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Free PF Briefs 1
Free PF Briefs
April 2024 - Resolved: The United Nations should
abolish permanent membership on its Security
Council.
Free PF Briefs 2
Table of Contents
TableofContents...........................................................................................................................2
Background..............................................................................................................................3
PRO...........................................................................................................................................6
Multilateralism...................................................................................................................7
Syria..................................................................................................................................12
Gaza...................................................................................................................................18
Ukraine..............................................................................................................................20
Taiwan...............................................................................................................................22
Myanmar..........................................................................................................................25
limateChange.............................................................................................................................28
C
ATSexualAssault.........................................................................................................................31
ATIran...........................................................................................................................................32
CON.........................................................................................................................................33
NorthKorea......................................................................................................................34
Iran....................................................................................................................................37
Effectiveness.....................................................................................................................39
DiplomaticCapital...........................................................................................................41
SexualAssault..................................................................................................................44
TSyria.........................................................................................................................................45
A
ATTaiwan......................................................................................................................................47
ATClimateChange.......................................................................................................................49
ATGaza..........................................................................................................................................51
Free PF Briefs 3
Background
he Security Council consists of fifteen members, five of which are permanent members: the
T
United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. These permanent members hold
a special status within the Council, as they were the primary victors of World War II and are
Free PF Briefs 4
r ecognized as possessing significant military and economic power. Importantly, each permanent
member has the right to veto any substantive resolution brought before the Council, regardless of
the level of support from other members. This veto power gives them the ability to block
resolutions that they perceive as contrary to their national interests or strategic objectives.
I n addition to the five permanent members, the Security Council also includes ten non-permanent
members elected by the UN General Assembly for two-year terms. These non-permanent
members do not possess veto power but participate in Council discussions and decision-making
processes. They include:
Algeria (2025)
Ecuador (2024)
Guyana (2025)
Japan (2024)
Malta (2024)
Mozambique (2024)
Republic of Korea (2025)
Sierra Leone (2025)
Slovenia (2025)
Switzerland (2024)
he UNSC carries out its mandate through a variety of means, including issuing resolutions,
T
imposing sanctions, authorizing peacekeeping missions, and establishing international tribunals
to address conflicts and human rights violations. One important thing to note about the
resolutions from the Security Council is that the resolutions arebindingto the member states,
unlike resolutions that may be passed in the General Assembly.
he issue of permanent membership and the veto power of the UN Security Council has been a
T
topic of contention since the establishment of the UN. Critics have argued that the current
structure, which gives disproportionate power to these permanent members, is outdated and
undemocratic. Many argue that it does not reflect the current geopolitical realities and prevents
the UNSC from effectively addressing global challenges.
Free PF Briefs 5
he creation of the UNSC and the allocation of permanent membership to the five victors of
T
World War II (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)
reflected the power dynamics of the time. However, this arrangement led to numerous stalemates
during the Cold War era due to the ideological divide between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
or the affirmative, most of the arguments are going to revolve around preventing the P5 from
F
unilaterally derailing efforts to address various global concerns. The first way that this is likely to
materialize is with various civil conflicts that the UNSC has tried to intervene in like Syria,
Myanmar and Venezuela. In addition to conflicts, the affirmative may also argue that removing
the P5 could allow for better multilateralism in areas like climate change, cybersecurity, space
exploration, etc.
or the negative, a lot of the arguments are going to rely on the fact that the alternative to the P5
F
is worse than the status quo. For example, the negative may concede that removing the P5 may
get some things passed, but the things that China and Russia would’ve vetoed would’ve been bad
to implement in the first place. For example, the negative may argue that if the P5 is removed,
sanctions on North Korea would be passed, causing the country to lash out in response. This is
one take that the negative could use. On a different note, the negative could also use a type of
legitimacy argument that would serve as a link turn to anything that the affirmative argues. For
instance, if the negative says that if the P5 is abolished, the originally permanent members might
leave the UN or at the very least resolutions that would be passed from thereon out wouldn’t be
legitimate.
Free PF Briefs 6
PRO
Free PF Briefs 7
Multilateralism
he permanent membership of the Security Council has played a role in
T
hurting multilateralism
Dayal et al. 23[6-28-2023, "UN Security Council Reform:What the World Thinks," Carnegie
ndowment for International Peace,
E
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/28/un-security-council-reform-what-world-thinks-pub-90032]
he impulse for reform is understandable. Nearly eight decades after its creation, the Security
T
Council retains the same five permanent members (P5)—China, France, Russia (following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since 1945,
however, major players like India and Brazil have emerged, to say nothing of Japan and
Germany, the long-rehabilitated aggressors of World War II. Even as the UN’s overall
membership has nearly quadrupled (from fifty-one to 193 member states) thanks to
decolonization and the dissolution of multiethnic states, the council’s composition has expanded
only once, in 1965, when the addition of four elected seats grew the council from eleven to
fifteen members.Compounding these frustrations aboutmembership, each of theP5
countries retains a veto permitting it to unilaterally block Security Council resolutions
inimical to its national interests(as Russia hasdone with respect to Ukraine).The result is
frequent council paralysis, exacerbated by deepening geopolitical rivalry between Western
democracies and authoritarian China and Russia.Toa growing proportion of the world’s
governments and citizens, the council today is both feckless and unjust, dominated by
irresponsible and unrepresentative powers inclined to abuse their position rather than
safeguard the peace. Restoring the council’s effectiveness and legitimacy, critics contend,
requires updating its anachronistic composition and unfair decision making rules to better
reflect ongoing shifts in global power and emerging centers of moral authority.
Unfortunately, UN members are divided over the shape of any reform, not least whether it should
focus on enhancing the council’s capability or its representativeness. Thanks to this diplomatic
deadlock, the Security Council is trapped in amber. Although the council has suffered previous
blows—among them the ill-fated U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 without its
authorization—Russia’s brazen aggression against Ukrainein February 2022 and ability to
veto any council response have radicalized reform demands.“Where is this security that the
Security Council needs to guarantee?” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyythunderedin
April 2022. With collective security paralyzed, another questionhung in the air: is the UN
destined, like the League of Nations, for the ash heap of history? The obstacles to council reform
are daunting. They include the high procedural hurdlesto amending the UN Charter; divergent
Free PF Briefs 8
ember state positions on the acceptable size and terms of any enlargement; disagreement over
m
current veto provisions and their potential extension to any new permanent members; and
gnawing uncertainties over whether any plausible enlargement—even if it made the council more
representative—would improve its functioning.Anychange to the council’s composition or
voting rules would require the approval of two-thirds of UN members—including each of
the P5—accompanied by relevant domestic legislation.Given intensifying geopolitical rivalry
and deepening political polarization in many countries, prospects for updating the council
appear slim.Yet, pressure for Security Council expansionand veto reform will surely grow as
the distribution of power and the nature of security threats shift ever further from what they were
in 1945. Absent structural changes, the council’s performance and legitimacy will inevitably
suffer. Given these stakes, the world requires fresh thinking on reform pathways that will help
the council meet the moment.
Thankfully,
Niland 23[Paul Niland, "Russia’s Ukraine invasionhighlights the need for fundamental UN reform",
0/12/2023, Atlantic Council,
1
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-ukraine-invasion-highlights-the-need-for-funda
mental-un-reform/] ZG
ver since the invasion began in February 2022, Moscow has used its position as one of five
E
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to block efforts to end the war or
hold Russia accountable. Faced with relentless Russian obstruction, UN leaders have been forced
to focus on mediation efforts, while the United Nations General Assembly has been limited to
voting on a series of largely symbolic resolutions condemning the invasion. If the purpose of the
UN is to prevent major wars, the current approach is obviously not working. The full-scale
invasion of Ukraine has focused international attention on Russia’s problematic role as one of the
most influential nations at the United Nations. Some have asked why Russia has not been
expelled for its attack on Ukraine, and have pointed to the expulsion of the Soviet Union from
the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, in response to the November 1939 invasion of
Finland. Others have questioned the legal status of the Russian Federation as a UN member
state, noting that Russia has never actually gone through the proper formal and recognized
procedures of applying to become a member of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was a key
founding member of the United Nations and enjoyed a seat on the UN Security Council, but the
USSR officially ceased to exist on December 26, 1991. Russia then took over the vacated Soviet
seat at the top table of the United Nations without any further formalities. When Czechoslovakia
Free PF Briefs 9
c eased to exist just two years later, the two new nations that had once been component parts of
that country, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both formally applied for and were granted
membership status in the United Nations. The same is true for the states that were once part of
Yugoslavia. This is a step that Russia never took. The Charter of the United Nations states that
“the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations shall be effected by a
decision of the General Assembly.” While Slovakia and the Czech Republic went through this
procedure, the Russian Federation did not. The UN Charter also states that membership of the
body is contingent on “accepting the obligations contained in the present Charter.” On these
grounds, too, Russia does not meet the required standards. The UN Charter states that all United
Nations members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” By invading Ukraine and
attempting to annex entire Ukrainian regions, Russia has evidently violated this fundamental
commitment expected of all UN member states. It can therefore be argued that Russia’s
membership of the United Nations is invalid as it was not formally applied for, and because the
invasion of Ukraine places Russia in direct breach of the UN Charter. This raises obvious
questions over Russia’s continued presence among the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council. Russia’s status within the UNSC is particularly controversial as
Moscow stands accused of repeatedly abusing its veto power to further its own foreign policy
objectives and avoid censure for breaches of international law. The Security Council’s five
permanent members are the only nations to wield veto power. Almost twenty months since the
invasion began, few would argue that the devastating scale of Russia’s attack on Ukraine has
highlighted the shortcomings of the United Nations. As noted by Tom Grant, a Senior Fellow at
the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law,“Russia’saggression against Ukraine is the
most serious violation of the UN Charter in the Charter’s history.”How can a country
engaged in Europe’s largest invasion since World War II and led by a man wanted by the
International Criminal Court for war crimes be allowed to undermine an organization committed
to maintaining world peace? The absurdity of Russia’sposition among the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council is fueling calls for fundamental reform of the United
Nations.For two years in a row, the reform of theUnited Nations Security Council has featured
in US President Joe Biden’s annual address to the UN General Assembly. The reform debate
centers on the need for the highest body at the United Nations to be more representative. At
present, the UNSC lacks any permanent members from Africa or Latin America, and is also
missing valuable input from emerging powerhouses such as India and significant developed
economies including Japan. One of the roadblocksto such reform is the current make-up of
the Security Council, which under the existing regulations would be required to vote to
approve any expansion of the UNSC. This would likely be blocked by Russia, due to
Free PF Briefs 10
erceptions in the Kremlin that any expansion would weaken the Russian position.
p
Tellingly, other permanent members would also see their influence diluted by an expanded
UNSC, and yet the push for this reform is being led by one of them, the United States. Other
possible reforms of the United Nations includetheremovalor restrictionof veto powers for
permanent members ofthe UN Security Council. Thiscouldpotentiallypreventindividual
countries from unilaterally derailing efforts to address global crisesor uphold international
law.Some critics feel even this would not go farenough, and argue for a complete rethink of the
role played by the United Nations in international affairs.
This has a multitude of impacts
Patrick 23[6-3-2023, "Rules of Order: Assessing theState of Global Governance," Carnegie
ndowment for International Peace,
E
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/12/rules-of-order-assessing-state-of-global-governance-pub-9051
7 ]
ebate over the state andfuture of world order hasintensified in the wake of Russia’s
D
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, whichmanyobserversinterpretas an
era-defining event. While its ultimate importanceawaits history’s judgment,Moscow’s
aggression and subsequent seizure of its neighbor’s sovereign territory violated
fundamentalprecepts of international lawenshrinedin the UN Charter, shaking the already
weakened institutional foundations of the open international system that the United States and its
closest allies promoted after 1945 and sought to globalize after the end of the Cold War.
