Chapter V.Criticality Analysis 2020

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/342921014
Criticality Analysis Methods. Based on the Risk Assessment Process.
Technical Report · May 2020

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25392.17926
CITATIONS READS
7 5,891
2 authors:
Carlos Parra Adolfo Crespo Marquez

Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María Universidad de Sevilla
272 PUBLICATIONS 820 CITATIONS 432 PUBLICATIONS 5,475 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE
All content following this page was uploaded by Carlos Parra on 14 July 2020.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

IngeCon
Asesoría Integral en Ingeniería de Confiabilidad
www.confiabilidadoperacional.com
Technical Series:
Reliability, Maintenance and Asset Management
Whitepaper # V:
Criticality Analysis Methods
(Based on the Risk Assessment Process)
Authors:
**PhD. Carlos Parra Márquez
PhD. Adolfo Crespo Márquez
Dept. Industrial Management. University of Seville
School of Engineering, University of Seville, Spain
**Email: parrac@ingecon.net.in
www.linkedin.com/in/carlos-parra-6808201b
Grupo de Ingeniería de Confiabilidad Operacional:

https://www.linkedin.com/groups/4134220/
https://www.youtube.com/c/CarlosParraIngecon
Editado por:
www.ingeman.net
May, 2020
Grupo de Ingeniería de Confiabilidad Operacional: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/4134220/

parrac@ingecon.net.in, www.linkedin.com/in/carlos-parra-6808201b
IngeCon
www.confiabilidadoperacional.com www.ingeman.net
ABSTRACT
Criticality analysis techniques are tools that allow the identification and hierarchy of
the assets within a production system. In other words, the criticality analysis process
helps to determine the importance and consequences of potential failure events of
production systems within the operational context in which they perform. In the
following article, the most important theoretical aspects of the techniques of
hierarchical analysis of equipment (criticality analysis techniques) are explained. In
addition, some models and practical examples of application of these techniques of
prioritization in production assets are presented.
V.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCESS OF PRIORITIZATION
Taking as reference the maintenance management model (MMM) of the 8 phases

proposed in Chapter 1, this section related to techniques of prioritization and criticality
is part of phase 2 of the MMM (see Figure 5.1) (Parra y Crespo, 2015).
Criticality analysis techniques are tools that identify and prioritize important
assets of a facility to which it is worthwhile to direct resources (human, economic, and
technological). In other words, the criticality analysis process helps to determine the
importance and consequences of potential events of failure of production systems
within the operational context in which they operate (Woodhouse, 1994).
The term "critical" and the definition of criticality may have different
interpretations depending on the goal we are trying to rank. An analysis of criticality
aims to establish a method that will serve as an instrument of aid in the determination
of the prioritization of processes, systems and equipment of a complex production
process, allowing to subdivide elements into sections that can be handled in a
controlled and auditable manner. From this perspective, there is a great diversity of
possible criteria that allow to evaluate the criticality of an asset of production. The
reasons for prioritization may vary according to the opportunities and the needs of the
organization. Below are some common criteria used within the prioritization
processes:
• operational flexibility (availability of alternate function or backup)
• effect on the operational continuity / production capacity
• effect on the quality of the product
• effect on safety, environment and health
• stoppage and maintenance costs
• failure frequency / reliability
• conditions of operation (temperature, pressure, flow rate, stream, speed)
• flexibility / accessibility for inspection and maintenance
• requirements / availability of resources for inspection and maintenance
• availability of spare parts
2
IngeCon
Figure 5.1. Process of maintenance management model (MMM) (Parra y Crespo 2015)
Specifically, for the development of this paper, several of the methods of analysis
of criticality to be evaluated are constituted by prioritization methods that generate
results of criticality based on the theory of risk, concept that mixes the factor reliability
(failure rate) and the severity/consequence of failure factor (impact of failures in:
safety, environment, quality, production, etc.) (Jones, 1995). It is important to mention
that the results obtained with the application of the techniques of criticality represent
the primary resource with which any optimization process based on the application of
techniques of reliability and maintenance engineering should be started. Below are
three models of prioritization based on the risk assessment and used to identify the
critical equipments of a system of production (Parra and Crespo, 2015 and Parra and
Omaña, 2001).
3
IngeCon
V.2. FLOWCHART OF CRITICALITY ANALYSIS METHOD (QUALITATIVE)
In this first method (Crespo, 2007, Parra y Crespo, 2015) a technique that makes
reference to a purely qualitative analysis on the prioritization of production equipment
is presented. As we can see in Figure 5.2, the result of the process is a classification of
our equipments into three categories: A, B C, being the A equipment the type
equipment of higher priority.
To get to that final classification a sequential series of questions to the natural
teamwork formed in the company is performed for that purpose. The sequence marks
the importance facing each attribute discussed when establishing the priority of the
task force. Somehow, the order in the sequence marks the weight we give our
management to each attributes.
Figure 5.2. Model of the flowchart of criticality (Crespo, 2007)
For each question there are three possible answers A, B, or C that help us to
characterize the equipment. For example:
• The first question makes reference to the environment (E), an equipment could
be considered as category A, if a failure can cause the company to have to
resort to give notice to public authorities due to problems that could affect the
health of people and the environment (e.g.: A leak of ammonia). The
equipment would be category B if a failure causes contamination or affectation
that could be managed inside the company (for example, a leak of soda that is
controlled via the water network of the company). Finally an equipment could
be deemed category C if a failure does not produce any environmental
pollution.
• The issues of security (S) are then considered. The assets of the category "A"
are those whose failure may cause accidents resulting in temporary or
permanent work absenteeism in the workplace. Category "B" active failures
could cause minor damage to the people at work, they do not produce
4
IngeCon
absenteeism. Once again, category "C" assets are assets whose failure cannot
produce consequences related to the safety of people;
• Quality (Q) is the next issue that must be assessed using the flowchart. The
procedure for this evaluation is very similar to the one we have already carried
out for the environmental evaluation of equipments. Quality failures can also
produce a significant external impact, or a very negative image of the company
in the market, as a failure is detected once the product reaches the end
customer (consumers in our case study). Category A is now engaged with assets
that could suffer this type of failure. Category "B" and "C" would be the assets
that, when not maintained properly, could suffer failures that produce only an
internal domestic consequence or that does not cause any impact, respectively;
• The working time of an asset (W) may also condition its criticality. In this case
study, the assets working three shifts will be of category "A". Assets with two
shifts will be under category "B". Finally, when production assets have a single
work shift in programmed per day, we will include them in category "C".
Sometimes the extra work required for corrective maintenance of assets, on
average, can also be considered within this criterion. Assets that require a large
amount of overtime to be repaired would enter into category "A", and so on;
• Delivery (D) is a criterion relating to the operational impact of a failure of the
asset. Category "A" assets now are those that produce a stoppage across the
factory when they fail. Category "B" assets can leave only one line of
production stopped when failing. Finally, assets that do not produce a
significant disruption of the production would be of the category "C";
• Reliability (P) is introduced as a criterion also in the flowchart and is related to the
frequency of failure that can exist in an asset that is not properly maintained. In
our case study, we consider as category 'A' assets frequently failing less than 5
h. Assets with frequencies greater than 5 h and less than 10 h of failure will be
included in the category "B". Finally, for asset failure frequencies greater than
10 h, we could use the category "C". It is normal to take into account a criterion
of frequency that produces 20% of the assets within the category "A", over 30%
of “B", while 50% would be in category "C".
• Maintainability (M), or suitability of the asset to be maintained, is the last
criterion which must be taken into account. This criterion is related to the mean
time to repair a failure. Assets that require a repair of over 90 minutes mean
time are classified as "A". Between 45 and 90 minutes, they would be in
category "B". Finally those whose average service time is less than 45 minutes
would be within category "C".
V.3. SEMI-QUANTITATIVE CRITICALITY MODEL “CTR” (TOTAL CRITICALITY PER RISK)
Total criticality by risk model (CTR) is here presented, it is a semi-quantitative, rather

