Caron, Joseph A., ‘“Biology” in the Life Sciences A Historiographical Contribution’, History of Science, 26.3 (1988), 223–268

Hist. Sci.
, xxvi (1988)
'BIOLOGY' IN THE LIFE SCIENCES:

A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTRIBUTION
Joseph A. Caron
Conseil de la Science et de la Technologie du Quebec
The word 'biology' was coined early in the nineteenth century to designate a
new, emerging area of scientific knowledge. 1 This paper reviews the historio-
graphy of the actualization of that projected science. This review is comple-
mented by lessons drawn from the sociology of science. I examine history of
scientific ideas concerning 'biology' concomitantly with the social and institu-
tional changes through which 'biology' passed during the period of its initial
creation. If study of the "creation" or the "beginnings" of a science or an area
of scientific knowledge is to have substantive meaning, one should be able to
describe the historical, social and institutional changes particular to that new
science during its formative period. I postulate that the emergence of 'biology'
was accompanied by such phenomena and that they may be described. Within
this perspective, it is hoped one may better understand the strategic signifi-
cance of the creation of 'biology'.
I am not, then, dealing in this article with historiography of life sciences in
their entirety. Rather, I examine histories professing to elucidate - directly or
indirectly - the time and place of creation of a science called 'biology'< This
review should permit identification of the conceptual and institutional steps
through which the field of knowledge known as 'biology' became distinguish-
able and duly recognized.
1. THE NECESSITY TO "PROBLEMATIZE" THE HISTORY OF 'BIOLOGY'

The number and variety of turning points identified as ostensibly crucial to the
constitution of the science of 'biology' is quite surprising. The beginnings of
biology have been reported in the first systematic examination by humans of
the living creatures in their environment;' in any number of new steps which
have marked scientific thought about living organisms;' or, again, in funda-
mental re-conceptualizations marking the passage from scientific study of
living beings to scientific knowledge of life> Many candidates have been
proposed as founder of biology: Hippocrates (c. 46O-c.377 B.C.),6 Aristotle
(384-322 B.C.),7 Vesalius (1514-64),8 Harvey (1578-1657),9 Redi (1626-94),10
Reaumur (1683-1757),11 Spallanzani (1729-99),12 Lavoisier (1743-94),13 Buf-
fon (1707-88),14 Cuvier (1769-1832),15 John Hunter (1728-93),16 Darwin
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224· JOSEPH A. CARON
(1809-82)17 and Schultze (1825-74).18 With each name is associated a particu-

lar concept or some extraordinary methodological or theoretical break-
through signalling the creation of rigorously scientific knowledge of life
processes. 19
One would certainly not wish to contest the value of the historic moments
hinted at through the above-listed names. Harvey's importance on the road
leading to a scientific view of physiological function of the human body;
Cuvier's position in comparative anatomy; Darwin's contribution to evolu-
tionary theory as a central underpinning of modern life sciences: these
represent labours which are, of course, fundamental in the history of the life
sciences. This should not obscure, though, the absence therein of indices
specifically descriptive and explicative of the creation of a science called
'biology', as will be shown shortly.
Indeed, it might be suggested that the large variety of proposed answers to
the question: "Where and how did biology begin as a science?" betrays a
certain degree of confusion about the issues. In the context of this question, it
seems significant that these proposed answers have dealt almost exclusively
with the conceptual character of that which was deemed, ex post facto, to
constitute 'biology'. Close description of use of the term itself is generally
absent. And yet: "Changes in the use of language can often indicate important
turning points in social history. "20 The institutionalization of biology as a
science has not generally been examined in these histories. And though history
of science certainly cannot be separated from history of scientific ideas, I
question, especially in the case of the beginnings of 'biology', that satisfactory
answers may be found within strictly intellectual history. Science is, "after all,
... a social process", as William Coleman has reminded US. 21
In this text, then, I try to ascertain, through examination of the historio-
graphy of the life sciences (sections 2.1 to 2.6) and through original research
(section 2.7), the first place and time that one encounters 'biology' and
'biologists' in the history of the life sciences. I take as criteria for the existence
of a science called 'biology', (a) a distinct cognitive content for that science; (b)
evidence of debate in the scientific community about the existence of the
science or about the postulates of the science; and (c) traces of the shaping and
informing of the means of production and reproduction of a science known as
'biology' (its institutionalization). Conceptual analysis of the first so-called
'biological' texts and socio-historical analysis of the first attempts at institutio-
nalization of some scientific activities labelled as 'biology' should permit
circumscription of the initial creation of a 'biological' perspective.
It bears repeating that my interest lies particularly in those facts, ideas,
techniques, etc., identified specifically as 'biological' or as relating to 'biology'.
Debate on postulates of 'biology' or even on the existence of the science should
permit identification of the proponents and antagonists of 'biology'. In this

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BIOLOGY . 225
way, I may identify a self-styled group of 'biologists'. This manner of

proceeding is crucial in the case of 'biology', given the lack of unanimity on the
part of historians, as shall be seen, concerning time and place of origin of this
science. It is this situation which justifies reference to a criterion such as
generalized recognition by contemporary life scientists of the phenomenon
under study.
Finally, given that by most accounts 'biology' first became known some
time after 1802, institutionalization may well be taken as an important index
of its development. Many historians (and sociologists) have noted the import-
ance of the institutionalization of the sciences since the nineteenth century in
modern Western societies."
2. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BIOLOGY: MUCH ADO ABOUT WHAT, EXACTLY?

I have discerned, in the many versions of the history of 'biology', seven discrete
traditions, each one implicitly or explicitly representing a distinct manner of
understanding what biology might be. I shall examine each one successively.
It is clear that confusion has existed between creation of the word 'biology'
and creation of the science. Partly for this reason, many persons have noted
the creation of the word 'biologie' in German and French in late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries by T. G. A. Roose," K. F. Burdach (1776-
1847), Lamarck (1744-1829) and G. R. Treviranus (1776-1837).24 As
Salomon-Bayet has clearly stated, no organized science may exist before the
creation of the term that designates that science." Further, it should be added
that creation of a new word, and afortiori, creation of a new science, is usually
accompanied by some clear motivation, be it conceptual, strategic or other.
Creation of the words 'ecology', 'genetics', 'biochemistry', 'chronobiology',
and the term 'molecular biology', for example, are significant of the creation of
a new scientific locus which may henceforward be profitably invested in by
scientists, most often in response to or in opposition to pre-existing schools of
thought. The designation of these loci may mark the beginning of a period in
which production of a particular scientific discourse and attempts at its
institutionalization are clear." Creation of the word 'biology' indicates such a
point of departure.
The first historiographical tradition I examine takes the date 1802 as a
significant index. Some uncertainty exists within that tradition about whether
creation of the word 'biologie' in or about that year is equivalent to the
creation of a science called 'biologic'. I feel that conflation of creation of the
word with creation of the science results from a biased historical reconstruc-
tion. It is anomalous to name as 'biological', activities which an author living
in that period did not perceive or conceive as such. The following section is
based on a demonstration that 'biology' as a science was not considered a

226' JOSEPH A. CARON
reality by the scientists of the early nineteenth century. It was at best a project,
but a very poorly organized one if it did indeed exist.
2.1. The Archaeology of Biology: Unearthing or Reconstructing a Science?
To start my study of the histories to which these introductory critical remarks

are addressed, I shall take Michel Foucault's archaeological reconstruction. In
Les mots et les choses Foucault wishes to describe the emergence of the
conceptual conditions of possibility of a scientific discourse on life. This occurs
at the point when a discourse on life itself becomes possible, in other words at
the point of inflection signalled by the passage: "de la notion taxonomique a la
notion synthetique de vie."27 An abstract notion of life is then considered a
condition of possibility of biology. This science thus attained its seuil de
positivite in the Lecons d'anatomie comparee of Cuvier (1800-5).28
According to Foucault, the passage from natural history to biology
represents one aspect of the shattering of the classical ordering of knowledge
wherein description of living beings was founded on a fixed set of visible
characteristics, defined by the interplay of similarities and differences. One
instance of such ordering may be seen in the common characterizations of
living beings according to the number, form, proportion and position of the
parts of the living organism. The naturalist, then, studied the visible structure
of organisms, whereas the biologist was henceforth to examine internal
organization of living beings, that is, questions of the "rapports internes entre
des elements dont l'ensemble assure une fonction"." This transformation
permits establishment of a new perception of living beings. This is based on
postulation of a hierarchy in vital structures, and on links between discrete
characteristics of organisms and their functions: indeed, the very notion of life
may be formulated and studied scientifically once this transformation has
taken place, says Foucault. The strict parallelism between classification and
nomenclature is thereby undone, the common thread of words and things to
representation thus being broken.P Further, life becomes a fundamental
force," just as the opposition between organic and inorganic becomes
fundamental. 32
I do not question the importance of the transformation described by
Foucault." However, I do deny the validity of his conclusions as he links this
transformation to the constitution of a science called biology." Foucault's
history betrays a strong degree of conflation between biology and comparative
anatomy.
Foucault finds in Cuvier's Lecons d'anatomie comparee, and rightly so, a
new conception of life. This nonetheless does not support the idea that a new
conception of life receives its first expression here and thus attains its seuil de
positivite. It is not the Lecons which henceforth form the expression of a

"pratique discursive" or "un seul et meme systeme de formation des econces"

concerning life. 35 The Lecons are certainly fundamental for ensuing studies of
comparative anatomy: they mark a new departure. This is not the case in
respect of life. Salomon-Bayet rightly points out that for Cuvier:
il s'agit de similitudes de rapports, non d'objet commun. Ce sont les
correlations qui sont l'objet meme de la taxonomie, non l'unite vitale: ce
qui signifierait qu'il n'y a que des vivants chez Cuvier, qu'il n'y a pas a
proprement parler de 'biologic cuvierienne'iv
Foucault's response to this criticism is far from convincing.
For Foucault, the establishment of the "conditions of existence" of this
hypothetical Cuvierian biology is based on the premise that biology, the
science oflife, exists once it is formulated on an anatorno-physiological base."
Cuvier, he says, effected this integration of anatorno-physiology and taxo-
nomy, whereas a second type of "conditions of existence" for biology, external
conditions one might say, are dealt with by Darwin. In fact, Foucault goes on
to say, the relations between the organism and its milieu, the ecology of an
organism, are integrated into biology in the work of Darwin." So it can be
seen that in the passage from the classical order to new, historical, episteme
described by Foucault;'? "cette historicite, dans l'ordre de la biologie, a eu
besoin d'une histoire supplementaire qui devait enoncer les rapports de
l'individu et du milieu" .40
There is, of course, an important contradiction here. Foucault says that an
"'histoire' de la nature a pu se substituer a l'histoire naturelle" at the point
where the Great Chain of Being cedes its position of dominance to a ruptured
categorization of living beings. This new history of nature permits the
historicity of life, a necessary condition for Darwin, a condition created by
Cuvier. However, the historical perspective on life itself is necessary to
biology. In this case, biology was created not with Cuvier but with Darwin.
Ancther example of this difficulty is found when Foucault says that "I'objet
de la biologie est ce qui est capable de vivre et susceptible de mourir. Cette idee
renvoie a deux systemes possibles de conditions d'existence" ,41 that of Cuvier
and that of Darwin. The date at which Darwin made public his system is well
known.
The ambiguity on this point, in Foucault's work, is persistent. For instance,
one finds in the same author another interpretation which contradicts that just
examined. Foucault says that biology is founded solely on anatomical and
physiological analysis." In this perspective, the history of the living organism
would be unnecessary in biology.
There is a problem here. It is clear that for Foucault the new conception of
life created by Cuvier is double,

puisque c'est celui, interieur, des coherences anatomiques et des compati-

bilites physiologiques, et celui, exterieur, des elements ou il reside pour en
faire son corps propre. Mais ces deux espaces ont une commande unitaire:
ce n'est plus celui des possibilites de l'etre, c'est celIe des conditions de
vie."
Foucault recognizes, albeit implicitly, that an essential part of the conditions
for a discourse on life will only be described later, by Darwin. Cuvier's
contribution remains crucial, but one must conclude that Foucault's archae-
ology permits him at best to uncover only a part of the necessary conditions of
a biological science.
One more remark is necessary. I would not want my comments to be
misconstrued as an erroneous interpretation of Foucault's aims. After all,
according to his terms, "L'archeologie ne decrit pas des disciplines". "Bio-
logy" is the name given by Foucault to indicate a certain positivity defining
"selon quelles regles une pratique discursive peut former des groupes d'objets,
des ensembles d'enonciations, des jeux de concepts, des series de choix
theoriques".« One must then conclude that it is the rules, established by
comparative anatomy (and especially as laid out by Cuvier in his Leconsy;
which determined the limits of all scientific discourse on "life" since the
beginning of the nineteenth century. However, it is well known, though its
importance is little appreciated, that since that time there have been numerous
attempts to found a new synthetic science of life. Comparative anatomy
represents only one base among others for such an attempt."
Salomon-Bayet's criticism of Foucault's position is borne out by a close
examination of the Lecons d'anatomie comparee. Cuvier, for example, insists
on the necessity that physiologists be furnished reliable anatomical data, so
that they may understand the material bases ofliving phenomena, so that they
may measure the speed and direction of movements within organic bodies.
Life itself is the expression of the movements of the living body and of the
introduction and combination of external substances in this body. The living
organism expresses itself as a whole being. The separation of any parts of this
body will destroy the living being, says Cuvier. Thus, the best systematic
experiment is, in his opinion, based on the comparison of living organisms
between themselvesand in nature, "jusqu'a ce que l'on ait reconnu les rapports
constans entre leurs.structures et les phenomenes qu'ils manifestent"." This
introduction surely aims to give a wide scope to studies on living beings. How-
ever, one finds in the remainder of the Lecons the sole study of comparative
anatomy. This Cuvierian base, it must be repeated, provides one foundation
among others, on which will be constructed a scientific knowledge of life.
In conclusion, it is impossible to find in Cuvier's work a discourse labelled
'biology' dealing explicitly with "life"." One finds therein a fundamental

transformation in the history of comparative anatomy, but this clearly

constitutes, on the basis of Foucault's own evidence, but an incomplete
formulation of a science of 'biology'. Cuvier never, to the best of my
knowledge, used the word 'biology'. The criterion of the usage of the word
must be held as significant, though not conclusive, in the history of the
creation of a science.
Salomon-Bayet, on the other hand, offers a different archaeological recon-
struction of knowledge of life, albeit one which is akin to Foucault's analysis.
Salomon-Bayet states that "l'age classique des sciences de la vie"48 is created
through the institutionalized practice of systematic experimentation on living
beings. For this author, then, to identify the creation of the necessary
conditions for the appearance of a science of physiology, one must work
within an archaeological perspective on biology: "II s'agit ici de la prehistoire,
ou de l'archeologie de la biologie. II n'y a d'histoire en effet qu'a partir du
moment ou il y a terme ecrit, Pour la biologie, il faut attendre 1802, Lamarck,
Treviranus, et Burdach."49
There remains, nonetheless, an ambiguity in Salomon-Bayet's text as
concerns relations between experimentation, experimental physiology, and
biology. One gets the impression that "une des formes de la positivite
proprement biologique", which she sees as necessarily experimental.v is
something more than simply one possibility among others in the creation of
biology, but rather the only crucial form representing its seuil de positivite.
Note that, according to Salomon-Bayet, although observations and exper-
iments are made on living beings in the classical discourse and especially in the
eighteenth century, "sont absentes la maladie, la guerison, la mort, comme en
est absente une theorie quelconque de l'organisme [.] [Le] vivant est l'objet
pratique de l'experience, sans speculation sur la vie: s'il y a science de la vie,
c'est dans la theorie de cette pratique."51
In Salomon-Bayet's view, one sees emerging here the epistemic structure of
experimental physiology "et d'une future biologiev.? In short, this road,
through physiology," announces the creation of biological science with Bichat
(1771-1802).54
It is surprising, then, that the biology which Bichat is said to have created is
not described in L'institution of Salomon-Bayet. Instead, in a shorter text,"
she suggests that life science, organized around a therapeutic aim, is created by
Bichet and developed "de l'histologie a la cytologie, de Bichat a R. Virchow".
So, for Salomon-Bayet, the starting point of biology in France lies in creation
of a "science du 'vivant eIementaire''', tightly allied to medical practice and to
experimental physiology. This origin of biological science would then hinge on
"la recherche du vivant elementaire, totalite organisee ou element specifique
d'un tout organise, objet et fin de ce savoir d'un type nouveau que les
naturalistes ont appele alors, mais a cote, biologie". 56