Although this multilateral order was alwaysincompleteand uneven, it did facilitate the
emergence of something historically unprecedented: adense and expanding networkof
international institutions—including treaties, organizations, and collective frameworks—that
permitted an increasing degree of collective management, even governance, across multiple
global spheres. That hopeful era appears to be over, or at least on pause.Intensifying
geopolitical and economic rivalry have left the world “gridlocked in global dysfunction,”in
UN Secretary General António Guterres’swords, underminingthe supply of collective action at
a moment when demand for it has never been greater.Many nations are turning inward, the
world economy isfragmenting, and commitment to multilateralinstitutions is eroding,
complicating cooperation on transnational challenges ranging from nuclear proliferation to
climate change to stability in outer space.Comingon the heels of the coronavirus pandemic,
the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has deepened the sense of a world adrift, divided,
disconnected, and ungoverned.Disturbingly,today’sglobal fissuresrun alongNorth-South
as well as East-West lines, dividing advanced market democracies not only from
authoritarian adversaries but also often fromlower-and middle-income nations.A case in
Free PF Briefs 11
p oint was the inability of G20 foreign and finance ministers, at their February–March 2023
meetings in New Delhi, to cobble together even a bare-bones communiqué. As India’s top
diplomatlamented: “Multilateralism is in crisis.”The current disorder has multiple causes,
although their relative weight can be debated. They include intensifyingstrategic competition
between the United States and China, two superpowers with dramatically different world
order visions and clashing material interests;Russia’sbrazen assaultagainst its neighbor,
resulting in the most serious armed conflict in Europe since World War II; an ongoing diffusion
of power from advanced market democracies to emerging nations withdiverse preferences,
combined with resistance from established powers against accommodating them in multilateral
institutions; a widespreadretreat from turbochargedglobalization, as national governments seek
to claw back autonomy from market forces to pursueindustrial, social, national security, and
other policies and, in some cases, toweaponize interdependence;growing alienation between
richer and poorer nations, exacerbated by accelerating climate change and stalled
development; a global democratic recession now initsseventeenth yearthat has left no
democracy unscathed; and a resurgence ofsovereignty-mindednationalismthat calls on
governments totake back controlfrom forces blamedfor undermining national security,
prosperity, and identity. (The“America First” ethosof Donald Trump’s presidency, which
rejected the tenets of post-1945 U.S. internationalism, is but themost prominentrecent example.)
In sum, thecrisis of cooperationis as much a functionof the would-be global problem-solvers as
it is a function of the problems themselves.
Free PF Briefs 12
Syria
Russia has consistently blocked resolutions relating to Syria
Mills 22[Richard Merrill Mills Jr. is an Americandiplomat who serves as the United States deputy ambassador
to the United Nations. "Remarks at a UN General Assembly Meeting Following Russia’s Veto of a UN Security
Council Resolution on the Syria Cross-Border Humanitarian Mechanism", 07/21/2022, United States Mission to the
United Nations,
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-general-assembly-meeting-following-russias-veto-of-a-un-security-coun
cil-resolution-on-the-syria-cross-border-humanitarian-mechanism/]ZG
ight now, the humanitarian needs in Syria are greater than they have ever been. When
R
the Security Council took up this issue, the Secretary-General asked for more aid. UN
agencies asked for more. NGOs asked for more.Tragically,heartbreakingly, the Syrian people
asked for more. But one country chose not to put humanitarian needs first. Rather than scaling
aid up, that country scaled aid down.Since the startof the conflict in Syria in 2011, Russia
has vetoed 17 Security Council resolutions on Syria. Throughout this time, Russia has only
sought to shield the Assad regime – to shield that regime from accountabilityfor its brutal
human rights abuses, its chemical weapons use.Russiahas propped up the regime’s
tattered standing in the international community and forced humanitarian organizations to
capitulate to the regime’s whims.Let us rememberthat the reason the Security Council has a
mandate for cross-border humanitarian aid is because theAssad regime has a well-documented
history; a history of corruption, of stealing aid, and of denying it to communities in need.
Action is necessary.
SNHR 20[SNHR, "Russia and China’s Arbitrary VetoUse 16 Times Contributed to Killing Nearly a
uarter of a Million Syrians, the Arrest of Nearly 150,000 Others, and the Spread of Impunity", July 17,
Q
2020, Syria Network for Human Rights, https://snhr.org/blog/2020/07/17/55263/] ZG
he Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reveals that Russia and China’s 16
T
arbitrary uses of veto on Syria has contributed to the deaths of nearly a quarter of a
million Syrians, the arrest of nearly 150,000 others, and the spread of impunity, also noting
that the timeline of the vetoes shows the extent of the UN Security Council’s (UNSC)
terrible failure to protect civilians and establish peace and security in Syria. As the
26-page report notes, the violations committed by the Syrian regime since March 2011, which
have also been detailed in reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and
Free PF Briefs 13
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, along with reports by other international
and local organizations, prompted the Security Council to take decisions that should have
guaranteed the achievement of security and stability; however, the Security Council’s most
serious and potentially effective draft resolutions in deterring the Syrian regime have been
repeatedly thwarted by Russia and China through the use of their veto power in defense of the
Syrian regime. This assurance of impunity for the regime regardless of its crimes has contributed
to an alarming increase in the extent of its atrocities. This impunity also paved the way for the
emergence of many other actors from different movements and backgrounds.Russia has used
its UNSC veto in favor of the Syrian regime 16 times, including 10 occasions on which it
voted jointly with China. The report also notesthat since its inception, the Security Council
has not undertaken any actual reform process to date that could contribute to, at a minimum,
setting limits and standards for egregious cases of this nature in which no country should have
the right to veto, involving crimes against humanity, war crimes, extermination, and the use of
weapons of mass destruction. The report further notes that the use of veto in such cases leads to a
grave lack of confidence amongst victims and the wider public in the Security Council’s
credibility and trustworthiness; this harms the image and standing of the United Nations in
general, making it clear that all resolutions issued by it are based solely on bargaining and
reaching consensus based on the national interests of the five permanent member states whose
unanimous approval is required for any resolution to be effective rather than on the wellbeing of
the victims. This means that such resolutions are not issued, as they should be, based on the
victims’ needs or on international law. The report stresses that the Syrian regime which has
consistently disregarded all of the resolutions issued by the Security Council, starting with
Resolution 2042 and Resolution 2043 related to Kofi Annan’s plan, continuing through
Resolution No. 2139 to stop indiscriminate attacks, including barrel bombs, and end enforced
disappearance, as well as following the same pattern with resolutions related to the prohibition of
the use of chemical weapons, namely 2118, 2209, and 2235, all of which the Syrian regime has
violated hundreds of times. Despite the regime’s flagrant contempt for all UN resolutions,the
Security Council has taken no action and has failed to protect peace and security in Syria,
from which 13 million Syrian citizens have been displaced to date, and more than 100,000
have been forcibly disappeared. The report statesthat the failure to protect the rights of
millions of victims and the complete impunity that the Syrian regime enjoys due to Russian and
Chinese support have caused and bolstered the spread and promotion of terrorist and other
extremist ideologies, for which oppression, injustice and instability are fuel, in Syria and
internationally. Fadel Abdul Ghany, Chairman of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, says:
“The time has come, more urgently than ever before,for a restructuring of the Security
Council, andlooking intoits permanent membershipsystem, under which the main criterion
Free PF Briefs 14
f or membership must be the level of each member states’ provision in the service of humanity,
international law and the defense of human rights; until such time, it is necessary to reassess
permanent members’ use of veto, which must be strictly prohibited for use in any defense of the
perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes, in any denial of humanitarian aid, or in
actions which contradict the main principles of international law. The law must be kept
sacrosanct above veto power, with the common good of mankind placed before the private
interests of any permanent member, and the states parties to the conflict must not vote to the
resolutions related to this conflict.” The reportoutlines the timeline of Russia’s and China’s
use of their veto power in favor of their ally the Syrian regime, linking each use of this veto
with the corresponding increasing death toll of civilian victims killed by the Syrian regime
and Russian forces following the date of the veto.The report also attempts to show the scale of
the escalation of the level of killing, in the context of Russia’s and China’s continuous assurance
of full impunity for the Syrian regime from any form of punishment. The report also outlines a
cumulative chart showing the reality of the veto use by Russia and China in the UN Security
Council, and the civilian death toll of those killed by Syrian-Russian alliance forces in the
periods between each time Russia and China used the veto power from March 2011 up to July
10, 2020. The report emphasizes the SNHR’s beliefthat the most egregious use of veto
power was its application in order to protect the Syrian regime over the issue of its use of
chemical weapons, which was, as the report reveals, conclusive evidence of both
superpowers’ support for the Syrian regime’s use of weapons of mass destruction, noting
that this means, in practice, a far wider and complete undermining of the mission for which
the Security Council claims to have been established, which is to protect international
peace and security. As the report reveals, the Syrianregime used chemical weapons 21 times
since the first veto use in relation to chemical weapons issue on February 28, 2017, until the last
documented chemical weapons use in al Kbaina village on May 19, 2019. The report also
outlines a timeline showing the distribution of these 21 chemical weapons attacks carried out by
the Syrian regime amid six Russian vetoes against UN draft resolutions regarding CW use in
Syria. The report notes that the Russia and Chinahave used their veto power three times
to prevent the delivery of UN aid provided for more than four million internally displaced
people, adding that the Security Council has subjected the process of delivering
cross-border aid to its hegemony, even though this assistance is humanitarian, neutral, and
provided by the OCHA, and is not considered interference in the conflict, being provided to
people who have been forcibly displaced. As thereport notes, the Syrian regime has
committed heinous crimes and violations against Syrian civilians on a daily basis for nine years
to date. It has also consistently failed to comply with any of the demands of the International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, or those of the High Commission for
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uman Rights, or even Security Council resolutions. The Security Council, which is supposed to
H
take collective measures and action under Article 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations,
has also failed because of the immunity granted by Russia to the Syrian regime, with Russia
routinely using its veto to protect the Syrian regime, which has not only failed to abide by its
responsibility to protect civilians, but has committed and continues to commit the most egregious
violations against them, reaching the level of crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the report
states, the type of “conscience-shocking situations” which the UN is required to take action to
prevent are exactly what have continued to happen in Syria on a staggering scale, not only in the
form of one massacre or one violation but in industrial-scale, continuous killings and torture,
sexual violence, enforced disappearances, the use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs, and
besieging civilians. In this context, the report cites a report issued in December 2001 by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which stressed that: “The
Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states
may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation. ” Thereport
stresses that thefailure of the UN Security Councilhas caused the prolonging of the
conflict, as well as enabling the emergence of extremist forces, movements and armed
factions with diverse religious and ethnic goals, with the Syrian state having been torn
apart and more than half of the Syrian people displaced as a result.It was initially and, it
appears, wrongly, believed that the Security Council, including Russia and China, would do their
duty in playing a vital role in bringing security and peace to Syria, and would impose pressure on
the Syrian regime to accept a political transition process since the first weeks of the popular
uprising. The report provides charts showing the most prominent losses suffered by the Syrian
people as a result of that failure, including the death toll of extrajudicial killings among civilians,
children and females, the record of arrests and enforced disappearances, as well as the death toll
of victims who dies due to torture. The report also stresses that Russia and China have
supported the Syrian regime indefinitely by using the veto in the UN Security Council and
through many damaging practices such as voting against UN General Assembly resolutions and
the Human Rights Council, aligning themselves publicly and shamefully alongside a regime
accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, further noting that while the conflict in Syria
is an internal armed conflict, it is also in part an international conflict, in which countries have
intervened directly, including Russia and Turkey. While Paragraph 3 of Article 52 of the Charter
of the United Nations states that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting, Russia has not
only not abstained from voting, but has instead arbitrarily interfered in pursuit of serving the
interests of the Syrian regime and protecting it in all resolutions related to the Syrian conflict.
The report calls on the UN Security Council to initiate fundamental reforms, particularly
Free PF Briefs 16
in the area of the use of the veto in accordance with international law and human rights,
and to establish strict limitations and standards for the use of the veto, to place the public
interest, especially that of victims and affected countries and the attainment of just security
and peace before the economic and political gains and interests of any permanent member
state, and to create a mechanism to monitor the extent to which Security Council
resolutions are compatible with the Charter of the United Nations, with international law,
and with the jurisdiction of the Security Council, and to monitor compliance with
established standards for the use of the veto. Thereport provides recommendations to the
UN General Assembly and international community, with recommendations related to expanding
the powers of the General Assembly at the expense of the Security Council and to rebuild the
relationship between them in favor of the main reference being the General Assembly and not
the Security Council. The report also calls on Russia and China to stop the arbitrary use of the
veto, as the Syrian regime is involved in crimes against humanity against the Syrian people, to
compensate the victims materially and morally for the catastrophic suffering caused by the
repeated and arbitrary use of the veto, as well as to provide reparation for the imbalance incurred
through accelerating the political transition process and supporting a path of transitional justice
conducive to stability, democracy and human rights.
