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The Great Irish Famine and Population: The Long View

Author(s): Timothy W. Guinnane


Source: The American Economic Review , May, 1994, Vol. 84, No. 2, Papers and
Proceedings of the Hundred and Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association (May, 1994), pp. 303-308
Published by: American Economic Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2117848

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ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GREAT IRISH FAMINEt

The Great Irish Famine and Population:


The Long View

By TIMOTHY W. GUINNANE*

The Great Irish Famine killed at least 1 be sustained by a small, primarily agricul-
million people and led more than that num- tural country. This line of thinking views the
ber to emigrate, but the Famine is not the Famine and subsequent depopulation as two
only dramatic element in Ireland's popula- sides of a Malthusian coin: Ireland was first
tion history. Between 1700 and 1845 Ire- visited by the positive check in the form of
land's population more than quadrupled to the potato blight, after which the Irish
over 8 million people. Following the Famine turned to the more gentle preventative check
the population declined for more than a to get their demographic house in order.
century. Depopulation did not cease until Recent research has cast doubt on the
1951, and even then increases were modest idea that pre-Famine Ireland was overpop-
and not always sustained. Ireland's popula- ulated in any simple sense (Joel Mokyr
tion history remains a testing ground for and Cormac 0 Grada, 1984; Mokyr, 1985;
theories about the relationship between O Grada, 1993). Nor does the post-Famine
population and economic growth, and it has experience correspond well to Malthusian
some relevance to those issues in contempo- thinking, which is inconsistent with some
rary society. This paper first sets the demo- evidence and tends to obscure the indirect
graphic consequences of the Great Famine role of the Famine in the character of the
in the context of Ireland's long-term popu- demographic adjustment that followed.
lation history and then discusses what may
be the most puzzling feature of Irish popu- I. Irish Population in the 18th and 19th
lation history, the demographic patterns that Centuries
emerged during the second half of the 19th
century. The paper focuses on rural Ireland, Figure 1 presents Ireland's population
where these changes were most stark. from about 1700 through 1975; it includes
Ireland's population history has long been England's population for comparison. (In
presented in frankly Malthusian terms (e.g., absolute terms England's population was
Kenneth H. Connell, 1962; D. B. Grigg, about 2.5 times as large as the Irish popula-
1980). According to this view, population tion in 1700.) Population growth in ireland
growth before the Famine was too rapid to in the century prior to the Famine was fast
by the standards of the day, averaging 1.4
percent per annum during the period
1751-1841. Today, growth rates like these
are lamentably common-several low-in-
tDiscussants: John R. Harris, Boston University;
Ruth-Ann M. Harris, Northeastern University; T. N. come countries currently grow at more than
Srinivasan, Yale University. 2 percent per annum-but for the period
*Department of Economics, Yale University, New
this was rapid indeed. The famine initiated
Haven, CT 06520. This paper summarizes arguments a century of population decline, a century
and evidence presented in more detail in the author's that saw robust demographic growth in most
The Vanishing Irish: Households, Population, and the other European countries. From 1841 to
Rural Economy in Post-Famine Ireland, forthcoming
1911, the period over which Ireland's popu-
from Princeton University Press. I thank John and
Ruth-Ann Harris, Kevin O'Rourke, and T. N. Srini- lation fell by half, the populations of coun-
vasan for comments. tries such as England and Germany more
303

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304 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 1994

1000- 1876 than before, suggesting that the pull of


900 _____ __ _-_ overseas labor markets was relatively less
800 important from that time onward. For my
700-
purposes, however, the nature of the shock
600 -
to which the Irish economy was reacting is
5 500 - _. __
not of primary importance. Ireland's popu-
:,400-

> 300 __
lation did fall after the Famine. In the
200 absence of industrialization-the paucity of
t 100 which is another great question in Irish eco-
S 1700 1725 1750 1775 1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975
Year nomic history-one could hardly expect
| Irish population English population
anything else.