simple and practical, process supported the concept of risk, understood as the result of
multiplying the frequency of a failure by the severity of the same (see the concept
PRN: Probability Risk Number in Jones, 1985). This method has been widely developed
by consulting firms and international companies (Woodhouse, 1996) and adapted to a
number of industries (see example for the refining sector in Parra and Omaña, 2001).
5
IngeCon
Here they are in detail, the expressions used to rank the systems from the CTR
model:
CTR = FF x C (5.1)
Where:
CTR: Total criticality by risk
FF: Failure frequency (range of failures in a given time (failures/year))
C: consequences of failure events
Where it is also assumed that the value of consequences (C) is obtained by
means of the following expression:
C = (IO x FO) + CM + SHA (5.2)
Being:
IO = Factor of impact operational
OF = Factor of operational flexibility
MC = Factor of maintenance costs
SHE = Factor of safety, hygiene and environment impact
The final expression of the model of prioritization of CTR will be the following:
CTR = FF x ((IO x OF) + MC + SHE)) (5.3)
The factors weighted in each one of the criteria to be evaluated by the
expression of the risk (3) are presented below:
• Failure frequency factors (FF) (scale 1-4)
4: Frequent: Greater than 2 events a year
3: Average: 1 or 2 events a year
2: Good: between 0.5 and 1 event per year
1: Excellent: less than 0.5 event per year
• Consequences factors
O Operational impact (IO) (scale 1-10)

10: Loss of production above 75%
7: Loss of production between 50% and 74%
1: Less than 10% production losses
O Impact due to operational flexibility (OF) (scale 1-4)
4: No reserve units to cover the production, very large times for repair
and logistics
2: There are reserve units that manage to cover in part the impact of
production, intermediate times for repair and logistics
1: There are online reserve units, little times for repair and logistics
O Impact on the costs of maintenance (MC) (scale 1 - 2)
6
IngeCon
2: Costs of repairs, materials and workmanship exceeding $20,000
1: Costs of repairs, materials and workmanship of less than $20,000
O Impact on safety, hygiene and environment (SHE) (scale 1-8)
8: High risk of loss of life, serious damage to the health of the personnel
and/or large environmental incident (catastrophic) that exceed the
limits allowed
6: Moderate risk of loss of life, serious damage to health and/or
environmental incident of difficult restoration
3: Minimal risk of loss of life and affectation to health (recoverable in
the short term) and/or minor environmental incident (controllable),
spills and repeated leaks easy to contain
1: There is no risk of loss of life, or affectation to health, or
environmental damage
The weighted factors are selected during work meetings with the participation of
the various people involved in the operational context of the active study (operations,
maintenance, processes, safety and environment). Systems to be prioritized are then
selected and a brainstorm session is held during which values corresponding to each
factor that makes up the expression of total criticality by risk (expression 3) are
assigned to each team. To obtain the level of criticality of each team/system, total
values of each principal factors are taken: frequency and consequences of failures and
are put up on the criticality 4x4 matrix (see Figure 5.2). The value of failure frequency
is put up on the vertical axis and the value of consequences is put up on the horizontal
axis (the final result of the expression (2) is taken: (IO x OF) + MC + SHE). The criticality
matrix shown below allows us to rank the systems in three areas (see Figure 5.3):
• Non-critical Systems (NC) Area
• Average Criticality Systems (SC) Area
• Critical Systems (C) Area
7
IngeCon
Figure 5.3. Criticality matrix proposed by the model CTR
Equation 5.2 may vary depending on the considerations made by the company
for each installation in particular or specific temporary circumstances, so we get
different variations of the function of risk and hence the criticality matrix. See the
following example for off-shore installation of an oil company.
V.4. SEMI-QUANTITATIVE CRITICALITY MODEL "MCR" (CRITICALITY RISK MATRIX)
The following criticality model is taken as a reference in the MCR method designed for
offshore production assets in the Magallanes area, prepared by ENAP SIPETROL, see
technical report: ENAP SIPETROL, 2008 and Parra y Crespo, 2015). The proposed model
is based on the estimation of the risk factor through the following expressions:
Risk = FF x C (5.4)
Where:
FF = failure frequency (number of failures in a given time)
C = consequences of failures to safety, environment, quality,
production, etc. (now calculated according to equation 5.5)
C = (impact on safety and the environment (SHE) x 0.2) +
(Impact on quality (IC) x 0.2) +
(Impact on production (IP) x 0.2) +
(Impact due to low maintainability (BM) x 0.2) +
(Cost of maintenance (CM) x 0.2) (5.5)
Below are the weighted factors designed for the process of prioritization of the
frequency factors and consequences of failure:
• Failure frequency (FF) factor (scale 1-5)
8
IngeCon
1: Highly improbable: less than 1 event in 5 years
2: Improbable: 1 event in 5 years
3: Possible: 1 event in 3 years
4: Probable: between 1 and 3 events per year
5: Frequent: more than 3 events per year
• Impact factors (scale 1-5)
O Impact on safety and environmental protection (SHE)
5: High risk to the life of personnel, serious damage to the health of the
personnel ; (catastrophic) major environmental incident and/or, spills
and leaks that exceed the limits
3: Risk to the life of personnel or minor damage to the health of the
personnel ; smaller environmental incident and/or, easy to contain spills
and repeated leaks
1: There is no risk to health or environmental damage
O Impact on quality
5: Affectation in more than 75% of the quality of product delivery
4: Affectation between 50% and 74% of the quality of product delivery
3: Affectation between 25% and 49% of the quality of product delivery
2: Affectation up to 24% of the quality of product delivery
1: No Affectation of the quality of product delivery
O Impact on production (IP)
5: Loss of production above 75% (no reserve units)
4: Loss of production between 50% and 74% (partial reserve units)
1: Loss of production in less than 10%
O Impact due to low maintainability (BM)
5. There is no reserve units to cover the production, very long repair and
logistics times
3. There are reserve units that manage to cover in part the impact of
production, moderate repair and logistics times
1. There are online reserve units, little repair and logistics times
O Impact on costs of maintenance (CM)
5: Irreversible damage to the system, repair costs including materials
and HH exceeds in 75% the value of the equipment
4: Replacement cost including materials and HH range between 50% and
74% of the value of the equipment
3: Repair cost including materials and HH, range between 25% and 49%
of the value of the equipment
2: Repair cost including materials and HH, range between 10% and 24%
of the value of the equipment
9
IngeCon
1: Repair cost including materials and HH are below 10% of the value of
the equipment
The results of the evaluation of the above factors are presented in a criticality 5 x
5 matrix (see Figure 5.4), where the vertical axis is composed of five levels of failure
frequency , while the horizontal axis is composed of five levels of failure consequences.
The matrix is divided into four zones representing four levels of criticality:
Zones of criticality:
L = Low criticality
M = Medium criticality
H = High criticality
VH = Very high criticality
Frequency 5 H VH VH VH VH
4 H H H H VH
3 M M M H VH
2 L L L M M
1 L L L M M
1 2 3 4 5
Consequences
Figure 5.4. Criticality matrix proposed by the RCM model
V.5. QUANTITATIVE CRITICALITY MODEL"AHP" (ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS)
The AHP methodology (Saaty, 1980, Saaty, 1990) is a powerful and flexible tool for
multicriteria decision-making, used in problems in which assessing both the qualitative
and the quantitative aspects are needed. The AHP technique helps analysts organize
critical aspects of a problem in a hierarchical structure similar to the structure of a
family tree, reducing complex decisions to a series of comparisons that allow
prioritization of different aspects (criteria) evaluated (Parra y Crespo, 2015). This
section proposes the use of the AHP technique to prioritize systems and optimize the
process of decision-making related to the maintenance of these systems, in other
words, within the process of maintenance management, we need to make decisions
that guide the financial, human and technological resources, in order to be able to
develop efficient maintenance plans , for which it is necessary to take into account the
level of criticality of different systems/equipment involved in the production process.
This situation is not easy to solve, since there are a lot of factors involved that
generate great uncertainty in the process of systems/equipment prioritization, which is
why the application of the AHP technique can help to identify specifically the level of
criticality of systems/equipment, allowing this way, to optimize the effective
distribution of resources of maintenance depending on the level of importance
(criticality) that each system/equipment has within the production process.
10
IngeCon
V.5.1. GENERAL APPLICATION PROCEDURE OF MODEL AHP
The process of hierarchical analysis proposes for the following steps to be taken (Saaty,
1980):
1. Define the criteria of decision in the form of hierarchical objectives. The
prioritization is divided into different levels: starting at the top with the
definition of the primary objective of the prioritization process, then the
intermediate levels (criteria and sub-criteria to evaluate) are defined and finally
the lowest level describes the alternatives to be compared.
2. Evaluate (weigh) different criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives according to
their respective importance in each level. Qualitative and quantitative criteria
can be compared using informal failure s to obtain weights and priorities. For
qualitative criteria, the AHP technique uses simple comparisons (pairwise) to
determine weights and evaluate them. In this way the analyst can concentrate
on only two criteria at the same time. In fact, the AHP technique is based on
the assumption that the analyst (decision maker) can more easily choose a
comparison value than an absolute value. Verbal values are moved to a scoring
scale (see table 1).
Later, in a matrix of values, a priority vector is calculated and used to
weigh (compare) the elements of the matrix. Saaty (1980,1990), showed
mathematically that the normalized autovector calculated from the matrix is
the best approach of evaluation of the analyzed criteria. In the case of
quantitative criteria, it is necessary to design a method of prioritization
enabling to consistently quantify the weight of each criterion to be analyzed
(Wind and Saaty, 1980).
Values Score
Same 1
2
Moderate 3
4
Strong 5
6
Very strong 7
8
Exteme 9
Table 5.1. Assessment of the values (Saaty, 1980)
3. The AHP technique allows the analyst to evaluate the congruence of the values
with the inconsistency ratio (IR). Before determining an inconsistency, it is
necessary to estimate the consistency index (CI) of an n x n matrix of values,
where CI is defined by:
11
IngeCon
 max − n
CI =
n −1 (5.6)
Where  max is the maximum autovalue of the matrix. In this way, IR is
defined by:
CI
I R=
RI (5.7)
Where RI is the average random value of CI for an n x n matrix. RI values are
shown in table 5.2.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35
Table 5.2. Values of RI for matrices of different orders (Saaty, 1980)
The values may be considered acceptable if IR  0.1. In cases of inconsistency,