The impact is massive.
SNHR 20[SNHR, "Russia and China’s Arbitrary VetoUse 16 Times Contributed to Killing Nearly a
uarter of a Million Syrians, the Arrest of Nearly 150,000 Others, and the Spread of Impunity", July 17,
Q
2020, Syria Network for Human Rights, https://snhr.org/blog/2020/07/17/55263/] ZG
he Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reveals thatRussia and China’s 16
T
arbitrary uses of veto on Syria has contributed to the deaths of nearly a quarter of a
million Syrians, the arrest of nearly 150,000 others,and the spread of impunity, also noting
that the timeline of the vetoes shows the extent of the UN Security Council’s (UNSC)
terrible failure to protect civilians and establish peace and security in Syria. As the
26-page report notes, the violations committed by the Syrian regime since March 2011, which
have also been detailed in reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, along with reports by other international
and local organizations, prompted the Security Council to take decisions that should have
guaranteed the achievement of security and stability; however, the Security Council’s most
serious and potentially effective draft resolutions in deterring the Syrian regime have been
Free PF Briefs 17
r epeatedly thwarted by Russia and China through the use of their veto power in defense of the
Syrian regime. This assurance of impunity for the regime regardless of its crimes has contributed
to an alarming increase in the extent of its atrocities. This impunity also paved the way for the
emergence of many other actors from different movements and backgrounds.Russia has used
its UNSC veto in favor of the Syrian regime 16 times, including 10 occasions on which it
voted jointly with China.
Free PF Briefs 18
Gaza
he U.S. has consistently shielded Israel in the UNSC to continue their assault
T
on Palestine.
Zinevich 24[Benjamin Zinevich, "Abolish U.S. vetopower in the UN Security Council!", March 7,
024, Liberation News,
2
https://www.liberationnews.org/abolish-u-s-veto-power-in-the-un-security-council/] ZG
n March 1, the United States blocked an Algerian-led effort within the United Nations Security
O
Council to condemn Israel for the horrific massacre of Palestinians in Gaza desperately seeking
humanitarian aid in the middle of the night on Feb. 29. Out of the 15 members of the UN
Security Council, the United States was the only country not to back a statement on the horrific
“Flour Massacre,” which led to over 100 casualties after the Israeli military opened fire on a
crowd collecting flour and other scarce resources from aid trucks. The images of the Biden
administration’s UN Ambassadors Linda Thomas Greenfield and Robert Wood have become
infamous for their lone raised hands, using U.S. veto power to shield its imperial outpost of
Israel from global condemnation, as virtually all other members of the UN attempt to condemn
or speak out against the horrific acts by Israeli forces in Gaza. Yet throughout the existence of the
UN, the U.S. Mission has continually exploited its veto power to assert its dominance over the
world. Below are six other key moments the United States used its UN veto to either reject the
sovereignty of oppressed peoples or otherwise protect the most reactionary and oppressive
regimes from international accountability. 1-Ceasefire resolution in GazaMore than 150 days
into Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, UN member states have made three separate efforts to
put forward a ceasefire resolution to a vote:oncethrough the General Assembly and twice
through the Security Council.At every instance, andeven when its closest Western
partners have either voted for or abstained, the United States has vetoed each effort calling
for a permanent suspension of violence in Gaza.UNGeneral-Secretary Antonio Guterres
has criticized the U.S. Mission’s usage of their veto as “paralyzing” the international body
from taking any meaningful action on the crisis in Gaza. Guterres also invoked a rarely-used
Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, which confers on the Secretary-General the power to
“bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his [her] opinion may threaten
the maintenance of international peace and security.” Days after blocking the second post-Oct. 7
ceasefire vote on Dec. 8, the Biden State Department declared it would bypass Congress to rush
through 45,000 tank shells to the Israeli military so it could further its genocide, making it clear
thatWashington plays a direct role in continuingthe genocide of Palestinians in Gaza.
Free PF Briefs 19
Thousands have been killed.
Shurafa 24[Wafaa Shurafa, "More than 29,000 Palestinianshave been killed in Israel-Hamas war,
aza Health Ministry says", 02/19/2024, AP News,
G
https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-02-19-2024-81c2d362340b611a98e4b929b4b5d0a4#:~
:text=In%20Gaza%2C%20the%20Health%20Ministry,which%20are%20even%20partially%20functionin
g.] ZG
I sraeli warplanes on Monday carried out at least two strikes near the southern port city of Sidon in one of
the largest attacks near a major city, wounding 14 people, Lebanese state media said. The Israeli military
said it attacked Hezbollah arms depots near Sidon in retaliation for a drone that exploded in an open field
near the northern Israeli city of Tiberias earlier Monday.In Gaza,the Health Ministry saidthe death
t oll had risen to 29,092 since the start of the war, around two-thirds of them women and
children. More than 69,000Palestinianshave beenwounded, overwhelming the territory’s
hospitals, less than half of which are even partially functioning.The ministry does not
istinguish between civilians and combatants in its count. The war began when Hamas-led militants
d
stormed into southern Israel from Gaza on Oct. 7, killing some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and taking
around 250 men, women and children hostage. After a round of exchanges for Palestinians imprisoned by
Israel in November, around 130 remain captive, a fourth of them believed to be dead.
Free PF Briefs 20
Ukraine
Affirming is necessary to hold Russia accountable for the invasion of Ukraine.
Niland 23[Paul Niland, "Russia’s Ukraine invasionhighlights the need for fundamental UN reform",
0/12/2023, Atlantic Council,
1
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-ukraine-invasion-highlights-the-need-for-funda
mental-un-reform/] ZG
ver since the invasion began in February 2022, Moscow has used its position as one of five
E
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to block efforts to end the war
or hold Russia accountable.Faced with relentlessRussian obstruction, UN leaders have been
forced to focus on mediation efforts, while the United Nations General Assembly has been
limited to voting on a series of largely symbolic resolutions condemning the invasion. If the
purpose of the UN is to prevent major wars, the current approach is obviously not working. The
full-scale invasion of Ukraine has focused international attention on Russia’s problematic role as
one of the most influential nations at the United Nations. Some have asked why Russia has not
been expelled for its attack on Ukraine, and have pointed to the expulsion of the Soviet Union
from the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, in response to the November 1939 invasion
of Finland. Others have questioned the legal status of the Russian Federation as a UN member
state, noting that Russia has never actually gone through the proper formal and recognized
procedures of applying to become a member of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was a key
founding member of the United Nations and enjoyed a seat on the UN Security Council, but the
USSR officially ceased to exist on December 26, 1991. Russia then took over the vacated Soviet
seat at the top table of the United Nations without any further formalities. When Czechoslovakia
ceased to exist just two years later, the two new nations that had once been component parts of
that country, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both formally applied for and were granted
membership status in the United Nations. The same is true for the states that were once part of
Yugoslavia. This is a step that Russia never took. The Charter of the United Nations states that
“the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations shall be effected by a
decision of the General Assembly.” While Slovakia and the Czech Republic went through this
procedure, the Russian Federation did not. The UN Charter also states that membership of the
body is contingent on “accepting the obligations contained in the present Charter.” On these
grounds, too, Russia does not meet the required standards. The UN Charter states that all United
Nations members “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” By invading Ukraine and
Free PF Briefs 21
a ttempting to annex entire Ukrainian regions, Russia has evidently violated this fundamental
commitment expected of all UN member states. It can therefore be argued that Russia’s
membership of the United Nations is invalid as it was not formally applied for, and because the
invasion of Ukraine places Russia in direct breach of the UN Charter. This raises obvious
questions over Russia’s continued presence among the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council. Russia’s status within the UNSC is particularly controversial as
Moscow stands accused of repeatedly abusing its veto power to further its own foreign policy
objectives and avoid censure for breaches of international law. The Security Council’s five
permanent members are the only nations to wield veto power. Almost twenty months since the
invasion began, few would argue that the devastating scale of Russia’s attack on Ukraine has
highlighted the shortcomings of the United Nations. As noted by Tom Grant, a Senior Fellow at
the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law,“Russia’saggression against Ukraine is the
most serious violation of the UN Charter in the Charter’s history.”How can a country
engaged in Europe’s largest invasion since World War II and led by a man wanted by the
International Criminal Court for war crimes be allowed to undermine an organization committed
to maintaining world peace? The absurdity of Russia’sposition among the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council is fueling calls forfundamental reform of the United
Nations.For two years in a row, the reform of theUnited Nations Security Council has featured
in US President Joe Biden’s annual address to the UN General Assembly. The reform debate
centers on the need for the highest body at the United Nations to be more representative. At
present, the UNSC lacks any permanent members from Africa or Latin America, and is also
missing valuable input from emerging powerhouses such as India and significant developed
economies including Japan. One of the roadblocksto such reform is the current make-up of
the Security Council, which under the existing regulations would be required to vote to
approve any expansion of the UNSC. This would likely be blocked by Russia, due to
perceptions in the Kremlin that any expansion would weaken the Russian position.
Tellingly, other permanent members would also see their influence diluted by an expanded
UNSC, and yet the push for this reform is being led by one of them, the United States. Other
possible reforms of the United Nations includetheremovalor restrictionof veto powers for
permanent members ofthe UN Security Council.Thiscouldpotentiallypreventindividual
countries from unilaterally derailing efforts to address global crises or uphold international
law.Some critics feel even this would not go farenough, and argue for a complete rethink of the
role played by the United Nations in international affairs.
Free PF Briefs 22
Taiwan
hina will invade Taiwan due to rising nationalist sentiment, risking a U.S. -
C
China war.
Chang 19(Gordon, columnist and attorney, JD fromCornell Law, “Gordon Chang: Is China Gearing
p To Invade Taiwan?” January 4th, 2019,
U
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/gordon-chang-china-gearing-invade-taiwan-40652)
i Jinping, in his first speech in 2019,told Taiwanit had no choice but to become part of
X
China.“China must be, will be reunified,” is howthe Chinese ruler put it on Wednesday,
according to the official Xinhua News Agency.Xi didnot break rhetorical or theoretical
ground when commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Message toCompatriots in
Taiwan,but he took the occasion to stress Beijing’swillingness to go to war. “We make no
promise torenounce the use of force and reserve theoption of taking all necessary means,”
he said.The New York Times reported “rousing applause”for his bellicose lines.The fact he
chose at this time to give “his first major speech” on Taiwan suggests belligerent themes are
popular in Beijing.There is way too much unprovokedwar talk in China at the moment, and
Taiwan is not the only target. For instance, twice last month a senior officer of the People’s
Liberation Army urged unprovoked attacks on the U.S. Navy. In the second such blast, Rear
Adm. Luo Yuan wanted Beijing to use its missiles to sink two American aircraft carriers and
cause ten thousand casualties. Bellicosity is never a good sign. In this case, thebelligerence is
almost surely the result of political distress at the top of the Communist Party. Xi Jinping, due to
one policy failure after another, is losing support, and after accumulating almost unprecedented
power—adversaries mock him as the “Chairman of Everything, Everywhere, and Everyone”—he
has no one else to blame.With no one else to blame,there is no tactic as effective for him as
nationalism.And there is no nationalist issue forthe Communist Party quite like Taiwan.