Salomon-Bayet omits, however, to describe this peculiar context in which

Bichat is said to have created the science of biology, which was named by
naturalists and whose study was finally pursued by others. The precise
intellectual articulation of biology's position, somewhere between histology
and cytology, could well be of great interest. Given Salomon-Bayet's silence
on these questions, however, further analysis must be held in abeyance.
2.2. Philosophic Physiology in France
In the second historical tradition I examine, the central focus is on the

beginnings of biology among life sciences in France, in 1802 or some time
after. (It is the distinctiveness of the archaeological analysis of Foucault that
justifies its demarcation from the present section, which deals with a similar
time and place.) The year 1802 marks, in this view, either the birth of the
science or the beginning of a period of intense scientific work done with the
objective of creating this synthetic science of life. I shall now examine the bases
for this view.
For Joseph Schiller the notion of organization constitutes a fundamental
shared character in all living beings. For him, the notion of organization
constitutes the very foundation of biology. It is Aristotle who ostensibly
showed this notion to be synonymous with life, making him the father of
biology." However, it is Lamarck, on the basis of conceptual developments of
the eighteenth century who, within this historical tradition, actually created
the science of biology. This science, it is said, was founded on three principal
elements: the notion of organization which permitted the unification of
animals and plants within the organismic realm, organization itself being
synonymous with life; a dynamic analysis of nature, breaking with the static
view prevalent up to the seventeenth century; and the notion of transfers
between solids and fluids, recognized as a distinctive mark of living beings.
"All other aspects of biology result from the merging of these components of
which only Lamarck had a total insight."58 It is in a text entitled "La Biologie"
that Lamarck is supposed to have most clearly expressed these ideas. In this
case, the date of publication of this document, 1944 (sic), is of the highest
relevance. Unless this text circulated as a clandestine document, a very early
form of "samizdat", and no one has yet claimed this, one is obliged to discount
the importance of this document in the history of the creation of a new,
biological perspective in the scientific community.
Given these facts, the reader will understand my refusal to admit Lamarck
as having had any determining influence on the outcome of the new science of
biology. Indeed, if Lamarck was perhaps more interested than his contempor-
aries in the notion of organization, and if one admits that this notion is a
prerequisite and a foundation of biological science, Schiller's characterization

of Lamarck's life science as materialist and evolutionary would still lead one to
expect "little interest ... in Lamarc.k's biology and evolutionism"." In my
opinion, the problem resides not only in the lack of interest for this science, but
also in the lack of its development in the work of Lamarck.
In 1802 Lamarck introduces in a most summary fashion his notion of the
science of biology. Studied ip conjunction with meteorology and hydrogeology
with the aim of understanding all terrestrial phenomena, biology's particular
object of study is stated as being "tout ce qui a rapport aux corps vivans, et
particulierement a leur organisation, a ses developpemens", etc. 60 In 1809
Lamarck publishes what he calls a re-made, corrected and augmented edition
of his Recherches of 1802,61 in which he incorporates information from a text
called Biologie that he will not be able to publish.v In the introduction to his
Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertebres (1815), Lamarck states clearly
that no science exists which is devoted to the knowledge of living beings, to life
and to the various faculties of living beings. And this is so despite the fact that
living organisms
offrent en eux, et dans les phenomenes divers qu'ils presentent, les
materiaux d'une science particuliere qui n'est pas encore fondee, qui n'a
pas rneme de nom, dont j'ai propose quelques bases dans rna Philosophie
zoologique, et a laquelle je donnerai Ie nom de BiologieP
It is clear, then, that Lamarck himself did not believe that he had succeeded
in founding a science of biology. Grasse, while situating between 1809 and
1815 the origin of the manuscript noted above, suggested that this negative
evaluation of the state of biology could be explained by the relatively weak
memory of Lamarck of his own contributions. It is rather Lamarck who wins
in this debate. The previously unpublished text discovered by Grasse adds
substantially nothing to that which Lamarck had proposed to develop under
the title of 'biology'. Not only did Lamarck's Biologie never see the light of
day, but, as well, "its format was never realized in any of Lamarck's other
writings"." Indeed, Burkhardt's study shows clearly the very minor place
which the idea of biology occupied in the work of Lamarck. One must
conclude that the various texts of Lamarck simply served to offer up a certain
idea of a new scientific domain to explore, without Lamarck contributing
thereto any precise and detailed substance.
Though the biology of Lamarck did not succeed in sparking interest in his
contemporaries for such a science, Schiller notes that there was indeed strong
interest in the nineteenth century for the idea of a synthetic life science. A long
list of individuals and names may be mentioned in connection with the more-
or-less systematic attempts at founding a synthetic science of life: F. Tiede-
mann (1808), physiologie, biologie or organonomie; K. A. Rudolphi (1821),
zoonomie; H. D. de Blainville (1825),physiologie, (1829 and 1836),physiologie

or biologie; H. Royer-Collard (1828), zoonomie; M. Fodera (1826), biologie; F.

Tiedemann (1831), physiologie; A. Comte (1838), biologie; Is. Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire (1854-56), histoire naturelle generale; G. Jaeger (1871), zoologie
generale; and F. Hoppe-Seyler (1877), biologie generale» I would add C.C.E.
Schmid (1798), zoonomie.» and the teleomechanists about whom I will have
more to say presently. According to Schiller, there seems to exist in all these
attempts a common motif, that of wishing to ascertain "'die Lehre von dem
Leben', 'les lois de la vie', and 'the laws of organic life'."67
This goal, once again according to Schiller, is finally achieved in the unifying
science called general physiology. Schiller pushes his point by attempting to
show that the notion of organization facilitated the separation of the taxono-
mic and physiological traditions, and consequently, the creation of a unitary
science of life, general physiology, founded upon the triple unity of structure,
of fundamental proqerties, and of physiological mechanisms linking animals
and plants. It is Dutrochet (1776-1847) who succeeded in creating the "idea"
of this science.w the history of which remains to be written.w
In a shorter chapter on "Physiology and biology" in which Schiller
enumerates many examples of the usage of the term biology in the nineteenth
century, these usages widely varying in meaning one from the other, Schiller
concludes simply that there has been a confusion between the two terms. This
confusion did not, however, slow progress in physiology (sic), says Schiller. It
is only in the twentieth century that biology "emerged with its modern
meaning";" whereas general physiology was constituted on the basis estab-
lished by Dutrochet. In fact, the origin of biology as a science is nowhere
described, much less explained, by Schiller. After having described this
profusion of terms which swept over the nineteenth century - terms designat-
ing a life science - Schiller rectifies his own terminology and states that what
was really in question was the science of general physiology."
In this context I shall now discuss the description made by Pickstone of the
new physiological work done at the Museum d'Histoire Naturelle.P He points
out that the physiology of the 1820s in France had a very wide connotation,
encompassing studies which we should probably call comparative, environ-
mental, pathological, developmental, chemical, physical and experimental
studies. Pickstone states that a new biologie was announced at this time,
inspired by German preoccupations in the life sciences (preoccupations of
unspecified character) and by the new experimental physiology with its
characteristically wide perspective. Pickstone suggests that this announcement
was favoured by the slow institutional development of the new physiology in
France at that time. Thus, for Pickstone, it is in Dutrochet's hands that the
biological spirit was most clearly exploited, despite the fact that for Pickstone
as for Schiller, "[Dutrochet] was not ... a biologiste in a strict early nineteenth-
century sense. He was a physiologist."73

Pickstone then proceeds to identify two other candidates to the title of key
promoter, if not founder, of biology. De Blainville (1777-1850) and Michele
Fodera are considered "early crusader[s] for the new science of biologie".
Pickstone unfortunately furnishes no other precise characterization of this
science."
It is indeed true that de Blainville showed a marked interest for a general
and synthetic science of life." On the question of a biologie as such, however,
his interest seems much less evident. As an example of this, it is significant that
the subject of biologie is discussed only in the third volume of his Histoire des
sciences de l'organisation, in the context of a discussion of the influence and
importance of Lamarck. One looks in vain, here, for a plea in favour of the
science of biology. It would be better to characterize this as a commentary
concerning divergences in methodology." This then confirms the absence of
continuity between Lamarck and de Blainville as regards production of a
biological discourse.
Fodera, on the other hand, develops a certain idea of biology ("science de la
vie") which he plans to expand upon in an "ouvrage qui, depuis long-temps,
est l'objet de nos meditations et Ie but de nos recherches. Cet ouvrage est un
peu avance... ";77 but one must conclude on the basis of present information
that this planned work never saw the light of day.
In a text in which he examines only humans (Man, as he says, "l'etre Ie plus
sublime et Ie plus complexe")," Fodera describes the nature of the general
principles which one should attempt to identify through the study of living
beings. Fodera wishes to construct an energetic science which would enable
one better "mettre chaque phenomene a sa place, d'apres la complication des
actions et des circonstances qui les accompagnent"."? He distinguishes that
which is physical, chemical and vital, on the basis that recognition of the
particularities of the living organism is necessary as much for the understand-
ing of the internal actions (or functions) of the body as for understanding of
the actions of external agents. Nutrition, the aim of all assimilatory functions,
and the development of the organism must also be studied within the scope of
biology, but Fodera gives no further elaboration on the particular methods
which he favours.
Biological energetics, or the biological aspect of energetics, studies that
which is peculiar to life, that which in the animal "concourt, conspire,
consent" in an absolutely unique fashion.w Thus, animal life, life in general
and even social life are part of this science, albeit that "la biologie, dans cet
ouvrage [n'est] envisagee que sous Ie rapport medical" .81 It is important to
note, finally, that in Fodera's terms, biology is considered in opposition to
physiology.v In conclusion, then, from Fodera's pen one can only find this
rather enigmatic speech on biology, accompanied by three appendices and two
tables on classification of the sciences. Fodera promises for "plus tard" the

publication of a plan "d'instruction publique pour les sciences et les hautes

etudes, surtout pour les sciences medicales"," where, one m~y presume,
biology was to have its place.
If this is the beginning of the crusade of which Pickstone speaks, the most
generous thing one might say about it is that the skills of its organizers were
sorely lacking. One could not call Fodera's text programmatic; nor does it
seem to have had any enduring effects in the scientific milieu or elsewhere. As
far as de Blainville is concerned, it is certain that he did have some success in
transmitting his particular perspective on a synthetic view of life, one which I
shall examine shortly. However, in general terms, one must, I feel, conclude
that the position ofa science of biology is very weak in the writings and actions
of Fodera and de Blainville. Pickstone's work does not convince one of the
contrary.
Another individual of the same period who used the word 'biology' and was
probably one of the major figures in spreading its usage, was Auguste Comte
(1798-1857). In his Cours de philosophie positive, Comte describes this new
science whose most clear expression is to be found in de Blainville.
Comte encompasses in his biology physiology, anatomy and a third,
fundamental and indissociable, aspect, a theory of the interactions between the
organism and its environment. It is the interaction between structures and
internal functions of the organism on the one hand and the external milieu on
the other, which produce the typical phenomena of 1ife. 84
This biology, "vraiment fondamentale", must be distinguished from
another utilization of the "denomination de biologie" which is also seen at
times in Comte's positive philosophy "pour designer sommairement l'ensem-
ble de l'etude reelle des corps vivans, envisages sous tous les divers aspects
generaux qui leur sont propres"." Comte, then, sees a dual utilization of the
term 'biologie'; it refers both to an encompassing or synthetic and fundamen-
tal science and to the ensemble of the life sciences. Comte wishes to pursue his
examination of a synthetic science of biology in his courses; and the study of
this science commences in the fortieth lesson.
At the beginning of that lesson Comte discusses the steps that marked the
progress of physiology or biologyw toward the state of a positive science." In
this discussion Comte does not distinguish between the terms 'biology' and
'physiology'. Indeed, his discussion in this area contains some degree of
confusion. For instance, Comte says that biology (sic) is well enough advanced
that one could envisage pursuing it without any regard for particular appli-
cations such as medicine. Such applications, he says, would only serve to make
it less free. Thus, Comte continues, physiology (sic) would develop a properly
scientific character, in isolation from any equivocation potentially caused by a
close relationship with medicine and its immediate and practical needs." The
two terms, it is clear, are interchangeable."

