Thesis Gabriel Anich

Leiden University
Department of Public International Law
Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies
LL.M Public International Law (Regular)
Uniting for Peace Resolution

Possible grounds for application in a post-Cold War world
Student name: Gabriel Anich

Student number: 3239985
Supervisor: Niels Blokker
Word count:
14.217
Academic year
2021-2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 3

CHAPTER II: CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF UNITING FOR PEACE ....... 5
1. The dawn of UN and Security Council conflicts ........................................................ 5
2. The Korean War: Uniting for Peace is born............................................................... 7
3. Invocation of Uniting for Peace: case-by-case analysis .......................................... 12
3.1 Suez Crisis (1956) .................................................................................................. 12
3.2 Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) ........................................................................ 14
3.3 Lebanon and Jordan crises (1958) .......................................................................... 14
3.4 Congo crisis (1960) ................................................................................................ 15
3.5 Six-Day War (1967) ............................................................................................... 15
3.6 East Pakistan refugee crisis (1971) ......................................................................... 16
3.7 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980) ................................................................... 17
3.8 Palestine (1980) ...................................................................................................... 17
3.9 Question of Namibia (1981) ................................................................................... 18
3.10 Golan Heights (1982) ........................................................................................... 19
3.11 Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1997) ........................................................................ 19
3.12 Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022) ..................................................................... 20
CHAPTER III: UNITING FOR PEACE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE ....................................................................................................................... 22
1. Certain Expenses ...................................................................................................... 22
2. Namibia .................................................................................................................... 24
3. Construction of a Wall .............................................................................................. 26
CHAPTER IV: THE FUTURE OF UNITING FOR PEACE ......................................... 29
1. Effective or futile? A critical assessment ................................................................. 29
2. What can the Assembly do under Uniting for Peace?.............................................. 35
3. Uniting for Peace 2.0? Resolution 76/262 and the “standing mandate” .................. 39
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 42
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 45
2
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The present thesis will seek to answer the question whether there are any grounds for
the application of the “Uniting for Peace” (U4P) resolution for present-day conflicts and
humanitarian crisis where the UN Security Council is unable to act because of a veto.
Uniting for Peace was adopted in 1950 at a time of Cold War when the USSR used
constantly its veto power in the Security Council to protect its allies in the proxy conflicts the
superpowers were supporting. In this scenario of Council deadlock, under leadership of the
US and its allies, the Assembly adopted Resolution 377 to discuss and recommend measures
to face threats, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Since 1950 to 2022, Uniting for
Peace was activated 12 times, 10 of them consisting in the convention of an emergency special
session of the Assembly.
After more than three decades after the end of Cold War, new conflicts have arisen and
the permanent members continue to veto resolutions in cases such as Syria, Venezuela,
Myanmar or Palestine. The Council is thus impeded to act in cases of internal conflict or mass
atrocities. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine resulted in invocation of Uniting for Peace
for the first time in 25 years. Can the Assembly recommend measures today under Uniting for
Peace, in a world substantially different from the one in 1950? Can it recommend for example
the use of force or the issue of sanctions despite those measures belonging constitutional
powers of the Council? Or whether at all, can the Assembly adopt any recommendations
without the need of activating Uniting for Peace?
For this purpose, this thesis will be structured in 3 main chapters: Chapter II will
examine the origin of Uniting for Peace and the context of its creation and will also
comprehend a brief study of each case when the resolution was applied, and an Emergency
Session of the Assembly was convened to that effect. Chapter III will address how the
International Court of Justice has interpreted Uniting for Peace and its conformity with the UN
Charter, focusing on three advisory opinions of the Court: Certain Expenses (1962), Namibia
(1971) and Construction of a Wall (2004). Finally, Chapter IV will scrutinize the potential
3
application of Uniting for Peace after the Cold War, with special focus on the scholarly
assessment of the resolution, the possible measures the Assembly can recommend acting under
Uniting for Peace and the impact of new instruments and doctrines such as R2P and the 2022
Standing mandate resolution.
4
CHAPTER II: CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
UNITING FOR PEACE
1. The dawn of UN and Security Council conflicts
Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in the 1945 San Francisco
Conference, provided the first and main purpose of the organization was to “maintain
international security”. For this, UN would have the power to “take effective collective
measures” to prevent and remove “threats to peace”, as well to suppress “acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace”. The idea of preventing a third world war was
even stressed in the Preamble of the Charter, as signatories were “determined to
succeeding future generations from the scourge of war”.
Within the framework of the UN, the Security Council would have the “primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”, as stated by
Article 24 of the Charter. The Security Council powers to that effect were encompassed
to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter and, most
importantly, the coercive action against aggression, threats or breaches of peace under
Chapter VII.
At the time of the Charter’s adoption, the Security Council was composed of eleven
members (expanded to 15 in 1965), of which five were to be permanent members with
right to veto. Those were the Allied powers emerging victorious from the Second World
War: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the Republic
of China. Veto powers were reserved to them only, setting a key difference with the
predecessor of the UNSC, the Council of the League of Nations, were each of its members
had a right of veto as all decisions had to be adopted by unanimity.1
On the other hand, the General Assembly was be created as the body representing all
member states of the organization. Article 10 of the Charter gave the Assembly the power
1
See Chapter V of the United Nations Charter and Articles 4 and 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
5
to “discuss any questions or any matters” related to the Charter or organs of UN and to
make recommendations on those questions or matters to the members of the UN, the
Security Council or to both Recommendations meant non-binding exhortations, this is, a
legal act expressing a desire but not binding to those who are addressed.2
As the UN began its operations, and the Security Council had its first meeting in
January 1946, the tensions between former allies became increasingly evident: the Cold
War had started between the US and USSR, as well the proxy wars and conflicts waged
in their spheres of influence. The Soviet Union, under Stalin regime, became the first
permanent member to use its veto prerogative and invoked it on a constant basis: from
1946 until the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, 41 draft resolutions were vetoed by the
Soviet delegation.3 This included issues such as the actions to take against the Francoist
regime in Spain, the Greek Civil War and the 1948 Soviet-backed coup in
Czechoslovakia.
In light of these early veto conflicts, the Assembly began to take some measures to
surpass the deadlocks within the Security Council. This was critical at a time when the
United States and its allies comprised most UN member states, controlling the General
Assembly in contrast to the veto powers exercised by USSR. For example, in 1946 the
Assembly denounced the Franco regime in Spain as fascist and in consequence,
recommended all member states to withdraw their ambassadors from Madrid. 4 In 1947 it
called upon the governments of European socialist states to stop aiding the communist
guerrillas in Greece fighting against the pro-Western government and established a
Special Commission on the Balkans to observe compliance with the Assembly’s
recommendations.5
2
E Klein and S Schmahl, “Article 10” in Bruno Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary, Volume I (3rd ed, OUP, 2012) 480.
3
United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. Security Council – Veto list. Available at:
https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (accessed 18 January 2022).
4
UNGA Res 39 (I) (12 December 1946) UN Doc A/RES/35(I)
5
UNGA Res 109 (II) (21 October 1947) UN Doc A/RES/109(II)
6
The Assembly also made pronouncements concerning the problem of abuse of veto
powers by the Soviet Union. In April 1949 it adopted Resolution 267 recommending to
the permanent members of the Council that in cases of lack of unanimity among them, to
refrain from exercising the veto unless they considered the question to be of “vital
importance”. The resolution included a list of proposed “procedural” decisions not
subject to veto under Article 27(3) of the Charter. Some of them were the submission of
questions to the Assembly, request for recommendations of the Assembly and request to
Secretary-General to convene a special session of the Assembly.6
2. The Korean War: Uniting for Peace is born
1950 would be a crucial year for the Security Council: it began when on 13 January
the Soviet Union announced it would walk out the Council meetings in protest over the
non-recognition of the Chinese communist government at Beijing as the sole
representative of China. Months later, in June 1950, North Korean troops supported by
the USSR and the PRC invaded South Korea. In the light of Soviet absence, UNSC passed
a series of resolutions that backed an US-led military intervention in the peninsula:
Resolution 82 of 25 June condemned the Korean situation as a “breach of the peace”; 7
and two days later, Resolution 83 called upon member states to military assist South
Korea against the attack from the North. 8 Finally, on 7 July UNSC established through
Resolution 84 a unified command under American forces to restore peace and security in
the region.9
In response, the Soviet delegation returned to its seat in the Council in August 1950.
It further blocked three draft resolutions to deal with the Korea conflict in September and
November 1950.10 The Security Council had returned to a stalemate caused by the Soviet
vetoes.
6
UNGA Res 267 (III) (14 April 1949) UN Doc A/RES/267(III).
7
UNSC Res 82 (25 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/82
8
UNSC Res 83 (27 June 1950) UN Doc S/RES/83
9
UNSC Res 84 (7 July 1950) UN Doc S/RES/84
10
UN Doc S/1653 (6 September 1950), UN Doc S/1752 (12 September 1950), UN Doc S/1894 (30 November
1950).
7
To overcome the deadlock, the US delegation, under the leadership of Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, decided to act. The Fifth Session of the Assembly had just started
in September 1950, so the US submitted a draft resolution in the form of request to
include as part of the agenda of the session an item named United Action for Peace. As
the US delegation stated in a note to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly had a
role to play in international peace and security, “including the role to discuss any question
related to this field”, and that role could be “enhanced” by enabling it to meet as soon as
the Council became unable to discharge its functions due to the veto exercised by one of
the permanent members.11 US Delegate John Foster Dulles would later expose to the
Assembly the importance of collective security to resist aggression that could unleash a
new world conflict and if the Council had failed on that mission, it would be up to the
Assembly by its “residual” recommendation powers. 12
After weeks of debate, the General Assembly adopted the Resolution 377 A (V),
called Uniting for Peace or “Acheson Plan”, on 3 November 1950, by 52 votes to 5
against (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Byelorussia and Ukraine) and 2 abstentions
(Argentina and India).13
Resolution 377 A was composed of a preamble and five sections (A, B, C, D and E).
The preamble recognized as the first and foremost purposes of UN the maintenance of
international peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations
(art. 1 UN Charter). It further reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Security
Council on peace and security affairs, as well the duty for its permanent members to “seek
unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto” 14 and recognized that a failure
in the Council action did not prevent the Assembly from exercising rights and duties in
regard to preserving peace and security. In other words, the resolution suggests the
11
United Action for Peace. Note Dated 20 September 1950 from the Chairman of the United States
Delegation to the Secretary-General, (20 September 1950) UN Doc A/1377.
12
UN GAOR Fifth Session, 299th meeting (1 November 1950) UN Doc A/PV.299 at 294. Available at:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/PV.299
13
Uniting for Peace, UNGA Res 377(V) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/1775
14
Ibid.
8
mission of UN is impeded by mala fide use of veto power and thus requires a legal
solution in order to fulfil the objective of preservation of peace and security. 15
Part A, by far the most important part of Uniting for Peace,16 in paragraph 1 was
clear:17
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression
the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and
security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency
special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special
session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven
members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations; (…)
In other words, this provision enabled the Assembly to address issues of threats to
peace and security when the Security Council is prevented from doing it so, always provided
the following requirements are met: 1) the Security Council must have failed to exercise its