Analysts say Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War, but that’s not technically true. Yes, Mao,
the communist leader, chased Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang one, off the mainland of Asia in
1949, but Chiang found refuge in Taiwan. Today, the People’s Republic of China, the state
occupying the so-called “Mainland,” and the Republic of China, the government with its seat in
Taipei, both claim to be the legitimate government of “China.” Although only seventeen
countries extend diplomatic recognition to Taipei, the civil war, in a real sense, continues. The
civil war also continues because the People’s Republic has never controlled the island. In fact,
there have been only a few decades when an ethnically “Chinese” government has effectively
ruled Taiwan.Xi’s argumentfalls downin other criticalrespects. “We are all of the same
family,” he said Wednesday. “Thecross-Straits affairsare domestic affairs.”Domestic? At least
Free PF Briefs 23
h alf, and generally about two-thirds, of Taiwan’s people in self-identification surveys deny they
are “Chinese” in any respect. They call themselves “Taiwanese.” About five percent—those who
came with Chiang in the 1940s or their descendants—see themselves as Chinese only. Yet no
matter how they self-identify, the people who call Taiwan home do not want to be absorbed by
Xi’s People’s Republic. His offer of a “one country, two systems” structure for reunification—the
formula implemented in Hong Kong—is extremely unattractive. Even Beijing’s friends on the
self-governing island, like the Kuomintang Party, are against it . As Gerrit van der Wees, a
Taiwan analyst associated with the Global Taiwan Institute, told the National Interest , “Mr. Xi’s
empty promises of ‘one country, two systems’ is universally rejected in Taiwan.” Taiwanese
undoubtedly would declare themselves “independent”—in other words, drop the outdated claim
to China and declare themselves to be sovereign on Taiwan—were it not for fear of what an
enraged Xi would do. So the status quo, which favors the self-governing island, continues. Many
say that, despite what the people of Taiwan think, the United States should just allow Beijing to
take the island. That was Nixon’s and Kissinger’s position when they reached out to Mao in the
early 1970s, and it was essentially Carter’s view when he formally switched diplomatic
recognition on January 1, 1979, not coincidentally the day the National People’s Congress issued
the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. Yet even if Taiwan were America’s to give—it, of course,
is not—Xi’s China is unappeasable. The Chinese ruler, in addition to Taiwan, demands
substantial portions of India, including the state of Arunachal Pradesh; a number of Japan’s
islands in the East China Sea; and just about every island, reef, and speck in the South China
Sea. Furthermore, Chinese state media and state institutions have made it clear that Xi wants to
take Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyu chain from Japan, and there is even ludicrous talk in
Beijing of “recovering” a large portion of Siberia. Finally, Xi Jinping has been dropping hints
that China is the world’s only sovereign state .Atsome point, therefore, the United States will
have to defend its own sovereignty and confront Beijing.Syndicated radio host John Batchelor
this week suggested Americans are not prepared for what is coming. “The American people will
not go to war for Taiwan,” he said on his Wednesday show. “Does Taiwan understand that?”
Whether Americans realize it or not, they may end up protecting the islandanyway. For
more than a century,the United States has drawn itswestern defense perimeter off the coast
of Asia. Taiwan is in the center of that critical line, protecting Japan’s southern flank,
where the East China Sea meets the South China Sea. “Peace and stability in the Taiwan
Strait is not an ‘internal affair of China,’ it is a core interest of the United States,” as van
der Wees says. “The U.S. insists that Taiwan’s future be determined peacefully with the consent
of the people of Taiwan, and rightly so.”Nonetheless,Xi Jinping this year could lash out at
Taiwan if he thinks he can get away with it. For fartoo long, Americans, with ambiguous
policy, have been sending weak signals. In September, for instance, former Defense Secretary
Free PF Briefs 24
J ames Mattis vetoed a State Department proposal to station Marine guards at the newly opened
headquarters, near Taipei, of the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto American embassy.
Cowering in the face of belligerence is no way to keep the peace. A much better approach would
be for President Trump to add one more country to the list recognizing the island, perhaps not as
the government of China but as the Republic of Taiwan.
China will use permanent membership to take advances
Nathan 24[Chow Xin Jie Nathan, "Taiwan: An InconvenientTruth But Inevitable Conflict?",
01/16/2024, TDHJ.org, https://tdhj.org/blog/post/taiwan-inevitable-conflict/] ZG
hina’s “Trump Card”While the CCP’s narrative providesthe intellectual basis for
C
invasion, the physical impetus lies in the PRC’smeteoricrise inthe economic andpolitical
domains.PRC’simplementation ofeconomic reformsin the1970s paved the way for its
international recognitionand admission into varioussupranational bodies.Notably,the PRC
was appointed a permanent member of theUnited NationsSecurity Council(UNSC) in
1971.[7]Thus,it can veto legally binding resolutionspassed in the United Nations General
Assembly.[8]Anonslaught on Taiwanese territory wouldbe an infringement of the United
NationsCharter2(4),which calls for swiftand decisiveactionby the UNSC.However, the
PRC would be able to impede any disadvantageous resolution. In doing so, it would buy
itself time to achieve its military objectives. In fact, the PRC could utilise UN Resolution
2758, which advocates the “One China Policy”, recognising it as the “only legitimate
government of China”.[9] This throws a spanner inthe works should the international
community attempt to utilise the United Nations Charter 2(4), which prohibits the infringement
of “territorial integrity of a state” by force.[10] The PRC’s vast diplomatic network is further
augmented with its Belt and Road Initiative—”investments” aimed at connecting the PRC with
Europe, Asia, and Africa through a labyrinth of overland infrastructure and maritime routes.[11]
The economic growth experienced by recipient states reinforces positive sentiments towards the
PRC. This quid pro quo prevents the PRC from being sidelined by Western-led economic
sanctions during a conflict. Furthermore, Chinese loans are usually unsustainable for recipient
states,[12] embroiling them in debt traps. The PRC impinges on their sovereignty to further its
interests by compelling recipient states to restructure debts. Amidst a likely global boycott of
Chinese goods during an invasion of Taiwan, the PRC’s foothold in these states will serve as an
economic lifeline. The seizure of infrastructure as collateral may even provide strategic military
outposts for the PRC.
Free PF Briefs 25
Myanmar
bolishing permanent membership in the UNSC can unlock efforts to quell
A
the Myanmar military coup.
Barber 21[Rebecca Barber, "Response to Myanmar coupshows need for UN reform",
0 4/01/2021, The Interpreter,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/response-myanmar-coup-shows-need-un-reform]
SM
I t’s been almost three months sinceMyanmar’s militaryjuntaseized power from the
democratically elected government. More than 700 protesters have been killed, and more than
3000 arrested. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has said that the
militaryis likely committing crimes against humanityincluding “murder, enforced
disappearance, persecution, torture, and imprisonmentin violation of fundamental rules of
international law”. The UN Secretary General, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special
Envoy and the Special Rapporteur have all condemned the violence in the strongest possible
terms. But as many have observed, words are not enough.What is required is a global,
mandatory arms embargo, mandatory sanctions against senior members of the Myanmar
military, referral of the worst offenders to the International Criminal Court, and
international agreement not to accord diplomatic recognition to the military junta. None of
these proposals should be regarded as overly ambitious.The UN Security Council has the
power to do these things, but it won’t. Why?Becauseof the veto powers of China and
Russia. Last month, the United Kingdom proposed aSecurity Council statement warning of
“further measures” against Myanmar if the violence didn’t cease. China, however, has said that
“one-sided pressure” would “only aggravate tension”. Thus far, the Security Council has
managed nothing other than a weakly worded statement, “condemn[ing] the violence” and
calling for restraint. In a briefing to the UN GeneralAssembly in February, the UN Special
Envoy on Myanmar said: If the numerous discussions here at the General Assembly and in the
Security Council continue to fall short of a forceful and timely response, perhapsexisting
structures are indeed in need of reforms,in keepingwith the times.Indeed, the continuing
failure of the Security Council and the General Assembly to produce constructive outcomes
points to one fact: the existing structures are in need of reform. But what would such reform
looklike? Security Council reform has been on theinternational agenda for decades, with the
central issue being the veto power wielded by the Council’s five permanent members – aka the
Free PF Briefs 26
5.The right of vetocan’tbe removedwithout amending the UN Charter, and the UN Charter
P
can’t be amended without P5 approval, so getting rid of the veto is a non-starter. Thus, most
proposals for reform of the international security system focus on getting around the veto.
Following are some of the ideas currently on the table. The Political Declaration on Suspension
of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocity. Launched in 2015, this initiative aims to secure the
agreement of the P5 not to exercise their right of veto when faced with mass atrocities. The
Declaration has been signed by 103 states. It deserves the utmost support, but it is inherently
limited. Russia and China are unlikely to sign, and even if they did, they would be free to ignore
it whenever they saw fit to do so. Increase the membership of the Security Council. By
increasing the number of permanent and/or elected seats. This proposal is widely supported by
states. Broader membership would enhance the representativeness of the Security Council, and
hence (arguably) the quality of its debate. It would not, however, solve the veto problem. The
first session of the United Nations Security Council, 17 January 1946 at Church House, London,
with Norman J.O. Makin of Australia presiding (UN Photo/Flickr)
Without action,
Myo 22[By Ye Myo, "Myanmar’s Military is a RegionalDestabilizer", 08/29/2022, Wilson
Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/myanmars-military-regional-destabilizer] SM
yanmarhasalways teetered on the edge of instabilitydue to the Sit-Tat’s misrule. Indeed, its
M
lack of control and manipulation of the long-running war to protect its political leadership has
only exacerbated Myanmar’s internal conflicts. In previous eras, the Sit-Tat isolated itself and the
country it ruled on the international stage, keeping its violence and oppression contained largely
to Myanmar’s periphery. Yet, even then, Myanmar’s instability had ripple effects. Chronic
instability has helped turn the so-called “Golden Triangle” into one of the world’s leading
producers of narcotics. Its periodic attempts to crush Myanmar’s diverse array of ethnic armed
groups have caused large spikes in violence, some of which crosses borders. In 2015, fighting in
the Kokang region led to the military’s accidental bombing of Chinese territory, the death of
several civilians, and refugees fleeing into Yunnan Province. The Sit-Tat next instigated the 2017
Rohingya genocide and refugee crisis that led to over 900,000 fleeing into Bangladesh.
Demonstrating the concern the international community felt for the regime, U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton even expressed concerns in 2009 about potential North Korean nuclear
assistance to the Sit-Tat.The post-2021 coup environmentradically escalates the instability
and threatens to plunge the country into failed state status, whichonlyamplifies the risks
further in a terrible feedback loop. Whereas the Sit-Tat’sculture of violence and the
Free PF Briefs 27
o n-and-off again civil war previously ignored the Bamar majority, the 2021 crackdown on
protesters and indiscriminate violence triggered a widespread popular resistance across all of
Myanmar’s ethnic groups. This spiraled into a full-scale civil war that touches 266 out of 330
townships. The war’s unprecedented scale and the unwillingness of either side to negotiate
portends a protracted conflict that could last years and trigger greater displacement. The
military’s mismanagement, the continued commitment of the Civil Disobedience Movement, and
the flight of international businesses contribute further to the devastation. The economy and
government services apparatus now teeter on the edge of collapse as a result of the coup. The
World Bank estimated that 40 percent of Myanmar’s population is now impoverished, a doubling
in its poverty rate that essentially reverses the gains made under democratization. This
assessment also reported that GDP is about 13 percent less than in 2019, and the odds that
international investors, scared off by the junta’s willingness to intervene in the economy and
Western sanctions, re-enter Myanmar are low. With the multifaceted post-coup crisis and
destabilizing actors in power, Myanmar is increasingly a black hole of instability and chaos with
impacts that extend beyond its borders. Previous eras of military rule triggered instability and
spillover, but the growing scale of this iteration renders the situation of far more concern for
Myanmar’s neighbors than in previous decades.Muchas howthecivil wars in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Somalia, and Syria destabilized the surrounding region through spillovereffects,a
fragmenting and collapsing Myanmar threatens to do the same for South and Southeast
Asia.From the direct impact of cross-border violenceto second order effects, such as refugee
crisesanddrug trafficking, a weak state beset byconflict at the juncture of South and Southeast
Asiacouldprove tobe a long-term problem for thegeo-strategically vital, andtense,
Indo-Pacific.Although previous eras of military rulesaw Myanmar isolated and disconnected
from its neighbors, the growing ambitions of great powers to spread their influence mean the
junta’s actions have more impact on regional politics. Geographically, Myanmar sits astride
South and Southeast Asia, and both India and China view the country as a gateway and target for
substantial investment, as do Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and others. New Delhi’s Act East
Policy hopes to connect India and its Northeast to ASEAN via Myanmar, while China’s Belt and
Road Initiative aims to bypass the “Malacca Dilemma” by opening up an energy and
infrastructure route to the Indian Ocean. Although both governments have warmed up to the
junta in a bid to maintain their influence—lest their competitor gain an edge—continued
instability and fighting within Myanmar will only stymie the country’s development and its
former promise as an economic juncture between China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Free PF Briefs 28
Climate Change
Arias 22[Sabrina B. Arias October 11, 2022 (PhD candidate at the University of
ennsylvania researching international organizations, diplomacy, and climate policymaking.)