According to Comte, again, the general aim of biological science lies in the
formulation and elaboration of laws of life, of distinctly biological principles.
The fundamental conditions for life are to be found in a kind of harmony
between the living organism and its environment, and following de Blainville,
in continuous, reciprocal, internal movement, entailing organic composition
and decomposition. According to Comte, biology must yet establish the
precise link between the "conflit vital et l'acte meme",90 to give a sense to the
rapports existing between the organ or organ part and the function or the act.
Though some characteristics of the living world lend themselves to physical
and chemical analysis (the acts of organic life, for instance), others do not (for
example, cerebral and nervous functions). Concerning these latter functions,
Comte explains their existence by referring to elementary principles of
irritability and sensitivity, "profondement distinguees de to ute propriete
physique"."
In final analysis, then, it is clear that Comte attempts to establish a
philosophy of living organisms and of life based primarily, but not solely, on
physiology. In the six lessons in which Comte discusses this question,
ambiguity reigns absolute concerning the use of the words 'biology' and
'physiology' .
This terminological ambiguity persists in France for a long time after
Comte, most probably on account of his teachings. The Societe de Biologie,
for instance, founded at the end of the 1840s and directed by Dr Charles Robin
(1821-85), publishes Memoires and Compte-rendus of the Society. These
publications disclose a clear and undisguised interest of its members for
physiological and medical questions, and in particular for human pathology
and physiology. Biology is therein treated in a medical perspective, albeit that
the Society seems to have been founded in opposition to a rigid clinical
perspective.v As Robin points out, the title of the Society was chosen as an
expression of the need for physiological and pathological knowledge produced
without regard to immediate or practical application. Pathology having been
recognized as worthy of study, normality must now be given its due, says he. 93
However, Robin admits candidly, "l'art medical... est pour nous le plus
important, celui vers lequel tendent naturellement to us nos travaux'I.P'
In France this ambiguity continues between biology and another general
science of life called, variously, physiology, experimental physiology, or
general physiology, all pursued in a medically-oriented vein, as may be seen in
the works of Claude Bernard (1813-78). Schiller, for example, says:
The object of general physiology is the study of phenomena common to all
living organisms independently of the simplicity or complexity of their
structure and dependence on definite taxonomic groups. This notion
clearly expressed by Dutrochet is part of Claude Bernard's definition: it is

the science that analyses the phenomena occurring concurrently in man,

animals and vegetables."
For Claude Bernard, in 1864, biology is synonymous with physiology; he
defines this latter science as "the science that deals with the phenomena
manifested by living beings, the science of life, biology as it is frequently
called" .96
The following year, in his Introduction a l'etude de la medecine experimen-
tale, Bernard explains the nature and the value of his experimental physiologi-
cal (sic) approach which, alone, will enable the foundation of a scientific basis
for medicine. Biology, which encompasses both physiology and medicine,"
cannot, however, yet produce valid and rigorous generalizations, its base not
yet being solid enough. For Bernard, it is experimentation that will give a solid
basis to biology." We see, then, that biology which hardly existed in 1865
according to Bernard, reposes on the same basis as physiology.
In conclusion, then, this partial picture of the case in France gives us a
rather complex portrait. Some interesting generalizations may nonetheless be
drawn.
The term 'biology' is often used in tandem with 'physiology': there is
confusion between the two terms. Biological science seems to repose, primar-
ily, on physiological bases. The historiography of life sciences in France
indicates no institutionalization of biology, except for one brief, enigmatic
reference of Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire'" and, as already described, the
Societe de Biologie with its predominantly medical perspective. I conclude,
then, that there is not sufficient evidence to support a claim for the existence, in
nineteenth century France, of a science called 'biology' answering to the
criteria mentioned earlier in this paper. In particular, there is no evidence of
clear and distinctive content of a science called 'biology'. There is no consistent
debate concerning the existence or the premises of such a science. Finally,
although there is some evidence of institutionalization of an activity labelled
'biological', this pertains to medical and physiological questions and does not,
in fact, show continued institutional support.
There is at this time in France, however, a marked interest for some general
and synthetic science concerning life. Many attempts were made to found such
a science, 'physiology' having certainly the greatest success.I'"
The project of a general science of life, possible as of the beginning of the
century, as Foucault has pointed out, attracts interest and circulated, though
in a limited fashion, under many names, as I have mentioned. In each case
examined above, however, the synthetic life science is constituted of practices
and discourses developed under the name of a science other than 'biology'.
The most elaborate project for the constitution of a general science of life in
France bears the name 'physiology'. Not surprisingly, the scientists who

attempt to further the project of a synthetic and encompassing science of

physiology do so in the context of an extension of their own scientific
activities. Indeed, one might quite legitimately ask why a physiologist such as
Dutrochet would wish to promote a biological science. It is perhaps not simply
chance which gave to a philosopher the task of formulating in France the first
explicit bases of a 'biological' science. Comte called this science dealing with
life, 'biology', and did so on reasonable epistemological and etymological
bases; this cannot obscure the ambiguous linguistic heritage left by Comte, due
surely in part to his frankly 'physiological' sources.
De Blainville, as shown above, uses the term 'biology' only sparingly.
Magendie (1783-1855), in 1836, adds to a previously given definition of the
science of physiology the word 'biology' as a synonym; at the same time, in his
discussion of the content of this science, only human physiology is included in
its scope.'?' As for Dutrochet, he also holds dear the idea of founding a general
science of life. His project does not bear the name 'biology'.I 02
The above elements indicate that one must seriously question, in terms of a
history of biology, the relevance of existing histories of life sciences in France.
2.3. Life Sciences in Germany: Treviranus, No Real Claim
I shall now examine a German case, also part of the historical vein which takes
1802 as a significant date. G. R. Treviranus, it has been pointed out, was one
of the co-founders of the word biology.
According to Hoppe, Treviranus's six-volume Biologie had "une grande
influence en Allemagne't.!" However, Hoppe's presentation of Treviranus's
role in creating a 'biological' perspective is not at all convincing. Hoppe
mentions that Treviranus is cited in four texts between 1807 and 1811, and
then again in 1839. This author affirms, without demonstration, that "le mot
'Biologic' et certains principes de la theorie scientifique de Treviranus ont
connu une large diffusion". Following immediately, however, Hoppe admits
that this diffusion or influence was probably ("vraisemblablement") due to
Treviranus's sources rather than to his own work.'?"
Lenoir provides further indications ofTreviranus's relative unimportance in
the creation of a 'biological' science.!" Lenoir shows that in Germany, from
the end of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, life sciences
are dominated by a teleo-mechanistic framework developed in absence of
vitalism. Founded in a Kantian philosophical cadre, the work of Blumenbach
(1752-1840) and his students, including Treviranus, served to lay a solid base
for three successive research programs within which were discussed a number
of issues crucial to the constitution of a general science of life.
Lenoir's position is justly considered as a major historical reconstruction,
lending a new richness to our knowledge of German life sciences in the

nineteenth century. My discussion is limited, however, to some problems

concerning Treviranus's position with relation to a biological science.
Treviranus did indeed, in his Biologie, formulate proposals for the basis of a
new synthetic science of life, but no information, to my knowledge, has been
presented supporting the affirmation that he expended effort "to found a new
science" .106 Indeed, it would seem that Lenoir became aware of this, because in
a later version of this same story, the above-mentioned affirmation disappears.
Even more, Treviranus's contribution, all told, is cast in a much more subdued
light. "The groundwork for this general science of organic form was to be
found in the Biologie of Treviranus, but the principles of the new organic
physics had been laid by Kielmeyer. "107 As well, Lenoir implicitly avows the
weakness of 'biological' science after Treviranus when he says: "Having stated
their vision of biology as a unified program for investigating the organic
world, the 'biologists' were forced just as quickly to retreat from it."IOS
Lenoir's history nonetheless provides important and substantial bases from
which to question at least one element of heretofore accepted historiography:
the position that says it was necessary to eliminate teleological thinking before
creation of a synthetic science of life. Lenoir's history remains closely linked,
however, to another important historiographical tradition which is based on
the affirmation of the crucial importance of the Darwinian elaboration of
evolutionary theory in the constitution of a life science.!" Indeed, Lenoir is
quite willing to accept the main lines of conventional historiography according
to which biology's founding had to await evolutionism. 110 Yet, contrary to his
own claims,'!' the science of 'biology' proper is absent from Lenoir's history.
He describes certain scientific positions as "biological", but does so without
justification.
To resume briefly, then, this German case shows many similarities with the
situation previously described for France. There is, in Germany, a clear
interest in the creation of some unified theory of the life sciences,':" and some
scientists call this unified approach 'physiologie'i'" As this interest for
physiological synthesis is documented by Lenoir in the case of scientists active
in developing a science of organic formI": the relevance and interest of
examining the production of a science of biology in such a context becomes all
the more acute.
Why, indeed, create a new science? Although the production of a general
and synthetic science of life is clearly of great interest throughout the
nineteenth century (implying much more competition between scientists on the
subject), an important question mark remains. What would push scientists to
create this synthetic science outside of their own area of specialization? In my
reading of Lenoir, Treviranus's science of biologie is completely lost in the
enormously detailed scientific work necessary to the production of the
teleomechanist synthesis. Teleomechanism does seem to bear comparison with

evolutionism as a key synthetic guide in the nineteenth century, pursued with

the aim of understanding the problem of biological organization. I IS
This situation, however, as in France, leads one to seriously question the
existence, in the nineteenth century, of any science called 'biology' .116 It seems
more reasonable to propose that in these cases, when unification of the life
sciences was an aim seriously considered, it was meant to be based on the
furthering of existing avenues of specialized research, followed by develop-
ment of the consequently greater capacity of generalization possible.
2.4. Evolutionary Biology: Only a Loose Connection
The theory of natural selection of Charles Darwin (1809-82) is the focal point
of a fourth historical tradition which claims to account for the history of
biology. No historian of the life sciences would for a moment entertain the
thought of denying the crucial influence of Darwinian theory in the constitu-
tion of the general theoretical framework of the modern life sciences. The full
acceptance of that fact does not, though, for an instant constitute any
argument in favour of the creation of the science of 'biology' on the basis of
evolutionary theory. A proper reading of the relevant histories cannot but
show the reader the immense confusion which exists therein between biology
and evolutionism.'!"
Darwin, to the best of my knowledge, used the word 'biology' only twice.!"
Thus, the paternity of 'biological' science may only be attributed to Darwin in
virtue of an erroneous historical interpretation. This interpretation, under-
standably, is based on the very real predominance or strong influence of the
evolutionary cadre in almost all life sciences, and that since its first formula-
tion by Darwin and Wallace.
Mayr, for example, sees biology as founded on evolutionism. In this
perspective, biology was unified by Darwinian thinking especially as refined by
the New Synthesis (1936-47),119 and is analysed in relation to the various
problems which scientists had to deal with in this specific framework. Despite
an expressed interest in the study of the origin of the science of biology, 120 the
question is simply not addressed. One is left with the impression that without
conflating evolutionary thinking and biology!" Mayr nonetheless thinks of
evolutionism as the cornerstone and the sine qua non of modern biological
thought. 122
Churchill concludes, on reading The Darwinian revolution, that Ruse
"provides a convincing argument that Darwin and his supporters fashioned
the modern English profession of biology".123 And yet, as the title so well
expresses, the only issue at hand in this book is Darwinian evolutionism. The
word 'biology' does not even appear in the index of the book!

Biology, in these two examples and in other cases, is defined by association

with evolutionism, in a manner similar to those cases seen previously, where
biology was associated with comparative anatomy, with general or experimen-
tal physiology, or with the teleomechanist science of organic form. Further,
this association is made for the most part in an implicit fashion. This is
possible, in most cases probably, because the origins and the constitution of
'biological' science are simply not considered problematic.
2.5. Biology at the Junction of Many Specialized Research Areas: Some

Suggestions
This next historical tradition I examine, although solely based on conceptual

analysis, leads nonetheless to problematization of the beginnings of 'biology'.
One does not find therein a description of the precise context of emergence of
the new biological perspective. Description of conceptual change, in other
words, is not linked to an analysis of the transformations on the social or
institutional level.
Important insights may however be obtained, for instance, from Charles
Singer's work. Singer, as with so many others, does not in the first instance
consider the question of the origin or the beginning of biology as problematic.
So, biology, for him, starts with the Greeks and passes through many key and
remarkable developments. Yet he does point out one particularly important
break in continuity, "about the year 1860": this is the beginning of the modern
period.'> Singer points to a complete upheaval of the dominant perspective on
living organisms in the twenty years following 1860, a change he describes with
reference to new conceptual elements dominant in life sciences. The conceptual
keys to this transformation are: the rapprochement of the scientific study of
animals and plants, based notably on the discovery of common elements as
concerns their reproduction, nutrition and respiration; the common nature of
their basic substance, protoplasm; the disappearance of the possession of
chloroplasts as the absolute criterion separating animals and plants; the
formulation of the cell theory and the common characteristic of cellular
division and conjugation in animals and plants; the formulation of evolution-
ary theory and the subsequent production of an ecological perspective; and the
formulation of the theory of biogenesis. 125
The diversity of positions making up the science of biology is also mentioned
by Coleman'> though he approaches the problem of the constitution of the
science of biology in a most general fashion. For him, "what had been but a
hopeful term in 1800 had become a vigorous and autonomous science by
1900."127 Coleman has little to say by way of explanation of the process
whereby this transformation occurred. The effect, he says, is the creation of "a

body of men who were recognizably biologists and whose subject, embracing a
multitude of specialities, was biology't.!" .
Like Singer, Coleman deals with specialized researches said to be constitu-
tive of biology. Coleman thus reviews the major gains made in the nineteenth
century concerning comparative anatomy, cellular theory, tissue doctrine,
embryology, physiological researches, evolutionism, and studies on humans
and on the place of humans in nature.
Biology, in this view, refers to a rather large ensemble of specialized
researches (Singer) and to research a multi-disciplinary origins (Coleman). In
the cases of both Coleman and Singer, despite lack of real problematization of
the notion of biology, their studies point in a direction which questions the
specific conditions and the significance of the creation of a science called
'biology'.
Perhaps one finds indices of answers which could be furnished to such
questioning in D. E. Allen's work. According to Allen, the second half of the
nineteenth century is marked by a growing cleavage between natural history
and the new science of biology. For him, the criterion of "professionalism" is
particularly characteristic of the supporters of biology.!" The representative
par excellence of this new tendency is T. H. Huxley. Farber suggests that the
new science of biology results, in the nineteenth century, from a series of
gradual changes within natural history, related to its empirical base, its
theoretical framework, its institutions, its practitioners and its public.'> These
suggestions remain, unfortunately, too schematic to be of much assistance.
One thus finds in this fifth historiographical tradition clear indices of an
important transformation. The science of biology, created in the nineteenth
century, is seen to be concerned with many areas of specialized research. This
science would seem to maintain links with other disciplines dealing with living
organisms and life, links which remain to be better characterized.
2.6. A "New American Biology": Skirting the Issue
The debate over what has been called, with some lack of precision, a "new
American biology" may serve to illustrate some of these links between biology
and more specialized areas of research mentioned in the previous section.
Garland Allen sparked this debate when he proposed that T. H. Morgan's
work, indissociable from a "historical struggle" between naturalist and
experimentalist traditions, led to the creation of a "new American biology".
Striking though this claim may appear, it needs to be said that (a) 'biology per
se, as a distinct science, hardly enters into the analytical picture at all; and (b)
the major element of this debate turns about the nature of scientific change, in
general and more specificallyin turn-of-the-century USA. I shall try to address
these two issues at the same time.