the process of assessment for the assessed matrix is immediately repeated.
More than 0.1 or more inconsistencies justify further investigation of the
evaluated criteria.
4. Rank the alternatives and make the corresponding decisions. For each
alternative (options to be ranked), the level of preference (prioritization) is
calculated on a scale between 0.0000 - 1,000, resulting in alternatives
encountered depending on the decision criteria evaluated, see details in (Saaty,
1980).
V.5.2. CASE STUDY. APPLICATION OF THE AHP TECHNIQUE TO RANK SYSTEMS OF AN

OIL REFINERY PLANT
In the processes of oil refining plants, it is common to make a large number of

decisions on maintenance, taking into account the importance that the different
systems within the specific operational context of each refinery have. Normally, the
prioritization of the different systems/equipment is completely qualitatively, based
only on the experience and the "feeling" of the human resources working in the plants.
The scenario proposed is propitious to make decisions with a high uncertainty,
therefore, the use of the process of hierarchical analysis (AHP) technique is
appropriate in order to be able to rank quantitatively oil assets from criteria related to
reliability, maintenance, quality, production, safety, the environment, among others.
The case study proposed consists of prioritization of the major systems that
comprise the plant of FCC (Fluid Catalytic Cracking) of the refinery REP-TOL. The
equipment to be considered in the assessment are the following: Reactor (Ra1-A),
regenerator (kg1-A), third stage separator (Sp1-A/B), power retriever train (Tr1-A), wet
gas compressor (Cg1-A), Preheat train (Th1-A/B/C), pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B),
boiler (Ca1-A). Currently, the refinery has a prioritization made based on entirely
qualitative criteria. This prioritization is specifically supported by the opinion and
experiences of plant operations and maintenance personnel . The existing qualitative
prioritization is as follows:
12
IngeCon
Systems Qualitative prioritization
Reactor (Ra1-A) 1
Regenerator (kg1-A), 2
Wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 3
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 4
Boiler (Ca1-A) 5
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 6
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 7
Pre-heat Train (Th1-A/B/C) 8
Table 5.3. Qualitative prioritization
For this specific case, an AHP model was designed taking the proposed risk
assessment process by (Woodhouse, 2000) as a basis. In general terms, the AHP model
based on the concept of risk searches to rank based on importance an oil installation
equipments on which maintenance resources (human, economic, and technological)
will be directed. As a result, the proposed method will generate a list of critical
equipment according to the basic risk factors to be evaluated: failure frequency, levels
of detection or control of failures, levels of severity and costs of failures within the
operational context. On the other hand, it is important to clarify the term "critical" and
the definition of criticality, since these can have different interpretations and will
depend on the objective we are trying to rank. In our case in particular, the
prioritization of the equipments will enable us to direct maintenance resources
towards the equipments assessed as critical.
In Figure 5.5 is the general framework of model AHP developed to rank the
equipments within the FCC plant:
Prioritize equipment
according to their criticality
Failure Frequency Failure Detection Failure Severity Failure Costs

(FF) (FD) (FS) (FC)
(Ra1) (Ra1) (Ra1) (Ra1)
(Kg1) (Kg1) (Kg1) (Kg1)
(Gg1) (Cg1) (Cg1) (Cg1)
(Tr1) (Tr1) (Tr1) (Tr1)
(Ca1) (Ca1) (Ca1) (Ca1)
(Vr1) (Vr1) (Vr1) (Vr1)
(Sp1) (Sp1) (Sp1) (Sp1)
(Th1) (Th1) (Th1) (Th1)

Figure 5.5. AHP Model designed to rank the FCC plant systems
Each step is then explained in the section above (II.4.1.), in order to implement
the proposed AHP model.
V.5.2.1. DECISION CRITERIA IN THE FORM OF HIERARCHICAL OBJECTIVES
Step 1. Three levels of prioritization are identified (see Figure 5.5):

