .Because they had led the target, not having experience with high-
velocity shells, only with rifles, the missile had hit forward of the engine. . .
•There was a long post-mortem on the shot. They wanted to get it right next
time. But there was no next time. The Japs never put a launch through the
Liloan Straits again. They preferred to go more than sixty miles out of their
way rather than risk it.......................................... .......... .
The Japs sent heavy-weapon squads out with their patrols. The guerrillas
let them go by. Theh, in the evening when the Japs came dragging back all loose
and tired from maybe a fifteen mile march on which they had found nothing, the
guerrillas hit them. . . .The troops retreated individually as they ran short
on ammunition, and there was always a rendezvous point seleoted in advanoe. . . .
There is ho accurate figure on Jap losses. Certainly they ran into the
323
hundreds and perhaps eventually into the thousands. . . .But guerrillas seldom
win and take over battlefields. They shoot until out of ammunition or until
the enen^r is successfully deployed. Then they retreat. . . .Soldiers who see
the eneny drop when they fire. . . .never consider they missed, and the man
might only be duoking. They count him hit. Soldiers who hit a man count him
dead. And soldier tales grow, particularly when girls are listening. . . .
Very slowly and desperately and doodily, Kangleon1s arny fought the Japs
back into the ooastal towns. The Japs oouldn’t send reinforcements. When re
inforcements came, they had no fighting to do. The guerrillas would lay low.
They'd just hit when the patrols were weak, and finally there were no more
patrols. The Japs didn't dare leave the coast. They yielded the hills to us.
But that was a long time happening. It had to wait until an American submarine
came in with help for us.^
Further north, the guerrilla was functioning in the same fashion. Abuyog's
municipal secretary wrote;
The resistance movement in Abuyog during the Jap re-occupation consisted

of *1* Co., 3rd Bn., 94th Infantry. . . .
Lest anyone overestimate the strength of 'I' Company, in view of itsre
markable achievements, it must first be known that there were less than 30
rifles even up to the first of February, 1944, when it struck its initial
blow against eight Japs at Himay-angan. . . .
On March 11, 1944, the company got from GHQ a little portion of the aid
unloaded in Mindanaoi 3 carbines, 1 sub-machine gun, and 1 BAR.
Between the first of February, 1944, andmid-April, while the company CP
was still in the hills, ambushes and snipings were limited to the Abuyog-Baybay
road. It was harvest time in mid-Aprilwhen orders to proceed to the plains
were reoeived. The reason was obvious; The rice crop should not go to the
enemy, and the harvesters must therefore be protected. . . .
On the plains the order was successfully carried to the letter. For sheer
abundance of the rice crop, however, plus the corresponding insufficiency of
armed guerrillas to defend it at the time, not all could be harvested. . . .
. . . .In Maitum hill on May 5, 1944, the 'I' boys gave the Japs the prelude
of what was to come later during the year. . . .The Jap patro£ of about 70—
even more— lost approximately half its original number. . . .
A portion of the Mindanao aid also reaohed Major Balderian's 95th Regiment,
making possible an intensification of sniping and ambushing in the vicinity of the
provincial capital. However, on the west coast, the remnant of the 'WLGWF, (now
ATolfert, op. cit., pp. 162, 174-182.

St. John also spoke of the exploits of Hazareno and his banca, describing
him as follows; "The big, brave, popular hero among the people in southern Leyte
was Major Joe Nazareno, a real fighting man. He was a guy who would do anything to
kill Japs, take any chances.
"Joe Nazareno was only about twenty-five years old, short, stocky, with blaok
curly hair. . . . " (St. John, op. oit., pp. 141-2)
2 -------
Aurillo, op. cit., pp. 11-12. Also see; St. John, op. cit,, pp. 143-4.
Wolfert, op. cit., 136-40.
324
centered outside of Merida), restricted its activities to the gathering: of in
telligence*
What to the guerrilla was a long-heralded event— the arrival of a submarine,
its oavernous invrards replete with badly needed arms and supplies, and scarcely less
important, the enheartening proof that American support was not myth but immediate
end palpable reality— was finally consummated in July of 1944.^ Esclepiades Kuison,
a student at the Cebu Institute of Technology before the war, (referred to in Leyte
Calling as nPerlingtt), and assigned as guerrilla radio operative, received the radio
warning of the submarine’s approaoh. In "The Big Fish Landing", a specially prepared
account for the present writer, Kuiion recorded:
Leyte received its first notice by radio from Southwest Pacific in the I
latter part of June 1944, of a supply shipment to be made by submarine* I
was with the Headquarters of the Leyte Area Command in the mountains of
Sogod with my radio station, ’TUL1. . . .1 will soon have a better radio
set, I said to mysdlf. Leyte will at last cease to be begging the left
over supplies from the 10th Military Distriot in Mindanao which was at
that time under the command of Colonel W. W. Fertig. . * *
. . . *We have to keep Southwest Paoifio informed of the progress of the

plans and enemy dispositions. . . .In the morning of July 12, a radio message
we received via Mindanao revealed that the submarine reported to have passed
Hingatungan Point the day before. Boy— they were very much ahead of the sohedule,
They must be lurking in our vicinity by now, just waiting for our signals to
be displayed. Due to the presence of the enemy at Laguma, we have to send
them back a message to land in the alternate site where the signals will be
made.
Tljis was at San Roque. This barrio was almost as big as Silago. From
îlago we hikod up the hills of Laguma. We can not follow the coastline.
The Japs were busy loading lumber at Laguma. We could clearly see them with
our binoculars from the hills. Damn Japs. They must be making nice barracks
out of those lumbers I said to myself. After passing them behind the hills,
we came down to the coast again and hiked along the Bhore towards San Roque. . . .
Morning of July 14. . . JTUL V KUS IMI QTC - I M3ST URGENT HW CA' was what
I heard from Mindanao control rddio station early that morning. This simply
means: ’TUL from KUS. How do you hear me? I have one message for your most
urgent, Now, go ahead.’ 'KUS' signal was coning in very weak. His signals
were broad and kept fading away beyond readability. Good heavens— what can this
message be? Very sure it muat be in connection with the submarine scheduled
to land that day.My dry batteries have long been run down. . . .
For an enthralling narrative of Commander "Chick" Parsons famous 6py squad

ron, known as "Spyron", that maintained a precarious liaison between guerrilla watcher
stations and supplied "Aid" by submarine, See: Ingham, op. cit., pp. 141-5, 196-8,
203-07, etc.
325
Four o'clock in the afternoon, July 14. The shore was all lined up with
people both volunteer guards, civilians young .and old, and guerrilla soldiers,
all anxious to witness the ooming up to the surface of the big fish. . . .This
ship would be the first American ship we would see after the lapse of three
years. They were soheduled to surface at dusk.
2ero hour. There was a big rush of water at the distance not far from
the small boat of the Colonel. . . .It looks like a ghost. There was a big
cry of happiness from among the crowd. . . .And immediately the big task of
unloading the supplies began. The improvised rafts were towed towards the sub
as she was guided to the landing spot by the Colonel. . . .No time should be
lost to unload the supplies before the Jap smells the chocolate bars, oigarettes,
and other appetising stuff. Every minute counts. • . .
Ammunition, medical supplies, signal supplies and many other kinds were pour
ing continuously ashore. The shore was covered with piles of boxes covered by
dry leaves to camouflage. At twelve o'clock midnight the unloading of supplies
was finished. We did not have a nit of sleep that night. Coffee was served
by. • . .the members of the Women's Auxiliary Service. . . .
Everybody was tired the following morning. . . .Some of the -rolunteer guards
already have left with some of the supplies under their care. . . .As a signal
man, I managed to assort all signal supplies. . . .The doctors took care of the
medical supplies, and the infantry for the arms and ammunitions. . . .Now they
get rid of their home made shot guns and with the new guns, they could harass
the Japs very well. . .
Referring to the oivilian assistance rendered, Abuyog's municipal secretary

a
proudly noted*
On July 14, 1944, Mayor Gallego mobilized about 5,000 loyal people— volunteer
guards and civilians— at barrio San Roque, ready with ropes and banana rafts*
In the evening, the submarine surfaced and the men unloaded the longed-for aid. .
In town where at least a company of Japs was always alerted, only a few
people knew that aoross the mountains along the coast, America was coming back.
And those people were the intelligence operatives and other confidential men.
. . . .On that night the U. S. Submarine 'Nautilus* uhloaded arms,
ammunition, newspapers, books, cigarettes, medical supplies, jungle boots, and
chewing gum. . . .
With their new equipment, distributed throughout the 92nd Division, the
guerrillas now lashed out against the Japanese with merciless fury. Thus, "I" Com
pany of the 94th Regiment:
The company got ten submachine guns, five BAR'S, and no less than 70 car
bines. Other carbineB were given to the volunteer guards. . . .
■LBsclepiades Kuison, "The Big Fish Landing", 1945, pp. 1-6 (typewritten).
2
Aurillo, op. oit., pp. 12, 14.
Also see: Wolfert, op. cit., p. 197; and St. John, cp. cit., p. 151.
There is bo need enumerating the various enoouaters * . . .The Jape sure got
hell of that aid. Aocording to some oivilians in town, after they were first
ambushed with a frat-a-tat*, the Japs in Abuyog eould not help mumbling, *ayuda,
amerioa'— meaning aid from the United States
And now, Colonel Kangleon was in a position to o&rry out a projeot he had
long oontemplated, -the formation of a guerrilla regiment in west Leyte, affiliated
with his oommand. His propaganda officer, Lieutenant Domingo Veloso, recorded!
. . . .The 96th Infantry was immediately organized. On July 18, 1944, Major
Jose R. Nazareno, Inf., was designated the Regimental Commander. Nucleus of
this regiment are officers and non-commissioned officers of the 94th Infantry,
veterans of many enoounters against the Japanese in the South. The regiment
was assigned to cover the seotor from Albuera to Biliran Island. Strength of
the 96th Inf .was readily bolstered by the Miranda men who deserted their
outfit. . . .2
A brief comment is oalled for by this quotation. A good part of the officers
and enlisted men of the TNLOTTF remained loyal to their organization until mid-1944.
After Kangleon had reoeived "the American Aid", and unimpeaohable confirmation of
his appointment as Island commander became known, the "Miranda m»nn had no reoourse
but to dissolve their general staff. Those who were absorbed into the 96th Regiment
aoquitted themselves oreditably, especially in combat with the Japanese after the
American landings. On their part, however, these same "Miranda men" were disgruntled
over the discrimination displayed towards them in promotional and assignment policy.
Consequently, in 1945, many of them worked actively to reactivate their organization,
and secure a belated American recognition.
And now, resuming this sketoh of the guerrilla combat mission, we note that
in the final pre-invasion period:
The whole idea that Colonel Kangleon worked on then was to d e a n out as
many small Jap garrisons as he could so that when the AmericanArmy came in,
they would not have to bother with those little outfits, which can cause a
lot of trouble. It takes a battalion of infsuitry a long time, sometimes,
to d e a n out a handful of Japs with machine guns in holes.
The emphasis of guerrilla warfare changed from just killing and harassing
to a definite military plan. Everything that was done in the last month before
Âurillo, op. cit., p. 12.

z.
Veloso, op. cit., pp. 9-10,
327
invasion was pointed direotly toward helping the liberating invaders.^
Glancing retrospectively upon the military accomplishments of Leyte’s guer
rilla, then, we see them essentially as anticipatory in intent. By preventing
civilian morile from flagging in defiance of a cruel Occupation Power, and by harass
ing the enemy relentlessly so as to deprive him of a secure b&6e of popular support,
the guerrilla was anticipating the American return and the liberation of Philippine
soil. In the testimonial of Commander "Chick?Parsonss
American forces landing on Leyte possessed the most oomplete and extensive
information of any that ever invaded an enemy-held area. This was entirely
due to the loyalty and good work of the guerrilla-soldiers and their
communications system.^
Law and Order
Not alone with defending the people of the resistance zone against the
Japanese, and organizing sorties against enemy patrols were the guerrillas ooncerned.
They also pledged themselves to afford protection to their loyal population against
the lawless elements infesting the province during the unstable occupation period.
They were obliged to prevent murder and pillage, and make some arrangements for en
abling the disposal of oivil litigation.
Wherever municipal governments were functioning within the resistance area,
the apparatus of a munioipal police force and a justice of the peace was theoretically
available for the redressal of grievances and the maintenance of the public safety.
But the functioning of these officers was dependent upon the type of control exeroised
by the guerrilla forces. Where the guerrilla respected the jurisdiction of the civil
functionaries, they merely lent the backing of armed might to the judieial process.
But where they took it upon themselves to dispense summary justioe, or to distort
justice for their own private interests, the law officers were as if non-existent.
The guerrilla chieftains who stood in the forefront of the struggle against
^ t . John, op. olt., p. 176.

2
Ingham, op. cit., p. 218.
328
the Japanese on Leyte: Kangleon, Miranda, Erfe, Pabilona, Pamanian, Nuique and
others, sought to bring about some approximation to a rule of law in the territory
they controlled. If the usual safeguards of procedural due process could not be
preserved intact, at least the substance of justioe would be guarded. Espionage
and collaboration must be discouraged through the judicious application of swift
punishment to the guilty. But malice must not be permitted to level false accusations
against the innocent in order that neighbors might conveniently dispose of their per
sonal enemies, or improperly acquire their property.
Yfhere an attempt was made to bring about centralization of administration
within the zone of a guerrilla organization, it would invariably be accompanied by
an effort to restore to functioning the system of provincial courts. Unfortunately,
harrassment by Japanese patrols interfered with the regular operation of these courts.
However, the bit of litigation that actually came up, as well as the instances of
military court-martial prove the intent of the guerrilla to check violence and
criminality, and thwart scoundrels masquerading as guerrilla fighters.
V7e shall pass in review as much information as we have been able to gather
concerning the provisions made by guerrilla organizations for upholding the rule of
law in their respective territories.
Guerrilla pretensions to being the lawful authority in Leyte were accepted
by the people in the measure that the guerrilla identified itself with sponsoring
a regime of law. Captain Glicerio I. Erfe succeeded in making that identification
manifest. In consequence of personal temperament and of the conditioning of previous
training, Captain Erfe sought to establish a regime thoroughly in consequence with
the requirements of legal process. His military command was to function with due
respect for the legal norms, and the civil authorities under his supervision were to
abide strictly by the dictates of laws
The organization, government, regimentation, operation and activities of the

Guerrilla V.'arfare Service shall be in strict accord with International Law, the
Rules of Land V.'arfare and the Articles of War (Military Law), Act of U. S.
329
Congress of June 1920 and the Revised Penal Code and of the Rules of Courts
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
All commanding officers, detachment commanders and group leaders, officers
and non-oommissioned officers of the Guerrilla Foroes and the oivil government
public officials in the exercise of their legal powers shall be governed by-
sound principles of justice and law. They shall proteot, defend and uphold
the constitutions, the laws and the ideals of liberty, justice and democracy
of the United States of America and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
and shall owe loyalty and subordination to said government.
Summary executions are no longer contemplated under the civilized laws of
War. No individual should be punished for any offense against the law of War
unless pursuant to a sentence imposed after trial and conviction by a court
or the Guerrilla War Tribunal. Those belonging to existing military organization,
meeting the requirements of lawful belligerents, must be tried by Court Martial,
otherwise by military commissions of Provost Courts to be designated by the
Commander of the USAFFS ALL. (Sec. 7, 15, 356 Rules of Land Warfare; Articles
29, 30, Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, and Articles 81, 82, A.W., USA).
Those belonging to civil courts shall be tried by the Justice of the Peace
of the municipality and governed by the provision of the Revised Penal Code
and of the Rules of Court.^
Other guerrilla commanders professed to bo concerned with the prevalence
of legal process in their zones, but nowhere within Leyte do we encounter so un
ambiguous an expression of obligation. Here is an explicit spelling out of the
sources of authority and of the norms that are to hold. A zealous regard for the
distinctions in the classes of legal subjects is also shown, with the correspondent
distinctions in covering sources of law. Erfe's specific administrative innovation
was what he called the Guerrilla War Tribunal. Abuyog's chronicler wrote of it :
This Erfe-sponsored jury, which was composed of lawyers and some prominent
men, tried people within Erfe's jurisdiction for having allegedly violated
the Articles of War. The creation of this body gave credit to Erfe’s ad
ministration, because, unlike other military leaders upon whose impulses
Erfe's Proclamation of May 21, 1943, read in part: ’’WHEREAS, that in order
to be considered lawful belligerents in accordance with the laws of Land Warfare, to
wit: First, to be commanded by person responsible for his subordinates; second, .to
have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; third, to carry arms
openly; fourth, to conduct their operation in acoordance with the laws of war. . . .
(GlicerioI. Erfe, Col., Inf. ’’Proclamation’’ May 21, 1943.)
There are timeswhen Erfe gave the impression that his regime was operating
under martial law. Yet the radiogram allegedly dispatched from Gen. MacArthur to Lt.
Col. Peralta, and transmitted to Erfe for his guidance, stated: ” . . . .You can not
RPT not operate under provision of martial law in the Philippines occupied as they are
by the enemy STOP” What construction Erfo puts upon this is not made clear. (nS*,
Capt., Inf. 3 May 1943. Message to Col. Kangleon.)
2Col. ”9’’, Inf.GHQ, USAFFE AT LARGE. Oct. 9, 1942. Unnumbered Circular.
Par. 3-5.
330
respected the freedom or death of an accused or suspect, Erfe gave demooracy

in all and every form.*
Attorney Enerlan of Burauen, a prominent local politician, and former member
of the Provincial Board, was appointed President of the Tribunal consisting of 21

2
members. Enerlan stated (Interview) that prior to the constitution of the Tribunal
there had been some liquidations of alleged "fifth columnists". Now such summary
procedure was interdioted. ^he unit leaders of the guerrilla were to turn over all
apprehended suspects to Erfe’s headquarters, to be held for trial. Those cleared,
(and some of the doubtful ones) were put on probation, while the others were detained)!
There were no executions ordered, said. Mayor Galjego of Abuvog added that
some of the guerrilla-instituted "treason" cases were pending at the tine that Capt.
Erfe *8 organization was dissolved,^
As in the other zones, some of the guerrilla soldiers construed their status
as a franchise to loot oivilian properties and to wreack their vengeance on personal
enemies. There was much disorder, and sometimes crime, traceable to guerrilla
sources in the early days *
Erfe’s staff officers and his auditor painted a sordid picture of lust and
Âurillo, op. cit., p. 4.

2
Mayor Pablo Molon of La Paz was the first President of the Guerrilla War
Tribunal. He had fallen into bad graces with the guerrilla while serving as mayor
because of his suspected pro-Japanese opportunism. Vice-Mayor Malate, who managed
to keep free of taint, was appointed acting mayor by Erfe after the guerrilla attack
on LaPaz. Molon eventually was exonerated and given the Presidency of the Tribunal
as a token of good feeling. According to Erfe’s adjutant, Molon went ahead and
married the sister of a man on the guerrilla black-list, and otherwise compromised
himself. He was impeached by his colleagues, and retired to his farm.
^Paza, Erfe’s adjutant, stated that the prisoners were interned at Bo. Cal-
tayan, Purauen, and that they were considerable in number. Mayor Toreno of Burauen
wes one of the prisoners, but was released by Erfe.
Êven in his mode of waging war, Erfe hewed to the line of legality. A
letter addressed to his field commander read* "No burning of any house if it oan be
avoided, even of fifth columnists, to insure that no others belonging to innocent
civilians be involved. No looting or terrorizing of civilians shall be allowed of our
own troops. . . .Proven fifth columnists beyond shadow of doubt shall be killed at
once, but suspects should be made prisoners of war pending investigation* by summary
court. . . . " ("9", Capt., Inf. 11 March ’42. Tos Lt. Balderian.)
331
misguided zealousness*
The self-styled guerrilleros, as there was no formal organization yet, be

came unruly, committing brutalitiee against innocent civilians. Anybody who
could carry a gun was a king of his domain. Unscrupulous civilians befriended
illiterate soldiers who were drunk with power. . . .These people took the
opportunity in eliminating their personal enemies^-. . . .Those days were the
dark days in the history of the resistance in Leyte. Anybody was liable to
meet his doom and go to ”thy Kingdom come" for a flimsy acousation.
By the middle of August it was already discernible the restlessness of the
people. . . .They Êhe guerrillerosTcould no longer see justice for they lusted
for blood. They returned to the Age of Barbarism. . . .Should this unwarranted
and wanton killings and brazen murders be tolerated? Would there be somebody
to dare these bandits and stop their depredations? Were these people justified
in taking into their hands the laws of the land? Their corrupt deeds were a
challenge to the upright and liberty loving people. No matter haw desirous
a person was to stop them, yet no one tried for he was helpless. . . .The people
were still dazed about the sudden change of government, and reoent happenings
set them abaok. • . .They could not differentiate what was right and what was
wrong *2
It was this state of lawlesscesf, with desperadoes masking themselves as
guerrilleros, that Captain Erfe determined to reotify. His followers, no matter how
autonomous they might be in conducting the oombat phase of their activities, were ex
pected to toe the mark on matters of administrative procedure. Unauthorized
requisitioning in collecting foodstuffs from the civilian population, and terroriza
tion in general, were grounds for court-martial and deprivation of oommand for
Mercado related two of these gruesome incidents:

nThere was a time that a soldier was made drunk by a fellow who. . . .wanted
to eliminate his barrio lieutenant. The soldier was told that the said barrio
official used to receive letters from town. Without investigating further the matter,
the soldier looked for the ’’Teniente” and shot him cold-bloodedly. Later, when the
soldier became sober and perhaps realizing that he had committed a most heinous
crime, he fetched in turn the informant and shot him also. . . .
An imbecile, who was suspected of petty thieveries, was caught in Sitio
Bantayan, about two kilometers from the town of Dulag. He was brought to town for a
formal charge and investigation. He was placed in the town jail. Under the usual
procedure, he should have been under medioal observation or be placed in the psycho
pathic hospital. But before he could be properly investigated, thirty self-styled
guerrilleros, headed by one Valeriano Asis, went to the jail and demanded the person
of the accused. And in spite of the intervention of the parish priest, they lynched
him. . . .After Asia had shot the accused, he cut the two ears and placed them on
a pointed stiok which already contained several pairs, as trophy. He braggingly told
the people that the man he shot a few moments ago was the eighth he had killed. He
and his companions were able to escape from a platoon of Jap soldiers that arrived
from Tacloban ten minutes after the commission of the "murder". (Mercado, op, oit,
pp. 23-24.)
332
officers, and reversion to civilian status for enlisted men.
A sure test cf the probity of a guerrilla leader may be found in the pro
curement procedures he adopts for getting supplies from the vivilian population.
Erfe's procurement system was decentralized, with each cf the guerrilla brigades
responsible for ius own sustenance, however, in each sector, the procedure tended
to be uniform, with solicitation limited to professed supporters of the guerrilla,
anu with uniform records kept. Aamon hercado, Erfe's auditor, stated "that
voluntary contributions in kind were the financial foundation and support of the
organization." hercado described his duties:
. . . .to straighten the financial status of the organization and to

see to it that no malversation either in cash or in kind be committed
by supply or finance officers; that through a system of accounting and
auditing in accordance with the existing rules and regulations, every
collection made by supply officers of the b-fferent units ’was reported
and their work co-ordinated; that no cash was taken by the organiza
tion fret?, the municipal funds of the municipalities v.lthin the terri
torial jurisdiction of Gol. Erfe's guerrilla organization, except when
he authorized the finance officer, 1st. Lt. Domingo C-asang to ret a
cash advance from the municipal treasurer of Abuyon, 1 r. Pedro Vorega,
for payment of allqwg.noos of these officers and enlisted men in the
fir in" line.
however, Erfe laid claim to blanket powers to "commandeer any article,
instrument, and the like, useful to the USArYE and with proper record", instructing
And one of the former leaders of the Dular guerrilla adds this testi
monial: " . . . .if banditry and other criminal actions on the part of black
hearted people has not flourished m these marts was due in great part to the
guerrilla organizations....gathered together under the leadership of Captain
Erfe." (.Eugenio Villegas. 3d Lt. Inf., Actg. Lun. Secty., Du lag. Sept. 10,
1943. To: prov. Gov. in the Field p. 2)
2
'According to l.ercado (Interview) ti e Abuyog municipal council adooted
a resolution that the money appropriated for the guerrilla fighting forces be
made chargeable to the national government. Erfe's Adjutant, Silverio Paza,
stated that in the guerrilla brigades, the Procurement Officer (holding the
brevet rank cf Capt.) appointed Procurement A-ents (with the rank of Spt.) to
canvass all the houses in their assigned areas. Pefusal to donate might lead
to indirect punishment for the male householder, such as the assignment to
guard the trail where the Japanese patrols were scheduled to pass. (Failure
to act cn this assignment might lead to internment.) The indigent were
exempted from the duty of giving to the agents. Storehouses for guerrilla
supplies would be built by the volunteer guards under the direction of the
Procurement Aênt. Th e su ply officers of the mobile combat units rr.ir.ht
requisition from the procurement a-ents.
'■'Ramon 1. V.erfcadc, Affidavit, Tacloban, Leyte. Anril 2C, 1945, o.l.
333
his sector commanders to avail themselves of this powere where necessary.1 More
over, WA11 articles taken from the enemy, Japs or fifth columnists, are regarded
as spoils of war. . . .Spoils of war, means, any article which could be used by the
soldiers of the USAFFE for any military purpose.*' This order was addressed
specifically to the guerrilla soldiers, but by extension, might cover cases of
appropriation by volunteer guards and other classes of Filipinos connected with the .
military.
What the guerrilla municipal secretary of Dulag declared of Erfe^s in
fluence upon his municipality might have been echoed by the functionaries of Abuyog,
La ?az, and Burauen:
, . . .But. . . .let it be mentioned here that if banditry and other

criminal action. . . .has not flourished in these parts, was due in groat
partto the guerrilla organizations. . . .who were gathered together under j
the leadership of Captain Glioerio Erfe. . . .^
One of the pioneer organizations in North West Leyte was Felix Pamanian.
The maintenance of law and order and the frustration of the designs of the collabo
rators were among the top rep sons for Pamanian’s existence as a guerrilla leader. In
his subsistence procedures, he was opposed to ruthless commandeering. Kow else make
clear the distinction between banditry and patriotic resistance? He urged this
followers to proceed with equal cautiousness vhen dealing with cases of suspected
collaboration. (Of course, every guerrilla leader interviewed invariably testified
that his sector stood as a paragon of tenderness for human rights and respect for
due ’-'rocess of law. Undoubtedly, there were cases of personal vengeance and dimilar
motivation affecting guerrilla determinations of guilt in specifiable cases.
âpt. 9, Inf. Cmdg., 11 Dec. *42. Memo to: All Commanding Officers,
USAFFE AT LARGE These orders are imputed to instructions contained in ’’the message
of Ppesident Franklin D. Roosevelt to the USAFFE AT LARGE in the Philippines as
broadcasted on November 7, 1942.”
2 —r
Rush Larkspur /Mrs. Erfe/ 1st Lt., Inf. Adj. H^, USAFFE AT LARGE. Genera 1
Orders No, 11. 9 Nov. »4c, '~ °
3t,
Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., 95th Reg. Actng. Mun. Secty. Sept. 10
1943. To: The Hon. Frov. Gov. "Report”, p. 2. *
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the co pyrig h t ow ner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.
334
Pamanian *s adviser, Lieutenant Guevara, had as one of his chief functions the can
vassing of civilian opinion regarding the administrative conduct o f the guerrilla
unit leaders. (Possibly part of the benefit of suoh procedure was vitiated by the
tendency on the part of those harboring grievances to remain silent, in fear of
roprisal.)
One of the principal functions of the guerrilla intelligence department
was the collecting of date, on enemy espionage agents, and the ordering of arrests
where neoessary. Intelligence also kept tabs on the merchants coming into a sector
from outside, especially from outside the province, lest they should prove to be
eneny agents. This department was centered in Garigara, under Dr. Posuncuy.
(Posuncuy, although nominally undor Pamanian at the outset, retained substantial
independence.J
Pamanian regarded Biliran Island as a center of vnruliness, requiring special
attention. Vfhen Pamanian became part of Balderian's division, the divisional conmand-
er held a similar opinion.^- Major Javelose was accordingly commissioned as Supervisor
over the military activities of the Biliran battalion and over the local governments
2
as well. By the end of July 1943, Baldcrian was still dissatisfied with the degree
The abuses in Laval, under the mayoralty of Icain, were notorious instances
of criminal malfeasance.
p
"Special Order y?.3 emitted from Balderian’s Gh^, signed by Salvador Ten,
and dated March 3, 1943, assigned Major Javolosa to special duty as ’’Supervisor ov&r
all military activities of the Third Battalion,” — viz., the units in Biliran Island,
within Pamanian*s regiment.
Undor the samo date-line, L t . Col. Pamanian elaborated in a set of ”General
Instructions"; .
"a. You shall exercise supervisory and administrative powers over all mili
tary organizations in the Third Battalion, and shall make recommendations and submit
reports from time to time to this Headquarters.
b. You shall also exercise supervisory powers over local governments
municipalities of Biliran, Laval, hawayan, L'iripipi, and Caibiran, and shall render
reports as circumstances may warrant to the Office of the Deputy Military Governor,
Division I;"
The following month, April 3, pamanian saw fit to amplify these instructions.
Evidently, he was not entirely pleased with the performance of the Batallion CD, °
Ramon Lierras;
”1. Pursuant to Par. 2 of the General Instructions. . . .you are hereby
335
of lawlessness on Biliran Island* With Javelosa now serving as quartermaster on
his own staff, Balderian ordered Pamanian to detail armed units to police Biliran.'*'
Part of the lawlessness was undoubtedly attributable to the disaffection of some of
the troops on Biliran, as a result of growing tension between Pamanian and his sub
ordinate, Corpin. However, the transfer of Corpin to Kangleon’s staff in South
Leyte cleared the atmosphere.
Pamanian was further aided in his law enforcement campaign by the presence
of the retired officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Luis E. Quintero. In a special affidavit
Pamanian declareds
That I have known Lt.-Col. Luis E. Quintero. . . .since January of 1942 when
he was made a food procurement agent in civilian capacity for^the District
Quartermaster, 9th Military Distriot. . . .Colonel Quintero was very valuable
in helping us not only in matter of organization but also in securing material
aid for the maintenance of the guerrilla units in the Sector in which he lived,
yte municipality
Recognizing his value to the organization, I accented his offer fbr active
service on Jan. 12, 1942 j error for 1943/and ne was at once designated as Pro
vost Marshall to organize a Military Police Service for the keeping of law
and order in all sectors occupied by the guerrilla. He actively campaigned
with me throughout North-west Leyte and the Islands of Biliran and Maripipi for
further ihstruoted to take all necessary steps in time of emergency for the Third
Battalion to carry out. You will personally represent this Headquarters and endeavor
to carry out necessary precautions for the safeguarding of life and property and
launch such military operations as to lead the command to successful victory over
the enemy.
2. You will accordingly issue such instructions to the Commander of the Third
Battalion and to civil authorities as you may deem proper in the best interest of
this Regiment.
3. These instructions serve as your authorization in the full exercise of
your functions.”
In April, Nierras was sent to Balderian's general service school for
training to improve his efficiency. By Special Order 29, dated April 15, 1943,
Javelosa was appointed by Balderian’s headquarters as Acting Battalion Commander of
the Third Battalion.
Javelosa explained that in litigation involving civilians where the local
justices of the peace did not act to redress the grievances of the oomplainaut-s, the
matter would come before the attention of Javelosa. Javelosa was of the opinion
that considerable progress was made under his administration in curbing illegal
activity and steengthening the bands of the local governments.
A memorandum dated July 31, 1943, under the signature of the Regimental
Executive Officer, Bonicillo, addressed to the Cmdg. Off. of the 1st Bn. (Pamanian)
reads* ”1. You are hereby instructed to take charge immediately of the military
police service in your sector. There has been reported a state of growing lawlessness
on Biliran Island. 2. Pending the organization of a Military Police Co. . . .assign
armed units. . . .as will be necessary to maintain peace and order in all parts of
your sector.” Note: Following the reorganization of Ealderian’s command, Pamanian’s
unit was reduced to battalion strength.
336
an effective support of all communities with gratifying results. . . .1 had

been aware of his success in performing all duties assigned to him especially
in the prevention of g raft and other abuses which would have otherwise been
prevalent had he not implemented the proper means of suppressing them.
In April 1943, Quintero was assigned to the staff of Balderian* Nonetheless
most of his activities oontinued to be centered in Pamanian's zone. In his own
affidavit, Quintero wrotei
Although my definite assignment was Prpvost Marshal, I was entrusted

with the establishment and maintenance of a concentration camp for all prisoners
of Northern Leyte j that the Camp located a few kilometers from my farm had
over one hundred prisoners from all guerrilla units o f Northern Leyte duly
maintained as to security and sustenance.
Quintero's son-in-law, Ricardo Comendador, who had been commanding officer
of the Leyte detachment was shifted to duty as an officer under Quintero. Comendador
stated (interview) that all of the internees were civilians, held on charges of
collaboration or breach of the peace. Among the principal prisoners were three mayors
Espoleta of San Isidro, Icain of Naval, and Bardillon of Dagami. The prisoners
planted camotes, onions, and other vegetables for their own diet. Comendador insist
ed that the prisoners had enough to eat, and were not mistreated. Colonel Quintero
stated that in the latter part of August, Balderian notified him that he (Balderian)
was dispatching an investigatory committee. The committee was to determine which,
if any, of the prisoners were being detained on mere hearsay evidence that could not
bear scrutiny. However, the resurgence of intenuified Japanese patrolling prevented
the consummation of this inquest. Comendador declared that the prisoners were
paroled in November of 1943, because of the imminence of Japanese assault.
Pamanian’s organization, and the units of the o ther chieftains of North and
East Leyte were brought within the fold of Balderian's 95th Infantry. The tightening
up of troop discipline under the regime of the 95th Regiment was reflected in the
curtailing of abuses, and the abatement in the summary execution of suspected
*Felix Pamanian, Affidavit. Cogon, Ormoc, Jan. 24, 1946.
/
337
"traitors". Balderian declared his policy to be one of handing over to the justices
of the peace cases of civil litigation, while capital crimes were handled by military
court martial proceedings. The regiment maintained its own concentration camp in
the interior of Dagami, viiere perhaps 30 prisoners were held for varied offenses.
In dealing with collaborationists, Balderian charged his officers to carry out care
ful preliminary investigation, with full reports, prior to apprehension of the suspect.
Officers of lower units, when taking a suspect prisoner, were supposed to deliver him
up to regimental headquarters for custody and inquest. However, Filipinos caught
in the act of guiding enemy patrols might be killed on the spot, Tinder certain cir
cumstances. The circumstances could not be defined with precision, since the guide con
ceivably acted under duress. Yet, the disposition to act with clemency was tempered
by the realization that guerrilla lives were placed in jeopardy. Balderian admitted
1
that some of his officers had committed errors. However, his disciplinary action
was restrained by the prudent conviction that thoroughgoing strictness on his part
might provoke his subordinates to assassinate him, — a not rare occurrence in other
provinces. For the most part, Balderian preferred the prophylaxis of a positive
policy of respect for civilian rights, this he incessantly endeavored to instill
in his men, rather than punish after the fact, as fbr the properties of known
collaborationists, the guerrilla officers were not free to expropriate without
specific authorization fran regimental headquarters.
Under his Politico-Military government, Balderian made provision for a
Court of First Instance to handle civilian cases in accordance with due process of
law. There was a problem of recruiting qualified personnel, possessing both the
1 Antonio Cinco furnished a notorious example of iuthlessness: "Cinco's men

developed the habit of killing Japan’s 'good neighbors', leaving their faces un
touched so that they might be recognized but mincing up their bodies gruesomely, then
floating them downstream to their home barrio where they could serve as an example
to the others. If there was no stream, they'd sneak the bodies into the main
square at night and leave than there. It was an ugly kind of politics. . . . "
(V/olfert, op. cit., pp. 116-7.
338
sympathy and the courage to serve under a guerrilla administration. Attorney
Siayngco acknowledged having reoeived a communication from Balderian*
Your appointment is Judge of the Court of 1st Instance for Leyte in the
resumed Provincial Government, under the Commonwealth, being a necessity
in the opinion of the undersigned, you are requested hereby to come to
Carigara any time from March 5 to March 15, 1943 for an interview
Siayngco begged off accepting the appointment because of the personal cir
cumstances in which he found himself at the time.
Belderian’s choice then lit upon Attorney Floro Cordero. But Cordero never
aotually exeroised his office. In June of 1943, Clerk of Court Narcisso Rocha,
drew up a list of cases in anticipation of the selection of a judge. No cases were
actually remanded to the Fiscal. In consequence, the graver cases were handled by
the G-2 (Intelligence) of the military. And, to a large extent the unit commanders
usurped this function, simply because in the rough-and-ready situation of the times,
they could not be bothered with long drawn-out affairs.
Within the Regiment, Attorney Cinoo served as Judge Advocate, and Attorney
Ribo as Assitant Judge Advocate. When Kangleon established his civil government
in July, 1943, Attorney Cinco became Judge of the Court of First Instance, end Ribo
2
was appointed Assistant Provincial Fiscal of East Leyte. Attorney Ribo stated
that Cinco never made up a calendar of cases for hearing. The oontact man between
Cinco and Ribo was Calda, who had been stenographer of the Court of First Instance.
Ribo reoalled having filed cases involving robbery and theft and other matters with
the clerk of the Court of 1st Instance then staying at Leyte, Leyte,— one Magallanes
(clerk in office of Clerk of Courts before war). Nothing actually was done.
Attorney Cinco asserted that the Acting Clerk of Court did receive some oriminal
files from Fiscal Ribo. Ribo had received these files dispatched by runner, from
local justices of the peace. Ribo studied the facts and charges and then drew up a
*A. Ealderian, CO, E. Leyte and Milit. Gov. 27Feb. '43. To; Atty. Siayigoo
Basey, Samar.
Înterview. Residence at Jaro, Leyte. 1945.
t
339
formal *information” . The Clerk of Court was next supposed to make up the oalendar.
It was the activity of the enemy, Attorney Cinco explained, that preoluded the
holding of hearings. (It was the activity for Acting Judge Alquino to preside over
oases in the other branch of the Court at Maasin because there was nc immediate moles-
tation by the enemy.)
While not interfering directly in cases involving local judicial machinery,
the Politico-Military Government lent its sanotion. In Jaro, for instanoe, according
to Attorney Ascarraga (interview), men convicted of misdemeanors by the justice of the
peace were jailed. Conditions in the jail were admittedly bad, and the far e was sub
standard. The inmates were sometimes allowed to leave the jail to get good water or
oigarettes from friends. Fear of the guerrilla deterred these ’’trusties” from attempt
ing a get-away. The justice of the peace would oall upo# the guerrilla in apprehending
criminals at large. Attorney Azoarraga oites the oase of a homioidist convicted dur
ing the tenure of Attorney Ribo, who took to flight. A posse of local policemen and
guerrilla soldiers overtook the fugitive within a week, and shot him.
Lawlessness by V G ’s or local guerrillas was also punishable. Attorney
Azcarraga recalls the episode of seven V G ’s who murdered an old man as an alleged
collaborationist simply because he refused to hand over a pig. The local guerrilla
commander assumed custody over the actual killer, pledging to return him for civilian
trial, while the local police took charge of the others. The Japanese reoccupied âro
before the case could come up, and the charges were dropped.
As commanding officer of the Leyte Area Command, Kangleon worked above all
for a restoration of law and order. This involved cond\rcting guerrilla activities
on a disciplined basis, according to military law, with striot enforcement of punish
ment for breach of regulation. On duty and off, the guerrilla troops were expected
to deport themselves as troops worthy of recognition as a unit of the Allied Paoific
forces. Enlisted personnel were to obey all commands, and officers were to observe
punctiliously the chain of command. In their dealings with the civilian population,
340
all troops were to respeot the rights of person and property of the Filipino citizen.
If there was to be any apprehension of suspected traitors, and if there was to be any
seizure of property, these things were to be done in conformity with legal process—
exoept in cases of great urgenoy. Civil affairs were to be handled by the civil
authorities, both provincial and municipal. ’Whatever requests the army 'would make
of the civilian population, except where matters of security were concernedi would
ho transmitted to the proper civil authorities by the military.
Kangleon appointed Attorney Fidel Fernandez as his Judge Advocate General.
Under him, Attorney Domingo Veloso, headed the Civil Affairs Section of the GHQ. One
of Veloso’s principal functions was to check up on and eradicate suspected abuses
committed by guerrilla soldiers. Kangleon also sought to faring the 95th Regiment
in line with top-command policy.''"
A system of courts was set up, with a southern branoh of the Court of First
Instance in Maasin, and a northern branch in Carigara. Fiscal Saavedra would file
2
the oomplaints, and Judge Alquino would try them. Courts-martial tried cases in
The actual task of controlling the subordinate officers fell upon the
shoulders of Kqjor Balderian, despite the credit assigned by the war correspondent
Gunnison to Kangleon. To be sure, affiliation with Kangleon enhanced Balderian’s
prestige:
’’The first bandit Kangleon cracked down on was ’Colonel* Isabelo Centano
^/Centino^ a famous fish peddler and dock-walloper. Centano v.-as a clever apportunist
and one of the first to see the advantage to himself o*' plundering in the name of the
guerrillas. . . .Kangleon reduced him to the rank of ’captain’ and under threat of
liquidation, Centano became a convert together with his unit of over five hundred
Filipinos.
"A seoorid charaoter who later saw the light was 30-year-old ’Colonel* Antonio
Cinco. . ...........................................................
•• * * • • • • o
"But Cinco’s efforts were drawn away from plundering when he was placed
under Kangleon’s staff. Like the others he played very seriously at cops and robbers.
He had played robbers first but later his boys and girls received United States arms
and ammunitions and were blazing away at the Japs when the first American division
hit. . . .(Gunnison, op. cit., p. 74;
2
Interview; Attorney Abiera, Tacloban, 1945.
Atty. Abiera described some of the important cases that came boforQ the
Courts. Two of the cases involved Americans, The first was that of an American officer
Turner by name, who came to Lalitbog in ITovember,’42, and joined up with Lang. He be- *
came intoxicated on ore occasion, and shot a Chinese civilian.He was arrested,confined
341
involving military officers, including such ones as those of Captain Erfe, Major
Espina, and Chester Peters# As was already mentioned, Attorney Atilano Cinco was
appointed judge of the Eirst Branch of the Court, (holding jurisdiction over the north
ern part of the Province), and Attorney Mamerto Ribo became the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal.
A concentration camp was established at Matalan on June 30, 1943, where im
portant prisoners were interned.1 The camp site had been formerly used by the
to quarters, and then turned over to the civil court. Turner pleaded to charges of
homicide when the case oame up. He was convicted, and held in custody. Y.rhen the
Japanese reoccupation occurred, he was evacuated to the mountains under guard. He
was eventually transferred to American authorities, and sent to Australia.
Chester Peters was arraigned on charges of homicide and forgery, with
Inopacan as the soene of the crimes. Peters pleaded not guilty, but the finding was
guilty. After detention at Camp Terra Nova; he was taken to headquarters to prevent
his falling into Japanese hands. He too was finally shipped out to Australia.
The third important case was a general court martial, involving Maj. Espina,
executive officer of Maj. Franoisoo. Espina was oharged with mishandling supplies
Espina was very popular with the VJ i nits . They er.rc.0^d the services of Atty. Abiera
as defense counsel at the trial, with Maj. Abay as presiding judge. (Abiera states
that he received S30 as lawyer’s fee, and 3*30 in expense money). The court found
against Espina. Abiera states that Espina was to have been dishonorably discharged;
but on the intervention of Judge Advocate General Fernandez, clemency was shown, and
Espina was reduced in grade to captaincy. (General Court Martial Orders No.3, Hq.
LAC - 29 Nov. 1944. Note; Espina appealed to Philippine Army headquarters in 1946 to
restore his rank, alleging a miscarriage of justice.)
A fourth court-martial proceeding, the trial of Major DeGracia, for alleged
violation of orders, aroso out of De Gracia’s invasion of Baybay, thereby provAking
"The Baybay Affair". De Gracia was reduced one grade#
In addition to the court martial proceedings enumerated, we must also men
tion two important cases brought before civil guerrilla authorities# In the first
case, the Fiscal in Maasin filed an information against Capt. Erfe and three of his
associates on the ground that they were falsely obliging the United States Government
to incur monetary obligations without proper authorization by the emission of special
currency. The case was left pending by the arrival of the Japanese in their i-e-
occugation drive. Erfe was released and permitted to return to Abuvog— only to be
executed by the Japanese in 1944.
Finally, vre may mention the indictment of Mayor Florentine Zara of Maasin
on charges of embezzlement. The case came before the court of First Instance in the
Liberation period.
Âtty. Abiera stated that the Provincial Jail was in Maasin, where 30-40
prisoners were held. The prisoners ware put to work at street cleaning and other kinds
of labor. Fines were turned over to the Provincial Treasurer— though inordinary
times, these had been tagged as insular monies.
The 95th Infantry Regiment continued to maintain its own concentration camp,
under the charge of Major Balerian’s trusted supporter, Capt. Damian Dadula. On an
inspectional visit in August, 1944, Major 3alderian counted 2 3 prisoners, including
four women. He recommended; "1. The Medical Surgeon should inspect the C.C. (con-
342
Philippine Arnjy, and was renamed Camp Terra Nova. Cadelina was Concentration Camp
Officer, and was assigned a squad of guerrilla soldiers as guards, augmented by a
detail of VG*s serving as supernumeraries. The prisoners were made up of criminals,
suspected collaborationists, and a miscellaneous collection of political offenders.
The heads of the prisoners were shaven for purposes of easy identification. Cadelina
asserted (interview) that the prisoners were not maltreated. They W 6 r e not beaten,
and were fed wholesome rations— (admittedly light, because of the general shortage.)
The prisoners planted camobes to eke out their diet. On the authorization of Captain
Espina the prisoners were permitted to receive gifts from civilians, including food,
plates, blankets, etc.
Alfonso Borromeo, one of the guards at Terra Nova, gave the impression
(interview) that Cadelina was a cruel, overbearing tyrant. Cadelina punished the VG*3
severely, often by the sun treatment, (standing at attention in the blazing sunlight),
fbr venial mistakes. The VG*s naturally reported their experiences to the oeople of
Matalom, who came to hate Cadelina intensely. Major Jain of the 94th Regiment came by
on inspection tours once or twice a week. But the prisoners did not complain of mis
treatment to Jain, fearing the vindictive Cadelina. The camp population, according to
Borromeo1s figures, numbered 67 prisoners, 25 soldiers, and 15 VG*s at about September,
1943. He stated that they were worked on a prison farm, and were fed inadequately
of rice and dried fish. In December, 1943, the camp was transferred to Malitbog.
Borromeo*s statemonts are substantiated by Major Jain. (Interview, 41st Inf.
Regt., 1945). Rumors of Cadelina’s high-handedness leaked out. Jain was convinced
that Cadelina was not fitted for the job, and he was replaced. In April, 1944, Cadelina
was reverted to inactive status, according to Jain, because of his harsh ways.
centration camp) at least once a month.

2. Variety of crops be planted in the prisoner’s lots to give variety of
food to the prisoners, and to be self-sufficient.
3. The Officer-in-Charge should see to it that the shed-houses will not
leak.” (Alejandro Balderian, Major, Inf., Cmdg. 12 August 1944 Report of Inspection.)
343
The area of West Leyte controlled by Miranda’s WLGWF was denounoed by
Kangleon as a land where murder and rapine abounded* "Vicious oolumny, born of
jealousy” - Miranda replied.
It was his proud claim, a claim reechoed by each of the sector commanders
in turn, that he had established a regime of law and order, giving the civilians a
sense of security that enabled them to turn a deaf ear to the blandishments of the
collaborationists. Miranda's procedure consisted in ordering the cooperating justices
of the peace in eaoh municipality to reassert their jurisdiction over the lesser
brenohes of the peace, while reserving the graver cases for military handling. But
there was an overlapping of oivilian and military jurisdiction in both the venue of
the oases and the disposition of the prisoners.
The justices of the peace for each municipality were inducted into the
UTLGWF and commissioned in the Judge Advocate Corps.^ Attorney Teleron, serving as
justice of the peace in Merida, was promoted to the post of Judge Advocate General.
This office was held by Teleron in conjunction with his post of Civil Affairs Officer.
Thus, there was a blending, through Teleron, of judicial, exeoutive, and legislative
functions of government in addition to the intermingling of military and civil func
tions.
Enjoying an array of legal talent affiliated with his organization, Miranda
dated his vituperators to bring forth evidence of his alleged banditry. Yfhat he
meant is not that he or his subordinates never committed an impropriety. How could
Âll of the officials were well-quel ified for their tasks. All had been
practicing attorneys, with the exception of Sensa of Merida, a law student who succeed
ed Teleron for this sector. But Ubay relieved Senesa, when Senesa was reassigned with
in the Merida regiment. Barte served as the military justice in Albuera, and Marilao
similarly functioned in Palompon. In Baybay, Rusiana became the appointee o f the
Miranda administration, serving until taken prisoner by the Kangleon forces. Then
Mesiano succeeded him. Polancos of Ormoo, according to his own statement, was the
first legal adviser of Miranda, counseling him on the proper way to set up hi# guer
rilla organization without running afoul of the law. Polancos became Assistant Judge
Advocate General, serving until August 1943. Evangelista of Ormoc served as the
sector justice of the peace.
344
men of the caliber of his legal staff tolerate the alleged abuses, much less identify
with them? Obviously, thie was outright falsification, Miranda would say.
Attorney Polancos (Interview) declared that he early took a stand in favor
of having all legal actions oonform with the canons of due proeess, wherever possible.
H© was completely opposed to star chamber proceedings against alleged collaborationists,
and a fortiori to their liquidation by the military, (unless taken in direot encounter).
No doubt, these norms were not invariably observed, but they constituted the temper
that generally prevailed.
Vincente Villegas YfLGWF Superintendent of Schools declared (Interview) that
the guerrilla put fear into the hearts of the people, so that relatively few crimes
were committed during this period.^ As for civil suits, most civilians were oontent
to maintain a status quo, and defer litigation to the post-war period. (This taoit
understanding, incidentally, constituted but another facet of the Filipino conviction
that the American liberation was just a matter of time.)
Lesser offenses committed by civilians came before the justices of the
peace. O n the other hand, the same personnel, sitting :s Judge Advocate, handled
the derelictions of the soldiery. Of course, tegimental and battalion commanders
and other line officers would be associated with them. Attorney Evangelista noted
(interview) that the judge advocate was always subject to call at the convening of
a court martial. Attorney Palancos recalled (interview) having presided at seven
cases of summary court martial on charges involving absence from camp without leave,
violation of guard duty regulations, conduct unbecoming a soldier, etc. According to
guerrilla captain Daffon of the Albuera sector, (Interview) the procedure followed
required the appropriate line offioer to draw up the charges and specifications, and
^The chief of staff notified Peralta in Panays

”• • • .The different municipal councils run the munbipal governments as in
normal times. All crimes committed, which before wore triable by Courts of First In
stance, are now triable by General Courts Martial according to the Articles of Yi'ar and
the Penal Code. Thus far, crimes have been reduoed to a minimum, possibly very much
lower than at any time before.” (Marcos G. Soliman, Maj. 81st Inf. June 5, 1943.
To: ”Dear Mac”^ e r a l t ^ p. 2.)
then endorse the case over to the judge advocate for handling. In the event that the
!
case vras regarded as a grave one, the matter was referred to the Judge Advocate General ^
Lieutenant Quetulio, chief of G-2 section, added (interview) that the regimental
commander reserved final judgment in the lesser cases, while the Commanding General
was the ultimate arbiter in all oases. Generally, however, no friction developed
between the line officers and their legal staffs*
Civilian lawbreakers were generally committed to the municipal jails and
put to labor for the community benefit, with appropriations for their subsistence
1
being met by the municipal council. Lieutenant Maglasang of the G-2, asserted,
(interview) that a prison camp was provided in Bo. Toglong, Ormoo, where the lesser
civilian and military offenders might be assigned. These prisoners were generally made
to work in the fields of the abandoned estates, or used as labor gangs where needed.
Six weeks was the longest period of detention, according to guerrilla captain Daffon
of Albuera,
Two features of pre-war penology, monetary fines and capital punishment
for crimes, were both abandoned, according to Daffon. Yfhat became of the more danger
ous civilian criminal or the soldier who had committed a grave offense? According to
Lieutenant Maglasang (corroborated by Attorney Polancos), this species of offender
was interned in a speoial concentration camp, located in Bo, Matagob, Palompon. These
men were more closely supervised to guard against escape. And they were assigned to
a regimen of heavy labor on the farms, in the base hospital, and wherever else needed.
Attorney Polancos asserted that all these prisoners were released, prior to the launch
ing of the expected Japanese assault in December of 1943,
One point that all of the men connected with the WLGWF would stress that any
soldier guilty of perpetrating some outrage against a oivilian would not be shielded
1
The oonsnanding officer in the Baybay sector, Rodrigues, stated (interview)
that in his municipality, the mayor assigned the work details to the jailed.
346
from punishment because of his military status* Only in this way oould the faith
of the oivilians in the integrity of the guerrilla be maintained. Captain Olaybar,
of the Palomoon Regiment, was a member of two general court martials. In the one
case, an enlisted man was confined to fifteen days at hard labotf for felling a Chinese
merchant in a fit of anger. The other case, involving homicide by a civilian saw a
sentence of 20 years 1 imprisonment imposed upon the murderer. (Presumably, the sentenc<
would be binding for the post-war period, unless the prisoner were pardoned by the
executive. But vrhat became of the prisoner during the Japanese occupation of Merida,
this writer has been unable to ascertain.) Gemelo Pastor of the êrida sector re
called (interview) having sat with a general court-martial board in a case involving
an enlisted man charged and convicted of attempted rape. The accused was assigned te
two months of hard labor in camp. This may seem likB a trivial punishment for sc
heinous an offense. Yet it sufficed to serve as a deterrent for the troops, for they
could not always expect such relative leniency. At the same time the oivilians were
made to understand that the guerrilla could not ride roughshod over the rights of
the non-combatants. Still, there remained a residue of mistrust in the mind of the
civilian regarding the outcome of any litigation between himself and a soldier, so that
the civilian would prefor avoiding any altercation with the latter.
h'e might mention also that it was customary for the guerrilla to detain
civilians entering their zone from other parts of the Province. If upon investigation
they could give a satisfactory accounts), of their business, they were generally re
leased with a reprimand— ana advised to apply directly to the sub-sector commander
before repeating their visit. Those who seemed eb all suspicious in their ways were
}
held longer. Suspected Kangleon agents might bo interned for a period; Japanese
agents would probably be executed.
Yfe are stopped from making quaititative judgments concerning the prevalence
of criminality or lawlessness in the guerrilla zones of Leyte by the absence of legal
statistics. Moreover, further burdens are placed upon our judgment by the necessity
347
of setting up criteria that will enable us to differentiate between tortious guerrilla
actions committed in the course of duty and orimes committed under color of neoessity.
This is virtually an impossible task. Still, we may draw some conclusion.
We may note a general increase in violence, particularly in the troubled first
period of the enemy occupation. The absence of police protection, especially outside
the limits of the poblacion, obliged families to resort to self-help, in place of
legal redress, for wrongs sustained. When the guerrilla groups began to develop, they
often were obliged to assume an air of coerciveness in order to impress the oivilian
element, and to ward off rival groups from encroaching upon their territory. As they
grew, they tended to arbitrarily lay claim to whatever they believed would further
their cause. To challenge guerrilla assumptions was to lay oneself open to the charge
of collaborationism.
There is no way of determining how many individuals were harshly punished or
executed for alleged enmity to the guerrilla cause. That there were many such instan
ces, there can be no doubt. Shall we call such cases crime, even when preceded by
some show of a hearing? Or shall we limit this designation to cases where the guer
rilla offender benefitted materially, either by acquiring property or settling an old
grudge score?
To the extent that the guerrilla movement attained centralization of command,
to that extent there was an increasing scrupulosity for legality of procedure. The
top leadership, hoping for American recognition, sought to meet the specifications
of law and order within their domain of control. They therefore sought to reestablish
some approximation to a peace-time system of courts and instituted certain norms and
inspectional procedures to be observed by their subordinate sector oonmanders. Down
to the very end, no clear-cut demarcation of offenses between those triable by oivilian
courts and those falling under the competency of the military was reached. However, we
must bear in mind that guerrilla unification of command was not reached in Leyte till
shortly before the American arrival~and then the Japanese were in control of a major
348
portion of the Island. By that time, ordinary orime had teen all but eliminated
whereas executions of suspected collaborationists grew in frequency. We may define
guerrilla law, in the last analysis, as the will of the seotor commander, tempered
by his private sense of right and wrong, and his fear of later punishment.
The Municipalities and the Guerrilla
A full understanding of the character of Leyte's resistance movement would
require an exhaustive study of the origin, form, and procedures of the guerrilla
organizations in eaoh of the Island's municipalities. Despite the substratum of a
general way of life throughout the Province, and despite the ubiquitous impact of an
enemy occupation, generalization is apt to be rash. If the main contending forces

s
are discernible everywhere, the particularity of their expression is equally un
mistakable. And it is this diversity, evident from community to community, that
marks the difference between the affairs of real people and the abstract classifi*
cations of the "academio" writer. In any one of several communities, the people
may apparently be joined together in resistance to the occupation forces. Yet,
closer inspection reveals a true unity of dedioation to a cherished cause in the
one case, and a selfish wrangling for political advantage and pecuniary gain in
another. Similarly, the puppet regimes set up in the various municipalities differ
greatly among themselves— some being little more than a pretense to hoodwink the '
conqueror, end others being genuinely devoted to implementing the occupation policy
despite the cost in Filipino suffering. Inseleoting nine municipalities, (geographic*
ally dispersed and falling under different guerrilla commands), for speoial con
sideration, this study seeks to convey some notion of local individuality while yet
highlighting the resistance-collaboration polarity.
Abuyog
We commence with Abuyog, a town located on the east ooast of the Island, but
not because of its position in any alphabetical listing of Leyte's municipalities.
lie do so primarily because Abuyog*s post-war municipal secretary, Francisco Aurillo,
349
had carefully chronicled the important events in the life o f the town during the
Japanese occupation."^ By drawing extensively upon Murillo’s account, w e shall
arrive at an adequate understanding of the varied influences at work upon the lives
of this town's population. In passing, we also note that Abuyog is of particular
interest in that its resistance movement passed successively under two leaderships—
that of Captain Erfe and that of Colonel Kangleon.
. . . .When the Imperial Japanese Army assigned a detachment to Abuyog in

June 1942, it found out that Mayor Pedro Gallego and Chief of Police Catalino
Landia, evading Japanese encroachment, had already eloped with the Commonwealth
Government to the marshy mountain fastness
Then the puppets came over and took the reins. Fired by the principles of
Nippon, most of them were, of course, wolves in sheep's clothing. They vociferat
ed loudly and much, but accomplished little, if at all, in the interest of public
welfare. It was small wonder, however, because most of them were not pure
natives of the place. If things had to go worse, therefore, why should they
have the welfare o f the abused, or tortured, or property-deprived Abuyognon at
heart— more than their own? As long as they could profit much from the Japanese
occupation, all that they oould probably think of was get the "neighborhood
association" on close guard, have the Japs comb the fields, capture "misguided
elements", and bow them beneath a blood-dripping Jap sword.
The Abuyognon should have seen some of these puppets nod and smile with
pleasure when the up and coming barrio of Palale was bombed, machine-gunned, and
burned suooesskrely from August 20 to 29, 1942, reducing to ashes several two-
story buildings, and creating panic; when barrios Tarragona, Rizal, Fioas Norte,
the stored rioe Captain Landia had at Tabigue— and oh, many more— were thrown
into flames. The Abuyognon should have notioed them pay little attention to the
ills of innocent people who were tortured to death by the inhuman Japanese I
(PP. 1-2)
The nucleus of the guerrilla organization inAbuyog was the Volunteer Guard. .
. .The VG organization continued to function up to and including the pre-Japanese
occupation. In fact, it w&s from December 1941 up to about the end of Maroh 1942
that the activities of the volunteer guards became even more intense. . . .The
Japs came; the VG "faded" away; but in its evanescence the guerrilla stood up
with a home-made shotgun and a repaired or improvised bullet, ready to exchange
fire with the Japanese invader.
Gallego and Landia, extremes in politics, but one in patriotism, collaborated
^Forked together^* The rapid campaign for membership was at once met with as
tonishing responses. Even without the campaign, the people were ready to take
up arms against them who so malignantly broke into Philippine decency. . . .Be
fore long, under the above-mentioned leaders, the municipality was divided into
several sectors and for each sector a guerrilla head leader was assigned. Gallego
and Landia directed that ODly men who were brave, honest, patriotic, and who had
at least a little military bearing were to be selected.
1
Francisco Aurillo, The Philippine Resistance Movements Abuyog Version
1945. ('Jnpub . ?.S,, pp. 1 ff.-) ~ ~ *
350
It must be known, in passing, that no government entity was, for a time,

connected with the mountain army and, therefore, none gave arms and ammunition.
Virtually, Gallego and Landia had to work tooth and nail procuring shotguns
and latongs, some men had to make improvised buckshots which proved to be no
less effective than the genuine ones. (pp. 2-5)
It was in mid-1942, when the people felt the rigidity with which the Imperial
laws were imposed upon them, coupled with the increasing and therefore menacing
magnitude of the town officials' oooperation with the Jap government, that Landia
and his men deployed at a certain point in the Abuyog-Baybay zigzag road, and
there fired the first shots. Thereafter, guerrilla activities began, one after
another, in positions where, with the maximum degree of success, the enemy
could be ambushed and harassed. By this time, Landia had already obtained the
assistance of a handful of genuine soldiers who 3etested the concentration
camp.
On October 13, 1942, the Jsps covered their foxholes and unexpectedly left
in the direction of Dulag, bringing with them the families of some "sympathizers.”
When the "intimate-looking” Abuyognons asked the Japs where they were bound for,
some of them answered ”for Australia.”
The guerrillas moved to town not long afterward, and the munioipal govern
ment of Abuyog under the Commonwealth was brought back downtown from its seat
in the hills. Then the reorganisation of the guerrilla and Women's Auxiliary
Service followed.
For purposes of maintaining the organization successfully in close collabora
tion with the civil administration, numerous conferences were held in different
barrios of the municipality. In barrio Balensasayao, where Landia established
his office as Plans and Training Officer, a local military institute was es
tablished for thd betterment of the guerrilla, (p. 3 )
Mostly with shotguns and latongs, and rarely with rifles, the Abuyog
guerrillas were one of the most— if not the most I— ill-equipped hill fighters
in the province. And yet, the land of the former Rising Sun lost a littleover
two hundred servicemen in Abuyog from the latter part of the month of June
1942 to October 2, 1942, when the last ambuscade took place at barrio Picas
Norte. I think that was enough achievement for three months by patriots, ninety-
nine per cent of whom fought with nothing but a seemingly instinctive hatred of
the Japs, and an admiration for American ideologies.
Several months after Ootober 13, 1942, the municipality of Abuyog attained
about ninety percent normalcy, at least as far as lives-lost-at-the-point-of-a-
\ gun was concerned. The drain of war— and more particularly, the enemy ocoupa-
tion--had telling effects upon the economic side; but this time, with no more
fear except re-occupation, the people were able to go on with their businesses,
undistraoted.
The municipality was also quick to bring back to life both social and civic
activities. And so, on November 15, 1942, the Commonwealth celebration went on,
unperturbed by Japanese bombing planes within easy reach. Then, on the 30th, *
those who 'fell in the night', were given their due with an imposing parade *
and the usual literary— nrusioal program that follows every suoh thing. On
December 30, Rizal Day, a mammoth crowd of no less than 5,000 guerrillas, members
of the Women's Auxiliary Service Units, and the enthusiastic oivilian population
jammed the poblacion while bombing was furious on San Esteban, Sslsadahay, and
Esperanza in Burauen. And so on with every official holiday ever since, not
to mention church celebrations, dances, picnics, etc. (p. 5 )
351
In October 1942, the Abuyog guerrilla, together with the bands of the neigh
boring communities, beoame part of an over-all organisation, commanded by Captain
Glicerio I. Srfe. The Abuyog guerrilla was designated the Second Guerrilla Brigade. 1
In the reorganization of December 1942 that led to the formation of the 11th Leyte
Guerrilla ’'Carfare Division, Gallego became a guerrilla major-general serving as
divisional commander. The Second Brigade published its own mimeographed paper, the
"Pioneer", which served to whip up civilian morale.

2
In April, 1943, Colonel Kangleon visited Abuyog , and there conferred with
Erfe, Gallego and their followers. The 11th Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Division was
dissolved, but the 2nd Guerrilla Brigade was allowed to continue. Henceforth, Gallego
was to be known simply as Hay or of Abuyog.
For Abuyog, the combat troops comprised "G" Company, 3rd Battalion, 94th In
fantry, 92nd Division— redesignated "I" Company in 1944. Interior guard duty
within the town was entrusted to this company, with Captain Landia as command
ing officer. The 2nd Guerrilla Brigade under the new name of ’Abuyog Guerrilla
Volunteer Service Corps', was placed in the charge of Mayor Gallego. (p. 5)
Captain Erfe made a brief, but futile attempt to retrieve control. After he
and his staff were arrested by Captain Landia and handed over to Colonel Kangleon
Abuyog was fully incorporated within the jurisdiction of the 94th Inf. Regiment,
luingleon appointed Gallego Deputy Governor for East Leyte, perhaps as a way of
off-settling his partisanship for Erfe. Among Gallego’s duties were the instructions
^ h e Abuyog guerrilla was organized by districts in the barrios. Ramon Ller-

cadp acknowledged the indebtedness of the Dulag guerrilla, during its formative period
to the already functioning Abuyog organization, particularly the unit in barrio Tar- «
ragona: "in the courso of the organization we met Victorio Tiozon of Tarragona, Abuyog
and a leader of the guerrilla, who was cooperating with us in our fight against the
Japs in Dulag. V.'e learned from him that their organization, which was headed by Mayor
Pedro Gallego, was already under the wings of Capt. 9. Victorio saidt 'Here is a copy
of the tentative layout of the organization which was furnished us by Capt. 9. I be
lieve it will serve as the patter for other organizations. . . .'n (p. 37) (Mercado.)
^Filipinos in the pay of the Japanese must have been in Abuyog during Col.
Kangleon’s visit, for at about 8*00 o'clock in the morning of Apr. 23, '43, a Jap ob
servation plane flew and circled over the municipality. It was the first airplane
seen by the townspeople since the enemy occupied and abandoned Abuyog. The next morn
ing— it was Holy Saturday— two planes hovered again, this time to wreak havoc on lives
and everything. One plane dropped "eggs of death" on the poblacion and another on Tar.
ragona. The enemy action on the poblacion, however, may rightly be called a waste of
gas, explosive, and energy. No public or private building had been destroyed, and on
ly the child of a school teacher was slifehtly bruised. The bomber at Tarragona was
more successful. It claimed some dead victims and a couple of wounded ones."(p,5 )
352
to coordinate the activities of the municipalities within his jurisdiction, to assist
in the transmission of the Lqyte emergency currency, and to arrange for the resump
tion of sohool instruction.
Classes promptly opened on October 1, 1943, quite as normally as when the

last hostilities was only a nightmare. . . .That same October breezed in like
nobody's business, and once more Abuyog became Abuyog of peaceful times— finan
cially sound, economically stable, with cultural and eduoational machineries
up and on. ThenNovember ensued, fhe threat of Japanese reoccupation. • • • now
became imminent. Teachers, pupils and the people became restless. . • .The last
days of November proved horrible, indeed. They were days of fear and gloom.
■ôr again, there would be evaouation, arrests, capture, torture, killing,
economic depression, starvation.
Unexpected suspenee oharaoterized the first week of November, the seoond
week, and the third. In the afternoon of the 22nd, the Japs came via the Bugho
road, but when they reached the juncture at Picas Norte, nobody knew why they
did not choose the way to town. On November 26, 1943, at about 3 in the after
noon, they came at last. (pp. 7-8)
Simultaneously after the Imperial Japanese Forces re-invaded Abuyog, the

people found themselvos recipients of a Nippon-given 'independence'. Leaflets
were circulated all about independence being real, for this had become the
basis of their propaganda. . . .1 For their part, therefore, the Jap detachment
including the constabulary, began their patrols with various meetings. Late in
1943 and early in 1944, they limited their patrols to barrios along the road,
emphasizing that independence was real, and that 'no Filipino who loves his
country should cut the telephone wires, destroy the roads, or sabotage all kinds
of communications'.
Of course, the campaign was only good while it lasted. Realizing that the
leaflets and the meetings were, in general, not paid attention to by the hill
resisters, the Japs and the constabularly that they had organized stopped the
campaign decidedly. It was mid-February of 1944. But before they stopped,
they circulated leaflets written in the vernacular. These leaflets were printed
exclusively for Abuyog. /They threatened harsh punitive action against the resis.
ters, and bore the signature of Assemblyman Jose Veloso, the aroh-collaboratory/
To make their propaganda more meaningful and solemn, they stamped the pic
ture of the Philippine Flag on the reverse side of a leaflet entitled, ’’Heed Your
Country's Call” by Guillermo B, Francisco, Director of the Jap-sponsored Constabulary.
o
The English rendition of the leaflets read: ”To Abuyog, Hurried Announce
ment.
"Ended are the fair dealings and patience of the officials of our own govern
ment and ended and the fair dealings and patience of the Japanese Boldiers who help
our government. Ended are the patience and advice to guerrillas and other misguided
elements that disturb our towns. Now the government shall be forced to employ
horrible means in its operation in the mountains and forests not only by means of
rifles, machine guns, or cannons, but also by astonishingly big bombs from numerous
aircraft. In view of this, everybody in the mountains, farms, and barrios of Union,
Himamara, Kahaplag, Ualaguikay, Matagnao, Naliwatan, Malitbog, and Inayupan, in
cluding hideouts of guerrillas within this municipality of Abuyog, should oome down-
. . . .The guerrillas were, of oourse, always thinking sanely. At least
seventy-five per cent of the Philippine guerrillas, a conservative estimate ,
were in the know that KaoArthur was on the way baok. Would it not 5 have been
insanity, on the other hand, if they ceased ambushos and sabotage knowing that
these were important aids in hastening liberation? That no American can make
a dead Eilipino breathe again is true. . • .So the members of the resistance
movement merely sooffed at the message and used the leaflets for wrapping to-
baoco. They had no cigarettes. A negligible number of volunteer guards, how
ever, gave up.
The Veloso message was fulfilled by the Japs onoe— and on one point— the
reckless Jap bombing of barrio Union in February, 1944. Then it was announoed
that horses were going to be used in the mopping up. Well, when the horses
were actually brought to Abuyog, a number of the guerrillas took it easy and
simply said, ’The Jap generals omn even replace their men with horses. It’s
another story if the horses can recognize a guerrilla and fire a gun. The thing
is, we will stay in the hills as long as the Japs are still conquerors.' It was
simply a trick, for the Japs never patrolled with one. Nor with dogs.
This month '(December), 'January 28', 'February 9', and 'February 15', 1944
successively were the numerous deadlines for the surrender of all 'misguided
elements', but whioh were only spent by the latter in a lie-low somewhere in
the hills of barrios Union and Himamara.
The civilians in Abuyog generally suffered much during the Jap occupation.
For instance, their personal properties like rioe, palay, root crops, livestock,
eggs— even their houses— were looted, confiscated, or burned— direotly or in
directly, by the Japs and the Filipino constabulary. And the worst part is that
these puppet peace offioers wers even more notorious than the Japs themselves.
They were good hands at scaring the poor civilians, and when the latter scamper
ed for safety, the 'constabulary men 1 would 1 augh to themselves. . . .and would
bring all catch to town at their headquarters, or simply divide their booty among
themselves for each of their families. I guess that was their main source of
living. At least some of these 'peace officers' were adept at giving blows
eten to innocent people in town. There was one Hngracio Caca whom Abuyognons
hated most and whom they would like, if he is still alive, to see in Abuyog again.
He had a list of the names of Filipinos the Japs had very much wanted to behaad.
Then there was the inflation. And the arrests. And tortures. There's no
need of desdribing the manner in which they treated suspeoted saboteurs or guor- l<
rillas. It was all the same from Harbin, lianohuria, to the smallest village they
had occupied in the Philippines. The Japs are either wanting of sportsmanship
town within five days from now, 4 Feb. 1944, so that you will not be crushed by bombs
and molested in the mopping up operation of the Japanese soldiers who will go to
the guerrilla camps. Bring to town your rice, palay, crops— everything you have, so > ’
that you can make use of them and nothing will be wasted.
"It is announced that our Government will spend even how much money and the '■
Jap soldiers will adopt all means to capture or kill Centino, Balderian, and Antonio
Cinco and their companions who are disturbing the peace of the towns in Leyte, if they
do not surrender to make use of the Amnesty proclaimed by the President of our
Republic.
"Guerrillas or not, do not anymore wait for that 'aid of America 1 or the 're
turn of the Americans' because America is not connected with the life of the Philip
pines and the Americans are not the ones who feel the pangs of our suffering. Safe
guard your own life because if you die, no America, no Americans, can make you live
again. Use your sane thinking now."(pp. 8-9). .
354
or by race blood-thirsty as a people, or both. Yfhenever they got ambushed,

and oould not wreak vengeance on the ’bandits’, they would shoot every oivilian
in the place and/or burn the nearest village— a popular feat they used to ex
ercise even without the slightest provocation.* In Abuyog, the Japs burned ho
less than three hundred houses, big and small, and that does not include furni
ture, food, utensils, and things inside most of them. (pp» 8-10). . . . . . . .
The resistance movement in Abuyog during the Jap reoccupation consisted of

’I' Co.2 3rd Bn., 94th Infantry, 92nd Division (Leyte Area Command); the re-or
ganized Civilian Volunteer Guards; the local (oivil) Municipal Government; and
the civilians who contributed for their subsistence. Most of the civilians
acted a double play by allowing themselves to be governed by the Japs but ac
tually serving as sources of information regarding ensny strength, movement.,
and disposition, and sending rice or oorn to the hillfighterB when circumstances
pern tted. This was successfully maintained till the time of liberation.
Lest anyone overestimate the strength of ’I ’ Company, in view of its re
markable aofcfevements, it must be known that there were less than 30 rifles even
up to the first of February, 1944 when it struck its initial blow against the
Japs. . . . The volunteer guards— not all of them— were armed only with the
usual home-made shotguns. . . .
Between the first of February, 1944, and mid-April, while the company CP
was still in the hills, ambushes and snipings were limited to the Abuyog-Baybay
raod. It was harvest time in mid-April when orders to proceed to the plains
were received. The reason was obvious; the rice crop should not gu to the
enemy, and the havesters must therefore be protected.
So downhill the boys trecked. It was Holy Thursday. On the plains, the
order was successfully carried to the letter. For sheer abundance of the rice
crop, however, plus the corresponding insufficiency of armed guerrillas to de
fend it at the time, not all oould be harvested.
GHQ announced later that ’I ’ Company ranked second in Jap-killing for the
"Of their lust for human blood, here are some incidents;
"Near barrio Himamara, the Japs fell into an ambush during the first week of
February, 1944. About an hour later, said barrio paid the Japs with 19 lives. The
male grown-ups and children were at once bayoneted to death, while the women were
first abused before being killed.
In a patrol south to Mahayahay. they shot a school teacher neatly in the head
"In barrio Caranjug, they caught threo boys about 17 years of age, tied each
of them to some trees, and poked them gradually with bayonets till they died.
"Behind the town hall and the Abuyog Intermediate School building, several
night? witnessed several heads parted from their bodies by the Samurai swords.
"Many Abuyognons luckily lived to tell us that to prisoners no food or water
was given them for at least one day, that a series of smahses with a rifle butt, a
baseball bat, or something had to be undergone by all parts of the body,that slapping
kiclc:ng, and the like were to be accepted as routine. These punishments, it seemed,
was the maning of a sentence contained in a leaflet dropped on November 7, 1943, whic
read; ’The Imperial Japanese Forces, as your friends, as well as the government
offices, will accord the most generous treatment to you.’" (pp. 10-11)
2„
. . . .This unit first saw action in Bay bay, Leyte, when Miranda was still
in bad fix with Colonel Kangleon over guerrilla unification. While many of Miranda’s
men died, and Kangleon's southern Leyte units lost some of their guns, this Company
did not lose a man— even retrieved some o f the rifles lost by the southern Leyte
unius."
^The initial blow was struck "against eight Japs at Eimay-angan, only two of
whom were armed. All the eight were easily killed and two ,25's were taken, together
with Japanese currency notes, a Jan officer’s portfolio, and ammunition." (p. H j
355
month of May, 1944. And yet, compared with other units, it was really poorly
equipped.^-
During the enemy occupation, most of the towns had only one form of govern
ments the Republic of Mr. Laurel. In Abuyog, strange as it may seem, both the
Commonwealth and the Republic were in existence— the first in the hills and the
second in the poblacion. All through the Jap reoccupation, the local 0ommon-
wealth functioned as of pre-war time— and smoothly. And exoept for slight
changes, the pre-war government officials and employees remained practically
intact. In the Municipal Council, for instance, only the Vice-mayor and the
Municipal Secretary were substituted. The Mayor and the Councilors were those
elected in 1940. In the Police Department, the majority were old hands.
There was only one difference between the sessions o f the Council in peace
time and during the occupation: while the councilors had to walk up to town to
attend sewsions before the war, they had to traverse hills or mountains to re
mote places during the occupation in order to convene and solve the various
problems confronting the municipality.
The Japs controlled the town and outlying villages; the Commonwealth, every
out-of-the-way barrio. The 'Municipal Government of Mr. Eluetorio Cana', puppet
mayor and biggest shot during the occupation, collected 'kalibapi' and other fees
at inconsistent rates; the Commonwealth, only a 10 centavo-a-month Loyalty Tax
and a ganta of rice or c o m as levy.
In order to counteract the deadly venom of Jap boasts and conventionalities,

GHQ designated Mayor Gallego as chief of the guerrilla propaganda for East Leyte.
• • •
September, 1944, Mayor Gallego passed the word to town warning everybody
to leave the place by all means before the end of the month. . . .
On October 18, a U. S. Davy plane began to circle over the place. Then
^"There is no need enumerating the various encounters up to the tine when

the helmeted Americans waded ashore on Leyte. The âps sure got the hell of that
aid. According to some civilians in town, after they were first ambushod with a
'rat-a-tat', the Japs in Abuyog simply could not help mumbling, 'ayuda, America'—
meaning aid from the United States.” (p. 12)
2
Eleuterio Cana was the elected vice-mayor of Abuyog, who was appointed
mayor by the Japanese. Mondejar, Paza, Raga, and Gallego affirmed that Cena was
rabidly pro-Japanese, anaspplied himself actively to the attrition of the guerrilla
will to resist. He accompanied Japanese search patrols, delivered speeches denounc
ing the guerrilla, and sent Filipino men to work on the Japanese air fi&d at Dulag.
Rega thinks that the Japanese campaign of terror in the barrios may have been in
spired by Cara as a way of hastening guerrilla surrender.
Mayor Gallego asserted that Cana's treasurer, Ricardo Collantes, had express
ed pro-Axis sympathies in conversation even before the Japanese invasion. He en
couraged the Japanese to seize the crops of the people living in the inteii or barrios.
By starving them, Collantes hoped to force the people to come down to the poblaoion,
and be under collaborationist regime.
Gallego declared that the puppet chief of police, Juan Canavela, actively sup
ported Cana's policies. He took special interest in ferreting out concealed side-
arms held by the citizens, and searching for weapons in the homes of surrendered sol
diers. Each district under Cana, had its NA, whichperformed guard duty against guer
rilla infiltration, and was responsible for furnishing its assigned contingent of
Filipinos for forced labor at the air fiold, cleaning roads, etc. Gallego claimed
that neither token pay nor rations were given.
356
cftnncns roared from the sea. And as the giant shells exploded on the town
with reverberating thuds, it seemed for a moment as if it was going to be
the end of the world. . . .On Qotober 20, there was no more shelling and
there were no more Japs in town. Word reached Abuyog that American troops
had landed. . . .and that MaoArthur himself was there.
A couple of days after that, we met units of the 7th Division bivouacked
and digging foxholes at Ulhay, a farm about two miles inland from the town,
along the road to Baybay. Abuyog had been liberated.** (pp. 13-15)
Summarizing our findings, we discover Abuyog to be a town that suffered
greatly during the Japanese occupation. Its population was reduced to starvation
notwithstanding the abundant natural resources of the district. Here, as elsewhere,
a handful of petty individuals rendered themselves pliant tools in Japanese hands,
doing the conqueror's will. But the elected mayor proved to be of tougher mettle
defying the puppet regime, and establishing a resistance administration in the
sanctuary of the hills. Displaying great qualities of leadership, this mayor not
only succeeded in upholding his people's faith in the final outcome of the war. He
also demonstrated unusual political sagacity in avoiding friction with his chief
political rival (now heading the guerrilla combat comparer in the sector), and main
taining cordial relations with two successive guerrilla oommanders— Captain Erfe
and Colonel Kangleon. Abuyog is an outstanding example of a municipality boasting
an active citizenry— loyally cooperating with the military but not succumbing to
outright military domination.
Baybay
Across the narrow wrist of Leyte, almost opposite Abuyog on the west coast,
is the municipality of Baybay— favorite resort of the GI's during the Liberation.
The municipality of Baybay had a hectic career during the war years. Like
Abuyog, this town also enjoyed the distinction of being not only under Japanese
oontrol, but under the direction of two guerrilla organizations. And this town,
like the apple of discord, was contended for by both organizations, and became the
scene of the only serious inter-guerrilla battle during the war years. However,
lest the reader conjure up before his mind's eye, a miniature Tito-ilihailovitch
oonflict, resting essentially on an ideological foundation, the writer will hasten
to dimdes this notion and go on with his story.
The Japanese plaoed a 3mall garrison in Baybay during the early period
of their occupation, gave orders for all unsurrendered soldiers in the vicinity
to come out from their hiding places and lay down their arms, instructed the people
to return to their ordinary occupations and avoid implication in Mbandit* activities,
and from time to time sent out patrols to implement these commands. The incumbent
mayor, kbdina remained at his post, and to all appearances, was oarrying out the in
structions of the local garrison in a way that prevented friotion with the Japanese.
In their conduct towards the civilians, the Japanese conceived themselves
as possessing an occupational right of eminent domain~a right they construed very
loosely to authorize their seizure of any properties useful to them in the prose-
oution of the war effort. In short, this meant vehioles, weapons, radios, tools,
metal fixtures and a variety of other commodities. Individual Japanese, with the
oonnivance of their detachment commander, indulged in small-scale looting from time
to times poultry, food, and attractive personal possessions. But by and large,
no outrages were comitted during this period, and the people for their part walked
softly and avoided giving offense.
Not the Japanese but bandits constituted the prinoipal menace during this
period. Many of the Baybay townspeople had evacuated to the hills in anticipation
of the Japanese coming, not knowing what fate lay in store for them. In these
places of dispersion, they were an easy prey for the criminal elements who reoog-
nized the situation as propitious for their parasitical activities. It was as muoh
to offer protection to the civilians as to stiffen the backbone of resistance that
the guerrilla groups came into being.
Gallenzoga, an unsurrendered member of the Philippine Constabulary, organized
a guerrilla band in Barrio Gakat. A soldier, Bagislao, started his unit in Earrio
Ciabo. And a third was started by one llaneja. All of these groups were independent,
but they maintained informal contaot with each other, and with prominent civilians
in Baybay poblacion.
358
Life settled down to somewhat of a stable pattern. The people were ex
pecting imminent deliverance from the enemy, and did not attempt to provoke the
local garrison. Danger from roving desperadoes remained, although this was be
ginning to diminish. Trade with other parts of Leyte, and with the neighboring
provinces slowly picked up.
Then suddenly in mid-September, like the proverbial bolt out of the blue,
a patrol of the local garrison was attacked. The attack was led by that high-
spirited guerrilla leader from the Haas in area, Gordon Lang. Lang had established
liaison with Gallenzoga; together they had concocted this daring enterprise. But
their ambush plans went amiss, and the Japanese made good their escape.
In one sense, the skirmish had a cheering effect upon the people. It con
vinced them that resistance was a possibility. On the other hand, they were pet
rified at the thought of the frightful toll in revenge that the Japanese might exact.
Layer Lodina himself took to flight, convinced that the enraged Japanese would place
the blame upon him, and behead him. It was then that Patorno Tan, allegedly with
the approval of Gallenzoga, suggested to the Japanese commandant that he authorize
the holding of municipal elections. The Japanese cousentod. Four candidates came
forward to vie for the local honor. Patorno Tan was sufficiently strong locally to
win out. And since ho had Gallenzoga's endorsement, he felt that he need fear no
charge of collaborating with the enemy. The Japanese officially installed him.
Early in October, the Japanese garrison pulled out, departing by sea at
night, ânwhile, Liranda's emissaries had been exploring the possibilities of
subduing the local guerrilla bands. Favorable reports were submitted to Hiranda
regarding t»-e willingness of Gallenzoga and bagislao to Join; a willingness perhaps
motivated by fear. But Kaneja, after indicating that he would resist such encroach
ments, and after roundly denouncing Lairanda's organization, suddenly nhigh-tailed"
it from the Rrea.
Francisco Corres (a civil and construction engineer by training, and a
359
mathematics teaoher in Onnoc in 1940) was designated by Miranda to organize a bat
talion in the sector. Corres proceeded to oarry out his instmotions.1 He con
tacted Gallenzoga and Bagislao, got them to pledge allegiance to Miranda, made
Gallenzoga his executive officer, and then sought out the municipal mayor. From the
municipal council, he learned that Modina was not to be found and that Tan had been
accepted as successor. Corres endorsed the arrangement.
Shortly after Corres arrived in Baybay accompanied by guerrilla captain
Rodriguez, he received an inviation from Chester Peters of Inopacan to confer at
the headquarters of Peters. Corres accepted, esoorted by a combat patrol under
Sergeant Galvez, freshly arrived from Miranda’s headquarters. The nature of the
'’inopacan Incident" that followed is related elsewhere. For the people of Baybay,
the "Incident" meant that those who hoped to be rid of the Miranda rule had best
suppress their feelings. And as a consequence of the affair, Inopacan became an
adjunct (unofficial of course) to the Baybay sector, with Miranda's position con
siderably fortified.
Meanwhile, Francisco Rodriguez, pre-war policeman in Cebu City and Corres1
confrere in the "inopacan Incident", had returned to Miranda's headquarters. There
Rodriguez successfully convinced Miranda that Corres lacked the qualifications for
the post of arch commander. Rodriguez in turn was dispatched, this time with the
commission to form a regiment. He arrived with one automatic and a few E n f i e l d
rifles plus a collection of homo-made weapons. Y/e shall dwell at some length on
Rodriguez' policy of control, since under his direction 3aybay became a hotbed of
seditious activity against the Miranda regime.
In fairness to Rodriguez, whatever his demerits, we must emphasize that he
was handicapped by popular ill-will before he over took over his assignment. He
Attorney Domingo Yeloso, serving as justice of the peace, believed that

Corres had classified him as the leading local collaborationist. Yeloso dreaded
the so-called "flying squad" of Qorres and fled to the south, whence he began an
incessant vilification of the YiLGWF.
360
was the residuary legatee o f the bitterness and distrust implanted by Haneja,
Attorney Veloso, and the "inopacan Incident". Nonetheless, he failed lamentably
in allaying the discontent, instead convincing a considerable part of the population
that his was a misrule, not a rule.
To begin with, Rodriguez ousted Tan (as a carry-over from the Japanese)
from the mayoralty* appointing the elderly councillor Tavera to replace him. This
proved to be a blunder. Rodriguez should first have sounded out popular sentiment
on the subject. Tan, unwilling to accept this action supinely, had his cronies
intercede with the WLCT.rT Civil AffAirs Officer. This liaison between the people
and GHQ, brought back a favorable arbitrament from Liranda ordering the reinstate
ment of Tan. Thus, Tan and his backers harbored a feeling of ill-will towards the
new regimental commander. On the other hand, the important local following of the
absent former mayor, Modina, tended to identify Rodriguez with the Tan faction.
Rodriguez was thus placed in the unenviable position of a man who has chafed the in
group while at the same time wondrously succeeding in irritating the out-group.
The vacant post of justice of the peace was filled at this time by an evaouee
attorney from Cebu, Aniano Rucsiano. In accepting the dual job of Lieutenant in
the judge advocate oorps and local judge sitting in civil cases, Rusiano further
embittered the fugitive Attorney Velos against the WLG7F.
Avellana, municipal treasurer under Tan, continued in office. The treasurer,
in accordance with a GHQ memorandum (Interview: Rodriguez) was to make available
5$ of the local income for use of the 4th Regiment, but sar-aarked specially for
medical supolies and extraordinary expenses. The regiment was also to receive the
landlord's share of returns on estates where the landlord had evacuated— the tenant
retaining his customary share. In addition to these monies and commodities, the
regiment sought to eke out its operating expenses by soliciting voluntary contri
361
1
butions from the population at large*
By June, 194S, the Regiment determined to revise its fisoal arrangements.
It could not depend upon voluntary contributions in kind, and its money income was
inadequate to its needs. The Municipal Council, on Rodriguez' prompting, resolved
to assess against all adults a capitation tax, collected by the barrio lieutenants,
and turned over to the municipal treasurer. The tax was to be collected monthly
at a fixed rate of 10, 20 or 30 centavos, the amount determined by a rough estimate
of the wealth of the citizen* Thereafter, when the procurement officers of the
reginent had any supplies to aoquire, they would buy directly from the vendors,
giving a receipt for the amount billed against them. The vendor could then present
his voucher to the municipal treasurer for reimbursement.
In keeping with the divisional policy of holding down prices, Rodriguez
energetically hndertook to implement the policy within his regimental sector. The
local civilian anti-profiteering committee, consisting primarily of teachers, under
mayoralty direction, campaigned among the civilians. On the surface, the campaign
was making headway. But Rodriguez found out about black market operations, where
scarce commodities were being sold at enormously inflated prices. To discourage
this practice, he promulgated an order, threatening confiscation by the military
of all who violated the municipal ordinance establishing a schedule of reasonable
prices.
Rodriguez also turned to encouraging food production and stimulating trade
with the other municipalities in the zone of the 7,'LGWF. However, he sternly en
forced the divisional policy forbidding the export of products from Baybay to other
parts of theprovinoe, confiscating the commodities of violators.2 Departure without
authorization was an offense. Traders in Baybay, coming from Mindanao, were always
^Rodriguez declared that there was no forced giving, and that those who felt
unable to contribute were not maligned as "collaborationists". Many would dispute
these words *
2
However, he claims chat people from Baybay who applied to the regimental in
telligence office ôr permission to visit the Kangleon district might be autho-tr*^
after careful screening. ^ 1Z9fi
362
looked upon with suspicion, until they had succeeded in proving that their business
was completely above board. Then the regimental intelligence would release them
to conduot their private affairs.
The monetary policy of the division proved a source of friction in the Bay
bay sector. First, the populace seemed reluctant to circulate the emergency money
that had been used by all the guerrilla groups since the early days of the occupation
They put a premium on the pre-war notesj and in somecases vendors refused to acce
emergency money. This was embarrassing to the trade of the zone, hampering division
al efforts to promote recovery to peace-time conditions. Rodriguez threatened to
jail the non-cooperating dealers.
The town merchants also distressed Rodriguez on a related head. The moun
tain people who came into town on Sundays to hear mass and also put in a stock of
supplies for the week discovered that the merchants would not make change. On pur
chases amounting to less than the 5 or 10 peso note handed to him, the merchant
would simply keep the difference, arguing that he had no c h a n g e T h e purchaser was
then compelled either to put up with the loss or to wait until he had accumulated
enough of a backlog of needs to run up a 5 or 10 peso purchase order. This con
dition likewise was an encumbrance upon exchange of goods. Again Rodriguez threat
ened punitive action. At the same time, he notified GHQ of the commercial bottle
neck brought about by the absence of token money in the form of emergency notes.
(Coins were out of circulation). And this condition must have caused Miranda to
waver in his determination not to tamper with the issuance of notes.2
Rodriguez claimed that he vrns never able actually to test the efficacy of
the fiscal arrangement authorized by the Baybay municipal council. He was recalled
to GHQ during June, being absent for about a month. On his return, he asserted
However, if the purchaser presteda pre-war treasury note, change somehow i

always appeared.
2 5
It is with this background that we can understand % o r Tan’s statement that j
GHQ was meditating the authorization of the emission of token notes for Baybay al- 1
though Miranda would vigorously dissent. j
J
363
that regimental funds were almost exhausted. In fact, he was compelled to reduoe
the active component of his regiment to half strength, in order to keep within the
budgetary troop subsistence allowance. The others were assigned to their own farms
on temporary duty, but relieving men on active duty in accordance with a prescribed
schedule of rotation. Even those remaining in camp had to go on diminished rations.
To supplement the regimental resources, liayor Tan authorized the construction of a
fish coral, using municipal funds for the materials. Volunteer Guards did the
building and the fishing. The catch was to be divided between the fishermen and the
guerrilla.
Rodriguez recalled (intervew) two general courts-martial in his sector. One
case involved one of his officers who had wronged a woman. He claims to have for
gotten the disposition of the case. The other involved a civilian by the name of
Tuyor, a merchant who was selling goods in occupied areas. Through devious means,
Tuyor had gotten hold of a Masbate clearance pass and also a Japanese pass. He was
charged with passing on information to the Japanese regarding guerrilla organization
and activities. Rodriguez stated that the accused was acquitted, for the evidence
was entirely of a circumstantial character.
Another court-martial occurred during Rodriguez' absence from his sector.
It arose out of an alleged dereliction of duty on the part of one of the guards at
the concentration camp in the Baybay sector. Among others, there were 20 persons
detained for questioning, including some women and some surrendered USAFES soldiers.
They claimed to heve come from Tacloban, whe’-e they had been interned by the
Japanese. After being released, they returned to Baybay, their home community.
Here, they were apprehonded by Rodriguez' men, and detained for invest!ration in
the concentration camp. Drying Rodriguez' absence, a prisoner (.not of this batch)
escaped. On Rodriguez' return, the guard was tried, convicted and punished at hard
labor.
364
The Baybay Agricultural School at first -,ms under the regimental juris
diction of Baybay.^ Some of its produce and supplies had been taken in 1942 by
Gordon Lang at the time of his visit to the sector. Undoubtedly the regiment also
helped itself, hater in 1943, Gr'Q assumed direct oversight, inducting one of
its faculty members, Zamar, into the guerrilla and commissioning him to head the
school. Rice, corn, fruits and poultry were raised under the energetic divisional
sponsorship.^
Rodrigue; had opnortunity to play host to two emissaries from outside of
Leyte. And reputedly, Rodriguez, and his mestiza wife from Zamboanga entertained
with elegance. The first occasion was during the visit of McLish's delegate, Lloyd
7/aters. Undoubtedly, the visitor was favorably improssod with Rodriguez1 urbanity
and open-handedness.1
Rodriguez also helped entertain Morgan during the latter's excursion through
the domains of the YiLOYfF. In fact, according to Rodriguez, Morgan tried to entice
him into joining up with his (Morgan's) outfit and returning to Mindanao with him.
That was the reriod when Rodriguez was under recall from his post by the GKQ.
Rodriguez spent the month of April, 1943 at the staff General Service School.
During his absence, his executive officer, Conopio, implemented a divisional memo
randum creating a branch of the YiAS ('Aomen's Auxiliary Service) for the regiment.
Elections were held for the office of president, and Mrs. Rodriguez was selected
from among a group of contestants. The organization, like the women’s auxiliaries
of the other regiments, carried on. much useful work: making bandages, uniform shirts
Interview: Claro Gofredo (Adjutant to Rodriguez) - 1945.

Miranda said that soldiers were assigned to the school on temrorary duty,
to study poultry-raising.
3m
a.his writer ihterviewed Rodriguez at the time he was living in a ramshackle
hut, contiguous to the camp site of the 1st Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army
in Palo. Rodriguez' generosity in the face of the trying conditions of life for a*
family subsisting on a sergeant's pay was most impressive. Perhaps he had some
hidden funds, secreted fror. the early occupation period. But then graoiousness among
Filipinos living the most wretched of circumstances was not uncommon.
365
repairing uniforms, and other needed work. In addition, the women members gave of
their time in gardening, mat-making, soap-mr.king and other tasks, selling their
handiwork, and donating the proceeds for the support of the regiment.
There was much social rivalry, of an invidious so^t, among the women of
Baybay. Those belonging to the ''aristocratic" families boycotted the WAS, organizing
their own secessionist society, Las Pomas« There was much oad feelirg between the
two organizations, made up of single and married women alike. They went so far as
to apply rather obscene epithets to one another. Even before this, however, there
had been adverse criticism of Mrs . Rodriguez on the part of an element of the towns
people . It was said that in order to celebrate her birthday befittingly in March,
the guerrilla had commandeered foodstuffs and delicacies, ostensibly as voluntary

*»
contributions.
Charges from many quarters drifted into GHQ that commandeering and injustice
prevailed in Rodriguez sector— that he took indiscrinately under the guise of volun-
2
t&ry contributions, and blackmailed those who fell into disfavor with him. Fear of
interpellation at GhQ may have induced Rodriguez to systematizing his fiscal pro
cedures by instituting the system of capitation taxes as the basis of a local re
volving fund. These difficulties, plus the commercial problems, and the political
strife between the local factions culminated despite Rodriguez’ efforts, in a
summons (in June 1943Q to appear at GHQ for investigation. Rodriguez was reinstated
after a petition was drawn up by his local supporters testifying to his alleged
popularity. But Bonifacio Capuyan, who relieved him during June as regimental
commander, maintained (Interview) that the charges were substantially correct, and
that the bulk of the population felt a sense of relief in the thought that Rodriguez '
had been replaced.
^Rodriguez denied this accusation, stating that he had given of his personal
funds.
2
Rodrigues accused Bagislao of improprieties, wrongly attributed to himself.
366
The ”Baybay Affair” in one sense seemed to substantiate the charges against
Rodriguez. It demonstrated his inability to hold his command together. And it
also showed, by the apparent welcome given to the Kangleon forces when they occupied
the municipality during a brief interregnum, that the ivLGWF had fallen into popular
disfavor. Key or Medina was reinstalled in the municipal building, and Attorr.ey
Veloso, riding in on this victory C'-est, prepared to aid in the reorganization of
the local government. (Both Gallenzoga and the divisional engineer, Coloma, re
mained in the town during this period.) Mayor Tan, Attorney RuBiano, and Absalom
Borneo, the chief of police, were taken prisoner by the Kangleon forces to their
Gamp Sleepy Hollow. (Rusiano and Borneo managed to escape; Tan was eventually
released.)1
The manner in which the Kangleon forces were driven out of Baybay is re
lated elsewhere, Rodriguez' followers allegedly looted the houses of ell the dis
affected. A not inconsiderable portion of the population fled in dismay, seeking
sanctuary behind the Kangleon lines in the southern towns, and necessitating local
appropriations for their emergency relief. These emigres continued to heap
damnation upon the WLGV/F.
The 4th Regiment had to bo completely overhauled. It was shot through with
defections. Rodriguez admitted that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were deoidedly pro-
Kangleor in their leanings. Largoly from the 1st Battalion troops, the Regiment
was reorganized. This time, Conopio, the executive officer, was given the command,
and Rodriguez was recalled to service in the GHQ. Belatedly, Miranda had recog
nized the gravity of his error in continuing Rodriguez in command. In place of the
— .
Kangleon's men under Major Degracia treacherously attacked my headquarters
at Baybay, captured my officers and the E/ll ênlisted mery, my arms and ammunitions*
My officers and EA' were severely punished and taken to a southern town where they
were confined. At that incident I was able to escape and make a personal report*to
Lt. Miranda. . , .When Baybay sector fell. . . ., Kangleon, Domingo Veloso, and some
of his ^Kangleon’j/off icers delivered speeches in Baybay, lambasting the organization
of Western Loyte, telling the people that we were bandits. . . .”
(Francisco K. Rodriguez, ”To Whom It Kay Concern” . 19 March 1945.)
367
captured municipal officials, Councillor Tavera was appointed mayor and Attorney
Miciano became .justice of the peace. Thenceforth, GHQ regarded Baybay as largely
disaffected and inconsequential.
A’hen the Japanese returned to Baybay, Acting Mayor Tavera was on hand to
receive them. But Paterno Tan, who after his release by Kangleon made his way back
to Baybay, was restored by the Japanese to the mayoralty post, xan claimed (inter—
view) that, he pursued a very shrewd policy towards the Japanese, one which netted
them only the shadow of collaboration. The Japanese were more rapacious nov; than
they had been in the opening months of their occupation. They were less squeamish
in seising civilian belongings, such as poultry or lumber of fish, though they
sometimes offered a trifling compensation. But they did insist that only Japanese
currency be treated as legal tender. Pre-war and guerrilla money was confiscated
whenever discovered, and the possessors threatened with punishment. However,
according to Tan, the banned currency continued to circulate illegally, since it was
impossible for the Japanese to stamp out its a c c e p t a n c e T a n , following what he
claimed was the advice cf puppet Governor Torres, went outof his way to appear
pleasant to the Japanese. The people simulated friendliness also. The local Home
Guards (recruited from the former Volunteer Guards) feigned carrying out Japanese
instructions, after they had been ceremoniously sworn in by tho Governor in Feb
ruary, 1944. All in all, the occupation forces were convinced that the people were
very tractable, ênce the town was spared the blood bath that occurred elsewhere.^
1
The people were very willing, however, to pay their taxes in cheap Japanese
monev.
2
In a special statement addressed to the present writer, Tan outlined his
policy: "While the Japs were in control of Baybay, the people cooperated, but only
in a way that was not harmful to their interests. For instance, if the local
Japanese Commander, Cant. Isibasi, would be very much pleased if the people took part
in morning calisthenics, called Radio Taisho. By getting one member from each family «
living in tre poblacion, Mayor Tan was able to win tho good-will and confidence of
the commander. iVhen members of the Volunteer Guards or Guerrilla were captured b'r
Jap patrols, the Mayor was in a position to petition the Captain for their release.
Actually the people were always in contact with the Guerrilla through the Barrio
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the co pyrig h t ow ner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission
358
Mayor Tan did find himself obliged to explain one embarrassing factor.
According to his count, only about 2,000 people remained in town during the re
occupation, the rest having evacuated to the barrios. The Japanese demanded an
accountal. Tan soothed their suspicions by explaining that they v/ere engaged in
planting to assure an adequate food supply for all. (The food situation in Eaybey
remained satisfactory during this period).
Those citizens who lived in the outlying areas, however, came under guer
rilla control by about June of 1944. They were assessed a ’’loyalty tax” to contri
bute to the upkeep of the resistance cause. The guerrilla were now representatives
of Colonel kangleon, for the Y«'LGWF in the sector had lost its top command. And
their leader in the sector was Lieutenant Filemon Pajares, with whom Tan kept in
constant contact. The Volunteer Guards were used to carry messages and supplies to
the guerrilla groups.
After the Japanese withdrevz from Baybay on the night of October 19, 1944, the
guerrilla came out in the open. Pajares now controlled the civil administration,
cooperating with the American sector commander after the American arrival on
November 1, 194-4.
All municipal officials, elected or appointed in 1341, w^re returned

to their former positions one month after the landing of the American Forces
in Leyte, except the Mayor elect who was called by Colonel R. K. kangleon. . . .
to organise the Commonwealth Municipal Government in the mountains.1
’’rlike Abuyog, Baybay passed through the occupation with only surface
scratches. The Japanese-appointed mayor, was shrewd enough to remain on ~oo£ terms
with the Japanese garrison without antagonizing; the guerrilla. But also unlike
Tenientes, furnished then supplies and supplied news of Jap movements. But the
Japs thought the people were submissive, and did little damage to the town. The
people missed the democracy of the former Commonwealth Government. However, their
living conditions mere net too bad. '.'.'bile there was a shortage of clothing* toilet
goods, and little luxuries, there "/as enough food to go around.”
(ratemo Ten, Former ksyor of Baybay. Pert. 15, 1945 To:An American
Friend.)
u-. C. i..odina, municipal Mayor, Baybay, Statement: 1945.
369
Abuyog, the strength of resistance was dissipated by a sordid, political
factionalism, that put private advantage before community welfare. Moreover,
dissension within the guerrilla ranks ended in the desertion of a local guerrilla
unit and an armed clash between the combat forces of the two leading guerrilla
organizations, vying for power. Ironically, the municipality of Baybay enjoyed
more tranquility and greater unity of purpose under the Japanese administration
than under the liberty of self-rule.
Merida
Up the west coast from Baybay, on the further shore of Ormoc Bay, stands
the town of Merida. Dwarfed by neighboring Ormoc, Merida was of importance as the
home of some of Leyte’s wealthiest' hacienderos. Into Merida came patrols from the
Miranda’s T/ILGWF. Japanese detaohment in Ormoc, hunting for unsurrendered soldiers,
and seizing weapons, radios, and useful equipment. The Japanese acted arbitrarily
in their dealing with the Filipino civilians, helping themselves to individual
valuables of a non-military natures Poultry, foodstuffs, furniture, and the like.
Bandit gangs were also on the prowl during this period of political break-down,
striking fear into the hearts of the helpless.
One bandit group, based in Ormoc but making incursions into the M©ri(ia
sector, was led by a certain Viotorino. He claimed to be a guerrilla organizer,
though many were inclined to judge his operations as purely rapacious. Mayor
Custodio Mendiola, apparently in league with the Japanese in that he gave them a
free hand without protest over abuses committed, became the pet target of Viotorino’
ire. In July, Mendiola fled to Bohol, believing that his life was unsafe so long
as Viotorino was "out to get him” • Vice-Mayor Gabriel Sanchez also disappeared,
kidnapped by Victorino according to common belief. Forcible abduction was also the
fate of Chief of Police Parilla, in the popular credence. Even the municipal
treasurer, Juan Rodriguez, vacated office, though in his case, resignation was due
to alleged sickness. To complete the picture, municipal secretary Gallicano Ruiz
left office and Justioe of the Peace Antonio Brillo departed for Taoloban.
An administrative vacuum was thus created.. It was in this setting that
guerrilla groups under Escolastico Geniston (a soldier in the Philippine Army),
Paterno Castor (a law student with some BOTC training), and Magdaleno Quintini 11a
(a local school teacher) came into being. Geniston early made contact with Miranda's
headquarters, organized Volunteer Guards, and undertook some defensive action against
enemy search patrols. Soon, all of the bands within the sector acknowledged the
leadership of Lieutenant Bonifacio Capuyan, who had himself declared fealty to
Miranda. Interference by Viotorino wqs brought to an end when Miranda sent out one
of his dreaded "flying squads".
Capuyan reorganized Merida under the aegis of the Tf/LGtfF. To the top post
of Mayor, he appointed Serafin Menesis, a man with some legal training. The civilians
contributed to the support of the guerrilla; the latter furnished protection and
stability, and did not interfere excessively in civilian administration. Landed es
tates, abandoned by the wealthy, were cultivated by the guerrilla for troop sub
sistence. Capuyan instigated the launching of a local public works program, involv
ing sizable disbursements for a small community.
Of special events within the Merida sector, we might notes a) the looting
of its treasury in the first months of the Japanese occupation by a bandit group,
presumably from the Villaba sector; b) the shelling of Merida by an armed Japanese
merchantship in June 1943, destroying some of the larger houses, and causing the
evacuation of the municipal government to Barrio Kalunasan.
During the intensification of the Japanese occupation in the province,
Federioo Boholst served as mayor— with the original support of the guerrilla regiment.
Both Attorney Teleron and Gemel Pastor (subsequently CO of the Merida reginent)
believe that Mayor Boholst was cooperating actively with the Japanese, deliver
ing speeches and urging the guerrilla who had gone into concealment to return
with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.
to town and surrender. In fact, many "believed Boholst went so far as to designate
Filipino civilians to guide the Japanese patrols on their hunt for unsurrendered
guerrillamen. As in other communities, an NA (Neighborhood Association) was
established, with its constituent districts ordered to do patrol work and to furnish
i
laborers to work on Japanese projects, especially at the Valencia airstrip.
Pastor claimed that the WLCSifF continued to operate-abandoned estates in the
hilly regions during the Japanese reoccupation of the sector, depending upon these
estates for foodstuffs. A number of-the Merida civilians who had returned to town
again evacuated to evade the forced labor draft instituted by the Japanese and the NA.
This resulted in an acute food shortage, lasting a number of months. Here was a good
2
talking point for the collaborationists appealing to the evacuees to return to town.
V/hen the Kangleon forces moved into the sector (that is, the 96th Regiment of the
92nd Division) they promptly liquidated mayor Boholst as a pro-Japanese.
The municipality of Merida exemplifies the "ideal" or stereotyped alignment
of forces during the Japanese occupation. Here, we find the wealthy element
Chief of Police Bioco also appeared diligent in executing Japanese orders,

going to the hills and urging t h e guerrilla to surrender. According to Pastor,
Bioco desisted in this practice when he was warned that he would be dealt with harsh
ly by the guerrilla. Roberto Adelante, the municipal secretary, was aaid to have
befriended the guerrilla. The new treasurer, Angel Boholst, brother to the mayor,
made little attempt to collect taxes beyond the town limits. According to Pastor,
Themistocles Boholst (former regimental commander), at first took an active part in
collaborating with the Japanese, He became one of the principal speakers in the
Japanese "pacification" campaign, was the announcer in Radio Taiso exercises (the
cult of physical culture and patriotism), and managed the local branch of the Daido
corporation (Japanese firm for purchasing Filipino commodities). But in April, he
seized an opportunity to flee (as Pastor explains it) and went to the Camotes Islands.
The local unit of the Bureau of Constabulary used to scour the hills, look
ing for resistance personnel. Pastor claims that six of these Filipinos were sur
rounded in April, disarmed and taken prisoner, eventually themselves joining his
forces. The other six remained with the Japanese garrison till it withdrew.
There were four more members of the BC in the local detachment, but they
were slain as members of a Japanese patrol during the one direct guerrilla-Japanese
armed encounter in the sector before D-Day. Pastor’s policy was to avoid these
head-on clashes, since the guerrilla were hopelessly outclassed during the lie-low
period. In this incident, a guerrilla patrol inadvertently collided with a Japanese
patrol, and an exchange of fire occurred without decisive results.
On another occasion, Pastor, leading 13 riflemen and 15 labor auxiliaries,
came upon a Japanese truck convoy. The Japanese contingent spotted than, opened fire
and gave chase, but the guerrillamen, exploiting their greater familiarity with the *
topography, eluded them.
372
collaborating with the Japanese, and the guerrilla secure in its leadership of the
common people. During the neriod of guerrilla domination of the area, (achieved only
after the suppression of 'banditry) relationships between the military and the civil
officials were most cordial. Under the Japanese reoccupation, the local officials in
the town lost contact with the guerrilla, and came to be branded enemies of resistenc
Rejecting the pattern of Abuyog, the guerrilla of Colonel Kangleon completely ignored
the work done by their predecessors in the sector (the VJXGFF) , and imported their own
combat unit. The newcomers also drew up their own proscription list, liquidating
a number of alleged collaborators, including the mayor.
Capoocan
Having examined two municipalities affiliated with the guerrilla organization
of the ULGwF v.re may now pass on to consider two towrns in ■the northern district of
Pamanian.
Capoocan, site of Felix Pamanian's headquarters, was the area of initial
landing of the Japanese invasion forces. Cn Hay 26, 1942, about 600-700 Japanese,
veterans occupation forces from Hanchuria and Korea, landed at Bo. Salod. Soon the
Japanese were sending cut patrols, hunting unsurrendered USAFFE soldiers. One of
their most effective procedures was to learn the identity of relatives of these
soldiers in hiding through paid Filipino informers, and then coerce them into re
vealing the hideouts, or frightening the soldiers into giving themselves up through
fear of torture to their loved ones.
Solomon Hernandez had been the lected mayor of Capoocan. At the time of the
Japanese landings, he fled to the hills along with the stream of evacuees. But when
the puppet government in Tacloban instructed the eleoted municipal officials to re
sume their duties, Hernandez returned to town. According to Pamanian (interview) he
immediately assumed an attitude of "all-out cooperation with the Japanese. Before
the surrender, the USAFFE had stored a large quantity of rice in the local school
building. It left instructions for free distribution of this rice to the populace in
the event of enemy occupation. How Hernandez disregarded these instructions, hoard-
/
ing the rice for himself. The people resorted to looting. Hernandez threatened to
turn,them over to the Japanese for dire punishment. Early in June, representatives
of the infuriated populace assassinated him.
The slaying of Hernandez served as an object lesson to dissuade other
municipal officials who may have been guided by the majror’s action. The municipal
secretary, Ignacio Petilos, went into hiding. The chief of police, Sabas Pigao,
warned to "watch his step" by Pamanian decided to quit his post, and evaouated to
1
Eiliran Island.
Continuity in administration was preserved by the continuance in office of
the municipal treasurer, Riel, and the vice-mayor Perfecto Pilapil. Pamanian effected
an understanding with Pilapil, and relied upon his friendliness implicitly. Evident
ly, Pilapil1s connection with the guerrilla ceased to be a secret. IVhen Borgueta
was appointed mayor of Carigara, he warned the Japanese to keep Pilapil under
surveillance. Fearing for Pilapil1s safety, Pamanian instructed him in March of
1943 to evacuate to Samar.
For the people living in their hillside evaouation, Pamanian appointed a new
municipal government. A former chief of police, Pedro Mercolita, became mayor. The
chief clerk of the District Health Officer, Juan de Lima, served as treasurer. And
Sergio Daffon, a former municipal councillor, acted as the police chief. Pamanian1s
trusted adviser, Attorney Alberto Aguja, now acted as justice of the peace.
Pamanian got along well with the civilians, partly because he was a native
son, partly because he had the backing of the most influential local figure Attorney
Aguja, and partly because he respected property rights and was not overbearing in
his demeanor. Capoocan, though small, enjoyed prestige as the headquarters of
Pamanian1s organization. Here he conferred with the other guerrilla leaders: with
^The guerrilla regarded the local parish priest, Padre Flores, as among the
most rabid of the Japanese supporters. At one time, Flores notified a Japanese patrol
in what house Pamanian had taken shelter, and Pamanian barely managed to effect a get
away. In 1944, after Pamanian had ceased to be a line officer, the guerrilla kidnaDnpd
and murdered Flores. *«u«ppea
374
Corpin at the time of fusion, -with Balderian before associating himself fully
with that organization. The ordnance shop of the Regiment w*s also located here.
When the Japanese reoccupied Cnpoocan, they appointed a local fisherman,
Juan Lagera as mayor, but continued Riel as treasurer. Lagera cooperated with the
Japanese, according to Rumanian, but only as far as necessary'. He winked at the
entrance into the town of guerrilleros, engaged in purchasing viands. He knew that
the HA guards were actually serving as informers to the guerrilla. And when the
Japanese issued orders to the mayor to make Filipino laborers available for military
projects, he went only as far as he had to in giving the impression of compliance.
Thus, at the time of Liberation, the transition to the Commonwealth Regime was not
accompanied by the hatred and blood-getting that was the lot of less fortunate
communities.
Villaba
Villaba hot only is an area of largo landed estates. It- has an edditional
resource ir the local asphalt mine. The mine suspended output at the time of the
Japanese invPsior. Its superintendent, Elias Laude, together with another mine
executive, Frank Y.'ilson, joined guerrilla lieutenant Higino Cabiljng in organizing
resistance in the sector. The barrio lieutenants were very cooperative in helping
subsist this growing guerrilla band, soon known as the "Villaba Roughnecks'*.
The local mayor, Vicente Yoloso, mc.de it known very early that he meant
to second the efforts of the puppet government in Taoloban to "pacify” the Province
by full cooperoticn in his own municipality. He early contacted Pamanian and coun
seled hi.-.to abandon the course of resistance. Subsequently, he attempted to seduce
Pamanian by promising him a post as inspector in the Japanese-sponsored constabulary—
an offer which âmanian ignored. Veloso w&s among the earliest of the mayors to be
attacked by his countrymen because of his detestable tactics.^
^-In this case, Veloso was fired upon by a squad under a certain Lasco in
June 1942 while he was cruising along in his motor launch. Lasoo, himself, was short
ly' after put to flight by a band under Uercolita of Leyte, Leyto, for irregularities
in the course he was pursuing.
375
Ifoyor Veloso was abetted in his collaborationist program by the municipal
secretary (his nephew Sofronio Veloso) and by the chief of police (Pedro Viagedor)
who was harsh in punishing civilian infractions of rules. Veloso relied for in
telligence information upon two Filipino hirelings from Cebu. Tftese latter fled
as soon as the guerrilla operatives had tracked them down.
By October 1942, Japanese patrols ceased their visits to Villaba. Lkyor
Veloso decided that the town was "too hot" for him, and departed for Tacloban. The
municipal secretary and t o ]ice chief likewise fled, while the justice of the peace
Marilao returned to his home in Falompon. The treasurer, kic&rdo Omega stayed on,
and was confirmed in office by the guerrilla.
In the same month, Cabiling and his band entered Villaba publicly, hoisted
the American flag in the town square, and with appropriate ceremony installed the
vice-mayor, Eusebio Gaviola, as the new mayor. Attorney Agripiano Ensoy (brother
of guerrilla sergeant Ensoy) became the new justice of the peace. The mayor called
upon the people to cooperate fully with the guerrilla and to show generosity in
supporting the cause. He also organised a VG detaohment to render assistance to
the guerrilla. Guerrilla leader Cabiling alienated many of the landowners and
merchants by attempting to regulate their economic activities and by collecting what
they regarded as inequitable taxes. Eventually, Qabiling v.-as forced out of the
sector by guerrilla headquarters.
■'hen the Japanese returned in force in December 1943, Velo6o was back with
them as mayor, he ap-ointed his own treasurer, Baldomero rerez. He ordered all
guerrilla in the sector to surrender threatening that it would go bad with them if
they should be caught. During this period, the Japanese showed greater arbitrariness
and harshness, commandeering whatever appealed to them. They decided to reopen the
asphaj-t mine, and ordered Veloso to recruit laborers. The mayor had established
a NA, and he instructed each district to furnish a contingent of laborers. Tfhen-
ever a Japanese patrol encountered Filipino males loitering on the streets, they
376
press them into service carting supplies and carrying commandeered goods. The
populace1 feared to have much in the way of foodstuffs stored in their homes, lest
it constitute a lure for Japanese seizure. Stories circulated that the mayor not
only -was a collaborationist; in addition, he was dishonest. Certain scarce
commodities that the Japanese made available for the people in limited quantities
as part of their propaganda to win their allegiance were not distributed by the
mayor. Reportedly, he was misappropriating these commodities for private sale to
merchants from other communities. The hacierderos continued to render some assist
ance to the guerrilla. But they were obliged to sell to the Japanese and to conform
with all regulations, lest they become suspect and subject to maltreatment.
After the first American bombings, the Japanese detaohment threatened to
punish any Filipino uttering a word about having seen American planes. For public
consumption (which deceived no one) the Japanese insisted that any planes overhead
were their own. The local guerrilla officer. Lieutenant Paciano Jrias instructed
the civilians to escape from town, because of the danger from bombing. Veloso
sought to escape to Tacloban by sailboat, but was captured by the guerrilla, and
sent under guard to the regimental office. His nephew, Sofronio, and other active
collaborationists were also apprehended by the guerrilla about this same time.
The people of Villaba underwent one more period of acute strain. The
Japanese had been cleared out of the sector by December, 1944. But after the
American occupation of Ornoc, the Japanese forces fell bech upon Villalr., machine-
gunning civilians, looting end burning houses.
In both Capoocan and Jillaba, the municipal mayors revealed themselves as
grasping opportunists, -with no sense of responsibility to their populations. In
both towns, the mayors touched off acts of violence, resulting in the death of one
and the flight of the other. During the Ja.pan.e60 reoccupation, the nunieioal
*Sgt. Easoy (duty Sgt. under Lt. Paciano Orias), Informant. Interview
1945. --------
377
officials of both communities got along with the conqueror, but with this difference-
-in the case of Villaba, collaboration was in earnest, while in the case of Capoocan,
surreptitious connections with the guerrilla were fostered. As guerrilla commander
of the northern zone, Felix Pamanian maintained good relations with the local vested
interests, cultivating the friendship of the influential Attorroy Aguya, and avoid
ing offense to the landed interests. The less cautious sector commander in Villaba
dared antagonize the propertied class, and was forced out of the area.
Dagami
Dagami, in East Leyte, was an inland town where the guerrilla exercised
substantial control. In this town were the homes of major Balderian and Attorney
Cinco— men who believod in a ”get tough” policy against potential collaborationists.
Dagami was a much contested sector, and the parallelogram of forces was so drawn
that the local residents were unable to adopt a two-faced neutrality.
mayor Bardillon was incumbent in Dagami at the time of the Japanese in
vasion. Attorney Siayngco, then evacuating in Dagami, attributed (interview)
Bardillon's policies to affiliation with the Veloso-Salazar faction of Leyte
politics. As soon as the puppet provincial official made 10007.01 their stand,
Bardillon followed through in his ov.n municipality. In short, he adopted a policy
of complete collaboration. Bardillon ana his chief of police, Kierulf, proceeded
to enforce Japanese ordors. In fact, Balderian regarded the police ohief not only
as a collaborator, but as a vicious hater of all guerrilla sympathizers.1
According to guerrilla intelligence agent, Sosing, also of Dagami, the
Japanese confiscated automobiles, radios, firearms, and tartanillas (interview)
on their first arrival In Dagami. The’.' instructed the mayor to order the return
to town of all civilians who had evaouated in the tense period before the Japanese
invasion, and to command that all unsurrendored USAFFE soldiers surrender and turn
Police Chief Kierulf was killed in the guerrilla attack aerainst the
Japanese force in Dagami in November, 1942.
378
in their arms. Bardillon proceeded with vehemence in executing these orders.
For their own security, the Jgânese instructed Eardillon to illuminate
the streets at night. In this way, prowlers could be detected. To accomplish this,
3ardillon had need of an illuminat— something scarce during this period. Attorney
Siayngco stated that the mayor set about seizing all supplies of kerosene held by
townspeople, and regarded all who concealed their supplies as hostile to his ad
ministration. Both he and his police chief arrested apparent non-cooperators
Both Attorney Siayngco and Attorney Cinco asserted that Bardillon became
progressively more deeply embedded in his pro-Japanese policy. At first, Bardillon
tried to give the impression that his cooperation was a surface affair, part of the
consequences of his being mayor while under the armed scrutiny of tho invade^.
Hut after he had attended the mayoralty convention in Tacloban in August, convoked
by Governor Torres, he threw in his lot completely with the program of the Tacloban
regime and made r.o bones about declaring his orientation.
The guerrilla of Dagami came to life oarly. It was not disposed to accept
Bardiilor.'s rule passively. Sergeant Teraza was one who b 1 ieved in bringing things
to a head. One of his first targets was local police Sergeant Fodrc Gernale.
According to Attorney Siayngco, the policeman had shown himself to be overzealous
in executing Japanese orders. In particular, he had been commandeering civilian
bicycles. Terazr.'s band caught up with him in July, 1942, and shot him in the
stroot.
The mayor was unnerved by this temerity, he felt that he needed Javanese
protection. Yet he would hove to get this protection in a way that would insure
civilian endorsement. He did not feel sure enough of himself to openly flout pub
lic sentiment. Attorney Circo stated that he called a public meeting, warned of
Âccording to Atty. Cir.co, the Japanese discovered that the police chief
himself had secreted some cans of petroleum and rere going to punish him. The mayor
interceded. The police chief wished to resign but Bardillon, perhars requiring
moral support, prevailed upon him to continue at his job.
379
the menace of lawlessness and inquired whether it might not be advisable to send
for a Japanese garrison to maintain order. The citizenry negatived the suggestion.
Even those who did not welcome guerrilla-instigated incidents were loath to look
to the enemy for maintaining public quiet. Bardillon acceded, though making it
known that he mmght feel impelled to revive the motion if conditions should further
deteriorate »
Sergeant Teraza decided to call his cards. That very evening, he and his
followers disarmed a policeman on duty at the municipal jail and spirited a way
a U3AFFE trainee who had been incarcerated for non-surrender. Pbr mayor Bardillon
there was no turning back. He announced that he would abide by his previous manifes
to. A few cays later, a Japanese garrison arrived.
The guerrillas continued their organization and growth. One o f their
prime responsibilities was the formation and training of VG units. Guerrilla agent
organized the unit in his own barrio (Tabon-tabon). It consisted of one company
of men, equipped with home-made weapons, that driiled weekly. It worked to deter
the civilians from cooperating with the enemy, and prevented lawless elements from
stealing. It collected foodstuffs for guerrilla.
Bardillon brazenly defied the guerrilla to attack the Japanese garrison.
The guerrilleros remained quiet, biding their time. In November, they struck.
According to Sosing, the guerrilla passed -word on to the civilians in advance so
that the latter would not be trapped. The guerrilla mission aimed at dislodging
the enemy garrison and the apprehending of the arch-collaborators. The citizens
night leave the poblacicn, if they chose, hayor Eardillon permitted those wishing
to take sanctuary in the municipal building, the church, end the local convent, to
do so.
As Attorney Ciuco described the attack, the Japanese were well prepared.
They had sub-machine guns, automatic rifles, and mortars. The thirteen members of
the police force were allotted c, special issue of rifles, shotguns, and revolvers.
380
In addition, the dozen members of the fire brigade were deputized as special police
and were also armed. The mayor and his retinue took up stations in the municipal
building, together with their families and other civilians, bringing the total
there to about 170.
The guerrilla, for their part, posted 4,000 V G ’s on the perimeter of the
poblacion, requiring spedial identification of all who would leave. Under Balderianfe
direction, Isabello Gentino’s combat force spearheaded the attack on the 16th.
The following day, Captain Antonio °inco arrived with reinforcements. The fighting
continued until the 19th.
The church end cement had been brought under guerrilla control on the first
night of the attack. About one fourth of the town was razed. Some of the people
who had sought refuge in the municipal building made their wry out and escaped
to the guerrilla. They reported that those in the municipal building had almost
run out of ammunition, and that the Japanese, entrenched in the puericulture build
ing, wore not sending them any fresh supply. Moreover, the food supply was almost
exhausted. Morale war. running out. Balderian was reluctant to attack the municipal
building as it wo ".Id involve the slaughter of fellow-Fi lipinos. He sent word to
Antonio Cinco, poised to assault this objective, to hold off and urge the besieged
to surrender. Cinco despatched an ultimatum, borne by two of his "Suspects” serving
as special couriers.
Iky or bardillon sought to temporize. The Japanese had sent reinforcements
on the 16th from their Tacloban base. Sergeant hieves Fernandez, the woman guer-
rillero, said (interview) that her mission and that of the troops taking orders
from her, was to intercept this relief column, and turn it back. The enemy was
turned back after an unsuccessful attempt to break through the guerrilla cordon.
The Japanese prepared a stronger force. Or the 20th, they were again on their way.
Bardillon, expecting their imminent arrival, requested an armistice till 3 Pi;, during
which time he would consider terms. Antonio Cinco would have no truck with
381
Bardillon, and ordered prompt surrender on pain of immediate storming of the build
ing, A policeman cane out with arms raised; other followed; and finally the mayor
himself.
The Japanese did arrive later in the day, in five truckloads. But they re
tired when they realized that the situation was irretrievable. The guerrilla then
addressed the people, calling for continued support. All those who were suspect
were led off to the mountains.for investigation. There they were sternly warned
of dire punishment unless they mend', d their ways. Then all were permitted to return,
with the exception of the police chief, six policeman, and some civilians suspected
of being enemy agents. Mayor Bardillon was interned in the Dagami concentration
camp, and subsequently transferred to Colonel ûintero'B camp at Leyte, Leyte.^
After the attack and the investigations following it, Balderian proceeded
to reorganize the municipal government. He appointed Cesnrio Suderio as mayor and
G. Berino as municipal treasurer. This government held office (in town most of
the time) through 1943, in close cooperation with the guerrilla.
Guerrilla soldiers or V G ’s who took civilian properties without proper
authorization were subject to punishment. The municipal jail was used, as in
peacetime, for the detention of those convicted of minor offenses by the justice
of the peace. The more serious offenders were turned over to the guerrilla, and if
adjudged guilty were held in the concentration camp at Da-ami, As for the liquida
tion of suspected enemy agents, the total in the Dagami sector, for the entire
2
occupation period, has been conservatively estimated at about 100.
The Japanese took over at the end of 1P43. Francisco Sudario was appointed
\ t . Bonicillo believed (interviow) this transfer was fortunate for Mayor

Bardillon, who migh'; otherwise have been killed. Bardillon was held on Biliran Islarc
from October 1943 until January 1944. According to Sosing, Bardillon went to
Tacloban upon release and joined the Japanese espionage net-work.
2
Sosing maintains that the guerrilla operatives were told to always inves
tigate suspects carefully. He disclaims knowledge of any killings having been insti
gated by personal grudges.
382
mayor. The new mayor actively supported his Japanese masters, urging the evacuees
to return to town, and recruiting laborers for Japanese projects. But the guer
rilla remained strong, ever, during the lie-low period, deterring much of the
population from all-out collaboration.
Dagami presents the case of a municipal administration inexorably sucked b
the force of circumstances into the vortex of complete collaboration with the
enemy. In this same municipality dwelt two of north-east Leyte's chief resistance
leaders— one a mi 1itury .figure and the other a politician. Confident of thoir own
strength, the local guerrilla perpetrated a series of provocative incidents, cli
maxed by a mass assault on the Japanese garrison. The assault succeeded the anti-
guerrilla administration being displaced by one favorably disposed to resistance.
The Japanese returned at the end of 1943, installed a new set of puppet officials,
out failed to extinguish the resistance spirit in this community„
Vex sin
Of southern Leyte ’s municipalities, we shall briefly consider two— Haasin
and Sogod. I.'ayor Esoolastioo Cabrera remained in L'aasin -when the -Aparese first
arrived, for a brief period, the Japanese maint.uined a small garrison in the school-
house j most ^f the time they visited L.aasin on patrol from their halitbog bps©*
)n August 1£, 19J-2, according to Cabrera sinterview), some guerrilla, soldiers came
to the mayor and, in the name of Gordon Lang, ordered the evacuation of municipal
officials end tour..-people. At the same time, they destroyed the postal telegraph
office, removed =500 from the municipal treasury and then blasted the cafe. The
orders of evacuation wore obeyed by the bulk of the population.
Lor a week, or so, the municipality lacked a government, iut the Japanese
required tho formation of a now government. According to Attorney Abiera (inter
view ), the townspeople remaining agreed to appoint Emilio Rosales, a former vico-
mayor, as acting mayor. Rafael Gerong, a school teacher, became treasurer and
383
Timoteo Llavanes, a former chief of police, resumed his old post.^ Behind this
ad hoc administration, stood Florentine Zara, the man primarily responsible for
the selection of Rosales. The guerrilla, realizing that a complete governmental
vacuum in Uaa6in was undesirable, acquiesced.
Angel Sspina claimed (interview) the chief responsibility- in inducing the
people to support Lang and his guerrilla. He felt that the guerrilla was neede
not only as security against the enemy, but as a means of terminating the looting
of both governmental and private properties.
Some time later, senility obliged Rosales' resignation. 3 spina suggested

2 r
Zara as successor, and Lang instel led him in office. ^he directorate continued
as an advisory body. Lang established his headquarters in town,using the Court
House for that purpose.
Zara's government introduced nrice-control ordinances. It also provided
a monthly subvention for guerrilla subsistence, which was increased to 51,000 at
Lang's importunation. In order to facilitate ooasuoi oial transactions, Zara and
treasurer Gerong agreed upon the printing of local emergency scrip to serve as
token m m o y . Citizens with regular currency might convert it into scrip at the
office of the treasurer by paying a small discount. According to Lspir.a, this
money was to remain on deposit with the municipal treasurer, as a ’’trust fund”, so
that it might be drawn upon at any time for the redemption of the emergency token
money. But Zara did not share this view, arguing that the monies were needed for
3
guerrilla upkeep.
To assist Rosales, the townspeople chose an cdvisorg Directorate of 6 mem

bers, including rrov, 3d. member Angel Espina, Vice-Hayor Eantug, Dr. Tunzon, and
Zara, pre-war interpreter of the Court of First Instance.
r>
“Cabrera, the former mayor, stated (Interview) that he had not objected to
this arrangement. However, others stated that Cabrera was thoroughly peeved.
The municipal council voted to make part payment to two American veterans of
the Spanish-American V.'ar residing in Ilaasin on their regular pension stipende. The
American Cover.-rent had defaults^ on payment since the outbreak of the war, 1'ajor
Jain of the 94th Rort. authorized payment of 540 per month. In July, 1943, the guer
rilla provincial government assumed responsibility.
384
\
Zara’s political opponents charged that he was conniving at Gordon Lang’s
confiscatory polioy towards the Chinese merchants# Zara was also accused of mal
feasance in establishing a municipal soap association to which local producers were
required to sell their product.'*'
After Gordon Lang was appointed Kangleon's liaison officer, Major Jain took
charge of the sector with Captain Espina as sector commander. Zara and Jain found
themselves at loggerheads over the matterof special processing taxes and license
fees whose proceeds were to be used for guerrilla support. Jain ousted Zara, and
recalled former mayor Cabrera to office.
Jain later sent his auditor to go over Zara’s books. Jain claimed (inter
view) that the post-audit revealed improper withdrawals by Zara against the munici
pal "trust fund” . Moreover, Zara allegedly authorized the release of more local
scripthan was covered by fund on deposit with the municipal treasurer. For these
2
alleged tortious acts, and for other misdeeds, Jain ordered the arrest of Zara, and
entered a complaint requesting the Fiscal to file an information against the ousted
mayor. Judge Alquino of the guerrilla Court of First Instance released Zara on bond,
after one month's detention awaiting trial.
During the Japanese reoccupation, Zara again became mayor, after first hav
ing obtained guerrilla consent. Cabrera became guerrilla mayor in the mountains.
The Japanese captured Cabrera during their mopping up drive. Cabrera was released
after a week of investigation, and then fled to Bohol. Vice-mayor Bantug took over
direction of the evacuee guerrilla municipal government,
Floro Kangleon and Orvi?.le Babcock believed (Interview) that Zara’s ad-
X
1
Zara allegedly sold to the public at a profit, putting the proceeds into
his own pockets instead of into the local treasury. A similar slipper association
and other types of enterprise were said to have netted Zara a tidy sum.
2
According to Cabrera, Zara took timbers and other materials from the munici
pal building and from the building of the Nacoco (National Coconut Corp.) for use in
his own house.
385
ministration was on the whole friendly to the resistance movement* The people of
Maasin sent supplies to the guerrilla in the mountains. The NA presidents and the
”home guards” maintained connections with the guerrilla. Provincial Board Member
Espina, captured by the Japanese, was appointed NA adviser. Some Filipinos were
requisitioned by the Japanese as garrisons laborers— but the guerrilla did not
take offense.
Cabrera returned to Maasin in August, 1944. The guerrilla did not let him
assume office beoause they were not certain whether the Japanese had suooeeded in
forcibly extracting information from him. Cabrera was highly critical of Zara,
accusing him of voicing anti-American sentiments in public addresses, of punishing
Filipinos who were absent from Radio Taiso exeroises, and of gathering foodstuffs
for the Japanese garrison. However, Cabrera’s testimony was prejudiced by personal
malice, and whatever truth might have been in it could not be accepted on mere say-
so*
Zara was on hand to receive the American troops on their arrival* He then
ceded the local reins to Vice-Meyor Bantug.
The resistance movement of Maasin got off to a good start by working in
close cooperation with the municipal government. What was even more promising, the
people themselves took action to organize a local administration, filling a tem
porary void brought about by the Japanese occupation. Unhappily, greed and mean
ness sapped the vitality of resistance. The local guerrilla leader, an American,
damaged the good name he had acquired through acts of bravery by adopting a reokless
confiscational policy (with himself as a leading beneficiary). And the acting mayor,
either through fraudulent practices ae his enemies alleged, or as the victim of a
shabby cabal as he himself charged, fell out with the local political bosses. Ousted
from office, the acting mayor was reinstated by the Japanese during their reocoupa-
tion of the town. While under Japanese scrutiny, the mayor managed to establish
a friendly contaot with the guerrilla. The final assessment of his role as a
1
386
"punnet” administrator varies with the source of information.--h.is friends lauding
his efforts in behalf of his countrymen, his opponents denouncing him as a "sell
out” .
So god
Lapulapu Londragon is the principal source of information in Sogod. As a
native of south Leyte, and in 1:1s capacity as second in command of the guerrilla
sect rr, he had a good grasp of the situation. In the first period following the
Japanese occupation, considerable lawlessness e::is bed ir Sogod. Neither life nor
property was safe. An ex-USAFi'TS soldier, Cadio, grthered a group of freebooters
about him, and te t o rised the countryside, faking advantage of his unchallenged
power, he settled a pre-war grudge score by slaying Layer i/.acasoiol. .lout the
same time, vice-mayor ilaglirte was slain, with robbery being the ostensible motive.
The municipal chief of police, Villanor, seemed utterly ineffective in maintaining
law and order.
It ’."as then that the small guerrilla group of Lieutenant " i i v e came to
tho fore. Its members realised that resistance nginst the er.ony must be ssnnrrted
from simple lawless prourcity. They l&un chrc a manhunt for slayers of facasokol,
and ki1led them ir. ambush. Then Lu.igue arvo:'nted a competent local citizen with a
driving ambit 1wi, Uospaciu Lnbr.ta, as mayor/'
*According to ItajT.undo Aidana (pubjic school district supervisor) (interview)

i-ayor hacasokol remained in town to prevent the Japanese from pursuing the civilian
evacuees to the hills. The Japanese did little damage at this tune. ~They ordered
the ;-ayor to have tho Filipinos come down from tho h ■11s. The mayor fallowed in
struct! nr. 1'acy townspeople returned while others visited to make purchases. Trade
v'itn Bate across the mountains, end with Tacloban and Bohol by boat vc.s resumed.
The Japanese, from their ma litbog base, ccmo to Sogod on p'atrol once or twice v/eoklv.
Lacasokol contacted Lt. "uique of tho guerrilla, indicating that he favored resistance
2
Alcana stated that for almost three weeks following the death of Lacasokol,
Sogod lacked a mayor. Then tho prominent citizens assembled and nominated a former
chief of nolice and mechanic by occupation, “abata, sc mayor. Luicue confirmed the
selection. Victorina •‘■ere&do was chosen as vice-nayor. The justice of the rsaco
Santiago Palermo, never reported for duty— and the town dispensed with this official.
The former municipal secretary, Gergorio Consado did not get alonr well with Labata
and loft; Narcisso Dublado took over. Dr. Abanilla, the sanitary president left;
Dr. Armlfo Salazar served.
307
Labata shewed a spirit of cooperativeness towards the guerrilla, so that
Lieutenant Nuique rarely had to interfere in matters of local administration. To
facilitate business recovery establishing a Reserve Fund consisting of good currency
deposited with the local treasurer by citizens receiving municipal scrip in exchange.
Labata pronosed using this Fund as financial backing for several projected municipal
business ventures— a scheme negatived by Kuique because he was not certain of
Labata’s basic trustworthiness. After this, -âbata was less cooperative, but dared
not flout military authority.
Kuique was not pleased with the performance of the municipal treasurer,
Justinbaste. Ibndragon and two competent assistants were assigned to audit the
treasurer's books. The check-up revealed certain questionable fiscal practices.
Justinbaste also refused to pay the local teachers--despite guerrilla instructions.
The upshot of an unpleasant relationship vms the replacement of Justinbaste by his
chief clerk.
The Japanese left Sogod in August 1942, after Gordon Lang's daring ambush
an enemy troop truck. The guerrilla dominated the sector, winning full civilian
cooperation. Kuique's easy-going policy attracted many friends.^ During the
Japanese reinvasion of December 1943, Col.r.el Kangleon transferred, his C-hQ to the
interior of Sogod. Labain was instructed to continue in office, maintaing secret
ties with the guerrilla. Summoned to a conference of mayors at Tacloban, Labata was
convi need by the puppet .:-rovj.r.cjel government of the ovorwhoiming Japanese might
on tho one hand, and the beneficient effect of the "pacification" program on
the other. On his return, Lshata was c charged man. He lent himself whole-hearted
ly to Japanese purposes, and showed unusual drive in carrying out the pacification
program.
kuique was largely responsible for the return of kangleon to Lgvte from
the .indanao internment camp. During Ealderian's incursion into South. LSvte
Kuique played an active role in trapping ralderian at Sogod. It -was at Sogod that
Kangleon's unification conference was held.
388
Labata assisted Japanese patrols in every material way. He intercepted
guerrilla couriers crossing Sogod Eay. As a mechanic, he also kept the Japanese
motor launch in good repair. Mayor Edillo of Libagon charged (interview) that
Labata led Japanese patrols to loot properties in Libagon, offering but the flim
siest pretext. Sogod became the mecca of the opponents of resistaroe.
The former teeasurer, Justinbaste became Labata's right hand man in bring
ing about guerrilla surrenders. He and Labata were active in establishing an
actively functioning !TA— an NA that supplied Filipino labor for the Japanese
garrison, and whose Home Guards were vigilant in detecting disguised guerrilleros•
According to school supervisor Aldana, himself forced to become president of an
11/ district, Labata used to despatch policemen to round up civilians delinquent in
reporting for their tour of forced labor.
The position of Sogod's inhabitants rapidly deteriorated. They were caught
between the nether millstone of Labata’s oppression end the upper stone of guerrilla
suspicion. Labata refused to let the townspeople evacuate, notwithstanding a
critical food shortage. It we * generally believed '-hat Labata wrongfully took
, possession of emergency food rations made available by the puvyot provincial govern
ment, disposing of them on the black market, for personal gain. Many townspeople
perished of famine during these d!?ys.
The townspeople who slipped through Labata’s enclosure remained 'under guer
rilla suspicion, risking liquidation as spies. They found starvation awaiting them
here, also. Japanese patrols conr r.sntly V. rassed the farmers. And tho possibility
of subsisting on coconuts and bananas was eliminated by the ravages of the recent
Decev.cer typhoon. 5ut the people ir. the mountains bore their hardships stoically.
They formed their own mountain administration for Sogod, unuor the former police
chief Villamor, and loyally obeyed guerrilla orders.
Shortly before the American landings, -abata abandoned Sogod for Tacloban,
knowing that certain death awaited him at the hands of his infuriated townspeople.
389
Of all the municipalities in south Leyte, Sogod was the soene of the bitter
est antagonisms between the forces of resistance and collaboration. Perhaps the
personality of the wartime mayor w e s the decisive influence in this unhappy develop
ment. Entering upon his position after violent lawlessness had taken the lives of
the ejected mayor and vice-mayor, the acting mayor at first seemed an ideal choice.
Energetic and capable, he established good relations with the guerrilla and strove
to restore local business, however, ho cooled decidedly towards the guerrilla when
their leader negatived ce -tain sclones he had projected whose consummation might
have brought him personal wealth, ’..'hen the Japanese roturned to town, he not only
executed their orders with despatch but behaved with signal cruelty towards all
suspected of a pro-guerrilla oriertat.ion. Hi? policies resulted in inciting the
guerrilla to acts of ruthlossness— particularly, the summary execution of all sus
pected foes of resistance. Ultimately, town and mountain dwellers turned against
each other in fratricidal strife— a situation that could benefit none but the
conqueror. The hr.erlean counter-' r.vasi on brought long-awaited end to ar. Intolerable
situ u i ion..
0 rmoc
be conclude ibis i;ur in On roc, re -logr largest art bert br.owr '>f Leyte's
r.uu.1cipali tiec 'ccause of o tensive. Am-rican newspaper cewwy': of military operc.-
î -rs 0 . '*’•is battlofrorf-* ".'a" came o'.rl to ^ rmon r<-ctor ar. •

’ c r.'-inu^c th~,iv
v.hor. res' 0 ° — 'other mvr.icr.prTitle«rrsm ulready a^so-bed in the emergency tasks
o" riorntrncbim. Throughout tho eorly ninths of 191?., wb'io a last-ditch defense
of Leyte was taken for graned, the army and its construction engineers were feverish
ly at v/ork putting the Jrnoc larding field into final shape. This defensive task
in itself invited the earliest attacks on the i'rovince. Before the boots of Japan's
infantry were tramming across Leybean terrain, the bombs of its air arm were pul
verizing the Ormoc air field. This softening process was intended to -revent any
'lal resistanco by Onnoc-based Filipino planes.
390
The Japanese deposited a garrison in Drmoc at the outset of the occupation.
Not only did this garrison affeot the life of the Onnoc. oomr.unity. From it, patrols
went forth to inspect the neighboring municipalities and discover whether the local
administrations were implementing tho Japanese-prescribed policies. During the
latter part of 1942 and through almost all of 1913, the hlGvYF dominant in the sur
rounding barrios, succeeded in penning u .. this garrison within the poblscion of
Ormnc proper.
The coming of the Japanese completely disrupted the local administration

1
of 0 rinse, and threatened to dissolve the social order. Criminal elements roamed the
countryside with amazing audacity, plundering and terrorizing. It was this con
dition of lawlessness in Irmoc, as much as patriotic sentiment, that gave birth to
the earliest guerrilla bands, f.r.d as these bands solidified, established contact
with each other, and worked out some pattern of authority, tho civilians who were
living outside the precincts of Ornoc poblacion were gradually reassured that their
life and property were not forfeit to the demands of sheer brute force.
Governor Torres, after a tour of the Lv-siegud town, described conditions;
The population tho o'-l'cion of Irmoc in normal times is about 00 in-

■ - itail';::•
how :v.ce s.ro abo -t i,i/... rco..lo in the town. . ..Tho majority
V
ht urn r s c -c-j -hi-'. r .r : „ t f bim.'c', -rot-";
hiranda, !,there was c.‘’furh'virui a*:;-ng the civilian vo.ulnth'1.. The norale
o- . yoOgj.0 . o trwn :.o .vil us ioi i'’r'’ ...ownsu~uc ut 4w t V-lj.-c . 'my low.
There was cora.lete disorder among the massos. Those days were trying days to measure
one's lopu:ty. :•itl., ani h' 't I- tho do•roi0r;power. It i..~.5rod one's pc■•aora.l
convictlor. in ’character, and the extent aw’ n reo one loved his country."
^ .._l v<e* Ciu., . 1# ^
The Imoc district was, ir. nsense, the most susceptible to oivil disorder
ir: tho hro-Lncu .r*o tho stability of* iw -wto.blishod regime, ’ with its conventional
social ar.d economic relationships, had oecr. upset. For a long time, agrarian dis-
corterh ha’’ boor, seething aw.r.g tenant farmers and far::, laborers over ’/'hat was
viewed as an oppressive cacique system of land tenure. The suspension of normal
policing seemed proputlor.r for a vsrwofrl blood-lettirg nd looting, and the general
satisfaction of long-standing feuds. Consternation ?-r"cn tho breasts of the proper
ty-holding class. Some fled before the ur,leased terror; o'-,hers, petrified, stood
their ground, uncertain vnen unseen hand would loose hole or bullet u;jn then, ho
wonder tha- many peaco-lovir.g inhabitants o'* this sector, ir reminiscing aho/’t the
Occuvr-ti -r feriod, refer to uheo.o uorths as "ormoc's hcigr. >f Terror”
391
of the prominent and rieh people, probably about 80??, are in the poblacion.
The people. . . .cannot go to their farms and haciendas nor to barrios to
visit their plantations and get their products. If they do, the deserters
and bandits heap them there, kidnap them or sometimes even kill them. Like
wise, those in the barrios are afraid to come to the poblacion because they
are not permitted by the deserters. Many of them are afraid that when they
come to town, the Japanese and local authorities, suspecting them of being
deserters and bandits, will punish them, put them in prison, or even kill
them.
Because of this condition, the people In the poblacion do not have enough
food, especially rice. Most of them are eating tubers (balunghay) and prircs
of commodities are terribly high. . . .
A home guard service is maintained to help the Japanese forces to maintain
peace and order in the ooblacion. These home guards are doing excellent work,
host of them are young men. The morale of the people of the poblacion is quite
high. They aro very indignant at the mountain soldiers. Their determination
to protect the poblacion is strong, but they feel they should be given more
arms and, if possible, more Japanese soldiers, and that more frequent patrols
by the Japenese Forces be made to the barrios and mountains.
The Governor dreaded a further deterioration of the food situation. "It
is feared that when tho people in the poblacion do not have anything more to eat,
they will be forced to join the people in the barrios". Ke therefore recommended
"that the poblacion be provided with rice, corn and other foods in the meantime from
outside. About 150 sacks of rice and corn a week plus salted fish will be sufficient
The Governor also pointed out that there "is a sugar central which can be a source
of sugar and alcohol."^
Governor Torres -was impressed by the strength of Grmoc's guerrilla organi
zation; "It is said that the mountain people are very numerous and that they nave
quite a big number of arms and a big quantity of ammunitions. It is even raid that
they are manufacturing ammunitions." Short of guerrilla response to pence over
tures, them could to but one way to dispose of them— force. "... .a strong
campaign should ro waged to annihilate them without mercy. For this I think a
bigger detachment is needed inOrmoc. . . ."
Miranda never tried to storm into Grmoc town because he knew he could al-
Torres, Prov. Gov.,"Brief Report of Our Visit to the Municipality of

Ormoc."
ways be expelled by Japanese sea-borne reinforcements. His policy was solely one
of containment and harrassihg. The several attempts to break through his cordon
by the besieged were successfully beaten back. But in December of 1943, augmented
by fresh manpower, the Japanese erupted from the town while other units enveloped
and completely overwhelmed the guerrilla headquarters. The WLGWF was soattered.
It is difficult to attempt a characterization of the Ormoc population from
the standpoint of evaluating their patriotism. Miranda does not hesitate to paint
the town-dwellers in lurid colors:
Those that loved comfort, luxury, frolic and fun, and money, as well as the
frivolities of life, cooperated with the enengr. • . .These elements represented
the classes who v;ere not willing to make a sacrifice for the redemption of our
homeland from the ruthless and inhuman invaders. They bartered their lives,
honor, and dignity for a temporary, fruitless and valueless favor and position
from the Japanese. j
This harsh censure of the Jrmoc population would undoubtedly be endorsed by
men like Vicente Villegas (the guerrilla superintendent of schools) and others who
were devoting their lives to the cause of resistance. Yet, there are two difficul
ties we must face up to. If we put asidethe question of soul-probing, we find j

i
ourselves confronted with the Japanese determination to reestablish civilian ad
ministration in the municipalities. We may assume as given and ineluctable, under

I
the circumstances, a Japanese-sponsored local administration. Then it becomes a
question of finding out which individual Filipinos will actually staff the offices.
Further, assuming a given post to be occupied, then the question arises as to what
kind of behavior will be appropriate for the incumbent. If he pretends to pat
riotism, he must at one and the same time prevent himself from being used to ex
tinguish the spark of hope for liberation— and yet, remain sufficiently adaptable to
counterfeit cooperation. If the first oondition is not fulfilled, he himself is
assimilated completely to category of a Japanese agent. If the second condition is
1 — ~
Miranda, op. cit., p. 1.
393
violated, he may be executed or simply replaced by a more pliable individual. He
would then be depriving the Filipino community of the services he might render in
its behalf. Moreover, he might enrage the invaders to the point of inviting a wave
of fierce repression against the entire civilian population. No single formula can
be mechanically applied in weighing these matters.
The second difficulty arises from the fact that individuals associated with
the resistance movement in one ph'so of the occupation may be compelled to at least
nominal compliance with the collaboration policy in a later phase. Thus, after the
Japanese "mopping up" campaign at the end of 1943 and early 1944, most of the
civilians who had evacuated from Ormoc poblacion streamed back to town. And num
bered among them was the soldiery of the VfLG.TF. Were these people simply turn
coats? Should we distinguish between those who remained in town during the first
phase of the occupation, and those who returned only after the Japanese had in
tensified their "pacification drive"?
Jne thing is clears that an evaluation of tho role of the municipal
officials in Crnoc poblacion during the occupation soems to be entirely subjective,
varying from one judge to the next. Among the officers of the '.YLGvYF, there is
decided difference of opinion in interpreting the roles of these municipal officials
-some estimates being condemnatory, others disposed towards explaining away in
criminating actions in terms of extern.r ting circumstances. V/here opinion is split
among those supposedly most competent to pass judgment, how can tho outsider speak,
without pontificating? As for those associated with the guerrilla in the first
phase of the occupation, who subsequently laid down their arms and returned to town,
are they able to make pronouncement from a del ched perspective?
It would appear that in actuality all character testimony regarding the con
duct of municipal officials is influenced by personal bias? specifically, by the
attitude of the interview regarding the politics, social class, and personlity
complex of the person under discussion. Hard and fast criteria for character iudr-
394
ment apart from personal perspective of the judge simply break down under the
tendency of the memory to work selectively and to dye its data with its own pre
ferential tints.
Mayor- Bermossilli sought to placate both Japanese and guerrilla in the be
ginning of the occupation period. And he could do so as long r-s the lines of
battle v:ere not tightly drawn. But when Miranda bottled up the Japanese in Ormoo
in October of 1042, and laid seige to the town, carefully scrutinizing all who
would ente • and leave, and in addition had his operative infiltrate and report
the activities of both the Japanese garrison and the Filipino administration, Mayor
Herrnosilla was too perplexed to know how he could temporize any further.
Once the V.’LJi.F had at sained its definitive organizt bional structure, it be
gan to put pressure on the mayov for fuller cooperation with the guerrilla. The
gauge was thrown. Miranda was now convinced that Ilormosilla would have to be
reckoned -with the enemy.^ w
Potenciano Larrazabal, 1 st Councillor of Ormoo under Herrnosilla, took tb the
hills when the Japanese had first arrived. But he returned to tho poblacion in
06'tober of 1342, according to his own account, (Interview - Tacloban, 1945), after
the Japanese had captured his father. The Japanese pillaged his estate, taking
sugar stocks, rice, corn, and sleughte ing farm animals. Larrazabal instrudted his
tenants to plant only enough to meet their immediate family requirements, since the
enemy wo- Id most certainly confiscate -.hatever surplus they could lay' hands upon.
In nr.timabirg "ormosalla, Larrazabal did not hesitate to attack the word ’’traitor”
le hxs name • fet the same Lsmrazabal on- •1 d say that congressman Demine dor Tar., who
delivered collaborationist speeches in Qrmoc in 1942, did so under Japanese duress.
T.iis may be true in Tan’s case, although the guerrilla sought to enjoin him from
lllonetheless one of Miranda’s loyal followers, Juauito Sen Jose (Interview)

said nor. so hold. Ho would ssy that as relations grew strained between the ma-'^r
nd the guerrilla commander, and contacts gradually ceased, all sorts of ugl-"rumors
prang up and thrived— cut probably had little basis in fact, herrnosilla did as
ell as ho could under the circumstances.
395
so doing, -fearing that Tan's prestige might win believers. The point* Larrazabal
and Tan both of the "aristocracy” grant each other renission of sins. But
Hermosilla, identified with the "lower class” political faction was anathema to the
hacionderos.
The evaluation of Hermosilla by two members of the V.'BG.iF, in that each put
a differing construction on the s..me events, also proves instructive. Sabellino,
Chief Propaganda Officer and for a time Chief of Staff, would not deny for a moment
that Herrr ’•ilia apparently went along with the Japanese. Yet, Sabellino avers that
Hermosilla secretly counselled the guerrilla and their suvportorr. to disbelieve his
anti-resistance exhortations, spoken while the screws were being tightened. In the
later period, the mayor did accompany Japanese patrols or. their man-hunt for un-
snrrendered 0 uerrilias, but never did he guide the enemy to the nssts of guerrilla
concealment. Sabellino would have us believe that the Japanese themselves were
rather sceptical of HemosLila's loyalty to their regime, he says that they wished
to install Attornoy Harwgo as mayor. But Ito, a local no chart of Japanese nation
ality, with ar. eye to s'-ability, counsel led against this step. Ito held that the
Japanese regime must be supported by the bulk of the Filipinos. To set up r.s mayor
a man identified with the losing political faction at tho previous mayoralty elec
tion would be to alienate mass support.
On the other hand, -alo ’k.^lasang, chief of intelligence 2>r the VYLGvJF dur
ing 1S44, docs not hesitate to brand rlenaosilla ar. active worker for the Javanese
cause. Gun the difference in who appraisal to travels' to I..aglasan!j1s connections
with tho Con .i clan (wife-Virginiu Conui): At sornoy Cor: ;t had identified himself
with the land-owning interests, and was a bitter political enemy of Ilemosillr.. Th
is admittedly conjectural— bat it makes the outsider unwilling to go along with
character testimony of a hearsay nature.
.-bether in feint or in actuality, Hayor Hermosilla reported illness, in
capacitating him from continuing, in office. Cedilla, a close friend of the rabidly
396
pro—Japan©se Congressman Jos© Veloso succeeded to the post* Attorney Evangelista,
former judge advocate for thw YTL&VF, described Codilla’s policy as one of oo—
operation with the Japanese in order not to jeopardize general civilian interests.
But Evangelista,asserts that Codilla was personally opposed to the "get-tough?1
policy towards the guerrilla. Again we migljt ask whether Evangelista’s disposition
to regard with leniency all of Codilla's administrative policy that was striped
with the watermark of collaboration was not traceable to his own involvement in
the matter* One of the most reprehensible of Codilla's practices was the recruit
ment of Filipino laborers for work on the Japanese airfield at Velenoia. But
through his position as president of District #5 of the Neighborhood Association
(Japanese sponsored), Evangelista became an instrument in the furtherance of this
labor recruitment drive.
Together with the provincial capital of Tacloban, Ormoe remained ooiu*
tinuously under enemy control* And except for the first few months, relations be
tween the town-dwellers and the guerrilla were most unfriendly. Even more thnn in
the oase of Merida, the town-dwellers came to be identified with the wealthy class
of haoienderos and merchants while the resistance people in the hills were pre-
ponerantly farm tenants and laborers. The tension of mutual suspicion and hostility
between town and guerrilla led to exoesses on both sides— the guerrilla liquidating
alleged foes on hearsay evidence, the town people turning informer against guerrilla
sympathizers and accompanying Japanese search patrols to the hills.
Attempts to assess the role of individual members of the municipal ad
ministration as well as the role of other influenotial leaders are hampe red by the
partisan character of the testimony offered. Moreover, the destruction of the
WLGRFF headquarters in December of 1943 meant that no full guerrilla coverage was
available until the 96th Infantry of Colonel Kangleon moved into the sector. All in
all, Ormoc presented a sorry Bpeotacle of hatred and disunity— a town to whioh the
American Liberation brought not only relief from tho invader but a muoh-needed
397
opportunity to repair the spiritual damage wrought by fratricidal strife.

Political Factionalism
As we review the history of resistance in Leyte from the standpoint of its
municipalities, certain common features emerge, presenting a fairly distinct pattern.
Vie find the Japanese uncertain of their specifio policies at the time of their
arrival, but anxious to restore "normalcy". Their principal contingents are limited
to a few centers, with scattered smaller garrisons used as jumping-off points for
reconnaissance patrolling* Aside from seizing firearms, radios, automobiles, bi
cycles, stocks of abaca and corpa, and ordering the municipal officials to resume
office, they interfere but little in the personal life of the Filipino inhabitants.
Individual Japanese officers show unnecessary harshness and some commit abuses upon
the local population.
There are communities, where the municipal officials flee (Lerida) or are
1
slain (Sogod) as criminal elements terrotize a defenseless countryside (Efeybay,Qrmoc)•
The puppet governor reported at the close of 1942s " . . . .municipal of
ficials cooperating with the Japanese Administration are declared enemies of the
guerrilla and are being hunted. They, their families and relatives are in constant
danger, Alien they travel in compliance with official duties, they arc- exposed to
hazards. . . .So far 2 mayors have been killed; 5 mayors kidnapped, but probably
living; 12 driven out of their posts. . . .About £0 municipal policemen lost their
lives in the performance of official duties. . . ." (B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21,
1942 . To ; Japanese Lili. Admin, for the Dist, of Visayas.)
Tanauan, menaced by the guerrilla but not controlled by them sustained a
high official mortality rate. Tho municipal treasurer denounced the "bands of ban
dits -which terrorize the lives of innocent citizens, as evidenced by the kidnapping
of former Layer J. Perez, municipal secretary 2. Roa, municipal clerk, G. Faron. . .
.and unjust killings of former ’.layor Pedro Bulik ana others. . . ." (llun. Treas.
Lonantte, Tanauan, Jan. 6 , 1943. To; Prov. Auditor.)
Among the municipal officials who had fled to Tacloban for sanctuary in 1S42
an off'cial compilation includes the names of i.bnyog's first pur pet mavor (F. Cana),
its treasurer (A. Collantcs), its chief of police (j. Cunaveia); Jaro; mayor
(C. Lastrilla), treasurer (P. Reyna), chief of police (A. Gordon)7 Alan paleng; mayor
(N. Salazar), police sergeant (A. Arivas); Pastrana; Layor (IT. Villeblanca), jus
tice of tho peace (J . Pigao), chief of police (A. Ripalda).
Other officials joined them in 1942 or left Leyte entirely. Some of these
evacuee officials found themselves destitute in Tacloban and whined for relief.
Cana of Aouyog implored; ",Ve officials have been here starving. . . .he can’t re
turn. .«e expect that something may ho done in our behalf. . . .A'h&tever assistance
is extended to us will have a moral effect upon the community as it will bo an in
centive to those who are still hostile to the present regime to com? across for
cooperation. . . ." (Prov. Gov. lie/ or Cana, Aouyog. Larch 15, 1943. To; Chairman
of Phil ippine inecut: re Coronissi on.)
396
In other communities, the local officials early seek a firm allianco with the local
Japanese commander (Villaba, C&poocan, Dagami), and vigorously push the Japanese
roliciss gradually evolving; particularly the hunting uovm of unsurrendered USAFF3
soldiers. In one community, (Abuyog) the municipal government evacuates es a unit,
determined to have nought to do with the Japanese occupation force.
dnsurrendered soldiers and various patriotic oivilian elements are aroused
to resistance ir the increasingly provocative y movee of the Japanese. At the same
time, they wish to stamp out the lav/less elements and protect the civilians. Small
guerrilla groups arise. Some contact the local officials and see-: support (Ormoc)#
Elsewhere, (Her-sin), they order the municipal government to evacuate, or work hand-
in-hand with an already evacuated government (Aouyog). They b gIn to put pressure
on the municipal governments, requiring them to define their shard. Some of the
waverers (Ornoo) decide that the risk of jffending the Japanese is too great, and
these official? take a stand against the guerrillas. Others, after the support of
local Japanese garrisons is withdrawn in a Japanese move of retrenchment, flee
(Villaba) or are killed yjuToooar).
how cogins a period wio-: oho guerrilla, oiyy-'lvabiors uehie 70 maximum control.
They install municipal c ff Lcial o favorable to their program (llorida, Gacoocan,
Villaou, oag&iui, Puyoay, inasir., Gogol)— either now gorcinnul or carry-overs from
the oI :1 administrate o::. ±n one coimaani by \g-aarln), tho cilice; s themselves help
determine m fairs t oru up .a-ivis-ory _>irocc >r, etc. In some Places iAbuyog), the
officials dominate the guerrilla organisation. As the guerrilla organisations
fuse, and some iaeasure of centralization takes place, the local officials are ex
pected to conform to certain over-ail guerrilla policies, whose implementation is
supervised by local sector commanders. A pood proportion of Ihr guerrilla leaders
gat along favorably with, the municipal officials and the local population; a frac
tion doss not (Baybay, Villaba). are those v;m arc content to let the
municipal administration take cure of itself, without neduli:v; others put their
399
oivr. impress upon local functioning (Baybay, Herida). In one case (Abuyog), one
guerrilla organization (Kengleon) supersedes another (Erfe) without effecting any
major change in the position of the local civilian administration.
Towards the middle of 1943, Japanese reinforcements begin to arrive in
Leyte, and their volume swells as the year draws to a close. In many municipalities,
the guerrillas propnra l'or the reestabli shnent of Japanese garrisons throughout
the frovince by designating certain local officials to assume office with the ex
pectation that they will protect the interests of their Filipino townsmen and es
tablish under-cover liaison with the guerrillas. In some cases, (Farida, Capoocan,
Baybay, Uaacin) the guerrillas are satisfied that their appointees are doing their
cost to curry out their mandate. In other localities, these officials turn their
backs on their guerrilla sponsors and uocoine all-out collaborators (Abuyog, Sogod).
Elsewhere, the guerrillas have had no say in the matter (Ormoc, Dagami, Villaba),
and the local officials aro undisguised Japanese tools. The Japanese policy during
this period alternates between appeals for Filipino support on the basis of the
"independence" ballyhoo and cruelly repressive measures, with the recruiting of
Filipino laborers for Japanese projects. Among the Filip* im* officials are the un
scrupulous v'lio not only collaborate hut graft at the expense of their victimised
townspeople (Sogod, Villaha;•
The guerrilla organisations fnilov: a period of lie-low during 1944 till
about Airil-hay, cor.fir activities to intelligence work. In July, Colonel
Kangleon receives e large supply of American arms, drugs, etc., and organizes a
new regiment. He assigns it to the territory formerly controlled by Ilironda, whose
vVLGVi'F was reduced to skeletal size during the Japanese "xnopping-up" drive. He
appoints his own local governments to administer tho affairs of the evacuated
population outside of the towns proper vOrmoc, Lerida), and also in other parts of
the province (Sogod, Kaasin, Abuyog), while his regimental commander in Horth-Sast
Leyte, Balderiar followed suit (fayaini, Capoocan).
400
Factional rivalry helped to embitter politics in many municipalities of
êyte before the war. This strife persisted into the occupation period in a number
of communities. Hot so in V.rest Leyte, Miranda boasts:
All the members of the guerrilla force were instructed to forget political
squabbles and party feuds. Ho member was allowed to capitalize on the name
of the guerrilla organization to build up his political future. As a matter
of fact, misunderstanding between some guerrilla units and ours was a re-^
suit of political influence of some interested and ambitious politicians.
By ’’ambitious politicians1’ Miranda obviously has in mind Attorney Domingo
Veloso of Baybay who became the chief propaganda officer of Kangleon. And if
Miranda m-ans that offering oneself as a political candidate in the post-war period
is presumptive evidence of having built one's political future while ostensibly
engaged in non-political civic activity, thou Veloso was an offender. Veloso
presented his candidacy as Congressman in the post-war elections, and succeeded in
being returned to Manila. But by the same token, both Bonifacio Capuyan and
Gemelo Pastor of the YiLGVF ran afoul of these strictures. That they were defected
in their try for office does not detract from the offense. Vie might likewise add
that the municipal elections in Ormoc, Albuera and the other communities ware
effected by the votes of the YYLG.'jF veterans.
In actual fact, the town of Eaybay exemplified sordid politics in the worst
sense, ue saw Rodriguez, as sector chief, balked in his purpose to remove all
Japanese appointees. Ousted by Rodriguez, Paterno Tan in favor of the aged Teavera,
Paterno Ten bed his cronies petition the Civil Affairs Officer, beseeching his re
instatement. And Miranda, from the isolation of bis headquarters, acceeded to this
petition. In the next months, Rodriguez and Mayor Tan worked out a tolerable re
lationship, 7,
rith Rodriguez and the military being the senior partner.
But Tan was always closer to Rodriguez' subordinate, ore of the pioneer
organizers in the pre-Miranda period, Gallenzoga. Both Tan and Gallenzoga were dis-
\liranda, op. cit., p. 4.
401
posed to sympathize with the attitude of the other early leader in the sector,
Baguslao, a nan decidedly disaffected towards the Rodriguez command. (During the
brief Kangleon ’’interregnum” in Baybay, following the temporary dislodging of the
WLSTF at the tine of the ’’Baybay Affair”, Gallenzoga remained in Baybay, un
molested.)
Rodriguez maintains that there was a strong, agitative anti-Tan faction in
Baybay. This clique's dissatisfaction radiated out to infect their attitude towards
himself, Rodriguez, ibid the leader of this faction was tho pre-war mayor, Medina.
Rodriguez claims that he had intended to appoint Medina, on first assuming command.
Hot being able to locate Modina, Rodriguez selected Tac-vera. The Medina faction
would not be appeased.
--•odrigues blanu-s the Rodina men for the besmirching of his name. And the
situation was further vexed when Rodriguez was recalled to headquarters for in
vestigation, v/ith Lieutenant Capuyan sent in as relief commander. During his
short stay in Baybay, Capuyan married one of the local belles— who happened to be
n member of the Rodina clan. According to Rodriguez, Capuyan’s wife poisoned her
husband 1o mind c gainst him (Rodriguez} • Donsc yuently, e\er. after Rodriguez waty
reinstalled as regimental commander for the brief period preceding tho Baybay Affair,
his position was shalcy, for Capuyan continued to give credence to the adverse re
ports that poured into the V.'LGwF headquarters, and sided with these animadversions
in his conversati -ns with Mi r o r . d a re Rodriguez.
Many examples o " the persistence of political factionalism of the bitterest
sort ir Leyte's municipalities could be pointed to— notwithstanding the presence of
the Japanese invader. In Abuyog, the leng-standing feud between Mayor Gallego and
Chief of Police Catalina Landia, had important consequercos for guerrilla organi
zation. Abuyog, brought within the c rgr nizr.tion of Captain Lrfe, felt honored that
its mayor, Gallego, should be raised high in guerrilla councils. Landia, given a
subordinate command, chafed under the slight, and directed his enmity against
402-
Captain Erfe. Entering into a carefully concealed plot with Colonel Kangleon,
Landia led a detachment of guerrilla troops in ambush of Captain Erfe, placed Erfe
under military arrest, and handed him over to Kangleon. Unhappily for Landia,
Kangleon appreciated the administrative ability of Gallego and appointed Abuyog's
mayor guerrilla Deputy Governor for East Leyte.
In L'aasin, political feuding between the group headed by the pre-war mayor,
Cabrera, and the foilc-ers of the vrar-time mayor, Sara, was very intense. Upon
the accession of Jain to guerrilla leadership in Haasin, he found it difficult to
reach a good working relationship with Zara, and recalled Cabrera to the mayoralty.
Sara's 03 .poncr.ts then attempted to indict him for embosslement during his tenure
of office, before the issue could be decided,the Japanese reoccupied llaasin. It
vas agreed by the local guerrilla authorities that Zara might serve as puppet mayor,
with the understanding that he would protect Filipino interests. Testimony is con
flicting in respect to his conduct in office. His political enemies charge him
with having ’’sold out" to the Japanese, while his friends vehemently dory these
charges as baseless and prejudiced. One way or the other, the situation v;as utterly
detestable.
he have already touched upon the political factionalism that led in many
municipalities to one clique supporting the guerrilla organizations and the others
supporting tê Tacloban puppet administration.
It is also pe~ti rent to obr.-rve that some of tho local politicians sought
to stand in well with their more influential constituents, by vouchsafing special
d3 epensations from guerrilla decrees, b'rote Major Balderian of Babatngon's mayor j
. . . .The detachment commander at Babatngon has made himself the head of

a sort of into]ligonco division in Babatngon, with members who are old and
distinctly connected with electioneering in the town. Tho municipal Mayor is
the man behind these, the detachment commander Capt. Lanonte being the automaton
of the mayor. . . .
There have been instances of oertain individuals who have broken the rulos
of th:s organization on the movements of civilians and sailboats, but due to
the intervention. . . .on the part of the Mayor for political reasons, my
403
operatives could not well prosecute these people.
Jockeying for political advantage within the guerrilla movement sometimes
extended beyond the limits of a single municipality. A conspicuous example appear
ed in the restrained but nonetheless keen rivalry of Attorneys Cir.co (Dagami)
and Aguja (Carigara)— reflected in the sometimes strained relations of their

A
C
respective military proteges— Balderlftn end Pamanien. And equally strong and
equally . v e i l cuarded was the unfriendly competition existing between Provincial
hoard Hember Angel Aspina and the military commander of ’’Free Leyte", Colonel
Kangleon. In this latter case, the problem was further vexed by the unpopularity
of the Protestant Espina in certain Catholic circles.
Other instances might be cited to underscore the general point— that a
ranter of politicans, ostensibly consecrating the •r lives to defeating the foreign
invader, wars neglecting no opportunity to build political bridges to post-war
preference. I f the outcome of such enterprise vras not invariably detrimental to
the resist';nee curse, it was not because the schemers were scrupulously sensitive,
Fortunately, selfishness and the common good sometimes coincided.
lAlejandro Palderisn, Col. 2 5 Jar.. *13. Ker.o to: ?ho Deputy military
Jove m o r, Div. II.
‘“In the post--,tar Congressional election, Attorue; Cinco was a successful

candidate, Attorney Aguja a loser.
404
The Economics of Guerrilla Control
From our inquiry into the political character of guerrilla rule, ve have seen
that at best guerrilla-civilian functioning exhibited cooperative planning and coordi
nated direction of affairs— at worst, disorganization or military oppression of the
civilian population. The apparatus of economic direction exhibited the same influences,
Ve shall proceed to examine them.
Guerrilla Subsistence and Procurement
The nub of civilian military relationships was in the domain of procurement
the complex of activities associated with provisioning the guerrilla troops. The
withdrawal of the guerrilla combatants from productive enterprise, and their complete
preoccupation with military and associated activities threw upon their leadership the
onerous responsibility of procuring subsistence. Subsistence came to be the primary
locus of relationship between combatant resisters and non-combatant, sympathizers, be
tween "mountain people” and "town dwellers". To the extent that civilians contributed
frequently, liberally, but above all, willingly to the fighting units, they gave
visible token of their pro-American allegiance, their anti-Japanese orientation, their
steadfast adhesion to the guerrilla cause. In proportion, as they gave stintingly,
infrequently, and then screamed "bandit" at the appropriators of their wealth, they
marked themselves as foes of resistance.
A pragmatic test of loyalty proved too crude to accurately sift partisan from
collaborator. Complicative factors muddied the situation and blurred distinctions.
How should sympatheticallv disposed persons respond towards self-styled guerrilla
leaders, freely appropriating whatever their eyes coveted, though the military value
of these seizures was but dimly discernible? Should a professedly pro-guerrilla
family donate onen-handedl y to a pseudo-guerrilla band , a band devoted principally to
-blhe heavy documentation originally accompanying this section was removed

from considerations of space. There is little of the controversial in this material,
thus affording ground for the belief that most, of the statements here made will be
acceptable to the reader without challenge.
405
self-indulgence but delinquent in providing those protective functions Justifying
its very raison d'etre. An* should the guerrilla supporter continue his active
allegiance once the Japanese troops had tightened their cordon of espionage and in
tensified their mopping-up patrol operations? These are but a suggestion of the
perplexities confronting the individual willing to give of his substance to the re
sistance movement, and yet unwilling to be despoiled or needlessly place his life
in Jeopardy.
From the very nature of their mode of struggle, the guerrilla forces were
dependent upon the people for foodstuffs and other supplies. Assuming a symbiotic
relationship of productive and protective elements in a population fused in sear
ing hatred of a sadistic invader, the guerrilla leadership from the very outset
felt Justified in soliciting material contributions. Troops in bivouac had to be
messed and clothed. A dependable, fairly regularized source of supply must be had
to support the central installation. When sorties were launched against the enemy,
or inspectional patrols dispatched, provisions must be arranged en route. However,
these levies on civilian bounty must be moderate and equitable.
At first, some of the guerrilla bands came into ill-repute for their rapa
city. In the colorful language of the American who served as guerrilla educational
sunervisor:
The guerrilla is too often a. financial burden to those who can least
afford it,--. . . .But whet-her on or off duty, his rifle is his constant com
panion. . . .--it is his meal ticket. The guerrilla has no commissary and
he does not carry any culinary equipment with him. He expects and receives
the best of evervthing--and many families which can ill afford it are eaten
1
out of house and home.-1-
Of what avail to gain foodstuffs and alienate civilian good-will? The har-
rassed, often destitute people must be made to see that their army was one with
them in enduring hardship, in living, abstemiously. The indigent masses could give
cnlv sparingly. But whatever threat of expropriation loomed up spectre-like before
^Babcock, o p . cit. . letter of Bov. 20 , 1942.
406
the eyes of the better-to-do must be allayed lest, in angry desperation, they cast
their lot with the enemy.
The procedures of requisitioning, when reviewed, show a trend towards greater
systematization, centralization of control, uniformity in appreciation. Fixed rates
of assessment and standardized modes of collection would not only increase certainty
of supply and improve efficiency of administration. An air of legitimacy would
clothe these operations; a semblance of governmental stability would exact greater
popular respect. A corollary to established requisitioning practices--the curbing
of the sector commanders in their hitherto unrestrained foraging activities--was in
tended to further enhance respect for and loyalty to the guerrilla forces. Culminat
ing this trend was the decision of guerrilla headquarters to abandon requisitions in
kind, and rely exclusively (save in special, circumstances) upon purchases in the
open market. Such a technique was necessarily predicated upon the unification of
guerrilla forces under single command, the restitution of civil government, the
steady receipt of funds from a combination of extra-prpvincial sources and local
taxation, and the institution of sound army finance and quartermaster services.
When the attainment of these objectives was not realized, as in Leyte, much
floundering and improvisation necessarily resulted. Failure to achieve a unified
command meant variation in fiscal practices among the several zones of guerrilla con
trol. Shortage of funds brought about periodic reversion to older modes of requisi
tioning. Severed lines of communication, necessitated considerable local autonomy,
and adaptation of fiscal practice to local conditions. The psychology of the people
itself militated against excessive rigidity in exacting contributions. Popular
restiveness under fixed arrangements such as percentage levies or specific assess
ments induced some unit leaders to favor the less certain but also less irritant
procedures of solicitation. Sagacity pointed to confiscation of municipal treasuries^
•*-”0ut of 47 municipalities,” wrote the puppet governor at the end of 1942,

”sc far 29 treasuries and post offices have been robbei and looted. . .Luckily most
of this money was emergency notes." (B. Torres, Prov.'Gov. Pec. 21, 1942. To:
Japanese Military Administration for Pistrict of Visayas.)
407
or ear-marking of certain municipal revenues as a better fiscal expedient, because
less directly felt by the tax-payer. What matter if a mesB-officer, supply sergeant,
procurement agent or other purchaser be disbursing funds of the citizens, so long as
farmers and merchants -were recompensed for their commodities? Better yet, if moral
suasion or veiled intimidation would avail, the municipal councils might be induced
to appropriate funds, in lump grant or in periodic installments, for guerrilla main
tenance.'*' This latter arrangement would remove the piratical stigma from guerrilla
fiscal operations.
Property and Its Control
Assurance that an adequate flow of supplies would reach guerrilla camps im
plied attention to the source of that flow, its direction and volume. The source
was the private holdings in land of Leyte's propertied class and, to a lesser extent,
business enterprise owned within the resistance zone. The direction and volume of
flow were affected by claims upon the income of these properties, and the nature of
the transactions in the produce of the properties. We shall accordingly direct our
attention to the guerrilla attitude towards private property, the regulations intro
duced looking towards its control, and related efforts to channelize commercial
transactions.
To understand the guerrilla attitude towards private property is to appre
ciate the purely pragmatic character of guerrilla regulations. The resistance move
ment of Leyte carried no revolutionary implications.^ It raised no banners of revolt
■*Tn the latter half of 1945, some of the municipalities of the WIGWF adopted
the practice of granting direct monetary subventions to the regiments. Only in Ormoc
did the guerrilla stabilize this pattern, receiving a semi-monthly grant from the
military municipal government (in the evacuation area, outside the poblacion). This
grant consisted of all that remained in the municipal treasury after payment of oper
ating charges. Heither Miranda, nor Vaieriano Daffon, the divisional finance officer,
have ever made a full and satisfactory accounting of the disposbfcion of these monies.
Of course, there would be no way for any post-war auditor to establish a case of em
bezzlement:, since in the vicissitudes of guerrilla administration (especially after
the Japanese assault on the GHQ) , the monies might have been employed in any number of
ways, or^simply lost.
An American general, in the course of a book review, declared: "Ideologies
played little or no part in the guerrilla activities of the Filipinos {of Leyte/.''
(Brig. Gen. Donald Armstr n g . "The Exploits of Lt. I. P. Bichardson", The Saturday
Beview of Literature. Vol 2S, Wo. 16', April 21, 1945, p. 70.) ----------
408
against prescription, undertook no sapping campaigns against the entrenched, interests
of the Island. Entreating whatever support could be obtained from the wealthier ele
ments, the guerrilla chiefs pledged protection to private properties in return. Re
peatedly, combat officers and civil authorities aligned with the guerrillas assever
ated an intention to maintain the status quo: "Transfer of ownership of real pro
perties during this period of emergency is illegal," declared a report of the 94th
Infantry Regiment.-’-
And although repeatedly assailed by Colonel Kangleon and his subordinates as
subversive of the established order, the "Western Leyte Guerrilla made clear its pur
pose to avoid unsetting the prevailing social structure:
This Command has and still is adouting the policy of status quo on cases
affecting real estate, such as inheritance, sale, mortgages, boundary disputes,
etc. In cases where 3.and question is grave, forward, same to this Headquarters
for action.
Drastic action will be taken against officers in the Regiments attempting
to settle land matters which will tend to violate the policy of status quo.^
And the Staff Judge Advocate General and Civil Affairs Officer, the officer
best placed for authoritative exposition of the Western Leyte Guerrilla policy,
declared: "... .With respect to civil cases affecting real property and property
rights, the policy of the WIGWF was the 'status quo', i.e. conditions affecting real
property and property rights at the outbreak of the war in the Philippines were
maintained."0
During the period that the WIGWF was seeking for recognition from GEO, SWPA,
its leaders constantly stressed their freedom from radical tincture, their respect
for prooerty rights, their preoccupation exclusively with the military aspect of re
sistance. To his friend, Lieutenant Colonel Macario Perulta, Major Soliman, Chief of
Staff for Miranda, wrote: "Big landed estates have never been touched and the owners
-’-Office of the Provost Marshall. 26 May 1943. Report to Regt'l Comdr., 94th
Inf. Regt.
2Sabelino. 1 March 1943. General Order Ho. 2, Par. 1-2.
"’Special statement by Atty. Yictcrino C. Telercn, prepared at his residence

i Ot'.oc , February . 1946 .
409
or administrators offer contributions to our forces for our maintenance and subsis
tence .
Legal titles to the ,rbig landed estates" had not been extinguished. Nonethe
less, the so-called "contributions" were not voluntary offerings as the uninformed
reader might surmise from this statement, but shares from the produce of absentee
landlords, on the one hand — indirect assessments paid out as a sign of adherence to
the guerrilla cause on tie other.”
That the guerrilla movement had dedicated itself to a purely military-
political objective and assumed no reformiatic overtones is not strange. For its
leadership, both military and administrative, it drew upon men in whose training social
evaluation was an alien element. Whether farmers, merchants, school teachers, law
yers, cr professional soldiers, the men who played an active part in organizing and
directing the guerrilla had developed no systematized concepts of social change, no
generalized philosophic constructions of economic classes irreconcilably opposed.
■'■Marcos Scliman. M a j . July 5, 1943. Letter to: L t . Col. Macario Peralta,

C.O., Panay Forces, n. 2, nar. "i".
În t>o int- of fact, the WIGWF discovered that under war-time conditions, the
friendly beneficence of the hacienderos was of mere utility for the subsistence of
the organization than any program of beneficence. Many of the hacienderos associated
themse]ves with the WIGWF in one capacity or another.
Potenciano Larrazabal, owner of a 3,0C0 hectare estate (former vice-mayor of
Ormoc. and arôinted mayor in June, 3944) . belonged to one of the wealthiest clans in
leyte. Yet, he had nothing but g o o d words for the WIGWF and denied that it had spon
sored drastic r o c :’.a1 changes. Ee himself gave generously to the guerrilla from his
stock of grain, sugar, coffee and salt in addition to monetary contributions . (inter
view . Tac? char , 1945)
In Merida, the hacienderc Jose Martinez headed, the 3-4 on the regimental
staff. In this same sector, Genelo Pastor, who headed the regimental S-3 and later
became CO, was the nephew of Alfonso Pastor, owning a 500 hectare estate. Pastor de
nied categorically that there was any planned liquidation of large-holders here.
In Palompon, the regimental surgeon, Dr. Serafica, owned an 900 hectare plan
tation. In the Albuera sector, Andres Polancos, owning a 500 hectare estate, served
as S-4. The hacienderc Zaldabar, with a 500 hectare estate, had two sons serving as
battalion Intelligence officers in this sector (Antonio and Guillermo).
Miranda sunned up the situation: "Big estates were never touched. If aban
doned, the administrators were responsible for the cultivation of the same. . .
Chinese and Spaniards cooperated well with the guerrilla. . . .The Larrazabal familv
and Messrs. Varela and Uriarte were loyal supporters of the w'LGWF." (Miranda, cn.c't
p . 5.) " '
410
Pre-war Leyte knew neither an active-trade union movement nor organized agrarian
populism. Whatever social discontent lurked beneath tie surface was directed against
individual instances of exploitative bloodsucking and chicaney. Tie underprivileged
had yet to taste the fruit of the "Tree of Knowledge".
Inherent in the war-time relationships, although engendered by no conscious
deliberation, were certain forces erosive of special privilege and additively preg
nant, with meaning for future social action. Per one thing, the common people, en
during unmitigated privation in their places of evacuation, could not but note the
relative ease, comfort, freedom from danger enjoyed by the wealthier elements. Many
the time and with much vociferousness had the great land-owners and opulent merchants
protested their devotion to the ideals of Filipino nationhood, swore their attachment
to the creed of American democracy, pledged their all to resisting the efforts of any
foreign aggressor to subjugate them. And, yet, how many were to be counted among
those resisting the Jananese invaders on the day of reckoning? Many quickly claBped
their conquerors to their bosoms and gave full, assurance of complete collaboration.
And even among those who maintained a surreptitious connection with resistance were
some who, by the totality of their deportment, revealed as their primary motivation
a desire to escape guerrilla reprisal through adeptly "playing their cards". A
paltry hand-out in money or supplies, scarcely curtailing their own scale of living,
was well-worth the small risk of Japanese detection involved, in return for the pro
tection from assassination or plundering by the guerrillas.
Indeed, those Filipinos electing to remain in the towns, rather than flee to
the mountains and be hunted down by Jap patrols, noted how well the local plutocracy
fared in comparison with themselves. Starvation, nakedness, beggary were the per
quisites of the lowly. The poignant resentments born of their sufferings would not
be forgotten by the masses. Individual collaborators might be formally absolved of
the pro-Jap tainture . But the collective mind of humbleness would remember where
gentility stood in the time of crisis.
411
Exigencies of warfare necessitated adoption of regulations seriously in
fringing upon so-called property rights. Foodstuffs and a host of commodities were
confiscated for the prosecution of resistance. Implicit in such procedures lay the
notion that property interests were subservient to the public welfare, and could be
overridden in time of emergency. Economic warfare constituted an undetachable part
of modern conibat. For the embattled guerrillas maximizing of output and stopping up
leakages of critical items from the free to the occupied zones of the Province” ranked
high on the priority list of military objectives. But accomplishment of these ends
entai ed a reticulation of controls and restrictions greatly shackling the pronertied
clans. So it came about that professions to serve as a bulwark for the status quo
notwithstanding, guerrilla leaders, in elevating the principle of common utility
above that of individual possession, in enthroning consumptional in the stead of
titular claims, temporarily dented the edifice of private property. And if to that
be added the joint or cooperative productional arrangements worked out under the
pressures of war-time living, plus the instances of violence and expropriation visi
ted upon the most hated of the land-owners by long-suffering tenants and laborers,
there was established a precedent for future concert to instigate change.
Small holdings, individually owned, characterized the system of land tenure
obtaining in much of pre-war Leyte. On the West Coast, however, particularly in the
northern portion, hacienderos had established title to ample tracts, planted to sugar
and corn or used as grazing land. These tracts had been leased to tenants, making
neriodic remittances in kind, on a share basis. Agricultural laborers also contribu
ted their efforts towards making this region productive, being compensated in cash,
in nreduce , or in some combination of the two."
1Some of the hacienderos had come by their land in questionable fashion.

Miranda stated, and other interviewees confirmed his allegation, that land-grabbing
was not uncommon. By one means or another, the large land-owner had succeeded in
extending his own boundaries at the expense of his helpless neighbors. Litigation
was always a long-drawn-out costly affair; and in such contests, the wealthy litigant
had a good chance of obtaining a favorable decision.
412
Disaffection towards some of the landlords centering in the Ormoc-Palompon-
Villaba district had long been smouldering. When the Japanese invaded Leyte, most
Sometimes, the large land-owners resorted to the knavish practice of luring

their neighbors' carabaos onto their own property. The farm animals would undoubt
edly cause some damage. The cunning haciendero would multiply the damages incurred
in his estimate, oresent a claim which in all likelihood could not be met by the in
digent small-holder, institute suit for collection, and would distrain part of the
neighbor's property in recompense.
Such fraudulent practices, together with the underpaying and sometimes non
payment of the farm laborer- on tho sugar plantations, stirred up over the years a
smarting sense of resentment, by the underprivileged against the large-holders.
These murmurings always remained amorphous, finding expression only sporadically.
The discontented, never organized a movement for agrarian relief, much less a full-
dress political movement, as did their counterpart in Centra] Luzon. Nevertheless,
the hatred was there, ready to erupt.
Among the large-holders of West Leyte, none were more hated than the Mejia
and Tan families in the Ormoc-Merida district. Over the years, these clans evinced
signal disregard for personal dignity and material well-being of the tenant farmers
and farm laborers under their control. No wonder then that with the sundering of the
normal social bonds, and the removal of the inhibitions of custom, following the
Japanese invasion, the big landlords, and in particular the members of these two
clans, dwelt in mortal fear of the security of' their properties and persons.
In the first few months after the invasion, many of these hacienderos looked
to the Japanese for protection. They felt that their lives were in constant jeo
pardy. Sabelino (Miranda's Executive Officer in the early days, and later Deputy
Chief of Staff of the WLGWF) affirmed that the Mejias and Tans went to the Japanese
out of fear of tenant vengence. And Bonifacio Capuyan (Sector Commander of Merida,
and last Chief of Staff' in the WLGWF) related that he had information directly from
the tenants of Mejia that the haciendero fed the Japanese garrison during the early
period.
Illustrative of this pall of fear overhanging the wealthy is the story of one,
Tayag, former cashier in the Ormoc sugar central. According to Miranda (and con
firmed by some of his officers), Tayag organized a guerrilla outfit from among the
former sugar workers in the sugar central, and blackmailed some of the wealthy into
contributing to his unit on pain of punishment as '’pro-Jap'-. The manager of the
sugar central, a uni dent gentleman, regarded it as a sound investment to buy protec
tion from Tayag. Tayag died during the early days of the resistance movement, but
he helped to create a precedent.
When the Jananese garrisons were temporarily withdrawn from the municipali
ties of Western Leyte (with the excention of Ormoc), some of the frightened land
lords fled to Tacloban, Manila, or other places in the Visayas. Among them were the
Mejias and Tans. In each of these clans, some murders occurred--with the murderers
escaping unidentified. Since these men lived within the zone of the WIGWF, and
since their abandoned estates were taken over by the WIGWF, what, was mere simple
t-han to Tinl: the name of Miranda with these murders. Miranda categorically demurred
to the charge that he rtfotted these homicides in co]d blood in order to acquire
coveted nrouerties. He argued in extenuation of these deeds: (a) that the Mejias
and Tans collaborated with the enemy; (b) that the deeply ingrown revulsion of the
mistreated peasants against these grandees, a condition these clans were well aware
of and made no effort to allay, made revenge almost a certainty once the ties of
social discipline had been relaxed.
413
of the larger land-holders either remained in the towns directly under Japanese
supervision or migrated to the provincial capital, Taclohan. These absentee land
lords expected their tenants to continue remitting that portion of the produce regu
larly assigned as rent payment. In the main, the tenants did not comply.
There were several reasons why the tenants withheld the established due of
the landlord. As already mentioned, many had long nursed a searing resentment against
the cupidity of the property owners. The time was now propitious for liquidating
their obligations by completely extinguishing the title of the legal owners to their
properties. Failing that, a moratorium on rent payments could be declared. 1/ho was
there to enforce the claims of the "outraged" landlords? By refusing, in the main,
to cast their lot with the resistance movement, they had forfeited the patronage of
the guerrilla leadership.
The views of the tenants and the military did. net completely coincide, but
they concurred in obstructing ordinary lega' redress by the landlords. The military
were especial •y toten up with subsisting 4 he troops. Flight by the landlords, their
managers a m foremen might "•ir-'rgar.ize product icn and curi ail out nut . Maintenance
of producticn at a high level ranked cardinal among guerrilla policies. If thi3
could be accomplished by the granting cl' certain concessions to the tenants— well and
good. However, the military authorities did net contemplate abandonment of the
landlord's equity in the harvest to the actual reapers . in the absence cf the land
lord, usufruetucry rights would redound tc the de facto government— the guerrilla
organization. While the guerrillas scrupulously abstained from vacatirg existing
legal titles, and promoting either wholesale land redistribution or collective farm
ing, they did not withdraw from constituting a sort of receivership, and administer
ing the properties as they were so disposed.
The military had another serious objection to the forwarding of cron shares
to the nre-var owners, residing in the towns ■vhere severe ±ood stringency o d earned,
J_ve Ian-'lords were riven tc the temptation of selling their produce to the townsmen
err to food sceonlators at hare5seme?y inflated "-rices., c-r,worse still , this produce
414
might he bought or seized by the Japanese military administration. Transfer of
foodstuffs to the landlords under such conditions would puncture the guerrilla-
imposed "blockade clamped upon the occupied towns of Leyte" and thus nullify an
imuortant weapon in the arsenal of resistance.
The Western Leyte Guerrilla early determined that military expediency would
■prevail over all consi derat ions of nronrietary rights. With abiding fear lent the
enemy gain possession of a bountiful cron, they sought to remove standing harvests
from the territory of Janarese advance. An order issued towards the close of 194?
punctuated the guerrilla resolve that, Filipino foodstuffs would not fall into the
breadbaskets of the Japanese army:
1. All landowners or persons in charge of haciendas are hereby ordered, to

evacuate the produce of said lands within 50 cays from this date of notice.
2. Failure to comply this order, such produce will be confiscated for use
of the guerrilla forces.
3. The sector and sub-sector commanders are hereby ordered, to execute this
order.^
The development of guerrilla policy in Western Leyte towards abandoned estates

2
is indicated in another general order:
% a c c . :C Ijov. 1942. General Order Eo. 5 -a.

O
"Where cultivation continued during the absence of the landlord, the sector
commander temporarily assumed the functions of the landlord. The supply officers of
the regiments ana smaller units would oversee the production, requiring that the
tenants meet the orders emanating from the G H G . And when it came time for the regu
lar collection of rents, the landlord's share was taken by the guerrilla. This did
not release the tenants from any responsibilities incumbent upon them for assisting
the guerrilla from their own stock.
Where the estates were abandoned in the complete sense , remaining idle, the
WIGWF took over their complete management. Famon Ad vincula was appointed as A.cminis-
trator of Abandoned Estates. This entailed the job of labor superintendent. It was
his resnonsibi?ity t o recruit laborers to work the land, and also to mill the rice.
Forest concessions control led by the absentee nronerty-owners were also under the
jurisdiction of Ad vincula. Most of the labor on these estates was unpaid. Work here
was 1ooked upon as a civic resronsibil ity. and it was by representing it in tnis
light that the barrio lieutenants helmed Advincula recruit his field hands. Perhaps
the bulk of the laborers were members of the Volunteer Guards, assigned on special
detail to this chore, and working in shifts. Additional manpower was gotten from
the guerrilla concentration camp for political and war prisoners , and also from the
municipal jails. 3y doing, constructive labor, the prisoners defrayed the cost of
their keep! In addition, idle public lands of all kinds might be put to the plow.
In this manner, then, were the idle properties operated. The innovations
were purely matters of expediency? guided by social doctrine . Iio doubt many of
415
1. Due notice is hereby published that all owners of haciendas must take
charge of their estates and receive orders from the officer in charge of the
Food Production Campaign.
?. Failure to cultivate their haciendas after 30 days from the time of the
nub] ication of this order, said haciendas will be administered by the Guerrilla
Forces and administrators will be appointed, to take charge of these neglected
estates. This command will exercise the general, power provided for in the Con
stitution of the Philippines to this effect and Emergency Power vested in the
Chief Executive in this period of emergency.
The legal foundation for the land policies of the WLGY7F, referred to in the
order Just quoted have been expatiated upon by its Judge Advocate General-
Proceeding upon the idea of the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces being
a 'de facto' entity, the organization officiously took over the administration
of the estates of absentee landlords. This action of the WLGWF finds legal bases
in two statutes subsisting under the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines,
i.e., the Civil Code and the Emergency Powers Act. Under the provisions of the
Civil Code, any person may officiously take over the administration of an aban
doned property of another, subject to such rules and regulations imposed by law
in the matter; under the Emergency Powers Act, there is a specific provision
which authorizes the President of the Philippines to take over the administra
tion of idle and abandoned lands even though the owner thereof is present. It
was the settled policy of the WIGWF to continue in operation the subsisting laws
of the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, and to promulgate only such
rules and regulations for the internal government of its organization as were
expedient and advisable under the circumstances.^
As legatee of the emergency rowers reposed in the President, the WIGWF pro
ceeded to promulgate its agrarian program.0 So long as the absentee landlord was not,
the tenants were pleased, by the development. Somehow it carried, undertones of es-
cheatal to the community for the rublic weal . Somehow it seemed to derogate from the
notion of absolute ownership. Many of them felt as though they •srere now the owners,
and that the 1evies uron their produce were merely communal taxes, in whose disbursal
they would have a beneficial interest--ant? not simply rent payments. Perhaps if the
occupation had lasted longer, these temporary arrangements might have crystallized
into new patterns of land tenure. The chief economic legacy of this period is some
thing intangible. The underprivileged elements of Western Leyte saw the properties
of hated hacienderos utilized for a communal purpose. If this was possible in war,
why not in peace? Should economic conditions deteriorate at some future date to a
point where the discontented are goaded into organizing an agrarian reform party, a
precedent will be available for social action.
V. Ibabo. 27 Jan. 1945. General Order Wo. 6.
^Statement of Atty. Victorino C. Teleron, former Judge Advocate General of
the WLGWF, prepared at his Ormoc residence, February, 1S45.
3
A memorandum from Divisional headquarters to one of the regimental commands
clarified guerrilla policy in administering abandoned estates:
"It is the policy of the WLGWF xhat Abandoned Estates should be administered
and supervised, such that the estates can be made productive.
"Administrator or Encargado of every estate is appointed by the General
Headquarters. In this case, you recommend the name of the Encargado for appointment.
416
from the guerrilla standpoint, treasonably aiding and abetting the enemy, his equity
in the properties remained. The Judge Advocate General denied that a confiscatory
policy prevailed:
Of the produce of said haciendas pertaining to the owners thereof, only 15#
thereof was taken for the subsistence of the soldiers of the WLGWF, and a
I cor-
responding receipt was issued therefor to the respective administrators.
The guerrilla authorities encouraged the migration of loyal Filipinos from
the enemy controlled areas to the unoccupied districts. In Western Leyte, this
policy meant specifically the evacuation of the town proper of Ormoc, and removal
to the mountainous interior, outside the control of the Japanese garrison. Towns
people complying with this policy found themselves uprooted from their source of
livelihood, and sometimes verging on starvation. To alleviate their hardships, cul-
A certain percent commission is given to the Encargado which is determined by the

Chief, Civil Affairs; however, it does not exceed ten percent.
"The product of the Abandoned Estate, after deducting the share of the ten
ant as well as that of the Encargado is intended for the Army; however, it should be
covered with requisition and be supported with reports if withdrawn." (Lt. E.
Advincula, Chief, Supply-Labor Administration. 3 Aug. 1943. To: Lt. Eeforzado, In
Charge, Supply-Labor Administration, 6th Inf. Kegt.)
Some of the guerrilla units inclined at first towards the outright confisca
tion of abandoned properties. The civil authorities of Albuera complied with "the
Memorandum of the Regimental Adjutant, 6th Infantry of the WLGWF, In the Field, re
questing the Municipal Council to pass a resolution". . . and "Resolved As It Is
Hereby Resolved, that all real estate and other properties abandoned by any owner
since the beginning of the Guerrilla, will be confiscated by the Government and will
be turned over to the proper military authority so that the products or money produced
from the abandoned properties will be used for the support of the WLGWF in the Field
until the end of this Warfare." (Municipal Council of Albuera £?. C. Calabia, Mun.
Secty/7. June 21, 1943. Resolution No. 19.
The more judiciously framed policy of the general headquarters made possible
a military sharing in the proceeds of the abandoned estates, while eschewing the
legally questionable procedure of direct sequestration.
■'"A.s to the system of administration of abandoned estates of absentee land
lords," Teleron went on to explain, "care was taken to preserve as much as possible
the property rights of the owners thereof. In my capacity as the then Civil Affairs
Officer, I took charge of the appointment of administrators. The Hacienda Casila of
Pto. Bel To, Merida, Leyte, was entrusted to Mr. Rodolfo Abanes, a relative of the
Mejias £ the owner7; the hacienda of Martinez at Curba and Margen, Ormoc, was adminis
tered by his son-in-law, Mr. Agapito Asturias; the hacienda of Dr. Lui3 Espina at San
Jose, Ormoc, wes administered by Mr. Necessito, assisted by the old administrator, Mr.
Uldarico Conejos; the hacienda of the Escanios at Valencia was administered by the old
administrator thereof, Mr. Elpidio Magalona; the hacienda of V. De Torres was adminis
tered by her son-in-law, Dr. Wenceslao Pongos, now mayor of Ormoc; and the hacienda of
Vicente Torres was entrusted to his old administrator, Mr. Manuel Tan." (Statement
of Atty. Victorino C. Teleron prepared at his Ormoc residence, Feb., 1946)
417
tivation of the abandoned estates seemed a sensible expedient. The difficulty arose
in the course of trying to settle upon a fair basis of tenure. Should idle lands be
partitioned, and small holdings be assigned to the landless in a grand redistribu
tion? The guerrilla government could not approve such a step. Paternalism was rer-
miss.ible--not the extinction of property rights.
The authorities finally adopted a compromise measure which, vrhile bringing
relief to the necessitous, kept clear of drastic populism. Barrio lieutenants re
ceived the following instructions:
Evacuees should be given a little parcel of land to till. Arrangements

should be made with the respective landowners or tenants so that they can plant
something to live on. It should be understood that lands cultivated by them
will be held temporarily and they will be returned to the proper owners as soon
as the war is ever, landa to be assigned to them should be vacant and workable.
Cultivation of every square inch of unused land--that was the guerrilla ob
jective. Where untended land escaped the cutting edge of the plow, the tillage of
this land became an important military project. Spurring on the establishment of
community plots, to be worked by available manpower, the authorities turned to the

2
public employees and officials to set an example.
Draft animals, an indispensable element in Filipino cultivation, were not
everywltere available. The working of vacant lands was predicated upon the securing
of carabaos. A memorandum from guerrilla headquarters offered a way out. . . ."You
-^By order of the Comdg. Off. , Briguez. Nov. 2-°, 1942. Memo. No. 7 To: All
Sector an^ Sub-Sector Commanders , Par. 3, Sec. (b) .
O
"The Barrio Tenientes and Cabieillas, Military Policemen, Rural Policemen,
an" Munlclral Teachers were urged to establish commonal plots in their respective
places, arm even the Women's Auxiliary Service were also urged to have gardens, for
the use of themselves and the Government. The children are also urged to establish
home gardens for their own use." (F. P. Befordazo, Prob . 3rd. It., QMS., In Charge,
Food Production, Albuera Sector. April 1, 1943. Report for the last 16 days of
March, 1943. To: It. Ramon Ad vineuia, Chief Food Production.)
According to 'Military Mayor" Barte of Albuera, an element of compulsion was
introduced into the promotion of community planting, and the people responded ener
getically. . . ."Every barrio is required to have a commonal plot to be planted tc
different crops or vegetables, the produce of which goes mostly to the army. Some
commonal plots have already been planted." (E. Barte, Mil. May., Albuera. Report of
Civil Affairs for March, 1943. To: Gen. Briguez through MaJ. Daffon, CO, 6th Inf.)
418
may request cooperation by borrowing carabaos during days when the owners do not
need them.
Outside the zone of the WLGWF, the largest landed holdings in Leyte were
found in the Villaba-San Isidro district and on the Island of Biliran. (Needless to
say, individual estates of large dimension are scattered throughout the Province.)
These areas were under the effective control of the 95th Infantry Regiment until the
latter part of 1943, when the Japanese restored the local -puppet, administrations to
their respective municipalities. And the principal policy determiner was Captain
Pamanian, of the 1st Battalion.^
A.s a pioneer organizer in North-West Leyte, Pamanian (a pre-war Philippine
Army Sergeant in the quartermaster department) decided upon a policy of attraction
towards the hacienderos. He himself was a resident of the Capocan-Carigara district,
and believed that he understood the psychology of the wealthy. He avoided generally
the allocation of fixed contribution quotas, leaving to the individual's impulse of
generosity the actual determination of the size of the contribution. He was aided
by the fact that few of the hacienderos abandoned their estates and fled to Tacloban
or beyond the provincial limits. Therefore, there was no question in the main of
taking over vacant estates and cultivating them for troop subsistence (with the re
sultant rumors of confiscation, as in the case of Miranda's WLGWF).
As long as the landholders supported his troops and maintained contact with
his operatives, Pamanian was disposed to wink at any transgressions that suggested
collaboration with the enemy.“ He realized very well that if the individual property
■*\By command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (Jose T. Ibabo, MaJ. , AGS). July 7, 1943.
Memo, to Commanding Officer, LFSO. pote: LFSO, may be Land Force Service Organiza
tion//
%eyte municipality was one of the communities where large land-holdings
existed. There was a close alliance between the municipal government and the hacien-
dero families. The mayor, Enrique Granados, owned a 400 hectare estate. The munici
pal secretary, Nestorio Deiantar, was related to Juan Lelanter— the latter, owning
about 1,000 hectares. For the guerrilla, this was very fortunate. So long as they
pursued a program of respect for private property rights, and they did by and large,
the guerrilla were the recipients of the landowners bounty. As mayor, Granados or
ganized the civilian Volunteer Guards, and instructed them to transport the civilian
contributions to guerrilla headquarters.
419
holder was to escape apprehension by the Japanese as a guerrilla sympathizer, he
would have to make a pretence of cooperation with the New Order. And the land
holders demonstrated surpassing adroitness in thus dissembling. To be fully accurate
we must grant that some of the hacienderos were inwardly indifferent as to the final
outcome of the struggle, being concerned almost exclusively with the preservation of
their holdings. Indeed, their guerrilla donations were more in the nature of "life
insurance", intended to ward off liquidation by the guerrilla "hatchetmen". More
over, since north-west Leyte was comparatively free of Japanese troops until 1944,
there was less of a feeling of urgency among the guerrilleros of this zone than in
the WLGWF. The espionage activities of the nro-Japanese were less intent, and the
guerrilleros were inclined to be less suspicious of the going3 and comings of the
civilian nopulation.
Enforcement of cultivation also was known within the jurisdiction of Colonel
Kangleon. The Municipal Council of Bato required:
the landowners to cultivate and to plant their agricultural lands, and

confiscating those which lie uncultivated until the lapse of time specified,
In San Isidro, too, were large land-iiolders producing grain, with numerous
tenants holding under them. The abundance of foodstuffs available made export to
other sectors, as well as outside the Province, possible, thereby fostering a fair
measure of prosperity when other municipalities were experiencing a financial strin
gency. The populace tended to be in an optimistic frame of mind, making them more
disposed to throw in their lot with the guerrilla. Capt. Famanian acknowledged gen
erous contributions to the subsistence of his troops from the hacienderos Martinez,
Alvirez, Muertique, Aguilar, and others.
On Biliran Island, Capt. Corpin and Lt. Juan Granados received ample provi
sions for the local detachments. When M a j . Javelosa was given direct oversight of
Biliran Island (Javelosa had been CO of the 81st Div. CM, USAFFE , in Lanao, Mindanao,
at the outbreak of the war), he succeeded even further in winning the confidence of
the land-holders. Garamendi, possessing 3,000 hectares in Naval and Biliran munici
palities, gave 300 sacks of rice and corn at each harvest. Alberto Enage with 500
hectares in Biliran municipality, Madraso with 300 hectares in Caibiran, and in Ka-
wayan, Mendezona and Manulat with 200 and 250 hectares respectively all gave open-
handedly. It is irrelevant here to endeavor to assay motivation.
Although there were relatively few instances of spoliation m north-west Leyte
the record of the guerrilla, was not unblemished. Perhaps they had less need tc re
sort. to "holding un" the wealthy for large donations in view of their absconding with
funds from the municipal treasuries. Maj. Javelosa estimated that approximately
P25,000 were taken from the various municipal treasuries of Biliran Island in 1942—13,
in addition to monies from Leyte municiral ity, Barege, Ganger a, etc. This is nor to
suggest that the monies were fraimu'ent: y employed by these guerrilla leaders, for
troop subsistence was an expensive proposition. But it mart.rally explains tr.e 'go-
easy" no? icy averted towards Jhe land-holders .
420
and penalizing those who violate the said ordinance.1 - 2
More specific in its application of sanctions, the pertinent ordinance of
Libagon forced
every owner of agricultural land to put it to cultivation within a certain time

limit during this time of emergency; uncultivated land shall be taken from the
respective owner by the municipal government and same shall be given to person
or persons designated by the Municipal Council as tenants; no share of the pro
duce thereof shall be given to the owner of confiscated land; and penalizing
fhose who disturb the possession of the land after same has been confiscated.
This ordinance was of particular significance in expressing the doctrine that
land tenure is not an absolute dominium but a species of usufruct right, voidable
when not exercised. And as a corollary, we encounter the propos it ion that- the public,
en V y i n g a transcendent interest in *he u t i l izai ion of natural resources, might vest
ex"v'oi tai tve rights to arable nanco in the rronsrt-ylecs, for the sake of maximizing
communal output.
Besponsibi1 1 ty for the plowing cf idle lands in the main was delegated to
local authorities, however, the provincial officials were ordered to directly inter
vene in the furtherance of this food-raising campaign. The Provincial "Food Adminis
trator and Agricultural Supervisor" received the specific instruction that "idle
A.
areas nay be given to other persons if the owners do not cultivate them."'
^Provincial Board of Free Leyte, Oct. 26, 1943. Ordinance 19, current ser
ies, of Bato approved in Kesolution 28c! of 30th Session.
g
'See: Ordinance 20 under resolution S3CS of Maasin, as approved by Kesolu
tion 282 of the Provincial Board of Free Leyte, "causing all agricultural lands
within the municipality of Maasin tc be cultivated."
Also: Kesolution 64, cs, of Matalom, as approved by F.es. 255 of Frov. Bd.
of Free Leyte "requiring all barrio lieutenants to submit a renort of all uncultiv
ated land in their resnective districts to the Mayor to determine if they are, to
pas3 an ordinance enforcing the owners or other interested persons to cultivate these
uncultivated 1 ands."
An intelligence renort of the 94th Inf. Pegt. , dispatched to Bivisional G-2
on Oct. 17, 1943, attested to the success of this campaign: "Vacant lands are now
being use'5 ."
Provincial Bd . of Free leyte, Ordinance 18, cs., of libagon, approved in
Fes. lie. 0 4 5 .
-p.. h. Kangleon. Col. 4 Feb. 1944. Memo: All Prov. Govt . Officials, Par.
421
Closely associated with the land-use program, the full and .judicious em
ployment of available manpower came in for emphasis. An individual not serving with
tne guerrilla combat forces and not engaged in productive endeavor was a drag upon
the community,a net loss, a social parasite. An embattled community would not
tolerate drones. A series of promulgations took up the question of idle manpower
and sought to divert it into useful channels.
The WLGWF determined that "vagrancy should be wiped out from this sector;
they j/the idle/ should be put to work."'*'
Tillable land received most of this shiftless element.^
All citizens carried community obligations, renderable in the form of public
services. Combatting insect nests constituted an imncrtant activity at a time when
diminution of the harvest meant reduction of guerrilla fighting potential. In Albuera
according to its mayor,
^very oerson from the age of 16 to 60 years may, meaning 'must', campaign
for honuers or flyers only once a week. The campaign should be by the pakyao
system at the rate of 1 petroleum can dead or killed honuers or fl,yers for
every 2 persons.
Men qualified by occupational training to render soecial services to the
community might be called upon to do so. The cocheros (the hackmen) were occasionally
impressed by the army for haulage of materials or for transport of personnel on trips
dictated by military necessity. In Eato, the drivers felt that their labors were
R . F. ueforzado, rrob . 3rd L t ., in charge of Food Production & Labor. 25

Feb. 1943. To: The Adj. Gen., GEK.., WLGWF, par. 4a.
IIon-employment of able-bodied men meant not only wastage of sorely needed
productive power. The slothful were wont to devote their leisure to drinking and then
on becoming intoxicated, liarrassed the sober, hard-working portion of the population.
With the view of eliminating drunken fracases and other breaches of the peace, the
authorities instructed the MPs and rural nolice— "do not give up searching for idle
but troublesome persons in your neighborhood." (Benjamin C. Barte, Chief, MP Force
of Batog. Instruction No. 19 at 2nd. meeting of military and rural police, Dec. 20,
1942.)
"Mayor Epitacio Barte. 3 Dec. 1942. To: Mr. Eobin Hood, Military Adviser,
Sherwood Forest.
Regulations of this tyoe antedated the war. What is noteworthy is that com
munity necessity rendered exinent the renrcmulgaticn of such measures.
being over-taxed, and accordingly memorialized the Provincial Board to intercede
in their behalf:
While the cocheros of Maasin and other towns have not been required to serve
the army regularly, the cocheros of Bato gladly offer to serve the army for each
tartanilla twelve hours every two weeks with the limited passengers of four per
sons for each tartanilla, excluding the driver, for every trip.
That to avoid comnandeering or duplicity in the service, the cochero be
furnished with service cards as identification that the latter has already ren
dered his appointed service as uer schedule, and that he be exempt to serve the
army unti] his day of service comes again, unless in extreme emergency.
Imnortant: That the cochero submit to continuous service and commandeering,
as we deem it a duty and honor to serve our army, our people, and our country,
only in extreme necessity as for examnle in case of war or chaos.
That during peace time, the further abuses as aforesaid, be stopped or cur
tail.ed .■■
The Provincial Board resolved to forward the petititon to Colonel Kangleon
for his decision.
A thorough-going conscription of manpower was never put into effect under the
guerrilla regime. Compulsory service rendered was looked upon as a levy in kind, a
species of commuted tax payment.
To sum up then, we find the guerrilla leadership verbally pledged to recon
stitute Leytean society in its pre-war design, but pressed by circumstances into
making piecemeal modifications. The removal of a considerable proportion of the
landlord class from the resistance area and their identification more or less with
collaborationism disposed the guerrilla leadership to debar the landlords from rent
collection. On the other hand, the guerrilla emphasized the doctrine, by deed rather
than by theoretical formulation, that nronerty is vested with a public interest, and
that rrivate rights therein, if not extenguishable , are subject to far-reaching con
trol . Communa1 cultivation of abandoned enta+es , guerrilla dictation to farmers of
a if anting r-n icy, a m the 1aying of claim by guerrilla sector leaders to rents not
raid to landlords constituted imnressive inroads on the traditional mroad.fi of private

im
ownershit. In short, resistance, requiring the subordinat/ of private to public
^Provincial Board of Free Leyte, resolution ho. 181, Par. 1-4.
423
interest, established precedent of uncertain potency for post-war economic and
social reorganization.
Regulation of Connerce
Ve have said that guerrilla preoccupation with subsistence led to control of
supplies at the source, viz. the regulation of private property already examined.
But that was not enough. The problem remained of directing a steady flow of food
stuffs and other vital commodities to the public markets, where they would be avail
able at reasonable prices for army and civilian consumption. We are led, therefore,
to examine three topics, closely related to one another; the general supervision of
commerce by the guerrilla, the control of prices, and the regulation of currencies.
In Leyte, as elsewhere in the world, a portion of the commercial class was
intent upon pursuing a "business as usual" policy. To a certain extent, they were
frustrated both by the Japanese military administration in the occupied zones of the
Province, and by the guerrilla authorities in the free zones. The most astute busi
nessmen frequently succeeded in circumventing these controls and amassing ample
profits. Some were detected in their attempted evasions and were penalized with
varying degrees of severity.
As their primary objective, the guerrilla-devised controls sought to prevent
leakages of supplies to the occupied areas where they might be appropriated by the
enemy.-1' Within the Western Leyte zone, a variety of restrictions encumbered trade.
Commercial dealings with the town proper of Ormoc, nucleus of Japanese activities on
the West coast of Ieyte, were strictly forbidden.
1The minuet Governor resorted grievously: " . . . .People can't ply trades
such a 3 merchandising from one nlace to another. Bandits confiscate products brought
from farms to noblacion to prevent people from transporting goods. . . . " (B. Torres
Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Adm. for Dist. of Visayas.)
Torres was obliged to admit the effectiveness of the blockade: "People in
thepoblacicn ccoperating with the administration and the Japanese are the ones that
suffer. When they can no longer suffer, they are forced to go to the barrios and
the mountains, not because they want to join, but as a matter of life and dea-th,."
(B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Mar. 1, 1943. To: Comar., Dist. of Visayas, Jap. Imp.
Forces.)
424
Once outside of Leyte, the enterprising merchant might succeed, in evading
the guerrilla commercial net, and. trade with the forbidden areas of Leyte--especially
Ormoc and Tacloban. But the risk involved in such enterprise was great. Not only
did the violator face guerrilla detection, with punishment of confiscation, fine,
imprisonment, or a combination thereof. In addition, his small craft might be over
hauled by a Japanese patrol boat. If it were discovered that he had been provided
with guerrilla papers or that he was not using the prescribed Japanese currency, woe
betide him. And if he had. been resourceful enough to buy or forge collaborationist
credentials and to carry with him a supply of Japanese currency, he had no guarantee
that the Japanese patrol might not confiscate his entire consignment as spoils of war.
With each other, and with the barrios of Ormoc, the unoccupied municipalities
might carry on normal intercourse. Under the title of "Inter-Town Trade", a general
order from the WIJGWF outlined the prevailing policy and designated the local offi
cials responsible for seeing the said policy through:
Civilians from the municipality of Baybay, Albuera, Merida, Palompon and the
barrios of Ormoc (Town excepted) are hereby permitted to trade in foodstuff and
other necessities of life.
Sector and Sub-Sector Commanders or their authorized representatives must
issue necessary rules and regulations, after consulting the Municipal Officials
or Anti-Profiteering Committees, to protect the best interest of the civilian
consumers.
Provision is hereby made that this inter-town trade be limited to local com
merce and not to include inter-island commerce until necessary orders will be
issued to this effect.
Exception is hereby made that products and articles coming from other towns
not specifically mentioned herein and from other island provinces are free to
enter but products coming from towns above mentioned cannot be exported until
blockade be lifted.^
Violation to any of the foregoing provisions and other rules and regulations
hereafter issued by the Sector or Sub-Sector Commanders will be dealt with
severely.'-
Flexibility on the part of the military command, consideration for local need,
is evident in the provision for consultation with municipal officials prior to the
promulgation of orders. Moreover, since the west coast was not self-sufficient, it
^-Writing to the then Lt.-Col. Peralta on July 5, 1943, M a j . Soliman, Chief

of Staff of the WLGWF, said: "Trading between towns is allowed, but exportation of
foodstuffs to other places is prohibited."
‘'Command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (Jose T. Ibabao, Capt. Inf., Adj. Gen.) , 31
Dec. 1942. Gen. Orders No. 18, Par. 7-11.
425
was the part of wisdom to permit unilateral imports from other provinces, even while
enforcing an export embargo.
To more effectively wipe out illicit commerce, the WIJGWF created a special of
fice, functioning under the control of regimental intelligence:
There is created in every municipality the Office of Harbor Inspectors,

under supervision of the Regimental S-2. The unit will perform the following
missions:
a. To police the coast lines where boats can dock and sail.
b. To enforce all orders pertaining to the blockade.
. . . .e. To utilize trusted sailors to procure war materials for the use
of our forces, like ammunition, medicine, powder, etc. . .
Between the areas controlled by Kangleon and Miranda respectively, trade was
desultory, affected by relative needs and the ebb and flow of organizational antagon
isms . The "Baybay Affair" of August, 1943. brought a tightening of frontier regula
tions as a counterpart of intensified hostility and suspicion. Trade between Baybay
and the southern communities virtually ceases. A report of the 94th Regiment to
Colonel Kangleon's Headquarters noted that "Capt. Conopio^ recently issued an order
prohibiting the civilians, especially the Chinese merchants, to bring corn or palay
to Inopacan and other /towns/ in South Leyte."3
Trade between Baybay and Burauen, across the central mountain range of Leyte
did not bulk large during the war period. On the other hand, according to the testi
mony of Pamanian, CO of the 1st Battalion, 95th Infantry Regiment, no damming up of
goods between San Isidro and Villaba on the one side and Palompon and the Ormoc barrios
on the other side occurred. The WIJGWF needed the foodstuffs grown in the cereal bowl,
under the jurisdiction of Kangleon's division, and in return offered commodities
ûlla. 9 Sept. 1943. General Order No. 80,

O
Capt. Conopio headed the Baybay Regiment of the WIJGWF after the ouster of
Rodriguez.
3S2. 94th Inf. Regt. 29 Oct. 1943. Report to: CO, 92nd Div.
426
desired "by the others.'1' The main commercial difficulty between the two organizations
arose out of the refusal on the part of the YTDGWF to accord transit privileges 'for
wayfarers proceeding between the district of the 94th Begiment, and that of the 95th,
separated by the interposition of the Miranda territory. Miranda feared the political
and military consequences inherent in a "corridor" and steadfastly rejected all over
tures looking to that end. The traversing of the Provincial Boad by a detachment of
the 94th Infantry, en route from Inopacan to Abuyog, via Baybay, violated the "sover
eignty" of tne WIGWF domain, and constituted the opening shot of the "Baybay Incident"
Enforcement of the blockade provoked considerable ill-will among the merchants
whose trade consequently diminished, and also among the consumers, confronted with
high prices and a scarcity of needed commodities. An investigation conducted by the
Judge Advocate General of the WLGWF on the subject of propaganda adverse to the or
ganization touched upon the general effects of restrictive commercial regulations:
This office has furthermore found out that the much talked of order pro
hibiting the sale of foodstuffs to persons coming from other provinces or Jur
isdictions did much to win for us their hostility and unfriendly attitude, in
stead of their friendship. This ban was, of course, beneficial to the inhabi
tants of Western Leyte, but actually it did more harm than good, especially in
sofar as our relations with other provinces are concerned. The sailors (soka-
yonos) who came here for the purpose of buying foodstuffs, naturally felt ag
grieved and when they returned to their respective provinces, they brought bad
information about this organization. This situation had a turn for the worse
when on one occasion many bancas were ordered tied in all municipalities under
this organization. It is Baid that those who were affected by this order could
not forget about it even to the present time.2
^Capt. Pamanian asserted that San Isidro, as an exporter of cereals, became

an important factor in the provisioning of the WIGWF zone, via Palompon. Transit
through Barrio Limon and the "Ormoc Corridor" to Cappocan to purchase fish and other
commodities was a regular procedure for Ormoc civilians. Had he shut the Corridor,
Pamanian stated, he might have brought about considerable hardship for these people
of the WLGVF. if not complete strangulation of their economic life.
To balance the picture, we must note the testimony of Pamanian's assistant,
Lt. Guevara, that the WLGWF supplied Pamanian with consignments of ammunition to aug
ment the 1 imited output of Pamanian'8 own ordnance shop.
"MaJ." Francisco Corres of the Baybay sector and Mayor Eduardo Bugho of
Burauen (under the 95th Begt.) also maintained amicable relations. See.
(a) E. Bugho, Mayor, Burauen. 27 Apr. 1943. To: Lt. Col. Balderian, CO, E.Ley. Sec.
(b) A. Balderian, MaJ. Hov. 10, 1943. Letter to: "My dear Gen. Briguez".
(c) A. Balderian, HaJ. June 10, 1943. Memo for: Atty. Bufo Eaga.
Âlberto Ubay, M a J .,JAS. 1 July 1943. To: The Commanding General(through
the Adj. Gen.)
Frustrating the efforts of conscienceless merchants, actively,engrossing
available cosmodities to intensify the already existing shortage and prodace a
spiralling of prices, engaged the vigilance of the guerrilla and local officials
Hoarding became a serious offense, with penalties inflicted upon the malefactors.
In the Albuera sector, MPs and rural police were directed into
spying /upon7 stocks of rice, corn, dry goods and other commodities in the
/bodegas/ of the merchants and producers whom you know Jto have stored/ more
than what they need for one year's consumption.
Most hoarders knew how to cover up their buying skillfully, and evade detec
tion. Since desire for gain actuated them in their regrating operations, they could
be checked only through a close scrutiny of the prices they charged when disposing of
their hoardings. The military and rural police were advised "to take note and record
of selling and buying anything you see."^
■^Dread of individual starvation, not only desire for gain, acted to induce
men to lay by necessaries. But the caches of the merchant class and larger land
holders alone reached serious proportions.
San Isidro was the center of inter-island trade in North-West Leyte. As the
granary of the Island, it enjoyed a brisk trade in foodstuffs with Cebu and Bohol.
The local guerrilla detachment leader, Higino Cabilirg, undertook to regulate the
grain dealings of the landlords. He entertained a lively distrust of their business
practices. As he observed the situation, the landlords, if unregulated, would sell
to outside merchants in bulk, at prices below the competitive margin of the tenants
and small owners. The small dealers, realizing the squeeze put upon them, would be
obliged to dispose of their produce to the landlords (as Jobbers) at ruinous prices.
Cabiling, according to his own words, was sensitive to the equities of the
situation. Ee determined to end these engrossing practices, which yielded monopoly
profits to the landlords. In pursuance of this policy, he assigned marketing quotas
to the landlords that made it impossible for them to satisfy the demands of the extra-
island trade. The small producers were thus able to supplement what the big producers
offered for sale, disposing of their grain to the merchants rather than the landlords
at more satisfactory price schedules. No wonder that Cabiling was in bad odor with
the landlord class. This state of affairs may partially help to account for some of
the stories concerning his extortionate administration of his sector.
Francisco Rodriguez, sector leader of the WLGWF in Baybay, complained that
the charges of malfeasance directed against him were in large measure the. malicious
back-biting of the wealthy merchant class, opposed to the regulations of commerce
enforced to their disadvantage. .
^Benjamin C. Barte, Chief, MP Force of Batog. Dec. 20, 1942. Inst. No. 9
given to members of military and rural police,
^Benjamin C. Barte, Chief, MP Force of Batog (as reported to the Hon. Robin
Hood, Capt., Albuera Sector Fighting Unit) Bee. 13, 1942. Inst. No. 4 given to mem
bers of military and rural police at first meeting of force in Batog.
In certain instances, the offenders turned out to be not civilian-dâlers
but army officials, sometimes working clandestinely through^ their- familiesj utilizing
the convenience and shelter afforded by their position to gouge out tainted richest
Strong measures were needed as a deterrent, and they were duly incorporated in an of
ficial bulletin:
It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that officers or members

of their families are engaged in business for the purpose of controlling the
market and even to the extent of violating paragraph 1, Memorandum No. 22, c.s.,
dated February 11, 1943 on blockade on the sale of foodstuff. Such practice is
condemned by this GHQ, for it undermines the attitude of the civilian toward the
personnel under this command.
Hereafter, any officer or members of his family engaged in business or de
siring to engage in business must obtain necessary permit from the GHQ, stating
the capital and kind of business, and be subject to the limitations that may be
imposed from time to time.
Any officer violating this order will be dismissed from the service.^
Food-dealers in Tacloban and other Japanese dominated towns were willing to
pay high prices to the producers and merchants of unoccupied Leyte furnishing them
the necessaries cut off by the guerrilla-imposed blockade. The temptation to run the
blockade was great. What matter that the strength of the guerrilla resistance would
be sapped, or that their fellow townsmen might later be famished. "Laws" of supply
and demand must not be violated."3
^Some of the sub-sector commanders took advantage of their position to mulct

conaneroe for their private benefit. That such license occurred in the Ormoc sector
would accord with general hearsay among the civilians of this sector. Noya, sub
sector commander at Lao, Oimoc, was a notorious offender in this respect. Traders
arriving b y sailboat had to pay a kind of ad valorem customs charge Assessed against
their merchandise. Likewise, those carrying on transactions in the market-place were
compelled to pay a sales tax levied against the value of the produce and commodities.
Possibly, a part of this income went to meet the subsistence costs of Noya’s detach
ment. But there is evidence that Noya was a heavy gambler, and that he drew upon the
proceeds of these special assessments to cover gambling losses.
Noya was not a unique practioner of the art of fleecing merchants. Another
Bub-sector leader, Cataag, also contrived a system of levies— although it gained less
notoriety, perhaps because the income was devoted almost exclusively to troop main-v,
tenance. (Evangelista, military Justice of the peace of Oimoc, and Cpl. Juanito San
Jose of-the WLGWF, a chemist b y profession, are the sources relied upon for this in
formation.)
^ y Command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (C. S. Sabellino, Lt. Col. Inf., Chief of
Staff) 29 March 1943. Bulletin No. 4, Par. 1-3, GHQ, WIGWF.
Întoy Diaz, of the 2nd Bn., 95th Inf. Begt., was unit commander in the Taclo
b a n sector. For him a cause of perpetual vexation was the behavior of the local
civilians. Those living in the interior barrios used to go into town for trading
429
In appraising the objection to the exportation of foocl-stuffs from well-
supplied communities, the investigator must reckon with another consideration in
addition to patriotic loyalties. Sometimes, localistic selfishness operated to re
strain the "have" communities from supplying essentials to the "have-nots", even
v though the latter had been baptized in the blood of the same cause. Gluttony might
hide under the mask of "Besistance".
Captain Erfe's intelligence officer reported:
In my inspection tour, I found some of the civilians in the municipality of

Dulag were selling their foodstuffs such as corn and rice to other towns and
provinces. I suggest that this business be stooped, otherwise it would mean
scarcity of food supplies for us in the future.^-
It would aooear that this recommendation for an embargo on merchandising
transactions in this case was inspired by a prognosis of genuine scarcity in the
future. At any rate, Captain Erfe received the report in this light and directed
Dulag's "military mayor" to:
Please advise all merchants, traders, and peddlers and producers in your
municipality to cease from selling their merchandise outside to prevent starva
tion among your people.^
purposes or to purchase necessities. There were two dangers involved; (a) that the
farmers selling or trading their foodstuffs in town were indirectly abetting the
enemy, inasmuch as it was guerrilla policy to hamper Japanese operations by with
holding foodstuffs and supplies from them; (b) that some of the rural people might
connive with the enemy by transmitting guerrilla intelligence to Japanese agents,
disguised as merchants, in the course of innocent-appearing business transactions.
According to one of his former associates, Diaz' policy was to hold civilians pre
sumptively innocent until their deeds belied this presumption. Civilian trucks,
transporting supplies to Tecloban, might be fired upon if manned by Japanese guards
or Filipino constabularyinen.
The reports of the puppet governor of Leyte were replete with references to
attacks on trucks made by the guerrilla. Thus, for April, 1943, he wrote:
"Passenger truck ambushed on way, and one passenger killed."
And at the tine of the election of delegates to the Constitutional Conven
tion in August, 1943: " . . . .Women voters from the interior could not proceed to
Tacloban to vote when passenger truck was attacked by the guerrilla, resulting in the
wounding of BC Inspector Cirioco Lucanta." (Actg. Gov. Salazar. Eeport of Activi
ties: April 1-Oct. 31, 1943. To: Com. of Interior thru Dir. of Local Govts.)
^Lt. T. Aoolonio, G-2, 12 Dec. 1942. To: Capt. 9.
'Capt. 9. 12 Dec. 1942. To: Mayor Bautista.
430
Nonetheless, trade between Japanese-ruled portions of the Province and
Captain Erfe's zone continued. Such commercial minglir^ carried dangers of anti
guerrilla espionage as well as the more direct disadvantage of draining out locally-
needed foodstuffs. The "Major-General" of the citizen's militia undoubtedly had con
templated both dangers when he warned his "brigade commanders":
Bringing of carabaos and palay from one place to another must be stopped.
Merchants from Jap-occupied territories must be stopped from going from place
to place
After Captain Erfe's zone had passed under the jurisdiction of the 95th In
fantry Eegiment, controls increased in stringency. In the Dulag sector, the militia
chief, appealing to the local guerrilla detachment commander requested
reconsideration of the Memorandum of May 16, 1945--movement of palay from place

to Place within Dulag being restricted ând that it~f be revoked., and that this
Headquarters Jjviz. . the militia headquarters/ be given the privilege of controll
ing transportation of food within the 3rd. Brigade.^
The detachment commander reconsidered, his restrictive order, relaxed somewhat
its severity.'5 He was not unmindful of the hardships imposed, upon the town-dwellers,
-*Brig. Gen. Gallego. 26 April 1943. To: Brigade Commanders.

%rig. Villegas, 3rd Guer. Brig. 26 May 1943. To: Capt. Olmedo, CO, "C"
Co., 95th Inf. riegt.
^The revised order was coursed from the Dalag militia commander to his sub
ordinates:
"I am quoting herewith for youi' information and guidance and strict compli
ance the letter of the commanding officer of ’i ' Company /the redesignated ’C ’ CoJ 3
95 th Inf. Eegt.
’1. In connection with the prohibition of the passing of food-stuff within
the Sector of Dulag, strict prohibition should be made in the going out and to the
poblacion.
'2. From one place to another within Dulag,, provided not to the ’’oblacion,
should be allowed, especially if they are for home consumption only.
'3. You may give certificate to any person as permission to transport food
stuff from one place to another, provided not to ifne roblacion or outsiae of Dulag,
especially where there are Japs, like Tacloban, etc.
" 4 . To the Poblacion, our civilian population living there may be allowed
to take for their home consumption only the following:
5 gantas of corn or rice at a time, but not oftener than every 3 days
5 coconuts a week
1 bottle of oil every 3 da.y3
'5. Please be guided accordingly. (Sgd) Jesus Olmedo, Capt. Inf., Comdg.’
"From the above you will notice that foodstuffs and others should be allowed
freely to be transported from one place to another vrth; n Dulag, provided noo to the
Poblacion." (E. Villegas, 2nd Lt. Inf. Brig. Comdr. 3rd Guer. Brig., Attached to
0 5 th inf. Perl.. 25 August 1943.)
431
compelled to travel outside the Poblacion to procure foodstuffs. Simple residence
within a Japanese-occupied area did not constitute circumstantial evidence of colla
boration. Eowever, surveillance was necessary. Hence, the guerrilla limited the
number of comings and goings from the town proper to the outlying barrios of a muni
cipality. Travel restrictions moreover reduced the possibility of town merchants
buying up foodstuffs of the unoccupied areas for resale to the hungry town population
at black-market figures.
Sometimes, food dealers living in the occupied areas, confident of their
own standing, had not been comnromised to the point of forfeiting approach to the
guerrillas, and might petition the latter to allow the ingress of necessaries. One
of Tacloban's principal merchants turned to the 35th Infantry in an effusive appeal:
Sir:
. . . .1 know of your constructive policy of establishing. . . .a period of
peace throughout the province with special regard to a free pursuit of life and
happiness for the inhabitants thereof with whose association we hope some day to
live again that life of the dear old cays. Many of us are well aware of the
difficulties and privations through which the present Filipino soldiers are
undergoing in almost unexplored areas. But we also know that your sacrifice
and disinterestedness, with great perils for your own lives are all offered as
a sublime holocaust in the altar of unequaled patriotism.
This recognition leads me to think, likewise, in the difficulties of the
unknown tao and its family who during the past uncertainties have also suffered.
As a matter of fact the population of Tacloban and other occupied territories
have for a long time been striving to live on whatever meager produce could be
gotten from the narrow strips of land within their reach. . . .
I know that in this struggle a piece of your patriotic heart is also reserved
for them. . . .
In view thereof, I am availing of this ooportunity to advance the suggestion
that a constant supnly of rice sufficient to cover the daily needs of the present
nopulation of the aforesaid territories be allowed to nass your guards. . . .
let me inform you, that, there is at present constituted in Tacloban an asso
ciation named 'Leyte Corn and Bice C o m o rati on1 (Lecorda) , with the aim in view
of negotiating, if noR.=n'ble. with the unoccupied towns of the province, in order
to exchange with them, those commodities that would be most needed in either
side of this our unfortunate predicament. But in order that the purpose sought
could be made operative it is necessary that an intelligent contact with you may
be established. One link therefore is missing. Please tell me how could we
get it.
Y/ith the assurance of any high esteem and deepest sympathy for the sacred
cause, I remain.--
•klerardo Villasin. July 59, 1943, Tacloban. To: Col. Alejandra Balderian,
(through Maj. Isabelo Centino).
432
Froducers desiring to transport foodstuffs outside the guerrilla-policed
area, ostensibly for the assistance of unevacuated relatives, would apply to the de
tachment commander for a permit. Should the traveler be stopped thereafter by guer-
rillamen, he would exhibit his permit as a guarantee of safe-conduct. Unauthorized
visits to forbidden territory were undertaken at the risk of capture, liquidation
from ambush, or detention and prosecution by court martial. Trucks of the Leyte Land
Transportation, plying the Provincial F.oad between Tacloban and interior towns, fre
quently guarded by Japanese soldiers, or by Filipinos of the auxiliary Japanese Con
stabulary, were fired upon by gueMllamen lying in wait--sometimes with loss of life.
Supniies of locally-grown foodstuffs in southern Leyte were limited. Pur
chases made by outsiders reduced these already limited stores. To conserve local
produce for local consumers, Bato passed an "Ordinance prohibiting persons from out
side of this municipality from going to the barrios, mountains, and other places out
side of the poblacion with the purpose of buying and purchasing local foodstuffs and
penalizing those who violate said Ordinance."1
One of the keenly-felt grievances of the southern communities arose from the
selling policy of the north-western towns. Towns, Buch as San Isidro, Villaba and
their neighbors, Leyte's granary, found it more profitable to export to other pro
vinces, completely disregard!tig the miserable plight of' their provincial brothers to
the south. In desperation, these under-supplied communities entreated the Provincial
Board to succor them. Regarding their condition sympathetically, the Provincial
Board passed the following resolution:
VEERSAS, the food problem is getting more and more acute in the southern
coast of Leyte because this region does not bring out sufficient production of
rice and corn.
VHEREAS, the products are in great abundance in most municipalities of the
North.
VEEBSAS. these corn and rice producing towns are exporting to other pro
vinces such nrod.ucts by the thousand cavanes every year.
]Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. August, 1943. Resolution No. 41 approving Ordi
nance N -'. 14cs of Bato.
433
ALSO, to effect proper control and regulate the exportation of rice and
corn to other provinces and to purchase all rice and corn that the province
can afford to purchase.
FURTHER: in order to push through the above proposition, to appropriate
an initial amount of P10,000 from unappropriated funds to purchase palay and
corn direct from the ^planters of the North and other municipalities and to sell
the same to the general public at cost adding, however, the cost of handling,
transportation, etc. to the selling price of the same.
FURTHER: to instruct the Food Administrator to look into this matter and
act immediately while the possibilities of obtaining these products in the North
are open in the view of the present harvest, using the services of the Municipal
Treasurers as agencies for distribution in the municipalities.
FURTHER: to request all municipal councils to pass ordinances prohibiting
the exportation, of corn and rice to other provinces without previous authority
from the Governor, upon recommendation of the Food Administrator.1
By the time of the American landings, a more complete centralization of con
trol over commerce had been accomplished. Guerrilla headquarters, directing the flow
of foodstuff, sought to smooth out the disparities in the quantities of consumables
available to the populace throughout the Province. A memorandum addressed to the
mayors of the southern towns notified them:
A great quantity of corn is for sale in North and North West Leyte; especially
in barrios of Bangon, Masis, Tabing, Tabango, and Daja of the municipality of
San Isidro.
This Headquarters prohibited farmers in that part of the province to export or
to allow /the going out J of that cereal to other provinces and advised them to
sell to people from towns of South Leyte.
You will inform the people of your respective municipalities that corn could
be had in the places above-named. They should provide themselves with necessary
pass from proper army authorities.2
Placing abaca under a strict embargo, the guerrilla authorities were even
more inflexible in granting dispensations from the ban on this top-priority war m a
terial. At a session of the Provincial Board, Colonel Kangleon was requested to ap
pear
in order to find out if the army's prohibition of the exportation of abaca from
Leyte to neighboring provinces could be regulated in such a manner as to allow
abaca fiber, locally known as 'escogido' to be sold and exnorted under conditions
that it would not fall into the hands of the Jans. The Commanding Officer stated
that abaca fiber is a war material needed, by the Jap army. The prohibition of
its exportation by the army will, stand till revoked by the same authority.3
]Prov, Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 23 , 1943. Peso. No. 261 passed at 29th Ses.
'’Maj. F. Fernandez. Oct. 10, 1944. For: Mayors of /southern towns listed/.
°Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 9, 1943. Minutes of 6th Session.
434
Whenever the possibility that valued stocks of war materials and foodstuffs
might fa1! into enemy hands, guerrilla leaders would not blink at commanding their
prompt destruction. The imminence of Japanese military operations in Abuyog led
Captain landia to take action:
I ordered the burning of 200.000 kilos of coprax deposited by merchants in

their bodegas, tome first class abaca evacuated to interior. I ordered imme
diate shipment of corn to Southern towns and suspended the hauling of foodstuffs
to the poblacion. There ic,but little corn for export in Abuyog as harvest in
August are about exhausted.1
It vac the general practice of the guerrillas to curtail or suspend any
economic activity which might in any way contr .bute to strengthening the hands of the
enemy. Shipping, such as there was, came in for constant monitoring to reduce the
hazard of the Japanese overhauling pro-guerrilia vessels as prizes of war. As the
American landings drew nigh, these dangers increased correspondingly. A memorandum
addressed to the mayors of Leyte explained: "For lack of bottoms the Japs are comman
deering two-masted sailboats, and those big enough which could be used for transport
ing troops and suowlies." As a -nreventaiive , therefore , the mayors were ordered to
•oroh tbit "owners of big sail boats to 'fy them to avoid being ccmmanceered by the
«• C*
g i p o p ’ '' . ' b
After the bsti le of Leyte had gotten under way, sailing risks multiplied.
C-ôno’ Kang1eon "to avo.!r loss of life and properties" finally decided: 'Until
further orders . no banca or pail beat w f 1 be a b ’owerl to make trios from Leyte to
neighbering is] art s ."•'
^•CC of "0" Co., 2nd Bn., 94th Inf. Hegt. 27 Oct. 1943. To: CO, 9th M.D.
^lay. F. Fernandez. 24 Sept. 1944. To: All Mayors, Far. 3-4.
. K. Kangleon. 21 Lee. 1944. To: All Unit Commanders.
435
Control of Prices
All the heroic efforts waged by the leadership, military and civil, to swell
the supply of foodstuffs and other prime commodities might be nullified by the
cupidity of the few. The scanty financial resources of the army, entrusted to its
•procurement agents, would evaporate in short, order if disbursed in the purchase of
excessively over-priced goods on an uncontrolled market. And the penurious civilians
the maintenance of whose stamina and morale became a paramount concern of the resis
tance movement, would be reduced to dire starvation. Suppression of profiteering and
hâck market operations together with the adjustment of prices at a level fair to the
consumer and reasonable for the producer absorbed a considerable part- of guerrilla
attention.
Prices jumped considerably on essentials immediately that producers and hand
lers realized the scarcity of the items they had engrossed. Commodity values, in
Albuera, provided a specimen of those generally prevailing in Wes+ern Leyte.-"'- Re
porting to the Adjutant General's department, the officer in charge of food produc
tion in the Albuera sector noted that:
Market conditions of food crops are still high, higher than the prices be
fore the war, especially those dry goods. Campaign for antiprofiteering will
be done during this month so that local prices will be lowered.^
These conditions obtained, it must be emphasized, a full nine months after
the initial Japanese landings, anc when the first, wild flurry of prices subsided.
The optimism over the expected efficacy of an anti-profiteering drive soon faded. A
month iater, the same officer could only refurbish his hopes:
The prices of agricultural products in this Sector are stil] high in spite
of the anti-profiteering campaign to lower the prices of all products. But we
ho"e t o evei
By the end of 1942, the mayor could state: "Profiteering in this community
is already controlled." (E. B. Barte, Mun. Mayor, Albuera. Pec. 15, 1942. Report-
of Civil Affairs from December 1 -15, 1942, to: The Comdg. Off., VIGWU.)
The mayor's sanguine summary turned out to be an inaccurate recording of
price trends.
% . E. Eeforzado, Prod. 3rd L t . (QMS) WIGWF, in charge Food Prod. & Labor,
Albuera.^ Monthly Report for Feb., 1943, to: The Adj. Gen., GHQ, WIGWF.
° F . R. Eeforzado, Prod. 3rd L t . (QMS) WLGWF. Report for first 15 days of Mar
1943. To: The Chief, Food Prod.-Labor, GEQ, WLGWF.
436
Attempts to curb run-avay prices, based upon appeals to civic responsibility,
were unavailing. Profiteering must be made a public offense, vith penalties an
nexed. Albuera
prohibited any person engaged in business or merchants selling goods, food

commodities, and other articles exceeding the prices fixed by the Anti-
Profiteering Committee of this municipality of Albuera.^
In executing this mandate, the anti-profiteering committees floundered upon
an embarrassing snag. To their dismay, they found that the people "do not care to
declare against anybody whenever they are asked by proper authorities."3
The military and rural police were also marshalled for the task of stamping
down steep prices.^
General Headquarters was not pleased vith the headway nade. For one thing,
the anti-profiteering committees had failed to hold down the soaring prices.
Prices fixed by the Anti-Profiteering Committee are excessively high, thus

jeopardizing the interest of the civilians. It is the policy of this Command
that these conditions affecting the civilian population should be remedied
at once.
Could it be that "peso-a-year men" had volunteered their services for the
price-control campaign and remembered their former business associates when fixing
price ceilings?®
■*An article of the same ordinance imposed upon violators "a fine not less
than one peso or not more than five pesos, with imprisonment of not less than one day
or not more than five days at the discretion of the court."
This investigator has no information regarding any arraignments forviola
tion of this ordinance.
^Mun. Council of Albuera. April 15, 1943. Ord. Ho. 1, series 1943, Art. 1.
MReforzado, In Charge, Food Prod.-Labor, Albuera Sector. April 1, 1943.
Report to: Lt. Bamon Advincula, Chief, Food Prod.-Labor.
%enjamip C. Barte, Chief MP Force, Batog. Dec. 24, 1942. Instruction Ho.
17 for Military and Rural Police.
% y coimand of Brig. Gen. Briguez (Usualdo F. Laguitan, 2nd Lt., AGS). Mar.
29,1943. Memorandum Ho. 32 to: All Regimental Commanders.
^ he actual composition of the Anti-Profiteering Committee varied somewhat
from sector to sector. Generally, both military and civilian representatives were
included. In the Ormoc sector, "the sub sector Commander and the barrio Lieutenants
within his sub-sector shall /bej constituted as the Anti-Profiteering Coimittee to
control prices." (By order of commanding officer, Briguez. /Sgd. Lt. Saco 7sabellino7
12 Hov. 1942. Gen. Ord. Ho. 2 to: All sub-sector Comdrs. and Barrio Lts. , Ormoc “
Sector.)
Elsewhere, members of the Municipal Councils and teachers were enlisted. The
437
Resentment of the profit-gougers against business curbs might reach a crest
of intensity inciting them to man-handle the inspectors. In the guerrilla dominated
outskirts of Ormoc, the civil authorities prudently sought military protection for
their agents:
Attached is a list of members of Anti-Profiteering Board and Food Production

Campaign.
Request that members working inside that sub-sector be given police protec
tion while performing their duties .-*•
Miranda stated in interview that he sought to improve the situation by re
quiring producers in the zone of the WIGWF to dispose of their commodities first to
the impoverished mountain peoule. Moreover, producers were required to hold a vary
ing percentage of their produce in reserve, as a protection against famine or Japanese

\
induced emergency. Whatever remained might be disposed of by the producer in the
best market, provided he did not run athwart the stringent security regulations.
From his Carigara headquarters, Major Balderian proclaimed that "prices of
all commodities should be as that of the pre-war prices," and authorized the munici
pal council "to pass an ordinance to that effect.
Anti-Profiteering Committees, by the terms of a general order "to protect the beet
interests of the civilian consumers" were further charged with recommending appropri
ate measures to the military commanders for controlling inter-town trade. (By command
of Brig. Gen. Briguez, JjoBe T. Ibabao, Capt. Inf., the Adj. Gen/7 Dec. 31, 1942.
General Orders No. 18, series 1942, Par. 8.)
Bolding down prices of local products would be of small avail unless certain
bounds were applied to the price range on imports from other municipalities. Al
buera1s mayor complained: "Due to the lack of food supplies, goods and articles which
are of prime necessities, some people of this municipality has to buy the necessary
things from other municipalities, such as soap, etc., from Maasin, food supplies from
Ormoc, aside from some traders from other municipalities that will come to sell some
thing. Said goods and articles are purchased in high prices plus expenses. Then
naturally those traders can hardly dispose their goods in accordance to the tariff of
this municipality." In view of this situation, the mayor recommended the articula
tion of price controls within the zone of the WIGWF by a "unified tariff. . . .giving
slight differences in price for transportation expense from one place to another."
(E. Barte, Mayor, Albuera. Report of Civil Affairs for Feb., 1943. /indorsed, C.
Daffon7, Par. 2, "Profiteering".)
^1. Taganas. Ormoc Military Mayor. 13 Feb. 1943. To: Commander, Sub-Sector
No. 5, WIGWF.
^Corml Flores (Sgd. Flores) USAFFE, CO, East Leyte. Nov. 27, 1942.
438
Price stabilization edicts were futile without executive enforcenent. An
"Office of the Anti-Profiteering Officer" was created within the framework of East
Leyte's "Politico-Military Government!' The duties of this official involved actual
apprehension of violators.^
Too many factors militated against an effective policing, of the commodity
market. In August of 1943 , a guerrilla intelligence report cculd but grimly repeat
the need for price control while naively averring that there wa3 "no reason for the
2
exhorbitant prices".
Concentration of Japanese troops in the Tacloban area and the activity of
their patro1s increased the nrofLiability of trafficking in scarce commodities. Pro
visioning the short-rationed townspeople of Tacloban yielded rich returns. Sound
business sense dictated the diversion of foodstuffs to the forbidden town mart, re
gardless how acute the needs of the guerrilla troops and the non-collaborating barrio-
folk. Such transactions further aggravated the price situation within the guerrilla
jurisdiction.
^The appointee to this office set forth the risks incidental to discharge
of duty:
"I have the honor to request that, in my capacity as an Anti-Profiteering
Officer, I be allowed to possess and carry a revolver for my personal protection in
the performance of my official duties. . . .
"Luring these days of rising emergency, I have to travel mostly in the
country in order to get in touch with people who are engaged in domestic trade and
commerce with a view of apprehending violators. he cannot expect people, especially
the re calc itrant and hostile persons . to give us full respect, if we fail to make a
good and decent front which carries with it the dignity and pres to ge proper to an
Office Fead in the province. It is therefore, obvious that the nature of my work de
mands a firearm in safeguarding the interests of the Government. . . . ” (Vicente F.
Jaca. Anti-Profiteering Officer, Feb. Of, 1949. To: The Hen. Politico-Military
Governor, Genl. Ha., Teyte Guerrilla Force.)
The psychology of the Anti-Frcfiteering Officer was by no means unsound. In
a period of political and moral subversion, the making of a good friend was of supreme
importance — whether in relationship between guerrilla leaders and the populace , rival
.vuerri’â ">eaders. cr the Japanese military administration and the subjugated. Fili
pinos. Vith infinite variations upon the same theme, the self-constituted authorities
strove to demonstrate that theirs was an over-powering might, but to be employed, vith
res+raint and beneficence so long as cooreeration was forthcoming. i-
The request of the Anti-Profiteering Officer was approved: ” . . . .his're-
nue 3 1. herein to possess and carry a revolver while m the discharge Ci fee duties per
taining to his office approved.” (Politico-Military Gov. ac reb. 19±4 . Iso Inoor.)
~ -B. Aguilos, Cant., S-2. Intelligence Report No. 10 of 95th Inf. Hegt. for
period from Aug. 15th to 31st, 1943.
439
Persisting in his anti-inflationary drive, Balderian nonetheless tacitly
conceded defeat. "In view of scarcity of palay and price correspondingly raised,"
he explained to the procurement officers, "you are allowed to purchase palay from P4
to 4.50 per cavan.
The municipalities of East Leyte, severally advancing to the skirmishers line
in efforts to reinforce the staying campaign of the military authorities, soon felt
out the formidahii it-y of the enemy. In La P a z , the Municipal Council despaired of
horning nrices at a single 1ine. Amending an earlier ordinance, pegging prices at
a lower figure, it staked out, the permissible bounds within which prices might fluc
tuate--an area ample enough to allow increases of 100$. Payments above five pesos
per sack were forbidden to the buyer, as acceptance was denied the seller.^-0
Southern Leyte, faced with the substantially same conditions promulgated
similar restrictive decrees, comparably ineffective.^ That all of the municipalities
failed to act in concert on this issue constituted a never-ending exasperation.
Maasin, instituting its own price-control ordinance, supplicated the Provincial
Board that it urge its sister-town, Macrohon, to follow suit. Following the pre
scribed formula, the Provincial Board endorsed the matter to Macrohon "for information
and consideration.
■'•A. Balderian, 95th Inf. 11 Sept. 1943. To: All Procure. Off., 3rd Bn.
^Resolution No. 65: Councilor S. Trinchera proposed that Emergency Ordinance
Mo. 8, current series , fixing the prices cf palay and. corn to be sold at P3.00 and
PR .50 ner sack, respectively, be amended and approved as fol lows: "Municipal Ordi
nance Mo. ]0— Be It Ordained. . . .
"Section 1. It is hereby strictly rrohibited that any person or persons,
association or entity, engaged in selling or buying palay or corn, either for public
or private consumption is only allowed to buy or sell such palay or corn at prices
ranging from PP.50 un to P5.00 rer sack.”
■-'Mun. Counc. of La Paz _/Antero Trecene, Mun. Sec tv// Mun. Ord. Iio. 10,
adopted on "5th day of July, 1943.
-Res . Mo. 108 of the Prov. Bd . of Free Leyte, adopted at its 15th Session,
Sept. 9. 1943, approving: "Ordinance Mo. 20. under Resolution Mo. 99, cs, of Abuyog,
fixing prices of foodstuffs and other local commodities and providing penalties for
any violation of its provisions."
^rov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept., 1943. Resolution H o . 163 indorsing Reso
lution Mo. 60, cs, of Maasin.
440
Price stabilization remained a matter to be pressed in each community, separ
ately . The Provincial Board was in no position to concentrate the reins of" regula
tion in its own grasp. However, some coordinated policy was unavoidable. The Beso-
lution of the Provincial Board, creating the office of Provincial Food Administrator,
vested in M m , among other tMngs, responsibility ". . . .to study and find out ways
by which price control in each municipality may be effective
Implementing this plan, the Provincial Board subsequently determined to in- -
dorse all:
Price Control Ordinances passed by municipal councils in Free Leyte to the

Food Administrator. . . .for him to study cautiously the various prices. . . .
in order to check up the rises of orices. . . .and also profiteering. In order
to carry out successfully the rd an of this Board to furnish all Municipal Coun
cils in Free Leyte with conies of a model ordinance for them to adopt. . . .
Further Besolved that the Food Administrator. . . .submit to the Board a proposed
ordinance which shall fix and regulate prices of commodities and prohibit profi
teering. ^
Foodstuffs were not the only commodities of enhanced price on the consumer
market. The various service enterprises, enjoying a choice position in respect to
demand, boosted their charges commensurately. Transportation was such an enterprise.
The initial Japanese seizure of motor vehicles, bicycles, and carriages followed by
occasional, guerrilla commandeer!ngs, put a premium on whatever transportation facili
ties still remained. Owners of tartanillas were quick to hoist their fees. Should
they not capitalize upon their fortunes in retaining assets of income-yielding value
in these hard times?
The citizens obliged to engage the service of hacks thought otherwise.
Bringing pressure to bear, they forced through some of the municipal councils certain
restrictive measures. Inter-municipal travel would remain hampered, however, until
uniform regulations had been imposed. Such were the thoughts of the people of
Hilongos as their local legislative body besought the Provincial Board "to fix the
tariff on tartanillas of these seven municipalities, Inopacan to Macrohon, for
^Prov. Bd . of Free Leyte, Aug. 30, 1943. Be solution Bo. 67, Par. 5, adopted
at its 10th Session.
Prcv. B d . of Free Leyte. Resolution Bo. 164.
unification purposes". And the Board seconded the resolution, indorsing "to the
municipal councils of the municipalities named, requesting favorable action as they
may deem wise in order to bring about the purpose of said resolution."1
Notwithstanding all efforts, exhortatory or punitive, the swollen bubble of
ascending prices would not be pricked. Striking the same somber chord as their con
freres at the other end of the Island, the intelligence officers of the South
chronicled: "Price abnormally high. Government efforts to control difficult because

O
of the law of supply and demand."
This "law of supply and demand" became a malevolent demiurge, not to be op
posed, much less overcome. In other words, the cornering of a limited supply of
commodities to be released at scarcity prices by avaricious speculators was equated
to the self-workings of an iron law. Such economic reasoning must inevitably condone
consumer exploitation no matter how sonorous the appeals to desist and how legion
the regulatory ordinances.
The collapse of the guerrilla government during the Jananese "mopping-up"
camnaign at the c ose of 194? could only nortend an intensification of this condition.
Had the military made a determined and sustained effort to punish violators
of the published schedule of fair prices, perhaps greater headway at holding down the
cost of living could have been achieved. Why did they withhold prosecution and
punishment? Dulag's procurement officer suggested the reason:
Prices may be controlled but it is not advisable because if it is done ,

there is a need of calling the army to help maintain the price; then the people
will feel that the army is making too much use of its power, which may result
in the lack of confidence of the people of the real purpose of the army.1-*
In this extract, we find the key term "the people" mentioned, with the pre
diction that the people would resent military intervention to force down prices.
Iprov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 26, 1943. Pee. Ho. 294 of Bd. adopted at
its 30th Session endorsing H e s . 179 cs of Hilongos .
^S-2, 94th Inf. Eegt. Intelligence Deport, from Aug. 1, 1943 to Sept. 30,
1943. To: G-2, 92nd Inf. Civ.
Êugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., Procurement and Supply Officer, 95th Inf.
Fegt. (Actg. Mun. Mayor, Dulag). Sept. 10, 1943. To: Prov. Gov., in the Field,
p. 4.
But this is a somewhat equivocal usage of the term, "people” . Most likely, it is a
shortened form of the expression, "the people who count”--notably, the petty busi
ness interests and politicians of the locality. These might lose confidence in "the
reel purpose of the army" if they had grounds for believing that the military was
becoming the backer of a little "welfare state". The military harbored no such in
tentions , and was anxious not to offend local "interests" by injudicious benevolence.
Any summation of economic affairs in the resistance areas of Leyte would be
but careless generalization, unless it could be broken down into specifications of
time and place. In north and east Leyte, "during the first year of the Japanese
occupation, the people have abundant food. The great masses of the people have
turned to farming. . . .Our food supply swelled high with the stoppage of our export?1
The guerrilla benefited from the ample supplies of foodstuffs, the peoole
giving unstinting1 y. In the case of the property-holders dwelling in Tacloban and
other town centers, the guerrilla simply appropriated what they needed. "Their
carabaos, usually in the hands of their tenants, who usually are guerrilleros them
selves, are confiscated. . . .Bice, corn, and all products of their land go likewise
to the guerrilla."2
Some fishing and handicraft activities were carried on in this region, but
chiefly for barter purposes. The guerrilla discouraged and actively prevented direct
trading between the interior municipalities and Tacloban.
In 1943, Japanese patrol activities along the main coastal road out of Taclo
ban were intensified. Many of the dwellers along this patrol route were caught be
tween the hammer of guerrilla attack and the anvil of Japanese occupation. What the
economic situation was in this "borderland" may be judged by a glimpse of Dulag in
1943. A guerrilla procurement officer wrote:
Because of the good understanding between the people of the 'poblacion' and
the barrio people, the inhabitants, generally speaking, do not find it. risky to
go on in the pursuit of their toils. However, because of the presence of the
■Potente, op. cit. , p. 14. 2lbid ., p. 5.
443
enemy which is synonymous to terror, the people are on the alert always, try
ing always to escape from the sight of the Japanese whenever they can. They
clear the lands with double effort and planting all kinds of crops available.
Financially speaking, approximately 60$ of the people have their earning
capacity paralysed. These 60$ of the people depend upon the harvest of their
crops for their income. But thinking that their earnings is not enough for their
own subsistence, they are forced not to sell. Hence the lack of pecuniary income.
Commerce is not extensively carried. Peddlers help the miniature commercial
activity. . . .Of industries engaged— the more extensive is the weaving of abaca
cloth. 50$ of the manufactured products are exported while the other half is
being used by the natives for their own use. Then there is the making of abaca
sliupers, sandals, mats and hats.
Salt making along the coast is also carried for home consumption
In west and south Leyte, agriculture and handicrafts were carried onlargely
without direct Japanese interference, but within the limitations imposed by a general
state of war. Uhen the guerrilla auditor arrived inMaasin in September, 1943, after
a perilous trip from north Leyte, he found:
Commerce was flowing freely. . . .Commerce was being carried with Bohol, Min
danao, parts of Cebu and Negros. Commercial sailboats always paraded the seas,
day in and day out. The market places in Bate, Maasin and Ichon (Macrohon) were
jammed with people; though the prices of commodities have already shown marked
increase. . . .Cotton clothing was sold as high as P5.00 a meter. But prices did
not matter much to the people, so long as there were no Japs to bother them.
The principal industry taken up by the people was soap-making, originating
from Maasin. One Filipino in that town happened to discover the secrets and
techniques of a Chinese soap maker. Ee lost no time in setting up his own fac
tory of soap. _/He used/ local materials --lime, ashes of trees cut from mangroves
and seashores, and coconut oil. Very soon Boap factories grew like mushrooms in
Maasin, then to adjacent municipalities. Big quantities of soap were coming out
from that region.
A kilo of this soap was being sold in Maasin at that time as low as P.15.
They were exported through the Japanese barriers to Manila, Cebu, Negros, Iloilo
and Mindanao, and there they commanded prices of as high as P I .00 or over, per
kilo. (The fabrication of this soap has been abandoned with the landing of the
Americans, because the people found out that the soap brought in by the Americans
was far superior in quality to the locally fabricated, soap.)
Another industry is the weaving of clothes. . . .This was principally the oc
cupation of women in Bato, Matalom and other adjacent towns. Ladies who should
have been studying in high schools, colleges and universities have taken up hand
weaving of abaca clothes this time as their occupation in those regions. Many of
them became so expert that to witness them at work, they seemed to move like ma
chines. Some of them could finish as much as 3 rolls a day. The 'ugpak' or
crude cloth sold at P 3 .00 per roll , and the 'pinokpok’ (beaten by sticks) or the
smooth and finer kinds cost P3.50 to P4.00.
Another industry taken by the people was the production of salt. This occu-
nation was taken not on1 v by people of Leyte but also in Samar, Bohol and possibly
in many other provinces. The seashore at that time was lined up with smoking
-Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt. Inf., Procurement and Supply Officer, 95th Inf.
Eegt. (Actg. Mun. Secty., Dulag). Sept. 10, 1945. To: Prov. Gov., in the Field,
p. 3.
444
furnaces where the sea water is boiled, and then mixed with coconut milk to pur
ify the salt and make the product crystal white.
There were also the fabrications of abaca slippers, hats, baskets, handbags
of different types, originating only from this war.1
It should be pointed out that the impetus given to the development of these
handicrafts was in large part traceable to the guerrilla authorities themselves.
They were determined to expand the Bupply of goods on hand. This entailed not only
the inhibitions on commerce intended to effecutate a more equitable distribution and
assure their own supply, but also the positive stimulation of production. In west
Leyte, the shortage of clothing was acutely felt. Abaca became the multi-purpose
miracle material, used not only in basketry but in cloth-weaving as well. In Baybay,
the guerrillas encouraged Mayor Tan to bring about the founding of weaving shops— an
enterprise that achieved considerable success. Tan asserted that there were fewer
than TO weavers at work when he assumed office, and that the figure increased to well
over 100.
The guerrilla also encouraged the extraction of salt from sea water by evapor
ation, and the making of soap by combining coconut oil with lime.
1944 brought the Japanese reoccupation of all Leyte and with it, the end of
most of these activities. The main guerrilla effort, as far as economic affairs were
concerned, was to afford protection for the rice harvesters before Japanese patrols
could confiscate the produce. The people in the interior barrios had to keep con
stantly on the move, using their wits to survive. And in the garrisoned town centers
as described elsewhere, economic activity was virtually in suspension. The resulting
extreme state of destitution befalling the people of Leyte was strikingly revealed
to the American troops as they drove forward to liberate the Island.
-‘-Potente , c p . cit. , pr>. 11, 28-39.

(see also: St. John, on. cit. , p. 122.
R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.
445
The Problem of Currency
So long as the guerrilla leadership did not adopt a program of general con
fiscation, it stood in sore need of money. And further, so long as civilian produc
ers in the resistance territories had surplus goods at hand, they too reauired hard
cash. As we have seen, economic life in guerrilla territory did not revert to a
system of barter, although direct exchange of commodities constituted an important
factor. The convenience of a monetary tender was perhaps even more generally appre
ciated because of the increased mobility of the population, and the need to convert
property into consumables.
In this section, we will consider the problems which stood in the way of a
prompt settlement of the money question by the guerrilla authorities. We shall dis
cuss the measures they adooted under the circumstances. We will also touch upon two
related issues of importance for Leyte's population: (a) the currencies emitted by
the guerrilla authorities of neighboring provinces, and their reception in Leyte;
(b) the need for small charge in Leyte, in the transaction of daily affairs.
But first we must say a word concerning the guerrilla attitude towards the
Japanese fiat money. Military notes emitted by the Japanese Military Administration
were sternly proscribed within the domains of unoccupied Leyte.J In the no-man's
land, regions nominally under Japanese control, but thinly garrisoned, infrequently
patrolled, and subject to guerrilla forays, possession of Japanese money might be
deemed prima facie evidence of pro-Japanese leanings. The population dwelling within
the penumbra of guerrilla control lived in a state of precariousness. The proximity
cf Japanese troops and their puppet auxiliaries necessitated the transaction of busi
ness affairs in a Japanese monetary medium. Yet, the possibility of guerrilla visi
tations was a dreadful prospect to those retaining the interdicted currency. Fearful
was the dilemma.
-LIn the words of the puppet Governor: "In places dominated by them, they £the
guerrillas/ force the people to accept emergency notes. When they see Japanese mili
tary notes, they destroy them, and punish or hill people for using them. . . . "
(3. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 31, 1942. To: Jap. Mil. Adm. for List, of Visayas.)
Also, see: Ingham, o p . cit., pp. 165-6.
446
A memorandum "by a sector commander to the local officials under his Juris-
.diction spelled out the attitude of the guerrilla towards Japanese currency:
You are hereby directed to stop immediately the circulation of Japanese

money in your municipality by advising the peorle to refrain from accepting it
as a medium of exchange. It is contraband of war. All persons who are in pos
session of any such money shal1 surrender it immediately to the municipal trea
surer who will turn over all collections to the military advisers. All treasurers
are advisee, when receiving the money of the enemy, to write the names of the
possessors and the serial numbers corresponding to the denominations of the money
being surrendered without issuing official receipts therefore, as publishing the
list of persons who have obeyed this order in conspicuous places in the munici
pality shall be deemed sufficient acknowledgment for reparation purposes in the
future. Possessors of Japanese money are given until November 20, 1942 to com
ply; thereafter, for noncompliance, they will be considered engaged in the fur
therance of the enemy's cause.^
The average Leyteno, if free to do so, would spurn Japanese "Mickey Mouse"
money. Its nominal value was invariably diminished in any exchange involving ore-war
money or emergency notes. Every upswing of civilian morale, based upon receipt of
encouraging war news or rumors of impending American landings was accompanied by a
corresponding depreciation of Japanese-sponsored tender. Even in the occupied areas,
Japanese money was devalued in clandestine exchanges, so that an intelligence report,
at the close of 1943, could state: "In every occupied area, the exchange is 1 pesos
to 2.20 pesos Japanese money.
Snecjal circumstances warranted the making of an exception to the general
rule orohibiting circulation of Jananese money:
Jan notes given to operatives should be used in raying civilian operatives

who are residing inside the Jan territories, and that money can be used in pur
chasing articies for home consumption. If our money is used, civilian operative
carrying it will be identified and his value to the organization in carrying out
his mission is lost.0
What, then, was to serve as money? Prior to the Japanese attack upon the
Philippines, when war clouds were already lowering, the Philippine Legislature had
declared a state of emergency, and vested certain extraordinary powers in the Chief
----------------------------v --------------------------------------------------------
1Filemon Pabilona, H a ^ .. L.G.F., Sector Cmdr. & Mil. Adviser. 2 Nov. 1942.
Memo. To: Mun. Mayors and Treas. of Alangalang, Batatngon, Barugo and San Miguel.
2Col. B . K . Kangleon. 5 Nov. 1943. Intelligence Keport To Col. W. W. Fertig.
^4aJ. A. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf. Begt. Nov., 1944. To: 3rd Lt. Francisco
D. Sosing, S-2, 3rd Ban.
447
Executive. Among these povers was included far-reaching controls over currency.
Herein lay the currency power later arrogated by the guerrillista.1
Before departing from the Philippines, President Quezon had assigned to Leyte
a quota of paper money for printing. Printing got under way, but the arrival of the
Japanese put a temporary quietus to the e n t e r p r i s e E c o n o m i c activity in unoccupied
Leyte was severely hampered by the scarcity of currency in circulation. To this
problem, the guerrilla leaders directed their attention.
What instigated Captain Glicerio Erfe to take action within his zone of East
Leyte was the urgent matter of subsisting his troops. After much pondering over al
ternative schemes for dealing with this necessity, the GHQ of Erfe's "11th Guerrilla
Pivision” decided in favor of the direct disbursement of pay to the troops. But what
sort? A guerrrt'a unit enjoyed no legal warrant per se to emit currency that would
-One of Col. Kangleon's directives to his unit commanders recapitulated the

nature of this delegation of power:
" . . . .(a) Only Philippine legislature can authorize issue of currency or
bill 3 with money value .
"(b) Prior to outbreak of war, Legislature passed the Emergency Powers to
President of Philippines.
"(c) By Emergency Powers A.ct, President created the different Emergency cur
rency boards in different provinces of Visayas and Mindanao to be composed of the
Provincial Auditor as Chairman and Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Fiscal as mem
bers for each province." (Col. Kangleon jj. P. Keyes, A&iJ 13 Sept. 1943. Memo for:
Unit COs of 92iid Liv. and Mun. Treasurers of 9th MB.)
O
Enrique Potente, guerrilla auditor for Col. Kangleon, gave a clear resume of
what had occurred: ,fWe were printing the pre-invasion issue of the Leyte Emergency
Currency notes at the small town of San Miguel, you already know,when news came to
us to the effect that the military and civil authorities of Leyte had decided to sur
render to the Japanese invaders. It was during those Jittery days, I believe about
May 20, 1942. We were shocked at hearing the news, as precisely we were printing the
emergency currency notes authorized by the President of the Commonwealth of the Phil
ippines to finance the resistance against the invaders. The printing of emergency
money, by the way, was necessary because no money from Manila was forthcoming, as the
capital was already occupied by the Japanese; and a shipment of money which was sup
posed to be destined to us had gone to the bottom of the sea with the sinking of the
S. S. Corregidor. On May 23, 1942, in comnliance with definite orders, we stopped
the printing of the money, and we burned the unissued notes and those partly printed
notes on the nlaza or town square of San Miguel. Our chief in the printing shop,
Mr. Albert.o Santa Cruz, Provincial Auditor, who was taking charge of the accounting
matters tol'd us that there had been is sued over six hundred thousand pesos to the
military and civi' government of the notes we have printed. (Potent, o p . cit. , p.l)
448
circulate as legal tender, even within its own Jurisdiction. Monetary authority of
that species was an incident of the operation of legitimate constituted government--
in this instance, carrying on from without the Philippines. By no official decree
of the Quezon government-in-exile had there occurred a valid delegation of plenary
power to the several military administrations functioning piece-ireal as a resistance
movement. Assumption of authority to print and emit paper money would be stark
usurpation, denounceable by the recognized government at a later date. Holders of
such fiat currency would find nothing by sheaves of irredeemable paper in their
possession.
And yet, 3 r f e 1s organization must find its pecuniary sinews or collapse. A
hopeful solution to this aggravating dilemma appeared in a radiogram from South-Ue3t
Pacific Headqu a r t e r s , addressed to the then chief of intelligence in the Yisayas ,
General Macario Pera.1ta. Its pertinent norticn read:
... .IT IS HOT. . . .P7ACTICABIZ TO ISEUE MCIiEY STOP YOU SHOULD ISSUE TO
YOU? MEN CEDTIFICATES SHOWING THAT THE UNITED STATUS OWES THEM PAY AS AOCPUED
STOP S B U T AD CERTIFICATES CAP BE USED AS T ' T U P H D STOP FOP FEFAITA FPOM GEHEPAI
MACAPTHU? STOP THE TOUTED STATES TILL HOKCP. THEM II'T DUS COUPES OF TIMS STOP
This writer o eery of the radiogram, allegedly a "True Copy'’ of a copy, ic
dated ]C; December 1941. Possibly this copy is spurious, and an original may be non
existent. At any rate, the putative instructions arrived at the GEC. through liaison
from Peralta, and were interpreted as declaratory' of guerrilla competency to devise
some monetary scheme. And within the Erfe zone, it was widely assumed that whatever
measures were drafted to implement this project were predicated upon ilmerican bene-
ficance--the guarantee of the financial Gibraltar to Indemnify holders of these pro
missory' notes.
The preamble to the resolution adopted by Erfe's organization setting up the
ad-mini strati re machinery for the printing of the currency' cited the exigency of the
situation:
whereas the uresent economic situation in the province of i^yte requires an

^t p Gnp “* 'Orat’i
*ve rer.e''v which, in cur c"..r. -ir , ro ■
. .-* upon --e c^.rou_i.ation
of Emergency Notes throughout the nrovince:
449
Whereas, our pre-war hills had heen and are being collected by the Japanese
forces and the printing of the same had been stopped;
Whereas, we, who are gathered here deem it necessary and indispensable to
continue the printing of the Emergency Currency Notes under previous authority
in order to mate effective the resistance of our soldiers and relieve civilians
from the present economic hardships. . . .1-2
A scanning of log entries made by Captain Erfe indicates interminable delays
in the execution of this ingjortant project.5 Several factors were responsible for
the delay, lack of equipment essential for printing constituted a material handicap.
Even more inhibitory was the hostile attitude of Colonel Kangleon to the emission of
certificates by what he deemed an illegal, insurgent organization. Subtle distinc
tions between certificates and bona fide tender were meaningless to Eaigleon. As
far as he was concerned, this scrip was endowed with purchasing power and was intended
to circulate as a medium of exchange— hence possessing the attributes of money. Erfe
4 h i s Resolution, drafted Mar. 1, 1943, at Camp San Gabriel, "Office of the

Military Adviser" (Capt. Erfe) was subscribed to by all of the top-ranking officers
and special functionaries.
‘'Some confusion regarding the character and backing of these notes led "Col."
Ramon L. Mercado, Auditor, GHQ, to include the following clarificatory statements in
his address at the Conference of May 18, 1943: "Those days when our Commanding Gen
eral, Gen. MacArthur, has left the Philippines, we were like chicks without a mother
hen. . . .Now that it has come to our mind that he left us without any means by which
we could survive, he has come to us in the way that he sent messages I believe to his
commanders so that these commanders were authorized to issue certificates to pay
soldiers fighting against our common enemy. There are probably people who do not
know about certificates because this is not entirely like the Emergency Currency Note.
These certificates. . . .we are determined to issue to pay our men negotiable in its
face and redeemable at any time either before or after this war when the American
Government shall be able to furnish us the needed amount that we shall ever incur or
pay men who are fighting their common enemy.” (Minutes of the Conference held on
May 18, 1943, at Bugho, Abuyog.)
5ConciBe entries in the Diary of Capt. Erfe highlight the progress in the
formulation of the currency scheme:
"March 9 : Conference with Guerrilla Major General Pedro Gallego and Staff;
Guerrilla trig. Gen. Eduardo Bugho and Staff ^from Burauen/; Guerrilla Brig. Gen.
Bernardo Closa and staff ff r cm Abuyog? Col, Ramon L.. Mercado end other responsible
men in the Guerrilla Organization. Financial matters \ere discussed, especially about
monetary problems for the pay of our soldiers in the field.
_ "April 4: Conference with Guerrilla Officers, 11th Division, Auditor, Mpal
/municipal/ {Treasurers & Mayors. Draftirg of the Resolution to continue the printing
of emergency currency notes, in order to remedy the financial condition of the pro
vince of Leyte.
"April 12: Conference was held in barrio Bugho, Abuyog, regarding the print
ing of the Emergency Currency Notes. Said conference was continued on the next day
at the poblacion of Abuyog.
"April 19: Conference at Abuyog presided by Col. R. K. Kangleon. Subjects
discussed: . . . .Printing of Emergency Money, etc.
"May 18: Conference at Bugho represented by Brigade Staffs, Division Staff,
450
himself was not too fastidious in insisting upon these distinctions, since he de
signated this scrip as "Emergency Currency Notes".
The actual printing of the currency vas conmitted by the officers resolution
of March 1, 1943, to the "Leyte Emergency Currency Board, created by the Commander in
Chief by virtue of his power to print the amount necessary to remsdy the situation.”
There is a bit of presumptousness in this resolution, casting as it does the
mantle of sponsorship by the President upon the therein provided Board. Or is the
"Commander in Chief" simply Captain Erfe, drawing upon certain assumed "war powers"?^
J
To underscore the legality of its proceedings, and to demonstrate the ground
ing of this scheme upon solid popular support, the Board on the printing of Emergency
Currency Certificates recommended the furnishing of
the Municipal Council of each of the five municipalities (Abuyog, Burauen, Dulag,
La Paz, and Tolosa) that comprise the 95th Infantry Regiment a copy of the reso
lution made by the ranking officers. . . .regarding the printing. . . .and re
questing at the same time that Body jîunicipal Councils, respectively/ to pass
a resolution on their stand on the former resolution and the creation of the
board for the purpose.
The Board also promised that: "The release of the said certificates will be
made not later than June ], 1943.
Regimental Staff Jot the combat unit/, Members of the Guerrilla War Tribunal, Naric,
Liaison Officer. Finance Division, treating the printing of Emergency Circulating
Certificates. (The original of this Diary is in the possession of Capt. Erfe’s form
er Adjutant, Silverio T. Paza, of Tacloban. A "true copy" was indited in my pre
sence.)
^The President of the Guerrilla War Tribunal, "Brig. Gen." Galicano Enerlan,
was installed as chairman. The Auditor and the Finance and Disbursing Officers very
logically were designated co-members.
The possibilities of counterfeiting and embezzlement impelled Erfe to ad
dress a special memorandum to his Auditor:
"2. Rush also the issuing of financial regulations in accordance with exist-,
ing lawB for the guidance and compliance of accountable and responsible officers.
"3. During the printing of the emergency notes, it is required that. . . .
all printing paraphernalia shall be well guarded to insure that no duplicates shall
be able to leak." (Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt. Inf., Mil. Adv. 26 April 1943. Memo to:
Col. Ramon L. Mercado. j M f i A & r i t of Ramon L. Mercado,âdjured before the Prov.
Fiscal at Tacloban, Leyte, on Jan. 10, 1946: Exhibit ‘T M y ) •
2Minutes of Meeting of Board on May 16, 1943, Bugho, Albuera, 4:00 p.m.
^Ramon L. Mercado, a ff i a n t 7 ~ Exhibit "F-.
451
Belatedly, the essential equipment and materials were collected and the
operation of printing actually commenced. Before any of these certificates could he
fingered hy the civilian population, Captain Erfe, Auditor Mercado and others were
arrested and concentrated at Matalom by Col. Buperto K. Kangleon on the flimsy

charge of masquerading, organizing a guerrilla other than the one he was organ
izing, and that Col. Erfe and his staff were printing and circulating emergency
currency notes.
The WIGWF did not adopt the expedient of printing money for the financing of
military activities. Not that the organization had any objection to this practice
2
per se. Utilization of other fiscal devices obviated the necessity of taking this
step. Nor did Major Balderian’s "Politico-Military Government" undertake to print
its own currency. Only in the domains of "Free Leyte" was the printing of money
boldly, as if of right, carried out.
On restoring a provincial government, Colonel Kangleon assumed that authority
to continue the printing of emergency money, interrupted by the Japanese invasion,
had devolved upon his government, within the limits prescribed for Leyte by President
Quezon. Beyond this sum, Kangleon would not go until he had secured approval from
the government-in-exile. Bis later instruction to the Emergency Currency Board
constituted a clarification:
. . . .You can print amount of PI,400 ,000.00, the remainder of the P2,000,000.
authorized for 1942. This headquarters will advise you to print another amount
when authority for it is received from President Q u e z o n . ^”4
Âffidavit of Bamon L. Mercado, p. 2.

^This information was derived from the former Civil Affairs Officer of the
WLG-WF, Atty. Teleron, in the course of an interview at his Ormoc residence, Feb. 1946.
% . K. Kangleon. 4 Nov. 1943. GHQ, 9th MD, par. 2-3.
În his Proclamation of July 19, 1943, reconstituting the Prov. Govt., Col.
Kangleon included instructions bearing upon monetary matters:
" . . . .That the Provincial Board will proceed to print Emergency Notes as
required by Executive Order of the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
(Proclamation of Col. Kangleon. 19 July 1943. Par. 8.)
Having determined to print money, Kangleon had to set up an instrumentality
to execute this project. The Provincial Board acted to create an "Emergency Currency
Board to be composed of Auditor, Fiscal, and Treasurer with instructions that they
wotfd immediate]y proceed to the printing of Emergency Notes, taking into considera
tion the demand for ca^h within Leyte and complying with the order of the CO, 9th MD."
(Prcv. B d . of Leyte. Res. No. 5. 26 July 1943. 1st Session.)
452
Having decided to print money, Colonel Kangleon had next to procure the
necessary paraphernalia. Mr. Potente condensed a long chronicle of disappointnente:
"Along with my duties as Provincial Auditor of Free Leyte," wrote Mr. Potente
they designated me as Chairman of the New Leyte Emergency Currency Board which was
established for the purpose of printing the Leyte Emergency Currency Notes."
(Potente, op. cit.. p. 17)
The need for money vas sufficiently acute to galvanize Col. Kangleon into
action, collecting the necessary paraphernalia and materials for the Job. Yet, whil
confident that the printing of this currency was not only a matter of utmost exi
gency, but also entirely legal, he cautiously forbore from actually releasing it unt
he had received explicit confirmation from abroad. He could scarcely act otherwise
in view of his high-handed treatment of Capt. Erfe and his staff. To the Provincial
Treasurer he wrote: "I have wired Quezon asking his authority for release. Hold fo:
orders." (Col. E. K. Kangleon. 23 Sept. 1943. To: The Prov. Treas.)
The radiogram referred to was coursed through Brig. Gen. Fertig in Mindanao:
"Quezon authorized Leyte Provincial Board print 52,000,000.00 for 1942. Only
PS00 .000.00 was printed and released. Eemaining 51,400,000.00 being printed. Ee-
quiremsnts new Currency Board fulfilled. Eequest authority release emergency notes.
Need badly." (Col. E. K. Kargleon. 23 Sept. 1943, To: Gen. Fertig)
Some days later, the anxiously awaited reply was received: 'Your recommenda
tions on personnel of Leyte Currency Board have been approved by Quezon. Proceed
with release of currency. Don't allow army to become involved in printing."
(Gfen. Fertig. 29 Sept. 1943. To: Col. Kangleon)
The injunction on avoidance of military involvement in the printing process

Col. Kangleon Btrictly obeyed. Since the army would become the primary beneficiary
of the released currency, there must be no taint of suspicion that it was printitg
money with one hand and taking it as it came off the press with the other. By en
trusting the actual printing to civilian authorities, Col. Kangleon could escape
possible charges cf defalcation, forgery, or organized plunder. Whatever money the
army would receive should be free of duress, the voluntary donation of the civilians
to their own combat troops.
Oddly enough, it was his American Chief-of-Staff, "MaJ." Eichardson, who
sought to persuade Col. Kangleon to take over this Job:
"My idea was to have the army print its own money, but Quezon refused. He
said that must remain in the province of the civil government. I imagine it would
be too easy for an army to balance its books." (Wolfert, op. cit. , p. 167)
(See also: St. John, op. cit. , pp. 109-110)
So it was with a sense of relief that Col. Kangleon laconically notified

the Provincial Treasurer? "President Quezon has authorized release of the Leyte
Emergency Notes." (Col. E. K. Kangleon. 6 Oct. 1943. To: Provincial Treasurer)
Evidently, some confusion still existed. At a special session, the Currency
Board declared: " . . . .it is but proper to state the total amount of money to be
printed so that the Currency Board could determine the number of bills to be finished
for each denomination." (Leyete Emergency Currency Board at Macrohon. 28 Oct. 1943.
Besolution No. 2. Excerpts from the Minutes of the Special Session.)
453
But we lacked a printing press, printing papers1 and ink. We sent agents
to Bohol*2 and other places5 to look for a printing press but returned empty
handed. We ordered wooden markers to be made of the different denominations
by local engravers. Printing ink was concocted by a local chemist. The mili
tary authorities took charge of the procurement of paper.4 After repeated at
tempts we were able to produce satisfactory prints of the desired emergency
notes out of whatever materials that could be had within our reach.5-6
Potente went on to describe the actual printing process:
The work was being done by hand. We have employed a number of laborers at
least 20 of them was the lowest in number at any one time. They were composed
mostly of high school and college students, and were made to master themselves
in the technique of stamping the markers on the papers already cut to the size
111. . . .Eight at present, the Province is lacking paper. Manila paper will
make a good material for money if we have a printing press. Those we are now using
do not work well on Manila, on account of it being glossy. If you could secure paper
like that of the P5, send them over so that the Province will continue printing the
money." (Col. E. K. Kangleon. 1 Nov. 1943. Memo to: 95th Inf. Eegt., Par. 4.)
^"To delegate Vice Mayor Bantug of Maasin to make trip to Bohol to look for
a printing press that could either be bought or rented to print currency bills for
Leyte and to confer with Provincial authorities of Bohol for purpose of getting in
formation and to seek cooperation in securing printing press." (Leyte Provincial
Board. 2 Aug. 1943. Eesolution No. 24, 4th Session.)
^"It has come to our attention that former Maasin printing press is stored
near Provincial Building of Tacloban, in private house. At time of this writing.
Provincial Government of unoccupied Leyte is sadly in need of printing press to print
better Emergency Notes.
"If you are able to send in a G-2 operative to find out the existing condi
tionsand then smuggle press and type out of city and deliver to Maasin, you will not
only receive highest recommendation and promotion, but also substantial cash reward.
Bevard will depend upon usability of press. For a good press, this office is pre
pared to pay in excess of P1000 (old issue money) plus expenses.
"You will realize from reward offered that teed is great." (MaJ. I. D.
Bichardson _^Chief of Staff, 9th MD/* 5 Oct. 1943. Memo to: Capt. F. Pabilona
_/C0, Bn. 2, 95th Inf. Eegtjj; Alangalang, Par. 1-3.)
It is revelatory of the popular attitude towards guerrilla currency that
even in the case of a guerrilla officer the "old issue money" was more highly valued.
4"Wc did not worry about counterfeiters. We had all the paper there was. We
used all kinds. We'd have used toilet paper if -vre could have got it. Some of our
money was printed on wrapping paper, some of Grade 3 notebook paper, lined and all.
. . . .The women made their own clothing out of abaca fiber--a rope-colored Manila
hemp. They couldn't stand looking all alike, so we were out of dye. In the end, vre
made our own ink by taking a crude oil lamp, putting a hood over it, and trapping the
soot. We mixed the soot with glycerin and printed new sheets as well as money with
it." (Wolfert, op. cit. . p. 168)
5Selecting designs for the currency involved some disagreement between Col.
Kangleon and his chief of staff, Bichardson. "I had some of Fertig's Mindanao money
as a model,” Bichardson declared, "but Kangleon insisted on adding pictures to it--a
carabao, a nipa hut, local soerery. It looked nearly official by the time we fin
ished." (Ibid., p. 167)
Potente, o p . cit. , p. 17.
454
of the notes, in the most satisfactory manner acceptable to the Currency Board.
The personnel consists of the following— Secretary of the Currency Board, who
acts as Superintendent of the Shop, an ink chemist, two holders of each denomi
nation marker who alternate in the tedious work, two assistants for each denomi
nation marker to spread and dry the printed notes, numbering machine holder,
holders of the markers for the seal, one holder each for affixing the facsimile
signature stamps of the members of the Currency Board, and one guard.^ At least
one member of the Currency Board was present during the work. A report of each
day's work was being accomplished by the Secretary, showing the quantities and
denominations of notes that were finished and those remaining unfinished during
the day. The finished notes were turned over to the Provincial Treasurer every
close of business each day, who issues for the amount the necessary official re
ceipt. All the printing paraphernalia are gathered at the close of business and
placed inside the safe. All these reports of daily output at the Shop and the
official receipts issued by the Provincial Treasurer have been properly preserved
and filed. A Becord Book containing the history of the printing of the Notes
is also being kept.2-3
The terms of the general currency authorization limited the sum total of
pesosêmittable. But discretionary power remained regarding the denominations of
bills to be issued. Lack of a printing press partially influenced the decision. The
Provincial Board resolved
to authorize the Leyte Emergency Currency Board to print denominations lower

than PI by means of stamping outfits, suspending for the time being the printing
of bigger denominations until printing press is secured.4
Why the printing of token money was abandoned was related by chief of staff
Bichardson:
We started off on 20-centavo bills— paper dimes. . . .1 am no good at cost

accounting, but after a week I began to get worried. There were nine men there
/in the printer// and in a week they had not printed up enough money to pay them
selves their own salaries. I made a rough stab at working out the expenses and
found out it was costing us 40 centavos to print one 20-centavo bill. After that,
^Bichardson tersely related: "The mint worked on an assembly basis in an old

schoolhouse. One man would cut the paper to size, another would place it in a frame,
stamp the wood block into a pad of ink, then press it onto the paper. The ink had to
dry before the paper could be turned over to be printed on the reverse side. It took
a long time." (I. Wolfert, p. 167, op. cit.)
Potente, o p . cit. , p. 26.
^"Whereas, it is essential to keep a complete and authentic record of the
printing of the Leyte Emergency Notes
"Therefore. . . .be it resolved by the Board in session to request Kangleon
to furnish Board with copies of all radiograms affectirg it for file and record pur
poses.” (Leyte Emergency Currency Board. 28 Oct. 1943. Excerpts from Minutes of
Special Session, Besolution No. 2.)
4Prov. Bd. of Leyte. July 28, 1943. Second Session, Besolution No. 11.
we ha.fi new blocks made and stuck to 20-peso bil]s, where each bill represented
a profit of 19 pesos and 60 centavos--$9.80. We had been authorized to issue
2.500,000 pesos.
The delay in issuing the money in appreciable volume hampered military opera
tions. In response to an entreaty for funds from the 95th Regiment, GH^ could only
say:
For lack of materials and printing press, the Provincial Government is able
to loan us only P52,000 a month. We are negotiating to increase it to F60,000
a month. . . ,
When the Provincial Government will be able to secure more materials and
print money with more speed, I will request for more loan to meet the demand.3
Rather than wait for the printers to complete their production cf the entire
quota of money allotted to the Province, the Provincial Board decided upon a partial
issue: "Resolved--to authorize the Currency Board to release PIOO.OOO of Leyte
Emergency Rotes in 20 centavo, 50 centavo, 1-peso and 20-peso denominations."*
And again:
Resolved— to request the Leyte Currency Board to turn over P500.000 out of
the money that has already been printed to the Provincial Treasurer for such
purposes as the Provincial Beard in the interest of the administration may de
termine ."
The Japanese "mopping-up campaign" in Southern Leyte halted but did not end
these monetary activities.®
We stopped the printing of the Emergency Currency Notes in the meantime,

which was being done up to that time in the Trade School Shop building at Macro-
hon. Up to them, we were able to print P I ,023,000.00, as shown by our records.
Most of this money has been delivered by the Provincial Treasurer to the Army
Finance Officer.
\ rolfert, o p . cit. , pp. 121-22.

^This figure quoted by Richardson represented an inaccuracy. As already ex
plained, the original authorization permitted the release of 2 million pesos, and of
this sum, 600,000 had been turned out preceding the Japanese landings in Leyte.
In his statement of expenditures, Mr. Potente computed P12,106.28 as the
total cost incurred in the printing of Emergency Currency Notes. (Potente, op. cit. .
p. 26.)
3Col. Kangleon, GHQ, 9th MU. 1 Nov. 1943. Memo to: 95th Inf. Regt. , Par. 1, 6.
^Prcv. Bd. Resolution N o . 155.
5prov. Bd, Oct. 15, 1943. Resolution No. 234, 27th Session.
®Col. Kangleon instructed the Emergency Currency Board to "place the parapher
nalia and personnel in a safe place ready for any direction of this Headquarters."
(P.. K. Kangleon. 4 Feb. 1944. Memo for: All Prov. Govt, Officials, Par. 3, Sec. a.)
^Potente, o p . cit. . p. 19.
456
By May of 1944, the Japanese no longer vent out on patrol from their garri
sons. Resumption of printing vas again feasible:
In a meeting of the Ieyte Emergency Currency Board, ve have decided to con

tinue the printing of the emergency notes, vhich by now has gained the name of
'Guerrilla Money'. Ve established as our printing shop, a private house inthe
mountains midway between Malitbog and Macrohon. When the Japanese deserted
their garrison at Macrohon, ve transferred our workshop to the School Building
of Barrio Ilihan, an interior Barrio of Macrohon. There we completed printing
our quota of PI,400,000.00.
Prior to the American landings, Colonel Eaigleon handed certain^currency di
rectives to his Judge Advocate General:
. . . .You will order the Provincial Treasurer to turn over to the Division
Finance Officer, LAC, all money they have printed. You will also issue order
for Provincial Treasurer, Auditor, and Fiscal to destroy all F20 bills now in
possession of Abay Major Abay, Division Finance 0fficer7 at certain place that
Maj. Francisco / then the Chief cfxStaff7 may indicate.2""
When the Commonwealth Government was reestablished under President Osmena,
F299,717.80 notes of the total allotted for printing to the guerrilla government
remained to be issued. These unissued notes were burned by the authorities at Taclo
ban, leaving a residue of P I ,100,282.20 to be accounted for. Mr. Potente prepared
the following balance sheet:
Amount expended for the Army and for the National bureaus and
offices P649,150 .05
Amount of Advance of Cash to the various municipalities for
the payment of teachers and various persons, not yet
liquidated 194,132.15
Expended as aid to the Provincial Government 122,611.08
Loaned to the municipalities for organization purposes 15,000.00
Amount, advanced to the Army, still to be liquidated 119 ,588.92
PI ,100,282.00
The Leyte emergency notes enjoyed a wide circulation throughout the Province.
Most of the people regarded their issue as valid, sanctionedby lav, and ultimately
redeemable in Conmonwealth currency. Nevertheless, some small proportion eyed skep
tically their legal tender value, and were not always prone to receive them when
proffered. Particularly did this hesitancy prevail on the fringes of Japanese-
1rbid. , p. 19.
2CcI. R. K. Kangleon. 22 Aug. 1944. Memo for: Maj. Fidel Fernandez.
^Potente, o p . cit. , pp. 26-27.
457
occupied areas. On the one hand, possessors of emergency money were liable to ap
prehension by Japanese patrols as sympathizers with the guerrilla cause. On the
other hand, farmers and middle-men visiting the occupied areas had need of either
Japanese-issued currency or pre-war money to conduct their business.
Fearing that a heightening of this tendency to refuse emergency currency
would cause its depreciation and undermine the entire financial structure of the
resistance movement, guerrilla leaders early adopted remedial measures. Their prob
lem was twofold: bolstering the emergency currency and discouraging the circulation
of unrecognized species. In practice, thie meant the promulgating of regulations
penalizing the non-acceptance of or the discrimination against guerrilla currency.
It also meant the undertaking of an energetic propaganda campaign, associating in
the popular mind the close tie between loyal, patriotism and willing receipt of
emergency notes:
. . . .All emergency money printed in Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Iloilo, or else

where in the Philippines, with or without stamp, is legal tender, authorized by
the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be honored and redeemed at faoe value
after the war. Enjoin the people to circulate it at par value without sufferii^
unauthorized depreciation. Any person who refuses to receive it as a means of
exchange in the market or otherwise causes other people not to receive it, or
who attempts to engage in profiteering by depreciating its value shall be con
sidered a public enemy .I"2
Eefusal to accept emergency notes might seriously affect the welfare of en
tire districts. North-western Leyte had long served as the granary for the popula
tion of the southern districts. But the sellers of grain were loath to receive
emergency notes in exchange for their produce:
Enclosed, affidavits to show that Emergency money not accepted in San Isidro.
People of that place make alibi by saying that they do not have corn to sell.
%ilemon Psbilona, HaJ., LGF (Leyte Guerrilla Forces), Sector Conmander and
Military Adviser (to the loyal civil authorities). 2 Nov. 1942. Memorandum to:
Municipal Mayors and Treasurers: Alangalarg, Babatngon, Barugo, and San Miguel.
2In forceful terms the commander of East Leyte let it be known that: "Effec
tive today, Nov. 27, 1942, Emergency Money must be accepted within the Jurisdiction
of Carigara. It shall have the same face value of that of the old money." (Cohnel
Flores, TJSAFFE, CO East Leyte)
This proclamation had been anticipated by the more sweeping memorandum of
Pabilona, already cited.
458
It is because they know that it vill be paid in emergency money.

Because corn dealers cannot buy corn vith emergency money in San Isidro and
other parts of Leyte, this sector confronted vith problem of hov long shall old
money last .1
Appeals alone did not suffice to check discrimination. Thoroughly exasper
ated, Colonel Kangleonfs legal adviser advocated sterner preventatives:
Con5 )laints were received at this Headquarters that some people discriminated
betveen old currency bills and emergency notes, and between emergency notes of
one province and another.
Complaint that higher prices are fixed on articles when medium used to pur
chase axe emergency notes.
To stop this discrimination and devaluation of emergency notes, it is sug
gested that circular below be adopted and published throughout the Division.
Circular to all Begimental and Batallion Commanders and Mayors:. . . . ~
There follows a specification of penalties to be meted out to the offender.4
" W j . Jain, CO 94th Inf. Regt. 30 June 1943. Memo to: CO, 92nd Inf. Div.
2Capt. K. Fernandez. 1 July 1943. To: CO, 92nd Div., Par. 1-4.
În keeping with the purposes of higher headquarters, the commanding officer
of the 95th Inf. Regt. instructed his battalion commanders:
"In compliance with instruction from the 9th Military District, all municipal
councils of this Province has promulgated ordinances declaring certain emergency money
bills valid legal tender at face value, and penalizing persons who refuse to accept
said notes, depreciate their value, or otherwise discriminate against them in favor
of either old notes or coins or Japanese money. Ordinances were enacted to safeguard
interest of public against selfish merchants and usurers.
"We are bound to extend necessary cooperation to civil authorities in execu
tion of above ordinances. Officers and men of the 95th Regiment are enjoined to re
port to mayors and chiefs of police violations of said ordinances, or catch, if pos
sible, violators and bring them to proper civil authorities." (Col. Balderian, CO,
95 th Inf. Regt. 27 Aug. 1943. To: All Battalion Commanders.)
We might call attention to Balderian’e preference for allowing the civil
authorities to actively prosecute the offenders, reserving for the military the se
condary role of helping to apprehend the violators.
4"Any person who discriminates between old bills and emergency notes iesued
by any province of the Philippines or who devaluates or trafficks in emergency notes
shall be subject to detention in any of the detention camps of the Army from 1-5 days
for first offense, from 10-20 for second, from 1-3 months for third and successive
offenses; or both detention and fine.
"Regimental commanders or batallion commanders or their authorized represen
tatives are empowered to summarily determine the innocence or guilt of alleged offen
ders and impose corresponding penalty.
"Any person found guilty by regimental or battalion commanders or their
authorized representatives may appeal from this decision to the Division Commander,
whose decision shall be final.
"Pending determination of appeal by Division Conmander, execution of penalty
imposed shall be suspended. , ,, ^ . ,. , .. .
"Upon appeal, commander or his representative shall forward inmediately to
Division Commander through the Judge Advocate General a s u m m a r y of proceedings to
gether with all pertinent papers and affidavits in connection with the case. ^
"Fines shall be paid to Finance Officer of regiment or battalion, receipted
and accounted."
459
Adopting this policy as their own. the municipalities severally sought to
give it effect. Bato's ordinance on the subject is in point; Its preamble reads:
An ordinance declaring legal tender the emergency money bills at their

face value, and penalizing those who directly or indirectly refuse to accept
at face value or charge higher prices for conmodities for which emergency money
notes are offered for payment.
Military orders and local ordinances could only attempt to frighten the re
fractory elements into compliance. Barely were the penalties annexed to the viola
tion of currency regulations actually applied. It was not strange, then, that even
after the American landings, when redemption of emergency notes seemed more likely
than theretofore, emergency currency was not honored in certain quarters. To one
of his unit commanders, uncertain as to how he should proceed egainst civilian vio
lators , the acting CO of the Regiment advised: "Civilians not accepting emergency
circulating notes should be left unmolested until the problem is solved by the Com
monwealth Government."3
Circulation of Guerrilla Currency from Outside Leyte
The guerrilla activities of Leyte constituted but a part of a wider movement
of resistance coextensive with the entire Philippines. In other provinces, guerrilla
organizations had also sprung up, varying in organizational perfection and operational
effectiveness. Confronted with the same financial problems that perplexed the lead
ers in Leyte, they too had emitted emergency notes endowed with legal tender value.
And every guerrilla organization sought to disseminate its currency over as broad an
area as possible. The wider the circulation of notes, the greater the possibilities
of inter-provincial trade. While the several guerrilla organizations were united in
fraternal insurgency, they were all too often lacking in full and accurate informa
tion concerning the character of each other's activities.
iprov. Bd. of Leyte. Eeso. Bo. 40 approving Ord. Bo. 12 cs of Bato.

2."Article 2: Imprisonment, not less than 10 days or more than 30 or fine
often to thirty pesos; or both."
3Capt. Abarientos. 18 Bov. 1944. Memo to: L t . Moralita (CO, 1st Bn.)
460
Misshapen descriptions of questionable operations drifted ashore in conroany
with trading bancas. Liaison agents, careless in sifting of data they had collected
in the course of their excursions, propagated distorted and incoaqjlete accounts. So
it was that the guerrilla leaders of Leyte oscillated between two tendencies: to
honor that currency in order to promote trade and uphold the national character of
the resistance movement; to repudiate that currency in order to safeguard the wealth
of the provincials from loss through transactions in devalued exchange and disavow
affiliation with disreputable organizations. At any one time then, certain extra
provincial currencies would be accepted by the Leytenos at par, some would be re
ceived at a discount, and some would be categorically rejected. Simultaneously, the
sector commanders would be promulgating regulations warning the population not to
discriminate against the emergency notes of other loyal provinces, and yet advising
them to beware of specific notes doubtful in value.1 Into this monetary Jumble,
'Regarding the emergency notes of other provinces, an excerpt from a guerrilla

memorandum already cited may be requoted as epitomizing the basic policy adopted in
Leyte: "All emergency money printed Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Iloilo, or elsewhere in the
Philippines, with or without stamp, is legal tender, authorized by the Commonwealth
of the Philippines. . . . " (Filemon Pabilona, MaJ., L.G.F. ^ e y t e Guerrilla Force7,
Sector Commdr. & Mil. Adv. 2 Nov. 1942. Memo to: Mayor & Treasurers of Alangalang,
Babatngon, Barugo and San Miguel.)
Adherence to equality of notes in principle could not prevent differentia
tion in the day-to-day transactions of the masses. Discrimination against the Bohol
emergency money by the leytenos led the Bohol guerrilla leader to address a gueri-
monious message to MaJ. Balderian, Commander of the East Leyte Sector: ". . .
These are instances that bancas loaded with corn from Leyte arrived at this province
to trade. Oftentimes in the past, complaints from our civil populace reached this
Headquarters to the effect that these traders refuse to receive emergency notes or if
they receive them, they depreciate the value so that this Headquarters issued instruc
tions to all Detachment Commanders (we have detachments in every town) to detain all
persons that refuse to accept emergency notes, or refuse to accept in its face value.
You will find in separate covers pertinent papers about this ruling. We could not
trace their definite point of departure for most of them do not carry passes or
authority. At present, however, such anomalies have been reduced. And with your
good policies, we are confident that these anomalies will still be reduced if not
stamped out." /’"anomaly" = abuse7 (Ismael P. Ingeniero. March 19, 1943. To: CO,
95th inf., East~Leyte Sector.)
But Ingeniero's optative conclusion did not come to pass. The regimental
conmander of the 94th Inf. pointed out specifically why the Bohol notes were ill-
favored: "It is the belief of this office that Bohol emergency notes is not yet
recognized by Gen. MacArthur. If we allow this note to circulate in our sector our
people will be at a loss. Merchants buying our comnodities are Boholanos. Bohol
note3 could not be accepted in other places like Iloilo, Negros, and Cebu not occu
pied by Japs.
461
muddying it still further, came the pre-war notes of the Commonwealth Government,
sporadically accepted in both the Japanese-dominated and unoccupied zones of the
Archipelago and commitable at different par value from place to place.
A memorandum emanating from the headquarters of General Fertig in Mindanao,
and affecting Ieyte, is suggestive of some of the iseues aggravating the monetary
question:
There are at present in the hands of many people P50 bills previously printed
for the Philippine National Bank. Those notes are genuinely printed currency.
But they are now valueless, inasmuch as the circulation thereof has never been
authorized by the Insular Treasurer of the Government of the Commonwealth. The
notes were illegally taken by Moros somewhere in the province of Lanao during
the Japanese invasion of that province and were put by them into circulation.^
. . . .In order to prevent further circulation, all commanding officers and
army personnel are ordered to vage an intensive campaign for their confiscation.
For all notes confiscated, corresponding receipt should be given by the of
ficer confiscating them to the possessor stating therein the serial number of
the bills confiscated. All bills thus confiscated should immediately be deposit
ed with the local Municipal Treasurer or the Provincial Treasurer under official
receipt.2-^
"Pending' result, this office will not tolerate circulation of said money in
our sector because it is inconsistent with a letter from this office a month ago, ad
dressed to the commanding officers in the Bohol Force regarding non-acceptance of
said money in this place. Also, there is conflict of previous memos from this head
quarters to all municipal mayors for not accepting same." (94th Inf. Begt. 23 July
1943. Memo for: CO, 92nd Div., Par. 1-2.)
A matter of legal nicety invalidated the acceptability of the Negros guer
rilla currency in Leyte: "Emergency notes issued by the Free Negros Military Cur
rency Committee are being circulated in Leyte and Samar. Ve doubt the legality of
the printing and circulating of these:
. . .(d) So far as is known, no Military Currency Committee was ever
created and authorized to issue emergency notes under the Emergency Po-vrers Act.
"(e) Emergency Notes issued by the Free Negros Military Currency Committee
should not be honored until said committee shows its authority from the powers that
be." (F. A. Reyes, Adj., 9th MD. 13 Sept. 1943. Memo for: Unit COs of 92nd Div.
and Municipal Treasurers of 9th MD, Par. 1.)
% e must not overlook the possibility of a political motivation to Fertig’s
prouncement. His Chief of Staff, Capt. Luis Morgan, with whom he subsequently broke,
had his source of power in Moro support. Perhaps, and this is only conjecture,
Fertig was already contemplating weakening a suspected competitor for supreme leader
ship. (See also: Haggerty, op. cit., p. 49)
%rig. Gen. W. V. Fertig. 17 Dec. 1942. To: All Comdg. Off., Par. 1, 3, 4.
5A similar field order, despatched under the signature of Gen. Fertig as of
January 20, 1943, directed commanding officers to forbid the circulation of Comnon-
wealth 20+peso bills within their jurisdiction. A description of the bills was in
corporated in the order.
462
Despite this general order, the Mindanao bills of the condemned issue were
accepted by the people of Leyte. The Judge Advocate General of the 92nd Division
counseled their authorization in the Province as a natter of both equity and expedi
ency.1 Colonel Kangleon went along with this advice. He also saw fit to sanction
the circulation of the pre-war paper currency as in the best interests of the re
sistance movement and the welfare of the common people.^
1,1. . . .The bills being genuine, they should be accepted and their circula
tion allowed. This Division has issued a circular not to discriminate between 'for
mer' bills and emergency circulating notes.
"Persons who had no participation in illegal extraction of said bills and
accepted them in the best of faith in exchange of equivalent labor or goods should
not be made to suffer any damage or be sacrificed for an offense committed by others.
"It is for the Government to prosecute and punish persons responsible for
their extraction.
"If these bills be confiscated and their circulation prohibited., the people
will be slow in accepting notes issued by and in the name of the government. . . . "
(Capt. P. Fernandez, JAS. 6 July 1943. To: CO, 92nd Div., Par. 6-10)
n
^Pre-war notes were used by people who spurned Japanese money, but dared not
use emergency currency. In his political testament, listir^ his beneficence to the
guerrillas, Tacloban's leading Chinese merchant recorded: "Sometime in March 1942,
I had exchanged the Leyte emergency money of Capt. Lapus (now Major), amounting to
P2,000 with my old Treasury Certificates. Capt. Lapus, unsurrendered USAFFE, became
a guerrilla leader in Sorsogon which at that time was occupied by the Japanese, who
prohibited the circulation of all emergency money there. According to him, he has
drawn this money from the USAFFE in this locality for maintenance of his men."
(Suya, op. cit., p. 11)
Questions continued to arise concerning the validity of pre-war money:
"Please inform us if the genuine bills, 1941, are good money.People from the west
and the south saythey are no good. Now, there are in Abuyog three sailboats from
Bohol buying corn by paying these supposed bogus bills. I ordered them seized, and
now they are detained. I confiscated more than one hundred of their P 2 0 .00 bills. . '
(Catalino Landia, Capt. Inf., Cmdg.— Hq. "G" Co., 2nd Bn., 94th Inf. Pegt. 14 Aug.
1943. To: The Dist. Com., 92nd Div., Par. 7)
Kangleon sent this despatch to his regimental commanders: "Treasury notes
and bank bills, series of 1941, issued by the Government of the Philippines by
authority of an act of the Philippine Legislature and approved by the President of
the United States of America are valid and should be allowed to circulate. Any in
struction to the contrary is revoked." (F. A. Keyes, 2nd Lt., Adj., 9th MD.
13 Sept. 1943. To: COs, 94th, 95th Inf. Regts.)
463
Small Change
One of the serious obstacles to the restoration of economic normalcy for un
occupied Leyte was the lack of small denominational currency. Coins had vanished
following the Japanese occupation. Dearth of small change formed the constant bur
den of all reports dealing with economic activities throughout the Province.^- On
every purchase the buyer generally paid an additional premium, arising from the in
ability of the seller to make small change.
To obviate this impediment to trade, several of the guerrilla leaders (some
times utilizing the municipal council's as instrumentalities) printed their own token
scrip. Civilians holding currency of large denominations could commute this money
for ]ocel scrip, thus facilitating simple transactions.
The validity of this fiat money was contingent upon its redemptibility. Re
demption, in turn, was possible only so long as the genuine legal tender was retained
by the municipal treasurer inviolate--a sort of trust fund. Here was the rub. In
some cases , this frozen fund was wrongfully expended by the necessitous municipal
authorities in the furtherance of municipal objectives
■^•Intelligence Report No. 10 of the 95th Inf. Regt., covering the second half
of August, 1943 (submitted by Capt. Briccio Aguilos, £-2), ranked lack of change
first under the heading ■'Needs of the Civilian Population" .
Ân Intelligence Report to the Chief of Staff, 92nd Inf. Div., covering the
month of May, 1943, stated: "All guerrilla leaders have seen the acute problem of
lack of change. Metallic tender driven out of circulation. They have tried to issue
paper money in small chance, backed by a deposit of the larger denominations of the
current paper currency. Because diverse means were used, circulation of change from
one part of Province to another precluded."
Ôf course, the municipal council might later vote a restitution to the fund
of the monies extracted. Thus, the Provincial Board of Free Leyte, in its Resolution
No. 39 (Fifth Session--August 7, 1943) approved Resolution No. 127 cs of the municipal
council of Hilongos worded as follows:
"Whereas, in view of expenditures that were made, Ex-Acting Municipal Trea
surer, Vicente F. Montera, during the absence of the regular incumbent in connection
of /resolutions7 of the Municipal Council Numbers 3, 7, 15, 54 and S8 current series
of the Council~of Hilongos which were advanced from the local emergency circulating
notes and the 20^ municipal reserves used by the municipality in good faith to settle
wise obligations;
"Whereas there is now available municipal collections to pay the amount ad
vanced or borrowed by this municipality concerned.
"Resolved to order Municipal Treasurer Andres G. Evangelista to pay the
amount of
464
In other cases military authorities, vith or without local permission, took
possession of all or part of this reserve fund.1 Counterfeiting of local money repre
sented another source of embarrassment.2 In Inopacan, "Major" Chester Peters printed
his own fiat notes and disbursed them on receipt of military stores and foodstuffs.
Refusal of payment in such baseless currency meant self-stigmatization as a pro-Jap,
with all the unpleasant circumstances therein entailed. In short, then, holders of
local scrip were fingering mere scraps of paper, backed up by no governmental re
sources, non-convertible, and acceptable only by courtesy.
With the approval of the Finance Service of the WLGWF, some of its consti
tuent municipalities issued local scrip of small denomination for the convenience of
the civilian population. Thus, in Albuera:
The Chairman submitted to the Council in session samples of Emergency Cir

culating Notes in different denominations from 1 centavo, 5^, 10$, 20^, 50^, and
1 peso for approval, as per instructions of the Chief of Finance Service, WLGWF,
during the conference held in the field.
Resolved, to recommend, as hereby recommended, the attached samples of the
Emergency Circulating Notes of different denomination, for the districts of the
WLGWF, in the field.
"P991.72 to the trust fund, liquidating the vouchers in the total amount of
"P991.72, which are being held as cash items in the local emergency circu
lating notes of Hilongos and to account said vouchers in the proper municipal ac
counts in turning over the amount of
"P991.72 to the trust fund in accordance with the Resolution N o . 54 cs, and
resolved that the Provincial Board be requested to approve."
^Resolution No. 104 of the Municipal. Council of Abuyog, as approved by Reso
lution No. 113 of the Provincial Board (15th Session)--September 9, 1943, authorized
"the municipal Treasurer of the aforesaid municipality to grant cash advance to Capt.
Landia for subsistence of his men and officers, which cash advance shall be taken
from the deposit for local Emergency Circulating Notes. . . . "
Resolution No. 72 of the Maasin municipal council petitioned for the re
placement of monies appropriated by the Army so that, among other things, "the redemp
tion of the GeroDg notes which are in circulation may be solved." As Acting Mayor of
Maasin, Florentino Zara had general oversight of the local trust fund, backing up the
scrip released by the municipality. Imputation to him of defalcation (by his politi
cal enemies, Zara insisted) led to his arraignment. The 94th Inf. constituted a
Special Court Martial Board to try his case (Special Order 30, 94th Inf., 14 May 1943,
Major Jain, Commanding) and appointed the prosecutors.
2Special Order 49, par. 1, of the 94th Regt., Major Porfirio E. Jain, Com
manding, (dated July 23, 1943) directed: "Upon receipt of this order, 1st Lt. Andres
T. Delfino, S 2 of this Regiment, will proceed to Maasin, leyte, to file charges
against Prudencio Mercado for counterfeiting Maasin Emergency Notes."
465
Resolved Further, to order the Secretary to submit the above-mentioned

sanies of Emergency Circulating Notes, vith a copy of this resolution, to the
office of the Chief of Finance Service through the Regimental Commander 6th
Infantry, of the WIGWF in the Field for guidance and information. Unanimously
approved.1 J
On assuming official command of the resistance forces in Leyte, Colonel
Kangleon proceeded to promulgate currency regulations, tightening up the issuance
of scrip:
. . . .(8) That sufficient amount of small denominations be printed J p y action

of the Provincial Board7 to solve the problem of small change; that all municipal
governments be required to stop the issuance of local scripts, and to redeem all
scripts issued by them upon release of emergency notes J^bj the provincial govern
ment/ herein authorized.
Colonel Kangleon originally intended to stamp out all local scrip.3 The
delay in the printing of Leyte emergency notes suggested to the Provincial Board the
advisability of relenting and permitting the prolongation of scrip releases, under
controlled conditions. In authorizing Macrohon to issue local notes, the Provincial
Board, resolved:
Whereas the Leyte emergency notes vhich have been put into circulation are
mostly in bigger denominations, viz: from 20 centavos to 20 pesos due to the
fact that for the present, there are not sufficient materials vith vhich to
print 5 and 10 centavo denominations for sufficient distribution to all munici
palities -within the province .
Whereas in view of the preceding fact, it has been made a policy by the Board
to authorize the circulation of local emergency notes in each municipality in
the denominations of 5 and 10 centavos for local circulation as soon as it has
properly redeemed all its notes previously printed.
And whereas the municipality of Macrohon has partially redeemed its local
notes.
Nov therefore Resolved to authorize the municipality of Macrohon to create a
local Emergency Currency Board to print local notes in the denominations of 5 and
10 centavos in an aggregate amount of 2000 pesos for strictly local circulation
in exchange with authorized emergency notes. Provided to submits to this Body
the names of the members of the Currency Board appointed, and the corresponding
designs of the 5 and 10 centavo denominations for approval and
^Mun. Council of Albuera. Special Meeting, March 19, 1943. Resolution No. 6.
^Col. R. K. Kangleon, 9th MD. Proclamation, July 19, 1943.
' W j . Balderian had banned the emission of token money scrip in hie zone.
Consequently, consumers, includirg guerrilla procurement agents, commonly bought goods
in quantity/in integral peso terms. Another contrivance to circumvent the need for
change involved the acceptance of comncdity vouchers, representing the difference be
tween the selling price and currency paid out. The vouchers were redeemable for
commodities.
466
Provided further, that whatever will be printed will not be released without
the previous approval of this Body.1
It is to the credit of the guerrilla leaders that they recognized the need
for a circulating monetary medium, and showed resourcefulness in dealing with that
need. It is to the credit of Colonel Kangleon that he perceived the possibilities
for abuse and embezzlement in the emission of guerrilla currency, and that he under
took to surround the printing and circulation of this money with precautions both
legal and administrative. Against this, we must conclude that the excessive severity
he showed in his treatment of Erfe suggests that Kangleon's scrupulousness was here
largely a mask for political vindictiveness.
The confusion brought to Leyte by the Japanese invasion was reflected in the
Jumbled state of most municipal treasuries. Flight of municipal officials, including
the treasurers, and later raids upon the fiscus by armed bands, seizing funds and
records, disorganized the budget. Vith the passage of time, some semblance of reor
ganization was accomplished in both the guerrilla and puppet sectors. Till the end
ing of enemy domination, however, business continued abnormal, and consequently the
ordinary sources of local revenue remained untapped. Support of municipal functions,
even in greatly attenuated form, tried all the patience and ingenuity of which the
directors of the local budgets were capable.
Under any circumstances, outlays would never cease, so long as even a shadow
of government continued. Eov to subsidize these drastically curtailed activities
became a major obsession in fund Jugglery. Lands had been vacated by cultivators
fleeing to the hills. Tenants stopped making remittances to land-ovners. Businesses
were abandoned. Forest concessions, plantations and their ancillary processing en
terprises went unworked. Everywhere economic activity was at a standstill and private
earnings abolished. On what capital and increments of wealth were taxes to be
assessed? And in these stagnant waters, the wheels of government must turn, and the
guerrilla be subsidized.
1Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 11, 1943. Peso. No. 232--26th Session.
467
Pushed to extremes, the localities were compelled to levy upon even the
most insignificant transaction. Financial tolls might be commuted to payment in
kind, but payable they remained. For this purpose, license fees were depended upon.
They constituted no innovation. Municipalities were long accustomed to collecting
imposts on economic functionings. But the proceeds from such sources had not bulked
so large in the aggregate collections as they did during the guerrilla period.^
Taxes of this kind were useful because of their easy administrability. Busi
ness (if not of the speculative type) was conducted in the open. Evading making over
of payment would be difficult. Moreover, liability of the businessman or transactor
was inflexible— a flat sum on a specified activity. Perplexities inherent in the
handling of variables and intangibles were eliminated.
By default of collection, remission' of liability for tax payment on the part
of property owners and income-earners was conceded in the first disruption of admin
istrative functioning. The gradual restoration of public offices led responsible of
ficials to strain feverishly in fund-raising efforts. Those on the tax-paying lists
were none too eager to give up their tolerated delinquency, especially in a period
of exorbitant living costs. As if to remind the people that revenue-raising was a
norma1 incident of government, the authorities published the renewal of tax collec
tions .
A general order of the WICWF conferred upon the municipal government of Ormoc
(that is. the unoccupied portion), outside of the poblacion "power to levy, impose
2
and collect municipal taxes and licenses, except land tax and residence certificates."
The excepting of land taxes and residence certificates from the category of
asseesables expressed recognition of the large-scale evacuations. Those who had fled
•Ône of Dulag's guerrilla leaders, briefly alluding to municipal finance,

stated: "At present, due to the presence of the Army which practically absorbs the
little income available for the municipality, there is no fund available. The only
ooBsible sources of income are as follows: (a) Cockfighting fees; (b) Slaughter fees;
(c) Municipal license fees." (Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt. Inf., Actg. Mun. Secty. ,
Dulag. Sept. 10, 1943. To: Frov. Gov., in the Field.)
^By command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (A. Susana, Capt. Inf., The Adj. Gen.)
16 Jan. 1943. General Order No. 2, Par. 11, WIGWF, G H C .
468
from the enemy-occupied town proper were forced to leave their immovables behind,
and could hardly be called upon to contribute tax payments on these properties.
Occupational license fees counted heavily in the gross tax receipts. An
Albuera ordinance required leaf tobacco dealers and merchants to "secure a municipal
license from the Municipal Treasurer of this municipality, before running the busi
ness." The fee was collectible in quarterly installments of three pesos, and viola
tions vere punishable.^
Applications for slaughter permits were long accompanied by fee payments in
validation. During the emergency, Albuera butchers had developed the practice of
commuting these tax obligations to payments in kind— the hind leg of large cattle.
Since the recipient of these cuts of beef was the nearest guerrilla camp, the muni
cipal treasury sustained a corresponding shrinkage in revenue. To command return to
the former practice would be an unthinkable affront to the military. Resolving on
a compromise , the Municipal Council petitioned the sector Military Adviser to certify
that any slaughterer, private or professional
is subject to pay the amount of PI.50 cash tickets _/the earlier fee had been
P2.907 as slaughter permit fee, aside from the perna or hind leg of large cattle
slaughtered that will be given to the Headquarters, Albuera Sector, for con
sumption purposes.2
The Leyte version of the American state tax on operators of legalized gambl
ing dens was the cockpit tax. If anything, the pati'onizing of the cockpits increased
in popularity during the war. Here, simple folk might foregather to relax in tra
ditional pastimes from the harrowirg experiences and- dour scarcity of those troubled
days .
These establishments were sure-fire objects for the imposition of operating
taxes. The proprietors, however, groaned that money was tight. Answering their
nraver for palliation of this burden, the Albuera MunicipalCouncil, gravely ack
ledging "the monetary crisis and economic condition of the world1, requested the
JMun. Council of Albuera. 15 Auril 1943. Ord. No.2, s 1943.