Allen's use of the term 'biology' is, implicitly, non-problematic: a most

disappointing characteristic of a text where, with some discernment, sensitivity
is otherwise shown toward the particular status of sciences in their own
development.!" In reading Allen's work, one is left with the impression that
biology's very existence is in no way questioned. Further, if this science
undergoes a major transformation in subject matter and methodology about
the tum of the twentieth century, it is because physiology (sic), in a frankly
experimental perspective, relies henceforth on physico-chemical methods.
Physiology succeeds thus in influencing all of the life sciences and gains
dominance in an imaginary life sciences hierarchy. Biology, understood as a
generic term, thus undergoes a transformation: towards experimentation and
radically distancing itself from its natural historical past.
The "revolt from morphology" described by Allen does not really concern a
'biological' science in the least. In this context one must question the identity
of the object under study. It is not a science called 'biology', but rather specific
and, certainly, important changes in specialized life sciences such as physio-
logy, genetics and experimental zoology.
Though one reads that "[w]ith Jacques Loeb, Morgan became an outspoken
advocate of 'the new biology''', 132 Allen never identifies the origin of the
designation "new biology". I must presume, then, that it is his own. So, once
again, it is the historian who reads his own understanding into the past.!" Of
course, labels - such as 'biology' - may be used for convenience, but they
should not obscure understanding events as they occurred. The "new biology"
claimed by Allen has neither texts nor names nor institutions attached to it, at
least not until the late 'twenties. And were one to accept Allen's claims for the
importance of Morgan's circa 1928 offensive in favour of creating a "division
or department of biology",134 one could easily point out that Morgan was
cetainly not the sole life scientist to have pretensions at that time of founding
the science dealing with living beings and life, in the United States and
elsewhere. Since that is the case, it would be necessary to examine the relative
values of the various claims on this account. Neither Allen nor his critics deal
with this issue.
Allen's critics are not as unquestioning as Allen himself on the notion of a
scienceof biology, but their data for strong claims for a specifically 'biological'
perspective are perhaps not quite solid enough.
In Jane Maienschein's view, 'biology' is not unproblematic. On the other
hand, Maienschein's main concern is solely the "emergence of 'modern'
American embryology't )» Maienschein's description of Ross Harrison's
embryology and its extraordinary innovativeness are based on little from
'biology' per se. For instance, Maienschein refers to Coleman's fairly vague
characterization of biology's nineteenth century itinerary as partial founda-
tion for her claim of relative autonomy for biology in late nineteenth century.

Unclear references to "labelling" in journals and institutions provide further

supposed support for her position. Finally, Harrison's rejection of "evolution-
ary constraints", in opposition to other identified leaders of "biology" of the
period, permits Maienschein to conflate Harrison's "biological concern with
seeking explanations of developmental processes" .136
Maienschein's studies nonetheless serve to show that, so far as embryologi-
cal study is concerned, it is not completely valid to argue for such radical and
rapid change as Allen pointed to. Her work gives a more balanced picture of
changing commitments and assumptions, as she puts it.
Turn-of-the-century biology holds special significance precisely because a
number of Americans sought to establish a unified science of biology that
would break down the old antagonisms: between field and laboratory
workers, between zoologists and medical researchers, between evolutio-
nists and physiologists, for example. They did not deny that different
individuals ought to do different research, of course, but they sought to
redefine what they considered appropriate assumptions about problems
and methods.!"
Still it merits repeating that the particular role of a 'biological' science in these
transformations, be they radical or progressive, is not elucidated by
Maienschein.!"
Benson's work, particularly that of 1985, begins to address some of the
issues more crucial to the history of 'biology'. As Churchill correctly points
out, "the most intriguing aspect of Benson's paper consists of the repeated
suggestion, unfortunately not fully developed, that morphology and physio-
logy are complementary sciences'"!" Though this issue does seem crucial (I
shall return to it later), it is left aside in Benson's study. This is perhaps due to
the target of this paper, that is, Garland Allen's position. Benson wishes,
above all, to re-establish the importance of the study of morphology at the
turn of the century. He does this effectively, though perhaps to the detriment
of a balanced view of the place of morphology within the life sciences.
Benson's crucial comparison of the number of doctorates produced in
physiology and in morphology constitutes very stong evidence in favour of a
relative balance in the Johns Hopkins biology programme. Yet there still
appears to be some confusion in Benson's position.
Benson says (without reference) that "it was decided that the new biology
department [at Johns Hopkins University] was to be basically a physiology-
oriented department and not a department of 'Natural History or Biology' as
Gilman had initially proposed't.!" Yet, as Benson mentions, H. Newell
Martin, chosen to head the department, disagreed with this plan!
How, then, should one explain the outcome of a fairly balanceddepartment,
an outcome that Benson goes to some pains to demonstrate? Is it because

Martin is, simply, sufficiently head-strong? Is it, rather, Gilman who decides
not to follow through with his own plans? If so, why? Or is there some other
reason for Benson to affirm that "the disparity between [Martin and Brooks]
and their respective areas in biology was not indicative of any overt depart-
ment preference for physiology'tt'"
Nonetheless, it seems that T. H. Huxley's suggestions were followed, and
that the co-author - Martin - of the first practical text-book of biology-
the well-known "Huxley & Martin" - was able to put into practice what he
had learnt earlier in England, under the influence of Huxley and Michael
Foster. 142
Once again, in this account, the question of the history of a distinct science
of biology is, if not ignored, at least not clearly elucidated. Some interesting
leads are suggested but not followed up adequately enough to inform us more
about the science called 'biology'. And though Churchill seems to have
understood the limitations of the texts he is reviewing, he simply suggests we
search further for the answers.w
Pauly searched'< and offers, "in contrast" to the studies just mentioned, a
different perspective on the history of the new American 'biology', one which
ostensibly explores "the process whereby biology acquired the status of a core
discipline in America't.!" Pauly links the creation of graduate biology pro-
grammes to laboratory science-based medical schools, the conditions for the
creation of biology programmes consisting of both the presence of an "ideal of
'biomedical' science" and an on-going inability to realize that ideal. l46
I shall briefly review two cases described in this analysis, that of Harvard
where, according to Pauly, biology does not succeed in implanting itself, and
Johns Hopkins where it does.
At Harvard, C. S. Minot was apparently interested in promoting work
which could be considered fundamental "for a theory 'of the ultimate and
essential nature of life'" .147 It is not clear, though, that Minot ever called such
work 'biology'. An unsuccessful attempt in 1881 to create a broad-ranged
introductory course within the medical programme is mentioned. But Minot's
attempts to bring the Harvard medical faculty to toe an ill-defined biological
line are not sufficiently well documented to be convincing.
At Johns Hopkins, according to Pauly, President Gilman, in working out
the original, internal, disciplinary arrrangements in life sciences, contacted T.
H. Huxley. Huxley's suggestions were eventually followed, as was his recom-
mendation for the first personnel in the department of biology. H. N. Martin,
Huxley's candidate, introduces into the Hopkins undergraduate curriculum
the course of "elementary biology" he developed with Huxley. This course, far
from being, as Pauly claims, based on a fortuitous link between physiology
and morphology.w follows a strategy developed in the South Kensington

predecessor of this course (see Section 2.7). There, physiology and morpho-
logy were taken to be complementary and indissociable in the unified field of
biology. Such an introductory course was deemed essential in furnishing a
comprehensive, elementary overview common to all life sciences.
Local institutional arrangements were surely of importance at Hopkins as
elsewhere. However, Pauly's documentary basis seems too weak to justify the
claim that a major conceptual foundation of biology, "the link between
physiology and morphology", was due to the unplanned distance of science
from medicine in the Johns Hopkins institutional scheme.!"
Discussion of the conceptual basis of 'biology' was, however, widespread on
the American scene about this time.
C. O. Whitman says in 1887 that, insofar as concerns
general aims and principles which should determine the organization of a
biological department, ... the nearest approach to an ideal organization is
to be found in German universities. The biological sciences are distributed
among five separate institutes, called, respectively, the botanical, the
zoological, the physiological, the anatomical, and the pathological. ISO
Thus, to adequately cover the subjects comprised under the rubric of
biology, a large number of professors might'!' be necessary in a well-endowed
university setting. (Pauly examines some institutional bases for Whitman's
relative failure in establishing such an ideal biological programme at the
University of Chicago.) Whitman points out that in American universities,
"biology is a word of many meanings". He accuses some few of "ftourish[ing]
that title ... just adapted to their versatile characterv.!v C. Macmillan, in
somewhat similar fashion, believes that a "sham biology", a false use of the
word 'biology', has appeared in America and in some American institutions.
He points out that at Johns Hopkins one sees teaching in only a "half-
science", "a sham biology which is principally, or all, zoology", the teaching in
botany being as yet "not available" (in 1893!). At Harvard University, on the
contrary, says Macmillan, zoology and botany being both "splendidly
equipped" with the "endowment, the gardens, the laboratories, the museums,
the libraries, the men were not to be easily had by any new institution [viz,
biology] that might spring up" .153
C. Hart Merriam has similar preoccupations when, in 1893, he hopes that
"the perverted meaning of the term 'biology' will [in the not-distant future] be
forgotten" .154 Merriam wants to see a swing back from the laboratory-based
biology to a more "rational biology" based on systematics. He says that it is
time to stop and ascertain what exactly is being promoted by "the modern
school of instructors who call themselves 'biologists"', and clearly define the
differences between them and the old naturalist school. He feels that "the
generally accepted meaning of the word biology" refers to physiology,

histology and embryology, to the detriment of studies necessary to a naturalist

perspective. Wishing to help the pendulum swing back from this exaggerated
emphasis on laboratory training and narrowly defined view of living orga-
nisms, Merriam argues for more balanced training, including laboratory
instruction in biological methods, practical training in systematics and orga-
nismal biology, study of the principles of biology and of geographic distribu-
tion of life forms, and study of evolution. "The teacher and professional
student who aspire to tread the higher paths of biology are unworthy of their
chosen field unless they possess a broad and comprehensive grasp of the
phenomena of living things".155 Merriam reminds his readers that T. H.
Huxley was not oblivious to the importance of nature study. Merriam says
that in such a perspective biology would be more apt to bring "the great mass
of the intelligent public nearer the technical specialist, thus creating that
interest in and appreciation of scientific research that leads to liberal
endowment" .156
Finally, in 1901, E. B. Wilson clearly affirms the value of utilizing all
methods available in the life sciences- particularly experiment and compari-
son - whatever the disciplinary origin of these contributions, be they anato-
mical or morphological, physiological, embryological, systematic or ecologi-
cal. A major point of his article relates to the necessity of "a better
understanding between the field naturalist and the laboratory morphologist
and physiologist, who in earlier days did not always live on the best of
terms".157 But Wilson also aims, clearly, at stemming the tide of experimenta-
lism as the overwhelming and dominant key to the life sciences of the time.
Wilson's well-tempered text is perfectly comparable in content to more radical
versions of this position expressed elsewhere.ISS
In the light of these contemporary comments, I remain unconvinced by the
claim that by 1900 one had witnessed "the stabilization of biology as a core
discipline".159 Many questions remain, from the 1870s to the early 1900s,
concerning the exact nature of so-called American 'biological' science. Ques-
tions about the character of 'biology' and debates as to the best route to
progress in the life sciences in the USA would seem to indicate that theoretical
and methodological issues are far from resolved at the time. It is difficult to
understand, for example, how to reconcile the notion ofconscious formulation
of a core discipline by the use of "vague and contradictory" proposals. 160 The
classification within which the notion of a core discipline would reveal its full
sense has not been examined or even made explicit. And how could a discipline
be founded by a single person?
The status of 'biology' as a discipline or as another form must surely be re-
examined and reformulated. One difficulty, which has been pointed out in
many of the preceding texts, concerns the relations between biology and the
more specialized sciences and research areas.

After presentation of a case study I have recently completed, I shall attempt

briefly to address this question.
2.7. The Science of 'Biology' in England: Its Propagandistic Beginning

In this last section I briefly examine the main lines of a study which explains
the history of 'biology' better than the preceding histories, in the light of the
criteria suggested earlier in this paper. I shall begin by recalling these criteria
for the identification of the beginning of a science called 'biology'. I suggest
that it is necessary to document (a) existence of a distinct scientific content; (b)
evidence of scientific debate about the existence of the science and/or the
postulates of the science; and (c) traces of the social processes informing and
shaping the institutionalization of biology. A transformation has been
reported!" in England between the 1850s and the 1890s which answers to all
three of these criteria. I suggest that this is the sole context furnishing sufficient
claim as to the time and place of the creation of a new synthetic science of life
called 'biology'.
As Kohler has pointed out,
we are left with the undisputed fact that at certain points in history groups
of scientists have stongly felt that they were participating in something
new, and these feelings must be taken seriously, if not at face value. These
nodal points, at which the feeling of change has been deep and wides-
pread, are nonetheless real and important even though that feeling was
not based on balanced historical hindsight. It is the historian's task to sort
out the complex intellectual and social changes that led these groups to
feel that they were doing something new and that their activities required
the establishment of new social arrangements for doing them.!"
Life scientists, in mid- to late Victorian England, were aware of participating
in a period of transformation. In that context, consciously proposed concep-
tual and institutional developments result in the first generalized recognition
of a field of knowledge called 'biology'. In Victorian England 'biology' gains a
conceptual and institutional identity which is thereafter universally recog-
nized, sometimes contested but most often reproduced. A further particularity
marks this science: it has solely an introductory and elementary content. No
research tradition is produced under the rubric 'biology', at this time. Let us
turn, first, to a brief description of the processes involved in this rich period of
history.
T. H. Huxley, in late 1856, sets out an explicit career plan for himself. This
includes early (1860) completion of studies in histology, morphology, physio-
logy, zoology and geology, and subsequent (15 to 20 years) fundamental
remodelling of these sciences. Huxley says, "I think it will be possible in that

time to give a new and healthier direction to all Biological Science" .163 That
new direction is first enunciated clearly and fairly completely in the Fullerian
Lectures T. H. Huxley delivers in 1858 at the Royal Institution of Great
Britain. These unpublished lectures, entitled "Principles of biology", may well
be the first public statement of the key precepts of the science to be known
thereafter as 'biology' .164 These lectures represent the first such declaration on
biology, as it is possible to show direct conceptual and institutional links
between these 'biological' statements and later events in the same area of
knowledge.
On the conceptual level, Huxley puts forward, in the Fullerian Lectures, a
new synthetic perspective on living beings and on life. This position is self-
consciously synthetic, general and elementary. In this manner, biology is
conceived to give the broadest overview possible of the life sciences, reporting
latest results and methods from all relevant disciplinary areas. Given such a
wide purview it is not surprising that the content of this science is of a general
nature, and elementary. As will be shown shortly, all early institutionalization
of the science of biology emphasizes these particular characteristics of the
science.
Huxley's Fullerian Lectures, in broadest outline, deal with the following
items:
(1) The physico-chemical nature of living phenomena is affirmed: no other
type of explanation is deemed necessary or permissible.
(2) A certain unity is said to exist between vital phenomena as they are
expressed in plants or in animals; so, biogenesis, fertilization, development,
reproduction, etc., are found to unite two of the three traditional realms of
nature more strongly than any of their differences might separate them.
(3) Living forces are expressed through protoplasm.
(4) Biology is a synthetic and unitary science of life, building on the
contributions of all life science disciplines. In particular, study of development
is absolutely necessary to any study of living beings and life, as change is the
essence of life. Further, structure and function are the objects of study of
complementary and indissociable disciplinary avenues of research: they are
represented in the complementary sciences of morphology and anatomy on the
one hand, and physiology on the other.
(5) Finally, biology concerns all living beings, including humans.
These are the basic tenets of biology as expressed by Huxley in the Fullerian
Lectures. Some of them are easily and widely accepted; others less so, causing
con troversy .
One example of the relatively easy acceptance of a biological doctrine by the
life science community at large may be seen in the affirmation of a fundamen-
tal similarity or complementarity of physiological functions and structural
attributes in animals and plants (but see, below, discussion of protoplasm

