Policy Options in a Time of Transition: The US and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Author(s): Geoffrey Aronson

Source: Middle East Journal , Spring 2013, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Spring 2013), pp. 249-256
Published by: Middle East Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698048

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Middle East Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Middle East Journal

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MEI Policy Essay

Policy Options in a Time of Transition:

The US and the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Geoffrey Aronson1

-A>fter decades of unprecedented national concern and diplomatic mobilization, popu-

lar and policy interest in Israel's continuing settlement in the territories occupied in
June 1967 has all but disappeared. This inattention is not a consequence of an American
policy triumph, but rather the opposite. Observers of all persuasions agree that during
its first term, the administration of President Barack Obama was singularly unsuccess-
ful in leading a diplomatic process between the antagonists. It stood by as Israel con-
tinued to marginalize the PLO and expand settlements in occupied territories, even as
the PLO focused on building a new, and at times troubled, relationship with Islamist
forces ruling the Gaza Strip. On Obama's watch, policymakers and the public alike
have surrendered to the passions that drive the conflict. Seemingly unable to affect the
course of the conflict, and drawn to the more hopeful and dramatic narratives of the
Arab Spring, the American public and policymakers alike have become bored with the
problem between Israelis and Palestinians.
But while the public may be forgiven for its lack of attention to, and interest in,
the finer points of the conflict, policymakers are responsible for adhering to a more
exacting standard. When the vital national interests of the United States are at stake,
as they are in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, there is no credible excuse for inattention,
much less for failure.
President Obama has noted that the United States is in an "era of transition"2 as
it seeks to define and preserve its interests in a rapidly changing and sometimes revo-
lutionary international environment. This article is both a response to these uncertain
times and a guide for navigating them. It outlines a results-oriented paradigm for re-
solving the bitter antagonisms between Israelis and Palestinians that have eluded solu-
tion for decades. The article rests upon a new, if unremarkable assumption - that the
United States, in order to advance its own interests, is obliged to draw a picture of the
future of relations between Israel and a new state of Palestine and to lead the parties, as
well as the international community, in realizing this vision.
Notwithstanding the current policy malaise, nothing that has transpired in recent
years is cause to alter the considered judgment that the resolution of the festering con-
flict between Israel and Palestine remains a critical and vital national security interest

Geoffrey Aronson is editor of the Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories , published by the
Foundation for Middle East Peace. He writes widely on regional political and security issues.
1. Geoffrey Aronson is the principal author, together with Col. Philip Dermer (Ret.), of an inde-
pendent Stimson Center Study Group Report, "US Policy in a Time of Transition, Ending Occupation,
Enhancing Israel's Security, Realizing Palestinian Sovereignty."
2. Speech by President Barack Obama at the New Economic School, July 7, 2009, Moscow.
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ★ VOLUME 67, NO. 2, SPRING 2013
HTTP://DX.DOI.ORG/l 0.375 1/67.2. 15

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
250 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

of the United States and a necessary prerequisite for fully realizing the uncert
ise of the Arab Spring. In order to act, and to convince others to act in concer
need to be credibly committed to this unambiguous objective. As a new but unc
era dawns in the Middle East and North Africa, the creation of a firm foundat
peace and security that includes the state of Israel living in peace and within r
boundaries alongside the state of Palestine remains a core US interest.
America's vital security interest in a solution was most cogently adva
General James Mattis, commander of US Central Command, in March 201 1 :

I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region is a viable two-stat
solution between Israel and Palestine. This issue is one of many that is exploited
our adversaries in the region, and it is used as a recruiting tool for extremist gro
... The lack of progress also creates friction with regional partners and creates p
litical challenges for advancing our interests by marginalizing moderate voices
the region. By contrast, substantive progress on the peace process would improv
CENTCOM's opportunity to work with our regional partners and to support mul
lateral security efforts.3

President Obama himself made the same point when he declared:

It is a vital national security interest of the United States to reduce these confli
because whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower, a
when conflicts break out, one way or another we get pulled into them. And that end
up costing us significantly in terms of both blood and treasure.4