P
“The UN Security Council Declined to take up Climate Change as a Security Problem.
Why?”,
ttps://multilateralism.sipa.columbia.edu/news/un-security-council-declined-take-climate-change
h
-security-problem-why]
I n December 2021, theUN Security Council(U NSC)failedto pass a resolution defining
climate changeas a threatto international peaceand security.Such a resolution would
have allowed theUNSC to take a more active leadershiprolein addressing climate change
and opening the doorfor bolder policies includingeconomic sanctionsin responseto
harmful climate practices. Why won’t the UNSC addressclimate change?More generally,
why do countries sometimes push to re-frame problems as security threats, and which countries
stand to benefit when this occurs?In new research,I showthat in UN debates,the permanent
members of the UNSC- who would gain institutionalpower from a larger UNSC mandate -
refer more to the security dimension of climate change than the countries who are
actually the most threatened by the problem.On theother hand,thePermanent 5, orP5,
members -namely, the United States, Russia, China,France, and United Kingdom-are
concerned with the perceived legitimacy of the Council.For this reason,weare unlikely to
see the UNSC play a large role in climate policymakinguntil a majority of UNmember
states are willing to give up their control over the issue of climate change. UNSC attention
leads to global focus, funding, and tools, but also political cost It matters which UN body
addresses an issue. Moving an issue from the agenda of the General Assembly, where all states
are represented, to the more exclusive UNSC determines whether and how an issue is
addressed by the international community. When the UNSC takes up a new issue, international
attention is focused, funding is increased, and new legal tools to address the issue - including
sanctions and the use of force - become available.For example, the UNSC took up the issue
of HIV/AIDS in 2000, resulting indramatic increasesin global attention and funding.
Other deadly diseasessuch as Ebola,malaria, andtuberculosis whichdid not receive the
attention of the UNSC,[and] did notreceivethe samenearlyas much international
attention and funding.Yet this increase in attentioncomes with costs.Once the UNSC takes
up an issue,it becomesmore narrowly defined withinthe security agenda, and can become
more intensely politicized.In the case of HIV/AIDS,the economic and humanrights
dimensionsof the crisis were sidelinedin the UNSC’sapproach after most developing states
lost their seat at the table. Redefining issues assecurity concernsalsoincreases the power
Free PF Briefs 29
o f the states that control the security agenda-the members of the UNSC.Consequently,
states that are notmembers of the UNSC-which representsonly 15 of the 193 United
Nations member states-lose their ability to influencethe outcome.Non-UNSC members,
then, are unlikely to support redefining issues as securitythreats.UNSC members - and
thePermanent5in particular-have concerns abouteroding the UNSC’s speciallegitimacy,
and are wary ofbeing perceived as overreaching.Thisdiscourages UNSC membersfrom
attempting to turn new issues such as climate changeinto security issues unless there is
broad support from other member states. SecuritizingClimate Change? We would expect that
the states most threatened by climate change would have the greatest incentive to “securitize”
the problem to raise attention and commitment.Smallisland developing stateslike Kiribati,
Tuvalu, and the Maldivesface the most severe threat.Yet these states also caredeeplyabout
the implications of climate change for international law, human rights, and development.
If the UNSC took up the issue of climate change, it could focus international attention, it
would also give important decision-making power to a small group of states that may not
represent advocate for the preferences of the most vulnerable countries While UNSCmembers
- particularlythe P5-w ould gain additional power,they may be unlikely to tryto expend
political capital in forcing a securitizing move, if they perceive that othermember states
would not be on board. Indeed, myresearchbasedon a machine learning model to examine
all speeches on climatechangegiven atthe GeneralAssembly’s annualmeetingsfrom
1970-2014sh ows that the P5 states are 5.4percentagepoints more likely to securitize
climate changethan other states,whereas small islanddeveloping states are 6.4 percentage
points less likely to do so. While security concernsmake up more than 15 percent of the
climate debate,most member states do not discussclimate change as a security threat.
Statesdo raise security implications of climate changes- for example, the threat of rising
sea-levels -but they do not dosoin a way that suggeststhe UNSC shouldplay a role in
addressingthe matter. This suggests that most memberstates would not be in favor of a
security-centricapproach to addressing climate change,and can explain why some of the
Permanent5members - namely Russia - blocked theDecember 2021 resolution. Indeed,
Russiastated thatexpandingthe UNSC’s authorityto address climate change would
neglect other importantdimensions of the climatecrisis, including socio-economic
development. Failed securitization of climate strengthensnon-security dimensions Though the
failed climate security resolution had more support from the non-UNSC members than any
similar initiative in the past, the political incentives of agenda control can help us understand
why the resolution was nevertheless rejected.Thefact that the climate discourse is not
securitizedsuggests that most UN members would notsupport a substantial role for the UNSC
inaddressing climate change.Policy responses frominclusive institutions like UNFCCC that
Free PF Briefs 30
h ighlight the non-security dimensions of climate change - like financing and human rights -
may have a better chance. The conservative positiontaken by the UNSC also suggests a
concern for its perceivedlegitimacy.Particularlyfor France and the United Kingdom - P5
states whose international political influence has declined in recent decades - shoring up the
UNSC’s authority is increasingly important. Balancing legitimacy and boldness will be a key
challenge for the UNSC addressing new non-traditional security problems like global
pandemics and cybercrime.
Every Degree Counts.
Taylor 19[Chris Taylor, "The Catastrophe: Climatechange and the 22nd Century", 03/28/2019,
Mashable, https://mashable.com/feature/climate-change-future-22nd-century] ZG
allace-Wells, in stitching their research together, is unafraid to describe the interconnecting
W
calamities of a relentlessly warming world. And it’s hard to gainsay any of it. More droughts,
more storms, rising seas, rising disease: all are coming, all will make each other worse. To take
one minor aspect of The Catastrophe:air pollution,whichclimate changeis already making
worse(opens in a new tab),will kill an estimated150 million more peopleworldwide(opens in
a new tab)for every single degree celsius of warming,researchers estimate. This, the author
points out, is the death toll of 25 Holocausts or two World War IIs. Human activity has already
locked in one degree of warming compared to pre-industrial levels. Two, three, or four more
may come along before you do.
Free PF Briefs 31
AT Sexual Assault
UN resolutions have already reformed peacekeeping
UN 17[UN, "Addressing sexual exploitation and abuse",Conduct in UN Field Missions, 2017
h ttps://conduct.unmissions.org/addressing#:~:text=The%20provisions%20of%20resolution%202
272,and%20hold%20their%20personnel%20accountable.] SM
I nMarch 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution2272(2016),addressing sexual
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers deployed under Security Council mandates.The
provisions of resolution 2272 focused primarily on military personnel and members of formed police
units serving in peacekeeping missions, and the responsibility of troop- and police-contributing
countries to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and hold their personnel
accountable.Through resolution 2272, the SecurityCouncil requested the Secretary-General
to[can]repatriate aparticularmilitaryunitorformedpolice unit when there iscredible
evidence of widespread or systemicsexual exploitationand abuse by that unit.The resolution further
requested that the Secretary-General replace all units of the troop- or police-contributing country from which the perpetrator is from if appropriate steps have not been taken by the country to investigate the
allegation, and/or when the perpetrators have notbeen held accountable, and/or when there has been failure to inform the Secretary-General of the progress of its investigation or actions taken.
Free PF Briefs 32
AT Iran
1. Turn - Strong sanctions prevent Iranian nuclear acquisition.
Morrison 21--- Master of Arts of Political Science,University of Waterloo.
allen, 2021, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Non-proliferation: A Comparative Study of North Korea
K
and Iran, “University of Waterloo, Fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts,
https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/16666/Morrison_Kallen%20.pdf?sequence=3
conomicsanctions have been successful in stoppingIranfrompursuingtheirnuc[s]lear
E
programthus far.Iran has conceded multiple timesto the United States and the international community
to halt the enrichment of uranium and the advancement of their nuclear program.The most notable
example of Iran’s concessions has been the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in which
Iran agreed to halt and greatly reduce their nuclear program in return for substantial easing of economic
sanctions. The second criteria has been met as Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to
continued economic pressure from the United States and the international community. Iran’s economy has
significantly worseneddue tocontinued economic pressurefrom the United Statesand the
international community.Continuedeconomicpressurehas been paramount to bringing Iran to
the negotiating table.While the United States andits regional allies do pose a military threat to Iran, that isunlikely a sufficient factorin dissuadingIran. We have established that the
level of political contestation in the targeted countries, their economic and security vulnerabilities, and the degree of international cooperation are important factors in determining if economic sanctions are
effective at limiting nuclear proliferation. In Iran’s case the regime, while authoritarian, allows for limited political contestation. The general public gets to elect the president (even if candidates are handpicked by
the supreme leader). Iranians have been able to protest against the government. One goal of economic sanctions is to galvanize the general public against the government and their policy decisions. Iranians have
Iran’s international environmentisalso
indeed been frustrated by the sanctions and voiced their discontent with the government policies targeted by the sanctions.
conductive foreconomicsanctionsto be effective.Iran is a regional power with an impressive arsenal
f missiles and extensive network of proxy forces. Therefore, nuclear weapons are not imperative for
o
Iran’sdefence. On the other end,Iran’s economy islargelybasedon oil and gas exports.
Integration into the global market isvery importantfor Iranians anda vital source of revenue
for the government. Economic sanctions have hurt the Iranian economy and therefore have hurt Iranians.
The economic squeeze has brought Iran to the negotiating table in the pastand will likely do so in the
future.The international approach to Iran has beenencompassing with the European Union and the
United Kingdom taking a common stand with the United States in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Even after the United States left the JCPOA the EU and UK have attempted to develop
mechanisms to provide Iran with economic incentives to keep Iran abiding to the JCPOA.Even though
China has given Iran an economic lifeline there is tension within Iran over concerns of becoming too
economically dependent on China.
2. De-link- Proliferating countries continue despite UN targeted sanctions.
Eckert and Biersteker 12 write
Eckert and Biersteker 12– Sue: Watson Institute forInternational Studies, Brown University,
homas: Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, The Graduate Institute, Geneva (2012,
T
Sue, Thomas, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “The Impacts and Effectiveness of UN
Nonproliferation Sanctions: A Provisional Report”
http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/nonproliferation/CCDP_Sanctio
ns.aspx, accessed 8-4-13, BH)
hat being said, targeted sanctions against Iran and North Korea are more difficult to implement than comprehensive measures.
T
Member States need to have legal authority and administrative mechanisms on the national level to freeze assets, prohibit
exports, screen travel, and ban arms exports. Selectiveor targeted sanctions may also be relatively more
Free PF Briefs 33
ifficult to enforce because permissible transactions can be used as cover for illicit trade or
d
financial flows.In addition, the networks for illicitgoods and their financing are well developed in the nuclear arena as the Khan network and its fractured
successors have proven. The ‘capturing contraband’ and ‘increasing the cost of illicit activities’ side of sanctions does exist in each case, but generally the criminal
networks in these goods remain a step ahead of the reach of targeted sanctions. In
¶ addition,targetedsanctions have been
erceived as “weaker”by somebecause they are lesscoercive and by design, have less
p
impact on the macro economy of the targeted country.It may be thatthepolitical,
psyc hological, or economic effects of targeted sanctionsare insufficient to induce potential
proliferators to change their behavior,but that couldalso be true of comprehensive sanctions. Targeted sanctions
ay still be useful to signal disapproval of the target’s behavior and support for international norms, and do so at far lower cost to
m
senders than comprehensive sanctions.
CON
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North Korea
Chinese and Russian P5 status has kept the West in check.
Al-Jazeera 22[Al-Jazeera, "North Korea escapes furthersanctions as Russia, China wield veto",
5/27/2022, Al Jazeera,
0
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/27/north-korea-escapes-further-sanction-as-russia-china-wield-ve
to] ZG
hina and Russia have vetoed an effort to tighten United Nations sanctions on North Korea
C
after a spate of missile launches this year, in the first split among the five veto-wielding
permanent members of the UN’s most powerful body since it began sanctioning Pyongyang
in 2006.The remaining 13 council members all votedin favour of the resolutionthat was
drafted by the UnitedStates andproposedbanningtobacco and oil exports to North Korea.
It would also have blacklisted the Lazarus hacking group, which the US says is tied to North
Korea.A united Security Council imposed sanctionsafter North Korea’s first nuclear test
explosion in 2006 and tightened them over the years in a total of 10 resolutionsseeking – so
far unsuccessfully – to rein in its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and cutoff
funding. This year alone, the country has carriedout a total of 23 missile launches, three of them
in the space of less than an hour on Wednesday morning. US Ambassador to the UN Linda
Thomas-Greenfield described the vote as a “disappointing day” for the council. “The world faces
a clear and present danger from the DPRK (North Korea),” she told the council, using the
country’s official name of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. “Council restraint and
silence has not eliminated or even reduced the threat. If anything, DPRK has been emboldened.”
She said Washington had assessed that North Korea had carried out six ICBM launches this year
and was “actively preparing to conduct a nuclear test”. British, French and South Korean envoys
voiced similar fears. Pyongyang last carried out a nuclear test in 2017. “Using a veto protects the
North Korean regime and gives it carte blanche to launch more weapons,” said the French
ambassador, Nicolas de Riviere.After vetoingfurtheraction,China and Russia told the
Security Council that the US needed to improve dialogue with NorthKorearather thanopt
for more sanctions. Thetwocountrieshave beenpushingfor sanctionsto be eased on
humanitarian grounds.“The introduction of new sanctionsagainst the DPRK [North
Korea] is a path to a dead end,” Russia’s UN AmbassadorVassily Nebenzia told the council.
“We have stressed the ineffectivenessandthe inhumanityof further strengthening the
sanctions pressure on Pyongyang.” China’s UN AmbassadorZhang Jun said additional
sanctionsagainst North Koreawouldonlylead tomore“negative effects andescalationof
Free PF Briefs 35
c onfrontation”. “The situation on the Peninsula has developed to what it is today thanks
primarily to the flip flop US policies and failure to uphold the results of previous dialogues,” he
told the council. Denuclearisation talks have been stalled since 2019 when a summit in Vietnam
between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then US President Donald Trump collapsed
without agreement. President Joe Biden’s administration has repeatedly said it is willing to speak
with North Korea without preconditions but that it will not make any “grand bargain“.
Pyongyang, meanwhile, has shown little interest in working-level talks. The UN General
Assembly will now discuss North Korea in the next two weeks under a new rule requiring the
193-member body to meet every time a veto is cast in the Security Council by one of the five
permanent members – Russia, China, the United States, France and the United Kingdom.
anctions are ineffective and cause North Korean nuclear strikes against the
S
US
lbert 18(Eleanor Albert is a senior writer at theCouncil on Foreign Relations and a PhD
A
student at George Washington University “What to Know About the Sanctions on North Korea”
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea//TU-SG)
hat are thechallenges associated with sanctions?Sanctionsevasion. Thebiggest challenge is
W
enforcement, whichis theresponsibility of individualstates.National authoritiesmayhave
meagerfinancialresources to inspectshipments atports of entry,carry outcomplex
investigations, and perform other enforcement activities.Someindividuals and entities,
motivated by financial gain, arewilling to do businesswith North Koreaoutside the law.
Smugglerstake advantage of lax inspectionsat portsin parts of Africa, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia.Black market activitiesthat oftengo undetectedensure that shipments elude
customs scrutiny and official reporting.China, whichaccounts for 90 percent of North Korea’s
trade, may have little orno political motivationto enforce certain sanctions. A February 2017
report[PDF]by UN experts revealed that China wasserving as the lead facilitator of black
market North Korean trade, and that Chinese companies were allowing North Korean banks to
remain connected to the global financial system.Weakmeasures. Someforeign policy experts
sayUN sanctions against North Korea tend to be weakbecause of the compromises
required to garner Chinese and Russian backing. Beijingand Moscow, permanent members
of the UN Security Council with veto power, fear outcomes associated with regime change in
Pyongyang. “[China] wants to send a message to Kim Jong-un that his nuclear program is
unacceptable and to punish bad behavior, but it does not want to trigger North Korea’s collapse
or turn its neighbor into a permanent enemy,” said the International Crisis Group’s Michael
Kovrig. Emboldening Kim.Tougher sanctions could havethe opposite oftheirintended
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e ffectandadd urgency to North Korea’s nuclear advancement.The young leader has already
conducted more missile and nuclear testssince hetook power in 2012 than his father and
grandfather combined.Kim may interpret more sanctionsas a threat to the survival of the
North Korean regime, and could motivate him to take more belligerent actions, like moving
on South Korean territory or targeting U.S. territory in Guam.
Free PF Briefs 37
Iran
hankfully, China and Russia will block future sanctions because of their
T
permanent status.
Stickings 23[Tim Stickings, "Iran plays for timeas nuclear sanctions slip off UN books",
9 /15/2023, The National News,
https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/2023/09/15/iran-plays-for-time-as-nuclear-sanctions-sli
p-off-un-books/] SM
ut they stopped short of invoking a “snapback” that would tear up negotiations with Tehran by
B
reinstating old UN sanctions. The option to do that expires in October 2025, as agreed to in the
2015 Iran nuclear deal. On the same date the UN Security Council “will have concluded its
consideration of theIraniannuclear issue” unlessa snapback is triggered before then. Iran could
divert funds from US prisoner swap to missile programme, expert warns This “de-securitisation”
matters to Iran because expiredUNsanctions are unlikelyto be reinstated given Russia and
China's veto powerin the council, said HamidrezaAzizi, an expert on Iran at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs. Iranian diplomats “think that time is on their
side”, he told The National. “Oncethesnapback isgone,that’s a point of no return sothere
won’t be any securitisation possible. That’s why thisis very important to Iran. It’s beyond
symbolic, there’s an actual concrete element to it.” Under the rules in place until 2025, the
snapback can be invoked unilaterally by parties to the nuclear deal, who include Britain, France
and Russia.However, European powers are likely tohold fire unless Iran enriches uranium to a
weapons-grade 90 per cent, said Jason Brodsky, policy director of the United Against Nuclear
Iran lobby group.
I f that changes, increased pressure from sanctions could cause Iranian
breakout and war.
Kahl 18(Colin, co-director of the Center for InternationalSecurity and Cooperation and Steven C.
ázy Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University,
H
“Pompeo’s Dangerous Delusions,” 10-24-18, )
For all these reasons,the strategy Pompeo outlinesis not likely to resolve anyof thechallenges
Iran poses—a
nd it may create new ones, includingtheprospect ofanother major war.Pompeo is
c learly sensitive to this possibility, so he goes to great lengths to insist that Trump is not seeking a military
confrontation with Iran, even as the president issuesmilitary threats to deter Iran from restarting its
Free PF Briefs 38
uclear program or attacking U.S. forces in the region. Even if we take such assurances seriously—and
n
Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton’s long track record of advocating bombing Iran
suggests we should not—history is littered with leaders who claimed not to seek war but stumbled into it
anyway. That is easy to imagine happening here. Paradoxically,the more theadministration’spolicy
“ works” to cripple Iran’s economy,the more likelyTehran is totake actions thatproduce a
military confrontation.During previousrounds ofsanctions, Iranrapidly expanded its
nuclear infrastructureto generate counter leverage.So far,Iran has beenrelativelyconstrained
in its response toTrump’s re-imposition ofsanctions.Butif the costs get toohigh,this restraint
couldeventuallyerode.Iran maystart creeping outof its nuclear obligationsunder the
CPOAby installing and operating more centrifugesor increasing its stockpile of low-enriched uranium,
J
all the while seeking to maintain as much international sympathy—especially from China and Russia—as
possible. Andthis,in turn,would lead torenewedprospects of an Israeli or American military
s trike.War could also result from inadvertent escalation.Pompeo admits thatthe
administration’s deterrent threats failed to prevent Iranian-backed groupsin Iraqfrom
carrying out rocket attacksagainst the American embassyin Baghdadand the U.S. consulate in
Basra in September.As U.S.-Iran tensions worsen,similar incidentsin Iraq, Syria, Yemen, or the
crowded waters of the Persian Gulfcouldeasily spiralout of control.
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Effectiveness
Hooper 21[ “Human Rights as a Means to Peace: Whythe UN Security Council Should Lead on
uman Rights, April 2021,
H
https://repository.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1682&context=honors_etd]
I n the search to find a solution for the ineffectiveness of the UNSC, many UN delegates have loudly
expressed their support to abolish the veto. The P-5, of course, would never allow this to happen; each
P-5 state would have to vote affirmatively to give up its veto power.Even if the UN were able to finda
loophole in its charter and abolish the veto without the consent of the P-5,abolishing the veto
would make the organization less powerful and less effective.P-5 states are among the largest
financial contributors to the UN system.With theexception of Russia, all P-5 nations ranked in
the top six largest contributors to the UN regular budget for the 2019-2021 period. The
contributions of these four nations make up forty-three percent of the total budget. The
United States and China alone are responsible for thirty-four percent of the total budget,
with the United States holding up the heavier end at twenty-two percent (“UN Funding,”
2021). The UN risks losing a significant amount of funding if it takes away the veto from
the P-5, which would reduce their power and influence.It is unlikely these nations would be
illing to maintain these large contributions if their power to control the direction of the organization is
w
overtly taken from them. The power these countries hold on the Security Council is a massive incentive to
pump money into the organization, which the organization needs to operate effectively. Not only would it
be nearly impossible to pass a resolution abolishing the veto, but the Council will likely become even
more ineffective.The UNSC has the unique power totake military action against aggressors,
a s it is authorized to use force to intervene in situations it deems necessary. The UN does
not have its own independent military, which means it must rely on national militaries and
military coalitions to get the job done when the UNSC authorizes force.All P-5 countries
c onsistently rank in the top ten most powerful militaries in the world. While sources vary on their military
power indices, the P-5 states are always among the top ten strongest militaries with the United States,
Russia, and China in the top three.12Members of theUNSC must be willing to employ their own
militarieswhen they authorize the use of force, andthose militaries must be powerful enough to fix or
a lleviate the problem. Now let us imagine, for example, that the veto did not exist, and non-permanent
members were pushing for military intervention in a small country in turmoil. Let us further imagine the
permanent members agreed that military intervention was premature, but the non-permanent members
overwhelmed the vote and passed a resolution to use force.The non-permanent members cannot
f orce the permanent members to use their own militaries for a cause they do not support
and may actively oppose, even militarily. If they cannot coordinate a coalition that is
Free PF Briefs 40
owerful and advanced enough to settle the issue, their resolution is useless, and nations
p
will view the UNSC as weak and incapable. It is for this reason that the abolition of the veto
cannot and will not lead to a more effective Security Council.
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Diplomatic Capital
Permanent membership is key to diplomatic capital.
Lipscy 23[Phillip Y. Lipscy is professor of politicalscience at the University of Toronto, where he
irects the Center for the Study of Global Japan at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.
d
He is also professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo. "UN Security Council Reform:
What the World Thinks", 06/28/2023, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/28/un-security-council-reform-what-world-thinks-pub-90032]
ZG
he need to periodically campaign for nonpermanent membership also imposes diplomatic costs
T
on Japan. Election requires a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Although these votes
are often uncontested, successful countries must secure widespread support from well over a
hundred UN member states to be viable. Japanese diplomats note that this situation puts their
country at a disadvantage amid intensifying geopolitical and geoeconomic competition with
China.While Japan must expend preciousdiplomaticcapitalevery few years just to securea
nonpermanent seat, Chinacan leverage itspermanentstatus and veto power as bargaining
chips in support of its other diplomatic priorities.Why has Japan failed to obtain a permanent
seat thus far? Formal amendments to the UN Charter are difficult, requiring a two-thirds majority
in the General Assembly and support from all P5 members. As a practical matter, the former
condition implies widespread backing from the Global South, and the latter requires the
unanimous consent of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—countries often at geopolitical odds with each other.
hus, abolishing permanent membership would hurt the United States
T
capacity to conduct diplomacy.