primary responsibilities under the Charter, 2) because of lack of unanimity as a result to
exercise of veto power by one or more permanent members, 3) when any of the following
issues described in Article 39 has arisen: a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression.18
15
A Carswell, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution” (2013) 18(3) JCSL
453, 463.
16
Part B established a Peace Observation Commission for the Korea crisis, Part C provided the organization
of armed forces to be made available for UN, Part D established a Collective Measures Committee and Part E
called upon all members to respect and promote human rights in to ensure international peace and security.
17
Uniting for Peace (n13)
18
Reicher adds an implicit fourth requirement: Security Council have dealt with the matter before the
Assembly can take any action. See H Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirteenth
Anniversary of its Passage” (1981) 20 CJTL 1, 16.
9
One question arising is what is to be understood as a “failure” of the Council and who
determines such “failure” has occurred. There is no problem when the Council itself refers
the issue to the Assembly, admitting its own failure to act. But when the Assembly requests
an emergency session, it is deciding upon its competence, and its own agenda is not
subordinated to the one of the Council, provided the latter has discussed the situation first. 19
Other authors argue the Council is the appropriate organ for determining a potential
abuse of veto, as the convening of an emergency session of the Assembly is a procedural
matter according to Article 27(2) of the Charter requiring a qualified majority of the
Council’s members.20 In other words, no permanent member can veto a referral from Council
to the Assembly under U4P.
The “failure” in question must come from the exercise of veto power by one of the
permanent members of the Council. Uniting for Peace does not apply in consequence for
situations when all the permanent members have voted against a resolution proposal or when
a decision cannot be adopted when the minimum vote requirement has not been met,
regardless how the permanent members voted. 21
When the conditions set forward by Resolution 377 have been met, the Assembly
may meet in “emergency special session” at the request of the majority of its members or by
a qualified majority (seven members in 1950, nine from 1965) of the Council. The Assembly
shall address the matter and is empowered to make recommendations for collective measures,
including the use of collective force. However, despite the Council’s paralysis, these
recommendations are not binding, as they go in line with the powers of the Assembly vested
by Article 10 of the Charter. Thus, the Assembly does not fully supplant the Council given
the scenario.
19
Ibid, 10-11. See also J Andrassy, “Uniting for Peace” (1956) 50 AJIL 563, 577-578.
20
Carswell (n15) 472. See also LH Woolsey, “The ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution and the United Nations”
(1951) 45 AJIL 129, 134.
21
E Klein and S Schmahl, “Article 12” in B Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary, Volume I (3rd ed, OUP, 2012) 513-514.
10
Besides the political elements involved in the adoption of Uniting for Peace, the
resolution raised constitutional concerns. During its discussion, the Soviet delegation claimed
the illegality of the Acheson Plan based on the premise the Assembly was barred from
making recommendations on a certain question when it was being discussed by the Council,
following Article 12(1) of the Charter. The other objection relied on the concept of “action”
laid down in Article 11(2): the Council was supposed to be the only organ empowered to
adopt action involving use of force and therefore, Uniting for Peace was an attempt to enable
General Assembly to use armed force outside of the Council.22 The Soviet arguments
followed the opinion of Hans Kelsen that “action” under Article 11(2) was supposed to be
“enforcement action”; therefore, Assembly could not recommend measures amounting to the
use of force, but to refer the situation to the Council. 23
Back to the Korean crisis, the Security Council removed the situation of its agenda
on 31 January 1951, 24 allowing the Assembly to freely discuss it under Article 11. A day
later, in exercise of its new duties, the Assembly passed on 1 February 1951 Resolution 498. 25
Given the highly political climate, this resolution did not explicitly refer to Uniting for Peace,
but the preamble used indeed its language: “noting that the Security Council, because of lack
of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security with regard to Chinese communist
intervention in Korea (…)”. 26
In consequence, Resolution 498 condemned the actions of the PRC in Korea as acts of
aggression and called all states to refrain any support to aggressors in the peninsula and to
“lend every assistance to the United Nations in Korea”. The Assembly had arguably
recommended, via the wording “every assistance”, the use of force in collective self-defence
to repel the Chinese and North Korean aggression, which had already been decided by the
22
UN GAOR Fifth Session, 301st plenary meeting (2 November 1950) UN Doc A/PV.301 at 333-334.
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/PV.301
23
H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (F.A. Praeger
1950) 204-205
24
UNSC Res 90 (31 January 1951) UN Doc S/RES/90
25
UNGA Res 498 (V) (1 February 1951) UN Doc A/RES/498(V)
26
Ibid.
11
Council.27 Others argue Uniting for Peace was not even activated in the Korean case, as the
Council had “dropped” this item from its agenda and the Assembly had merely picked it up;
as nothing was transferred from one organ to other. 28
Later, on 18 May 1951, the Assembly passed Resolution 500 ordering new measures such
as an embargo of arms, oil and other goods against the PRC and North Korea in the territories
controlled by them.29
Stein and Morrissey note Resolution 377 was adopted in the wake of certain accidental
elements that made possible the UN action in Korea, such as the USSR boycott of the Council
and the presence of US troops stationed in Japan at the time of the conflict. One of the
purposes of Uniting for Peace in consequence would be to ensure the handling of future acts
of aggression when such circumstances would not be present.30 But deeper reasons made the
Assembly adopt the resolution, in White’s view: as the USSR was constantly using (or
abusing) its veto power, the hopes for unanimity in the Council quickly vanished, prompting
Western states to no longer seek agreements for collective security in the Council, but by
majority vote in the Assembly. 31
3. Invocation of Uniting for Peace: case-by-case analysis
3.1 Suez Crisis (1956)
Uniting for Peace was next applied in the Suez crisis of October 1956, in which Israeli
forces supported by the UK and France invaded Egypt to take control of the recently
nationalized Suez Canal.
27
LD Johnson, “‘Uniting for Peace’: Does it still serve any useful purpose?” (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound 106,
111-112.
28
KS Petersen, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950” (1959) 13 IO 219, 224.
29
UNGA Res 500 (V) (18 May 1951) UN Doc A/RES/500(V)
30
E Stein and R Morrissey “Uniting for Peace Resolution” in Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
Volume 4 (Elsevier, 2000) 1232.
31
ND White, “The Relationship between the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in Matters of
International Peace and Security” in Marc Weller (ed) The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in
International Law (OUP 2018) 309.
12
Despite having rejected Uniting for Peace during the Korean War, the USSR decided to
trigger it against UK and France, who were vetoing any proposals in the Council. 32 UNSC
Resolution 119 of 31 October 1956 admitted the Council’s failure and called for an
emergency special session of the Assembly in accordance with UNGA Res 377.33
Notwithstanding the British and French negative votes, this resolution was seen as a
procedural vote to transfer the issue from the Council to the Assembly. It further clarified
that this mechanism had to be preceded by a resolution not only defeated in the Council, but
a defeat by veto.34
Intents for treating the convocation of emergency sessions as questions of substance were
seen as “wrong and unlawful”, since this would imply amending the Charter via sorting
matters as procedural and non-procedural.35 Subsequent practice of the Council by convening
Assembly’s emergency sessions despite the votes against made on the respective resolution
by permanent members was recognized as a procedural matter under Article 27(2) of the
Charter not subject to veto,36 as well not in contravention of Article 20.37
The first emergency special session of the General Assembly started the very next day, 1
November 1956 and lasted until 10 November. A fundamental decision of this session was
Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, which established the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF I) to secure peace and security in the region. 38 The first UN
peacekeeping force was therefore created by the Assembly under Uniting for Peace and not
by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII. The Assembly also called inter alia for
an arms embargo in the area of the conflict and the reopening of the blocked canal. 39
32
UN Doc S/3710 (30 October 1956), UN Doc S/3713/Rev.1 (30 October 1956).
33
UNSC Res 119 (31 October 1956) UN Doc S/RES/119.
34
Petersen (n28) 226-227.
35
Andrassy (n 19) 577.
36
C Eick, “Article 20” in B. Simma et al (eds.) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume I
(3rd ed, OUP, 2012) 668.
37
Article 20 of Charter provides for regular and special sessions of the Assembly, the latter of which can be
convened at the request of either the Council or the majority of members of the Assembly.
38
UNGA Res 1000 (ES-I) (5 November 1956) UN Doc A/RES/1000(ES-I).
39
UNGA Res 997 (ES-I) (2 November 1956) UN Doc A/RES/997(ES-I)
13
3.2 Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956)
The same year of 1956, USSR invaded Hungary to supress a nationalist uprising. As it
was expected, a draft resolution from France, the UK and the US was vetoed by the Soviet
delegation.40 Again, this time on US initiative, the Council transferred the issue to the
Assembly on 4 November 1956.41 In the lapse of five days, the Cold War superpowers had
activated the Uniting for Peace procedure for different conflicts, probably with the intention
of distracting the world’s attention from the respective crisis that involved them directly:
Western powers in the Suez and USSR in Hungary.42
The second emergency special session of the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1004
(ES-II) condemning the Soviet invasion and mandating the Secretary General to appoint a
commission of inquiry to investigate and report the facts surrounding foreign intervention in
Hungary, and also calling the Soviet and Hungarian governments to allow UN observers to
freely enter and travel into the territory of Hungary. 43
3.3 Lebanon and Jordan crises (1958)
In May 1958, an armed rebellion supported by the USSR and the Arab nationalist
governments of Egypt and Syria attempted to overthrow the pro-Western government of
Lebanon. In response, the US military intervened in Beirut. Later in July 1958, British troops
deployed in Jordan following a successful coup in Iraq that toppled the Hashemite monarchy.
By unanimous vote, after previous Soviet vetoes,44 the Council decided on 7 August 1958 to
convene the third emergency special session of the General Assembly to address the situation
in the Middle East.45
40
UN Doc S/3730/Rev.1 (4 November 1956).
41
UNSC Res 120 (4 November 1956) UN Doc S/RES/120.
42
D Zaum “The Security Council, the General Assembly and War: the Uniting for Peace Resolution” in V
Lowe et al (ed), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since
1945 (OUP 2010) 163.
43
UNGA Res 1004 (ES-II) (4 November 1956) UN Doc A/RES/1004(ES-II).
44
UN Doc S/4050/Rev.1 (18 July 1958), UN Doc S/4055/Rev.1 (22 July 1958).
45
UNSC Res 129 (7 August 1958) UN Doc S/RES/129
14
The Assembly adopted Resolution 1237 (ES-III), calling for the early withdrawal of
foreign troops for the territories of Lebanon and Jordan,46 thus expanding the mandate of the
UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) created earlier by the Council. 47
3.4 Congo crisis (1960)
The former Belgian Congo obtained its independence in June 1960 and a chaotic internal
conflict soon erupted. The Security Council first reacted by establishing the United Nations
Operation in the Congo (UNOC) peace force in July 1960.48 However, the impartiality of the
mission was questioned by the superpowers: the USSR was military supporting the
Lumumba government, while the US was backing opposition forces. Following a Soviet
veto,49 Security Council activated U4P on 17 September 1960.50 It was the first time the
resolution was applied in a civil war or internal conflict.
In the context of the Fourth Special Emergency Session, the Assembly passed Resolution
1474 (ES-IV) confirming the mandate assigned to ONUC.51 It also requested all states to
refrain from any direct or indirect military assistance any of the parties in the Congo conflict,
except at the request of UN and to accept, carry out and furnish assistance to the measures
decided in this respect by the Council.
3.5 Six-Day War (1967)
In June 1967, hostilities started between Israel and its Arab neighbours, resulting in Israeli
forces capturing and occupying the Golan Heights (from Syria), the West Bank and East
Jerusalem (Jordan), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt). Security Council called
for a cease-fire,52 but Israel continued engaging in war. USSR submitted a draft resolution
calling for the withdrawal of Israeli from the seized territories and asking an emergency
46
UNGA Res 1237 (ES-III) (27 August 1958) UN Doc A/RES/1237(ES-III).
47
UNSC Res 128 (11 June 1958) UN Doc S/RES/128.
48
UNSC Res 143 (14 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/143
49
UN Doc S/4523 (17 September 1960).
50
UNSC Res 157 (17 September 1960) UN Doc S/RES/157.
51
UNGA Res 1474 (ES-IV) (20 September 1960) UN Doc A/RES/1474(ES-IV).
52
UNSC Res 233 (6 June 1967) S/RES/233, UNSC Res 234 (7 June 1967) S/RES/234, UNSC Res 235 (9
June 1967) S/RES/235.
15
session to discuss further measures to be taken. However, this proposal did not reach the 9
votes necessary to be adopted in the Council, with no veto exercise involved.
Thereupon, USSR asked the Secretary General to convene an emergency session on the
grounds Israel had failed to obey the cease-fire calls made by the Council. 53. A clear majority
of 98 states supported the convening of the emergency session. 54 For the first time, Uniting
for Peace was triggered by the General Assembly and not by the Security Council.
The Fifth Emergency Special Session adopted Resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-
V), which condemned as illegal Israeli unilateral actions to change the legal status of the City
of Jerusalem and to rescind all measures taken in that direction. 55 However, authors like
Reicher consider this was not a proper Uniting for Peace situation as the Council had passed
a series of resolutions on the issue with no veto involved and the subsequent resolutions
adopted by the Assembly related to international peace and security outside of U4P
framework.56
3.6 East Pakistan refugee crisis (1971)
In December 1971, Indian forces intervened in support of East Pakistan (now