2Mun. Council of Albuera. Reso. No. 4, s 1943.
469
sector Military Adviser’s "approval that the Fifty Pesos regular tax of cockpits in
this municipality he reduced to Thirty Pesos quarterly during thiB energency period
and Guerrilla Warfare.-*-"^
Wars did not put a quietus on marriages. And fees were still collected at
wedding ceremonies. Some marriages, however, were not legally solemnized and the
usual registration fees were lost to the municipal treasurer.
In pre-war times, taxes were due only at specified intervals. This arrange
ment was not revised. Because of the slender trickle of monies into the local trea
suries, financial stringency during off-periode might become embarrassing. Accountir^
for his low collections during the first half of December, 1942, the Treasurer of
Albuera stated that January would be the collection month for a number of taxes local
ly imposed. As a etop-gap meanwhile, "this week ve will begin campaign for branding
of large cattle--a source of revenue which may be collected at any period of the year.
In the zone of Captain Erfe, where municipal officials were at the same time
officers of the citizen quasi-military brigades, the gathering of taxes was undertaken
on a mi' itary basis. The Military Mayor of La Paz, "Brigadier" of the 1st and 3rd
A
Guerrilla Brigades,- directed his executive officer for the 3rd Brigade to
instruct all your captains and everyone concerned to submit to you all receipts
of matanzas, license fees, cockpit fees for all collections made by them, and
have them ready with ca3h to be turned over to Mr. Dalmacio Berdejo, G-4 for
Dulag and La Paz.5
Under the aegis of "Free Leyte", the Southern municipalities used the licens
ing system as a sponge to be wrung dry of its soakings. Wherever an ordinance of
Commonwealth origin looked promising, it was continued in force. Modifications of
existing schedules and various improvisations often seemed desirable to the architects
■Âlbuera Mun. Council (Sgd. P. C. Calabia, Mun. Secty) 11 Feb. 1943. Peso.
Ilo . 3.
2The resolution was approved in its first indorsement on Feb. 17, 1943. (Sgd.)
Dominador Saino, 3rd Lt. (Inf.), WIGWF, Actg. Comdg. Off.
^7. J. Competente, Trees., Mun. of Albuera. 16 Dec. 1942. Beport to Comdg.
Off., WLGWF.
^During the temporary fusion of La Paz and Dulag, the designation of a La Paz
functionary to handle Dulag monies constituted a sore point for some of the Dulag
people.
Palate, CO, 1st & 3rd Guer. Brig. 15 Mar. 1945. Memo to: Capt. E. Villegas,
Exec. Off., 3rd "Guer. Brig.
of the emergency budget. If they expected the Provincial Board, to simply rubber-
stamp their proposals, they were mistaken. Considerations of legality in the legis
lative process were never forgotten by the provincial guerrilla government, anxious
that no deed of folly should disparage its pretensions to legitimacy.^-
The Provincial Board would not adopt the requisite resolution enabling Bato
to lay down an assortment of license and special fees without previous reference "to
the Provincial Fiscal for comment on its legality."^
Some mill-owners of Sogod, chafing under a local export duty compelling them
to pay PI on every cavan of milled corn or grain shipped to neighboring towns, ap
pealed for an adjustment "to present living conditions". Convinced that the local
ordinance was unduly irksome, the Provincial Board instructed the mayor of Sogod "to
suspend, until further orders, the effect of Ordinance No. 15 s 1943 insofar as it
3
affects foodstuff, such as corn grain, milled corn, milled and unmilled rice and sugaic
When the Japanese extended their puppet regime throughout the Province in
1944, they found the municipal treasuries in a state of depletion. The situation
scarcely improved durirg the months intervening before the Liberation, inasmuch as
local revenue was drawn in the debased occupation currency. The municipalities were
looking forward to some sort of indemnification from the United States to cover their
-^Where questions of expediency or lawfulness were involved in fiscal proce

dures, the Provincial Treasurer ordinarily served as consultant. Thus, the Provincial
Board submitted to this expert "for comnent" a Maasin ordinance "imposing municipal
licenses on beauty parlors, tobacco producers and tobacco leaf dealers." (Prov. Bd.
of Free Leyte. Aug. 25, 1943. Reso. No. 56 adopted at 9th Session, acting on Ord.
No. 13 under Reso. No. 53 cs of the Mun. Coun. of Maasin.)
Should the legality of a pending ordinance turn upon the precise construction
of existing law, conference with the Provincial Fiscal was in order. La Paz, approv
ing the holding of a "tabo-tabo" under license, saw the Board commit this ordinance
to its legal officer. (Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 7, 1943. Reso. No. 95 adopted
at 14th Session, acting on Ord. No. 11 under Reso. No. 78 of La Paz.)
^Prov. B d . of Free Leyte . Sept. 17, 1943. Reso. No. 140 adopted at 18th Ses
sion, acting on Ord. No. 16 of the Mun. Council of Bato.
Sprov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 6, 1943. Re30. No. 84 adopted at 13th Ses
sion .
471
war-time outlays in support of the guerrilla. But, of course, only a restored Com
monwealth Government would he empowered to make representation in their naxie.
Social Service Functions
The dislocation of economic life incident to war thrust upon the guerrilla
authorities certain functions ordinarily outside the scope of the government. These
assumptions of business undertakings were all in the nature of ad hoc improvisations,
mobilizations of resources for the support of resistance. Viewed in their aggre
gate, such activities constituted no deliberately and systematically planned revision
of the established economic order.
Eeference has already been made to the appropriation by the Provincial Board
of monies for governmental purchase of grain whenever available for resale to the
general public at cost. Centralized purchasing effected considerable savings for the
consumer in the form of lower prices, and tapped supplies of foodstuffs beyond the
reach of the small buyer.
Where general provincial administration stood in need of certain services of
undependable regularity when furnished commercially, the government might either
subsidize the utility or take over operation directly itself. Of this nature was the
authorization to the Governor "to make transaction with a sail-boat owner to make
regular trips from Maasin to Calubian that would last ten days on each way. . . ."1“2
Secural of land transportation for governmental use proved more difficult.
Automobiles had disappeared. Should some vehicle be discovered or reconstructed out
of salvaged parts, its actual operation would still await the obtaining of motor fuel?
^Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 22, 1943. Peso. No. 249 adopted at 28th Sea.
^The terms of the transaction stipulated:
"1. The Board gives the subsidy of 60 pesos for the round trip covering not
no re than twenty days.
"2. Any government official embarking on this banca for purposes of inspec
tion or otherwise in connection with hi.s official duties be charged for his transpor
tation at the rate of P.05 per nautical mile.
"Eesolved: to appropriate P200 from the unappropriated funds."
^The Japanese had confiscated whatever gasoline they could discover.
472
The combat forces enjoyed a priority on all critical items of this kind. Consequent
ly, the Provincial Board resolved
to request the Commanding Officer of the 9th Military District to authorize the
Provincial Government to operate an auto for the exclusive official use of this
Government; and to produce alcohol with which to operate said vehicle if granted.^-
A subsequent resolution of the Board approved a request from the Provincial
Treasurer for
advance authority to spend not exceeding 200 pesos for construction of a tem
porary shed for a distillery for production of alcohol and for purchasing neces
sary materials for the same, which the Provincial Government will operate.^
As a substitute for gasoline, the transportation service used alcohol, dis
tilling it from tuba (fermented palm Juice). The efficiency of this fuel fluctuated,
depending upon whether it had absorbed moisture, and whether periodic engine adjust
ments on the cars had been made.'-’ The vehicles themselves were commandeered from
civilians, proper receipt having been delivered to the owners. A number of stills
were constructed, the main one being at Maasin. Civilians sold tuba to the distil
lery officers at 50 centavos per 5-gallon can.
^Frov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 2, 1943. Resolution No. 19 adopted at

Fourth Session.
‘T ’rov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 9, 1943. Resolution No. 116 adopted at
15th Session.
3
I. D. Richardson, for a time Kangleon's chief of staff, has recalled with
some humor some of the difficulties encountered by the transportation services:
"Gasoline was a nearly immediate problem. The Japs had taken all they could
find. But Frank Laird got us over this hurdle. He was an American about forty-five
who had served some fifteen years in the army and had been discharged because of his
heard. 'You learn hew to do anything in the army,' he said, and we got him some bar
rels, galvanized pipe, elbows, and a wrench or two, and he went into the petrol busi
ness, distillirg alcohol out of tuba. He managed to get a 90 percent alcohol concen
tration out of the tuba, and we called Laird Chief Distillery Officer. The care
would run on the alcohol all right if you opened the gasoline Jets on the carburetors
or reamed them out to let in more alcohol than they would gasoline. There wasn't
much power to the stuff--unless you drank it--but the cars ran and they made six to
eight miles on a gallon. , ____
"The fuel was rather treacherous. It absorbed water very quickly. II you
left half a bottle around with the cork off, in a few hours it would fill right up to
the ton, the tuba aloohol soaking up moisture right out of the air. The water would
give our cars all kinds of trouble. But we finally had the tuba growers organized—
payirg them 50 centavos for a five-gallon can of the unfermented palm Juice and had
seven plants running all day long and a separate still to make drinking fuel, The
rainy season knocked our production down considerably by lowering the alcohol yield
from the tuba. But our production on the main plant at Maasin kept fairly consistent
ly tc a daily average of from five to six gallons." (Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 170-71)
473
The value of the distillery became questionable after the Japanese mopping-
up campaign put a quietus on the operations of the transportation service.^-
The guerrilla government undertook a number of public projects for the better
ment of living conditions. Some of these activities vere not novel— simply resus^tion
of ordinary peacetime public works. They are cited here principally to show that in
unoccupied Leyte, the government endeavored to restore as nearly as possible the con
ditions of normal life.
The torrential rains of Leyte necessitated constant road maintenance. Any
extended period of neglect allowed the formation of ruts seriously impeding traffic.
Following the Japanese invasion, the roads fell into a state of decay. The guerrilla
government sought to repair the roads, despite handicaps in the way of limited equip
ment and labor power.
The Provincial Board authorized "the Governor to appoint two capitazeB for the
repair of the provincial roads.
To supervise road maintenance and related constructional activities, the pro
vincial government created an Overseer for Public Works. Various assistants and
labor gangs were to carry out approved projects. Handicapped by lack of funds, the
government could not retain its full crew of maintenance men on a regular full-time
basis.^
^The alcoholic output of the stills perhaps found its use in bibulous activi
ties, rather than as a combustion agent in automobile engines. At any rate, Col.
Kangleon notified the Provincial Treasurer to withhold appropriations for its main
tenance: "For the time being, the distillery should not function. Its operation by
now is a waste of money." (By order of Col. Kangleon . Fernandez, Capt^Y 22 May
1944. Memo, for: The Prov. Treas.
^Prov. Bd. of IVee Leyte. A.ug. 7, 1943. Reso. No. 30 adopted at 5th Session.
3A letter to the Provincial Board from Candido Javellana, the Overseer, touch
ing upon the delay in repairing a branch of the provincial road, raised the question
of general work policy. The Board resolved "to require the Overseer and such foremen,
capitazes and camineros as are necessary to return to their respective posts to look
into the repair of the roads. Their enployment, however, shall depend upon the ex
istence of necessary work, without vhich they would be considered as on leave of ab
sence without salary untii the necessity of their return to their respective posts to
look into the repair of roads. Their employment, however, shall depend upon the ex
istence of necessary work, without vhich they would be considered as on leave of ab
sence without salary until the necessity of their return to service arises.
'"P .g 7m ; h p j '' 1 \ 'p n T G I '! . V hen ru "1 i ! i S ; C <-■ G j n £ \ i - n e e r . t".
474
The WLGWF had its own corps of engineers. Its activities were not only re
lated to strictly military affairs, hut also took in various public improvements.
Both civil engineers and surveyors were included among tlie personnel. Miranda,
himself with an engineering background, took a direct personal interest in the ac
tivities . Lieutenant Florencio B. Coloma, pre-war assistant civil engineer in the
Bureau of Public Works, became divisional engineer of the VLGWF The table of or
ganization of each regiment, according to Coloma, provided for a platoon of 60 men
assigned to the headquarters service company. These men might be drawn upon by the
divisional Engineer Corps for various construction activities. At the outset, Lieu
tenant Quetulio headed thi3 work, but was transferred to intelligence section when
Coloma Joined. The engineer corps constructed the base hospital., provided a Clear
water system in the GBP. dug field latrines, and built the fortifications of the GHC .
The bridges built and trails laid cut in the Pal cmnon and Merida sectors were of
benefit to the civilians as well as to the army.
Of all the rnunicinel i.tie? . Merida undertook the most far-reaching public im
provements nr 'gram. In addition to the obvious reason of civic betterment , the sec
tor commander lieutenant Capuyan adduced another purpose underlying these projects.
Fearing that trie monies in the municipal treasury were unsafe (Merida’s treasury had
earlier been looted.) Capuyan believed that it would be better to disburse these funds
appointed., the Overseer or foreman, as the case may be, be held responsible to the
Provincial Board to aeteimine as to the existence or non-existence of necessary re
pair work in their respective districts and should communicate with the Governor of
such before any such work is started." (Prov. 3d. of Free Leyte . A u g . 30, 1943.
Peso. Bo. 73, 10th Session)
The road-workers serving the government were dissatisfied with their remun
eration. Confronted with the mounting costs of living, they were hard pressed to make
ends meet. The Provincial Board took notice of !,an unnumbered resolution current
series of the Camineroe under the Bureau of Public Works requesting the Board that
the daily wage of each and every caminero be increased from P. SO to PI.60." (Frov.
3d.of Free Leyte. Peso. No. lp0)
Beferred to the Provincial Treasurer, the petition was unfavorably indorsed
back, "in view of the limited income of the province at present." However, recogniz
ing the genuineness of the read-workers need, the Beard voted, "to increase the daily
wage of each and every caminero from P.60 to 21." (Prov. 3d. of Free Leyte. Oct. 13,
1947. Peso. Ho. 679. 27th Session)
475
in beneficial projects than to leave them sterile, a constant temptation to the un
scrupulous. Capuyan won the Municipal Council of Iferida to his point of view. The
Council authorized the immediate appropriation of 500 pesos, and set up a Bureau of
Public Works. The pre-war principal teacher, Themistocles Boholst, was appointed
Checker of Public Works. The Checker was responsible for the maintenance of con
struction records and payrolls in a condition open for audit. All told, some 4000
pesos w r e spent on improving the municipal roads and other public works. The En
gineer Corps assisted the municipality in some of these undertakings.
The guerrillas looked with hostility upon the public works program carried
on by the puppet administration. For one thing, any improvement in facilities made
it simpler for enemy patrols to track them down. Secondly, a public works program
helped to stabilize conditions by providing income for the unemployed. Early in
January, 1943, Manila notified Tacloban that the
Japanese Military Administration has appropriated P 5 ,260,000.00 for main

tenance and construction of national roads and bridges in the provinces. . . .
The Provincial Treasurer or his representative is authorized... .to come to
Manila for the purpose mentioned.•*-
The guerrilla took the only measure they knew possible in expressing their
opposition. In his June report, the Governor noted: "At the end of the month, the
assistant engineer of the Bureau of Public Works and four laborers were killed in
ambush outside of Tolosa."2
Thereafter, the puppet authorities provided military protection for their
public works personnel when engaged in the field.
The government could be depended upon to turn a receptive ear to suggestions
for augmenting food supply. In this connection, the Provincial Agricultural Super
visor forwarded a letter from his Assistant to the Provincial Board. This letter is
of interest in indicating some of the factors contributing to the food shortage and
^-Dir, of Local Govts., Luna. Jan. 14, 1943. To: The Governor, Leyte.
2Actg. Gov. Salazar. Report of Activities: April l-0ctober 31, 1943. To:
Commissioner of Interior through Director of Local Governments.
476
in proposing a practical remedy:
Owing to the difficulty in transportation hy water, the importation of com

modities in this province is greatly reduced. And inasmuch as fishing materials
and implements are very scarce, and as many fishermen quit their fishir^ indus
tries due to the present condition, the supply of fresh fish in the province is
greatly diminished. Reducing the importation of dried fish and diminishing the
sur>p]y of fresh fish raises the demand for eggs, poultry and pork.
The demand for these commodities is very high so that the private poultry
and hog raisers cannot supply the demand. The undersigned therefore recommends
to the Food Administrator and Provincial Agricultural Supervisor the putting up
of three poultry and hog-raising projects for the province. The projects must
he located in the municipalities where fees are abundant. Places like Bontok
and Bato are suitable.
To carry out the project, the Office should request the Provincial Board to
appropriate the amount of PI,000 for building poultry houses, piggery, and
fences; purchase hens, roosters, sows and boars; purchase of feeds; and for
salaries and wages. I presume that a project of such kind, if properly adminis
tered, will turn out profitable at the end.
Endorsement of so ambitious a scheme entailed too many fiscal considerations
for the Board to act without consulting the Provincial Treasurer.^
The Treasurer counseled suspending action until available fundB had been de
termined, and the Board concurred.^ Not long afterwards, the Provincial Agricultural
Supervisor revised his initial estimate, and sought a grant of P5,000 for the project
as "the Provincial Budget has already been fixed and approved." Again, the Board
7 ^
passed on this request for a supplementary allocation.
Rrov. B d . of Free Leyte. Oct. 5, 1943. Peso. N o . 203, 23rd Session.

Resolution No. 240 of the Board, adopted at its 27th Session on Oct. 15,
1943, concurred with the indorsement of the Provincial Treasurer (Oct. 12, 1943) ,
"advising that action on the request. . . .for PI,000. . . .be held in abeyance until
the Provincial Agricultural Fund Budget shall have been approved, and until this of
fice shall have determined the availability of funds by actual collection of revenue."
Rrov. B d . of Free Leyte. Oct. 26. 1943. Peso. No. 292, 30th Session.
Resolution No. 293 of the Beard, indorsing to the Provincial Treasurer a
"1etter from the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, dated October 25, 1943, subse
quently requesting the Provincial Board and the Provincial Treasurer 'to appropriate
the amount of P5 ,000 for nutting up poultry and hog raising project as the Provincial
Budget has already been fixed and approved.'"
The municipality of Abuyog contemplated undertaking a similar project to
help defray local administrative costs and at the same time subsist the troops of the
sector. Designating the municipal prisoners as caretakers of the project, Abuyog1a
Council specified that the "hogs and chickens so raised are intended primarily for use
of the municipal government and for soldiers as the case may be, and appropriating
the amount of twenty peeos for the expenses of the project. It might be seriously
auestioned whether the niggardly outlay provided for subsidizing the project would
suffice. (Leyte Prov. Bd. Sept. 9, 1943. Peso. No. 114 of the hun. Council of
Albuera, approved by Peso. No. 114, adopted at loth Session)
477
Dissemination of choice seedlings among the general, public was another agri
cultural project to win governmental favor. The Provincial Board voted to establish
a provincial nursery and demonstration lot for the purpose of raising various types
of seedlings for free distribution to the public. "Besolved, to acquire through
purchase a parcel of land, not less than three hectares, in Maasin."-*-
Thereupon, the Board proceeded to authorize the Acting Provincial Supervisor
"to make proper negotiation in purchase of a lot owned by Lin Ching Liam."^
Conservation of forest preserves came in for great emphasis. In something of
a lyrical vein, Colonel Kangleon tacked a preamble to an Executive Order, imposing
various restrictions on the use of the forests:
Leyte lias proven to be a stumbling block to the enemy not only because of
the patriotism of its inhabitants, but also because of the thick and wide forests
it has which afford safe place for the evacuation and hiding of loyal Filipinos.
The importance of Leyte is due to its wealth in forest products and the numerous
streams it has, which give beauty to the scenery and fertility to the soil.
All efforts should be exerted to conversation.
Turning to the regulatory aspects, the Order goes on to say:
It is unlawful for any person to make a 'caingin' fe. small nipa hut, put up
by cultivators, or in this case forest workers, to obviate the need of returning
to their regular dwellings at the end of a day's work/ in a public forest or in
any manner to destroy such forest or part or products growing therein during
this emergency. It shall also be unlawful for any person negligently to permit
a fire which has been set upon his own premises to be communicated with destruc
tive results to any public forest. Violations jpunished by imprisonment not ex
ceeding six months, in the court's discretion.0
The VJLGWF also appreciated the importance of conserving timber resources.
Miranda wrote:
Our forests in the municipalities under the supervision and control of the
WLGWF were safeguarded and protected from unwise use. Forester Datoon of the
Bureau of Forestry was in charge of the investigation and inspection of all for
ests . Violators of the forestry law were dealt with accordingly
•^-Prov. B d . of Free Leyte. Sept.. 1943. Beso. No. 153.

^Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte . Oct. 5, 1943. Beso. No. 197, adopted at 23rd Ses.
"Col. P. K. Kangleon. 26 April 1944. Executive Order No. 7.
i
'Miranda, o p . cit,. , p. 5.
478
By "accordingly" in the last sentence quoted, Miranda implied that violators
of the forest code were punished, although the customary fine would be commuted to
labor for the public.
Agricultural Policy
Other examples of emergency projects might be cited. They were all in the
nature of more or less ingenious scheme intended to raise output in some limited
segment cf the economy or in some particular locality. What ve do not find, in fact
vhat we could hardly expect to find knowing the ideational framework in which the
guerrilla organizations functioned, are indications of over-all rationalization of
agricultural production.
While we have noted that the guerrilla pressed for the turning of every parcel
of land into cultivation, we fail tc encounter any comprehensive land-use program
worked out on paper, much less put into operation. No talk was heard of dispossess
ing lazy or inefficient farmers, and assigning them to other work in the interest of
community welfare. No mention was made of conserving agricultural manpower by re
distributing land--even temporarily--to the end, of shaping farm lay-outs to conform
with the technical requirements of efficient tillage. And indeed, the thought of
compelling farmers , or even of advising them, to organize for cooperative marketing
of their produce simply never arose because outside the ken of guerrilla experience.
Long-term agricultural policy, in the sense of a program for post-war land
utilization and development within Leyte, of extending some of the amenities of town
life to the peasantry, of calling upon Manila tc sponsor certain schemes, did not
reach that point of maturity where it might become the topic of campfire discussion.
Of course, it might be said in protest, a guerrilla movement not unified even on a
provincial scale, could hardly be expected to think in economic terms ordinarily as
sociated with national planning boards. Such objection ie merely a lootnote to the
gereral condition noted elsewhere in this study--that independent thinking on the
provincial level has been stultified by an cver-centralization of Philippine
479
administration unfriendly to the exercise of initiative. And it does not invalidate
the contention here advanced— that the entire concept of planning from the standpoint
of community well-being was foreign to the operational ideas with which the guerrilla
carried on in Leyte Province.
So far, we have sampled certain instances of expansion of governmental func
tioning under the guerrilla that resulted not from any carefully conceived plan, but
rather from the non-feasance on the part, of the usual agencies. Now we must move
ahead to consideration of another problem whose solution devolved upon the guerrilla
authorities.
Poor Relief
Almost axiomatic for an invaded territory, the pinch of hunger and the sting
of nakedness must be dumbly endured by a subjugated people. How much more fierce the
pangs of a loyalist population, evacuated to the hills to avoid collaboration with
the hated invader. For these families, a scanty diet and a garb of tatters were
meekly accepted. But when the breadwinners were mustered for active service, the
burden of feeding the hungry little ones falling upon the women left behind became
unbearable. And what ray broke through for the widows and orphans of those fallen
in the struggle for liberation'.
Practicing a rigorous retrenchment, the guerrilla civil administrations yet
remembered the plight of the destitute and did what they could tc allay their afflic
tion. But the guerrilla could not allow their sympathies to upset their budgeting .
Let them allocate but an additional peso for poor relief and by that much must they
subtract from the military grant or from irreducible overhead costs. In a constant
tugging contest, philanthropic and prudential impulses alternately won out.
Impoverishment hung like a pall over western Leyte. Into the drive for its
mitigation, all efforts flowed. Dependents of deceased soldiers and militia men had
first call upon the largesse of the community. A species of death benefits, payable
to the widow, were a token of communal responsibility for the victims of war. To be
sure, such compensation was pitiably meager, and scarcely more than carried the
480
survivors over the first shock of the tragedy. Thereafter they must fend as well
as they might, receiving paltry donations whenever the state of the municipal purse
would permit.
Comsunity charitableness was prodded from time to time by public appeals.1
Among the standing orders received by the military and rural police, campaigning for
the assistance of the necessitous became a fixed responsibility— especially for the
aid of "those wives of soldiers who are actually fighting in the front, within our
district first, then to other districts.
General arrangements for poor relief early engrossed the attention of the
west coast communities. Limited funds delayed devising of actual machinery for this
undertaking. Towards the end of 1942, Albuera's mayor, admitting that no positive
steps had been taken, in exculpation made it kno^na that "we are trying our best to
find ways and means for the relief of the people, especially the indigents."3
By February of 1943, Mayor Barte announced that "very soon the Municipal
Council will open a project for this purpose.
March and April passed. Barte summed up:
The Municipal Council has approved a resolution for relief of two wives of
■'Of the many hard-hit elements of the population, the fugitives from the
Japanese-occupied areas--notably Ormoc and its vicinage--Btood particularly in need
of charity. Virtually all of their possessions had been left behind in the precipi
tate flight. His feelings touched by their plight. Miranda himself interceded to
succor them.
"Becent information has it," began his memorandum to his sector commanders,
"that the civilians who evacuated to the different barrios are suffering hunger and
privation in their evacuation places. In order to alleviate the living conditions
of these evacuees, especially those in the burnt areas, it is hereby ordered that the
barrio tenientes in all the barrios where these evacuees are found look into the wel
fare of these families. Humanitarian help should be extended to them." Then, as an
afterthought— because many of these evacuees had been living for some time in the
enemy-dominated sections, thereby earning the stigma of "collaborationist"— Miranda
added, "No sign of hostility or antagonism should be shown to the victims provided
they have no affiliation with the enemy." (By order of Comdg. Off., Briguez— Lt.
Saco ^Sabellino/. 28 Nov. 1942. Memo No. 7. To: All Sector & Sub-Sector Comdrs.)
%enj. C. Barte, Chief MP Force of Batog. Dec. 20, 1942. Ins. No. 10. To:
Military and Burai Police of Albuera.
3E. B. Barte, Mun. May. Dec. 15, 1942. Beport of CivilAffairs fromDec. 1-
15, 1942, Par. 4. To: CO, WLGVJU (thru CO, Albuera Sector).
*E. B. Barte, Mun. Mayor. Beport of Civil Affairs forFeb., 1943, Par. 4.
To: CO,WIJGW, (thru CO, Albuera Sector).
481
soldiers sent to front J_i.e., Luzon7 at outbreak of war and not returned. Said
•wives hard up in their living and given P10 each. Other means of relief not
made due to lack of funds.
Eventually, relief activities were placed on a more permanent and regular
footing. Out of his enthusiasm for the projects undertaken, the Civil Affairs Offi
cer gave voice to undoubtedly hyperbolic sentiments:
For the first time in the political history of municipal governments in the
Philippines did the same go paternalistic. Appropriations were made by the
municipal councils from the municipal revenue to rehabilitate the helpless in
digents. Thus, a political precedent in the system of municipal governmental
administration has been established. A very significant one because healthfully
revolutionary.’
Belief was needed on the east coast and in the south as well— and for similar
reasons. La P a z , through the Provincial Board, requests
an information from Col. Balderian. . . .as to what help the authorities con
cerned can make for the heirs of those deceased/killed by the Japs patrolling
at Barrio Sta. Ana, on or about August 25, 194377 especially that they were not
inducted to the First Guerrilla Brigade.4-^
The "Baybay Affair", prolific in its consequences for Leyte's resistance
movement, also created a rehabilitational problem. When Major De Gracia of Colonel
Kangleon's command, in his surprise attack on Baybay, routed the local garrison, that
part of the population opposed to the Miranda rule showered triumphal greetings upon
the invaders. The reestablishment of Miranda control presaged retribution upon the
^Mun. Council of Albuera (£gb.— Pedro Calabia, Mun. Secty.) Beport of Civil
Affairs for April, 1943--Par. 4.
"This appropriation, ear-marked specifically, was prompted by the special
"recommendation of the Adjutant General, by command of the Brigadier General of the
WLGWF, In The Field. that the Municipal Council of this municipality may create a re
solution for relief of indigent women. . . .whose husbands were sent to the front at
Cabanatuao, Bueva Ecija." (Mun. Council of Albuera _/Sgd.--Pedro Calabia, Mun. Secty.7
Peso. N° . 14 adopted April 30. 1943. ~
^Victorina C. Teleron. Capt.. JAGS, Staff Judge Adv. Gen. Sc Civil Affairs Off.
3] May 1943. Peport on Civil Affairs. To: The Adj. Gen., VIGWF. in the Field.
4Prov. B d . of Free Leyte. Oct. 11, 1943. Beso. No. 228 adopted at 26th Ses
sion, acting on Beso. No. 83, cs ., of La Paz.
^That is to say, the deceased w r e not members of the La Paz citizens militia
organization, to the disparagement of their dependents' claims for survivors'
benefits .
482
disloyal element who therewith escaped across the Western Leyte "frontier". The
towns offering sanctuary to these "rebels" had to adopt emergency assistance measures
As the implacable opponent of the Miranda government, Attorney Domingo Yeloso
(elected Congressman in the 1946 elections) implored Governor Deneterio of "Free
Ieyte" (that is, in the Kangleon zone) to give support:
During and after the recapture of Baybay by the forces of Miranda, most of
the people of that municipality evacuated to Inopacan, Hindang, Hilongos and
Bato in order to be far from the scene of battle. A.t present, over 1,000
Baybayanoe are scattered in these southern towns, waiting for the restoration
of peace and order and '-.he reestablishment of a Just government in Baybay by
the forces of the 92nfi Division.
Meanwhile, these innocent victims of circumstances, far from their homes,
and without their lands on which to fall back, are forced to make a living
under the most miserable conditions. . . .rather than submit to the rules of
the Briguez State.
On behalf of these suffering compatriots, I respectfully address this letter
in order to request the Hon. Provincial Board to extend a helping hand by ap
propriating a relief fund for these unhappy Baybayanos.
The Governor prc-ed sympathetic. On receiving the Governor's communication,
the Provincial Board resolved to "refer the said letter to the Food Administrator
and Acting Provincial AgrJcultural Supervisor, requesting him to make proper survey,
investigation of said evacuees from Baybay and report on his findings with recommen
dations ."-*■
Subsequently, former Mayor Modina of Baybay appeared before the Provincial
Board, adding his teetimo>y in favor of assistance to the refugees.^ In the face of
indisputable need, the Board could not temporize. It resolved:
. . . .to extend relief to Baybay evacuees in the municipalities of Ino-

paacan, Hindany and Hilongos, authorizing for this purpose the Provincial
Treasurer to release from the unappropriated fund in the Provincial Treasury
the amount of P240 to be distributed as follows:
For the evacuees in Inopaacan. P100; for Hindang, P40; for Hilongos, P100.
Further Pesolved: that for the distribution of this relief, the Mayor of
Baybay is authorized to determine who among the evacuees are to receive aid.
He is instructed to be in contact with the Mayors of the above-named municipali
ties who are also instructed to cooperate with and extend aid to said Municipal
Mayor
-*Prov. B d . of Free Leyte. Sept. 1. 1943. Peso. No. 81, 11th Session.
% i s estimate of the number of fugitives is lower than Veloso's. He cited
250 evacuees in Inonaacan. more than 50 in Hindang, more than 200 in Hilongos, about
24 in Bato, a few in Matalom and some in Macrohon. However, he declared that the
stream of evacuees had not ended at the time of his count.
•-Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 4, 1943. Beso. No. 83, 12th Session.
483
Summarizing. we may say that there took place a noteworthy growth of govern
mental powers durii^ the period of guerrilla control in Leyte. However, to infer
from these developments any long-range trends in this direction would he quite un
warranted. We may arrive at such conclusions independently, however, by projecting
into the future a recurrence of extraordinary circumstances, either of economic de
pression or social unrest, when the usual agencies for the transaction of affairs had
been broken down. In the war-time expansion of governmental Jurisdiction, tentative
and uneven though these enlargements were, we might discover models for later deli
berate planning.
Education for Resistance
A war of popular resistance against a foreign conqueror can only be success
fully carried on by means of the mobilization of the total resources of a people. In
Leyte, the guerrilla leadership understood this principle with sufficient clarity.
They labored manfully to develop and enlist the invisible resources of the population
to the end that the invader's yoke might be cast off. In the sections that follow,
we shall concern ourselves with guerrilla efforts to arouse and educate what we might
call loosely the "will to resistance".
Earlier in this study, we considered the program drawn up by the puppet govern
ment in Tac" oban to win over the population to accepting Japanese dominion. It was
important that the guerrilla nullify the effects of this apneal and replace it with
their own counter-propaganda. We shall appronriately take up the guerrilla program
of counter-indoctrination as the foundation of their resistance campaign.
Once having won over a sizable segment of the population to support their ob
jectives, the guerrilla had next to train them to resist with intelligence and effec
tiveness. First of all, the civilian elements absorbed into the guerrilla combat
force must be schooled in the fundamentals of soldiering, while soldiers and special
ist civilians called up to officerehips must be given special leadership training.
Secondly, the auxiliaries, both men and women, marshalled as a home defense force,
must be given special training. We shall consider the guerrilla program of mass
484
education for military resistance.
Scarcely less important, the guerrilla undertook an intensive public health
campaign to maintain the physical fitness of Leyte's population in the face of the
debilitating conditions of war. Let the stamina of the population droop, the guer
rilla leadership realized, and enemy surrender propaganda would exert an irresistible
influence. We must therefore inquire into the health education program as part and
parcel of the general resistance program.
As was pointed out before. Leyte's population is made up largely of adherents
to Roman Catholicism. The guerrilla were anxious to have the weight of institutional
religion aligned on their side. Short of this, they were concerned that the religious
obligations of the devout should in nowise collide with their duties as resisters.
We shall pause then to touch upon the status of organized religion during the occu
pation years.
Finally, we turn to the question of education in the traditional, formal
sense of schooling for the young. The guerrilla were concerned that the public
schools in the area under their control should again function as a stabilizing in
fluence in a period of turmoil and distress.
Guerrilla Propaganda
During the first phase of the war in the Pacific, when one after another
the citadels of Western power in the Orient toppled before the advancing Japanese
forces, the peonle of Leyte were thrown into deep despondency. Filipino hopes that
the initial Japanese smash attacks would be repulsed— the attackers thrown reeling
back as soon as the Allies recovered from their surpriee--met grim disappointment.
With the T>a8sage of months, the Japanese dug in, consolidated their holds, andspoke
of a "ong period of imperial ru]e. Their agencies of propaganda: press, radio,
movies, mass meetings and controlled public schools--backed up by the strong and
terrible arm of counter-intelligence, worked around the clock. And the conquerors
painted luminous pictures of untold blessings, provided the local population collab
orated with them--warned of instant and frightful reprisal in the event of non
cooperation.
485
But the Japanese failed to win the friendship of the people of Leyte, though
they succeeded in cowing large elements into submission. Despite their pretense of
championing the rights of the Orientals against the oppression of Occidental im
perialism, of restoring dignity to the degraded colored peoples in defiance of the
supercilious whites, cf building a new pan-Oriental culture purged of degenerate
Western influences, the Japanese conducted themselves as cruel taskmasters interested
almost entirely in exploiting their subjects. Wo new concepts of citizenship emerged,
notwithstanding the fanfare of mass rallies. To the Filipino was reserved the role
of the docile, obedient servant eligible for charity so long as he performed the
tasks assigned to him with alacrity. And an occasional kick or elan was in order
simply to give reminder of who was master.
The resistance movement in Leyte had its origin in revulsion against Japanese
demeanor as much as in positive affirmation of Filipino nationalism and denxocracy.
The guerrilla leaders realized that hatred against the invader was growitg even if
inhibited from public expression. They determined to capitalize upon every mistake
made by the Japanese in their occupation policy and daily behavior in order to make
them appear as heinous as possible. Much of guerrilla propaganda took the form of
scathing denunciation of Japanese cruelty and stupidity, coupled with an expose of
what they called the hypocrisy of the enemy's Filipino spokesmen. The rest of the
guerrilla outpourings in broadside or at gatherings of the barrio folk was directed
towards giving the lie to Japanese claims of victory in the Pacific war and in re-
n1anting the seeds of faith in American liberation.^
In this section, we will look into the nature of guerrilla propaganda in
Leyte, as carried on by some of the leading guerrilla organizations.
The guerrilla units of Eastern Leyte carried a good part of the burden of
^The puppet Governor acknowledged the effectiveness of anti-Japanese propa

ganda: "Many still think that America can and will send aid to the Philippines.*
This they hear from radios which they were able to take with them to the mountains. ."
(B. Torres, Prov. Gov. March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of Visayaa, Japanese
Imperial Forces)
486
counter-propaganda. Eastern Leyte was the center of enemy troop concentrations}
here the pro-Japanese propaganda was most intensively disseminated. One such unit
declared:
In order to enliven the spirit and keep up the morale of both fighting men
and the civilian population, and to disseminate correct information about the
war situation, both ax home and abroad, this headquarters has organized a
Propaganda Corps.
This guerrilla unit's program, duplicated by other organizations, consisted
of the following activities:
A unit of this Corps is editing a news-sheet, 'The Bugle', which came out
under this name on November 11, 1942, an outgrowth of the 'News Highlights'
which first came out on October 19, 1942.
This news-sheet shall be, as heretofore, issued daily and on a non-profit
basis. And for our sources of news we use the daily broadcasts of the follow
ing stations: KGEI--Sn. Francisco, KWID— Sn. Francisco. KET— Sn. Francisco and
BBC— London.
The following is the Table of Organization of the Editorial and Business
Staff of 'The Bugle' :
Editor ........ Chief, Propaganda Corps
A s s o c i a t e ........... Chief, S-l Stenographer & Typists . . Members, S-l
Business Manager. . Chief, S-4 Circulation Manager. . . . Chief, S-2^
The amalgamation of the East Leyte guerrilla outfits under the command of
Major Ba^derian presaged a stepping up of resistance propaganda output, as well as
improvement in quality of the releases. The able B r . P.alph Posuncuy, Balderian's
intelligence chief, assumed directorship of the enterprise. He worked out an ambi
tious program including the holding of public meetings in the barrios (and in the
towns, wherever possible), designed to whip up public sentiment for resistance and
elicit material support for the guerrilla. He aleo printed inflammatory leaflets,
secretly distributed by his operatives.
The difficulties that Posuncuy sought to overcome were presented in more
limited context by one of his followers, treating the psychological obstacles
encountered:
The VOFP's Job was made harder by the fact that Mr. & Mrs. Average Header
opened their paper, expecting to read of the bombing of Tokyo, the landing of
American soldiers in the Philippines or the sudden miraculous end of the war.
]-Lt. F. Balagtas, S-l, Hdqtrs. No. 8, Leyte Guerrilla Forces, USAFFE. 11 Nov.
1942. Par. 1-4.
487
But the day's nevs told only of fighting in remote, far-flung places. . . .The
local situation did not lend encouragement to despairing hearts. People scanned
the sea and air in vain for a sign of those planes and ships vhich, they vere
told, -were coming out of American factories and shipyards hy the thousands.
Not a few Thomases shook their heads in doubt. Japs and more Japs were pouring
into the island. The guerrillas, already running low in ammunition, were carry
ing on a fight, brave, but seemingly futile and hopeless.
The job of the man who has to soothe a suffering patient by telling him that
the doctor would surely come — in spite of the fact that a fierce storm is raging,
the bridges are down, the rivers swollen, and the roads badly destroyed— has
never been easy or enviable. And yet that in effect was the VOFP's job. To
tell the people that America was coming back, no matter what. . . .To contribute
to Japan's strength and fighting power by helping supply her factories with
needed raw materials would be to delay the day of our deliverance and. prolong
our period of agony. The guerrillas had done their Job of harrassing the enemy,
disrupting his plans and hindering his efforts to make the most out of his occu
pation of the country. It would be up to the civilians to do their share, too,
by remaining loyal to the cause and refusing to cooperate with Japan.
That was the burden of all VOFP preachings. It was asking the people to make
sacrifices and endure hardships. . . .But the great majority of the people. . . .
were prepared to give more than just enough. The people feared and hated the
Japs so much— a fact for which we stand indebted to the Jap soldier himself, who
with his brutal ways did a very efficient job of making himself most sincerely
hated.1
The VOFP was the Voice of the Free People, a fortnightly laboring in the guer
rilla cause, first published by Posuncuy's office in November, 1942. The setting up
of the VOFP is recalled in a Liberation number of the same publication, dated January
18, 1945. Adorned by a coverpiece symbolizing "revival", the issue carried an article
entitled, "The Story of a Voice":
.. . .The Japs had full control over the press and radio. Jap periodicals,
leaflets and pamphlets literally rained over the country giving the people the
Jap side to the news and issues of the day. The people were tired of hearing
about the exploits of the invincible Imperial Japanese Fleet, the ever-victorious
Imperial Japanese Army. . . .They wanted to read some real, honest news--not the
sort of hash ground out by the sleek Japanese propaganda machine in Tokyo. If a
guerrilla newspaper could only be published. . . .
Soon Capt. Posuncuy 1 Co. got busy translating the idea into reality. . . .
Somehow they got together some nondescript equipment and materials: a battered
but still serviceable mimeograph, several radio sets, badly needing repair,
some stencils and paper salvaged from schoolhouses and municipal buildings. The
press looked more like a Junk room than anything. But what the budding publishers
lacked in materials, they made up with their ingenuity and spirit. Burning their
midnight oil. they labored and sweated over their first issue.
The first issue made its debut unobtrusively, with no fanfares and without
benefit of any prominent man's benediction. It was a modest beginning, containing
gone war news and a reproduction of President Pcosevelt and President Quezon's
inspiring massages to the Filipino people given on the occasion of the 7th Anni
versary of the Philippine Commonwealth, then an exile government. The news had
1P. L. Yap, "The Story of a Voice", The Voice of the Free People , January 18,
1945, p. 3. (Mimeographed).
488
to be checked and rechecked carefully against errors; atlases and encyclopedias

had to be consulted--a tedious process which became a matter of routine with
every succeeding issue and which eventually earned for the paper a reputation
for accuracy and reliability. The paper was given a name: 'The Voice of the
Free People* . It was more than a name; it was, unwittingly, an apt description
of a queer situation— of a people of an enslaved country remaining free. As the
Japs were to find out later, the Philippines was conquered but not the Filipinos.'
In December, 1942, Posuncuy learned of the presence in San Isidro of Pedro
Yap, a young man with a Journalistic flair. Yap had edited several college publica
tions as an undergraduate at the University of the Philippines. He consented to
serve as chief of Posuncuy's Propaganda Corps (including the editorship of the VOFP)
when the situation and the need for directorship in this important branch of resist
ance work was out]ined to him. Yap said of the public reaction:
The response of the public was gratifying. In time, people began clamoring
for the VOFP. It was to them an oasis in a veritable desert of lies and misin
formation. . . .Tc the people reached by its circulation, the VOFP gave out newB
which no Jap-control led newspaper vou]d even dare to publish— news of Allied air,
naval and land victories in all theaters of the war, of Jap and Nazi losses,
and of the gigantic war production of America, the arsenal of democracy.^
The VOFP played an important part in stiffening civilian morale, and deserves
some comment regarding its lay-out. The outer cover was an off-set from an original
sketching, tastefully done on a stencil sheet, a sketching changed with every issue.
Then would follow a timely editorial, a commentary on some phase of the over-all war
situation, on Japanese intentions vis-a-vis the Philippines, or on the policies of
the local puppet officials. The feature section carried varied articles, some poli
tical, some moralistic and exhortative, some literary. A final section consisted of
a brief round-up of the latest news events throughout the world, mainly concerned
with military operations. Interspereed throughout the paper or in one section were
chatty tid-bits about personalities within the local guerrilla movement, intended to
foster a comraderie among the troons and to knit closer ties between civilians and
guerrilla. In addition to editor-in-chief Yap (nom de plum Y. Plaredo) were
Hermenegi] do Granados serving as news editor (Gil Grand.) , Angel Enteroso as art
editor (Enso Gelanrete), Fortunato Fore (Purita Fortuna) as business manager.
-Ibid. . p. 2. 2Ibid., p. 3.
489
I«t us offer a few excerpts from a typical issue, that of June 19, 1943,
from the editorial of that date, devoted to an analysis of the Japanese "independence"
pledge to the Filipinos:
But if the Japanese propaganda magicians think that they can hypnotize ub
into submission by continually harping on the prospect of our getting independent
within this year as Premier Tozyo promised they are sadly mistaken. We cannot
easily be hoodwinked into accepting promises— especially when such promises come
from Tokyo. We know exactly Just what value to attach to Japanese promises. . . .
The tide of war in the Southwest Pacific and in China has clearly turned. Japan
is suffering heavily from the terrific blows. . . .If she withdraws from the
Philippines, Japan would lose face. And to lose face, for Japan, is unthinkable.
For this reason, she must be thinking now of a good face-saving excuse. By
promising to grant us our independence on condition that we cooperate with her
wholeheartedly, Japan could say later, when she will be forced to withdraw from
the Philippines, that she is only making her promise good. . . .But there is one
thing which the Japanese propagandists have missed in their calculations. They
have forgotten that we are a people trained in the processes of democracy. . . .
Hence we have been trained to think for ourselves. . . .Japan's version of inde
pendence is freedom granted to a people to obey and follow her wishes and her
dictates. . . .Clarifying the condition of Burma's independence, the Japanese
Premier explained that the independence of Burma will not be based on the Anglo-
American idea of independence. . . .The Philippines will become a mere piece in
the huge Japanese Jig-saw puzzle, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. . . .America has promised us Rea] independence. We believe in America's
word. We are fighting side by side with her. . . .Tie victory of our cause means
not only the liberation of one nation, but of all nations which are suffering
under the heel of the modern tyrants.
Here is a sober assessment of hollow Japanese pretensions. an exposure of
chicanery, and with enough emotional ring to arouse a detestation in Filipino hearts
of this Japanese imposture .
A timely article on "Teodora Alonza", mother of the Philippine national hero
Jose Rizal, must have offered some consolation to the mothers whose sons were risking
their lives in prosecuting the cause of resistance. The article concludes:
For a mother to rear a genius and a hero to manhood, to watch him grow into
a fine, well-principled man, to see him persecuted for his ideas and ideals, to
suffer persecutions herself on his account, to witness his martyrdom and finally
to see his country do him honor and justice is perhaps more than any mother can
ask for. And yet, that--in a nutshell — is the life of Teodora Alonzo Realonda.
Another article, entitled "Our Sixth Column", a reprint of "a speech delivered;
at the General Convocation of Volunteer Guards held at Barrio Cutay, Carigara, June j
12 194-3," by Captain Bticcio Aguiios undoubtedly found an appreciative audience
among a wide segment of the civilians:
490
So far, we have succeeded in keeping these parts of our country free from
the contaminating and polluting touch of the enemy. But the enemy seems to be
resuming his activities. Increased vigilance on our part, therefore, is neces
sary. A volunteer guard, as the name suggests, must ever be on the guard. It
is a grave responsibility ana a difficult task which all volunteer guards are
expected to perform to the best of their ability. It is a duty which they owe
to themselves, to God. and to country.
There is power in the simple directness of this appeal and invocation.
Under the caption of "Here and There", the "Roving Reporter" commented:
Speaking before a capacity crowd which gathered to witness the first Home
Guard competition to be held in Carigara last June 12, Col. Balderian stressed
the importance of planting short-time crops in order to prevent any shortage of
food. . . .Sixty-eight student officers, comprising the second batch of graduates
of the Officers' Service School, took their diplomas last June 14. Topping the
list of graduates was Capt. Robert Welstrom (MC). Lt s . P. Posuncuy and A. Mate
got second and third places, respectively. . . .Motor alcohol from tuba which can
be used to run cars has been successfully produced in experimental quantity by
the AIAC0. . . .Miss Anita Trani became the wife of Major Fio Oritz in a quiet
and simple ceremony held at the Carigara church last Thursday, June 17. Miss
Henrietta Tcnolet-e was the bridesmaid and Capt. P. Kierulf, the best man. After
the ceremony, the wedding breakfast was served at the house of the bride's
grandmother. . . .
The war news, consisting of a global coverage, is temperate in tone, contain
ing no blood-thirsty war-whooping against Japan, but attempts to create the impression
by a mountainous heaping of items in every theater of operations that the massed
might of the Allies is simply irresistible. The section closes with a quotation from
Franklin D. Roosevelt: "The light of democracy must be kept burning. To the per-
netuation of this light, each must do his share. . . . ”
Yan recalled with oride:

The YOFP staff continued to nut out the oaper despite the enemy. The press
had to keen moving, taking care not to stay in any one place too long. The Jans
might come to know its address, and pay the paper a surprise visit. But eventu
ally the Japs caught the YOFP. In a surprise midnight raid, on November 7, 1943,
the Japs found their prey in a small hut deep in the forest of Carigara. Most cf
the men, including Capt. Fosuncuy, managed to escape though. The Japs killed
three, captured, two of the YOFP editors and smashed the printing equipment. And
equipment at the time was even harder to replace than editors. . . .The YOFP as
a news organ of the guerrilla met its tragic and in that November raid. But as
a voice speaking for freedom and human dignity, it never died. It cannot and
will never die. . . .so long as there be men willing to forego the privilege of
living in comfort and ease, of drinking coffee every morning, of never missing a ,
meal of sleeping in soft warm beds, and of wearing shoes and well-pressed clothes;
--nen who would rather forego all these than lose their rights and dignity as
free men. . . .Men like Dr. Ralph Posuncuy who sacrificed a lucrative practice
491
and a life of ease and comfort in order to dedicate his life to freedom's cause,
preferring death, in the end, to surrender. . . .!
Wot only the 95th Regiment, hut the battalions too carried on their propaganda
activities. Francisco Monge reported (in interview) that the "Propaganda Publicity
Corps, Intelligence Section" of Battalion 2 had its own radio set, mimeograph machine
and accessories. He depended upon friends in Tacloban to supply the materials and to
secretly recharge the radio batteries whenever they began to go low. They called
their little paper the Karatung, which sometimes appeared as often as twice weekly.
If was not as finished a piece of work as the VOFP, but it was distributed widely by
intelligence operatives and their agents. The S-2 office of the battalion was mobile.
Unfortunately, Japanese counter-intelligence informed the enemy at the time the S-2
was in San Miguel. The Japanese despatched a patrol, which raided the S-2 office
(June 19, 1943), capturing the printing materials, two radio batteries, and the Kara
tung office file. The remains of the paper were finally lost during the American
shellings, which destroyed the evacuation place.
A guerrillero summed up the resistance propaganda work in north-east Leyte:
While the pro-Japanese were publishing the Leyte Shi nibun newspaper in Tacloban
. . . .publications in mimeographed form were being circulated to the mountain
people to counteract the pro-Japanese paper. They were being published in Carigara
Jaro, Babatngon, where radio receiving sets were available. . .
The same writer also paid tribute to the efforts of the public school teachers:
The teachers were assigned to canvass homes tc take a census of the families,
tc teach home industries, and for the dissemination of information on the War.
Lectures were being conducted by the teachers in different places to bolster up
the morale
In east central Leyte. Captain Hrfe was faced with the reality of the enemy
occupation. The material fact of enemy oppression was indisputable. He could not
argue this away. He could only appeal to the love of nation and of freedom, and the
promise of American aid in an unspecified future. The rapacity and intimidation prac
ticed by outlaw bands posing as guerrillerc3 only deependd the sense of mass despair.
4 ap , op . cit. , p. 4. ^Potente , op . cit. . p. 13.

5Ibid., p. 15.
492
Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that there was "plenty of
loose talk and the people could not be prevailed upon to stop it."1
Erfe mustered all his resources to inflame the population of his zone to
the cause of resistance. His cause was a righteous cause, and no true Filipino could
fail to respond to its appeal. In an open letter to the people of Leyte, he declared:
. . . .1 should like to take this opportunity, as the Comnanding Officer,

USAFFE AT LAHJE, LEYTE, and the Guerrilla Warfare Service Units, to mention
here-under what our soldiers and guerilla men are fighting for and pray to
Almighty God for our ultimate victory.
a. Preservation of human liberty and democracy
b. Preservation of our way of life and the principles of self respect
c. To uphold rule of right and justice
d. To preserve our future independence. , . .
e. To be free from fear of aggression and subjugation by a nefarious nation
f. To safeguard the life and properties of our civilian population from law
less and subversive elements.
g. Elimination of sectionalism and regional prejudices, but instead to in
still in the people a stronger consciousness of national solidarity which now,
more than ever before, necessitates consolidation of our efforts and resources
into one solid and united front.’5-
This Headquarters directs, therefore, that all Commanding Officers, Detach
ment Commanders and Brigade Commanders should read this Message to all their
soldiers and guerrilla men and to civilians in order to eliminate doubts as to
what our soldiers and guerrilla men stand for in their stubborn resistance against
the invaders; and in order that they shall know the noble purposes and aims of
our countrymen who have voluntarily taken up arms; that besides the perpetuation
of those that are already mentioned above, freedom of worship, freedom of speech,
freedom to follow our own conviction and the dictates of our heart shall be pre
served forever in our midst."5
And in another message, addressed to the guerrilla leaders, he urged them to
remember the glorious traditions of Leyte:
^Mercado, o p . cit. , p. 26.

^This point is unique. Wore of Leyte’s other guerrilla leaders included it
among expressions of fighting aims. It suggests Erfe’s own sensitivity to his Ilocano
extraction in a region populated by Visayans, traditionally suspicious of Ilocanos.
His guerrilla auditor, Eamon Mercado, voiced the same anxiety that localistic
narrowness might vitiate the effectiveness of guerrilla propaganda. He too was a non-
Tisayan, and in his stumping he found himself saying: "It is true that I am not a
native of this province. But the place of birth is not important. What is important
is that I am like you— a Filipino. The last drop of blood that flows in my veins is
Filinino. The place where I was born is within thejurisdiction of the Philippines.
And therefore, I am your brother who feels what you feel and having a sentiment as
yours. Ae a Fi]ipino, it is not onlymy pride and birth right, but it is my solemn
duty to fight for my country's rights and ideals. .. ." (Mercado, o p . cit. . p. 26.)
39 Col. Inf.. GKQ USAFFE At large. 11 Jan. 1943. Subject: WHAT THE USAFFE
AT T.AFGE AND GUEBP.ILIA VABFABS UNITS, LEYTE, Are Fighting For. To: All the people
of Leyte, Par.2-3.
493
You have heard and read in the history of Leyte, the exploits of Polahan
and guerrilla warriors of Francisco Flordelis of Hilongos forty three years ago.
The guerrilla units now well organized in Leyte shall not be found wanting in
their exploits against the barbarian invaders now bent on slaughter! i^;, maraud
ing our people in Leyte. Our guerrilla fighters are well selected men’of bravery
and daring, ready to sacrifice their life and their loved ones in order to
destroy this 'Scourge of God'.l
Erfe, in many other messages and proclamations, sought to whip up the will
of the people to endure the asperities of resistance, rather than succumb to the
alternate terror and blandishments of the Japanese.2 With a sense of the dramatic,
Erfe used every contrivance to get his message across. Thus, Erfe directed that the
mayor of Burauen, be "installed. . . .immediately after the taking of the town with
an appronriate ceremony, with all his people present. This is necessary in order to
mark the return of democracy in his civil government. . .
Erfe had the active, unceasing cooperation of his subordinates in the further
ance of his purposes. Ramon Mercado recites some of the conditions faced in these
exhortations in the Dulag sector:
We started a systematic campaign meeting the barrio lieutenant and some in
fluential people, and in places where there were many evacuees talking to them
on the importance of united action for a common cause. At first we found the
people cool and frigid about the idea for fear that when caught by the Japs they
vould suffer torture and possibly death. It was not only for themselves that
they were afraid, but for their families as well. It was already a comnon know
ledge among the people that when a guerrillero was caught, he and his family were
•4?rov. of Leyte. 11 Jan. 1943. Memo. No. 13. To: All Conmanding Officers,
Detachment Commanders, Brigade Commanders.
2Elsevhere, Erfe had declared that "the love to live a life of right and Jus
tice has prompted us not to surrender and to form the so-called USAFFE AT LARGE,
Leyte. This organization because of that inspiration prefers to live and die fight
ing the enemy wherever opportunity opens." (9, Capt. Inf., Comdg. USAFFE AT LARGE.
14 Dec. 1942. Memo to: L t . Balderian.)
And in a ringing manifesto, at the time of his final reorganization, Erfe
said: " . . . .WHEREAS; we know that the progress of a nation has for its firm foun
dation her independence and liberty, thus the citizens treasure this the noblest and
sublime sentiment before which should fade the fear for the safety of our interests
and of our families and for which we should not hesitate to shed blood that we may
break the barbarous abuses of the enemy;
"WHEREAS; this truth, that resistance is inspired by Justice and right, is
exemulified in the history of all civilized nations, for none of these would tolerate
the least aggression against its territory without being ready to sacrifice the last
drop of blood in the defense of its national integrity. . . . " (Glicerio I. Erfe,
Col. Inf.. Mili. Adviser, 11th Guer. Div. 21 May 1943. Proclamation)
39 Comdr. USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte. 1 Nov. 1942. Post Haste Memo to: Lt.
Balderian, ^1050.
494
killed. But due to our incessant pounding on them the sense of patriotism,
coupled with the idea of the liability of being killed even if they were not
members of the underground, their doubt vanished and they Joined the movement
freely and enthusiastically.
In our campaign I stressed the necessity of being united for mutual help and
protection. I said, 'It is important in this time of emergency to have mutual
understanding for by such we may be able to protect ourselves and escape the
brutalities of our enemy. We have two kinds of enemies to deal with. The enemies
from within and the enemies from without. From within are those quislings vho
may be with us now. This kind of enemy could hardly be recognized for he is like
us— a Filipino. From without are the Japs who at times can be mistaken for Fili
pinos. With an organization, we will not only be able to repel the tyranny of
the invaders but we may be able also to stamp the activities of the quislings and
ultimately catching them. . . .
'We can never be slaves. We have learned from our tutor, our beloved USA,
to be free and liberty loving people. We were taught to lead a democratic life,
but such life is being curtailed, nay withheld from us, by the tyrannical and de
spotic invaders. But we will not regain the lost freedom by Just sitting and be
ing indifferent. We have got to do somsthing. We have got to fight. Fight with
all our might. Fight for our right; fight for the rights of our children's
children; fight for our liberty and freedom. I am appealing to your sense of
patriotism to defend our country's freedom. Let us unite and fight for a conmon
cause, common principle and common ideal against our common enemy. Let us sacri
fice. There is no sweeter, better and greater sacrifice than that sacrifice made
for the freedom of our country.'*
To maintain morale, it was necessary for Erfe to show that Leyte was not to
tally cut off from the world outside . How else could promises of Allied aid to the
conquered Islands be made known? It was also of vital importance to give the lie to
enemy boasts of victory after victory in the Pacific war, and of Axis victories else
where. Erfe came to regard the dissemination of favorable -war news, and the making
of prognostications on that basie, as a highly important aspect of his mission. !
Silverio Paza, serving as Erfe’s chief clerk before his appointment as Adjutant, used
to make transcriptions of short wave news broadcasts from San Francisco (Station KG-EI)
received on the Headquarters radio set. Erfe was further aided by the addition to
his staff of Manuel P. MondeJar, who had received some training as a newspaperman
along with his legal education. Mendejar was appointed Chairman of the Propaganda
Corps, and also Editor-in-Chief of the Eeadquarters Journal.
The Abuyog guerrilla brigade was actively engaged in its own propaganda work:
On the morning of March 50, 1945, 'PIONE.CB' a mimeographed tabloid containing

but four nages greeted the eyes of the people for the first time in many months.
^Mercado, o p . cit. . pp. 55-56.
495
It was published by the second guerrilla brigade and contained foreign war news,
local briefs, editorial column, and a vernacular section. It was the local
version of what the Public delations Office publishes for the armed forces.
The paper went as far as the municipalities of Baybay, Tacloban. and Carigara,
but came out only four times— eight pages in its second and third issues, and six,
but. wider, rages in the last. It could not come out beyond June. 194?, since
we who stood behind it ran short of stationery and were called to teach when “I
schools were reonened in maces not. occnoied by the enemy.'
Besidents of east-central T.eyte will testify concerning the effectiveness of
Crfe's propaganda messages and activities. Ironically, Crfe's organization fell
short in selling itself to higher authorities, and failed to gain American recogni
tion as a bona fide guerrilla outfit. A more successful liaison with GKt, South-west
Pacific, might have brought a more favorable issue.
Maintenance of civilian morale was one of the primary missions of the VLC-WF.
The civilians ijad to be convinced that collaboration witti the Jarane.se was unpatrio
tic, that the Japanese victories were only temporary and would be soon reversed by
growing Allied might , that Use United States would redeem her pledge to establish an
independent PhilippInes--and. on the other side, that those apprehended as collabora
tionists would be dealt with hefittingly. An indispensable item in such, a program
was a radio set that could tune in to the world outside blockaded Leyte. The Japan
ese confiscated whatever radio sets t h e y could lay their hands on during the initial
stages of the occupation. Miranda was able to selvage some damaged sets and brought,
them to his GIL..
1 st Permeant '
Jamon 0evl’a. a tire-3aw student before the war. had had some
exrerience in radio repair work. He fixed the damaged sets in Miranda's headquarters
and succeeds," in tuning In on broadcasts from c-an Francisco and Chungking. Sevilla
stated in interview that the procedure followed consisted in his copying down all
newscasts verbatim and then transmitting them tc a runner, assigned to his post, for
immediate delivery to the GHg.
Listening in on an overseas newscast for t-lie guerrilla had been a 24-hour
assignment for Sevilla. The news was too important for even a jot to be missed.
•Âurillo, op. cit.,p. 4.
496
Sevilla alternated with hie wife in standing sentinel and making transcriptions.^-
One of the most enhe&rtening pieces of news, from the standpoint of effect upon troop
morale, according to Sevilla, was that of the American landings on Hew Guinea. The
Aleutian campaign also created a stir, for it stressed the invincibility of the
American home base. As for the speeches of President Roosevelt, they were received
with much elation, copied in quantity, widely distributed, and interpreted in local
Visayan dialect for the English illiterates by the guerrilla officers.
When a runner, buzzing with excitement, entered the GH<, brandishing last-
minute newscopy from an overseas broadcast, he was generally referred to the desk of
the Peputy Chief of Staff. Conrado Cabellino. in his capacity as chief of the Pro-
naganca Corps had as major responsibility the dissemination of pro-Allied propaganda
among troons and civilians alike. Orientation hours were arranged for the soldiers,
during which time the latest news was related and interpreted by a unit officer,
while the enlisted, men were encouraged to discuss its significance. Sabellino had
the responsibility of contacting the units, directly or through assistants, and
priming the unit officers. In every barrio, community assemblies were held, gener
ally presided ovez’ by the barrio lieutenant. Here the Volunteer Guards and all in
terested civilians had :he opportunity to hear and talk over the latest military de
velopments on all fronts.
Sabellino's office also distributed copies of interesting news stories and
nolitical cartoons, all designed tc bolster troop morale. In the months of September
and October. 194.?. when the Japanese released their barrage of Philippine independence
nronaganda (made in Tokyo independence, as the guerrilla styled it), Miranda specially
^During the tirre of the Eavbay attack by the Kangleon forces, Sevilla trans
ferred his set from the GHQ. He feared that it might be confiscated in the event
that the southerners should storm the GHQ. Four months later, he undertook the pain
ful Job of disconnecting the wires and abandoning his set in the mountains. The
Japaneee had begun their mopping-up campaign. Radio sets were not only being seized;
possession of a set sealed the fate of the owner.
497
comnissioned Sabellino to offset this appeal.1 And Miranda believed this counter
propaganda was very necessary, in view of the effect of the Japanese appeal. (Only
in terms of Japanese persuasiveness could Miranda account for the treachery of some
of his own followers, who personally led the Japanese cohorts in their assault upon
his GHQ.)
In southern Leyte, the name of Attorney Domingo Yeloso surmounted the list
of propagandists selected by Colonel Kangleon to head his propaganda service. Velosote
methods were essentially the same as those used by the other guerrilla spokesmen.
He made effective use of the schoo] teachers in agitating among the barrio folk in
favor of resistance, and in urging the people to hold fast against the demoralization
accompanying arrival of Japanese reinforcements.
Unfortunately for the cause of Leyte's resistance movement, Attorney Veloso
had a pet hate--the WI/3WF of Miranda. For this, there are several explanations. One
is that he had been serving as Justice of the peace in his home coumunity of Baybay
during the first phase of the Japanese occupation, and was frightened by a "flying
squad" (sent by Miranda) into flight to the "south". Another--that he was nursing a
bitter family grudge against his cousin and namesake Dr. Domingo Veloso (chief sur
geon of the VfLGWF), and was prepared to damn any organization granting honors to this
kinsman. Attorney Veloso himself declared that he hated the ULGUF because it was a
corrupt and tyrannical organization.^
Be that as it may, Veloso devoted much of his efforts (with the complete ac
cord of Colonel Kangleon) to vituperative articles and speeches against the WLGWF,
inflaming the population of the southern communities to abhor Miranda as an ogre lit
tle better than the Japanese. Not only that, representatives of the guerrilla move
ment in neighboring islands, while on visit to Leyte, had their ears filled with
lurid accounts of Miranda's gruesome organization. Unfortunately, this vilification
It he WI/IWF propaganda releases were at once spirited and to the point. Speci
mens have been placed in the Appendix.
Înterview, 41st Inf. Begt., Leyte, 1945.
498
campaign backfired. It led some of the people to regard all of the guerrillas as
cutthroats and robbers, and hence, to accept Tacloban'b characterization of the
guerrillas as outlaws--enemies of the people.
By and large, ve may say that the anti-collaborationist propaganda dissemi
nated by the guerrilla groups on Leyte was highly successful. It brought encourage
ment and faith to thousands of Leyte's people during the darkest hours of the enemy
occupation. It brought news of Allied victories in a global war that flatly contra
dicted Japanese reports of mastery everywhere. And it helped to weld bands of fel
lowship among the resisters, shoving them that they were not alone in the struggle,
but were in partnership with other groups carrying on in neighboring municipalities.
Guerrilla Officership Training
A citizen army, if it is to be more than a nondescript collection of men
authorized to bear arms publicly, requires considerable training. And training im
plies the pi'esence of trainers, men reasonably versed in at least the rudiments of
military science. The guerrilla organizations of Leyte experienced an acute lack of
trained officers capable not only of leading but of developing latent leadership
capacity among the non-commissioned officer personnel. It was to cope with this de
ficiency that each of the guerrilla organizations set to work establishing general
service officer training schools.
The administrative and instructional staffs of these schools were drawn from
the few comnissioned officers already serving with the guerrilla forces. cuite often
the commanding officer of the organization recognized his own incapacity to function
as commandant of the training school, and sought desperately for a qualified adminis
trator. Thus Alejandro Balderian, but. a lieutenant at the outbreak of the war. found
himse1f breveted a colonel and heading a guerrilla division at the beginning of 1943,
with no experienced field grade officers to lean upon for advice. And Bias E. Mirancfc.
breveted a brigadier genera], had been but a constabulary lieutenant when the Japan
ese came to Leyte. It is true that Glicerio Erfe. pretender to the guerrilla head
ship of Leyte in the early period, was a captain, and had had some previous
499
administrative experience as adjutant, but this scarcely sufficed for the Job in
hand.
Fortunately for Miranda and Balderian, circumstances conspired to enable the
setting up of service schools vithin their territories. In the case of Miranda, a
highly competent officer who had before the war been sent by the Philippine Army to
attend a special training course at Fort Benning, Georgia, Major Marcos Soliman, had
taken refuge at Palompon, Leyte, within the Jurisdiction of the WLGWF. Miranda
learned of his whereabouts, invited him to Join up with his guerrilla, and appointed
him chief of staff with the special mission of founding a General Service School, and
serving as superintendent.
Balderian's service school got under way under yet more peculiar circumstances.
One of his subordinates succeeded in ambushing a small party of high ranking officers
sent out on a pacification mission by the puppet authorities in Tacloban. When cap
tured. they pleaded that their supposed mission was simply a hoax, a plot hatched by
them to e n a M e them to throw d ~wn their collaborationist assignments without risking
decapitation at Japanese hands. Be that as it may, they were handed over to
Balderian and taken into custody. Balderian had the perspicacity to appreciate the
possibilities of exploiting this windfall. Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing and Major
Abay were appointed to set up and administer a general service school, with their
assistants Lieutenant Ifadaza ana Sergeant Gabe acting as instructors.
The guerrilla leaders were to afford their unit commanders the benefit of
this special training at once. Many of the mainstays of Balderian (such as Pabilona
and Pamanian) or of Miranda (such as Daffon) had been only sergeants before the war,
and had much to learn about the responsibilities of officership. It was urgent that
they acquire the needed skills with the utmost despatch so that they in turn might
impart, information to their subordinates.
A special series of short courses, lasting from four to six weeks, was insti
tuted. at the guerrilla division headquarters--of each of the organizations. The
first class of enrolees consisted generally of the executive officer oj each sector
500
conmand, and one or more unit officers. Upon graduation from this course, the
executive officer would tenroorarily assume charge of his unit, while the commanding
officer went on temporary duty with the service school. In the case of sous units,
the cadre was incomplete or inexperienced, with the result that a deprivation of of
ficers, even temporarily, was quite serious. Nevertheless, each unit worked out its
own adjustments, and was all the stronger for the training its officers had received.
The courses of instruction were in no sense novel. They included the old
stand-tys'as prescribed by U. S. Army training manuals) of close order and extended
order drill, military courtesy, first aid, etc. What constituted their special
value, in terms of their adaptation to conditions of guerrilla warfare, were the
lectures on military-civilian relations. Unfortunately, insufficient attention was
devoted to this most important subject, with the result that needless blunderings in
nublic relations were committed by the guerrilla officers.
In addition to the direct effect this training program had of improving the
officership of the guerrilla units, it also exerted a significant secondary influence
upon the general morale. The guerrilla commanders were insightful enough to realize
that the stock of resistance would rise in the minds of the people if the public was
kept informed of all measures undertaken to improve the quality of the fighting men.
Accordingly, the guerrilla undertook to give the widest possible publicity to the
training program. Along the same line, the public was invited- to the special gradua
tion ceremonies held at the termination of each training period. It was a gala event,
attended not only by the families and friends of the proud graduates, but by companies
of the Volunteer Guards drawn up in full array. Local politicans lent prestige to
the occasion by their presence, and utilized the opportunity to exhort the people to
remain true to Filipino ideals and to confirm their faith in a speedy delivery at the
hands of American liberation force. Graduation stood out as a Joyous and yet
solemn event in the minds of Leyte's re3isters .
501
Training the Guerrilla Auxiliaries
Mention has been made of the Volunteer Guards. It is inroortant that they
be considered in this general section, wherein we are concerning ourselves with the
education of the citizenry for resistance. The Volunteer Guards, sonetimes known as
’bolomen" after the arms with which they were usually equipped, were an auxiliary
guerrilla force drawn from the male citizenry. They consisted of the older nen and
adolescents, as veil as the men of fighting age who for one reason or another were
exempted from active combat duty. They were organized into companies and regiments
under the general supervision of the sector commander of the combat detachment. They
might he headed by a retired professional soldier or by some person of local influ
ence— frequently the barrio lieutenant in the rural barrios, and the mayor in the
town (where the town was under guerrilla contro]) .
The Volunteer Guards would assemble weekly, usually on Sundays, either at a
guerrilla camp or an open area for parade and drill. lectures and demonstrations in
first aid,military courtesy and allied subjects would also take place. In addition
to these prescribed times of assembly, the VGs, as they were known, were to hold
themselves in readiness for muster, either by units or as individuals. They might
be called on for a great variety of labor services: soliciting foodstuffs for the
combat troops, hauling supplies to points of storage, cultivating communal fields
for the benefit of the troops. And, of course, the VGs were expected to mount guard
at stipulated outposts, keeping sharp lookouts for the approach of enemy patrols and
giving warning by a Jungle code of bamboo drumming. In the event of skirmishing be
tween guerrilla units and Japanese patrols, the VGs were expected to render whatever
service they could.
Colonel Kangleon's guerrilla auditor, himself a volunteer guard, related the
multifarious activities of the VGs:
The number of able-bodied men were such that we could install outposts of
volunteer guards located at less than \ kilometer distance from each other, de-
tai' ing three guards at each post at a time; each man serving only once a week
on a l?-hour duty. These guards perform a number of duties, among which were:
502
to keep peace and order, to be posted on the movements of the enemy and relay
news to the next outpost, advise the surrounding inhabitants of any precaution
ary measures, examine passers-by of suspicious characters and when in doubt to
turn them over to the quarters of the corporal, or higher authorities; to serve
as guide of newcomers, to help people needing assistance on the way, carry of
ficial matters from his outpost to the next, including correspondence. As this
volunteer guard service extended to the whole length and breadth of the Province
of Leyte, letters and other comnunications relayed thru their service travel
very fast. The network of this service extended across the mountains.
These guards serve voluntarily and spontaneously. . . .Everyone believed that
it was his duty to render service during those trying days. . . .The officers
were--captain, lieutenant, sergeant and 1 corporal, in every outpost. . . .
. . . .It is our opinion that, above all, the volunteer guards as a unit has
played the most important role in the prosecution of the resistance against the
Japs ,1 "2
Supplementing the "VGs vere the various units of the WAS, the Women's Auxili
ary Fervice. Each sector, and sometimes sub-sector, had its unit organized by the
women themselves under the supervision of the local guerriLla commander. These
women .rendered service to the guerrilla cause in a great variety of ways.
First of all , the WAS was active in the food production campaign. These
"Amazons" cultivated small gardens on previously untilled land, raised poultry, and
went about exhorting the people to dig up their fallow land. In addition, they cul
tivated special plants which could be used as tobacco substitutes, rolled into
cigarettes and distributed to the guerrilla troops.
The WAS, furthermore, undertook special weaving projects. From hemp, the
women fabricated uniforms for some of the troops, and special bandaging cloth from
kapok. They also made mats, slippers and hats, sold at very low cost to the people,
with the proceeds donated to the guerrilla.
In the public health program, the WAS played a prominent role. These auxi
liaries received basic instructions from guerrilla medical personnel, and then trav
eled about the barrios advising the people on waste disposal, water purification, and
dieting. They also received first aid instructions, serving as aids to the few army
nurses and staffing first aid stations set up by the guerrilla.
■''Potente , o p . cit. . pp. 8-3.0.

2A3so see: Woifert. c p . cit., pp. 127-8.
503
From the standpoint of bolstering morale, the YiAS played an indispensable
part. The women organized dances and entertainment for the troops, servin~ as hos
tesses aid preparing refreshments. Moreover, they sponsored a variety of social
f m o t 1 ins among she public-at-large, donating the not inconsiderable proceeds to
the guerrilla."
Public Health
she atil xuy o, a poprlawion to oiler r ^svshancc to a aetormined conoueror
s ta n rn a . ■ .e gucrrvila l o r - -’er ship u n d e r s t o o d this
rc .m oi its program o f e d u c a t i o n f o r resistance v u s d i r e c t e d to the
maintenance of p u b l i c h e a lth as the m o s t o b v i o v - . 'a y o f p r o v e n t . i n >' e r e r v u t i o n o f th e
•'•'ill to r o o t s : . There we r e many f a c t o r s rf.1 itching a g a i n s t t h e sv.o oc. s 'f t h e p r o -
-ru -.. fir s t of a l l , uni o r c o n d i t l - e i s of c v a c u n t i o r , a C'-v'

.d-orr.hl - n •V
a o -t : i v. -, n .;••.=• „ i. e i : i-,s •.?

•-. emergency rations. I..any persons,
and particularly children, v;ero effected b y dietary inadequacy, suffering loss
o f vitality and tie or.sct of deficiency discvser<

> Added to this -ur the effect of
i...^roper sanitat. o n in the ramshackle emergency habitatior? occupied by the evacuees
in the hills. bnsur~oncereu :oidlors -ruing from m u z or., thoir iodies racked with
.ualarla end emetics' s, served as carri-n'o v 0 disease a m o n g " t o o ..lati j.. al-nody cn-
feobiod. The inclder.cc of tuberculosis, pnov.r.-'uia and other respiratory diseases,
along with tropical ulcers end a host of skin maladies, rose rapidly. And in the
face of this general deterioration of health, the supply of drugs and surgical ma
terials reached exhaustion, while the limited number of physicians and nurses on the
Island before the war decreased still further.
The guerrilla undertook an emergency campaign of preventive medicine and
public hygiene. The population ras instructed to plant camotes (a tuberous plant
easy to cultivate) and a variety of greens, and to systematically and thoroughly ex
ploit the food potential of coconuts, bananas, and bamboo sprouts, Theywere en
couraged to use abaca fiber for emergency clothing in keeping warm during the chill
^See: St. John, op. cit. pp. 152-65.
504:
of the rainy season. And they vere urged to adhere to certain minimi sanitary pre
cautions in disposing of vaste.■*■
Of all the guerrilla organizations, the WLGWF was without question the most
active in the field of medicine and public health. The crowning glory of the WLGWF
was its base hospital, located in the General Headquarters, San Jose, Tangnan, Ormoc —
one of the best hospitals ever built in the Visayas by any guerrilla organiza
tion. The Division Surgeon, (Dr. Domingo C. Veloso), was formerly the Assistant
Director of the Southern Islands Hospital. Cebu. Major and minor operations ^
were performed. The hospital was opened to officers, enlisted men and civilians.
Under the general supervision of the Division Surgeon, regimental hospitals
were established in every municipality within the sphere of the WLGWF. Competent
physicians and nurses in each municipality were inducted into the service. They
also treated civilian patients while conducting theBe hospitals. A dozen medical aid
3
men, given special training, were assigned to each sub-sector. First aid stations,
dispensaries and puericulture centers were also opened up and staffed. Obviously,
in a province whose health facilities had been limited even in peace-time, the capa
city of these establishments to service the ailing was severely restricted under war-
■*The guerrilla did not have an easy time in convincing the population of the
extreme urgency of talcing proper sanitary measures. Dr. Veloso complained:
"As per reports to this office, majority of the civilian population as well
as the soldiers have been indifferent to the existing Sanitary rules and regulations.
Bemoval of bowels are done outside. . . .toilets and Army latrines. Pigs are allowed
to stay under cottages and allowed. . . .to scatter their wastes. Surroundings are
filthy.
"To avoid the occurrence of water-borne diseases, such as cholera, dysen
tery, etc.. you are enjoined to do your best to make the peoplein your sectoradhere
as much as possible under present circumstances to sanitaryrules andregulations for
the safety of all." (Domingo Veloso, MaJ. |kc/, Chief, Base Eospital. Jan. 13, 1943.
Memorandum To: Comdg. Off., Sub-Sectors, Ormoc, Par. 1-2.)
^Miranda, op. cit. . pp. 3-4.
^ h e guerrilla leadership took this trainingprogrem very seriously andex
pected all trainees to tee the mark. A memorandum from GHQ makes this plain:
"Expedite the sending of your lady students to the School of Auxiliary Hurs-
ing which will open on August 2, 1943.
"Said students must comply with the requirements set forth in a previous
training directive issued to this effect." (C. S. Sabelino, Lt. Col., Inf. 1 Aug.
1943. Memo: To: COs, In the Field, Par. 1-2.)
Sabelino was Deputy Chief of Steff at this time.
505
tine stresses. Nonetheless, Miranda boasted that "dysentery cases which were re
ported at Baybay about June 1943 were immediately eradicated.
The units of the Women's Auxiliary Service found in every sector were of
great assistance to the troops. Under the supervision of the regimental physician
and any nurses available, these women received valuable instruction in the essentials
of first aid, plus information about materia medica and public sanitation. Many of
the WAS units prepared bandages and compresses as special projects, and volunteered
regular service as nurses' aids.
Miranda'8 own Ordnance Shop made some simple surgical instruments, while his
chemist (Mr. G. Zambo) "conducted research on the possibility of using Philippine

O
plants to substitute imported drigus which could not be bought or procured."
Miranda reported that his zone was free of animal diseases brought on by
pests. "The Chief of the Veterinary Corps, Dr. R. C. Mandin, was always on trips to
inspect the different barrios. Veterinary school graduates of the WLGWF assisted him
in his work."'-
The veterinary school referred to was established by the WIGWF along with an
auxiliary nursing school.4 The graduates, while employed primarily by the military,
were available for civilian consultation as well.
If the WIGWF was outstanding in its medical work, the other organizations
did their utmost to provide medical service for troops and civilians and to educate
the general public in a preventive medicine program. Dr. Jose Lucinario of Dagami
stated (in interview) that he was summoned by Major Balderian to his headquarters to
treat soldiers wounded in the attack against the Japanese gartison of Dagami. Some
time after, Balderian called upon his chief intelligence officer (a physician by
^•Miranda, o p . cit. , p. 5. ^Fbid.. p. 4. Îbid., p. 5.

4"There are only twelve medical men for every Sub-Sector. If you have this
number snd all have gone training at the Base Hospital, then you don't have to send
any more." (Jose T. Ibabao, Capt. Inf.. The Adj. Gen. Jan. 11, 194c. Memorandum
To: CO, Sub-Sector No. 5.)
506
profession and locally celebrated as a man of unusually -varied attainments), Dr.
Posuncuy, to establish a base hospital at Carigara. It was a modest enterprise,
comparing unfavorably with that of the WIGWF, but rendering very valuable service.
According to Dr. Lucinario, the wounded and the ill who could not be treated satis
factorily at unit dispensaries were sent on to the base hospital. The number of in
mates never fell below 60 and at one point reached 200. The meagre facilities were
badly over-taxed. Captured medical supplies plus contributions from pre-war drug
gists were employed stintingly. Seme experimentation with local herbs was tried.
Ordinary cloth was sterilized and used as bandage material.
Balderian sent Dr. Lucinario on tour of the battalions to check the health
conditions of the troops. He was assisted by two registered nurses and three nurses
aides. The WAS also supplied first-aiders, chiefly pre-war teachers. The VGs ren
dered valuable help in performing various heavy labor chores at the base hospital and
the emergency aid stations.
At the base hospital, Dr. Posuncuy’s assistant. Dr. Valstram, gave instruc
tion in the fundamentals of medicine to enlisted personnel, sent up on temporary duty
for training as medical aid men. When Dr. Tiu became Fegimental Surgeon of Balderian's
95th Regiment, he provided for the creation of regular medical companies. He noti
fied his colleagues serving as battalion surgeons to take the following steps:
Select 20 men from each Bn., giving preference to those EM with medical
training of the previous PA or USAFFE, to compose the medical platoon under a
Bn. surgeon. These EM will be distributed to the different Cos at an average
of one company aid man to a platoon, and two assistants for the Bn Surgeon,
usually a sergeant and a corporal.
Each Bn Surgeon is entitled to a Sergeant (duty) , a Corporal and 18 First
Cl aes Pvts.
Request all Co commanders to submit to your Office all names of EM that are
with medical training so as to facilitate your choice in the selection of your
personnel.
Submit to this Office as soon as you can your strength and the distribution
of your nen to the different Cos. Include also the educational qualifications
and as to whether they are Reservists or not and where they were assigned before
the surrender.-1-
%estorio U. Tiu, (Bvt) Capt., 95th Inf. Regt., Regimental Surgeon. 6 April
1943. Memo To: All Bn. Surgeons, 95th Inf. Regt., 92nd Div., Par. 1-4.
507
The training course offered improved steadily. By mid-1944, the Beginent
decided to establish a
School for First Aiders. . . .in an ideal place, safe from attack by the
enemy.
a. The purpose of this school is to train two EM from each unit into highly
efficient and disciplined First Aiders. EM selected to attend this school must
be at least primary school graduates. Preference should be given to intermediate
and high school students.
b. The following subjects will be taught in the training:
(1) Organization of the Medical Corps
(2) Military Courtesy and Discipline
(3) First Aid and Emergencies
(4) Materia Medica
(5) Anatomy and Physiology
(6) Wounds and Fractures
(7) Dental Care
c. The length of training will be 15 days. It will conmence on 15 August
to 30 August T944. . . .The Commandant of the Schoo] , the Begimental Surgeon,
wilt provide the necessary textbooks and references for the students
One might be skeptical about the advisability of instituting this type of
"cram course". Even though some care was given to the educational qualifications of
the candidates, they could scarcely digest so muchmatter in so short a period of
time. Nevertheless, the guerrilla was showing its appreciation of applied theory in
this vital field.
The 95th Begiment also enjoyed the services of one dentist, Dr. Cesario N.
Sudario of Dagami. Using Dagami as his base, Dr. Sudario went on circuit throughout
the zone of the regiment, inspectirg the teeth of the troops and rendering emergency
treatment. For drilling purposes, he used a foot engine drilling machine. Be had his
personal dental equipment, and used his supply of oral medicaments sparingly. On
several occasions, Dr. Sudario came within a hair's breadth of capture by scouting
Japanese.
The situation in South Leyte was not essentially different. Dr. Andres S. Lao
holding an MD degree from Santo Tomas University, evacuated to the hills when the
Japanese arrived. In October. 1942, he Joined the guerrilla unit of Major Francisco
at Ma1 itbog. serving as 'Uedical Inspector . later, he was appointed Battalion
1B. V. Abarientos. Capt. Inf., Exec. 0. 19 July 1944. Training Directive

No . 1.
508
Surgeon for the 1st Battalion, 94th Infantry Regiment. Ee organized a small hospital
and kept it in operation during 1943. There were onxy 8 beds available at first, and
no surgery was attempted. The VGs gathered medicine from the public school dispen
saries of the district. One registered nurse and one dentist served with Dr. Lao.
Dr. Lao undertook an active extension program of public health. He visited
the units of the WAS, lecturing on sanitation and diet, and giving demonstrations in
first aid. With the information imparted, the WAS leaders would visit the barrios of
their municipality, expostulating with the people to boil water of uncertain purity
and to dig pit latrines to prevent the outbreak of disease. Dr. Lao recalled (in
interview) a serious outbreak of dysentery in Hinunangan in 1943. He and two other
guerrilla physicians, Drs. Velasco and Parado, were called upon to render emergency
service. The patients were treated with a diet of fried banana and an infusion of
guava leaves.
Dr. Lao recalls how great was the joy of the medical staff when shipments of
drugsand other sunplie3 reached Leyte by American submarine in July, 1944. The WAS
proceeded to organize a network of first aid stations serving the barrios, minister
ing to the local nopul ation. (Dr. Lucinario acknowledged that part of this supply
reached the territory of the 95th Regiment in North Leyte.) Dr. Jose Gaviola, serv
ing in the Abuyog sector in 1944, declared that he was extremely handicapped for
want of medical supplies until the submarine consignment was distributed.
The Divisional Surgeon for Kangleon's 92nd Division, Dr. Mercado, had his
headquarters at Sogod. He did not have a base hospital on the order of that operated
by the WLGWF. But he aid an important job coordinating services, and promoting the
public health extension campaign through lecture and demonstration.
509
Religion
Leyte, like the other provinces of the Philippines, is a predominantly Cath
olic region. During the Japanese occupation, the Church adopted a policy of cautious
neutrality. In the zone of theWLGWF, organized religion continued to he an active
force in the lives of both the combatants and the civilian population. As in the
case of justices of the peace, physicians, and other professionals, some of the
priests -were inducted directly into the WLGWF--in this instance, into the Chaplaincy
Corps. These priests recited mass and administered the sacraments to the troops.
Sometimes the priests would have to go considerable distances to officiate at guer
rilla encampments. Both officers and enlisted men were expected to give notification
through proper channels at GHy of their intention to take the marriage vows. Neither
at marriage ceremonies for enlisted men, nor on the occasion of baptismal rites for
their children would the officiating priests collect a fee. Wherever possible, the
church was called upon to provide last unction, and to preside over the burial of one
of its communicants.!
From the Japanese standpoint, membership in a chaplaincy corps in itself con
stituted a breach of neutrality, and ranged the priests on the side of resistance.
A fortiori, delivery of sermons to the troops exhorting a continued resistance, suf
ficed to obliterate the protection as an incident of his status. The Reverend Father
Pab]o Penserga, head of the Chaplaincy Corps (and assistant priest of Ormoc Parish
before the war) . and some cf his col leagues were even worse offenders in that they
preached ti the masses as well as to the treeos. Regardless of the content of such
religious instruction, a preacher who was identified with the guerrilla ipso facto
whet the temper of revolt among the masses. And. the consequence, according to Miranda
was that some were apprehended, by the Japanese for investigation, some were punished,
and one or two executed. Francisco Corres, one of the pioneer guerrilla organizers
in the Aibuera sector, related (in interview) that the Japanese slew one of the parish
priests in the early period because of his alleged guerrilla connections.
Brig.-Gen. Briguez (Jose F. Ibabao. Ma j ., The Adj. Gen.). ;■? reo., 1943.
T~ ' CO. Sectors and Sub-Sectors.
510
Capuyan reported, in interview, that Padre Penaranda served as regimental
chaplain in the êrida seotor. And Rodriguez declared, in interview, that Padre
Daffon held mass for the troops of his Baybay regiment. ..'e might add that only on
rare occasions would the entire personnel of a regiment assemble for religious com
munion. Generally on a Sunday, the chaplain would hold several masses, making a tour
of the battalions.
To balance this account, we must note that some of the parish priests would
have nothing to do with the guerrilla. In fact, one or two were believed to be en
gaged in espionage activities against the guerrilla. Captain Olayvar of Palompon
claimed that Padre Astorga, wh le nominally regimental chaplain, never actively
officiated.
An interesting sidelight of ;eneral religious and sociological significance
occurred during this period in the Ormoc sector. Here Oemelo Pastor is the principal
informant, though many others have confirmed this account. Shortly after the out
break of the war, a small sect of messianic believers, mostly from Jest Leyte, had
established a communal settlement of some 500 huts in the neighborhood of an Ormoc
hill which they regarded as sacred to their cult, and it became their wilderness
tabernacle. Somehow, they had come to identify this hill with the Biblical land of
promise. The leader of the sect, for reasons unknown, had been killed at the begin
ning of the Occupation, and was succeeded by his widow. Pastor estimated that there
were over 1,000 of all ages at the time of the incident to be related.
/.hen. the Japanese commenced their "mopping up" campaig;: in December of 1943,
they made it known t) the general population that they would deni ruthlessly with all
civilians who held out and did not place themselves under the municipal authorities
recognized by the Occupying Power. These sectarians evidently were ignorant of this
general order. Or else, as some wo Id have it, they had identified the war with the
final judgment and, as Pastor believed, they had gathered together to irrrolore God to
speedily end the war. 1'eanwhile, the Japanese were sending out patrolB, scouring the
hills for unsurrendered guerrillamen and lawless bands. One of their patrols, led
511
by Filipinos coerced into guiding them across the rocky terrian, stumbled upon the
encamped sect. To the Japanese, they vere an outlaw group. Whether or not they were
tied in with the resistance movement, they and other hold-outs were delaying the con
solidation of the new regime. They must he dealt with ruthlessly as an example to
other non-cooperating elements of the population. The patrols proceeded to deploy
around the hill, and at 2:00 a.m. announced the attack with a burst of mortar fire.
At 6:30 a.m. the Japanese closed in from five directions.
By chance, at this very time, some of the officers of the "WLGWF who had not
escaped were engaged in scouring the hills of the Ormoc-Merida district, searching
for unsurrendered guerrilieros. From these remnants they would endeavor to regroup
their commands, or at least establish cadres. Thus it happened that two small bands,
led by Pastor and Villasin, moving together with some 100 soldiers in aggregate, came
upon the denloying Japanese. "Remaining concealed, these guerrilieros carefully noted
the Japanese movements. As the Jananese began their daylight encirclement of the
religious camn. Pastor's scouts reported to them that Japanese firepower was concen
trated at two points. Armed with this information, he carefully moved his own men
towards the exposed flanks of the attackers and enfiladed their positions. The be
wildered Japanese, not expecting resistance to speak of, hastily withdrew to regroup
along other tactical lines. Pastor at once sent a squad ordering the cultists to
clear out along a route that he indicated. They complied. Then the guerrilla with
drew. dispersing according to plan, and making good their escape.
When the Japanese reattacked, they found the encampment deserted, but for one
insane man who had strayed from his fellows. In their wrath, as subsequent guerrilla
reconnaisance revealed, the Japanese put all the huts to the torch. The members of
the sect did not reassemble for the duration of the war.
512
Educating the Young
It might be supposed that the resistance forces, hemmed in as they were by
the enemy occupation troops, and hunted down by reconnaissance patrols, gave no
thought to the education of the young. After all, their success depended on mobility,
not of themselves alone but, if necessary, of their loyal non-combatant supporters.
The educations'1 enterprise, with its fixed school buildings, no matter how flimsy,
and its patterned behavior arising out of the relatively stable pupil-teacher rela
tionship, would seemingly nullify or curtail this mobility. But the resistance
chiefs thought in other terms.
In their judgment, they represented the legitimate sovereignty. They were
the residuary legatees of the Commonwealth Government, temporarily in exile. It was
their mission to convince the ordinary Filipino that he must hold firm in his allegi
ance to the lawful authorities. But everywhere was the evidence that the Occupation
Power was entrenching itself for an enduring stay, while denouncing the defiant as
outlaws. Japanese punitive squads harrassed all suspected of abetting the guerrilla.
Staunch faith in an American deliverance under such tribulation was badly shaken.
Only by inspiring a definite belief in the invincibility of the Allied
forces could the resistance leaders shore up a sagging morale. What better way to
deronstrate a confidence in the future than by turning to the education of the young
er generation. Parents would be reassured on seeing the teachers going about their
appointed tasks. And the pupils themselves would receive instruction in the tenets
of Philippine democracy, uncensored by an inhibitory collaborationism. Eeopening the
public schools in the ungarrisoned sectors and in the places of civilian evacuation
was the counterpart to the guerrilla manifesto that teachers must desist from render
ing service in municipalities policed by the Japanese.
Regarding the actual system of guerrilia-sponsored instruction in Leyte, we
must content ourselves with but a skeletal reconstruction. Pertinent documents have
perished in large part irretrievably burried, burned, decayed, or otherwise lost to
the investigator. Remaining fragments are only suggestive, with some of the lacunae
513
verbally supplied by ex-guerrilla personnel. And needless to say, no more unifica- I
tion was achieved in this branch of guerrilla activities than in other phases of
Leyte's resistance movement.
Let us first direct our attention to the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare
Forces. The organizational conference of the WLGWF took place at the end of Decem
ber, 1942. The setting up of a hybrid military-civilian government was intended as
the cornerstone of a more normal society. Reopening of the public schools would
build upon this. Sector commanders took the initiative, contacting the municipal
mayors. In turn, the mayors were to instruct the principals of the elementary schools
to commence enrolments.
Vicente Villegas, West Coast Academic Supervisor in the Liberation period,
served as General Supervisor of Schools for the five West Coast municipalities united
under the WLGWF banner. Son of a former Tanauan mayor, Villegas held bachelor S
and master's degrees from Silliman University, and further had studied law at the
University of the Philippines. At one time, he had been district supervisor of
Palompon, Leyte, and until the outbreak of the war was academic supervisor incumbent
in Negros. Governor Torres' offer to appoint him to the division superintendency of
Leyte during the Japanese occupation was spurned. Instead, Villegas evacuated to
his farm in Palompon, whence he was pressed into service by the WIGWF.
With the Jurisdiction of the WIGWF, Villegas recalled, in an interview in
Tanauan in 1945. that classes -were generally reopened by June of 1943, and continued
to function, with certain interruptions, until October of that year. Most of the pre
war teachers came forward in response to the guerrilla muster. High school graduates ^
-were called upon to serve in the emergency and complete the teacher rosters. The
average salary earned was P15 per month, with some teachers in the Ormoc sector re
ceiving P25. In a few barrios. the local folk provided lodging and board for out-of-
town teachers.
514
Many parents were reluctant to send their children to these guerrilla-operated
schools. Dread of Japanese patrols often paralyzed those who had thrown in their lot
with resistance. Moreover, under circumstances of sharp privation, the children were
needed to assist in the eking out of a livelihood. The GHQ of the WIGWF did not at
tempt to coerce school attendance.
It is not surprising that under war-time conditions, the schools abandoned
their more exacting peace-time standards. Typical was the temporary waiver of the
standing central office regulation that no school might be established other than on
a school site of at least one hectare in area. This modification was necessary to I
allow for location of schools in suitable places of concealment. I
The pinch of an insufficiency of books, experienced in other parts of Leyte, I
was not so acute here.-*- School storerooms and individual places of concealment ex- I
pelled their holdings. But stationery and other supplies were appropriated by the I
O |
military. In most cases, teachers did away with written lesson plans, and reduced I
-*-During the first months of the occupation, the Japanese did not come to the
West Coast of Leyte in force\ the poblacion, or town center, of Ormoc was the main
exception. Consequently there was not too much confiscation of public school equip
ment, and no censoring of text-books.
În all of Leyte's guerrilla zones, the schoolhouse served as an important
storehouse for stationery used by the guerrilla clerical staffs. Many of the build
ings were locked, instruction having ceased, making seizure fairly simple. Sometimes
midnight pilferage or armed robbery might be resorted to where the custodians ware
disinclined to part with their stock of paper, pencils, ink, and most precious (when
available) . a typewriter. Where the schools were functioning in a Japanese-dominated
Bector, nothing but risk of capture would deter the determined purloiners from their
objective.
An intelligence report of the 94th Inf. Regt. alluded to this source of
equipment: "Office supplies , expendable and non-expendable properties have been se
cured from schools, including kitchen utensils, plates, etc. ^/probably taken from thati
popular warehouse--the home economics building/, properly receipted." (S-2, 94th Inf,
14 July 1943. Renort of July 1-15, 1943. ToT AC of S , G-2, 92nd Inf. Div.)
The absence of the Japanese from the zone of the 94th Regiment in mid-1943
simplified procurement expeditions. When Capt. Erfe decided to print paper currency 3
for circulation within his jurisdiction, he at once came up against the stumbling- 1
block of no equipment. The chief of his militia reserve, "Maj . Gen'.' Gallego (Mayor 1
of Abuyog. and later Deputy Gov. of Kangleon's "Free Leyte") had a solution, and ad- 1
dressed the following memorandum to his "Brigade Commander" in the Dulag sector: |
"This office would like to know action you have taken on orders for stencils, carbon I
typewriter ribbon. This Office was tipped that some stencils in schoolhouse , either I
in primary or intermediate building of Dulag. You can order your men to get same. 1
Needed badly in connection with printing of National Emergency Circulating Notes. §
Manage to have the mimeograph machine borro-wed and sent to Bugho /a barrio of Abuycg7l
515
their administrative paper work to a minimum. Paper leaves were the writing mate
rials of the children, with pointed sticks the instruments of inscription.
The principals submitted monthly supervisory reports. Serviliano de la Cruz,
principal of Albuera before the war, served in his own municipality under the guer
rilla. Also serving at home was Martin Banes— installed in the Ormoc principalship,
and before the wax* serving as head teacher in one of the barrios, Barrio San Jose.
Eizai Zapante substituted the Baybay principalship for his pre-war Eilongos assign
ment. And Eugenio Viacrucis and Jose de Ocampo traded posts in Dagami and Biliran
for new ones in Palompon and Merida, respectively. The WIGWF zone could Justifiably
boast that its educational administrators were all experienced persons, even if some
of the emergency teachers fell short in qualification.
We have more information concerning Albuera than for any of its sister-
municipalities within the ambit of the WIGWF. Insofar as educational procedure is
involved, we may take Albuera as fair]y representative of the ether four. Its prin
cipal. Serviliano de la Cruz, was inducted into the guerrilla, with the rank of pro
bationary 3rd Lieutenant, and the civilian title of Supervising-Frincipal Teacher.
In addition to his regular duties, he was expected to Bubmit regular reports of his
charge to the Adjutant General of the WLGWF, coursed through the regimental commander
of the 6 th Infantry.
The chronicler of Albuera's war-time history acclaimed the Begimental CO,
Conrado Daffcn, as the initiator in the reopening of the local, schools.
Ee also thought of the school children, and brought the matter before the
Commanding General for approval. This was approved and school houses were built
in the evacuation places among the hills. Ee left the task to Lt. Serviliano
De La Cruz (principal teacher), who also did not leave a stone unturned to
carry out this noble project.
De la Cruz reported: "Regular classes from grades I to III were first opened
from January 15. 1943, in consonance with the verbal instructions of the Commanding
at once. Machine in Abuyog not very good.” (MaJ. Gen. Gallego. 6 April 1943. To:
Brig. Gen. Villegas.)
■1-Sot t o , op. cit. , p. 3.
516
Officer and of the Military Municipal Mayor of Albuera, Leyte."-1-
But a -week later, the Supervising-Principal Teacher notified his staff:
Complying with the suggestion of the Brigadier General of the WLGWF in the
Field,as per -written endorsement shown to me by the Municipal Mayor of Albuera,
Leyte, I have the honor to inform you that all classes of the public schools will
be discontinued for the time being, and will be opened in June, 1943.^
This order was rescinded shortly thereafter, upon the receipt of new instruc
tions from the GHQ:
To comply with the contents of the indorsement, second paragraph, reopening

of classes, dated February 3, 1943, of the Chief of Staff of the WLGWF, and with
the request of the other authorities, regular classes of nearly all classes
(grades), opened in the school year 1940-1941, have been reopened beginning
March 1, 1943.3
It was one thing to order the reopening of the schools of Albuera, and anotb
to provide financial maintenance. Mayor Barte hoped the municipal council might vot
the necessary appropriations. Ee accordingly sought out the Supervising-Frincipal
for pertinent figures. Serviliano de la Cruz was pleased to reply:
In compliance with the contents of your letter. . . .requesting the number

of teachers to be employed. . . ., based on the number of pupils who reported
to school last Friday. . . .the Municipality needs 26 teachers, including the
undersigned. To insure a scientific, Just, educational, and customary way of
giving compensation, it is deemed fitting and proper. . . .to follow the seme
or uniform percentage of reduction which the other municipal employees receive,
based on the following basic salaries which the teachers concerned received
during peace-time:
1 teacher at PS0.00; 5 teachers at P55; 7 teachers at P50; 1 teacher at P45;
12 teachers at P40.4
The mayor appeared before the Municipal Council, which adopted the following
resolution:
Whereas, in view of the instruction of the Chief of Staff. . . .regarding tb

reopening of classes,. . . .classes from grades one to five were opened. . . .
The sixth grade class was not opened due to lack of pupils.
Whereas, to the effect that this municipality has no sufficient fund and in-
confi to maintain the salaries of twenty-six teachers. . . .the Council unanimous
resolves to inquire the Chief of Staff. . . .as to what to do with these teacher
1S.
de la Cruz. Narrative Sc Inap. Eeport of Schools of Albuera, Leyte.
To: Adj. Gen.
^Serviliano de la Cruz. Jan. 21, 1943. To: Ail Teachers and Others.
3s. de la Cruz. Ear. & Insp. Eeport of Schools of Albuera, Leyte. To: AdJ.Gi
4S. de la Cruz. Mar. 13, 1943. To: The Military Municipal Mayor.
^Fedrc Caiabia, Mun. Secty. Mar. 19, 1.943, Eeso. No. 5.
5 1 7
To the bewildered Municipal Council, the GHQ could only adviBe that Albuera's
teachers render their services gratuitously. The Municipal Council mulled over this
advice and resolved:
Whereas, in the event that the teachers of this Municipality have already
rendered their services beginning March 1, 1943, until this date, without com
pensation, due to the insufficiency of funds;
Whereas, in view of the first indorsement of the Adjutant General of the
WLGWF by command of the Brigadier General, dated March 30, 1943, addressed to
the Military Municipal Mayor of this Municipality, the Council resolved to
adopt. . . .the provisions of paragraph 3 of this same indorsement that teachers
services be rendered voluntarily.
Lest the teachers be abandoned to total destitution, the Municipal Council
Further resolved to approve that teachers rendering their services voluntar

ily will be given an allowance at the rate of P 1 0 for every teacher concerned,
and Pj5 for a Supervising-Principal Teacher, monthly from March 1, 1943 to June
30, 1943 respectively."1
The arrangement, though a mere palliative, worked retroactively to the bene
fit of the teachers.
To cover this appropriation, the Municipal Council was compelled to adopt a
further measure:
The supplementary municipal budget, General Fund, as approved by the Munici

pal Council in its meeting held on April 2, 1943 under Resolution No. 8 , was
resubmitted before the Council, due to the transfer of funds, known as the M a
triculation Fees, to the amount of P538.48 to the General Fund, that will be in
cluded to the appropriation for the teachers allowances. Resolved to transfer
the amount. . . .to the general fund that will be included in the appropriation
of teachers allowances for four months, from March 1, 1943 to June 30, 1943,
respectively, as itemized in the same supplementary budget.^
What was to be the fate of Albuera's schools after June?
The chairman submitted before the Council a Memorandum, dated June 11, 1943,
of the Assistant Adjutant General, WIGWF in the Field, which enquires the Muni
cipal Mayor if there is fund available that will cover the expenses for the re
opening of schools in the ensuing year 1943-1944, and the number of teaching
positions to be created by the Municipal. Council.
Be It Resolved, by the Council to inform. . . .the Assistant Adjutant General.
WIGWF, through the Military Adviser, 6 th Infantry, that there is no fund avail- *
able to cover the allowance of teachers and other expenses for the reopening of
schools as reouired in the above-mentioned Memorandum.^
"P. Calabia.Mun. Secty. April 6 . 1943. Resolution No. 9.