Clark 11[Ian Clark was educated at the Universityof Glasgow and the Australian National University. He joined
the University of Queensland as Professor of International Relations in 2014. Previously, he taught at Cambridge
University and was E. H. Carr Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University. He has held visiting
appointments at Chuo University, Tokyo; RSIS, NTU, Singapore; the Australian National University, Canberra;
University of Melbourne; and ASERI, Milan. He has published many books in nuclear history, the ethics of war, and
the combination of international history and international relations theory. “Hegemony in International Society,”
April, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556267.003.0008] ZG
hat this conundrum points to is the indissoluble interconnection between the deployable power
W
of the USA and that of the Security Council. This is certainly true to a lesser degree even with a
Free PF Briefs 42
n umber of other states as well, but in no other case does this reach the levels applicable to the
United States. It is for this reason that US ‘hegemony’ in the Council has been a recurrent theme
of analysis, and especially so since the end of the Cold War. The paradox for both parties,
however, is that the more successful Washington seems to become in getting what it wants from
the Council, the less utility it actually has for US policy. Conversely, while any alienation of the
USA resultsindegrees of de facto Council disempowerment,the Council is hamstrung in trying
to rectify that situation, as to do so risks its more general standing.Thisapplies with particular
force to the issue ofSecurity Council reformwhere—inthe absence of any satisfactory
outcome—there is the very real prospect of deligitimationand disempowermentfor all
concerned.Horizontally,this would represent a significantloss of diplomatic capital for the
United States,as well as be corrosive of any consensuswithin the P5 as a collective
hegemon.Vertically,it would portend the danger forall others that a disillusioned United
States might simply chose to act through an alternative political medium.There is already
an implicit warning of this under the Obama administration in its recurrent emphasis on the need
for effective international cooperation, suggesting that the USA will work with influential
partners wherever these can be found, and not simply ‘inside formal institutions and frameworks’
(USNSC 2010: 41). The squaring of these various circles poses multiple political challenges.
Because of the particular sensitivity of the Council, this certainly means that no singular
hegemony can be too ostensibly set in place, and the likelihood is of some permanent propensity
to locate the US role within a variant collective or coalitional form.The former, if the Council
is agreed, allows for the greatest assertion of its potential, and offers the best returns on US
political investment.However, in turn, that requiresa brokerage role on the part of the USA to
keep the concert intact, and entails levels of concession that may be hard to support domestically.
For that reason, the coalitional route holds equally strong, if opposite, attractions. It is an easier
form of hegemony to institute, and promises less frustration of the hegemon’s wishes. The reason
is simply that the hegemony is less complete, and politically easier to accomplish.
Diplomatic capital is limited.
Cooke 10[Jennifer Cooke, Director of the Africa Programat CSIS, “African Conflicts and
.S. Diplomacy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010,
U
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/100115_Cooke_Af
ricanConflicts_Web.pdf] WP
.S. engagement cantakeonmany forms, rangingfromhumanitarian assistance todiplomacy
U
tomilitaryaction.Given finite resourcesand capacities,the UnitedStatesmustoftenmake
hardchoices on how much diplomaticcapitalto investin crisis or conflict situations.It
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c annot invest equally in every crisisor potential crisis. In intervening in these situations,
decisionmakers must be carefulandsensitive in settingground rules for engagement since
intervention is never impartial—it can decide, for better or worse, who governs, who eats, and
who survives. At the same time, setting rules for where, when, and how to intervene has become
more difficult as U.S. interests in Africa have become harder to define following the end of the
Cold War. The reality is thatdecisionsaremade onacase-by-casebasis or in response to events.
A triage process is inevitable, whereby possible types and places of intervention are ordered in
terms of priority and their likelihood of success,basedon the availability of resources. For this
reason, U.S. diplomatic activity has focused on the Horn of Africa and Sudan in particular, to the
detriment of other crises such as those in the Great Lakes region or Niger Delta.Decision
Makers must makehard-nosed decisionsin setting criteriafor intervention.Among the
criteriathatpolicymakers need to consider, saidCrocker,arecaseswhereU.S.security
interests are at stake;where a crisis risks havingbroad, regionalconsequences;where the
United States isexpectedtotake the lead; wherethe United States can usefully follow the lead
of others such as the United Nations; and where grave humanitarian values are at stake and
where domestic public opinion demands that the United States provide policy leadership. The
United States must also take into account the willingness of African governments and regional bodies to accept such leadership.
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Sexual Assault
N Security Council Peacekeepers who engage in sexual abuse are not
U
punished
arlaFerstman, 2013, Ferstman is director of REDRESS,a London-based human rights organization that helps
C
torture survivors obtain justice and reparation, and was a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at USIP (2012–13).
She previously served as REDRESS’s legal director and as the executive legal adviser of the Commission for
Real Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a mass claims body established under the Dayton Peace
Agreement, Criminalizing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-
Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf DOA: 1-3-15
iven the UN’slack of competence over disciplinaryand criminal matters, and theabsence
G
of an appropriate international criminal tribunal to prosecute crimes associated with
sexual exploitation and abuse,focus has turned tonational investigationsand
prosecutions, which is appropriate.5 Both would normallybe undertaken by the
troop-contributing countries. In light of the limited success with such prosecutions to date,
however, a number of expert studies have also recommended, somewhat controversially, that
greater attention should be paid to the possibility for the host state—the state emerging from
conflict where the peacekeepers are stationed and where the crimes are understood to have
taken place—and possibly other states as well to carry out complementary investigations and
prosecutions. This report canvasses what has been proposed and what steps have been taken and
argues that, despite the progress, much more needs to be done if accountability is to be assured.
The barriers to investigations and prosecutions areknown; the options to remedy them
have been meticulously set out in a series of reports.Nevertheless, significant gaps remain.
The failure to routinely prosecute and punish abusers undermines other laudable
prevention efforts and makes a mockery of the victims and all that they have endured.
Addressing the criminal law barriers is thus a necessary component of any strategy to
eradicate sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions. It remains a pressing
concern.
Free PF Briefs 45
AT Syria
1. Resolutions fail anyway
Nadin 17[Peter Nadin, "How the UN Security Councilfailed Syria", 08/01/2017, The Interpreter,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-un-security-council-failed-syria] ZG
he two most recent vetoes have concerned chemical weapons proliferation and the Khan
T
Sheikhoun gas attacks in April of this year.The firstdraft attempted to sanction the elements within the regime for the
production and use of chemical weapons, while the second draft condemned the regime for the Khan Sheikhoun and called for an investigation.
If these resolutions were adoptedwould the situationbe different? The trajectory of Council action may have been different
without Russian and Chinese obstructionism. Butitis likely that these vetoed resolutions would nothave
brought about peace in Syria. This begs the question: should we temper expectations of the
Security Council? In the modern era, is it possiblefor an institution built by states for states to solve a labyrinthine conflict played out
by myriad local and regional players? The case ofSyria highlights the limits of global governance
mechanisms in the face of complex situations.It isstill premature to give up on the UN Security Council but, if it is to
remain relevant in the future, it must perform better. Let’s hope Syria is its nadir.
2 . Only a military victory ends the war
Hampson 12“How Diplomacy failed Syria” July 26, 2012.
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/how-diplomacy-failed-syria/
Diplomacy has failed Syria and the Syrian people.The latest chapter in this sorry saga was the Russian Security
ouncil veto last week of further sanctions on the Assad regime. It dashed any hope that the Russians might finally decide to play ball and help
C
with Assad’s departure. The Chinese who never want to appear offside by themselves were all to happy to hide behind Putin’s resounding Nyet.
The Russians were also intent on hammering the final nail into the coffin of the UN observer mission in Syria by refusing a further extension to
its mandate. They reluctantly agreed to extend it for another 30 days at a meeting of the Security Council late Friday.The
stalwart
efforts offormer[the] UNSecretary General KofinAnnan to broker some kind of negotiated political
transition with Assad’s opponents have been an abysmal failure.His was mission impossible from the
o utset for the simple reason that neither he nor anyone else could answer the four “Ws” for any kind of negotiation: who, what, why, and when.
On the “who” question, although Assad speaks for himself it is not at all clear who speaks for the opposition. The Syrian National Council is
largely comprised of Syrian expats who lack legitimacy and credibility with their own people and have been unable to speak with one voice.
Those doing the actual fighting to unseat Assad – the so-called Free Syrian Army and other groups – are not a coherent military or political entity.
They are divided along Syria’s religious and sectarian fault lines and lack shared leadership. The “what” or substance of any kind of negotiated
settlement also remains elusive.The
situation hasdeteriorated too far for any kind of “power sharing”
agreement between Assad and Syria’s opposition groups.Nor is it at all clear if Assad is toppled whether Syria’s
majority Sunni group would countenance sharing power with Syria’s Alawite Shi’ite minority and those who have resolutely backed the Assad
regime.At this point, too much blood has been shedfor meaningful negotiations to occur.
lthough many believed that Russia was (and still remains) the key to any kind of diplomatic resolution to this crisis, they fail to answer the
A
question why Putin would throw Assad to the dogs and support a negotiated settlement that would give Syria’s Sunni population a greater role in
running Syria. Putin may eventually dump Assad, but he is unlikely to let the Sunnis run Syria for the simple reason that Russia has its own
existential fears of an Islamic takeover given its own problems with its Muslim communities. Russia and China have watched the “great
awakening” of the Arab world with fear and trepidation. If Putin loses Syria, it will further embolden Russia and China’s own alienated Muslim
communities.In any negotiation, the parties will only come to the table when they feel the pain and believe the costs of a political solution
outweigh the costs of continued violence. The Syrian people are feeling the horrific costs of this brutal civil war as casualties mount and Assad’s
goons murder, pillage and rape their fellow citizens sparing neither children nor the elderly. There have also been reports that some opposition
fighters are using similar tactics. However, the sad truth is that as Assad’s regime totters there is little incentive for Syria’s emboldened opposition
to come to the table, especially after the successful assassination of Assad’s top military commanders including the president’s brother-in-law
Free PF Briefs 46
Assef Shawkat (who allegedly masterminded the assassination of Lebanon’s former president Rafik Hariri). Assad and his Alawite, Druse, and
Christian supporters have also long since concluded they are in a fight to the death.If
there was a timefor diplomacy it
came at the beginning of this conflict and not in its final chapter.Western powers led by the UnitedStates
s howed little imagination or political acumen in their own efforts to deal with this unfolding crisis. They failed to soothe Russia’s and China’s
wounded pride and acute sense of betrayal in the Security Council over the NATO-led intervention in Libya. Instead, the West crooned its success
in toppling Gaddafi as the beginning of a new moral order.The so-called Friends of Syria, of which Canada has been a member, have proven to be
little more than a wailing Greek chorus in this tragedy.The
only thing now is to wait for events to play
themselves out. Syria’s fate will be decided not through diplomacy but brute forceand a civil
war that now threatens the stability of the entire region.
Free PF Briefs 47
AT Taiwan
1. China won’t invade Taiwan – Xi wants to be perceived as a
peacemaker and the Ukraine conflict has deterred them from
taking military action.
I an Bremmer 23 –a foreign affairs columnist and editor.He is the president of Eurasia Group, a
political-risk consultancy, and GZERO Media, a company dedicated to providing intelligent and engaging
coverage of international affairs. He teaches applied geopolitics at Columbia University’s School of
International and Public Affairs. 4-12-2023, “Why China Won’t Invade Taiwan Anytime Soon”,
https://time.com/6270599/china-invade-taiwan///AN+ recut ZG
hough China will not show Taiwan, the U.S., or anyone else exactly how it would launch a full blockade or invasion of Taiwan, China’s armed
T
forces find it very valuable to practice. After all, Chinese troops haven’t faced a shooting war since a brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Finally,
Taiwan will hold national elections next year. Though China’s latest intimidation may not lead to military conflict anytime soon, it may have an
effect on how Taiwan’s voters imagine the future.