FIGURE 1. POPULATION OF IRELAND AND Demographic Components of Depopula-


ENGLAND, 1700-1970 tion.-Economists are often content to ex-
amine population growth rates rather than
Notes: Population totals for Ireland prior to 1841 are
the underlying dynamics that cause those
conjectural. English figures prior to 1821 are based on
a national sample of parish registers. Pre-1821 data are growth rates. In the Irish case the compo-
for England (less Monmouth) only; later data are for nents of population change are instructive.
England and Wales. A population grows through some combina-
Sources: Ireland, pre-1821, Leslie Clarkson's esti- tion of positive net immigration, a surplus
mates, as presented and discussed in Mokyr and
of births over deaths, or both. Marriage
0 Grada (1984 table 1); Ireland after 1821, official
patterns in historical Western European so-
census; England, pre-1821, E. A. Wrigley and Roger S.
Schofield (1981 table A3.1); England after 1821, official cieties add a wrinkle to the births issue. In
census. Official census estimates for Ireland and for most other historical societies nearly all
England and Wales are reproduced in Mitchell (1980 women married and did so by their late
series BO).
teens. Many women in western European
societies never married, and most who did
than doubled (Brian R. Mitchell, 1980 se- marry waited until their mid-twenties. Be-
ries B1). cause of what John Hajnal (1983) calls the
Recent research suggests that depopula- "western European marriage pattern," the
tion would have occurred, famine or not, as number of births per thousand people in a
a result of changing external economic con- western European population is a function
ditions. Ireland was a small part of the both of marriage behavior and the fertility of
expanding Atlantic economy. Depopulation marriages. (Extra-marital births complicate
reflected the Irish economy's reaction to this picture in some societies. Ireland was
two external changes. Growing demand for not one of them, however; extra-marital
labor in Britain and North America meant births were rare.) Thus the relationship be-
that Irish workers would have to be paid tween births and deaths is a function of
more at home or seek their fortunes else- mortality, marriage patterns, and the num-
where. At the same time, the increases in ber of children born to couples who do
grain imports into Western Europe-the marry.
so-called "grain invasion -encouraged Unsatisfactory sources have not permit-
Irish farmers to switch from growing crops ted agreement on the causes of the pre-
to less labor-intensive pastoral agriculture. Famine population increase. The most likely
Rural districts of England were exposed to interpretation holds that high marital fertil-
similar forces and in some cases also experi- ity coupled with some change in marriage
enced depopulation during the same period. behavior drove the rapid growth of the late
Kevin O'Rourke (1991) has shown that for 18th and early 19th centuries (Mokyr and
Ireland overseas labor markets were the O Grada, 1984). During the early 19th cen-
dominant of these two changes for the pe- tury emigration became common among the
riod up to 1876. The prices of agricultural farming classes. Mokyr (1985 p. 230) esti-
products shifted more dramatically after mated that at least 1.5 million people left

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VOL. 84 NO. 2 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 305

Ireland between 1815 and 1845. Because of population was thus heavy emigration com-
this emigration, and perhaps aided by some bined with unremarkable overall birthrates.
changes in marriage behavior, population What makes the depopulation seem more
growth in the two decades prior to the exotic is that the Irish arrived at unremark-
Famine had slowed considerably from its able birthrates through a combination of
peak. large families but low marriage rates.
The Famine initiated mass emigration by
the poor. Net emigration rates from Ireland II. The Famine's Direct Impact
remained high throughout the period up to
World War I. The official tally of emigrants Before considering the Famine's indirect
for the period 1850-1910 is 4.2 million per- role, it is worth considering two counterfac-
sons, although the true number is probably tual questions to get an idea of the Famine's
higher. In many years during this period direct role in Irish depopulation. First, if
emigrants amounted to 1 percent or more the Famine had not occurred, could one
of the population, and emigration fell below still imagine depopulation rapid enough to
this figure consistently only in the 1890's reach the actual 1911 population? The an-
(W. E. Vaughan and A. J. Fitzpatrick, 1978 swer is yes. From 1851 to 1911 the popula-
table 54). The more striking post-Famine tion declined at an average rate of 0.65
development was the emergence of a large percent per year. Had the Famine not oc-
fraction of each cohort who never married. curred, a rate of depopulation of 0.88 per-
In 1851, about 10 percent of Irish adults cent from 1841 to 1911 would have left
aged 45-54 had never married. This figure Ireland with her actual 1911 population.
implies that Irish nuptiality was entirely un- This rate of depopulation is indeed rapid,
remarkable; about the same proportion of but amounts to little more than extending to
English, French, and German adults had larger areas of the country the rates that
never married at mid-century. By 1911 aboutsome regions did experience between 1851
one quarter of men and women aged 45-54 and 1911. The population of County Clare,
in Ireland had never married. The age at for example, declined at a rate of 1.09
which people in Ireland married also rose percent per annum during the period
during this period, although relatively mod- 1851-1911. Whether such depopulation
estly. Marriage patterns in England and could be sustained by the population as a
other major western European countries whole depends, of course, on the 1841 pop-
changed less. Ireland's marriage patterns ulation's age and sex structure. Simulations
are striking, but to call them "unique" is an using demographic projection methods show
exaggeration. Ireland was not absolutely that depopulation rates of 1.09 percent and
alone in seeing a decline in the popularity even higher were, in fact, feasible. This ex-
of marriage during this period. More impor- ample establishes an important point. The
tant, people who never married in Ireland Famine's direct impact on the Irish popula-
were not doing anything that did not have tion was considerable. But if we posit that
long roots in European tradition. Ireland's population had to shrink by the
Irish demographic behavior was distinc- end of the 19th century, which is to say that
tive in another respect for not changing. Ireland would remain heavily agricultural
Most Western European societies experi- and could not support a population of 8
enced a fertility decline starting in the 1870's
million with such an economy, then the
or earlier (Ansley J. Coale, 1986). In Ireland Famine's direct demographic impact was by
the fertility transition came later, not start-no means necessary.
ing until the 1890's or later (O Grada, 1991). This simple counterfactual assumes a
Yet these large families were not sufficient constant growth rate and so ignores an im-
to offset the numbers who would leave Ire- portant aspect of any human population,
land for good, and those who would remain which is its ability to react to a shock such
but never marry and have children of their as a famine. Europe's historical experience
own. The proximate causes of Ireland's de- was to see increases in population growth