13
IngeCon
• Level 1. Definition of the main objective.
Rank the 8 main systems that make up the FCC of the REP-TOL refinery plant.
• Level 2. Definition of evaluation criteria
The theoretical basis of the risk assessment process was taken from
(Woodhouse, 2000). The AHP model designed proposes to rank systems by
assessing criteria related to systems failures:
O Frequency of failure occurrence (FF)
o Failure detection (FD)
o Severity of failures (FS)
o Costs of failure (CF)
At this stage of the process of applying the AHP technique, we proceed to
assess the level of importance of each one of the selected criteria (frequency of
failure, failure detection, severity of failures and costs of failures). The importance
among each one of the criteria is calculated from a qualitative comparison among
criteria in a paired (pairwise) form. This qualitative comparison among criteria is
made in this way, mainly due to the lack of agreement between the operations and
maintenance personnel and the processes to generate a table of levels which
allows us to evaluate each one or the four criteria in a precise manner. Paired
comparison activity was carried out in a work meeting in which the following FCC
plant personnel participated: process engineer, premises engineer, operations
supervisor, maintenance supervisor, instrumentation and control supervisor, safety
and environment supervisor and operator on duty. Below are the results obtained
in the paired comparison for the four criteria considered in the process of
prioritization of the FCC plant systems (the scale of assessment of values used to
perform the comparison among the evaluated criteria is shown in table 5.1):
Criteria Frequency of Failure Severity of Costs of failures

failure detection failure
Frequency of - 3 1 1
failure
Failure detection 1/3 - ½ 1/3
Severity of failure 1 2 - ½
Costs of failures 1 3 2 -
Table 5.4. Paired prioritization criteria comparison
• Level 3. Description of alternatives to be ranked.

Systems of the FCC plant to be evaluated: Reactor (Ra1-A), regenerator (kg1-A),
third stage separator (Sp1-A/B), power train retriever (Tr1-A), wet gas
compressor (Cg1-A), Preheat train (Th1-A/B/C), pressure control valves (Vr1-
A/B), boiler (Ca1-A).
V.5.2.2. WEIGHTS OF ALTERNATIVES FOR EVERY SELECTED CRITERION
Step 2. We proceed to evaluate each criterion quantitatively. A process based on the

analysis of a series of weighted factors that allows quantifying each criterion for each
alternative to rank is defined. In particular, each criterion is divided into several classes
which are assigned different levels of criticality (interval from 1 to 10). Scores for each
14
IngeCon
criterion are assigned quantitatively in work meetings with the maintenance,
operations, processes and security personnel . Below is a brief description of the
evaluation method of the criteria.
• Failure frequency Criterion (FF). The Failure frequency Criterion is evaluated
based on the number of failures per period of time (table 5). For the definition
of the level of frequency of failure for each alternative (System) to be evaluated
it is required to collect information of the failure history of each system.
Different levels of failure frequency are presented in table 5.5.
FF Failure frequency level Level definition

10 Very high: Almost An occurrence each week
unavoidable
9 An occurrence each month
8 High: Continuously An occurrence every three months
7 An occurrence every six months
6 Moderate: Occasionally An occurrence every nine months
5 An occurrence every year
4 Low: Few failures An occurrence every two to three
years
3 An occurrence every four to six
years
2 Remote: Failure very An occurrence every seven to nine
unlikely years
1 An occurrence every ten or more
years
Table 5.5. Scale enabling to define the failure frequency criterion (FF)
• Failure detection criterion (FD). The failure detection criterion is related to the
systems of protection, control and warning available to detect the occurrence
of failures safely. For the definition of the level of failure detection of each
alternative (System) to be evaluated it is necessary to collect information on all
aspects of instrumentation, control and protection existing in each one of the
systems to be evaluated. Table 5.6 presents the different levels of detection of
available failures.
15
IngeCon
Failure detection
FD Level definition
(control) level
10 Absolutely Equipment is not inspected nor controlled.
uncertain Failure events are not detected
9
8
7 Low Control is reduced to visual inspection of the
equipment
6
5 Moderate Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. One inspection point. (25%
automated inspection)
4
3 High Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. Two inspection points (75%
automated inspection)
2 Very high Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. Total inspection (100% automated
inspection)
1 Totally controlled Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. Total inspection and permanent test
equipment calibration (100% automated
inspection)
Table 5.6. Scale enabling to define the failure detection criterion (FD)
• Failure severity criterion (FS). The failure severity criterion is related to the impact
of failures on security, the environment and operations. For the definition of
the failure severity criterion, it is necessary to know what the effects that
failures can produce are once they occur within a specific operational context.
Table 5.7 presents the different levels of severity of available failures.
Failure Severity
FS Level definition
level
10 Dangerously high Failures may cause loss of human life
9 Failures may create complications with existing laws
and regulations
8 Failures producing function loss and inoperable
equipment
7 High Failures causing important decrease in customer
satisfaction
6 Failures impacting a production subsystem
decreasing service quality
5 Low Failures causing efficiency loss and customer
complaint
4 Failures that can be avoided with minimal
modifications and with low service impact
3 Very low Failures creating small inefficiencies to the customer
that the same customer could correct
2 Failures difficult to be recognized by the customer
and whose effects are not significant for the process
1 Non-existent Failures that cannot be detected by the customer and
not impacting process efficiency
Table 5.7. Scale enabling to define the failure severity criterion (FS)
16
IngeCon
• Costs of failure criterion (CF). The costs of failure criterion is related to the
possible economic consequences of failures on security, the environment and
operations. For the definition of the criterion of severity of failures, it is
necessary to estimate the costs that can result in failures once they occur
within a specific operational context. Table 5.8 presents the different levels of
severity of available failures.
FC Failure costs level Level definition