All that said,the
actual risk ofimminentChinesemilitary action against Taiwan remains low.
eijing always flexes military musclewhen highest-levelU.S. and Taiwanese officials meet face to face.Yet,though
B
Speaker McCarthy’s visit with Taiwan’s president marks the highest-level U.S.-Taiwan meetingon US soil
since 1979,China’s latest response wasless militarilythreateningthan its reaction to last summer’s visitto
Taiwan by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi – and Beijing is well aware thatWashington will notice that.
More importantly,Xi is spending considerable energythese days on playing a larger role on the global stage,
particularly as a peacemaker.He has offered a 12-pointpeace plan for Ukrainehe hopes will encourage othersto see
China as a global mediator, even if this particular plan has no chance of success.This past weekend,Xi welcomed French
President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission Chairman Ursula Von der Leyen to Beijing for
discussion of the Ukraine war and the future ofChina’srelationswith Europe more broadly. Though Xi didn’t
promise his European guests to lean harder on Russia, the Chinese and French governments issued a joint statement pledging they would work
together to bring Russian and Ukrainian negotiators to the bargaining table.This
follows the remarkablevisit to China of the
foreign ministers of Middle East rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, where they agreed under China’s mediation
to improve their historically contentious relationship.
Most importantly, just days ago, Taiwan’s former president Ma Ying-jeou became the first current or former Taiwanese leader to visit the
ainland since Taiwan broke away in 1949, and during his visit he spoke of the “common inheritance of blood, language, history and culture”
m
between the two sides, raising hopes in Beijing that reunification can still be achieved without risking a potentially catastrophic conflict. In short,
iJinpingwants to be(at leastperceived as) a peacemaker,and though Taiwan’s future
X
remains offarmore importanceto him that any ofthese issues,China’s president is unlikely to
reverseall thesediplomatic victoriesby stumblinginto a costly war.
here are more basic reasons why China is unlikely to move against Taiwan soon.Xihaswatched
T
carefullyasRussia’s President VladimirPutinhasprovided avividdemonstration ofjusthow
unpredictable, costly, and humiliatingan ill-conceivedwar can be. Taiwan, backed with generations of
s ophisticated and powerful American weapons, has been preparing for a possible Chinese invasion even longer than Ukraine has prepped for a
full-frontal assault from Russia, and given the complete lack of Chinese combat experience over the past 44 years, Xi understands that the risks of
Pyrrhic victory – or even of defeat – are real.Ata
time when China is emerging from the world’s most draconian
lockdown and its worst economic slowdown in decades,Xi is likely to be extra carefulabout the fights
he picks. At least for now.
Free PF Briefs 48
2. Too many economic harms and US commitments deter invasion even
when capabilities are ready
Kastner 16—PhD in Political Science from U of Cal(San Diego) and an Associate Professor of Government and Politics at U of Maryland [Scott L., “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a
Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan,” International Security, 40(3): 54-92, Emory Libraries]
aiwanStraitwill notagainbecome a flashpointfor conflict
T
On the one hand,there are several reasonsto be optimisticthatthe
even ifthePRC'smilitarycapabilitiescontinue toimprove.First, as noted earlier, it is hard to predictthe long-term evolution of the
balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait, and as such itis not a given that a shift in the PRC'sfavor willindeedbecome the dominant trend in cross-straitrelations. Some analysts have
suggested, for instance, that aiwan's defenses arequitestrong, particularly iftheU.S. commitmentto the island's
T
security remains robust .100 Second,even if a shiftingbalance of power does become the dominant trendincross-strait relations,it will notnecessarilybecomeso
dominant that Beijing concludes it could reap greater benefits froma cross-straitwar than it receivesfrom the status quo. That is,
even if the PRC isconfident
that it would “win”a cross-strait war (in the contextof figure 1, the war outcome might lie very close to the unification end of the continuum),ii t mightstill
viewthe costsof waras prohibitively high(enoughto keep China's redline to the right of the status quo). Also, there is good reason to think that
these costs arein factsubstantial and will remainso for the foreseeable future. As Paul Godwin andAlice Miller write,
a PRC-initiated warin the TaiwanStrait
woulddamagethePRC's “effort to be perceived asaconstructive, responsiblemember of the internationalcommunity,”
whichin turnwould“haveundesirable consequencesfor China'sglobaleconomicand
commerciallinks.”101 Finally, Taylor Fravel has shownthatthe PRC historically has been most likely toescalate territorial disputes when its bargaining power is declining, not
hen it is improving.102 This is a point emphasizedin the pessimistic trends-analysis scenario highlighted earlier. Indeed, ifBeijing is confident that, overthe long term,factors such as
w
increasing cross-strait economic integration or increasing people-to-people contacts across theTaiwanStraitwill ultimately help to transform Taiwan's identity and make unificationmore
hinese decisionmakerscouldforgothe use offorceeven ifthey believed
C
palatableto Taiwan's citizens, then
they could win a better outcome through war.
Free PF Briefs 49
AT Climate Change
1. Global climate coop fails anyway
Subramanian 22[Arvind Subramanian, "Global CooperationIs Not Necessary to Fight
limate Change", 11/10/2022,
C
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/multilateral-cooperation-climate-change-
unnecessary-inflation-reduction-act-by-arvind-subramanian-2022-11?barrier=accesspaylo
g#:~:text=Efforts%20to%20promote%20multilateral%20coordination,in%20today's%20f
raught%20geopolitical%20environment.] //ZG
fforts to promote multilateral coordination to mitigate climate risks are most likely
E
doomed to to fail in today’s fraught geopolitical environment. But a global race to subsidize
renewable energy may encourage the development of cheap sustainable technologies, sparking a
twenty-first-century green revolution. PROVIDENCE – This week’s United Nations Climate
Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt highlights the growing consensus that multilateral
cooperation is necessary to avert environmental catastrophe. Butwith geopolitical tensions
spiking and the US-China rivalry heating up, suchefforts seem doomed to fail, much like
previous efforts to promote global coordination on vaccines, trade, technological
innovation, and macroeconomic policy.
2. Warming 100% locked in and inevitable
ingTsjeng, 19, 2-27-2019, executive editor and theauthor of the Forgotten Women book series, "The
Z
Climate Change Paper So Depressing It's Sending People to Therapy",
[https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vbwpdb/the-climate-change-paper-so-depressing-its-sending-people-
to-therapy], AVD
" Deep Adaptation" is quite unlike any other academic paper. There's the language ("we are about to play Russian Roulette with the entire human
race with already two bullets loaded"). There's the flashes of dark humor ("I was only partly joking earlier when I questioned why I was even
writing this paper"). But most of all, there's thestark conclusions that it draws about the future.Chiefly,thatit's too
late to stop climate change from devastating our world—andthat "climate-induced societal
collapseis now inevitablein the near term."How near?About a decade. Professor Jem Bendell, a sustainability
academic at the University of Cumbria, wrote the paper after taking a sabbatical at the end of 2017 to review and understand the latest climate
science "properly—not sitting on the fence anymore," as he puts it on the phone to me. What he found terrified him. "The
evidence before
s suggests that we are set for disruptive and uncontrollable levels of climate change, bringing starvation,
u
destruction, migration, disease, and war," he writesin the paper. "Our norms of behavior—that we call our 'civilization'—may also
degrade." "It istime," he adds, "we considertheimplications ofitbeingtoo late to averta global
environmentalcatastrophein the lifetimes of peoplealive today." Even a schmuck like me is familiarwith some of
the evidence Bendell sets out to prove his point.You only needed to step outside during the record-breaking heatwave
last year to acknowledge that 17 of the 18 hottest years on the planet have occurred since 2000.
Scientistsalreadybelievewearesoonon course foranice-free Arctic,which willonlyaccelerate
global warming.Back in 2017, even Fox News reportedscientists' warnings thatthe Earth's sixth
mass extinction was underway.Erik Buitenhuis, a seniorresearcher at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, tells
me that Bendell's conclusions may sound extreme, but he agrees with the report's overall assessment. "I think societal collapse is indeed
Free PF Briefs 50
inevitable," he says, though adds that "the process is likely to take decades to centuries."The
important thing,Buitenhuissays, is
to realize that the negative effects of climate change have already been with us for sometime: "Further
gradual deterioration looks much more likely to me than a disaster within the next ten years that will be
big enough that, after that, everybody will agree the status quo is doomed.""Jem's paper is in themain
ell-researched and supported by relatively mainstream climate science," says Professor Rupert Read, chair of the Green House think-tank and a
w
philosophy academic at the University of East Anglia. "That's why I'm with him on the fundamentals. And more and more people are." Read's
key disagreement with Bendell is his belief that we still have time to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, saying, "I
think it's hubris to
think that we know the future." But that doesn't meanBendell'spremise iswrong: "The way I see it,deep
adaptation isinsuranceagainstthepossibility—orrather, the probability—ofsome kind ofcollapse,"
says Read. "'Deep Adaptation' is saying, 'What do we need to do if collapse is something we need to realistically plan for?'"When I speak
toBendell, he tells me he thinks of "Deep Adaptation"as more of an ethical and philosophical framework,
rather than a prophecy about the future of the planet."The longer we refuse to talk about climate change as already here and
s crewing with our way of life—because we don't want to think like that because it's too frightening or will somehow demotivate people—the less
time we have to reduce harm," he says with deliberation. What does he mean by harm? "Starvation is the first one," he answers, pointing to
lowering harvests of grain in Europe in 2018 due to drought that saw the EU reap 6 million tons less wheat. "In the scientific community at the
moment, the appropriate thing is to say that 2018 was an anomaly. However, if you look at what's been happening over the last few years, it isn't
an anomaly. There's a possibility that 2018 is the new best case scenario."That
means, inBendell'sview, that governments
need to start planning emergency responses to climate change, including growing and stockpiling food.
Free PF Briefs 51
AT Gaza
1. Palestine doesn’t accept a 2 state solution - fighting is inevitable
andel 20. “Why Palestinians can’t sign an end-of-conflictpact”
M
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/why-palestinians-cant-sign-an-end-of-conflict-pact-635225
alestinian[s]Arabscannot sign an agreement thatends all claims and recognizes the right
P
of a Jewish state to existand live unmolested onland that was ever Muslim.A recent article in The
ill by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, two veteran peace negotiators and advisers who should know better, referred to a “two-state solution”
H
and a “viable two-state outcome” in their attack on the Trump peace plan. Those terms mean completely different things to the Palestinians than
they do to Western negotiators. To Palestinians, two states mean an Arab state in the West Bank and a binational state in Israel that will become
Arab-ruled with time, because the Palestinians will never give up the right of return, as well documented in the new book The War of Return by
Adi Schwartz and Einat Wilf, a former Knesset member from the Center-Left Independence and Labor parties.The
Palestinian
emand is that all Palestinian refugees and their descendants in perpetuity have the right
d
t o move into Israel at any time of their choosing. In other words, this is the demographic
destruction of Israel as a Jewish state.
2. Non-Unique - The UN just passed a resolution calling for ceasefire
in Gaza
Serhan 24[Yasmeen Serhan, "U.N. Security CouncilPasses Gaza Ceasefire Resolution",
3/25/2024, TIME, https://time.com/6960334/united-nations-ceasefire-gaza-us-abstention/] SM
he U.N. Security Council passed a resolutionon Mondaydemanding an immediate ceasefire in
T
Gaza for the duration of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan as well as the unconditional
release of all hostages.The resolution, which passedto widespread applause, is the first to be
approved by all U.N. Security Council members after four previous attempts during the past
five months of war.The U.S., which vetoed three previousresolutions and put forward its own failed proposal last week, abstained. U.N. Security Council resolutions are binding on
member states, though it remains unclear how it will be enforced. Despite
some efforts to take U.S. editsto the resolution into account, U.S.
ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield said that the U.S. “did not agree with everything in
the resolution,” most notably its failure to include explicit condemnation of Hamas. “For that reason,
we were unfortunately not able to vote yes.”
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