Bangladesh), fighting an independence war against the central Pakistani government. The
refugee crisis caused by the hostilities motivated the Council to transfer the issue to the
General Assembly via Resolution 303,57 after three Soviet vetoes.58
In this case, a special session of the Assembly was not convened because the 26 th Regular
Session was still meeting at the time of the referral. The matter was included in its agenda
53
Letter dated 13 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (13 June 1967) UN Doc A/6717.
54
UNYB 1967 page 191.
55
UNGA Res 2253 (ES-V) (4 July 1967) UN Doc A/RES/2253(ES-V), UNGA Res 2254 (ES-V) (21 July
1967) UN Doc A/RES/2254(ES-V).
56
Reicher (n18) 46-47.
57
UNSC Res 303 (6 December 1971) UN Doc S/RES/303.
58
UN Doc S/10416 (4 December 1971), UN Doc S/10423 (5 December 1971), UN Doc S/10446/Rev.1 (13
December 1971).
16
under the item “UN Assistance to East Pakistan Refugees” and a resolution was passed to
that effect.59
3.7 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980)
USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in order to assist the communist

government of Kabul in the fight against Mujahideen guerrillas. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet
delegation blocked a resolution proposal in the Security Council, 60 so the organ referred the
situation to the General Assembly on 9 January 1980; with the USSR voting against.61
The Sixth Special Emergency Session adopted Resolution ES-6/2 deploring the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan as a violation of its “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence” and called upon the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghan territory. 62
3.8 Palestine (1980)
Senegal (then chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People) triggered Uniting for Peace in July 1980 by requesting the Secretary-
General to convene a special session of the Assembly to discuss the issue of the Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel since 1967,63 to which a majority of states agreed. 64 This was
made in response to a US veto in the Security Council of a Tunisian draft resolution calling
for the Israeli withdrawal from the territories. 65 For the first time, U4P was invoked by a non-
permanent member of Security Council.
In the Seventh Special Emergency Session, lasting from July 1980 to September 1982,
Resolutions ES-7/2 to ES-7/9 were adopted. They called on Israel to “withdraw completely
59
UNGA Res 2790 (XXVI) (6 December 1971) A/RES/2790(XXVI).
60
UN Doc S/13729 (7-9 January 1980).
61
UNSC Res 462 (9 January 1980) UN Doc S/RES/462.
62
UNGA Res ES-6/1 (14 January 1980) UN Doc A/RES/ES-6/1.
63
Letter dated 1 July 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General (21 July 1980) UN Doc A/ES-7/1.
64
Ibid.
65
UN Doc S/13911 (30 April 1980).
17
and unconditionally” from the occupied territories and to dismantle the settlements built on
them.66 The Assembly further requested to the Council, in the event of non-compliance by
Israel, “to consider the situation and the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII”. 67
3.9 Question of Namibia (1981)
In September 1981, Uniting for Peace was again activated by the Assembly on the request
of a non-permanent member of the Council, this time Zimbabwe. South Africa, under the
regime of apartheid, had invaded the territory of South West Africa (now Namibia) and
entered hostilities with the liberation movements supported by Angola and Cuba, in the so-
called Border War. Four draft resolutions had been vetoed in the Council by France, the UK
and US.68 Zimbabwe then requested to the Secretary General to convene a new special
session of the Assembly to address this Question and again a majority of member states
supported such request.69
Resolution ES-8/2, adopted at the end of the Eighth Emergency Special Session,
reaffirmed the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and expressed support for
the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) as the “sole and authentic
representative of the Namibian people”. 70 The resolution went even further and called for
“increased and sustained” support for SWAPO and military assistance to the “front-line
States” (i.e. Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) participating in the Border War in order to
enable them to defend themselves against “renewed acts of aggression by South Africa”. 71
The resolution did not end there and further called upon all states to impose against South
Africa “comprehensive military sanctions” and to cease all dealings “to isolate it politically,
economically, militarily and culturally” given the threat represented by South Africa to
66
UNGA Res ES-7/2 (29 July 1980) UN Doc A/RES/ES-7/2.
67
Ibid.
68
UN Doc S/14459 (30 April 1981), UN Doc S/14460/Rev.1 (30 April 1981), UN Doc S/14461 (30 April
1981), UN Doc S/14462 (30 April 1981).
69
Letter dated 12 August from the Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General (2 September 1981) UN Doc A/ES-8/1.
70
UNGA Res ES-8/2 (14 September 1981) UN Doc A/RES/ES-8/2
71
Ibid.
18
international peace and security. 72 For the first time, since Resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 1956
(as we saw above), the General Assembly imposed military sanctions against a state (in 1960
it had ordered such embargo against “all parties in conflict”, most of them armed groups), as
well the first time it ordered economic and cultural embargoes. It finally urged the Security
Council to impose sanctions against South Africa as provided in Chapter VII.
3.10 Golan Heights (1982)
The US had vetoed a draft resolution submitted by Jordan related to the Israeli occupation
of the Golan Heights of Syria and condemning its non-compliance of UNSC Resolution 497
(1981) and UNGA Resolution 36/266 B (1981).73 The Security Council then transferred the
issue to the Assembly by Resolution 500, adopted by 13 votes and the abstentions of the UK
and the US.74
In the Ninth Emergency Special Session, the Assembly adopted Resolution ES-9/1
declaring Israel was “not a peace-loving state” that had “carried out neither its obligations
under the Charter”.75 This can be seen as an implicit questioning of Israel’s membership of
the United Nations.76 States were called, among other sanctions, to refrain from military
supplying to Israel and to “sever diplomatic, trade and cultural ties” with that state in order
to “isolate it in all fields”. 77
This was the last time Uniting for Peace was activated during Cold War.
3.11 Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1997)
72
Ibid.
73
UN Doc S/14832/Rev.1 (20 January 1982).
74
75
UNGA Res ES-9/1 (5 February 1982) UN Doc A/RES/ES-9/1.
76
Zaum (n42) 161. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Charter opens membership of UN to “all other peace-loving
states which accept the obligations” of the Charter.
77
UNGA Res ES-9/1 (n75).
19
Qatar requested the activation of U4P in March 1997, as the Chair of the Group of Arab
States in UN,78 in response to two US vetoes of draft in the Security Council concerning the
situation of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel. 79
The Tenth Emergency Special Session was convened in April 1997 and has been on
session ever since. Until its last meeting on 13 June 2018, the Assembly has adopted 19
resolutions on “Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest Occupied
Palestinian Territories”. One of them, Resolution ES-10/14 requested an Advisory Opinion
from the ICJ about the legal consequences arising from the construction of a Wall in
Palestinian territory. 80
The last to date resolution, ES-10/20, (2018) adopted with 120 votes against 8 with 45
abstentions, condemned Israeli “excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate force”
against Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories, particularly in the Gaza Strip, as well
condemning the firing of rockets from Gaza to Israeli civilians.81
3.12 Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022)
In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in support of the

separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Donbass area. As expected, the Security
Council could not act due to the Russian veto of an US-Albanian resolution,82 prompting the
last-to-date activation of Uniting for Peace and the first time the Council invoked it after forty
years. Resolution 2623 was adopted on 27 February 2022, with 11 votes in favour, 1 against
(Russia) and 3 abstentions (China, India and the UAE).83
78
Letter dated 31 March 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General (22 April 1997) UN Doc A/ES-10/1.
79
UN Doc S/1997/199 (7 March 1997), UN Doc S/1997/241 (21 March 1997).
80
UNGA Res ES-10/14 (12 December 2003) UN Doc A/RES/ES-10/14.
81
UNGA Res ES-10/20 (13 June 2018) UN Doc A/RES/ES-10/20.
82
UN Doc S/2022/155 (25 February 2022).
83
UNSC Res 2623 (27 February 2022) UN Doc S/RES/2623.
20
The Assembly passed Resolution ES-11/1 on 2 March 2022, by 141 votes to 5 against,
with 35 abstention and 12 states absent.84 It strongly deplored the Russian aggression against
Ukraine in violation of Art 2(4) of the Charter and the Russian recognition of the breakaway
regions as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. It further called
Russia to cease the use of force against Ukraine, to withdraw from its territory and to reverse
the recognition of the separatist regions. The Assembly condemned all violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights in Ukraine and finally urged for the peace
resolution of the conflict.
The 11th ESS has resumed since, adopting two further resolutions: the first one, related
to the protection of civilians and non-combatants;85 and the second one (by 93 votes to 24,
with 58 abstentions) suspended Russia’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council
following reports of “gross and systematic” human rights violations during the war.86 This is
the second time the Assembly has removed a member from HRC, as in 2011 Libya’s rights
on such body were suspended due to atrocities committed during the Civil War,87 and
following the legal basis of the resolution that created the HRC in 2006.88
So far, Uniting for Peace was activated 12 times after the Korean War, with 11
emergency special sessions of the General Assembly convened to that effect. However, we
saw that this resolution sparked a major controversy between supporters and opponents,
raising doubts about its conformity with UN Charter. The International Court of Justice
would address these issues in three advisory opinions, that will be the object of the next
chapter.
84
UNGA Res ES-11/1 (2 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/1.
85
UNGA Res ES-11/2 (28 March 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/2.
86
UNGA Res ES-11/3 (7 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/ES-11/3.
87
UNGA Res 65/265 (3 March 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/265.
88
UNGA Res 60/251 (3 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251.
21
CHAPTER III: UNITING FOR PEACE BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The following will analyse three advisory opinions of ICJ in which U4P was
involved: Certain Expenses (1962), Namibia (1971) and Construction of Wall (2004). Either
explicit or implicitly, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the resolution and the
practice of the Assembly and the Council in the preservation of peace and security.
1. Certain Expenses
In accordance with Article 96(1) of the Charter, the General Assembly had requested an
Advisory Opinion from the ICJ regarding the expenses authorised by it to fund the UNEF
and ONUC peacekeeping missions.89 These missions were object of political criticism about
their impartiality, particularly the Congo one as we saw in Chapter II. Some states, most
notably France over UNEF and the USSR over ONUC, refused to the pay the expenses
assigned by the Assembly under Article 17(2). This was critical considering UNEF was
created by the Assembly in its First Emergency Session and not by the Council, where
permanent members such as France and the USSR enjoyed veto powers.
The Opinion scrutinized the relations between the Assembly and the Council, in
particular the distribution of competences made to the two organs under as provided by the
Charter. With regards to the mission of maintenance of international peace and security
assigned to the Council in Article 24, the Court established it a “primary” responsibility but
not an exclusive one, as the Assembly was “also to be concerned with international peace
and security”, thus having a secondary responsibility on the matter. 90 This derives from the
general powers of discussion vested by Article 10 to the Assembly, allowing it treat virtually
“any political questions of international importance”. 91
89
UNGA Res 1731 (XVI) (20 December 1961) UN Doc A/RES/1731(XVI).
90
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion)
[1962] ICJ Rep 161, 163.
91
Klein and Schmahl (n2) 463.
22
The Court interpreted “action” in Article 11(2) as “enforcement or coercive action”,
meaning the Assembly could make recommendations to both the Council and member states
in order to establish peacekeeping missions at the request or with the consent of the states
involved.92 In other words, while the Council is the only organ entitled to “require
enforcement by coercive actions” as a response to the situations of Article 39,93 the Assembly
has the power to take actions that do not amount to the use of force, including the
recommendation of “measures for the peaceful adjustment” of disputes. 94 In the Court’s
view, this was the case of UNEF and ONUC, as both “were not enforcement actions within
the compass of Chapter VII”. 95
Klein and Schmahl note the distinction between the recommendation of enforcement
measures and the actual taking of such measures. An “enforcement action” is of a binding
nature and can only be taken by the Council either on its own or requested by the Assembly
through a recommendation to take those actions.96 The limit of Article 11(2) means if the
Assembly “is of the opinion that binding enforcement measures” under Chapter VII must
taken, the Council is only who can decide on those measures. 97
Furthermore, the Court was of the opinion that UN organs have the power to determine
the scope of their own competences. Thus, “when the Organization takes action that warrants
the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes” of UN,98
particularly the main goal of international peace and security, it can be presumed is not acting
ultra vires; thus, confirming the prima facie validity of the Assembly resolutions.99
With the issuing of this Advisory Opinion, ICJ implicitly recognized the constitutionality
of Uniting for Peace concerning the power of the Assembly to make recommendations that
92
Certain Expenses (n90) 164.
93
Ibid, 163.
94
Ibid, 163.
95
Ibid, 166.
96
97
Ibid.
98
Certain Expenses (n90) 168.
99
Carswell (n15) 468.
23
do not contemplate the use of “enforcement action” against states. 100 However, it can be
argued the Court did not address the question of the legality of the procedure of Resolution
377 because of a possible disagreement between the judges in the matter; but the conduct of
USSR first harshly condemning U4P in 1951 and then activating it in 1956 reveals the
constitutionality mechanism was no longer in discussion.101
Scholars have further agreed Uniting for Peace did not create new powers for the
Assembly beyond those provided by the Charter but revealing its potential and thus “re-
legitimized” those powers. 102 Resolution 377 is seen to respect the separation of functions
between the Assembly and the Council and the primary responsibility of the latter and
providing it will be triggered once the Council has failed to act in the situation.103 Klein and
Schmahl argue the power of recommendation of coercive measures is not conferred by U4P,
but the Assembly has it “by virtue of the spirit of the Charter itself”. 104
2. Namibia
The Namibia Advisory Opinion did not either explicitly mention Uniting for Peace, but
as Certain Expenses it would also deal with issues directly related to Resolution 377.
For the first and only time to date, the Security Council requested an advisory opinion
from the ICJ: Resolution 284 (1970) on the question of the legal consequences for states of
South African presence in Namibia despite the Council’s resolutions in the matter. 105 In
particular, UNSC Resolution 276 (1970) had declared the illegality of the South African
occupation.106 Before that, the General Assembly by Resolution 2145 (1966) had terminated
the Mandate over Namibia assigned to South Africa by the League of Nations. 107 South
Africa contested the power of UNSC to request the opinion from the Court, as Resolution
100
P Sands and P Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 32
101
R Higgins et al, Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations (OUP 2017) 61.
102
Reicher (n18) 48.
103
Andrassy (n19) 572.
104
105
UNSC Res 284 (29 July 1970) UN Doc S/RES/284.
106
107
UNGA Res 2145 (XXI) (27 October 1966) UN Doc A/RES/2145(XXI).
24
284 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, concerning enforcement action
measures.
In line with the Certain Expenses AO, the Court reiterated in Namibia the power of UN
organs to determine their own competences and therefore, a resolution of a “properly
constituted organ” such as the Security Council, adopted following its procedural rules “must
be presumed to have been validly adopted”. 108 It further reaffirmed the validity of Security
Council resolutions adopted with the abstention of one or more permanent members, which
was the case of UNSC Resolution 284. 109
Returning to the issue of distribution of powers between the Council and the Assembly,
the Court affirmed the validity of the termination of the mandate by the latter, as it relied on
previous ICJ decisions. Recognizing the recommendatory powers of the Assembly, the Court
concluded it also could adopt “in specific cases within the framework of its competence,
resolutions which make determinations or have operative design”.110 This interpretation
supported the powers of the Assembly to determine certain situations pose a threat to peace
and thus make recommendations, as it has been its practice since the Korean War. 111
The Court also determined the Assembly acted in conformity with Article 11(2) of the
Charter, when requesting the cooperation of the Council by calling its attention to Resolution
2145 in order to ensure the South African withdrawal of Namibian territory, given the lack
of powers to ensure the decision.112
Concerning the question of the enforcement powers the Council, the Court found that its
decisions were binding for all states under Article 25 of the Charter, even for those who voted
against it in the Council.113 This provision is not confined to resolutions ordering measures
108
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971], ICJ Rep 22.para. 20.
109
Ibid, para. 22.
110
Ibid, para. 105.
111
E Klein and S Schmahl, “Article 11” in B Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary, Volume I (3rd ed, OUP, 2012) 503.
112
Namibia (n108) para. 106.
113
Ibid, para. 116.
25
under Chapter VII, as the Charter makes no distinction whether the respective decision was
adopted under Chapter VI or VII.114
3. Construction of a Wall
General Assembly requested an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ via Resolution ES-10/14
of 8 December 2003, 115 at one of the resumed meetings of its Tenth Emergency Special
Session, about the legal consequences surrounding the construction of a wall by Israel in the
occupied Palestinian territories. The Security Council could not discuss this issue, as a draft
resolution was vetoed by the US in October 2003.116
Israel argued the Court had no jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion, as the Assembly
was supposedly acting ultra vires by making the request. Concerning the engagement of the
Security Council of the Palestine Question, the Court determined it had jurisdiction on the
basis a request for an Advisory Opinion was not a recommendation under Article 12(1) of
the Charter. As in Certain Expenses, the Court reaffirmed the “primary responsibility” of the
Council set out in Article 24 was not an exclusive one.117
The Court acknowledged the evolution of the practice of the Assembly and the Council
in regard to the limitation of Article 12(2). At first, the Assembly abstained from making
recommendations on matters being discussed by the Council, the latter occasionally
removing items from its agenda to enable their debate in the Assembly, which was the case
of the Korean War. However, as the Court noted, interpretation of Article 12 evolved in time,
as the Assembly and the Council have tended to deal in parallel with the same matters, often
with different perspectives: the Council focusing on aspects “related to international peace
and security” and the Assembly taking “a broader view, considering also their humanitarian,
social and economic aspects”. 118 The wording “also” used by the Court suggests, in Barber’s
114
A Peters, “Article 25” in B Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume
I (3rd ed, OUP, 2012) in 794.
115
UNGA Res ES-10/14 (n 80).
116
UN Doc S/2003/980 (14 October 2003).
117
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para. 26.
118
Ibid, para. 27.
26
view, the Assembly is not only concerned with the aforementioned aspects, but with the
peace and security issues arising from certain situations as well. 119
Another of Israel’s objections was the alleged non-fulfilment of the requirements for the
convening of the Tenth Emergency Special Session established in Resolution 377(V). On
one hand, Israel contended Security Council was never seised of a proposal to request an
advisory opinion from ICJ, and thus, the Assembly could not request that opinion based on
the Council’s inaction. On the other hand, it was claimed the Council had already started
exercising its functions with the passing of Resolution 1515 endorsing the “Roadmap” for a
peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.120 For the first time since its adoption,
Uniting for Peace was going to be examined by the ICJ, specifically concerning its
application to a particular affair.
The Court first identified the conditions required for the activation of Resolution 377: a
failure of the Council to exercise its functions due to the veto of one or more permanent
members and a situation of those described in Article 39 of the Charter.121 Consequently, the
Court located the Council’s deadlock in 1997 from the US negative vote on the issue of Israeli
settlements in Palestinian Territory, which created a threat to international peace and
security.122
Further into 2003, the Court noted the Assembly requested the opinion following the US
veto of a draft resolution on the Israeli Wall, constituting another “failure” in the sense of
U4P. The Court also concluded the Council had neither discussed the Wall issue in concreto
nor adopted any resolution concerning it,123 and neither UNSC Resolution 1515 nor the
“Roadmap” contained any specific provisions with regards to the Wall. 124 In consequence,
in the view of the Court, the Assembly did not act ultra vires when making recommendations
119
R Barber, “A survey of the General Assembly's competence in matters of international peace and security:
in law and practice” (2021) 8(1) JUFIL 115, 133-134.
120
UNSC Res 1515 (19 November 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1515.
121
Wall (n117) para. 30.
122
Ibid, para. 31.
123
Ibid, paras. 32-33.
124
Ibid, para. 25.
27
on the issue and therefore requesting an Advisory Opinion to ICJ. The Court’s reasoning was
that, despite the Council discussing an issue as a whole (i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict),
the Assembly could make recommendations on a particular topic of the whole issue (i.e., the
construction of the wall). 125 It also clarified the request for an advisory opinion was not “in
itself a ‘recommendation’ by the General Assembly ‘with regard to [a] dispute or
situation’”.126
Finally, the Court dismissed another of Israel objections for which the Tenth ESS had
reconvened at a time the General Assembly was holding one its regular sessions, questioning
the validity of the procedure of requesting the opinion. In the view of the Court, there was no
rule of UN prohibiting the simultaneous holdings of regular and emergency sessions of the
Assembly, thus no rule had been violated. 127 The Court ended its analysis by upholding the
convening of the Emergency Session referring to the presumption of validity of the
resolutions of UN organs adopted according to their respective rules set out in Namibia.128
The evolution of the practice of the Assembly and the Council of the restriction of the
Article 12(1) identified by the Court in the Wall opinion had led to some scholars to argue
this provision is “almost obsolete”. 129 Others suggest this only a marginal restriction to the
discretional powers of the Assembly derived from an extremely narrow interpretation of
Article 12,130 which only bars the Assembly from making recommendations (but not
discussing) on an issue being dealt by the Council at the same time. 131
125
M Cowling, “The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly with particular
reference to the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the “Israeli Wall” Case’” (2005) 30 SAYIL 50, 72.
126
Wall (n117) para 25.
127
Ibid, para. 34.
128
Ibid, para. 35.
129
Higgins et al (n101) 59-60.
130
131
28
CHAPTER IV: THE FUTURE OF UNITING FOR PEACE
In this chapter we will cover different topics concerning the impact of Uniting for Peace
and its potential for the future. We will scrutinize the opinions of different scholars on
Resolution 377 and its eventual effectiveness, as well the different measures the Assembly
can recommend when acting under U4P. Finally, the emergence of a new resolution related
to deadlocks in the Council, Resolution 66/256 or Standing mandate, will be analysed on its
impact on U4P.
1. Effective or futile? A critical assessment
The world is not the same as in 1945 and neither are the powers who obtained permanent
seats in the Security Council. France and the UK are no longer the colonial empires from the
centuries past and both participated in the construction of the European Union (although the
UK withdrew in 2020). China is no longer represented by the Taipei nationalist government
but by the current communist People’s Republic of China since 1971. Finally, the USSR
broke down in several independent republics in 1991 and its international successor is the
Russian Federation.
As the Cold War ended, new dynamics have emerged in Security Council: between 1990
and 2000, veto was used only 9 times and more than a thousand resolutions were adopted.
Collective security measures found consensus in Resolution 678 of 1990 against the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.
However, uses of veto power risen since 2000, especially after the 2001 9/11 terrorist
attacks. From 2000 and up to May 2022, the US has vetoed 14 resolutions, most of them
proposals concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict. China, on the other hand, has casted 14
vetoes all of them together with Russia on issues such as Venezuela, Syria and Myanmar.
Russia has vetoed 28 resolutions since 2000 in the latter cases and also regarding Yemen,
Georgia and Ukraine. Finally, the UK and France have not made use of their veto powers
since 1989, when they prevented the Council from condemning the US invasion of Panama
29
along with the US.132 The most recent veto to this date, was cast on 26 May 2022 by Russia
and China, on a draft resolution strengthening sanctions against North Korea over non-
proliferation issues.133
However, the elimination of the veto seems unlikely due to the unanimous consent of the
five permanent members not to strip themselves from a prerogative they enjoy. Veto use is
surrounded by problems of responsibility on its use and for its application in cases of massive
atrocities. Writing in 1946, Kelsen correctly predicted the permanent members of the Council
would exercise their veto power in the interest of a third state and thus lead to “open
clientelage” system of friendship and protection of convenience. 134
What is the purpose then of Uniting for Peace in a different context from its conception
in 1950? We must find answers to questions surrounding its limited use and the current
assessment made by scholars of this tool.
Concerning its application over time, we can appreciate its use waned progressively: U4P
was invoked 4 times between 1956 and 1960, then 2 times the next 15 years and afterwards
on 4 occasions between 1980 and 1982. The international community would have to wait
until 1997 for an emergency session of the Assembly and then until 2022 when the Council
last called for such meeting.
This could mean a rapid loss of enthusiasm to activate U4P after its impetuous creation
during the Korean War. At that moment, UN had a Western majority that could pass such a
resolution in the Assembly. White argues the US and its allies wanted to create and
alternative form of collective security based not on the consensus of the Council but on the
132
In Hindsight: Challenging the Power of the Veto (Security Council Report, 29 April 2022)
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2022-05/in-hindsight-challenging-the-power-of-the-
veto.php accessed 20 May 2022.
133
UN Doc S/2022/431.
134
H Kelsen, “Organization and Procedure of the Security Council of the United Nations” (1946) 59 HLR
1087, 1119-1120.
30
majority they enjoyed in the Assembly, so they could recommend military action against the
interests of the vetoing USSR.135
However, in the subsequent decades new states originating from decolonization joined
UN to form the current 193 member-states organization. With a “Third World” in
contraposition to the Western powers, the latter might be prevented of activating U4P as they
no longer enjoy the influence on decision-making they had in the past.136
This fear can be illustrated by the fact noted before in 1982, when the Council called for
an emergency session of the Assembly about Golan Heights, the last time it did so before
2022, when a majority of the Assembly condemned Israel’s membership of UN for not being
a “peace-loving” state.137
Another problem of U4P, as well with all mechanisms and tools of international law, is
that political considerations make it highly selective. U4P has not been used in all cases
where the Council was blocked by a veto, but only in a handful of limited situations.
An example of this selectivity occurred in 1998-99 during the war in Kosovo. In the light
of a Chinese veto,138 Western powers discussed the idea of activating U4P to deal with the
atrocities committed in the conflict. However, they did not do so as they could not assure a
majority in the Assembly: most Third-World states would stand with Yugoslavia in the event
of Western actions against Belgrade and thus defeating their purpose. U4P was therefore not
applied, and the UN remained impaired from intervening in the Balkans, triggering the
NATO military campaign in the region relying on “humanitarian intervention”. In White’s
view, U4P was “conveniently forgotten” in the Kosovo crisis.139
135
White (n31) 309.
136
Higgins et al (n101) 21.
137
UNGA Res ES-9/1 (5 February 1982).
138
UN Doc S/1999/201.
139
White (n31) 312. See also Zaum (n42) 165-166.
31
Zaum provides another example of political use of U4P, albeit during Cold War tensions:
we saw in 1956 the first two emergency special sessions of the Assembly met in parallel for
the Suez and Hungary crises. The main powers, the US and the USSR, used the resolution to
drive attention away from their respective interventions in those regions, meaning neither
superpower could interfere in the other’s sphere of influence. 140 The same author adds a
further example of political disputes about the impartiality of ONUC in the former Belgian
Congo, that led the Assembly to call all parties to refrain from assisting any parties in the
conflict, in which the USSR supported the Lumumba government while the US and Belgium
were supporting separatist forces in Katanga region.141
Carswell identifies policy considerations for the fading use of U4P, as the Assembly has
been historically reluctant to challenge the powers of P5 and fear to fall out of favour with
them, during and after Cold War. 142 The volatility of the Assembly after the aforementioned
expansion from decolonization has given space to an ever volatile and unpredictable body of
which the Council members no longer have clear majorities to defend their interests, and thus
U4P became a “double edged sword” for its original creators.143
Some scholars even argue U4P has no viable use nowadays. Johnson gives a series of
arguments for this conclusion:144 the Assembly meets are year-long and there is no need for
calling emergency sessions. Second, following the Wall AO, the Assembly can discuss any
matter on the agenda of the Council and there is no impediment to discuss and make
recommendations in the field of international peace and security. Third, the Assembly can
recommend voluntary sanctions during regular sessions without reference to U4P, giving the
example of Resolution 41/35F of 1986 calling for an oil embargo against South Africa. And
finally, the Assembly cannot recommend the use of force outside the right to collective or
individual self-defence of Article 51.
140
Zaum (n42) 164-165.
141
Ibid, 172.
142
Carswell (n15) 477.
143
Ibid, 479.
144
Johnson (n27) 106 ff.
32
On the other hand, other scholars defend U4P as a valid tool. Answering Johnson’s views,
Richardson argues the resolution is a “now established narrative” under the competence of
the Assembly to recommend measures when the Council has failed due to the veto. 145
In this respect, it is relevant to consider UNGA Resolution 66/253B of 2012 concerning

the Syrian Civil War and the related human rights abuses.146 Albeit adopted during regular
sessions and without explicit reference to U4P, the resolution condemned the “failure” of the
Council (due to Russian vetoes) to take measures to end the conflict and protect the Syrian
population and encouraged the Council to consider such measures. It further calls states to
provide “all support” to the Syrian people, which can also comprise in Richardson’s opinion,
the assistance to rebel groups against the government responsible for abuses and atrocities. 147
Barber acknowledges UNGA can make recommendations on peace and security with or
without U4P, however this resolution has a strong political relevance today: by convening a
meeting of a special session of the Assembly this procedure may showcase the gravity of the
situation and the failure of the Council to exert its primary responsibilities. The consequences
are the increase of political legitimacy of the measures recommended by the Assembly at the
same time the Council is pressured to take the necessary actions under the Charter. 148
Therefore, Uniting for Peace confirms the powers of the Assembly under the Charter while
establishing their own limits, a concept upheld by ICJ in Certain Expenses.
Concerning the procedure of activation of U4P, Barber is of the view a referral from the
Council to the Assembly is politically advantageous, as the majority in the Council could
express its dissatisfaction with the vetoing member and it would increase pressure on the
Assembly to adopt measures in the matter. 149. Another advantage of this referral, according
to the same author, is that it would confirm the primary responsibility of the Council in peace
145
H Richardson, “Comment on Larry Johnson, ‘Uniting for Peace’” (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound 135, 139.
146
UNGA Res 66/253B (16 February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/253B.
147
Richardson (n145) 138-139.
148
R Barber, The Powers of the General Assembly to Prevent and Respond to Atrocity Crimes: A Guidance
Document (Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P, 2021) 15.
149
R Barber, “What can the UN General Assembly do about Russian Aggression in Ukraine?” (EJIL Talk, 26
February 2022).
33
and security affairs according to Article 12(1) of the Charter, preventing any claims of
usurpation of power by the Assembly.150
Ramsden also defends the role of the Assembly under U4P, particularly in the realm of
international criminal law. While admitting the political character of UNGA and its
selectivity when addressing international crimes, the Assembly can offer greater legitimacy
to the investigation of such crimes and enforcement of international justice, as it represents
all states and does not require the unanimity of the main powers present at the Council. This
would revitalize U4P as a mechanism to “unite against impunity” of grave atrocities. 151
And what have been the opinions of governments and UN itself about U4P? Since the
1990s when the Council became more active and collective action was adopted after the Cold
War, new doctrines emerged in international security such as the not-uncontroversial
humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. The latter was
proposed in the 2001 report of the Canada-led International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty.
The ICISS report addressed the importance of U4P as tool against a deadlocked Security
Council. It acknowledged it served a basis for operations in Korea, Suez and Congo (all in
the first years of U4P application) and that an intervention carried out with a 2/3 backing vote
of the Assembly “would clearly have powerful moral and political support”. 152 Although it
noted the Assembly lacks such powers to direct action, an overwhelming majority of states
would give such “high degree of legitimacy” for the intervention and lead to the Council to
take the proper course of action. 153
R2P was endorsed by governments in the 2005 World Summit Outcome adopted by the
Assembly in Resolution 60/1. The document, however, does not seem to authorize the
150
R Barber, “Uniting for Peace Not Aggression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in Syria Without
Breaking the Law” (2018) 24 JCSL 71, 106-107.
151
M Ramsden “‘Uniting for Peace’ in the Age of International Justice” (2016) 42 YJIL 1, 8.
152
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (2001) at 48.
153
Ibid. at 53.
34
Assembly to recommend use of force against massive atrocities, but to take collective action
through the Council under Chapter VII. 154
2. What can the Assembly do under Uniting for Peace?
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have renovated the potential for U4P
after decades of non-use, at least explicitly. Questions arise as what measures the Assembly
can adopt when a deadlocked Council impeded from acting in the issue. We must remember
Articles 10-14 give the Assembly the power of making non-binding recommendations and it
cannot take the place of the Council in this scenario.
The most common course of action for the Assembly, as we could see in Chapter II, is to
condemn the breach of peace or aggression and call for cease of hostilities or withdrawal of
troops in case of aggression. But over the series of emergency sessions and uses of U4P we
can appreciate different measures undertaken by the Assembly.
For instance, under U4P the Assembly created a peace-keeping mission (Suez, 1956),
and broadened the mandate (Lebanon, 1958) or confirmed the one of a mission (Congo,
1960) already created by the Council. It is worth noting that, despite the favourable view of
ICJ over such authority in Certain Expenses, all subsequent peacekeeping missions were
established by the Council and not the Assembly, but the latter organ retains powers on the
apportionment of expenses of such missions.155 This reluctant to authorize peacekeeping
missions may be explained on the refusal of France and USSR to finance UNEF and ONUC
and the following 1965 compromise on scale financing.156
Other measures include establishing a Commission of Inquiry (Hungary, 1956), calling