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306 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 1994

rates after a famine or epidemic. Increases impact on simple numbers would have been
in the land/labor ratio increased wages, erased quickly had external conditions not
permitting more people to marry and to changed and had the Famine not brought
marry at younger ages. Higher wages also about other changes in Irish economic and
increase net immigration rates and may re- social organization.
duce mortality. Noting this effect implicitly
poses a different counterfactual: if nothing III. After the Famine
else had changed after the Famine, could
population growth rates have increased Discussions of post-Famine depopulation
enough to make good the losses of often employ frankly Malthusian ideas, por-
1845-1849? The answer seems to be yes. traying emigration and the rising number of
Susan C. Watkins and Jane Menken (1985) nonmarried people as two different re-
have recently addressed the long-run demo- sponses to "population pressure." Yet this
graphic impact of the recent South Asian account is inconsistent with two features of
famines, using a simple model that incorpo- post-Famine history. The first problem is
rates a population's ability to react to severe the relationship between wealth and in-
shocks. Their most severe set of assump- comes on the one hand and demographic
tions (a five-year famine with a 150-percent choices on the other. In the Malthusian
increase in mortality, which reduces the story a reduction in income leads young
population by nearly one-quarter) corre- adults to postpone or forgo marriage en-
sponds roughly to the Irish Famine. Even tirely, reducing birthrates. Evidence on
this simulation implies that 50 years later post-Famine economic growth is imperfect,
the famine's effects are barely noticeable but rural incomes per head rose substan-
(Watkins and Menken, 1985 table 3). Yet tially between the Famine and the end of
their analysis, while entirely credible in the the century (0 Grada, 1993 table 30). This
context they model, incorporates two as- increase in incomes came during the same
sumptions that do not pertain to 19th-cen- period as the retreat from marriage. Rural
tury Ireland: early and more nearly univer- Irish people were becoming less likely to
sal marriage and zero net migration. These marry at precisely the time they were enjoy-
assumptions amount to saying that prior to ing (on average at least) larger incomes.
the postulated famine the population had The Malthusian story is also inconsistent
little or no unused reproductive capacity, with the identity of those who did not marry
and that none of the people born to this in Ireland. In a cross section, the model
population would be lost to emigration. In implies that nonmarried individuals should
Ireland, on the other hand, the Famine be poorer than those who married. This is
survivors could in theory have increased not true in Ireland, at least in the 1901-1911
overall fertility through earlier and univer- period. Those who never married were not
sal marriage, and a cessation of emigration restricted to the poor. In fact, wealthy farm-
would have meant that none of the new ers were as likely to remain unmarried as
births would be lost to emigration. In other were poor farmers and landless laborers
words, if a South Asian famine cannot have (Guinnane, 1991).
long-run effects strictly through its impact on The Malthusian model is also inconsis-
numbers, then the Irish Famine could not, tent with the role of emigration. Several
either. Just how rapidly the post-Famine historians have noted a negative time-series
population could make good the loss de- and cross-sectional relationship between
pends, once again, on the specifics of the emigration and the proportion of adults who
age- and sex-structure of the survivors. De- never married. Earlier interpretations have
mographic projection methods confirm what claimed the inverse relationship between
the Watkins-Menken study suggests: Ire- marriage and emigration rates as evidence
land's population could have recovered that increases in the number of single peo-
quickly. The Famine killed thousands and ple reflect reactions to population pressure.
forced thousands more to emigrate, but its Where emigration did not release some of