. Calabia,Mun. Secty. April 6 , 1943. Resolution No. 10.
. Calabia.Mun. Secty. June 15, 1943. Resolution No. 16.
518
ATbuera's schools had a plenitude of textbooks, though mostly in secret
storage. The Supervising-Principal directed the teachers to
gather all textbooks, etc. in the hands of the pupils, vho did not return the
textbooks, etc. when the schools had a sudden and unexpected closing. . . .Teach
ers should hold all textbooks, manuals, and other things which belong to school
and which are in their hands and should keep or hide them as safely as. . . .if
they were their own; but they should be under receipts that should be kept and
receipted by the Barrio Lieutenants, whose receipts should be submitted to me
together with the teacher's receipts. Teachers should submit reports on things,
textbooks, etc. regained from the pupils, as asked during our meeting. They
should submit a list of losses. Those teachers who have not yet inventoried as
assigned by me should do so at once, or those who have not yetbegun should get
all the books, etc. from the pupils and others and return them to Mr. B. Mercado
or to me, who should give the information whether teachers have losses or not.-*-
De la Cruz was a conscientious administrator. He aimed to achieve the high
est standards for education within reach. Be checked to see that his teachers were
prepared, and that they were given as much equipment as the municipality could pro
vide, and he was also solicitous of the well-being of the pupils, and tried to improve
the nhysica] conditions of the school plant. In his conferences with the teaching
personnel, de 3a Cruz took up the following points:
(a) Construction of outhouse to every school, and other possible facilities

of standard schools.
(b) Strict economy on the UBe of supplies; paper, pencils, chalk, etc.
(c) Seeing to it that every teacher has. . . .copies of the necessary text
books, manuals, supplementary readers, copiesôf new courses of study of all
subjects in the two single-session plan, etc.“
The WLGWF succeeded in firmly welding school and community. Albuera well
illustrated this unity. When its classes, hardly recommenced, were ordered to dis
continue instruction, it was feared that the popular morale might be undermined:
Teachers should use their tact in informing their pupils, the parents of
their pupils , and the persons who labored to construct or borrow the school build
ings . in order that they would not be discouraged, afraid, and disgusted; but be
kept encouraged, brave, and inspired to help make the schools a success, when the
schools open in June, 1945. To keep the morale of the people, to retain the good
faith and love of the people in us who have helped open the schools, the follow- j
ing reasons and exnlanations may be presented. . . .in favor of the discontinu
ance of the classes for the time being: (1 ) lack of clothing; (2 ) lack of school ;
supplies; (3) lack of textbooks. . . .
■^S. de la Cruz. Jan. 21, 1943. To: All Teachers and Others.
%. de la Cruz. Narrative and Inspection Be port of Schools of Albuera,
Leyte.
These same general directions indicated how the community might help. To
handle the lack of supplies for the schools, the Anti-Profiteering Committee would he
called upon "to inventory all stores so that the things greatly needed in the school,
as well as the public, can be bought or secured at reasonable prices." And the empty
school buildings could become the centre of loom-weaving. "Our proposed school
buildings now were not built or secured in vain, inasmuch as they may become the in-
custria" and social center of ai 1 members of the Women's Auxiliary Service (WAS)
which can see cloth and of lier things later on." In the task of carrying out the in
ventory of school properties, the teachers were assured: 'You may secure help from
the Barrio Lieutenants, Military Police, Volunte q v Gu.fix’dtj j bt,c • , who can facili'fca'tG
the recovery of the things."^
The school buildings used by the guerrilla were made available through the
exertions of the adult community. The supervising-principal teacher made acknow
ledgment :
Temporary school buildings constructed by the people and borrowed or rented

spacious buildings are being used to house the pupils. All of them are located
not less than two kilometers from the provincial road. Coconut groves, other
trees, mountains, hills, location and appearance are used as camouflage.^
What- proportion of rhe pre-war teachers reported for service in the schools
of Albuera? Mr. de la Cruz stated: "Pearly all teachers who are living here and
who were employed in the school year 1940-1941 are being employed." Among the ex
ceptions were: "Lieut. Dominador Salvo and Lieut. Ben,1amin Earte, who recently sub
mitted their resignation effective Auril 2, 1943, and are taking un active duties in
the 6 th Infantry." Others mentioned were on maternity leave."
Pespite the war, the supervising-princinal teacher took his supervisory func
tions seriously. "Individual conference was conducted after the observation of every 1
teacher where the ways and means to improve the work was brought out."
■^Serviliano de la Cruz. -Jan. 21. 1943. To: All Teachers and Others.
. de la Cruz. Narrative & Inspection Report of Schools of Albuera, Leyte.
Îbid.
520
The supervising-principal had the following consuents to make regarding the
quality of instruction in the different subject-areas:
1. Language: In most classes observed, the drills in correct usage were not
snappy and lively and very few pupils participated. The language forms were not
used in normal conversational situations fixed by the teachers. Too often (in
many schools), the teacher simply called upon pupils to use the word in a sen
tence. (This does not give the practice needed to use that word in normal situa
tions demanded by common social usage.)
2. Art Education: In a grade I recitation, whose aim was to teach color re
cognition, the recitation was a failure for there was no color chart or object
representing different colors.
5. Reading: Development of words or group of words in one class were not in
context forms. They should be in context forms and should be expressed in the
different situations in order to make them clear in the minds of the pupils.
The drill in sentence meaning of "yes" or "no" in --- school was quite good,
but there were only a few sentences; thereby, it lasted only less than 2 minutes.
Three to five minutes should be devoted to drill lesson in the primary grades.
The other tyres of sentence meaning. . . .should be used also.
In oral reading, while one was reading, the others were also opening their
books. There was no real audience situation as per her aim. For oral reading
(of training type) purposes, a story read in past week or months may be used. If
ever a Wesson involves both silent and oral reading, there 3hould be an aim for
each. Pages 20?-204 of 'Reading Activities in the ^rimary Grades--Stem and
Smith' gives 'Row to Make the Audience Interested in Oral Reading'.
4. Arithmetic: In --- school. the teacher presented the lesson properly,
only that she failed to diagnose the pupils' difficulties in certain processes.
As noted, more than one half of the class were followir^j the wrong procedures,
yet the teacher did not know about it. Inventory test should be given first be
fore the new process or combination is taken up. Remedial teaching should be
given at once. While the pupils are working on exercises and problems, the
teacher should go around from pupil to pupil to find out their difficulties and
to give the pupils concerned the necessary help.^
We may take passing notice of the school organization in two of the other
municipalities. Aristoteles Olayvar, Commanding Officer of the Palompon Regiment,
testified in interview in Tacloban in 1945 to the reopening of the schools in his
municipality, under WLGWF auspices. Teachers received a bare P20 in salary. The
program of studies roughly approximated the pre-war combinations.
Speaking for Merida, Bonifacio Capuyan, its regimental Commanding Officer,
took credit for the reopening of the schools in October, 1942. This is very probable,
inasmuch as Capuyan undertook a complete reorganization of the municipal government
at that tine. In 194?, the Merida schools were brought within the general system of
Îbid.
521
the WLGWF.1
The WLGWF was more than a passive spectator to the educational process. It
assumed the burden of education. In addition to general orientation lectures on the
progress of the war and the principles at stake in the conflict, the guerrilla in
stituted special projects. The national Baybay Agricultural School was utilized,
first by the Baybay Regiment, and then by the GHfct, as a special training center for
troops on detached service, where they might acquire the know-how essential for in-
O
creasing crop yields. Of broader interest was the literacy program.
The instruction in the rudiments of literacy was a cooperative enterprise,
staffed Jointly by the municipal teachers and the regimental officers. In April,
1943, a memorandum circulated among the regimental commanders: "Submit a report on
the progress of the Adult Education Campaign in your sector ."0
One of the regiments (source not identified) replied: ”We were successful
in helping our soldiers to write their names and read, through this campaign."
According to the General Supervisor of Schools, Vicente Villegas, the chief
^Capuyan named Marcos Baylon, a Merida teacher, as principal of its war-time

school. This apparently conflicted with Villegas' data, where Jose de Ocampo is
cited as holding this position. The discrepancy may be explained if we remind our
selves that Capuyan was transferred to another command, and that a change in the
nrincipalship may have occurred after his departure.
?The WLGWF made good use of this school. Miranda's guerrilla officers and
non-commissioned officers attended the reopened school on detached service, studying
methods of poultry production and other subjects vital to troop feeding. Miranda
declared when interviewed after the war that he could not understand the ill-will of
Supt. Warner towards the WLGWF. Did he not authorize the Division Finance Officer
to grant a small stipend to Warner, so as to aid him in this period of distress for
Americans stranded in Leyte?
Claro Gofredo, Adjutant of the Baybay Regiment, declared that the Agricultur
al School was originally under regimental control. The GHW assumed Jurisdiction and
encouraged the intensive raising of poultry, rice, corn and fruits. A member of the
faculty of the school, Mr. Zamar, was granted a commission in the WLGWF, and put in
charge. Gofredo added that Zamar retired to the hilly interior of the Baybay sector
upon the Japanese return at the end of 1943.
During this period of WIGWF control of the Baybay Agricultural School, the
puppet superintendent of schools in Tacloban remained quite unaware of the use to
which these properties were being put. He wrote to Manila: 'Many attempts were made
to open the Baybay Agricultural School, but all in vain. This is due to hard trans
portation and conmunication. Several letters of this Office to Mr. lamex’ m charge
of that school were never answered. It is feared that either our letters did not
reach him, or his replies were not received." (F. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt. Aug. 1,
1944. Annual Report for the Academic Year, 1943-1944.)
Ûsualdo F. Laguitan, 1st Lt. AGS. 23 Apr. 1943. To: All Regtl. Cmdrs., WIGWF,
522
credit for this program must he accorded Bonifacio Capuyan of the Merida Regiment.
Under an Ormoc school teacher, Felipe Adolfo, attendance at these extension classes
was made compulsory for all regimental illiterates. Civilians interested in learning
how to write were also eligible. Outside of Merida, Villegas testified, this program
met with less success.
During its short-lived career of independence, the "Politico-Military Govern
ment" of Fast Leyte displayed an unmistakable interest in education. Even before
fully consolidating his organization, Major Balderian (alias Colonel Flores) had ap
preciated the utility of reopened schools as a bulwark fortifying the guerrilla
cause. He designated the district supervisor of Jaro as his chief instrument for ac
complishing this purpose, and instructed Captain Felix Pamanian (alias Major Mayo M.
Ricarte) to oversee the matter.
Captain Pamanian replied:
In connection with your verbal instructions to the Supervising Teacher of

Jaro, Mr. Isodor Durana, regarding the opening of classes, we have talked about
the matter yesterday during the visit of the members of the Staff of this Head
quarters to Jaro. Mr. Durana is hesitant to open said classes as according to
him he cannot assure the safety of the lives of the children in case of emergency.
We have agreed therefore that the opening of classes in Jaro can be done in the
future and not at this time.-*-
Eustaquio Ligutan, clerk in the provincial auditor's office and a native of
Carigara, declared, in interview, that the guerrilla reopened the schools in his
municipality. A local teacher, Estaquio Boncaras, served as principal. The princi
pal continued at his post until the Japanese despatched their mopping up squads to
the municipality. Then he went into hiding, and was replaced by a Japanese appointee.
Major Balderian's Administrator of Biliran Island, Martin Javelosa, stated
in interview that he set July, 1943. as the date that he reopened the schools of his
bailiwick. The teachers were put on a salaried basis, but actually received no pay
ment. After August, the schools were compelled to close. Rumor of an iurainent Jap
anese occupation in forcediscouraged pupil attendance.
Viayo M. Ricarte, Maj., y4S. Oct. 25, 1942. Memorandum. To: Col. Flories, .
Inf.
523
Durana's records were either destroyed or lost. At any rate, they did not
come to the attention of this investigator. We know of the Carigara school, and there
are some indications that the guerrilla may have opened classes in Jaro, Dagami, and
Alangalang, under Durana's supervision.
Aside from their classroom duties, the teachers rendered signal aid to the
guerrilla government:
The teachers were assigned to canvass homes to take census of the families,
to teach home industries, and for the dissemination of information on the war.
Lectures were being conducted by the teachers in different places to bolster up
the morale .1
When Colonel Ruperto Kangleon inaugurated the guerrilla government of "Free
Leyte", he turned to Orville Babcock, pressing him to assume the superintendency of
schools. Babcock, an American with considerable administrative experience in the
Philippine school system, had served as a superintendent during the years 1930-35.
He was on inspections] visit to the schools of Leyte as representative of the Central
Curriculum Office and was trapped by the Japanese invasion. Babcock declined in
favor of his Filipino friend, Manuel Gaviola, a district supervisor in Eilongos.
Gaviola was installed by the guerrilla governor, Demeterio, with the title of Gen-
9
eral Supervisor of Schools] Babcock consented to serve as special supervisor."
The Japanese had succeeded in temporarily opening the schools of South Leyte.
Following the Japanese retirement from the area, the schools promptly shut down.
Babcock, provided vith a bicycle for the carrying on of his functions, set about to
•'•Potente , op. cit., p. 13.

O:
"Regarding the restoration of the old system of public instruction, an-
nouncenent was made by the General Supervisor of Schools at Maasin (this position
was equivalent, one way or another, to the division superintendent, of schools) to
the effect that classes left off in December, 1941, because of the war, were to be
resumed in October, 1943. For obvious reasons, each municipality was considered one
supervisory district, with a supervisory principal in charge." (Aurillc, o p . cit. .
p. 7)
The obviousness of designating each municipality a supervisory district is
not so apparent to the outsider. Evidently, t%vious" meant administratively con
venient.
524
reopen them under nev auspices.1 From the end. of September to mid-December, 1943, he
made the rounds of the municipalities, exhortiEg hoth teachers and parents. Through
the deputy governor for North Leyte, Gaviola also envisioned the opening of the
schools elsewhere in the Province. This latter project was abandoned for reasons set
forth in a letter to the Provincial Board:
The undersigned understands the financial problem the Board is facing at

this time, and in order not to aggravate the situation, it is believed advisable
to hold the opening of schools and classes in the municipalities of Biliran,
Calubian, Caibiran, Naval, Maripipi, San Isidro, Kavayan, Villaban2 and Leyte in
abeyance until the financial condition of the province becomes stable and defined.
Under the present circumstances, it is reasonable not to make further expansion
of our educational program.
In a verbal conversation I had with the Deputy Governor, Mr. Salas, I was in
formed that our enemy (the Japanese) make frequent visits to these municipalities,
causing the disturbance upon the inhabitants of the towns. These unfavorable
conditions affect the school attendance. Possibly because of the disturbance,
classes are not held for the children are evacuated to their far-away-interior
barrios, while the teachers continue to receive their pay, advancing as their
reason that they remain in their respective posts. Under this condition, no
amount of instruction will become worthwhile, and hence, it does not warrant the
expenditure of public funds.
The transportation facilities to these places at this time are awfully diffi
cult, dangerous, and very expensive. Correspondence to these places is very
much delayed, so that instructions issued to them would be worthless when they
are received.
The seventeen municipalities from Inopacan down to Hinunangan, including
Abuyog where authority to reopen the schools and classes has been given, would be,
for the time being, sufficient to begin with. Later, however, when conditions
permit, the reopening of schools and classes in the other municipalities in the
east may be considered favorably.5
Babcock felt that he could not manage his Job single-handedly. He suggested
to the General Supervisor that he take on an administrative assistant. Gaviola pe
titioned the Provincial Board for an additional staff member, and the Board acted
favorably: "A letter from the General Supervisor, dated October 4th, reconmending
for approval the appointment of Leonardo Torredos, formerly District Supervisor for
Liloan, as Financial Clerk and Field Supervisor, attached to the office of the under
signed, effective upon his taking the oath of office, to assist in supervising and
administering the work of the Supervising Principals and teachers in the field."
(Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Eesolution No. 200) .
2The Deputy Governor's trip to North Leyte bore some fruit, according to the
word of the Provincial Auditor: "Mr. Benito Salas. . . .designated as Deputy Governor
. . . .was commissioned for an inspection trip to the North. . . .establishing the
schools in Villaba." (Potente, op. cit. . p. 27).
Manuel S. Gaviola. Sept. 25, 1945. To: Prov. Bd. (included inEeso. No.
1S8 of the Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte.)
R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission
525
The municipalities of East Leyte were in closer contact with Colonel
Kangleon's GHQ than were those of North Leyte. The war-time chronicler of Abuyog
related:
Mayor Gallego was appointed Deputy Governor for East Leyte. . ..Mayor Gallego
conferred with the Commonwealth officials of such municipalities as La Paz, Dulag,
Burauen, Dagami. Pastrana, and Tolosa regarding the opening of the old system of
public education. . ..
Since neither the district supervisor nor the principal teacher for Abuyog
before and at the outbreak of the war was available at the time, Mayor Gallego's
unbiased recommendation for the vacancy was at once sought for. Decidedly, from
among the old teachers and the new ones, Mr. Bosario S. Tan became the Mayor's
logical choice. On September 16, 1943. therefore, the teachers conmenced their
services .
Classes uromptly opened on October 1 , 1943, quite as normally as when the
last hostilities were only e nightmare. And for the first time in twenty months,
the 1ocai kids got back to the four walls provided for them freely by the Com-
monwea’th Government, but cl osed to them on December S, 1941, by the sons and
grandsons of Nippon. . . .
Then November ensued . The threat of Japanese re-occupation. . . .now became
imminent. Teachers and pupils and the people became restless. In their sta
tions. the teachers stayed with no little sacrifice, particularly in their poc-
ketbooks . Now, with the Japs at the gates of Abuyog what if they would not be
able to draw even only their first month's salaries?-^
This quotation speeds us through our story too quickly. It does not tell us
what instruction went on within "the four walls", though hinting that the pre-war
curriculum was resumed. But the reader can imaginatively project himself into happy
communities that were given a brief taste of uncontaminated teaching. He can share
the gleefulness of the youngsters as they skipped into the simple rooms opening up
I
lively exotic vistas denied them in their dreary situation. He can admire the teach-
i
ers as they renewed their nrofessional obligations to prepare the minds of the young j
ones for life in a better day. disregarding their own miseries in their determination '
*' ' t
to m ake t h e m o s t o f an u n c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t y . 1-
The La Paz schools had omened , but were not provided for in the arpronria-
tions granted the General Suoervisor of Schools. Its Municipal Council (Desolation ::
Ho. °f) requested "that the Military Teachers be given c’

nances for appoint rent as ■
Anri* - . op. eit. nr

" A former officer in Capt. Erfe’s guerrilla command, Dominador Mendragcn fa> I
i•iar at first hand with conditions in East Leyte, asserted (in interview) that I
greater number of the pre-war teachers in these localities did not report/for as<vVr I
ment under the guerrilla regime. Most of the teachers were allegedly*neveerers * §
filling in the vacancies. This investigator has been unable to substantiate
deserve highst
Mondragon's ca
ot
me
mm
ee
nn
dt
a, whatever
tion. the case, those actuallv *
servin^g dc
uu
ri
rnirn-g UJlls
526
classroom teachers on the opening of schools and classes in said municipality. . . . "
The Provincial Board took no action, deciding to refer the matter to the
General Supervisor. (Resolution N o . 229). The designation "military teachers" has
reference to the period when La Paz belonged to the guerrilla comnand of Captain Erfe.
At that time, the teachers were looked upon as an adjunct of the guerrilla staff.
With the absorption of La Paz and its sister communities into the Jurisdiction of
Kangleon, the teachers expected Bimilar treatment, and were disappointed over the de
lay in confirmatory action. The General Supervisor's recommendations were in the
offing, but were cut short by the return of the Japanese.
The General Supervisor of Schools depended upon appropriations in emergency
uoney. granted by the Provincial Board of Free Leyte. Gaviola submitted
for approval the following appropriations for traveling expenses and subsistence
for the General Supervisor and his personnel, and for the seventeen Supervising
Principals in the seventeen municipalities in which classes are actually func
tioning: ?2 ,530
The Provincial Board declined to act. referring the request to the "Provincial
Treasurer. Treasurer Xaadavero returned this communication to the Board:
Returned to the Board with the inf-•rroation that if the amounts requested by
the General Supervisor of Schools are necessary, this Office will have no objec
tion to the inclusion of the items in the budget for the office of the General
Supervisor of schools.
The Provincial Board, thereuron resolved to ''include in the Annual Provincial

i
O
Budget' the items requested."
The Board also ratified the plantilias of teachers’ salaries submitted for a
^'hie sum was itemized:

P500 for the General Supervisor and his personnel for the period October 1.
IS45, to June ZD, 1944.
PI.550 for the 17 Supervisire Principals, at FLO per month.
2
Provincial Board of Free Leyte. Resolution Lo. 2io.
i
I
527
ten month period'*' by the municipalities of Maasin ( P 3 1 , 0 7 0 ) , Macrohon ( ? 1 0 , 7 5 0 ) ,
Malitbog ( P 2 4 , 9 0 0 ) , Sogod ( P 2 4 , 5 8 0 ) ^ and Libagon ( P d , 4 2 0 ) , payable by the provincial
treasurer. Guerrilla auditor Potente computes cash advances to the municipalities at
P 1 9 4 , 1 3 2 .1 5 in aggregate.2
Babcock felt that the salaries paid out by the Provincial Board -were too
4
high. He favored a policy of retrenchment, but his opinion was vetoed. The general
1The breakdown by items is as fcllovG:

Principals & Pegular Teachers Temnorary Teachers Emergency Teachers
Malitbog 16 - P P.,300 5 - P 2 ,650 31 - P13 ,950
Sogod 21 - l l ’ooo 12 - 6,300 16 - 7'200
Libagon 7 5',670 5 - 1 j550 4 - 1,800
substitutes: 3 - 1,400
Maas in 24 - 12 .020 18 - 9,600
Macrohon o 4,100 14 - 6,650
A further breakdovn of the 3alary scale in two municipalities reveals, as

month'y nay:
Maasin regular Temno rary Emergency Macrohon Regular Temnorary
At PRO Pr Incinal At P75 1
At PBS 1 teacher
At P55 2 " 15 At P55 3
11
At P52 1
M
At P50 1 At P50 4 1
1!
At P45 11 21
'T.
At P45 3 10
At P60 j.
An examination of these figures reveals the great number of emergency t e a c h

ers employed during this period, as well as the temporaries and substitutes, who
lacked the qualifications to establish themselves as regulars within the Bystem. The
disparity in salary schedules for the different categories is also evident.
^Larulapu Mondragon, guerrilla leader in Sogod, accused the municipal trea
surer. Justirribaste, of defalcation. On one occasion, the treasurer had refused to
make payment to the teachers of the municipality. The teachers submitted their com
plaint to the local guerrilla headquarters. Justirribaste. called in for interroga
tion, sought to clear himself by pleading adherence to Japanese orders. Mondragon
severely rebuked him, emphasizing that it was guerrilla policy to pay the teachers.
Justimbaste was soon replaced.
■^Potente , o p . cit. . p. 27.
% o r a number of months, Babcock and other Americans in South Leyte were
receiving monthly loans from the guerrilla government of P40. He also received a
direct, loan from Colonel Kangleon of P300.
Babcock’s attitude nc doubt occasioned surprise to many Filipinos. They
had always thought of Americans, particularly Amdrican educators, as unstinting
backers of the educational enterprise. Perhaps, under the circumstances, Babcock
believed other govei-nmentai expenses deserved priority.
1.
528
supervisor believed that the multitude of civic duties thrust upon the teacher— crop
production work, anti-profiteering supervision, propaganda missions, in addition to
home visitation to improve pupil attendance--Justified paying the teachers as much
as possible.1
In his tours, Babcock discovered that the school children were keenly inter
ested. Only hunger and lack of clothing could suffice to keep them away. They had
practically no text-books. Banana leaves and sharpened sticks did duty as writing
materials. As far as possible, writing was eliminated from classroom work. Oral
drill in arithmetic and reading were the principal procedures. Shopwork for the
older boys and home economics for the girls were necessarily dropped.
In most municipalities, the guerrilla classes went as far as Grade IV only,
though some municipalities succeeded in setting up intermediate grades. The two
single-session plan was followed for maximum utilization of school resources.
Faymundo Aldana assisted Babcock as field supervisor, receiving -110 in emer
gency money as monthly salary. He visited Macrohon, Malitbog, and Abuyog, as well as
Sogod. ' He noted a falling off in attendance in the latter rart of November, as tid
ings of Japanese reinforcements for Leyte reached the ears of the people. Aldana was
on an insnectional tour in Albuyog when the Japanese reached South Leyte. Japanese
re occupation brought in its wake the closing of the schools until the attempt to re-
onen them by the collaborationists.
^Teachers were widely used in food procurement service for guerrilla trocp3 .
When Col. Kangleon reorganized his food procurement work, he ordered "that the Of
fice of Food Administrator of Leyte will establish a net of food procurement agencies
. . . .Only Government employees, preferably teachers, will be appointed as agents.
(?.. Kangleon, Col. 10 Feb. 1944. Executive Order No. 3.)
The superior intelligence of the teacher, his self-denying devotion to duty,
his preparedness to hold fast to his assignment where others would shrink unless of
fered adequate remuneration, his essentially unbusinesslike approach made him the
logical choice for this post. The teacher could combine in a single mission food pro
curement and propaganda work intended to buttress the morale of the populace.
Âldana had been district supervisor in Sogod before the Japanese invasion,
and it was he who reopened the schools of teat municipality. Almost half of the pre
war enrolment of punils reported to school. Most of the teachers were on hand. The
schools in that municipality had almost their full stock of books and supplies, a
most fortunate situation. Attendance began to fall off towards the latter part of
November.
529
Guerrilla educational policy had its negative or inhibitory facet. This facet
is an integral part of the over-all policy, and is appropriately created here. Con
cerned as the guerrilla authorities were with promoting the education of the young,
they were equally anxious that school-age children outside of their Jurisdiction
should be shielded from what they considered the baleful influence of the collabora
tionist schools. Beyonc! this, they sought to offset the stabilizing effect that the
functioning collaborationist schools exert,ed upon Japanese-Filipino relationships.
Florentine Kapil i. Superintendent of Schools in Leyte's puppet administration,
noted with satisfaction in September, 1943, that "in the task of pacification, the
organization of classes serves as a great inducement in convincing the people to re
turn to their homes in the poblacion." This is precisely what the guerrilla were de
termined to prevent. Constant acts of sabotage, perpetrated, by the fighting units
of resistance, directly or indirectly aimed to bring about the temporary or permanent
closing of the schools.
How successful were the guerrilla in this objective? Eeports drawn up by
puppet officials supply some information. The principal of Leyte municipality mourneds
It is indeed a regret that on Sept. 24 /19427 no pupil reported to school.

The people were going away from the poblacion to their evacuation places due to
the trouble caused by the bandits, ^/head "guerrilleros'\7 Thinking that the
pupil may return to school as Boon as possible, the teachers waited for them up
to the end of the month. I stayed in my station up to the month of October,
still waiting for the return of the children to school. Believing that the return!
of the children may be delayed, I then left for Tacloban to report personally the
aforementioned situation. . .
Dulag was one of the municipalities whose schools managed to stay open a good
part of the tine. But on January 9, 1943, "the Head Teacher of Dulag reported that
due to unwholesome incidents, the school in his municipality was closed, beginning
ITovember ' . . .
This, in tbs words of the superintendent of schools. He went on to report
that most of the other schools closed "in the month of November or December, 1942.
Ânglesio Tugaao, Leyte Elementary School Principal. Nov, 19, 1942. To:
The Div. Supt. of Schools.
530
due to unwholesome incidents that happened in the poblacion of the different
municipalities.
Capoocan groped its way towards school organization. It
was allotted five teachers, and the Mayor was requested to instruct the Acting
Principal to submit the enrolments. . . .Unfortunately, no report has been re
ceived until the end of the school year. Evidently the classes were not able
to continue due to unwholesome incidents.^
All of these reports refer elliptically to attacks or to other intimidatory
actions by the unmentionable guerrilla forces. On two occasions, guerrilla bands
struck in direct assault at entire communities. Of course, instruction by the local
schools was disrupted. The superintendent of schools recorded dolefully:
The site of the poblacion of Dagami is very pathetic. This town was burred
by guerril leros some time during the month of November, 1942 . and practically
no house was left. From Dagami to Burauen, more than 90$> of the houses of the
barrios of Guinarona and Buri were burned, including school h o u s e s .3
Guerrilla opposition failed to bring about the closing of the schools. But
it did succeed in discouraging many parents from sending their children to attend
classes, notwithstanding orders from Tacloban.
Elsewhere, we have inquired at some length into the general nature of Leyte's
resistance movement, scrutinizing its social and economic philosophy. Our inquiry
failed to disclose any tendencies of fundamental social revolutionary import as, for
instance, were notable in Central Luzon. It is true that some changes of wider sig
nificance were instituted by the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces, but they
were of a tentative character, their unfoldment interrupted by the reestablishment of
the Philippine Commonwealth.
This being the case, we can scarcely expect the guerrilla to have initiated
any aveeping reorganization of Leyte's Bchool system. The children browsed in the
nre-war educational pastures, the gras 3 less green, the shepherds fewer and less
■^Report of September, 194?.

?Y . Fanil i . Actg. Piv. Supt. July ] , 1943. To: Direct,or of Pub. Instruction,
Mari' s..
'^Report of December, 1943.
531
experienced, end the menace of ravenous beasts more immediate. And if the metaphor
breaks down in that the school children showed greater independence and drive than
a flock of sheep, the fact remains that what is loosely called progressive education
did not crop up in guerrilla Leyte. Little effort was exerted to provide the child
ren with a deeper insight into the nature of Filipino life, and an appreciation of
the instrumental character of knowledge in the solution of practical affairs. There
was no experimentation with the child-community-centered orientation of education.
Instruction hewed to the traditional formalistic lines, albeit with slightly
more flexibility because of the unfavorable material conditions. Eut if it takes
more than one swallow to make a summer, moie than reversion to inscription with
sticks on leaves is needed for conversion of rural schooling to a dynamic, imagina
tive educational experience. Except for the fact--and its emotional significance is
not to be minimi zed--that the guerrilla-sponsored schools were uncensored, and sym
bolized a realm of Filipino freedom, further hardening the resolve to throw off the
conqueror. n~ import.ant differences in educational philosophy and practice were to
be found in Ieyte, whether occupied or unoccupied.
gummarv
fa
To the student of guerrilla warfare who approaches his subject armed with
definite ideological convictions, the guerrilla movement of Leyte will prove a sorry
disappointment. Fere he will find neither fervent dedication to the overthrow of a
pre-war social order— a social order denounced as morally reprehensible and economi
cally wasteful— nor even the more modest drafting of a program for the mitigation of
srecific social evils. Indeed, the student, will discover that intellectual analysis
of the relationship between the individual and society is signally absent, along with
the correlate Inquiry into the ordinal disposition of community resources.
this should not. be taker, rc signify that: pre-war Ieyte was an island paradise,
that its re'The were devoid of grievances and that, they could project no visions o"
532
a better post-war ]ife for themsel ves. What it does mean is that their aspirations
were extremely nebulous, vague dreams of personal, and coimiunity betterment, sonehow
to be conjured into actuality by the very termination of the war. There was nothing
articulate about all this, in the sense of a systematic linking of cause and effect
in order to solve concrete problems.
But tc. one acquainted with tie background of the provincial resistance move
ment, this seeming torpor would occasion no surprise. Social ills there were, along
with an awareness of dissatisfaction. But on this preponderantly agrarian island,
with a high proportion of its population illiterate, no organization existed to serve
the reeds of the discontented, to clarify frustrations and formulate modes of intelli
gent grappling with difficulties. The local intelligentsia, primarily professionals
from land-owning or mercantile antecedents, saw the problem entirely in terms of in
creasing aggregate production and hastening modernization. Those of this class who
associated themselves with Leyte's resistance movement transposed their customary
notions to the war-time setting. To the extent that they exercised influence, their
ideas and activities were directed to a restoraticn of the pre-war order.
The mil * tary element composing the resistance organizations carried their
snec.iai ized ments" patterns over int~ t>e new situation. The few professional sol
diers of •f-f'icer rank sought io make their combat •-■rganizations replicas of the ore- ,
war ^hii in-nine army. Tn insisting up-'-n troop discipline, they aimed to gain a re-
spectab]e name for their organizations, and thereby qualify for official recognition
conferred by All ied headquarters in Australia. In a limited way . their influence was
good for they compelled the semi -brigand bands to toe the mark or face expulsion,
while at the same time blotting out the undisguised bandit elements. Their influence
was bad in that they tended to regard the pro-resistance civilian authorities as
rubber-stamps, suitable primarily for appropriating funds and furnishing supplies.
Among the non-officer brackets of the professional solidery-be cone -res is tance-
fighters, two types were distinguishable. There were those who simply hated the in
vader. and were determined to harass his regime until such time as the arrival of
533
American aid v.uld allow a full-scale counter-offensive. And then there were those
more intriguing cases of men with a long-standing under-dog complex. These men saw
guerrilla warfare as a windfall for the heaping of glory and wealth upon themselves.
Until the war sergeants and corporals, receiving a small pittance and leading a
none too comfortable existence, they now breveted themselves captains, majors and
colonels, took command of whole sectors, and dictated to municipal officials how they
should run their administrations (including how much money they should allot to the
guerrilla). This species of soldier became the type of guerrilla sagamore most em
barrassing to the guerrilla commanders and most disconcerting to the loyal civilians
of the resistance movement.
Eaually interesting as a subject of study were the reserve officers and the
civilian polLticians directly commissioned into the guerrilla. Some of them, of
course, perhaps most, went about their assignments quietly, conscientiously, and
efficiently. But the others, seeking fame and a possible cache of loot, labored to
groom themselves for post-war advantages in politics and business.
lacking an ideological basis, the guerrilla organizations with their hetro-
geneous an^ often self-centered leadership found they could agree on a minimal uro
gram of non-cooueration with the puppet, regime and military opposition to the Japan
ese. Their declared goal was the reinstatement of the Commonwealth Government, with
an immediate objective of maintaining law and order and upholding faith in the ful
fillment of the promised American liberation. Unhappily, this purpose and this
program were not sufficiently compelling to overcome the competing motivation of
self-interest. The result wan the unwillingness of the sector chiefs to accept a
supreme leadership and unite under a single command. Unambiguous orders from Allied
headquarters would no doubt have proven decisive, but these orders were confused by
conflicting ambitions within the inter-island intelligence network.
Ae previously stated, the guerrilla organizations of Leyte conducted their
military and administrative operations, unguided by (or unimpeded by, if the reader
so regards it) any compelling social doctrine. Nevertheless, implicit in ohe
534
resistance function was some inchoate concept of corporate unity,of a total commu
nity pulling together for greater strength and more efficient husbanding of assets.
And this undeclared -oostulate required, as a sub-head, tie marshaling of communal
resources. With this as a beginning, the guerrilla uroceeded to spin out a reticula
tion of controls on pronerty and trade, designed to maximize resources at the dis
posal of the guerrilla troops while choking off the flow of products to the enemy.
Further, the resulting concept of conmunity--a community of resisters— Justified
the levying of a variety of taxes in money and kind, in practice adjusted to the
capacity of the citizen to give (and often weighing quite heavily upon the wealthy),
constituting a drastic departure from pre-war practice. And as a crowning measure,
one of the two principal guerrilla organizations adopted the attitude that estates
abandoned by collaborators were community property and should be worked for guerrilla
benefit. This viewpoint, taken with the widespread unofficial moratorium on payment
of rents, tended to subvert the vested property rights. All in all, the exigencies
of armed resistance led to a host of measures which, taken separately, had only
ad hoc significance, but regarded in their totality pointed to a modification in the
genera] conception of private property and in the relation of the property-holder
to society.
How the civilian peculation reacted to these controls depended in considerable
measure uuon the nature of the relationship subsisting between the guerrilla leader
ship and the 1 oca’ governments. Where the guerrilla worked out appropriate adminis
trative devices for Joint consir tation and planning by the military and civil direct
orship. and where they allowed the civil ian authorities a measure of responsibility
in the executory ana evaluative phases, the results were consistently superior.
There is no need to enumerate at this point the variety of schemes adapted to stren
gthening the military-civilian nexus, other than to remark that some of these schemes
showed considerable ingenuity.
In concluding this overview of Leytean resistance, we must advert to a major
guerrilla function— that of education for resistance. First we must say (although
535
we treated this matter under a different heading) that guerrilla adherence to legal
procedure, manifested in efforts to eliminate banditry, in the curbing of the more
rapacious guerrilla chieftains (without going so far as to drive them to open revolt),
and in the instituting of civilian courts wherever possible, in itself served to
impress the people with the worth and honorableness of the enterprise. Second, the
enrolment of the general population as a civilian defense and espionage force through
the medium of the Volunteer Guard and Women's Auxiliary Service units furnished the
ordinary citizen with an exhilarating sense of mission, an inner drive that comes
onTy through direct, personal involvement in a cause. Finally, the meritorious
achievements of the guerrilla propaganda department deserve special mention. Not
only did. the guerrilla combat the disheartening effect of so-called war news, dis
seminated by Japanese agents along with the pernicious publicity releases concerning
the "made-in-Japan Philippine Eepublic", but guerrilla spokesmen also stirred Fili
pino hearts to remain true to their traditional love of freedom, loyal to the demo
cratic way of life, and staunch to their conviction that American liberation would
soon be at hand.
Foremost in this campaign to bolster public confidence and mobilize the re
sources of resistance were the public school teachers. This group of men and women
employed their education and the local esteem they commanded for a variety of purposes
--to arouse patriotic sentiment, to stimulate greater crop productivity, to denounce
hoarding and profiteering, to procure subsistence for the guerrilla, to give training
in first aid and to campaign for the observance of public hygiene. It is to be re
gretted that in their own specialization, the education of the young, the teachers
carried over into the guerrilla schools the pre-war academic curriculum, instead of
constructing a new community-child-centered curriculum more appropriate to the newly
evo"ved concent of community and the novel conditions of life. Hovrever, the teachers
did disrlay remarkable improvisatorial ability in providing instruction with virtually
536
within Leyte an oasis for the imparting to the youth of the finest precepts and
ideals of Filipino life, uncorrupted at the behest of a foreign invader.
In short, Leyte's guerrilla movement aimed not to make over a v s , of life,
and did not promise future abundance to its supporters. Its orientation was exclu
sively outward, directed against the expulsion of a tyrannical invader who had de
stroyed democratic liberty and plundered the land of its wealth. Holding large por
tions of the population steady in a course of non-cooperation with the enemy and firm
in their hope for redemption (while at the same time preparing detailed intelligence
reports of tremendous value to the Liberation forces then in staging for their big
drive), the guerrilla accomplished wonders. Whatever its defects, the guerrilla of
Leyte succeeded in carving a glorious name for itself. Future generations of Leyteno
school children reading accounts of guerrilla exploits in their histoiy books , will
glow with inward pride as they reflect that the deeds of their fellow-provincials
made possible the selection of their Island--Leyte— as the invasion site for the
liberation of their country.
5”3CoA
BUTTLE OF LEYTE
Mi/es
5
C<trear'd
Ormoc
lura'Wfi
OMPJ^WON
ssm
m c z *
BOHOL
^SUfJIGAO
'^yOMJL^Si
reR77CAL Vt£tY r • . B u x n a n
537
CHAPTER IV
LEYTE DURING THE LIBERATION PERIOD
The Exptils lop of the Japanese from Leyte
The American Landings
We do not propose to treat at length the military aspect of Leyte's libera
tion from Japanese subjugation. The very able historians engaged by the Pentagon
to reconstruct events have been hard at work preparing military narratives both
readable and authentic. But we cannot completely pass over the initial phase of
America's thunderous return to the Philippines, inasmuch as the first landings
occurred on Leyte, locale of this study.
For a most graphic and moving resume of the landing operations and their
immediate sequel, we must turn to Carlos P. Eomulo's book, I See the Philippines
Rise. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner of the Philippines and holding the rank
of brigadier, rode back with the invading tide. To the scenes he witnessed, he
brought the practiced eye and facile pen of the journalist, the pensiveness of
the statesman, and the patriot's burning love for his ravished homeland. We shall
restrict our quotations chiefly to the factual reporting, commending the reader,
as interestir^ background material, to the portions in which Rcmulo dilates upon
his inner feelings.
Romulo accounts for the success of the invasion fleet in reaching Leyte
unintercepted:
^The Japanese) had refused to believe the American fleet was headed for
Leyte, one of the poorest of the provinces, through narrow straits con
trolled by Japs. They would not believe the American armada would make a
move so daring and so utterly mad.
That was why six hundred ships--the greatest armada ever collected in
the Pacific— was gathered here in Leyte Bay this morning of October 20,
1944, pouring hell over a beachhead in the very heart of the Philippine
Islands, while the Japanese forces that had planned to resist our attack
were massed together in futile might on the island of Mindanao, past which
we had slipped in the night, without their knowledge. . . .
For days the huge American convoys had been converging from thiir many
bases, to keep this rendezvous. All around us were ships crowded with men
and the vehicles of war. There were the warships of the Seventh American
Fleet under Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaifl, the Amphibian Forces under Admiral
Daniel Barbey, and the Australian squadron, and elements of Admiral Halsey's
Third American Fleet
1Carlos P. Rcmulo, I See the Philippines Rise (Doubleday & C o., Inc.,
N. Y . , 1946) pp. 79-80.
538
Naval "bombardment of Japanese shore installations at Bed. Beach, Palo, be
gan at 5 a.m. on October 20th. Bomulo describes the operations:
The bombardment of Leyte Bay was a spectacle of power and destruction

never to be forgotten by those who saw it from the sea or skies.-1-
One and a half minutes after ten the first wave of our infantry hit
Leyte Beach. . . .The big landing ships opened their ramps like Jaws,
spewing forth tanks, Jeeps, bulldozers, masses of equipment on a scale
that had never been seen before, and men were being landed by the tens of
thousands. It was an incredible spectable of massed manpower. . . .Clouds
of planes were supporting them with rockets and bombs; the full force of
the Pacific Fleet was blastirg the way ahead.2
The troops engaged in this landing were the United States Sixth Army
under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, and made up of the X and XXIV
Corps. . . .They were supported from the air by Navy carriers, Far Eastern
Air forces, and Eoyal Australian Air f o r c e s . ^
Tacloban, a mile and a half south^ of Bed Beach, was the capital of
Leyte. . . .and the airfield there was a Japanese power artery. . . .Their
beach defenses were blasted in the aerial and naval fire. Their main forces
were entrenched in the hills beyond Bed Beach. So taken by surprise were
they that our first landing party had made five hundred yards before a
single Japanese shot was fired. Our assault troops seized the beachheads,
and our tanks and mobile guns fanned out over the sand and disappeared be
hind the fringe of palms. Tanks, bulldozers, and armored cars set out in
waves to take the airfield and the capital.
Exquisitely timed and executed had been this co-ordination of Air, Army,
and Navy forces in Leyte Bay. It has been based on guerrilla information6
1Ibid., p. 82.
2Ibid., p. 84.
Îbid., p. 85.
^Tacloban lies north of Bed Beach. In its issue commemorating the first
anniversary of the American landings, The Guardian reported: "Following are the
first-hand accounts of the invasion on Leyte gleaned from a copy of the Free
Philippines:
The Initial landings were made at 10 o'clock in the morning. . . .One
beachhead was established at San Bicardo (former name of Barrio San Jose) , three
miles south of Tacloban, and another twelve miles to the south between San Jose
and Du lag. A third landing force went abhore on Panaon island Just off the
southern tip of Leyte. First troops to reach land drove ahead 500 yards before
the enemy fired a single shot." (Vol. I, No. 10, October 20, 1945, p. 1.)
^Romulo, op. clt.t p. 86.

6’In October, 1944, Chick Parsons returned to New Guinea. . . .
"Summoned to the headquarters of Lieutenant General Valter Krueger's
Sixth Army in Hoilandia, Chick Parsons found himself in the midst of an extremely
solemn conclave of staff officers." This was the beginning of Parsons' crucial
mission, prenaring the guerrilla for the American landings. Through the efforts of
Parsons, Tacloban and Panaon Island werespared demclishment. (Ingham, op. cit.,
up. 199-22 7.)
539
smuggled out of the Islands and on aerial observation. It was falling

together as neatly as the words of a song.-1-
The drafters of the invasion plans had been extremely anxious about the
weather. Luckily, the weather remained favorable during the debarkation operations.
Then it changed:
By this time the smoke-filled skies had darkened and opened and the
tropical rain began that turned Leyte into a bog and led us through the
rest of the campaign in mud to our knees. Two days later came the typhoon
with the fifty-mile gale that, had it broken that day, would have ruined
our landing plans .2
American ground forces advanced successfully. Dulag fell on October 21st.
By the 22nd, Tacloban and its airfield had been retrieved. But suddenly, the
entire American position became gravely imperiled. Japanese naval forces had moved
up from Mindanao, while others streamed down from home waters .0
Two days after the landing, the second battle of the Philip-nine Sea
began. . . .It was the death struggle between our sea forces and Japan's,
and off Leyte our invasion fleet that had covered the landing was fighting
for its life. The Japanese were meeting MacArthur's pincer movement with
one of their own, and if they succeeded in cutting our sea urotection away
from our 1 anded armi.es we would be left unprotected, on Leyte. . . .
MacArthur's p1an did not fail. Halsey's fleet did not fail. His ships
drove a! ong the Leyte coast like hounds of the sea, crippling the Japanese
fleet and. driving the last remnants to their doom. Within the week the
sea scrimmage was over. . .
How the arduous task of penetrating the interior of Leyte, dislodging the
Japanese defenders and exterminating them must be commenced. It was a nasty piece
of work and required the whole-hearted cooperation of the Island's Filipino popu
lation. The American commander, General MacArthur, President Osmena heading the
•'•Ibid. , p. 80. Îbid., p. 78.

•% o t e : For a terse summary of American military operations in Leyte, see:
(a) "The World at War--War Department--The Infantry Journal--(Washington, 1945),
p p . 323-31.
(b) General of the A.rmy George C. Marshall, Biennial Beport of the Chief of Staff
of the United States A r m y , July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, (infantry Journal
Press, Washington, 1 9 4 6 ^ pp. 136-141.
(c) A fuller treatment of the naval engagement is contained in: C. Vann Woodward,
The Battle for Leyte Gul f , (The Macmillan Co., Hew York, 1947) .
(d) Fletcher Pratt, "The Great Victory cf Leyte Gulf", HarperTs , Vol. 191, Nov.-Dec.,
1945, pp. 431-44, 537-52.
4
Bomulo, op. cit., pp. 126-27.
540
Commonwealth Government returning from exile, and Romulo as liaison proclaimed
the order of the day at the time of the original landing:
General MacArthur'e proclamation, delivered in the rain, was a rallying

cry to the captive people of the Philippines beyond the enemy lines:
’I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again
on Philippine soil— soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We
have come, dedicated and committed, to the task of destroying every vestige
of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring, upon a founda
tion of indestructible strength, the liberties of your people.1
Osmena, in his speech, told of his regret that Quezon had not lived to
see the triumph of this day. Then he too urged the Filipinos to fight on
in the name of democracy. . . .
Romulo recalled:
In my talk that followed, I also urged on the forces fighting on our

side. . . .My talk was the Voice of Freedom, revived again after the long
silence that began when Japanese bombs drove the last Fil-American forces
out of the Tunnel on Corregidor. . . .My duties in the liberation were those
of liaison officer between General MacArthur and President Osmena. My
loyalty must serve two leaders and their single purpose. So in the terms
that I had spoken from the besieged Tunnel I called on Filipinos everywhere
in the captive Philippines to aid us in our fight. And I praised by their
names the fighting leaders of the guerrilla forces whose loyalty had helped
lead us to A-Day on Leyte.^
The following day, the Philippine President spoke again:
President Osmena, on October twenty-first, broadcast a call to Fili

pinos everywhere to fight with the American advance as the tide of battle
reached their towns. This was his second proclamation on Philippine soil.5
General MacArthur did not intend to substitute an American military occu
pation for the Japanese. He appreciated the tremendous propaganda value a re
established Commonwealth Government would have for the success of future American
military operations. He sent word to Romulo to Join him:
I had not seen General MacArthur since A-Day. On October twenty-fifth

a message came from him. A PT boat would take us to the capital, Tacloban. . .
In a simple and impressive ceremony General MacArthur turned the pro
vincial capital of Leyte over to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines
• • • •
4
In President Osmena's simple words of acknowledgment the Commonwealth of
the Philippines was born again.5
“Ibid., p p . S9-100.
2Ibid. , p. 103.
5Ibid., pp. 125-26.
4Ibid., p. 122.
5Ibid., p. 129.
541
The Combat Bole of the Guerrilla
With the provincial capital in Filipino hands, the campaign to reconquer
the remainder of the Island got under way. Tactics varied from place to place.
Wrote Romulo:
There vere towns such as Dulag, that had been blasted from the face of
the island under the shattering attack of our invasion.
There were other towns that the guerrilla fighters had taken over be
fore we arrived. Kangleon's forces had attacked such places in enemy-held
land, wiped out the garrisons, and cleared the streets of the Japanese.
All three regiments of Colonel Kangleon's 92nd Infantry had been alerted
since August, notwithstanding inadequate equipment, for participation in the
fighting. The 95th Regiment of Major Balderian covering the East Coast had its
battle plans formulated in accord with anticipated Japanese action:
The 95th Inf., in conjunction with other units, LAC, in the event of
Allied landing in any part of Leyte may be charged with the following:
a. To organize a covering force for the landing Allied forces by at
tacking enemy rear installations until the landing forces will gain suf
ficient grounds to render enemy resistance along the beach ineffective.
b. To cut enemy reinforcements by conducting attacks on car-borne
troops and supplies along the roads and building road blocks.
c. To protect interior trails which may be used by the enemy as a
line of retreat or reinforcement.2
The 95th Regiment did not stop with a statement of its general mission.
It worked out a detailed scheme for troop deployment:
a. The 3rd Bn., 95th Inf., minus the 'L' Co., will occupy and establish
filing position between La Paz and Burauen and harass the enemy frcm their
rear. The C.O. will be charged of constructing road blocks about roads and
detours within the Bn. sector, to prevent enemy penetration into the interior.
b. 'L' Co., 95th Inf., will occupy position on the north side of the
road between Baybay and Abuyog and will prevent flow of enemy troops and
supply by conductirg attacks on the enemy along the road and by constructing
road blocks.
c. The 1" Bn., 95th Inf., minus 'A' Co. will occupy and take positions
between Jaro and Dagami and,harass the enemy from the rear pushing towards
Alangalang and Pastrana. The C.O. is charged of preventing the enemy from
using all roads within the Bn. sector.
d. 'A' Co., 95th Inf., will occupy and take position in the southern
side of the road between Tunga and Jaro and conduct attacks on car-borne
•^T b i d . , p. 153 .
Ârmanda Guevara, 1" L t . , Inf., Rgtl. Plans & Training Officer, 9fith Inf.,
92nd Div., LAC. 22 August 1944. 'Plans of Attack',' Par. 2.
542
and foot troops along the road. The C.O. Is charged with preventing the enemy
from using the road by constructing road blocks on roads and detours.
e. The 2nd Bn., 95th Inf., will be held in reserve and guard all trails
leading into the interior and thru Ormoc and Albuera.
f. One section of the Combat Co. will be attached to each Battalion.
g. H q . & H q . Svc. Co. will be charged with distributing supplies and
ammunitions.
h. All units wilf destroy a]] means of communications of the enemy within
their respective sectors."'
This 1 ay-out of troop disposition by units was subsequently modified in de
tail to meet the requirements of synchronization with the invading American forces.
But the operative procedures remained substantially as outlined.
A series of precautionary instructions issued from Colonel Kangleon's Leyte
Area Command on the eve of and during the firstphase of the landing operations:
Instruct your soldiers not to wear Japuniforms. Friendly air men shot
down may mistake them for enemy .2
Instruct your men and civilians to keep off roads when planes are in action.
Remove your troops to near forests west of Dagami-Burauen road to harass enemy
moves into interior.5
Landings by American troops will be made Friday in the Tacloban-Dulag area,
to drive out Japs from our country. Keep your troops well behind lines and away
from scenes of action. Do not let them or civilians come out to meet landing
American forces. Remain in hills, till contacted by representative of landing
forces. . . .-
. . . .Do not kill captured Japs, especially aviators. G2 , 7th Div., needs
them.for investigation.5
1Ibid. , par. 5, 4.
2Col. Kangleon. Oct. 14, 1944. To: Ma,1. A. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf.
Richardson commented on this order: "Whenever our soldiers killed a Jap,
they would appear in complete Jap uniform. Five days before MacArthur landed, Colonel
Kangleon ordered his soldiers to remove all Jap uniforms, but most refused. A Jap
uniform is a badge of honor. You cannot disrobe a Jap until you have killed him.
The guerrii'as were very puzz1ed when American soldiers shot at them in their Japanese
uniforms. 'Ve have not Japanese faces,' they cried. Neither have many Japs, they
ver~ tn'd, and then they took off their uniforms and put them away to wear after the
war." (WoTert, op. cit., p. 218.)
5Co! . Kangleon, CO, IAC. Oct. 15. 1944. To: Ma,1. A. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf.
-Col . Kangleon, CO, LAC. Oct. 18, 1944. To: Maj. A. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf.
St. John amplified: "I was cheering and shoutingwith the restof the people
when my radio man rushed out with a message. I have lostthe thing now, but it said
something like: 'Warn people to remain in safe place. Tell them not to repeat not
to run around among troops.' We sent runners all over hell with that message. The
bamboo telegraph would have it all over the island before the end of the day."
(St. John, op. cit., pp. 187-8.)
53rd Lt. F. Losing, S-2, Bn. 3, 95th Inf. Regt. Nov. 3, 1944. Memo: Co.
Cos, Bn. 3.
543
Guerrilla adherence to these directives smoothed the going considerably for
the American shock troops, and helped save Filipino civilians from unnecessary
slaughter.
Once the American invasion forces had consolidated their beachhead, the
Japanese had no recourse but to retreat into the interior. Then the guerrilla
undertook their own offensive, synchronizing their harassing operations with the
main American ground action.
"I" Company's (94th Regiment) valor and resourcefulness was suggestive of
what the guerrilla participation meant:
Captain Landia had some ideas, though. He sent his men into Abuyog, from
which the Japs had withdrawn the day the shelling started. . . .CV's /VG§/
had sent word to him by way of the bamboo telegraph that the Japs had pulled
north and vest, toward Dulag and La Paz. The shelling was too much for them
to take on those beaches, which were lightly fortified, and they pulled inland.
Without any word from the Americans, Captain Landia figured out the best
thing he could do would be to cut off any possible line of retreat southward
that he could.
His men went to the Bito Biver Just north of Abuyog and burned down the
100-foot bridge. If the Japs were chased to the Bito, the Americans would have
plenty of time to catch up with them when they hit that river.
But Captain Landia took another precaution. In case the Japs retreated and
got to the Bito with time enough to get across before the Americans caught
them, he deployed his men in the underbrush on the Abuyog side of the Bito. If
the Japs came, his men would wait until the river was clogged with them and then
shoot them down like clay pigeons.
That was the way guerrillas helped Americans all over the island.
And not only the guerrillas. The CV's and the unorganized people helped.
They stole Jap horses and guns and brought them to the Americans. They stole
Jap food. They killed Japs cut off from their outfits. They led Americans to
Japs who hid in little groups, in houses, under bushes, in holes.
The people in the towns where the war went stood around and looked helpless.
But they were sharp. They knew what the Americans wanted to know, and they were
quick to tell them.
These were the poorest of the people, the people who had not been organized,
had been browbeaten by the Japs. But they were interested in a quick American
victory. They wanted to go back to peaceful homes, and to begin to rebuild
their own life. So they helped. ^
The guerrilla had the difficult responsibility of protecting the civilians,
caught between the fire of the advancing Americans and the retreating Japanese. The
Japanese reacted with savagery to their forced retreat, and wreaked their fury on
hapless civilians inadvertently stumbling across their path. The guerrilla gave
^St. John, op. cit.. pp. 191-2.
544
instruction to the Volunteer Guards to herd the civilians away from the line of
skirmishing, ordered civilians to furnish whatever rear-line assistance they could
to the American battle troops, and rendered first-aid to casualities encountered
along the way.
After the guerrilla had made contact with the Americans, seme individuals
were detached for temporary duty with the main forces. They Joined reconnaissance
patrols and combat teams as guides, signal men and specialists, as also for more
menial fatigue detail. They acquitted themselves well, and were highly commended.
There were few Jurisdictional conflicts between Colonel Kargleon's Leyte
Area Command and the American forces. The 95th Regiment and the Americans maintained
close liaison: "Commanding General, 6th Army, desires you send officers from your
staff as liaison officers with Amer. 10th Corps, vicinity Carigara.
Then one battalion was assigned directly to American headquarters. "6th
Army has ordered 1st Bn. and same smaller units to work directly with American troops
in that area. . . .Chain of command will be observed whenever tactical situation
permits."2
Finally, Kangleon placed the entire regiment at American disposal. "Here
after, you take orders direct from Cremanding General, 6th Army."3
Guerrilla intelligence doubled its efforts. Operatives were sent behind
Japanese lines to make careful note of troop movements and locations of supply
dumps, for rapid transmission to guerrilla and American headquarters.
Jap notes given to operatives should be used in paying civilian operatives

who are residing inside Jap territories, and that money can be used in pur
chasing articles for home consumption. If our money is used, Civilian Opera
tive carrying it will be identified, and his value to the organization in
carryicg out his mission is lost.4
% . Kangleon, Col., CO, IAC. Nov. 8, 1944. To: MaJ. Balderian, CO, 95th
Inf. Regt.
2Col. R. Kangleon, CO, LAC, Nov. 10, 1944. To: Capt. Abarientos, Ex. 0.,
95th Inf.
. Kangleon, Brig. Gen., IAC. Nov. 14, 1944. To: Capt. Abarientos,
Ex. 0., 95th Inf.
4A. Balderian, MaJ., 95th Inf. Oct. 25, 1944. To: 3rd Lt. F. Sosing,
S 2 , Bn. 3.
Notification was also sent to the regimental intelligence officer of Japan
ese tactics:
There were only ahout 1,000 Japs along these ranges and only from l/6 to
1/3 were armed, the rest only armed with spears, with 6 cal. 50 MS-s, and only
one 75mm. gun.
Several guides of the Japs which came over from Valencia, Ormoc, also
informed that they were forced to guide the Japs from Ormoc, and that during
their stay with those Japs they received artillery shells from the east, pre
sumably from the Jaro area.
All of this information was properly brought to the attention of the CIC
and the G-2, X Corps, for their proper action.^
The danger of hostile Filipinos lurking behind American lines was well-
appreciated by the guerrilla. They discussed counter-action with the American mili
tary and with Filipino civilians in positions of responsibility:
A new threat which developed in this area was the reported entrance of
enemy espionage agents. These agents are disguised as laborers, . . .or as
'boys' of the Americans.
To remedy this situation, the undersigned suggested to the Municipal Mayor,
who is the direct supervisor of these laborers, to talk to them, appeal to
their patriotic spirit, explain to them the real situation as well as the
gravity of having enemy agents amongst our midst. In this matter, the Mayor
had a talk with all the foremen (capatazes) to look after a suspicious laborer
and the general behavior of his men, as well as to have his laborers in general
look after a suspicious fellow-1 aborer. In such a way there will be a check
and counter-checking of all laborers. This plan has been put in practice and
might work out all right. . . .
This situation has been brought to light here because of one act of sabotage
that has happened here already in re several laborers who reputedly disappeared
suspiciously, after having been well informed of our installations. . . .
Guerrilla liaison officer of the X Corps, 6th Army, feeling the need of
more men to check these laborers have requested Sgt. Gonzalo Makabenta and
Cpl. Caesar Kierulf to be formally attached to the X Corps to work with the
Civil Affairs Unit. His request has been sent to Col. Euperto K. Kangleon,
C.O., 92nd Div. . . .
The situation here regarding the entrance of enemy agents to locate the
American defenses and installations might be true in all places in our sector.
The undersigned therefore suggests that the same policy, that is to have the
Municipal Mayors talk to the laborers to check and counter-check his fellow-
laborer, be applied to all places in our s e c t o r . 2
Another type of enemy infiltration, even more audacious, had to be combated.
Thus:
Disarm and investigate the 13 men who have presented themselves to

that Hq. as having been acting as guides to American patrols. Ask their
êrmenegildo Granados, 3" Lt., Inf., Liaison Off. Nov. 16, 1944. To:
CO, 95th Inf. Eegt., pp. 1-2.
2Ibid.. pp. 2-3.
identification papers and let your "boys identify these men. These
asn might have "been the ones who stole carbines at Tahontabon and who
fought ’G ’ Co., Bn. 2. . . .■*•
Enemy espionage continued, but was held down to easily manageable pro
portions. It came to an end as soon as the Japanese cause was recognized as
doomed.
Excerpts from the narrative reports of the 95th Regiment’s component
units will give some idea of the military missions undertaken by the guerrilla:
1 Nov. 1944: "1st Lt. P. Baguisi, Ex 0 & Adjutant and 3rd Lt. C. N.
Posoncuy with 3 B/fa left Bn. CP at barrio Bonglayen for Jaro at 7:30
A.M. to attend a conference called for by the CO, American forces at
Jaro. On their way the party engaged with the enemy; 6 Japs were killed
in the encounter and no casualty on our side. . . .
19 Nov.. 1944: 1st Lt. P. Baguisi with one man was sent by Bn. Comdr.
for inspection re present disposition of our troops as to what U.S. Army
unit they were attached. 1st Platoon "B" Company, led by Sgt. Guzman
. . . .intercepted the enemy within the boundary of Ormoc and Carigara
and killed 2 Japs.
The 3rd Platoon "C" Company patroled neighboring places of Alangalang
for the purpose of spying civilians possessing arms.
29 November. 1944: Lt. D. Aguilos with the 2nd Platoon "B" Company en
gaged with the enemy at Bo. Camansi, Carigara, killing 2 Jap officers,
and captured 1 rev., 1 saber 1 rifle cal. 27, 1 compass, map of the PI,
notes and Japanese writings.**
|yjbjBn^2
27 Oct., 1944: At about 9:00 A.M. in Sawahon River, Dagami, Leyte, a
platoon of the "E" Co. under Sgt. A. Murillo surprised the enemy while
they were resting in rear of their defense line. Many of the Japanese
ran away leaving their arms behind them when they heard the burst of fire
made by the men. More than 50 of them were killed and many were wounded.
Arms, ammunition and some Japanese equipments were captured.
50 Oct.. 1944: At about 6:00 A.M., three successive shots were heard from
the direction of an outpost of the Base Hospital. A group of Japanese
soldiers, about 70 in number, were trying to reach the Base Hospital in
three columns. With the presence of Capt. Pabilona, 1" Lts J.G. Fernandez
and E. Diaz and a handful of men, the Japanese attempt to reach the base
was not successful, although there was heavy firing from the enemy. . . .3
^Nov. 15, 1944— To: CO, Bn. 1 — A. Balderian, MaJ., 95th Inf.
%ovember 30, 1944— Narrative Report: November, 1944. Panfilo B.

Baguisi, 1st Lt., Inf. Ex 0 & Adj., 1st Bn., 95th Inf. Reg.
37 November 1944— Narrative Report for October, 1944— Felimon Pabilona,

Capt. Inf., Cmdg. Hq., 2nd Bn., 95th Inf., 92nd Div.
"I" Co.. 5r& B n . -
Oct. .26; 1944: . . . .A platoon was sent to Cadahonan and met some enemy
troops there inflicting 8 dead, capturing 4 Jap rifles, 214 rds of ammun
ition, 2 helmets and other supplies. There were six enlisted man who
were wounded hy return fire for the enemy.
Oct. 50. 1944: Lt. Dacurro and his platoon left Burauen for patrol pur
poses. They were with the Americans during their patrol. ...•*•
'K" Co.. 3rd B n .

Nov. 2. 1944: All the rifle men of ’'K* Co. under the command of the CO
went on patrol to the mountains of Burauen. . . .In the evening at about
8:00 PJ4. the 'K* Co. met an encounter near Bo. Caanislagan. The firirg
lasted almost three hours. We had one casualty and four wounded, while
on the other side, many casualties. . . .
Nov. 15. 1944: Lt. C. Coral with 38 EM went on patrol. . . .12 EM under
Sgt. B. Dinola were attached to the American force and were brought to
Garigara.
Nov. 25, 1944: At about 4:00 P.M. around 50 American soldiers arrived at
Bo. Abuyogon and held their night rest in the said place. These American
soldiers were going to Lobe. The following morning they proceed to Lobe
with some soldiers and YGs as guide.2
Hq. & H q . & Svc Co., Hq. Bn., 95th Inf. Begt.
3 Nov. 1944: At 7:30 A.M., the unit under the CO engaged the retreating
enemy force. The fight lasted for 30 min. and 27 Japs were killed. The
unit started at 8:00 A.M. and arrived the American outfit in Bo. Tingib
at 11; A.M. From this place the party continued and arrived Pastrana
where we spent the night at 4:00 P.M.
Medical Co., Hq. Bn., 95th Inf. Regt.

1 Dec. , 1944: Lt. Dolorico, on duty with the 3rd Battalion as Bn. Surgeon,
assumed his post as C.O., Medical Co., with Lt. Lucinario as Executive Of
ficer. Lt. Sudario remains as Regimental Dental Surgeon and Lt.
Abarientos as Eegtl. Aid Nurse. In the afternoon, the whole hqtrs medical
staff visited the 321st Clearing Station to get an idea of how the Station
is set up and how it functions. The officers of the Clearing Station were
very cooperative and the visit was very instructive.
6 Dec. . 1944: . . . .Officers and EM who are sick should be sent to Hospi
tal of this Eegiment and not to US Army Hospital. . . .4
Combat Co. , Hq. Bn., 95th Inf. Begt.

Oct. 26. 1944: . . . .Capt. Centino and the 2nd platoon ambushed the Japs
near Dagami and killed 3 Japs, wounding others. 3rd platoon has been
divided into three flying squads. At 1:30 _ M
October 27, 1944: 1st Platoon has been divided into three flying squads.
At 1:30 PM, Lt. Pedrique. . . .are sent on mission to contact the American
forces.
^20 November 1944— Monthly Narrative Report: October— E. Dacurro, 3rd

Lt., Inf., J.O., "I” Co., 3rd Bn,, 95th Inf. Eegt.
^30 November, 1944— Monthly Narrative Report: '— Loreto A. Trinchera,
1st Lt., Inf., Commanding
^1 December 1944— Monthly Narrative Report: November— B. Aguilos, Capt.,
Inf., Cmdg. Hq. & Hq. & SVC Co. Hq., 95th Inf. Eegt.
^Monthly Narrative Report for December— Medical Co., Hq. Bn., 95th Inf.
Reg.— Julio E. Dolorico, 1st Lt., MS, Cmdg.
548
Oct. 29, 1944: Capt. Gentino and 2nd platoon ambushed the Japs across the
Hiahangan Eiver and killed five Japs and wounding several. Captured many Jap
equipments.1
The 95th Infantry Eegiment was the first component of Colonel Kangleon's 92nd
Division to enter the fray on the main front. But the 94th and the 96th Eegiments
had their assignments on the West and South Coasts. They pitched in, harassing
enemy supply lines, checking closely on enemy troop movements, and engaging in minor
skirmishes. Smaller Japanese garrisons were expelled from towns they had "been oc
cupying, notoriously pro-Japanese Filipinos were rounded up, and municipal govern
ments approved "by the guerrilla were installed.
The south-eastern and southern sectors of the Island were comparatively quiet
during the greater part of the Leytean campaign. But for the first days, while the
naval battle was joined, this region was of great strategic importance. The 3rd
Battalion of Major Jain's 94th Eegiment was entrusted with the security of the
Hinunangan-Hinundayan district, and the 1st Battalion with the Liloan district. The
guerrilla were very helpful to American combat and radar units, guiding patrols,
procuring supplies, and organizing the restoration of local government. Guerrilla
combat troops wiped out several Japanese units whose boats were sunk, and who tried
to seek shore-and escape into the interior.
Battalion 2 of the 94th Eegiment saw the heaviest fighting.2 Contacted
by Commander Parsons of the United States Navy, the Battalion, in a joint operation
with an American PT boat squadron, wiped out the Japanese garrison at Malitbog and
Maasin.3 Then, the Battalion moved up to the Baybay sector, fighting alongside
the American forces. In January, the Battalion was transported to the nearby
Camotes Islands, ordered to eliminate the Japanese defenders. Things did not
Pedrique, 3rd Lt. Inf., 2nd in Command. 15 Nov. 1944. Narrative Beport:
October— Combat Co., Hq., 95th Inf. Eegt.
2Abuyog's guerrilla chronicler asserted that Battalion 3 participated in the
fighting: "In the Jap stand at Camotes Islands between Cebu and Leyte, the 3rd
Battalion of the 94th Infantry, which bore the brunt of the fighting, had some cas
ualties." (Aurillo, op. cit., pp. 12-13)
3Ingbam, op. cit.. pp. 231-44.
549
go as veil as heretofore in this action.. "E" Company was ambushed by the
Japanese, with most of its effectives put out of action. "F" and "G" Companies
were disheartened hy this set-back, and further demoralized by lack of clothing
and drinkirg water. In February, the Battalion moved to Ormoc.
Major Nazareno's 96th Eegiment engaged the enemy in one of the "hottest"
parts of the front. As the Americans drove northward from Baybay towards
Damulaan, Albuera, they had need of all the support the guerrilla could render.
And they found the 96th (strengthened by elements of Miranda's disintegrated
Western Leyte Guerrilla) a dependable and valiant fighting force.
A former member of the Western Leyte Guerrilla wrote of the fighting at
Albuera:
At last the Americans came. We saw with our own eyes at our very
shores and seas real dogfights. Could anyone help cheering for our
liberators? Everybody was ready for action. The V.G. took an active
part in killing stray Jap soldiers stranded on our shores, and rescued
American pilots who would unluckily fall. With us they found genuine
allies. During the whole month of November, 1944, civilians were ex
periencing the hardest life of evacuation, for Japanese soldiers began
to be scattered in the hills. There were gigantic encounters now between
the American ground forces and the Japanese on our very soil. For some
of us who were caught in no-man's land, the third anniversary of the war
in the Pacific. . . .was a day and night of suffering. On Dec. 9, 1944,
we met the American soldiers in the heart of our dear little town of
Albuera. . . .Everybody was extremely happy to taste the sweetness of
liberation at last. . . .Everybody was doing some service in one way or
the other for the US Army. . . .^
The final phase of the Leyte campaign took place in the Ormoc-Villaba
district.2 Elements of the American forces pushing west from Carigara effected
a junction with those advancing northward from Albuera. At barrio Limon, Ormoc,
where the Japanese were deeply entrenched, they literally had to be excavated.
•^Felix Sotto, Brief History, 6th Infantry. WIGWF (1945). p. 7.
9"During the naval battle and the weeks following, the Japanese were
able to transport reinforcements to Leyte, but by mid-December General Kenney's
land-based fighters and Admiral Halsey's carrier planes had strangled this
stream of reinforcements.-j? Marshall, o p . cit., p. 139.
550
Again the combined operation of naval shelling and aerial bombardment helped
to soften up the way for the hard-slugging infantry.
Both the 95th and the 96th Regiments participated in these decisive -
engagements. Guerrilla combat narratives again may be scanned for suggestive
data:
"C" Co.. 1st B n . . 95th Inf. Begt.

16 De c .. 1944: . . . .The 1st Platoon. . . .engaged the enemy at Bo. Jupit,
San Miguel and killed four Japs and three vounded. . . .
21 Dec., 1944: The second platoon, led by Cpl. D. Bayani, was attached to
the Americans stationed at Tunga. . . .
27 D e c .. 1944: The second platoon. . ..reach Ormoc. . .
1-3 Jan. 1945:After 8 days of holding the strategic mountain area of
Limon, the second platoon of this company. . . .came down from the hills
and was stationed for 2 days at Manaypanay, Carigara, to guard the remain
ing rations of the U.S. Army.
6 Jan. . 1945: 11 EM who were with the 2nd Platoon o f . . . .112th Cav. U.S.
Army arrived safely at the station. . . .
19 Jan. 1945 : 8 EM on special mission to Danao to contact. ...American
patrol arrived safely at this station with mission accomplished. . . .2
2nd Bn., 95th Inf. Begt.

Dec. 6 : "F" Co. - 1st Platoon under Sgt. L.Peruengaged the enemy in
Migobigo, San Miguel, killing 17 Japanese EM and one of
ficer, wounding 11 EM, and capturing 3 Jap rifles.
"G" C o . - Seven of the boys who were attached to the 77th Div.
left Tarragona on board the LCM bound for Ormoc. . . .They were
subjected to heavy Japanese bombing before they could land at
Ormoc. . . .
Dec. 10: Whi]e the fighting in Ormoc continued, the remaining men in Tar
ragona started with another convoy of ships to reinforce the fighting
forces in Ormoc. . . .
Dec. 15: "F" C o . - 1st Platoon. . . .engaged the enemy at Anabonogay, San
Miguel, killing 7 EM on the enemy's side and capturing 3 enfield rifles, 3
Jap TGs, etc.
Dec. 16: The invading troops of the 77th Div. with some men of the "G" Co.
advanced about a mile east of Ormoc, following the road to Valencia. . . .
Dec. 18: "G" Co. - Japanese resistance was completely shattered. Filipino
forces attached to the 77th Div. were ordered to guard bridges on the Ormoc-
Valencia road. . . .3
%austino B. Dipa, 2nd Ltv,. Inf., Cmdg. "C” Co., 1st Bn., 95th Inf.
Begt. 31 December 1944. Narrative Beport: December, 1944.
2F. B. Dipa, 2ndLt., Inf., Cmdg. nCw Co., 1st Bn., 95th Inf. Begt.
31 January 1945. Narrative Eeport: January, 1945.
^Felimon Pabilona, Capt., Inf., 2nd Bn., 95th Inf. Begt., 92nd Div.
17 January 1945. Narrative Eeport;: December, 1944,
551
We .may reckon the contribution of Leyte's guerrillas to Philippine
liberation under the followirg headings: (a) direct battle participation;
(b) shortening the campaign and conserving expenditure of American lives through
intelligence of enemy movements and detection of enemy espionage agents; .
(c) helping to enlist active civilian support by constituting a visible link
with the American command; (d) inspiring the resisters in islands yet to be
recaptured to continue and intensify the underground struggle.
Both General MacArthur and President Osmena showered the highest lauda
tions upon the guerrilla. But practical expression of gratitude came on Novem
ber 5, 1944, when President Osmena declared:
In recognition’of the services rendered by the guerrillas, I have

issued an executive order placing in the Philippine Army all guerrilla
forces recognized by General MacArthur.
No higher honor could be paid to men who had fought a seemingly
hopeless fight beyond the bounds of military lav.^-2
The Post-Combat Career of the Guerrilla
Having sketched the nature of guerrilla participation in the Liberation
campaign, we must now enquire into the sequel. A very .absorbing psycho-sociolo
gical study could be carried out in which the attempt would be made to analyze
the changes undergone by the guerrilla, collectively and individually, as they
metamorphosed into a "regular army" outfit— that is, a component of the Philip
pine Army. We lack the time here for such an enquiry, but we shall adduce some
suggestive material.
In the first place, the type of regimented discipline imposed by the
Philippine Army was somewhat of a hardship. During the Occupation period, the
guerrilla personnel did undergo a training program that included formal drill
■^Carlos P. Romulo. I See The Philippines Rise, pp. 134-35.

Gunnison, o n . cit. . p. 77.
and the standardized regulations of "military courtesy". But exigencies of
guerrilla fighting rendered Impossible regular inspections from Colonel
Kangleon's divisional headquarters. Moreover, vhile the troops respected
their officers, an informal camraderie had developed among them which, in a
certain sense, tended to undermine the aloof, formal relationship of garrison
duty. But now Colonel Kangleon was under scrutiny by his superiors in the Philip
pine Army and also by friendly "snoopers" from the U. S. Axmy. He must foist
a greime of "spit and polish" upon his troops, with frequent drill and inspec
tion, and meticulous observance of "military courtesy".
We must also note that the guerrilla troops had grown accustomed to
irregular practices of messing, billeting, and supply. A unit commander or a
squad sergeant had heretofore applied to a Filipino homestead for rice and
chicken, or sent out a soldier to contact an authorized procurement agent. Now
the recognized supply officer, and he alone, must file a requisition slip with
the quartermaster's office for deliveries of canned goods, clothing issue, and
military equipment.
The reprimand administered to one of the junior officers was by no
means unique:
It has been repeatedly reported to me by officers and men that once you
come to the Bn. CP and I am not present, you take anything you can see
which appear good to your eyes. . . .even without the consent of anybody.
. . . .Bemember that those actions of yours are unbecoming an officer. . .
Finally, we must take stock of the guerrilla soldier's impatience of
restraint after his harrowing sojourn in the hills. He was eager to don his
new uniform, sport his chevrons and medals, carry a pistol if he could filch
one, and "take off" for a gay little cafe in town. The formalities of applying
xLt. F. Moralita, CO, Bn. 1, 95th. Nov. 15, 1944. To: Lt. P.
Kierulf, CO, "A” Co.
for a pass and signing the "off-duty" roster were too bothersome. And let
one who would detain him in camp for fatigue-detail first manacle him.
Philippine Aimy and American MP*s picked up stray soldiers in Tacloban
and turned in their names to Colonel Eangleon's headquarters. In exasperation,
the Colonel fulminated: "Cpl. P. Centino, Combat Co., 95th, came to Tacloban
with his arms without a pass from his C O . . . .This is one of many cases of
soldiers of the 95th who came to Tacloban without pass that were picked up by
the MPs and delivered to me. . . .This is my last warning to you."-*-
Back in camp, the unlucky culprit would be confined to quarters during
after-duty hours. But punitive measures were no solution. What was needed was
a recreation and special events program to bolster morale and occupy leisure
time with constructive activities.
A regimental intelligence officer offered some pertinent suggestions:
The undersigned has exerted effort to have the former Organ of our
Guerrilla period printed, that is the 'Voice of the Free People'. A r
rangements have already been made with the G-2, X Corps, to have this
organ printed. . . .The undersigned therefore requests the C.O., 95th
Inf. Eegt., to give his formal consent. . . .For his information. . . .
most members of the staff of the VOFF are willing to work on the paper
• « • •
2
The printing of the VOFP received regimental authorization. The U. S.
Army provided mimeographing equipment, paper, and other help. The guerrilla
was proud of his paper, and distributed copies among the Filipino civilians.
Thanks to U. S. Army co-operation, the guerrilla troops also received
a motion picture projector, "overseas editions" of books and magazines, athletic
equipment and "PX" supplies for the canteen. These amenities helped to make
camp life more attractive, and reduced the number of "AWOL" cases.
1B . Kangleon, Col, CO, LAC. Dec. 5, 1944. To: CO, 95th Inf.
% . Granados, 3" L t . , Inf., Liaison Off. 16 ITov. 1944. To: CO, 95th
Inf. Pegt.
m
The 92nd Division did not succeed in developing an esprit de corps
powerful enough to overcome the parochial loyalties of the separate components.
This was understandable enough. The top officers and many of the men of Major
Nazareno's 96th Eegiment csme from southern Leyte. They remembered the march
of Balderian's 95th to the south at the time he styled himself "Politco-
Military Governor” and the action that led to his disarming. Since then, peace
had been made between North and South Leyte, but true friendship had not ripened.
Shortly before the American landings, Balderian chided Nazareno: "Please
inculcate in minds of your officers and men assigned adjacent to 95th sector
spirit of comradeship. Avoid egoism and superiority complex. . . .
Within the 96th Eegiment, bad feeling existed between Nazareno's original
troops and the members of the disbanded Western Leyte Guerrilla (WLGWF) assimi
lated into the organization. While Nazareno and his subordinates conceded that
the erstwhile followers of Miranda had conducted themselves well, they refused
to fraternize. On their part, the ex-Miranda personnel protested against dis
criminatory treatment meted out to them. The situation was not improved by the
rumors in circulation that Miranda was seeking retroactive recognition for his
organization by the U. S. Army authorities.
Neither did harmony prevail within the 95th Eegiment. Each battalion
had developed its own clannishness. Antonio Cinco's obstreperous 3rd Battalion
had yet to be bridled, its subordination to the regimental command having been
little more than a formality. Towards Centino's Combat Company, attached to the
Headquarters Battalion, Cinco bore a long-standing animosity. And Pabilona's
2nd Battalion had been at loggerheads with the 1st Battalion ever since Felipe
Moralita was detached from Captain Morgan's Mindanao "Expeditionary Force"
and placed in charge. Moralita murmured in protest to regimental headquarters:
Â. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf. Sept. 10, 1944. To: MaJ. Nazareno, CO,
96th Inf.
Some officers and men of Battalion 2 have for a loi^ time been dis
criminating the authority and right of the officers and men of this
conanand. . . .One of my men was boxed by Pabilona in Alangalang before
.my two eyes for the simple and plain reason that he wanted to punish my
soldier in my presence, to arouse and ignite something within me for
creating a scandalous scene. . . .Something must be done so that those
that are trying to create misunderstanding within the ranks must be
eliminated. . . .■*■
In 1945, the 92nd Division in its entirety transferred to a camp site
outside of Ormoc town. There, the Division was stripped of a good proportion
of its personnel and reactivated as the 41st Infantry Eegiment, P.A. The
erstwhile 94th Eegiment became the 1st Battalion, the 96th Eegiment the 2nd
Battalion, and the 95th, the 3rd Battalion. Eivalries persisted, but in less
acute form. By now, both officers and enlisted men were becoming army-weary,
and trained their thoughts on mustering out and returning hone.
The 1st Eeplacement Battalion, P.A., located outside of Palo, adminis
tered the processing-out and reassignment of the Filipino troops. It was a most
amazing set-up. Here reported not only the troops of Colonel Kangleon's 92nd
Division. Former officers and enlisted men of Miranda's Western Leyte Guerrilla
were ordered by the Philippine Army to repair here, pending determination of
their military status. Miranda himself was processed here, being assigned to
temporary duty with an American engineering unit before his transfer to Manila.
(He admitted that he lived in constant fear of being murdered by a "hatchet-man"
of Kangleon's guerrillas.) And even more startling--mingling with the ex-
guerrilleros were members of the late Japanese-sponsored Bureau of Constabulary
(BCs) , reverted to their pre-war status of Philippine Army soldiers and constabu-
larymen.
In the evening, clusters of soldiers at this Filipino camp might be found
in serious conversation, reviewing the course of events from their respective
■^t. Moral ito, CO, 1st Bn., 95th Inf. Dec. 26, 1944. To: CO, 95th
Inf. Begt.
standpoints. In same cases, a better understanding developed and amity replaced
hatred. The present writer had occasion to organize an informal colloquium on
a Sunday afternoon among selected inmates of this camp, representing the views
of the North, South, and West Leyte guerrilla forces. The consensus seemed to
be that difficulties of communication aggravated suspicions and raised a monster
of distrust. Had the different guerrilla factions been able to meet calmly as
they were now doing, the feuding and lack of co-operation would have been elimi
nated.
The Civilians Under Fire
We have been tracing the career of the guerrilla during the initial
phase of the Philippine Liberation. We must now return to the general popula
tion— whom we left on the threshold of the American counter-invasion— and dis
cover how they fared during these momentous weeks.
On guerrilla instruction, the bulk of Leyte's East Coast population still
residing in the" towns evacuated to refuges in the hills. This move enabled them
to escape the terrific pounding of American gun-power. However, they were by no
means shielded from risk. Their evacuation places lay directly athwart the enemy
escape route into the interior. Should they fall into Japanese hands, they might
either be slaughtered or coerced into serving as guides. Furthermore, the care
less or the unlucky might be killed by the shrapnel or bombs of the pursuing
Americans.
Tacloban, the capital, was a center of turmoil and confusion. Withdrawal
of the Japanese garrison to battle positions and the impending debacle of the
pro-Japanese provincial government loosened the reins of authority. Pent-up
loathing fOr the oppressive Occupation regime--for its brutalities, its destruc
tion of liberty, its conversion of neighbors into cold distrust, and for the
general miseries inflicted— burst out in hysterical acts of vandalism and a number
557
of slayings. Hunger and want galvanized a wild citizenry into storming governmental
and Japanese warehouses, looting stocks of rice, corn, clothing and anythin usable.
Though a municipal government nominally functioned, it dared not attempt to break
up this unleashed fury.
For the public officials and others on guerrilla black-lists, this was indeed
a time of trepidation. Some in panic took to hidirg. Otherg keeping their wits
about them, craftily sought flight to the American lines where they might make out
a good case for their "actuations" before the anticipated denunciation. The remainder
waited stoically, undertain what would befall them once the American troops would
penetrate to the capital.
For those who had nought to fear, jubilation was unbounded. Laughing, sing
ing, shouting, embracing, with liberal reviling of the Japanese intermixed, were the
harbingers of Liberation. Musty and tattered American flags emerged from long con
cealment. Hoarse throats screeched out American anthems and songs. At last, the
conclusion was approaching to a long chapter of misfortune and woe
It is greatly to be deplored that only verbal accounts by eye-witnesses to
the scene depicted could be drawn upon as sources of information. For here was a
critical juncture, so revealing of human characteristics, where externally imposed
norms of behavior were in process of rapid disintegration. Basically, the Filipinos
of Leyte had not accepted the authority of the Japanese and the procedures of politi
cal and social behavior prescribed. This negative attitude, originating in value
conflict, was intensified by physical deprivation, engendering feelings of hostility.
Then, suddenly, this artificial superstructure, propped up by force, crumbled, and
the acknowledged foundations of Filipino society again lay bare.
At the same time, the customary restraints on immediate gratification of
human appetites and impulses were removed. For these restraints were temporarily
'Americanos cornel* I shouted at the top of my lungs, and the people took
up the cry. . . .Then they went crazy. They danced and hopped and jumped and clapped ’
and cried and laughed and sang and hollered. . . . "
(St. John, op. cit.. pp. 186-87). $
identified with the rejected authority of the foreigner, and hence were not
regarded as morally binding. Not until the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government vere the ordinary inhibitions on self-help reestablished.
Finally, it is regrettable that the puppet officials of occupied Leyte
have published no memoirs in which they candidly introspect and analyze their
own deeper feelings on the occasion of the regime’s overturn. How many, having
hitched their personal fortunes to the career of Japanese imperialism, unexpec
tedly saw the gloomy abyss of ignominy and oblivion yawning before them? How
many experienced the agonies of a scaldirg contrition welling up within them?
And how many were simply reduced to the forlorn shivering state of one stripped'
of the raiments of power, timorously awaiting an uncertain nemesis? One can
only surmise, on the basis of confessions made elsewhere by men in similar situ
ations, that this very brief interregnum marked a period of intense inner pangs
for those who had been associated with the Japanese rule in Leyte, now in
dissolution.
It should not be imagined that the Filipino civilians played a purely
passive part during this campaign of pursuit and extirpation. On the contrary,
those who had actively associated themselves with the resistance movement, par
ticularly the Volunteer Guards, rejoiced in this opportunity to avenge themselves
upon their brutal oppressors. The smaller detachments of the enemy had to run
an unceasing gantlet of sniper firing. And isolated Japanese, separated from
the main body, or pilots vho had bailed out, were hacked by grim bolomen. In
addition to this "direct action", Filipino civilians were immensely useful in
passing on to the guerrilla intelligence of enemy movements.
As the Americans succeeded in throwing back the Japanese from the coastal
margin, the civilians showed signs of impatience to.return to their homes. They
were anxious to inspect the wreckage left by American blasting. Ferchance, some
homes vere habitable, if not unscathed. Moreover, many were ill and famished
and required aid in'the form of emergency rations and medical attention. But ■
the XJ. S. Army authorities felt that immediate return of the evacuees was
fraught with hazard, and counseled delay.
By the 7th of November, the American command saw fit to authorize civ
ilians to return to specified areas in lowlands, provided they first received
guerrilla clearance, and came in small groups. But this was not to he a general
trek, for a week later a liaison officer advised guerrilla regimental head
quarters :
According to present developments, the tactical situation does not

yet permit the return of the civilians, especially those who have
evacuated to Biliran Island. . . .In this matter, the undersigned also
sent a radiogram. . . .to the C.O. 95th Inf. Eegt. requesting him to
advise Major Nazareno regarding the strict prohibition of entrance of
civilian evacuees to area of the 95th Inf. Eegt. from the area of the
96th Inf. Eegt., 92nd Div. This was made to prevent any accident be
cause the incoming boats might be fired at.-*-
In the Palo-Tacloban sector where the American assault first breached
the Japanese shore defenses, groups of excited Filipinos disobeyed, orders and
flocked to the beach. Eomulo describes his first impression:
Looking around me, trying to see everything that was going on, l a w
groups of ragged people peeping between the guards and trying to attract
my attention. It was thus I saw my countrymen again for the first time.
They had dared the guns to meet us on our return.
While MacArthur and Osmena were talking I broke through the lines to
see them. There were about one hundred of them, all walking skeletons
and all in rags. The children were so haggard they looked like little
old people. . . .
They all wanted the answer to one question: ’What can we do to help
the American Army?1 I urged them, ’Wait’. There will be plenty for you
to do. Even the children will be able to help build the airfield and
unload the ships. You must wait for the proclamations.’2
Others followed this vanguard. Soon an enormous aggregation dotted the
beach:
....And almost simultaneously, on the very beachheads of Leyte, hospi

tals and camps for the refugee Filipinos sprang u p . Seventeen thousand
refugees had found shelter in one beachhead camp only a few thousand yards
from the Japanese lines.
% . Granados, 3" Lt. Inf., Liaison Officer, 95th Eegt. Nov. 16, 1944.
To: The C.O., 95th Inf. Eegt.
^Romulo, I See.The Philippines Eise. pp. 95-7.
fugees :.ibemsei’^ ^ j f e ^ v O f 2 & ; : b a | ^ b ^
fire. Bice ^tailen/ilirth^'. way b^^^
vmilitaryê^hori1&M|foi£p.str:fbutibn^^^^^^
The Filipinos were bager to;belp the f i g M in a^ pWa4v»*r‘ ;,f
labor was âllv■'bhey^had to:'&fer$Yand labor; was"a"cpB^dity' ^
invading forces. ' The refugees vere put .'to yoirk. unloving boats and
and clearing airfields. Even the little children vprked, clearing the; lan^v-f^r-;î
the new air bases. .- ‘ v ’"*c
They did not want money at first.'. . .Food and after/ that clothing1vere Y'f
their needs, and these vere given them in payment for their, toil.-1 v
Civilian affairs units of the United States A r m y '(PCAU) played a major roli l; ,,
in t h e .initial work of rehabilitation. They cooperated with the guerrilla in jointly^
installing local governments, in setting up public dispensaries, in distributii^ ;
emergency issues of clothing, and in providing construction materials for demolished .
public schools. A n American correspondent wrote: Y?
. . . .In the morning I valked to the market place, where there was to be a
meeting of citizens at ten o'clock. . . . - . -^
. . . .One purpose of the gathering was to welcome the American troops and ,;i
another vas to recruit native labor to work for the. Philippine Civil "AJBPairs -Y'YYY
unit, an organization set up in Australia a year ago to control civilian affairs ;
on the Islands when ve got there. The meeting was opened by Caesar Sotto, a 1
former Davao assemblyman and Labor Commissioner of Leyte Province, who had been: Y .
forced by the Japs to recruit the workers, for the air strip. . . . ■'YYr'Y
Sotto spoke again, and a man next to me in the crowd explained that he w a s . '
comparing the food policies of the Japanese and Americans as an argument to round;'
up labor volunteers. . . .Mr. Sotto vent on to say that ten thousand tons of rice;
would be brought in shortly by the Americans. . . . ^ ?
The next speaker was Captain Abner Pickering, one of the American Civil Af- 'J
fairs officers. . . '.'We are going to see that you get food and clothing. We
want you to be patient. We need labor. You will get paid for the work you do
in Philippine currency and with it you will be abie to buy the rice and the <;
■ other products ve will bring. But by God, you'll do it as free men!1 ’
The Fate of the Collaborationists
The guerrilla had been awaiting the American invasion bombardment with
the nervous anticipation of the sprinter, crouched for the starter’s signal.
And the trophies they were set to win were the scalps of those from whom, they
had been fugitive under the enemy occupation These scahps they Intended to Y
Îbld.. pp. 151-2.

Shaplen, op. cit., pp. 52, 55.
3 *
561
have "both literally and figuratively. They had carefully prepared proscription
lists of persons branded as "traitors*'. These "damnables" they would liquidate.
But beyond this, they were determined to wipe out as men of influence in Leytean
affairs, all those who had taken an active part, on either the provincial or
municipal level, in the recently dominant regime.
For the first week or two, the guerrilla was a law unto itself. Its
intelligence officers and civilian operatives relentlessly tracked down their
terrified quarry, and execution squads made short shrift of the trapped. A
battalion commander submitted a typical report:
The following 5th columnists were liquidated by this command in the

town of A1angalang when the Jans moved out. These men were collaborators
and responsible for the death of soldiers and civilians during the Japs’
mopping operations: (15 named)^
And the following ominously-toned message was sent by one guerrilla
leader to another:
In order to avoid friction, this office requests to furnish us with

a list of persons living in the sector now occupied by the Bn.l, 96th
Inf who have been blacklisted by the 95th Jnf. and the reasons therefore
so that we may be able to act accordingly
An untold number were slain unofficially by guerrillercs and VG-s, who had
been nursing private grudges against alleged "enemies of the resistance", and
who had sworn a private vendetta against them. And the upBhot of this blood
letting was a near-panic among all who had any reason to suspect that their
names might be on the "wanted" list.
But President Osmena had no intention of permitting a regime of private
self-help to supersede one of public law. He declared in an address at the
provisional capital of the Commonwealth:
1F. Pabilona, Bn. 2, 95th Inf. October 25, 1944. To: CO, 95th Inf.
2Lt. L. Mondragon, CO, Bn. 1, 96th Inf. October 24, 1944. To: CO,
95th Inf.
562
Precisely when the eyes of the civilized world are focused on our
country we cannot allow acts of personal revenge and misguided zeal to
cast a reflection on our civilization and ourability to maintain an
orderly government. Ours is a government hy law; the splendor of its
majesty must never he dimmed in our land.-*-
In keeping with this policy, President Osmena made arrangements to estab
lish the Leyte Provincial Jail as an internment camp. Here those accused of hav
ing abetted the enemy were to he detained, pending determination of their guilt.
The President served notice on Colonel Kangleon that he expected a compliance on
the part of his troops. The Colonel handed down clear directives to his regi
mental commanders that summary executions vere to cease, and that all suspects
vere to he pronerly investigated. The order was passed down the line:
Beginning today there shall he no killing of civilians who have been

cooperative to the enemy hy EM or officers of the U5FIP, otherwise charge
of murder will he filed, hy the G2, 7th Div. or the Philippine Government.
If a Jan sry or collaborator is caught, send the name to the Bn. CP
or to the GIG of the G2, 7th Div. for investigation and concentration.
The S?, Bn. 3 will hold no responsibility for killings hereafter.c
Exnatiating upon procedure some days later, the Colonel commanded: "All
persons detained for espionage and collaboration with enemy will he turned over
to concentration camp at Tacloban. Forward to me all evidence against them."6
Colonel Kangleon was constrained to issue special warning to the 95th
regiment to keep hands off the newly reorganized constabulary. A high percentage
of its personnel was drawn from members of the late Japanese-sponsored Bureau of
Constabulary.4 The haste with which this constabulary had been improvised
•*Bomulo, op. cit. , p. 131.

^3rd Lt. F. Sooing, 52, Bn. 3, 93th Inf. Begt. Bov. 3, 1944. Memo for
Co. COs, Bn. 3. Note: G2 and 92 vere the military intelligence offices on the
divisional and battalion levels respectively.
?E. Kangleon, Col., CO, LAC. Nov. 11, 1944. Tc: Capt. Abarientos, Fx 0,
95th Begt.
4].st S g t . Martiniano Bao, who had served with the EC during 1944, stated
that the PCAU made use of 3C manpower during the first days of the American Lib
eration. On Oct. 26, Bao and his men took the prescribed oath swearing them into
the newly organized 1st Leyte Constabulary. Mayor Eeyes, who retained command of
the constabulary, was relieved hy Map. Gaviola in November. Some of the constabu-
larymen were detached for MP duty in Alangalang and Pastrana. At the beginning
of 1945, the let Leyte Constabulary became the 1st MP Command, (interview, 1st
Eeplacement Battalion, PA, December, 1945)
563
prevented immediate screening of personnel. The guerrilla regarded this neglect
as an affront. They champed the hit: "At instance of U.S. Army authorities,
BC soldiers sent to Pastrana to keep peace and order. Inform Centino not to
molest them. Complaints against BC may he filed and action taken.
The U. S. Army made it plain that it desired to have this "no liquidations"
policy enforced. The Liaison Officer advised the commander of the 95th Regiment:
. . . .All enemy spies and collaborators vill he turned over to the

CIC, and after due investigation if found guilty would he concentrated
for final trial hy the civil courts of the Commonwealth Government. . . .
This policy therefore remains the same as explained hy the Staff Officers
of the Sixth A.rmy after a conference with our Staff Officers.^
Howheit reluctantly, most of the guerrilla unit commanders capitulated.
The one int.ransigeant was Captain Antonio Cinco of the 3rd Battalion. Cinco
had a1ways hal ked at discipline. He refused to allow standing orders to cheat
him out of the many grudge scores he had to settle. His was the attitude of
the freebooter, believing that the lives and properties of those who had defied
his orders during the Occupation were now forfeit. But Colonel Kargleon regarded
the regimental commander as responsible for the behavior of his subordinates:
I have received. . . .reports from 24th Corps that Cinco's men are
looting civilian homes. Commanding General 6th Army disturbed. Tell
Cinco one more report of such actions and he vill be placed under arrest
and his commission taken away.°
Cinco promised improvement. But soon he was among the backsliders:
Capt. Cinco came down to Tanauan and made arrests of civilians. This
caused trouble with the U. S. army authorities. Explain why Cinco was
allowed to come down when orders given to you was to keep your troops in
mountains vest of Dagami. . . .^
The regimental commander was not in a position to proceed against Cinco.
He temporized, offering a weak reply to Kangleon:
. Kangleon, Col., CO, LAC. Kov. 7, 1944. To: Maj. Balderian, CO, 95th
Inf.
. Granados, Liaison Officer, 95th Inf. Regt. Kov. 16, 1944. To: G.O.,
95th Inf. Regt.
•z
'HR. Kangleon, Brig. Gen, CO, LAC. Kov. 14, 1944. To: Capt. Abarientos,
Ex 0, 95th Inf.
%rig. Gen. P.. Kangleon, CO, LAC. Kov. 28, 1944. To: Maj. Balderian.
564'
I have instructed my Battalion Commanders time and time again not

to make arrests of persons suspected to be 5th columnists without
filing charges in court and having in hand sufficient evidence
against them.
The matter blew over temporarily. But some months later, as a result
of further abuses attributed to Cinco, coupled with charges filed with the pro
vincial government of Cinco's alleged crimes during the guerrilla period, this
storm center was confined to quarters. The confinement was short. Cinco jumped
custody and took to the hills, gathering about him a band of adventurers and
desperadoes.
Meanwhile, the guerrilla worked actively with the American CIC and the
Commonwealth authorities gathering and collating evidence against accused sup
porters of Japan. The regimental intelligence of the 95th Infantry was called
upon to furnish much data:
In our work to discover evidence against Japanese spies or against

■oersons who committed offenses against national security in the Philip-
uinee, we are very much handicapped. . . .1 request your good office to
require the chiefs of the Intelligence Division in your Regiment to come
to our office at Tacloban, bringing with them documentary evidences and
affidavits of persons who can help us build our case agginst the follow
ing: 118 detained in Provincial Jail and 110 BC. . . ,c
The Regiment complied:
Proceed to Tacloban on or before 8 AM, November 27, 1944 and report

to Piscal Saavedra. Bring all evidence against Torres and Salazar,
especially S2 records dealing with enemy spies and collaborators.3
In some cases, the Commonwealth investigators had gathered their evidence
against suspected FilipinQB independently. But they had need of the guerrilla
to apprehend the suspects:
% a j . Balderian, CO, 95th Inf. Dec. 6, 1944. To: Co. 92nd Div. LAC.
%ilemon Saavedra, Actg. Attny. in Office of the President. Nov. 21,

1944. To: Maj. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf.
3Abarientos, Capt. Ex. 0., 95th Inf. Nov. 24, 1944. To: Sgt. Miralles.
565
Reliable information has been gathered by the Office of Special

Counsel against the following civilians from Burauen, pointing them
as Japanese spies, thus confinning our List of Spies and Collaborators,
dated October 31, 1944. (6 named as spies)
Locate where these persons are now and report their whereabouts to
the Office of the Special Counsel, in the Office of the Provincial
Governor, Tacloban. . . .1
Of those the guerrilla wished most to bring to trial, Governors Torres
and Salazar and Senator Jose Ma. Veloso stood foremost. But in addition to
these obvious cases, the guerrilla also determined to settle accounts with mayors
and other municipal officials hostile to them during the Occupation. One mayor,
indicted on the following grounds, was by no means the most hated:
Alejandro Reyes is now in Tacloban. . . .Alejandro Reyes was the

puppet mayor of San Isidro, Leyte; vent with the Japanese garrison
when the garrison in San Isidro was first abandoned; came back with
the Japanese when the garrison was reestablished in San Isidro to
commandeer corn; and he was the brain in estimating the productive
capacity of each and every haciendero in San Isidro, and at the same
time, the one responsible in giving corn quota to every haciendero to
be turned over to the Japanese Army at dictated price. Meager infor
mation has it that, presently, he is engaged in the buy and sell of
3o c a H y concocted 'whiskey'. . .
Municipal treasurers, chiefs of no]ice, and municipal secretaries joined
the mayors on the lists of the hunted. Along with these officials went the
district presidents of the Neighborhood Associations, especially if they had
won a reputation for zealousness:
Person of D.Y., suspected enemy spy, leader of IJA, is hereby de

livered to the Regt Cmdr for action. Said person was caught entering
our firing line. On being asked what his motive was. . . .he retorted
that he was afraid of the Japs. . . .As a matter of fact, he was one
of the NA district leaders in Dagami. . . .3
And even though inducted into the reorganized constabulary, the members
of the BC did not thereby become respectable in guerrilla eyes. Investigations
■^Lt. Tidalgo, Rgtl. S2, 95th Inf. Dec. 10, 1944. To: Lt. Francisco
Sosing, S 2 , Bn. 3.
^Lt. Tidalgo, Rgtl. S 2 , 95th Inf. Dec. 9, 1944. To: CO, LAC.
3A. Ripalda, "G" Co., Bn. 2, 95th Inf. Oct. 29, 1944. To: CO, 95th Inf.
566
continued: "Proceed to Dulag to obtain evidence against A.L., BC officer,
now with Constabulary Organization of Maj. Gen. Basilio Valdes, PA. . . .nl
The taking of testimony and the arresting of suspects was a laborious
enterprise. Yet, for the guerrilla it was a labor of love. Restrained from
executing those they had come to loathe, the guerrilla determined to amass a
heap of evidence so overwhelming that acquittal for the accused would be im
possible!
We have approached the subject of proceedings against the Occupation
functionaries from the guerrilla standpoint. But it would be well to consider
the matter from the standpoint of the accused.
Governor Torres (in interview) stated that he met President Osmena
aboard ship on October 22, 1944. The President received a full report of con
ditions in the Province, and then instructed the Governor to place his office
at the services of the American troops.
Torres reported to Genera] Krueger, and was referred to the American
Civil Affairs officer. This officer assigned him to the job of recruiting
Filipino laborers for the armed, forces. On the job but a few days, Torres sud
denly found himself under arrest, on orders of Colonel Kangleon. He arrived
at the Provincial Jail, converted into a detention center, to discover his erst
while colleague, Pastor Salazar, already incarcerated.
Jose Ma. Veloso had been arrested and interned in Manila.^
And so with the others.
-*A. Balderian, Maj., 95th Inf. Dec. 22, 1944. To: Sgt. Nieves
Fernandez, Rgtl. S2. (See Gunnison, op. cit. , p. ]], re Sgt. Fernandez.)
^Veloso's craving for political life had not abated. As late as Octo
ber of 1945, he still sought recovery of his Congressional seat:
"Congressman Velcso of Leyte was not seated because the charge upon
which the detention by the CIC was based has not been withdrawn."
(The Guardian, Vol. I, ITo. 7, September 29, 1945. p. 2.)
567
Homobono Bardillon, pre-war mayor of Dagami who served during the Jap
anese Occupation, was arrested hy a guerrilla sergeant in his home town, and
taken to the Provincial Jail. Attorney Leon Rojas of the Leyte-Samar Bulletin
staff also was interned. Others followed, arrested on a variety of charges.
According to Torres, the total number of inmates reached 900 at one time, includ
ing 150 women.
All of the internees vere not arrested in October or November. Mayor
Avila of Tanauan (his son, Rafael Avila, was interviewed) was arrested by the
guerrilla and sent to the municipal jail of Abuyog. He was under CIC super
vision, but guarded by the guerrilla. A multitude of duties were showered
upon Avila— helping the PCAU unit, assisting in the upkeep of the guerrilla camp,
and helping to maintain the sanitation of Abuyog's streets and market-place.
For two months, the inmatee vere fed corn and camote leaves; then, the CIC pro
vided canned goods. In February, 1945, Avila was transferred to the Provincial
Jail.
Mayor Vicente Yeloso of Villaba was placed under arrest by Major Nazareno
of the 9Gth Infantry after D-Day, and set to work in the guerrilla csmp as mess
supervisor, and food procurement agent. In January, 1S45, Yeloso vas referred
tc an American CIC unit in Palompon. He vas placed on parole, being ordered to
report weekly. In April, he vas transferred to the jurisdiction of the CIC in
Tacloban, and then interned.
Mayor Catalino Eermosilla of Ormoc, pre-war mayor and one of the two
incumbents under the Japanese, escaped arrest until late in August of 1845. His
arrest came on orders of the CIC, though he claims that it was inspired by poli
tical enemies who had trumped up charges against him.’*'
And thus it went. Some fortunates were released promptly after CIC in
vestigation. Felix Anover, pre-war mayor of Jaro and the first incumbent under’
^Hermosilla was popular with the masses, disliked by the hacienderos. His
supporters drew up a petition, requesting his release.
568
the Japanese, was cleared "by the CIC, hut denied the privilege of resuming his
post. Norbertor Villablanca, "puppet mayor" of Pastrana, was cleared hy the
CIC, only to meet death at the hands of an assassin in May of 1945. (interview
with Attorney Epifanio Yillablanca.) And Attorney Rojas was released from the
Provincial Jail upon CIC certification in February of 1S45.
We do not intend anything approaching an exhaustive cataloguing of
Leytean officials processed hy the investigatory authorities. But we might say
a word or two shout conditions within the internment camp. The camp administra
tors and guards were Kangleon's troops until the first of 1945, when the Ameri
cans relieved them of the responsibility. According to Torres, the food was
quite ample. The inmates vere permitted a 3arge measure of self-rule, so long
as they abidedhy administrative regulations. They were organized hy platoons,
and chose their own platoon leaders and assistants. Each platoon was assigned
some set of chores within the camp: sanitation, kitchen, repairs and mainten
ance, etc. Torres was elected Camp Leader, with Major Eeyes (of the Japanese
constabulary) as Executive Officer. The Camp Leader had oversight of the duty
roster, and the general deportment of the inmates.
Prisoner gangs were set to work constructing a camp on the outskirts of
Tacloban. It was known as the "Stockade", and to it the prisoners were trans
ferred in April, 1945. The camp administration remained essentially the same.
The inmates were tractable, and in the main presented no disciplinary problems.
On one occasion, some of the prisoners vere discovered to have illicitly entered
the women's quarters. Inasmuch as a platoon vas held collectively responsible
for the misconduct of its members, the whole platoon was deprived of rations
for a day. The platoon lead.er subsequently committed suicide. On another oc
casion, a prisoner ran amnk, stabbing some of his fellows and one of the guards,
and terminating the outbreak by hanging himself. These and a fevr minor incidents
569
constituted the only "breaches of prison discipline. One "by one, the internees
vere freed, Torres leaving on December 13, 1945.1
The prisoners had been treated humanely, and none vere the worse physi
cally for their confinement. While some vere chastened by their experience,
fev felt that they carried the stigmata of public disgrace. The great majority
vere persuaded that they had done no vrong, but that it vould be prudent to
render themselves inconspicuous for a time until the poignant memories of the
var years had been svalloved up by the tribulations of reconstructing a devas
tated land.
It should be remembered that the internment camp vas not a penitentiary.
The internees vere being held pending full investigation and legal trial. But
the trials barely got under vay, before they became enmeshed in an inextricable
tangle of public policy. President Osmena had created a Commission of Inquiry,
staffed vith attorneys and fact-finders. The guerrilla vas urged to submit all
available evidence against the accused. Then hearings vere commenced. Carlos
Bomulo, quoting President Osmena, shovs that the Commission did not presume the
guilt of the accused:
The collaboration trials began in October at Tacloban. Kangleon

served as prosecutor. These trials, or rather searings, vere conducted
in the capitol building, in orderly fashion, vith no mob interference.
The Commission of Inquiry created by Osmena vas disnassionate^ but
there vas no laxity. . . .If there vas the slightest suspicion against
a man he vas jailed and held for trial. One of the first to be nut on
trial vas Bernardo Torres vho had been governor of Leyte and vho held
"Sometime ago" Provincial Governor Demeterio vas in receipt of a tele

gram. . . .stating that all political prisoners in Leyte stockade vere to be
sent to Manila as soon as transportation vas available. But through the ef
forts of Leyte officials and families of the prisoners, the order vas rescinded.
"Last Monday all local political detainees, 545 in number, vere turned
over to the Commonwealth government.
" . . . .Bernardo Torres. . . .vere the first to be released from the
local concentration camp last Thursday afternoon, it vas learned from unim
peachable sources."
(The Guardian. Vol. I, No. 18, December 15, 1945. p. 1)
570
the same position under Japanese rule. What else hut accept Japanese
dominance? he pleaded.
•We cannot close our eyes’, the President said on November 24,
1944, at Tacloban, 'to the realities of the Japanese occupation. It
is cruel and harsh and every kind of suffering has been imposed on the
Filipino people by this rule. The initial misfortune of American and
Filipino armies left the majority of eighteen million Filipinos no
other recourse but to submit to the despotic regime if they vere to
survive.
'Not all public officials could take to the hills to carry on the
heroic struggle. Some had to remain in their posts to maintain a sem
blance of government, to protect the population from the oppressors to
the extent possible by human ingenuity and to comfort the people in
their misery.
'Had their services not been available, the Japanese vonld either
have themselves governed directly and completely or utilized unscrupu
lous Filipino followers capable of anytreason to their people.
'. . . .Every case should be examined impartially and decided on its
ovn merits. Persons holding public office during enemy occupation for
the most part fall within three categories: those prompted by desire to
protect the people, those actuated by fear of enemy reprisals, and those
motivated by disloyalty to our government and cause. The motives which
caused the retention of the office and activities in office rather than
the sole fact of its occupation ought to be the criterion upon which such
persons will be Judged.
1. . . .Persons in possession of information on acts of disloyalty
. . . .should report to the authorities, but under no circumstances
should any person or group take the law into their hands.
'. . . .Due respect for the law, rigid adherence to those principles
established in civilized countries, complete obedience to the decisions
of the courts, all these involve strength of character and high moral
attributes that are the possession of enlightened countries like ours
• • • • »1
As it stands, this pronouncement is high-minded and equitable. It
counsels against an upsurge of vicious, irrational passion that strikes blindly
but accomplishes nought. Yet, it does suggest that those who merit punishment
will receive their due.
The hearings got under way in earnestness. However, until the close of
the year, the Commonwealth authorities were preoccupied with the military cam
paigning and the restoration of government to the newly liberated areas of the
Island.
^•Romulo, op. cit., pp. 154-5.
571
Once the national officials had departed for Luzon, hearings continued
only perfunctorily. The report of the Commercial Agent for Leyte included this
hit of peevish, veiled sarcasm: "For some reasons or other, or perhaps behind
the curtain of Military Secret, the special_Board of Inquiry is not nov in
operation."1
The end of the war marked another significant change. Pre-war Philip
pine politics again moved into high gear. The issue of collaborationism became
a political football, to be used in vote-getting scrimmages. Moreover, the
clearing of Manuel Boxas by testimonial of General MacArthur's headquarters,
despite his connections with the Occupation regime in Manila, contributed to
further obfuscation. The pertinent and overriding question concerned not
Boxas' guilt or innocence. It concerned determination of some heuristic prin
ciple that would make possible an intelligible approach to the ambivalent nature
of collaborationism.
All of this national indecision was reflected in Tacloban. Beams of
evidence had been collected. But what was to be done with it? Local politicians
were disposed to let the trials coast along until after the next general elec
tion. Perhaps, if the guerrilla had been united behind one of the two national
contestants, Osmena or Boxas, they might have impressed a retributive policy
upon the provincial party representing their candidate. But the guerrilla leaders
were split in their allegiance— as were, for that matter, the anti-guerrilla
■h-aca, op. cit., p. 6.