The policy consequences of such sober assessments are clear. The newly ree
American administration cannot afford to leave this festering problem hostage t
too-evident shortcomings of its antagonists and their demonstrated incapacity
their dispute on their own or through the intensive diplomatic support provided f
by US governments and others. This old paradigm has proven inadequate to the
The failure to secure Israel's future on terms other than its continuous uni-
lateral use of force and unending occupation and settlement, as well as the associated
failure to establish a Palestinian state at peace with Israel, represent a significant stra-
tegic liability for the United States. The United States must, therefore, establish a new
political-security paradigm in order to protect and advance its interests and to create
a firm foundation for peace and mutual security. It must lead when the parties to the
conflict cannot, and it must put forward central parameters of an agreement to resolve
the antagonisms manifested by the continuing stalemate.
The characterization of the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a
"vital national security interest of the United States" is not self-fulfilling, nor are its
policy implications self-evident. At the very least, such an assessment testifies to the

3. Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Central Com-
mand, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of the U.S. Central Command,
March 1, 2011, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Mattis%2003-
01-11. pdf.
4. Press Conference by President Barack Obama at the Nuclear Security Summit, April 13, 2010,
Washington, DC.

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 POLICY OPTIONS IN A TIME OF TRANSITION ★ 251

fact that the issue is of such importance to the United States that resolving i
priority that must be pursued in a manner that does not subordinate vital US
to those of other parties. The current deadlock, however, does just that. The
interest of the United States requires an end to Israeli occupation and the
a sovereign Palestinian state living at peace with the state of Israel, with both
within secure and recognized borders.
The conflict presents numerous critical issues that do not bear directly o
of security and sovereignty. A detailed agenda on issues as diverse as Jeru
refugees in the context of peace is of course vital. Yet to be relevant, suc
require an overarching policy context in which the American commitment to
such a goal is absolutely clear.
US leadership is vital in the effort to craft an agreement, because the part
conflict are themselves demonstrably incapable of resolving their conflict on th
or any others. This failure obstructs the achievement of a central objective of U
There is, however, an equally compelling, if fundamentally flawed, count
rative. At its most succinct, US officials lament that Washington cannot want
the conflict more than the parties themselves. More than one president has e
this sentiment in a manner that suggests the concept is self-evident. If, howe
US commitment to achieving an outcome that meets US national security
ments is left hostage to the interests of other (i.e., warring) parties, then Wa
cedes the strategic initiative to them, promising not only continued instabilit
the perpetuation of a conflict that costs the United States both blood and tre
which by its own estimation threatens vital national security interests. Simpl
defining the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a vital nation
requires Washington to be prepared - more so than the parties to the co
seek a durable solution not primarily for their sake, but for its own. An unam
US commitment to pursue such a policy will transform the regional environm
mobilize the interest of the parties themselves to respond positively to US lea

THE CENTRAL FEATURES OF US POLICY

1) The United States has a vital national interest in defining the parame
agreement, particularly as they relate to the core issues of security and
realizing these parameters in a treaty of peace between the parties that
principles of international law; and implementing the parameters through l
a robust, third-party mechanism in a process that fulfills the provisions of
Council Resolution 242 and recognizes the sovereignty, independence, s
territorial integrity of the states of Israel and Palestine.
2) The United States is committed to Israel's existence as a secure and in
nation in which citizens are free to determine their own political, religious,
character. In order for Israel to be part of a stable regional environment - a
its neighbors, democratic, and with secure and recognized boundaries - a
cupation and the fulfillment of national self-determination for the people of
required. A final status agreement must establish a new basis - that is, other t
ence of settlements and settlers - for defining and accommodating legitima
curity interests. In this new environment, settlements will be stripped of their h

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
252 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

political functions as instruments for the implementation of Israel's security doctr