theory). Although the implications of this position, especially on the moral

level, cause a good degree of debate, the basic similarities, at functional and
structural levels, are not generally questioned.ts' Concurrently with biologists'
later acceptance of cell theory, similarities between animals and plants are all
the more readily accepted as an important and characteristic element in the life
sciences.
On the other hand, a number of statements by the biologists cause a large
degree of controversy. It should be noted that in many instances the
controversy itself is not new to the scientific community. What is new,
however, is the explicit appropriation of one side of the controversy by a vocal
and aggressive group adopting a clearly defined new banner, a banner by
which members of the group claim to be acting in the name and spirit of the
ensemble of workers in the life sciences. This banner is, of course, 'biology'.
The following are examples of controversies provoked by the biologists. The
physico-chemical basis and protoplasmic nature of living beings is deemed
heretical and materialistic by many. This particular element of biological
thought provokes strong reprobation as does, for similar reasons, the inclu-
sion of human beings within the scope of such a science.tw For some, "The
laws oflife as furnished by biology may come into conflict with the higher laws
of man".167 For others, the idea of the unity linking the living and the non-
living implies a conception of nature
in the shape of a blind, insatiable, relentless, irresistible fate, falsely called
law - working like a dull, senseless machine of overwhelming light,
maiming, crushing, distorting, destroying, and thus continuing and pre-
serving [sic], - and destitute of intelligence and reason, - devoid of
justice and mercy.168
Obviously, the advancement of 'biological' science stirs up hostile feelings for
reasons "at least partly [related to] its implications for religion"169 as Geison
has mentioned with respect to the protoplasm debate. However, the proto-
plasm theory is but one aspect of the larger 'biology' debate of this period.
Biogenesis and evolutionary theory are the other central points of debate in
biology. The issue of biogenesis is addressed by T. H. Huxley in his 1870
presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science
concerning "the rise and progress of a single biological doctrine". The debate
which ensues between Huxley and H. C. Bastian concerns "one of the very first
principles of Biology",'?" a problem which is "of more fundamental import-
ance than any other throughout the whole range of Biological science" .171
Abiogenesis, defended by Bastian, is considered totally inimical to "scientis-
tic" (from the French scientiste) evolutionary thinking in the eyes of the
Victorian "scientistic" naturalists. From this perspective Herbert Spencer, for
example, ably takes up arms in favour of the biologists.!?

Though evolution does not figure in the first definition of biology's concerns
(that is, in the Fullerian Lectures of 1858), Huxley's role has been well
described as a stronger defender of evolutionary thinking as 'a reasonable
hypothesis concerning the origin of life.173
It is important to note, then, that evolution is not specifically mentioned in
texts about biology until the mid-1870s and it is rarely found in the principal
means of communication of 'biological' ideas, i.e. in elementary textbooks,
until the 1890s.174 Huxley and other biologists seem, indeed, to be doing their
best to avoid mention of evolution. So, if Huxley states in an ironic tone,
concerning his work at South Kensington: "I have a class of 353 + instruct
them in dry facts - particularly warning them to keep free of the infidel
speculations which are current under the name of evolution",!" the frequency
of such commentary leads one to appreciate how closely Huxley and his
collaborators seem to guard their language. Another example, concerning a
proposed address: "I am thinking of taking Development for the subject of my
evening lecture, the concrete facts made out in the last 30 years without
reference to Evolution. If people see that it is Evolution, that is Nature's fault
not mine."176
Finally, biology's affirmations of its own centrality in the hierarchy of the
life sciences do not go unnoticed: on the contrary, they cause acerbic debate,
particularly over the impact of such a claim on English physiological science.
The principal feature of this conflict concerns the relationship of physiology to
medicine.
On the one hand, the rearguard in physiology in Victorian England are in
the uncomfortable position of having dual loyalties, to the profession of
medicine and to the teaching of physiology. The medical background seems to
be the stronger of the two loyalties. This biology/physiology conflict underlies,
for instance, the strong resistance which greets the creation of a Biological
section at the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) in
1866. Complaints are expressed at the perceived "lowering of Physiology from
a sub-section with independent officers properly announced in the programme
of the meetings, to a dependent and unannounced department't.!" The
medical establishment points out, further, that the conflict is not simply one of
publicity and visibility, but concerns the status of physiology. They ask, Is this
science to be simply a department within biology - as claimed by all biologists
and biologically-oriented physiologists - or must not "Physiology ... not
simply be at the root, but ... itself form the root of medical science'Y!"
At the same time that biology is making claims of encompassing the whole
domain of the life sciences in England, other physiologists are stating to the
contrary that it is physiology which, in the present century (the nineteenth)
"has been gradually widening its boundaries, and at the present day ... holds

out the prospect of an indefinable increase". 179 The range and direction of this
"indefinable increase" clearly indicate competition for hegemony in the life
sciences between physiology and biology. For example, there is direct conflict
on some issues essential to the biological position described above: protoplasm
theory, "hydra-headed, myriad-handed" is criticized, physico-chemical reduc-
tionism is rejected and discussion of creative agencies is perfectly acceptable
alongside scientific debate on origins.
A later example of antagonism against biology may be found in the
Hunterian Society Oration for 1877 delivered by Walter Moxon (183&-86),
M.D. and Lecturer at Guy's Hospital, London. For Moxon, the biologist and
the physician are directly in opposition. 180 The physician, claims Moxon, takes
inspiration in a vital principle and this inspiration must, as it did for Hunter,
lead him resolutely to pursue the practical objective of that profession.
Physiology must continue to serve medicine, continues Moxon, as it has done
for so long. Physiology must not be deviated by passing through the hands of
the "special biologist". This should not happen because, according to Moxon,
the zoological biologist is "not very humble or reverent; in fact, he shows very
openly a sad penchant for doubtful theology", he discourses on "the divine
attributes of protoplasm", and he "eulogisels] mud as the great parent of
things". This type of biologist is said to be found at the Royal College.
T. H. Huxley teaches at the Royal College. Furthermore, he is the
acknowledged leader, "the General", the "Llama", etc."! of the younger
generation of life scientists whose loyalties, in opposition to the scientists and
doctors just discussed, are directed toward the ensemble of biological sciences.
These young scientists are personified in university-based researcher-pro-
fessors such as Michael Foster, H. N. Martin, William Rutherford, E. Ray
Lankester, F. M. Balfour, T. J. Parker, etc. These life scientists, whatever the
detailed and highly specialized research they pursue in their particular branch
of the life sciences, follow Huxley's lead concerning the relative positions of
biology, physiology and medicine.tv
Biology, then, is certainly seen as new. Indeed, its distinct content is
affirmed and recognized through debate and controversy over its existence and
its postulates. Further, as a science it undergoes a distinct process of
institutionalization.
In 1860, at the University of London, Huxley and J. D. Hooker succeed in
obtaining the adoption of the science of biology as a university-level subject in
the newly created science degree curriculum. As is well known, the University
of London at this time is simply an examining body. This examining office is,
however, the centre of the examining system of the United Kingdom. Its
services are used by the key university colleges outside Oxford and Cambridge.
This University of London ruling constitutes, then, the key early factor in the

institutional success of biology as a science. As of this period, teaching begins

in this subject, as so many students prepare to qualify at the London
examination system.
The 1871 South Kensington schoolmaster's summer course in biology,
created by T. H. Huxley with help from Martin, Foster, Rutherford, Lankes-
ter, Parker and others, furnishes the occasion for the University of London
course to become better systematized and consecrated in the well-known
practical and elementary biology text-book by Huxley and Martin. The model
set in this book is well known as it has been much followed by college students
for over a century since its publication. As well, in the seventeen years
following 1875 regulatory changes impose the Huxleyean course as an
obligatory 'biology' course in general scientific degrees and in pre-medical
scientific courses in England in the Universities of London, Oxford, and
Cambridge, and in all medical programmes. The creation of biology lecture-
ships and professorships thereby takes a decided leap forward.
A final point must be noted, as it is crucial to the sense which may be derived
from the creation of biology. The conception and delivering of lecture and
practical courses, the publication of books and articles, and the institutionali-
zation of teaching positions and learned society sections are not complemented
by the development of anything more than the elementary and general content
outlined above. In short, no distinct biological research tradition is created at
this time in England. Life scientists, though distinctly pro-biology, pursue
their more specialized research in areas known by other disciplinary rubrics.
For example, Michael Foster, whose "biological" outlook has been well
documented.P" without rejecting or diminishing the importance of biology per
se, retreats from direct contact with this subject matter in the early 1880s so as
to pursue other activities related to physiology.tw
In introducing this section I stated that I would show that biology
represented a novel science in the Victorian period. Indeed, I think indications
have been given of this perception on the part of scientists and the intellectual
community. Yet, examination of the content of the science brings into light
its peculiar character, that of an exclusively elementary albeit synthetic
science.
Assuredly, then, from the point of view of the scientific content involved,
e.g., new experiments, new theory, Huxleyean biology is poor. At no time,
however, do biologists qua biologists claim to be pursuing specialized research.
They are, rather, appreciative reporters of advances made in the specialized
disciplines of the life sciences at the same time as they are systematizers of the
ensemble of the life sciences. They advocate a synthetic picture, enabling
representation of all life sciences and the work of all life scientists to the public
and politicians as well as to beginning science students. The biological

perspective put forward by Huxley and others influences the work done in
more specialized life sciences. Biology relativizes, however, the experimental
work of physiology, the descriptive work characteristic of comparative
anatomy, the fundamental nature of embryology within the life sciences, etc.,
enlisting all of them in the service of the general biological picture.
It is this very distinct character - elementary and synthetic - that provides
the key to understanding the importance of the creation of this new science in
Victorian England. Biology must be seen as a publicist science par excel-
lence. 185 Without a distinct research programme to aid its progress, paradoxi-
cally, as the success of biology as a publicist science advances, the banalization
of the term 'biology' increased. 'Biology' represents, at first, a narrow
perspective identifiable with a group of restless and bright life scientists and
philosophers (T. H. Huxley, J. D. Hooker and Herbert Spencer'< in particu-
lar). Within this perspective, 'biology' is the object of a serious and successful
organizational coup: control of the central university-level examining body in
England assures the creation of examining and teaching positions, thereby
enabling a large number of potential disciples to be brought into the picture
(Foster, Lankester, Martin, Rutherford, Parker, W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, etc.).
Later, however, the term 'biology' loses completely its narrow sense of
identification. With a group of "followers" of strong intellectual and organiza-
tional strength, a narrow base of original conceptual unity, and the lack of a
clearly defined research programme, it is not surprising that the term 'biology'
within one generation loses even a semblance of unanimity over its basic
reference points. Previously self-avowed 'biologists' are seen, in later years,
commenting on the failure of the initial attempt at creation of a unitary
perspective.ts? other former 'biologists' actively pursue a sort of "sabotaging"
of some of biology's chief institutional gains of the early period. Thus, for
example, the BAAS, in the 1890s, splits up the biology section it had created
with such difficulty in 1866.1 88 Huxley's own position in biology at South
Kensington is split after his retirement from active teaching, into two
positions, one in animal biology, the other in vegetable biology. The Univer-
sity of London examining system in the Faculty of Science eliminates the
biology examination in 1898 in favour of two separate examinations in botany
and zoology.
Biology may thus be said to be a novelty in England as of the 1860s and
1870s. The meanings of the term as discussed then and following, and as
crystallized in publications and in socio-institutional developments, are dir-
ectly tributary to the twentieth century acceptations of the term. Biology as a
publicist science succeeds in earning publicity and support!" for the life
sciences, but no discipline per se emerges bearing that name. Biology is
originally intended to serve the rest of the life sciences in an introductory

capacity. It is in this context that biology "catches on", becomes known and is
successfully reproduced. Simultaneously, the term is presented and progressi-
vely adopted as the generic term for the life sciences; the more so as biology is
progressively dissociated from the initial English biologists' positions, which
are reductionist, evolutionist, and organismally-based.'??
These particular characteristics and historical circumstances of early bio-
logy in England set the conditions for the subsequent banalization of the term
'biology'.
In conclusion, then, in Victorian England the work of obtaining support for
scientists is a necessary and contemporaneous activity for leaders of the
scientific community, as much as research itself.'?' So, the history of biology
must be appreciated for its propagandistic aims. This science may be seen, in
its earliest stage in England, as one front among others in favour of
protoplasmic theory, evolutionary theory, physico-chemical reductionism on
a methodological basis, anti-vitalism, and a radically scientistic attitude in
general. The institutionalization of this science results in wide adoption of an
elementary and practical 'biology' course. This course does not lead to
specialization in a discipline called 'biology'. It is accompanied, however, by
subsequent specialization in a fast expanding range of specialist life science
disciplines. The widespread dual use of the word 'biology', to designate an
elementary course and the ensemble of life sciences, leads eventually to
adoption of the generic term 'biology' to describe, indiscriminately, methods
and results of all the life sciences.
3. DISCUSSION
To conclude, then: in the historiography concerning 'biology' many concep-
tual breakthroughs, research traditions, methodological practices or general
outlooks on life and living phenomena have been claimed as fundamental to a
science of life. Eloquent confirmation of this is found in the large variety of
histories of this science. Until recently, however, life sciences historiography
has not described the conceptual, social and institutional bases on which
'biology' as a specific area of scientific knowledge was created.
The elucidation of this history - the institutionalization, in Victorian
England of an elementary and synthetic introduction to the life sciences,
without accompanying specialized research in 'biology' per se - could per-
haps be taken as simply one more interpretation of the history of 'biology':
another interpretation to be added to an already long list (see above). This
might be so, but for one element. The history of the rise and subsequent
banalization of Huxleyean 'biology' in Victorian England, beyond showing
the success of this science within its self-defined limits, has one major

advantage over previous professed histories. The history of Huxleyean biology

affords an explanation of the existence of the numerous historical interpre-
tations previously referred to and exa~ined in the preceding pages.
In Victorian England one notes the constitution, for the first time, of a
distinctly biological corpus, of a group of self-designated biologists (and,
concomitantly, an assemblage of scientists set systematically against the
biologists), as well as unmistakable indices of the institutionalization of a
'biological' science. These developments lead to creation of 'biology' as an
elementary and synthetic science. Later generic utilization leads to banaliza-
tion of the term 'biology', i.e., its usage to designate all manner of perspectives
and all types of attitudes toward various situations and disciplines in the life
sciences.
This last aspect of the Victorian 'biological' initiative - banalization of the
term 'biology' - accounts for the multiple meanings!" of the subsequent
usage of the word 'biology'. These various meanings and contexts would seem
to have imposed themselves as competing terms of reference in the life sciences
and therefore, not surprisingly, in the histories of 'biology'. The banalization
of the term 'biology' would then account, at least partially, for its numerous
histories, some of which we have examined above.
Further, however, and more importantly no doubt, the particular nature of
the beginnings of 'biology' escaped the notice of historians of science, very
simply, because they were not looking for it. Indeed, the relatively new interest
in linking sociological and historical studies surely has been instrumental in
leading to questioning of heretofore unproblematic issues. Life scientists'
claims of what biology was and is, what it entails, etc., have long been taken at
face value. This obscured the more interesting fact (historically speaking) that
life scientists have at various times claimed a similar character (e.g., a
particular approach or methodology claimed as fundamental for knowledge of
life and living beings) for different sciences (physiology, biology, molecular
biology, etc.)! In comparison, in the case of biology, the same rubric has been
claimed to encompass different perspectives, depending on the time and place.
Thus, the character of prescriptive methods and approaches in the study of life
and living beings have often been at issue among scientists. These competing
claims have been heretofore reflected uncritically in portions of life sciences
historiography.
This paper examined the basis on which claims in the name of 'biology' were
made and supported, conceptually and institutionally speaking. Recognition
of the fact of multiple claims to the title of a general and synthetic life science
invited questioning of the very notion ofa single, dominant life science. This in
turn suggested re-examination of the history of 'biology' in the light of the
strategic role of scientific institutionalization.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Support is gratefully acknowledged from Fonds pour la :Formation de