for an arms embargo against states (Suez, 1956; Golan Heights, 1982) or armed groups
(Congo, 1960), providing aid for refugees (East Pakistan, 1971), calling for assistance to a
154
UNGA Res 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome (16 September 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1.
155
M Bothe “Peacekeeping Forces” (2016) in A Peters (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law
(online edn) paras. 35-36.
156
Zaum (n42) 169-1970.
35
national liberation movement (Namibia, 1981), requesting an Advisory Opinion from ICJ
(Israel-Palestine, 2004) and suspending a member from its seat in the Human Rights Council
(Russia-Ukraine, 2022).
This catalogue of measures shows the different paths the Assembly can take when using
the U4P tool. Some authors suggest the disputes in the Council may lead states to seek
support in the Assembly for protecting peace and human rights and the request to ICJ an AO
on the Israeli Wall issue shows new and non-military actions might revive the potential of
U4P in a different way from its original conception to confront the war in Korea. 157
One of the most controversial issues surrounding U4P is whether the Assembly can
endorse the use of armed force in the issue The general prohibition of the use of force of
Article 2(4) of the Charter is one of the first and foremost principles of the whole UN System.
Exceptions are however provided for individual or collective self-defence (Article 51) and
decisions of the Security Council under Chapter VII.
With regard to the powers of the Assembly Certain Expenses was clear on stating the
monopoly of “enforcement action” by the Security Council and that peacekeeping missions
were not actions of such kind, meaning the Assembly was not acting ultra vires when creating
and financing them.
However, twice the Assembly has made recourse to measures of force: the first time in
Korean War when it called all states to continue support the UN action in the region; 158 and
the second time in the Namibian Independence War, requesting military assistance for
SWAPO and allied states against South African aggression. 159 Does this mean the Assembly
today can recommend military assistance to Palestinian groups and authorities or to the
Ukrainian government against acts of aggression?
157
C Binder “Uniting for Peace Resolution” (2017) in A Peters (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia of
International Law (online edn) para. 36.
158
UNGA Res 498.
159
UNGA Res ES-8/2.
36
Scholars cannot agree on what exactly the Assembly did in Korea once the conflict
was on its own agenda. Some believe it did not order or authorize anything new, as the
Council had decided on forceful actions before the USSR returned to the Council and vetoed
any subsequent decisions.160 Others are of the view the Assembly authorized nothing more
than the inherent right of self-defence of Article 51 or host state consent by assisting the
affected states against acts of aggression, a situation also present in Resolution ES-8/1
concerning South Africa and border states.161 Finally, another group of commentators go
further and argue the Assembly recommended more than use of defensive force by
recommending the continuation of military action to establish a “unified, independent and
democratic government” in Korea, as stated in Resolution 376 adopted before U4P and after
the Soviet vetoes, and thus expanding the mandate of the operation.162
It must be remembered that the Assembly did not make an explicit reference to U4P
in Resolution 498 on Korea and the Council had removed that item from its agenda before
the Assembly could discuss; and also that the 8th ESS, when the resolution on Namibia was
adopted, it was convened by a majority of the Assembly and not by a referral of Council. In
both cases, the Council did not intend the Assembly to supplant it in the authorization of use
of force and thus U4P has never been invoked to justify such recommendations. In
Tomuschat’s view, Resolution 498 remains the only case where the Assembly recommended
the use of force against the wishes of a permanent member. 163
This practice apparently shows that the Assembly is entitled to recommend the use of
armed force despite not explicitly provided in the Charter and that it regards itself competent
to authorize of force,164 with some scholars arguing while the Assembly cannot invoke
Chapter VII, its resolutions effectively have endorsed member’s actions in armed conflict. 165
160
Zaum (n42) 159.
161
Johnson (n27) 111-112.
162
White (n31) 311, M Ramsden “‘Uniting for Peace’ and Humanitarian Intervention: The Authorising
Function of the General Assembly” (2016) 25 WILJ 267, 291-292. See UNGA Res 376 (V) (7 October 1950)
UN Doc A/RES/376(V).
163
C Tomuschat, “Uniting for Peace General Assembly Resolution 377(V) New York 3 November 1950”
(2008) UN Audiovisual Library of International Law.
164
Barber, “Survey” (n119) 149-150.
165
MJ Peterson “General Assembly” in TG Weiss and S Daws (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the United
Nations (OUP 2018) at 126.
37
Other argue such recommendation may “authorize” states via delegation under U4P to use
force in a particular situation when the Council is unable to act and thus becoming an
exception to Article 2(4). 166
However, this has been the exception, as most of the Assembly recommendations
throughout its history have been against the use of force rather than recommend it. The
practice under U4P has also gone in that direction, again, deploring acts of aggression against
political independence and integrity of states.167
Other measures fall short of the use of force and one of the most important is the
issuing of sanctions. Under Uniting for Peace the Assembly has recommended military and
oil embargos in cases such as Korean War, the Suez Crisis and the Congo Crisis, the South
African occupation of Namibia and Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. Additional
economic, commercial and cultural sanctions have been also called against South Africa and
Israel in the two former cases, with the purposes to “isolate” both states for their actions of
occupation and aggression.
Again, these sanctions are entirely voluntary and only the Council is empowered
impose mandatory sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter. Unilateral sanctions are
therefore to the states who decide how and for long will implement them.
Back to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, most states have adopted unilateral sanctions
against Russia even before the 11th ESS was convened. It has been proposed UNGA should
act as a forum to certify if those sanctions, albeit not yet recommend by the Assembly in this
case, are valid under the relevant rules of international law such as Article 49 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility. This coordination of unilateral sanctions could prevent
illegal measures (i.e. blockades) and contribute to the international obligation of states to
cooperate to end violations of international law such as aggression.168
166
Ramsden (n162) 304.
167
Barber, “Survey” (n119) 150.
168
Barber, “What can the Assembly do” (n149), M Ramsden, “Uniting for Peace: The Emergency Special
Session on Ukraine” (Harvard International Law Journal, April 2022)
38
Finally, another measure under U4P is the urging of the Assembly to the Council in
order to enable it to fulfil its functions properly, a practice also common outside the
Resolution. Focusing in U4P, the Assembly has recommended the Council to adopt
“comprehensive and mandatory sanctions” (Namibia, 1981) and criticised its permanent
members for blocking action on the issue (Golan Heights, 1982). 169 Since the 1990s it has
been observed the Council has engaged in consultations with all members to decide on
enforcement actions, due to the constant pressure and influence of the Assembly. 170
3. Uniting for Peace 2.0? Resolution 76/262 and the “standing mandate”
Recently, on 26 April 2022, the Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 76/262 also
known as Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security
Council.171 This resolution was adopted during the 76th regular session and not during the
11th ESS and it is based in a draft proposal introduced by delegation of Lichtenstein. The
explicit bases for this resolution are the Assembly’s general powers of discussion and
recommendation on Article 10 and 12 of the Charter.
The main provision of the Standing mandate resolution is that in the exercise of veto
power by one of the permanent members of the Council, the president of the Assembly shall
convene a formal meeting of the Assembly within 10 working days since the casting of the
veto to “hold a debate in the situation the veto was cast” provided the Assembly is not
meeting in an ESS in the same situation. The resolution also provides an exceptional order
of precedence on the Assembly’s subsequent debate, requiring the vetoing permanent
member to explain the reasons for its actions before all member states.
This is the first action by the Assembly to obtain certain accountability from the Council
concerning veto use. The Charter grants the permanent members of the Council powers of
vetoing but does not require them to explain or justify the reasons leading to block a proposal.
169
UNGA Res ES-8/2, UNGA Res ES-9/1.
170
Barber (n 119) 154.
171
UNGA Res 76/262 (26 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/262.
39
This particularly critical when threats and breaches of peace may result in serious human
rights abuses or international crimes. However, the Charter mandates the Council to carry
out its duties acting on behalf of all members of UN (art. 24(1)) and the Council shall submit
annual and special reports to the Assembly for its consideration. This opens space to political
and rule of law accountability of the decisions of the Council. 172
In the preceding years, multilateral attempts have been made to limit the use of veto in
such cases. In August 2015, the “Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in
Cases of Mass Atrocities” was launched by the governments of France and Mexico as a
voluntary initiative for a more responsible use of the veto rights. As of April 2022, 103 UN
members have signed the Declaration, with France and the UK being the only permanent
members of the Council to do it so.173
Months later, in December 2015, a cross-regional group of small and medium-power