West Bank, just as they were in Sinai as a consequence of the Egypt-Israel peace
and in the Gaza Strip as a consequence of disengagement. This is not to deny or to
estimate the role of settlement in Israel's national and political ethos. However,
an environment in which Israel's security can be convincingly enhanced by withd
a critical prerequisite for US policymakers. An agreement that enhances Israel's
and enables the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty is a key objective for US poli
3) The United States welcomes the entry of Palestine into the family of na
The establishment of a Palestinian state will enable the people of Palestine to
national self-determination and freely choose their own destiny - pursuing
reconstruction and devising an all-encompassing solution to decades of disper
diaspora - in an environment characterized by peaceful and mutually-benefi
tions with their neighbors.
4) The United States supports the creation of a permanent, recognized, and
border between Israel and Palestine with minor and agreed changes to the 19
stice line to take into account some settlements, with compensatory swaps
territory to Palestine.
5) The creation of the Independent Monitoring and Verification Organ
(IMVO) represents the institutional and international expression of US leadership
international partnership committed to moving from an environment character
conflict to one characterized by peace.
IMVO is the key US-led operational mechanism for monitoring, evaluati
institutionalizing peaceful relations and transparent working venues between Isr
Palestine. It represents an unprecedented demonstration - in policy and op
terms - of the international commitment generally, and the United States' dedi
in particular, to ensure the transition from a state of conflict to an era of peac
IMVO proposal goes beyond the prescriptions of President George W. Bus
2002 Road Map and President Obama's May 201 1 speech in that it sets out a
exposition of US positions on the central elements of a peace agreement between
and the Palestinians leading to the creation of a Palestinian state.
6) Continuing Israeli deployment of forces in the sovereign state of Palestin
disproportionate and destabilizing response to challenges that can be better a
without compromising Palestinian sovereignty. There should be no Israeli pr
sovereign Palestinian areas unless agreed to by the parties. The United States, th
IMVO and other avenues, will develop open and transparent information-sh
gimes for the various security subcomponents and share data with the parties. A
deployment of IMVO, coupled with advancements in technology and use of
aerostats, remote sensing, biometrics, and networked automation, as well as
systems already or formerly operating in theater (the Olive Harvest intellig
surveillance mission), will enable IMVO to synthesize its human and techn
capabilities in support of the mission.

SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE - VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

1) The United States is committed to an agreement that accommoda

gitimate security interests of each party and recognizes the right of each s

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 POLICY OPTIONS IN A TIME OF TRANSITION ★ 253

in peace and security, supported by a multifaceted security framework that e

stability and transparency, and that addresses the ability of both parties to de
defend against challenges.
2) To be lasting and effective, the security of Israel and a Palestinian stat
be mutual and reciprocal. An end to occupation, the creation of a negotia
between the two states, and an agreed-upon mechanism for ending the conflic
associated claims will transform relations between the former enemies.
3) Israel and Palestine each have legitimate security concerns and requirements.
These need not be mutually exclusive or antagonistic; rather, they can be convergent
and mutually reinforcing. It is preferable to structure them in a multilateral framework,
rather than a bilateral arrangement.
4) There is a central and multifaceted role for third parties, under US leader-
ship, in the security framework to be created as a key element of an Israeli-Pales-
tinian peace agreement. A core tenet of the new arrangement is to operationalize
the transition to a post-conflict era. The prevention of conflict through transparent,
inclusive, and non-coercive mechanisms for dispute resolution at all levels, as well
as regional and international participation energized by active US leadership, is a key
element of this new strategy.
It has been argued that the United States, no matter how vital its interest in an
agreement, simply lacks the tools to establish an effective solution agreeable to the
parties, hence the lament about the inability of the US to do more than the parties
themselves would allow to end their conflict. Such a view seriously underestimates the
power of determined American intervention. It is more of a self-imposed constraint on
action than a realistic description of the limits of American power.
Under vigorous US leadership, the security prisms of both Israelis and Palestin-
ians ought to be transformed, enabling the legitimate concerns of each party to be ad-
dressed in a new, post-conflict environment characterized by cooperation, transparency,
minimization of threats to security, and effective and committed international support
of this transformation. True, lions will not lie with lambs. But they will no longer see
each other as prey and predator.
Israel will certainly face security challenges in the aftermath of an agreement. But
it is also true that Israel's security will be enhanced by an end to occupation and the
creation of a Palestinian state at peace with it.
5) The United States remains committed to maintaining Israel's qualitative mili-
tary edge (QME). This commitment is a cornerstone of US policy toward Israel. A
US-Israeli security dialogue in this new era reinvigorates Israel's QME and operates as
part of this new vision. The result is a win-win for Israel. This commitment recognizes
the extensive range of existing bilateral consultation and discrete agreements. It accom-
modates evolving asymmetric, conventional, and non-conventional regional threats and
recognizes that even as Israel makes an historic accommodation with Palestine, the
former will require a credible deterrent posture.
Rather than holding the United States (and Israel) perpetually hostage to ma-
lign influences, it is far better to confront these challenges in an environment char-
acterized by active and effective US leadership. In this position of leadership, the
US must work to establish and preserve a framework that enshrines an end to the
conflict between Israel and Palestine, fulfills a component of the Arab Peace Initia-