Chercheurs et I'Aide Ii la Recherche, Government of Quebec. The ideas
expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.
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Everett Mendelsohn, "The biological sciences in the nineteenth century: Some problems
and sources", History of science, iii (1964), 39-59, p. 46.
14. Jacques Roger, "Chimie et biologie: Des 'molecules organiques' de Buffon la 'physico- a
chimie' de Lamarck", History and philosophy of the life sciences, i, pt. I (1979), 43-64, p.
49.
15. According to Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5).
16. Philip C. Ritterbush, Overtures to biology: The speculations ofeighteenth-century naturalists
(New Haven and London, 1964), chapter 5. See also L. S. Jacyna, "Images of John
Hunter in the nineteenth century", History of science, xxi (1983), 85-108, p. 90. For
further comment, see Stephen Cross, "John Hunter, the animal oeconomy, and late
eighteenth century physiological discourse", Studies in history ofbiology, v (1981), 1-110.
17. Again, Gasking, op. cit. (ref. 8); Asimov, op. cit. (ref. 8), chapter 3, pp. 20, 23, 62; Ernst
Mayr, The growth ofbiological thought (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 131,249,70; see also,
implicitly, in Camille Limoges, La selection naturelle: Etude sur la premiere constitution
d'un concept (1837-1859) (Paris, 1970), lSI. Much less rigorous in its treatment is F. B.
Churchill in a critical review of Michael Ruse, The Darwinian revolution: Science red in
tooth and claw (Chicago, 1979), "Book review", Victorian studies, xxiv (1981), 255-7. See
also, Magner, op. cit (ref. 3); and L. C. Miall, The early naturalists: Their lives and works
(1530--1789) (London, 1912).
18. William Locy, Biology and its makers (New York, 1908),275. Locy takes up the idea from
Patrick Geddes, "A synthetic outline of the history of biology", Proceedings of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, xiii (1885-86), 904-11, p. 907.
19. For others, there is not even discussion of the "origin" or "beginning" of biology. In some
cases the titles are surely misleading. See Baumel, op. cit. (ref. 9); Ben Dawes, A hundred
years of biology (London, 1952); William A. Locy, The story of biology (Garden City,
N.Y., 1925); Jane Maienschein, "History of biology", Osiris, 2nd ser., i (1985),147-62.
20. Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London (Harmondsworth, 1984), p. xxv.
21. William Coleman, "The cognitive basis of the discipline: Claude Bernard on physiology",
Isis, Ixxvi (1985), 49-70, p. 49.
22. See Serge Moscovici, Essai sur l'histoire humaine de la nature (Paris, 1968), 333--42,377-82; J.
Ben-David, The scientist's role in society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971). See also Pierre
Bourdieu, "La specificite du champ scientifique et les conditions sociales du progres de la
raison", Sociologie et societes, vii (1975), 91-116.
23. Roose used the word 'Biologie' in his Grundziige der Lehre von der Lebenskraft (Braunsch-
weig, 1797); see Dittrich, op. cit. (ref. I).
24. Karl F. Burdach, Propedeutik zum Studium der gesammten Heilkunst (Leipzig, 1800),
according to K. Rothschuh, History of physiology, trans!' by G. B. Risse (Huntington,
N.Y., 1973), 170. J. B. Lamarck, Recherches sur l'organisation des corps vivans (Paris,
1802), 185-6, 202; see Grasse, op. cit. (ref. I); M. J. S. Hodge, "Lamarck's science of
living bodies", The British journal for the history of science, v (1971), 323-52. G. R.
Treviranus, Biologie, oder Phi/osophie der lebenden Natur fur Naturforscher une Aerzte (6
vols, Goettingen, 1802-22); see Hoppe, op. cit. (ref. I).
25. See Claire Salomon-Bayer, "1802-'Biologie' et medecine", in H. N. Jahnke and M. Otte
(eds), Epistemological and social problems of the sciences in the early nineteenth century
(Dordrecht, 1981), 35-54, p. 46. For independent expression of this, see William
Coleman, Biology in the nineteenth century (New York, 1971), 1-2.
26. See C. Limoges, "De I'economie de la nature aux ecosystemes: L'histoire de l'ecologie
esquissee a grands traits", Spectre, (Dec. 1980), 9-14; Jan Sapp, "The struggle for

authority in the field of heredity, 190(H932: New perspectives on the rise of genetics",
Journal of the history of biology, xvi (1983), 311--42; also Sapp, Beyond the gene (New
York and Oxford, 1987); Robert E. Kohler, From medical chemistry to biochemistry: The
making of a biomedical discipline (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); Alberto Cambrosio and
Peter Keating, "The disciplinary stake: The case of chronobiology", Social studies of
science, xiii (1983), 323-53; Edward Yoxen, The gene business: Who should control
biotechnology? (London and Sydney, 1983), chap. 2; and Pnina Abir-Am, "Themes,
genres and orders of legitimation in the consolidation of new scientific disciplines:
Deconstructing the historiography of molecular biology", History ofscience, xxiii (1985),
73-117.
27. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5),281.
28. Ibid., 294. See Georges Cuvier, Lecons d'anatomie comparee (Paris, 1800(5). I used the
edition of Paris, 1805, 5 vols.
29. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5),230; preceding statements discussed, pp. 146, 174.
30. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5), 239 ff., 144.
32. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5), 245.
33. It seems that Vincent Labeyrie, "Remarques sur l'evolution du concept de biologie", La
Pensee, cxxxv (1967), 125-37, does not fully understand Foucault's argument. Foucault
is discussing the very general question of the manner in which science perceives living
organisms. I do, however, agree with Labeyrie's serious reservation about the "tournant
uniformisateur de la structure de la pensee biologique" (p. 127) hypothesized by Foucault
as of the end of the eighteenth century.
It is well to note that the description of the transformation given by Foucault is far
from novel or revolutionary; see E. S. Russell, Form and function (London, 1912). The
interpretation of the basis of the transformation is of course Foucault's alone.
34. See, for example, Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5), 232.
35. Michel Foucault, L'archeologie du savoir (Paris, 1969),243.
36. Michel Foucault, "La situation de Cuvier dans l'histoire de la biologie-II", Revue
d'histoire des sciences, xxiii (1970), 63---{)9 and the discussion following, pp. 70-92; see p.
89.
37. Ibid., 84.
38. Ibid., 85.
39. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 5),231-2.
40. Ibid., 307.
41. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 36), 84.
42. Ibid.
44. Foucault, op. cit. (ref. 35),233,237.
45. For example, Stephen Cross, op. cit. (ref. 16), examines John Hunter's (1728-93) compara-
tive anatomy as informed by other fields of life science knowledge. In a Foucaldian
tradition he analyses the "implicit biology" found in Hunter's work. However, if indeed
there is in Hunter's work constitution of "the problematic of biology" (p. 26), on the
grounds that his work in comparative anatomy, physiology and pathology are quite
tightly intertwined and mutually supporting, this does not prove that one sees in Hunter
the appearance of a biological science along the discursive rules defined by Foucault (p.
67).
See, conceming the constitution of the science of physiology, Claire Salomon-Bayet,
L'institution de la science et I'experience du vivant: Methode et experience a l'Academie

Royale des Sciences 1666-1793 (Paris, 1978). Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), also analyses the
production of general physiology as a life science in the nineteenth century.
46. Georges Cuvier, Le regne animal distribue d'apres son organisation, pour servir de base Ii
a
I'histoire naturelle des animaux et d'introduction I'anatomie comparee (4 vols, Paris,
1817), i, 7.
47. See the importance of reformulation of the problematic about "life" in Cuvier's work in
Dorinda Outram, "Uncertain legislator: Georges Cuvier's laws of nature in their
intellectual context", Journal of the history of biology, xix (1986), 323--68. However, it
merits repeating that the object of this paper is to re-examine historiographical issues
related to the creation of a science called 'biology' per se.
48. Salomon-Bayer, op. cit. (ref. 45), 15.
49. Ibid., 7, 334n.
50. Ibid., 195.
51. Ibid., 341.
52. Ibid., 410.
53. Ibid., 438, 173.
54. Ibid., 436; and see Salomon-Bayet, op. cit. (ref. 25),47.
55. Salomon-Bayet, op. cit. (ref. 25), and see also Georges Canguilhem, "Du singulier et de la
singularite en epistemologie biologique", pp. 211-25 in Etudes d'histoire et de philosophie
des sciences (Paris, 1975; 1st edn, 1968).
56. Salomon-Bayet, "1802-'Biologie' et medecine" (ref. 25),48--49; see also John Lesch,
Science and medicine in France: The emergence of experimental physiology, 1790-1855
(Cambridge and London, 1984),222-3.
57. Joseph Schiller, La notion d'organisation dans I'histoire de la biologie (Paris, 1978), 84;
Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), 7. (Little consideration is given to the fact that the word
'organisation' appears only in 1796!).
58. Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), 85.
59. Ibid., 88.
60. See J. B. Lamarck, Recherches sur I'organisation des corps vivans (Paris, 1802),202, 185--6.
See also Lamarck, Hydrogeologie (Paris, 1802),31, 112-15, 188.
61. Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (2 vols, Paris, [809), i, [4.
62. Ibid., ii, [26.
63. Lamarck, Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertebres (Paris, [SI5), 49.
64. Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr, The spirit of system: Lamarck and evolutionary biology (Cam-
bridge and London, 1977),210.
65. Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), 86-87.
66. C. C. E. Schmid, Physiologie, philosophisch betrachtet (3 vols, Jena, 179S-[SO[), i, 240. See
G. B. Risse, "Kant, Schelling, and the early search for a philosophical 'science' of
medicine in Germany", Journal of the history ofmedicine and allied sciences, xxvii (1972),
[45-58, pp. [53-4.
67. Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), S5.
68. Ibid., chap. XII.
69. Ibid., chap. XIII.
70. Ibid., 93.
71. Ibid.
72. J. V. Pickstone, "Locating Dutrochet" (Essay Review), The British journal for the history of
science, xi (1978), 49--64, pp. 52-53. Further, this reading is generally in conformity with
the major lines of the portrait of France given for this period by William R. Albury in
"Experiment and explanation in the physiology of Bichat and Magendie", Studies in the
history of biology, i (1977), 47-131.

73. Pickstone, op. cit. (ref. 72), 59. The distinction made by Pickstone between biologist and
physiologist seems to be based on the following differences: the taxonomic variety of
experimental organisms is wider in the case of the biologists, especially for the simpler
organisms; one finds in the work of biologists a search for elements common to animals
and plants; biologists use "genetic" analysis whereas physiologists tend to use "compo-
nential analysis". Dutrochet is on the side of the biologists on the first two counts, but not
on the third (ibid., 58-59). Pickstone concludes that Dutrochet is not a biologist albeit
that this section ostensibly dealt with his "conversion" to "biologie" (ibid., 55).
74. J. V. Pickstone, "Vital actions and organic physics: Henri Dutrochet and French physiology
during the 18208", Bulletin of the history of medicine, I (1976), 191-212, p. 208. Cf
Pickstone, op. cit. (ref. 72), 54, according to which in the 1820s biology had a non-
negligeable influence.
75. See, for example, H. D. de Blainville, Histoire des sciences de l'organisation et de leurs
progres, comme base de laphilosophie (3 vols, Paris, 1845). It is well to note, however (i, p.
xvii), the explicit recognition that at that time there was no distinct science dealing with
living beings.
76. Ibid., iii, 425-31, 461 ff.
77. M. Fodera, Discours sur la biologie, ou science de la vie; suivi d'un tableau des connaissances
naturelles envisagees d'apres leur nature et leur filiation (Paris, 1826), 5.
78. Ibid., 5.
79. Ibid., 9.
80. Ibid., 21, 19.
81. Ibid., 23. Medicine and biology function according to different systems of logic, the former
searching for particularities and the solution of immediate problems, the latter interested
rather (ibid., 22) "connaitre les phenomenes dans leurs rapports generaux, pour les
enchainer, les lier, les coordonner, pour atteindre et fixer la connaissance des actions
principes."
82. Ibid., 19. Biologie is considered to be absolutely distinct from hygiologie ("appelee impropre-
ment physiologic").
83. Ibid., 24.
84. Auguste Comte, Cours de phi/osophie positive (6 vols, Paris, 1830-42), iii, 307-8, 301. It
should be noted, further, that at the beginning of this section on philosophical biology, in
the third volume (1838), Comte praises the work of de Blainville and especially his
courses of 1829-32. In the first volume (1830) Comte did not utilize the word 'biologie'
but rather 'physiologie'; physiology was described, there, as the science studying "en
general, les lois de la vie", i, 59.
85. Comte, op. cit. (ref. 84), iii, 473. See also another triplet making up biology, in Cornte's view:
"biotomie" (anatomy), "biotaxie" (classification or taxonomy) and "bionomie" (physio-
logy): "Telles sont done les trois branches generales de la science biologique: la biotomie,
la biotaxie, et enfin la bionomie pure ou physiologie proprement dite; Ie nom de biologie
etant consacre a designer leur ensemble total", ibid., iii, 476. Comte is, here, describing a
position in express contradistinction with that of Bichat.
86. Comte sometimes uses the words 'biologie' and 'physiologie' interchangeably, and some-
times not.
87. The reader will recall Comte's three universal stages of advancement of thought: theological
or fictive, metaphysical or abstract, and scientific or positive.
88. Comte, op. cit. (ref. 84), iii, 282-3. See generally, here, 281-8.
89. One sees the same situation at the Societe de Biologie, founded some years later in a clearly
Comtian view, and with the aim of constructing a science of life. One sees, though, a
dominance of medical thinking, and especially of human pathology and physiology in the
works of this group (see Lesch, op. cit. (ref. 56),217,219).