states known as the Accountability and Transparency and Coherence Group presented a
“Code of Conduct” calling all members of the Council, permanent or not, not to vote against
draft resolutions regarding mass atrocities and crimes. Again, France and the UK are the only
permanent members to sign this code of conduct along with other 120 member states as of
February 2022.174
What does this Resolution 76/262 mean for Uniting for Peace present and future? At a
first glance, it respects the existence itself of U4P as a tool for overcoming the veto as
Standing mandate will not applied when the Assembly is meeting in emergency sessions
convened under Resolution 377.
172
A Peters, “Article 24” in B Simma et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume
I (3rd ed, OUP, 2012) at 780.
173
Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (1 August 2015)
Available at: <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto-powers-in-
cases-of-mass-atrocities/> accessed 8 May 2022.
174
Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war
crimes (14 December 2015) <https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/code-of-conduct-regarding-security-
council-action-against-genocide-crimes-against-humanity-or-war-crimes/> accessed 8 May 2022.
40
U4P was conceived at a time when the Assembly did not meet all year-round and was
necessary to hold emergency sessions as soon as possible the Council referred a blocked
decision to the Assembly in order to discuss the matter. As we can appreciate, U4P is a
mechanism that enables, or at least facilitates such power, to discuss issues in which the
Council failed to act because of veto and thus make the appropriate recommendations for
preserving international peace and security. It has even been argued that a referral of the
Council to the Assembly via U4P is a challenge to the legitimacy of the veto in question. 175
However, we already know U4P has only been triggered in handful cases and not all vetoed
resolutions have given place to an ESS.
On the other hand, Resolution 76/262 is more of an attempt to make the Council more
accountable. According to this resolution, a debate must follow after a veto is cast and the
concerned permanent member of Council shall explain the reasons of its veto before all
members at the Plenary of the Assembly. We would have to wait for a next veto situation to
determine how will the Standing mandate resolution will take effect and what are going to
be its consequences for the maintenance of peace and security.
Similar to U4P, this is not an explicit provision of the Charter, but Standing mandate
derives from the “primary responsibility” of the Council set out in Article 24 Charter and the
mandate for the Council to act “in accordance with the purposes and principles” of the
organization.
In short, the Standing mandate resolution does not confront U4P but makes an ideal
complement to it when the Council is blocked by veto and to increase responsibilities and
accountability for its use. Some commentators are of the view Standing mandate, as a such
complement, will give place to an enhanced debate of the Assembly when U4P is not
immediately activated and one its possible outcomes is an invocation of the latter resolution
via the Assembly.176
175
Carswell (n15) 472.
176
“Liechtenstein’s ‘Veto Initiative’ Wins Wide Approval at the UN. Will It Deter the Major Powers?”
(UNA-UK, 28 April 2022) < https://una.org.uk/news/liechtensteins-veto-initiative-wins-wide-approval-un-
will-it-deter-major-powers> accessed 29 May 2022.
41
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION
Uniting for Peace was a product of Cold War tensions. The main challenge for the
Security Council in its first years was the abuse of veto power by the USSR, that prompted
the US and their allies to use their majority in the Assembly to continue military action in
Korea. Despite its initial denounce of Resolution 377, the USSR later activated it in other
situations where the US, the UK and France were using the veto as well, meaning Uniting
for Peace won acceptance in the international community as a political tool. Newly
independent and non-aligned countries would invoke Uniting for Peace after joining the UN.
In its first ten years since its adoption, the Assembly made a daring use of Uniting for
Peace not only by recommending the use of force in Korea, but also creating or mandating
peace-keeping missions and by calling to arms embargoes. However, enthusiasm
progressively disappeared, and emergency sessions were less frequent. In fact, 10 out of the
12 activations of Uniting for Peace were during Cold War.
The ICJ has ruled favourably to the constitutionality of Uniting for Peace, particularly
in the Certain Expenses and Namibia AOs. The Court determined the Assembly has a
“secondary” responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, that is
master of its own agenda and that in can discuss similar issues along with the Council.
Resolution 377 respects the balance of powers between the two organs and it can only be
activated when the Council is unable against to an Article 39 situation because of the veto of
the permanent members.
Question remains, however, whether Uniting for Peace is strictly necessary to