10 Dangerously high Failures may cause high indemnification cost
9
8 Very high Failures causing total production loss
7
6 High Failures causing high maintenance direct cost –
repair cost
5
4 Moderate Failures causing significant operation or
maintenance cost
3
2
1 Very low Failures causing no significant cost to production
process
Table 5.8. Scale enabling to define the costs of failure criterion (CF)
• Results of the evaluation of the alternatives (systems) for each selected criterion.
Following are the results of the assessment of the 8 systems of the plant of FCC,
based on each one of the four criteria explained above (frequency of failure
occurrence (FF), failure detection (FD), failure severity (FS) and costs of failures
(CF)).
17
IngeCon
FF local FD Local FS Local CF Local
prioritization prioritization prioritization Prioritization
Criteria
FF = FD = FS = CF =
Systems (FF/Total) (FD/Total) (FS/Total) (CF/Total)
Reactor (Ra1-A) 2 0,083333333 0,06060606 10 0,20408163 10

2 0.2
Regenerator (kg1- 2 0,083333333 6 0,18181818 6 0,12244898 7
A) 0.14
Third stage 3 0.125 2 0,06060606 2 0,04081633 4 0.08
separator (Sp1-
A/B)
Power retriever 6 0.25 2 0,06060606 9 0,18367347 8 0.16
train (Tr1-A)
(Cg1-A) wet gas 2 0,083333333 2 0,06060606 5 0,10204082 6 0.12
compressor
pre-heat train 1 0,041666667 8 0,24242424 2 0,04081633 3 0.06
(Th1-A/B/C)
control Pressure 5 0,208333333 5 0,15151515 6 0,12244898 4 0.08

valves (Vr1-A/B)
Boiler (Ca1-A) 3 0.125 6 0,18181818 9 0,18367347 8 0.16

Total 24 33 49 50
Table 5.9. Evaluation of systems for each selected criterion
Similarly to the qualitative comparison paired between the 4 criteria, the

evaluation quantified from of each one of the criteria by system was also
performed in a work meeting with the same participants mentioned above, the
main difference in this assessment process consists in that the work group should
reach a consensus and assign each system (of a total of 8) a value quantified by
each evaluated criterion, taking into account the scale of values presented for each
criterion in tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8.
V.5.2.3. PRIORITIZATION BY LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND EACH CRITERION
Step 3. Based on the prioritization values obtained for each one of the criteria (table
5.9), we proceed to sort systems by level of importance (from most to least) for each 4
criteria evaluated. Following are the results of prioritization by level of importance
obtained from the "Expert Choice" software:
18
IngeCon
• Failure frequency criterion (FF):
Criteria FF Criticality
Systems FF
(FF/Total)
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 6 0.25
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 5 0,208333333
Boiler (Ca1-A) 3 0.125
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 3 0.125
Reactor (Ra1-A) 2 0,083333333
Regenerator (kg1-A) 2 0,083333333
Wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 2 0,083333333
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 1 0,041666667
Total 24
Table 5.10. Prioritization by failure frequency of occurrence criterion (FF)
• Failure Detection criterion (FD):
Criteria FD Criticality FD
(FD/Total)
Systems
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 0,24242424
8
Boiler (Ca1-A) 6 0,18181818
Third stage separator(Sp1-A/B) 2 0,06060606
wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 2 0,06060606
Reactor (Ra1-A) 2 0,06060606
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 2 0,06060606
Total 33
Table 5.11. Prioritization by failure detection criterion (FD)
• Severity of failures criterion (FS) :
Criteria FS Criticality FS
(FS/Total)
Systems
Reactor (Ra1-A) 10 0,20408163
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 9 0,18367347
Boiler (Ca1-A) 9 0,18367347
Wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 5 0,10204082
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 2 0,04081633
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 2 0,04081633
Total 49
Table 5.12. Prioritization by failure severity criterion (FS)
19
IngeCon
• Costs of failure criterion (CF):
Criteria CF Criticality CF
(CF/Total)
Systems
Reactor (Ra1-A) 10
0.2
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 8 0.16
Boiler (Ca1-A) 8 0.16
Regenerator (kg1-A) 7 0.14
wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 6 0.12
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 4 0.08
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 4 0.008
Pre-heat Train (Th1-A/B/C) 3 0.06
Total 50
Table 5.13. Prioritization by cost of failure criterion (CF)
V.5.2.4. CONSISTENCY OF THE VALUES. INCONSISTENCY RATIO (IR) AND

PRIORITIZATION OF EACH OF THESE CRITERIA
Step 4. The (IR) estimation and prioritization of criteria were performed with the
computer tool called 'Expert Choice'. Following are the results:
Criteria Failure Failure Failure Costs of Prioritization by

frequency detection severity failures criteria
Failure
- 3 1 1 0,302
frequency
Failure
1/3 - ½ 1/3 0,110
detection
Failure severity 1 2 - ½ 0,230
Costs of failures 1 3 2 - 0.358
Inconsistency
0.02
ratio (IR) =
Table 5.14. The (IR) estimation and prioritization of evaluated criteria
V.5.2.5. FINAL PRIORITIZATION OF THE EVALUATED PLANT SYSTEMS
Step 5. We proceed to quantify the final prioritization, based on the valuation made to
each one of the criteria (local/total) evaluated in steps 2, 3 and 4 for each system
evaluated (tables 5.9 and 5.14). Subsequently, the results are ordered by level of
importance (ranking) from greater to lesser. Following are the results of the
prioritization and the final ranking obtained with the computer tool called 'Expert
Choice':
20
IngeCon
Criteria Local Local Local Local Final

Prioritization prioritization x prioritization x prioritization x prioritization =
x Total Total criterion Total criterion Total criterion (1) + (2) + (3) +
Systems criterion FF FD FS CF (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reactor (Ra1-A) 0,083333333 x 0,06060606 x 0,20408163 x
0.2 X 0,15037211
0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
Regenerator 0,083333333 x 0,18181818 x 0,12244898 x 0,12344993
0.14 X
(kg1-A) 0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
Third stage 0.125 x 0,06060606 x 0,04081633 x 0,08244442
0.08 X
separator (Sp1- 0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
A/B)
Power retriever 0.25 x 0,06060606 x 0,18367347 x 0,18169156
0.16 X
train (Tr1-A) 0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
wet gas 0,083333333 x 0,06060606 x 0,10204082 x 0,09826272
0.12 X
compressor (Cg1- 0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
A)
0,041666667 x 0,24242424 x 0,04081633 x 0,07011776
0.06 X
Pre-heat train 0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
(Th1-A/B/C)
Pressure control 0,208333333 x 0,15151515 x 0,12244898 x 0,1363866
0.08 X
valves (Vr1-A/B) 0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
Boiler (Ca1-A) 0.125 x 0,18181818 x 0,18367347 x 0,1572749
0.16 X
0,302 0.11 0.23
0.358
General index of
inconsistency:
0.02
Table 5.15. Final prioritization
21
IngeCon
Systems Final Ranking
prioritization
Power retriever train (Tr1-A), 0,182 1
Boiler (Ca1-A) 0,157 2
Reactor (Ra1-A) 0.150 3
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 0136 4
Regenerator (kg1-A) 0,123 5
wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 0,098 6
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 0.082 7
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 0070 8
Table 5.16. Final ranking
The results obtained with the designed AHP model (table 16), show a big
difference with the existing levels of qualitative prioritization (table 3). The following
table presents a comparison between the prioritization obtained with AHP method
and existing qualitative prioritization:
Systems AHP Systems Qualitative

prioritization prioritization
• POWER RETRIEVER TRAIN
1 • REACTOR (RA1) 1
(TR1-A)
• BOILER (CA1-A) 2 • REGENERATOR (RG1) 2
• WET GAS COMPRESSOR
• REACTOR (RA1-A) 3 3
(CG1)
• PRESSURE CONTROL VALVES • POWER RETRIEVER TRAIN
4 4
(VR1-A/B) (TR1)
• REGENERATOR (KG1-A) 5 • BOILER (CA1) 5
• WET GAS COMPRESSOR • PRESSURE CONTROL
6 6
(CG1-A) VALVES (VR1)
• THIRD STAGE SEPARATOR • THIRD STAGE SEPARATOR
7 7
(SP1-A/B) (SP1)
• PRE-HEAT TRAIN (TH1- • PRE-HEAT TRAIN (TH1-
8 8
A/B/C) A/B/C)
Table 5.17. Comparison between AHP prioritization with qualitative prioritization
In general terms, the system evaluated with the AHP model which had the
biggest change of level of prioritization, was the power retriever train, that went from
position 4 (qualitative prioritization) to position 1 (AHP prioritization), i.e. it became
the most critical system at the FCC plant. Other systems such as the boiler and control
valves also increased their levels of prioritization in comparison with the original
(qualitative) prioritization. Systems like the reactor, the regenerator and the wet gas
compressor decreased their levels of prioritization places going from positions 1, 2 and
3 to positions 3, 5 and 6; respectively. Finally, the third stage separator and preheat
train systems kept the same levels of prioritization in both evaluations. The results of
the prioritization carried out a 8 FCC plant systems, will allow more efficient decisions
and with a lesser degree of uncertainty in the activities of allocation and distribution of
human, technical and financial resources within the maintenance and operation
22
IngeCon
processes, helping to maximize the profitability of the products produced in the
refinery study FCC plant. In annex II at the end of this book, an article is included
related as prioritization models, referred to as: Proposal of a method of prioritizing
of stock in the area of the maintenance called: PR- C&V (prioritization of spare parts
by criticality and economic value).
V.6. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES
- Crespo Márquez A, 2007. The maintenance management framework. Models and

methods for complex systems maintenance. London: Springer Verlag.
- ENAP SIPETROL, 2008. A matrix of assessment and risk management to the
operational reliability, designed for the deposits Pampa del Castillo - La Guitarra.
Edited by ENAP INF-10-2008-CONF1, Santiago, Chile.
- ENAP SIPETROL, 2008. Definition of critical process developed for Off-Shore
production, Magellan area assets. Edited by ENAP INF-10-2008-CONF2, Santiago,
Chile.
- Jones Richard, 1995. Risk-Based Management: A Reliability-Centered Approach, Gulf
Publishing Company, Houston, Texas, First Edition.
- PDVSA INTEVEP, 1999. Reliability and operational risks of PDVSA engineering manual.
Edited by INTEVEP (Venezuelan oil technological Institute), Series X-1999-345,
Caracas, Venezuela.
- Mitchell J, 1998. Physical Asset Management Handbook. Published by Clarion
Technical Publishers.
- Parra, C. y Crespo, A. 2015. Ingeniería de Mantenimiento y Fiabilidad aplicada a la
Gestión de Activos. Editado por INGEMAN, Segunda Edición, Escuela Superior de
Ingenieros de la Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, España.
- Parra Carlos, 1997. Methodology of implementation of reliability-centered
maintenance in Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Universidad de los Andes,
postgraduate diploma in maintenance engineering, Venezuela.
- Parra C, 2002. Application of process of hierarchical analysis (PHA) technique in
refining and production of the Venezuelan oil industry systems. Doctoral course in
mechanical engineering. Modern systems of production management, University
of Seville, Spain.
- Parra C y Omaña C, 2001. Report: qualitative technique of audit of the maintenance
management for the refining sector. VII Congress of maintenance engineering of
Petroleos de Venezuela, Caracas, October 2001.
- Saaty T.L., 1980. The Analytic Prioritization Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
- Saaty T.L., 1982. Priority Setting in Complex. Proceedings of the Second World
Conference on Mathematics at the service of Man. Las Palmas, Canary Islands.
- Saaty T.L., 1990. How to make a decision: the analytic prioritization process.
European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 48, pp.9-26.
- Wind and. and Saaty T.L., 1980. Marketing applications of the analytic prioritization
process. Management Science, Vol. 26 No. 7, pp.641-658.
- John Woodhouse, 1994. Criticality Analysis Revisited. The Woodhouse Partnership
Limited, Newbury, England 1994.
23
IngeCon
- Woodhouse J, 2000. "Introduction to the Operational Reliability". Training manual,
PDVSA - CIED, Venezuela, pp. 1- 38.
- Internet: Software ExpertChoice, http://www.expertchoice.com . Address: 1501 Lee
Highway, Suite 302, Arlington, VA 22209.
Authors:
PhD. MSc. Eng. Carlos Parra Márquez**

PhD. MSc. Eng. Adolfo Crespo Márquez
E-mails: parrac@ingecon.net.in, adolfo@etsi.us.es
Gerente General de IngeCon (Asesoría Integral en Ingeniería de Confiabilidad)
Representante de INGEMAN Latinoamérica
www.confiabilidadoperacional.com, www.ingeman.net
E-mail: parrac@ingecon.net.in parrac37@gmail.com
www.linkedin.com/in/carlos-parra-6808201b
Grupo de Ingeniería de Confiabilidad Operacional
https://www.linkedin.com/groups/4134220/
Universidad de Sevilla, Escuela Superior de Ingenieros, Doctorado en Ingeniería de Organización
Industrial
www.ingeman.net, https://ingeman.net/?op=profesores
Programa cursos presenciales y virtuales 2020:

https://sites.google.com/view/aulavirtualingecon/home
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/programa-de-cursos-presenciales-2020-ingenier%25C3%25ADa-
riesgos-carlos-parra
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/cursos-virtuales-2019-2020-%C3%A1reas-ingenier%C3%ADa-de-
riesgos-carlos-parra/
24
This page left intentionally blank

View publication stats

Chapter V.Criticality Analysis 2020

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter V.Criticality Analysis 2020

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

Criticality Analysis Methods. Based on the Risk Assessment Process.

Technical Report · May 2020

Carlos Parra Adolfo Crespo Marquez

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Grupo de Ingeniería de Confiabilidad Operacional:

Grupo de Ingeniería de Confiabilidad Operacional: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/4134220/

V.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCESS OF PRIORITIZATION

Taking as reference the maintenance management model (MMM) of the 8 phases

Figure 5.2. Model of the flowchart of criticality (Crespo, 2007)

V.3. SEMI-QUANTITATIVE CRITICALITY MODEL “CTR” (TOTAL CRITICALITY PER RISK)

Total criticality by risk model (CTR) is here presented, it is a semi-quantitative, rather

O Operational impact (IO) (scale 1-10)

Figure 5.3. Criticality matrix proposed by the model CTR

V.4. SEMI-QUANTITATIVE CRITICALITY MODEL "MCR" (CRITICALITY RISK MATRIX)

Figure 5.4. Criticality matrix proposed by the RCM model

V.5. QUANTITATIVE CRITICALITY MODEL"AHP" (ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS)

Table 5.1. Assessment of the values (Saaty, 1980)

The values may be considered acceptable if IR  0.1. In cases of inconsistency,

V.5.2. CASE STUDY. APPLICATION OF THE AHP TECHNIQUE TO RANK SYSTEMS OF AN

In the processes of oil refining plants, it is common to make a large number of

Table 5.3. Qualitative prioritization

Failure Frequency Failure Detection Failure Severity Failure Costs

(Ra1) (Ra1) (Ra1) (Ra1)

(Kg1) (Kg1) (Kg1) (Kg1)

(Gg1) (Cg1) (Cg1) (Cg1)

(Tr1) (Tr1) (Tr1) (Tr1)

(Ca1) (Ca1) (Ca1) (Ca1)

(Vr1) (Vr1) (Vr1) (Vr1)

(Sp1) (Sp1) (Sp1) (Sp1)

(Th1) (Th1) (Th1) (Th1)

V.5.2.1. DECISION CRITERIA IN THE FORM OF HIERARCHICAL OBJECTIVES

Step 1. Three levels of prioritization are identified (see Figure 5.5):

Criteria Frequency of Failure Severity of Costs of failures

• Level 3. Description of alternatives to be ranked.

V.5.2.2. WEIGHTS OF ALTERNATIVES FOR EVERY SELECTED CRITERION

Step 2. We proceed to evaluate each criterion quantitatively. A process based on the

FF Failure frequency level Level definition

FC Failure costs level Level definition

Reactor (Ra1-A) 2 0,083333333 0,06060606 10 0,20408163 10

control Pressure 5 0,208333333 5 0,15151515 6 0,12244898 4 0.08

Boiler (Ca1-A) 3 0.125 6 0,18181818 9 0,18367347 8 0.16

Table 5.9. Evaluation of systems for each selected criterion

Similarly to the qualitative comparison paired between the 4 criteria, the

V.5.2.3. PRIORITIZATION BY LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE AND EACH CRITERION

• Failure Detection criterion (FD):

• Severity of failures criterion (FS) :

V.5.2.4. CONSISTENCY OF THE VALUES. INCONSISTENCY RATIO (IR) AND

Criteria Failure Failure Failure Costs of Prioritization by

V.5.2.5. FINAL PRIORITIZATION OF THE EVALUATED PLANT SYSTEMS

Criteria Local Local Local Local Final

Systems AHP Systems Qualitative

V.6. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

- Crespo Márquez A, 2007. The maintenance management framework. Models and

PhD. MSc. Eng. Carlos Parra Márquez**

Programa cursos presenciales y virtuales 2020:

Grupo de Ingeniería de Confiabilidad Operacional: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/4134220/

View publication stats

You might also like