90. Comte, op. cit. (ref. 84), iii, 301; preceding statements discussed pp. 287, 289, 295.
91. Ibid., iii, 706; preceding statements discussed pp. 302-4,310.
92. See Charles Robin, "Sur la direction que se sont proposee en se reunissant les membres
fondateurs de la Societe de Biologie pour repondre au titre qu'i1s ont choisi", Comptes
rendus de /a Societe de Biologie, i (1849), i-xi, pp. x-xi:
C'est certainement pour avoir voulu considerer l'art medical exclusivement, comme
point de depart et non comme but, sans s'appuyer sur les elements d'etudes que lui
fournissent les autres branches de la biologie, que trop souvent des tentatives
analogues a celles que nous faisons ici se sont vues, au bout d'un certain temps,
frappees de sterilite. Du reste, deja d'autres societes, dont nous faisons partie pour
la plupart, ont pour direction speciale l'etude directe de la pathologie, dont on ne
saurait mettre en doute I'importance, vu les applications immediates a l'homme.
C'est done a chercher completement autant que possible, sous un autre point de vue,
I'ensemble des connaissances qui nous sont necessaires a tous que doivent tendre
nos efforts collectifs.
See also Lesch, op. cit. (ref. 56), 222-3.
93. Robin, op. cit. (ref. 92), p. ix.
94. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
95. Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), 165-6.
96. Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7), 91 cites (translating) Claude Bernard, Tissus vivants (Paris, 1866),4.
97. Claude Bernard, Introduction a l'etude de /a medecine experimentale (1865) (Paris, 1966),69-
70, 100, 105,49, 157. See Coleman, op. cit. (ref. 21).
98. For example, Bernard, op. cit. (ref. 97), 238, 164 or 206--7.
99. Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Histoire naturelle generate des regnes organiques (2 vols,
Paris, 1854, 1859). In these volumes Comte is not at all a central reference point. The
word 'biologie' is used by Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire in characterizing the "chefs des trois
principales ecoles biologiques, Cuvier, Schelling, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire" (i, 169-70).
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire does clearly understand the novelty of the term. He mentions that
neither Bichat nor Lamarck developed a new scienceof biology. The first-mentioned only
dealt with "a part" of biological sciences; the other "n'alvait] ni developpe ni precise ses
vues [on a sciencecalled bi%gie], et iI est reste, sur ce point, sans influence sur les travaux
ulterieurs" (i, 249n-5On).
However, the classification in which biological sciences take their place "entre les
sciences physiques et les sciences humanitaires ou socia/es" (i, 264) is gaining ground,
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire seems to be saying. He affirms that the changes in the examina-
tions at the Facultes des Sciences in Paris represent a consecration of his own positions,
because the material examined in the "sciences naturelles" exam is actually, in his
opinion, an exam in "sciences biologiques" (i, 255n).
100. I do not wish to intervene, here, in the debate on the origin ofa general scienceof physiology.
That is not the aim of this text. See, to this effect, Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7); Georges
Canguilhem, "Theone et technique de l'experimentation chez Claude Bernard", in
Etudes d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences (Paris, 1975), 143-55; Canguilhem, "La
constitution de la physiologie comme science", in ibid., 226--73; Albury, op. cit. (ref. 72);
see also Salomon-Bayet, op. cit. (ref. 45).
101. Schiller, op. cit. (ref. 7),91. I looked at the translation of the fifth edition of the Precis of
Magendie, wherein one reads the following: "Physiology, or Biology, is that vast natural
science which studies life wherever it exists, and investigates its general characters." See
Francois Magendie, An elementary treatise on human physiology. on the basis ofthe Precis
elememaire de physiologie, trans!. by John Revere, 5th edn (New York, 1838), 13. This is

the same description of life science as the one seen previously in Magendie's work, with
the simple addition of the word 'biologie' as a synonym to 'physiologie'.
102. In M. H. Dutrochet, Recherches anatomiques et physiologiques sur 7a structure intime des
animaux et des vegetaux, et sur leur motilite (Paris, 1824), the word 'biologie' does not
appear.
In the introductory "Avertissement" of L'agent immediat du mouvement vital devoile
dans sa nature et dans son mode d'action, chez les vegetaux et chez les animaux (Paris and
London, 1826), Dutrochet says:
L'ouvrage que je publie mettra dans tout son jour cette verite, qu'il n'existe point
deux physiologies, I'une animale et I'autre vegetale, entre lesquelles il soit possible
d'etablir une ligne de demarcation. La science de la vie est une, et I'on ne peut que
perdre de precieux secours en isolant les unes des autres les diverses parties qui la
composent; car c'est par Ie rapprochement des faits que la sciencedevient feconde ...
(v).
In Nouvelles recherches sur l'endosmose et l'exosmose ... (Paris and London, 1828),
Dutrochet expresses himself even more clearly:
L'importance de la physiologie comparee des vegetaux et des animaux est aujourd'·
hui sentie pour tous les bons esprits. La vie a des phenomenes generaux qui
appartiennent au regne vegetal comme au regne animal. II est done necessaire
d'etudier comparativement ces phenomenes chez tous les etres vivans sans excep-
tion. C'est de cette etude que sortira la physiologie generate, science qui est encore a
creer, mais pour laquelle il existe de nombreux materiaux,
103. Brigitte Hoppe, op. cit. (ref. 1),235. See also Brigitte Hoppe, "Urnbildungen des Forschung
in der Biologie im 19. Jahrhundert", in Alwin Diemer (ed.), Konzeption und Begriffder
Forschung in den Wissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts (Meisenheim am Glan, 1978), 104-
88, and Biologie, Wissenschaft von der belebten Materie von der Antike sur Neuzeit:
Biologische Methodologie und Lehren von der stofflichen Zusammensetzung der Organis-
men (Sudhoffs Archiv, Beiheft 17; Wiesbaden, 1976).
104. See Hoppe, op. cit. (ref. 1),235-7 and in particular p. 236. It is true, as Hoppe mentions, that
Engelmann in 1846 lists (see the word 'Biologie' in the index) about twenty works
supposedly relevant to 'biology' (see Wilhelm Engelmann, Bibliotheca Historico-Natura-
lis: Verzeichniss der Bucher iiber Naturgeschichte welche in Deutschland, Scandinavien,
Holland. England, Frankreich,1talien und Spanien in den Jahren 1700-1846 erschienen sind
(Leipzig, 1846),749). The link with Treviranus, it must be noted, is not thereby proved.
Further, only five of these titles deal specifically with 'biologie' (Treviranus, Chiaverini,
Martini, Bartels, Wetter).
Indeed, I think that a more telling point is that in the second edition of this volume, the
word 'Biologie' is dropped from the index. See J. Victor Carus and Wilhelm Engelmann,
Bibliotheca Zoologica: Verzeichniss der Schriften iiber Zoologie, welche in den periodischen
werken enthalten und yom Jahre 1846-1860 selbstandig erschienen sind (2 vols, Leipzig,
1861).
lOS. Timothy Lenoir, The strategy 0/ life: Teleology and mechanics in nineteenth century German
biology (Dordrecht, 1982); Lenoir, "The Gottingen School and the development of
transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic era", Studies in history 0/ biology, v
(1981), 1I1-205; Lenoir, "Teleology without regrets: The transformation of physiology
in Germany: 1790-1847", Studies in history and philosophy ofscience, xii (1981), 293-354.
106. Lenoir, "The Gottingen School" (ref. 105), 190.
107. Lenoir, The strategy 0/ life (ref. 105),71.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BIOLOGY • 263
108. Ibid., I. W. Baron, ..Gedanken.;", cited in Schiller. op. cit. (ref. 7), 88 where he says that the
term 'biologie' disappears from Treviranus's works.
109. Lenoir, The strategy of life (ref. 105).247. .
110. Ibid., I. Coleman is incorrect in this issue. See further on.
Ill. Lenoir, "The Gottingen School" (ref. 105), 190.
112. Lenoir, The strategy of life (ref. 105).2, 13.
113. There is, for example, Kielmeyer (ibid., 41). Dollinger (70-72), and J. Muller (103 If.).
114. The morphotype is at the nucleus of the teleomechanist approaches (Lenoir, The strategy of
life (ref. 105), 13). The second research programme is called developmental morphology,
the third functional morphology (see also pp. 56. 65, 112).
115. Darwinian evolutionism and teleomechanism are the two major theoretical currents in the
life sciences in the nineteenth century, according to Lenoir, The strategy oflife (ref. 105).
247.
116. Cf I. Scheele, Von Liiben bis Schmeil: Die Entwicklung von der Schulnaturgeschichte zum
Biologieunterricht zwischen 1830 und 1933 (Berlin, 1982).
117. See Mayr, op. cit. (ref. 17); Churchill, op. cit. (ref. 17); and Limoges, op. cit. (ref. 17), 151.
118. See C. Darwin to Fritz Muller, 5 June 1882, in Life and letters of Charles Darwin (3 vols,
London, 1888), iii. 251; and C. Darwin to H. Spencer. 25 Nov. 1858. in ibid., ii, 141-2.
119. Mayr, op. cit. (ref. 17), 119.
120. Ibid., 36: "The word 'biology' is a child of the nineteenth century. Prior to that date, there
was no such science." Mayr continues, 108-9:
... and the coining of the word biology did not create a science of biology. In the
early 1800s there was really no biology yet, regardless of Lamarck's grandiose
scheme and the work of some of the Naturphilosophen in Germany. These were only
prospectuses of a to-be-created biology. What existed was natural history and
medical physiology. The unification of biology had to wait for the establishment of
evolutionary biology and for the development of such disciplines as cytology.
121. See ibid., 131:

if one wanted to characterize modern biology in a few words. what would one say?
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of current biology is its unification.... More and
more biologists have learned that functional and evolutionary are not an 'either-or'
situation, but that no biological problem is solved until both proximate and ultimate
(= evolutionary) causations are determined.
122. On the other hand, Mayr points out, without further analysis, the existence of an important
period of transformation between 1830 and 1860 (ibid.• 127).
123. See Churchill, op. cit. (ref. 17). In fact, Ruse shows simply and schematically (notably in
chapter 9, esp. pp. 250--67)that Darwinism was largely accepted by scientific contempor-
aries and also by a larger public. It is Churchill who confuses biology with Darwinian
evolutionary theory.
124. Charles Singer, "Biology. history" (1929). in Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago. 1958), iii,
909--18, p. 917.
125. Ibid.; see also Charles Singer. A history of biology to about the year 1900. 3rd edn (London
and New York, 1959). esp. 413-16.
126. Coleman, op. cit. (ref. 25). 8. Coleman does not say. as Lenoir suggests, that evolutionary
theory constituted the starting point of biology.
127. Ibid.• 3.
128. Ibid., 15.
129. D. E. Allen. The naturalist in Britain: A social history (London, 1976).

130. Paul Farber, "Discussion paper: The transformation of natural history in the nineteenth
century", Journal of the history of biology, xv (1982), 145-52, p. 152. These multiple
changes are only mentioned suggestively in this "Discussion paper"; the empirical base
for this interpretation is only barely sketched.
131. See, for instance Garland E. Allen, "The transformation of a science: T. H. Morgan and the
emergence ofa new American biology", in Alexandra Oleson and John Voss (eds), The
organization ofknowledge in modern America. 1860-1920 (Baltimore and London, 1979),
173-210, p. 173, italics added: "In the earlier decades of the century, most biology was
concerned with descriptive studies of natural history: the study of anatomy, biogeogra-
phy, paleontology, and what today would be called ecology and embryology." Or, of
course, the whole argument of this text as concerns the evolution of biochemical and
molecular genetics. Cf G. E. Allen, Thomas Hunt Morgan (Princeton, N. J., 1978),chap.
VIII.
132. Ibid., 202.
133. It should be very clear that this criticism is not the same as that of Maienschein, Benson and
Rainger, as concerns the supposed imposition on history of a descriptive-speculative/
experimental dichotomy in the life sciences. My point is that 'biology' is external to the
whole argument here.
134. Ibid., 204.
135. Jane Maienschein, "Shifting assumptions in American biology: Embryology, 1890-1910",
Journal of the history of biology, xiv (1981), 89-113, p. 98, emphasis added.
136. Jane Maienschein, "Experimental biology in transition: Harrison's embryology, 1895-
1910", Studies in history of biology, vi (1983), 107-27, see pp. 110-12.
137. Maienschein, op. cit. (ref. 135),93.
138. Indeed, Maienschein later acknowledges that "biology never quite became one science", p.
50 in "Introduction" to Jane Maienschein (ed.), Defining biology (Cambridge, Mass.,
1986), 3-50.
139. Frederick B. Churchill, "In search of the new biology: An epilogue", Journal ofthe history of
biology, xiv (1981), 177-91, p. 179.
140. Keith R. Benson, "American morphology in the late nineteenth century: The biology
department at Johns Hopkins University", Journal of the history ofbiology, xviii (1985),
163-205, p. 166.
141. Ibid., 167-8.
142. Martin's contribution to A course of practical instruction in elementary biology is well
established. Foster, it seems, might have preferred a title page with Huxley's and his own
name on it, and perhaps Martin's and William Rutherford's names in tiny, tiny lettering.
It is Huxley who makes the final decision on the title page. See Huxley papers, iv, Foster
to Huxley, 27 Jan. [1875], pp. 194-7; Foster to Huxley, 31 Jan. [1875], pp. 200-1; Huxley
to Foster, 1 Feb. 1875, pp. 102-3. The Huxley papers are to be found at the Archives,
Imperial College of Science and Technology, London.
143. Note however that Churchill quotes a supposedly important article of Huxley and Chalmers
without even pointing out that Huxley has, at time of publication, been dead 15 years. In
the particular instance the detail is relevant. The words quoted were written not by
Huxley but by Chalmers (compare the 9th and lith editions of Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica). Indeed the tenor of those words echoes well a transformation we have noted
elsewhere(Joseph Caron, "Les commencements de la biologie: Ses bases conceptuelles et
institutionnelles dans I'Angleterre victorienne" (doctoral thesis, University of Montreal,
1986),257-8) between the first «2 vols, London, 1884; orig. 1864-67), i, 96) and second
«2 vols, New York and London, 1910; orig. 1898), i, 125) editions of the Principles of
biology of Herbert Spencer, the first edition of which was the first English language