recommend measures for the sake of international peace and security. We know that not
every veto in the Council in a situation determined as threat or breach of peace or aggression
has resulted in an emergency session of the Assembly. We also know the Assembly has used
powers to recommend a wide arrange of measures in the course of regular sessions and not
under Uniting for Peace. The powers of the Assembly and other UN organs are determined
by the Charter and not by Resolution 377.
42
In contrast, we answer that U4P is above all a political mechanism: the Assembly has
no power to undo the veto in the Council. The Charter grants primary responsibility in peace
and security to the Council and the monopoly to order military action. U4P makes the
Assembly a forum for moral condemnation, to showcase that a majority of UN repudiate
situations of massive atrocities and aggression in which veto was exercised in the Council.
This is striking when a resolution is passed by a large majority of the Assembly, a symbolic
practice to attempt to change attitudes of the Council and the main powers in cases of war
and human rights abuses.
Separation of powers between the Council and the Assembly translates in the
dominant powers of recommendation of the latter organ, contrary to the binding decisions of
the former. However, the Assembly can act in other ways in the realm of peace and security
before a deadlocked Council as we could appreciate. Most importantly, the Assembly can
request an Advisory Opinion to ICJ (as in the Wall case) and to suspend membership from
the HRC (as in the recent Russia) due to massive atrocities. Again, while the Assembly can
still take these steps outside Uniting for Peace, this mechanism reveals the will of the
Assembly to act when the Council cannot do so.
At present, the war in Ukraine seems to have brought us back to the starting point of
Uniting for Peace. Once again, a Russian veto on a large-scale invasion of another sovereign
state takes the US and its allies to refer the matter to the Assembly for discussion and
recommendation. Symbolically, this may signal a new life for U4P and a renovation of its
potential.
This may be exemplified by the current case between Ukraine and Russia at ICJ. One
of the reasons argued by Russia to justify its invasion is an alleged genocide committed by
Ukraine against Russian minorities in the Donbass. Ukraine disputed this claim and initiated
proceedings against Russia at ICJ under Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention on
March 2022. The Court issued soon a Provisional Measures Order calling Russia to suspend
43
the invasion of Ukraine. In fact, one of the bases for such order was Resolution ES-11/1
which condemned the aggression and expressed grave concern for its humanitarian
consequences, taking the Court to the conclusion that Ukraine has a plausible right to be
protected before a judgement is handed. 177
Another product of the invasion, the Standing mandate that the Assembly created for
itself, is also in the spirit of attempting to overcome the veto in the Council, by ordering a
debate on the reasons to veto a resolution proposal before all states in the Assembly. We can
expect Standing mandate will be an ideal complement of U4P in the road to ensure a better
and more transparent use of the veto in the Council.
Recent developments and the balance of powers between the organs of UN show
Uniting for Peace still has a relevant place in the international law of the 21st Century, where
the recommendation and promotion of measures other than the use of force (uncontested
monopoly of a Council always exposed to veto) by the General Assembly will contribute to
the present and future of international peace and security preservation.
177
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures Order of 16 March 2022, paras. 76-77.
44
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. Case law
1. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter)
(Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151
2. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)
(Advisory Opinion) [1971], ICJ Rep 22
3. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136
4. Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures Order
of 16 March 2022
II. Treaty law and instruments
1. Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October
1945) 892 UNTS 119
2. UNGA Resolution 377 (V) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/1775
3. UNGA Resolution 76/262 (26 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/262
III. Books
1. Barber R, The Powers of the General Assembly to Prevent and Respond to Atrocity
Crimes: A Guidance Document (Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P 2021)
2. Higgins R et al, Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations (OUP 2017)
3. Kelsen H, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental
Problems (F.A. Praeger 1950)
45
4. Lowe V et al (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of
Thought and Practice since 1945 (OUP 2010)
5. Sands P and Klein P, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (6th ed, Sweet &
Maxwell 2009)
6. Simma B et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volumes I
and II (3rd ed, OUP 2012)
7. Weiss TH and Daws S (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (OUP
2018)
8. Weller M (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP
2018)
IV. Journal articles
1. Andrassy J, “Uniting for Peace” (1956) 50 AJIL 563

2. Barber R, “A survey of the General Assembly's competence in matters of
international peace and security: in law and practice” (2021) 8(1) JUFIL 115
3. Carswell A, “Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace
Resolution” (2013) 18(3) JCSL 453
4. Cowling M, “The relationship between the Security Council and the General
Assembly with particular reference to the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the “Israeli Wall”
Case’” (2005) 30 SAYIL 50
5. Johnson LD, “‘Uniting for Peace’: Does it still serve any useful purpose?” (2014) 108
AJIL Unbound 106
6. Kelsen H, “Organization and Procedure of the Security Council of the United
Nations” (1946) 59 HLR 1087
7. Petersen KS, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950” (1959) 13
IO 219
8. Reicher H, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirteenth Anniversary of its
Passage” (1981) 20 CJTL 1
9. Ramsden M, “‘Uniting for Peace’ in the Age of International Justice” (2016) 42 YJIL
1
46
10. Richardson H, “Comment on Larry Johnson, ‘Uniting for Peace’” (2014) 108 AJIL
Unbound 135
11. Woolsey LH, “The ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution and the United Nations” (1951)
45 AJIL 129
V. Encyclopaedia entries
1. Binder C, “Uniting for Peace Resolution” (2017) in A Peters (ed) Max Planck
Encyclopedia of International Law (online edn)
2. Bothe M “Peacekeeping Forces” (2016) in A Peters (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia
of International Law (online edn)
3. Stein E and Morrissey E “Uniting for Peace Resolution” in Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Volume 4 (Elsevier, 2000)
4. Tomuschat C, “Uniting for Peace General Assembly Resolution 377(V) New York 3
November 1950” (2008) UN Audiovisual Library of International Law
VI. Blog entries
1. Barber R, “What can the UN General Assembly do about Russian Aggression in

Ukraine?” (EJIL Talk, 26 February 2022) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-can-the-un-
general-assembly-do-about-russian-aggression-in-ukraine/> (accessed 1 March
2022)
2. Ramsden M, “Uniting for Peace: The Emergency Special Session on Ukraine”
(Harvard International Law Journal, April 2022)
<https://harvardilj.org/2022/04/uniting-for-peace-the-emergency-special-session-
on-ukraine/> (accessed 29 April 2022)
3. “Liechtenstein’s ‘Veto Initiative’ Wins Wide Approval at the UN. Will It Deter the
Major Powers?” (UNA-UK, 28 April 2022) < https://una.org.uk/news/liechtensteins-
veto-initiative-wins-wide-approval-un-will-it-deter-major-powers> accessed 29 May
2022.
47
VII. Other documents
1. ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001)
48

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Leiden University

Department of Public International Law

Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies

LL.M Public International Law (Regular)

Uniting for Peace Resolution

Student name: Gabriel Anich

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 3

1. The dawn of UN and Security Council conflicts

2. The Korean War: Uniting for Peace is born

3. Invocation of Uniting for Peace: case-by-case analysis

3.1 Suez Crisis (1956)

3.3 Lebanon and Jordan crises (1958)

3.4 Congo crisis (1960)

3.5 Six-Day War (1967)

3.6 East Pakistan refugee crisis (1971)

In December 1971, Indian forces intervened in support of East Pakistan (now

3.7 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980)

USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in order to assist the communist

3.8 Palestine (1980)

3.9 Question of Namibia (1981)

3.10 Golan Heights (1982)

3.11 Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1997)

3.12 Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022)

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in support of the

1. Effective or futile? A critical assessment

In this respect, it is relevant to consider UNGA Resolution 66/253B of 2012 concerning

2. What can the Assembly do under Uniting for Peace?

Other measures include establishing a Commission of Inquiry (Hungary, 1956), calling

Months later, in December 2015, a cross-regional group of small and medium-power

Question remains, however, whether Uniting for Peace is strictly necessary to

II. Treaty law and instruments

IV. Journal articles

1. Andrassy J, “Uniting for Peace” (1956) 50 AJIL 563

VI. Blog entries

1. Barber R, “What can the UN General Assembly do about Russian Aggression in

1. ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on

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