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VOL. 84 NO. 2 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE GREAT IRISH FAMINE 307

this pressure, this interpretation goes, there their histories. Ireland was dominated by
were insufficient resources to permit the small peasant holdings, England by capital-
marriage of all those who remained. ist farmers. Decisions about emigration in
The relation between emigration and rural England did not involve relationships
marriage is actually inconsistent with the to land, an asset which by itself and through
Malthusian story. Rising numbers of never- family relationships provided insurance and
married people implies increased poverty, a form of old-age support to those who
while falling numbers of emigrants implies would remain in Ireland. The differences in
just the opposite. Thinking about this issue land tenure reflect earlier history and form
in terms of revealed preference suggests their own contribution to Irish history in the
something different. Emigration was costly form of struggles over the land reform (e.g.,
in both money and personal terms, but mil- B. L. Solow, 1971). Famine survivors often
lions did leave, and for most emigration was felt, rightly or wrongly, that holding land
a real possibility. Many who stayed in Ire- was the best guarantee against starvation;
land and did not marry had implicitly re- by shaping the decision to leave, this land-
jected the option to emigrate, revealing, in tenure system altered the character of Ire-
effect, that Ireland even without marriage land's post-Famine demographic adjust-
was preferable to emigration. Thus the in- ment.
verse relation between marriage and migra- The Famine also shaped the conditions
tion propensities reveals not the work of under which later generations of Irish peo-
population pressure, but the judgment that ple made decisions about migration and
life in Ireland even without marriage was household-formation. The huge upturn in
preferable to emigration for larger and emigration during the Famine deposited a
larger fractions of cohorts coming of age in large number of Irish people in the fastest-
the later part of the 19th century. This does growing industrial economy of the 19th cen-
not imply that Irish people did not wish tury. Emigration from Ireland was subse-
they lived in a world where marrying and quently easier, since individuals were often
rearing children were possible without sacri- joining family overseas, and if not family,
ficing anything else, but it does suggest that then individuals they "knew" through local
to young people in 19th century Ireland connections. Irish emigrants continued to
decisions about emigration and marriage in- send large sums home to parents and to
volved an economic calculus more subtle finance the emigration of siblings, leading
than that envisaged in Malthusian accounts. couples in Ireland to think of a larger family
not as a burden, but as so many chances in
IV. The Famine's Role in Subsequent a generous lottery. Those large families also
Developments produced generations of young people with
a foot in each of two countries and helped
Malthusian logic, then, cannot explain the to produce the numerous brother-brother
character of Ireland's adjustment to world or brother-sister households that became
economic conditions. Much of the problem something of a substitute for conjugal
lies in the model's ahistorical character. Ru- households in post-Famine Ireland.
ral Ireland and rural England both experi- Without external economic change in the
enced the changing world labor markets and decades following the Famine Ireland might
price conditions that characterized the sec- not have experienced further depopulation.
ond half of the 19th century; but Ireland's However, given the economic forces that
history dictated the type of adjustments it brought about depopulation, the Famine's
would make when faced with shocks from impact was longer-lasting and more far-
the outside. Ireland's rural depopulation re- reaching than can be seen in the numbers
sulted more than England's from the limita- who fell victim to starvation and disease
tion of marriage. The contrasting adjust- between 1845 and 1850. The Famine left
ments reflect two differences between rural its stamp on future generations by altering
Ireland and rural England, both rooted in the decisions young people made about

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308 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY1994

migration and household-formation, and so Press, 1983, pp. 65-104.


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graphic adjustment. tics 1750-1975, 2nd Ed. New York: Facts
on File, 1980.
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