biology manual. Spencer's comments may be read as an implicit statement to the effect
that the scope of biology as a science is not quite so ambitious as at the start.
144. See Philip Pauly, "The appearance of academic biology in late nineteenth-century America",
Journal of the history of biology, xvii (1984), 369-97, p. 373n.
145. Ibid., 369.
146. Ibid., 373.
147. Ibid., 376.
148. Ibid., 380n.
149. Ibid.
150. C. O. Whitman, "Biological instruction in universities", American naturalist, xxi (1887),507-
19, p. 517.
151. Ibid., 518-19: Whitman says that the minimum number of professors necessary to give
instruction in the life sciences would be two, and perhaps four or five could be required,
according to the particular scheme adopted.
152. Ibid., 516.
153. Conway Macmillan, "On the emergence of a sham biology in America", Science, xxi (1893),
184-6.
154. C. Hart Merriam, "Biology in our colleges: A plea for a broader and more liberal biology",
Science, xxi (1893), 352-5, p. 355.
155. Ibid., 354.
156. Ibid.
157. Edmund B. Wilson, "Aims and methods of study in natural history", Science, n.s., xiii
(1901), 14-23, p. 19. On this, I concur with Maienschein's reading (see "Shifting
assumptions in American biology", 94). Cf W. T. Sedgwick and E. B. Wilson, General
biology (New York, 1886).
158. See, for example, W. T. Thiselton-Dyer in 1895 before the BAAS, where a similar note is
struck but in a much more strident tone. See, for example, W. T. Thiselton-Dyer,
"Address" (of the president, Section K, Botany), Report of the BAAS transactions,
(1895), 83lr-50.
159. Pauly, op. cit. (ref. 144).
160. Ibid., 383.
161. Caron, op. cit. (ref. 143).
162. Robert E. Kohler, Jr, "The enzyme theory and the origin of biochemistry", Isis, Ixiv(1973),
181-96, p. 181.
163. T. H. Huxley, journal entry, 31 Dec. 1856, in L. Huxley, Life and letters of Thomas Henry
Huxley (London, 1908), i, 217.
164. T. H. Huxley, "The principles of biology: A course of twelve lectures", given at the Royal
Institution between 19 January 1858 and 23 March 1858. The manuscript is at the
Archives of Imperial College of Science and Technology, London; see Huxley Papers,
xxxvi, 163 pp. A copy may also be found at the Library of the American Philosophical
Society in Philadelphia. My thanks to both these institutions for their collaboration.
165. Important work on the question of nineteenth century comparisons of animals and plants
remains still to be completed. See Singer, op. cit. (ref. 124) for some indications of the
English scene. The importance of the dichotomous treatment of cellular theory and
protoplasmic theory is somewhat better known. See, for instance, Gerald Geison, "The
protoplasmic theory of life and the vitalist-mechanist debate", Isis, Ix (1969), 272-92.
166. On the question of humans in nature, it is important to note that the question is very much in
the centre of biological thinking, for instance, as of 1858 in the Fullerian Lectures. This
question is not specifically related to the evolution issue.
167. James Iverach, The ethics of evolution examined (London, n.d.), 3.

168. L. S. Beale, The new materialism: Dictatorial scientific utterances and the decline of thought
(London, 1882), 10.
169. Geison, op. cit. (ref. 165),284.
170. H. Charlton Bastian, "Facts and reasonings concerning the heterogenous evolution ofliving
things", Nature, (30 June 1870), 170--7; (7 July 1870), 193-201; (14 July 1870),219-28;
see p. 170.
171. H. Charlton Bastian, "Reply to Professor Huxley's inaugural address at Liverpool on the
question of the origin of life", Nature, (22 Sept. 1870),410--13, p. 410.
172. Herbert Spencer, "On alleged 'Spontaneous generation''', Appendix, in Principles ofbiology
(18~7) (2 vols, London, 1884),479-92, p. 480.
173. It seems clear that Huxley's evolutionary thinking informs his biology. Cf., however, Erling
Eng, "Thomas Henry Huxley's understanding of 'evolution' ", History of science, xvi
(1978), 291-303; and Michael Bartholomew, "Huxley's defence of Darwin", Annals of
science, xxxii (1975), 525-35. See discussion in Mario A. Di Gregorio, T. H. Huxley's
place in natural science (New Haven and London, 1984).
174. See also, in a similar vein, Gerald Skoog, "Topic of evolution in secondary school biology
textbooks: 1900--1977", Science education, lxiii (1979), 621-40; and John I. Cretzinger,
"Biological generalizations appearing in secondary texts published between 1800 and
1933", Proceedings of the Pennsylvania Academy of Science, xiv (1940), 84-87.
175. T. H. Huxley to H. Spencer, 15 June 1875, Spencer papers, MS 791/109 (i), on deposit by The
Athenaeum at the University of London, Paleography Room.
176. T. H. Huxley to J. Tyndall, 22 July 1874, Huxley papers, viii, 165.
177. Anon., "Physiology at the British Association" (Editorial), The lancet, (issue of 8 Sept.
1866), ii, 270--1, p. 270.
178. G. M. Humphry, "An address delivered at the opening of The Section of Physiology"
(Annual Meeting, British Medical Association, 6 Aug. 1873), British medical journal,
(issue of 9 Aug. 1873), ii, 160-3, p. 160.
179. J. Bell Pettigrew, "A lecture on the relations of plants & animals to inorganic matter, and on
the interaction of the vital and physical forces. Introductory to a course of physiology",
The lancet, (issue of 15 Nov. 1873), ii, 691-6.
180. Walter Moxon, "The biologist and the physician: being the annual oration before the
Hunterian Society for 1877", Medical times and gazette, (issue of 3 Mar. 1877), i, 221-9.
181. This treatment of Huxley is quite general. See, for instance, Michael Foster's relation with
Huxley (e.g., Huxley Papers, iv, 194-7,204-5, 173-4, 186-7, 157-60, 164-5), E. Ray
Lankester with Huxley (Huxley Papers, xxi, 88), etc.
182. See T. H. Huxley, "An address on the connection of the biological sciences with medicine"
(delivered at the International Medical Congress, London, August 1881), British medical
journal, (issue of 13 Aug. 1881), ii, 273-6. For references to persons mentioned as
favourable to biologist aims, see the following. In Michael Foster, A text book of
physiology (London, 1877), the introductory pages are explicit concerning recognition of
the importance of biology and the volume in entirety contains other relevant passages. H.
N. Martin is co-author with T. H. Huxley of A course of practical instruction in
elementary biology (London, 1875), the first book of this genre in biology per se. See
William Rutherford, "Introductory lecture on the present aspects of physiology", The
lancet, (issue of 14 Nov. 1874), ii, 683-9. E. Ray Lankester works with Huxley as an
assistant in the first practical elementary course developed at South Kensington and is
later strongly active at University College London in creating similar courses of
biological instruction. F. M. Balfour, a brilliant embryologist who died accidently at a
young age, actively pursued the interests of biology, for instance at Cambridge University
(debates recounted in Cambridge University reporter, issue of 25 Mar. 1879, 472-3 and

issue of I Apr. 1879, 499). T. J. Parker also assists Huxley at South Kensington a few
years after the beginning of the course; he later publishes his own textbook on biology,
Lessons in elementary biology (London, 1891). It is Parker who apparently convinced
Huxley to invert the original presentation of material in the elementary biology course.
The innovation permitted students to examine vertebrates in first place as opposed to the
least complex organism, the amoeba, originally studied at the outset of the course.
183. Gerald L. Geison, Michael Foster and the Cambridge School of Physiology: The scientific
enterprise in late Victorian society (Princeton, N.J., 1978).
184. See Cambridge University, Archives, Minutes of Special Board for Biology and Geology, i
(1882-1904), see the questionnaire facing minutes of 12 Dec. 1882. Also Cambridge
University reporter, (13 June 1883),885, 886.
185. I use the term publicist in the sense of public science as described in F. M. Turner, "Public
science in Britain, 1880-1919", Isis, Ixxi (1980), 589--608. However, I prefer the word
publicist as (a) it is difficult to conceive of a science as being anything other than
"public", in the sense of shared and organized knowledge; and (b) this word renders
better the sense of the expression.
186. I have dealt little in this paper with Herbert Spencer's role in the formulation of biology,
aside from mentioning his Principles ofbiology (ref. 143). This manual of biology, it must
be remembered, constitutes a contribution to Spencer's System of philosophy, a multi-
volume formulation of a new philosophical spirit of the Victorian period to which some
of the more influential biologists lent their full support.
187. Compare the two editions of Spencer, op, cit. (ref. 143).
188. See British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), Minute Book of Section
'D', Zoology (1890-1905), starting at Committee Meeting, IS Sept. 1893. The BAAS
archives are deposited at Oxford University.
189. Between 1870-71 and 1910-11, at least 79 distinct positions were created in the United
Kingdom for the study and teaching of biology in 40 separate institutions.
190. See, in England alone, about or after the turn of the century, the following connotations
given to the term 'biology' and the new precisions applied to this term. In 1904 an
Association of Applied Biology is founded, and in 1905 an Association of Economic
Biologists. The British Social Biology Council is formed in 1914. Further, debates
between Karl Pearson and William Bateson are reported under the name 'mathematical
biology'; see Anon., "Mathematical biology", Natural science, iv (1894), 82-84, and
follow-up articles, ibid., iv, 172-3, and ibid., v (1894), 1-2. D'A. W. Thompson's
"Magnalia naturae; or, The greater problems of biology", BAAS report, (1911), 395--404
gives yet another portrait of biology.
191. See in particular, as concerns this question, E. Ray Lankester, "Address" (of the President of
Section D), Report of the BAAS transactions, (1883), 512-28. See also W. T. Thiselton-
Dyer, "The needs of biology", in Essays on the endowment of research (London, 1876),
226-43. See, for a general background to this question, among other articles on this issue
by Roy M. MacLeod, "Resources of science in Victorian England: The Endowment of
Science Movement, 1868-1900", in Peter Mathias (ed.), Science and society 160Q-1900
(Cambridge, 1972), 111--66.
192. For turn-of-the-century England, see for instance William Bateson, "Heredity, differentia-
tion and other conceptions of biology", Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Ixix
(1901), 193-203; Karl Pearson, "On the fundamental conceptions of biology", Bio-
metrika, i (1901-2), 320-44. Conceptions of biological science vary widely, from The
biological problem of today ofO. Hertwig, trans!. by P. C. Mitchell (London, 1896) to H.
Spencer's second edition of Principles ofbiology (London, 1898). In this period, one sees

diffusion of 'biological' conceptions in marine biology, mathematical biology, applied

biology, economic biology, social biology, etc.
Through the twentieth century, numerous and widely differing positions are expressed
concerning the fundamental nature of 'biological' study. The following lists only a very
few instances published in English until the 19705: Jacques Loeb, "The recent develop-
ment of biology", Science, xx (1904), 777-86; James Johnstone, The philosophy ofbiology
(Cambridge, 1914); J. S. Haldane, "A lecture on the fundamental conceptions of
biology", British medical journal, (issue of 3 March 1923), i, 359--63; H. S. Jennings,
"Biology and experimentation", Science, lxiv (1926), 97-105; T. H. Morgan, "The
relation of biology to physics", Science, lxv (1927), 213-20; J. H. Woodger, Biological
principles: A critical study (London, 1929); Max Delbriick, "A physicist looks at
biology", Transactions. The Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, xxxviii (1949),
173-90; Barry Commoner, "In defense of biology", Science, cxxxiii (1961), 1745-8; C. C.
Davis, "Biology is not a totem pole", Science, cxli (1963), 308, 310; Theodosius
Dobzhansky, "Biology, molecular and organismic", American zoologist, iv (1964), 443-
52; C. H. Waddington, "The basic ideas of biology" (1968) in The evolution of an
evolutionist (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), 209-30; Delbriick, "A physicist's renewed look at
biology: Twenty years later", Science, clxviii (1970), 1312-15.
For comment on this and the preceding period, see Maienschein, op. cit. (ref. 138);
Pauly, op. cit. (ref. 13); Keith Benson, Jane Maienschein, Ronald Rainger (eds), The
emergence ofbiology in America, forthcoming; Abir-Am, op. cit. (ref. 26); Edward Yoxen,
"Giving life a new meaning: The rise of the molecular establishment", in N. Elias, H.
Martins and R. Whitley (eds), Scientific establishments and hierarchies, Sociology of the
Sciences, vi (Dordrecht, 1982), 123-43.
This list could be expanded for other languages, in particular French and German
about the tum of the twentieth century.

Caron, Joseph A., ‘“Biology” in the Life Sciences A Historiographical Contribution’, History of Science, 26.3 (1988), 223–268

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Caron, Joseph A., ‘“Biology” in the Life Sciences A Historiographical Contribution’, History of Science, 26.3 (1988), 223–268

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Hist. Sci.

'BIOLOGY' IN THE LIFE SCIENCES:

1. THE NECESSITY TO "PROBLEMATIZE" THE HISTORY OF 'BIOLOGY'

0073-2753/88/2603-0223/$2.50 © 1988 Science History Publications Ltd

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(1809-82)17 and Schultze (1825-74).18 With each name is associated a particu-

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way, I may identify a self-styled group of 'biologists'. This manner of

2. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BIOLOGY: MUCH ADO ABOUT WHAT, EXACTLY?

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2.1. The Archaeology of Biology: Unearthing or Reconstructing a Science?

To start my study of the histories to which these introductory critical remarks

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"pratique discursive" or "un seul et meme systeme de formation des econces"

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puisque c'est celui, interieur, des coherences anatomiques et des compati-

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transformation in the history of comparative anatomy, but this clearly

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Salomon-Bayet omits, however, to describe this peculiar context in which

2.2. Philosophic Physiology in France

In the second historical tradition I examine, the central focus is on the

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or biologie; H. Royer-Collard (1828), zoonomie; M. Fodera (1826), biologie; F.

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publication of a plan "d'instruction publique pour les sciences et les hautes

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the science that analyses the phenomena occurring concurrently in man,

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attempt to further the project of a synthetic and encompassing science of

2.3. Life Sciences in Germany: Treviranus, No Real Claim

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nineteenth century. My discussion is limited, however, to some problems

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evolutionism as a key synthetic guide in the nineteenth century, pursued with

2.4. Evolutionary Biology: Only a Loose Connection

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Biology, in these two examples and in other cases, is defined by association

2.5. Biology at the Junction of Many Specialized Research Areas: Some

This next historical tradition I examine, although solely based on conceptual

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2.6. A "New American Biology": Skirting the Issue

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Allen's use of the term 'biology' is, implicitly, non-problematic: a most

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Unclear references to "labelling" in journals and institutions provide further

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histology and embryology, to the detriment of studies necessary to a naturalist

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After presentation of a case study I have recently completed, I shall attempt

2.7. The Science of 'Biology' in England: Its Propagandistic Beginning

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theory). Although the implications of this position, especially on the moral

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institutional success of biology as a science. As of this period, teaching begins

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