2
In a book carrying an introduction by the then Secretary of the In
terior Harold L. Iekes, the Filipino journalist Abaya wrote: "The political
atmosphere at the time of Boxas' 'liberation' was surcharged. It became ob
vious, immediately after his 'liberation' that the forces of reaction, which
were closely identified with the Japanese during the occupation, were out to
wrest the government from Osmena. . . . "
(Abaya, op. cit.. p. 70.
572
elements. Political spoils, in the traditional sense, offered the paramount
incentive in questions of party loyalty. And so the trials issue vas hamstrung
in a mess of misleading verbiage.
This state of mind infected the witnesses vho vere to give testimony
against the accused. Serious doubts assailed them. Suppose they should make
incriminating depositions against those detained. Suppose, further, that despite
the damaging charges, the accused vere to be released, because of political ex
pediency. Might not the accused later avenge themselves upon their accusers?
No, the risk vas too great, the public conscience too uncertain. And so it
came about that after a relatively short period of penance in the internment
camp, those accused of having aided the Japanese during the Occupation vere
released, vhile other.?, against vhcm charges had been filed, vere not even
arrested.
Pank-and-file supporters of the resistance movement vere shocked by vh&t
they regarded as a flagrant denial of justice. As they sav it, the cagey
beneficiaries of the Japanese regime had vcrmed. their vay info the good graces
of the /userican liberation forces. The Americans, not in a position to discrim
inate betveen good and evil, vere charmed by the affability cf their hoars, and
attributed their cordial reception to the much-sung Filipino hospitality.
A government clerk vho had been associated vith the guerrilla vrcte
o-Ci.Cv.j .
. . . .It may be interesting to knew vho vere the people that met you
upon entering our tovns. Who vere they? Well, you vere greeted mostly
by pro-Japs. They may not be rabid pro-Japs, but they vere pro-Japs. . . .
Those that vere disposed to sacrifice their conveniences, fortunes and
even their lives for the sake of their convictions on the faith of America
and the Philippine Commonvealth. . . .have gone to the mountains— vhile
those that have sacrificed their convictions for the sake of conveniences
and fortunes. . . .remained in tovns. . . .The people of the tovns vith
all the comforts had all the chances to amass fortunes and riches thru the
573
buy-and-sell business and other Japanese enterprises. . . .They call

the members of the resistance forces 'Bandidos1, especially at the
capital of Leyte, Tacloban. . . .Being the first to greet the landing
forces, they got the chance to occupy the key positions in the Govern
ment .
The guerrilleros being far in the hills came to tovn weeks later,
dead broke. . . .finding in the tovn their house and properties destroyed
or their equipments and other things looted. They fall to the mercy of
the tovn people that have amassed riches and now engaged in black-market
ing.
. . . .Of course, it does not take long for one to be converted from
a pro-Jap into being a pro-American. They are at large as only the most
rabid pro-Japs have been clapped up to now in the Concentration Camp. . . .
Of course, they are not all pro-Japs that stayed in the tcvn. . . .
There were some that have helped the resistance forces in some way or
other. . . .But the most important fact that remains outstanding to this
day is that the Honest Guerrillero has not been given yet a fair deal.^
This slashing invective is quite vide of the mark in its conception of
the case of tovn life under the Occupation, But it aces convey the sense of
frustration felt by many Leytenos who had suffered much during the var, who had
expected stern punishment of anti-guerrilla elements, and. an easier life for
themselves.
Carlos Romulo noted that portions of the American press were critical of
the lavish welcome accorded the Americans. Be explained:
As a result of the Filipino passion for giving all they have to give
to those they love, admire, or feel grateful toward, there was quite a
bit of news comment in the American press regarding the 'nospitable and
la vj.silly snocked homes of Leyte'. Those people were not well supplied
. . . .But they rallied every resource to make a welcome for the American
soldiers worthy of the way they felt about America. . . .**
Ecmulo's appraisal of Filipino hospitality woe right insofar as it applied
to the interior of the Island. It erred on the side of motive when it referred
to Tacloban, Ormoc, and some of the other towns. Romulo himself had been taken
in, as witness:
-^Potente, op. cit. , pp. 30-31.

9
"Romulo, op. cit., pp. 137-8.
574
Our presidential group, that first day in Tacloban, lunched in the

home of a man named Bedona, vho had been a city aide to the guerrillas.
The meal stuck in our throats. It vas GI issue and had been given to
the family only that morning by Americans. They, vho had not eaten,
saved it for us.-1-
ThiB vas Margarito Bedona, President of NA District No. 2 in Tacloban
and a heavy investor in the larger business enterprises during the Occupation.
He had fared quite well. If he had dined his guests on GI issue, it vas not be
cause M s cupboard vas bare of palatable viands. . . .
As the trial proceedings dragged on, followed by the release of the in
ternees, the former resistere grew philosophical. "Wasnot this the way of the
world?” The age of heroism had ended. The Province had relapsed to its pre-var
condition.-
~*Tbld. , p. 136.
2
Subtle preparation of the public mind for abandonment of the collabora-
tionism issue vas accomplished by such statements as the following:
”0n his death-bed. . . .President Manuel L. Quezon declared to an in
fluential American friend that all seeming acts of collaboration with the Japan
ese by Filipino leaders, except one or two, were in accordance with a policy
agreed upon between him and them in Dec., 1941. . . . ” (The Guardian, Vol. I,
No, 20, December 29, 1945, p. 1.)
At the end of 194C, there were indications that the People's Court would
prosecute some of the "small fry" as a sop to popular indignation. The "Leyte
Times?, published by the student body of the Leyte Institute, reported:
"The People's Court this week vent to work in Leyte, intent to hear and
decide forty three scheduled cases up to December 13. . . .
"Six cases were scheduled to be heard this week. The prosecution has
already presented charges against Eleuterio Cana, Isabelo Javier, Ceferino
Bartiqun, and Germersendo Goversion.
"Bartiqun faces 7 charges. It is alleged that in his capacity as teniente

del barrio of Pambolaguin, Ormoc, he led various Jap patrols and pointed to them
guerrilla suspects.
"Cana allegedly forced the building of trenches and foxholes for the Jap
anese when he vaB serving as puppet mayor of Abuyog. He further delivered speeches
urging the surrender of guerrillas in Abuyog for the reason that the Americans were
not coming back. He also allegedly ejected Filipinos from their homes in order to
house Jap soldiers, forced the farmers to give their harvest to the Jap forces,
and led patrols into the interior.
"Javier, when he vas munitipal police of Libagon, allegedly accompanied
Jap patrols to Sogod and Libagon and shot to death a guerrillero named Jose
Maturan." (The Leyte Times, Vol. I, No. 1, December, 1946, p. 2.)
Whatever the outcome of these trials, the fact remained that the accused
were acting under the direct encouragement of Congressman Jose Ma. Veloso and
Governor Pastor Salaxar, and that the guilt of the latter vas really the basic
issue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright ow ner Further reproduction prohibited without permission
Rehabilitation
We have seen Leyte Province gravely ill, its malady brought on b y an
invading foreign organism. Treated by the powerful anti-toxin of American
arms, it emerged painfully from traumatic shock. We may now assay the extent
of the injury, and accompany the convalescent on the early stages of his re
covery.
On the morning of October 20, 1944, when the American fleet lying off
Red Beach was unloosing its earth-shaking bombardment, a Filipino observer
stood pensive:
But even while I watched that softer.ing-up process in the dawn I vas
thinking of all that waited beyond the destruction, and the victory that
would follow destruction. Beyond those spreading flames lay the heart
of the Philippines, oppressed by human and economic problems greateri.than
it had ever known. The real battle for survival would come after this
war. . . .1
Carlos Romulo was right. So long as the battling was in progress, the
Filipino people might exult in victories and celebrate with abandon the wonder
ful relief from foreign oppression. But after the smoke had lifted from the
battlefield, and the ruin had been disclosed in all its ghastliness, the cele
brants quickly sobered.
Extent of War Damage
The havoc wrought in Leyte was enormous. By some estimates more, by
others less, the total damage represented a crushing burden of debt for the popu
lation. Yincente F. Jaca, Provincial Commercial Agent for Leyte, vho prepared
an "Economic Survey of The Province of Leyte" in 1945, presented the following
figures:
Surveys of war damages in Leyte have been conducted. 10,455 war damage
'claims have been reported up to June 30, 1945, with the estimated value of
^Romulo, op. cit., p. 82.
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.
576
57,330,331.08. Only 2,181 claims have heen verified with the estimated
value of 5696,384.78. From the verified claims, ahout 81$ of the
damages were caused on private buildings and about 19$ on transporta
tion and private belongings.T
Analysis of these figures might suggest that some of the claimants had
padded their damage estimates, and that the claims review board had been whit-
O
tling them down. Nonetheless, even a set of figures revised downward would not.
alter the magnitude of loss sustained by an undeveloped, rural economy deficient
-in replacement capital.
Destruction of public properties was equally impressive. Jaca computed:
Damages caused on public roads, public buildings and improvements and

equipment and supplies are as follows:
Boads Buildings & Improvements Equipment & Supplies
Province of Leyte. . .5 639,500.00 5 193,326.00 5 408,640.00
Municipalities. . . . 368,500.00 1,264,814.88 602,127.39
Total 51,108,000.00 51,458,140.88 51,010,767.39
In all Leyte, two towns, Dagami of 22,776 inhabitants and Dulag with
28,693 population, have felt the fury of bombs and artillery operations.
They are to-day completely gutted and leveled towns. . . .The towns of
Ormoc, Capoocan, Carigara, Jaro, and Tanauan, although not totally destroyed,
have suffered much from the ravages of the war. . . .The rest of the muni
cipalities of Leyte have sustained smaller damages. . .
The Restoration of Local Government
The restored Commonwealth Government fell heir" to the repair of the
wreckage. This implied, first of all, the reinstatement of functioning municipal
governments in the various localities as they were liberated from the grip of the
enemy.
There was no trouble as authority shifted from military to civilian--

from MacArthur's to Osmena's hands. . . .This smooth transition was due to
three factors.
First, General MacArthur had faithfully followed the liberal policy
set by the American Congress in dealing with the Philippines, which policy
has been reaffirmed many times by President Franklin Delano Eoocevelt.
V aca, op. cit., p. 6
*3y the terms of Public Law 370, entitled "An Act for the B.ehabilitation
of The Philippines", the United States appropriated $400,000,000 as indemnifica
tion to Filipinos for war damage to private property, and $120,000,000 as assist
ance in the restoration and improvement of public properties and services.
^Jacq, op. cit., p. 6.
Second, President Osmena bad returned to the Philippines with a master
set of "blueprints laid out in advance to facilitate a return to the
democratic government without delay. Third, the Filipinos themselves,
having revolted against the Japanese Government, were spiritually ready
to accept the restoration of their constitutional rights and liberties,^-
In most of Leyte’s municipalities, Kangleon's guerrilla actually set up
the local governments. Where the pre-war administrations had successfully main
tained liaison with the guerrilla during the Occupation, while nominally under
allegiance to Governor Torres' regime, they were reconfirmed and resumed their
normal transactions. Where the guerrilla had created a local government in the
hills in rivalry with the so-called "puppet government? in the poblacion, the
guerrilla government was certified to take over affairs. In some instances, a
full slate of local officials could not "be drawn up, due to deaths and transfer
from the community. Then, the guerrilla might compromise with its policy of
debarring undesirables, and authorize the return of an Occupation official whose
record was not too black. Thus, Biliran needed a municipal treasurer:
Information received. . . .that Juan Lajara of Biliran has been ar

rested and confined. . . .sometime during the months of June, July, and
August. Inasmuch as he vras formerly senior clerk in the Treasurer's
office of Biliran, the papers of his case are hereby requested in order
that this Headquarters can find for itself reasons for making him 3erve
under the Commonwealth Government or disqualifying him to so serve.
This inquiry is made in vie# of the need for one qualified person who
can act as Treasurer. . .
In 1945, the Commonwealth authorities announced that all pre-war munici
pal officials might resume their posts, provided that they had not been indicted
for having been in league with the enemy. This directive caused no disturbance
in Leyte. Many guerrilla incumbents were the actual pre-war officials. In
other cases, the guerrilla appointees realized that their incumbency was only
temporary, and graciously retired from office. But in a few instances, such as
%omulo, op. cit., p. 330.
^Lt. L. Mondragon, CO, Bn. 1, 96th Inf. October 25, 1944. To: CO, Bn.
1, 95th Inf.
that of Eduardo Bugho of Burauen, the pre-war mayor had incurred the ill-will
of the guerrilla (even though not under indictment) and cquld not dislodge the
incumbent. Then he had recourse to contesting the mayoralty seat hy petition
ing Manila for redress. By and large, though, the shift over to peacetime
government was accomplished easily with some lubrication and a few spare parts
needed for the machinery.
Until the end of 1944, the affairs of Leyte Province and of the Philip
pine Commonwealth overlapped and interlaced. Tacloban was serving as the pro
visional capital of the Philippines. The functions of national administration
were resumed in Leyte. Carlos Romulo, as Acting Secretary of Public Instruction,
was despatched to help reopen the public schools in the towns as they were
liberated. The task of reconstruction had its beginnings on the Island, and com
merce with the outside world was slowly renewed.
The actual details of reconstruction were appalling. In the words of
Romulo:
The recccupation authorities, with responsibility shared between

MacArthur's civil affairs unit and Osmena's civil affairs unit, were
facing the seemingly impossible task of restoring every government ser
vice -- currency, housing, labor, sanitation, police protection — and
of distributing medicine, clothing, and food through recaptured areas
that had been stripped clean by the vengeful Japanese on their retreat
« • • •
The aid given by the United States authorities was indispensable in the
first stages of Filipino rehabilitation. But the aim of the Filipino leadership
was to wean away the nursling from prolonged dependence on American bounty, and
encourage it to draw upon its own resources. In line with this objective,
President 03mena acted quickly to turn over the domestic affairs of Leyte to
its own provincial government.
The President appointed Colonel Kangleon as acting governor of Leyte.
In so doing, he sought to pay tribute to the resistance movement, and at the same
^Rotanlo, op. cit., p. 142.
tune reward a man for distinguished service in time of national danger. But
Kangleon himself vas war weary. After the fighting had died down, he went on
furlough to his farm in Macrohon, South Leyte. The direction of affairs was
entrusted to the Colonel's energetic and very capable Judge Advocate, Major
Fidel Fernandez.'*'
Under Fernandez' supervision, the government undertook the reinstitution
of basic services, the emergency feeding of the destitute, the rendering of medi
cal aid to the suffering, and the provision of employment for the jobless. Sup
pression of crime and for a time the gathering of evidence against alleged
collaborationists also were pursued. And not to be overlooked, the government

p
resumed collection of taxes.
■*The wartime civil governor of Col. Kangleon's guerrilla regime succeeded

Maj. Fernandez as Leyte's chief executive: "Hon. Salvador Demeterio is now the
provincial governor of Leyte. His induction into office was held July 23 at the
Capitol Session Hall in the presence of high government officials and represen
tatives of the U. S. Army forces." (The Guardian, Vol. I, Ho. 2, Aug. 15, 1945,
P. 1.)
2
The income of the province from October 24, 194-4, to June 30, 1945, is
as follows:
Internal Hevenue
Heal property tax--preceding year P 949.65
Heal property tax— current year 27,452.47
Weights and measures 237.00
Penalties 77.69
Aid from National Government 107.500.00
Other Receipts 2,109.14-
Total Income P138,325.93
Total Expenses up to June 30, 1945 129.746.01
(Jaca, op. cit., p. 5.)
Not till the close of 1945 did Tacloban recover some of its utilities:
"The U. S. Army will turn over to the owners next Saturday the Tacloban Electric
and Ice Plants, it vas reliably learned yesterday. . . .
"The Leyte Metropolitan Waterworks is now being handled by the govern
ment. Sometime next month, those private houses that had water connections be
fore the war will first be attended to.
"The different department heads of the Leyte provincial government have
already submitted their lists of army supplies and engineering equipment they wish
to buy for their offices." (The Guardian, Vol. I, No. 17, Dec. 8, 1945, p. 1.)
The Leyte Chapter of the Philippine Red Cross was also reorganized:
"Immediately after the liberation of the Philippines, the Philippine Red Cross
was reconstituted so as to assume a society status independent of the American Red
Cross. . . .
"The Philippine Red Cross has rendered invaluable service to the civilian
population. . . .most particularly in locating and reconciling lost members of
families. . . ." (ibid., p. 2.)
580
■Agriculture and Food
The cardinal responsibility of the provincial administration was the feeding
of the Island's million inhabitants. Army rations turned over to the Province could
be used only as a s t o p - g a p T h e Provincial Agricultural Supervisor declared:
As quick as peace and order has been established. . . .the services of the
Provincial Agricultural Extension Service was then necessary in order to re
habilitate. . . .all destructions particularly underlying agriculture. It is
imperative indeed that food production campaign be waged instantly in order that
the people may acquire enough agricultural foodstuffs first for the sustenance
of their families and second for wealth accumulation in order to resume n o m a l
livelihood and pay personal and government obligations. . . .2
By the estimate of the Commercial Agent, "about 70$ of the agricultural
activities in the province of Leyte had been hampered, if not paralyzed, by the war."3
In addition to damage sustained by Japanese burnings and by American bombings and
shellir^s, Leyte's farms had deteriorated through neglect. Faim equipment, fertilizer
and seed were lacking. Moreover, the enemy
had taken and slaughtered hundreds of carabaos and cattle without the consent of
the owners. . . .Before the war, carabao, being the most important work animal,
was found in almost every farm. But now, hundreds of Leyte's farmers are with
out carabao and plow. Horses were also raised in the province, but during the
Japanese occupation many had been commandeered and slaughtered for food by
the enemy. ^
Both the Commonwealth and the provincial authorities urged the farmers to
reclaim their farmlands. Some responded promptly.
Even under fire, the carabao, water buffalo, could be seen toiling in the
rice paddies between the nipa huts, and the farmers worked in mud to their
knees to plant the crops, for now that the Japanese were being driven beyond
the hills they would plant rice again. Their women worked with them. . . .5
Unhappily, a significant proportion of Leyte's farmers delayed in re
turning to their pre-war occupation. They found it more profitable to engage in
•*-See: Municipal Council of Tacloban, Ordinance No. 5, s 1944, called "Ration

ing of Commodities", December 13, 1944.
2Berdan, op. cit., p. 2. 3Iaca, o p . cit. , p. 10.
Îbid., p. 25. ^Romulo, op. cit. , p. 148.
"buy and sell" or to find jobs with the U. S'. Army installations. This drift
away from the f a m e tended to prolong the period of scarcity and contributed
to the sharp post-war inflation. As during the Japanese occupation, rapacious
produce dealers succeeded in cornering the bulk of the foodstuffs available.
They established a black market and sold to the necessitous at outrageous prices
"At the time of the re-establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in
Tacloban/’ stated the Commercial Agent, "the government tried to peg rice at the
fair price of 32 centavos a ganta. . . .but still rice could not be bought at
that price."'1'
The U. S. Army sought to break the vise of the black-marketeers by trans
•Dort-ing the necessitous directly to the farms of the interior:
To re1 ieve the precarious food situation. . . .particularly Tacloban

. . . .the Phil 3onine Civil Affairs Sect ion of Ease K authorized last
March, 1945, the free use of i2 array trucks for passengers and freight
over three routes: namely, P-oute A, which covered from Tacloban tc
Abuyog and return, with stops at Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa, Pulag and Mayorga;
Poute 3, which covered from Tacloban to Pulag and return, with stops at
Palo, Tanauan, Bagami and Burauen; and Poute C, which covered from Tacloban
to farigara and return, with stops at Talc, Alangalang, and Jaro. Priority
was given only to the transportation of food and produce to authorized
sales points^ and to individuals transporting food info towns for family
consumption.-
3y the end of IS45, the situation hau taken a distinct turn for the bet
ter. The size of the American occupation forces in Leyte had shrunk to the
point where it no longer exercised a torsional influence upon the provincial
economy. Save for the Tacloban district, most of the farmers were returning to
their regular occupation.

Trade With American Troops
Business recovery in Leyte was another urgent matter engaging govern
mental attention. "The commercial houses in Tacloban are still devoid of mer
chandise," declared the Commercial Agent. "They are as yet used by the U. S.
■*Jaca, q~
d. cit., p. 26.
'Ibid ., p. 26.
Army for headquarters, offices, bodegas and warehouses.
Barter between the Leytenos and U. S. Army personnel _was the principal
form of business relationship during the first month of the Liberation, and
continued as important for a good four months. The GIs craved Japanese battle
trophies and articles of native craftsmanship, for these mementoes, they
"swapped" army K rations, 'candy bars, packages of chewing gum, cartons of
cigarettes, parachute material for dress-making, towels, fatigue uniforms, and
sundry supplies. They also accepted the temporary services of houseboys and
laundresses as payment. This barter, incidentally, worked to promote cordial
relations between Americans and Filipinos.
The barter procedure was modified as soon as the army paymaster had
organized his records and. commenced to disburse "Victory PeBcs" to the GIs. While
the frugal among the GIs took out savings bonds and sent their pay "Stateside",
a Targe percentage accepted cash and discovered they had no way of spending it.
Aside from gambling at dice or cards, this currency could only be used to buy
up Filipino trinkets. The result was a competitive bidding up of price on what
ever was offered for sale.
Japanese "Mickey Mouse" money held a special attraction for the GIs--and
they bought it avidly. Eomulo called attention to the consequences of this mad
spending:
Just the same, as we had expected, the ’worthless1 Japanese money shot
up in value. GI Joe’s passion for souvenirs sawto that, he it was who
stood in the way of a practical economic adjustment to the Leyte problem,
as the soldier with money will pay any price for anything he wants. The
Japanese money, the Philippine postage stamps with the value blacked out
by the frugal Japanese, Japanese swords, flags, coconuts, and chickens
all hit the skies in price despite anything that couldbe dcne.^
Bomnlo might have added that the troops also spent liberally for such
prized acquisitions as Filipino bolos, decorative wooden slippers, fibre-woven
Îbid., p. 25.
Êomulo, op. cit., p. 152.
583
scarves and table-cloths, abaca mats, and miscellaneous bagatelles. The coco
nuts and chickens (with which might be included bananas, pineapples, fresh eggs,
fish and vegetables) referred to represented relief from the tedious diet of
tinned and dehydrated army rations. Peculiarly enough, the GIs took umbrage at
the "hold-up prices" of edibles while tolerating the exhorbitant tags on novelty
items. Word of GI indignation was passed, on by the Filipino liaison office:
"New regulation has been made regarding profiteering and the trading of sundry
articles for clothing or canned goods. This was occasioned by the abuse of
civilians who went so far as to approach offices, trading fruits, chickens, eggs,
etc. . . .for exhorbitant prices."•'•
If seme of the simple farmers became food hucksters during the early
months of the Liberation, and sought to earn a few extra pesos this way, their
sin was relatively venial. Far more unscrupulous, the Commercial Agent recalled,
were the sharpsters who set about slaking the GI thirst.
During the Japanese occupation, the manufacture of tuba was undertaken

to a very limited extent. Upon arrival of the American forces in Leyte,
the manufacture of tuba had reached its peak, when a demijohn of tuba
cost from P15.00 to P18.00, while the pre-war cost of the same quantity of
tuba was only from PI.00 to PI .50. During the liberation. . . .the manu
facture of all kinds of whiskey flourished. Whiskey establishments in
Tacloban have sprung up like mushrooms. With American soliders as good
customers, many people in Leyte have been able to accumulate millions of
pesos in victory money from this lucrative whiskey-making industry.'1'
The tuba, or fermented sap of the coconut jalm, was not toxic when imbibed
in moderation. But much of the so-called whiskey was decidedly toxic. An ex-
guerri'ia officia1 , in whose eyes the "get-rich-quick" boys were odious, inveighed
against the whiskey traffic:
The alcohol abandoned by the Japs was mixed with water and some sugar,
and this concoction they call ’whiskey', which thgy sell to the American
soldiers, poisoning 3ome of these soldiers. . . .°
% . Granados, 3" Lt., Inf., Liaison Off. Nov. 16, 1944. To: C.O.,
95th Inf. Regt., 92nd Div.
p
‘‘Jaca, op. cit., p. 25.
^Potente, o p . cit., p. 30.

See Municipal Council of Tacloban, Resolution No. 14, Nov. 24, 1944.
584
Inflation and the ECA
The plenitude of "Victory Pesos" thus tempted the corruptible into at
tempting to fleece the GIs. But it is dubious whether the bulk of the Filipinos
benefitted from this easy money. The sudden pumping of Victory Pesos into
Leyte* s channels of trade, and the high velocity of currency circulation, brought
on an acute inflation. The average Filipino saw his little gains cancelled out
by the sharp rise in the price of rice, viands, and basic commodities. Wrath
ful] y, the Commercial Agent noted:
The buy and sell. . . .which existed during the Japanese occupation
predominated during the liberation of Leyte. . . .The 'buy and sell*
business had caused to be born one of the most coBtly and insidious
aftermaths of the war— the black market. The people in Leyte have suf
fered and are still suffering from the nefarious work of the selfish
black market operators. . . .
An emergency control administration was established in Leyte to cope with
the commodity situation. It utilized consignments of American goods to undermine
the black market.
About one and a half months after the American Forces landed in
Leyte, food, clothing and other consumers' goods and medicine, imported
from the United States, arrived in Tacloban and were placed on sale as
rapidly as they could "be unloaded. Substantial quantities of rice,
canned meats, pork and beans, cooking fats, flour and the like and also
cloth and textiles were sold to the people. The PCAU unitB distributed
these goods to wholesalers, who in turn made them available to small
tiendas (shops) and other regular retail outlets. The goods were allo
cated to different towns on the basi3 of population. The ceiling price
regulations were set by the Commonwealth Government and were enforced
by the regular courts.
The present administration of the Emergency Control Administration
is managed by the Office of the Provincial Treasurer at Tacloban. As
Provincial Director of the CCA, the Provincial Treasurer appoints re
tainers in the different municipalities recommended, by their respective
municipal treasurers. The goods are transported directly to the munici
pal treasurers, who in turn act as the sole distributors in their re
spective municipalities. The municipal treasurers divide their towns
into community districts and assign retailers at strategic places, de
pending on geographical location, extent of area, and the number of
families to be served. Each retailer is required by the municipal
treasurer to make a list of the families comprising his or her community
V aca, op. cit., p. 26.
585
district, showing the head of the family and the direct members thereof
living with him. The municipal treasurer mates the distribution of
every article to each and every community district. In turn, the re
tailer sells for cash at prices stipulated in the invoice prepared by
the Office of the Provincial Treasurer.
In September, 1945, Leyte became the distributing center of the ECA for
the other Visayan and the Bicol provinces. A special office vas created to ad
minister these expanded activities. Pctenciano Larrazabal, a prominent haciendero
who had been serving as mayor of Ormoc under assignment by the guerrilla, vas
placed in charge.
As might have been expected in the case of a large governmental project
of thin nature, the EGA directorship -wan maligned as flagrantly corrupt, shoving
favoritism to preferred dealers and indirectly feeding the black market. That
this belief vas widespread the present writer gathered from conversation with
both retailers and consumers. Particularly outside of the provincial capital,
many people discussed the ECA with asperity, believing that the bulk of the better-
quality merchandise never left Tacloban for the interior. Such allegations may
have been maliciously inspired and greatly exaggerated, but they contained some
core of truth.
The Provincial Treasurer, Jiminez, demurred against audit of the ECA bocks,
O
arguing that the ECA vas not a responsibility of the Commonwealth government.^
But on November 20, 1945, the Provincial Auditor received instructions from the
1Ibid., n. ?R.
-In resrvnse to the nersistent clamor of the people representing all

walks of life that the Emergency Control Administration (ECA) be asked to serve
the general pub1 ic rather than a privileged few, the new Municipal. Council of
Tacloban passed a resolution on Aug. 21 requesting the provincial director of
the ECA to furnish the Council, with the following data: (a) quantity or amount
of foodstuffs, clothing, and other commodities allotted for distribution or sale
to the people of Tacloban, (b) names of persons and business concerns which have
been handling the distribution or sale of such articles since the beginning of
the operation of this governmental agency in Leyte. "The Provincial Board of
Leyte has recently passed, a resolution requesting the Department of the Interior
to order an investigation of the ECA in Tacloban. . . . " (The Guardian, Vol. I,
No. 3, August 31, 1945, p. 1.)
586
Auditor General (according to Enrique Potente of the Auditor's Office, and
lately guerrilla auditor) to proceed at once to an audit of ECA hooks. Startling
was the Auditor's discovery: that the major portion of ECA goods had heen dis
tributed without the formalities of accounting procedure. So-called "damaged"
goods had heen condemned without the giving of notice to the auditor. Moreover,
certain favorite retailers were allowed frequent consignments of merchandise,
while the unprivileged received hut a single delivery. After these disclosures,
the Provincial Auditor introduced a system of inventory and verification which
cut down on irregularities.
Nevertheless, even if imperfectly administered, the ECA did serve to
arrest the spiraling of prices, and then reverse the trend. The general index
of prices read over 50cp lower. (See appendix for schedule of retail prices.)
And as a secondary effect, the ECA commodities coaxed a growing volume of domes
tic products into the open market. 5-
Abaca and Copra Revival and the USCC
Governmental interest in the foodstuffs industry arose primarily from
its preoccupation with the general welfare. The revival of the retail trade was
an incidental benefit. However, the government had a paternalistic interest in
the restoration of raw material production and export.
Declared the Commercial Agent: "The most important export products of
this urovince are abaca and copra. Both are war-essential materials and as such,
they wi1 1 goon occupy an important place of the export items to the United States
of America." 2
-'-Jose S. Brillo, assistant director of the provincial ECA, was very

helpful in contributing information about the workings of the ECA in Leyte.
2
Jaca, op. cit.. p. 22.
The United States had been cut off from access to these essential mate
rials durirg the weir. With the fighting ended in Leyte, she awaited renewal of
deliveries.
American abaca experts have planned to aid in the revival of Leyte's

war-essential abaca industry. An Abaca Mission office under the FEA has
been opened in Tacloban. Five abaca and. copra-buying agencies have been
establ ished at different places in the province: one in Tacloban, and
the agent is T. Suya; one in Baybay, and the agent is Jesus Moraza; one.
in Ormoc, and the agent is Diego C. Veloso; one in Malitbog, and the
agent is Hijos de F. Escano; and one in Cabalian and the agency is under
two agents, Alfred Boberts and Vicente Almario. . . .
H. C. Derham, a British citizen with long experience in the hemp industry
(and a released Japanese prisoner of war) was placed in charge of the Philippine
Abaca Management Company (the Abaca Mission). Derhum explained (interviewed at
M s office, February, 1946) that the schedule of prices for abaca, rigged ac
cording to grade and quantity (the Mission was interested primarily in good
cordage grades) was determined by the Mission's Washington, D. C. headquarters.
The planters found the government price an insufficient incentive for sale. Ac
cording to the Commercial Agent:
Abaca was selling the last two months from PI.20 to P I .50 a kilo,
despite the fact that the government's price for the best quality is
only P0.32 a kilo. Had the agents been buying abaca at the government's
price, there would have been no abaca produced and exported because the
abaca producer would not produce abaca for the price given by the
government. The agents had to work in some way or other in order to be
able to offer to the abaca producers the price that would attract the
abaca sellers. According to a confidential information, the agents have
to sell to the Mission their abaca— 70$ in cloth and canned goods, and
30$ in cash at P0.32 a kilo. With these cloth and canned goods, the
agents have to barter them with abaca from the abaca producers, in such
a way that their losses in their abaca deal with the Mission at £0.32 a
kilo are made uo or covered up. . . .2
To make the procedure somewhat more clear: the Mission received American
merchandise, and turned a given lot over to the agent, according to a calculation
1Ibid., p. 9.
2
Jaca, op. cit., p. 10.
of "vhat he was good for*'. The agent was given a truck (which he was expected
to maintain out of his own funds) , and allowed a 10-15$ commission on trans
actions with the producers. When the agent or the agent’s dealers approached
the planters, he generally found that the latter stipulated a higher than
government price for the abaca being offered. On the other hand, the planters
were interested in obtaining the otherwise unavailable American merchandise.
A deal would be arranged. The planter would be paid in kind up to an agreed
percentage, with the balance payable in cash. The agent in turn would settle
with the Mission, receiving pajment at the government price plus commission,
minus the value of the American merchandise (selling also at published govern
ment prices). From this it can be seen that the dealings between agent and
planter might involve considerable haggling— and that what the agent lost in pay
ing a higher than government price for the abaca, he hoped to more than recoup
by judicious pricing of his merchandise.
Wot until July, 1945, Mr. Derham recalled, when the Mission received its
first shipload of American goods to be used in barter, did deliveries begin. At
first the merchandise vas restricted in type, consisting of flour, sardines,
dress material, and a small quantity of rice and sugar. By November, a greater
assortment of goods was arriving from the United States, including a variety of
canned foods, textiles, shoes, more sugar, a large shipment of Chilean rice.-*-
The Mission operated a fleet of trucks on loan from the army until Wovember,
1945, when it received its own. It met its fuel needs through purchase from the
army quartermaster. Its warehouse, rented at 5200 per month, belonged to the
merchant T. Suya.
■*•8,200 tons of Chile rice have arrived in Manila, imported through the
FEA. It will be sold through regular commercial channels at 51.80 a ganta.
Tacloban will get its share of 2,000 tons of this rice. (The Guardian, Vol. I,
Wo. 16, December 1, 1945, p. 1.)
589
The Mission was trying to persuade the planters to acquire stripping
machines as a means of increasing production. But the machines, so effectively
employed in Davao, were expensive. A few planters indicated they might change
over from manual to machine production on a trial basis.
Meanwhile, the Mission vas striving to fulfill a U. S. Army contract.
The army had arranged with two Filipino hemp mills in Manila to supply raw mate
rial for steady operation and looked to the Mission to deliver the abaca. Army
and navy vessels would attend to the transportation. The Tacloban, Baybay and
Malitbog agencies began shipments to Manila in Ju3y, 1945, and increased their
consignments in the succeeding months. In October, Suya's Tacloban Agency ex
ported its first cargo to the United States. Additional agencies were estab
lished in Abuyog and in neighboring Samar province. Every indication held forth
hope for an early restoration of the industry to pre-war levels. (See Appendix
for figures.)
The revival of Leyte's copra industry began under similar sponsorship
and difficulties:
A Copra Mission under the FEA has also been opened in Tacloban, and
its agency is managed by T. Suya, a Chinese capitalist in Leyte. As
yet no copra has been exported as there is no stock in the marlcet--as
the farmers are reluctant to produce copra on the ground that copra at
the present time does not command good price. The agents are offering
from P0.07 to F0.08 only. The farmers prefer to take up work on various
army projects to that of producirg copra.•*-
The Copra Export Management Company (CEMCO) operated as the working sub
sidiary of the United States Commercial Company (USCC) , which in turn fell under
the administrative control of the FEA. In November, 1945, the USCC became in
dependent. A. M. Selg, a Swiss citizen living in the Philippines since 1920,
^T b i d ., p. 9. ’
■became chief of the Leyte Copra Mission. Under USCC auspices, the Copra
Mission adopted a leaf from the hook of the Abaca Mission, and introduced in
centive goods in its field transactions.
CSMCO merchandise came from two sources: direct shipment from the
United States, aB in the case of sugar, rice, flour, canned fish, textiles for
women's apparel, and U. S. Army salvage, clothing and equipment (as entrench
ment tools, canvas tentage, cots and ponchos) delivered from quartermaster stocks
in Tacloban. After some delay, trucks for hauling the merchandise and copra ar
rived from overseas. Warehouse laborers were provided in part from the Intern
ment Camp, thus helping to hold down overhead. On the other hand, building
rentals were increasing--one warehouse originally renting to the U. S. Army at
P250 per month made available to the CEMCO at P500. Pilferage from warehouses
was estimated to be as high as 15-20$, for the civilian watchmen went unarmed.
Finally, deterioration of army supplies meant further loss. "If we break even,
we're doing veld ," Selg mused.--"even with a 40$ mark-up on merchandise."
The CEMCO followed the practice of the Abaca Mission in selecting ex
perienced agents to do business with. Selg declared that an agent must have at
least P5C,000-60 ,000 in capital, warehouse space, and.considerable trade know
ledge. Ee must stand the expense of shrinkage, plus all costs incidental to
gathering, handling, storage, and insurance. That is why the Copra Mission
designated the merchant T. Suya as Tacloban agent, and the shipping companies
Aboitis 8e Company (Jesus Moraza, manager) and Hi Jos de F. Sscano as sgents in
Baybsy and Malitbog respectively. Furthermore, the Copra Mission found it
simpler to deal with a few giant outfits than a swarm of small ones. And, if
further Justification was needed for the arrangements worked out, Selg affirmed
that the Justification lay in the resuits--copra being delivered.
Through the operations of the Abaca and Copra Missions, the USCC fell
into bad repute with the general population of Leyte. Derharn, drawing an
591
invidious distinction "between his office and the neighboring Copra Mission,
asserted that the Abaca Mission dispensed with the USCC label in most of its
transactions, to avoid being tainted. In point of fact, the public knew no such
differences.
At the outset, the USCC distributed commodities exclusively through its
two operating subsidiaries, the Abaca and Copra Missions. The American merchan
dise, used as incentive items, vas designed to stimulate the rehabilitation of
Leyte's two key industries. Somewhere along the course, some of these goods
were diverted from proper channels, winding their way into the recesses of the
black market. Pilfered goods of the USCC origin reached the same murky swamps
of commerce. Add to this the irascibility of Filipino dealers whenever they
learned of USCC goods in the hands of Chinese Jobbers, with the subsequent whis
pering campaign conducted, and you have the basis cf USCC disesteen.
In December, 1945, the USCC became a source cf supplies for the Philip
pine Deconstruction 1 Rehabilitation Administreiion--successor to the UCA.^ The
ERFA supplied commodities both to regular retail cutlets and to municipal wel
fare committeeo for poor relief. In addition, the USCC began to allocate a por
tion of its goods to local business concerns not serving as outlets for the
Abaca and Copra Missions. These developments helmed to combat the pernicious
consequences of b"ack-marheveering.
Some Other Industries in Leyte
Having discussed tne early ei'forus ax. renauiiitating cereal, abaca, and
coconut cultivation, and their tie-in with local commerce, we must now say a
few words about Leyte's other industries. The Commercial Agent listed sugar
and uobacco among Leyte's principal industries. Of sugar, he stated: . . . .At
the present time the sugar industry in Leyte, particularly in Ormoc, is at a
^■"According to reports emanating from Manila, all the present agencies

of the government for relief and reconstruction will scon be put under the
Philippine Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration, created in a bill
recommended favorably to the President by the cabinet. The SCA will be one cf
the agencies to be absorbed by the PSBA." (The Guardian, Vol. I, Ho. 16,
December 1, 1945, p. 1.)
. standstill. The two sugar centrals had "been destroyed "by the war."!
The repair ox' the damage done this important branch of agriculture by the
war vou> d await rehabilitations! aid allotted to the Province by Manila.
Tobacco, once a subsidiary crop, had become an important source of wealth
to Leyte’s population. Except for some isolated patches here and there, tobacco
cultivation ceased during the war. First steps towards resumption of planting
were taken in 1945. However, the general Filipino craving for American cigarettes
tended to restrict the market for native tobacco.
Of the lesser industries, established in Leyte, lumbering had been one of
the most thriving. Recovery was delayed by lack of machinery. The Commercial
Agent commented: "As yet no sawmills in Leyte are in operation; and if there is
one like in Tacloban, the Eureka Sawmill, it is operated by the U. S. Army, and
the lumber saved is supplied by the U. S. Army from lumber imported from the United
States
The Commercial Agent's statement stands, but with a minor correction.
Marcelo Abesamis’ Visayan Saw Mill in Tacloban had delivered 3,000 telephone poles
to the U. S. Army, cut from Leytesn timber (at P5-7 a pole). Otherwise, this mill
processed American wood. Some 700,000 board feet had been cut for the army by
Kovember, 1945, according to the estimate cf Abesamis.
Another important industry, while carried on chiefly for the local market,
vas fishing. Lgyte's fishermen had continued their activities during the Occupa
tion, though the Japanese often confiscated their catch. The slaughtering of
carabao and cattle by the Japanese‘made meat extremely expensive after the war,
and increased the consumption of fish. However, the drying and smoking of fish
for export to neighboring provinces had not yet gotten under way.
1rbid., p. 22.
2Ibid., p. 23.
’6593..-
In concluding tliis resume of trends within the industries of Leyte, we
note that the local asphalt and sulphur deposits were not yet being worked by
1946. Here again, rehabilitational capital from the USA, via Manila, would be
required. On the other hand, pot-making and fibre-weaving were reviving as
theee industries were predominantly of the household variety.
Hew Corporations in Leyte
The ECA, the PHRA, the USCC and its subsidiaries were the generators in
the revival of Leytean business. The principal beneficiaries of these undertak
ings were the local giants (such as Suya, Aiboitis & Company, and Escano--finns
with ties in Cebu and Manila) and the petty retailers. The Liberation also brought
about the appearance of a number of medium-sized corporate enterprises of Leytean
ownership. The time was apparently opportune, since the bulk of the previously
we 11-entrenched Chinese middlemen had been undermined during the war. The post
war Filipino nationalism was assiduously cultivated by local entrepreneurs as
bulwark against the reestablishment of Chinese hegemony in the merchandising
f i e l d . A provincial Chamber of Commerce was organized under the distinguished
presidency of Judge De La Cruz, with the local businessmen Margarito Redona and
Gerardo Villasin leading members. Among other things, the C of C planned to
organize a camnaign against the alleged partiality of the USCC to certain Chinese
deal ers.
\a letter to the Editor cf The Guardian by an irate businessman reflected

the common viewpoint of concern: "I notice the Chinese are again back to their
old trick--outsmarting the Filipino merchants. At the distributing centers they
have always fellow Chinese to look after the retailers around the corner. There
is Mr. So and So who controls the distribution of prime commodities and of ship
ping space. (Suya?)
"What are your suggestions so that we Filipinos in wholesale or retail busi
ness can succeed?
"One more thing--The price of bread is still high. Is it because all bakers
are Chinese? Or is it because our government is slow or afraid in checking up
these aliens who are enjoying the monopoly of business in our country?
A Businessman"
(The Guardian. Vol. I, Ho. 19, December 22, 1945, p. 4.)
See appendix for text of two resolutions adopted by the municipality of
Tacloban relevant to Chinese merchandising.
The Index of Corporations, on file in the Securities and Exchange Com
mission Office, Manila, listed 11 corporations in early 1946 of Leytean ad
dress. Of these, perhaps the "People's Trading Corporation" was the outstanding
Filipino businessmen, wholesalers and retailers. . ..have organized

trading corporations in order to be able to present a solid front against
al ien competition.
Under the leadership of former judge Vicente de la Cruz, a group of
local businessmen organized last month a corporation known as 'People's
Trading Corporation' with an authorized capital stock of one million
pesos. Mr. de la Cruz is its president.-
With De la Cruz vas the local capitalist Ciriaco Enriquezj the company
was set up as a wholesale outfit handling building materials, textiles, school
supplies, and medicines shipped from the United States.
The Judge had an additional interest in the smaller Araba Photo Supply
Company, Inc., capitalized at P50,000.
Another million peso businessvas M. A. Kedona & Sons, Inc. Redona, vho
had been a successful grain dealer during the Occupation, sought to ride on the
crest of the post-war boom and enter the field of general merchandising. He was
experiencing some difficulty in securing freight arrangements for the transpor
tation of his American goods from Manila to Tacloban, but hoped to prosper once
this vas worked out. Along with this enterprise, Redona had a substantial in
terest in the Leyte Transit Company, whose capital stock aggregated F200,000.
Several of Leyte's leading politicians also decided to try their hand
at business. Attorneys Atilano E. Cinco and Domingo Veloso, both candidates for
the Philippine Congress and both having served in the Judge Advocate Corps of
Colonel Kangleon's guerrillas, took the lead in organizing the Philippine De
velopment Company. This outfit, capitalized at P250,000, concentrated in the
^The Guardian. Vol. I, No. 18, December 15, 1950. p. 2.)
595
field of lumber and construction. Attorney Cinco also linked up with Major
Alejandro Balderian, lately commander of Kangleon's 95th Begiment, to undertake
the formation of the Leyte Express Company, declaring its capitalization at
?£50,000.
Congressman Mateo Canonoy teamed up with some local 'businessmen to form
another P?50,000 company doing business in general merchandise, the Southwest
Pacific Trading Company. And on a smaller scale, in Baybay, the former mayor of
Baybay, Paterno M. Tan, helped establish the P100,000 Leyte Commercial Company,
Inc. One of its directors, Manuel Bernardo, vas also serving as a board member
of the Baybay Enterprise Company, with a capitalization of P49 ,000.
Two other corporations remain to be mentioned, both founded by members
of the Socrates and Urbi families, capitalized at P50,000 each, located within
the bounds of Tacloban, and bearing charming feminine names--the Corazon Mercedes
Lumber Company, Inc. and the Nenita Farm & P.anch.
All of these enterprises were impeded in commencing operations by lack
of inventory. Available cargo space on Philippine-bound ships had been stowed
with supplies for the armed forced. Even when a vessel did reserve space in its
hold for Filipino consignees, its destination was almost invariably Manila. The
problem of transshipment to Tacloban remained.
A further business handicap vas the non-availability of banking facilities.
The Commercial Agent stated:
At the nresent time, both the local Postal Savings Bank and the Leyte
Agency of the Phi! ippine National Bank are not yet in operation, although
information has it that the agency of the Philippine National Bank at
Tacloban will resume its business sometime in November, 1945.
These conditions in themselveB would account for the fact that eight of
2
the firms enumerated delayed incorporation until after December, 1945.
Ijaca, op. cit., p. 5.

^The Guardian announced: "The Leyte Agency of the Philippine National Bank
will resume its business sometime next month. Assistant Agent Yisaya is on his way
to Tacloban, it was learned from intimate circles." (The Guardian, Vol. I,
No. 9, October 13, 1945, p. 1.)
Tacloban' b A s cendanc.y
la this stock-taking of Leytean "business, ve must note Tacloban’s com
mercial ascendancy.
One of the far-reaching effects of the var is the fact that Tacloban
is now made a port of entry. If ever there vas a move to make Tacloban
an open port before the outbreak of the var, the var hastened the move
to its realization.-1-
Congressmen Canonoy and Montejo co-sponsored the bill to make Tacloban

O
an onen port and exnerienced little difficulty in securing passage.^ It vas ob
vious that Tacloban merited this status. The selection of Leyte as distributing
center of the Visayas for ECA goods vas but further confirmation of Tacloban's
immrtance:
Tacloban, the capital of the province, is at present the busiest

tovn in all Leyte and the biggest port of the province. The port of
Tacloban is equipped with a modern vharf which has not been harmed by
the Japs, and improvements and minor repairs of the vharf have been
made by the U. S. Army upon its landing in Leyte. Several temporary
small wharves have been constructed by the U. S. Army at different
points in Tacloban Bay. Tacloban Bay is vide, deep and its under-sea
is not rocky. It ranks next to BombIon Bay as to its shelter for
navigation during rough weather and during typhoons. Ocean liners
and big army transports are able to dock at Tacloban wharf without
difficulty.0
Unfortunately for business on Leyte, the larger ships did not make Taclo
ban a port of call once Manila had been wrested from the Japanese:
Inter-island vessels plying between Tacloban and Manila and between

Tacloban and Cebu are not calling regularly at the port of Tacloban.
The Compania Maritima has only one vessel making irregular trips to the
Visayan provinces, the S.S. Mactan. Since this boat called at Tacloban
on September 21, 1945, up to this date, October 10, 1945, she has not
shown up yet to get passengers and cargoes at the port of Tacloban.
The American President Lines has some vessels available for inter-island
transportation, but also it lias no regular schedule for its vessels to
depart from and arrive at Tacloban from Manila or Cebu, despite the fact
that Tacloban is now made a port of entry.^
Jacaj op. cit., p. 8.

2"The bi"!l making Tacloban a Free Port has been approved by the Congress
of the Philipoines during its special session which ended the 15th of this
month. An appropriation of P25,000 will be set aside for the operation of the
n e v law, according to Leyte's Congressman Mateo Canoncy who is in town." (The
Guardian. Vol. I, Ho. 1, July 21, 1945, p. 1.)
5Jaca. on. cit.. p. 8.
^Tbld., pp. 4-5.
As a port of entry, Tacloban had "an income collected hy the collector
of Customs since August 16, 1945 up to October 4, 1945, which amounted to
P8,858.55, collected from the registration of vessels and other charges and
compensating taxes and other charges;"-^
The authorities expected the port's income to grow once shipping would
be released from Manila to service the Visayas more regularly.
Within Leyte itself, Tacloban vas beyond question the most active tovn.
Fortunately, its access to the other towns was not crippled by the var:
A great portion of the highways was not used during the Japanese
occupation, for many bridges connecting these roads were destroyed by
the guerrilla as a means of fighting successfully the enemy. At present
they are opened to traffic as they have been repaired by the army and
temporary bridges have been constructed to take the place of those which
were destroyed.1^
What the Commercial Agent failed to mention vas the Province badly needed
the resources for maintenance of its roads once the American forces had left.
Stretches of road had become deeply rutted, while the temporary bridges were be
coming a hazard. Behabilitation funds were counted on as the sole means of ef
fecting improvement.
Full use of Leyte's overland arteries vas hindered by shortage of motor
vehicles. The Japanese had seized whatever trucks and automobiles they could
lay hands upon. After the Liberation, the local population launched a treasure
trove, salvaging wrecked cars and attempting to repair them. Some of those that
dared the highways held together miraculously, no doubt destined to undergo the
fate of the "One Eorse Shay".
"P»ice or palay and corn," wrote the Commercial Agent, "are brought to
Tacloban by some salvaged and dilapidated trucks and U . S . Army trucks leased to
the Leyte Land Transpoitation Co., Ltd. . . ."3
3-Ibid., p. 5.
2Ibid., p. 4.
3lb id., p. 27.
The District Engineer of Leyte undertook emergency measures:
To provide the public as soon as possible with adequate means of trans

portation during this period of emergency, the District Engineer. . . .has
been authorized by the Public Service Commission to register motor vehicles
under 'Hire' classification. Privately owned trucks which have been given
the license TE are allowed to accept passengers until the end of 1945. The
rates shall not be in excess of P.05 per passenger per kilometer with a
maximum charge of P.50 and P.60 per ton per kilometer for freight.
There are at present 40 registered TPU trucks operating in the province;
32 are owned by the 'Leyte Land Transportation Co., Ltd.’, 7 are owned by
the 'West Leyte', and 1 is owned by the ?Xeyte Transit'. Motor vehicles
registered in the Office of the District Engineer at Tacloban, up to Sep
tember 28, 1945 are as follows:1
143 privately owned trucks; 149 TE trucks; 40 TPU trucks; 23 govern
ment trucks; 33 private automobiles; 14 motor cycles.2
To the Commercial Agent's statement, it should be added that traffic regu
lations did not govern size of freight and passenger loads. The commercial haul
age outfits, eager for large earnings, crammed their vehicles with sacks of rice,
baskets of fish, bundles of clothing, live chickens, crying children, pregnant
women, perspiring laborers and businessmen, far beyond safety capacity. More
over, some of the drivers of the dinkey "jitneys'’ toting uassengers were inex
perienced and a menace on the highway. This was surely a period when the Fili-
D i m ' s sense of humor stood him in good stead.
We shall round out this account of Tacloban's post-var commercial posi
tion by brief reference to the other agencies of communication:
îany complaints were heard concerning the distribution of motor ve

hicles. Tacloban's newspaper voiced this grievance:
"Despite repeated verbal or written requests, our Tacloban municipal
government does not have a jeep or truck to its credit.
"People complain of the insanitary conditions of the streets, but there
is no truck available for collecting the garbage cans. . . .
"Yet the Leyte Land Transportation company has been able to lease 32
trucks; the Filipino and Chinese agents of the ECA and the FEA, and the CRSD
and the USCC are provided with jeeps and trucks for official and commercial use."
(The Guardian. Vol. I, Ho. 18, December 15, 1945, p. 1.)
2-
«feca,- pp.- ci-t., p. 4.
^"It has been reported again that some private trucks are charging more
than the rates authorized. . . .Likewise it has been pointed out that some of
the passenger buses are seen overloaded every day." (Ibid., p. 1.)
599
Only one radio station is at present installed in Leyte and it is

located at Tacloban the capital. Radio messages are only sent to Manila,
Cebu, Zamboanga, Iloilo, Catbalogan and some points in Luzon. All post
offices of the different municipalities of Leyte have been opened only
for mails, no telegrams accepted and no money orders issued yet. The
telegram lines in the province have not as yet been repaired.^
The U. S. Army had hooked up the offices of the provincial government and
some nearby municipalities to its own military circuit. In addition, it included
in its urogram of genera] entertainment and information broadcast by the Base
"K" station some features vith special appeal to a Filipino radio audience.
Before summing up, we mu3t do justice to the war-battered municipality
of Ormoc. Located on the West Coast and facing Cebu, the local boosters hoped
to develop their community into a center of commerce and of culture. Some of
the ex-guerrilleros of the WLGWF organization had discussed prospects with
businessmen, politicians and local educators, and were exploring schemes for
raising capital. And the likelihood was good that Ormoc's long agitation for
incorporation as a chartered city would soon bear fruit.
Economic Trends in the Liberation Period
Reviewing commercial trends in Leyte during the helter-skelter Liberation
period, we may make the following observations .2 in the first place, the pre-war
avenues of commodity distribution were abandoned in favor of questionable impro
visations. Retail establishments, in many instances, made claim to being whole-
sa?.ers in order to be advantageously placed for receiving larger invoices from
the distribution agencies. .And even more disturbing, ordinary consumers pretended
to be retailers for the purpose of hoarding. Secondly, an inordinate number of
•*T bid. , p. 4.
By the end of the year, the communication situation had improved con
siderably: "Telegraph and radio stations can now accept radiograms addressed to
all places, according to Post-office Inspector Cunanan. . . (The Guardian,
Vol. I, Wo. 20, December 29, 1945, p. 1.)
2For an illuminating general discussion of the post-war Philippine economy,
see: Shirley Jenkins, "Financial and Economic Planning in the Philippines", Pacific
Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1, (March, 1948), pp. 33-45.
legitimate business establishments had mushroomed— in the main with inadequate
capital, skimpy trading facilities and little experience. Oftentimes, these
fly-by-night concerns helped to maintain black-market practices by themselves
charging excessive priceB. More firmly-established enterprises tended to accomo
date their pricing to prevailing practice, so that the consumer was disadvantaged
wherever he turned. Finally and preponderantly, the omnipresence of the vicious
black-market complete]y deranged the flow of commerce.
With American aid, the rehabilitation of the provincial economy got under
way. There were signs, as in the copra and abaca fields, that the monopoly
interests of the pre-war period were being reinstated. The argument advanced by
the protagonists of this policy was that the big outfits possessed the "know-how"
so necessary for Leyte's rapid recovery. In disagreeing, Leyte's provincial Com
mercial Agent recommended:
To afford Filipino businessmen in Leyte the benefits of fair competi

tion by providing them with means of transportation at competitive prices
for merchandising or for resale; to afford the small lumberman and small
lumber merchants the benefits of fair prices by affording them means of
transportation other than those controlled by the bigger lumber merchants;
and to afford the small copra producers the benefits of fair prices for
their products by destroying the powers of local agents of private steam
ship companies to dictate prices to the producers and other local mer
chants through the former's control of available vessels for the transpor
tation of products— efforts be exerted that regular steamship lines should
be established and maintained between the big commercial ports of the Philip
pines and Tacloban, the capital of the province.
The agglomeration of local capital in the organizing of new medium-sized
corporations was an encouraging portent on the commercial horizon. Unfortunately,
this tyoe of enterprise tended to confine itself to the merchandising field.
There was need for local risk capital to penetrate the fields of abaca, coconut
and sugar cultivation and processing, as well as the lumbering and mineral pro
specting and mining industries. And there wa3 need for this development to take
place in the uncongealed economy of the early post-war years, before the local
^ Jach., op., cit., p. 29.
601
agencies of the "big Manila and Cehuan interests had preempted and frozen control.
The proliferation of business enterprises in Leyte was a temporary post
war phenomenon. Primarily, it was due to spending by the U. S. armed forces on
the Island. The departure of the United States forces had a deflationary effect
upon the provincial economy. Filipinos dependent upon the United States custom--
souvenir hawkers, whiskey vendors, cafe proprietors, laundresses, etc.— disap-
neared. This trend became visible in stages, the retailers vanishing along the
way-stations to Tacloban as the U. S. naval and army installations progressively
contracted, centering near the provincial capital. Moreover, civilians directly
in the employ of the U. S. aimed forces as office clerks, mechanics and. laborers
were released,■*- In keeping with the "multiplier" principle, the resulting unem
ployment and. reduced, general purchasing power snowballed, hitting the businesses
providing goods and services to the Filipino population. This led to the closing
up of many businesses, further unemployment, and eventually--price stabilization
at lower levels. Gradually, save for a small proportion of the skilled who
followed the U. S. forces up to Manila, seeking employment there, many of these
fledgling businessmen were reconverted to farming.
Leytean Society in the Liberation Period
Our account of the military and economicphasesofLeyte'srestoration
to Filipino control should be but foreword to the more engrossinganalysisof
the Liberation's impact upon the lives of the people themselves. Unfortunately,
the dimensions of this study do not allow a full delineation of this subject.
It is noteworthy that even as ]ate as December, 1S45, the United States

Army was sti'1'1 engaging specialized Filipino personnel, as witness the following
ad in The Guardian:
'WJiTFD: Telephone Operators
Highschool girl3 (graduates preferred)
with fair knowledge of Unglish.
Apply to: L t . Cushman, 'Jockey' Exchange."
(The Guardian. Vol. I, Do. 16, December 1, 1945,p. 2.)
602
We can, however, touch upon certain salient aspects of law and order, public
health, labor conditions, religion, and education. We shall also take up the
question of Filipino-American social relations within Leyte, and attempt a non-
quantitative evaluation of American cultural influence upon the Island's popula
tion. With this, we shall have reached the concluding paragraphs of this study.
Post-War Grime
In the chaotic interval between the overturning of one regime and the
effective establishment of its successor, the depravity spawned by the criminal
underworld frequently emerges. It is much like the little sand crab one glimpses
while strolling along the tideland fringe, furtively scampering while the bathers
are preoccupied;— with the important distinction that the crab is harmless.
During the earlier change-over to Japanese rule, the lawless had formed into
bandit gangs, preying upon the defenseless. This time, the localauthorities
determined on drastic prophlactic measures.
The "Executive Order" promulgated by the mayor of Dagami suggests the
sort of action being taken in other municipalities. It read in part:
There shall be organized in the poblacion and all barrios and sites of
the Municipality units of Folice Patrols. . . .All maleresidents of this
Municipality who are between 18 and 50 years ofage are required to enlist
for service with the Police Patrols. . . .
It shall be the duty of the head of unit or group, upon noting the pre
sence of bandits, thieves, or persons of questionable character in his ter
ritory, to immediately mobilize with due order and precaution the forces at
his command with a view to preventing the commiticn of crimes. . . .and to
give assistance in the capture of the perpetrators. . . .
It shall be the duty of the head of the unit or group to help. . . .
Municipal Police Forces and/or Philippine Military Police in apprehending
. . . .criminals. . . .
Any head or member of a unit of Police Patrols violating the provisions
. . . .of this Executive Order shall be subject to disciplinary action. . .
Such "deputizing" of the citizenry into emergency police units at the very
time that the American invasion forces were splashing onto the beaches of Leyte
^Pablo Ontimare, Mun. Mayor, Dagami. 20 October 1945. Executive Order
603
undoubtedly helped to safeguard civilian life and property. And from the nature
of the military campaign, the continuance of these auxiliaries in service was
needed until full control of the Island's interior had been wrested from the
Japanese and restored to the Commonwealth government.
But such improvisation was not too satisfactory. On the initiative of
President Osmena, the Philippine Constabulary was reactivated:
The Philippine Constabulary has been reestablished in Leyte, with units

now in operation in 'Tacloban and Dulag. The Philippine Constabulary units
are the recognized civil lav enforcement agency of the Philippine Common
wealth and the Province of Leyte. They are vested by law with the powers
and responsibilities of the pre-war Philippine Constabulary. Officers and
men of the units have been selected from Philippine Army personnel and from
members of the pre-war Constabulary.^
The CommerciaT Agent was sanguine over the effect of these measures:
Life and property are now safe and secure. They are safeguarded by the
police force composed of the Philippine Constabulary men and by the Ameri
can and Filipino Military Police, to say nothing of the municipal police
men of all municipalities of this province.^
This announcement proved to be abortive. As a matter of fact, the inci
dence of crime was on the increase. The loosening up of social discipline during
the war years provided the climate in which criminality night flourish. Dis
banded guerrilla soldiers and Volunteer Guards, accustomed to seizing private
goods for the "public interest" and to liquidating suspected "pro-Japanese"
•without much ado, would not be restrained only in the presence of the constabulary.
Criminal elements from elsewhere in the Visayas, thieves, swindlers, prostitutes
flocked to Leyte, especially to Tacloban, where they hoped to line their own
pocketB with some of the loose pesos afloat. Unemployed juveniles with uncertain
futures gravitated to the capital from the countryside, attracted by lurid tales
•*Jaca, on. cit., p. 5.
?Ibid., p. 5.
604
of easy money. Some of these were soon floundering in the quicksands of crinK.
And above all, the stockpiles of valuable American goods, inadequately guarded,
encouraged pilferage— feeding the black market and further damaging respect for
legal processJ
To this powder-keg— the propensity to crime in the Liberation period— the
match of widespread illegal possession of firearms was applied. These firearms cane
from a number of sources. The American landing forces allocated certain arms to the
under-equipped guerrilla. The guerrilla, in turn, pc.3sed some weapons on to Volun
teer Guard units. In addition, some GIs improperly handed over carbines to Filipino
civilians who beseeched their aid while battle was still raging. Finally, Filipino
guerrillas and civilians stripped the fallen Japanese of their weapons, and retained
them for private use.
Antonio Cinco, upon whose doorstep many accusations of crime had been laid,
defended his "good" name:
. . . .discontented soldiers who were formerly in the service of the USFIP

but were mustered out, reverted into inactive status or dishonorably discharged
from the service of the USFIP are taking the opportunity in securing arms from
the Americans. And with their arms, they took advantage of the time and attack
the USFIP organization by accusing them of commandeering foodstuffs of the civi
lians and also their animals and other defamatory words detrimental to the USFIP.
Civilians who are opportunist and who have previous leanings towards the Japs
are bartering some flags and other articles with the Americans for some kind of
arms. When they succeeded in getting arms they go around and campaign for food,
viands and confiscated, army uniforms which were honestly secured by good civi-
lians. These peonle who are bearing arms and are going around soliciting for
food. viands and confiscating uniforms said that they are authorized by Capt.
Cinco, when in fact they are only posing as such.2
Both American and guerrilla headquarters ordered that captured arms be re
linquished. The 95th Begiment favored forcible disarming of all Filipinos wrongfully
possessing arms. But some of the unit officers were slow to obey.
■'•"Last month saw thousands of yards of printed cloth, bed sheets, spools of
rice and canned foods and other commodities stolen from the EGA bodegas. . . . "
(The Guardian, Vol. I, No. 16, Dec. 1, 1945, p. 2.)
2Antonio G. T. Cinco, Capt. Nov. 16, 1944. To: CO, 95th Inf.
3
Abarientos, Ex. 0., 95th Inf. Nov. 14, 1944. To: Col. E. Kangleon, CO,
LAC.
6Q5
The American command was vexed hy this laxity. To the chagrin of the
guerrilla, certain American sector commanders began disarming all Filipinos,
guerrilla included, on their return from the battlefront.
Request information whether LAC was informed of disarming of 95th Inf.,

coming from front line. Officers and EM dislike idea, as they have iden
tification cards. Request matter be taken up with higher authorities to
prevent trouble that may arise as some may refuse to be disarmed. Suggest
BCs be disarmed and not men belonging to this Regiment. This Hq will co
ordinate with American forces but get orders from LAC.-'-
This friction was eliminated. But the guerrilla authorities continued to
encounter obstacles in enforcing the general policy of civilian disarmament. For
one thing, the Volunteer Guards had to be dragooned into surrendering their mili
tary caches: "Report to this Headquarters, bringing with youall arms andequip
ment captured from the enemy by your VG s . . . ."2
And even more undesirable, guerrilla unit commanders persisted in ignor
ing orders, and. permitted weapons to pass into the hands of barrio lieutenants
and favored civilians:
Renorts that desnite previous orders, you should have been issuing per
mits to nossess firearms to civilians and barrio Its, Explain why charges
should not be filed against you. You will at once stop issuing such per
mits and disarm civilians not authorized to oossess. Turn over to this Hq.
a11 weanons and equipment and all arms in excess of TO
Writing in September, 1945, the Provincial Fiscal Pajo correlated the
spread of crime with the dispersion of weapons:
As an incident of the present war, especially in the Province of Leyte

where the initial landings of the Americans were made, there is a large
number of firearms in the possession of civilians at the present time. Our
government is trying its very best to recover the said firearms; but due to
its limited facilities, many of these firearms are still in the hands of
people who have no legal permits to possess the same. Many crimes have re
cently been committed with the unlawful use of these firearms. I believe
Âbarientos, Capt., Ex. 0., 95th Inf. Nov. 14, 1944. To: Col. R. Kang-
leon, CO, LAC.
2Abarientos, Capt, Ex. 0., 95th Inf. Jan. 3, 1945. To: M. Cabrera, San
Roque, Tolosa.
Â. Balderian, Maj., 95th Inf. Jan. 5, 1945. To: Co., Bn. 1.
that unless these firearms are recovered by the government, and this done
promptly, the growing crime wave in this province may not diminish in size
or number.
Of these unsurrendered, concealed weapons in the possession of disbanded
guerrilla troops and civilians, a fair pronortion were retained simply for house
hold protection. But an undeterminable quantity were sold at high prices on the
b"i ack market, and came into the custody of criminal elements. These were the
weapons that harassed the Filinino constabulary and the municipal police forces,
and prevented the prompt restoration of order and the safeguarding of private
property.
Chief of police Pefecto Perez of Tolo3a stated in interview that during
the 12-months period running from December, 1944, to December, 1945, he had be
fore him 118 cases involving illegal possession of firearms. This state of affairs
partly accounted for Tolosa’s Ordinance No. 5 (dated May 31, 1945) , which required:
"Any persons coming to the Municipality of Tolo3a from other parts of Leyte are
hereby compelled to report to the Office of Chief of Police for investigation as
to their purpose or motive of coming. . . ." And it also explains why Ordinance
Ho. 12 (dated July 9, 1945) enjoined: "ITo civilians. . . .are permitted to go
out of their houses after 11 o'clock at night."
Curfews were imposed in several municipalities. Civilian apprehensiveness
over the lurking menace of bandits and cutthroats was with difficulty allayed..
Turning to the American authorities for assistance, the Fiscal acknow
ledged the he1r> he received:
My office appreciates very much the full cooperation of the Provost Mar
shal of Base I£ and the American Provost Marshal of this province under
whom the local constabulary is operating. Much of this investigation work
which normally corresponds to this office is being handled by the American
Provost Marshal of this province.^
-1-Juan C. Pajo, Act. Prov. Fiscal. Tacloban, Sept. 14, 1945. "Memorandum
for Elmer Lear”, p. 2. \
2Ibid., p. 2.
The Fiscal's Monthly Deports of criminal cases handled reveal the ac
cumulation of a backlog of cases beyond the facilities of his office to dispose
of. There is a ring of desperation in the August, 1945, report:
These records referred to are cases coming from the 47 municipalities

of this province. The drafts of informations have been prepared but the
same have not been gone over by me for material lack of time, due to the
volume of -work piling every day. During short recesses of court sessions,
I go over these records and make the necessary corrections. . . .1 even
bring my records to the house in order to correct. . . .A valuable part of
my time. . . .is also spent in conferences with American officers who have
consultations to make. After office hours in the afternoon, my time is
spent in interviewing witnesses in 4 or 5 cases going into trial the fol
lowing day.^-
The montilly reports enumerate a considerable number of crimes involving
violence. But — "Among the common offenses now handled by this office," the Fiscal
summed up, "are theft of large cattle and illegal traffic of Army clothing and
other properties."2
The succeeding year brought no substantial alleviation of the crime wave.
The report of the next Fiscal, Gregorio Abogado, abounded in discouraging statis
tics :
When I assumed office, there were 781 cases pending trial, 247 of which
were without information. There were 88 cases that came in during the
month, malting the total number of pending cases at the end of August 803,
of which 86 have been disposed of during the month.
From the 1st day of September when there were 793 pending casesfor
trial to December 31st, during which 397 new cases entered, making a total
of 1190 registered cases, we were able to dispose of 347 cases. The number
of cases pending filing of informations is reduced to 146 only. Wehave
an average entry of 7 cases a day, and a disposal of practically 2cases
each day.
The Fiscal accounted for the ^regressive ailing up of cases by the shortage
of personnel:
Our office is handicapped on account of the lack of personnel; only two

Assistant Fiscals, the pre-war force, are handling the work with me. Due
to constant change of office personnel, clerks and stenographers, the works
were delayed'and action was quite slow. . . .
■^Juan C. Pajo, Acting Provincial Fiscal. Monthly Deport of All Criminal

Cases Deceived and Disposed of by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte during the Month
of August, 1945— Per Circular Bo. 9, dated July 9, 1945.
2Ibid.
608
For the improvement of the service, it is recommended that the number

of Assistant Fiscals for this province be increased from two to four. .The
salaries of the personnel are too inadequate so that we cannot keep com
petent men. . .
As Leyte's post-war boom subsided, some of the criminal elements drifted
off to better pluckings in Manila and in other provinces. There were signs in
evidence that the restoration of tranquillity to the Island was not far away.
Some Special Legal Problems
Before leaving off our discussion of this subject, we must pause to con
sider a special phase— the disposal of litigation coming down from the war years.
Some question arose regarding the status of criminal cases originating
in courts of guerrilla jurisdiction during the Japanese Occupation. The Fiscal
declared his opinion:
During the Japanese occupation of this province, the guerrillas had

their own civil government in unoccupied portions of the province. They
had their own courts and their own prosecuting officers. Some of the
cases comity from the said courts are now before this office for further
action; and in order to obviate legal complications later on, I contem
plate to file again before the present court the said complaints started
during the guerrilla period, the reason being that the present courts are
duly constituted according to law, and the courts then were not so con
stituted.2
More embarrassing to Fiscal Pajo were the actions arising out of alleged
guerrilla abuses during the Occupation:
During the Japanese administration, abuses were committed by guer

rillas, such as manslaughter, murder, robberies, etc. I believe that
under the circumstances, the offending parties thought that they did
not. transcend the bounds of law and legal procedure in committing these
offences. I have sympathy for them, being myself a guerrillero, but it
is my plain duty to prosecute them for the offenses they have committed.
I believe that killings by them, unless made in actual combat. . . .are
not justifiable. And. theoretically, the Commonwealth penal laws were
still enforced in this country at that time for the reason that we had
our Commonwealth Government in exile in Washington. I have actually filed
■klregorio B. Abogado, Prov. Fiscal, Ley. Feb. 1, 1947. To: The Secy,
of Justice, Manila.
2.
J‘uhn/C_v;L,aJo,-Act. Prov. Fiscal. Tacloban, Sept. 14, 1945. "Memorandum
for Elmer Lear", p. 1.
609
four informations against 'guerrilleros "before the Court of First Instance

and I "believe that the accused cannot legally set up the defense that they
have committed those offenses on the ground that the victims were friendly
to the enemy. The victims were entitled to due process of lav and even
spies are entitled to a regular court martial trial.^
Pajo explained in interview that, speaking realistically, it would "be im
possible to discover all the offenses committed by the guerrilla, much less to
bring the offenders to trial. On the other hand, it was of utmost importance
that Judicial notice be taken of a few of the most egregious crimes in order that
the very sanctity of law itself be not subverted. Ee, the Fiscal, would seek
convictions in these select instances but would recommend clemency, due to ex
tenuating circumstances controlling in these cases.^
The Fiscal's attitude to this thorny issue was an intelligible one. But
it provided no clarification for a host of cognate problems also originating in
the confusion of the Occupation regime. These problems warrant our notice here,
if only for mention. That they were not merely of conjectural interest is attested
by their implication in cases assigned to tribunals throughout the Philippines.
Under the Commonwealth regime, the Philippines' government was of the
unitary type. Accordingly, the provincial governments were merely administrative
subdivisions, enjoying the exercise of only such powers as had been expressly
delegated by the insular government in Manila. When the lawful Commonwealth
government evacuated to militarily safe territory overseas, the various resistance
grouns were left to carry on as veil as they were able, without direct authoriza
tion or instruction from President Quezon. In Leyte, the guerrilla commanders
proceeded to invoke the emergency executive powers conferred upon President Quezon
•'ibid ., pp. 1-?.
Ân interesting case arose out of charges pressed against Florentino Zara,
mayor of Massin during the guerrilla period, that he had misappropriated public
monies. Zara had authorized, the emission by the municipality of small denomination
scrip, exchangeable for larger bills presented to the local treasurer by citizens
of the community. The bills were to be held on deposit, available for redemption
of the token scrip. Both Zara and his accusers introduced testimony by accountants,
the one side attempting to disprove the charges of misappropriation, the other at
tempting to make the charges stick. Col. Kangleon refused to commit himself, either
to exonerate or to convict Zara.
610
fay the National Assembly on December 16, 1941. In other words, the Leyte
provincial authorities were assuming the powers of the national government. And
they forthwith proceeded to implement this assumption of power fay adopting regu
lations affecting the judicature, finances, education, and the whole panoply of
national powers. We might inquire whether these changes could properly give rise
to actions asserting commission of unconstitutional acts.
Furthermore, granting the legality of the guerrilla rule, were its powers
plenary and unqualified? What actions, adopted under color of overriding "neces
sity for prosecution of the war effort", might later be construed as arbitrary
and ultra vires? Might aggrieved civilians have recourse to the courts after the
war for satisfaction in any and all cases involving tortious action fay officers
and agents of the guerrilla government? Where a guerrilla government sequestrated
the estates of absentee landlords and reassigned them among elements of the anti-
Japanese population, where does legal tenure today reside? What are the legal
consequences of conflicts of law in areas where two rival and unreconciled guer
rilla authorities enact contradictory regulations to be scrupulously obeyed fay
the civilian ponu ation?
From the civilian standpoint, not alone legitimacy of rule, but effective
control were dominant considerations. Even though their main strength was largely
confined to one portion of the Province, Japanese troops and their auxiliary Fili
pino constabulary, continued to make harrassing forays into the ungarrisoned
sectors.
What would be the legal effect of guerrilla decrees upon the civilian
population, in an area controlled fay an occupying belligerent power? Were these
decrees to be regarded as obligatory upon the civilian population, if continuous
and effective enforcement was impossible? Could the guerrilla authorities legally
mete out a summary "Justice” to those suspected of violating their compulsive
611
edicts? Could they legally commandeer vehicles and requisition foodstuffs and
materiel as an incident of a sovereign war-making power? Moreover, we may ask
whether a distinction may properly "be drawn between the legal effect of their
orders before and after recognition by Allied headquarters? What would be the
status at law of the decrees of the unrecognised guerrilla.administrations?
All of the queries thus far propounded have to do with alleged, guerrilla
wrong-doing. But a collateral deposit of cases, both criminal and civil, origi
nated under the Japanese administration, and came before the purview of the Com-
monvea",th courts.1 One might inquire concerning the permanent legal effect of ac-
tlorrs carried out in conformity w i t h Jc.pe.nene regulations in areas under effec
tive Japanese control. Are decisions rendered in o r d i n a r y criminal cases, pro
perly tried before Filipino tribunals in accordance with Philippines' law, re
versible today simply on the ground that the court was convoked under Japanese
auspices? What is the present standing of debts, contracted by way of borrowing
or as obligations incurred in the purchase of goods cr services, whet: negotiated
in terms 01 the Japanese peso? What is the present status of pre-war leans
amor it zed by agreement of all parties concerned during the Japanese period'! Is
the voluntary consent of both parties to the transaction a necessary element to
its legal consummation? hoes the transfer of title to landed properties during
the Japanese period constitute a different order of cases? Gan landlords then
living in Japanese controlled areas today initiate action at law to recover retro
actively unpaid rents from their tenants? Would it be relevant to inquire whether
the defaulting tenants were residing in Japanese or guerrilla-controlled areas?
A full inquiry into the issues here raised would be both pertinent and instructive,
Limitations of space forbid this excursus. Those interested in any or all of
these issues might encounter legal discussion in scattered opinions pronounced by
the Philippine judiciary. These opinions, handed down in the course of judgments
^See: Arnold Duncan McKair, Legal Effects of W a r , Cambridge University

Press (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 336-43.
T- "!
612
on cases rooted in war-time events may not prove conclusive, "but they may stimu
late the monograph-writers into undertaking a more exhaustive and perhaps more
penetrating analysis.
Public Health
History is replete with instances of disease following in the wake of
war. That Leyte should possess some special immunity was highly improbable.
Her population's resistance to disease had been lowered by wartime privations.
The medica1 facilities necessary for coping with disease were grossly inadequate.
Cardina’ nrincip'!es of sanitation were daily being violated. Only prompt action
ecu’ d stay the onslaught of virulent epidemic.
Fortunately for Leyte, the American military command was determined to
prevent these ravaging outbreaks. While yet the invasion battles were raging,
American medical personnel set up aid stations and treated wounded and ill Fili
pino civilians. Additional medical supplies were apportioned to the guerrilla
and subsequently to the Commonwealth authorities. And. a sanitary regimen was
speedily introduced.
The Commercial Agent took note of certain measures adopted in Tacloban:
Immediately after President Sergio Osmena. . . .set up his provisional

'capital in Tacloban, he caused to function right at once the local Health
Bureau. The Leyte Bureau of Health has been and is waging a sanitation
campaign in cooperation with the army in Tacloban and other towns. Posters
have been prepared urging the people to kill all flies and to dump their
garbage in the containers placed at strategic points by the army. . . .•*■
The American armed forces adopted the enlightened policy of not only aid
ing Leyte to deal with emergency problems of public health during the Liberation,
but of equipping the Province to advance its own health frontier. The Commercial
Agent declared jubilantly:
"^Jaca, on. cit., p. 3.
613
Leyte was the receipient of the first public health laboratory estab
lished on Philippine soil. . . • M is training Filipino personnel to
carry on with its work of improving sanitary conditions thruout the pro
vince. . . .Dr. Yirginio Fuentes, a Leyteno and veteran of the Bataan
campaign, heads the new laboratory, originally set up under the auspices
of PCAU 1.
The laboratory is at present undertaking the examination of local well
water and conducting health examinations of all persons who handle food.
Wells found to be contaminated are purified free of charge by the labora
tory.
Dr. Fuentes said the laboratory has invited the people of Leyte to send
in samples of their well water. Of the first ten samples submitted, Dr.
Fuentes said, only two were found to be free from infecting bacteria.
The work of the laboratory aleo includes blood and other examinations
for the detection of such diseases as typhoid and dysentery. A number of
tests have already been conducted for people from the interior. Later,
the laboratory will conduct serological examinations for syphilis. Other
work of the laboratory includes the culture of disease germs for study.
But one modern laboratory could hardly compensate for the inadequate fa
cilities and unhygience practices prevalent throughout the Island. The Commercial
Agent catalogued some of the deficiencies:
In all Leyte, there are at present 13 public markets without water

supply. . . .There are seven slaughter houses without rater supply. . . .
There are at present seven waterworks functioning in the province. . . .
The rater system in Tacloban is at present out of commission.^
There was every reason to suppose that this situation would improve con
siderably. On the other hand, a far-reaching and sustained program of fundamental
education in hygienic living would be needed to correct custom-embedded malprac
tices. The Commercial Agent touched upon sanitary garbage disposal. But he did
not refer to the related matter of allowing swine to scavenge amidst refuse
dumped under or in the vicinity of the nipa huts serving as the habitations of
the poor. Nor did he advert to the more delicate issue of the population’s
excretory practices. The Filipino public school children had been receiving a
good grounding in hygienic waste disposal in rural areas even before the war.
Îbid., p. 3.
2_
ibid., p p . 3-4.
Unfortunately, the variance "between the pedagogue's admonitions and household
custom was too great to permit lasting implantation of hygienic habits in the
bulk of the school children. But in the post-war era, the public schools of
Leyte were determined to inaugurate a program of adult education in this area.
Perseverance might bring results.
Leyte's public health program was a long-term affair, to be implemented
over the years. Immediately, however, two special problems— a heritage of the
war--required attention. Firstly, it would be necessary to wage an energetic
campaign to wipe out malaria on the Island. The disease had reached epidemic
proportions in the Palompon area— a final contribution to the Filipinos of Jap
anese soldiers, infected in the New Guinea Jungles. 3ut Filipino survivors of
the Eataan campaign returned to their home province as carriers of this malady,
and unwittingly helped its spread. Both to safeguard their own troops and to
assist, the Filipinos, American authorities on Leyte inaugurated, an anti-malarial
urogram. Chemical spray, to eradicate the mosquito pest, atabrine distribution
among the Jocal health officials, and an educational program in malarial pro
phylaxis were of tremendous value. With this beginning, the provincial officials
were well on the way to containing and then eliminating the malarial pockets on
the Island.
A more stubborn scourge to combat, because entrenched by human perversity,
was venereal disease. The contagion existed during the Japanese Occupation, but
was aggravated in the Liberation period by the host of prostitutes attracted to
Leyte and it's "Victory pesos". Again the American authorities were concerned
with checking this contagion, for the earless among the GIs were heirs presumptive.
Dr. Virginio Fuentes stated in interview that he v:as assigned by the PCAU as
Tacloban*s acting "city medical officer", with special responsibility for VD
control and sanitation enforcement among food handlers .•*• Fuentes was inclined to
^See: Municipal Council of Tacloban, Besolution No. 7, Nov. 14, 1944* Be-
solution No. 10, Nov. 22, 1944; Ordinance No. 2, Nov. 24, 1944.
favor segregated "red-light" districts, with compulsory medical examination
for the inmates of the local horadellos. But Taclohan's municipal council de
murred. Subsequently, he joined the staff of the army Base Surgeon's Office,
as gynecologist, treating Filipinos vho had contracted VD.
Meanwhile, Dr. Fuentes' two physician brothers, Manuel and Jesus, had
joined with him in opening the San Jose Civilian Hospital, which included a
special social hygiene clinic. Dr. Manuel Fuentes acknowledged (in interview)
the receipt of surgical instruments and hospital supplies from the U. S. Army
133rd General Hospital, from the PCAU, and subsequently, additional salvage ma
terials from army field hospitals. The brothers then opened another social
hygiene clinic at San Joaquin, Palo, and in February, 1946, City Hospital in
Tacloban.
By means of film documentaries, orientation lectures, and arresting posters,
the U. S. Army and Philippine Army also indoctrinated the troops on VD prophylaxis.
Frequently, VD films were included in the regular movie bill, shown to the troops
at night in the outdoor camp theatres. (An amusing side-]ight of these showings
was the embarrassment of the chaste Filipiras, not anticipating this type of
gratuitous "entertainment" as they huddiled' together at the rear of the movie
area.) Thus the combined resources of the American military and the Filipino
civilian officialdom converged to stamp out an ancient pestilence. If the full
attainment of this objective was not for the immediate future, at least there
was reason to hope that effective control was imminent.
The total health picture of Leyte, then, was not unfavorable. It would
be necessary to build up the stamina of the population, impaired by wartime mal
nutrition, exposure, and anxiety. The campaign to increase productivity and force
down prices on basic commodities, along with the utilization of science and the
dissemination of information about public hygiene promised substantial improvement
in Leyte's health standards.
616
Labor Relations:— Post-var Leyte has "been untouched so far by the social
unrest disturbing the Central Luzon provinces. The Commercial Agent thus accounts
for its tranquillity:
The labor situation in the province of Leyte is satisfactory. So

far, there is no unemployment -problem to tackle with in this part of the
country. . . .People do find work on various army projects and in the
farm if they prefer to go back to till the soil. The labor wages in the
province are very reasonable and commensurate with the present cost of
production of commodities. The lands in the Province of Leyte are well
and uniformly distributed among the people. The people are contented.
They have their own land where they can raise and produce crops from
which to derive their food and income with which to clothe and educate
their children.1
This idyllic sketch, acceptable in some respects, requires serious modi
fication. It is true that unemployment has not been a major concern of the Pro
vince. Nonetheless, temporary pools of unemployment did exist, comprised of
Filipinos displaced when the United States military establishments left the Is
land. These pools evaporated gradually, the unemployed being reabsorbed in farm
occupations. But it would be too early to say whether the farms can retain a
permanent hold over the rural population. Diminished spending power may cause
a hankering after other modes of employment.
The assertion that "the people are contented" is rather myopic. It de
rives from a static vision of human adjustment. It ignores the fact that Leyte's
leaders intend to develoo the Island's resources, involving a considerable measure
of technological innovation. The consequences of these changes may mean derange
ment of the present low-level equilibrium. For example, the adoption of strippir^;
machines by the abaca plantations may displace the hand-strippers. And more ex
tensive use of automobiles and buses will deprive the drivers of the horse-drawn
tartanillas of this source of livelihood.
As for the statement that "the lands. . . .are well and uniformly dis
tributed. . . — it is simply not true. In the west and northwest of the Island
Îbid., p. 28.
617
are to be found large haciendas, engaging the services of underpaid farm labor
ers. If elsewhere on the Island a high proportion of the farmers do own small
patches of land, it does not follow that they are able to properly "clothe and
educate their children". Indeed, the statistics on public school mortality
beyond the primary grades decisively refute this contention.* And surely the
data on criminality have some relevance to this entire issue.
What is a fair wage is a question difficult to resolve. Yet few would
concur with the Commercial. Agent in holding the median wage rate of PI.50, paid
to Leyte's farm laborers in 1945, to be ’’very reasonable", though more than double
the prevai'1ing rate of 1941. It is also significant that the so-called "high"
rate of P3.00 pain in 1945 had fallen by l/3 in 1346, as farm labor became more
plentiful. Many people we ire asking whether the 1941 "low” rate of P.30 would
be restored, once "normalcy" returned.4'
It must also be borne in mind that even in preponderantly rural Leyte,
wage labor other than farm hands was employed. In the words of Leyte's single
labor organization, "Los Obreros Unidos De Leyte" founded in 1939, some eighty
thousand workers, lacking in direction and leadership, were struggling in
wretchedness. In florid appeal, the union called upon the "children of sweat"
to achieve the "unity of the red ants" and find the "dynamic direction. . . .of
7 .
a new Mcses" who would "lead them to a new land of promise".0 (See Appendix
for text of Constitution.)
•^Joseph P.. Hayden has indicated the relationship of social class to edu
cation: "Only a profound alteration of the economic and socialsystem of the
nation can secure a popular acceptance of the idea that the people born at the
city laborer's or agricultural worker's level should be satisfied to have their
children receive an education planned, to enable them better to perform the func
tions of that cl.as3 rather than to give them direct access to ahigher class
. . . ." (The Philippines. Macmillan, 1945. p. 556)
Late of Wages of Farm Laborers in the Philippines, by Provinces: 1941,

■'.945, 1946, Tabê 46. p. 85. Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol. Ill, Jan.-
Dec., 1947. Manila, P. I.
3"
"Constitucion Social de Los Obreros Unidos De Leyte", p. 1. (Mimeographed)
618
Notwithstanding its inflammatory manifesto, the union had undertaken not
a single strike "before the war accordii^ to its president, Espiridion Brillo.
Possibly apathy might account for its impoverished membership of 400. The mem
bership was cut in half when the organization reopened its offices in 1945, the
majority being recruited from among the dock and warehouse workers. Given this
composition, it was problematic whether the organization would not stagnate once
the volume of merchandise handled at Tacloban1s port during the post-war boom
would begin to dwindle.
In order to prosper, a labor organization in Leyte would have to work to
raise farm wages. It could not hope to negotiate a contract with business firms
so long as the latter could tap the reservoir of cheap farm labor. But once bring
the level of farm wages into line with the prevailing urban rates and the drift
to the towns would diminish. Under such conditions, capital would not be adverse
to dealing with unionized labor, and union membership would expand.
Admittedly, this facile solution is a begging of the question. How raise .
farm wages? Perhaps Manila might legislate on the subject. Or perhaps the local
land-owning class, frightened by events in Central Luzon, might voluntarily initi
ate an ameliorative program, featuring wage boosts. At any rate, it was evident
that the structure of wages in Leyte was a unitary matter, and that an overhauling
was long past due. It would remain to be seen whether the influential groups in
the Province would act before the cleavages between classes had sharpened, and
bitterness had foreclosed peaceable discussion.1
"^For general discussion of organized labor in the Philippines, see:

Kenneth K. Kurihara, Labor in the Philippine Economy, Stanford University Press,
(1945, California), pp. 60-84.
’:-?,S;*§l?^;?»/';■ ^ ^ o- .:;--^
' 'Ji,5V';:
i ? V : ^ ~ - ‘V''?'--'---'"~c --- !v^^rS^? " V : " i - ' !'~ ‘^7'-;-'I:-'”1-' J- C' ^ r ; ■'*~ Y ; 0
,- - Beligion During the Liberation Period ^ 1 ~
-77' ,;- :: The Liberation "of 3^yfce vas received by .bhe .Island^ devout as an;occasion' .^
7, . for reiigioue thekkBgiving. For, as BonkLo-obseiTea, the ’'first act: of, the Conmon- '
’; wealth Government upon resuming the reins of government was to reopen the churches
., - . ' . and the schools.”
Church bells pealed a joyous invitation to. the Island’s Catholics to'assemble
for special devotions. And the worshippers had good cause to be thankful. For des- ■
,pite the physical damage sustained by some churches and ecclesiastical properties
- 'I' ■ . ■ ■* ' ' O
the "Christian religion", in the words of Bomulo, "held the Filipino to his church."
Of the church buildings themselves, the Commercial Agent reported:
During the Japanese occupation, some churches in Leyte were converted into
barracks and garrisons; and when the Americans landed in Leyte, all the churches
■were reopened except a few which were for a short time made as hospitals or
houses of refuge. The shell-scarred cathedral of Palo, Leyte, was for sometime
made a house of refuge where evacuated sick and wounded Filipinos and Americans
from Leyte combat zones were cared for.^
The bishopric of Palo (i.e., Leyte) at once undertook the resumption of
full diocesan functions: filling of priestly vacancies in the parishes,4 reac
tivation of lay auxiliary'organizations, reopening of parochial schools,® and
transfer of the seminary to Tanauan. In these activities, the bishop and parish
priests had the cooperation of American chaplains of Catholic faith. Catholic
^Bomulo, op. cit., p. 143. Îbid., p. 144. 3Jaca, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
^The following facts summarize the status of the diocese at the commencement
of the Liberation period!
"The Diocese of Palo (Leyte) was established in 1937 with Bt. Bev. Manuel
MaScarinas as its first and present bishop.
"Assigned to the 47 parishes in the Bishopric are 60 priests, 9 of them

aged. To every priest there are 14,700 souls.
"There are only 6 parochial schools and one College.
"Many churches are old and dilapidated. Some 15 of them are to be rebuilt.
"In the next 6 years there will be no more than 11 new priests to be turned *
. out by the major Seminary at Calbayog, Samar.
"The 25 Benedictine Sisters are the only nuns here. These Sisters and the
Society, of the,Divine Word, which came to Leyte in 1941,. are the only missionary or-
ganizations in this Diocese." (The Guardian, Vol. I; Bo. 1, p. 4,.July 21, 1945, p.2)
sThe following are the parochial schools, as of 1945r Hoiy Infant Academy,
Tacloban; Leyte Central Acadany/ Palp; Diocesan Seminary, Tanauan; Assumption Aca-
7r7 777.7'^j a e n i y - y s 7A c a d e ^ i T ; 'st* Peter’s Academy, Ormoc; Instituto
7-/'7."_7;;.' . ;Q-e San Jose; Msasin. . (ibid., p.. 2) J ... '.7:.7v7!7^.
620
GIs also donated generously to special Catholic welfare funds.1 Mutual visiting
"by American Catholic troops and Filipinos (both soldiers and civilians) at their
respective celebrations of mass had the effect not only of heightening religious
fervor but of fostering good "international" relations.
Aside from the United States publications which were avidly read by the
F i l i p i n o s t h e local Catholic press was the principal source of news to Leytenos
in the Liberation period. The Guardian, as the local paper was called, was pub
lished weekly in Tacloban by St. Paul's College, under the editorship of a former
high school teacher of English, Eamon Esperas.0 Its introductory issue proclaimed:
'The Bishop was especially interested in raising funds for a new seminary
building: "In connection with an island-wide campaign for the erection of a
seminary budd i n g in Leyte, Monsignor Manuel Mascarinas said that there is at pre
sent an insufficient sunrly of rriests to attend to the spiritual needs of almost
a m i n i o n inhabitants. . . .
"The Bishon has appealed to the generosity of the American Catholic sol
diers. In his message to the GIs in the field he said:
"'If the drive becomes a success, the seminary will be a monument to the
generosity of the American Catholic soldiers and the missionary spirit of their
Catholic Chaplains. Then the occupation of Leyte would mean not only the politi
cal liberation of the Filipino people, but also the reawakening of the Catholic
Faith. . . .'" (Ibid. , p. 2.)
rp
‘'"America's first step toward restoring democracy in Tacloban was to go to
press.
"As soon as the capital fell the men from the Office of War Information
scurried around to locate some means of spreading news. They discovered a press
the Japanese had overlooked in their flight, set it up, and went on a door-to-door
paper hunt. The municipal buildings contributed paper, so did the convent, and
the stores donated wrapping paper, until enough was gathered so the newsmen would
bring out the first single-sheet edition of the Leyte-Samar Free Philippines ,
printed in English for the Filipinos.
"In that first edition of Sunday, October 29, 1944, I announced the re
opening of the schools." (Eomulo, op. cit. , p. 143)
Thi3 newspaper continued publication for almost a year:
". . . .Its original staff was composed of 0UI newsmen headed by Frederic
S . Marquardt, former associate editor of the Philippines Free Fress. Editor
Marquardt was born in Tanauan, Leyte, son of V,. ¥. Marquardt who was one-time
division superintendent of schools for Leyte. . . .
"March 18, 1945 saw the last issue of this paper in Leyte. . . .
"With the signing of the instrument of Surrender by Japan, the Free Philip
pines as a Manila metropolitan daily brought to a clone its unique career Septem
ber 3. . . ." (The Guardian, Yol. I, V.o. 8, September 22, 1945, p. 2.)
"7
‘Esperas’ name had been compromised by his association with the collabora
tionist nress and school system. He decided, for the time being, to transfer to
the fie"! d of private education.
621
As implied by its name, The Guardian will therefore undertake to ad

vance and safeguard the interests of the schools and colleges under the
diocesan fold and help the parishioners get a more enlightened grasp of
practical Catholicism.and thus better appreciate the Church. . . .
It will strive to;serve. . . .because of the scarcity of newspapers
news and information of interest to the
This declared purpose was indeed a worthy one. Nonetheless, it is ques
tionable whether the journalistic needs of a million people were adequately
cared for by a paper avowedly parochial in outlook and objectives.
The Filipino Protestants of Leyte, numerically insignificant, took on a
new lease of life with the Liberation. The presence of American troops of Pro-
convinced that their future growth would remain stunted. They also seemed, to
m'.gh4- undertake in the missionary field, how, however, they were inspired to great
eyerrion.
ven more
religious services between American troops and Filipino provincials had an iu
spiring effect. The Filipino Protestants came into possession of great quantities
of religious literature: Protestant redactions of the Hew Testament, pocket-sized
prayer books and hymnals, and a variety of tractates dealing with Biblical themes.
In addition, GI Protestants donated generously to a religious expansion fund.
The subsidizing of several Protestant-maintainted non-sectarian schools (offering
•*d?he Guardian, Vol. I, Ho. 1, July 21, 1945, p. 1

'We are sending this week subscription forms for the Guardian which is
now hitting the street every Saturday afternoon. The yearly subscription rate
is P5.00; outside of Tacloban, P6.00. Limited advertisements are accepted at
the rate of P5.00 per column inch." (The Guardian, Vol. I, Ho. 6, September 22,
1945, p. 2.)
religious instruction from the Protestant standpoint, along with the secular
curriculum) bore testimony to the fruits of these efforts.^
It might be noted.in passing that casual visits by curious Filipinos to
Jewish services (conducted under United States Army auspices) constituted their
first direct contacts with Judaism and helped dispel many bizarre notions. More
important, the fact that Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish soldier worshippers
could assemble in the same chapel (sometimes at a service conducted by a chap
lain outside of their own faith) helped to drive home the implications of demo
cratic living.
Education
Resumption of Public Education
The Filipino passion for education showed itself in the alacrity with
which the government reopened the public schools. The immediate aide to Presi
dent Osmena, Brigadier General Carlo3 F.omulo, appointed Acting Secretary of
Pub]ic Education, took a deer personal interest in education. Ee was most anxious
to recommence public education as a sign of renormalization of Filipino national
life. He commented mournful]y:
By closing of the schools the Japanese set back literacy in the

Islands by at least five years. . . .They had forced Nipponese restric
tions upon the schools of which the Filipinos had been so proud, for
these American schools had been paid for by us, by our own taxes. . . .2
It was in Tacloban, provisional capital of the Philippines, that the pub
lic schools first resumed instruction. 2 Bomulo has written a poignant description
•k)n October 20, 1945, Bev. Jacinto G. Dayola, director of the Liberation
Memorial'School at Carigara, arranged a special program dedicating his schools to
the American Liberators, especially to the "Chaplains and their men who have made
the Liberation Memorial School a reality". The Eev. Juan I. Pia of the United
Evangelical Church, Tacloban, acknowledged (in interview) theaid contributed by
American servicemen to the Maasin Institute. It might be noted that American mem
bers of the Masonic Order also took up a collection for the restoration of the
battered Masonic Temple, located in Tacloban.
^Romulo, op. cit., p. 144.

^The Acting Division Superintendent of Schools of the Occupation, Florentine
Kapili, continued in office during the first months of the Liberation, until re
placed. He did not retire thereafter from public education: "Florentino Kapili
. . . .has recently been appointed principalof the Zamboanga llormal School."
(The Guardian, Vol. I, Ho. 17, Dec. 8, 1945, p. 2.)
623
of the pupils' reaction on that memorable first morning:
. . . .When they first marched in they did not seem to be like children
at all. They were queer little people of a race I did not know. Their
hair was cut Japanese fashion and they marched like robots.
Then they saw us standing beside their teachers— President Osmena and
his cabinet and General Fellers and former Vice-Governor Hayden, and they
saw their teachers weie both smiling and wet-eyed. They stared at us, im
passively as little idols, not daring to break the mask fear had placed
over their faces for so long. And suddenly, all together, their quavering
childish voices burst out into the song, 'God Bless America'. . . .
And then, as tangible evidence of the renaissance of the spirit that
had come back to the Philippines, the school-teachers brought back to the
schoolrooms the American schoolbooks that had long been buried in large
tin oil cans in the earth'.
By March of 1945, the Division Superintendent of Schools for Leyte re
ported:
There are 47 municipalities in Leyte. Schools are reopened in all,

except in Villaba and San Isidro.2 . . . .The high school is functioning as
efficiently as it can be made possible under these trying circumstances.
. . . .The possible reopening of the Baybay Agricultural School needs at
tention. ^
In some municipalities, schools could not open because of the scarcity
of indispensable equipment. The Department of Public Instruction had issued a
strict ruling that schools unable to collect the basic minimum of equipment by
the close of January, 1945, should postpone their reopening until the commence
ment of the next school year in July.^
Eeporting on conditions in Eastern Leyte, the Academic Supervisor of East
Leyte stated:
Much property has been destroyed during the Japanese occupation.

Furniture and equipment and instructional materials were used as fuel or
firewood by enemy forces, and school plants were damaged or razed to the
ground by burning or through shelling and b o m b i n g . ^
•*T b i d . , pp. 145-6.

2After the battle of Ormoc, the Japanese retreated along the West Coast,
taking their last stand in the municipalities cited. This delayed the reopenirg of
the schools in this district. Moreover, the presence of diseased Japanese and de
caying cadavers spread infection among the local population, precluding the assemblage
of school children in a public place.
°F. Kapili, Acting Div. Supt. of Schools. March 14, 1945. Memorandum to:
My Successor, 0. A. Babacock.
^F. Kapili, Acting Div. Supt. Jan. 13, 1945. Div. Memo. Ho. 1, s 1945.
B e n i t o Saavedra, Acad. Sup. E. Leyte. May 11, 1946. To: The Div. Supt.,
Leyte.
The estimated cost of repair of partially damaged buildir^s was fixed at
P313,400. The estimated cost of reconstruction of totally destroyed buildings
was put at P 885,400. This meant that P I ,198,800 would have to be spent to restore
schoo] buildings demolished during the war.^
For many people, the schools of Leyte were the pillars of stability and
hopefulness in the turbulent, post-war period. A local college student, veteran
of many guerrilla actions against the Japanese, expressed this feeling with
sincere simplicity:
With all these high schools and colleges established in Leyte, Leyte
will someday come to the front as a literate province, no loqger a land
of roving bandits and crime-hungry people. Peace and order are coming
back to Leyte, especially with the extension of the Filipino GI bill of
Eights to recognized or deserving guerrillas. . . .Sooner or later, social
conditions in Leyte will improve and be elevated and less crimes committed,
due to the establishment of schools in the interior towns, in which places
crimes are rampant, and peace and order is always threatened. . .
Despite the difficulties of the times, there were indications of some
growth in Leyte’s educational program. Whereas in the academic year 1939-40,
some 99,117 pupils were enroled in elementary schools, 155,593 were found in
1945-46. That this was no ephemeral affair, occasioned by a sense of relief
after expulsion of the invader, might be judged by the persistence of the trend
into 1947. In October of that year, elementary school attendance was up at the
192,553 mark, a noteworthy growth. We also find an increase in the number of
barrio schools serving the rural population from 562 in 1940 to 870 in 1947.^
^"Summary Report of Damaged School Buildings by Provinces", Leyte, as of

July 15, 1946.
‘Trimo Talacay. Nov. 12, 1946. To: Mr. Elmer N. Lear.

*2
"Comparative Data for Leyte" Bureau of Public Schools, March, 1940-
October, 1947.
625
Perhaps-more significant from the standpoint of a literate, civic-,
minded population was the growth of the secondary school population fiom 2,341
in 1 940 to 7,432 in 1947.“ Thife increase represented a change in the ratio of
the secondary school population from 2.455? to 3.78$. And if we break down the
el ementary school figures into the subdivisions of primary and intermediate
pupils, we find a significant realignment of percentages in the intermediate
component, as compared with the aggregate school population from 10.07$ in 1940
to 11.50$ in 1947.
Part of the increase in the secondary school enrolment is to he accounted
for cy the appearance of a' new piênomenon in Leyte, the junior high school.
Thanks to municipal initiative, several junior high schools were established in
the interior of the Island: at Alangalang, Baybay, Burauen, Cabalian, and Laval
Isidro attributes the coming of the junior high school to the war:
One of the latest developments in Philippine secondary education is the

organization of high schools in municipalities other than the provincial
capitals. They are generally known as junior high schools, although their
functions and curriculum are not different from those of high schools es
tablished in the provincial, capitals. In fact, they might be called com
munity high schools. . . .
The community high school ic a post-war institution. It is an out
growth of the extensive devastation caused by the war. The destruction of
many provincial high school buildings, the lack of boarding facilities in
the nrovincial capitals, the accumulation of students who had become over
age, and a resurging thirst for education made it imperative that oppor
tunities for secondary education be made available in the larger munici-
ra1 ities. As a result, many such municipalities requested the Bureau of
Public Schools to allow them to establish schools offering at least the
he here call attention to the selective factor at work in determining

which of the elementary school pupils will go ahead with their studies. It is
disclosed in a comparison of the promotional ratios found on the different school
levels. Whereas 86.91$ of the primary grade pupils were promoted in 1947, 94.79$
of the intermediate pupils and 98.56$ of the secondary pupils advanced to the
next higher grade. ("Comparative Bata for Leyte"--Bureau of Publid Schools--
March, 1940-October, 1947)
g
"Opening of first and second year classes for beys and girls in Baybay
High School has been approved by the Department of Instruction. Some 232 stu
dents have been enrolled, according to reliable information." (The Guardian.
Vol. I, Ho. 6, September 22, 1945, p. 2.)
/
626
first two years of high Bchools. It vas believed that this was the beat
way to aeet the increased demand for secondary education. Moreover, the
establislnent of community high schools vould enable the pporer students
to obtain a high school education and thus promote a greater democratiza
tion of our educational system. . . .
Farther expansion would await increase of Leyte's educational allowance
by the central office — a move dependent upon Increase of the total grant to the
Department of Education.2 Leyte's share in the academic year 1947-48 stood at
P3,2007,668— a sum scarcely adequate for the magnitude of the Job in which it
was to be employed. But the proposed allotment for 1948-49 showed an insignifi
cant gain, viz., 53,275,709.
Joseph B. Hayden, one of America's outstanding experts on Philippine af
fairs, summed up concisely the educational needs of that nation:
. . . .putting a sufficient number of children in school at the various

educational levels; keeping them there long enough to give them a fair
chance of retaining in later life a reasonable proportion of what the
schools have to offer; and providing them with instruction which is good
enough to develop in them the qualities sought for.3
Improving Instruction
The needs of Leyte were not at variance with those of the country as a
whole. And here, too, the problem of qualitative as well as quantitative growth
was Important.
Both Academic Supervisors of the school division of Leyte offered some
practical recommendations for improving the quality of instruction. Benito
Saavedra noted certain organizational confusion that needed attention:
^•Isidro, op. clt.. p. 155.

2It should be noted that educational expansion was also hampered by a
critical shortage of teachers— which condition, of course, was traceable to the
same financial stringency: "Only 53 per cent of the pre-war number of teachers
reported for duty, according.to Yenancio Trinidad, acting superintendent of Manila
city schools. The reason for this small percentage. . . .is the fact that most
teachers have found employment either in other branches of the government service
or In the U. S. Army, where salaries are higher than they had previously received."
Leyte's crisis, while less acute, vas nonetheless severe. (The Guardian. Vol. I,
Ho. 12, Hovember 3, 1945. p. 2.)
Hayden, op. clt.. p. 469.
627
More-thorough knowledge of the scope of work in each grade by principals and

district supervisors. This school year, as late as January or February, grade
two classes were found still doing grade one work, grade three classes doing
grade two work, and grade four classes doing grade three work.1
And Vicente Villegas advised:
The test and measurement division of the Department of Instruction

should devise tests for the measurement of attitudes, interests, ideals
and improved ways of thinking which are receiving much emphasis as aims
of education. The standard tests sent to the field measure achievements
only in knowledge, understanding, and concepts. They do not evaluate the
growth of the pupils in total behavior. Consequently teachers emphasize
only aims for which tests have been devised.^
Both academic supervisors looked towards some kind of in-service training
for the teachers to enlarge their professional horizon and improve their classroom
techniques. Saavedra recommended:
that universities or colleges give teachers of tested ability, say excel

lent or above average in efficiency rating, a chance to study on a contract
plan. They take the tests on the subject or subjects contracted during
the stunner vacation and may take up some more subjects during the vacation
classes.3"4
Benito Saavedra, Academic Supervisor, E. Leyte. May 11, 1946. To: Div.
Supt. of Schools, Leyte.
^Vicente J. Villegas, Academic Supervisor, W. Leyte. May 14, 1946. To:
Div. Supt. of Schools, Leyte.
5
Saavedra, op. cit., p. 3.
4
In 1947, the Bureau of Public Schools announced:
"Vacation classes will be held for teachers in the service during May and
June, 1948 at Teachers Camp, Baguio, at the Philippine School of Arts and Trades,
Manila, and at the following normal schools (5 specified, Cebu Normal School in
Cebu City being the closest to Leyte). The following courses will be offered if
there are enough applicants to warrant their organization.
a. Normal courses of the two-year general curriculum
b. Home economics course (to be offered only in the Philippine Normal School,
Manila)
c. Special courses for secondary normal graduates.
d. Secondary normal courses (in Cebu and Zaniboanaga only)
e. Various courses in physical education and folk dancing (in Manila only)
f. The usual summer courses (in the teachers curriculum) offered in the Philip
pine School of Arts and Trades, Manila
g. School nursing, first aid, and remedial work (in Manila only)
h. Professional courses for supervisors and principals. . . . "
(Esteban B . Abada. Director of Public Schools, Memo No. 54, s 1947, to Div. Supt.,
December 11, 1947.)
628
And Villegas put forward this schema:
Division and district supervisors should be assigned to teach Principles

of Teaching and Principles of Education and allied subjects in both public
and private normal schools in order to bridge the vide gap separating educa
tional theory from actual practice in classroom.
He also took note of a condition which threatened to damage the standards
of teaching in the Province: "Closer supervision should be given the normal schools
run by private enterprise. Their graduates are all assigned to the public schools.
Close supervision will cause a gradual rise in standards."■*•
Finally, Saavedra alluded to the financial .straits of the teachers,
recommending:
. . . .that the bonus now being given teachers should be maintained

until Congress can give a minimum entrance salary of at least P80. Teachers
and supervisors who are receiving more than P100 per month should be given
a little consideration. Many supervisors are spending more than P300 a
month.
Bruno Lasker attributes to Mrs. Marie Keesing the recommendation of four
principles which, if put into practice, may contribute immeasurably to increasing
the capacity of Leyte's common people for self-rule:
. . . .demonstration (especially in relation to the economic life, matters

of health, and technical improvements of all sorts, where the value of
proposed innovations can best be brought to popular appreciation, leaving
no doubt as to their results); visual modes of teaching, rather than reli
ance on words; democratic procedure (presumably something akin to the methods
practiced in our progressive schools); and the most rapid possible substitu
tion of educated native for even the best non-native leadership.5
Leyte would do well to emulate the practices of the more progressive rural
schools found in the United States of America. It has yet to work out a truly inte
grated curriculum whose subject-matter is the life of the community, not artificially
^Villegas, op. cit.. p. 5.

9 '
'Saavedra, op. cit., p. 4.
'^Bruno Lasker, "Training for Native Self-Buie", Supplement to Educational
Progress in S. E. Asia— IPB Series, (New York, 1943), p. 171.
4 629
splintered iofco disparate subjects. The project method (built around the
landscape, the resources, the occupations, the social and political life of the
comaunlty, vorking vith the techniques and materials of the industrial arts,
utilizing the skill subjects as tools in problem-solving, exploiting the local
resources of specialized personnel and institutions as educational media, and
above all— instituting a democratic classroom procedure in determlniig what and
how shall the pupils study) more extensively and systematically used may go far
towards the vital!zatiop of teaching procedure. Heedless to say, the most per
spicacious techniques may be rendered opaque by a centralized administration pre
suming to dictate what shall be taught in all the minutiae. Until there is
further devolution of administrative control in the field of education, progress
in the direction advocated will most likely be blocked.
What should be the long-range alms of elementary education in Leyte?
Academic Supervisor Villegas felt that there vas need to answer this question in
order to determine the proper way to present the subject-matter. He offered a
tentative formulation, "after consulting the Philippine Constitution, the report
of the Director of Education for the school year 1940, and the various profes
sional bookB and magazines." For the primary grades:
To equip the child vith effective habits and skills, functional knowledge,
understanding, concepts, and other attainments under this grouping, worth
while interests, vholesome attitudes, worthy ideals and standards, and
improved vays of thinking which are essential for the unification and in
tegration of the members of a democratic society and for active participa
tion in that society. Included in this equipment are: a comnand of the
functional processes, desirable health habits, personal discipline, moral
character, civic conscience. . . .
For the intermediate grades, Villegas regarded the alms as: "to con
tinue on a higher level the integrating function begun in the lower grades, to
develop the ability to do some constructive and non-vocational work, and to
understand the natural and social phenomena."
630
Yillegas believed that the post-var society demanded such qualities In
its adult members as could be secured only by emphasizing in the education of the
young these aims: "To develop citizens who are: intensely patriotic, physically
veil-built, mentally alert, morally straight, and capable of thinking for them
selves."1
Higher Education
Some Leyte nos, looking out over Ormoc Bay towards Cebu, were appalled by
the disparity in cultural life of the two islands. Leyte, indeed, could not hope
to rival Cebu, but she need not lag so far behind. They resolved that the post
war era must be one of general development, in which Leyte’s cultural life would
forge ahead. The attainment of this objective, in part at least, called for the
founding of a local college.
On the Vest Coast, some of the former leaders and active supporters of
the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces pooled their resources to establish
the Western Leyte College in Ormoc. It vas their belief that Ormoc should be
able to take care of the educational needs of West Leyte's youth, so thatthey
need not cross water to Cebu City or to Silliman University in Dumaguete.
St. Paul’8 College in Tacloban superseded the former Tacloban Catholic
Institute.^ Its instructor of freshman English, Esmon Esperas, stated that 180
students were enroled in this division at the end of 1945. They were taking
courses in education, pre-lav, pre-medicine, and business administration. All
^Villegas, op. cit.. p. 3.

2"To meet the insistent demand for collegiate courses in Tacloban. . . .
the Divine Word Fathers under the directorship of Eev. Father Stoll, have opened
a new college named 'St. Paul's'. . . .The former Tacloban Catholic Institute
. . . .has been incorporated as Junior College, thereby losing its old name. . . ,
"The school is owned by the Diocese of Palo (Leyte). The administration
lies inthe hands of the Society of the Divine Word. . . .
"The college may be considered as a branch of the San Carlos College,
Cebu."
(The Guardian. Yol. I, Ho. 1, Jhly 21, 1945.)
631
50 of the education majors were female, as were most of the business majors.
The aale students predominated in pre-medicine, while there were only 8 pre-law
female enrolees. The school was lacking in textbooks and laboratory equipment.
The religious order SVD (Sociedad del Yerbo Divine) administered the
college. One member, serving as dean, taught philosophy; two others taught
J
courses in religion. All three members of the Order held master's degrees. The
lay members of the 25-man staff held bachelor's degrees, and were compensated at
the rate of P40 per student-class.
Also enlarging its structure was the Leyte Institute, whose collegiate
department opened in Tacloban in October, 1945, under the personal direction of
Attorney Astilla. Among its faculty members were Amador Daguio, a well-known
Leyte writer teaching English^; Jose Cusi, teaching political science and serving
as registrar; and the logic Instructor, Cabanatan, holding an M.A. from the Uni
versity of Michigan.
The enrolment was small: 17 students in the pre-law sequence; 8 in busi
ness administration; 7 in education; and 7 special students. The students were
paying a tuition fee of PI40 per eemestre. Vith a rental of F300 per month, the
school was spending some PI,200 per month, and allegedly losing P200-300 monthly.
What should be the function of higher education in Leyte? Is the college
to be the agency whereby the traditional in Filipino culture is exposed as com
pletely obsolete, to be superseded by the culture of the West? Some Filipinos
do see it this way. But a greater proportion are more in accord with Bruno
Lasker when he writes:

The creative ability shown by those Orientals who have had the chance
to combine a knowledge of Western science with respect for their own
people and their historic culture is the best answer to those who see
^Daguio had succeeded in clearing himself of "collaborationist" charges.

He secured employment subsequently with the Infoxmation and Education Bureau of
Base K, U. S. Army. His assignment included responsibility for helping to put
out the Base newspaper, The Banner", including the writing of occasional un
signed articles.
632
only * disruptive force in modern education, and especially in higher

education. . . .Foreign learning itself— or, better, modern learnirg,
for, its sources are no longer limited todistantlarda— when pursued
far enough will turn the oriental student back from too intensive a
longing for the external finish and glitter of occidental accomplishment
to a fairer appraisal of his own heritage.
The development of higher education in Leyte promisee to possible
the proper amalgam of the traditional culture vith the scientific disciplines of
the West. In the past, too many of Leyte's more gifted sons vent to Manila to
pursue their advanced study. Having enjoyed the amenities of cosmopolitan life,
they developed an aversion for the "barbarisms" of their home province, and were
reluctant to return. But Leyte badly needed their services:
In as far as modernization of attitudes and skills is indispensable

for the entrance of pre-industrial societies into the modern world, there
is need for specialization— perhaps even for the deliberate creation of
vocational and professional classes so that the interests of every group
of the population may find full scope when all take part in the management
of their common affairs.2
Hot all of Leyte's "Manila-products" remained expatriates of their home
province. Many returned— some, unhappily, vith the attitude that a perquisite
of their diploma vas the exploitation of their native fellov-provlncials, either
through politics or through business. Furnivail notes: "The Philippines are
overrun with lawyers. . . .There is a demand for Western lawyers, and the supply
tends to exceed the demand, lowering standards of legal practice, until it be
comes synonymous vith sharp practice These lawyers frequently become office-
seekers in Leyte, both in the provincial and municipal goverments • This, in
itself, is no evil. But some of these men, frustrated in their professional am
bitions, inwardly resolve to mulct the body politic, and acquire the means of
living on a scale agreeable to their cultivated appetites.
^Lasher, op. clt.. pp. 146-47.

2Ibld.. p. 163.
3
J. S. Furnivall. Educational Progress in Southeast Asia. Institute of
Pacific Belations. H. Y., 1943. p. 116.
633
Medical practitioners can make a far more Important contribution to the
life of Leyte than can the lawyers. The Province badly needs their services.
" l e t o b s e r v e s Furnivall, "everywhere the people prefer their native healers."
Haturally, the aspiring professional will avoid a field that seems unable to
absorb them.
Fumivall goes on to say:
Similarly, there is a very limited demand for engineers and other

technicians. In the construction of village buildings, roads, bridges,
Irrigation works and so on, Western methods are no more demonstrably suc
cessful or economic than they are in native agriculture. With the ex
ceptions. . . .of bicycles and the petrol engine, the demand for techni
cians hardly extends beyond the Western element in the community. . . .
Vocational Education
The entire question of vocational education is raised by this discussion,
and deserves more extended treatment. Writing of the situation in the Philip
pines on the eve of the war, Furnivail says:
Despite the abundant provision for vocational instructions this re

mains unpopular, and the academic course is overcrowded, though the value
of its diplomas continually declines. . . .The Monroe Survey criticized
the vocational training as 'not suited to the Immediate needs of the
country,' and recommended every endeavor to attract boys to rural high
schools. Another inquiry, in 1930, found that some courses still gave a
trainii£ for which there was no demand, and that 'only a small propor
tion of the students in the specialized courses in agriculture and the
industrial arts later entered the vocations for which they were trained.'
In 1938, of 76,000 pupils in the high schools, only 9,000 were in the
trade schools and 4,600 in the agricultural schools, and 'it is a matter
of common knowledge that a large proportion of the students attending
them are there not because they wish to take the vocational work offered,
but because the vocational schools are free and in some cases provide op
portunities for self-support.' Only the prospect of starvation will drive
them, discontented, back to the land.2
Many students of the Philippines seek to explain the unpopularity of
vocational educationbb but one facet of the generalized disparagement of manual
1Ibid., p. 117.
2Ibld.. pp. 93-4.
634
labor, itself a concomitant of the long Spanish rale and the Spanish scale of
■values. To a large extent this argument is admissible. But there is more to
it. All education is preparatory, in part, to the business of gaining a liveli
hood. The youth, pondering oyer the range of occupations open to him, tends to
select that educational sequence which will prepare him for the occupation of
his choice. In the Philippines— and we may specify Leyte— the occupational
range has been very limited. Together with Furnivall, we may declare: "The fact
is that industrial education has 'operated in a vacuum'; business is still largely
in the hands of foreigners. . . ,m1
The attempt to fuse vocational and general instruction is an attempt to
"liberalize" education in the fullest meaning of the word. John Dewey points
out that the industrial arts were invidiously contrasted with the "liberal arts"
in the past: "The useful or industrial arts were acquired by sheer apprentice
ship in fixed routines in which insight into principles played a negligible part
. . . .They are now technological, a fact which signifies that they are founded
in scientific understanding of underlying principles."2
Dewey emphasized the fact that social organization has been transformed:
The distinction between 'liberal* and 'useful* arts is a product of

the time when those engaged in industrial production were mechanics and
artisans who occupied a servile status. The meaning attached to the tra
ditional doctrine of liberal arts cannot be understood except in connec
tion with the social fact of division between free men and slaves and
serfs, and the fact that only the former received an 'intellectual educa
tion' , which under the given conditions necessarily meant literary and
linguistic training.3
Of course, it is true that Dewey is not writing specifically of the Philip
pines, and that the political democracy found there is not identifiable with social
Îbid.. p.94.
2John Dewey, Problems of M e n . Philosophical Library, B. T., 1946. p. 84.
3Ibld., p. 84.
democracy. Yet, it Is undeniable that social mobility is on the increase there,
too, and that this change requires an intellectual sanction in the content of
the curriculum. In the combination of academic and vocational subject matter
the educator must see to it
that the technical subjects which are nov socially necessary acquire a
humane direction. . . .The outstanding need is interfusion of knowledge
of man and nature, of vocational preparation vith a deep sense of the
social foundations and social consequences of industry and industrial
callings in contemporary society,1
The spurt of intensified American influence following the GI landless
had definite bearing upon the matter under analysis here— although how much it
is difficult to assess. Wherever an American military installation appeared,
there vas the ubiquitous "Jeep”, symbol of American mechanical genius. And vith
the Jeep and other motor equipment vent crews of maintenance men. Ths multi
farious activities falling upon ordinance outfits, motor pools, and engineering
detachments required the recruitment of local labor. Not only did these openiz^s
provide positions for skilled and semi-skilled Filipino mechanics; they also at
tracted untrained youths., offering an opportunity to acquire skills on the Job.
But above all, the very manifest esteem with which all American soldiers seemed
to hold mechanical ability had a galvanizing effect upon the local people. Was
it not the case that American culture and opulence rested on her power, and vas
not this power a function of the massive industrial machine under operation?
Admiration for American fighting power and operational efficiency in con
structing camps, laying down landing fields and roads, equipping motor pools,
kitchens, field hospitals, radar stations vith the latest devices, providing
electricity and moving pictures everywhere, eradicating mosquitoes and conducting
1Ibid., p. 87.
636
large-scale sanitary operations must have stirred many youthful minds to the
advantages inhering in these scientific techinques for the further development
of Leyte. Surely acquisition of the modern techniques of production, transpor
tation and communication vas a vorthy subject of study. Thus Filipino attitudes
towards the manual skills and towards the vocational schools vhere they were
taught underwent some revision.
In agriculture, the problem is less acute. Here it is possible to apply
principles of scientific farming directly to small-scale cultivation, vith the
consequences isnediately patent. Schools of agriculture and demonstration farms,
run along American lines vith necessary adaptation to altered conditions, have
been more readily integrated into the community pattern. We may expect the in
creasing utilization of machinery by the larger plantations engaged in raisirg
cash crope.
The viability of the Philippine Bepublic is dependent upon its capacity
to achieve the degree of modernization necessary for competition in this inter
related vorld. The government has fully recognized this necessity, Lasker states,
and
has tried in recent pre-war years to reinforce its own existence

through education for economic as well as social and political self-
determination. Here the campaign against illiteracy has been linked up
vith parallel forward movements in vocational and a more widely diffused
higher education. . . .To some extent they have helped to dignify labor,
to elicit local initiative, and to train for responsible leadership.*
Leyte‘s income depends primarily upon the extractive occupations. Its
population is rural, and no doubt will continue as such. But without the corro
sion of its basic character, it can graft on to itself much of the technical
know-how largely introduced by contact vith the United States. A variety of
processing industries can be developed as auxiliaries of fishing and agriculture,
*Lasker, op. clt.. p. 159.
637
and the provincial mineral resources can "be more systematically exploited.
Public vorks projects in road construction, rural electrification, malarial con
trol, vater purification, and sanitation can raise the general level of health
and augment income.
The linking of the economic affairs of a commanity vith its schools as
a means of fostering a more thoroughgoing, realistic, and democratic education
is advocated hy Marie Eeesing:
A primary need in most of the countries and dependencies is the de

velopment of the local economy as a first claim on the educational sys
tem. Public vorks of one kind or another may give rise to projects on
vhlch primary and vocational education can he centered at the same time
that basic needs are met and basic problems solved— at the same time,
this usually means that the community is brought into beneficial contact
vith civilization.1
The public schools have heretofore paid insufficient attention to the
marketing of farm produce. In Leyte, vhere hemp, coconut products, and tobacco
play a significant part in the provincial economy, the population is sensitive
to market conditions. Until nov, the United States, has been a major factor in
the absorption of Leyte’s crop exports. But vith independence for the Philip
pines, and the satisfaction of the backlog in orders for tropical products,
Leyte's economy may face a severe crisis.
In 1936, the nature of this crisis vas apparent to Grayson Kirk. He
vrote:
Over the period of a quarter of a century this export trade has been
built up on the basis of free and unlimited access to one of the greatest
consumption markets of the vorld. It has been neither possible nor neces
sary for the Islanders to diversify their production or to search actively
for non-American market outlets. Under the terms of the Independence act
this great export market is nov to be closed, and the Philippines vill be
faced vith the dismal prospect of marketing their vaxea over an unassail
able American tariff barrier, or, failing that, of seeking nev markets
elsevhere.2
1Ibld.. p. 170.
‘'Grayson L. Kirk. Philippine Independence. Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.,

1936. p. 209.
638
The final terns of Philippine independence differed in detail but not
in principle from those set forth in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Act Kirk had
in mind. And independence precipitated the momentous question for the Filipinos
of whether or not they should continue to plant cash crops, or diversify their
agriculture for home consumption.^ It should be one of the tasks taken up by
the school to explore questions of this kind, in addition to acquainting the
younger generation with the technical phase of agriculture.
The vocational education of the future must be focused upon such topics.
And it must acquaint the students not only with the scientific information in the
narrow sense, but also demonstrate to them the forms of social organization best
adapted for such purposes.
A concomitant of the American Influence in education has been the undue
adulation of individualism. (This is not to argue against the individualistic
forces operative in the Spanish and native Malayan components of this polyglot
culture.) If education is to play a real and significant role in the life of the
Leytenos, it must prepare the young for a life of civic and vocational coopera
tion. To quote Lasker again:
Of course, no one believes that higher productivity alone will insure

a higher degree of prosperity. The producer must also be able to hold on
to his fair share in his product and know how to put it to uses that bene
fit him and his fellows. . . .But the more discerning of the educators at
least realize that there will be little lasting Improvement in the condi
tion of the masses unless they also learn to organize for the protection
of their economic interests. . . .
^The Philippine Trade Act of 1946 postponed a final solution b y guaran

teeing a preferential United States market for Philippine products for a period
of 28 years. For 8 years, the pre-war duty-free system was to continue. During
the ensuing 20 years, a graduated tariff would be Imposed on these commodities,
the annual Increment to the tariff rate being 5$. (Public Law 371— 79th Congress)
Masker, op. clt.. p. 131.
639
The cooperative, both the producers1 and consumers' variety, holds forth
many possibilities of most effectively implementing these p u r p o s e s T h e Filipino
individualism must be modified sufficiently to allow of such developments. Simi
larly* rural organization of farm labor is a subject scarcely knovn to the inhabi
tants of Leyte. But if undertaken by some of Leyte's young men, who have had the
benefit of an advanced education in social science together with an agricultural
training, the possibilities for achieving both social Justice and higher living
standards are considerable.
Adult Education
It has been found that modern scientific education makes the greatest
headway among children of unschooled parents when these adults themselves enrol in
extension programs of fundamental education. Then, the parents no longer fear this
education as some evil brew, of which their children will drink and be transformed,
so that they disavow an affinity for the traditional way of life. Neither will the
more ambitious parents entertain false illusions about the potency and functions
of this education, imagining that its sole purpose is to equip their offspring for
positions of power in the nation. B y understanding the nature of educational
subject-matter through first-hand acquaintance, they will be inclined to permit
their children to continue with their studies--at least through the intermediate
division and, with greater frequency, on through secondary school.
^Ln the past few years, a wide variety of consumers' cooperatives has
come into being throughout the Philippines. Thus in Leyte:
"The Leyte government employees have organized.... 'Government Employees
Cooperative Association' or 'GECA' for short. Seme of the members sometimes call
it the Good ECA. Its officers are
"Pres .— Enrique Potente; Vice-Pres.— Vicente Mate; Auditor— Federico
Gaviola. . . .
"This association gets a regular supply of commodities from the ECA. . . .”
(The Guardian. Vol. I, No. 17, December 8, 1945, p. 1.)
The possibilities for good inherent in many of these cooperatives was
vitiated by the narrow nationalism animating them. They sometimes degenerated into
transparent "fronts" for businessmen, dedicated to wresting control of merchandis
ing from Chinese merchants, long resident in the Islands.
640
Granted--how then are the adults to he weaned away from their antipathy
or sheer Indifference to the new-fangled "book-learning"?
Before the people can want the knowledge and skills which schools nay
be able to give their children, they must have been brought into contact
with that side of their pluralistic universe in which these things count;
and this contact can most effectively be established by leading members of
their own comnunity in whom they trust.
Bruno Lasker is sayiig that the initiative in the promotion of fundamental
educational programs must be taken by the acknowledged leaders of the cosmunlties,
and not by well-wishing interlopers who lack rapport with the ordinary folk. And
the process is a reciprocal one. As Lasker further argues:
Without the elementary disciplines, especially without literacy, it

is exceedingly difficult for simple peasant and laboring folk to form
criteria with which to judge the bona fldes (italics) or the ability of
those who offer themselves for posts of leadership. . . .The populace
must be at least far enough advanced in m o d e m knowledge to understand
ftiws and to comprehend the general character of proposed means.
But it is needless to spell out the benefits conferred by literacy upon a
rural, pro-industrial folk. The important question is one of the form it shall
take. Lasker noted:
. . . .already, in recent pre-war years, the Commonwealth Government,

seeing the greatest hindrance to progress in the ignorance of the average
villager who has had only a very few years of elementary schooling, has
embarked on a vigorous program of adult education, administered since
1936 by an Office of Adult Education in the Department of Public Instruc
tion.^-
In Leyte, before the war, some 8,943 adults were studying under the aus
pices of some 123 special adult education committees. This program vas revived
at the conclusion of the war. It recosmenced somewhat hesitantly, for in 1946,
there were only two adult education cosmittees function!Eg, serving two schools,
2
with a combined registration of 145.
But by October, 1947, 164 such extension classes were functioning, sup
ported by an allotment of P230,469.20.3 This was not an overwhelming showing,
^Lasker, op. clt.. p. 148.

^Yearbook of Philippine Statistics— Bureau of Census & Statistics, 1946.
Comparative Data for Leyte", Bureau of Public Schools, October, 1947.
641
"but It Indicated that Leyte had more than recovered the ground It had gained
before the war, and would continue to fozge ahead.
And with all that, the objection might still be raised that the substance
of the information imparted vas not education in its most vital sense, a fitting
of its initiates for the most effective utilization of their environment in the
solving of life's problems, and the development of attitudes appropriate to a
cooperative attack upon problems community-wide in dimension. "In the education
of adults it is, of course, almost equally Important that the students themselves
be von for a purposeful consideration of means and ends."* What must be done in
the future, if adult education in Leyte is to realize its possibilities is to
evolve a course of study around a core of genuine concern to the common tao: the
economic, hygienic and local political problems of life. The basic arithmetic and
literary skills then become invested with real significance as tools in the adjust
ment of life's problems.
Antonio Isidro looks to the teacher as evangelist of modernism among the
barrio folk:
Another means whereby the teachers may be able to contribute to the pro
motion of comnunity welfare is the holding of educational programs in the
barrios. Life in the barrio is dry and insipid; there is no challenge to
intellectual growth, nor much opportunity for general enlightenment since
the people practically live in isolation. Books, newspapers, and magazines
are a rarity in the small towns and barrios. Hence, from time to time
some form of community program should be held where the people could listen
to an instructive lecture on a vital topic. . . .The social and economic
problems affecting the country should be brought to the attention of the
barrio people. They should constantly be apprised of the Important events
of the times so that they may have true and unbiased information on which
to base their decisions on important questions affecting their welfare.
Other wpanH of promoting the program of mass education are the acquisi
tion of radio sets and the establishment of a comnunity library. . . .In
stead of gossiping about the life of their neighbors, the peasants should
be encouraged to listen to the educational broadcasts. . . .
The organization of a community library is an indispensable part of the
educational program for the adults. . . .The people can read only if they
^Quoted by Lasker, op. cit., p. 160.
642
know how to read and have something to read. . . .Conmittees composed of

teachers and parents may he organized for the acquisition of bookB, news
papers and magazines. . . .
The principal role of the teacher in these undertakings will involve
leading, planning, organizing and evaluating. On account of his background
and training, the teacher is in a position to select topics and Issues for '
the conmonity forum which have direct and Important bearing on the life of
the community. He also knows and has personal contact with prominent citi
zens in the community who would be of invaluable assistance. The teacher
should utilize to the maximum the services of the parent-teacher associa
tion for the community activities and he may serve as consultant and adviser
to the organization. In any event the activities will demand of him his
enthusiasm, energy and leadership.1
The social function of the teacher will extend far beyond the imparting of
simple book knowledge. He will be the mentor of the community, offering counsel
on civic and legal affairs, and directing the reconstruction of the people's
leisure-time habits.
The position of a barrio teacher places him in high regard and estima
tion of the people in the conmnnity. . . .He may be the interpreter of the
iaws. . . .The kind of taxes to be paid and why they should be paid, the
prohibition against illegal methods of fishing, the need for clean elec
tions and for safeguarding the sanctity of the ballot are some of the top-
ics that the teacher may bring to the attention of the barrio people.
It is a common observation that our masses have a great propensity for
gambling. Too much of their off-season is spent at the card table or in
the cockpit. Por this, they cannot be seriously condemned. A farmer who
has been working from sunrise to sunset every day during the planting or
harvesting season seeks relaxation after long and heavy toil. . . .The
situation calls for leadership of the teacher in the redirection of the
peasants' leisure-time activities toward wholesome recreation.^
Education thus becomes social education, and better fits the adult for a
life of fuller citizenship in a comounity growing progressively more Integrated
with the affairs of the nation and the world. Only in this way will the dweller
in one of Leyte's inner barrios cease to be a "provincial” in the invidious sense.
Henceforth, he will be intellectually and politically equipped to appreciate the
role of a Carlos P. Eomulo in the chambers of the United Nations.
1Isidro, op. cit.. pp. 280-1.
2Ibld.. pp. 282-3.
643.
Centralization In Bducatlonal Administration
As a result of our concern vith education In Leyte, It becomes pertinent
for us to treat vith such aspects of national Philippine education as bear upon
the state of affairs In the Province. Clearly, one of such matters is that of
educational administration and its consequences for Instruction.
Filipino instructional methodology partially defeats the purposes to
vhich the school system is theoretically committed. Under the Impact of John
Levey and his disciples, American education has applied itself to develop!eg the
creative and critical faculties in its student material. To that end, it had de
vised a vhole slue of techniques and procedures such as the socialized recitation,
individual projects and laboratory set-up, group self-evaluation, etc. Experi
mentation in all directions has been fostered by decentralized school units, each
functioning vith a large degree of autonomy.
The Philippine school system allows very little initiative to the pro
vincial school divisions, rating their performance in terms of fidelity and
thoroughness shown in executing central directives. Hot only is there a high de
gree of centralization; there is also excessive standardization, so that all
grades of a certain level are apt to be engaged in covering the same unit of work
at approximately the same time. The teacher is also burdened vith a host of ad
ministrative forms that must be accomplished, which tend to place him in a sort
of straight-Jacket, instead of facilitating the main Job of teaching. Super
visory field workers tend to act under an authoritarian conception of their func
tion, rather than one of consultation. In the classrooms, there is still far too
much memoriter learning, and not enough stirring of an active Independent intelli
gence.1
^ h e Monroe Commission had some strong words to say in 1925 on Philippine

educational administration and the Philippine curriculum vhich would veil bear
Iteration today. (A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands.
The Board of Educational Survey, Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1925. pp. 51, 228,
559.)
644
Vhat has happened la simply an artificial transplantation of an alien
educational system to a soil not prepared in advance vith the proper cultural
compost. The Filipino has accepted it enthusiastically, without appreciating its
deeper implications. This is true even of some Filipino educators vho have car
ried on graduate study in the United States. They have mastered techniques vith
some degree of success, hut wrenched from the appropriate philosophical context.
For their own attitudinal screen has acted as a sieve, through vhich only the out
ward froms have been filterable. Generations of catechismic, religious education,
confined to a thin strip of the upper social crust, has not been foundation con
ducive to universal public education.
In extenuation, it must be stated that the organizational procedure is
understandable insofar as it has aimed to veld together into a strong, self-con
scious nation a collection of disparate, localistic elements. It must also be
granted that lack of qualified teaching personnel and a dearth of essential in
struction materials has Imposed a severe strain on the school system, and rendered
a high degree of centralization a stabilizing factor.^-
The Filipino unity sought can only be the end product of active, demo
cratic participation in a process vhich must include determination of goals and
Writing in 1942, Joseph E. Hayden came to the defense of centralization:

"In practice, however, the administrative process cannot be safely democratized
more rapidly than self-reliance, initiative, responsibility and a dozen other
necessary qualities are developed among the people vho man the service administered.
These qualities are gradually being strengthened among the Filipino people, but
attitudes and habits acquired through centuries cannot be transformed in a genera
tion."
This writer vould question Hayden's line of reasoning. What is to be the
source of administrative know-how, if not actual training in the field? Hayden
goes on to say: "The extent to which the schools are operated in a way which cul
tivates regularity, order and adherence to fixed standards is one of the most ad
mirable characteristics of the system. To weaken these qualities in order to cul
tivate teacher and pupil 'initiative' among a group which, as a whole, is deficient
in the background of discipline and exactness, without which Initiative is futile,
and even dangerous, vould be almost criminal folly." (p. 509} op. cit., Hayden.)
One can only reply that as long as this line of reasoning is adhered to,
Filipino democracy will remain purely formal, an affair for patriotic oratory.
645
Judgment as to means best suited for attainment of those goals. This entails
delegating part of the responsibility of constructing educational curricula to
the provincials, of utilising the rich resources of the many sub-cultures, vith
their own proud traditions, fashioning the emergent national culture. In this
way, the people of the rural barrios will not shrug their shoulders indifferently
to the announced objectives of far-off Manila, for they will recognize strands of
their own creation, only transformed into greater meaningfulness by their rework
ing into a more magnificent pattern.
The division superintendents must be authorized and encouraged to devise
educational programs stemming out of the peculiar needs, interests, traditions,
and resources of the provinces. Leyte, for instance, has characteristics and prob
lems different from, let us say, Ilocos Norte, Bulucan, Negros Oriental, or Zambales.
These must find expression in the school program. A substantial proportion of the
graduates of its elementary schools and even of its secondary schools will spin
out their lives within its borders. Why should not the schools equip them for
more satisfactory living within these borders?
In the years ahead, as in the past, some of the more promiBirg of Leyte’s
students will travel abroad to acquire a more rounded general education, or to
pursue a program of professional study. Of these, many will study in the United
States. It would be well, in line with Bruno Lasker *b suggestion, that they be
introduced
into such intensive regional courses for administration as those now being
given at several American universities. . . .The oriental students partici
pating in such courses and seminars--while at the same time also pursuing
their separate studies of Western lore— would receive an encouragement that
has often been lacking in the past to re-examine the values of their herit
age and to help it to a new flowering with the aid of modern knowledge .1
Higher education of this type would not precipitate the dissociated mind,
bred of antagonistic cultural components. The man of learning would return to his
1Lasker, op. clt.. p. 168.
home province, secure in M s feelings of self-worth, and prepared to contribute to
the life of M s fellows. Then the dictum of Lasker vould be confirmed:
The creative ability shown by those Orientals who have the chance
to combine a knowledge of Western science with respect for their own people
and their historic culture is the best answer to those who see only a dis
ruptive force in modern education, and especially in higher education.^'
American Influence in Philippine Education
What has been the net influence of the United States upon the PMlippine
educational enterprise?
The American school system in the Philippines has justly been criticized
as wasteful; but at least a useful byproduct has been the enhanced ability
of the people to make use of the local resources and of their own talents,
to think ahead a little way, to have faith in themselves. Through improved
agricultural methods, through new enterprises connected with processing and
manufacture of the resources, many parts of the Philippines have since come
to realize the importance of technical knowledge.2
Lasker's estimate of American influence on Filipino education is applicable
in good measure to the Province of Leyte. The incumbent division superintendent '
of schools, Leyte's American teachers of former years, and the Filipino teachers
who came under American preceptors hip in Manila and elsewhere all contributed to
the educational tone of the provincial schools. The Leyte no's belief in the
inherent worth of the human person, in the superiority of democratic government,
in the inestimable value of education (albeit sometimes just a vague sentiment),
and more recently, a growing respect for honest manual labor and for the findings
of science all bear the stamp of American doctrine. It may be that "Western" in
fluences are still largely confined to the teachers, the professionals in general,
the government officials, and to some of the more enlightened business elements.
But these elements are the leaven, working upon the younger generation.
Let it be stressed, however, that Filipino educators are not simply held
by American leading strings. The reflective Filipinos are beginning to assess
*Tbld., p. 146.
2Ibld.. p. 154.
647
American educational materials from the standpoint of their suitability for the
Filipino learner*
Joseph B. Hayden has called attention to this condition:
One of the peculiar problems of the Philippine schools has been to plan
curricula and prepare study materials closely adapted to Philippine condi
tions. It is hard to appreciate the difficulties and labor involved in
building up a body of such material frcm zero, as has been done since 1901
. • . .A. Judicious balance had to be struck betveen American and Filipino
material. Too much that vas alien vould make the courses artificial and
unrelated to native life. On the other hand, it vas the purpose not only
of the Americans but of the Filipinos to modify the national mores of the
people b y the introduction of certain American ideas, and this could only
be done by the development of curricular material that were basically
American. . . .*"2
Many of Leyte's teachers believe that the time has come for rejecting much
of the illustrative American material if the needs of the younger generation are
to be properly served. Materials incorporated in literature courses, drawn from
an unfamiliar environment, aze being discarded in favor of themes related to the
familiar Filipino mores. The study of American history has been dethroned and
relegated to its proper place in the vorld perspective, while the Filipino is be-
\
ginning to concentrate more upon Filipino affairs in their Oriental setting. In
struction in national language vill further tighten the bonds linking Leyte and
its sister provinces vith the cultural life of the nation's capital.
Many students of Philippine affairs vould endorse Isidro's program for
a nev orientation in Philippine education:
. . . .We should change our attitude from one of subserviency to the

West to one of leadership in the East. Instead of teaching almost ex
clusively the literature and culture of the West as had been done here
tofore, our schools should nov teach more and more the life and culture
of the East. . . .
. . . .Our education should aim at the development of Philippine

leadership among the Malayan peoples. Our relatively higher standard
of culture and our fortunate aseociation vith the West have given us an
advantage over our Malayan brothers, vho even today are struggling for
self determination. • . .3
%ayden, op. clt.. p. 488.

^The Monroe Canmission had declared in 1925: "The whole course of study,
reading bookB included, reflects American culture. The reading books should ex
press Filipino ideas, ideals, sentiments, and attitudes." (The Board of Educa
tional Survey* °P» clt., pp. 41-2.)
Slsldro. op. clt.. p. 59.
648
Before undertaking his investigation of "Educational Progress in South*
eastern Asia", J. S. Furnivail commented: "One can transplant the school hut not
the atmosphere of which it is a product nor the environment in which it works.
Western education is preoccupied, especially in the United States of America, with
the instruction of the pupil in occupational know-how. In an apt play upon words,
Fumi v a l l pleads for the restoration of modern education in the Orient from the
"preparation for the life of "business" to a "preparation for the business of life".2
With him, we express the hope that education in Leyte can succeed in taking the
best that American experience has to offer without pandering to the comnercial
ethos.
Summary
Summing up, then, the education required by Leyte is not the out-moded
system of book-learning and formal recitations in which the pupil learns to docilely
swallow and regurgitate at specified intervals the isolated facts fed him by a
benevolent despot, misnamed a teacher. It is not the system where the successful
pupil (success being Judged by degree of perfect conformity), bloated with a steady
diet of this pabulum, comes to look down upon his lean parents and villagers, and
abandons them for the metropolis. And it is not the system where the school is
a little oasis in the desert of real life, a sanctuary where the pupil's tender
mind is Instilled with specious idealism and abstract virtues while being screened
off from the pollution of adult society. Uo, this system sees the schools Joined
together with the progressive forces of the community, galvanizing the older gen
eration into acquiring the cultural tools for a better life, and equipping the
youngsters with the information and techniques needed by them for an active role
in society. So it is that some colonial educators
see livelihood and health as objects easy to understand and therefore suit
able starting points for training the minds of simple people in receptiveness
^Furnivall, op. cit.. p. 12.
2Tbid., p. 118.
649
to nev ideas; incidentally these subjects, taken directly from the pupils'
environaent, also afford rich opportunities for evoking individual initia
tive and for building habits both of self-reliance and cooperation. If
a large enough proportion of the people, both children aid adults, take
part in such learning experiences, these teachers hold, the ground vill
have been laid for the practice of social self-determination. . .
Leyte's program of adult education also antedated the war. There vas no
question here of having to choose between the slower process of educating the
children and bringing fundamental education to the adults— both would be carried
on simultaneously. And even with respect to the curriculum of the secondary
schools, as handed down by Manila, much favorable in tone could be said for it:
the philosophy of the comprehensive high school, the broader conceptions of voca
tional education, etc.
The attainment of these aims is by no means beyond the reach of Leyte's
population. For one thing, the classroom teachers are close to the people. We
have already seen what varied and important service they have rendered to the com
munity at large during the war by assuming the leadership in popular campaigns
waged to increase crop productivity and to check run*away prices. And we also
noted how prominent was the role played by some of the teachers in the resistance
movement. That the parents of school children appreciated the services of the
teachers is shown by the efforts of volunteer groups to construct emergency school
buildings in the first months of the liberation, and in many municipalities to
help the underpaid teachers eke out their livelihoods by special donations. It
is to be hoped that the Manila government will demonstrate a sound statemanship
by enlarging its educational appropriations, thereby enabling the guardians of
the national future to perform an adequate piece of work.
1B. Lasker, p. 141, on. cit.
A S IG N THAT GENERATED F R IC T IO N
U. S. Aimy unit set up the sign at the

entrance to a compound near Tacloban. Ihe
sign meant to warn "civilians" away from
the premises. It was construed by sensitive
Filipinos as racialist in motivation.
650
Amity in the Liberation Period
A study in contrasts is the comparison of Filipino warmth towards Ameri
cans on Leyte with Filipino numbness towards the Japanese. A genial smile had
spread over features lately Impassive or terror-stricken, a friendly vave had re
placed the humiliating how. Little children gaily skipped alongside the GI,
coaxing favors, instead of scuttling with fright, as had heen their wont, at the
approach of the Japanese soldier. In short, a psychology of attraction had super
seded one of avoidance. A tie, whose key word was equality, banished the foxmer
as ce ndance -submiss ion relationship.
This cordiality was deepened by American conduct of military operations in
a fashion that would least expose Filipino civilians to accidental death from gun
fire. And it was reinforced by American solicitude for Filipino hungry and ailir^,
and by the speedy relief measures adopted.
But true international fellowship is born on the person-to-person level
among ordinary citizens of two nations. In Leyte, a genuine comradeship developed
between the American combat troops and the Filipino man-on-the-street. Carlos
Bonulo has sketched with feelings of personal delight the nature of the first con
tacts between the GIs and the Filipino fighters for freedom:
While President Osmena and General HacArthur worked together. . . .GI

Joe and Juan de la Cruz, who had fought together under the same flags,
worked out a plan of their own.
We saw them walking the muddy streets of Tacloban together, arm in
arm, sharing experiences, a mutual love of boyish nonsense, and any small
possessions that Blight come their way.
I cannot stress enough the importance of the meeting on Leyte. . . .
between the native and the boy who had landed there on a barge under
fire. . . .
To see those fighters of two races grouped together, walking together,
talking and playing together and presenting one another with their small
treasures was an example to shame our warring world. Leyte was testimony
that friendship, understanding, and loyalty are not to be limited to
boundary lines and racial differences, but belong in the illimitable re
gions of courtesy and understanding of other people's dreams and aims. . . .
These fraternal relations subsisted not only between GIs and Filipino sol
diers, but between Americans and Filipinos in general. Bomulo put it well:
651
The hones of Leyte were principally nipa huts, the food was scanty
and poor. . . .Poor as those homes vere. . . .they opened their doors to
their new friends. Filipino girls met the tired men returning from the
front lines with fried chicken, barbeoued pigs, and the native panocha
of hrovn sugar and shredded coconut that is a special treat. . . .
Our American hoys also vent without to share. In turn their packs
vere opened, their hoses of K rations and cartons of cigarettes vere
handed around, until a universal shortage threatened. 17ot only did GI
Joe turn his pack Inside out, he shared with the kids and grownups his
treasure of candy and chewing gum, and to the girls he gave his valued
towels, to he worn as sarongs. . . .Filipinos sprouted out in GI fatigue
uniforms .1_3
In each community, the mayor and leading citizens planned and worked to
make the off-duty hours of the GI more pleasant. The guerrillas offered a sug
gestion that was readily adopted:
Another matter. . . .is the formation of the U.S.O. (United Service

Organization). This organization has for its purpose the entertainment
of all soldiers, regardless of nationality and creed vhile on leave from
the hattle fronts. This matter can he taken up with the Municipal Mayors
of each tovn.^
Peculiarly enough, amidst all these manifestations of friendship, some
measure of mutual dislike developed between the former guerrilleros of the 41st
Infantry Begiment, PA, and the 1st Begiment of the U. S. Army made up of "State-
side Filipinos". Both outfits vere encamped near Onnoc, and the personnel of hoth
competed for the favors of the local belles. Unhappily for the ex-guerrilleros,
they vere put to disadvantage hy their cousins from the States vho commanded a
fatter pay envelope. And they vere doubly disadvantaged hy the "unfair wooing
tactics" of the American-Filipinos seekirg brides to bring hack to the States.
However, with the exception of a few cafe brawls, there vere no untoward inci
dents. (Incidentally, an interesting social-psychological study might have been
made of the adJustive reactions of the American-Filipino soldier to the unique
situation in which he found himself— the "conquering hero" helping to liberate
his ancestral homeland.)
■^Bomulo, I See the Philippines Blse. pp. 136, 139-40.

% . Granados, Liaison Officer, 95th Inf. Begt. Hov. 16, 1944. To:
C. 0., 95th Inf. Begt.
3Shaplen, o p . cit. , pp. 48-50.
653
We have already discussed the effect the American liberation forces had
upon the economy of Leyte. But it would be appropriate to introduce at this
point a thumbnail sketch of Taeloban drawn by Leyte's Conmercial Agent which
captures very well the provincial capital's breezy, new-found freedom, and the
warmth of its disposition towards its liberators.
. . . .With the liberation from the Japanese, Tacloban has been trans
formed from a town almost without life into a friendly city, teemi eg with
people and buzzing with work. Since the expulsion of the Japs, Tacloban
has increased threefold its population of 31,235, not including American
troops. Residents who had sought refuge on farms and in the hills of the
interior have returned, and people from liberated Samar and other. . . .
provinces have crossed. . . .to Leyte to temporarily establish their abode.
Many of them have taken up work on various army projects. Endless streams
of army trucks give Tacloban the bustle of a busy city.
The freedom to meet and move about has been restored, replacing the re
strictions and suspicious looks of the Japanese military police during the
occupation. This freedom is evident in the thronged streets, in the grow
ing number of social gatherings, soarirg church attendance and in the re
opening of the schools. . . .Social life, restricted during the Japanese
occupation to small family gatherings, is expanding again to give expres
sion to traditional Filipino hospitality. American soldiers are welcomed
in every home, where they visit and partake of the delicacies prepared by
the hosts.-*-
So much for the story of first contacts between the Americans of the
liberation forces and the Filipinos of Leyte. We shall now train our binoculars
upon the broader vista of Filipino-American culture contact, discriminating cer
tain elements for more sustained attention.
Paradoxically, American acquisition of the Philippines was accompanied
by the instillation in the Filipinos of a thoroughgoing patriotism. This state
ment may appear absurd, at first blush. "Is it not true," you may say, "that
the Americans forcibly imposed and maintained their rule against a truculently
rebellious native population?" This may scarcely be denied. Still, without
impugning the intensity of devotion to the independence movement, we may safely
assert that Philippine nationalism meant nothing to great numbers of the native
population. Many of them passed their days, secluded within the limiting confines
^Jaca, op. clt.. p. 8.
653
of their local "barrios and, because of Illiteracy, 1acted spiritual identifica
tion vith any larger entity. In this archipelago, reaching out across 1,500
miles of ocean water, where 87 languages are spoten, little self-contained com
munities found difficulty in evolving a cultural unity. Three hundred years of
centralized Spanish control did not materially advance a sense of conmon loyalty.
American rule, especially through the educational system which it intro
duced, did that. Love of country, the extolling of national heroes, the celebra
tion of patriotic holidays are familiar features of the American educational
scene. What the American curriculum planners and administrators did was to intro
duce these familiar concepts— only substituting Filipino personages for their
own. In this sense, the American occupation policy was cutting the ground from
under itself, even before it was fully committed to releasing its charge.
As a unifying factor, the English language was a far more potent force
than Spanish. While it is true that the educated Filipino spoke Spanish, so that
it became a lingua franca for Filipinos carrying on activities outside their home
province and a medium of literary expression for the diffusion of nationalist
sentiment, this literate class remained quite small. Under American rule, literacy
greatly increased, and with it the feelirg of oneness. By the time Filipino mould
ers of nationalist thought were already thinking in terms of elevating Tagalog to
the status of a national language, English had already done its work.
We might add that the literacy program of the American authorities was
eagerly accepted by the native population because it corresponded to a sense of
self-acknowledged need.
Closely associated with this endeavor was another hall-mark of American
education— education for democracy.1 The Filipinos had some practical and
-*Many of the Filipinos who have risen to prominence in recent years have
been educated in the public school system, and thus embody in their own persons
this very American influence. In contrast, the leaders of the older generation
were the products of the Filipinized Spanish schools.
654
psychological preparation for this philosophy of government in tbs character of
their local rule. Offsetting this were the accumulated effects of three centuries
of bureaucratic Spanish control, in which the native population was non-participating.
To cultivate the needed characteristics of self-reliance, initiative and sense of
disciplined responsibility would be no simple matter. It is significant that the
late President Eoxas found it necessary to publicly inveigh against the peculation
and inefficiency infesting his administration from top to bottom, and warned that the
viability of the yourg republic depended upon its ability to eradicate these evils —
examples of American occupancy notwithstanding.
Filipinos are quick to acknowledge the benefits they have received from the
United States in the fields of general medicine and public health. Yet they admit
to being almost subconsciously in oppositionafc a certain point. Under American con
ceptions of nutritional adequacy, Filipino agricultural leaders have been encourag
ing a shift from staple cultivation to diversified farming. The absence or insuf
ficiency of cooked and raw vegetables in the Filipino diet has impaired health and
reduced vigor. But preachment alone by Filipino health officers will not suffice.
Far more promising is the program of cultivating school gardens by the pupils as the
focus of a project to modify the dietary complex of the younger generation.
Illustrating the conservatism of dietary habits were the experiences of the
American army and relief authorities with the Leyte population in the period follow
ing the liberation. During the initial landings, the famished population rejoiced
over the GI packaged rations, distributed with great largesse. The emergency canned
and dried foods parceled out by EREA during the early reconstruction period were
also gratefully received. As commercial shipping between the United States and the
Philippines was restored, and the standard items of American fare made their appear
ance in the local markets, the Filipinos avidly bought up the limited supplies. An
outsider, observing local consumer trends over a period of months, soon recognized
a sharp decline in the purchase of American food items. Native dietary preferences
had begun to reassert themselves.
655
An interesting sidelight on this matter is found in regard to bread eon*
sumption. Although vhite bread is frequently eaten by upper-class'. , urban families,
it is something of a delicacy among working class families, and is virtually unknown
in many rural barrios. The American counter-invasion was accompanied by the setting
up of army field kitchens everywhere. Filipino guerrilla forces billeted with the
GIs, as well as native laborers of the countryside feeding at army mess halls, were
inducted into Yankee cuisine (of a sort). It was not long, however, before the army
cauldrons were filled with boiling rice, supplementing regular rations with the in
dispensable Filipino staple. It is not likely that the dietary folkways of the
people of the interior were materially altered by this brief contact with American
food. Possibly some residuary taste for canned fruits, vegetables, and packaged
dry cereals will occasionally manifest itself.
One of the major Issues of contention dlsturbirg Filipino-American amity
lay in the area of race relations. As a people of Malayan stock, the emancipated
Filipinos had long resented the racialist pretensions to superiority on the part of
the whites, whether Spanish or American. Their early agitation to staff administra
tive agencies with Filipino personnel was an expression not simply of nationalist
sentiment. It was Intended to vindicate the claim that Filipino people, though brown
of skin, vere capable of rendering a satisfactory performance in any position pre
viously heldly whites.
During the Japanese occupation, President Laurel of the puppet "Philippine
Eepublic" delivered a harsh tirade against American snobbery— and no doubt found
many sympathetic ears. Filipino pique was mollified in the early months of the
liberation by the unstinted GI f r a t e m a l i s m . B u t in the ensuing period, as the
lA sensitive American guerrillero recalls how irate he became on overhearing

an instance of this smug racialist talk: "Beattie and I almost got into a fight
with one guy, though. He was a stupid liettenant down on the beach at Dulag. All
around him were those poor Filipinos who had been bombed, who had lost all their
clothing, who had no homes, were hungry, dirty, tired, and hurt. . . .This stupid
guy looked at them and said, 'Look at those people. Maybe it would have been better
if the Japs stayed a little while longer and raped a few more of their women. The
cross between Jap and Filipino would have looked better than those people.* He did
not know who Beattie and I were when he made that crack, but he damned soon found
out....... " (St. John, op. clt.. p. 215.)
656
American combat soldiers and sailors vere mo-red out, and replacements arrived as
occupation forces, Filipinos began to comment upon the discernible chaige in the
bearing of many Americans. They vere offended by indelicate American expressions,
by brusque treatment, and in a fev overplayed instances by the exclusion of Fili
pinos from certain military installations.
On their part, the Americans vere irked by Filipino pilferage, by local
profiteering, and by vbat seemed the tapering off of an overtouted native hospi
tality. Actually, most of the estrangement could be ascribed to the almost inevi
table fading avay of the high-pitched crisis psychology and combat solidarity,
replaced by a general irritability— caused by the vicissitudes of rehabilitation
on the one side, by the mounting home-sickness and weariness of military life on
the other. Happily, the more reflective and self-controlled on both sides prac
ticed mutual forbearance, and did not indulge in needless laments of disillusionment.
This matter of racial tensions had a by-product even more deplorable, in
that it threatened the integrity of Filipino principle. It vas generally expected
that the Filipino would be an exemplar of racial equal itarianism in his own social
practices. Before the last war, this had been largely the case. Of course, there
vere seme evidences of self-hatred among Individuals of mixed blood— a phenomenon
not infrequently accompanying racial fusion vhere one race enjoys a position of
dominance. Members of mestizo families sometimes insisted that they vere full-
blooded Spaniards, although traces of Filipino admixture vere obvious. On the
other hand, political demagogues and others courting popular favor, might be found
asserting that they vere pure Filipinos ("Filipinos of face and of heart"),
neither tainted by admixture of white or of Chinese blood. And there vere seme
gllmmeritgs of resentment toward negroes, particularly on the part of the sun-baked
Filipinos. This resentment, arising from cases of mistaken Identity, cannot simply
be dismissed as an example of one subjected group venting its humiliation against
another degraded group. Feelings vere complicated by the fact that some of the
657
aborigines are negroid; consequently, mistaken identity carried with it compari-
sons with despised "primitive" tribesmen.
Vorld War II tended to sharpen this inchoate racialist feeliig. Amoig the
American military personnel were contingents of "Southerners", who Imported their
own race prejudices into the Islands. Observant Filipinos soon became aware of
American patterns of segregation and discrimination, vith their accompanying
superiority-inferiority dichotomy. This awareness, in turn, led to differential
responses in American-Filipino dealings along lines of the racial identity of the
American. This differentiation had both a practical and a psychological side.
Filipino tradespeople, particularly proprietors of cafes and places of
amusement, discovered that their Southern GI clientele refused to patronize their
establislments, or threatened to boycott them, if they opened their premises to
colored GI patronage. The strange phenomenon of establishments of restricted
clientele made their appearance on the Island among Filipinos of lover economic
and social brackets. (The economic level where the discriminating practices vere
operative is of significance. No doubt, even before the last- war, descendants of
negro Spanish-American war veterans who had settled in the Islands could not gain
entry to the more exclusive hotels and night clubs patronized by the local aristo
cracy.)
A corollary of this trend was manifested in the attitude of Filipinos toward
one another. Filipino girls fraternizing with negro soldiers vere generally shunned
by the white troops, or treated contemptously. Furthermore, amoig these circles of
Filipino girls mingling with Americans (and such mingling was strictly forbidden
in many households within a few months after the American landings— a possible ex
ception being made in favor of American officer personnel), a rift soon developed
between those associating with white troops and those accompanying negroes. Rumor
that a certain girl had been seen escorted by a negro GI would detract considerably
from her reputation. No attempt was made to break down this pattern of segregation,
658
except in a limited number of military recreational resorts sponsored by tbe USO
and tbe Bed Cross.
It would be difficult to predict how long these divisive attitudes will
persist into the post-war period. The likelihood is that it will only be of sig
nificance for the few successful negro businessmen who seek acceptance in upper
class society. The whole issue is muddled now, by the upsurge of Filipino patrio
tism, which is tinged with both anti-white and anti-Chinese sentiment. Should
some pan-Oceanic league develop serious proportions, the matter might again arise
in cross-racial dealings with Melanesian peoples.
With possible demurred encountered in certain quarters, most observers
would agree that American influence upon Filipino inter-sex social relations has
been salutary in character^ even before the war, well-to-do Filipino households
were sending their daughters to the universities, for higher academic and profes
sional training. Yet, only in advanced feminist circles, represented by the YWCA
in Manila, the Association of University Women, and a sprinkling of social leaders,
did women really assert themselves as independent personalities. Generally, it was
felt that education must not undo the essential modesty, domesticity, and religious
mindedness of feminine purity. In other words, no assault was made on the en
trenched Spanish traditions of decency.
World War II had a multiple impact in this area of human relations. In the
first place, serious and irreparable inroads were made on tbe chaperonage system.
Girls were permitted to attend American military clubs, at first in clusters, under
the supervision of a social worker or leader (other than a relative). In time,
American soldiers were calling for them at their homes to escort them for an even
ing's entertainment in keepirg with the familiar patterns of the American "date".
With this went changes in personal habits or accentuation of trends previously
known frcn American magazines and movies— dancing, smoking, drinking, eating ice
cream. It is important to note in this connection that American influence now
penetrated deep Into the rural barrios— far beyond the previous reach of cosmo
politan Manila and cities like Cebu City and Iloilo. Moreover, these contacts
-vere not tbe vicarious ones of the screen, but personal face-to-face relations
vith carriers of American culture.
Secondly, the better educated troops, in personal conversation vith the
Filipinos (and to a lesser extent in discussions vith their relations in the more
liberal homes) deliberately sought to break dovn the provincial type of thlnklt^
validating masculine social domination. Clerical personnel in headquarters and
special service army outfits, both male and female, vere also apt to find them
selves involved in cross-cultural comparisons, leading to reappraisal of their
own mores. The presence of American WACs and nurses and Bed Cross girls overseas
also acted as a leaven, for they personified emancipated American womanhood. (This
statement must be qualified, for the American soldiers communicated their ambiva
lent attitudes towards these "maids in uniform" to tbe Filipinos.) Perhaps the
cumulative effect of such analyses and self-probings was to weaken somewhat the
hold of the traditional value attitudes.
Finally, ve must note a surer sign of indelible change— modifications in
courtship practices among Filipinos themselves. Filipino young men, envious of
the easy-goir*? manners of the GI that apparently gave him ”a way vith women", fol
lowed the example. He, too, would "date" the girls, walk hand in hand with them
dovn the street, keep them amused vith spicy anecdotes and double talk, learn
jitterbug, and acquire a savior-faire. This trend has not made as much headway
in the rural communities, but it is patently on the increase.
We may round out this discourse on the acculturative process in the Philip
pines by touching upon language patterns. Reference has already been made to the
polyglot character of the population. While all the lingual divisions are variants
of basic Malay, it is nevertheless true that Filipino peasants coming frcm different
660
language areas, remained mutually unintelligible, savo for the fev linguistically
trained.
As a unifying influence, Spanish vas confined largely to the social elite.
Of course, some Spanish, in corrupted font, Jocularly referred to as "bamboo
Spanish", filtered down to the rural population. Although its social prestige
still continues, Spanish has lost its hold upon the younger generation of the
"cultured class". Perhaps Latin-American rhythms in music and dancitg constitute
the chief stronghold of Spanish culture today— reinforced, no doubt, by their
current vogue in the United States.
The English language has penetrated much more extensive segments of the
population than ever Spanish did. Nonetheless, the bulk of the peasantry have been
largely untouched by its influence. The smattering of English, acquired by pupils
during their schooling, vas quickly forgotten--especially since pupil mortality in
the primary grades has been so high.
Stylistically, the brand of English taught in Filipino schools has been
stiff, somewhat archaic, literary— its tedium unrelieved by the easy colloquialism
of American usage. The errors in diction and peculiar twists of phrasing have
tended to Jell as American teaching and supervisory personnel dropped out of the
system, with no new American replacements.
The war brought an English-speaking soldiery swarming over the Islands.
Their arrival gave an added fillip to the acquisition by great numbers of people a
working knowledge of the English language. It also exerted a revivifying influence,
infusing a stream of racy American idioms into the conversation, softening some of
the formalistic rigidities, and providing standards of enunciation and sentence
structure with which the Filipino might compare his own speech. (It might be said,
parenthetically, that the literate Filipino vas very apt to command a far richer
usage of the English language than most of the American soldiery.)
661
Before the outbreak of the late war, a revulsion against the use of English
was developing in nationalist circles. On the one hand, tbe generalized adoption
of English hy the educated classes in all parts of the Islands, and the acquainting
of sections of the peasantry vith the language, convinced the planners of indepen
dence that a simple national language would greatly solidify the national conmunlty.
On the other hand, they argued that the national language should not be English,
but one truly expressive of the "folk soul" of the people— in short, one of the
local tongues. And Tagalog, as the language of Manila and the central provinces
of Luzon, vas nominated to fill first place.
Since achieving statehood, the Filipinos have officially designated Tagalog
to be the national language. What remains to be done, now, is to equip the non-
Tagalog speaking portion of the population for mastexy of the newly adopted language.
For a lotg time to come, however, English will continue to occupy a commanding po
sition in the Islands— at least until such time as Tagalog evolves the necessary
abstractions for coping vith the technological and philosophical concepts of
presentday life. However, along vith Isidro (who had Just criticized Filipino
usage in English as tending to "employ a flowery expression when directness would
convey the idea more clearly and adequately") we may voice our skepticism: "Or
would it really be desirable to pattern our oriental thought to the style of the
American English?"!
Acculturation is a two-way process. It would be interesting to study the
adaptive patterns of the discharged American serviceman who settled down to a per
manent existence in the Islands. It would be of little value to undertake an in
vestigation of the modification of American life in Manila, although this is the
locus of the American colony. Americans in Manila constitute, to all intents and
purposes, a closed caste, inaccessible to all but officialdom and the native aris
tocracy. Moreover, cosmopolitan Manila furnishes most of the amenities familiar
!lsidro, op. clt., p. 320.
662
in any large Americaa city.
In tbe provincial towns, may be found a scattering of Spanish-American
War veterans, some American businessmen who entered tbe country after World War I,
and their offspring. It would be most misleading to draw any valid generaliza
tions from the limited number of homes that this writer personally visited, espe
cially amidst the abnoxmalities of the early post-war~period. As far as could be
Judged, from superficial inspection and conversation, however, one could say that
the Americans and their mestizo children had appropriated the behavioral patterns
of tie Spanish grandee class— with whatever modification might be expected in
non-Catholic households.
A few of the World War II veterans and a handful of Americans living in
the rural areas exhibited the symptoms of having "gone native”— of a more complete
social fusion. These people dwelt in nipa huts, slept on mats, ate rice, fish,
and gulay, had primitive "priwies", dressed scantily, let pigs and poultry
scamper about under their stilt-upheld floor, and seemed indifferent to many of
the niceties Americans customarily tale for granted. On the other hand, they
would invariably possess an old "fliwer”, a radio, a sewing machine, and certain
relatively scarce domestic labor-saving devices.
This writer would like to study the changes in personality constellation,
as well as the more overt behavioral modifications of Filipinized Americans on
a return visit to the Islands. In particular, he would seek data on the selective
inhibition of American traits, the relative sequence of the sloughing off of these
traits, the variations in the process in terms of the socio-econcmic, sectional,
and religionb backgrounds of the Americans involved, the child-rearing patterns
for children of mixed marriage, the position of the Americans and their children
in the community, the role of the wife in such a household, and a host of related
questions. Of course, tbe writer is aware that the findings of a study in "de-
Americanization” would be qualified by tbe continued concurrent operation in
663
Manila, the nation*s capital, of Americanizing acculturative tendencies, vith
inevitable implication for provincial life.
Summary of Trends
Less than a Tear after American naval vessels boomed the opening of the
Leyte campaign, these same vessels treated the local population to a brilliant
pyrotechnical display. The occasion vas a special one— an occasion for great
Jubilation. These glorious flashes vere celebrating the long-awaited arrival of
V-J Day.
vas
If less dramatic, more impressive for the local folk /the daily sight of
their late oppressors reduced to servitude. For wherever they might turn, they
caught glimpses of Japanese prisoners of war moving about as labor gangs, engaged
in the most menial chores. Occasionally a bereaved mother spat from a passing ve
hicle upon the now irglorious figures, lately the warriors of imperial Japan. Or
a group of children would interrupt their play to hoot and Jeer, with the bolder
among them casting a contemptuous pebble. Only the screen of a GI overseer stood
between them and rougher treatment.
One never-to-be forgotten incident vas that of a thirsting Japanese road
gang, granted a brief respite frcm the scorching sun under a shady clump of coco
nut trees. Nearby stood a typical native nipa hut. A husband and wife leaned
against its side, languidly eyeing the resting prisoner group. They noted the
Japanese greedily looking up at the ripe coconuts and muttering with animation to
themselves. The GI foreman approached the Filipinos to inquire whether it would
be permissible for one of his prisoners to climb the tree and pry loose some of its
listious fruit. Upon receiving permission, he signalled to the prisoners. One of
the group agilely clambered up the trunk, and vas soon hacking away vith his machette.
Before the prisoners vere permitted to gather up their refreshment, the GI ordered
them to present two of the largest coconuts to the Filipinos. Both smiled, the
woman somewhat pensively adding (e^loying a vocabulary that, one would; scare,--.,
associate with peasant life): "Die situation is now inverted. Formerly we Fili
pinos climb trees for Japanese; now they climb trees for us."
Biis incident sunmed up the genuine satisfaction enjoyed by all Filipinos as
they reaccustcmed themselves to the delicious sensations of self-mastery. For the
people who, during the dark days, had clung to their conviction that the invader
would soon be driven out, and had thrown their support to the resistance forces, the
victory over the Japanese constituted the vindication of their faith. And-now they
would turn their efforts to the herculanean task of reconstruction.
If there was genuine enthusiasm among the masses of Leyte's Filipinos for their.
regained freedom and for their approaching political independence, there was also
unmistakable evidence of disillusionment. Unlike some of the Asiatic and European
peoples, struggling not only to throw off the yoke of a foreign tyrant but also to
overhaul seme of the archaic features of their own societies, the politically naive
Leytenos (with sane rare exceptions) thought only of the external oppressor. Yet the
inspiring message of 1he Four Freedoms had penetrated even to -the backwash of Leyte's
shores, and roused inchoate feelings of grievance and of hope. True, no systematic
fonnulation of political and economic reconstruction emerged from these feelings.
Nonetheless, the end of the war was yearned for with messianic faith. Somehow, peace
1
was to bring not only repair of physical ruin but a fuller life for the cannon man.
1 Romulo has recorded a conversation with a group of guerrilleros on the

occasion of the reinstatement of the Commonwealth government in Tacloban, in which
they "spoke their wants and dreams". One of them urged with earnestness: "Before
the war a certain favored group in Manila got all the political Jobs. The man
without pull didn't have a chance to serve. We want to see everyone given his turn
at helping out on the new deal. . . . "
And Romulo meditated: "Here, I thought, was a new spirit that, properly
channeled, could serve as a lever in ihe rise of the new Philippines. Here, ragged,
starved, indomitable, was the foundation of our new democracy."
(Romulo, op. clt., pp. 133-4.)
665
Among the resisters during the period of enony rule, a strong sense
of community had been built up, despite the traditional Filipino individualism.
The Resisters had learned to subordinate in part their own conception of per
sonal needs to the exigencies of organization. Special levies had been made
upon their properties, their commercial freedom had been hedged in by irksome
restrictions, and their free time had been commandeered in the service of
increasing food production. Such controls were quite light when compared with
the onerous restrictions foisted upon property and business in many other parts
of the world. Nonetheless, the operating principle of the paramountcy of
commmal well-being was significant. Especially in Western Leyte, the
territory administered by the WLGWF, this principle weighed heavily.
But the end of the war seemed to restore the status quo ante. Although
a few of the more important guerrilla leaders succeeded in capitalizing upon
their war-time records for business or political advantage, the bulk of the
guerrilla soldiers quickly became forgotten men. The guerrilla followers of
the late Captain Erfe and of Lieutenant Miranda received no consideration. Ibis
neglect could have been predicted, since their organizations went unrecognized.
But considerable disgruntlanent was apparent even among the troops of Colonel
Kangleon, reconstituted as the 41st Infantry Regiment, and incorporated into the
Philippine Amy . They had expected to collect their pay retroactively for their
period of guerrilla service, especially those who had already been serving at
the outbreak of the war. And many had been led to believe that the full privi
leges of American GIs would redound to than at once: a mustering-out bonus, edu
cational benefits, compensation for war-sustained disabilities, hospitalization,
etc. They were bitter when their expectations were not immediately realized.
Of the general civilian population associated with the resistahce
movement, many professed to see the collaborationists enjoying the fat of the
666
land. The most rabid collaborationists bad been interned. But as tbe months
slipped by, tbe tribunal constituted to try tbese "traitors”, Tbe People’s Court,
failed to function, hamstrung by the vacillation of tbe Manila authorities.
Meanwhile, tbe land-holders and businessmen who bad been tbe outspoken
henchmen or tbe prudently silent supporters of the Japanese were again carrying
on as was their wont. Tbe post-war political alignments failed to reflect tbe true
economic and social realities of tbe Province. Traditional local factions ganged
up either behind Osmena's "Nationalists” or Eoxas1 "Liberals”. But these align
ments were in no sense expressive of basic cleavages. "Puppet officeholders”
would remain out of the picture as candidates for one or two elections. Yet they
made known their affillations in discreet whispers. In both camps, the late guer
rillas and the late collaborationists mingled together, quickly patching up their
recent differences for the sake of party solidarity. Colonel Kangleon threw his
support to Eoxas, not over matters of principle, but simply because of personal
antagonism towards Osmena. His wartime governor of "Free Leyte", Demeterio, held
firm to his Nacionalista allegiance. And so it went with the others, all Jockey
ing for personal advantage.
The situation of the common people was serious. If money vas easier to
obtain during the initial post-war period, when American liberation troops vere
spending freely and the American army was providing work for many Filipinos, it
was also true that inflationary prices for needed commodities quickly consumed
savings. Somehow, after the stream of American money had completed its courses
of circulation, it seemed to flow into the pools of accumulation controlled by
the wealthy, (in fact, to the chagrin of the humble folk, the local American of
ficers seemed to single out the foxmer collaborationists when paying social calls,
perhaps because they could furnish the comforts and superficial "culture" that
vas so welcome to war-tired officers^
Even, the intense love for the United States, found among the average
Filipinos of Leyte, had begun to pale. Uncontrollable irritations developed in
the contacts of the home-sick GIs with the economically hard-pressed Filipino
population, abrading ragged tempers. Moreover, Filipinos who were not benefitting
by sales transactions with the American troops blamed the inflationary conditions
on those whose coming they had lately welcomed. As for the shipments of American
relief supplies, the rural population complained that these found their way into
the storehouses of the wealthy merchants, emptying into black-market channels. All
in all, Leyte exemplified the high propensity to disillusionment among liberated
populations that reap no social bettement as compensation for wartime suffering.
But if there was some bitterness, yet optimism was not entirely ex
tinguished. Leyte's farmers were again cultivating their fields, her craftsmen
plying their skills. The people knew that their Island was wealthy in undeveloped
resources. And with American aid for rehabilitation and development (which
they believed Manila was negotiating), they looked forward to these resources
bearing fruit.
It is in the schools, though, that Leyte's real hope rests. But let
it be clear that the schools here spoken of are not the formalistic, bookish
schools of the past. Ihey are the schools Isidro has in mind when he declares:
The conviction is now growing among the educators of the country that
if our rural communities are to be improved, and improved immediately, the
school must leave its cloistered halls and go out into the community. The
school cannot depend solely upon the principle of the carry-over, which
assumes that what the teacher teaches in the school will be carried over by
the pupils in their daily life in the community. Our experience in educa
tional work during the last half century has demonstrated that much of what is
taught in the classroom does not function in the child's behavior or in the
comaunity improvement. 1
A realistic elementary and secondary education, centered about the
community, its problems and resources, and utilizing a progressive methodology
^•Isidro, op. cit., p. 276.
668
would go far in helping to transform Filipino rural life. In conjunction with
such vitalized schooling for the younger generation, a program of fundamental
education (comprising literacy, health education, and vocational education
adapted to the needs of Philippine society) aimed at the present adult generation
would help to create a favorable climate of opinion for social reconstruction.
The schools are the principal agency at present engaged in bringing
about a directed change in the living habits of the population. By elevating
the standards of the younger generation and activating the adults, the schools
may succeed in implanting not simply a sense of injustice, a mute dissatisfaction
with things as they are in terms of possibilities open to the Province, but a
social intelligence that will furnish guidance in the engineering of constructive
change.
669
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671
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16, 1944. Pp. 17. (mimeographed).
673
Sabelino, Conrado S., Lt. "The Surrender of General Sharp." Leyte: 1945. Pp. 11.
(typewritten)
Soliman, Eduardo P. "Letter to Lt. Miranda (Dear Lt. M i r a n d a ) O c t o b e r 18, 1943.
Soliman, Marcos G., Major, (former Executive Officer of thQ 81st Regiment). "State
ment". Manila: 1945.
Soliman, Marcos G . , Major. "Letter to Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, Jr. (Dear Mac)
June 5, 1943.
Soliman, Marcos G., Major. "Letter to Col. Kangleon." August 13, 1943.
Sotto, Felix. "Brief History, 6th Infantry, WIGWF, Albuera, 1945." Pp. 7. (type
written) .
Veloso, Domingo. "Brief History of the Leyte Guerrilla". 1945. Pp. 10. (type
written) .
Yap, Pedro L. "The Story of a Voice", The Voice of the Free People. January 18,
1945. (mimeographed).
674
APPENDIX DIVISION
1. The Leyte Guerrilla and Japanese Rule.
!• A Japanese Surrender Appeal to Three Guerrilla Officers.

2. The Guerrilla Reply,
3. An Open Letter to "Puppet Governor11 Torres.
4* Guerrilla Reflections on The Fourth of July,
5. Sn Exhortation Addressed to Guerrilla Officers.
6. On the "Made-In-Japan" Philippine Independence.
7. Y.hy the Guerrilla?11. '
II* Guerrilla Correspondence.
1. A Specimen of Inter-Island Guerrilla Correspondence.

2. Inter-Organizational Friction Among the Leyte Guerrillas.
3* Report By A Battlion Commander To His Superior*
4* A Guerrilla Intelligence Report (Battalion level).
III. Collaborationism.
1. "To The People Of Leyte" — A Proclamation by "Puppet Governor18 Salazar.

2. The Kalibapi.
3* "Puppet Governor" Torres Berates the Leyte Special Force.
4* A Memorandum to the Municipal Treasurers of Occuoed Leyte.
5. Notice To The Merchants of Tacloban.
6. Leyte’s Tax Collection Campaign.
IV* Leyte’s Trade Union Movement.
1. The Constitution of the Leyte United Workers.
V* Post^WarJtegte.
1. A Judicial Decision Denying A Writ of Habeas Corpus to Filipino Petitioners

Interned on Charges ofCollaboration By The United States Army.
2. Resolution No. 270 (1945) of the Municipal Council of Tacloban.
4* Export of Abaca from Leyte: July - October,1945.
5* A Comment Upon Leyte's First Post-War Elections.
VI* Specimen Post-War Interviews and Statements.
1. An Interviev: With The A a r - Time "Puppet ilayor" of Ormoc.

2. An Interview With A Tacloban Physician.
3. A Statement By A Former Member of the Leyte Special Force.
4. A Surrendered Guerrillero Seeks Exoneration.
5. Affidavit Of A Surrendered Guerrilla Officer.
6. A Post-War Evaluation of Leyte’s Resistance Movement by Former Guerrilla Chiefs.
1
678:
I# THE LEYTE fflTPRBTT.T.A AND JAPANESE RULE.
1* A Japanese Surrender Appeal to Three Guerrilla Officers.

Lilo-an,Ormoc
May 23,1944
Captain Kulafu Villasin

Captain Antonio Cataag
Major Galo Maglasang
Last night we go on patrol to meet you so you can join with us in our strug
gle to fight against the Americans who had long been holding you as slaves. Be Jap
anese people are not your enemies. We had given you a complete independence which
now your brothers who are with us are enjoying. You brother in the hide-outs must
know that we have the same blood, skin and traditions, only you are misguided by
false American propaganda.
I only wonder why you shot us this morning early, when our purpose in coming
to your camp was to make friends with you, so that you and your men can enjoy the
blessings of Independence which the Japanese people has given you.
Please come down and surrender to the Lilo-an garrison. We guarantee your
safety, Now it is useless to hide for long because we know all your hiding places
and the number of guns you have. Many civilians had informed us about your hiding
places as it's useless to hide. But now if you continue fighting against us Japanese
soldiers, we will kill all mountain civilians and guerrillistas. If you surrender
all your arms voluntarily to us, I promise to give you Government Jobs. I'll save
all your lives and civilians. And if you come to our garrison to surrender, bring
with you a white flag or a piece of white cloth, for if you don't have this kind of
flag may be we will be forced to shoot at you. So please follow this order if you
will come to surrender.
Last best regards to you and your men. Hoping for a reply. Please send your
reply thru the bearer of this letter.
You have understand that if you surrender now all of you and civilians will be
very happy. So you must come down and surrender to the Lilo-an Garrison.
(SGD) CAPTAIN OKUI, LILO-AN GARRISON
A TRUE COPY:
USUAIDO F. LAGUITAN, 1" Lieut., Infantry
Asst., The Adjutant General, (WLGWF)
2. The Guerrilla Reply.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
WESTERN LEYTE GUERRILLA WARFARE FORCES
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
IN THE FIELD
8 June '44
Capt. OKUI
C.O., Jap Garrison
Lilo-an, Ormoc, Leyte
Dear Capt. Okui:

We are in receipt of your letter dated 23 May '44 in which you have asked us
to surrender together with our men. In this connection, be informed that while we
are grateful for the benefits attendant to the offer of surrender we refuse to accept
it. We believe we have as much right to fight it out as you Japanese. Regarding
your invitation to join the Japanese Imperial Forces to fight against the Americans,
676
it would be ignominious for us to do that to the Sovereign Power. The Americans
never did oppress us much less did they ever treat us like slaves. We enjoyed the
blessings of democracy under the American regime and therefore we have no reason
whatsoever to betray the nation that has taught us the elements of equality and
justice.
Re-par .1 Of your letter you state among other things that we are not your
enemies because you had given us a couplete independence. That we have the same
blood, skin, and tradition. You have even stated further that we are misguided by
false American propaganda. Please allow us to explain our side of the case for we
will refute same in the light of reasons and common sense. The Japanese people
are our enemies because they came to our country by force and treachery which is a
clear manifestation that the occupation of our homeland is not a redemption from a
despotic form of government but an invasion and conquest. Relative to that indepen
dence you talked about, may we ask the genuineness of the Independence? Is it recog
nized by the United Nations or all the warring nations involved in this global war?
To us the Independence you have given the Filipino is not genuine but only a compli
mentary and temporary gift to Filipinos who doesn't understand and realize the mean
ing and sacredness of national freedom. While it is true that we have the same blood,
skin, and tradition it should not be construed to mean that we will fight side by side
with you when we k n o w that you Japanese started this war in the orient. In connect
ion with the American propaganda, it is surprising to note that you consider thesame
as false. In any war the Propaganda Corps is essential. It is up forthe person
concerned to evaluate the truth of that news disseminated. Propaganda raises the
morale of the people. The Japanese Imperial Forces have their own Propaganda Corps.
It is up for the Japanese or Americans to prove whether their propaganda is true or
false. You vdll be enlightened to hear that American aid is only 200 miles from
your door. Please familiarize yourself with the daily radio broadcast.
Re Par. 2. of your letter in which you wondered why we shot you early in the
morning, is it not proper for one to shoot when somebody trespasses his dwelling
especially in time of war? We are really sorry such an incident happened but we
are positively sure that your purpose was not to make friends with us but to kill us.
You must remember that the element of surprise is always essential in any attack.
Re Par. 3. of your letter in which you stated that if we continue fighting
against you Japanese you will be forced to kill all mountain civilians and guerrill-
istas, you can kill all guerrillistas if they fight you. But is there any sense for
you to kill the mountain civilians? That statement of yours is inconsistent to
that phrase in the 1st paragraph to quote "we have the same blood, skin,and tradi
tions". It would be an injustice act to kill our civilians.
In conclusion we are extending to you in anticipation our heartfelt thanks
for the kind offer but we repeat that we have chosen the latter NOT TO SURRENDER
for we are confident that we will win this war together with the American Aid in
the form of men, materials, and supplies which are now in sight. Please accept
our best regards to you and hoping a better future treatment of our civilians, we
are,
Very respectfully yours,
(SGD) G. S. MAGLASANG, Major FA
Note: This letter was prepared in ray hideout at Gass, Ormoc, Leyte on May 30,1944.
BLAS E. MIRANDA, 1st Lt. ,CE
3. An Open Letter to "Puppet Governor" Torres.
(AN OPEN LETTER)
Somewhere in Leyte
October 23, 1943
Ify dear GovemorTorres:
677
We have just read your "Proclamation on the Philippine Republic!* (your Jap
anese-made republic) with kind interest and consideration. It was indeed a long
exposition in defense of your position and service under the Japanese government.
Tactfully you have approached the subject to allegiance with your master, the Nip-
onese, in a manner as to draw us and entice us to submission and eventual subjuga
tion. In your characteristic and persuasive Torres style of conciliation you waxed
enthusiastic over the apparent generosity of your master, Japan, in giving your New
Philippines Independence, with due respectto your ability and prestige, it is unfor
tunate that you side with our enemy instead of casting your lot with your countrymen.
You indignantly denied that you are neither a Japanese agent nor a Japanese
puppet. You are proud to proclaim yourself a Filipino Agent. If you are a real
Filipino agent, for whose interest have you been championing? Your pronouncements
and your acts show that you are indeed a "Filipino agent", working for the interest
of your new master, Japan. In war, what do we!.call an agent working for the inter
est of the enemy? It is hard to say after we have long regarded you with respect
and veneration that you are a Japanese "fifth Coumnist" seeking to wreck the morale
and patriotism of your countrymen now persistently engaged in the war of liberation.
You want to call yourself a Filipinio agent presumably because you are "Governor
of Leyte". If you ponder and examine carefully, to what portion of Leyte are
you the governor? Is it not clear to you that your title as Governor is nominal
and that your influence is limited to the regions in Leyte where Japanese oppres
sion prevails? Now then can you claim youself a Filipino agent, in its true sense
when you are with your own voluntary will, working for Japan? What made you talk
and act for Nippon? Is it because you want to be the champion of pacification thus
enhancing your prestige for the future? If it is motivated by your sense of duty,
why must you not lie low instead of aiding the enemy? Yihatever.may be your motives,
why turn your back to your friends and comrades in a period of crisis hold communion
with the eneay?
In a conciliatory tone, you seemed to imply that we who are now fighting are
now fighting in the guerrilla are your long-lost friends and that' you guarantee our
safety and protection in case we join you to become Japanese subjects after we get
tired of our "Robin Hood"lives. How can we meet as friends when you have allied
yourself withthe enemy? Your offer of protection has been proved time and again
that it is a snare, that you are the stool pigeon and that when we are under the
Japanese clutches your offer of protection is as good as useless. By the way, how
many officers and soldiers have you induced to surrender in the past under your pro
tection only to be maltreated by your Allies, the Japs? Are we blind to all these
instances? Are we dumb fools to be led again to the next surrender just because you
are Governor of Leyte for the Japanese?
You made mention of the invincible power of the Japanese Imperial Army, of
Japan's right of conquest, of the victor's absolute possession of the spoils, of
Nippon's power of life and death over us and so on down the line. Your words were
carefully guarded and chosen but behind every narration was a veiled threat to nnaka
us submit to your master or else I All those "teacher-to-pupil" lecturing are
useless. You are addressing a sensible patriotic Filipinos who have the grim deter
mination to stake their very lives and their future to the rightrous cause in this
war, who still have not lost hope in the eventual victory of the Allies and the
liberation of the Phillippinesj men who cannot be cajoled by attractive offers of
convenience or by the threats and intimidations by a superior foe. To all your
implications and entreaties we answer like Caesar of old: "The die is cast".
You made us understand that good guerrilleras must protect life and property
in the area under their control. You need not tell us that. It is precisely for
that reason that "guerrillas" came to exist. With a conquering enemy not interested
in the welfare of our people, it is incumbent upon us tp give that protection of life,
and property to our brother who are with us in our cause, heart and soul. If you
resent that some Filipinos died when in the act of betraying us or while serving
678
your Japanese allies, do they expect to be honored for their treachery and unpatriotic
deed? Do you expect them to live and cause future damage? If you are astounded by
the appalling ruin and desolation of towns and barrios, of private dwellings razed to
the ground, why not ask your Japanese friends to refrain from setting fire to our own
comminities and property? Why not don't do anything about it now that you are in
the good graces of the "Nippongos"? If only you have a chance to observe how we
administer the affairs of civilians in our territory, you will look away in shame
for never had the civilians enjoyed peace and contentment than is at present despite
hard times. Leave us in peace. We know how to look after the civilians.
But your biggest peace of artillery in asking us to join you and your cohorts
is the grant of independence by Japan. You invited us to accept that Tokyo-made
independence because it is an independence no matter who gives it. You asked us to
unite with you because the talk of building a greater., and new Philipines has at last
come. At first we hardly believe that a man of your intellect and position could
easily jump to conclusion as risky and hazardous as that you have offered us. We
thought you were joking, but then we r ealise that the war is not yet over? That Japan
has no clear title of her possession of the country since no treaty has been signed
yet? Granting that you have overlooked all those glaring facts, did you not stop to
consider what Vicente de la Cruz, and Pastor Salazar, your rubber-stamp delegates to
your Constitutional Convention were approving? Has it not occurred to you upon
analyzing that Constitution how national defense has been completely left out and how
easy it will be for your Puppet President to sell the birthright of every Filipino
by negotiating the development of our wealthy resources and utilities with a foreign
power which is no doubt, Japan? We can enumerate many of'those deceptive provisions
which you and your cohorts have enthusiastically approved. Is that the Independence
which you expect us to swallow?
By the way, Governor Torres, are you allowed to hear radio news from Allied
stations? Have you not been appraised of the fact that America is granting the
Philippines Independence in 30 days time? Between your Tokyo made independence and
the real independence granted by America, who do you think is reliable? Willyou
still,.proclaim an independence which is full of deception and granted for Japan's
convenience? Now that your Japanese masters have granted you and other gullible
Filipinos "independence, when is your republic supposed to declare war against the
Allies as in the case of "independent" Burma? If it is a real independence that
your Japanese friends are giving, when will they scram anyway? Why don't they get
out and help fight in the South Seas where Gen. MacArthur1s forces are moving them
down like blades of grass? To show your allegiance to Japan, when are you sending
those obnoxious Japanese Constabulary to the southern front to help fight Japan's
battles instead of fighting against us?
You derailed us as sentimentalists when we refused to have anything to do with
that "made in Japan" independence. You presented an analogy (. of bird given by
another instead of one who promised) to drive your point home but analogies are in
varying degrees fallacious. Nov/ that /unerica is giving the loyal Filipinos real
independence, your analogy does not hold water, if we choose to be sentimentalists
in favor of American's grant of independence, because we refuse to be cheated by
Japan's deceptive independence, are we not right and you are wrong? How soon have
you lost faith in America and how easy have you fallen prety to the vulture of Jap
anese propaganda? You who have enjoyed the fat Juan de la Cruz' treasury should be
the last desert in time of need; but you are among the first to jump into Tokyo's
band w^gon. How changeable is time?
governor Torres: We who aee in the opposite side of the fence from your own
used to have been your colleagues, comrades in the profession and many of us have
been under you since v/e studied our three R's until we got our smattering knowledge
of political and social sciences in college under you. We have been inspired by
your teachings of love of country in the opening exercises,of your masterful pre—
679
sentation of history and the lives of great Filipinos. Greater still, we have lis
tened intently and with respect to your profound lectures on nationalism, Filipino
ideals and etc. Vie catapulted you into the various offices you have held since; we
rejoiced when you were appointed Governor because you represented the young genera
tion in the government. But when crisis came to test one's character and patriotism,
you were among the first to leave us in favor of the enemy to our utter disappointment.
Until now, we cannot reconcile Mr. Tbrres, Rep. Torres »wd Dean Torres of the past
and the Governor Torres of the present. Do you have a double face as in the case
of '‘Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde"? After teaching us ideal traits of a Filipino citizen
which have penetrated into our very system, must you undertake to correct those teach
ings by giving us the Japanese way? As if to add insult to injury to our bewildered
conscience because of your stand, must you carry us with empty and hollow promises to
follow you and offer us to your Japanese masters whom you have already learned to love?
Mr.Torres, why don't you continue serving your new masters, and enjoy to your
heart's content that Tokyermade independence and leave us alone peacefully to fight
our own battles for the sake of the rightful cause? If by a long chance, the Japs
will leave you with that "made-in-Japan" independence while.we have our own "made-in-
U.S.A."independence, where will you side next?
"Fickleness of the wavesI there is only one like you — a fickle man's soul".
With regrets,
YOUR FORMER PUPILS
4. Guerrilla Reflections on The Fourth of July
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
WESTERN LEYTE GUERRILLA WAREFARE FORCES
IN THE FIELD
4 July .'43
ORDER OF THE DAY
Independence Day for the United States will be the Independence Day of the
Philippines in a few years to come. It has been the cherished hope of every freedom-
loving people to manage their own affairs without outside interference. Under the
sovereignty of the United States of America, the Filipino people have been imbued
with that ambition and its realization would have materialized under peaceful and
orderly auspices had it not been for this great war we are involved today. The
peaceful fight for freedom of our country has been changed, since the outbreak of
this war, to a bloody fight for liberation. The victory of the United Nations
will also be ultimate victory of our fight for liberation from the clutches of
imperialistic nations. Let us not be carried by the attractive offer of independ
ence by our enemy now desecrating the sanctity of our shores. Such type of inde
pendence by our enemy now proclaimed to be ours is the independence of death for
subject peoples, so. well manifested in the so-called independence of Manchuria.
> There can be no freedom under the totalitarian influence but eternal slavery with
dawn of peace and the ultimate victory of our democratic cause, the freedom of our
country will be "granted and protected",in the words of President Roosevelt.
Let me turn your attention to our local struggle against the common foe.
For over a year from now, since the guerrilla warefare started in Western Leyte,
I have been impressed by the spontaneous response of the soldiers and civilians
to serve. I watched with admiration the discipline and courage shown by my brothers-
in-arms. This wonderful manifestation of military valor is sufficient to make every
soldier proud of his organization. To those who fell in line of duty, to them
belong the eternal gratitude of their beloved country for their supreme sacrifice.
680
To those who will receive awards of having fought valiantly and for having been
wounded in action, the commendation and grateful tribute of the WESTERN LEYTE
GUERRILLA WARFARE FORCES and the heartfelt congratulations of your Commanding
General are hereby expressed.
This unprecedented achievement of our forces will not have been realized
were it not for the constant and patient efforts of our silent partners in this
struggle-the Eorce Reserves. With complaint and with such untiring will to serve
the members of the Force Reserve have proved once and for all in this struggle that
they constitute a potent force in our war efforts. To them the eternal gratitude
of our organization is and will be due.
(SGD) BRIGUEZ
A TRUE COPY:
USUALDO F. LAGUITAN, 1" Lieut., Infantry
Asst,, The Adjutant General, (WLGWF)
5. An Exhortation Addressed to Guerrilla Officers.
WESTERN LEYTE GUERRILLA WARFARE FORCES

IN THE FIELD
28 February '43
TO THE GRADUATING OFFICERS OF THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOL:
In the Phillippines today one cannot find any Military School existing
under the same conditions and under similar circumstances like that of the General
Service School now being conducted by the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces.
During this turbulent period in our lives it is indeed an extraordinary fate
to graduate from a Military School; most especially so in a country ravaged and
torn by war. What other persons considered impractical to be done and inpossible
at this time, you have succeeded. You have the distinction and honor of being
the first batch of officers to undergo and finish the course of instruction offered
in the General Service School. I hope you will apply the knowledge and training
you have acquired from the school honestly and wisely in the field.
Our forefathers have earned the credit and fame in guerrilla warfaee. You
should work for the same end. Let us cooperate and work for the best interests
of our people during this crucial period of our lives. You have the responsibility
of protecting the lives and property of your people. Remember we are in this fiîb
not to our own choosing. The enemy forced war upon us without limitations. It is
therefore, our duty to avenge the atrocities committed against our own people by
fighting the enemy efficiently with the least loss of life and property.
Accept my congratulations on your graduation ana assuring you that with
your continued cooperation, faith and confidence in me as the Commander of the
Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces, I will not fail you. Victory will be ours.
(SGD) BRIGUEZ
A TRUE COPY:
4—26—45
USUALDO F. LAGUITAN, 1st Lieut., Infantry
Assist., The Adjutant General (WLGWF)
681
6, On the "Made-In-Japan11 Philippine Independence.
THE SPIDER AND 1HE FLY
"Wi n you come into my parlor?1’, said the spider to the fly. Thus even in
fables, the insect world is said to have employed deception to catch their unwary
prey>-. Nowadays we have an unwelcome Japanese spider in our midst building a huge
cobweb network known as Tokyo-made independence. Far and wide they propagated to
the suspicious patriotic Filipino civilians and to the ever-hostile guerrilla forces
the so-called "good intentions" of Nippon in liberating the Philippines. In spite of
their proverbial fame as a "broke" nation, they even resort to giving out much desired
coins,in the American fashion, to our civilians to go to town. Belatedly, they pro
claimed that "civilians" are their friends, after killing and looting the very civili
ans that they now want to call their friends.
Patriots bewareI The pernicious Japanese propaganda machine is now at work full
blast. In the guise of attractive offers that they will not fulfill and of alluring
promises that they will not comply, they work in our finer sensibilities. As a main
feature, they have prostituted and polluted the independence aspirations of the Fil
ipinos by peddling that idea to gullible Filipinos now in their employ and to unwary
who may fall under their deceptive magic spell.
The independence that they loudly proclaim is a fraud. That issue is resorted
to by Tokyo and his henchman to achieve their subtle and clever policy of gobbling
the Philippines to the ingenious Greater East Asia program of swalling the Orient.
Japan is offering her so-called independence as did to Burma so "that the Philippines,
after that independence, declare war on America and the allies. That "made-in-Japan"
independence is a clever device to conscript our man-power to fight Japan's wars where
she is now on the critical stage. And if the expected day will come for Japan to
leave our shores, when she is vanquished in this war, that"made-in-Japan" independence
will be the best and honorable exit so that Japan will not "lose face" for it is a
great dishonor.
Filipinos. 11 America is giving us INDEPENDENCE — immediate, complete and abso
lute in thirty days time. That independence is backed by the men and materials of
America - our tried and true mother country. Refuse to acknowledge that made-in-
Japan independence for it is as cheap as the goods bearing that brand. Let us aill
unite to back up the independence granted by America.
ISSUED BY THE PROPAGANDA CORPS
’WESTERN LEYTE GUERRILLA WARFARE FORCES-----
7. "Why the Guerrilla?"
WLGWF PROPAGANDA CCRPS

2ND BN., 3RD. INF.
Nov. 1, 1943.
WHY THE GUERRILLA?
The terra GUERRILLA is a Spanish name for "petty War". In Europe in the present
war, "guerrilla" has come to be known as 0OMMANDOS. China has resorted to this
means of warfare in her wars with Japan. To the Filipinos, to our very ancestors,
"guerrilla" or "insurrection" has come to be known as che Filipino way of fighting.
Our Moro brothers are masters of ambuscade which is "guerrilla" in itself. Why
should people all over the world resort to such means of warfare after the formal
fight is over?
To all freedom-loving people, to oppressed patriots, "guerrilla" is the last
resort of defiance against the enemy. It is a manifestation of invincible spirit
of resistance and non-cooperation on the part of the patriotic people against the
7
682
enemy* As a means of warfare, "guerrilla" is a harrassing tactic that affects the

enemy in its plans and operations when least expected. To the enemy, guerrilla is
merely a feehle attempt at resistance, but like the bite of a malarial mosquitos, it
exacts a heavy toll of lives.
In a fistic enoounter, one may be dovm but not out$ the same case as in war."
The foimalfight is over but the unconquerable spirit of our people who have tasted the
bitterness of defeat and the humiliation of being oppressed still rankles in our hearts
and pervades in our memories. It is for that unconquerable spirit that "guerrillas"
came to exist.
Added to that spirit is the hopefhl fact that the second world war is not over
yet. Only the initial fight had been fought with the weak peoples of the world as the
victims. That initial victory of the treacherous Axis powers over the weak nations
has goaded the righteous Allied Nations to launch a WAR OF LIBERATION to free the
oppressed peoples from the clutches of the AXIS nations. In this war of liberation
all GUERRILLAS and COMMANDOS throughout the world are prepared to rise and unite with
the ALLIED powers in driving out the enemy from eveiy oppressed country.
Already the Jugoslav COMLLANDOS have been transformed into an Army of Liberation
and is now fighting side by side with the Allies against the Germans who occupied and
oppressed Jugoslavia. The Greek patriots will soon have their turn in this fight for
liberation. The French, the Czechs, and other trampled peoples of Europe are now
stirring ip like cauldrons in a fire. In the Far East, China, Java, Indo-China, etc.
are seething threat to repel the Japanese.
How about the Philipines and her widespread guerrillas? All Filipino patriots
now in the Guerrilla Army are ready to take up arias in formal warfare whenever the hour
of liberation shall come. The "guerrilla" tactic has beai resorted to by Filipino
patriots since that surrender as a delaying action and as a check to all the wanton
abuses of the enemy to civilians during its period of occupancy. In a moment's
notice the "guerrilla" forces can transform itself into a Filipino Army of Liberation
to fight side by side with Gen. MacArthur's forces in driving those squint-eyed pests
of the Orient now occupying our dear Philippines. In this long range plan, the Western
Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces will be among the first to answer the call to arms for
liberation.
The "guerrilla" has heen pictured by the Japs in their propaganda as a dog
barking at the moon. - Indeed for the present that may be true, but when the American
sun will radiate its sunshine of liberation will the Japanese moon not fade out into
insignificance?
ISSUED BY THE PROPAGANDA CORPS

WESTERN LEYTE GUERRILLA WARFARE FORCES — Nov. 1,1943*
»
683
II* Guerrilla Correspondence.
1* A Specimen of Inter-Island Guerrilla Correspondence.
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

9th MILITARY DISTRICT
HQ. 93RD DIVISION IN THE FIELD
NH-5
15 October, 1943•
Col. Macario Peralta, Jr.

C.O., 9th Military District
Somewhere in Panay
Dear Colonel Peralta:

I am acknowledging receipt of the radiogram sent to me by General MacArthur
of August 31, last, in reply to my radiogram to him sent in Panay by Secretary Dino
throuî your very kind office. I wish to thank you from the very bottom of my heart
for the courtesy and help which you have extended to the Secretary, without which
his mission would have been an utter failure.
You might also be interested again in hearing something from us. Since we have
received your order to effect the unification of all guerrilla forces in Samar to
form the 93rd Division, we have been unflinching in our efforts to have all the for
ces in Samar be united under one command. We have gone quite a headway and the
unification should have been long accomplished, were it not for the butting i n of
Col. Kangleon about whose interference I take this occasion to tell you in this
letter. Also conflict of interest and prevailing doubt among guerrilla leaders here
as to who is Who in the Army in the Visayas and as to Which is Which among the many
orders. All these three factors are responsible in delaying our unification.
Col. Kangleon stands outstanding as a block on our way to unify the snail
force under Captain Abia in Basey. He has also been the cause of Lieut, (now Captain
thru promotion by Col. Kangleon j valley a delayed response to our plan of unification.
Much as I regret to say, Col. Kangleon seems to be very antagonistic to our plans.
In my letter to you dated July 19, last, I already made mention of Col.Kangleon1s
telling us to forget our designations because he will have another plan of organiz a-
tion. Col* Kangleon went on by advising us to tell my officers to forget their per
sonal ambition. To cap his insult to us, he stated in his letter that historians
will ridicule us, and those who understand Army organization. In a memorandum, he
told us to aligi with him; otherwise, we shall be forced to lay down our arms and
leave Samar or else be outlawed.
But we continued and are continuing with our work in compliance with your
desire, notwithstanding Col. Kangleon’s outlawing the 93rd Division here. To effect
the fusion of the forces in the Southern part of Samar under Captain Valley with
the 93rd Division, a conference of officers was Bet on September 15,1943, in one
of the towis in the eastern coast of the province. We never thought that Lt. Col.
Causing would be present there. Acting under Special Orders No. 17 of Col. Kangleon,
Lt. Col. Causing appeared in the conference and made know his mission to effect, among
other things, viz:
A. To contact all guerrilla commanders and unify all guerrilla forces of
Samar by placing them under one command.
b. to organize in Samar the 93rd Division under the 9th Military District.
c. Once organized, to assume command of the Division.
d. To appoint in his (Col. Kangleon1s) behalf provincial officials.
a. To establida the civil governmmt under the laws of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines in accordance with the direction set forth in the Proclamation of
the District Commander, 9th Military District.
Regarding the mission of Mi. Col. Causing, we should say that he practically
had nothing more to do as we have practically unified all the guerrilla forces in
684
the province except the small force of Mr. Pedro Arteche, Brigadier General,PGF,
and Capital Abia ( a pro-Kangleon man by virtue of a recent promotion to Major) given
him by Col. Kangleon. We are also-.almost through with the organization of the 93rd
Division organized as per your instructions under the defunct IV Philippine Corps.
We have also reestablished the civil government before Lt. Col. Causing came to tell
us that he was sent to do all these things.
Naturally, in the conference, we rejected the mission of Lt. Col. Causing be
cause all these things he was sent for to acoomplish were either already accomplished
or nearing completion. In the Conference, Lt. Col. Causing argued that with the
abolition of the IV Philippine Corps, the 93rd Division in Samar was also abolished.
We could not see the validity of his argument. Another reason why we had to reject
Lt. Col. Causing's mission is: that we began to smell some selfish motive at work.
It is to be remembered that Col. Kangleon outlawed the 93rd Division that we organ
ized. Then he sent one to organize a brand-new 93rd Division in Samar to sport the
banner of Col. Kangleon as organizer. We hold, therefore, and so hold strongly, that
if the 93rd Division which Col.Kangleon wants to be organized in Samar is legal then
from all aspects of the case, our 93rd Division organized since February 17,1943 is
legal. We cannot understand vhy a Division organized in compliance with the order
of Col. Macario Peralta, Jr. will be outlawed and after a few days a 93rd Division
in Samar will be legally organized by Col. Kangleon. Is thisa question of technical
legality or purely personal motive at work? We are inclined to believe the latter
until after reason for the former is given by higher headquarters.
It was really very unkind of Col. Kangleon to brand us rank-conscious, per
sonally ambitious, and so on and so forth. If we are really personally ambitious,
we should have organized a Division before there was any order to this effect. If
we are really rank conscious, we should have promoted ourselves. But our ranks
before are still our ranks today. If we continued with the Division in spite of its
being outlawed by Col. Kangleon, we did so in conpliance with your desire and not
with aiy order of our own making. In the absence of an order nullifying or super
seding a previous order received, the previous order stands.
Colonel Kangleon1s butting in in matters about which he does not know fully
well is really much regretted. He does not know the oonditicns in Samar. His inter
ference is the cause of the delay in the unification of the forces in Samar. YJhen
he invited Captain Abia (now Major) to join us, he implied his willingness. He was
then receiving orders from Major Alfonco Jayme, the Regimental Commander of our
forces in the southern part of the province. Now, Col. Kangleon butted in and appointed
Captain Abia as the C.O. of the 96th Infantry, 2nd Division. By virtue of the appoint
ment and the recent promotion received by Major Abia, he began to give orders to Major
Alfonso Jayme, who as Regimental Commander of the 97th Inf. Regt. was in turn giving
orders to him (Major Abia).
Another guerrilla force which has not until now united with us is that under
the command of Mr. Arteche. We are anticipating failure in our attempts at having
him and his force join our Division throuî diplomatic means, because he insists on
following orders that are sealed, properly authenticated or duly signed by either
the Secretary of Yfer or by General MacArthur. But his force is negligible. The same
is tzue with Major Abia's force. Major Abia controls only some barrios of the town
of Basey as some of the barrios of this towi are under Captain Valley, who has already
joinfcd us. In ths conference of officers which I previously mentioned herein, Captain
Valley and all his officers voted for the resolution presented for the unification of
the Southern Forces (.except Major Abia's) to the 93rd Division in. Samar. I am enclos
ing herewith a copy of said resolution.
We have also accomplished some other things here about which you may be also
willing to know.. We have long organized a Medical Battalion, an Ordnance Service, a
Judge Advocate Sergice, a Cavalry detachment, an Engineer Battalion, an Inshore Patrol,
a Chaplain Service, an Inspector General Service, an Artillery Regiment, a division
band and other services. On the side of eoonomics, we have started several projects
like taming, shoe-making hat-weaving, soap-making, and salt-making ail of which have
685
groan to profitable scale. We have also encouraged the people to increase foo4 pro
duction. We have reduced internal disorders (palahan activities) and have minimized
the commission of crimes which became rampant shortly after the Japanese landed here.
We have also worked out plans for the opening of schools. We have also been train
ing and still are training civilian volunteers to meet the requirements and strength
of a Division. We conducted schools for Reserve Commissioned, and non-commissioned
officers. Herewith I a m enclosing a copy of the progress of our third batch of
aadets. I a m also enclosing a map of Samar showing the extent of the territory .con
trolled by the 93rd Division. You will note in the map that the areasunder Mr.
Arteche and Major Abia constitute but a small, part of the province, and -these areas
are still not wholly under their control.
Before closing, I might give few statements about our Ordnance service. We
have turned out some rifles and trench mortars. We have manufactured hand grenades
and are refilling empty shells for our ammunition. Although our arms and ammuni
tions output are not enough to meet the needs of a largescale encounter, we are glad
that our ammunitions have been enough for the engagements we have had with the enemy
and the Pulahanes. We are doubling our efforts to augment our prodiction of arms
and ammunitions, although we do not expect to be self-sufficient in these things.
We are, therefore, always expecting for the aid.
I think I have given you a fairly good idea of our organizaticnand activities
here. I trust that you will do something for us in the way of havingour Division
in Samar recognized by the higher headquarters.
So long. Here is extending my best wishes to the faaily, to our fellow
brothers in the Army and to friends vho happen to know us. I am also hoping for the
success of our common endeavor to defeat our enemy and to reestablidi the peace which
our people lost through the penetration and occupation of the Japanese in our land.
For Captain Merritt:
Very sincerely,
(SGD) EDUARDO P.SOLIMAN,2nd ht.,Inf.
Chief of Staff
EPS jICA
Incl.: As stated
TRUE COPY:
(SGD) EVARISTO ABAD, Capt., AGS, WLGWF
2. Inter-Organizational Friction Among the Leyte Guerrillas.
HEADQUARTERS, NINETY FIFTH INFANTRY

OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER
In the Field
June 9, 1943
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Reply to letter of Warning
TO : Col. Ruperto Kangleon
Commanding General
92nd Division, 9th Military District, USFIP
1. When you were in Peliway last, I was already informed that Gen.MacArthur
will recognize the reorganization of all fitting forces in the Philippines based
on the original plan of the Military Adviser, Philippine Commonwealth, as embodied
in the National Defense Act- Recruiting man power by Military Districts. As the
91st, 92nd and the 93rd of the Slat Div. has already surrendered, I know that Gen.
lâcArthur meant to mobilize the 94th, 95th and the 96th regimsits of the 92nd Div.,
9 th M.D? in the case of Leyte and Samar.
2. I took the opportunity immediately to inform you by the letter that I had
reorganized already my combat troops into the 95th Inf. Regiment for absorption into
686
the 92nd Div., 9th M.D. In that same letter I tendered cy resignation as Acting
District Adjutant in order to retain my troops (Special Combat TrOops, 11th Div.
OWS) tinder me. Evidently,how ever, this letter was not received by you, otherwise,
your letter of warning would have never been made. I wish to reiterate once again,
Sir, that you should understand me better before condemning me, for I did not intend
in the lease to deprive you of your riîts or the rights of others, as no matter how
humble I am, I never forget that I am an officer like you with honor and pride.
3. I issued an order to Captain Olmedo not as an Adjutant, for I have already
tendered my resignation as such before this incident, but as the Commanding Officer
of the Special Combat Troops of vhich Capt. Olmedo is the Company Commander, to disarm
Coral. Coral and his men are bandits. My one object was in order to protect civilians
and have complete peace and order. Bandits should be disarmed and abolished. You
ordered Olmedo not to mind my orders and let the bandits go scot-free. Is this your
policy - to let alone bandits to avoid bloodshed? With this bandits at large there
will lj© more bloodshed. How many bands of bandits and robbers do you think have oper
ated in this sector during the early days of invasion? Of course you do not know.
Plenty. But where are they now? You will have read the records of the USAFFE ALL
at the GHQ what happened to them. Did I spare them for fear of bloodshed? If I
did, you would not have found this sector as you dicl. This Coral bandit has just
popped out recently and I intend to disband it, bloodshed or no bloodshed. Hie
people must be protected. So I ordered Capitan Olmedo again in qpite of your inter
vention for I know you are not wellinformed. Shall you court martial an officer for
giving orders to his own soldiers to protect lives and properties. Ridiculous.
Shall I be court martialed for correcting what I know to be wrong.
4. Mjy dear Colonel: I have dean records of all what I did in Leyte, duplicates
of vhich are in the hands of my people vho are holding the government in my sector.
Of course, I have not done mnch. Verylittle indeed. But whatever I have humbly
done for the protection of the people both from the enemy, bandits, and murders, I
have done themhonestly and above reproach. To do this, I have organized all un
surrendered soldiers in this sector to back up my policies. They are a bunch of
honest, liberty-loving soldiers, faithful and loyal to the core. The state of train
ing, discipline and fitting spirit you found them possessed at your visit here is
made possible by a good leadership of my officers and sound decentralization of com
mand from this headquarters. Through my company oommanders Capts. Olmedo, Landia,
and Lieut. Loren to, this Headquarters was able toeliminate political supremacy anong
leaders in La Paz and Abuyog; sectionalism and tribal prejudices were put to an end;
robbers, killers, and bandits were apprehended, routed, killed or disbanded; enemy
patrols relaxed and confined only to barrios bordering occupied towns; enemy air
raids suspended, except the retaliation after the day your m m encountered the
japs patrol from Dulag. Peace and order reigneth; farmers returned to their farms;
civilians returned to their household duties; merchants and businessmen ply their
trade again; civil government function regularly as before the invasion; civil
government officials were required to return to their legal powers; Guerrilla brigades
were organized, commanded by Military Mayors, members of which ware to render volun
teer service to the USFIP, inducted properly into the service in accordance with
military regulations, officers given commission and an oath of office in accordance
with the civil service law; a uuerrilla War Tribunal was instituted for the trial
of fifth columnists, espionage, sabotage, treason';: and etc., which cannot be tried
by lower courts and to insure justice to all persons that may be brou^rt before it
before the law; government prices on commodities of prime importance enforced;
profiteering eliminated; except on occasional cases in places veiy remote from our
control; hoarding of foodstuffs prohibited; strong consciousness of national soli
darity has already consolidated the people's efforts and resources into one solid
and united front. The complete withdrawal of Japanese forces in Sogod, Malitbog,
Mas sin, Matalom, Baybay, all totals in the North and their subsequent retreat to
the tovns of Dulag, Burauen, Tanauan, Palo,Sta. Fe and Tacloban was attributable
687
to the initiative of this headquarter:l, when on October 1,1942, it is issued Field

orders No. 9 ordering Lts. Balderian, Pamanian, Corres, Terraza, Olmedo, Loreno,
Kempis, Mercado, Mayor Gallego, assisted by Chief of Police Landis, to attack their
respective sectors on the night of Ocjbober 9,1942. 14,000 rounds of ammunition
was issued by this Headquarters to insure that the order is carried out. Result:
About 1,300 Japs killed; 18 guerrillman casualty; Filipino Judas Scariotes and
quislings rounded and concentrated, others killed; Japanese forces withdrew from
South, West and North of the Island and concentrated in Tacloban, Dulag, Burauen,
and Tanauan where casualties on their part was heaviest; Morale effect: (l) People
who were once under Japanese influence united with our effort to resist the enemy
to the last (many pro-Japs); (2) Demoralization of the eneny and securing their
respect to the fighting spirit of our soldiers; (3) Neighboring islands - Cebu, Panay,
Bohol - organized their guerrilla also and followed the offensive of their brothers
in Leyte; (4) Japanese military authorities changed their attitude of atrocities to
friendliness'towards Filipinos. Proof: Japanese Propaganda of Philippine Independence
and Neighborhood associations.
5. I have endeavored to bring to your attention the picture of ny records
and performance; my soldiers, guerrillamen and civilians within my sector; circulars,
memoranda, special orders, general orders, letters, etc., are the living witnesses.
All what I have done ever since the arrival of our enemy I have complete records
of everything in detail I can‘stand responsible for all I did to the highest command.
I have established in spite of my personal danger and of my family too, peace and
order. I have excellent disciplined fighting men, under,who, may God bless them,
were able to fight on without heavy losses. I maynot be with them most of the time
but I was not idle.
6 . I did not build a house of cards. What I did for my soldiers and
thousands of people of East Leyte will never be forgotten. I never forget that I am
but a little man. I never forget His Divine Guidance in solving perplexing pro
blems. I never forget the delicate and heavy responsibilities entrusted to me by
the people of East Leyte. I never forget the confidence they bestowed on me in the
discharge of my duties. I never had any occasion to condemn any one. I always under
stand them. I always figure out why they do what they do, for I believe that’s a lot
more profitable and intriguing than criticism. It breeds sympathy, tolerance and
kindness. "To know all is to forgive all". Dr.Johnson once said, "God Himself, Sir,
does not propose to judge man .until the end of his days".
7. The conference in Bugho held on May 18 was called to inform the members
of the 11th Div. OWS of your unification movement and to eradicate their doubts,
suspicion and confusion, brought about after the conference presided over by you in
Abuvog. The soldiers were called to parade before them after the conference in
order to give them a feeling of importance in the hearts of our soldiers. On this
conference a joint resolution manifesting and reiterating and giving a vote of con
fidence in me as the Military Adviser of the 11th Guerrilla Division and as the
rightful Commanding Officer of all fighting forces included in the District embracing
La Paz. (1st CB), Abuyog (2nd CG), Dulag (3rd CB), Tolosa (Attached to 3rd CB, and
Burauen (4thGB), designated as the 95th Infantry Regiment. A proclamation to that
effect was accordingly issued.
8 . In order to preserve this organization with all its officers and en
listed men intact; in order to prevent injustice, dissention, indiscrimination, and to
the officers and men of his pioneer organization; in order to avoid untoward trouble
and confusion of its history and documents, it is hereby earnestly requested that
this organization and personnel should stand as it was organized, viz:
a. Authority of Organization:
Radiographic instructions of Douglas MacArthur, CG, USFIP
b. Source of Personnel:
Combat Special Troops 11th Div. (GWS)
c. Date and place of organization;
May 1, 1943 (reorganized)
St. Gabriel, Leyte
688
Remarks:The nucleus of the 95th Inf.is as follows:

Hq. & Hq. & Serv. Co.................18 men
Cos. A - Capt. J. Olmedo............65 men
B - Capt. C. Landia........... 72 men
C - Lieut. Loreno............. 65 men
9. I suggest, and I hope, you won't mind, that Capt. G. Almendra be assigned a
Bn. Comdr. 1st Bn. Capt. Almgndra was a 3rd Lt. PA reserve and at the outbreak of
the war was serving with the PS. He is a straggler from Bataan. He joined last Nov
ember and was assigned as the Plans and Training Officer of the USaaffe All. Lt,
Balderian may be assigned as Bn Commander, 2nd Bn and Lieut. Pamanian to the Bn. 3rd.
Of course, the Southern Forces will constitute the 94th Regt. and Samar the 96th in
accordance with your plan. The rest of the Bn Hq 95th Inf. Reg. composing the Med
ical and Combat will of course be left to you. I wish to repeat here again my resig
nation as an Adjutant and I wish to request that such an honor be designated from
those who have never had any command since the invasion and one who could always stay
with you in the Headquarters and one whose family is not exposed to the enemy like
mine.
The next time you are in the neighborhood please visit me and willget the sub
ject threshedout for all time. So here is a handclasp overthe mountains andthrough
the valleys and thrills, I am
(SGD.) GLICERIO I. ERFE
Captain, Inf., Commanding
Copy furnished:
Gen. ,W. W. Fertig, CO, 10th MD
Capts. Olmedo, landia, Almendra
Lieuts. Balderian, Loreno, Kempis, Pamanian
File
A, TRUE COPY:
S.T.PAZA
Adjutant
3. REPORT BY A BATTALION COMMANDER TO HIS SUPERIOR
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IK THE PHILIPPINES

HEADQUARTERS 3RD BN. 95th INF.REGT. 92ND DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER
IN THE FIEID
— oOo—
21 Sept. 43
SUBJECT: INFORMATION
TO: COL. A. L. BALDERIAN
1. A letter from the Mayor (Tanauan) from Gov,Torres was sent ordering
him to advise Quijano that his services as Chief of Police is no longer needed
in asmuch as there is a P. C. detachment here already. So Quijano is no longer
the Chief of Police. He has done much wrong to the public. He is hated by the
people here and in Samar.
2. A letter from your camp signed "The Mountaineers Swingmaster" was received
by Quijano last Sunday morning in which the capture and release of Mauricio Escarda
by Basas (JC) was related. This incident was reported to Capt. Ikuta. So Basas is
now under investigation. - Basas and Quijano are now in a clash - Quijano although
689
he is no longer the Chief of Police remains a spy of Ikuta.
3. Yesterdy, Ongi. "Martin Varcna" was caught by Ikuta and Sosing, but he is
now released*
4. last n|ght, Basas ordered the people in the nearby houses of Avilas1 ,,camalign
in Sabang to evacuate hecause there were rumors, that the carnalig was to be burned
last night. ,
*>• Palo people are getting mad everyday due to murders caused by the Japs in the
civilianpopulation. Dead bodies are seen in the river of San Joaquin. Ikuta is in
clined to oust Alvarado as Mayor for beingconnected with the mountaineers. I pity
Osoy he is a good man.
6 . FOREIGN NEWS:-
Fighting is now in Celebes. Good Luck we are near noi'$ano?
Italy is now cleared. 40 Italian battleships are joining the Allied
Navy in coming to the Southwest Pacific together with the Mediterranean Fleet.
Fighting operations are now in German soil. EngLish-American soldiers
landed at Kiel an Bremen, Germany.
A.G.T.CINCO
Major Infantry USAFIP
Battalion Commander
4. A Guerrilla Intelligence Report (Battalion level.)
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

HQ., HQ., '95th INF.,9 2 © DIVISION
IN THE FIELD
Office of the Bn. S-2
1 Nov. 43
SUBJECT: Findings and recommendations
TO : CO 95TH INF. 92ND DIVISION
1. Enclosed herewith are affidavits of the persons concerned which are self-
explanatory.
2. White it is true that Jesus Alberto was slapped on the face as a result of
his impolite answer (ambot) to a pertinent question, the fact that he received a
terrible blow on the mouth, does not warrant any truth. In other words his declara
tion was altogether too enlarged. The undersign regrets the fact that Jesus Alberto
framed up a dissatisfying accusation against the EN. S-2 after he had been treated
with all humanliness and essences of friendship.
3. It is to be admitted that the ASBESTO erred in furnishing an office order

to one who was a suspect, a fellow tidiQ was not even a member of this section. How
ever, his issuance of that order was not ultimately to secure enemy information as
we &ave Inland Observers and Members of the Combat Reconnaisance Section who fur
nishes an up to date information. Most important thing that Jesus Albezfco was to
get from that town was stationery. He (Jesus) was being shadowed when he left the
office at San Javier.
4. It would indeed be foolish to trust a man who have been maltreated and to
690
that extent therefore the Chief S-2 of this Hq. cannot readily believe that Jesus
Alberto was devoided of tvro days without food.
5. It must please be understood by the CO of the 95th Inf. that such action
of the Bn. S-2 was just a tactic to obtain enemy infermation and other pertinent
information not only that of the enemy bat of the men working in this Organization
as the work of the S-2 is not only limited to the sector where it is located, but
everywhere and anywhere where adequate information could be obtained.
6 . Jesus Alberto posed as an Agent of Lt. Moralita and of Lt. Santillian. As

this office was already cheated by the rugar coated lies of Aniceto Marmita, it was
trying to find out the real state of things and conditions regards men trusted by
the 2" BN., with a view of providing safety to everybody.
7. Leopoldo Matila has been reprimanded severely and was concentrated for one
week in this office at hard labor. The Matila arrested Jesus Alberto, he was in the
honest belief that Jesus was guilty. His threats of killing was solely directed to
Alberto as he (Alberto) was reluctant in going with Leopoldo to San Javier for pro
per investigations, and even tending to show some signs of resistance.
8 . Regarding that escaped prisoner Aniceto Marmita the office of the Bn. S^=2
has the following to say:
a. The declaration of Marmita to the JIF was unfounded and untrue. His
actions rather tend to show thst he was already a Jap spy even before
he was arrested.
b. Because of his iranly behavior and cultured manner aside from the testi
mony of people from Alang-ALang and theletter from Major Papilona, which
we are now in possession, guarrantying the loyalty and trustworthiness
of Aniceto Marmita, we treated him humanly like that of a respected
visitor, not only in respect of his comely bearing but in respect to
the Co of the 2" BN. Marmita was exempted from all routine duties. He
was even given a novel to while away his time. Not a single soldier
of this office dared to pinch his soft skin, as it is the ruling in
this office thay anybody who touches a prisoner without the consent
of the Chieft S-2 would receive a corresponding blow.
c.My only explanation to all of this is that Marmita is in love with the
Japanese long before they occupied Jaro. That Marmita is a real Jap
at heart as evidenced by his incessant services as guide to the Jap
Patrols. His going to the town was not a revenge for his being mal
treated for God and human witnesses can testify that not a bit of harm
was done.
d. Persons caught in the patrol where Marmita was a guide can readily
testify whether Marmita has any blemished or bruised part of his body.
9. The above are the findings of the BN. S-2.
10. Recommendations:
a. That no further measures should be taken against any member of this
section as Lt. Miralles has been properly cautioned and reprimanded
while Leopoldo Matila has been reprimanded and concentrated for one
week of hard labor.
b. That the operatives of the S-2, be still given the authority to catch
suspected persons whenever and wherever they are operating and when
ever deemed necessary.
c. To submit any member to a court martial proceeding if and whenever they
create any infraction in their activities.
JUANITO D. PEDRIQUE Chief S-2

691
III. COLLABORATIQNISM
1. “To the People of Leyte11; - A Proclamation by "Puppet Governor11 Sal azar
AL PUEBLO DE LEYTE
La situacion actual de neustra provincia demanda imperiosamente de todos nostros

patriotismo sano y persistente actividad en todas las empresas que nuestro Gobierno
Provincial en intima colaboracion con las fuerzas imperiales japonesas esta desarrol-
lando en beneficio del pueblo.
La campana para el pronto restablecimiento de una paz completa en esta provincia y
la campana para una intensa y extensa produccion alimenticia debe ser llevada a cabo
con firmo decision por todos, absolutamente todos sus habitantes.
Mirando con abso-.uja confianza nuestro porvenir, nuestro lema actual es: Trabajo,
mas trabajo y mas trabajo.
PASTOR SALAZAR
Gobernador Provincial
2. THE KALIBAPI
"The Kalibapi", we are told by its organizational handbook, "wa3 born of a cru
cial need for creating a new Philippines on the ruins of the old...The Kalibapi is
the concrete expression of the will of the Filipinos to meet the changed and chang
ing situation, with courage and vision. Accordingly on December 4, 1942, the Chair
man of the Philippine Executive Commission, with the approval of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, promulgated Executive Order
No. 109,now known as the Charter of the Kapisanan sa Bagong.Pilipinas, or Kalibapi
for short,1
".... On May 18,1943, Chairman Jorge B. Vargas of the Philippine Executive Commission
issued Executive Order No. }j56.... to provide for the organization of the Junior
Kalibapi and the inclusion of the post of Assistant Director-General....Dr. Camilo
Osias, then Assistant Commissioner of Education, Health, and Public Welfare, was named
Assistant Director-General and Director of Publicity.2
"....On June 18 and 19, delegates of the Kalibapi from chapters in the provinces,
cities, and towns met in a Special National Convention For the first time, the
Kalibapi was accorded formal recognition as a body representing the popular will when
it was asked by the Highest Commander of the Iaperial Japanese Forces in the Philip
pines to form a Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence, following the as
surance of Premier General Hideki Tozyo at the 82nd extraordinary session of the Im
perial Diet that independence would be granted to the Philippines in the course of
the current year....3 "
To appreciate the intimate articulation of the Kalibapi with the Philippine

government, it is only necessary to glance at its structure.
1. Association For Service To The New Philippines. The Kalibapi Worker’s Handbook.
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943), p.ll.
2. Ibid.. p.12
3. Ibid.. p.13
692
"The Kalibapi is headed by a President who is at the same time the Chairman
of the Philippine Executive Commission. He fixes and determines the policies of
the Association with the advice and assistance of an Advisory Board composed of
the Vice-President and Director-General of the Kalibapi, the Assistant Director-
General, members of the Philippine Executive Commission, the heads or bureaus of
offices of the Association, and the Directors-at-large.
"Next in rank to the President is the Vice-President who is also the Director-
General. The Director-General heads an Executive Staff which included the Assis
tant Director-General and the heads of the different bureaus or offices of the
Association, and the Directors-at-large... Next..cis the Assistant Director-
General who takes charge of the administrative supervision.
"There are at present ... in the Association...the Bureau of General Affairs,
Research and Planning.... Provincial and Municipal Branches...Publicity, and the
Office of the Secretary-Treasurer and the Office of the Auditor General..."
Article 1 of the amended Kalibapi charter (dated May 18, 19ii3), describes
the organization as a "non-political service association", known in English as
the "Association for Service to the New Philippines". Why did the charter speak
of the Kalibapi as a non-political entity? Camilo Osias explained that "this was
done with a view of doing away with factional differences and partisan rivalries".^
With the dissolution of the former political parties tinder the Philippine Republic,
the Kalibapi had an enhanced position. "But let me tell you", Pres. Laurel af
firmed, at his inaugural address..."the Kalibapi is a political party, an instru
ment of the people and of the government for making the national dreams and ideals
serviceable to the government and for eradicating political groups in the unifi
cation of our people. The Kalibapi is a political organization necessary for the
propagation of the principal of national solidarity."^
The most comprehensive, abbreviated statement of the professed aims and

purposes of the Kalibapi is contained in its catechism known as the Kalibapi
Decalogue:
"1. The Kalibapi is an association for service to the New Philippines. It
is my duty to help it.
2. The Kalibapi is an organization of, by, and for Filipinos. I believe in
its high and noble ideals, aims, and purposes. I am a member of the
Kalibapi and proud of it.
3* The Kalibapi is formed to bring about the rapid reconstruction of the
Philippines, and the rehabilitation of the people. I will cooperate.
ii. The Kalibapi is to secure the unification of the Filipino people of
all classes. I must have the spirit of unity, for in union there is
strength.
5* The Kalibapi is to coordinate all activities and services of organiza
tions or individuals concerned with promoting the ’welfare of the people
physically, economically, socially, culturally, spiritually, and other
wise. I shall do my full part.
6 . The Kalibapi is to insure a stable basis for the New Philippines. I must
aid to make the foundation of an independent Philippines strong and en
during.
7. The Kalibapi fosters the cultural, moral, spiritual, and economic ad
vancement of the Filipino people by strengthening such virtues as hard
work, faith, self-reliance, loyalty, bravery, discipline, and self-
sacrifice. I shall strive to be a good Oriental and a true Filipino.
1. Ibid, p. 52 2. Ibid., p. 37
3. Association For Service To The New Philippines. The Kalibapi: The
People«s Party. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 19hh)., p. 12^ U r ibl'd, p723
693
8. The Kalibapi stands for the development of a more sturdy and vigorous
race of Filipinos. I must be healthy and strong.
9. The Kalibapi aids the Filipinos to understand the significanceofthe
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the role that the Philippines
should play in the community of cooperating nations in the Orient. I
must know the principles of neighborliness and cooperation and render
service to the Philippines as a worthy member of the Sphere.
10. The Kalibapi is to do any and all acts that will advance theidealsand
causes of independence and inter-dependence. I must be efficient and
self-directing in sacrificial service to ideals and causes which are more
precious than property and life."
(The Kalibapi and the Filipino, 191*3, pp. 6-7, Manila, Bureau of Printing).
On the principles here set forth in compression, the national figures of the
puppet government waxed eloquent, spinning out in elaborate exegesis all the hidden
implications. Some of these points merit a bit more attention. The theme of
unity was one embroidered again and again with cunning rhetoric. "The essence of
nationality is the organic community and continuity of common interests. The
Kalibapi as an Association to unify all Filipinos of all classes must foster a
deeper and more widespread consciousness of this sense of organic community...."
Unity provided the text of many appeals directed by the collaborationists

towards the resisters, deploring the destructive rifts within the community, and
urging that the community bridge its differences — specifically, repel the efforts
of the U.S. to turn brother against brother in civil strife.
The doctrine of "coordination" seemed quite commendable. "The Kalibapi is

fostering coordination, seeks to develop a higher idea of togetherness or teamwork.
It brings about integration of efforts and methods... Organizations and individuals
that are not coordinated often are animated by rivalry and jealousy. There is
unnecessary duplication of work and effort.
The objection to this statement lies in its incompleteness. In practice,

the transition from coordination to totalitarianism is too simple once the idea
of plurality of association has been publicly undermined.
The concluding article of faith is a catch-all. Taken in conjunction with

the preceding pledge to serve Japanese interests, it simply means that the Filipino
hands his governors a blank check to be filled out as an order to do whatever is
commanded.
The Kalibapi directorship realized that its program would fail unless vigor
ously implemented throughout the Archipelago. It was not enough that a small core
of able personnel, centered in Manila, should understand the Kalibapi mission.
It was essential that organizers be recruited in the provinces, and inspired to
carry out the national directives. To this end, a Kalibapi leader*s Institute was
1. Association For Service to the New Philippines. The Kalibapi and the Filipino.
(Manila: Bureau of Printing, 191*3), pp. 6-7.
Ibid, p. 21*.
3. Ibid, p. 26.
694
set up. In the words of Jesus I. Martinez., Chief of the Educational Service
of the Office of the Assistant Director-General, "the training at the Institute
aims among other things,
(1) to rejuvenate the delegates spiritually, morally, and physically, (2) to

develop in them the spirit of whole-hearted cooperation, with the present Adminis
tration in its program of building the New Philippines, (3) to train them in the
efficient and economical administration of the public service; (U) to instill in
them a high sense of honesty and collective responsibility; (5) to develop habits
of simple and frugal living and endurance for hard work, and (6) to strengthen
in the delegates such virtues as hard work, faith, self-reliance, self-direction,
loyalty, bravery, fortitude, discipline, patriotism, and self-sacrifice. "■*•
"The majority of the delegates were appointed by the Provincial Governors or

by the Mayors of chartered cities, preference in the selection being given to those
■who had finished professional courses and had shown proficiency in some line of
service and had ability to speak before groups and write for publications... As to
privileges, each delegate is entitled to a monthly allowance of fifty pesos during
the period of training, ana to free traveling expenses on their way to Manila, and
on their return to their stations after graduation. On the other hand, each dele
gate is bound by a written contract to serve.... as a Kalibapi leader in the pro
vince or chartered city which he represents.... and at such salary as may be fixed
by competent authority."
The delegates attended a three months1 course of instruction, listening to

lecturers and going on excursions. The courses offered were: "(1) Physical Edu
cation (including Radio Tai so), Mass Singing, and First Aid; (2) Vocational Edu
cation; (3) Japanese Culture; (U) Filipino Culture; (£) Nippon-go; (6) The
Filipino Language; (7) Public Administration; (8) The Kalibapi; Its Philosophy,
Work and Service.... It is interesting to note that Vocational Education is not
only a theory course but a work course as well, for the delegates.... are each re
quired to finish at least six work projects of the handicrafts or art crafts
variety. The delegates are thus convinced of the immense possibilities... for the
amelioration of the economic condition of the Philippine family through increased
production.... The courses in Public Administration and on the Kalibapi are per
sonally handled by Dr. Camilo Osias..."^
At the Institute exercises of November 29, 19it3> Pres. Laurel charged the
Graduates: "Herein lies your mission. You must awaken in our people the immortal
ideals for which our heroes lived and died. You must preach not once but always
the virtues of unity, solidarity, cohesion among all classes. From the platform,
in the schools, in the small gatherings where people meet to discuss and comment
on the events of the day, you will find that the land is fertile for your pat
riotic calling. You must break down the apathy of our brethren in civic matters..
1. Association for Service to The New Philippines. Kalibapi Leaders1 Insti

tute, Ed. A.J.Agbayani, (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 19H3), p.6.
2. Ibid, p.7 3. Ibid, p .6
U. Ibid, p.9
695
3. "Puppet Governor11 Torres Berates the Leyte Special Force*
PHILIPPINES EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

PROVINCE OF LEYTE :
TACLOBAN
Office of the Governor
October 28, l^Lg

Sir:
In connection -with the shooting incident last night vhich has caused consid
erable alarm and confusion in the town, the undersigned regrets to inform you that
said incident is indeed deplorable and embarrassing. An incident of this nature
not only shows lack of organization of your force but also manifests poor disci
pline of your men. This causes fear in the minds of the towns people and lessens
their confidence in the ability of the force to maintain peace and order in the
community.
You are, therefore, requested to conduct an investigation on the matter to
fix responsibility on the persons who caused the incident. A prompt report hereto
is desired.
BERNARDO TORRES
Provincial Governor
Major E. Abay
Leyte Special Force
Tacloban, Leyte
li. A Memorandum to the Municipal Treasurers of Occupied Leyte.
PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

PROVINCE OF LEYTE
TACLOBAN
Office of the Treasurer
MEMORANDUM (UNNUMBERED)
September 30, 19l±2
TO ALL MUNICIPAL TREASURERS
Province of Leyte
It is now well known that looting or pillaging is frequently done in the
different municipalities of the Province. Municipal treasurers are helpless when
the outlaws come to town to loot the government’s money. In view hereof, it is
hereby ordered that municipal treasurers keep their money in safe places and that
as often as the opportunity to come to Tacloban offers itself, they should come
and deposit in this Office whatever amount there is for safekeeping to avoid it
being looted. The coming to Tacloban by the municipal treasurers or by their
trusted employees for this purpose is hereby allowed and the trip should be made
as secretly as possible so as to avoid being detected by the outlaws or by their
agents.
Compliance hereof is enjoined.
(SGD. I. D. JIMENEZ)
Provincial Governor
Copy furnished:
Prov. Governor
Prov. Auditor
Prov. Police Inspector
696
5. Notice to ^he Merchants of Tacloban

PROVINCE OF LEYTE
TACLOBAN
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
December 17,1942
TO ALL MERCHANTS OF TACLOBAN:

Please be present at a meeting of all merchants and retailers of prime com
modities of this municipality tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock at the session
hall of the Provincial Capitol.
At this meeting the formation of the branch of th6 Philippine Prime Comiiodi
ties Distributing Association in Tacloban will be treated. Manbers of the Asso
ciation are given the privilege of buying prime commodities in Manila and Cebu at
cost price and they will be accorded all facilities in the prosectuion of their
business, thru representations of the Association.
Respectfully,
BY AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNOR:
ANTONIO V. BENEDICK)
Provincial Secretary
6. Leyte's Tax Collection Campaign.

PROVINCE OF LEYTE
TACLOBAN
Office of the Treasurer
CIRCULAR (Unnumbered)
September 17,1943
SUBJECT:
Tax Collection Campaign
The poor collections realized since the organization of the local governments
under the present regime had given a wrong impression to the minds of many people
that the officials and engplpyees entrusted with the duty to collect taxes and other
revenues due to the Government are remiss in the performance of their official
duties. On the other hand, the present unsettled condition of peace and order in
the municipalities may be given as an excuse by the parties concerned for not being
able to collect taxes. For the very reason that peace and order must be maintained
and preserved it is necessary that the agencies of the Government, especially title
police service, must function. V,rithout funds, however, there cannot be agents of
the lawj nay, no Government even can exist. It is, therefore,incumbent upon all
concerned, officials and employees of the Government on one hand and the taxpayers
on the other, to see that funds are not wanting for the efficient operation of the
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government in order that we may enjoy the
blessipgs of a happy life, free from the plunderings of lawless elements. But
we cannot have funds for the support of the Government unless the taxes are paid
and collected.
Due to the poor collections of revenues, almost all the municipalities of this
province, Tacloban not excepted,now find themselves in financial difficsilty. Salar
ies of the municipal officials and employees are not paid on time. Their important
activities such as the cleaning of roads, and streets, and the maintenance of muni-
R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the co pyrig h t owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission
697
cipal bridges and other public buildings, and most important of all obligations to
the community, the maintenance of peace and order, are neglected. Several municipal
ities were fortunate in receiving financial aid from the Japanese Military Admini
stration Local Branch and from the Central Administrative Organization so that they
are able to function, although stringently. The local governments are almost inactive,
due largely to lack of cash. These unsatisfactory conditions of the local governments
must not continue. Taxes must be paid and collected. The local officials and em
ployees, therefore, especially the municipal treasurers and their employees, must see
to it that taxes are paid by the taxpayers.
Taking cognizance of the suggestion of the Director of local Governments that in
order to insure the financing of the administration of the municipalities the collect
ion service in the province be organized with a view to prosecuting immediately the
tax collection campaigi, the municipal mayors and municipal treasurers are hereby
advised to wage more vigorously and intensively their campaign for the collection of
taxes. In this connection,the instructions contained in Menorandim No. 493 dated
March 17,1932, of the Provincial Treasurer of Leyte should be read carefully and
complied whenever practicable under the present circumstances and will not run counter
to the present canpaign of pacification and rehabilitation of the local communities.
If in the opinion of the Municipal Mayor, for soma reason, it is not practicable to
wage a campaign for the collection of taxes, report to that effect should be sent
to the Provincial Governor thru the Provincial Treasurer for such action as may be
deemed expedient.
In order to inform us of the progress of the collectinn campaign being waged by
the local officials, the municipal treasurers are hereby directed to submit a weekly
report of the results of their canpaign (model form attached). This report should
be submitted together with the weekly cash report and the report called for in our
Circular N0. 1 dated July 22,1942.
I. D. JIMENEZ
Provincial Treasurer
APPROVED:
BERNARDO TORRES
Provincial Governor
To All Municipal Mayors and
Municipal Treasurers
Provincial of Leyte
698
IV. LEYTE'S TRADE UNION 1&3VEMENT
1. The Constitution of the Leyte United Workers.
CONSTIUJCIUN SOCIAL
DE
LOS OBREROS UNID03 DE LSITE
(LEYTE UNITED liDttKERS)
DECLARACLQN DE PRINCIPIQS:
Per cuante, no menos de 80 milobreros y trabajadores en las diferentes oficios
da la actividad humana, esparcidos 3in eaudillaje y orientacion nueva en los 47
muni capos de Leyte luchando per su majoramiento social, sortean defultades de vivir,
y apenas viven con lo que encuentran como proletariados miserables e irredentos, cual
del antigue Egipto, por la rebatina y competencia de brazos en les trabajos, obras
y servicios en toda clase de faenas entre individuos y grupes desperdigados y desun-
idos. Y el esfuergo humano se queda tan menos remunerado, y las tarifas de jernalo
sueldo anterierment e convenidas entre capital y trabajo, a la gaga, preponderando
el mandato y la voluntad del patrono y del capital. Come lo es hoy. Y asi el trabajo
sumido a la mas patetica miseria, parece que tiende al suicidio de clase, aun cuando
quejoso per su mismaapatia de cubijarse bajo una union armonica y cooperacion fraternal.
Y oomo remedio perentorio para este mal social que aflige y subyuga a la human-
idad obrera pulutante en los pueblos de Leyte, nada hay mas imperativo, social div-
ino y patriotico que establecer una unidad armonica cuanto mas sentida tanto mas
acariciada y necesaria entre los Kijos del sudor bajo un eaudillaje fuerte, dinamica
dereccion y nueva orientacio de un nuevo Moises que los conduzca en una nueva "tierra
de promision" al fragor de les yunques, en que el valor y esfuerzo humanos no de los
antigues esclavos oprimidos, sustenen la justicia de su causa y sepan redamar el
trato justo, salario cojapensativa-equitativo y justicia social de quien haya sido
satisfactoriamente servido, - Cual la unidad de las Hormigas Eojasl
Por Cuanto, la Asociacion que se propone constituir no sera de ningun valor ni
color religioso, ni partidaria remota ni acerrima de ningun otro sistema obrerista
extranjero, ni local ni partido politicoalgune en el paiz: - se centraera tansola-
mente a los preceptos morales y constitucionales obedeciende a las leyes publicas
y respetance a las aut6ridades constitudas del Estace.
POR TANTO, Caudillos obreros intelectuales, caudlllos representatives, cabecilLas
de trabajos y abreros hoy reunidos en comita para escribir, discutir, aprobar y
promulgar, libre y voluntariamente, promulgan la siguiente.
- C O N S T I T U C I O N -
•CAPITUJjO PRIUBHD
Articulo.l. - Constitucion, Mombre Oficial y mesidencia de la Asociacion. Se
organiza y se con3tituye la asociacion como union obrera integrada de solamente
filipino3 obreros y trabajadores, intelectuales y manuales, de diferentes activi-
dades, oficios, trabajos y habilidades que seran reglamentados denominandose
oficialmente Los Obreros Unides de Leyte, o conocida en ingles Leyte United Workers,
extablecida en el municipio de Tacloban,. cabecera de la provincia de Leyte, sin nin-
guna capitalizacion mas que el esfuerzo humane y servicios del invidiuo asociado.
Art. 2 - La Asociacion se Inspira eh el Ideario de los Aiguientes Pines:-
fi). Mantener unidos, bajo una disciplina social,a todos los obreros y traba
jadores Cque son de una misma acepcion,aqui) de diferentes oficios y acti-
vidados dentro de un solo santuario comun de union y hermandad, en Leyte;
b). Velar y representar a los obreros asociados en la contractacion de y super
visor sus servicios pedidos en cualquier parte; protegiendoles contra los
abuses, discriminaciones y trato injpsto de quien procedieren, en el cum?
plimento de sus obligacioners;
c). Reclamar per les medios de justicia social y legal lo que en derecho pro-
ceda en las reclaciones sociales intre capital y trabajo; y la justa oom-
69*
penaacicn per ca3os de accidents, invalids3 o muerte de cualguier obrero unido, en

el complimiento de sus deberes y obligaciones;
d). Declarar huelga parcial o total paro momentaneo o temporal, o el "boicoteo"
cuando en el transcruso de las negociaciones por demands de aumento o major
amiento de jornal o salario, trato justo y equitativo y justicia social,
fallen los buenos oficio3, los derechos obreros conculcados y no haya medio
factible, racional y llevadero de transaccion, y el agravio fuere real, grave
y discriminatorio para el obrero unido o para su unidad o asociacion;
e)» Ofrecer servicios de los obreros unidos que esperan trabajar sea por jornal,
0 sea por suelde en todas aquellas actividades en que se los requiera, bajo
contrato, por tierra, campos da cultivo o industria,o per mar;
f). Crear medios oportunos de ayuda mutua entre obreros unidos a enfemos asoci-
ades y desvalidos, y a ser posible extensiva a sus familias indigentes,
cuando ho hayo o pocas facilidados a un acogiraoiento en un hospital o dispen-
saiio gratuitos a gente pobre;
gj. Inculcar en la mente del obrero unido las ideas de ciudadania, del afan de
vida felez, contents y sosegada; de orientacicn a mejoramiento progresivo;
y del conocimiento basico de sus deberes y obligaciones para con su Dies,
con la Patria,con el gobierne y con su familia, embebiendose en las ensenan-
zas del "bushido" filipino;
h). Ser indiferente, imparcial y ecuanimo a y se hace libre de influencias de
ningun culto religioso ni de ningum partidismo politico.
Art. 3 - Tiempo de vida de la Asociacion. - A unos 25 anos desde la fecha de esta
Constitucion, la asociacion para termino a sus actividades; o renovandelas durante
otro tiempo de vida come justifiquen circunstancias favorables.
CAPITULO SEGUNDO.
Art. 4 - Administracion y Gobierno. - La asociacion sera gobernada, administrada
y regida por un oomite directivo central cospuesto de: -
1 - Presidents
1- Vice-Presidents
6 - Directors3-consejeros
Que estos cargos sen honorificos hasta que de otra manera pagados y cubiertos
por la forma y manera que prescriban los reglamentos durando un ano. nntendiendose
quo cuando los recursos justifiquen para la eficiente administracion de los asunto3
de la asociacion, las remuneraciones, del presidents, vice-presidente, secretario:,:
tesorero, auditor generales y sus auxiliares, se dispondran y se sacaran de los
fondos consignados al e fecto en reglamentos, acuerdos o resoluciones supletorios:
Art. 5. ~ Deberes de los Miembros del Comite Directivo Central:-
1. (§). - El presidents sera el alto representante de la asociacion en todas
las relaciones entre el trabajo y el capital o patrono;
(b;. - Presidira las deliberaciones del comite directivo central y de la
asemblea obrera general que se creara con voto decisive para aprobar
o desaprobar acuerdos o resoluciones tratados y discutidos per los mis-
mos, en los empates; podra expedir ordenes y disposiciones raandatorias
sobre cumplimiento y ejecucion de esta constitucion, los reglamentos,
acuerdos y resoluciones del comite directive central y de la asemblea
obrera general;
(c). - El presidents tomara y presantal comite directive central o a la asam-
blea obrera general las medidas convenientes y necesarias de tiemp, en
tiempo, y aprobadas, seran ejecutadas immediatamente;
(d). - El presidents firmara los contratos de servicios de los abreros unidos
a nombre de la asociacion; y tendra la alta supervision aobrs todas
los servicios pedidos y sobre los asociados, estando facultade para
obrar en la manera como diete la razon alii donde es imperativo un
acto necesario en bien de la organizacion.
2, - (2) El vice-presidente tendra las mismas facultades, deberas y obligaciones
en ausencia, dimision o inhabilitacion del presidents. I cuando no
actua en lugar del presidents, no sera mas que redunden en beneficio
700
de la asociacion.
Art. 6 - Funcionarios de la Administracion - El Comite directivo central nombrara
al secretario, tesorero y auditor generales y sus auxiliares o ayudantes*
Sus deberes son:
1. El secretaiio general hara que se escriban todas las ordenes, resoluciones y
acuerdos del presidente, del comite directivo central y de la asamblea obrera
general en un archivo abierto a la inspecion de todos los asociados; guardara
todos los papeles relativos a la administracion de la asociacion y respondera
de sus actos al oomite directivo central; y hara todo lo que ordena el presidente
por raaon de sus deberos,. y como tal es al misme tien^jo secretario de el.
2. El tesorero general cobrara bajo recibo oficial las cantidades dispueatas
consignadas en la constitucion, en los reglamentos, acuerdos o resoluciones; dara
cuenta detallada de ellas en un libro oficial de la asociacion; y mientras no
haya orden de desembolso de las cantidades recibidas, las depositara en un banco
del gobierno a nombreda la asociacioncomo cuenta corriente; y bajo comprobante
firmado por el presidente y aprobado por el auditor general, pagara obligaciones
o cuentas por conceptos aprobados.
3. El auditor general velara como guardian de la hacienda publica de la associacion
por los recursos de la misma; hara inspeccion continua sobre cuentas y recursos
en la tesoreria general. Ordenara al tesorero la manera como ha de cuidar de
los ingresos recibidos y como ha de arriglar sus libros. Aprobara o desaprobara
cuentas por pagar cuando se dude de su legitimidad;o como previamente no hablian
sido aprobadas por el comite directive central. Aprobara o no desembolsos siendo
facultado a suspender pagos o investigar cuando crea que se hayan cometido irregu-
laridades en la disposicion de los fondos de laasociacion suspendiendo immediata-
mente de sus funciones al funcionario culpable, y dando informo detallado de
ello al presidents para una accion ulterior.
Art. 7 “ Facultades del Gomite Directivo. - Central. - £1 comite directive central
tendra facultades:
a) - Governar y regir la asociacion, crear fondos y disponer la inversion de los
mismos prescribiendo medidas para el efecto con el consentimiento de la asamblea
obrera general;
b) - Tomar y hacer la indiciativa de quellas actividades que se crea convenientes
y necesarias en beneficio y progreso de union y de la asociacion;
c) - Dictar reglas que castiguen la traicion y deslealtad a la causa de la unidad
entre los asociados, las infraciones de esta constitution, de los reglamentos
interiores, y demas acuerdos, resoluciones y ordenes;
dj - Eh. los caisos de inhabilitaci on, ausencia larga o muerte de cualquier miembre
y funcionario del comite directive central, nombrara al sustituto por al resto
del cargo;
e) - Establecer subcomites locales o pueblerinos en los municipios de Leyte donde
haya un razoaable numero de obreros unidos dedicados a trabajos para velar por
ello3, bajo immediata supervision del comite directive central;
f) - Redactar una publica relacion de gastos t,presupuestosj para cada ana aproban-
dolos y un detalie de las actividades, ingresos y gastos de la asociacion,
durant e el ano.
Art. 8 - De la Hacienda. - La tesoreria general de la asociacion cobrara:
a). - No menos de trenta centavos ni mayor de cincuenta, como cuota de entrada
por cada varon o mujer que solicits sea admitido obrero asociado, en la union;
b), - No menos de cinoo centavos ni mayor de veinte como cuoto mensual de caca
asociade.
c). - El comite directivo central esta facultado para crear moderados impuestos
per capita sobre titula p distintivo de asociadoy sobre socorro o ayudas y sobre
categorias de asociados;
d). - Cobrara, ademas, todas aquellas cantidades presciitas por les reglamentos,
acuerdos y resoluciones, para los conceptos establecidos.
El oomite directivo central determinara en los reglamentos, acuerdos o resoluciones
701
las cantidades para los gastos de la administracion y cuales seran las cantidades para
secorro o ayudas o enfermos o invalidos o sus familias.
CAPITUlO CUARTO.
Art. 9 “ De la Asamblea Obrera General. - Una asamblea obrera general de todos, de la
mayoria o decien obreros asociados a la organizacion, formara quorum, en una reunion
anual debidamente convocada. Una mayoria de este quorum decidira, aprobara o desapro-
bara medidas como son;
1 - Aprobacion de una huelga, paro y boicoteo parciales y generales.
2 - Derogacion o enmienda de la constitucion y de los reglamentos interiores.
3 - Destitucionsumaria del presidente y vice-presidente y directores-consejeros
culpables del mal uso de fondos de la asociacion y por medio de una resolucion
unanime la asamblea obrera general presentara denuncia por delito o falta ante
los tribunales mediante la oficina del defensos publico*
4 - Si el presidente o el comite directivo central por una causa u otra o per
razon de companarisrao no se incautaran de los papeles y fondos de la tesoreria
general habiendo usado dichos fondos o parte de elios el teserero paia su piopio
provecho no autorizado legalmente, la asamblea obrero general podra incautarse
de el los, y suspender a todos.
5 - Aprobara a desaprobara esta constitucion y reglamentos, os presupuestos annuales,
los gastos de la administracion o dara voto de coni'ianza respecto a los gastoa,
al comite directivo central.
6 - mligira a los miemoros del comite directive central cada ano.
darilULQ wlllmU.
Art. Ip - De las Ayudas o oocorros mutuos. Se proveeran, cobraran y distribuiran
entre los obreros unidos que han cumplido sus obligaciones ayudas o socorros dis-
puestos por resoluciones. Kntendiendose, que el comite directivo central pedra
requerir de cuando en cuando y por justo motive oontribuciones extras para fines
de ayuda urgente a asociados enfermos, invalidos o temporalmente inhabilitadoes
por causa de accidents cuando sus familias no cuenten con medios mas modestos
para alviarlos durante su enfermedad.
CAPITULO SEXlO.
Art. 11 - Efectividad de esta Constitucion. - Esta constitucion antnra en vigor tan
pronto como sea aprobada por uncom.ite directivo central formado en un sesicn o reunion
de nuevos asociados que constituyan la primera asamblea obrera general, convocada para
discutir, aprobar o desaprobarla, para los fines de registro en el departamento del
trabajo del gobierno.
APROBADA hoy 23 Enero, 1939 por el Comite Directivo Central y por la Primera Asam
blea Obrera General de la Asociacion LOS OBREROS UNIDOs DE LEITE (Leyte United V/orker3).
Electos como primeros miembros del Comite Directivo Central son:
(EDO) ESPIRIDION BRILLO (FDO.) MAGNO B. BADAR
Presidente Dir ector-Conce jero
( FDO) GREGORIO R. PALACIO (FDO.) EMILIO LEOPANDO
Vice-Presidente Dire ctor-ooncejero
(FDO) AKBRDSIO A. REXES (FDO.) ANGEL TOMANDA
Dire ctor-Concej ero Director-Cancejero
(FDO) MELICO RALIA (FDO.) BRAULID 0. AURELIA
Dire ctor-Concejero Dire ctor-Concej ero
(FDO) LEOCADIO CASTRO CFDO.) ESPERID3DN BRILLO, Jr.
Tesorero General Auditor General
COPIA EXACTA DE SU ORIGINAL:
(FDO.) FRANCISCO IDO
Secretario General.
(Redactada por Esp. M. Biillo)
702
V. POST-WAR LEYTE.
1* A Judicial Decision Denying a Writ of Habeas Corpus to -Filipino Petitioners Interned

on Charges of Collaboration by The Unibed States Army.
COMMONWEALTH DE FILIP INAS

JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA DE LEYTE
S.o Distrito Judicial
EEVERENDO PADRE VITO BRIONES

Recurrente Causa Civil No. 1
contra HABEAS CORPUS
ALCAIDE PROVINCIAL DE LEYTE

y CORONEL E. R. THORPE
Recurridos
COMANDANTE ARTURO A. REYES

contra
HABEAS CORPUS
Recurridos
ENRIQUE Q. ENACE
contra
HABEAS CORPUS
Recurridos
SIMEON LUZ
Recurrente Causa Civil No. A
contr a
HABEAS CORPUS
Recurridos
-x
D E C I S I O N
Por convenio de ambas partes, estas cuarto causas que versan sobre solicitudes de
habeas corpus, se someten a una decision conjunta.
Al llamarse ayar a vista esto3 asuntos, los recurrentes pidieron su posposicion
y esta manana han sometido peticicnes enmendadas en las que se incluye como recurrido
adicional al Cor. E. R. Thorpe, alegando que este, en union con el Alcaide Provincial,
detiene ilegalmente a los recurrentes. En vista de esta enmienda, el Juzgado expidio
otro requerimiemto dirigido al Comandante General o a cualquiera de sus agentes autor-
izados para que comparesca esta tarde, las 3s00 p.m., y traiga a los recurrentos. De
esta orden no ha podido ser notificado ni el Comandante General ni el Cor. IBiorpe,
pues solo el Sargento que vigilia a los recurrentes en la carcel firmo al pie de la
orden. Pro bablemente por este notivo, ninguno de los dos comparece ah or a, pero los
recurrentes estan en esta sala provisional de sesidnes custodiados por un Sargento
de la Constabularia.
703
Nadie discute dl hecho de que, sin previo mandamiento judicial estan detenidos y
recluidos en la car cel provincial los recurrentes Reverendo Padre Vito Brinnes, desde
el Octoubre 24, 19*44* Comandante Arturo A. Reyes, desde el Noviembre 23,1944* Enrique
Q. Enage desde el Octubre 24*1944* y Simon Luz, desde el Noviembre 26* 1944* sinque
hasta ahora se haya presentado a ningun Juzgado denuncia o querella que les impute la
comision de algun delito. Sin embargo, el recurrido Alcaide Provincial, alega en su
devolucion de la orden de requerimiento fechada en 18 de los corrientes, que cuando
asumio el cargo de Alcaide Provincial de Leyte el lo de Diciembre de 1944* T3- estaban
confinados en la carcel provincial los recurrentes arriba nombrados y que los mismos
son prisioneros del Ejercito de los Estados Unidos de America bajo el control de dicho
Ejercito. Y el Fiscal Provincial Interino acaba de someter a este Juzgado un documento
firmado por el Ayudante General Auxiliar que obra por orden del Comandante General del
Ejercito Americano destacado en Leyte, en donde se hace constar que los aqui recurren
tes estan detenidos en la carcel provincial como prisioneros del Ejercito de los Estados
Unidos de America por estar acusados de "Voluntarily Have Given Aid, Comfort and Sus
tenance to the Enemy".
(Exch. A, pagina 2)..
En opinion de este Juzgado, este certificio as final y concluvente para quitar al
mismo toda clase de jurisdiccion sobre las personas de los recurrentes (Mekin contra
Wolfe, 2 Jur. Fil., 75* y Asunto de la solicitud de H. G« Smith, 14 Jur. Fil., 113)•
Si en tiempo de paz un certifico de esta clase ha sido causa suficiente para denegar las
solicitudes presentadas en estos dos asuntos, con mayor razon se deben de denegar las
que.son objeto de estos expedientes; porque, debido al presente conflicto armado, la
seguridad y vida del Estado, cuya defensa constituye el deber primordial del Gobierno
(Const., art. 2, Tit. II) estan en gravismo peligro.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, se dejan sin afecto los requerimientos de este Juzgado
dirigidos a los recurridos y se declara no haber lugar a las cu atro peticiones de
mandamiento de habeas corpus, sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto al pago de las
costas.
ASI SE ORDEHA.
Dada en Corte abierta hoy 20 de enero de 1945* en Tacloban, Leyte.
S0TER0 B. CABAHUG
Juez Interino
SBC-tac
EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE R E G U L A R

SESSION OF THE MUNCIPAL COUNCIL OF TACLOBAN, HELD
ON DECEMBER 4, 1945, AT THE SESSION HALL, TACLOBAN,
LEYTE, PHILIPPINES
PRESENT:
Mr. Vincente A. ûintero, Municipal Mayor
Mr. Francisco Ido, Municipal Vice Mayor
Dr. Arcadio A. Ortiz, Municipal Councilor
Dr. Dionisio Maravo, it ii
Atty, Emilio Benitez, it ii
Mrs. Margarita V« Estalilla, it it
Atty. Vincente C. Romualdez, T! II

Dr. Nicolas P. Benedicto, Act*g »
ABSENT:
Dr. Alipio Casilan, Municipal Councilor
Mr. Epifanio Aguirre, ti it
RESOLUTION NO. 270
The policy established by the Coanonvrezlth Government to encourage active
704
participation of Filipinos in business which is 95$ in the hands of the Chinese busi
ness man, it is timely that this Coundil should look with interest that the Filipino
small merchants in Tacloban be encouraged and that the cooperationof new big commer
cial firms or corporations of the United States as established be sought, if possible,
for the realization of this policy.
On Motion, therefore, of Vice Mayor Mr. Ido, be. it
RESOLVED to ask, as it is earnestly and respectfully asked, the Manager of the
U«S»Commercial, a wholesale commercial firm duly established in Tacloban,his much
needed assistant and cooperation with the Filipino businessmen so that the Filipino
merchants who could afford to purchase not less than five thousand pesos worth of mer
chandise can be allowed to purchase directly from his firm in order that commerce is
generally handled by Filipino merchants and Filipino customers in consonance with the
policy thus established; and to furnish a certified copy of this resolution to the
Manager, U* S. Commercial and the Honorable, the Provincial Governor of Leyte, Tacloban,
for their information.
Approved unanimously.
I HEREBY CERTIFY To the correctness of the above quoted resolution.
M. R. MANZAMARES
Municipal Secretary.
COPY respectfully furnished:
The Manager, U. S. Cornnercial
The Honorable, the Provincial Governor of Leyte
Tacloban, Leyte
nerv/
EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE R E G U L A R SESSION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF

TACLOBAN, HELD ON DECEMBER IB, 1945, at THE SESSION HALL, TACLOEAN, LEYTE, PHILIPPINES
PRESENT:
Mr.Vincente A.Quintero, Municipal Mayor
Mr. Francisco Ido Municipal Vice Mayor
Dr. Arcadio A. Ortiz, Municipal Councilor
Dr. Dionisio Morave,
Dr. Alipio Casilan,
Mr. Epifanio Aguirre,
Mrs. Margarita V.Estalilla,
Dr.Nicolas P. Benedicto, Act* g
ABSENT:
Atty. Emilio Benitez Municipal Councilor
Atty. Vincente C. Romualdez ii ti
RESOLUTION NO. 284
It is of a common knowledge that commerce in the Philippines especiallyinTacloban

is practically controled by foreigners, wholesalers, and retailers, notonlyweaken the
economic life of the Filipino people but also contrary to the policy of the Commonwealth
Government in encouraging Filipino merchants to invest money without fear and the Filipino
people to participate in business.
On motion of Councilor Mr. Aguirre, be it
RESOLVED to adopt, as it is hereby adopted, the following Municipal Ordinance, pro
hibiting foreigners, excepting American citizens to occupy or lease municipal lots and
buildings for business purposes especially in the public markets;
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 42
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING FOREIGNERS, EXCEPTING CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, TO OCCUPY OR LEASE MUNICIPAL BUILDINGS AND LOTS FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES, MARKET
BUILDINGS, TIENDAS, STAILS AND GROUNDS, AND IMPOSING PENALTY THEREFOR
Be it ordained by authority of the Municipal Council of Tacloban, that:
705
Section 1* No foreigner, excepting United States citizens, shall be alloted to
occupy or lease any municipal buildings or lots for commercial purposes, municipal
market buildings, tiendas, stalls or grounds for the purpose of business or commerce
either wholesale or retail dealer within the municipality of Tacloban, Leyte.
Section 2. No Filipino merchant or citizen of the Philippines or of the United
States is allowed to occupy or lease municipal market buildings, tiendas, stalls, or
grounds if upon investigation his capital belongs to a foreginer under his name,
neither a commercial firm or corporation is allowed to occupy, rent or lease such mun
icipal buildings andgrounds as prescribed hereon if the total share of the Filipinos
is less than 65% of the total capital paid up in the business.
Section 3« Any person, commercial firm or corporation, association,or entity, who
violates the provisions of the ordinance, shall be punished, upon conviction, by a fine
of not more than six months, or both, at the discretion of the court, to suffer a sub
sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In the case of comuercial firm or corpor
ation, association or entity, the President or Manager, or the person in charge thereof
shall be held liable to the Penalties herein prescribed, besides the revocation or
cancellation of the license, grant or lease, in all cases without rights to d a i m for
the money paid of the same from the Government,
Section 4* This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval, while lease granted
to foreigners before the. enactment of this ordinance shall automatically cease at the
expiration of the terms therein stipulated.
Approved unanimously.
APPROVED, December 18,1945.
I HEREBY CERTIFY to the correctness of the above-quoted resolution.
M.R.MANZANANES
Municipal Secretary
nerv/
4. Export of Abaca from Leyte: July - October. 1945
Export of Abaca from Leyter July-October, 1945.

Tacloban Agency - To Manila
F/S 187 - July, 1945 - 23,250 kilos valued at 5,474.00
F/S 91 -Aug., 1945 - 17,800 » 11 » 3,397.50
F/S 274 - Aug., 1945- 62.350 » » 15.348.50
Total 103,400 « » 11 24,220.00
Tacloban Agency - To U.S.A.
Oliver Wendell Holmes - October, 1945
160,655 kilos valued at 41,964.50
Baybay Agency 7 To Manila
F/S 187 - July, 1945 - 40.199q kilos valued at 10,287.03
F/S 187 - July, 1945 - 6,766 » « " 533.00
F/S 371 - Aug., 1945 -128,499 " " " 34,906.90
F/S 314 - Sept. 1945 -130,078 " " » 35.247.01
81,023.94
Malitbog Agency - To Manila
F/S 187 - July, 1945 - 14,242 kilos valued at 4,281.52
F/S 187 -Aug., 1945 - 83,753 " " " 26,448.20
F/S 193 -Sept. 1945 -96,013s " " " 30,118.50
Vincente F. Jaca, Extracts from The Report Of The Provincial Commercial Agent On
The Economic Survey Of The Province of Leyte. (Leyte: 1945), P.9
706
5* A Comment Upon Leyte1s First Post-War Elections.
Yanauan, July 12,1946.

My dear Mr. Lear:
I have just read your letter dated June 22 ultimo for I was out on inspection and
distribution of books and school supplies.
I am still the Academic Supervisor for the West Coast of Leyte, I do not know if I
will be continued in the service since we have read in thepapers that there will be a
complete overhauling of all office. Should I betransferred from Leyte, I may be forced
to resign because it will he difficult to transfer my family to another province.
In the past election for national officials at Leyte, V. de la Cruz, Fidel Fernandez,
and Colonel Kangleon worked for Roxas. The then Senator Martinez, then Governor Demeterio,
and several others in the administration worked for Osmena.
In East Leyte, all former guerrillas and ex-soldiers worked so hard that Roxas
received the biggest landslide in the history of the province. The victory of President
Roxas was not due to the work of de la Cruz nor Fernandez but due to the work of the
former "mountain people", patriots all.
The Western Leyte Guerrilla Forces of Ormoc, Albuera, Merida and Palompon were for
Capuyan for Congressman and Osmena for President. Both lost in the elections. But the
new local officials of Ormoc from Mayor down are all ijierabers of the Western Leyte
Guerrilla Forces.
On your question of former guerrillas combinging with former "puppets", I have this
to say. Col. Kangleon and alleged "collaborator" Jose M. Veloso were for Roxas. On
the other hand, "Puppet" Governor Torres and the Western Leyte Guerrilla Forces were
for Osmena. You can make your own conclusions.
Canonoy suffered defeat at the hands of a veteran politician Carlos Tan. The cause
of the defeat was the candidacy of Guerrillista Jose Martinez whom many Canonoy sup
porters in 1941 supported. The Assemblyman Carlos Tan wor with a very slight majority.
Mbntejo lost because he went down under the avalanche of piO-Roxas votes. Montejo was
Osmena1s standard bearer in the fourth district of Leyte.
Pilferage, black market and hold-ups are reported from time to time. Gasoline is
very hard to secure from legal sources but many are known to be getting their gasoline
from clandestine sources, so it is rumored. Many vehicles have been registered in Leyte,
Please communicate with me again from time to time. I feel it is a pleasure to be
in constant communication with friends.
Our regards and sincerest wishes for a very successful life.
Very sincerely,
Vincente J.Villagas
707
VI• Specimen Post-Yfer Interviews and Statements.
1* An Interview With the 'War-Time "Puppet Mayor” of Ormoc.
1 - Por que Vd. ha side nombrado Mayor? - Por que ha sido propuesto por el Govemador
Bernardo Torres.
(a) - Cuando? - Enero, 19, 1944
2 - Haga Vd. la Lista de los funcionarios Municipales
(a) - Vice-Mayor, Jefe de Policia, Juez de Paz, Secretario Municipal, Maestro Principal?
Sin Vice, Tesorero Municipal Sr. Rafael Omega, Jefe dd Policio Lflpal, Sr, Victor Penalosa
Juez de Paz Sr. Lucilo Con-ui, Secretario Municipal Sr. Lucas de Loyola, Maestro Princi
pal Sr. Clodualdo Timonera.
3.- Que politica lleva Vd. de su administration con respecto al Garrison de Los Japonesas
en Ormoc? - Cumpliendo las instruciones e ordenes del Garrison siempre y cuando no im-
plicarq peligro y perjuicio a los ciudandanos; en caso contrario, este es. si perjudi-
caba o tenian peligro, amena a, e inaeguridad a los ciudadanos, Civiles, protestaba
energicamente de tal forma que no engendrara sospecha contra mi persona y poner asi en
tela de juicio la sinceridad aparente en el cumplimiento de mis deberes como Alcalde.
Muchas veces, mis protestas o major dicho mis suplicas y reclamaciones para protejer
a los particulares y a todas en general, han sido concedicas y otras veces denegadas.
4 - Que oolitica de administracion lleva Vd. a los residentes de este Pueblo?
(a) - Sobre trabajos obligatorios? - En los casos en que el Garrison necesitaba traba
jadores, 10 enunciaba a la gente con un sueldo de P 1.10 a P 1.50 al dia. segun la
clase de trabajo a que se destinaban. Si la gente aceptabla, muy bien para mi; y si
no aceptaba, tampoco me valia de mi cargo para forzarles me limitaba a dar aviso a
Garrison dando cuenta de que no habia gente del nuniero que necesitaba, y en cuyo caso
el Garrison recorria a la fuerza por medio de susConstabularios o de sus mismos solda-
dos para la recluta de los trabajadores fuera ya de mi intervencion.
(b) - Asocacion de Neighborhood? - En cuanto a la organizacion de Neighborhood sus
actuaciones y detalles de su actividad, no tengp ningun conocimiento, porque cuando
asurae el cargo el Neighborhodiya habia sido organizada, ademas dicha asociation estaba
practicamente bajo la administracion y supervision directa de los constabularios. Toda
mi intervencion sobre Neighborhood, se limitaba a recibir algun que otro orden del
Garrison y endosarlos a los Presidentes respectivos de la raisma sin ninguna observa-
cion.
(c) - Del Kalibapi? - En lo respecta a lo que han dado en llamar Kalibapi no tenido
ningung existencia real en este pueblo, el mnico signo de existencia de la misma, ha
sido la venta arida y monotona de unos cuantos alfileres (insignias) de dicha insti-
tucion, la cual se hacia desde la administracion de mi predecesor.
5 - Deque manera los Japoneses de este Pueblo lo han tratado los gentes?
(q) - Matanzas? 'Durante mi administracion no ha habido ni he tenido conocimiento,de
algun particular matado por los Japoneses. Con respecto a los presos siempre inter-
venia y por medio de mi intervencion la mayor parte de ellos han sido puestos en lib-
ertad.
(b) - Distrucciones de las propiedades ajenas? - Durante mi incomvencia no ha caido
ninguna bomba de los Japoneses., ni ha habido destruccion de propiedades en el caso
de la poblacion, Pero en los barrios, los soldados Japoneses quemaron casas, y tan
pronto como tuve conocimiento de ellos, iba al Garrison sin perdida de tiempo, y regar-
le que semejante conducta sea'.cortada por que ?os particulares se quedarian sin hogar.
(c) Confiscaciones delos products y otors? - Eh.el caso de la poblacion los soldados
Haponese solian apoderarse de verduras (gulayes; gallinas, y cerdos, contra la volun-
tad de sus duenos, pagados, algunas, veces, y otras ■'"’
.ces no, pero todo esto, sin
mi conocimiento ni consentimiento, y si alguien se cuiara en mi oficina sobre algun
caso de esta naturaleza, acudia al Garrison en demanda de proteccion para los ofen-
didos. Sin embargo los soldados Japoneses continuaban sus obras vandalicas. Asi que
708
secretamente daba instrucciones a la gente, no corrtinuasen la produccion de gulayes

en grande volumen, y esconderles sus gallenas y cerdos.
(d) - Del Primco/f El objectivo primario del Primco, era la compra de articulos de
primera necesidad, y revenderlos al publico con poca genacia.
(e) - Administracion de Justicia? - No puedo dar una informacion exacta y detallaada
sobre la Administracion de justicia, el Juez de Paz sin embargo tenia los mismos poderes
que ejercitaba el Juez de Paz antes de la Guerra. Con respecto a los acusados a sus-
pectados por actividades de la guerrilla, Vease la contestacion a la pregunta, No.3
6 . - Cual es las condiciones dentro de la Poblicion?
(a) - Cosas de Comidadas? - Es caso y pobre.
(ti) - Del Negocio o Comercio? - Insignifanante e inflado.
7. - vue opinion tiene Vd. en la administracion de Hermosilla? - No puedo aducir
ninguna opinion, porque estaba fuera del pu’eblo condistancia de 11 kilometros hacia
mi Hacienda.
8 . - Que opina Vd. sobre la administracion de Miranda? - No puedo aducir ninguna
opinion.
(a) - Los gentes de el, llevan encuantros de los Japoneses? Segun informes han habido
unos cuantos.
(b) - Aiue manera los gentes de Miranda pueden tener cosas de vida a losgentes? De
buena manera y con el consentimiemnto y plena voluntad de losagricoltorespatriotas.
(c) 7 Que cosas estan exigiendo a los voluntaries? - Los voluntarios se encargaban
entre otras cosas, de pedir contribuciones en dinero o en especie como palay, maiz,
tuberculos, y caminos a dar aviso a los guerrilleros si los hubiera, moler maix, pilar
palay, y llevarlos juntamento con otros articulos de subsistencia al Campo del General
Miranda o de un destacemento a otro alternativa y casi incesantemente.
(d) - Los Gentes de Mirande han hecho abuses? - Todo lo que se sobre este particular,
es todo de referenda.
(1) - Matanzas? - La misma contectacion, que la anterior.
(2) - Confiscaciones? - La misma contestacion.
9. - Que opina Vd. sobre el 96th Infanteria de Nazareno? - No tengo conocimiento sobre
ello.
10. - Que instrucciones ha recibido Vd en la Capital? - Intensificar la produccion,.
11. - Sobre al estado financiero? - No estoy muy impuesto.
12. - Contribuciones territoriales y otros? - Unos pagaban al Gobierno de la Guerrilla,
y otros en el Pu’eblo, pero relativamente pocos pagaron.
13. - Los Guerrilleros han recibido dinero a la Tesoreria? - Yo creo que no.
Es todo.
Ormoc, Leyte, Feb. 10,1946.
(Sgd.) Jose Codilla
2. An Interview With A Tacloban Physician.
1. IN WHAT WAY DID THE JAPS INTERFERE WITH YOUEWORKSDURING THEVAR?

Obligando,por medio del Gobemador, del Alcaldedel municipio, del Presidente del
neighborhood y otros agentes filipinos, a hacer trabajos raanualos en los airfields y
montar guardia por las noches en las estaciones de la asociacion.
2. DID THE GUERRILLAS MAKE ANY DEMANDS OF YOU? Si, Mis servicios Profesionales fueron
requeridos para tratar guerrilleros heridos en los campos, pero esto no ha sido
posible porque ora uno de los muy vigilados de cerca por los espias de los japoneses;
pero si convenimos en instruir secretamento a dos guerrilleros los mas intelligentes
en el arte de curarnhoridas, y asi se hizo.
3. HEALTH CONDITION DURING THE WAR IN TACLOBAN,COMPARED WITH PRE-WAR DAYS AND PRESENT
TIME.
La Condicion de la salud publica parece que se consiguio coneervar dentro de lo nor
mal, Digo parece, porque no era y entonces el oficial medico de Tacloban; segun mi
observacion no ha habido notable diferencia entre los tres periodos, antez, en v des-
709
pues de la guerra, Veanse los siguientes datos.
(a) HUMBER QE CASES. - El numero de casos de los 3 anos anteriores a la guerra
{Del, 1939 al 1941), son 2,135 casos. El numero de casos de los 3 anos durante
la guerra son 1,680. Durante el ano 1945, tuvimos 1,610 cases.
(b) TYPES OF CASES - (Prevalent cases only, in 3 years)
Del 1939 al 1941, prevalecieron los casos de super del tubo respiratoris
" 1942 al 1944 n " 11 n ** M " ”
Durante el ano 1945 " " " " "n " " "
4. DID YOU LACK EQUIPMENTS, MEDICINES, PERSONNEL, ETC. DURING THE VfAR?
Durante la guerra, todos ios equipos y medicines han sido saqueados ’looted) primero,
por los filipinos y luego por los japoneses. De todo habia escases. Siempre ha habido
personal insuficiante para los trabajos de sanitacion: en Tacloban, habia un Presi
dente de Sanidad, doctor, y tres Inspectores Sanitarios.
5. SALARIES: PRE-WAR: WAR TIME, PRESENT El Presidente de Sanidad, recibia P 125.00
mensuales y cada Inspector Sanitario, recibia P 40.00. Estos eueldos, se mantiene-
nan la actualidad, excepcion hecha el del Presidente de Sanidad que recibo ahora
P 150.00 mensulaes. Sobre esto, se cree pertinente hacer constar que los sueldos
del personal sanitario siempre se ha hecho pasar por una criba muy fina y, por con-
eecência, muy pobre si se tiene encuenta la seria responsabilidad y el volumen
detrabajo que tiene que realizar. Por lo demas, los precios de los articulos de
primero necesidad en la actualidad, y aun on tiempos normales,son demasiado elevado
y, realmente, la vida de un sanitario con el sueldo actual querecibe parece un
rogante curioso. Pero siempre es bueno pensar en otro ingreso de no dudosa legitimidad
para creer en un gesto de heroico sacrificio en beneficio del servicio de sanidad de
parte del personal sanitario, pues de otro modo no seria extrano que las oficianas
de sanidad quedasan vacias de aervidores.
6. WERE THERE ANY EPIDEMICS DURING THE WAR/
a) En esta costa de la provincia, no se conocio ninguna.
B) ANY DISEASES DUE TO LACK OF FOOD? - Si las informacio nes que poeeo son ciertas,
casos de enftermedad debidos a la falta o escasez de articulos alimenticios, han
sido muy pocos. Durante el ano 1945, ha sido una era de abundancia, graciax a la
llegada del ejercito americano y al espiritu filantrofico categorico de todos y
cada uno de sus miembros.
7. INFORMATION REGARDING FEES PAID BY PATIENTS, BEFORE WAR. Segun los casos. Ordinaria-
mente los honorarios se pagaban entre 2.00 y 4.00 per cada visita. Debe considerars
el caso de los pobres a quienes no se les cobra, aparte de quehabia consultories
gratuitos del gobierno,
b). WAR - Los honorarios profesionales subieron un poco debido a las cii’cunstancias
imper&ates. Los precios elevados de todos los articulos, comenzaron desde la
llegada de los japoneses, y, es cierto que estos precios subieron todavia mas
cuando la llegada del ejercito americano. En los tiempos actuales, mientras unos
articulos han bajado de precio otro, sip. embargo, se mantiene aun bajo la base
del BLACK MARKET, esto es, estacionario en su nivel mas alto.
8 . YOUR OPINION REGARDING (DURING THE WAR)
a) THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT - El gobierno establecido por los japoneses, era un
caos desesgerante y tenia autoridad nominal. Los derechos civiles, eran un mito
aun dentro del periodo en que se establecio la desgraciado Republica. Las autoridad
es provinciales se movian en un ambiente viciado y muy propicio para $oda clase
de calculos immorales, so pretexto de que tenian el canon de los fusiles por la
espalda y el filo de los sables japoneses por la nuca. A mi juicio, el gobierno
provincial ora una faraa y una decoracion enganosa parede este mo do digiaular los
designioa salv&jes dignos de las hordaa de los O&ligulaa y Artajerjes del gobier
no militar de ocupacion. Pero la mas horripilante y opresivamente triste
durante esta epoca de confusion y terrorismo, fue que ciertos filipinos desal-
f
710
mados hicieron su agosta para madrar para su bienestar personal, ocasionando con elio
una ofensa vergonzosa contra los principios o ideales sacrosantos, por los cuales
Filipinos sangre en una lucha a muerte contra agresores que solo ansiaban cenirse a
sus frentes cromomales la muerte contra agesores que solo ensiaban cenirse a sus frentes
criminales la diadema del orgullo jr de la codicia mereenaria. amasda con sangre de
nuestros heroes martires que cayeron en el campo del honor. Opino que esta ofensa de
lesa patria, debe merecer un castigo adecuado, sin conteraplacion.
b) THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT - Seria descabellado negar la santidad del empono y sacri-
ficio de los legitimos guerrileros; bajo la sombra de nuestra gallarda ensens muchos
hermanos ofrendaronusus vidas. No tengo mas que sinceras plegarias al Altisimo por
su inmolacion y legitimo orgullo personal por este decidido desprecio de sus vidas
en aras de la santa causa. Pero, si es desgraciado el negarlo, tambien es innegable
que el movimiento de los guerrilleros o de ciertos elementos de esta-organizacion de
resistencia, ha registrado incontables e injustificadas crueldados y lagrimas inneces-
arias por el sacrificio de muchas vidas de inocentes. 3e dira que ello e s inevitable
. en una conmocion nacional de esta naturaleza. En parte, si. Pero la mitad o mas de
la mitad de los hermanos inmolados sin justificacion, se hubiera felizmente evitado
si se hubiese hecho un esfuerzo ma inteligente y decidido por parte del elemfento dir-
ectriz para encausar la irresponsible actuacion de elementos recalcitrantes de la
organizacion. Indubablemente, el caudlllajo de la resistencia no contaba con el neces-
ario prestigo y corage que debiera reunir todo lider de movimientos de esta magnitud.
Las luchas fratrecidas entre guerrilleros en que muchas vidas se han sacrificado, prue-
ban esta asercion. Hubo machisimos casos de muertes ejecutadas son formacion de
expedients de ninguna clase, muchos de los cuales se debieron solo a rencillas person-
ales habidas ahtes de la guerra. Y muchas de esas muertes han sido ejecutadas,no solo
por ofioialos subalternos sin ninguna autoridad legitima para decretar pena capital,
sino hasta el ultimo guarrrillero se erigla en acusador, juez y verdugo, y, se
mataba al presunto oulpable a la vuelte de una vereda rural o de un camino vecinal,
no ya por un delito reeonocido an tiempos de guerra, sino hasta por un motive el mas
baladi* Y, ni los offioiales de alto range ni memos el caudillo de la organizacion,
se enteraban de estas ejecuciones torpes y criminales. Se ha hablado y se habia que
los guerrilleros mataron muchisimo mas filipinos inooentes que sus enemigos, los
ajponeses.
Pueblos ocupados por japoneses y tornados por los guerrilleros, al menos en el
norte de la provincia de Leyte, ne se conoce ni uno. El hecho siguiente contado por
muchos testigos presemciales es memorablej un municipiogrande del interior en el norte
de esta provincia, se hallaba ocupado por unos 30 soldados japoneses. Una noche, unos
3 mil guerrilleros, entro estos y miembros del bolo Battalioij, entraron en el publo
para tomarlo. El tiruteo duro 3 dias, los soldados japoneses se metieron en sus hoyos
y se hallaban practicaraente rodeados por los guerrilleros atacabtes. Resultado: ninguno,
ni uno de estos se atrevio a acercarse a aquellos, no obstante de estar armados mas de
100 con fusiles y granadas de mano. Los refuerzos japoneses llegaron al tercer dia.
y, muchos filipinos murieron. Ni un solo japones ha muerto. Hermosa y provechosa
leccion para quienes quieran erigirse en lo futuro en directores de movimientos de
esta clasel.
c) THE NEIGHBORHOOD ASOCIACION - Erta organ i.oani 1-1s "uracter popular, no era mala
en si y sus actividades, bien encausadas y debidamente administradas mucha ayuda
efectiva podia reportar para el bien estar de la comunidad. Su administracion durante
la ocupacion japonesea, era may de fectuosa y sus procedimientes irrisoriamente in-
quisitoriales. Sus miembros han sido reclutados medicate procedimientos opersivos y
bajo amenazas de castigos corporales a los individuos habies, inclusive a sus familias,
si no se alistaban, se consiguio organizer los neighborhoods. La figura ad£sta del sol-
dado japones con el latigo o al sable en la mano, siempre se veia detras de estas de
orgsnizaciones y delas ordenes del gobernador de la provincia y del Mayor del municipio.
Es mass los miembros del neighborhood que montaban gjiardia por las noches, se hallaban
a merced de los malbechoses armados y soldados japoneses irresponsables, sin ninguna
711
proteccion para sus personas. Y estaba prohibido para todo guardia que llevase arm?, algu
na, si quiera para au defensa personal. Por este motive, las agresiones menudearon con
frecuencia, aun contra los soldados de la constabularia, dentro de las zonas guarda-
das. AMI fue esta organizacion.
1). RATIQNIBG - La racion que por largos intervalos so hacia por medio del neighbor
hood,no servia para nada. Cada nos, tres semanas o frecuentementa cada dos o tres
raeses, se vendis o se daba no mas del ganta de arroz o de maiz, un poco de aal. otro
poco de azucar de la peor clase, 1 cajetilla de fosforos y otros trastos sobrantes
de los japoneses, era toda la racion conocida que se destribuia. En cambio, buejjo
es que se sepa, en las casas del entonces gobernador Pastor Salazar ydesus alegados,
so nadaba en la abundancia; con frecuencia se veian las fastuosas comidas y orgias
eh esas en que de todo abundaba. Las figuras de los oficiales japoneses no faltaban
en las mismas.
2). COMPULSORY LABOR - Todos, sin distincion, teniamos que prestar trabajo obligatorio,
sin comida, y por tada compensacion de todo un dia de trabajo en los campos o en los
rios para acarrear piedras, se daba 1/4 o l/5 de ganta de arroz o de maiz, otro 1/4
de kilo de azucar o de sal.
3/. YOUR PERSONAL ACTIVITIES - (During the War?). - Durante la ocupacion japonesa,
me dedicaba al ejercicio de la profesion y parte del tiempo lo empleaba en la siembre
de cualquier legumbre, hortalizas o de tuberculos de pronta cosecha.
(SGD. DR.ENAGE
3» A Statement By A Former Member of the Leyte Special Force.
On 10 December 1941, I was called to active duty in the service of the USAFFE,
being a reservist. I was assigned in the Medical Company, Leye Provincial Regiment, and
was later attached as Company Aid Man to E Company, of the same Regiment, which was
stationed in Ormoc from January to May 1942. On 22d May, 1942, Colonel Theodore M.
Connell, Sector Commander for Leyte and Samar, issued orders to all units under his
command to surrender. Our battlion commander, having perhaps foreseen things to come,
did not compel us to surrender, but just had us make our own choice - to surrender or
not. Most of us, including /qyself, chose the latter. So I turned over my arm and
equipment to my CO, and made my way home, avoiding the Japs on the way, who were
already in this island then.
I stayed home for almost a month not expecting to have anything to do with
soldiering anymore. Ify place, being secluded from any other town in the island, was
just running things as usual when one d^r, a patrol of Japs guided by one Andrada,
came unexpectedly, I and a companions of mine was in a dance that time, and hefore
we knew it, there was Andrada with his Japs. I &nd ray companion wefe unfortunately in
uniform, so there-was no need telling them who we were. They simply loaded us into
their car and took us to Malitbog, where, according to Andrade, we were to be invest
igated" and then released. But when we reached Malitbog, they placed ud under
guard andthen taken to Tacloban and placed in the concentration Camp. The way I was
treated in the concentration Camp was not quite good, but it v:as I guess much better
than any PW camp, We had food, although not quite sufficient,and we had good running
water for drinking and bathing.
By the month of September, Lt. Watanabe, the Jap Officer in Charge of our
Canp, told Lt. Col. J. Causing, our former Regtl. Comdr. that they (the Japs) needed
men to maintai npeace and order. And they were thinking of gettingthose men from
among us. So it was keft For Col. Causing to select among us those whom he thought
would be willing to cooperate.
I was one of the second batch of prisoners taken out. Before we were hauled
out of the canp, Lt. Watanabe, thru Causing, warned us that upon our behavior and the
way we carried out our duties, depended our final release, together with those who
were left in the Canp. If we did well in maintaining "peace andorderfi, we would be
given our release papers and sent home. But if not, they will place us back in the
712
concentration camp. The day after we were taken out, we were given rifles (YS
enfield) and some ammunition and were made to go on patrol to Tigbao, a place some
4 kms. north of (Tacloban, where Marcial Santos and some other guerrillas were reported
to be hiding. We went, but did not meet them.
& week later, my company, which was under Captain Jorge Sevilla, was moved
to the town of Alangaleng. We were to garrison the place as the Japs instructed us,
for en indefinite period. We were supposed to go on patrol every other day and fight
the "bandits" if we met them. We did meet them, not only once or twice, but every cday.
They just hang around our garrison and ask for food, salt, ammunition, paper, and
everything which they badly needed in the mountains. Twice Captain F.Pabilona, who was
a 1st Sgt. then came to our camp with around a hundred men trying to make us desett
from the Japs, But Captain Sevilla just told him not to worry because he thought the
American Forces would be coming by December of the year, and that would be the time
for us to act. And Captain Pabilona took his word for it,
Colonel Causing often comes to our garrison with Colonel Matsunaga, and later
with Colonel Qrauri, Comdr.Jap., for the Imperial Forces in Leyte, to inspect us.
Captain Sevilla would tell Col.Causing about our secret activities. He would just say
to keep our mouths shut or else— .
We had a smooth understanding with the guerrillas in the town of Alangalang
for two months. The Japs probably got suspicious bedause we always requisitioned
for ammunition and yet we never got a single "bandit". So, they moved us hack to
Tacloban.
In Tacloban, I was getting uneasy. There were rumors that the Americans
sould be coming soon.The Japanese Army was calling for volunteers for the "Bureau
of Constabulary", and if none of us volunteered, they would force us to enlist.
Collaborationists were being murdered by the BANDITS. Mr. Mansa, one of the pro
minent men of Tacloban who was employed by the Japanese as an operative to get
information about guerrilla activities in Burauen, was shot to death. We heard
rumors that the guerrillas were already so active that whenever the Japanese went
out on patrol, they surely would meet them.
So I talked things over with a buddy of mine and one other fellow from my
place that we would take our chance at getting out. On the night of 8 Nov.1942,
we got a small rowboat in San Fernado Beach, Tacloban, and shoved off. A storm over
took us on the way and we were forced to land at Tolosa, where we were immediately
arrested by the Guerrillas there under Major Dadula. We were taken to the Head
quarters of Colonel (then) Balderian at Dagami, for questioning. Having been per
haps convinced that we were loyal to their cause, he made us join thei. organization,
minus arms, of course, because arms were very scarce then.
After two weeks stay in Tolosa, we requested that we be taken to Ninunangan,
where we knew there was also another guerrilla organization founded by CapELan
Sergio Nuique and commanded by M/Sgt. Elpdie Ramada. We were taken there and joined
the outfit of Ramada right after our arrival.
4» A Surrendered Guerrillero Seeks Exoneration.
33 P» Burgos St.
Tacloban, Leyte
December 20,1944
The Commanding Officer
92nd Division, USFIP, LAC
In the Field
(Ihru the C.O., 95th Inf. Regt,
the Field)
Sir:
I have the honor to request for reconsideration of par. 1 General Orders
713
No, 17, Hq, Lac, dated iteirch, 1944, and further requet that I be given an honorable dis
charge for the following reasons:
1, My surrender was not voluntary as erroneously reported, but compelled,
2, My having gone out of the limits of the 95th Inf, was done after I received
reliable information that there was an order for all units to lie low and withdraw from
suspected areas. This was in October and November, 1943*
3 . 1 left the necessary instructions to a responsible man in my unit how I
could be reached in case the order to lie low was lefted. But not a single communica
tion from any source reached me,
4, I could not have collaborated with the enemy.
5, During the period that I was in the service of the USFIF, I did not make
any virong exercise of power to abuse of authority.
6 . 1 took the initiative to rejoin the nearest military unit to the place I
was forced to reside.
On the last week of Sept. 1943, I was given a leave of absence by Lt. Eonicillo
then Executive Officer and Adjutant of the Regiment while our CP was yet Hibacongan,
Leyte, to get ny family so that I may bring it with me where I will finally be assigned.
On October 12,1943, I was at Balaquid, Biliran. Here, I was informed by T/Sgt. E.
Drapiza, FS, that Lt, Bonicillofs CP was already transferred presumably to Dagami, and
that also Lt. HJDumilom was at Qotusan, Calubian, auditing the accounts of Lt. Ortiz.
At this time the BN Hqs. of Capt. Pamanian was already moved to a barrio near Calubian.
It was here I received information that there was an order to lie low and withdraw from
suspected areas. Notwithstanding this, I still stayed in Balaquid by this time suf
fering from"tropical ulcer (capithok) and ."maho" on my left leg, hoping somehow I could
let the Reg. Hqs. know ray whereabouts.
A ray of hope came in the persori of Lt. G, Gasimpan, when he passed by Balan-
quid,I should have gone with him but he was still on his way to a mission he did not
disclose. So, I only sent a communication thru him to Hqs. about my whereabouts and
request for instructions. Lt. Casimpan did not pass by Bzlaquid anymore.
After this time,I met Lt. Ramos of the 1st BN S04 who eased up my hard sit
uation by loaning me a sack of palay for subsistence. .Before this and after it was
jJonsumed, I subsisted my family on what I could get in ray civilian capacity. This was
about the middle of November,1943. iiost of my subsistence I owed from acquaintances
and from Lt. Salvador F, Tan, who happened to be in a nearby barrio.
The enemy occupied Leyte, Leyte, and make i ntensive mopping up operations.
I was still in Balaquid, still hoping I could find a way to join nr C,0. The enemy
made frequent visits to Biliran Island and this put me on the alferfc. I was inclined
to the belief that if I stayed in Biliran Island, being a stranger but my identify
known, at the same time suffering from disease (not to mention my wife who was in the
family way)my family would starve and I m,ight be taken by the eneny. So I decided
to transfer to nearest safe place across 'Samar. In December, 1943, we were across.
But soon Samar, too, had its moppingup operations. I took the situation in
hand. Believing, I was less known in Samar than in Leyte, I placed my family in an
evacuation place I was confident was beyond the reach of the enemy. However, we were
always on the move in order to avoid much acquaintance and suspicion. Betweai periods
of transferring and planning, I'd got to make a livelihood. It should be borne in
mind that I am not a native of Samar. In making a living, it was therefore necessary
to mix with theciviliar.s.
Somehow or other, I must have been betrayed. On February 12, 1944, at about
4 o'clock in the morning, a platoon of Japanese Soldiers and (3) three Constabulary
of the Japanese surrounded the house and shouted for all ofi us inside to not make any
move. YJe were only three in the house, ray father-in-law, ray wife and myself. Awakened
from a tired sleep, I tried to survey the surroundings if escape was possible, but
the house was all surrounded. 7/e were forced to open up. All at once my house became •
a ghastly scene of ransacking and disorder. The Japanese Officer thru the BC asked about
my revolver. I told him I did not possess any. The immediate answer from him was a kick
and a rifle butt. They said I was a guerrillo. How they came to know was beyond my
714
imagination. The BC told me to stop denying but admit inasmuch as my real identify was
known. However, I denied. My wife and father-in-law were not left out in the asking
about my revolver. Their efforts of ignorance about it made my wife receive slaps
which started blood out of her nose and father-in-law slaps and kicks. This happened
in the Sitio of Homalayhay, 15 kilometers from Calibiga and near the boundaries of
Villareal and Sta. Rita. That very morning I was brought to town maybe for further
questioning. Resistance was useless now as also yy family was brought with me. I
admitted I was connected with the Guerrilla as an Auditor but not in the fighin& unit
so that I did not possess any revolver. The insistence for the release. Somehow or
other they stopped t o r t u m i n g me provided I surrender my arm within 48 hours. That very
morning I told the BC I was ready to surrender my arm but first I be allowed to speak
with my wife. So we were allowed to talk.
I told her in whispers to procure at whatever price the shotgun (latok) of a
neighboring farmer. My wife was allowed to return to the evacuation place to get my
supposed arm. My wife must have been also a die-hard in her desire to save my revolver
for future use for in the afternoon my father-in-law and she came to the Municipal
Building bringing with them the latok. The Japanese Officer accepted the arm with a
smile of satisfaction,. After this, my treatment was more of a prisoner Which lasted
for three days. In three days I was allowed to get out provided I reside in town or
in a barrio constantly patrolled by them or the BC. I was closely watchec by them. .
However, in March, 1944, I got a permission to bring ny wife to Tacloban for
medical treatment. This must have been the time that I was seen by theoperative of the
95th Inf. who erroneously reported me to have voluntarily surrendered on March 25,
1944. In April, 1944, I went out of Tacloban and never returned until the Americans
landed. During the period I went out of Tacloban and before the landing of the Amer
icans, I tried my best to join the forces under Major Alfonso A. Jayme of the 93rd
Division in Samar.
: If my dishonorable discharge is based on my supposed voluntary surrender, I
have to state here that it was riot voluntary but compelled or rather it can be termed
capture. I did it with bitterness and unwillingness bearing in mind the long period
of time I served with the 92nd îv. which will be worth nothing at all. % possession
of my revolver, and the fact that I took the initiative to rejoin a military organiza-
tionduring my absence from the 95th which I was unable to contact, is proof enough
that I still wanted to carry the cause to its glorious end. Major Alfonso A. Jayme
can be referred to in regards my desire to join his unit. The above reasons and those
in paragraph 1 can support my request for honorable discharge.
This is not a request for a reconsideration for re-enstatement in the USFIP
for I know that ny comrades-in-arms have already lost confidence in me, but this is
only an application for honorable discharge,
It must be stated in this connection, Sir, that Iwas a civilian who took up
work of those whose duty it was and obligation to continue the fight, but were not
willing to shoulder the responsibility. Now I ask for nothing more but my civil&n
rights and opportunities, and as such I humbly pray that my request for honorable
discharge be granted.
Yours very respectfully,
(SGD) qUINTIN QUIJAI'D
Certified true copy:
5. Affidavit Of A Surrendered Guerrilla Officer.
C01QDNWE3LTH OF THE PHILIPPINES )

PROVINCE OF LEYTE ) SS
MUNICIPALITY OF 0 R M 0 C j
A F F I D A V I T
I, LOIS E. QUINTERO, retired under Gratuity Act as Lieutenant Colonel,
715
PA, after being duly sworn on oath according to law,
declares: -
That at the outbreak o f the war in December*, 19Al I applied through the Dis
trict Commander, 8th Military District to NPA for active service, but I was informed
by radiogram from the Adjutant General, HPA on or about 12 Dec. 1941 that there was
no available position for me.
That due to my inability to join ative service I and iiy family evacuated
from Cebu City on Jan, 5, 1942, to ny farm at Barrio Consuegra, Leyte, and thereafter
contacted the District Quartermaster, 9th Military District offering my cooperation
in matter of procurement of supply for the Army, having performed my duty as civilian
procurement agent for the District Quartermaster, 9th Military District up to early
part of May, 1942.
That upon invasion of Leyte by the enemy I remained in my farm until I

joined actively the Guerrilla Service, North-west Leyte Sector on Jan. 12,1943 under
Bvt. Major Felix M» Pamanian who was then the admitted military leader of all c o h h
munities of North-west Leyte including the Islands of Biliran and Maripipi.
That although my assignment was that of Provost Marshal I cooperated actively

in the consolidation and unification of all local guerrill a units in the different
municipalities which resulted in more coordinated activities and cohesion under effective
corauand of the leader. Military Police Service throughout the sector was organized thus
insuring law enforcement iii all communities of the Sector.
That in April 1943, I was assigned to the Staff of Bvt. Colonel Alejandro
Balderian whose command took over the Sector of Major Pamanian wh o became a Division
Commander for all guerrilla units of Northern Leyte Sector. Although my definite
assignment was Provost Marshal:! was entrusted with the establishment and maintain-
enance of a Concentration Camp for all prisoners of Northern Leyte; that the Camp
located a few kilometers from my farm had over one hundred prisoners from all guerrilla
units of Northern Leyte duly maintained as to security and sustenance.
That I received other assignments such as Chairman of Commandeering Commitee

which regulated matter of procurement of supplies from civilian sources and curtailed
abuses; also as financial campaigner, having succeeded in securing fixed quotas of
big planters and leading citizens and centralized collection in the hands of Muni
cipal Treasurers who kept official recox’ds of all donated foods.
That while on duty procuring food supplies for the Concentration Camp about
the middle or November, 1943, 1 was pursued by patrols of the eneny in the moutsins
of Leyte, and had to flee for safety with my entire family.
That after several days of evading capture, we reached the sea at Barrio
Matungao, midnight of Nov. 20,1943, after terrible suffering of my daughter in
advanced pregnancy climbing high mountains in complete darkness; and while at about
wOO yds from the seashore on a rowboat we were fired upon by the pursuingjapanese,
That on Nov. 22, w hile awaiting our baggage at Barrio Daja, San Isidro,
we were captured by the enemy, there having been no other recourse but to give up
further attempt to flee which would otherwise have resulted in the loss of my life
and those of my family.
That I and my son-in-law, Lt. Ricardo M. Comendador were placed in a
716
sailboat tied in both hands and kept as prisoners in San Isidro for two days and later
brought to their Headquarters at Leyte, Leyte,on Nov. 25,1943• Upon our delivery to
their Headquarters my wife and daughter collapsed into fainting at seeing our jewelry
beat at the table of the Japanese Commander already empty of our familynjewelry which
represented years of economy during my twenty-six years of Constabulary and Arny Ser
vice the value of the jewelry could be about P5,000.00. Some of our suitcases were,
return to us empty and all of the most costly social dresses of my wife and daughter
including the college dresses of the latter, an accumulation of her seven years in
college had all been confiscated and distributed to women of pro-Jap sympathies. Thence
forth we depended from the few clothings we had during our days of wandering in the
mountains and with a few remnants presented to us by friends. This explained why we
failed to receive our baggage at Baja as prearranged with cargadoresj they were inter
cepted and baggage seized by Japs. In Leyte, Leyte was were not actually imprisoned
but under guarranty of those people of their confidence, we were paroled to live within
a perimeter of 100 meters from the Jap Garrison and inspected inter-mittently day and
night. After two months of close surveillance wewere permitted to transfer our resi
dence to Barrio Cotusen, 2:5 Kn. from the town of Calubian, where on the mid-night of
Jan. 30,1944 I was rearrested by a Japanese detachment alleging my complicity with
suspected guerilla activities, my hands having been tied up behind me and t he rope
held by a Filipino Constabulary who used to be made as their guide. The town Mayor
was able to convince the Japs that there was no guerrilla movement anywhere in his
municipality thus saving me from being shot had they been able to convince themselves
of the presence of guerrilla men within proximity of the town. I was released after
15 hours in darkness of an enclosed room without food and benefit of toilet. I was dis
patched under close guards to the town of Biliran, the Headquarters of another Jap
Garrison and there required to live in a house a little distance from their barracks.
As usual I was duhjected to frequent investigation or*, alleged reports that I maintained
connection with the guerrillas in the mountain and about Feb. 1 5 , 1944 I was told that
subsequent report of my alleged connectionwith the mountain guerrillas would no longer
be investigated but would be sufficient motive to shoot me and my son-in-law Lt.
Ricardo Gomendador outright. About the end of February I was reaiired to go to Tacloban
to present myself to the Kempe-tai, having been guarranted by L&yor Joaquin Espelota of
San Isidro enroute from Biliran to Tacloban.
Fearing ultimate imprisonment by the ‘'Kempe-tai" ( Jap MP) I accepted a post

of secret agent of the Constabulary Inspector Major Arturo Reyes in order to enable me
to travel freely thereby enabling me to change my residence from Biliran to San Isidro,
Leyte where I was employed as agent of the Semi-government business "Leyte Prime Food
Stuffs Association", buying corn. Although I was required bo control the movement of
c o m and buy all for the Association I only asked all hacenderos to sell me twenty
cavanes each vhich was commplied by only a few of them their respective harves ts of
thousands of cavanes were being disposed by them in secret markets and part sent to
the mountain for the disposal of the guerrilla which was well known to me and Mayor
Joaquin Espeleta. I bought 22,500 ears of c o m at the behest of the Provincial Gov
ernor for seedling, delivering the cargo at Tacloban on May 25,1944 and the Leyte Prime
Food-stuffs Assn. resold them for seedling purposes, About 200 cavanes. bought in San
Isidro were retained to be sold to municipal employees who were then in hardship
from scarcity of corn, fihile at Tacloban on May 31at, I resigned my post as secret
agent of Major Reyes, havingbeen able to accomplish ny aim to be free from Japanese
molestation. My connection with Major Reyes was mutually understood never to prejudice
the cause cf allies, as in fact, due to my personal report to Major Reyes that his
Constabulary detachment were being used by the Japs as their advanced guards during
their expeditions disuaded him from materializing his pla n of detailing one full
Company of Constabulary in Naval and another in San Isidro.
That while apparently unmolested in San Isidro I was arrested by the Japs
on Aug. 25,1944i for alleged rumors that during the evacuation of the Jap Garrison,
July 18nto Aug. 15,1944, I was entertaining guerrilla outfits which was raally true
but no traitor would declare openly; so I was only punished by cleaning out t he septic
vau^-t of their toilet. During July and early August I and ex.-iL.yor Espeleta had been
receiving the guerrillas in town especially those units of Lts. Mercoleta and Catad-
man. To our surprise another Japanese Conpany came to San Isidro on Aug.15,1944.
with the purpose of buying all of the corn production which would amount to about
100,000 cavanes as they apportioned quotas to all hacenderos who could not help but
to give promise to do so. As the corn would be used by the Japanese Army it would
constitute not only direct material collaboration but treason to voluntarily deliver
their c o m to the Japanese, So I campaigned with Capt. Espanola now CO, UP, Dulag,
Leyte, warning corn producers of this danger and as a result only a small portion of
the promised corn reached the garrison and mostly taken by force. Those of the Haci
enda Borromeo and Lumapac were padlocked in their bodagas and the administrators went
in hiding. Several of their bodagas had been broken into by the Japanese and extracted
the corn at t heir pleasure. The hacienda of the father-in-law of Capt. Espanola
was likewise forbidden to the Japanese and only by means of force and robbery could the
Japs extract corn.
That by Sept. 10,1944 I had succeeded in hiding my family secretly and on

my way out of the bay on a small sail-boat, a motor boat met us un-expectedly and we
were caught and I was identified by one of the Japs aboard. Although I was able to
explain that I was on my way to Hacienda Daja to procure food for my starving family
I was arrested on attempt at scaping and made to unload all of their baggage and
equipments ( they were 18 Japs) from 5:00 p.m. to midnight, the tide being very low
and the distance to the shore was about 100 yards 0.1 deep m u d and sharp fossils
causing various lacerations in both feet. After concluding the unloading at midnight
I was forced to shoulder one big pig to cary it to the town over a kilometer from the
landing. They allowed me to sleep in my house which they knew to be close to the
garrison on condition to report the following morning, As we vacated secretly our
house the morning of that date I took to the bushes after leaving the Japs and escaped
to warn my family in secret hiding. TKhile in hiding I contacted loyal friends in
active collaboration with the guerrilla particularly the administrator of Hacienda
Borromeo and both of us prepared a report of the Japanese situation, their number
(34 in all) two (2) mortars, 4 machine guns constantly mounted in fox hole and four
(4) machine rifles the rest being service rifles. As the garrison could be conven
iently dominated from strategical points by a force of more superior fire power,
say, one or two full guerrilla Companies, I prepared a plan of attack and sent it via
a special messenger thru the Administrator of Borromeo Hacienda, Mr. Cubarrabias,
to the nearest guerrilla post commanded by Lt. Pastor, presumably at Barrio Tabango,
Aan Isidro. From here I made my definite escape at night of Sept. 11,1944, on a small
sail boat together with my family, reaching Almeria, Biliran Island early the follow
ing day. As Providence would have it, it was the day of the first American bombinb
sinking several Jap big boats at the range of our sight. This was our Providential
deliverance and consequent liberation fro m the enemy not long afterwards. I immedia
tely dispatch several errands to contact the guerrilla command of nearest regiment
but to no avail. I proceeded to the Regimental CP on Sept.28 and contacted Major
Mazarano and Capt, Corpin making myself available for service with them, but I was
told to stand by for further orders from Col. Kangleon. To hasten my joining the
active Service, I contacted Major Martin Javalosa, QMS, and together we proceeded
by sailboat on Oct.12,1944 reaching Hilongos Oct.15,1944, and contacted the nearest
Cp to report our presence to Col. Kangleon. We were however apparently ignored as no
reply could be received and the American landing in Leyte having taken place, we
returned, undetermined as to our military situation. I was only able to report to
Colonel Kangleon on Dec. 5 , 1944 and om investigation as to my connection with
Major Arturo Reyes though satisfactorily explained as a subterfuge to liberalize
my perilous situation under the close watch of Japs, I was told to return home and
0 0 uld not be reinstated in the guerrilla active service.
718
The above is a faithful narration of my connection with t he guerrilla service
and events after my capture, and in fatih whereof I hereby affix ray signature .
L« E. QUINTERO
Lt-Colonel (Ret'd)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ____ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 1946, here at

Oogon, Ormoc, Leyte.
B.V.ABARIENTOS
Capt. Inf.
Regt'l. Adjutant, 41st Inf. (PA)
6 . A Post-War Evaluation of Leytefs Resistance Movement by Former Guerrilla Chiefs.
Draft Agenda For Roufld Table Discussion on the Leyte Guerrilla
Auggested-order of topics (subject to revision):
1. Was Col. Kangleon the best possible choice for the position of unifier of the Leyte
Guerrilla forces?
a. What was the situation at the time Col. Kangleon came to Leyte?
1) Was there any cooperation between theexisting groups at that time?
2) Were there any outstanding differences or grievances among the different groups?
3) Was any one else trying to unify or coordinate the guerrilla factions?
4) Was one single organization needed for successful guerrilla work?
b. Did Col.Kangleon go about the job of unification in the best possible manner?
1) Did he take steps to assure the other guerrilla leaders that he was acting
purely on patriotic motives and not for purposes of gaining personal power?
2) Was he willing to recognize the work already acoomplished by the guerrilla
pioneers in Leyte?
3) Did he go about his work on the basis of persuasion or force?
4) Were the guerrilla leaders who accepted his authority satisfied with the
effectiveness and justice of his organization?
2. From what source did Col. Kangleon get his authority?
a. What were his contacts with SYJFA Hq?
b. What were his contacts with the Hq. of:
1) Fertig? 2) Peralta?
c. Yiihen did it finally become clear that Col .Kangleon had been appointed by MacArthur
to head the resistance movement in Leyte?
3. Why didn't Lt. Mirada1s organization recognize the supremacy of Col.Kangleon?
a) What offers were made to Lt. Miranda by Col. Kangleon to join him, when were they
made,and in what spirit?
b) 7/as the unwillingness to join just the sentiment of Lt. Miranda or of his
officers and men as well?
c) Were the civilians in the sector controlled by Lt. Miranda satisfied to remain
unaer the WLGWF?
e) why were conflicting recommendations made to Fertigis Hq, by Cept* Lloyd Waiters
and-Capt • Luis Morgan?
f) Did Lt. Miranda ever show any.willingness to submit to Col.Kangleon under
specified conditions?
g) Were the members of the WI/3WF who later joined the 92nd Div. treated fairly?
4» Finances and Supply
a. Can Col. Kang's organization give satisfactory accountal of the source and
expenditure of its funds?
1) Relations with municipal treasurers
2) Methods of procurement from civilians?
b. Ditto for the WLGWF?
5. Were there other guerrilla leaders in Leyte dissatisfied with the official organ
ization?
6* Comparative effectiveness of the 2 organizations?
a) Military efficiency
b) Civil Adminstration
7. Incidents:
a. Inopacan
b. Hilongos
c. Baybay
d. Sogod
e. Raid on Miranda's GHQ
Agenda:
Prepared: by E« N# Lear
Meeting: December 30,1945 - at the First Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army
Presiding Officer: - Benjamin N. Viloria, Major, Inf., P»A.
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COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, and LIBERATION A Study of Society and Education in Leyte, The Philippines, Under Japanese Occupation.

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COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, and LIBERATION A Study of Society and Education in Leyte, The Philippines, Under Japanese Occupation.

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A Study of Society and Education

This dissertation has been approved for final

Donald G. Tewksbury., Chairman

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

I. IEYTE BEFORE THE JAPANESE INVASION ................... ’ 1

II. THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF LEYTE . . . .................... 29

III. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN LEYTE................................ 2 1 3

V. LEYTE HIRING THE LIBERATION PERIOD.............................. 537

APPENDIX........... ................ ......... ......... ............... 6 7 4

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . ...................................................... 669

I remember how closely my companions and I followed the military bulletins

In the course of conversation, I was introduced to two prominent Leytenos,

and problems to fascinated GI audiences. Maj. Fernandez had served as Judge

At my first free moment, I paid my respects to Atilano Cinco in his "home­

I reflected upon the information supplied to me while returning to camp. !.ly

It woulu be impossible to acknowledge at this point all of the Filipino

Surprisingly enough, the 1st Replacement Battalion, in its capacity of catch­

Now I commenced to systematize the congeries of facts I had been collecting.

By now, I was adequately prepared to look up a temporarily "shelved" contact,

Some five months elapsed before I had an opportunity to follow up this

Again, I would be hard put to in attempting to give an exhaustive listing

First, I must express my gratitude to Lt. CoL Mortera who, as commandant

What proved most embarrassing to me duiing my investigations in the can?)

While a considerable part of my time was thus given over to interrogation of

Proximity to the t o m center of Ormoc gave me the opportunity to follow

The office of the provincial Fiscal, headed by Juan C. Pajo, furnished me

Pajo's assistant, Conrado Abiera, was of especial interest to me inasmuch

For a delineation of provincial affairs, a very valuable source was Pro­

Torres' provincial secretary, Atty. Antonio Benedicto, supplemented the

Most sensitive to the issue of collaborationism, and in certain respects the

For information about the governmental activities of Tacloban Municipality,

A different order of informant was the Tacloban businessman. He viewed both

Chief among my business interviewees in Tacloban were: Gerardo Villasin

To complete the picture of provincial economic affairs, I called upon the

method of impromptu conversation with random contacts: farmers, fishermen, and

The following mayors of the Liberation period granted me full-length inter­

Special reports about criminality in post-war Leyte in addition to general

On the fiscal condition of the municipalities, and also on matters of local

troops regarded as a recreation center — Baybay, on the west-central coast of

I was fortunate in having been able to interview Mayor Gofredo Modina of

At the regimental hospital of the Ulst Infantry, I had the opportunity to

The second category of interviewees of special interest to me were the

Finally, I wish to mention a few of the business people outside of Tacloban

Some of the interviewees previously mentioned in other contexts also contri­

In the final period of my investigations in Leyte, I became extremely selec­

As already mentioned, I had interviewed Ramon Mercado, Dominador Hondiagon,

In winding up my interviewing, I visited a few of the local men of influence

Two other Americans contributed to my knowledge of post-war Leyte. The

My voyage to Manila in a flat-bottomed boat (LSM)over the choppy inter-island

Cn subsequent visits to Philippine Army Headquarters, I interview ;d a number

My second informant, Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons, I buttcn-holed while

Guerrilla in The Philippines).

Of my many interviews in Manila, only two proved disappointing. In both

I turned to the Philippine legislature for my final interviews. I renewed

My final congressional interviewee was a Moro leader elected from Lanao,

In my reference to the many Filipinos interviewed, I made no mention of the

It is important that, a research worker should recognize the limitations of

It is possible that the Military Intelligence division of the Department

One final word in these preliminaries. My sincere apologies to any purist

A Japanese Anti-Guerrilla Handb i l l ...... 106

The Guerrilla Staff Officers of the 2nd Battalion,

The Battle of L e y t e ............................... 537

At my first free moment, I paid my respects to Atilano Cinco in his "home

Surprisingly enough, the 1st Replacement Battalion, in its capacity of catch

For a delineation of provincial affairs, a very valuable source was Pro

The following mayors of the Liberation period granted me full-length inter

Some of the interviewees previously mentioned in other contexts also contri

In the final period of my investigations in Leyte, I became extremely selec

therefore appropriate that we prefix to this record of Leyte1s experiences dur

omnipresent influence of religion insured a not unfriendly working relationship be

of national administrative offices functioning in the field according to the require

The material on Philippine government in this section is drawn prin