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
254 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

tive promising Israel peace and recognition, and creates institutions to m

peace and to resolve differences.
The new Palestinian state will be sovereign, secure, viable, at peace w
neighbors, and anchored by the establishment of a regional security framework
the United States. The parties themselves recognize that constraints on the exer
sovereignty are an ever-present and growing characteristic of the system of sov
states that exists today. Such limitations do not undermine the sovereign essenc
state. They serve a useful purpose when they are negotiated and proportionate.
respect, the sovereign powers of the state of Palestine, created with US support
no different than any other nation. Agreed-upon limitations on the exercise of so
power in return for mutually advantageous security and stability will be a usefu
necessary aspect of any agreement between Israel and Palestine. The record of n
tions between the two parties over the last decade supports this principle.
Palestine, like any country, must have the sovereign right to a compet
curity force capable of acting not only in defense of its borders against agg
but also able to counter internal challenges. While it would be unrealistic to
Palestinian forces with missions they cannot reasonably be expected to per
for example, to provide Israel with absolute security - it would also be un
constrain their ability to perform core security functions. The most appropriat
of fulfilling these responsibilities is to establish national forces with a limi
ity to project military force in defense of Palestine's borders - that is, a d
of defensive security - backed by appropriate third-party security mechani
competent internal security capabilities.
The terms de-militarized or non-militarized , currently used to describe Pal
ian forces, obscure more than they clarify. Whatever term is adopted, weap
technology limitations must be agreed to by the parties involved and verified b
IMVO, with the recognition that the security trajectories of the West Bank
Strip will differ because of their different security realities.
In shaping a relevant security doctrine for Palestine within the context of
the realities created in Gaza and Sinai in the aftermath of Israel's disengagement
not be ignored or simply wished away.5 In Gaza, a new security paradigm was cr
by Israel's redeployment in 2005. The intent was to improve Israel's strategic sec
through the withdrawal of permanently stationed Israeli military forces and the
of all settlements and settlers from the Gaza Strip. The resulting security envir

5. The defining qualities of the current security regime engaging Israel, Gaza, and Eg
enabled as a consequence of unilateral Israeli policy choices - principally, the decision t
post-Gaza evacuation defense doctrine on an informal, inherently unstable "state-on-state" d
model, in addition to pained acceptance of a new Palestinian military structure (Hamas) wh
lization and armament were limited only by its capabilities (economic, smuggling, and local
tion) in the territories under its control. The situation thus created reflects a classic, hostile
stable border standoff. For Israel and many in the international community, its responsibili
occupying power in Gaza continue in a new context of "diminished responsibility." Notwith
an on-again, off-again unofficial hudna (cease-fire), relations between Israel and Gaza are
cally unstable. They have nonetheless exhibited a modicum of operational stability based on
"rules of the game." However inadequate as a security model in an era of peace, this relat
seen by Israel as preferable to the model of military occupation it abandoned in 2005. The a
in Gaza see the standoff as confirmation of the utility and the costs of their rejectionist view o

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 POLICY OPTIONS IN A TIME OF TRANSITION ★ 255

has arguably fulfilled this basic objective.6 However insufficient as a mode

future, the Gaza paradigm stands as a real-world window into a key element of
sible future security environment where intentions and capabilities are modera
overall interest in reducing conflict and maintaining peace.
The security environment around the Gaza Strip is particularly challenging
current force structure in Gaza is based on entirely different principles than t
erating in the West Bank. In Gaza, a Palestinian army under a unilateral chain o
mand and in full control of defined territory engages Israeli forces, threatens
threatened by Israel, and fights to defend its control of Gaza and its interests w
political-social context of the divided Palestinian Authority. As a result, Gaza's
environment more closely resembles the tensions and lack of stability consisten
situations of unresolved state-to-state conflict.
In contrast, in the West Bank, Palestinian forces are precluded from arming or
deploying in a manner consistent with enforcement of a national security doctrine or
the defense of a defined and agreed-upon homeland. Palestinian force structures and
doctrine are, by agreement with Israel, currently subordinated to Israeli interests.
These differences in Palestinian security regimes will persist, even in the aftermath
of reconciliation among Palestinian factions. In the construction of a peace agreement that
results in secure, agreed-upon borders and the creation of peaceful relations, the elements
now in place in Gaza will need to be evaluated against the requirements for consolidating
the post-conflict environment. These elements include continuing, if diminished, effective
Israeli control of Gaza's borders; a Palestinian security system with a mission to defend
itself and its territory despite its limited capability to do so; and the creation of a limited,
if somewhat effective, deterrent force based upon indigenous and smuggled rockets and
mortars. The vital challenge is to fashion a peace agreement between the parties that, by re-
solving outstanding issues, removes the critical incentive for the use of force by all parties.

THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

ORGANIZATION (IMVO)

The parties require the creation of a new organization to support peace.

meant to secure the strategic transition from uncertainty and conflict to the end
ence and the establishment of a sustainable peace. It will assure that each part

6. In the context of the 2005 disengagement, neither Israel nor the international commu
upon agreed restrictions on Palestinian armaments or force size, composition, or doctrin
currently the case in the West Bank. Similar to the West Bank, there is currently no bi
third-party mechanism for security cooperation and coordination in the Gaza Strip. Ha
a standing centralized security apparatus, much sought after in the West Bank, which
six different "arms" with varying influences and loyalties. Hamas' s weapons inventory
ticular security objectives, subject to limitations that are self-imposed due to fiscal and int
constraints and continuing international efforts to counter arms-smuggling into Gaza. F
balance of power perspective, Hamas cannot take on Israel force-on-force, nor can it t
existence. Indeed, the power that Israel can bring to bear dwarfs anything in Hamas' s
The impact of conflict upon daily life in Israel and Gaza should not be minimized, and b
be expected to continue to act against threats. However admittedly problematic the cu
between Israeli and Palestinian forces in and around the Gaza Strip are, an unstable de
effect that in some measure belies both Hamas' s revolutionary doctrine and Israel's wis

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
256 ★ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

its responsibilities and certify the effective contribution of all parties to maintai
peace. IMVO will be deployed to the agreed-upon border for verification and mo
Mechanisms will be established with Israeli and Palestinian forces to address tim
hand-off issues. IMVO personnel will staff and monitor Israel-Palestine border-c
locations agreed to by the parties. After it is certain that each party is capable of
mitted to exercising the wide range of responsibilities necessary for the mainte
peace, relevant missions of IMVO will disband with the parties' assent.
Many of the institutional elements or systems that could make up or contrib
the mission have been or are already deployed, including the Multinational F
Observers (MFO), Olive Harvest, United Nations peacekeeping organization
pean Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), and others. For many reas
preferable that any new multinational organizations developed be clearly US
US-staffed in key positions.
IMVO is meant to be a tangible expression of the international community's
clad commitment to transforming the security environment in the region, enab
rael to remove its forces and settlements permanently from the new Palestinian
building confidence in a peace agreement's viability, reducing tensions, and
key layer of local and regional deterrence.
IMVO is not intended to be, nor will it be, configured for classic milita
terrence or as a trip-wire force. It is not an offensive "boots on the ground
deployment, but a robust peace-monitoring and verification mission. The very f
its physical presence offers a potent and visible symbol of the US (and inter
commitment, and therefore adds a de facto layer of deterrence against dest
actions by any party. This deployment enhances Israel's security - a key U
tive - while enabling another key objective: affording the state of Palestine
platform for independence, security, and sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

This "era of transition" creates unprecedented opportunities and ch

US policymakers as they navigate a rapidly changing international envir
collapse of the old order throughout the Middle East creates what in many
an entirely new context in which US national interests are redefined, as
tected. In this new environment, the festering conflict between Israel and
ians is more broadly a fundamental source of instability between Israel
and Islamic worlds. The recasting of ruling institutions now occurring thro
region reflects the rediscovered voice of newly-empowered civil societies w
the Israel-Palestine conflict an unprecedented popular dimension, one which
new and energetic US-led policy to resolve the bitter antagonisms between
Palestinians that have eluded resolution for decades.
This policy brief has focused on the critical, interdependent elements of this rela-
tionship - the enhancement of Israel's security and the creation and recognition of Pales-
tinian sovereignty. These are not mutually exclusive objectives. Yet without a firm, clear-
eyed, and unyielding view of its own interest in their achievement, the United States will
continue to be frustrated in its pursuit of an equitable diplomatic solution, and the peoples
of Israel and Palestine will continue to suffer the increasing costs of unending strife.

This content downloaded from

223.238.202.0 on Mon, 20 Nov 2023 19:04:06 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms